Geographic illiteracy is a problem in the US. Geography matters today more than ever because students are growing up in a globalized world, yet American students are comparatively less literate about geography than students in other countries.
One year after the attacks of September 11, 2001, a National Geographic article revealed that only 17% of young Americans could find Afghanistan on a map although the US military was at war there. I
n 2003, a US Strategic Task Force of Education Abroad
report concluded that the United States has a "serious deficit in global competence" and geographic ignorance is so deep and widespread that it may constitute a national-security threat.
Six years later, research findings from a
2009 survey of the US and Europe revealed that only 58% of Americans could describe the Taliban, compared with 75% of Britons, and overall Americans scored more poorly than citizens of Denmark, Finland and Britain. In 2016, the Council on Foreign Relations conducted a
survey with geography questions that have relevance for US policy, such as where American troops are stationed in the world and what countries the US is bound to protect, and only 29% of participants scored 66% or higher on the test.
Unfortunately, geographic illiteracy is not only endemic to US schools, but also appears to be widespread among the US policymaking establishment. This ignorance of the rest of the world, coupled with Washington's drive for the US to be a world policeman, is a dangerous recipe for costly entanglements and
threats to international stability.
For example, recently the US assassinated one of Iran's top military leaders, General Qasem Soleimani, and brought the two countries to the brink of war, y
et 77% of Americans surveyed had problems identifying Iran on the world map.
Back
in June 2017, the US Senate failed to pass a bipartisan bill to halt a new arms package for Saudi Arabia to wage its near-genocidal war in Yemen, following deliberations the previous September wherein some senators seemed ignorant about what they were rubber-stamping or knew which country was the targe
t of a US military-supported bombing campaign.
When asked why they vote
d against blocking the deal, some senators cited concern that the Strait of Hormuz would be threatened if Houthi rebels took over Yemen, apparently confusing
Oman with Yemen. The Strait of Hormuz actually separates Iran and the Omani Peninsula, whereas Yemen is hundreds of kilometers to the southwest and borders the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
US officials and their staff also exhibit similar ignorance when receiving foreign dignitaries. This past week President Donald Trump met with Nechirvan Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan, and appears to have confused him as the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
This is not an isolated event, and misidentifying foreign leaders with the wrong countries has occurred in the past. In 1995, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
, Jesse Helms, mistakenly introduced Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto as the leader of India - her country's neighbor and rival. After the introduction, Helms mentioned he had just completed "a delightful hour-and-a-half conversation" talking mostly about India, and surprisingly none of his staff intervened to correct the error.
Aside from the government, geographic illiteracy also appears in another part of the US establishment in mainstream media.
In coverage of the recent coronavirus outbreak, on January 20, NBC News mislocated China's capital Beijing and other cities when showing a map of China. Shanghai is depicted in the north of China with Wuhan next to Beijing further south, when in actuality Beijing is up north and Shanghai further south, with Wuhan west of Shanghai.
Likewise with CNN, in a 2019 coverage of Hurricane Dorian it
mislabeled Alabama as Mississippi on a US map.
For a country that professes exceptionalism and wants to continue being a global policeman, ignorance of geographic regions is a national liability in a globalized world. If the US wants to continue being a world leader, it needs to exercise responsible statecraft in geopolitics and, as
Derek Alderman of the American Association of Geographers has argued, instill geographic literacy in the US.
As the 2003 congressional task force report on education abroad recommended, Congress can set aside budgets to fund fellowships and allow students to earn college and university credits overseas, as well as install geography courses in schools and also instill the notion of "human geography" in the study of culture, economy and politics. Such literacy is necessary for being sensitive to and standing in solidarity with the differences and legitimacies of other countries, Alderman argues, and to examine critically and challenge inequalities that include dehumanizing portrayals of countries and regions.
Finally, given that crises ranging from climate change to migration to
pandemics are increasingly
globalized - as witnessed by the latest outbreak of the coronavirus - geographic literacy indeed seems to matter now more than ever.
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2. China's Censorship Helps Spread the Virus
A very scary subtitle to this article.
China's Censorship Helps Spread the Virus
Consider the Spanish flu, which killed 50 million in 1918-19 as governments at war suppressed the news.
Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Jan. 6.Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press
Xi Jinping has acknowledged that the "accelerating spread" of a new coronavirus from the central Chinese city of Wuhan is a "grave situation." To stop the virus's spread, the Chinese government has barred residents of Wuhan and nearby cities from traveling and blocked outbound flights, trains, buses and ferries. But if this develops into a catastrophe, the cult of personality around Mr. Xi and the Communist regime's efforts to control information will deserve much of the blame.
For a precedent, look back to 1918, when the Spanish flu broke out amid World War I. In the U.S., government officials and the press did all they could to play it down lest it hurt the war effort. While the Los Angeles health chief declared there was "no cause for alarm" and the Arkansas Gazette described the disease as the "same old fever and chills," people were dying by the thousands.
The name "Spanish flu" was a misnomer. In the countries where it originally surfaced-France, China and the U.S.-the news was suppressed by censorship and self-censorship to maintain wartime morale. (China sent only civilian laborers to the battlefield, but it declared war on Germany in August 1917.) Not until King Alphonse XIII of neutral Spain fell ill did news of the virus spread widely.
Between the spring of 1918 and early 1919, three waves of Spanish flu tore across the planet, facilitated by censorship and secrecy. The results were catastrophic: 50 million people were killed world-wide, including nearly 700,000 Americans.
Because the Chinese Communist Party cares more about its social control than the well-being of China's people, a similar situation is imaginable today. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar has praised the Chinese authorities for being transparent and cooperative, including by publishing the sequence of the viruses they have isolated. But in other respects Beijing's behavior has heightened the risk.
China has no independent media and strict censorship even in peacetime. The virus has spread to Xinjiang, where the government holds more than a million Uighurs in densely populated "re-education centers." Beijing has blocked Taiwan-which has three confirmed cases of the virus-from participating in a World Health Organization discussion of the outbreak.
Meanwhile, Chinese police are interrogating people for "spreading rumors" on social media about the virus. Two days before Wuhan's government disclosed the severity of the outbreak, it hosted potluck banquets for more than 100,000 people. On Jan. 10, a government expert told the state network CCTV that the virus was "under control" and a "mild condition." Wuhan's bestselling newspaper didn't put the outbreak on its front page until nearly three weeks after the first cases.
Analysts suspect the actual number of infected is thousands higher than the currently confirmed 1,400. The lesson of 1918 is that secrecy can kill. Chinese communism now threatens the world with a massive medical disaster.
Mr. Wolfowitz is a scholar and Mr. Frost a senior associate in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute.
3. China's camps now have survivors, and their ordeals aren't over
Are we witnessing the beginning a modern 21st Century holocaust?
This is the first priority action listed in the 2017 National Security Strategy (Page 42):
SUPPORT THE DIGNITY OF INDIVIDUALS: We support, with our words and actions, those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law. We are under no obligation to offer the benefits of our free and prosperous community to repressive regimes and human rights abusers. We may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and whose actions run contrary to our values. We will not remain silent in the face of evil. We will hold perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities accountable.
The more I read and review the National Security Strategy the more I realize how well it was written. I have heard a lot of senior leaders refer to it (and the National Defense Strategy) more than I ever have in the past, but my question is are we following the guidance and working to implement and execute the elements of the strategy?
Opinion | China's camps now have survivors, and their ordeals aren't over
The Chinese government
is busily spinning lies about its massive "re-education camps" for Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. But as survivors escape China, their first-hand accounts tell the true story - and their terrible ordeals continue.
Twenty-four-year-old college student Vera Yueming Zhou came to the United States in 2008 and is a U.S. permanent resident. She also happens to be a member of the Hui, a largely Muslim ethnic group. In October 2017, she used a virtual private network application to file her University of Washington homework while visiting her father in the city of Kuytun, China. That infraction was enough to get her arrested and sent to a "re-education camp," where she spent five months in a small, crowded cell with 11 other Muslim women. She never had a hearing or trial.
