Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If you feel pain, you're alive. If you feel other people's pain, you're a human being."

- Leo Tolstoy

"We protect our minds by an elaborate system of abstractions, ambiguities, metaphors, and similes from the reality we do not wish to know too clearly;

we lie to ourselves, in order that we may still have the excuse of ignorance, the alibi of stupidity and incomprehension,

- Aldous Huxley

“Strategic warriors operate much differently. They think ahead toward their long-term goals, decide which fights to avoid and which are inevitable, know how to control and channel their emotions.

When forced to fight, they do so with indirection and subtle maneuver, making their manipulations hard to trace. In this way they can maintain the peaceful exterior so cherished in these political times.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War

1. Asymmetric warfare as an antidote to Chinese aggression

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 9, 2023

3. Think tank simulation predicts ‘heavy’ losses on all sides, including US, if China invades Taiwan

4. Welcome to 2033: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

5. Against Undiplomatic Diplomacy

6. Japan dives into rare earth mining under the sea

7. New worldwide threats prompt Pentagon to overhaul chem-bio defenses

8. The Largest Armies in the World

9. US Navy considers Cold War-era squadrons to boost readiness

10. The US Army Can Be the Joint Force's Contact Layer in the Pacific

11. Pentagon awards $40M ‘Vampire’ contract for Ukraine’s drone defenses

12. Ukraine Situation Report: US Strykers, Modern European Tanks On The Table For Kyiv

13. Obama’s Anti-Imperialist Fantasy Bears Bitter Fruit

14. Where US troops are currently deployed in a new era of global conflict

15. How AI Could Predict The Damage to Ukraine from Russian Missiles

16. US-led group of countries aiding Ukraine will convene again at Ramstein

17. Without Hesitation, Ukraine Goes Toe to Toe With Russia in Bakhmut

18. Pentagon prepares for series of GOP-led investigations

19. The tragic downward spiral of a special operations pilot

20. China claims to have mastered laser-powered drones

21.Opinion | What the right’s war on ‘wokeness’ in the military is really about

1. Asymmetric warfare as an antidote to Chinese aggression

A view from Australia.

I attended an asymmetric warfare conference in Taiwan military in 2017. I think they may have a greater sense of urgency these days.

Asymmetric warfare as an antidote to Chinese aggression

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/11195-irregular-warfare-as-an-antidote-to-chinese-aggression

Image Credit: Taiwan's Presidential Office via AFP

KEY ENABLERS

06 JANUARY 2023

By: Reporter

Outsized and outgunned, Taiwan must turn to asymmetric warfare to maintain independence and raise the human cost of any invasion on the island.

Indeed, within the Taiwan Strait alone, the US Congress has estimated that China has fielded more than four times the number of military individuals: fielding 416,000 personnel compared to Taiwan’s 88,000.

As such, Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review affirmed that the nation’s strategic objective was to “raise the cost and risk of PRC invasion” as a primary deterrence mechanism against invasion — a nuanced nod to China’s overwhelming conventional superiority.

Alongside the acquisition of conventional weapons, interestingly, the Quadrennial Defense Review doubled-down the government’s commitment to all-out defence — a concept by which the Taiwanese government can rapidly mobilise the nation’s available manpower to repel invading forces.

Writing for the Modern War Institute, Dr Chris Bassler and Aidan Greer encouraged the Taiwanese government to embrace the equalising effects of irregular warfare to raise the cost of a Chinese invasion.

While the pair recognise the importance of Taiwan moving toward a Porcupine Strategy — defined broadly as a large number of small but impactful weapons systems including sea mines, artillery, anti-ship missiles and drones to defensively wear down an invading force — the pair contend that uptake is sluggish.

Indeed, the Porcupine Strategy has all the hallmarks of an effective defence policy.

First, relying on offence-defence theory, island states have an inherent “build-up advantage at point of attack”. According to Professor Adam Lockyer in Australia’s Defence Strategy, this is because the military capabilities of offensive states are funnelled by water — constrained by the number of air or water craft that can transport assets and fighters — and thus are unable to completely exert their power. At the time of writing his textbook, Professor Lockyer estimated that despite the millions of soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), that China could only transport 10,000–15,000 at any one point in time.

Second, the assets used within the Porcupine Strategy such as mobile artillery, mines, and coastal cruise missiles are affordable relative to large-scale conventional weaponry, meaning that Taiwan can buy the capabilities at scale. According to James Timbie and Admiral James Ellis Jr in the Military Strategy journal, the vast scale at which these capabilities can be purchased would indicate that many of the assets could survive China’s initial shock and awe missile strikes, and still “engage Chinese forces crossing the strait”.

While this indicates an improvement on Taiwan’s prior focus on conventional weaponry, Bassler and Greer nevertheless urge Taiwan to integrate guerrilla warfare into their deterrent model. To the pair, guerrilla warfare will add additional redundancies in the event of PLA victories in major population centres.

This has, however, been overlooked.

Current demographic trends indicate that there would be willingness from the nation’s population to undertake guerrilla-style irregular warfare following a Chinese invasion from both the nation’s voter base and elites.

Citing research from the Taipei Times, the pair contend that 72.5 per cent of Taiwan’s population have indicated willingness to fight against Chinese occupation, with local elites funding partisan training movements.

“There is newfound private sector support for a civilian defence force in Taiwan. Robert Tsao, founder of one of Taiwan’s leading semiconductor manufacturers, recently announced his plans to spend more than $30 million of his own money to fund the training of three million “civilian warriors” over the next three years with Kuma Academy, a civilian defense organisation,” Bassler and Greer penned.

Though it has yet to fully integrate irregular guerrilla forces into the nation’s order of battle, Taiwan’s government has steadily begun the nation’s infrastructure for occupation.

“And it has created a system of underground bases and tunnels, safe houses, hide sites, shelter areas, and mountain refuges, not to mention bunkers along the coastlines,” they observe.

“Taiwan could again look to the Swiss for a model of how to destroy infrastructure to make it useless to occupiers, especially when considering the value of semiconductor foundries.

“Paired with an Operation Paperclip-style effort that would temporarily relocate key swaths of the Taiwanese workforce to places such as Japan, the United States, South Korea, and Australia, this could keep vital technology and knowledge out of the hands of the CCP.”

The pair also suggest making irregular warfare material widely available for the population to disrupt enemy forces following an invasion. Indeed, this has been done to great success in Ukraine.

In June, Defence Connect published an article examining Ukraine’s “National Resistance Center”.

Emblazoned with the tagline “Together we turn our enemies’ lives into hell!”, the educational website run by Ukraine’s special operations forces offers must-know tips and tricks to train Ukraine’s behind enemy lines guerilla forces.

Ukrainian special operations forces have created this website to train the country’s guerrilla and partisan fighters, publishing an educational course on how to conduct insurgency operations behind enemy lines.

Titled Citizen resistance on occupied territories!, the 19-page Ukrainian language handbook details how everyone can conduct sabotage and civil resistance operations from pencil-pushing bureaucrats to priests.

Indeed, the document provides a roadmap into how Ukraine has structured their guerrilla warfare strategy, with the country’s insurgency operations conducted via three concentric nodes:

The underground: the organisational structure that oversees the conduct of operations within occupied territories.
The guerrilla forces: now civilians with military experience who engage Russian soldiers and conduct armed operations.
Civilian resistance: those civilians who can enable the underground and guerrillas to successfully conduct their operations through simple acts of resistance and sabotage.

Among those professions given advice as part of the SOF handbook include:

Government managers
Government office workers
Pharmacists, doctors or nurses
Warehouse managers
Police officers
Priests
Teachers
Mine workers, and
Agricultural workers.

In the document, advice given to government workers includes suggestions to “misunderstand” orders and “ask endless questions”, while priests have been encouraged to take up employment as postal workers to administer to parishioners.

Meanwhile doctors have been encouraged to over-prescribe medications to their patients in order to facilitate the transfer of medical supplies to the underground.

The educational document also contains a series of recommendations for civil disobedience.

Recommendations range from the mundane, including setting off fire alarms in everyday locations such as shopping malls to distract Russian forces, clogging toilets, unscrewing lightbulbs.

Through to more destructive suggestions, including the sabotage of electrical systems, engines, and impairment of conveyor belts in mining operations.

In addition to the sabotage manual which can be found here, the centre also provides regular news updates of how civilian actors have undertaken bouts of civil disobedience to disrupt Russian occupiers, as well as analyses of how to protect yourself throughout the unrest and latest updates detailing trending guerrilla methods.

One article teaches Ukrainians to use VPNs to bypass Russian-blocked websites, while others illustrate how to avoid being misrepresented by Russian media outlets as supportive of the invasion, or even what to do if you see a Russian drone.

One of the news items even seems to discuss acts of violence undertaken against collaborators, detailing how partisans blew up the car of Russian collaborators in Kherson — though the targets survived.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch with [email protected], [email protected], or at [email protected].

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 9, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2023

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized corruption in Russian through domestic legislative manipulations.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the Russian information space for the censorship of figures deemed as pro-Ukrainian sympathizers, garnering some acceptance from the nationalist milblogger community.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar and Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued to reinforce positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces continued to construct defensive fortifications and transport military equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued concerns over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area.
Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that a second wave of mobilization may be imminent or ongoing.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 9, 2023

Jan 9, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

January 9, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force. Wagner Group forces claimed to capture territory within Soledar over the past few days, and many Russian sources have discussed the gains as indicators that Wagner Group forces may soon encircle Bakhmut.[1] Combat footage widely circulated on social media on January 9 shows Wagner Group fighters engaging in fierce small arms combat near the city administration building in central Soledar.[2] Several Russian milbloggers remarked on January 8 and 9 that Wagner Group forces are responsible for block-by-block advances in Soledar and other critical settlements northeast of Bakhmut, as well as within Bakhmut.[3] Prigozhin emphasized on January 9 that “exclusively” Wagner Group units are taking ground in Soledar, and noted that Wagner fighters are currently engaged in “fierce battles for the city administration building.”[4] Prigozhin will continue to use both confirmed and fabricated Wagner Group success in Soledar and Bakhmut to promote the Wagner Group as the only Russian force in Ukraine capable of securing tangible gains, as ISW has previously reported.[5]

Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill setting conditions for further institutionalized corruption in Russia through domestic legislative manipulations. Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma on January 9 denouncing the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and withdrawing Russia from the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).[6] Putin submitted the bill on the grounds that the Council of Europe terminated Russia’s GRECO membership, thus removing Russia’s ability to vote but requiring them to cooperate on several obligations.[7] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that this move does not undermine Russian legislative capacity to fight corruption and emphasized that corruption has not been eradicated anywhere in the world.[8] ISW has previously reported on Putin’s efforts to institutionalize corruption through various legal manipulations, and Russia’s discontinued membership in GRECO would likely serve as another means by which Putin can institute legislation supporting and enabling corrupt practices without facing international legal mechanisms to hold him to account.[9]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the Russian information space to accept increased censorship of opposition voices in a Telegram message on January 8. Medvedev posted a message on Telegram on January 8 which he framed as a response to discussions in the Russian information space about “traitors who have gone over to the enemy.” Medvedev stated that a serious conversation began “between the bosses” (likely in reference to Russian leadership) on whether to respond with rule of law or with justice.[10] Medvedev noted that “quiet groups of impeccably inconspicuous people” operated in Russia to enforce “special rules of wartime” during World War II with great success, likely alluding to internal censorship.[11] Some Russian milbloggers appeared to understand Medvedev’s implied censorship and agreed, noting that Soviet security and counterintelligence organizations were highly effective at censorship and that “ideological people” are willing to assist these efforts.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have recently intensified efforts to silence Russian milbloggers who criticize the Russian government, as ISW has previously reported.[13]

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized corruption in Russian through domestic legislative manipulations.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the Russian information space for the censorship of figures deemed as pro-Ukrainian sympathizers, garnering some acceptance from the nationalist milblogger community.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar and Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued to reinforce positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces continued to construct defensive fortifications and transport military equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued concerns over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area.
Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that a second wave of mobilization may be imminent or ongoing.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) on both January 8 and 9.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops neutralized Ukrainian sabotage groups northwest of Svatove near Kotlyarivka, Novoselivske, and Dvorichna.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian command is rotating forces along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.[16] Russian forces also continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attacked near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[17] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that heavy fighting is ongoing near Kreminna and that Russian forces transferred several paratroop battalions and heavy equipment to the area in order to hold their line of defense.[18] A Russian milblogger warned on January 9 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a renewed offensive on the Lyman sector west of Kreminna and are concentrating equipment near Terny (15km west of Kreminna).[19] Geolocated combat footage shows a duel between Russian and Ukrainian tanks southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova, indicating that Ukrainian troops have likely made gains in the forest area west of Kreminna.[20] Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian reconnaissance activities in this area southwest of Kreminna, particularly in forest areas along the Serebrianka-Hryhorvika line 10km south of Kreminna.[21]

Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian assets along critical ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Internal Affairs Ministry stated on January 8 that unidentified actors, presumably Ukrainian partisans, committed an act of sabotage and mined a gas pipeline near the Lutuhyne (20km southwest of Luhansk City along the H21 highway), causing an explosion that left 13,000 people without gas.[22] Local LNR Telegram channels additionally reported the activation of an air siren in Alchevsk (35km west of Luhansk City along the M04 highway) and air defense over Stakhanov (45km west of Luhansk City along the T1317 highway) on January 9.[23]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Soledar on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian defense officials reiterated that while Russian forces do not fully control Soledar, the situation in the settlement is extremely difficult and Wagner Group personnel are advancing in certain areas.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces are fighting in central Soledar, and footage posted on January 9 shows intense small arms exchanges near the Soledar administration building.[25] A Russian milblogger noted that Ukrainian troops maintain control of the Artyomsol enterprise and surrounding high-rise buildings in northern Soledar.[26] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces took control of Bakhmutske (just southeast of Soledar), Krasna Hora, and Paraskoviivka (just southwest of Soledar); and that battles are ongoing in Berkhovka (10km southwest of Soledar along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Soledar, Krasna Hora, Pidhorodne, and Rozdolivka between January 8 and 9.[28]

Russian forces continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut and within Bakhmut itself on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut, Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Zalizne (25km southwest of Bakhmut) on January 8 and 9.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 9 that Russian troops captured Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut), and geolocated footage of Ukrainian drones striking Russian positions confirms that Russian troops have made marginal advances in this area.[30] Russian sources continued to discuss urban combat on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut and south of Bakhmut.[31]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian attacks near Vodiane, Pervomaiske, and Krasnohorivka on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and near Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka on the southwestern outskirts between January 8 and 9.[32] A Russian milblogger also reported fighting in these areas.[33] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage on January 9 of the 5th DNR Brigade firing incendiary munitions at a Ukrainian force concentration in Marinka.[34] The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts use of incendiary weapons as a means or method of warfare during armed conflict.[35]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk or eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on January 8 or 9. Russian sources, however, claimed on January 9 that Ukrainian forces are concentrating a large group of forces in western Donetsk Oblast in the Vuhledar area in preparation for renewed offensives.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are active in this area.[37] Russian forces continued routine indirect fire in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[38]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to reinforce their positions on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces continue to move military personnel equipment to Henichesk Raion near the Kherson-Crimea border and are preparing to defend Crimea.[39] Khlan stated that Russian forces used a smoke screen to conceal the unloading of military equipment in Novooleksivka, 9km northwest of Henichesk on the R47 Henichesk-Kakhovka highway.[40] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces shelled Kherson City with incendiary munitions overnight on January 7–8 and posted footage of the munitions detonating over the city.[41] The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts use of incendiary weapons as a means or method of warfare during armed conflict.[42] Russian forces continued routine shelling of Kherson City and its environs on January 8 and 9.[43]

Russian forces continued to construct defensive fortifications and transport military equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 8 and 9 amid continued concerns over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated on January 9 that Russian forces continue to build defensive fortifications southwest of Melitopol towards Crimea, including dragon’s teeth anti-tank fortifications on the E105 Melitopol-Dzhankoy highway between Vovchanske and Chervone, and trenches along the Kakhovskyi Canal that runs between Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast and Novohryhorivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[44] An image posted on January 8 shows a Russian train transporting tanks in an unspecified direction near Melitopol.[45] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian authorities purposefully lowered the water level in the Kakhovka Reservoir, which Rogov claimed indicates Ukrainian forces are preparing to cross the reservoir and may land near Enerhodar.[46] Rogov also claimed on January 9 that Ukrainian forces significantly increased their rate of shelling along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline in the past 24 hours.[47]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets in southern Ukraine on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that there were explosions at the Hidromash factory in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Rogov claimed that Russian air defenses shot down drones over the city.[48] A Russian source claimed that there is evidence that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian ammunition depots in Melitopol.[49] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to strike Tokmak, Enerhodar, and Mykhailivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[50] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions in occupied Nova Kakhovka, Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City), Hola Prystan (10km southwest of Kherson City), Skadovsk (57km southeast of Kherson City), and Zaliznyi Port (58km southwest of Kherson City), Kherson Oblast on January 8 and 9.[51]

Russian forces continued routine fire against areas in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 8 and 9.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that a second wave of mobilization is imminent and could potentially begin on January 15. Former Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District Andrey Gurulev called on Russian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on January 7 to begin actively preparing a mobilization reserve, despite his comments on January 4 that "there are no prerequisites for a second wave of mobilization in the next six months."[53] Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitsky told The Guardian on January 6 that Russia will begin the second wave of mobilization on January 15, after the Russian holiday season ends.[54] Skibitsky stated that he expects Russia to mobilize another 500,000 people.[55] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Igor Girkin also stated on January 4 that Russia “will be forced to carry out a second, and maybe a third wave of mobilization. To win in Ukraine, [Russia] will need to put another half a million soldiers into service.”[56] As ISW continues to assess, discussion of a second wave of mobilization is erroneous to some extent because mobilization has never truly ceased and that this has been a part of a greater, ongoing effort to recruit reservists and others into service since before February 2022.[57]

Russia’s systematic force-generation failures continue to have ramifications for Russian offensive capacity. The Russian information space circulated a video recorded by Russian troops from Belgorod Oblast addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian MoD leadership detailing how they trained as artillerymen but were sent to the frontlines in Ukraine as infantrymen under the 1stArmy Corps (the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic) and used as cannon fodder.[58] A Russian milblogger amplified the video to criticize the transfer of artillerymen of the 568th Howitzer Artillery Battalion, which is now subordinate to the 1st Army Corps, to the infantry.[59] Another Russian milblogger reposted a statement from a Russian artillery officer who claimed that Putin is trying to create new artillery units, but the officer is unsure where Putin will get the personnel for these units because Russian military leadership keeps sending trained artillerymen to fight as infantrymen.[60] ISW previously reported that the Russian military deployed personnel trained as artillerymen and tankers to infantry divisions in Ukraine with no formal infantry training, likely to the detriment of the overall combat capabilities of such units.[61]

Russian leadership may be planning to reduce previously promised compensation for Russian servicemembers wounded in action. A Russian Telegram channel, citing internal sources, claimed on January 8 that Russian leadership is considering the possibility of limiting compensation payments to only Russian personnel who incurred major injuries such as loss of limbs while fighting in Ukraine.[62] The posts claims that this change would be unofficial and is likely already occurring as there has been an uptick in reports of headquarters “losing” the required proof of injury documents that would enable the injured to receive payments.[63]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continued to face partisan pressure in occupied territories on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 9 that collaborator policemen in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, are submitting their resignation as they fear that highly effective partisans will continue targeting law enforcement in occupied territories.[64] The Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) Internal Ministry claimed on January 8 that likely Ukrainian partisans committed sabotage by mining a gas pipeline in Lutuhyne, Luhansk Oblast.[65]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to take measures to control movement throughout occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities will begin issuing passes allowing residents to move throughout Zaporizhia Oblast on January 9.[66] Rogov stated that Zaporizhia Oblast residents and organizations must submit an application and provide documents verifying vehicle ownership to a military commandant’s office in Melitopol, Tokmak, or Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, to receive the required passes.[67] A local Ukrainian Mariupol news outlet reported on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities established a mobile checkpoint in the Kalmiuskyi district of Mariupol.[68] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities continue to demand that residents present passes when seeking to move throughout the occupied territories.[69] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities are continuing to block the entrances to and exits from select settlements in Luhansk Oblast and arrest residents whom they have accused of assisting the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[70] A Ukrainian Kherson City media outlet reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities continued searching private homes in Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, to identify people cooperating with and assisting Ukrainian forces.[71] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces Yevhen Yerin reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities continued imposing restrictions on civilian movement in Zaporizhia Oblast, including at the Vasylivka checkpoint.[72]

Ukrainian sources reported on January 8 and 9 that enterprises in occupied territories continue to accept the hryvnia despite Russian occupation authorities’ threats and raids.[73] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities are conducting raids on enterprises in occupied territories to identify any person or establishment using the hryvnia.[74] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities in Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, are removing ATM terminals from businesses to prevent residents from acquiring the hryvnia, as well as threatening to confiscate the property of local businesses if they are found accepting the hryvnia.[75] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities in occupied territories are threatening local businesses with fines and sanctions if they do not set prices in rubles.[76]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing passportization efforts by withholding social services from those without Russian passports in occupied territories. Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushenko stated on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities will offer mortgages on real estate in Mariupol by the end of January 2023 but require that all applicants hold a Russian passport, official income, or housing or property for collateral savings.[77] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities require that residents in Luhansk Oblast hold a Russian passport in order to receive car registration documents, license plates, and driver’s licenses.[78]

Russian occupation authorities continued taking measures to consolidate social control of occupied territories on January 8. Advisor to Mariupol Mayor Petro Andryushenko stated on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities plan to bring approximately 50,000 Russian civilians to Mariupol from Russia.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities replaced all Ukrainian television channels with Russian broadcasting in Hornostaivka, Kairy, Zavodivka, and Marinske, Kherson Oblast.[80]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to seize and repurpose civilian hospitals to support Russian forces operating in occupied territories. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities are removing pregnant women from a maternity hospital in Antracyty, Luhansk Oblast, and converting the facility into a military hospital.[81]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 9 that Russian forces removed a significant amount of weapons and equipment deployed from Russia to Belarus out of long-term storage for maintenance and repair.[82]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Voice of America’s (VOA) US National Security correspondent Jeff Seldin amplified a statement made by an unidentified senior US defense official on January 9 that while Russian and Belarusian troops are training together, the US has not observed any indicators that Belarus intends to enter the war.[83]
Ukrainian State Border Guards Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on January 9 that the situation on the border with Belarus remains fully under control and that there are no signs of movement of Russian or Belarusian equipment, personnel, or units.[84] Demchenko stated that there are some units on the border with Ukraine, but that the number and nature of their activities is not changing.[85]
The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated on January 9 that there are no observed signs of Russian offensive groups forming near Ukraine’s northern border regions.[86]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[6] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/272467-8; https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/879954; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/09/putin-vnes-v-gosdumu-zakonoproekt-o-vyhode-rossii-iz-konventsii-ob-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti-za-korruptsiyu

[7] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/272467-8; https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/879954; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/09/putin-vnes-v-gosdumu-zakonoproekt-o-vyhode-rossii-iz-konventsii-ob-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti-za-korruptsiyu

[8] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/272467-8; https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/879954; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/09/putin-vnes-v-gosdumu-zakonoproekt

[22] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2293; https://telegra dot ph/V-Lutuginskom-rajone-proizoshel-vzryv-gazoprovoda-01-08; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2294; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10142; htt...

