"Irregular Warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge."
- T.E. Lawrence
"Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."
- Sun Tzu
"In a national insurrection the center of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed."
- Clausewitz, 1832.
1. Adversaries Pose Unconventional Threats in 'Gray Zone,' DOD Official Says
2. The War On Terror, Through The Eyes Of 3 Women At The CIA
3. US bombs its own ammo dump in Syria as most troops beat a hasty retreat from the country
4. Humanitarian assistance? Regional security? Whatever the scenario, Defender Pacific isn't a war game, says general
5. China warns US it will take 'countermeasures' over Hong Kong bill
6. United Nations Backslides on Human Rights in Counterterrorism
7. How the U.S. Military Will Carry Out a Hasty, Risky Withdrawal From Syria
8. Naval Academy midshipmen seek Satanic Temple space
9. New, longer Army infantry training is making better shooters, soldiers and life savers, data shows
10. Knowledge Management in Special Operations
1. Adversaries Pose Unconventional Threats in 'Gray Zone,' DOD Official Says
I am reminded of these two memes/photos.
Adversaries Pose Unconventional Threats in 'Gray Zone,' DOD Official Says
The unconventional and insidious threat U.S. adversaries pose is in the "gray zone," the space between U.S. traditional concepts of a peaceful state of affairs and full-scale war, a Defense Department official said.
Theresa Whelan, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security, participated in a multidomain homeland defense panel discussion at the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting and exposition in Washington.
"The gray zone is a pretty busy place these days because our adversaries see it as the space where they can achieve their national objectives without triggering full-scale combat with us," Whelan said. "We've seen the Russians [use] the gray zone in Ukraine. Our adversaries really don't have any interest in confronting us on the battlefield. They know what that means for them. They want to defeat us by trying to make sure that we don't even get to the battlefield."
Cyber Training
U.S. service members and civilians, as well as partner nation military personnel, participated in the Cyber Flag 19-1 exercise, June 21-28, in Suffolk, Virginia. The tactical-level exercise focused on the continued building of a community of defensive cyber operators and the improvement of the overall capability of the U.S. and partner nations.
Quoting former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, Whelan said the Defense Department knows its near-peer adversaries have the intent and the ability to hold critical U.S. infrastructure at risk without conventional warfare.
"This really makes the homeland a new front line, which is a huge change in mindset we have to make for ourselves," she noted.
While the United States must work with its partners to address defensive requirements, DOD also needs to think about how to change the way it does business, Whelan said.
Lab Exercise
Lt. Col. Made Dwipayana Atmaja of Indonesia's air force works on a cybersecurity lab exercise during the 2019 Information System and Technology Exchange in Jakarta, Indonesia, July 23, 2019. Part of the Hawaii National Guard's State Partnership Program, the exchange aims to share best practices, assist in cybersecurity doctrine development, and enhance cybersecurity capabilities to effectively defend and protect critical cyber information infrastructure from malicious virus and cyber intrusion.
"We know that China and Russia have the ability to cause disruptive effects on our critical infrastructure, and during a conflict or prior to an actual conflict, we really have to anticipate attacks against our critical government infrastructures," she said. At risk are defense and economic-related infrastructures, Whelan said. Limiting DOD's retaliatory options and challenging the will of the American people to fight and to win are also part of adversaries' objectives, she added.
Addressing the near-peer challenge is going to require work at home, and implementing the National Defense Strategy is essential to maintaining stability, she said.
"It's dangerous for us, but also for our adversaries to have the impression that they can deter us by disrupting us here in the homeland," Whelan said.
Cyber Mission
The Ohio National Guard cyber mission assurance team assesses the network during Exercise Cyber Shield 19 at Camp Atterbury, Ind., April 16, 2019. The National Guard is standing up cyber mission assurance teams to help in securing the critical infrastructure that services Defense Department installations.
DOD has a responsibility and a need to work with other departments and with the whole of society to try to improve its defensive posture domestically, she noted.
"We also have an equal responsibility to be prepared to operate in a degraded [homeland] environment, and we need to prepare ourselves by rethinking how we do our planning, how we develop our capabilities domestically and also how we train," Whelan said. "We train as we fight."
Amaryllis Fox was about to start her senior year in college when the Sept. 11 attacks hit in 2001. The next day, she drove from Washington to New York to see the smouldering rubble. Just a few years later, she was an undercover CIA officer meeting extremists.
"One of the things I think we all forget is how incredibly young so many of the intelligence officers really are," Fox said in an interview with NPR. Her new book,
Life Undercover: Coming Of Age In The CIA, was published Tuesday.
Tracy Walder was a sorority sister at University of Southern California, and a news junkie, who joined the CIA just weeks after graduation in 2000. The terror attacks the following year accelerated her training.