Despite having recently undergone cancer surgery, she was denied necessary medical treatment in the camp. She was allowed only one highly supervised visit with her father during her imprisonment, for 15 minutes. The prisoners were forced to sing patriotic songs, forbidden to speak their native language or practice their religions, kept under constant surveillance and encouraged to report on each other to their jailers.
After being released from the camp for unknown reasons, Zhou remained trapped in China because authorities kept her passport and green card. She was placed under extreme surveillance in Kuytun, where she lingered in limbo for 18 more months.
Back in Washington state, Zhou's mother, Mary Caiyun Ma, frantically tried to secure help for her daughter. Ma told me she pleaded with University of Washington officials for assistance that never came.
"I did not know where to turn after she was arrested, so I turned to the university for help. But the university just absolutely did not want to do anything," Ma said. "What the school did made me disappointed and desperate. I was wondering, am I still living in America?"
After months of frustration, Ma contacted human rights activist Bob Fu, who took her to Washington, D.C., for several rounds of meetings. She spoke with State Department special envoy for international religious freedom Sam Brownback, National Security Council official Matthew Pottinger and Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.), among others.
After those meetings, the State Department added Zhou to a list of prisoners it is petitioning the Chinese government to release, Fu said. In September, 23 months after her arrest, Zhou was given back her passport and forced to sign documents promising to keep silent. She is breaking that silence now, aware that speaking out poses risks to her family in China.
"What they did to a lot of people, this should be published," she told me. "We have a right to know what they are doing to those Uighurs and Kazakhs and other innocent people."
Although Zhou is free, her ordeal is far from over. Initially, the University of Washington kept billing Zhou for her tuition. Even after the billing ceased, Zhou's federal student loans went into default. Her landlord sent her unpaid rental bills to a collection agency. Her credit was ruined. Unable to secure new student loans, she can't resume her studies.
A group of alumni wrote a
letter to University of Washington President Ana Mari Cauce on Jan. 10 asking the school to help Zhou navigate her loan problems, publicly declare support for her, provide her psychological counseling and give her a scholarship to return to school.
University spokesman Victor Balta told me that the school reached out to Zhou's mother several times and contacted the State Department on Zhou's behalf, but was told options were limited because Zhou was a Chinese citizen. Zhou is welcome to re-enroll, he said, although the school can't fix her federal student loan issues. The school cannot help Zhou with counseling unless she re-enrolls, he said.
Ma and Fu say the university failed to advocate for Zhou because university officials
feared risking the school's partnerships with Chinese institutions, which include an exchange program with
Tsinghua University and
a Confucius Institute on campus. Balta denied that these relationships had any bearing on the university's actions regarding Zhou's case. U.S. universities
are routinely failing to protect their students when they are persecuted by the Chinese government.
A
report released in November by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China says that "several American residents" are being held among the more than 1 million ethnic minorities in the Chinese camps. The Chinese government's efforts to stamp out Muslim minorities' ethnic and religious identity in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity, the report argues. But it won't work.
"Reeducation through coercive surveillance and detention cannot fully achieve what it is designed to achieve, because people know their own history,"
wrote University of Washington doctoral graduate Darren Byler. "They know when a '
never again moment' is happening."
Zhou and
other survivors are among the first to tell the true stories about China's camps, but they won't be the last. These survivors need help from all free people and countries who believe in human rights and dignity - for their own sake, and on behalf of the millions still imprisoned.
4. The Taiwanese sending protest equipment, messages of solidarity to Hong Kong demonstrators
De Oppresso Liber - to free the oppressed - or to help the oppressed free themselves. It looks like the Taiwanese are providing support to resistance, helping their Chinese brethren in Hong Kong.
The Taiwanese sending protest equipment, messages of solidarity to Hong Kong demonstrators
A church in Taipei is major backer of Hong Kong's anti-government movement, sending supplies to frontline demonstrators
Hongkongers find support from Taiwan groups who draw links between protest movement and 'white terror'
Some in Taiwan may find it strange that crowds of Hongkongers flew to their island to observe the presidential poll, attend campaign rallies and join locals in celebrating the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen.
But it is not all one-way traffic. In Taipei, a church, book stores and cafes are lending their support to anti-government protesters 700km away in Hong Kong.
One of the movement's biggest backers in Taiwan is the Chi-Nan Presbyterian Church, which has set up a "Lennon Wall" with a huge banner bearing the words "Safeguard freedom, let's add oil with Hong Kong".
Kong Chao-ksun volunteers at the Chi-Nan Presbyterian Church in Taipei, where the congregation has backed Hong Kong protesters with donations of equipment. Photo: Kimmy Chung
The congregation has also sent piles of protective gear such as hard hats to demonstrators in Hong Kong - which is in its eighth month of
- and supports those protesters who have fled to Taiwan.
"It all started with a prayer meeting in June last year, when protests broke out in Hong Kong," said Kong Chao-ksun, a volunteer at the church.
"After that, many church members wanted to offer a helping hand by sending us materials, hoping we would transfer it to Hong Kong."
Equipment worth about US$530,000 (HK$4.1 million) including gas masks, helmets, air filters, ice packs and alcohol wipes has been gathered by the church. At its peak, it collected 800 helmets in a single week.
Some of that has been distributed by the church itself while the rest has been sent to Hong Kong through different channels.
The church has also offered humanitarian assistance to 200 protesters who have fled to Taiwan, including a couple whose story has touched Kong.
Fearing arrest and needing a break from the chaos in Hong Kong, they visited the self-ruled island twice, Kong recalled.
"We promised to keep in touch and have dinner with them when they are back in Taipei, but we lost contact with them soon after they returned to Hong Kong," said the 61-year-old volunteer, who believes they were arrested.
"They are just kids in their 20s. As a father, it is so heartbreaking to see them fighting so hard for their future and ideas they believe in."
Beijing and Hong Kong protesters react to Tsai Ing-wen's win in Taiwan presidential election
What started as vehement opposition to proposed changes to Hong Kong's extradition laws in June, has morphed into a wider anti-government movement focused on democratic reforms and police accountability.
Equipment worth about HK$4.1 million including gas masks, helmets, air filters, ice packs and alcohol wipes has been gathered by the church. Photo: Kimmy Chung
Hong Kong's protests have boosted the popularity of Tsai, head of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who used the unrest as a cautionary tale for the self-ruled island against encroachment from mainland China.
She has warned Taiwan's population of 23 million of being swallowed up by Beijing, which considers the island part of its territory that must one day be brought under its fold, by force if necessary.
Tsai netted a historic 8.17 million votes in the January 11 election, comfortably beating her main challenger Han Kuo-yu, from the mainland-friendly Kuomintang (KMT).
Kong agreed that fears Beijing would one day control Taiwan, and turn it into the next Hong Kong, had made Taiwan people feel more connected with Hong Kong protesters.
Taiwan went through "white terror" from 1949 to 1987, when martial law was imposed by the government led by the KMT and political dissidents were suppressed.
Kong, who has written a book on that era, said he believed Taiwan's history had made people wary of the situation in Hong Kong.
"What is happening in Hong Kong is like what happened in Taiwan during the times of white terror," he said. "We experienced such kinds of institutional violence 70 years ago."
Kong said Hong Kong protesters who fled to Taiwan found themselves in a similar situation to that faced by dissidents during the white terror, when political persecution prevented many from returning home.
Driven by those memories, he revealed the church was considering setting up a foundation or a non-governmental organisation to help Hongkongers, in a move he said would replicate American and European assistance for the island's white terror victims in the last century.
Son Yu-liam, one of the founders of the Philo Cafe. Photo: Kimmy Chung
On top of the church's support, some shops in Taipei are helping people from both cities connect.
Philo Cafe in Taipei, co-founded by a few local NGOs, has put up a sign at the entrance saying "Stand with HK".
As a cafe selling books on philosophy, social movement and justice, its owners have hosted seminars and an exhibition on Hong Kong's anti-government movement, inviting guests from the city.