[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/ganna-malyar-pro-sytuacziyu-na-donnechchyni-u-soledari-vazhko-ale-na-deyakyh-dilyankah-povilno-prosuvayemos-vpered/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/okupanty-soledar-ne-kontrolyuyut-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://suspilne.media/354832-50-ukrainskih-zahisnikiv-povernulisa-z-pol...

[46] https://t.me/vrogov/7038; https://ria dotru/20230109/dnepr-1843568220.html

[47] https://t.me/vrogov/7035; https://ria dot ru/20230109/zaporozhe-1843554876.html

[50] https://t.me/vrogov/7035; https://ria dot ru/20230109/zaporozhe-1843554876.html

[64] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/09/na-luganshhyni-kolaboranty-vidmovlyayutsya-vid-spivpraczi-z-vorogom/

[65] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2293; https://telegra dot ph/V-Lutuginskom-rajone-proizoshel-vzryv-gazoprovoda-01-08; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2294; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10142

[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/na-zaporizkij-aes-prodovzhuyut-perebuvaty-rosijski-vijskovi-ta-tehnika-agresora/

[73] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/08/okupanty-bezuspishno-polyuyut-na-gryvnyu/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7896

[76] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/08/okupanty-bezuspishno-polyuyut-na-gryvnyu/

understandingwar.org

3. Think tank simulation predicts ‘heavy’ losses on all sides, including US, if China invades Taiwan

The 165 page report from CSIS can be downloaded at this link: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ

Think tank simulation predicts ‘heavy’ losses on all sides, including US, if China invades Taiwan

BY BRAD DRESS - 01/09/23 12:56 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3805119-think-tank-simulation-predicts-heavy-losses-on-all-sides-including-us-if-china-invades-taiwan/?utm_source=pocket_saves

A war games simulation of a full-scale Chinese invasion of the self-governing island nation of Taiwan predicts “heavy losses” for all parties likely to be involved, including the U.S. and Japan.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ran the simulation of a 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan exactly 24 times, drawing on historical data and operational research. The simulation’s events are included in an extensive report released Monday.

In most scenarios, an alliance between the U.S., Japan and Taiwan defeated China after three or four weeks of fighting — but at the loss of dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of troops.

Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program and an author of the report, told The Hill the big takeaway from the simulation is that Taiwan can be sustained as an independent nation.

“But the cost is very high,” he added.

In the report, Cancian recommended policies and efforts to deter a future invasion, noting that even if a war is seen as risky for China, the nation still might consider a direct conflict.

“Although our analysis indicates that the United States and Taiwan would prevail and inflict heavy casualties, it’s possible to imagine the Chinese are looking at it differently,” Cancian explained. “That’s why we recommend enhancing deterrence so we don’t get into this situation in the first place.”

In recent years, China has increased its aggressive rhetoric against Taiwan, a democratic, independent country that broke from the mainland in 1949. The ruling Chinese Communist Party, however, sees the island as part of its territory.

The U.S. abides by the One China principle, which says Taiwan is part of China, but commits to informal relations with the island nation, including supplying arms for Taipei.

At the same time, the U.S. also commits to “strategic ambiguity” in the event of a Chinese invasion, making it unclear how American forces would respond.

The CSIS war games simulation did run a model on a “Taiwan stands alone” approach, assuming Taipei has no support from the U.S. or Japan — it ended with a quick Chinese takeover. Unlike with the U.S. arming of Ukraine against Russia, China could block off American supplies to the island.

The simulation draws on historical information and data for ground combat operations during an amphibious invasion, as well as speculative models on missile attacks based on the size of warheads and how much area they would cover on impact.

The games include a wide range of scenarios, taking into account instances in which China performs better than expected or underperforms in the invasion.

While the U.S. and Taiwan prevail in most scenarios, there are some conditions for success, according to CSIS, including that Taiwan must hold the line and that U.S. forces must have access to bases in Japan.

The model forecasts 19 scenarios in which Japan gets involved in the conflict. Japan is ambiguous about defending Taiwan, but Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced last year a historic switch from a defense-only strategy and a major boost to its annual defense spending.

Although China has a larger presence in the South China Sea, the U.S. still has a stronger military across the globe, and several pessimistic conditions would have to come true for a military loss in the war, researchers said.

“What China is trying to do is very, very difficult,” said Cancian. “An amphibious assault on a hostile shore — even though the [Taiwan Strait] is 100 miles across — is just very, very hard.”

Still, any direct conflict between China and the U.S. would devastate Taiwan and possibly weaken the U.S. on the global stage, the simulation found.

There were some limitations of the model, including that it assesses China based on where its military forces would be in four years. China is pushing to build up a “world-class” military in the next two decades and is aiming to quadruple its nuclear arsenal in the next 13 years, according to the Department of Defense.

CSIS also did not simulate a scenario in which nuclear weapons are used, which would mean an entirely different type of warfare, or the possibility of a Chinese blockade of the island.

Another possible scenario is that Taipei quickly surrenders to China and puts up little resistance, or the war lasts longer than three or four weeks, which would mean more casualties.

Matthew Cancian, who modeled the conflict with his father Mark and has simulated other war games at the U.S. Naval War College, said the simulation is not “advocating” for the U.S. to “defend or not to defend” Taiwan.

“It’s just showing the cost and likely results of those choices,” he said.

4. Welcome to 2033: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

Please go to the link to view the graphics and statistics and properly formatted articles: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/welcome-to-2033/

The topics:

Explore findings on…

1. Potential Russian collapse

2. New nuclear powers

3. Conflict over Taiwan

4. US-Chinese decoupling

5. Future American power

6. Peak carbon emissions

7. Pandemics and economic crises

8. Democracy vs. autocracy

9. Democracy’s dangerous decade

10. Global security architecture

Welcome to 2033: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

atlanticcouncil.org · by Nancy Messieh · January 9, 2023

Welcome to 2033

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

By Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Prepare for Russia’s coming crack-up. Plan for a Chinese military assault on Taiwan. Temper the optimism about peak carbon emissions. Brace for the further spread of nuclear weapons. Buckle in for even greater global volatility ahead.

These are just some of the forecasts that emerged this past fall when the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years.

A total of 167 experts shared their insights on what geopolitics, climate change, technological disruption, the global economy, social and political movements, and other domains could look like a decade from now. Although respondents are largely citizens of the United States (roughly 60 percent of those polled), their nationalities are spread across thirty countries, with European citizens constituting the majority of non-Americans. (In the following analysis, all geographic distinctions among those surveyed are based on what individuals identified as their sole or primary nationality, not on the countries where they currently reside.)

Respondents are also employed in a range of fields, including the private sector (26 percent), academic or educational institutions (21 percent), non-profits (19 percent), government (16 percent), and independent consultants or freelancers (13 percent). They are quite evenly distributed across age categories over thirty-five, with less than 10 percent between the ages of twenty-two and thirty-five, but they skew heavily male (a result that we will aim to rectify in future surveys).

So what will the world look like in 2033? Here are the ten biggest findings from the survey.

1. Russia as we know it may not survive the coming decade

One of the most surprising takeaways was how many respondents pointed to a potential Russian collapse over the next decade—suggesting that the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine could precipitate hugely consequential upheaval in a great power with the largest nuclear-weapons arsenal on the planet.

Nearly half (46 percent) of respondents expect Russia to either become a failed state or break up by 2033. More than a fifth (21 percent) consider Russia the most likely country to become a failed state within the next ten years, which is more than twice the percentage for the next most common choice, Afghanistan.

Even more striking, 40 percent of respondents expect Russia to break up internally by 2033 because of revolution, civil war, political disintegration, or some other reason. Europeans are particularly pessimistic about Russia breaking up: Forty-nine percent of them foresee such an event, compared with 36 percent of Americans.

This puts another finding into a darker context: Fourteen percent of respondents believe that Russia is likely to use a nuclear weapon within the next ten years. Among those expecting the country to experience both state failure and a breakup in the coming decade, a sobering 22 percent believe that use of nuclear weapons will be part of that history ten years hence.

Some, though, see hope: Of those who believe Russia is likely to experience state failure or a breakup over the coming decade, 10 percent think that it is the most likely of any currently autocratic country to become democratic by the end of this period.

2. We’re heading for more countries with nuclear weapons and less cooperation on stopping the spread of these weapons—but not necessarily actual nuclear use

Barely one in eight respondents (13 percent) stated that no additional country will obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, and more than three-quarters named a specific country that they expected to become a nuclear-weapons state during this period. Iran was most often cited as a likely nuclear-armed state by 2033 (68 percent of respondents)—an outcome that the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig, in a separate assessment, argues is highly likely to occur as soon as this coming year. But Iran may not be alone. Respondents who expect some expansion of the nuclear-weapons club believe, on average, that 1.6 countries will join within the next ten years.

One reason for this anticipation of multiple new nuclear-armed countries could be that experts expect regional rivalries to drive nuclear proliferation over the next decade. For example, of those who believe that Iran will obtain nuclear weapons during this timeframe, 41 percent say Saudi Arabia will as well. In contrast, of those who do not believe that Iran will acquire these weapons, just 15 percent envision Saudi Arabia doing so anyway. Similarly, 57 percent of those who say that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons believe the same of South Korea. The former is almost certainly a function of Saudi-Iranian antagonism (wherein if one gets the bomb, the other will feel pressure to follow suit); the latter is likely less a function of Japanese-South Korean tension than of both countries feeling increasingly threatened by China and/or North Korea. Indeed, among those who foresee China initiating military action to retake Taiwan in the next decade (discussed in more detail below), 22 percent think that South Korea will obtain nuclear weapons over the same period while 16 percent believe Japan will. Among those who foresee no such Chinese use of force, the equivalent figures are 13 percent and 6 percent.

On the positive side, a majority of those polled (58 percent) believe that nuclear weapons will remain unused over the next ten years. On the negative side, it’s nevertheless quite disturbing that nearly a third of respondents (31 percent) expect the next decade to include the first use of nuclear weapons since World War II. Responses from those who foresee nuclear use suggest that the weapons may be deployed in a regional rather than global conflict. Russia is most frequently cited (14 percent of all respondents) as likely to use such a weapon by 2033. But, of those who expect the country to do so, only one-third believe Russia will fight a war with NATO during this period. The second-most-cited potential perpetrator, North Korea (10 percent), presumably would also initially deploy nuclear weapons regionally against neighbors without nuclear weapons rather than, say, a country with superior nuclear capabilities such as the United States.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is consistent with respondent answers that predict a lack of international attention to this issue. Less than 2 percent of respondents named nuclear nonproliferation as the area likely to see the greatest increase in international cooperation over the coming decade. When given the chance to name the biggest global risks receiving insufficient attention, 10 percent mentioned either proliferation or war involving nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

3. Expect a Chinese military offensive against Taiwan

Recently, US officials have been warning that China could launch a military campaign to reunify Taiwan with the mainland on a faster-than-anticipated schedule between now and 2027. And our survey results support that dire assessment. Fully 70 percent of respondents agree—though just 12 percent strongly agree—that China will seek to forcibly retake Taiwan within the next ten years. Only around two in ten don’t believe that such a scenario will occur. Intriguingly, among government employees, the figures rise to near certainty: Eighty-eight percent agree that China will use force against Taiwan, just 8 percent disagree, and the remaining 4 percent do not know.

Many people are currently focused on the risk of Russia engaging in a direct fight with the United States and NATO. But notably, even in the throes of a hot war in Ukraine right on NATO’s borders, the majority of respondents (more than 60 percent) disagreed with the notion that there will be such a Russia-NATO military clash within the next ten years—perhaps suggesting a belief that the conflict in Ukraine can be contained to that country or that the war has exposed Russia as too weak to take the fight directly to NATO. Given that a Chinese military assault on Taiwan would likely prompt the United States to intervene in support of the island, and that respondents were far more inclined to see a China-Taiwan conflict as probable than a Russia-NATO conflict, the biggest impending risk of war between great powers might be in Asia, not Europe.

4. US-Chinese decoupling may not be as dramatic as we think it will be

There has been a lot of talk about “decoupling,” or efforts to disentangle the US and Chinese economies. But the experts we surveyed delivered a clear verdict: Full-blown decoupling is very unlikely. Despite all the geopolitical tensions and tit-for-tat trade restrictions between the two countries, the most likely outcome (according to roughly 40 percent of respondents) is that the US and Chinese economies will be “somewhat less” interdependent in 2033 than they are today. Moreover, of those who believe China will use force against Taiwan, 64 percent predict at least some decline in economic interdependence—a surprisingly low number given how drastic a move a Chinese military campaign against Taiwan would be. Fully 22 percent of those expecting Chinese use of force against Taiwan believe that the US and Chinese economies will become more interdependent by 2033.

Overall, 58 percent of respondents forecast less economic interdependence between the two countries by 2033 and just 23 percent expect more. US respondents are slightly more convinced about this direction of travel, with 64 percent anticipating a drop in interdependence (24 percent still anticipate an increase).

Just as important, though, roughly eight in ten respondents—both overall and among Americans—expect any change in either direction to be limited at most. The widespread expectation, then, is a slow decoupling.

5. The United States will remain powerful but not hegemonic

Respondents generally expressed a belief in the United States’ staying power over the next ten years, though many envisioned a country preeminent in some domains of national clout but not others. Seven in ten foresee the United States continuing to be the world’s dominant military power by 2033—a notably high percentage given concerns about China’s military modernization and the United States losing its military edge—while about half think the United States will maintain its technological dominance over everyone else. Just three in ten, however, believe the United States will be the world’s dominant player in diplomacy, and only slightly more than three in ten believe it will be the world’s dominant economic power.

All of which raises a question: If the United States loses its economic and diplomatic dominance, can its other advantages be maintained? After all, military power depends to a substantial degree on strong alliances and economic and technological prowess, while technological power relies in large part on a country’s capacity to commercialize technological advances.

Two minority groups of respondents have sharply divergent views about American power. The first group, constituting 19 percent of the survey pool, are pessimists, believing one or more of the following will be true by 2033: The United States will be a failed state; it will have broken apart; or it will no longer be the world’s dominant power in any category our survey covered: military, economic, diplomatic, or technological. (Notably, roughly the same proportion of respondents—7 percent—listed the United States and Pakistan as the country most likely to fail over the next ten years.) Fourteen percent of American respondents and 17 percent of European respondents fall into this group. The most striking answers are from those who are citizens of countries outside the United States and Europe: Over half of these are in our pessimists category. (This analysis does not treat them generally as a category because they are too diverse to characterize and too few to rely on statistically.)

The second group, constituting 12 percent of all respondents, are optimists, believing that the United States will be the single dominant power in all fields: military, economic, diplomatic, and technological. Among American and European respondents, the proportions of optimists—12 percent and 15 percent respectively—are roughly the same as those for pessimists. The big difference comes from the rest of the world, where no respondents expect the United States to have such multifaceted hegemony by 2033.

6. Global cooperation on climate is set to increase, but curb the enthusiasm about peak emissions

Climate change is the issue most likely to shoot up the international policy agenda in the coming decade, according to respondents. A plurality (42 percent) believe that it will garner the biggest increase in international collaboration, comfortably ahead of second-place public health (cited by 25 percent of those polled).

Of those who assert that climate issues will attract the biggest boost in global cooperation by 2033, nearly a third (29 percent) believe that, among various social movements presented to respondents, environmental movements will have the most political influence worldwide over the next ten years. Among those who do not think climate change will rise up the international agenda, only 12 percent expect environmental movements to wield such influence.

If political leaders and policymakers focus more on climate issues, will greenhouse-gas emissions peak and start to decline over the next ten years? Views are mixed. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently estimated that global carbon-dioxide emissions will peak in 2025 (although it also admitted that a significant gap remains between countries’ stated emissions goals and the target of stabilizing the average rise in global temperature at 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels). Respondents who foresee greater global cooperation to address climate change are split on peak emissions, in a reminder that such collaboration could result from both a proactive effort to accelerate the clean-energy transition or a more reactive response to a still-rapidly warming world: 47 percent believe that the peak will have occurred by 2033, but 42 percent disagree. Among the others, the equivalent figures—26 percent and 60 percent—reveal much greater pessimism.

Overall, in a clear counterpoint to the IEA’s assessment, a majority of respondents don’t think greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2033. The experts we polled are only a bit more bullish about that peak and decline happening within the next decade (35 percent) as they are about humans safely landing on Mars and returning to Earth during that period (23 percent). Only 6 percent strongly agree that we’ll see emissions peaking and declining over the next ten years.

On a separate question, respondents on balance were also more inclined to agree (39 percent) than disagree (35 percent) that by 2033 humans likely will have begun deliberate, large-scale geoengineering of the planet (for example, seeding the atmosphere with aerosols) in order to reduce the impacts of climate change—indicating that a slight plurality presumably think those climate impacts will be big enough by that point to spur such a controversial and consequential move.

7. Get ready for even greater global volatility

One remarkable survey result is how many respondents expect the world to face additional economic and public-health perils in the coming decade. Seventy-six percent predict another global economic crisis on the scale of the 2008-2009 financial crisis by 2033. A further 19 percent say that there will be two or more such crises. Forty-nine percent foresee another global pandemic with the scale and impact of COVID-19 breaking out by 2033, with an additional 16 percent anticipating two or more such pandemics.

These results might reflect recency bias, where recent experience of crises leaves us more concerned about others occurring. But they may also suggest more troubling trends, including a coming era of more frequent and intense public-health emergencies rather than once-in-a-century pandemics as well as a return to historical economic patterns after the relative calm of the post-World War II decades; between 1908 and 1946, five global recessions brought about greater declines in global per-capita gross domestic product than did the 2008-2009 crisis—amounting to more than one per decade.

8. The tug of war between democracy and autocracy will persist, with democracies potentially losing some ground

Our respondents as a whole do not foresee a clear triumph for either democrats or autocrats over the next ten years. More expect the number of democracies in the world to shrink (37 percent) than to grow (29 percent). But almost all forecast any change to be modest: Just 4 percent foresee many more or many fewer democracies by 2033. Thirty-five percent believe the world will have roughly the same number of democracies as it does today. (It’s worth noting that we asked about the future number of democracies, not the projected strength or type of these democracies.)

When asked open-ended questions about which countries are most likely to move from democracy to autocracy or the reverse by 2033, respondents most frequently chose “none.” Notably, 46 percent foresaw no shifts from autocracy toward democracy and just 31 percent predicted no countries going in the other direction, which is consistent with respondents’ general view that overall change will be modest but trending away from democracy.

Democracy and autocracy, moreover, are not necessarily distinct categories. For example, several countries—including Hungary, Turkey, and Russia—are cited both as autocracies likely to become democracies or democracies likely to become autocracies, suggesting that some respondents have differing views on how to categorize these countries.

Also notable: A small but significant minority of 9 percent of all respondents—and 10 percent of US respondents—selected the United States as the democratic country most likely to grow autocratic by 2033. Some respondents’ views on the future of US and global democracy appear to be linked, suggesting that they see the United States as the most important democratic country and guardian of global democracy. Among those who foresee either no change or a decline in the number of democracies worldwide, 12 percent expect the United States to become autocratic—their top choice. For those who expect the number of democracies to expand, none predict an autocratic United States.

9. Democracies will face a difficult decade of systemic dangers

Democracies are entering a dangerous decade in which they will need to contend with nationalist and populist forces and all the challenges associated with rapidly evolving technology. When asked which social movements they expected to have the most political influence worldwide over the next ten years, only 5 percent of respondents chose pro-democracy ones—whereas a majority picked either nationalist or populist movements. A third of respondents went with movements advocating for other causes often associated with democratic societies: the environment, youth issues, and women’s rights.

Admittedly, nationalists and populists are not invariably more supportive of autocratic political systems than democratic ones. Nor are, say, youth movements invariably opposed to autocracy. But our survey responses pointed to a connection between gathering nationalist and populist strength and greater popular pressure toward autocracy. Among those who foresee fewer democracies in the next decade, 68 percent predict increasing political influence for populist or nationalist movements and just 2 percent growing clout for pro-democracy ones. Of those forecasting more democracies, the equivalent figures are 38 percent and 10 percent.

Trends in mass communication and new technologies also present potential perils for democracies. Against the backdrop of a tech sector undergoing great transformation—from new regulatory efforts to the corporate upheaval at social-media companies to the ways in which these platforms have been caught up in broader political polarization—over half of respondents (53 percent) predict that social media will prove a net negative for democracies by 2033. Only 15 percent think it will be a net positive—a remarkable shift away from the dream, so prevalent during the early Arab Spring era, of social media as a democratizing force. Eighteen percent say that social media will have so evolved over the next ten years as to make the question impossible to answer.

For those who forecast a reduction in the number of democracies around the world, a large share (69 percent) expect social media to be a net negative for democracies.

Another compelling finding involved optimism about the speed with which some disruptive technologies—specifically commercial quantum computing, level 5 autonomous vehicles (where the vehicle performs all tasks under all driving conditions without the need of human input), and artificial general intelligence (where computers and machines exhibit human-like intelligence and creativity)—will be developed. In all three cases, majorities of respondents (between 57 percent and 68 percent) agree that these technologies will exist and/or be commercially viable by 2033. Although all three technologies promise enormous benefits for humankind, they also will raise challenges related to the future of work and income, public health and safety, national security, and democratic governance, among other domains. Democracies will need to ground the development and implementation of such technologies within democratic norms and values through appropriate regulation and standards and via international cooperation.

Through their answers across several questions, respondents raised the prospect of two contrasting scenarios for the coming decade. One of a world with democracy in decline, corroded by nationalism, populism, and social media, with a more autocratic United States deepening the trend. And another—predicted by a minority—of a world where democracy is ascendant, bolstered by a democratic United States, as well as social movements and mass-communication platforms consistent with democratic values.

10. International security organizations are likely to remain largely unchanged even as the world confronts unprecedented change and challenges

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed the capabilities and limits of institutions designed to enhance international security. While our respondents predict a range of major challenges to human security over the next ten years—from conflict over Taiwan to the fragility of the Russian state to more pandemics and economic crises—they expect the world’s existing security architecture to stay mostly the same.