"To be completely honest with you, I had been placed in the counterterrorism center not because I was spectacular but because I was young. So a lot of us newbies were placed in the counterterrorism center," Walder said. Her book,
The Unexpected Spy: From The CIA To The FBI, My Secret Life Taking Down Some of the World's Most Notorious Terrorists, is set for release early next year.
These two women, along with a third, Nada Bakos, all have books that lay out in striking detail how they went about that secretive work in the years after al-Qaida struck.
Readers learn how to create an undercover identity as an art dealer. How to trade coded messages via a Starbucks gift card. And as Tracy Walder explains, it's not easy blending in when you're a young, blonde American in the Middle East.
"Sometimes I would have to travel in the trunks of cars just because that was the way that it was. And I was going to stick out no matter what," she told NPR.
An infusion of new recruits
The war on terror marked a major shift for a spy agency long run by older white men who had specialized in Russia. After the 2001 attacks, the focus turned to radical Islam. The CIA scrambled to ramp up its counterterrorism operations, and this led to an infusion of new recruits, many of them women.
Nada Bakos' book, published in June, is called
The Targeter: My Life In The CIA, Hunting Terrorists And Challenging The White House. The title is also her job description.
Her mission was to learn everything possible about extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a leader of the Iraq insurgency that followed the U.S. invasion in 2003.
"You're looking for information that you can act on," she said. "You give it to whatever action arm that we have at the time, and in my case, quite often it was special forces."
Zarqawi was ultimately killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2006 in Iraq.
Amaryllis Fox writes about making her way through the congested streets of Karachi, Pakistan, for a clandestine meeting with extremists. She's trying to learn about a possible attack. They wanted to discuss U.S. drone strikes that are killing civilians.
"There are electric moments walking into meetings," she said. "There are moments of intense drama that we associate with the war on terror, with the spy world."
Changes at CIA
And this spy world now includes women in more prominent positions than ever before. Last year, Gina Haspel became the CIA's first woman director. Just below her, three of the agency's five directorates are now headed by women.
"It's a great time to be a woman at the agency," Haspel said in April. "Setting aside my own position, the head of operations is a woman, the head of analysis is a woman, the head of science and technology is a woman. You might sense a conspiracy here."
The three women authors don't see a conspiracy. They see a distinct skill set that many women bring.
"There was a gradual awakening to the idea that some of the traits that we tend to associate with feminine characteristics - intuition, emotional intelligence and multitasking - these are things that make really excellent operations officers," Amaryllis Fox said.
These book are also filled with frustrations.
Nada Bakos was on a team looking into possible links between al-Qaida and Iraq leader Saddam Hussein.
"We really didn't find a connection between Iraq and any larger international terrorist organization that would have really posed a threat to the United States," Bakos said.
Which was not what President George W. Bush's administration said as it launched the war against Iraq.
"There were moments in my career when I just wanted to go out into the street and yell exactly everything that I told the policymaker that they aren't telling the public. I mean, it's incredibly frustrating," Bakos added
.
Going to war
Around the same time, Tracy Walder's team made poster-size graphics showing that Saddam Hussein likely did not have weapons of mass destruction. That material was sent to the White House, and it morphed into the poster that Secretary of State Colin Powell famously used at the United Nations to argue that Hussein did have such weapons.
"Obviously we were horrified," Walder said. "I do think part of that chart, along with the whole WMD case, was used sort of incorrectly as the impetus for the Iraq War."
Like all books by former CIA employees, these manuscripts had to be submitted to the agency for review.
Tracy Walder's book will include the blacked-out redactions made by the CIA. Nada Bakos filed a lawsuit against the CIA to get her book released. And the book by Amaryllis Fox recently caused a stir amid reports it had not been cleared for publication. But it was published as planned on Tuesday.
All three women left the agency by 2010 and have moved on with their lives.
Amaryllis Fox sometimes travels to Iraq to work with those scarred by violence. Nada Bakos is at a social media company in Seattle. Tracy Walder teaches a course called Spycraft at an all-girls school in Dallas. Some of her students have followed in her footsteps.
"Some of the girls I've had now work at State Department, the CIA, the FBI. They've gone to military colleges," she said.
In the compartmentalized world of the CIA, these three women say they've never met. If they ever do, they'll have a lot to talk about.
Greg Myre is an NPR national security correspondent. Follow him @gregmyre1.
3. US bombs its own ammo dump in Syria as most troops beat a hasty retreat from the country
US bombs its own ammo dump in Syria as most troops beat a hasty retreat from the country
On Wednesday, the U.S. military had to call in an airstrike on one of its own ammunition dumps in northern Syria because the cargo trucks required to safely remove the ammo are needed elsewhere to support the withdrawal, Task & Purpose has learned.