Son Yu-liam, a co-founders of the cafe, is also secretary general of the Taiwan Labour Front, a union founded in 1984.
Son said: "Most Taiwan people support the movement in Hong Kong, as we share the same faith: our belief in pursuing freedoms and democracy.
"From an advocacy perspective, we also hope that more locals could understand the situation in Hong Kong, as Taiwan has been facing the same pressure from Beijing."
A bookstore called Poetry in Life, which is also in Taipei, has put up donation boxes to raise funds for protesters in Hong Kong.
Pro-democracy banners, posters and a Lennon Wall, where messages of support for protesters are posted,
can also been seen in the shop.
In the past, Hong Kong was a lighthouse to us as we had no freedoms to publish certain books. But it seems the situation has reversedLiu Gi
The shop was founded by Hong Kong poet Luk Wing-yu, whose husband Liu Gi, 40, is Taiwanese and works in the publishing industry.
Liu said: "As some Hongkongers know about my shop, they send us products supporting the movement for sale towards charity.
"In the past, Hong Kong was a lighthouse to us as we had no freedoms to publish certain books. But it seems the situation has reversed."
Liu Gi hopes Hong Kong and Taiwan can support each other to safeguard their freedoms. Photo: Kimmy Chung
He hoped the two jurisdictions could support each other and safeguard freedoms in the face of "threats from China".
Beijing's top leaders have been wary of closer ties between Hong Kong and Taiwan, fearing connections between what they see as "pro-independence forces".
Son, the unionist, is not shy to admit he is supportive of separatist movements in the area.
On election day earlier this month, Son's bookstore put up banners supporting independence for Hong Kong, Taiwan and even Tibet as he organised a party to witness the vote count and Tsai's subsequent victory.
"It is expected that Beijing will smear us as Taiwan's independence forces interfering with Hong Kong affairs," he said.
"But I still welcome more Hongkongers to come to this little cafe and brainstorm how we can resist the Chinese Communist Party.
"Hongkongers fight on just because Beijing has failed to give them democracy as promised. It is Beijing which has to think about that clearly."
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Kimmy Chung joined the Post in 2017 and reports for the Hong Kong desk on local politics and Hong Kong-mainland issues. Prior to joining the Post, she covered Hong Kong politics and social policies for more than six years for different media outlets.
5. How Great Power Competition Is Changing the Geopolitics of Mongolia
Excerpts:
Ultimately, the final guarantor of Mongolian sovereignty remains Russia. It has a clear and enduring interest in an independent Mongolia, and its strategic control over Mongolia's energy and transportation sectors would make it a formidable adversary in the event of future Chinese threats, be they economic, political or military.
Mongolia under President Khaltmaa Battulga is deepening that relationship, but it also needs to strengthen the threat of hard global pushback from multiple directions should an aggressive China ever decide to move on it. To do that, Mongolia needs to deepen its strategic alliances with select allies, and build regional bridges in peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.
How Great Power Competition Is Changing the Geopolitics of Mongolia
Mongolia is in a uniquely precarious situation, geographically, demographically and economically. Landlocked and isolated in East Asia, it has the lowest population density of any sovereign nation in the world. Its 3 million people, in a country about the size of Alaska, are dwarfed by 133 million Russians to the north and 1.4 billion Chinese to the south. It also has one of the coldest climates in the world. While these factors greatly constrain Mongolia economically, it has the world's best cashmere, huge eco- and cultural tourism potential and - most critically - an enormous mineral resource endowment.
Mongolia in the 20th Century
Mongolia has a proud cultural history dating to the founding of the Mongol Empire (1206-1368). Its later occupation by China's Qing dynasty lasted from 1691 to 1911, when Mongolia deposed the local ruler and declared independence. The 1915 Treaty of Kyakhta briefly reestablished Chinese control, but Russia helped Mongolia finally expel the Chinese after the 1917 October Revolution.
The Soviet Red Army settled in, abolished the Mongolian monarchy in 1924, and used Mongolia as a buffer with China. Mongolia maintained good relations with both China and the Soviet Union until the Sino-Soviet schism of the 1950s. By 1968 the Soviets had six military divisions in Mongolia, which Russia kept there until December 1992.
After the Cold War
Russia's departure left Mongolia facing two major problems. The most immediate was a severe economic crisis. Russia had accounted for 40 percent of Mongolia's national income, all of its gasoline, 90 percent of its imported machinery and half of its consumer goods. As Russia withdrew, Mongolia's economy effectively collapsed.
The second problem was existential. For the first time, Mongolia was truly on its own. Although Beijing recognized its independence in 1945, China by some accounts still harbors latent territorial designs on Mongolia. Some see Mongolia as part of China's historical domain, and Mongolian elites are concerned that younger and more nationalistic Chinese could press for annexation. China's history with Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan - as well as Mongolia itself - isn't reassuring.
Because of this, protecting its sovereignty and preserving its independence is Mongolia's top priority. Its strategy has been to walk a geopolitical tightrope tethered by two policies: a "good neighbor" policy with Russia and China, and a "third neighbor" policy to build ties to other countries - especially the United States, Japan, South Korea, India, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.
In the three-dimensional chess game of Mongolian geopolitics, great power competition is now changing the calculus on Mongolian sovereignty.
After the Cold War, rooted in Francis Fukuyama's idea that the end of history was nigh, there was great initial enthusiasm for a lasting new liberal international order. That notion proved both illusory and short-lived. By 2014 great power competition had fully reemerged, bringing with it a fundamental shift in the international security environment. In the three-dimensional chess game of Mongolian geopolitics, great power competition is now changing the calculus on Mongolian sovereignty.
Beijing's Changing Calculus
The most visible feature of great power competition is China's emergent regional and global hegemony. It relies on using big infrastructure as leverage, built in countries of strategic importance through its Belt and Road Initiative.
One of the initiative's six transnational corridors would connect China to Eastern Europe via Mongolia and Russia. That would open new mineral export markets for Mongolia and help it develop as a regional logistics hub. China appears to be slow-rolling the project, however, even as it rapidly builds expensive infrastructure around the globe.
The U.S.-China trade war affects Mongolia directly. China now dominates important parts of Mongolia's economy, buying about 80 percent of its exports - primarily copper, coal and gold. This geo-economic reality renders Mongolia highly vulnerable to Chinese economic fluctuations, a factor contributing to the International Monetary Fund's $5.5 billion bailout of Mongolia in 2017.
Economic leverage is a potent tool of Chinese foreign policy. In 2016 it slapped import tariffs on Mongolian goods as punishment for the Dalai Lama's visit. With China now weaponizing its 80 percent share of global rare earth production, the geopolitics surrounding Mongolia's rare earth deposits are likely to heat up.
Perhaps the most consequential impact on Mongolia derives from the new political, economic and military alliance formed by Russia and China to counter the United States. As the Sino-Russian alliance strengthens, Mongolia's value as a buffer state will weaken.
Moscow's Changing Calculus
Moscow, however, still sees China as a potential long-term threat. Balancing China's influence in Mongolia is a priority, and Russia is attempting to rebuild and strengthen its economic ties there. It supplies about 80 percent of Mongolia's oil market, and trade has grown nearly 40 percent since 2017. In 2019 the two countries announced a strategic partnership that includes a $1.5 billion infrastructure investment fund, an upgrade of the trans-Mongolian railway and possible routing through Mongolia of a Russia-China natural gas pipeline.
Russia worries that if its 3,485-kilometer (2,165-mile) border with Mongolia falls under Chinese control, its Siberian underbelly would be exposed. Meanwhile, Russian territorial issues elsewhere concern Mongolia because of their potential to strengthen Chinese arguments for reoccupation. These include Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its negotiations with Japan over the Kuril Islands.
Washington's Changing Calculus
While Mongolia's location is strategically important, the United States has broader interests in the country. These include commerce, democracy, security, nonproliferation, trade, investment, sovereignty, the rule of law, peacekeeping and North Korea. What the United States most wants, however, is to see Mongolia remain a sovereign and independent state - one that is successful, prosperous and plays a constructive role in the region and beyond.