Eighty-two percent of respondents, for example, believe that over the next decade NATO will remain an alliance of North American and European countries based on a mutual security guarantee. Among respondents who are citizens of NATO member states, 85 percent think that the Alliance’s current form will be maintained; among those from other countries, 71 percent say the same.

Responses on the possible expansion of the United Nations Security Council convey a similar message. Sixty-four percent of all respondents expect no new permanent seats to be added to the UN’s most powerful body by 2033. The difference between respondents who are citizens of countries with permanent seats and those who are citizens of countries without permanent seats isn’t pronounced (66 percent and 61 percent, respectively).

Beyond institutional inertia and the self-interest of the Council’s current permanent members, a major challenge in expanding the Security Council is the complexity of doing so. As one respondent told us, “If additional seats are added, it will be more than one because the rest of the world will not come [together] around a single candidate.” As a group, those surveyed seem to agree: Respondents who predict Security Council expansion identify an average of 1.7 new members. The strong presumption is that, if the number of permanent seats grows, India will be one of the beneficiaries. Over half of those forecasting that Japan, Brazil, Nigeria, or South Africa will gain a seat also say that India will get one. For those who chose Germany this figure is less than half but still 45 percent. If India’s time could soon come, however, Africa’s looks distant: Only 6 percent of respondents mention Nigeria or South Africa as likely new permanent Security Council members within the next ten years.

A question not directly posed to our respondents is whether this forecasted lack of change in NATO and the UN Security Council is indicative of strength (that these organizations will be effective tools amid the coming decade’s challenges) or weakness (that they are unable to adjust even amid manifest need). Some respondents offered comments pointing to the latter possibility. One worries that, without change, the Security Council will lose relevance as an increasing number of decisions about international security are made elsewhere. Meanwhile, 4 percent of respondents noted, unprompted, that they expect NATO will need to take on a wider global remit, including Asian security, over the course of the next decade. These are more whispers in the margins than the expression of a common opinion, but they do raise questions about whether stasis in these institutions should be interpreted as a sign of institutional health.

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Deputy Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation in Stuttgart, Germany, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC.

Uri Friedman, Managing Editor, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

Against Undiplomatic Diplomacy - The American Conservative

The loudest voices in the Senate call for strategies that make negotiation and peace harder.

The American Conservative · by Rand Paul · January 9, 2023

When ambassadors or secretaries of State come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I ask them to detail what policy changes have been achieved as a result of America’s sanctions on Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea.

To date, no official of our government has been able to describe behavioral changes due to the sanctions we impose. The response I have received that came the closest to an answer was that sanctions under President Barack Obama prompted Iran to come to the negotiating table to forge the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement. Perhaps. But one might argue that it was the lure of removing sanctions that actually brought Iran to the table.

Too often, loud voices on both sides of the aisle appear to believe that imposing more and more sanctions will change an adversary’s policy, rather than understanding that it is actually the offer of removing sanctions that can move our adversaries.

When the Iran agreement was initially negotiated, I had my doubts. I felt the U.S. could have insisted upon a more gradual release of impounded funds to Iran based on continued compliance with the pact. But as time went on, inspectors ascertained that Iran adhered to the uranium enrichment restrictions. In fact, the loudest criticism of Iran was not that they abrogated the JCPOA, but rather their continued development of ballistic missiles that were not restricted in the JCPOA.

Subsequently, the Trump Administration pulled out of the JCPOA, not because Iran was evading the pact but because Iran was building and improving weapons not regulated by the pact. But Trump and then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s maximum pressure campaign did not, in fact, influence or change Iran’s behavior in the least, nor did leaving the Iran agreement.

Instead, if we desire a ballistic missile treaty with Iran, the first thing to do is to ask why Iran develops ballistic missiles. Iranians live in a world dominated by nuclear powers. Europe, the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan, and India all have nuclear weapons. In addition, Iran sees the Sunni sheikdoms as its adversaries.

Under what circumstance would Iran choose to limit their ballistic missiles as the surrounding Sunni sheikdoms enhance their own missiles and house U.S. troops? Anyone seriously desiring a ballistic missile pact with Iran should understand that no such agreement will ever occur between the U.S. and Iran unless it includes the Sunni sheikdoms. A useful diplomatic goal would be to have a regional dialogue among the countries actually in the Middle East.

Now, some may reasonably argue that the U.S. can only use the removal of sanctions as a negotiating tool if sanctions are imposed in the first place. Fair enough. But while we have imposed sanctions on Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea for decades, there has been little U.S.-led dialogue about trading sanctions relief for policy change. The Russian–Ukraine war should present such an opportunity.

Instead, the loudest voices in the Senate continue to shout about labelling the killing of civilians in Ukraine a genocide, as if that will somehow push the Russians to the negotiating table. Contrary to what those noisy Senators assert, pushing a narrative that ultimately requires Russian leaders to be tried at the Hague for war crimes and jailed in perpetuity is unlikely to facilitate negotiations.

No one questions that the war has caused and continues to cause civilian deaths, or that Russia started the war and is the aggressor nation in defiance of all international norms. But genocide has a definition; it is a mass killing of an ethnic or religious group of people. To those eager to label Russia’s killing of civilians a genocide, how would they respond to a Japanese claim that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were genocide? Fortunately for the U.S., Japan was in no position to make such claims; Japan’s defeat was unconditional surrender.

But most wars do not end with unconditional surrender. Most wars end through negotiation.

Now, the people who want to label the killing of civilians in Ukraine a genocide also oppose negotiation in Ukraine. They argue that there should be no negotiations until every Russian leaves all Ukrainian territory. I don’t doubt the sincerity of the no-negotiations-until-victory crowd, but someone must also assess what Ukraine will ultimately look like if this war drags on interminably.

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In addition to $100 billion already sent from U.S. taxpayers to Ukraine, the loud voices against negotiation are already talking of a trillion-dollar reconstruction plan for Ukraine. I guess they assume China will continue to loan us the money. One thing is certain, though: Instead of 1 to 2 percent interest on the borrowed money we airmail to Ukraine, the rate will likely be double that. Last year, the U.S. interest on our debt was about $400 billion. Expectations are that U.S. interest rates will continue to rise to over a trillion dollars a year over the next decade, ultimately exceeding what we spend on our military.

To those who advocate endless intervention in every foreign war on the planet, it might be prudent to ask if our national security is enhanced by having debt payments that exceed our defense spending.

No negotiation until victory resembles a position of no peace until unconditional surrender. Over and over again, the strategy of more and more sanctions has proved ineffective. The loud, chest-thumpers on Capitol Hill may believe they are the noble ones, but as the destruction of Ukraine continues, history may ultimately judge them the naïve.

The American Conservative · by Rand Paul · January 9, 2023

6. Japan dives into rare earth mining under the sea

Excerpts:

JOGMEC noted: “According to prior research, it is expected that the area tested around the Takuyo No 5 Seamount contains enough cobalt to meet Japan’s demand for 88 years and enough nickel to meet Japan’s demand for 12 years.”

Two years earlier, in 2018, Associate Professor Yutaro Takaya of Waseda University and his colleagues reported that they had found enough rare earth metal deposits near Minami-Torishima to supply Japan for hundreds of years.

According to Takaya, “Our findings may change the nation’s policies and strategies on natural resource management, for we could possibly become self-reliant in terms of rare-earth mineral resources and build a sustainable future.”

But first the deposits must be excavated, pumped to the surface and transported to metal processing plants.

Japan dives into rare earth mining under the sea

Japanese move aims to cut current 60% dependence on China and become self-sufficient by end of the decade

asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · January 10, 2023

TOKYO – Japan’s effort to mine the seabed is moving from the research and development stage toward resource extraction as technological advance is spurred by the demands of national economic security.

If all goes according to plan, Japan’s current dependence on China for its rare earth metal supplies could be greatly reduced or eliminated by the end of the decade. China currently dominates global production, processing about 85% of the world’s rare earths.

Japan’s new National Security Strategy document, released in December, states that “with regard to supply chain resilience, Japan will curb excessive dependence on specific countries.”

Furthermore, it will “secure stable supply for critical goods including rare earth, and promote capital reinforcement of private enterprises with critical goods and technologies, and strengthen the function of policy-based finance, in pursuit of protecting and nurturing critical goods.”

The English version is stamped “Provisional Translation,” but the statement is consistent with the original Japanese.

Rare earth metals are a group of 17 heavy metal elements, some of which are of critical importance to the manufacture of electric vehicle motors (dysprosium), wind power generators (neodymium) and other electronic devices. They are used in magnets, batteries, lasers and many other industrial products and processes.

Japan currently imports about 60% of its rare earth metals from China, but they are available in large quantities on the sea floor – if they can be accessed.

Last August and September, Japanese marine engineers working under the auspices of the Cabinet Office’s Cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion Program succeeded in pumping up seabed material from a depth of nearly 2,500 meters in the waters near Minami-Torishima.

Ocean area claimed by Japan. Map: International Institute for Law of the Sea Studies

Now the pumping system must be extended to a depth of 6,000 meters, where large deposits of mud containing rare earths have been found. Pumping from this depth is scheduled to start in 2024.

The task will be made more difficult by strong ocean currents and typhoons. The government has allocated 6 billion yen (US$45 million) to finance the project.

Minami-Torishima is a coral reef located almost 1,900 kilometers southeast of Tokyo and almost 3,350 kilometers east of Taiwan. It is Japan’s easternmost and most remote territory with its own separate Exclusive Economic Zone (see map).

In late December, the government also decided that only organizations licensed by the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry (METI) will be permitted to mine rare earth metals on Japanese territory. Legislation to put this decision into effect will most likely be submitted to the Diet this year and will almost definitely pass.

In addition, the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) will be allowed to invest up to 75% in rare earth mining projects. JOGMEC’s official English name, which used to be Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, was changed last November.

Established in 2004, JOGMEC combines the functions of the former Japan National Oil Corporation and Metal Mining Agency of Japan and acts to ensure stable supplies of oil, gas, coal and metals for Japanese industry.

To this end, it is active in geologic surveying, exploration, development, production, stockpiling, recycling and environmental protection. It also provides private Japanese companies involved in these fields with technical support, equity capital and debt guarantees.

Under its new name, JOGMEC now also promotes carbon neutrality, capture and storage, stable supplies of hydrogen and ammonia, methane hydrate research and development, geothermal energy and offshore wind power.

In August 2020, JOGMEC announced that it had for the first time succeeded in excavating seabed crust [often referred to as mud] containing cobalt and nickel around the Takuyo No 5 seamount near Minami-Torishima.

The JOGMEC test excavator on the seabed. Photo: JOGMEC

The expedition, which employed the Japanese research vessel Hakurei and specially-designed excavation equipment, was commissioned by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).

Mineral processing (ore crushing and component separation), refining and smelting tests were also conducted and the environmental impact of excavation was assessed.

At the time, JOGMEC identified the following seabed mineral resources:

Hydrothermal deposits

Characteristics: ore deposits formed by the precipitation of metal components contained in hot water discharged from the seafloor
Location: Okinawa, Izu peninsula/Ogasawara islands
Metals: copper, lead, zinc, gold and silver
Depth: 700 to 2,000 meters

Cobalt rich crust

Characteristics: manganese oxide with a thickness of about several millimeters to more than ten centimeters that covers the rocks from the summit to the slope of the seamount
Location: Minami-Torishima
Metals: cobalt, nickel, copper, platinum, manganese and others
Depth: 800 to 2,400 meters

Manganese nodules

Characteristics: elliptical manganese oxide nodules 2 to 15 centimeters in diameter distributed on the seafloor
Location: Pacific Ocean
Metals: copper, nickel, cobalt, manganese and others
Depth: 4,000 to 6,000 meters

JOGMEC noted: “According to prior research, it is expected that the area tested around the Takuyo No 5 Seamount contains enough cobalt to meet Japan’s demand for 88 years and enough nickel to meet Japan’s demand for 12 years.”

Two years earlier, in 2018, Associate Professor Yutaro Takaya of Waseda University and his colleagues reported that they had found enough rare earth metal deposits near Minami-Torishima to supply Japan for hundreds of years.

According to Takaya, “Our findings may change the nation’s policies and strategies on natural resource management, for we could possibly become self-reliant in terms of rare-earth mineral resources and build a sustainable future.”

But first the deposits must be excavated, pumped to the surface and transported to metal processing plants.

Follow this writer on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667

asiatimes.com · by Scott Foster · January 10, 2023

7. New worldwide threats prompt Pentagon to overhaul chem-bio defenses

"Modulating the immune system?" This was once science fiction I think. Surely there will be push back even greater than there has been for vaccines when DOD begins doing this (if it is feasible).

Excerpts:

It’s no longer just the special operations forces fighting terrorists who might be exposed to chemical or biological weapons deployed by regional actors such as Iran or Syria, Watson said. Now, the problem has evolved to threaten the entire force.

...

DoD has concluded that a good offense is the best defense for many pharmaceutical-based threats. Instead of developing medical countermeasures against each toxin — such as Naloxone, an auto-injector designed to treat fentanyl intoxication — officials are looking at “modulating the immune system” through six metabolic routes to improve troops’ defenses, Watson said.

The Pentagon is also targeting naturally occurring viruses, which adversaries may now be able to manipulate. For example, officials are developing monoclonal antibodies — also used to treat Covid-19 — as treatment for three viral families: Nipah/Hendra, Rift Valley Fever and Pan-Orthopox.

New worldwide threats prompt Pentagon to overhaul chem-bio defenses

Politico

The department is shifting its approach as new technology hits the battlefield.

Emergency workers in protective suits search around an assisted living facility after a man and woman were exposed to the Novichok nerve agent on July 6, 2018, in Salisbury, England. | Jack Taylor/Getty Images

By LARA SELIGMAN and ERIN BANCO

01/09/2023 01:23 PM EST

The Defense Department is overhauling its approach to countering biological and chemical weapons, as potential adversaries such as Russia and China rush to create threats that are easier to use and can evade traditional defenses.

Officials are launching a new plan to develop medical treatments, vaccines and personal protective equipment that can adapt to a range of evolving biological and chemical threats, said Ian Watson, DoD’s deputy assistant secretary for chemical and biological defense.

That’s a change for DoD, which traditionally has developed tools to counter a specific list of biological and chemical threats. Recent advances in technology allow potential adversaries to manipulate existing pathogens and toxins and create new ones, leading to an almost infinite number of new hazards for troops. Adding to the complexity of the problem, those dangers can be naturally occurring, accidental or deliberate, Watson said.

He previewed the new framework, officially called the Chemical and Biological Defense Program’s Enhanced Medical Countermeasures Approach, in an exclusive interview.

It’s no longer just the special operations forces fighting terrorists who might be exposed to chemical or biological weapons deployed by regional actors such as Iran or Syria, Watson said. Now, the problem has evolved to threaten the entire force.

U.S. officials are particularly concerned about adversaries that already have advanced chemical and biological capabilities and have proven themselves willing to use them. Russia and China now have the technology necessary both to tweak current threats — from toxins to naturally occurring pathogens — to make them more deadly and to create new weapons, Watson said.

“We see what we have to prepare for, for the National Defense Strategy, for the pacing threat of China and Russia,” Watson said. “We see not only the technology, the intel, the intent, and also the potential impact it would have to our forces if we don’t prepare.”

“It’s a different scale,” he added, “and it’s a different environment in which our soldiers are going to be asked to potentially find it.”

The move to develop tests, treatments and vaccines for a range of threats marks a shift in strategy for the department. For years, DoD responded to potential chemical and biological attacks in the field by developing tools to combat a specific list of hazards. But the list continued to grow. Now, the U.S. is adapting, Watson said, adding that it will likely become more difficult over time to determine nature and origin.

“The technology is accelerating at such a pace that the threat profile and the diversity of the threat and the attributes of the threat have increased and will continue to do so at a quick clip,” Watson said. “We can’t develop a countermeasure for every single one of those, every single toxin, every single biological potentiality, every single chemical potentiality.

“Our ability to simply sink endless amounts of defense dollars into a single countermeasure for every single threat that can easily be modified by our adversaries is no longer a solution,” he added.

DoD is releasing the new approach ahead of its first-ever National Biodefense Strategy, which Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called for in November 2021. The strategy was slated to come out last fall; Watson said it is expected “soon.”

Gregory Koblentz, the director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, said the decision by the administration to look more holistically at chemical and biological threats is a strategic national security decision — one that could help the U.S. keep pace with countries such as China, Russia and Iran.

“There’s definitely a much higher kind of salience and appreciation of how nation-states are using these technologies,” Koblentz said. “Until fairly recently, the focus has mostly been on ISIS and Al Qaeda using chemical and biological terrorism. This [strategy] might be another kind of paradigm shift.”

The change in approach has been shaped in large part by the Covid-19 pandemic, Watson said. It can be impossible to tell whether a new threat is naturally occurring or intentionally manipulated by adversaries, but either way, the countermeasures are often the same, he stressed.

DoD learned lessons from the outbreak on the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in March 2020, which sickened hundreds of crew members — one sailor died — and sidelined the ship in Guam for weeks. The incident had ramifications beyond the carrier: The captain was fired, the acting Navy secretary resigned, and the service was plunged into chaos.

The Roosevelt outbreak showed the importance of identifying a chemical or biological threat early to before it hits crews and affects military assets, Watson said.

“We took combat power off station because of a disease that took down the crew,” Watson said. “And so the early indications and warnings where we can actually separate and identify those things preclude us from having to go down below readiness and keep our forces not only on station, but how they’re supposed to operate.”

DoD requested an additional $300 million for fiscal 2024 to develop the new strategy and $1.2 billion over the next five years, Watson said, but more money is needed.

Watson said it is impossible for the U.S. to continue to pour millions of dollars into preparing for every known and future chemical and biological threat — it has to change course and develop a broad range of tools that will help protect troops in the field for whatever they may encounter.

“We can never ever protect the warfighter in entirety the way we’ve been doing if we don’t start switching to this in the future,” he said.

One problem is the evolving threat posed by pharmaceutical-based agents that are easy to stockpile and hide from traditional intelligence-gathering methods.

Over the past several years, China has ramped up its production of fentanyl, contributing to a global opioid crisis. And Russia has used nerve agents, namely Novichok, in assassination attempts. Experts warn that U.S. adversaries could use such pharmaceutical-based agents in large-scale attacks.

“Russia’s use of Novichok on multiple occasions has definitely highlighted the threat that so-called fourth-generation agents pose,” Koblentz said. “These are agents that we know existed, but people were not really focused on them because they were secret until recently.”

DoD has concluded that a good offense is the best defense for many pharmaceutical-based threats. Instead of developing medical countermeasures against each toxin — such as Naloxone, an auto-injector designed to treat fentanyl intoxication — officials are looking at “modulating the immune system” through six metabolic routes to improve troops’ defenses, Watson said.

The Pentagon is also targeting naturally occurring viruses, which adversaries may now be able to manipulate. For example, officials are developing monoclonal antibodies — also used to treat Covid-19 — as treatment for three viral families: Nipah/Hendra, Rift Valley Fever and Pan-Orthopox.

Officials are using advances in computing to rapidly develop new treatments. DoD has an agreement with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to use its El Capitan supercomputer to model new threats and generate vast numbers of potential treatments, similar to the way the U.S. responded to the Omicron variant of Covid, Watson said.

Out of those treatments, officials choose not only the most effective candidate, but also the one that can most easily be manufactured in large quantities. Once these treatments are on the shelves, they can be sent out rapidly to troops in the field in an emergency.

“You’re modeling out very much like Formula One racing. They’ll do thousands of designs in the computer,” Watson said. “What that does for us is it allows us to be cost-effective.”

As part of the new strategy, DoD is developing, standardizing and deploying biological sensors that troops can wear in the field, called “wearables,” that can detect and identify the characteristics of a threat early on, for instance, if it’s viral or bacterial. The devices use biological data such as the troops’ blood oxygen levels and heart rate to come to a diagnosis.

These devices already exist across the department; Watson’s shop is focused on standardizing them, he said.

“You can start indicating that you’re ill four or five days before, like when [you catch Covid], you can see it spike three or four days before you ever saw symptoms,” Watson said. “The more we’re using those to do the tests, the algorithms are improving, so those biomarkers are giving us better indicators.”

Another effort is wastewater surveillance, which local officials also used during the pandemic to identify Covid outbreaks quickly.

All of these pieces of the puzzle come together to help DoD better protect its forces, Watson said, likening the biodefense effort to integrated missile defense.

“Think about it like integrated missile defense, the handoff of multiple sensors, early warning to identify, you have a surveillance radar or something up there, you lock on with your fire control and you identify what it is,” Watson said. “We do integrated, layered defense not only with our medical countermeasures but also the early warning detection.”

POLITICO

Politico

8. The Largest Armies in the World

Yes quantity has a quality all its own (Stalin). But it is not the sole indicator of combat power.

The Largest Armies in the World

worldatlas.com · by Cory Price

Treaties and political promises mean nothing if they cannot be upheld or protected with state-sanctioned force. Opportunist states, since the beginning of human civilization, have been quick to take advantage of vulnerable neighbors regardless of whether peace agreements were in place. Therefore, mass mobilization of national populations is an integral part of existing as a country in the 21st century. The presence of military might is an ongoing balancing act between maintaining peace and engaging in open warfare.

Religious, geopolitical, and economic disputes are not always solved diplomatically, which is why each of the following countries has invested in building up the largest and most powerful armies that the world has ever seen. This ranking considers active personnel to be the key metric, and the combined military might of reserve units is not considered. Furthermore, the tooth-to-tail ratio (combat units as opposed to supporting units) can vary, with a single soldier often relying on the assistance of two or even fifteen additional support personnel, on average.

China - 2 Million Active Personnel

A platoon of Chinese soldiers with the Chinese flag. Image credit SemikArt via Shutterstock

An article in 1999, written by expert Bates Gill, declared China’s military to be a hollow and empty threat to its opponents, despite the former total of 2.8 million soldiers. Today, the 2 million units that comprise the Chinese military are better trained and better equipped. GlobalFirepower (GFP), an independent analytical group, ranked them 3rd in strength out of 142 countries. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the moniker for the Chinese forces, represents its Infantry, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force. Every year, the PLA goes through a budget of around $229 billion in order to maintain its capacity. Despite the high number of personnel, there is no ongoing conscription of the civilian population. The GFP ranks consider only conventional deployments, as opposed to nuclear capabilities.