Two F-15Es destroyed the LaFarge Cement factory between Kobane and Ayn Issa after all U.S. troops had left the area, said Army Col. Myles Caggins, a spokesman for the U.S.-led military coalition fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq.
"Blowing the ammo was part of the plan," Caggins told Task & Purpose. "Abandoning unguarded ammo would not be prudent."
The White House first announced on Oct. 6 that a small number U.S. special operators in northeastern Syria would withdraw ahead of Turkey's invasion of Kurdish-held territory, but the Turkish military operation proved to be bigger than expected.
The Turks have advanced deeper into Kurdish territory and further to the west than the U.S. government thought they would, a senior defense official told reporters on Tuesday.
On Oct. 11, U.S. troops operating near Kobane came under Turkish artillery fire. No U.S. personnel were harmed.
The incident was the first significant indicator that the Turks would operate outside the safety zone they had said they were establishing in northeast Syria, the senior defense official said.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced on Oct. 13 that most U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria to avoid being caught between the warring sides. A small residual force is expected to remain at the Al Tanf garrison - for now.
4. Humanitarian assistance? Regional security? Whatever the scenario, Defender Pacific isn't a war game, says general
Excerpts:
But Johnson made it clear that while aspects of the exercise might take place within the bounds of the South China Sea area, "this is not a war game. We're not doing a war game with our bilateral partners," he said, "We're simply trying to make sure that if we had to come to their assistance in that part of the region, that we certainly can. We've got to understand the environment, we've got to understand the constraints, the challenges, and we've worked through them."
The exercise will consist of many things the Army has not practiced at such a large scale. Forces will be in countries like the Philippines and Thailand, and they will likely work with other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.
Humanitarian assistance? Regional security? Whatever the scenario, Defender Pacific isn't a war game, says general
WASHINGTON - The first year for the military exercise Defender Pacific will be smaller in size than its sister drill in Europe in 2020, but it will still be one of the largest exercises conducted by the U.S. Army and its partners and allies in the region since Team Spirit drills in South Korea ended in the early 1990s, according to acting U.S. Army Pacific Commander Lt. Gen. John "Pete" Johnson.
The Army will flow roughly 12,000 soldiers into the region next year around September for the exercise, Johnson told Defense News in an interview ahead of the Association of the U.S. Army's annual conference.
The exercise is fueled by a rising China, characterized in the National Defense Strategy as a long-term, strategic competitor of the United States. The NDS lays out a world where great power competition rather than counterterrorism will drive the Defense Department's decision-making and force structure.
While the U.S. Army has 85,000 permanently stationed troops in the Indo-Pacific region and is conducting exercises such as Pacific Pathways with allies and partners, the service is aiming to practice rapid deployment from the continental United States to the Pacific.
"We're clearly doing it to demonstrate our commitment to the region and reinforce each of our bilateral relationships," Johnson said. "We're also doing it to train ourselves, increase our ability."
Exercise elements could include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or address a range of security concerns the U.S. might have, Johnson said.
Before retiring, the former U.S. Army Pacific Command chief, Gen. Robert Brown, told Defense News that the major exercise would focus on a South China Sea scenario.
"They will get the challenge of coming to the Pacific with the Pacific-assigned forces already there," Brown said, "and we won't go to Korea, we will actually go to a South China Sea scenario where we will be around the South China Sea; and another scenario we can do that is the East China Sea."
The South China Sea has been a hotbed of contention for several years. China has laid claim to the area, building artificial islands in disputed waters with military facilities on them, with the country claiming it has the authority to restrict international navigation.
But Johnson made it clear that while aspects of the exercise might take place within the bounds of the South China Sea area, "this is not a war game. We're not doing a war game with our bilateral partners," he said, "We're simply trying to make sure that if we had to come to their assistance in that part of the region, that we certainly can. We've got to understand the environment, we've got to understand the constraints, the challenges, and we've worked through them."
The exercise will consist of many things the Army has not practiced at such a large scale. Forces will be in countries like the Philippines and Thailand, and they will likely work with other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.
The Army also plans to conduct parts of the exercise with other partners "like our compact states, Papua New Guinea, etc." to deliver the force forward, Johnson said. The compact states consist of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau.
The exercise will aim to challenge the U.S. in its ability to deploy from the continental U.S., Johnson said. "The tyranny of distance is real from the continental United States into this region, and it takes a tremendous amount of effort to do that."
Defender Pacific "will go a long way to enable our joint logistics enterprise, to itself, and for us to train on those key force projection tasks to be able to flow forces into theater," he said, " and then once into theater, we're essentially connecting to our existing bilateral relationships."
