In response to the article below and my comments I received this article from Chosun Ilbo. It was only published in Korean. I ma grateful to Raymond Ha from HRNK for translating it for us.  This seems to confirm my comments that South Korea is more than capable of developing nuclear weapons.  And the South has 24 nuclear power plants as opposed to the 23 I said in my comments.


6 Months to Produce Fissile Materials, 6-9 Months to Develop a Detonation Device...South Korea Could Arm Itself With a Nuclear Weapon in 1.5 Years
 
Lee Young-Wan, Science reporter
 
Following North Korea's nuclear test and the subsequent long-range missile launch, there have been voices calling for South Korea to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. According to experts, "the question of whether South Korea could do so is not a question of technology or capability, but only a question of [political] will." They added that South Korea could "deploy a nuclear weapon in only 1.5 years once the decision is made, and in no longer than 2 years."
 
 
Fuel Reprocessing Possible in Laboratories
 
In order to create a nuclear weapon, it is necessary to obtain fissile materials, such as uranium or plutonium. Furthermore, there needs to be a detonation device that can set off a high-grade explosive with a precision of less than a millionth of a second. This is necessary to initiate the nuclear fission chain reaction. Lastly, it is also important to have materials that can safely encase the fissile material.
 
Of these requirements, obtaining fissile material is the most important. Nuclear bombs can be made from both uranium or plutonium. Under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Agreement, South Korea is prohibited from obtaining fissile material. However, this does not mean that it lacks the requisite capability or technology to do so. We currently operate twenty-four nuclear power plants, incuding the Gori-1 plant, which is set to be shut down.
 
During the course of their operation, nuclear power plants produce spent nuclear fuel rods that contain small amounts of plutonium. In particular, the four Wolsong power plants (#1-4), which are heavy water reactors, produce spent fuel that is of higher plutonium content than that produced by light water reactors. On average, the spent fuel from the Wolsong plants consists of 1% plutonium. At the end of 2014, the Wolsong plants stored 7,414 metric tons of spent fuel rods. If this reprocessed, it is possible, in theory, to obtain 74 metric tons of plutonium. Only 4kg of plutonium is necessary for a single nuclear bomb, which means that up to 18,500 bombs could be made from this amount.
 
Kim Seung-Pyong, a professor of nuclear engineering at Chosun University, said that "there are multiple ways of extracting plutonium from spent fuel rods, including electrolysis (dry method) and liquid-liquid extraction, but none of them present technical challenges." He added that "it would take time to construct a large-scale reprocessing facility, but it can be done [at a smaller scale] even now in laboratories." South Korea is prohibited from reprocessing fuel, but Japan has a reprocessing facility in Rokkasho, Aomori county. This facility is used to separate plutonium from spent fuel for the purpose of re-using it in power plants, but the facility could potentially be used to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs.
 
South Korea also has advanced reprocessing technology. One professor of nuclear engineering said that "our capabilities when it comes to pyroprocessing, which involves reprocessing by using electolysis, are world-class." He noted that "if spent fuel is first reprocessed using pyroprocessing and then dissolved using nitric acid-which is the typical method-then it is possible to obtain more fissile material in a shorter amount of time." Experts estimated that it would take a total of 6 months to build a reprocessing facility and then obtain the necessary fissile material for a nuclear bomb.
 
 
South Korea also has new laser enrichment technology
 
To obtain fissile material for a uranium bomb, naturally occurring uranium must be enriched. This is because uranium, when found in nature, is a mix of the two isotopes U-238 and U-235. Natural uranium only contains 0.7% of U-235, which is the fissile isotope. It is necessary to cross the 90% threshold to be used in a nuclear weapon, and U-235 of such high purity can only be produced through an enrichment process using centrifuges. To obtain 1kg of uranium of such high concentration, one needs 1,000 metric tons of naturally-occurring uranium. Because of this, North Korea has been unable to construct large-scale enrichment facilities even though it has pursued nuclear weapons for several decades.
 
South Korea could develop uranium bombs faster than North Korea. In 2000, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute tested a sophisticated laser enrichment technology. It is said that 1kg of highly enriched U-235 can be produced in around 4 hours if this technology is used.
 
It is also straightforward to obtain the technology to construct a nuclear bomb. Most of the requisite technology was developed in the 1940s and 1950s, and blueprints can even be easily found online. One professor at a private university in Seoul said that "we teach some elements of nuclear weapon design to students taking classes in nuclear design, so that they can understand the power of nuclear bombs." Seo Gyoon-Ryeol, a professor in the Nuclear Engineering Department at Seoul National University, said that "alloys and precision manufacturing are necessary to develop the materials to encase fissile material, but this technology is already commonly used for industrial purposes in South Korea." South Korea's  civil engineering capabilities, which are necessary in preparing for nuclear tests, are also world-class.
 