India - 1.45 Million Active Personnel

Indian armed forces are marching with light machine guns for India's republic day celebration. Image credit Rudra Narayan Mitra via Shutterstock

The border between India and China is in a heated state of competition, which is one reason why India maintains almost one and a half million active personnel. In 2021, footage reported by CNN recorded a violent confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops. The Indian Armed Forces, comprised of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, costs around $66 Billion to maintain each year. In 2019, that equated to roughly 2.4% of India’s total GDP. This expense does not go without merit, as India managed to place 4th on the GFP index. However, the vast distance between the strength of China and India is still palpable.

United States - 1.39 Million Active Personnel

US soldiers giving a salute. Image credit Bumble Dee via Shutterstock

The lionized war machine of the United States stands in third place with its active military personnel at roughly 1.39 million units. This is significantly complemented by its 2022 budget of $782 Billion, which is triple the amount of the PLA. However, the reserve unit bolsters around 1.1 million members which is identical to India's, while China has a little over 1.2 million. GFP considers the US forces to be the strongest military in the world and considering its eleven sophisticated aircraft carriers compared to China’s two, the reasoning is sound. A VICE interview with a military analyst, Dylan Lehrke, revealed that it is unlikely the combined forces of the world could launch a successful invasion against the United States. Although, projecting force is much more difficult than defending a large territory.

North Korea - 1.2 Million Active Personnel

North Korean soldier at the military parade in Pyongyang. Image credit Astrelok via Shutterstock

Nearly 30% of the North Korean population is in their armed forces, giving them the 4th largest military in the world. However, sheer numbers are not enough to grant them a top ten position, thus, they are 30th in terms of strength between Algeria and Thailand. Ruled by an oppressive and isolationist regime, North Korea's economic struggles alongside mass poverty have resulted in significant famines over the past several decades. The nation sits between South Korea, its long-term rival, and China, which has a vested interest in tolerating North Korea’s presence. In the media, it is common for North Korea to announce its plans to attack western powers. In addition, dangerous missile tests have endangered the Japanese mainland, although a direct strike has not yet occurred.

Russia - 850 Thousand Active Personnel

The Russian army in red berets and green uniforms, Moscow, Russia. Image credit Anton Brehov via Shutterstock

Currently considered the modern world’s greatest ‘paper tiger,’ Russia has a force that consists of roughly 850,000 active members. Updates in 2023 will likely reveal that approximately 100,000 Russian service members and conscripts died in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The reason for this colossal failure is due to internal and external overestimations of Russian military strength. Rampant corruption and misallocation of resources incapacitated the Russian military before the invasion. Rumors and reports have become abundant that Russia is desperate to make use of mercenary forces, alongside mass conscription of prison and civilian populations, in an effort to gain ground in Ukraine. However, when the dust settles, the international community will be unlikely to fear the Russian war machine as much as they did in years prior.

Pakistan - 640 Thousand Active Personnel

Pakistani military officials marching. Image credit Asianet-Pakistan via Shutterstock

The Armed Forces of Pakistan is the 6th largest military in the world with 640,000 active personnel. In a similar model to other nations, the military comprises an army, navy, and air force. At $10.4 billion in cost per year (4% of total GDP), the arrangement is not insignificant economically or politically. However, despite the size, Pakistan is 9th according to GFP behind the United Kingdom, France, South Korea, and Japan. Due to long-term cultural and geographical disputes Pakistan’s primary opponent is India (and therefore Iran) as well as Afghanistan. Although open conflict simmers and tensions brew, the last significant confrontation between India and Pakistan occurred in 1965.

Iran - 575 Thousand Active Personnel

A platoon of soldiers of the Iranian army with the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Image credit SemikArt via Shutterstock

The subject of civil unrest is currently Iran’s greatest challenge, with protests breaking out across the country in 2021 and 2022. The active force of nearly 600,000 military personnel stands at the ready, however, to guard against all internal and external threats. The force cost $25 Billion in 2022, which accounted for 2.5% of its GDP. Tensions between Iran, Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia have persisted for decades due to complex differences in ideology, politics, and geographical disputes. This state of passive (and sometimes active) conflict is a prime motivator for each named country to increase its military efforts in the region. In particular, Iran is seemingly outnumbered. However, Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon arsenal. Behind Egypt and Turkey, Iran is the 14th strongest military power according to GFP.

NATO - 3.3 Million Active Personnel

Patch flag and symbol of NATO force integration unit in Lithuania. Image credit Michele Ursi via Shutterstock

Nearly 3.3 million personnel make up the combined troop numbers of NATO. The arrangement consists of 30 nations that have agreed to a defensive military alliance. These nations are Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The structure is unique because NATO’s forces encompass an integrated enchainment of all member nations, rather than a singular body. However, because member nations such as France and Germany are much lower down on the list with only 205,000 and 183,000 respective troops, their combined forces are a commanding presence internationally. The combined defense expenditure for members of NATO in 2022, including the United States, was $1.2 trillion.

Conclusion

Perhaps an era will come that sees the total dismantlement of all the world’s armed forces and nuclear arsenals. That day has not yet come, and modern societies continue to brace themselves for ongoing or eventual conflict. Despite the tentative peace achieved worldwide since the end of WWII, it may take only one nuclear-armed leader to unleash a devastating global chain reaction. Plenty of tensions and disputes still exist between countries today, alongside a handful of open conflicts, which cements the need for each state’s investment in an armed force. In the future, space forces will likely become more prevalent as the warring nature of humankind turns its attention to the stars. Regardless, universal peace must remain the focus of every world citizen in the coming millennia.

Rank Country Number of Active Military Personnel 1 China 2,000,000 2 India 1,450,000 3 United States 1,390,000 4 North Korea 1,200,000 5 Russia 850,000 6 Pakistan 640,000 7 Iran 575,000 8 South Korea 555,000 9 Vietnam 470,000 10 Egypt 450,000 11 Turkey 425,000 12 Myanmar 400,000 13 Indonesia 400,000 14 Brazil 360,000 15 Thailand 350,000 16 Colombia 295,000 17 Sri Lanka 250,000 18 Mexico 250,000 19 Japan 240,000 20 Saudi Arabia 225,000 21 France 205,000 22 Ukraine 200,000 23 Morocco 200,000 24 Iraq 200,000 25 United Kingdom 194,000

worldatlas.com · by Cory Price

9. US Navy considers Cold War-era squadrons to boost readiness

I cannot assess the Navy but I think there may be some very useful "back to the future"concepts from the Cold War era that are worth exploring.

Graphs and charts at the link: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/01/09/us-navy-considers-cold-war-era-squadrons-to-boost-readiness/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

US Navy considers Cold War-era squadrons to boost readiness

Defense News · by Megan Eckstein · January 9, 2023

WASHINGTON — In 2009, the U.S. Navy faced a readiness crisis.

The cruiser Chosin and destroyer Stout were both deemed unfit for combat operations by the service’s Board of Inspection and Survey, which at the time checked ships’ material conditions every five years.

And they weren’t the only ones. From 2005 through 2009, nearly 14% of surface ships failed their inspections, up dramatically from 6.2% from 2000 to 2004 and 3.5% from 1995 to 1999.

The crisis came after the Navy discontinued several of its Cold War-era organizations focused on maintenance and training in an effort to save money during a time without a significant threat to U.S. security.

But the failures of Chosin and Stout drew new attention to the problem. Adm. John Harvey, who led U.S. Fleet Forces Command at the time, helped charter a fleet review panel to determine how the Navy ended up in this position.

The review, released in 2010, was condemnatory. “The panel is in full agreement that surface force material readiness is in decline. [T]he message is clear: the trend is in the wrong direction.”

Chief among the review’s recommendations was a call for the return of readiness squadrons, which oversaw surface ship maintenance and basic training. The review found that when these squadrons were eliminated in 1995, so too was the fleet’s focus on and accountability for making deployable ships and crews.

In 2010, Harvey pushed to reinstall the readiness squadrons, but he couldn’t rally enough support from the Navy’s manning, engineering and budgeting leaders, among others. The recommendation was never implemented.

But in summer 2017, two separate collisions by Navy ships in the Western Pacific killed 17 sailors. The service once again had to dig out of a ship readiness hole, and a key leader again called for the return of the readiness squadrons. Again, the idea went nowhere.

Now, though — as ship maintenance metrics improve from a recent low, but remain inadequate, according to naval officials — the sea service is poised to establish “surface groups” meant to renew the Navy’s focus on maintenance and training.

Commander of Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener has tasked a working group to identify the necessary billets and the appropriate command-and-control structure for these surface groups, with the aim of kicking off a pilot program in San Diego, California, this summer.

The U.S. Navy has not made significant progress toward growing its fleet size above 300 ships. The FY23 National Defense Authorization Act allows the service to shed 12 of the 24 ships it proposed retiring. Even with a slower retirement rate and marginally higher shipbuilding and construction funding from Congress, it will prove difficult for the Navy to grow the fleet toward 355 ships. That was the last publicly stated force structure objective, back in 2016; since then, the Navy has not officially stated a revised target. (Source: Doug Berenson/Oliver Wyman)

The effort could bring to each ship home port dozens of additional sailors who would solely focus on ensuring the ships there receive the best and most efficient maintenance and training.

Kitchener said there are two key differences this time around: an advanced adversary in China that’s forcing the Navy to think about its near-term readiness to fight; and data analytics and modeling that prove the surface groups will be worth the investment.

The three-star officer said ongoing, data-based work generated ways to improve maintenance performance, but the service still needs an organization focused every day on ensuring those ideas are executed and rigorously adhered to.

Kitchener said he consulted with Navy technical authorities, fleet commanders and the chief of naval operations, and that these three- and four-star leaders support the initiative “because of the focus on the Western Pacific and what we need to do to … generate enough forces to meet the requirements for that threat.”

A surface group for every home port

Data is central to Kitchener’s new effort. He told Defense News in an interview that various efforts have identified the ways to improve ship maintenance: building up a larger inventory of select spare parts, adding capacity in key shops and departments that are potential chokepoints, increasing training and growing expertise in certain technical areas, and more.

But the challenge is in the execution, and that’s why he’s so interested in the surface groups.

Take Destroyer Squadron 9, for example, located in Everett, Washington. Its ships are scattered geographically: one located in Everett, five in San Diego and two in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

They also move through the readiness and deployment cycle on different schedules; the squadron staff and five of the ships deployed in December with the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, but the other three remain at home port for maintenance or training without the captain-level supervision and assistance they may need to reach peak readiness.

Kitchener used this squadron as an example of how he’d like the surface groups to function. As the squadron was in final training and certification for the recent deployment, one of the ships experienced a maintenance problem. Rather than bog down the staff of Destroyer Squadron 9, which has a limited readiness and logistics shop and was focused on upcoming operations in the Western Pacific, the ship instead went to Pearl Harbor at the end of predeployment training for a ship repair period completely conducted under the control of Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific.

Once the repair was complete, the ship was turned back over to Destroyer Squadron 9 for the deployment — an arrangement Kitchener said let the technical and tactical experts each focus on their own work in parallel, without distraction.

The U.S. Navy is increasing its funding for research and development for unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, which could help expand its combat power at a lower cost per hull. The FY23 presidential budget request for the Navy envisioned starting procurement of Extra Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles in FY24 and Large Unmanned Surface Vessels in FY25. (Source: Doug Berenson/Oliver Wyman)

Kitchener said he’s awaiting the final recommendations of his working group this summer, but expects each fleet concentration area to have a single surface group responsible for maintaining and training all surface ships, including cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships and amphibious warships, based in those cities. These home ports include San Diego; Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Everett; Pearl Harbor; Yokosuka, Japan; Manama, Bahrain; and Rota, Spain.

Each surface group would be led by what’s known as a post-major command captain — a senior O-6 officer who has already led a destroyer or amphibious squadron, or captained a cruiser or large-deck amphibious assault ship. That individual would report directly to either the commander of Naval Surface Force Pacific or the commander of Naval Surface Force Atlantic.

Each surface group would devote itself entirely to readiness. They would be most active in helping ships during the maintenance and basic training phases of the 36-month Optimized Fleet Response Plan, but they’d also play a supporting function for ships on deployment. For example, in the case of a maintenance casualty, the surface group back home would work to find the quickest solution, allowing the destroyer or amphibious squadron staff to continue focusing on operations.

“This is oversight and responsibility and accountability throughout the entire” readiness cycle, Kitchener said. “The idea is, this exists in the fleet concentration area, it’s got a cadre of people that are constantly on our ships assessing, understanding what the problems are; we’re pulling the trend analysis here at the headquarters, giving them focus areas. It’s a very active, not just some sort of bureaucratic, organization.”

Though the exact command and control isn’t finalized — and will almost certainly look a bit different than the Cold War-era readiness squadrons and tactical destroyer squadrons — Kitchener said he’s committed to ensuring “we’re not going to turn over a ship from force generation to force employment until it’s ready.”

How surface groups can boost readiness

The Navy has observed improvements in maintenance performance, but is also facing new setbacks as labor and supply chain challenges across the manufacturing sector continue to take a toll on the ship repair industry.

Rear Adm. Bill Greene, the fleet maintenance officer for U.S. Fleet Forces Command, said in the fall that only 36% of surface ships are expected to complete maintenance availabilities on time in fiscal 2022, down from 44% in fiscal 2021.

But, he added, the cumulative delay days across all maintenance work has gone down for several years in a row. So, more ships are missing their expected completion dates, but they’re coming out “less late,” he said.

This duality is also reflected in the most recent Board of Inspection and Survey report, which noted surface ships are seeing higher overall readiness scores than the six-year average, but have more functional areas deemed “degraded” than the six-year average, using a scoring method of satisfactory, degraded or unsatisfactory.

Electrician’s Mate 3rd Class Heather Vinson performs safety checks on electronics for members of the Board of Inspection and Survey aboard the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower. (MC3 Kaleb J. Sarten/U.S. Navy)

What vexes the Navy, Kitchener said, is variance in maintenance performance: Some ships come out of availabilities on time and with no major problems, while others get bogged down with repeated delays. Kitchener and his staff, as well as Naval Sea Systems Command on the engineering side, said they are limited in their ability to identify early signs of poor performance, and thus intervene.

Kitchener outlined a three-step process to address this. The first step was already done under Performance to Plan, an effort led by the vice chief of naval operations meant to identify areas of poor performance and use data to identify the actions that will most improve that performance. In the area of ship maintenance, for example, P2P has highlighted the need to prioritize people or materials for a certain ship availability, and then coordinate activities across multiple shops at a shipyard to get a specific repair done on time.

The second step is allowing surface groups to devote their full attention to implementing the actions identified through P2P in hopes of achieving better on-time maintenance rates.

The third step, on which Kitchener said he’d offer more details soon, is creating a surface response plan that prioritizes certain ships’ readiness over others.

If a contingency arose and a combatant commander needed three destroyers, the three ships at the top of the list would be called upon to deploy on short notice. Those ships higher up on the list would be expected to stay in a peak-readiness state, and the maintenance and supply communities would act accordingly. Ships lower on the list and less likely to be called upon for unexpected tasking may be in a lower readiness condition if the fleet is short on personnel or materials, for example.

The surface groups are central to this plan. Each fleet concentration area already has an organization that oversees crewing, training and equipping issues in their respective port. But compared to the Cold War readiness squadrons, Kitchener said these units are reduced in their size, scope and authority.

The cruiser Chosin conducts counter-piracy operations in 2009 amid a U.S. Navy readiness crisis. (Robert Taylor/U.S. Defense Department)

These organizations will be renamed and given larger staffs so they can usher surface ships through maintenance and training, share their technical expertise with ship crews, and mentor ship commanders.

Kitchener said the future SURFGRU Southeast, currently named Naval Surface Squadron 14, is the “most robust” organization and has served as a model for the working group, which determined how many supply specialists, logistics personnel, diesel engine (versus gas turbine) experts, and so on, were needed to keep ships properly ready.

Kitchener said the Mayport group has 105 billets for a squadron that tends to about 10 destroyers — compared to just 10 personnel tending to nine destroyers and cruisers in Everett. The exact number of billets in each group would depend on the number of ships at a particular port, but Kitchener said the groups would more closely resemble the Mayport squadron than the Everett unit.

Kitchener declined to say exactly how many new billets he’ll request, but did note the working group had mostly finalized its recommendation. Some of the billets will come from elsewhere — the SURFGRU Southwest organization in San Diego will likely be staffed at first by some of Kitchener’s data team — and some will be new billets. The admiral said the Navy can, without Pentagon or congressional help, set up these squadrons and begin to staff them using existing resources.

Cmdr. Arlo Abrahamson, a spokesman for Kitchener, told Defense News that Naval Surface Forces is still developing an early cost estimate for this change, but that the Navy would use existing resources and billets to the greatest extent possible while setting up these more robust surface groups.

Why now?

In 2010, the fleet review panel’s report, dubbed the Balisle Report after lead author retired Vice Adm. Phil Balisle, shocked the surface fleet with its data on the poor state of ship readiness and crew training. It painted a dire picture of a surface navy that needed to be fixed; otherwise, there was a risk someone could get hurt or killed.

“The Balisle Report gave us this tremendous look at a history, really since 2000 or so, of these various decisions that were made in various different parts of the Navy,” Harvey told Defense News. “The collective impact was very, very negative in terms of our ability to keep our ships properly manned, trained and equipped.”

Harvey, the retired admiral who led U.S. Fleet Forces Command from July 2009 to November 2012, took the first crack at implementing the recommendations.

“Bringing back the readiness squadrons,” Harvey said, “if you talked to Adm. Balisle, it was his No. 1 recommendation to do. And I agreed with that.”

Still, Harvey added, the urgency to make this major change was “overcome by other events at that time.”

The Navy was skipping training and maintenance to achieve unsustainable levels of at-sea presence, and it was down about 12,000 sailors thanks to the individual augmentee program that sent personnel to support joint operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sequestration cuts to the federal budget in 2012 further diminished readiness, Harvey explained.

Seaman Bradley Biggerstaff, attached to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1, fills his magazines prior to weapons familiarization training. NMCB-1 was deployed to several locations in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Micronesia in 2007.

“It was going to take more billets, more people. … And there just was not a clean, widespread agreement among everybody who had to agree that this was the right way to go,” Harvey said. “In the greater scheme of things and what was going on, it just never rose to the level where it had a critical mass of leadership who all said: ‘Yes.’ ”

Retired Vice Adm. Rich Brown, who investigated one of the two fatal ship collisions in 2017 and then took command of Naval Surface Forces in 2018, resurrected the push to bring back readiness squadrons. He said that, by 2017, virtually all Balisle’s recommendations were implemented — with the readiness squadrons being the major exception.

Brown told Defense News a robust readiness squadron likely would have prevented the fatal collisions involving the destroyers Fitzgerald and John S. McCain.

The existing structure asks destroyer squadrons to oversee the maintenance and certification of ships and serve as the sea combat commander for a carrier strike group. If the squadron needs a ship to fulfill a warfighting requirement, it creates a conflict of interest that can put maintenance and training needs at risk.

Brown said this construct “failed, and we recognized that it was failing, and so that’s why the Balisle Report said, and later I said, we’ve got to do this. And we just didn’t do it.”

He called the 1980s readiness squadrons “a proven model” that restored the Navy from having a hollow fleet in the 1970s to having a robust surface force by the 1980s.

Brown said the model will work today as long as the Navy settles on a clear command-and-control structure and pays for the necessary billets for Kitchener’s beefed-up surface groups.

A future “high-end fight requires so much dedicated concentration and focus that we need these additional commands. They’re going to come at a cost — it’s going to come at a huge manpower cost, and the Navy’s got to buy that manpower because it’s the right thing to do for our carrier strike groups,” Brown said.

About Megan Eckstein

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

Defense News · by Megan Eckstein · January 9, 2023

10. The US Army Can Be the Joint Force's Contact Layer in the Pacific

Usually in a tactical engagement you want to make contact with your smallest element. Just saying. (but i guess US Army Japan is a relatively small element)

However, the subtitle suggests a tall order for US Army Japan.

The US Army Can Be the Joint Force's Contact Layer in the Pacific

Team a multi-domain task force with U.S. Army Forces Japan to keep tabs on China, boost deterrence, and—if necessary—fight until reinforcements arrive.

By MAJ. GEN. J.B. VOWELL and MAJ. KEVIN JOYCE

JANUARY 9, 2023 07:14 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Maj. Gen. J.B. Vowell

In preparation for large-scale combat operations with the People’s Republic of China, the Joint Force requires a formation that is persistent, survivable, and capable of providing command and control over a full range of warfighting functions. The Army is uniquely suited to fill this role. By combining U.S. Army Japan with a multi-domain task force in the first island chain, the U.S. would present the PRC with a dilemma that is not easily resolved, and thus increase credible military deterrence.

The concept of a contact layer is as old as war itself. Garrisons and outposts on the edge of friendly territory have long been used to see, sense, and understand adversaries—and to serve as the first echelon of defenses against invading forces. To be effective, a nation’s contact layer must be persistent: present in competition, ready ahead of crisis, and survivable in conflict.

This is especially relevant as China continues to threaten the international status quo and play a dangerous game of chicken with U.S. forces in the first island chain—the “barrier formed by Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and maritime and peninsular Southeast Asia,” as a CSBA report put it.

The question then arises: who “gains and maintains contact” in the first island chain? Not the Navy or Air Force. The PRC’s sophisticated munitions and deep magazines represent a grave threat to locally based maritime and air assets, whose best defense is dispersal beyond weapons engagement range before the missiles start flying. The Marine Corps, while a highly capable tactical ground combat force, will certainly be challenged by any scenario in the theater to command and control at scale, project deep fires, protect joint force formations, and manage the significant sustainment activity that any expanded confrontation would require. Only the Army has these capabilities, plus the “staying power” that comes with man-made cover, underground facilities, and modern concealment techniques.

The Army can serve as a contact layer, survive an initial strike, and fracture the enemy’s anti-access and area-denial network, allowing follow-on joint forces to reach the theater and maneuver without having to fight their way in. It can do this because for much of the past decade, the service has been testing and building an “organizational centerpiece” for just such a problem set: the multi-domain task force. MDTF-1 was established in 2017 at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; MDTF-2 in 2021 in Germany; and MDTF-3 four months ago in Hawaii.

Such a team, combined with the U.S. Army Japan, as a contact layer in the first island chain, would provide fires, protection, sensors, command and control, sustainment, and security cooperation. The team would facilitate theater opening and sustainment for the joint force by reducing the efficacy of the PRC’s anti-access and area denial system across all phases of the conflict—helping to solve the Joint Force’s A2/AD predicament. It would also minimize China’s advantage of interior lines and present its leaders with multiple dilemmas.

And by supporting integrated deterrence and unequivocally signaling the will of the United States in the region, the Army team would decrease the likelihood that a crisis will erupt at all.

Next steps

Time is, of course, ticking, which begs the question of how to achieve this quickly. Some might suggest sending a corps—the highest level of command that can provide operational direction for actual combat—to the first island chain. But the Army has just four active corps, making forward-stationing neither feasible nor operationally desirable in competition.

