On the surface, this appears to be a two party (Assad's regime and the opposition) negotiation, and the conveners in Geneva seem to be approaching it as such by attempting to facilitate dialogue between representatives of these two groups. 

What is less obvious to the international community observing this war from afar, is that the opposition itself is made up of many factions that do not necessarily have common goals and objectives. To mention just a few of these diverse groups, there is the Free Syrian Army, a self-declared non-sectarian group and the largest and most established opposition group made up of about 50,000 former military and civilian fighters. Then you have  the Syrian Liberation Front and the Syrian Islamic Front and unlike the non-sectarian Free Syrian Army, these groups adhere strictly to Islamic ideology. Jabhat al-Nusra is yet another group which has declared itself a Jihadist group and pledged allegiance to al-Qaida leader Ayman al Zawahiri and to al-Qaida in Iraq. This group has been growing with thousands of men from the Free Syrian Army reportedly defecting to it's side. Al-Nusra has some of the rebels most tested and effective fighters and has been designated by the US as a terrorist group.

In addition to these actors in the theatre of the Syrian civil war, there are other stakeholders such as neighboring countries concerned about stability in the region. The West at large  also  has a concern about giving the Muslim extremists a strategic, political and economic foothold with which to advance their crusade of global domination. Adding to this labyrinth,  is the proxy-war element with the  principals really being Iran and Saudi Arabia  concerned with power and influence in the region as well as  the religious Shiite-Suni issue.  As we understand more about the opposition players and the concerned stakeholders, the nature of this negotiation becomes an extremely complex multi-party and multi-layered negotiation.

For purposes of this column and for the sake of simplicity however, let us focus on the opposition players only and not all the stakeholders identified above.

All these groups that make up the "opposition" have one thing in common in as far as what they DON'T want. They all DON'T want  Assad in power!  But for negotiations to advance effectively, it is not enough to know what the parties DON'T want -  we need to have a thorough understanding of what the parties DO want.  As far as what each faction of the opposition DOES want has not been very rigorously explored, meticulously uncovered and thoroughly understood.

By perceiving this as only a two-party negotiation is an abject oversimplification of the problem. Even if they successfully drive Assad from power, whether by negotiation or military force, the real problems will just  begin. In the absence of leadership, each of these factions  will vie for power and authority as each tries to fill  the vacuum left behind. Because each faction has such different drivers, goals,  interests and concerns, these negotiations need to be approached as a multi-party negotiation, and until that is recognized and implemented, there cannot be any effective,  durable and compliance-prone agreement.

THE SOLUTION

Before there can be negotiations with the Assad regime and it's sponsors there needs to be serious internal dialogue and negotiation within the opposition groups themselves.

We need to understand what each faction is looking to achieve; what are the needs, fears and concerns of each? Which do they share and in which are they different? Which are in alignment and which are in conflict?  In what are each prepared to compromise and in what will they not yield? This process itself will generate enormous value in that so much will be learned about themselves, each other and whether or not a working coalition can exist between them.  

We then need to help them work towards creating a common vision for a future Syria that take all of their differing interests into account, and one which they all will be able to accept, if not embrace, and to live with. Only once this crucial groundwork is achieved, are we then ready to start facilitating talks with the other side.

THE APPLICATION 

Often we are negotiating either in teams or representing teams particularly in diplomatic or large corporate negotiations. The same is true for our counterparts. There are actors who are parties to the negotiation and there are stakeholders who are impacted and can influence the outcome of negotiations. Often each has their own individual interests and concerns that differ from one another.

When we are preparing for negotiations, we need to make sure that we explore and understand the differing individual perspectives, needs, and concerns within our own team so that we can reach a common  collective consensus of what we need to achieve in the negotiations. 

Similarly, when we are engaging with the other side, we must help  them, in a very non-threatening way, to  understand and merge their various individual needs towards a common and agreed upon objective, should it become evident that they are not on the same page. In this capacity, we should see ourselves almost as  collaborative counselors rather than negotiators, which will not only advance productive discussions but will also build a degree of trust. Only once this groundwork has  been effectively implemented, can we look forward towards a successful, productive, profitable and satisfying outcome.