The U.S. national defense and security strategies - both constructed around great power competition - are opening doors for bilateral and regional cooperation that can strengthen Mongolia's geopolitical hand.
The significance of democracy in U.S. foreign policy has arguably declined. But the U.S. national defense and security strategies - both constructed around great power competition - are opening doors for bilateral and regional cooperation that can strengthen Mongolia's geopolitical hand. These include the U.S. emphasis on Russia and China, the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific and U.S. outreach to North Korea - where Mongolia is positioned well to facilitate peace negotiations.
The Upshot
Ultimately, the final guarantor of Mongolian sovereignty remains Russia. It has a clear and enduring interest in an independent Mongolia, and its strategic control over Mongolia's energy and transportation sectors would make it a formidable adversary in the event of future Chinese threats, be they economic, political or military.
Mongolia under President Khaltmaa Battulga is deepening that relationship, but it also needs to strengthen the threat of hard global pushback from multiple directions should an aggressive China ever decide to move on it. To do that, Mongolia needs to deepen its strategic alliances with select allies, and build regional bridges in peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.
At the geographical nexus of great power competition, Mongolia has its work cut out for it.
Jeff Goodson is a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer. Dr. Jonathan Addleton was the U.S. ambassador to Mongolia from 2009 to 2012.
6. China is now world's 2nd-biggest weapons producer - SIPRI report
I am reminded of the scene in the Lethal Weapon movie when Mel Gibson says to the bad guy, "Would you like a shot at the title?" And he responds with, "I don't mind if I do."
China is now world's 2nd-biggest weapons producer - SIPRI report
China has been ranked as the world's second-largest weapons manufacturer, according to new research by a leading peace institute. The Asian superpower jumped ahead of Russia, from whom they used to buy many weapons.
China is the world's second-largest arms producer, behind the the US, a Swedish research institute announced on Monday.
New research from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that four Chinese arms groups generate sufficient sales to be ranked among the world's top 20 weapons sellers. The four groups have combined sales worth $54.1 billion (€49.1 billion) in 2017.
"This research represents the most comprehensive picture of Chinese companies' weapons production to date," SIPRI announced on their website. They also noted that the new figures are likely an underestimate, given the lack of transparency in China.
In the
previous report published in 2017, SIPRI placed China at sixth place in the world. These new figures place it ahead of Russia. In the past, China was a major importer of weapons from Russia.
SIPRI ranks individual companies rather than countries. Three Chinese arms manufacturers would be placed in the top 10.
7. To Be Most Ready When the Nation is Least Ready, the Marines Need a New Headquarters
New deck chairs or rearrange the old ones? (apologies for the sarcasm)
Conclusion
The commandant's force design initiative, assuming Congress permits reprioritizing and reallocating currently projected resourcing decisions, will undoubtedly result in significant change to the tactical capabilities of the Marine Corps. That will reflect a significant effort made outside of, and at times in opposition to, the principal organizational structure of Headquarters Marine Corps. However, if the Marine Corps is to be organized, trained, equipped, and postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment, it should move with urgency beyond mere tactical capabilities and produce consistent change more frequently than once a generation. A headquarters structure that is more agile, and with clearer roles and responsibilities, is critical to this task. The ever-changing character of war demands a degree of adaptability that the current structure fails to provide, and the best way to produce it is through a refined and improved organizational structure.
To Be Most Ready When the Nation is Least Ready, the Marines Need a New Headquarters - War on the Rocks
MATTHEW ROHLFING
, JONATHON FRERICHS
, AND MARK NOSTRO
"[The Marine Corps] has fully demonstrated the vital need for the existence of a strong force in readiness ... The nation's shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is generally least ready ... to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war."
America's 9-1-1 force is not ready to receive the call. The last and current commandants of the Marine Corps have made this fact clear in public statements and official documents. And both expressed their desire to fix this major national security issue, with the current commandant going so far as to explain that he is willing to kill the Corps' "sacred cows" to do so. Unfortunately, redesigning the Corps is not enough, even if some blessed bovines are beheaded along the way. Setting the Marine Corps back on the right path first requires fixing the structural ways in which the service's decisions are made and implemented within Headquarters Marine Corps. Without addressing the major imbalances that have led to the service "
not [being] organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment," future commandants will likely find themselves in the same predicaments again and again.
Since the release of Gen. David Berger's planning guidance, the Marine Corps has focused its
force-design efforts on new tactical capabilities and formations. If realized, these capabilities have the potential to provide the naval services and joint force with a combat credible, risk worthy, stand-in force to meet the demands of the
National Defense Strategy. However, these capabilities will be irrelevant if the Marine Corps does not address how it generates these capabilities as a service and employs these forces at the operational level as a part of the joint force.
Coded in law, the commandant, with the support of Headquarters Marine Corps, is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the service's forces for their employment in operations. You might say that Headquarters Marine Corps is the brain of the Marine Corps. It is meant to control the functions of the rest of the service. But there's a problem: The synapses aren't firing.
The current organizational structure of Headquarters Marine Corps does not align with any other military department, or with the
typical numbered staff organization and structure of most other subordinate Marine Corps units. Instead, it employs deputy commandants who serve as both primary staff members and commanders of subordinate supporting establishment elements, often responsible for
generating and fulfilling their own requirements. While the bureaucratic model of Headquarters Marine Corps is uniquely "Marine," it raises a critical question: Is it optimized to meet the bold demands of the
Commandants Planning Guidance and the
National Defense Strategy? We don't think so.
The Marine Corps, as a service, must be able to generate and sustain new desired tactical capabilities. This requires a recognition of the interdependencies between tactical formations, the operational commands that employ them, and the service's institutional role in organizing, training, and equipping them. To accomplish this, we propose broad organizational change that should
organize our force into capable subordinate elements each assigned its own task. Specifically, we recommend that Headquarters Marine Corps transition to a standard numbered staff model, and that the supporting establishment be reorganized into three principal subordinate commands responsible to the commandant for the execution of
Title 10 responsibilities. Finally, the operational Marine Corps structure should align with the Navy's employment model to allow for the development and prosecution of naval campaigns.
Source: Image generated by the authors.
Headquarters Marine Corps
The Department of Defense is organized with two parallel chains of command -
service and operational. Within the service chain, as directed by
U.S. Code Title 10, the commandant is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Marine Corps forces. These forces are then provided to combatant or joint force commanders, in the operational chain of command, for employment. Under this construct, the commandant currently executes his Title 10 responsibilities through Headquarters Marine Corps' deputy commandants and their subordinate organizations.
The existing Headquarters Marine Corps bureaucracy is unnecessarily convoluted because it has no unifying principle. Some portions of the staff are organized by warfighting function (
deputy commandant for information) and some by capability or platform (
deputy commandant for aviation), while others are aligned more closely to a standard "G-coded" general staff function (
deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs). Further, many deputy commandants also command supporting establishment structures and as such are responsible for executing and assessing the policy they establish.
This bureaucratic model creates unnecessary inefficiencies, inhibits unity of effort, and has led to major structural imbalances across the service. One clear example of the challenges that the existing structure poses is in the process to mobilize Marine Corps forces. Per the
Marine Corps' Total Force Mobilization order (MCO 3000.19B), there are tasks specified to at least 13 different commanders, most of whose only common superior is the commandant.