But there is already a headquarters in the first island chain, one with decades of command-and-control experience in theater, key relationships with local governments and forces, and substantial responsibility for sustainment of the joint force in conflict: U.S. Army Japan, or USARJ.

Japan is a long-time ally—indeed, our “anchoring” ally in the region. Possessed of a robust defensive military of its own, Japan can provide assured access to key terrain, reliable basing and overflight, and a mobility corridor in and through the theater. And USARJ has a close relationship with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, fostered through decades of combined training exercises.

Pairing a multi-domain task force with USARJ completes the package by providing multi-domain intelligence, information, protection and a full range of fires capabilities, along with the experts to plan for and employ those capabilities, all while drawing on USARJ’s years of bilateral coordination, sustainment, and protection planning experience. Access for MDTF fires assets is a critical challenge, and USARJ is the Army’s expert on access in Japan. Pairing these organizations would enable a persistent presence and interoperability through bilateral exercises, which supports the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, while simultaneously setting the theater.

Given the acute urgency of the current problem set, Japan is the place to test and employ the concept of a land-based contact layer that would provide the Joint Force commander with eyes, ears, and kinetic weapons inside a potential adversary’s near abroad, while also allowing larger warfighting formations to remain uncommitted and flexible. As the 2022 National Defense Strategy aptly directs, we must “act urgently.” Pairing USARJ with an MDTF achieves this quickly and at a lower cost than other options.

Major General J.B. Vowell is a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, currently serving as the Commanding General of United States Army Japan. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

defenseone.com · by Maj. Gen. J.B. Vowell

11. Pentagon awards $40M ‘Vampire’ contract for Ukraine’s drone defenses

"Vehicle agnostic."

Can these be useful in Korea?

Pentagon awards $40M ‘Vampire’ contract for Ukraine’s drone defenses

Defense News · by Joe Gould · January 9, 2023

WASHINGTON ― The Pentagon has awarded L3Harris Technologies a $40 million order to send Ukraine “Vampire” counter-drone systems by mid-year, the company announced Monday.

L3Harris said it will install 14 kits onto vehicles the U.S. government provides Ukraine. Vampire, which stands for Vehicle Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment, consists of a laser-guided-missile launcher that can quickly be installed in a civilian truck bed.

The kits are meant to allow Ukraine’s ground forces to strike ground targets as well as drones that Russia has been using to hit Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

L3Harris said the contract calls for the company to deliver four systems to the Defense Department by mid-2023 and 10 more by the end of 2023.

‘Vampire’ to transform Ukraine pickups into deadly missile launchers

The L3Harris-made Vampire will be included in the nearly $3 billion in aid announced Wednesday.

The award, technically a purchase order, was part of a Navy prototype contract that pre-dated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according a Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Cdr. Tim Gorman.

The prototype, submitted to the Defense Department in April, was selected in August as part of a Pentagon’s $3 billion security assistance package under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. The company said it began field testing in 2021 and continued range and durability tests in summer 2022.

The Vampire system includes a WESCAM MX-10 RSTA targeting sensor, and it uses an Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System rocket that can be combined with L3Harris’ proximity fuze.

“We’ve invested in procurement, testing and certification since August so VAMPIRE production can begin without delay,” Luke Savoie, the company’s president of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance business unit, said in a press release.

“We’re committed to supporting a U.S. strategic partner with a robust capability, as the people of Ukraine continue to defend their country and protect their independence.”

About Joe Gould

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

12. Ukraine Situation Report: US Strykers, Modern European Tanks On The Table For Kyiv

Ukraine Situation Report: US Strykers, Modern European Tanks On The Table For Kyiv

Discussions are underway in Britain and Poland to provide Ukraine with modern tanks, while the U.S. is mulling sending Kyiv Strykers.

BY HOWARD ALTMAN

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · January 10, 2023

Ukraine may be one step closer to receiving modern Western tanks as well as Stryker armored combat vehicles.

The British Defense Ministry (MoD) is considering sending Kyiv a limited number of Challenger 2 main battle tanks, according to a report Monday by Sky News while Poland is considering sending Leopard 2 tanks, according to The Associated Press. If that happens, it would mark the first time Ukraine has received non-Soviet-era tanks from NATO members. And Politico on Monday reported that the U.S. is mulling the idea of sending Ukraine Stryker armored fighting vehicles. A senior U.S. defense official confirmed that to The War Zone Monday evening.

In a message to The War Zone, an MOD spokesperson would neither confirm nor deny the Sky News report but seemingly left the window open for a transfer of Challenger 2 tanks to take place.

“The Government has committed to match or exceed last year’s funding for military aid to Ukraine in 2023, and we will continue to build on recent donations with training and further gifting of equipment,” said the spokesperson, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the situation.

Britain has 227 Challenger 2 tanks, said the spokesperson.

Officials in Poland, meanwhile, are considering sending a limited number of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

On Monday, Polish President Andrzej Duda met with the prime minister to discuss, among other security related issues, Kyiv’s request for Western-made heavy battle tanks, according to The Associated Press.

“A presidential aide said the request for German-made Leopard 2 tanks which Poland, among other countries, uses, will be on the agenda,” the AP reported.

Poland is considering sending Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks. (Krauss-Maffei Wegmann photo)

Any agreement to provide Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks would “only be within a wide agreement and an undertaking by other countries that have these tanks,” said Pawel Szrot, the Polish presidential aide. Because the Leopard 2 is a German-made tank, Berlin would have to sign off on the deal as well.

Britain, Poland and France, however, are thought to be trying to goad Germany into allowing the Leopards to go to Ukraine, according to Politico.

"A French official told POLITICO that Paris is turning the screws on Germany in the hope of extracting an agreement from Berlin to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine ahead of a Franco-German summit on January 22, the 60th anniversary of the Élysée partnership treaty between the two nations," Politico reported. "Similar pressure is coming from Poland, which wants to form a broad coalition among Western partners to jointly hand over Leopards to Ukraine."

“We encourage other countries to form a broad coalition for the transfer of more modern tanks to Ukraine, such as Leopard tanks,” Deputy Foreign Minister Paweł Jabłoński told Polish public radio on Monday.

The U.S. "is considering sending Stryker armored combat vehicles to Ukraine in an upcoming aid package to help Kyiv fend off an expected Russian spring offensive," according to Politico, citing "two people familiar with the discussion." The Strykers "may be part of the next tranche of military aid, according to a Defense Department official, who like others asked for anonymity to discuss internal deliberations ahead of an announcement," according to Politico.

John Kirby, a spokesman for the White House National Security Council, declined comment to The War Zone about the Strykers. However, a senior U.S. defense official told The War Zone that the U.S. is "considering" sending the Strykers to Ukraine.

While the Stykers are being considered to help Ukraine in the spring, those vehicles were so ill-suited for Arctic conditions that U.S. soldiers in Alaska had little faith in their effectiveness and spent far more time repairing the wheeled vehicles than operating them in the field. The Strykers often freeze up in the extreme cold. Soldiers became so frustrated with the Stryker's performance in Alaska that their replacement was seen as at least a partial salve to morale that had dipped very low. You can read more about that here. Of course, this wouldn't matter in the spring and they are unlikely to arrive anytime before then, that is if they are offered to Ukraine.

Speculation about British and Polish tanks and U.S. Stykers comes ahead of a Jan. 20 meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group of 50 defense ministers working to provide Ukraine with arms.

So far, the U.S. and its allies have been reluctant to give modern main battle tanks to Ukraine, but last week, the U.S., Germany and France announced plans to send Ukraine armored vehicles - 50 M2A2-ODS Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Marder Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) and AMX-10 RC armored cars respectively. You can read more about those plans here.

Soldiers assigned to 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment conduct tube-launched, optically tracked, Wire-guided", live fire excessive at Fort Campbell, KY. April 25, 2018. the "TOW" missile is an anti-tank missile that forms part of the U.S. Army Bradley fighting vehicle.

Whether the decision to provide Ukraine with armored IFVs leads to a change in Washington’s policy, at least as far as U.S. M-1 Abrams main battle tank, remains to be seen. Since September, the U.S. has said that main battle tanks are on the table for Ukraine.

On Friday, Laura Cooper, deputy assistant defense secretary for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, told reporters, including from The War Zone, that the U.S. was still not ready to give Abrams to Ukraine.

“We absolutely agree that Ukraine does need tanks,” she said. “It's one of the reasons that we've partnered with the Netherlands to refurbish a number of T-72 tanks that are already arriving on the battlefields. But we have to be cognizant of maintenance and sustainment considerations with tanks, and certainly, we know that the Abrams tank, in addition to being a gas guzzler, is quite challenging to maintain.”

There is other pushback from the West on the tanks as well.

American officials have argued that Ukraine has enough good tanks in its Soviet-era T-72s, though it is running short of ammunition for them, according to The New York Times. "The Americans and Germans argue that to train Ukrainians to operate modern Leopard or Abrams tanks — and to maintain them in the field — would take many months."

The Challenger 2 and Leopard 2 tanks - which each have 120mm main guns, improved armor and optics - would represent an upgrade to Ukraine’s collection of Soviet-era tanks, including a planned 90 Czech Republic T-72 tanks being refurbished by the U.S. and Netherlands, which are splitting the $90 million price tag to modernize them.

So far, 20 of those T-72 tanks have arrived in Ukraine, Marine Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesman, told The War Zone Monday afternoon.

The provision of Challenger 2 tanks would benefit Ukraine politically and militarily, a defense and security expert in Kyiv told The War Zone Monday.

Politically, the source, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss procurement issues, Ukraine's receiving Challenger 2 tanks could pave the way for other Western nations to provide their more modern armor.

Militarily, the Challenger 2 would "increase level of agility of the troops, improve efficiency in direct actions, improve their maneuverability and physical defense capabilities," the source said. "In addition, it would improve the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to breakthrough fortified positions, destroy firing strong points, military equipment and manpower of the enemy, as well as rapid organization of their defensive lines."

Despite long-standing Ukrainian desires and ongoing talks, no deal to send these kinds of tanks to Ukraine has yet been made. That's in part over logistical concerns like the ones raised by DASD Cooper and others as well as over lingering concerns about the reaction by Moscow, which has been arguing they are fighting not just Ukraine, but NATO as well given the tens of billions of dollars of arms provided to Kyiv by the U.S. and its allies.

Given the importance of these tanks as Ukraine eyes the liberation of Crimea while seeing its troops bogged down in the Donbas, this ongoing saga is something we will be watching closely.

Before we head into the latest news from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can catch up with our previous rolling coverage here.

The Latest

On the battlefield, Donetsk remains a meatgrinder for both sides as they battle over Bakhmut and Soledar, where Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malyar said Russia was making new efforts at retaking lost ground.

"After an unsuccessful attempt to capture Soledar and retreat, the enemy regrouped, recovered losses, transferred additional assault units, changed tactics and launched a powerful assault," Malyar said on the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's (MoD) Telegram channel Monday.

"So far, the enemy has deployed a large number of assault groups formed from the best reserves of the Wagnerites," she said, referring to the Wagner Group's army of mercenaries run by Yevgeny Prigozhin. "The enemy literally steps on the corpses of his own soldiers, massively uses artillery, volley fire systems and mortars, covering even his own fighters with fire."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also acknowledged the ferocity of the fighting there.

“Although the occupiers have now concentrated their greatest efforts on Soledar, the result of this difficult and prolonged battle will be the liberation of our entire Donbas,” he said Monday on his Telegram channel. "And what did Russia want to win there? Everything is completely destroyed, there is almost no life left. And thousands of their people are lost: the whole land under Soledar is covered in the corpses of the invaders and in scars from the blows. This is what madness looks like."

Luhansk too has seen fierce fighting, as both sides battle over territory along the P-66 Highway running from Svatove to Kreminna.

Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War assessment:

Russian forces continued counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on Jan. 8. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that Russian forces transferred several battalions from the Bakhmut area to the Kreminna area.[20]
Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated on Jan. 8 that Russian forces do not control Soledar, and other official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Russian positions near Bakhmut. Prominent Russian milbloggers expressed divergent opinions of the potential for the Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on Jan. 7 that 300 Chechen Akhmat-1 OMON personnel deployed to Ukraine.
Russian forces are continuing to intensify filtration measures to identify partisans in occupied territories. Russian occupation authorities claimed that likely Ukrainian partisans committed sabotage by mining a gas pipeline in Luhansk Oblast on Jan. 8.
Russian occupation authorities intensified passportization efforts in occupied territories on Jan. 8.

Beyond Russia's immediate tactical goals for Bakhmut and Soledar are the long-term strategic value of those two mining cities, both for the natural resources as well as their capacity for underground storage. This could be critical to Russia that keeps losing topside ammo storage facility in and near Ukraine.

The fight for Bakhmut and Soledar has taken a huge toll on both sides.

A Russian merchant ship whose owner has "allegedly carried weapons for the Kremlin turned off its transponder last month before surreptitiously docking at South Africa’s largest naval base, where it delivered and loaded unidentified cargoes, according to witnesses and a senior U.S. official," The Wall Street Journal reported Monday.

"South Africa has declined to say what the ship was carrying or what was loaded onto it at the Simon’s Town navy base," according to the newspaper. The country’s defense minister shrugged off U.S. concerns, saying Washington “threatens Africa, not just South Africa, of having anything that is even smelling of Russia.”

The Ukrainian Black Sea port city of Ochakiv in Mykolaiv Oblast has come under increasing fire, with dueling stories about what was hit there. Ukrainian officials say that 100 buildings were damaged and eight civilians injured. But the Russian Rybar Telegram channel said Monday that "missiles hit an ammunition depot of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, located on the territory of the former 7th coastal battery near the ship traffic control post...According to some reports, along with the ammunition depot, the radar station of the air defense complex was also destroyed."

Whatever it was, it certainly caused a major explosion.

Though it gets fewer headlines, Zaporizhzhia Oblast has seen its share of fighting and will be a key battleground in any Ukrainian effort to liberate Crimea. Russian forces in the occupied city of Polohy have expanded their trenches there over the past week, according to Brady Africk, a spokesman for the AEI Foreign and Defense Policy think tank.

Ukrainian victories in either or both of the Zaporizhzhia or Luhansk oblasts could have serious implications for Russia, the British MoD says.

While it is still unclear whether Russia really is planning a future offensive into Ukraine from its client state Belarus, Moscow is moving aircraft there, according to the Belarusian MoD.

From Jan. 16 to Feb. 1, "a joint tactical flight exercise will be held with the aviation units of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation," the Belarusian MoD said Monday on its Telegram channel. "Today, an aviation component from the Military Space Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation arrived in the Republic of Belarus. During the tactical flight exercise, all airfields and training grounds of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Armed Forces of Belarus will be involved."

The Russian Wargonzo Telegram channel claims that Russian forces have captured a hand-launched Polish-made Ukrainian Fly Eye reconnaissance drone, which recently began to appear on the battlefield.

"In the Luhansk direction, Russian troops managed to take possession of a Polish drone," Wargonzo reported Monday. "They appeared in the arsenal of the Polish special forces at the end of 2010. And in the middle of 2016, they were already used by the Ukrainian army in the war zone in the Donbass."

The Russian Wargonzo Telegram channel claims Russian forces have captured a Polish-made Fly Eye drone used by Ukraine. (Wargonzo Telegram photo)

If you ever wondered what it is like to be a Ukrainian tank crew member, check out this video by the Ukrainian Hromadske news agency.

Here's a look at Ukrainian armor in action, driving through mud and snow.

But even for those driving around in armor, this conflict is dangerous, as you can see by these images, provided by the Ukrainian Weapons Tracker OSINT group, of a damaged Ukrainian BVP M80A IFV donated by Slovenia.

It's dangerous as well for Russians, with the scope of that devastation becoming more apparent as Ukraine captures and holds more territory, as in the case of this recently discovered Russian Pantsir-1 air defense system.

But Ukraine still manages to capture Russian air defenses as well, like the intact S-300 launcher seen in this video.

Ukraine is using its own S-300s against Russian drones, as you can see in this video apparently showing one such battery targeting a Russian Orlan-10 drone. It is not quite clear in this video below what the outcome of that was.

Ukraine's rotary-wing aircraft continue to operate despite the dangers.

Things did not go well for the Russian soldier apparently using an "armored" vest made out of aluminum. It did not save him from a gunshot, according to @wartranslated.

And finally, we have shown you numerous examples of both Ukrainian and Russian drones dropping munitions on troops. But sometimes, those munitions don't explode, they just burrow into the troops below. Here is how Ukrainian medical personnel dealt with one such situation, in this case a Russian VOG grenade that somehow managed to enter the body of a Ukrainian soldier.

Our military doctors conducted an operation to remove a VOG grenade, which did not break, from the body of a soldier.

The operation lasted in the presence of two sappers who supervised the safety of the medical staff and the patient.

One of the most experienced surgeons of the Armed Forces, Major General Andrew Willow, operated without electrocoagulation, as the grenade could detonate at any time.

The operational intervention was successful and the injured soldier was sent to further rehabilitation and recovery.

Ukrainian Armed Forces StratCom

Contact the author: [email protected]

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · January 10, 2023

13. Obama’s Anti-Imperialist Fantasy Bears Bitter Fruit

Obama’s Anti-Imperialist Fantasy Bears Bitter Fruit

The longer we refuse to acknowledge the mistakes of the Iran deal, the greater a price we pay

MARK DUBOWITZ

JANUARY 09, 2023

Tablet · by Mark Dubowitz · January 9, 2023

The eventual fall of the Islamic Republic of Iran will reveal the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement to have been one of the worst unforced strategic errors in the history of U.S. foreign policy. At home, the Islamic Republic is the enemy of perhaps 80% or more of its own people, who see it as a criminal entity that murders them in the streets. Abroad, the clerical regime sows further chaos and bloodshed, threatening the United States and its allies and earning the hatred of peoples across the Middle East. Locking the United States in a nearly decadelong embrace of a failing theocratic totalitarian state is a policy disaster of unrivaled proportions, driven by no apparent external necessity. So why is the Biden administration finding it so difficult to move on?

Oddly, or not, the answers—or nonanswers—to this mystery seem to reveal as much about the unique psyche of the American president at the time, Barack Obama, as they do about the decadelong policy debate on Iran that continues to consume Washington. Yet for some of his supporters and detractors, Obama was simply a practioner of fact-based geopolitics—even if the facts in the end were against him. In this view, Obama as president understood the Islamic Republic as posing a severe threat to American interests and forged a limited agreement to constrain a regime that would be even more dangerous with nuclear weapons. To these critics, he pursued the right goals, but was just remarkably bad at achieving them. A more experienced bargainer might have achieved a better deal.

Alternatively, to others, the explanation of what went wrong is rooted in the unique character and upbringing of the American leader himself. According to this reading, Obama’s choices were rooted in a personal distaste for Western imperialism and American power that was not shared by many of the deal’s supporters or its detractors. It was Obama’s own picture of the world, not any broader consensus view of how American power should be employed or conserved in the Middle East, that led him into a delusional engagement with anti-Western Sunni and Shiite actors, notably the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Republic, and into a strategic realignment that strengthened these American adversaries against America’s traditional allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Israel.

In life, as in politics, incompetence can often explain more than bad ideas. In this reading, Obama deserves more blame for his negotiating ineptitude with the mullahs than he does for some ill-conceived scheme of Middle East realignment that supercharged Persian regional power. The 2015 deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, was simply a bad deal that wouldn’t stop Iran’s nuclear weapons programs, not a bad idea rooted in anti-Western theories from the American faculty lounge, where Obama had spent considerable time. But then why are we still stuck backing such an obvious loser?

Even as the clerical regime publicly disintegrates, JCPOA supporters continue to argue for the merits of a limited agreement that would even temporarily put Iran’s nuclear program “back in a box,” as Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, put it. Opponents counter that, more than seven years later, a return to the 2015 agreement would be even more wrongheaded than the original deal. Sunsets kick in over a few short years, and the regime would receive a windfall of an estimated $245 billion in sanctions relief in the first year, and over $1 trillion by 2030 when Iran’s nuclear program would be free and clear from meaningful limitations—rescuing a tottering, ill-intentioned and widely hated regime by pumping it full of cash that it would use to build nuclear weapons and sow regional chaos. The arms control paradigm, in which supporters and critics argue back and forth over what would constitute “a better deal,” is preventing a clear acknowledgement of Obama’s failure—and blocking the development of a workable strategy for dealing with current developments in Iran and throughout the region.

The faults of the JCPOA have been covered many times, including by this author. The Obama administration abandoned its negotiating leverage, provided mainly by a bipartisan Congress which passed biting economic sanctions on Iran between 2009 and 2012 over the objections of the Obama White House. The administration concluded a flawed interim nuclear agreement in 2013, and an even worse final agreement in 2015. The eventual deal trashed decades of bipartisan U.S. policy and multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to cease enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium on its soil. While it temporarily delayed Iranian nuclear expansion, the deal ceded the right to develop nuclear fissile material to the Islamic Republic and contained a series of sunset provisions under which nuclear restrictions disappeared. These sunsets permitted Tehran to develop, over time, an industrial-size enrichment program, near-zero nuclear breakout capability, and an advanced centrifuge-powered sneak-out capacity, as even Obama himself acknowledged after the deal was concluded.

Many critics of the deal argued that a longer, stronger, and broader agreement was possible if Obama had maximized the pressure on the regime, including through a credible threat of military force. Indeed, the Trump administration came into office promising to do exactly that. Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, imposed crushing sanctions that ravaged the Islamic Republic’s finances, and dealt a serious blow to Iranian regional power with the joint Mossad-CIA killing of Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s most competent military strategist and most feared battlefield commander.

Analysts and partisans continue to debate what could have transpired if this “maximum pressure campaign” had lasted longer than two years. But Biden reversed Trump’s pressure strategy, looked the other way as Chinese purchases of Iranian oil spiked, and waited too long before tackling a massive clandestine sanctions network that earned the regime tens of billions of dollars in hard currency. Predictably this “maximum deference” approach, meant to lure Iran back to the bargaining table, has failed to deliver any agreement, including even a return to a weaker version of the JCPOA. Instead, Iran’s nuclear program has rapidly and dangerously expanded under Biden’s watch, with no serious discussion about how to stop it—aside from stuffing the Islamic Republic’s pockets with more cash.

As protests continue to rage in Iran, with more than 2,000 demonstrations in over three months across all of Iran’s provinces and Iranians demanding regime change and “death to the dictator,” the place to start to answer the question of how we got ourselves into this mess is an earlier Iranian uprising: the 2009 Green Revolution. Then, the fraudulent reelection of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in an even more blatant act of election manipulation than had been common in the Islamic Republic, led to massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Tehran.