According to experts, it would take 6 months to obtain fissile material, 6-9 months to develop a detonation device, and 3-6 months to conduct a nuclear test. This means that a nuclear bomb could be made in 1.5-2 years. Lim Man-Seong, a professor of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering at KAIST, said that "the time needed to create a nuclear bomb would vary depending on how much financial and human resources are invested into the project."
Text in Embedded Graphic:



* The information written in the dark blue panel at the bottom of the graphic is reproduced exactly in the article, so it has been omitted here .
 
 
Title : Time Estimated to Produce a Nuclear Weapon, as estimated by experts
 
Stage 1 (light brown, far left)
 
Obtaining Manpower (3 months)
1.      Interviewing & selecting personnel in relevant fields
2.      Designing a nuclear weapon
 
Stage 2 (light brown)
 
Producing Fissile Material (6 months)
1.      Construction of reprocessing factory or a reprocessing system relying on laboratories
2.      Collecting spent fuel rods from Wolsong 1-4 nuclear power plants
3.      Primary extraction of plutonium using electrolysis
4.      Liquid-liquid extraction using nitrates and other substances to obtain weapons-grade plutonium
 
Stage 3 (light brown )
 
Developing a detonation device (6-9 months)
1.      Testing a detonation device
2.      Building a nuclear test site
 
Stage 4 (light brown, far right)
 
Nuclear testing (3-6 months)
1.      Complete production of nuclear warheads
2.      Nuclear test
3.      Deployment on missiles
 
 
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:  David Maxwell  <David.Maxwell@georgetown.edu>
Date: Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 8:28 AM
Subject: Ending South Korea's Nuclear Temptation
To: 


One thing I think we forget and perhaps many Koreans in the South forget is that South Korea is already a nuclear capable nation.  It has some 23 nuclear reactors operating in the South and builds nuclear reactors overseas.  I am quite sure that it has the capability, technology, and probably evens plans and designs for nuclear weapons.  In comparison we should recall Dr. Bruce Bennett's description of north Korea:  "a non-compliant (with the NPT). unsafe, nuclear experimenter."  The ROK is far superior to the north in terms of nuclear technology and capability.  It just has been a responsible member of the international community (er.. except that one time when it was discovered actually conduct nuclear weapons research).

And I certainly agree with this conclusion.  The ROK can and should have a greater leadership role and we should be comfortable with that.  But as an ally and a superpower we must provide strategic reassurance and demonstrate strategic resolve.

The challenge for the U.S. is to accept that Seoul should have a greater leadership role. Giving Seoul greater freedom to act militarily against Pyongyang can lead to inadvertent escalation and drag Washington into the fight. It could also be misinterpreted by Pyongyang as a weakening of U.S. defense commitments to Seoul. (South Koreans sometimes demonstrate the same fear: when Washington accedes to demands for greater autonomy, they worry about abandonment.)
Allowing Seoul to drive the diplomatic agenda also makes some Americans worry that they may be cornered into agreeing to a less-than-optimal solution. Yet this is the best way to quell South Korean frustration and growing calls for nuclear weapons.
U.S. strategists often mechanically seek to strengthen deterrence of adversaries like North Korea to reassure allies that they don't need their own nuclear weapons.  But a more sophisticated strategy is required, starting with a clearer understanding of why allies are tempted to begin with. Without that, U.S. allies may one day go nuclear, with South Korea leading the pack.

Ending South Korea's Nuclear Temptation

Only firmer resolve among its allies to stand up to the North can reduce Seoul's need for its own deterrent.