Specific to structural imbalances, this organizational model exacerbates issues associated with the advocacy process, whereby parochial interests are naturally elevated based on cultural biases and/or preferences rather than based on what is necessarily best for the service. This reality should be no surprise to
War on the Rocks readers. Numerous
articles over the
past few years have
highlighted just how
problematic these structural imbalances have become, with the deputy commandant for aviation possessing an
overwhelmingly powerful influence across the service. This influence has led to a situation where the service now finds itself spending an ever-growing and disproportionate share of its allocated resources on expensive, traditionally-manned aviation platforms that are, according to one Marine,
eating the rest of the Marine Corps. In many ways, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis'
Close Combat Lethality Task Force is a scathing indictment on Headquarters Marine Corps for allowing the service to get to the point that it is now spending just
1 to 2 percent of its allocated modernization dollars on its infantry forces while prioritizing funding for the
only all
"5th generation" F-35 tactical air component in the Department of Defense. Moving beyond internal Marine Corps concerns, the structural imbalance issues have left the service in a position where it now consistently requests from Congress more than twice the amount of money for short-range, traditionally-manned aviation platforms than it does for amphibious platforms of any type. It will be hard for the Navy to accept that the Marine Corps is truly serious about greater naval integration unless this changes. While
recent changes to the Marine Corps' advocacy process are promising, they fail to address the inherent parochial stovepipes and structural imbalances created by the idiosyncratic organization of Headquarters Marine Corps.
Again, we propose that the service transition to a more standard numbered staff organizational model. A numbered staff model, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, simplifies the existing structure and enables better alignment with the Navy and other joint and service headquarters
. Under this construct, Headquarters Marine Corps staff would serve as principal advisors to the commandant in specific functional areas. On behalf of the commandant, the staff becomes responsible for establishing policy, assigning tasks to subordinate organizations, and managing and supervising the execution of the service's Title 10 responsibilities. For example, the proposed MC-1 is the principal adviser to the commandant for establishing and overseeing service-wide human capital and manpower functions relating to the Marine Corps' personnel, including military, civilian, and contractors.
Major Subordinate Commands
Reorganizing Headquarters Marine Corps towards a more standard staff organization would allow for the structure and functions currently held by deputy commandants to be better aligned to major subordinate commands. These organizations then become the service's primary means of developing and generating fleet marine forces for combatant or joint force commanders. We propose that the existing structure be modified to form three major subordinate commands.
First, Marine Forces Command should be responsible for training, mobilizing, deploying, sustaining, and reconstituting fleet marine forces. To accomplish this, many of the functions currently associated with manpower and reserve affairs, marine corps installations command, marine corps logistics command, and marine corps forces reserve will need to be realigned and subordinated to the new Marine Forces Command. Aligning and subordinating the functions associated with force generation and provision under the new command allows it to function as the service's force provider. Further, a single commander provides unity of command, generates unity of effort across the service, and postures the service for mobilization and force generation in contingency.
Second, Training, Education, and Doctrine Command should be responsible for recruiting; developing, educating, and training marines; and developing doctrine. This allows for rapid development and implementation of new ideas through a streamlined doctrinal and education process, in keeping with commandant's desire for an information-age education system.
Third, Marine Corps Combat Development Command should be responsible for modernizing the corps by designing, developing, and delivering future force organizations and materiel capabilities. This headquarters serves as the single repository for emerging concept and capability development, ensuring that the Marine Corps continues to provide relevant capabilities to naval and joint force. And yes, for those wondering, this would mean Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation would cease to exist. Instead, Marine Corps Combat Development Command would be provided the necessary resources to ensure the service's aviation component is appropriately integrated within the organization, as well as with the Navy and the rest of the joint force.
This organizational shift, while significant, will streamline the execution of the commandant's Title 10 requirements. It establishes a clearly defined chain of command with delineated roles and responsibilities. Additionally, its postures the service to better develop, generate, and actualize force design changes now and in the future. This in turn optimizes the service's ability to meet the requirements of the joint force.
Align the Operational Marine Corps to the Navy
The changes articulated above will posture the Marine Corps to better meet its service-specific Title 10 requirements in organizing, training, equipping, and ultimately providing capabilities to the joint force. However, to ensure that joint force requirements are in keeping with the
commandant's intent and the Marine Corps' naval purpose, the service ought to reorganize its structure within the Department of Defense's operational chain of command. Within the legal limits, Marine Corps organizations that work for combatant or joint force commanders should
align to and integrate with their Navy counterparts.
Alignment to and
integration with Navy counterparts at the service component level organizes the naval services to feed future force design in a way that directly supports naval campaigns and joint forces requirements. Navy and Marine Corps integration within the operational chain allows for the development and prosecution of
cohesive naval campaigns, thereby generating naval operational requirements. Integration at echelon within the operational chain reduces or eliminates individual Navy and Marine Corps-specific tasking within combatant command campaign plans and theater security cooperation requirements. At the component command level, this in turn facilitates holistic naval inputs to the global force management, program objective memorandum, posture, and strategic capabilities processes. Without change within the operational chain, the feedback loops between operational and service chains of command will be incongruent with the commandant's guidance.
Counterargument and Rebuttal
Our proposal will likely have many naysayers. Some may argue that the existing structure is almost completely analogous to the numbered staff model, but with slightly different names. Those deputy commandants that do have additional roles (e.g. the commanding general of the marine corps combat development command), or a niche (e.g. the deputy commandant for aviation), were deliberately designed that way to enhance, rather than detract from, the organization's effectiveness. Others could point out that consolidating the amount of responsibility in the proposed Marine Corps Forces Command described above is well beyond what that headquarters can accomplish, or that given the other changes currently underway, restructuring headquarters marine corps bureaucracy is a step too far for an organization already in the throes of significant change.
These arguments fail to recognize that the amount of institutional change required to realize the commandant's vision would not be hindered by simultaneous changes to Headquarters Marine Corps structure, but rather accelerated by it. The inherent inertia within Headquarters Marine Corps can be broken while also setting the conditions to align structure, requirements, and processes with the Navy. This will improve, rather than hinder, delivering fleet marine forces with the right capabilities to fleet commanders and allow the Marine Corps to fully realize its role as part of "
Integrated American Naval Power."
Conclusion
The commandant's force design initiative, assuming Congress permits reprioritizing and reallocating currently projected resourcing decisions, will undoubtedly result in significant change to the tactical capabilities of the Marine Corps. That will reflect a significant effort made outside of, and at times in opposition to, the principal organizational structure of Headquarters Marine Corps. However, if the Marine Corps is to be organized, trained, equipped, and postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment, it should move with urgency beyond mere tactical capabilities and produce consistent change more frequently than once a generation. A headquarters structure that is more agile, and with clearer roles and responsibilities, is critical to this task. The ever-changing character of war demands a degree of adaptability that the current structure fails to provide, and the best way to produce it is through a refined and improved organizational structure.
Maj. Matthew Rohlfing is an armor officer and marine air-ground task force planner currently assigned to Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa and a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies.
Maj. Jonathon Frerichs is an infantry officer and marine air-ground task force planner currently assigned to Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa and a graduate of the School of Advanced Warfighting.
Maj. Mark Nostro is an armor officer and marine air-ground task force planner currently assigned to 1st Tank Battalion and a graduate of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School.
The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
8. Duterte looks to boot US troops from Philippines
This does not bode well for our longest standing treaty alliance.
Asia Times | Duterte looks to boot US troops from Philippines | Article
Filipino leader threatens to scrap Visiting Forces Agreement in response to US travel bans against his inner circle
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has renewed a longstanding threat to sever security cooperation with the United States, an angry response to recent travel bans imposed on Filipino officials involved in alleged rights abuses.
The firebrand Filipino leader has also reportedly turned down US President Donald Trump's invitation to attend a special US-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting to be held in Las Vegas later this year.
If Duterte follows through on his threat, it would mark a significant diplomatic and strategic departure for the long-time mutual defense treaty allies, and give China a new advantage in the contested South China Sea.
As the US and other Western nations ramp up sanctions against perpetrators of human rights violations in the Philippines, including those behind a lethal drug war, Duterte seems increasingly worried about his and his allies prospects as he enters the twilight of his six-year tenure.
By dangling America's future access to strategic Philippine bases, crucial outposts in the contest for influence in the South China Sea, the Filipino leader likely hopes to deter any escalation of targeted Western sanctions against his inner circle and potentially himself in the months and years ahead.