The 2009 demonstrations were bigger in size than anything since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, including the current protests. The Green Revolution had clear leadership with support inside some elements of the regime itself; it arguably represented a more cohesive and threatening political opposition to the regime than this year’s leaderless street demonstrations. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself said that the 2009 protests had taken the clerical regime “to the edge of the cliff.” So why did the 2009 Green Revolution fail?

The key to the regime’s successful campaign of repression in 2009 was America’s decision to appease the Islamic Republic at the expense of the Iranian people. The demonstrators were clearly looking outward with the expectation of Western support, especially from the young, supposedly idealistic, newly elected American president. When Obama instead took pains to reassure the Iranian leadership of his commitment to engagement, he made it clear to the demonstrators that they were on their own against their jailers. Within a few weeks, the would-be revolution collapsed.

In the moment, many people outside Iran cut Obama considerable slack. It was just the beginning of his presidency, and his focus was clearly on getting out of Iraq, as he had promised. Yet, in retrospect, there is something disturbing about what Obama did in 2009 that looks even more troubling from the vantage point of Syria, Crimea, and the Donbas, and America’s continuing inability to forget about the JCPOA.

Why did Obama so comprehensively and demonstratively turn his back on the Iranian democracy protesters in 2009, in what was his first major foreign policy decision as president? It is a deep question, especially since Obama himself, after bipartisan and European support swung behind the 2022 protests, has belatedly acknowledged that his lack of support for the Green Revolution was a mistake.

The first set of answers again lies in the familiar area of realpolitik: Obama didn’t want any distractions in getting the United States out of Iraq, and he saw Iran as the keystone to a smooth withdrawal. Angering the Iranian leadership would only lead to greater American casualties, which could cause a political firestorm, with Obama blamed for getting U.S. soldiers killed. That would force him to surge in more troops to Iraq to assuage the Pentagon and Congress, rather than withdrawing them.

Yet Obama had a problem in carrying out his withdrawal from Iraq: Congress was passing tough sanctions on Iran over the objections of the White House. In response, he wrote letters to Iran’s supreme leader offering an end to U.S.–Iranian hostilities and greater political and economic engagement. As the regime took Obama’s messaging as a green light to rapidly increase its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, even as America’s Sunni allies warned of a “Shiite crescent” that threatened their own stability, Obama did little to confront Tehran.

Yet Obama’s strategic priority in 2009 was not to cement a U.S. deal with Iran at any cost. It was to engage with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was seen as the commander of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. Obama characterized Erdogan as the type of moderate Muslim leader that could help him stabilize a turbulent Middle East. Turkey was a NATO member and major Middle Eastern military power. Engaging with Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood also meant taking out Egypt’s authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak, who had repressed the Brotherhood, and stood in the way of the Arab Spring.

It is possible from one angle to see Obama’s support for the Arab Spring as support for democracy in the Middle East. Yet as his decision to turn his back on the Iranian pro-democracy protesters suggests, Obama was hardly a supporter of regional democrats. Nor was he particularly interested in supporting Iraq’s struggling democracy, which he saw as a tar pit that would only prolong U.S. engagement in the region—which he strongly opposed. In place of U.S. engagement, Obama supported anti-Western, “one election” Islamists who, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Erdogan in Turkey, and Khamenei in Iran, used and abused democratic mechanisms to gain and keep power. His preference was not for democrats per se, but for anti-imperialists who overthrew or sought to overthrow autocratic U.S. allies.

Yet the Arab Spring turned out very differently than Obama expected. When the Arab Spring in Egypt led to the takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian military, backed by many secular Egyptians who had demonstrated against Mubarak, launched a coup to restore secular authoritarian rule. In Syria, a democratic uprising led to a brutal crackdown by Bashar Assad, with support from Iran-backed ground troops.

The failures of the Arab Spring meant the collapse of Obama’s vision for a Middle East led by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates. It was only after that vision collapsed that Obama sent his advisers Jake Sullivan and Bill Burns to Oman in 2013 to explore nuclear negotiations with the Iranians—in the hopes of finding another Middle Eastern power aside from Turkey that could “stabilize” the region in the wake of America’s withdrawal from Iraq.

Unsurprisingly, Iran often seemed to exist for Obama not as a threat to U.S. interests but as a historical victim of Western imperialism, which supposedly overthrew a “democratically elected” Iranian prime minister and installed the shah. Iran’s repressive theocratic regime seemed less notable for its blatant offenses against its own people, or its efforts to destabilize neighboring states, than for its role as the bête noire of warmongering neoconservatives in the United States, who supported a regional structure that put America on the side of troublemakers such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Faced with the choice between the Islamic Republic and its enemies, Obama found it surprisingly easy to take the side of the mullahs—putting himself and the United States crossways both to U.S. interests and the hopes and dreams of the Iranian people.

Obama’s big Iran play was neither ‘values-driven’ nor purely pragmatic.

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Obama’s big Iran play, which continues to shape U.S. regional policy to this day, was therefore neither “values-driven” nor purely pragmatic. His apparent goal was to extricate the United States from a cycle of endless conflict—one of whose primary causes, as he saw it, was Western imperialism. In doing so, Obama sought to be the first anti-imperialist American president since Dwight Eisenhower, who had backed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser against the British, French, and Israelis in the 1956 Suez war. (Eisenhower later admitted that backing Nasser and abandoning the United States’ traditional allies had been one of the biggest mistakes of his presidency.)

Yet the Iranians were not, in fact, powerful enough to play the “balancing” role Obama envisioned for them, as their failure to stabilize Syria proved. He therefore stood aside, willingly or not, as the Russians intervened on the Iranian side to bomb the Syrian resistance. For rescuing the Islamic Republic and its allies in Syria, Putin was allowed to invade Crimea and the Donbas with minimal opposition from the Obama administration.

Anti-imperialist narratives were clearly important to Obama, and make sense as products of his unique upbringing. The fact that they utterly failed to correspond to regional realities caused multiple problems on the ground in the Middle East. Obama’s policy of trying to put the United States on the side of his own preferred client states created a slaughter in Syria that in turn led to multiple other slaughters throughout the region. The rise of ISIS was fueled partly in response to vicious Iran-backed attacks against Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis. The shocking rise of the Islamic State required Obama to send U.S. troops into Syria and back into Iraq. It also emboldened Putin, who invaded Ukraine for the third time in 2022.

Obama’s ongoing and catastrophic policy failure, which has blocked the Biden administration from developing any kind of workable strategic vision for dealing with current realities in Iran and throughout the region, demonstrates that substituting American narratives about purity and guilt for hard-power realities is a dangerous business. Ideologically driven anti-Western narratives led the United States to place dangerous and wrongheaded bets on Sunni Islamists and Shiite theocrats at the expense of our own interests and friends. Poorly executed policy led to a fatally flawed nuclear agreement that continues to bedevil the Biden administration and America’s European and Middle Eastern allies. The JCPOA was a big mistake. The longer we refuse to admit that, the higher the price we will continue to pay.

Mark Dubowitz is the CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Tablet · by Mark Dubowitz · January 9, 2023

14. Where US troops are currently deployed in a new era of global conflict

Perhaps a useful reminder for those who do not follow the locations of US troops around the world.

Excerpts:

Coming soon: a military pivot to Asia?

The U.S. may have made China the centerpiece of its national security policy and increased the tempos of drills with allies in the region, but the numbers of troops at longtime U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea have stayed fairly static at around 61,000 and 28,000 respectively.

That may change. The Pentagon has recently announced plans to bolster the U.S. military presence in Australia, including air, sea and land forces, all with an eye on China.

The big picture

“The U.S. military’s role is multifaceted, globally. And it’s not always apparent why the U.S. has this number of troops in various place,” Michael Allen, a professor at Boise State University whose work tracks U.S. overseas deployments, told Grid. While the U.S. discloses the number of troops on what it calls “permanent deployments” overseas, reporting on those deployed into combat can be patchy. For much of the Trump administration, to take an extreme example, the U.S. did not even disclose the number of troops deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria.

Overall, the number of U.S. troops deployed overseas has declined steadily since the Cold War, with an uptick during the post-9/11 years. And no country today has anywhere near the level of American forces seen at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — when there were more than 168,000 and 110,000 troops deployed to those countries, respectively.

But it remains a fact that while the “Global War on Terrorism” may no longer be the defining feature of American military deployments, U.S. forces are currently stationed in (and in a few cases, actually fighting in) a remarkable number of countries with little public debate or awareness back home about what exactly they are doing.

Where US troops are currently deployed in a new era of global conflict

As 2023 begins, American troops are deployed on many missions that get little attention.

Joshua Keating

Global Security Reporter

January 9, 2023

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

On Sept. 11 of last year, the U.S. military passed a little-noticed milestone. For the 21 years before that date, virtually all U.S. service members were issued the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal. From now on, it’s being given only to troops who work directly on a counterterrorism operation for more than 30 days.

That may seem a minor distinction, but what it means is that it’s no longer assumed that any U.S. service member is working in support of a counterterrorism mission — an acknowledgment that with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, an era in U.S. defense policy has come to an end. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT, as it was once officially known) is not a thing of the past, but it’s fair to say it’s not the all-consuming priority it was in the two decades that followed the 9/11 attacks.

But of course that doesn’t mean the world is now at peace — or that the U.S. military has pulled back from the global stage. As 2023 begins, there are hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces deployed around the world.

Six months after the last American troops left Afghanistan, the Russian military invaded Ukraine. While U.S. troops weren’t sent into combat as a result, the invasion did prompt an unprecedented military assistance effort that has included the deployment of tens of thousands of additional troops to Europe to shore up NATO’s eastern flank. Meanwhile, U.S. tensions with China, which the Biden administration describes in its national security strategy as “the only competitor with … the intent to reshape the international order,” are also prompting a redistribution of U.S. resources, including troop deployments.

And beyond these high-profile security concerns, there are U.S. troops deployed from Niger to Djibouti to the Philippines, and dozens of other missions that have merited little or no debate in Congress or coverage in the media.

What are those troops doing in all these different parts of the world? The answers help paint a picture of the U.S. global military posture, nearly a quarter-century after the 9/11 attacks.

Remnants of the war on terrorism

After the withdrawal of the last troops from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden assured the country that the global fight against terrorist groups would continue.

“We have what’s called over-the-horizon capabilities, which means we can strike terrorists and targets without American boots on the ground — or very few, if needed,” he said.

Almost a year and a half later, we’re starting to get a better idea of what this “over the horizon” counterterrorism war looks like. In some places, it does indeed involve “boots on the ground,” though in far fewer numbers than were seen in the peak years of the Global War on Terrorism.

The U.S. still has some 900 troops in Syria, where they continue to conduct operations targeting the Islamic State (ISIS) in cooperation with Kurdish forces who control much of the northeast of the country. This has been a huge irritant to NATO ally Turkey, which considers those Kurdish forces a terrorist group and has launched repeated military incursions targeting their positions in Syria.

Though the U.S. combat mission in Iraq formally ended in 2021, some 2,500 U.S. troops remain in the country, and U.S. commanders don’t expect that to change for the foreseeable future. Though the troops are there on what the military calls an “advise and assist” mission to help the Iraqi forces fighting ISIS and haven’t led combat operations in years, these American troops and those based in Syria have been frequently targeted by Iran-backed militia groups.

Shortly after taking office, Biden announced an end to U.S. support for the controversial Saudi-led war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. But the White House said a “small number” of troops are still deployed in Yemen to conduct operations targeting ISIS and the group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. According to data from New America, it’s been over a year since these forces carried out a publicly reported drone strike or ground operation.

According to a letter last month from the president to Congress detailing troop deployments around the world, as required by the Vietnam-era War Powers Resolution, 2,755 troops are also deployed to Saudi Arabia to “protect United States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran and Iran-backed groups.” U.S. troops are also providing “military advice and limited information” to the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, which the White House stresses is a “noncombat” role.

Since the 2021 pullout and Taliban takeover, no U.S. troops have been based in Afghanistan, but according to the White House, American forces “remain postured outside Afghanistan to address threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests that may arise.” These operations included the drone strike last August that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

One other often forgotten remnant of the post-9/11 era: Around 1,800 U.S. troops continue to operate the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba — now for just 35 remaining detainees.

“I think the picture is largely one of continuity in many respects,” Brian Finucane, a former State Department legal adviser on military issues, now with Crisis Group, told Grid. “You see a lower operation tempo, what you might call GWOT-lite, but continuity in terms of deployments or even some increases in places in Africa.”

Africa: the war’s new frontier

In addition to the missions listed above, U.S. troops are working in a “train and assist” capacity for counterterrorism operations in countries including the Philippines, Lebanon and Jordan. But increasingly, the focus has shifted to Africa.

In May 2022, Biden signed an order to redeploy roughly 500 U.S. troops to Somalia, reversing Donald Trump’s 2020 decision to remove troops from the country. Somalia has been the most active counterterrorism battlefield of the Biden era, according to New America’s tracking data, with 16 drone strikes targeting the militant group al-Shabaab in 2022. U.S. troops are also deployed to neighboring Kenya and Djibouti to support the operations in Somalia.

Meanwhile, according to the White House War Powers notification, U.S. military personnel are deployed to several countries in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel region, in Western Africa, to “conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations” to assist counterterrorism operations by local and European militaries. These include 1,001 U.S. troops in Niger, an increase from around 773 when the last report was issued in June. The U.S. operates a drone base in Niger and has increased its cooperation in recent years with the government of what is, by some measures, the world’s poorest country. The U.S. deployment to the country made headlines in 2017, when a joint patrol was ambushed by a local ISIS affiliate, killing four U.S. and four Nigerien troops.

The incident sparked a brief debate over a deployment that most Americans knew nothing about. Even Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a prominent national security hawk who sits on the Armed Services Committee, admitted that he “didn’t know there was a thousand troops in Niger.” Five years later, those troops remain. While the U.S. government has provided few details about current U.S. deployments in other countries in this region, there have been recent American military operations in Cameroon, Chad, Mali and northern Nigeria as well.

All these deployments raise separate questions about the nature of the various missions. For one thing, it’s not clear that local terrorist groups in these countries pose any risk to the U.S. — and therefore whether these missions are in the U.S. national interest. The argument for these missions is that these groups are tied to global networks like ISIS and al-Qaeda and could metastasize into global threats. For now, the U.S. troops have not generally been in direct combat with these groups, except for those instances when the Americans themselves come under attack.

But it’s also the case that in countries such as Somalia, ostensibly “noncombat missions” have morphed into something more ambitious. As one U.S. official put it, discussing the drone base in Niger, so far used just for reconnaissance purposes, “once you have the facility, you want to use it or the host government wants you to use the capabilities on their behalf.”

These aren’t the only concerns. In Burkina Faso and Mali, U.S.-trained officers have been involved in military coups in recent years. In Nigeria, they’ve been accused of serious human rights abuses.

Europe: the new threat

The U.S. has had a large, though steadily declining, troop presence in Europe for decades. Biden took some steps to slow that decline shortly after taking office, halting a Trump order to reduce troop levels in Germany. Then came the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The U.S. has sent some 20,000 additional troops to Europe since then as part of an effort to bolster NATO’s defenses, assist Ukraine’s war efforts and deter Russia from further aggression. This includes additional deployments to Poland, the Baltic countries and to Romania, where the Army’s 101st Airborne Division is conducting exercises just miles from the Ukrainian border in its first European deployment since World War II.

Despite these increases, the total number of U.S. troops in Europe, around 100,000, is back to only about where it was before cuts made during the Obama administration, and far from Cold War levels, which peaked at 430,000 troops in the late 1950s.

Coming soon: a military pivot to Asia?

The U.S. may have made China the centerpiece of its national security policy and increased the tempos of drills with allies in the region, but the numbers of troops at longtime U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea have stayed fairly static at around 61,000 and 28,000 respectively.

That may change. The Pentagon has recently announced plans to bolster the U.S. military presence in Australia, including air, sea and land forces, all with an eye on China.

The big picture

“The U.S. military’s role is multifaceted, globally. And it’s not always apparent why the U.S. has this number of troops in various place,” Michael Allen, a professor at Boise State University whose work tracks U.S. overseas deployments, told Grid. While the U.S. discloses the number of troops on what it calls “permanent deployments” overseas, reporting on those deployed into combat can be patchy. For much of the Trump administration, to take an extreme example, the U.S. did not even disclose the number of troops deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria.

Overall, the number of U.S. troops deployed overseas has declined steadily since the Cold War, with an uptick during the post-9/11 years. And no country today has anywhere near the level of American forces seen at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — when there were more than 168,000 and 110,000 troops deployed to those countries, respectively.

But it remains a fact that while the “Global War on Terrorism” may no longer be the defining feature of American military deployments, U.S. forces are currently stationed in (and in a few cases, actually fighting in) a remarkable number of countries with little public debate or awareness back home about what exactly they are doing.

Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

15. How AI Could Predict The Damage to Ukraine from Russian Missiles

The "magic" of AI (we hope)?

How AI Could Predict The Damage to Ukraine from Russian Missiles

By training a machine-learning model on battle-damage imagery, one company aims to help understand where attacks are happening and assess damage more quickly and accurately.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

A Silicon Valley company is using artificial intelligence to help Ukraine better predict and prepare for Russian airstrikes like the ones that have knocked out power to thousands of Ukranian families.

Starting last March, Scale AI began to collect imagery of places in the war-torn country where there might be heavy military activity, said Shands Pickett, the company’s head of federal deployments.

“We started buying images of three primary areas"—Kyiv, Kharkov, and Dnipro—"and then essentially doing change over time…We're looking at around 2,000 square kilometers of Ukraine, and about 370,000 structures, and looking to see where damage was occurring. And then using [machine-learning] first techniques to automate that process,” Pickett said.

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military launched an AI pilot program, Project Maven, to make sense of the vast amount of drone footage it was collecting, to help human analysts more quickly find potential targets. But while Ukraine is a bit smaller than Afghanistan, far more data is coming out of the war there.

“If you think about that amount of geography and that number of structures, you really have to have machines to do that for you,” Pickett said.

Rather than help analysts hunt for targets, Scale AI sought to help the Ukrainians understand where attacks were happening and assess damage more quickly and accurately than human reporting would allow.

“If you look at just from an overhead image and the change in a building footprint—and it can just be a small change,” you can see “if there's an impact from some sort of munition. But doing that over a city center and an urbanized area…doing that is super difficult, right. And this damage, the scale of the damage was just so incredible,” Pickett said.

Scale AI has donated the datasets to the Ukrainian military, he said, and he believes they are using them for real-time damage assessments, as they’ve been downloaded some 200,000 times.

But the real value of this sort of application will come later, with much more and much higher-resolution image data. The potential is there to predict what sorts of targets will receive what type of damage based on the patterns that are already emerging from the conflict.

“There is a lot of demand for that type of thing,” Pickett said. “I mean, you can look at, you know, patterns of damage over time and assess what weapons systems are used, what the likelihood would be of a certain level of damage, if that same weapon systems are used in another area, you know, all those things are absolutely possible. That's the kind of analysis we're trying to enable.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

16. US-led group of countries aiding Ukraine will convene again at Ramstein

US-led group of countries aiding Ukraine will convene again at Ramstein

Stars and Stripes · by Jennifer H. Svan · January 9, 2023

From right, U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin; and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov give opening remarks to reporters in September at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. The base will host its third Ukraine Defense Contact Group later this month, according to U.S. military and German defense officials. (Alexander Riedel/Stars and Stripes)

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KAISERSLAUTERN, Germany — Ramstein Air Base will host its third meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group later this month, according to U.S. and German officials.

Headed by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, the group of leaders from dozens of nations has convened eight times at various locations and virtually since late February, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht first announced the Jan. 20 meeting at Ramstein following a phone conference with Austin on Friday.

A spokesman for U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa confirmed the meeting details Monday but declined to say how many countries will be part of the next contact group session.

The Russia-Ukraine war has been raging for more than 300 days, with no end in sight. Discussions at meetings of the group are focused on how to enhance the military capabilities of Ukrainian forces.

Germany’s defense ministry said Friday that Lambrecht and Austin discussed the delivery of armored personnel carriers and Patriot air defense systems.

Germany has pledged to provide Ukraine with up to 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles from industry and German military stocks, Lambrecht said.

In addition, Germany will deliver a Patriot fire unit with ammunition to help Ukraine defend against the recent barrage of Russian airstrikes targeting cities, she said.

The next contact group meeting comes on the heels of the White House announcement Friday of $3 billion in weapons and other aid, the largest package of U.S. military assistance for Ukraine to date.

Some American and European leaders have expressed concern that U.S. support for Ukraine may be reduced now that the Republicans control the House of Representatives.

A handful of GOP lawmakers have questioned support for Ukraine amid domestic problems, such as inflation and illegal immigration.

Jennifer H. Svan

Jennifer reports on the U.S. military from Kaiserslautern, Germany, where she writes about the Air Force, Army and DODEA schools. She’s had previous assignments for Stars and Stripes in Japan, reporting from Yokota and Misawa air bases. Before Stripes, she worked for daily newspapers in Wyoming and Colorado. She’s a graduate of the College of William and Mary in Virginia.

Stars and Stripes · by Jennifer H. Svan · January 9, 2023

17. Without Hesitation, Ukraine Goes Toe to Toe With Russia in Bakhmut

But it is still a long war. Ukraine may be able to win a war of exhaustion but perhaps not a war of attrition. Or perhaps they can, given Russia's ineptness and dwindling pool of soldiers.

(Unlike a war of attrition, where the objective is to defeat the enemy, the objective in a war of exhaustion is to defeat a nation's will to fight.)

Without Hesitation, Ukraine Goes Toe to Toe With Russia in Bakhmut

Earlier in the war, Ukraine’s leadership was more equivocal about pitched battles with high casualties. There’s no second-guessing this time. Some analysts say it makes sense strategically.

nytimes.com · by Andrew E. Kramer Nicole Tung · January 9, 2023

Ukrainian military analysts on Friday near Bakhmut, in the country’s east, reviewing videos obtained by drone operators.

BAKHMUT, Ukraine — It was midmorning last Friday when the camera of a Ukrainian drone zoomed in on a Russian soldier moving furtively among trees on the edge of town. Another enemy assault was underway in the eastern city of Bakhmut.

The drone pilot marked coordinates as he watched, then sent them by satellite link to artillery commanders.

Within a few minutes, Ukrainian artillery units struck the houses where they had seen the Russians taking cover. Smoke from the hits could be seen rising silently on the drone operator’s screen.

Later that day, however, an armored vehicle rumbled out of an eastern neighborhood carrying wounded Ukrainian soldiers toward a stabilization point in the city’s west. Ukraine’s army was taking its hits, too.