ENLARGE
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un salutes during a visit to the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces on the occasion of the new year on Jan. 10, 2016.  PHOTO: KCNA/REUTERS
By 
BRAD GLOSSERMAN And
 
DAVID SANTORO
March 10, 2016 12:51 p.m. ET
South Koreans are frustrated. They feel powerless against yet another round of North Korean provocations, and their frustration has driven some mainstream politicians, with considerable public support, to champion a strategy once advanced only on the fringe: acquiring nuclear weapons.
In response, nonproliferation experts and officials trot out the usual arguments why this is a bad idea. It would hurt South Korea's economy, security and international status. It would further entrench the nuclear problem on the Peninsula and could lead Japan or Taiwan to reconsider their nuclear options. Most important, it would be unnecessary because the U.S. remains steadfast in its defense commitments to South Korea, including its "nuclear umbrella."
Correct though these explanations are, they won't reverse South Korean nuclear sentiment because they don't address the frustration behind it.
South Koreans see that a poor, backward and isolated North Korea has developed sophisticated nuclear and missile capabilities in defiance of international pressure. That country is threatening to attack them. Perhaps most galling, North Korea has captured international attention and overshadowed the South's economic miracle and rise within the international system.
South Koreans are further irritated that they have lost the diplomatic initiative to address the problem. Neither the pro-engagement attempts of the "Sunshine Policy" (1998-2008) nor the harder-line stance of subsequent administrations has changed North Korean behavior.
South Koreans feel sandwiched between the apparent fecklessness of U.S. "strategic patience"-the refusal to offer Pyongyang incentives to return to negotiations-and Chinese reluctance to apply pressure. Despite Seoul's overtures since 2013, Beijing has refused to wield its unique power over North Korea. It has also demanded that Seoul not deploy an advanced U.S. missile-defense system, saying it threatens China's security.
South Korean thinking isn't monolithic. Some prefer policies that include Washington allowing Seoul to acquire sensitive nuclear technology to maintain a latent weapon capability, or the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Peninsula, options the U.S. resists.
Yet it's pointless merely to explain why these are bad choices. South Koreans need suggestions that would relieve their mounting frustration.
While no solution would be total, the only long-term remedy is the restoration of some South Korean control over matters involving their security and the diplomatic agenda. Until recently, the U.S. handled most matters and consulted with its ally on an ad hoc basis. Washington "extended deterrence" of North Korea on Seoul's behalf, leaving South Koreans mostly on the receiving end of U.S. decisions. Frustration grew in tandem with the North Korean threat.
The establishment in 2010 of the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (renamed the Deterrence Strategy Committee, or DSC) rebalanced the relationship by institutionalizing bilateral dialogue on ways to strengthen defense and deterrence. While the U.S. remains responsible for contingencies at the high end of the conflict spectrum (with U.S. nuclear weapons being critical to that effect), South Korea has been given more room to act at the lower ends.
The DSC, which met in California last month and conducts an annual tabletop exercise to boost alliance military capabilities and bilateral coordination, helps temper South Korean frustration and reassure skeptics in Seoul that U.S. defense commitments remain ironclad. Joint military drills and joint shows of force during crises also serve this dual goal. These initiatives should continue and deepen.
But South Koreans also need to feel that they lead or at least influence diplomatic efforts to resolve the current standoff. While acknowledging that their country is "a shrimp among whales," South Koreans want to use their middle-power status to play a larger regional and global role.
After taking office in 2013, President Park Geun-hye proposed the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative to overcome the regional disconnect between deep economic interdependence and poor political and security cooperation. The effort has won the support of the U.S., Japan, China, Russia and Mongolia and created an arena for cooperation on nontraditional issues such as nuclear safety, energy security, the environment, cyberspace and disaster management.
Seoul should now steer the initiative toward addressing the North Korean problem. While it probably can't solve it, this will make South Koreans feel that they are in control, rather than dependent on U.S. and Chinese decisions. Middle powers may be bound to accept greater powers' policy choices, but they can-and should-influence these choices.
The challenge for the U.S. is to accept that Seoul should have a greater leadership role. Giving Seoul greater freedom to act militarily against Pyongyang can lead to inadvertent escalation and drag Washington into the fight. It could also be misinterpreted by Pyongyang as a weakening of U.S. defense commitments to Seoul. (South Koreans sometimes demonstrate the same fear: when Washington accedes to demands for greater autonomy, they worry about abandonment.)
Allowing Seoul to drive the diplomatic agenda also makes some Americans worry that they may be cornered into agreeing to a less-than-optimal solution. Yet this is the best way to quell South Korean frustration and growing calls for nuclear weapons.
U.S. strategists often mechanically seek to strengthen deterrence of adversaries like North Korea to reassure allies that they don't need their own nuclear weapons. But a more sophisticated strategy is required, starting with a clearer understanding of why allies are tempted to begin with. Without that, U.S. allies may one day go nuclear, with South Korea leading the pack.
Mr. Glosserman is executive director of the Pacific Forum, a program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where Mr. Santoro is a senior fellow.

David S. Maxwell
Associate Director
Center for Security Studies &
Security Studies Program
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
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