At the same time, he has doubled down on his strategic pivot to Russia and China, which, according to the Filipino president, "respect the sovereignty of the [the Philippines]", something that he says has been "totally lacking" by America and the West.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on the campaign trail in 2016. Photo: AFP/Noel Celis
Since his ascent to the presidency, Duterte has been at loggerheads with the US and Western partners over human rights concerns. His scorched-earth drug war, which has reportedly claimed the lives of thousands of drug suspects, has soured relations with traditional allies.
The Trump administration initially sought to de-emphasize disagreements in favor of tighter strategic cooperation, especially in light of shared concerns over China's assertiveness in the South China Sea.
But tensions came to head last year when a bipartisan effort to punish human rights violators in the Philippines was approved by the US government.
In recent days, a number of top Philippine officials have openly expressed their concerns over facing travel bans and other punitive measures for their alleged involvement in alleged abuses.
The most prominent among them is Senator Bato Dela Rosa, a former Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief who oversaw the most brutal phase of Duterte's drug war.
"I was told [by the US Embassy] to just apply again if I want, because the present visa was cancelled," Dela Rosa, who is now a senator, confirmed on January 22 when asked about reports his US diplomatic visa was revoked.
Shortly thereafter, Duterte upped the diplomatic ante by threatening in retaliation to abrogate the Philippine-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
US and Philippine troops at a joint exercise event in a file photo. Photo: Twitter
The VFA, negotiated soon after the closure of American military bases in the Philippines in the early 1990s, provides the legal framework for US soldiers to enter the Philippines.
It also provides the operating software for the Philippine-US defense alliance, enshrined in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which at any given time sees US troops stationed in the country on a rotating basis, including in terrorism-prone southern regions.
"Now they won't let Bato (dela Rosa) go to America. I am warning you...if you don't do the correction there. One, I will terminate the bases, Visiting Forces Agreement. I will end that son of a bitch," Duterte thundered in remarks reported in local media.
Without the VFA, the US would not be able to sustain its significant military presence in the Philippines, a turn that would have major ramifications for America's strategic position in the Western Pacific, particularly vis-à-vis China.
It would also impact on joint military activities and exercises, of which nearly 300 were held last year.
Ratified by the Philippine Senate in the late 1990s, some suggest that the upper house would have to approve Duterte's scrapping of the VFA. However, top government officials maintain that Duterte can unilaterally abrogate the agreement without legislative approval.
"The termination of the VFA may be unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, and it is well within the right of the Philippine government to do so if it determines that the agreement no longer redounds to our national interest," Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana told reporters on January 24.
"All that is required is that a notice of termination be served to the US government. The termination shall take effect 180 days after the date of the notice."
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana delivers a speech during a closing ceremony of an annual joint US-Philippines military exercise, Manila, May 19, 2017. Photo: AFP/Ted Aljibe
The defense secretary, known for his independent views and longstanding ties with the US, placed Duterte's latest threat within the broader context of perceived persistent US interference in Philippine domestic affairs.
"I can understand why [Duterte] is peeved by the cancellation of Senator Bato's visa because of alleged extrajudicial killings in connection with the drug war," Lorenzana told this writer on January 24. "It is a direct affront to [Duterte] being the architect of the drug war that he started upon his assumption of office."
"[Let's not forget] Duterte ordered Bato, then the newly installed PNP Chief, to launch the drug war and enjoined the entire PNP to do their duties and pledged he would back them up. That he would take responsibility for their official actions," Lorenzana said. "That he would go to prison for them. He is just being true to his promise," the defense chief added.
The reaction among Filipino senators, however, has been mixed. Key Duterte allies such as Senator Aquilino Pimentel III, who chairs the upper house's foreign relations committee, said that the president can nix the VFA "with or without a reason."
"That agreement (should) always be subject to review...He can even say that 'times have changed and it is no longer needed by the country,'" he added.
More independent-leaning senators such as Panfilo Lacson have referred to Duterte's threat as "unfortunate and unnecessary" since "[t]he VFA is a bilateral agreement between the [Philippines] and the US that went through some careful and diplomatic discussion" he wrote on Twitter.
Civil society groups have been equally critical. Even progressive leaders such as Renato Reyes of the left-leaning Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), a longtime critic of America's military presence in the Philippines, warned against trivialization of the matter for personal reasons.
A Philippine naval officer stands guard during the arrival of American missile destroyer USS Chung Hoon before US-Philippine joint naval military exercises in a file photo. Photo: AFP/Noel Celis/Getty Images
"The termination of the VFA is a serious matter. We have fought for it since 1999. It is not a mere bargaining chip to get Bato back his US visa," Reyes said. "The termination of the VFA is needed because it is an affront to our national sovereignty. Don't trivialize this issue."
Though the Presidential Palace (Malacanang) has announced that the VFA termination process is underway, few believe that it will actually be done any time soon. US sanctions against top Duterte administration officials, however, are expected to intensify.
The travel ban imposed on Bato and apparently other top Filipino police officials is justified under the US's Magnitsky Act (2012) as well as the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which calls on the US government to promote "human rights and respect for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region."
Apart from travel ban, the US and other allied countries that subscribe to the global Magnitsky mechanism may impose asset freezes and other forms of financial sanctions against top Filipino officials involved in human rights violations.
Duterte's threat could thus be seen as a calculated maneuver to deter further sanctions against his inner circle, including against his long-time assistant and current senator, Bong Go, if not himself after his single term expires in 2022.
The Filipino president has sought to portray his latest threat to abrogate the VFA as both a nationalistic assertion of sovereignty and a diplomatic bid to prevent regional conflict, namely between the US and China.
Philippine and US flag bearers during the opening ceremonies for the annual Balikatan joint exercises at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City, April 4, 2016. Photo: Facebook
He has consistently blamed America's military presence on Philippine soil as a major source of tensions, while consistently overlooking China's provocative actions in the South China Sea.
"It would be a reckless move if I send out just like Vietnam small vessels [into the South China Sea] only to get a bloody nose [from China] at the end of the day," Duterte said on January 25 amid criticism of his threat to nix the VFA.
"[The US] might just want to take advantage and make a pretext that they are defending the Philippines, and it will go beyond our control."
9. It's time for Southeast Asia to stand together against China - with Indonesia leading the way
Excerpts:
None of Indonesia's options in dealing with the challenge from China are likely to be swiftly effective, but Jakarta does have recourse.
The most important will be for Indonesia to take its place as first among equals in Southeast Asia - particularly within the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) - and take a greater interest in collective regional resistance against Chinese revisionism.
...
Indonesia is not the Philippines - especially in the realm of material capabilities that it can bring to bear in pushing back on China - but it still stands to gain from asserting its rights under international law.
It's not yet too late for Indonesia to lead Southeast Asia back toward institutionalised solutions, especially as negotiations continue toward an Asean-China code of conduct for the South China Sea with an anticipated agreement by 2021.
The fact that Asean this year is chaired by Vietnam, which has been the most forward-leaning of the territorial claimants in the South China Sea against China in recent years, should facilitate matters, too. It's time for Southeast Asia to stand together against China; Indonesia can and should lead the way.
It's time for Southeast Asia to stand together against China - with Indonesia leading the way
Ankit Panda writes that it's not too late for Indonesia to lead Southeast Asia back toward institutionalised solutions as talks continue toward an Asean-China code of conduct for the South China Sea.
For the final weeks of 2019 and into the new year, China and Indonesia have been facing off over the sovereignty of waters around Jakarta's Riau Islands, in the South China Sea.
Jakarta's exclusive economic zone, a 200-nautical-mile zone within its afforded special rights to exploit marine resources, overlaps with China's capacious nine-dash line claim, under which Beijing asserts rights over nearly 90 per cent of the critical waterway.
That means the core of the ongoing dispute between the two countries boils down to resource exploitation rights within a section of the South China Sea northeast of the Natuna Islands.
While Indonesia's claim is founded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - a convention both Beijing and Jakarta have signed and ratified - the Chinese claim dates back to questionable territorial assertions first made in the latter part of the first half of the 20th century.