It’s a grim stalemate that has taken on the rhythms of a heavyweight title bout, with each side going toe to toe in one of the longest-running battles of the war. That stands in contrast to Ukraine’s strategy elsewhere along the front line, where it succeeded by avoiding direct confrontations, relying instead on nimble maneuvers, deception and Western-provided long-range weapons to force Russian retreats.

In an earlier phase of the war, Ukraine’s leadership had been more equivocal about pitched battles like Bakhmut. President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a rare moment of public self-doubt, mulled then whether the deaths of about 100 Ukrainian soldiers per day in Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk were worth the fight for two already ruined cities.

But this time, there has been no second-guessing. And new research suggests the lethal urban combat last summer was not as senseless as it might have seemed at the time.

An analysis by two leading military analysts published last month by the Foreign Policy Research Institute vindicated the attritional fighting. The pitched battle weakened the Russian Army enough for two Ukrainian counterattacks in the fall to succeed, wrote the analysts, Rob Lee and Michael Kofman. Those offensives, in the Kharkiv region in the north and Kherson in the south, delivered two of the most embarrassing defeats of the war to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.

Battling for Bakhmut: Ukraine and Russia are going toe to toe in the key eastern city. That stands in contrast to Ukraine’s strategy elsewhere along the front line, where it succeeded by avoiding direct confrontations.
New Equipment: The Western allies’ provision to Ukraine of infantry fighting vehicles signals their support for new offensives in coming months.
Sexual Crimes: After months of bureaucratic and political delays, Ukrainian officials are gathering pace in documenting sexual crimes committed by Russian forces during the war.
Adapting to Survive: The war has taken a severe toll on Ukraine’s economy. But it has also pushed Ukrainians to restructure parts of the economy at lightning speed.

“The amount of ammunition Russia expended and the casualties they took set up the Russian Army for failure,” Mr. Lee said in an interview.

Whether Bakhmut winds up playing a similar role ahead of expected spring offensives by Ukraine depends on many variables, he said, including how many soldiers Russia can field after a mobilization this past fall.

Fierce fighting continued to rage on Monday along the front line that extends from Bakhmut northeast toward the city of Soledar, with the Russians claiming to have taken a nearby village and Ukraine saying that it had repelled Russian attempts to storm Soledar itself.

Ukraine’s deputy defense minister, Hanna Maliar, said in a post on Telegram that after an unsuccessful attempt to capture Soledar and subsequent retreat, the enemy regrouped “and launched a powerful assault.” Ukrainian forces were “bravely defending every inch,” she wrote.

Bakhmut’s strategic value is debatable, but it carries symbolic importance for both sides. For Russia, capturing it would be the most significant success in months. In Ukraine, the long battle and heavy losses have turned Bakhmut into a national symbol of defiance. Mr. Zelensky cited the city in a high-profile appearance before the U.S. Congress last month, and presented House Speaker Nancy Pelosi with a Ukrainian flag signed by soldiers fighting in Bakhmut.

(The imperative to “Hold Bakhmut,” as Ukrainians say, nevertheless carries some risks, analysts warn, saying that it could cloud military judgment and potentially delay a retreat if one becomes necessary).

Viewed from the sky, on the monitor of a drone pilot, Bakhmut slides silently by in sepia hues of brown mud roads, gray rubble of homes and white smoke rising from fires. The stalemate has transformed a swath of ruins and mangled, muddy fields on the city’s eastern rim into scenes reminiscent of World War I: Shell craters are ubiquitous, and the abandoned bodies of Russian soldiers lie about, with Ukrainian troops often complaining of the stink.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

“It’s a place like Verdun in the First World War, where each side is trying to bleed out the other,” Lt. Gen. Frederick B. Hodges, the former American commanding general in Europe, said of the battle of Bakhmut, now in its sixth month.

A drone overflight of the wasteland on Thursday recorded a typical scene: two Russian bodies lying on the battlefield beside an artillery crater. “It looks like apocalypse,” Pvt. Oleksiy Kondakov, a Ukrainian soldier who rotated out of Bakhmut last month, said of the area.

Inside the city, few civilians remain, most on the less heavily damaged western bank of the small river that divides Bakhmut, the Bakhmutovka. The eastern neighborhoods are panoramas of collapsed and burned houses.

Soldiers settle into a familiar routine. Last Friday, a team of Ukrainians careened down a muddy street in a sport utility vehicle, wheeled into a courtyard and piled out, standing next to a wall with rifles ready, just as they do most days.

Inside the relative safety of a ruined building, one soldier set about unspooling cable for a satellite link. Another unpacked a drone. They exchanged pleasantries with another unit that happened to be using the same devastated building that day, sharing tea with them and ignoring the booms and rattle of gunfire outside.

In czarist times, the city was a trading hub in eastern Ukraine and a center of salt mining. The Soviet authorities renamed it Artyomovsk, after a Bolshevik who helped quash a short-lived Ukrainian independent republic in the early 1920s. Before Russia’s invasion, it was home to red brick merchant houses and universities, nestled between rolling, grassy hills in the eastern Donbas region.

Today, about 7,000 people remain of the city’s prewar population of about 100,000, according to Tetiana Scherbak, a director of a volunteer soup kitchen on the western bank, where a few dozen civilians huddled around a wood stove on Friday, warming their hands and charging phones from a generator.

In the central square, heedless of the explosions, on some days a drunken woman spirals and dances, arms out like a child mimicking the flight of an airplane. She is a character known to the locals who have remained.

“Everybody suffers” in her own way, said Svitlana Shpachenko, 54, a former accountant warming up at the soup kitchen.

The battle in Bakhmut has been fought in two phases: for the first 100 days or so the Russian regular army was involved, and from then on a private military contracting company, the Wagner Group, which has recruited prisoners into its ranks.

The second phase has been the bloodier one, as the Russians have assaulted the city using brigades made up of the convicts. The company’s owner, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, who is a close associate of President Vladimir V. Putin and is seen as wanting a victory in Bakhmut to boost his political standing back in Russia, tested new tactics.

Many of these units were essentially throwaway soldiers; Ukrainian soldiers have called them human wave assaults.

“Essentially they take the brunt of whatever Ukrainian response there is,” said the senior American military official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss operational details. “Then you have better trained forces that move behind them to claim the ground that these individuals have walked over.”

Serhiy Hrabsky, a former Ukrainian colonel and commentator for the Ukrainian news media, called the fighting around Bakhmut “a completely different nature” of war. Ukraine persists in the city’s defense, he said, in part because “their losses are important for us.”

The attack on Friday was a case in point.

The Russians were moving forward from the forest into the town on foot, with no armored vehicles to be seen by the drone flying overhead. On the screen, the readings of altitude and range ticked up and down.

“Without eyes, we lose people,” said the drone pilot, who asked to be identified by his nickname, Navara, in keeping with Ukrainian military policy. “And we cannot lose people. We have fewer anyway.”

Navara asked not to reveal precise locations but said it could generally be said of the Russians moving into town that “the bastards are about 800 meters that way,” pointing a finger out the broken window of the building.

Not long afterward, Ukrainian artillery hit the Russians as they took cover in an area of deserted and mostly destroyed one- and two-story homes. In the streets of the neighborhood, a firefight was picking up, and the clatter of machine guns echoed about.

After a few flights, the drone team drove out by another road, avoiding the street fighting.

Private Andriy Pancheko, a member of the drone team, had been working as an electrician in Poland before the invasion but returned and volunteered in the army. Broadly, he said, Ukrainians were defending their country because “if we don’t fight, we won’t have freedom.”

The purpose of holding out specifically in the ruins of eastern Bakhmut was less clear, he admitted. “I don’t know, I just take orders,” he said. “They commanded me to be here. But why not? It’s our land.”

Evelina Riabenko contributed reporting from Kramatorsk, Ukraine, and Eric Schmitt from Washington, D.C.

nytimes.com · by Andrew E. Kramer Nicole Tung · January 9, 2023

18. Pentagon prepares for series of GOP-led investigations

Pentagon prepares for series of GOP-led investigations | CNN Politics

CNN · by Haley Britzky,Oren Liebermann · January 9, 2023

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley speak to members of the press after a virtual Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at the Pentagon on November 16, 2022.

Alex Wong/Getty Images

CNN —

Pentagon officials have held multiple high-level meetings in recent months in preparation for a barrage of Republican-led House investigations into issues varying from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan to what conservative lawmakers have deemed “woke” military policies, according to a senior defense official.

House Republicans have long signaled their intent to launch a series of probes if and when they gained the majority. Some of those priorities were flagged by Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee in November last year, when they released a 1,000 page report on what they said was the politicization of the Justice Department and FBI, complete with dozens of letters sent to various government officials – current and former – detailing inquiries about various DOJ and FBI investigations.

After finally winning a protracted battle to be named House speaker in the early hours of Saturday, Rep. Kevin McCarthy suggested the Pentagon would come under scrutiny.

“We will hold the swamp accountable, from the withdrawal of Afghanistan, to the origins of covid and to the weaponization of the FBI,” McCarthy said.

Pentagon leaders are well aware that the investigations could begin soon after House members are sworn in.

Asked about the potential probes on Thursday, Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder said that the Defense Department “respects Congress’s important oversight role and as always will continue to work closely with Congress and respond appropriately to legitimate congressional inquiries.”

The Afghanistan withdrawal

The Biden administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been a top investigative target for Republicans since its chaotic conclusion in August 2021, underscored by the killing of 13 US service members at Kabul’s international airport in the closing days of America’s longest war.

A series of key decisions including the early closure of Bagram Air Base, a perceived lack of security at Hamid Karzai International Airport, the evacuation of the US embassy in Kabul, relations with the Taliban – will likely be examined in an investigation that goes beyond the Defense Department to the State Department and the White House.

Texas Republican Rep. Michael McCaul, who is slated to take over as the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, told CNN on Thursday that the Republican majority will “continue to demand answers to why the withdrawal from Afghanistan was such a disaster.”

“The American people deserve transparency from this administration,” McCaul said, “especially when it comes to national security, and we will work to deliver that to them.”

Led by McCaul, Republicans on the committee prepared their own investigation into the withdrawal, released one year after the fall of Kabul. The report, which has yet to be released in its entirety, alleges a severe shortage of State Department personnel at the Kabul airport to process Afghan evacuees.

But the Defense Department has faced questions about Afghanistan already, albeit from a friendly Democratic House that faced criticism for not digging deep enough. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley have testified to Congress about the withdrawal, as has former commander of Central Command, Gen. Frank McKenzie, who openly said that he opposed a complete withdrawal.

Now it will be re-litigated by more hostile GOP-led House committees.

The White House is likely to stick to its position that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was the only feasible option after the Trump administration signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban a year earlier. Administration members maintain that if the US had stayed longer it would have violated the agreement and would have invited attacks from a resurgent Taliban and other militant organizations.

Republicans may also investigate the effectiveness of the military’s so-called over-the-horizon options in Afghanistan, which officials promised would be a way of tracking and, if necessary, striking terrorist organizations.

FBI Director Christopher Wray said this summer that he was “worried about the potential loss of sources and collection over there.” Some intelligence officials have derided the over-the-horizon strategy as “over-the-rainbow.”

The Biden administration can point to the precision strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in downtown Kabul in August as proof of the viability of the over-the-horizon strategy. But tracking one high-value target is far different than tracking the growth of al-Qaeda throughout the country, and the Republicans may seize on that gap.

‘Woke’ military

Republicans have promised to focus on so-called “woke” initiatives and policies in the military, to include diversity and inclusion efforts and service academy literature and discussions.

The military has at times struggled to find its footing in how best to confront complaints over “wokeness”, as the institution attempts to stay out of politics. That was put on display in October when Army Secretary Christine Wormuth addressed the complaints at the annual Association of the US Army meeting in Washington, DC, saying that the Army had to stay “out of the culture wars” because “we have got to be able to have a broad appeal.”

“When only 9% of kids are interested in serving, we have got to make sure that we are careful about not alienating wide swaths of the American public to the Army,” Wormuth said.

But staying out of the conversation has become increasingly difficult as lawmakers and media pundits alike have pushed officials to respond.

Republican lawmakers have grilled defense officials including Austin and Milley on policies on diversity and inclusion, saying they are negatively impacting retention and recruitment and interfering with the military’s focus on the defense of the nation. Pentagon leaders have rejected that argument as a distraction from the military’s primary function, however, and have not cited “wokeness” as one of the main challenges to recruiting.

Wormuth and Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, for example, said in a July memo last year that the recruiting shortage – most severe for the Army – was due to a declining number of young Americans who are qualified to serve, Covid-19-related education restraints, and a lack of trust in American institutions.

And in March 2021, Fox News’ Tucker Carlson was rebuked by military officials after mocking women in uniform during his show. Carlson complained that new uniforms meant to fit women properly and updated hair standards made “a mockery of the US military.” Service leaders and Pentagon officials alike pushed back on the rhetoric, pointing instead to honorable service of women around the military.

“They are beacons of freedom and they prove Carlson wrong through determination and dedication,” tweeted Gen. Paul Funk, head of the Army Training and Doctrine Command. “We are fortunate they serve with us.”

The tension over the topic of wokeness in the military resulted in a heated exchange between Milley and Republican lawmakers in 2021, after he was questioned about “critical race theory.” Milley said it was “offensive that we are accusing the United States military, our general officers, our non-commissioned officers of being ‘woke’ or something else because we’re studying some theories that are out there.”

Milley discussed his frustrations with lawmakers’ politicization of the military while being interviewed by the House January 6 Committee. According to the transcript of his interview, Milley acknowledged that he has “become a lightning rod for the politicization of the military,” along with several other senior military officials.

“Some of it is comments that I made in testimony about critical race theory and white rage. You know, so 90 seconds with Congressmen Gaetz and Waltz result in, you know, four, five, six months of this constant drumbeat that is very damaging, in my view, personally, to the health of the Republic, because there is a deliberate attempt, in my view, to smear the general officer corps and the leaders of the military and to politicize the military, for whatever reasons that they think that that’s valuable.”

Republican Rep. Michael Waltz, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told Politico in November that the Biden administration is pushing a “progressive, socially-driven agenda that is being forced on the military” and that lawmakers will “provide oversight” and “legislate it.”

And just two months earlier, Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin, ranking member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, said in a statement that Republicans would “expose” diversity and inclusion ideology at the military service academies.

“I guarantee you,” Gallagher said, “when Congress is controlled by Republicans, as it will be in the new year, we’re going to push back on this and expose this ideology for the distraction from war fighting that it is.”

Oversight of Ukraine aid

Republicans have promised a harder line on US aid to Ukraine, questioning the large amount and the ability of the administration to effectively oversee the massive quantities of weapons and equipment flowing to Kyiv. Since the start of the war, the administration has given more than $24 billion in aid to Ukraine, including the largest ever package of $2.85 billion announced Friday.

In October, before it was clear Republicans had taken control of the House, Rep. Kevin McCarthy vowed there would be no “blank check” for Ukraine. Last month, McCaul, who supports ongoing weapons shipments and aid to Ukraine, said there was still a need for “oversight and accountability.”

But some House Republicans have taken a far harder line on Ukraine, vowing to oppose the high-value weapons packages the Biden administration has been sending.

The Defense Department has a small group of personnel in Kyiv under who carry out inspections of weapons and equipment provided to Ukraine. Though the team cannot visit the volatile front lines, the Pentagon says it has seen no indication that US weapons have been siphoned away from Ukrainian forces and ended up on the black market or elsewhere.

“We have no indication that there has been any type of illicit spread,” said Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder in November.

The $40 billion Ukraine aid package passed in May also contained requirements for oversight of weapons shipments, including from the DoD Inspector General. The package also requires periodic reports from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to the oversight committees. Last month, the omnibus spending bill dedicated $6 million for oversight and inspections.

The larger and more expensive systems, such as the HIMARS rocket launchers, are easier to track on the battlefield. All of them remain in service and accounted for, according to a defense official. More difficult to track are the lower-cost, high-volume items the US has sent, such as small arms and ammunition or thousands of Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles.

The Covid-19 vaccine mandate

While lawmakers at times included the military’s Covid-19 vaccine mandate in their criticisms of “woke” initiatives and policies, the fight over that particular complaint appears settled as the requirement was repealed in the new National Defense Authorization Act.

Republicans have said that the vaccine mandate had a negative impact on recruitment, which was a significant challenge for the services last year. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger also said in December that there are “still myths and misbeliefs about the backstory” of the vaccine, which was impacting recruitment in “parts of the country.”

However, a Marine Corps spokesman later clarified that Berger was not referencing specific data, and Austin said at a press conference that he has not “seen any hard data that directly links the Covid mandate to an effort on our recruiting.”

It’s unclear what lawmakers would investigate in regards to the mandate, though Indiana Republican Rep. Jim Banks, chairman of the Republican Study Committee, told Military.com last year that “[cleaning] up the mess the administration has made with the excessive and dangerous Covid mandates on our troops” would be one of Republicans’ “very top priorities.”

CNN · by Haley Britzky,Oren Liebermann · January 9, 2023

19. The tragic downward spiral of a special operations pilot

The tragic downward spiral of a special operations pilot

A family is broken after an Air Force special operations pilot’s years of misconduct and mental health challenges culminated in alleged domestic violence. What could have been done?

BY HALEY BRITZKY | PUBLISHED JAN 9, 2023 2:34 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Haley Britzky · January 9, 2023

On Nov. 25, 2021, Air Force special operations pilot Capt. Matt Jacobs and his wife Stephanie engaged in an intense argument at their home in Florida.

Like many married couples, they argued about “issues they have had in the past,” according to a police report about the incident. After the disagreement escalated, he grabbed a rope from Stephanie’s medical bag, and “stated he was done” as he walked out. Before Stephanie could stop him, Matt pulled out of their driveway in his Toyota Prius. It wasn’t the first time he’d abruptly left home after getting into an argument, but this time was different.

Stephanie called the police.

“I viewed [his] movement history off her phone, I witnessed what appeared to be [Matt] going to a liquor store, the Navarre beach fishing pier, and other locations heading west on Highway 98,” the responding officer wrote in the police report. The officer sent out a BOLO, alerting officers in the area to be on the lookout for Matt’s vehicle, “for a welfare check.”

Other officers checked locations near where they’d seen Matt show up on Stephanie’s phone’s GPS tracking. The search came up empty. The officer eventually made contact again with Stephanie, who told them that Matt “sent out a mass amount of texts to individuals saying he was sorry,” according to the report. She gave the officer his phone number and carrier, and after several more attempts, the officers found him.

An employee at a local hospital told one officer they found him outside the facility in his car, “heavily intoxicated with a noose tied around his neck,” though the noose wasn’t tied to anything. A doctor admitted him to the hospital under the Baker Act, which provides “emergency mental health services and temporary detention” for someone who is “unable to determine their needs,” according to University of Florida Health.

Matt is just one of the many active duty service members who suffer from mental health issues, make threats of suicide, and even engage in domestic violence. It wasn’t the first time Matt had been admitted to a hospital under the Baker Act. And it was far from the last of the couple’s problems. He was in a downward spiral, and to this day, questions remain. What could have been done to help him — and his family?

Matt is a pilot assigned to the 1st Special Operations Air Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida, according to his command’s public affairs office. He is currently facing at least one charge in civilian court for allegedly violating a protective order his wife filed against him. The order resulted from an alleged domestic violence incident in July 2022, for which Matt was arrested but the charges ultimately dropped, which followed several other instances of documented misconduct over the years which he admitted to in January.

But it also follows significant mental health diagnoses, of which it’s unclear what the Air Force has done to help address or treat over the years.

The reporting in this story is based on public court records, official military documents, hospital records, and interviews. Task & Purpose is using pseudonyms to refer to Matt and Stephanie to protect private health information and Stephanie’s privacy as an alleged victim of domestic violence. Matt did not respond to repeated requests for comment, and his civilian attorney declined to comment. The Air Force has declined to comment on the specifics of this case, providing only general information about mental health support available to airmen and a rebuke of domestic violence in the ranks.

A spokesman for Matt’s command said they are waiting for the civilian court process to finish before they decide to take any action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But Stephanie claimed his chain of command repeatedly failed to intervene and get him help and has not sufficiently supported her after various incidents between them.

She recalled one moment in 2022 when she was working with Matt’s care coordinator after his arrest this July. They were meeting so Stephanie could pass over some of Matt’s belongings as he was moving into a new home.

“She looks at me, and she’s like, ‘Are you trying to destroy him?’” Stephanie recalled. “Like, I’m sorry? He put his hands on me. After months and months and months of stuff, and she asks if I am trying to destroy him? No, I’ve been begging you guys to get him help.”

A U.S. Air Force 16th Special Operations Squadron AC-130J Ghostrider arrives at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, April 18, 2022. (Airman 1st Class Cassidy Thomas/U.S. Air Force)

Aside from concerns over his mental health, Matt has admitted to multiple instances of misconduct, including fraternization and affairs with at least one enlisted service member and abusing drugs on deployment. He also received non-judicial punishment in 2020 after going absent without leave (AWOL) and breaking the Air Force’s restriction of movement order during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to a base newsletter, Matt received non-judicial punishment; the same newsletter said an enlisted service member who also broke the restriction of movement order was suspended and knocked down a rank.

In an email on Nov. 4, 2020, Matt sent the newsletter to Stephanie: “Look,” he said, “I made the ‘news.’”

The official documents obtained by Task & Purpose paint a full picture of an officer’s career littered with slip-ups and more serious instances of misconduct, along with clear mental health concerns that appear to have been overlooked or insufficiently addressed by unit leaders. It’s unclear how much the Air Force was aware of until he laid his career bare in an official statement to the Air Force in January 2022.

Much of the misconduct appeared to happen while he was assigned to the 16th Special Operations Squadron at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, from 2016 to 2021. Capt. Amy Rasmussen, a spokeswoman for the base, told Task & Purpose she was unable to say what his leaders at the time were aware of, adding that the 27th Special Operations Wing “is committed to ensuring that its Airmen have access to mental health care and support” and that “any reported incidents of misconduct are thoroughly investigated.” Matt’s former squadron commander at Cannon AFB, Lt. Col. Michael Murphy, declined to comment, referring Task & Purpose back to the Air Force’s response and adding that there are “always three sides to every story.”

Don Christensen, the former chief prosecutor for the Air Force and president of Protect Our Defenders, told Task & Purpose that looking at all of the incidents together, it doesn’t make sense that Matt is still on active duty. Even if the Air Force intended to help him with continued care, Christensen said, it’s possible to receive that out of uniform instead of staying on the Air Force’s payroll.

Matt is a trained AC-130 pilot who graduated from the Air Force Academy in 2011. At the time of a mental health evaluation report in April 2022, he was working as a senior duty officer for the 1st Special Operations Air Squadron; the report said Matt was pending “separation per command,” and had come in for an evaluation of his own accord, wanting to “know what is wrong with me.”

But according to other official documents, Matt’s mental health struggles began long before then.