Indonesia is not the Philippines - especially in the realm of material capabilities that it can bring to bear in pushing back on China - but it still stands to gain from asserting its rights under international law
Tripling down on its alienation of Indonesia amounts to a massive strategic miscalculation by China, ultimately. Instead of building a bridge to Jakarta at a time when the United States appears adrift in Asia, China is alienating what could otherwise be an important partner.
At a time when the Trump administration is vindicating the foreign policy instincts of many in Jakarta who see value in the country's middle-of-the-road, autonomous foreign policy, Beijing is giving cause for a rethink.
To be sure, Jakarta is far from bandwagoning with the United States when it comes to the South China Sea.
Ever careful to emphasise its position as a nonclaimant of territory in the disputed waters, Indonesia has made clear that it is in a position to push back on Chinese challenges to its maritime sovereignty independently.
For an archipelagic state like Indonesia, maritime boundaries are as good as national borders.
A view of shipyards on Batam island, Riau Islands province, Indonesia. Photo: Reuters
The 2019-2020 round of tensions in the waters around the Natuna islands aren't Indonesia's first crack at dealing with Chinese coercion. Jokowi, during his first term, contended with multiple incidents in 2016 - the same year the Philippines received a favourable judgment from The Hague-based international tribunal invalidating China's nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea.
Back then, Indonesia's former defence minister used an evocative metaphor to describe Jakarta's view of the challenge around the Natuna islands. Ryamizard Ryacudu called the islands a "front door" to Indonesia, warning that if it weren't guarded properly, the "thieves" would come in
The premise of that metaphor was that Indonesia would need to find a way to deter China from asserting its claims to the southernmost extent of the nine-dash line by imposing costs, effectively practising a strategy of deterrence by denial.
In the intervening years, Indonesia simply hasn't had enough capacity to implement such a strategy, even if the political will to defend the Natunas was there. Indonesia did build up its capacity in the area, including by deploying warships, fighters, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
A China Coast Guard ship is seen from an Indonesian Naval ship during a patrol at Indonesia's exclusive economic zone sea in the north of Natuna island, Indonesia on January 11. Photo: Reuters
None of Indonesia's options in dealing with the challenge from China are likely to be swiftly effective, but Jakarta does have recourse.
The most important will be for Indonesia to take its place as first among equals in Southeast Asia - particularly within the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) - and take a greater interest in collective regional resistance against Chinese revisionism.
Following the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling largely in the Philippines' favour, what should have become apparent is the value of international legal norms in helping weaker countries push back against China.
Manila, however, had just seen a change in leadership; President Rodrigo Duterte abandoned his predecessor's approach and began a period of rapprochement with China.
Indonesia's president, Joko Widodo (centre), along with Military Chief Gatot Nurmantyo (left) and Air Force Commander Agus Supriatna (right) during a military exercise on Natuna Island in October 2016. Photo: Reuters
Indonesia is not the Philippines - especially in the realm of material capabilities that it can bring to bear in pushing back on China - but it still stands to gain from asserting its rights under international law.
It's not yet too late for Indonesia to lead Southeast Asia back toward institutionalised solutions, especially as negotiations continue toward an Asean-China code of conduct for the South China Sea with an anticipated agreement by 2021.
The fact that Asean this year is chaired by Vietnam, which has been the most forward-leaning of the territorial claimants in the South China Sea against China in recent years, should facilitate matters, too. It's time for Southeast Asia to stand together against China; Indonesia can and should lead the way.
Ankit Panda is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists, a Senior Editor at The Diplomat, an online magazine on Asia-Pacific affairs, and a Contributing Editor at War on the Rocks. Panda is an award-winning writer and a frequently cited analyst on geopolitical and security issues in the Asia-Pacific. His writing has appeared in The Diplomat, The Atlantic, The Daily Beast, Politico Magazine, and War on the Rocks, among other publications.
10. Watch six decade-long disinformation operations unfold in six minutes
In an effort to see the forest from the trees, in this article I will present high-level visualizations of six state-backed disinformation operations on Twitter. I will periodically dive into parts I find interesting, but will leave the granular analysis for other projects and researchers. Hopefully my visualizations will spark further ideas about the strategies a country, or suite of countries, may have deployed. Maybe you will see something in my visualizations that confirms or contradicts your own knowledge. If so, I'd love to explore it with you further.
Work like this takes time and resources, and I would like to thank the Mozilla Foundation for generously granting me a Mozilla Open Source Support Award to conduct this project.
I've boiled down a year of curiosity and exploratory analysis into the following question: what are the similarities and differences between the evolving structures of six state-backed information operations on Twitter? It's a strange question that can't be answered with just any data science method, or even suite of methods.
Watch six decade-long disinformation operations unfold in six minutes
Here's a bird's eye view of six state-backed information operations on Twitter, and how they evolved over the last decade. This research was funded by the Mozilla Foundation by an Open Source Support Award.
I remember the moment when I found out that Twitter had released
millions of tweets that were tied to a Russian disinformation campaign, which may have effected the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential election. I was in a bar, in a backroom full of disinformation experts, and the datasets have shaped my research ever since. The
multiple bombshells of Twitter data which followed were the most fruitful datasets a social data scientist with an interest in disinformation could ask for.
Fast forward a year, and Twitter has released 10 GB of tweets from 11 countries (and counting) which they have attributed to "state-backed information operations" on their platform. Researchers have analyzed the datasets individually, and I myself conducted a temporal network analysis on the first Russian datasets with Dr. Charles Kriel for the
NATO Defense Strategic Communications Journal. Each in-depth analysis has served an important role in understanding how each country has individually curated processes for manipulating public opinion and information. But, as I dove further in, I couldn't help but wonder
how these individually evolving networks of information manipulation would look side-by-side and what this could tell me.
The Question
In an effort to see the forest from the trees, in this article I will present high-level visualizations of six state-backed disinformation operations on Twitter. I will periodically dive into parts I find interesting, but will leave the granular analysis for other projects and researchers. Hopefully my visualizations will spark further ideas about the strategies a country, or suite of countries, may have deployed. Maybe you will see something in my visualizations that confirms or contradicts your own knowledge. If so, I'd love to explore it with you further.
Work like this takes time and resources, and I would like to thank the Mozilla Foundation for generously granting me a
Mozilla Open Source Support Award to conduct this project.
I've boiled down a year of curiosity and exploratory analysis into the following question:
what are the similarities and differences between the evolving structures of six state-backed information operations on Twitter? It's a strange question that can't be answered with just any data science method, or even suite of methods.
The (method to the) answer: temporal network analysis. The process of mapping out relationships within a dataset is called network visualization, and has been used by social scientists and criminologists to understand human interactions from friend networks to crime networks. Patterns in human interaction are inherently dynamic, as they change as time passes. Factoring in that element of time unfurls a static network into a temporal one. I have chosen to conduct a temporal network analysis on six countries because I believe that it is the best way to synthesize the rich, nuanced, and complicated patterns in the data. For background on temporal network visualization itself and how it was used in this project, I've created this short video explainer:
What I Found
All six datasets began their activities around the turn of the last decade, and have shifted languages, structures, and hashtags. Some countries mostly stayed focused on the languages of their own countries (Egypt & UAE, Ecuador), while the rest (Russian IRA, Venezuela, Iran, China) pushed beyond their own country's main language to tweeting in others, such as English and Indonesian. Most datasets began with steadily quiet amounts of tweeting, and graduated to deploying multiple bursts of hashtag use (when a large amount of hashtags are used at once for a period of time). Often, operations began by tweeting innocuous hashtags in order to build their presence, such as #followme,#felizmartes ('happy Tuesday'), #noticias ('attention'), or #news before graduating to more political hashtags in loud bursts of tweets such as #deleteisrael, #blacklivesmatter, #maga, #HongKong, and #إردوغان ('Erdogan').
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Iran deployed newer accounts in their hashtag bursts while Russia, China, and Egypt & UAE deployed old 'sleeper' inauthentic accounts (which may potentially have been purchased) alongside newer accounts. The countries who chose to create new accounts for their hashtag bursts may have been
saving their older, more established, accounts for future opportunities in their disinformation operations.
The Datasets
The data I have crunched was all open-source and downloaded from Twitter's
Election Integrity Hub. According to Twitter, the data originated in China (three datasets), Venezuela (three datasets), Ecuador (one dataset), Russia (the Internet Research Agency, one dataset), Egypt & UAE (one dataset), and Iran (one dataset analyzed in this study).
Each of the datasets underwent a standardized process towards the final visualizations. Per country, I:
Combined separate sets into one dataset
Selected only tweets which contained a hashtag and extracted metadata
Visualized a network of inauthentic account - to - hashtag relationships in Gephi (a random sample of 300,000 relationships were used due to software restrictions)
Unfurled the network to play over time, and recorded it as a video
I chose to colour the lines which connected inauthentic users to hashtags by the age of the account in order to visually display the foresight that may or may have not gone into the hashtag bursts throughout the operations. In my previous research into the Russian IRA dataset, my co-author and I found that the year an account was created was the greatest indicator of how it behaved over time. This showed the high amount of organization and foresight the IRA exhibited, which I hope to compare in depth to other country's disinformation operations in future research.
The following section will outline each of the six disinformation operations as temporal network visualizations. I like to think of the networks as a birds eye view of state-backed employees hiding behind the curtains masquerading as honest people or groups who simply
have something to say, as I believe this perspective breathes life into the datasets.
The Temporal Network Visualizations
China
All Chinese tweets over time
Total number of tweets: 10,241,545 (16% contained hashtags)
Number of languages of tweets: 53 (top three were English, Chinese, and Indonesian)
In the video of the network, it can be observed that Chinese inauthentic accounts had been engaging in seemingly innocuous behaviour since their creation in as early as 2009. While the oldest (green) accounts were active and building their presence by tweeting hashtags #follow and #travel for a decade, the humans who were running this operation chose to deploy new (grey) accounts to tweet the Hong Kong protest related hashtags in 2019 alongside the older accounts. The old (green) 'sleeper' accounts they did not deploy during the protests were potentially being groomed for another use, but the burst of #HongKong related activity ultimately brought the entire network down.
Venezuela
All Venezuelan tweets over time
Total number of tweets: 12,070,658 (40% contained hashtags)
Number of languages of tweets: Undisclosed by Twitter (top-used hashtags were in Spanish, and few in English)
Twitter released three separate datasets which it deemed to be "
targeting audiences with in Venezuela and abroad". Spanish language hashtag use was prevalent in the network during the entire period (2010-2019), while English language hashtag use was prevalent in 2017 and appeared to be about Trump and the 2016 US election.
Throughout the evolution of the Venezuelan disinformation operation, accounts were created and deployed, and were not resurrected after going quiet (they did not use 'sleeper' accounts). The operation consisted of two regions of mostly Spanish-language hashtags, and a region of English-language, US and Trump related, hashtags which were used in 2017. The (pink) US-related hashtags were used a year after the 2016 US election, as they may have been attempting to influence post-election narratives. These accounts were created in 2017 (pink) and immediately deployed, while their older (green) counterpart accounts continued to tweet.
A dense region made up of accounts which were created between 2014 and 2017 (blue, pink) tweeted about the Bolivarian National Armed Forces between 2015 and 2017. Further research should be conducted into the narratives embedded in this tweeting region.
Ecuador
All Ecuadorian tweets over time
Total number of tweets: 700,240 (31% contained hashtags)
Number of languages of tweets: 51 (top three were Spanish, English and Indonesian)
The first six years of the Ecuadorian disinformation operation were quiet, with few inauthentic accounts using hashtags in their tweets. Then, between 2016-2019, the network engaged in multiple bursts of activity around various groups of hashtags, including those with legal and sporting themes.
The bulk of activity in this network occurred in 2018, with accounts which were created that year (grey) suddenly tweeting unique hashtags and popular ones, such as #atencion (attention), #telediarioec (TV news Ecuador), and #siguemeytesigo (follow back).
Russia (Internet Research Agency)
All Russian IRA tweets over time
Total number of tweets: 8,768,633 (28% contained hashtags)
Number of languages of tweets: 58 (top three were Russian, English, and German)
The IRA information operation consisted of multiple languages, each taking up specific regions in the network. First, inauthentic accounts tweeted in Russian, with a spike in activity in July, 2014 when
passenger airplane MH17 was shot down over Ukraine by a Russian missile. During this time, a Russian-language hashtag which translates to "Kyiv shot down a Boeing" was popular.
In 2015, activities shifted towards English language tweeting on the left side of the network. Regions of accounts using different hashtags such as #blacklivesmatter and #maga are active in the network visualization into the time of the US election in November, 2016. The IRA also tweeted in German, Italian, and Arabic between 2015 and 2017. Some inauthentic accounts also tweeted in multiple languages. This can be observed by the bridging blue and green lines between the Russian and English regions in the center of the network visualization.
Interestingly, they key region of specific US election-related hashtag use was executed by older (green) accounts which were created in 2013, but deployed between 2015 and 2017. This pattern of deploying 'sleeper' accounts was unique to the IRA and the Egyptian & UAE datasets analyzed in this article.
Egypt & UAE
All Egyptian & UAE tweets over time
Total number of tweets: 214,898 (82% contained hashtags)
Number of languages of tweets: 33 (top two were Arabic and English)
Only a handful of inauthentic accounts tweeted hashtags before 2016. Activity increased between 2016 and 2019, and then a stepped increase in hashtag use was observed in 2019 and utilized accounts which were created in different years in the stepped bursts. Some were were accounts that were created before 2013 (green), and into 2019 (black).
The attribution of these inauthentic accounts to a private technology company leads to the question of whether the older (green) accounts were purchased from another party at some point in time. The key difference between these suddenly active older (green) 'sleeper' accounts in 2019 to the 'sleeper' accounts in the Russian IRA dataset is that the latter were active and building their presence through hashtag use
before being deployed in a hashtag burst, making them appear less likely to have been purchased from elsewhere.
Iran
All Iranian tweets over time
Total number of tweets: 4,447,056 (46% contained hashtags)
Number of languages of tweets: Undisclosedby Twitter (main alphabets used in hashtags were Arabic and Latin)
The dataset used in the above network visualization was released by Twitter in October 2018 and was found to have "
potentially originated in Iran".
The disinformation operation was gaining momentum across the network until it's peak in 2017, when all regions of the network were highly active with accounts which were created across the last decade. These regions included ones with popular hashtags ranging from as innocent as #nature and #art, to ones as political as #deleteisrael and #freepalestine.
It is interesting to note that in this disinformation operation, the oldest (green) accounts were tweeting hashtags in multiple regions in the network, possibly tweeting in different languages. This tactic was also present in the Russian IRA and Chinese information operations.
To the Future
It is worth noting the limitations of this study before looking forward to the future of this work. First, Twitter has not released information about their attribution methodology, and it cannot be guaranteed that any inauthentic account which has been attributed to one country has not been purchased from another. Second, the choice to visualize inauthentic account relationships with hashtags was a subjective one, and visualizing account relationships with other Twitter users produces similarly interesting results. Third, high-level representations can lead to assumptions, so I have done my best to translate my deeper conclusions into future research ideas. Finally, soaking in these network requires parallel examination of two static graphics and one moving one, which can be difficult to understand. I am curious about how these networks can be communicated better, and hope to start a PhD researching just that this Fall.
This project has built on my research with NATO Defense Strategic Communications, and on my MSc Data Science dissertation (for which a Medium article summary is forthcoming). If you've made it this far and have any questions or curiosities you'd like to explore, please direct message me on
Twitter. I'm always looking for new opportunities to use temporal network analysis to understand disinformation, and human interaction. I believe that temporal network analysis has the power to unlock the nuanced intricacies of complex interactions in a way that no other individual method can, and the bird's eye view it affords deserves further effort to make it understandable to others.
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
is the second-largest arms producer in the world, behind the
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