In an official statement on Jan. 10, Matt said he’d been on a “downward spiral for quite some time” since he deployed in 2014. He admitted to “destructive” and “illegal behaviors,” including “excessively” using alcohol to cope and abusing “prescription Ambien both home-station and deployed.” He wrote that he engaged in “multiple affairs … including an affair with an enlisted member in 2017-2018.”

And according to official records viewed by Task & Purpose, Matt was hospitalized twice for suicidal ideations in 2021. He was discharged from the last visit in January 2022 with diagnoses of alcohol use disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, personality disorder with primarily narcissistic traits, partner relational issues, and a “recurrent, severe” major depressive disorder.

It’s unclear how much Matt’s commanders were aware of, though Brandi Hoff, an Air Force veteran and the former director of the True North program at Minot Air Force Base, told Task & Purpose that when it comes to pilots, commanders are often willing to overlook a lot to keep them operational.

In January 2019, for example, official records say Matt was diagnosed with PTSD and following treatment was “successfully terminated from mental health treatment” that May. He was found ready to deploy in January 2020, the record says, and “deemed WWQ [world-wide qualified] and cleared for deployment from a mental health perspective.”

With PTSD alone, Hoff said airmen can be deemed deployable “if you’ve acquired the coping skills.” But she also raised questions over how legitimate that was, given the other mental health issues he was later diagnosed with.

“I would question when they returned him back with no clinical signs — did he actually not have clinical signs? Or did they overlook it, or dismiss it, because they had to get him back?” Hoff asked. “They have a lot of commander pressure, too. And the commander from his unit will pressure the commander from the med group … A lot of times, the enlisted airmen especially will just get written off, just recommended he be discharged or separated or whatever, where a high-value asset like a pilot, they don’t want that to happen to.”

An Aircrew from the 16th Special Operations Squadron at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., lands an AC-130W Stinger II to participate in Emerald Warrior/Trident at the Naval Air Station North Island, Calif., January 15, 2019. (Staff Sgt. Erin Piazza/U.S. Air Force)

A hospital record from December 2021, which documents Matt’s conversation with a psychiatrist during his in-patient stay, offers more insight. According to the document, Matt told his doctor that while he was stationed at Cannon Air Force Base, before his assignment at Hurlburt Field, the Air Force “went after my pilot’s license.” When asked about Matt’s comments, Rasmussen, the Cannon Air Force Base spokeswoman, told Task & Purpose only that the Air Force “does not have a pilot’s license that is achieved like a typical civilian process. In order to fly for the military, you have to maintain qualifications in both physical and mental fitness.”

According to the report, Matt said “when he got transferred to Hurlburt Air Force Base, that his pilot license was reinstated.”

In retrospect, it seems Matt’s PTSD in 2019 was just the first in what would be a series of increasingly severe concerns.

In August of 2021, Matt was admitted to a hospital under the Baker Act. Before his admission, Stephanie said Matt threatened to shoot her and himself with her firearm, though Matt has said he only threatened to kill himself in the incident.

In his written statement in January 2022, Matt said the incident stemmed from an argument they had over “porn I had watched on a public website.” The argument “escalated to the point where I wanted to take my own life,” he wrote. After she called the police, Matt said he cleared the firearm and handed the gun to her. He ultimately was not charged in the incident and was discharged from the hospital six days later. In his statement, he said he spent two months in an intensive outpatient program.

Stephanie said she recently learned Matt told his chain of command about the incident, and they “just basically sat him down and said don’t do that again.”

However, weeks later, he was admitted under the Baker Act again. A police report from the Santa Rosa County Sheriff’s Office says that on Nov. 25, an officer responded to a call from Stephanie, who said she and Matt had an argument which resulted in him “grabbing a rope from her medical bag” and leaving the residence in his car. The report goes on to say that Stephanie informed the officers that Matt had sent a “mass amount of texts to individuals saying he was sorry,” and that by logging into his email account, Stephanie saw that he’d recently put in a “Google search of how to tie a noose.”

The sheriff’s office was contacted by people who said they were alarmed by the texts they received from Matt, which led officers to provide Matt’s phone carrier and phone number to dispatch.

Officers searched several places for Matt based on his cell phone location. They ultimately found his empty vehicle parked outside Ascension Sacred Heart, a hospital in Pensacola. An employee notified the responding officer that they’d “found [Matt] in his vehicle heavily intoxicated with a noose tied around his neck, however not tied off to anything,” according to the police report.

Both of those incidents were mentioned in Matt’s January 2022 statement. It’s unclear what action, if any, the Air Force took with the sworn statement; in response to a detailed list of questions from Task & Purpose, Matt’s command’s public affairs office said they could not comment on specifics due to “the ongoing investigation,” but added that their service members “have access to several wellness resources geared toward this type of scenario.”

Nevertheless, the situation continued to escalate. In February 2022, Matt crashed his car into a pole at high speed, resulting in a traumatic brain injury, bleeding in his brain, and “traumatic contusions” on the frontal lobe of his brain.

Stephanie said she “fully” holds his chain of command responsible for what has happened to her husband, who she is now separated from.

“They could have prevented this very easily,” she said. “They could have gotten him real help.”

Hoff agreed that leadership “should have helped him sooner.”

“You have to be accountable for your actions, commanders included,” she said. “More could be done in every aspect of it. The member has to be responsible for their negative behaviors, however, commanders have an obligation to engage when they see an issue. There’s a lot of blame to share here.”

It’s unclear what exactly commanders are required to do in the case regarding his misconduct, given that Matt has not yet been convicted of a crime in civilian court. Air Force regulations say service members are subject to discharge if they are found guilty in a civilian court of something that would result in a punitive discharge under the UCMJ, or when a civilian sentencing includes confinement of six months or more.

But the regulations also provide some level of commander discretion. A discharge should be initiated “if the specific circumstances of the offense warrant separation,” the regulations say.

Additionally, the military and Air Force specifically have clear guidance about what to do if they have concerns about a service member’s mental health. Department of Defense Instruction 6490.04 says a commissioned officer senior to the officer in question can make a command-directed referral for a mental health evaluation. A command-directed evaluation (CDE) for mental health care is meant to be used when a commander believes a service member is at risk of hurting themselves or others, or when a commander believes the service member could be “suffering from a severe mental disorder.” The CDE “has the same status as any other military order,” the regulation says.

But if a commander doesn’t believe their concerns rise to the level of a CDE they can “make informal, non-mandatory recommendations.”

“Commanders or supervisors may request a CDE for a variety of concerns including fitness for duty, occupational requirements, safety concerns, or significant changes in performance or behavioral changes that may be attributable to possible mental status changes,” the Air Force regulation says.

It’s unclear if any such evaluation was ever ordered or suggested by Matt’s chain of command, though his 2022 mental health evaluation acknowledges he “presented to the mental health clinic” in September 2020 after he received “administrative paperwork” regarding the time he was AWOL.

What is clear, however, is that the problems continued after his car accident earlier in 2022.

Months after the accident, Matt was arrested on charges of domestic violence following an argument he and Stephanie allegedly got into that turned physical. According to police records from the July 15 incident, Stephanie told the responding officer that the two were fighting over a laptop when he pushed her down, sat on top of her, and “grabbed her left bicep area and began to utilize his thumb to apply pressure” to her arm. The responding officer said they observed bruising and “redness” on the arm she said he grabbed in their written report after the incident.

That domestic violence charge was ultimately dropped; court records say the “witnesses’ statements and testimonies are not consistent.” The same reasoning was used for dropping two other charges of violating the no-contact order with Stephanie, according to police reports. Police reports document allegations that he followed her on social media, sent her Google calendar invites, and called her from inside jail after another arrest.

According to Christensen, seeing domestic violence-related charges get dropped is not particularly surprising.

“You have to be realistic, and understand that just because the charges are dropped doesn’t mean this isn’t a serious situation,” Christensen said. He later added that, generally, there is “a lot of smoke” that gets ignored before domestic incidents escalate — and by then, it could be too late.

“You may not have enough to say for sure that domestic violence has occurred,” he said. “But you have enough to be concerned and to be intervening … If you’re demanding to be in charge of these things like command does, then you have to be a big boy and understand these things happen and not just blow it off.”

Throughout everything, Stephanie said she felt hurt again and again because of her husband’s actions and the loss of their relationship. But she also said one of the biggest frustrations has been a lack of support from Matt’s command. After his July 2022 arrest, she said she had to fight to get Matt to fulfill his financial obligations.

Asked about the support provided to Stephanie, 2nd Lt. Trego said dependents “are offered confidential resources in times of need. At this time, we are not aware of which, if any, resources she utilized.”

An aircrew from the 16th Special Operations Squadron at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., lands an AC-130W Stinger II to participate in Emerald Warrior/Trident at the Naval Air Station North Island, Calif., January 15, 2019. (Staff Sgt. Erin Piazza/U.S. Air Force)

While Trego said it is the command’s understanding that “local law enforcement has dropped all charges against [Capt. Jacobs],” public records show at least one charge from September 2022 is still open.

According to public records, police were called on Sept. 22 after Stephanie reported Matt had violated the order. The officer who arrived at her home wrote in the report that Stephanie was “fearful and sometimes crying” as she told him that the day before, she “saw a balloon tied to her fence” outside of her home. Her father retrieved the balloon, along with a card that was addressed to him, gift certificates to the flower shop that delivered the package, chocolates, and a happy birthday card.

Nothing in the delivery was addressed to Stephanie, the report said, but she insisted that it was sent to her by Matt. Stephanie said when she called the flower shop to ask who sent the delivery, the manager “was initially hesitant” because the sender had asked to remain anonymous. But, the report says, the manager eventually said Matt had placed the delivery.

The officer wrote in their report that they saw in the “special delivery instructions” section of the order a note that said, “Please hide billing information from the recipient at all times. Would like them to receive the gift and never know where it came from.”

“This statement confirms [Stephanie’s] statement that [Matt] was trying to hide the fact that he sent these items to her which shows he willfully violated the (DVI),” the report says, adding that Stephanie was experiencing “noticeable emotional stress” from the incident.

It adds that the Sept. 22 incident, combined with the previous reports of violations of the protective order, showed Matt “is willfully, and maliciously violating the (DVI), and he is harassing [Stephanie] and engaged in a course of conduct directed at her, causing her substantial emotional distress and serving no legitimate purpose.”

The Air Force and military as a whole have been messaging more and more over the last several years that mental health is important, and service members should seek help if they need it. At the beginning of 2022, for example, Gen. Mike Minihan, the head of Air Mobility Command, shared a photo of his calendar online showing a scheduled mental health appointment. “Warrior heart,” he said. “No stigma.”

But as one might expect, it’s not quite that easy for airmen on the ground. As one active duty Air Force JAG wrote for Task & Purpose, “there are multiple disincentives and penalties written into Air Force policies that — whether intended or not — make life difficult for Airmen who seek mental health treatment.”

It may be difficult to pinpoint where the failure stems from in Matt’s case, but experts say his experience is indicative of a much larger problem within both the military and society in how mental health is handled. Neither the military nor civilian society has adequate systems in place to truly help people, said Dr. Craig Bryan, professor of psychiatry and behavioral health at Ohio State University. And when it comes to pilots, both inside and outside of the military, he said, the problems can get even worse.

“Related to pilots, the DoD has policies in place that, in essence, have negative career impacts for somebody like this. So if they go forward to seek out help, they risk being taken off of flight status,” Bryan said.

He and Hoff both said that’s particularly troublesome for the Air Force, which is already experiencing a pilot shortage.

U.S. Air Force aircrew members assigned to the 16th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron perform pre-flight checks onboard an AC-130W Stinger II before a mission in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, Southwest Asia, July 23, 2018. (Staff Sgt. Keith James/U.S. Air Force)

“This becomes another part of the challenge of catching things early because the individual, the service member, is motivated to conceal, to hide, to minimize a lot of these challenges and struggles,” he said. “And so things tend to build and get worse over time until they become very, very severe. And then it’s sort of like at this point, you have this really complicated situation where we then, in retrospect, look back and say, ‘Well, could we have done something earlier?’”

When it comes down to it, Bryan said it has become increasingly clear that the processes and policies the Pentagon operates off of now “don’t work very well anymore.”

“We keep holding on to this organizational structure and mindset that is less and less sort of adapted to the needs of the modern-day service member in society … We probably need to change the system itself, as opposed to just saying more people need to go to the doctor,” he said. “No, we need to create an institution, an organization, where people feel like they matter, that they’re taken care of. And that people have their back.”

Note: Certain dates in this report were updated to clarify that an event occurred in 2022, rather than “this year.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Haley Britzky · January 9, 2023

20. China claims to have mastered laser-powered drones

China claims to have mastered laser-powered drones

Optics-driven drones can be recharged while in flight and have AI-driven potential to replace costly and vulnerable military satellites

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 10, 2023

Chinese researchers have invented a way to keep drones airborne indefinitely by recharging them with laser beams, which may one day enable drones to complement or replace military satellites in some scenarios.

This week, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that scientists from Northwestern Polytechnic University (NPU) fitted drones with photoelectric conversion modules that could convert light into electricity, enabling high-powered laser beams to power the drones remotely while in flight.

The report notes that the team from NPU’s school of artificial intelligence conducted a drone experiment that combined autonomous charging with intelligent signal transmission and processing technology.

“Highlights of the research are 24-hour intelligent vision tracking system and the autonomous long-range energy replenishment for optics-driven drones (ODD),” the team said in their official WeChat account, as cited by SCMP.

SCMP noted that the researchers mentioned that the first challenge they encountered was tracking the drones in the air. The source notes that the team was able to develop an algorithm based on intelligent visuals that could accurately track ODDs in the air.

The team also overcame the challenges of laser distortion and weakening due to atmospheric conditions and distance by using adaptive beam shaping technology that reportedly can autonomously adjust laser intensity, SCMP says.

Regarding safety features, the SCMP report says that the team added a protection algorithm that automatically adjusts laser intensity to safe levels once an obstacle is detected in its path.

The research team did not disclose specifics of their experiment due to its sensitive military applications, though it did say it had successfully conducted indoor follow-up, outdoor daytime and outdoor night flights.

China’s Northwestern Polytechnical University’s research team says it carried out three field tests. Photo: Northwestern Polytechnical University

China can use ODD drones to create a “low altitude satellite” or “artificial moon” and increase the combat effectiveness of drone swarms, the SCMP report said.

Meanwhile, the US has its own projects to power drones with lasers. In July 2022, The Warzone reported that the US is exploring converting aerial refueling tankers into “airborne energy wells” to recharge battery-powered drones.

The report said that the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency requested that same month industry feedback on converting the US Air Force’s existing KC-135 and KC-46 Pegasus tankers with an “underwing beaming pod.”

The Warzone article mentions that the pod should contain a continuous-wave laser that can generate at least 100 kilowatts, have a thermal control unit and be able to cover a “nearly hemispherical field of regard,” to make sure it can charge drones where needed.

The report also cited other requirements for the airborne energy well concept, such as the need to generate more power aboard tanker aircraft with new or existing equipment.

In a September 2018 article, The Byte reported the US Army is developing a ground-based system that can power up drones in mid-flight at 500 meters.

The report said that the system aims a laser precisely at a photovoltaic cell mounted on the drone, which converts light into electricity. However, it notes that any excess laser energy not converted by the photovoltaic cell turns into heat, which can severely damage the drone.

Laser-charging drones face various technological hurdles. In a 2022 article in the peer-reviewed journal Micromachines, Syed Mohsan and other writers enumerate the challenges of powering up drones with lasers. They note that water, dust and air temperature can degrade the performance of lasers and that they grow weaker over distance.

Nevertheless, such technology may be used in drones as stand-ins for satellites. Asia Times has reported on China and Russia’s fielding various anti-satellite weapons, such as microwave-armed satellites, mobile anti-satellite missiles, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and that the US is developing advanced anti-satellite weapons such as ground-based lasers, signal jammers and hunter-killer satellites.

These developments mean outer space is no longer a sanctuary for military satellites, which are costly to launch and difficult to repair or replace when damaged or destroyed.

Drones, on the other hand, are much cheaper to launch, operate and maintain than satellites. They are a feasible option to ensure multi-layered battlefield communication infrastructure, acting to reinforce, provide redundancy or in some situations replace satellite-based command, control, computers, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISTAR) capabilities.

Given those developments, high-flying solar-powered drones may soon be a feasible replacement for military satellites, with laser charging potentially giving drones nearly unlimited endurance.

A 2016 article by Futurism notes that such drones, called “high-altitude pseudo-satellites (HAPS),” can perform all the functions of current satellites but at a lower cost.

Airbus’ Zephyr drone. Image: Airbus Defense and Space

The report notes HAPS have longer operating times than satellites and need to land only for maintenance and upgrades. It notes that these drones can be used for military monitoring, emergency communications, and high-speed internet.

One such drone is the Zephyr made by Airbus. It has a 25-meter wingspan and can fly continuously for months at an altitude of 21,000 meters, placing it above weather conditions and commercial air traffic. Airbus touts the Zephyr as capable of providing mobile connectivity to underserved or remote areas, earth observation and secure tactical communications.

Not to be outdone by Zephyr, in September 2022, SCMP reported that China unveiled its Morning Star 50 HAPS drone, which experts describe as a “pseudo-satellite.” SCMP notes that Morning Star has a 50-meter wingspan that is twice the size of the Zephyr, flies at altitudes above 20 kilometers, and can stay airborne for months or even years.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 10, 2023

21. Opinion | What the right’s war on ‘wokeness’ in the military is really about

Yes this excerpt is the bottomline truth. (And no one wins a culture war.)

Excerpts:

So here’s the truth: The military has indeed changed, because American society has changed, and so has the nature of modern warfare. Our military needs not just guys with big muscles, but people with a wide variety of skills and knowledge. To be maximally effective, it can’t deprive itself of the talents of large swaths of the population.

...

Unlike joining the actual military, service in the culture war is easy. You don’t have to suffer through boot camp, or follow orders you don’t like, or risk your life. All you have to do is stay mad.

Opinion | What the right’s war on ‘wokeness’ in the military is really about

The Washington Post · by Paul Waldman · January 9, 2023

Congress just gave the military a staggering $858 billion for the coming year; if there’s one thing the two parties agree on, it’s that we should shovel as much money as possible at the Pentagon. Nevertheless, Republicans are convinced that the military is being rapidly destroyed from the inside by “wokeness,” a catchall term that refers to any development related to a social issue that conservatives don’t like.

The evidence they present for this alleged crisis is comically weak. But this isn’t about evidence, or the actual nature of warfighting in the 21st century. It’s about discomfort with modern society, deep insecurities about the changing nature of manhood, and an impulse to delegitimize institutions, even those conservatives used to revere.

“These Are The Top 7 Times The Military Went Woke In 2022,” trumpets the Daily Caller website, lamenting developments such as the removal of Confederate names from buildings. The Wall Street Journal editorial board breathlessly exposes “woke training” manuals in the Pentagon, while admitting it’s unclear who actually has to undergo this training.

Prominent conservatives regularly complain that the military is becoming “emasculated.” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) and Chip Roy (R-Tex.) put out a “report” called “Woke Warfighters: How Political Ideology Is Weakening America’s Military.” A GOP lawmaker expresses his outrage about a West Point course on “white rage,” even though there’s no such course. The fantastical picture they’re trying to paint is one of a military that looks more like the gender studies department at Oberlin College than what it actually is — our enormous and sprawling machinery of war.

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Now that Republicans control the House, they’ll be holding hearings on “wokeness” in the military, offering members a chance to emote angrily for the Fox News audience. “All this wokeness in the military, we are going to be aggressively trying to root that stuff out,” says Mike D. Rogers (R-Ala.), who will likely chair the House Armed Services Committee.

Lacking from any of this bloviation is evidence that the various things conservatives call wokeness, from trying to prevent extremism in the ranks to designing body armor that fits female soldiers, have harmed the military’s mission in any way. Have there been attacks on the United States that weren’t stopped because soldiers were being forced to read books on critical race theory? What exactly can’t our military do that it used to be capable of, now that gay soldiers don’t have to stay in the closet? The critics can’t quite say. At least one lawmaker says parents of potential recruits are complaining to him about military wokeness. And where might they have learned about it? Fox News, perhaps?

So here’s the truth: The military has indeed changed, because American society has changed, and so has the nature of modern warfare. Our military needs not just guys with big muscles, but people with a wide variety of skills and knowledge. To be maximally effective, it can’t deprive itself of the talents of large swaths of the population.

But conservatives — especially those whose ideas about war come mostly from the movies — don’t like many of those changes. While they sometimes claim to oppose “politicization” of the military, what they actually want is for their cultural and political agenda to prevail there. They want the military to be a bulwark against progressive social change, where traditional gender norms are reinforced and reproduced.

When the wokeness panic is aimed at the military, it isn’t about the military at all. In a world where most men are unable to demonstrate that their upper-body strength justifies their superior social status, some are desperate to defend a physical hierarchy wherever it can be found. But if women can do nearly all military jobs just as well as men, then what’s left?

What’s left for many on the right is the feeling of being unmoored from any order that makes sense to them. Government can’t be trusted, the media are corrupt, corporations are against you, and the only appropriate response is rage. That feeling, Republicans also believe, is political gold.

That’s why leading figures on the right are so eager to tell everyone we’re suffering through a “crisis” of manhood. The answers to the supposed crisis range from the banal to the bizarre: Few men are likely to follow Tucker Carlson’s advice to reinvigorate their manliness by tanning their testicles. The point is the problem, not the solution; it’s to make men more insecure and angry, so they’ll find reassurance in joining the culture war and voting Republican.

Unlike joining the actual military, service in the culture war is easy. You don’t have to suffer through boot camp, or follow orders you don’t like, or risk your life. All you have to do is stay mad.

The Washington Post · by Paul Waldman · January 9, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d [email protected]

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Asymmetric warfare as an antidote to Chinese aggression

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 9, 2023

Jan 9, 2023 - Press ISW

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Think tank simulation predicts ‘heavy’ losses on all sides, including US, if China invades Taiwan

Welcome to 2033: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

Welcome to 2033

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts

1. Russia as we know it may not survive the coming decade

2. We’re heading for more countries with nuclear weapons and less cooperation on stopping the spread of these weapons—but not necessarily actual nuclear use

3. Expect a Chinese military offensive against Taiwan

4. US-Chinese decoupling may not be as dramatic as we think it will be

5. The United States will remain powerful but not hegemonic

6. Global cooperation on climate is set to increase, but curb the enthusiasm about peak emissions

7. Get ready for even greater global volatility

8. The tug of war between democracy and autocracy will persist, with democracies potentially losing some ground

9. Democracies will face a difficult decade of systemic dangers

10. International security organizations are likely to remain largely unchanged even as the world confronts unprecedented change and challenges

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