Forces on the ground are expected to execute missions and train with allies. The Army rescheduled some exercises traditionally held during different times of the year to fall under Defender Pacific "so that we can get the stressor, the simultaneity, and we get the stressor on our joint logistics," Johnson said.
Adding in elements of Mutli-Domain Operations, the service's war-fighting concept, a multidomain task force will be integrated into the exercise.
While Defender Pacific in 2020 will be smaller in troop count - a "light" version - as Johnson called it, the exercise the following year will be much larger - the "heavy" version.
Defender Europe will be larger this year but will trade off in size with the Pacific as the Defender series become annual, Johnson explained. It's possible the Defender series might even have elements in the homeland, he added.
In 2021, Defender Pacific is preparing to involve roughly 30,000 troops in the region, Johnson said.
5. China warns US it will take 'countermeasures' over Hong Kong bill
China warns US it will take 'countermeasures' over Hong Kong bill
Foreign ministry says it will damage American interests in the city, while Chief Executive Carrie Lam calls it 'totally unjustified and unwarranted'
Analysts warn the proposed legislation, which was passed in the House of Representatives, could inflame the situation in Hong Kong
China's top legislature and government agencies on Wednesday slammed the US House of Representatives for passing a bill in support of
anti-government protesters in Hong Kong, warning of "countermeasures" and that American interests in the city would suffer.
The National People's Congress, the foreign ministry, Beijing's top office on Hong Kong policy and state media all issued fiery statements condemning the bill and said China would take action after the House
passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act on Tuesday, moving it one step closer to becoming US law.
"We strongly urge the US Congress and some American politicians to immediately stop interfering in Hong Kong affairs ... halt further deliberation of the bill, and do more to benefit the long-term development and fundamental interests of China and the US," a statement from the NPC Foreign Affairs Committee said.
Meanwhile, foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang made clear that China would not give an inch on national sovereignty issues, saying in a regular press briefing in Beijing: "With regards to the incorrect decision by the US, China must take strong countermeasures to firmly safeguard its sovereignty, security and developmental interests.
"If the relevant bill is ultimately passed into law, not only will it harm Chinese interests but it will damage China-US relations and seriously damage the US' own interests."
The bill, which was passed in the House on a voice vote, now awaits a vote in the US Senate, where it currently has bipartisan support.
If passed and signed into law by the president, the bill would require the US government to assess whether political developments in Hong Kong justify Washington changing its treatment of the city as a separate trading entity from the Chinese mainland.
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It also paves the way for sanctions against individuals deemed responsible for actions that undermine Hong Kong's autonomy, such as the rendition to the mainland of anyone exercising "internationally recognised human rights in Hong Kong".
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on Tuesday stressed that Americans must do the right thing and reaffirm America's commitment to democracy.
"If America does not speak out for human rights in China because of commercial interests, then we lose all moral authority to speak out on behalf of human rights any place in the world," Pelosi told the House.
"To those who want to take the repressive government's side in this discussion, I say to you: What does it profit a person if he gains the whole world and suffers the loss of his soul?" the speaker said as she praised the young protesters in Hong Kong for their courage.
But Chinese analysts warned that the bill could inflame the situation in the city, which has seen increasingly violent street protests in recent weeks.
Zhang Jian, a Hong Kong affairs expert with the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, said it sent "a very bad message" to radical protesters.
"Of all foreign countries in the world, the US has the most interests in Hong Kong," Zhang said. "If the US revokes Hong Kong's status as a separate trading entity [from mainland China], both countries [China and the US] will suffer.
"There are a large number of US businesses and Americans in Hong Kong - China will have plenty of ways to deal with them," he said.
Shi Yinhong, an international affairs expert from Renmin University of China in Beijing, said the move would cast a shadow over the continuing US-China trade talks.
"China will definitely enact countermeasures if the bill has a negative impact on Hong Kong's social stability, financial and political interests - and China's national pride," Shi said. "But it is difficult to predict what the specific measures will be [although I expect] them to be not as strong as the bill."
Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations at Nanjing University, called the bill the "harshest" legislation passed by the House against China in more than 40 years.
Li Xiaobing, an associate professor of law at Nankai University in Tianjin, said the vote indicated that Hong Kong had become a card for Washington to play as its rivalry with China intensified. He also warned that as Hong Kong struggled to end the unrest, the city could lose its edge in the Greater Bay Area and Beijing may need to adjust its strategy.
Four months of protests in Hong Kong - initially over an
extradition bill that would have allowed criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China - have plunged the city into its worst crisis since it came under Chinese rule in 1997.
The protesters' demands now include universal suffrage and an independent inquiry into alleged police brutality, but Beijing has portrayed the demonstrations as a separatist movement with backing from "foreign forces" such as the US.
Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor said on Wednesday that the US bill was "totally unjustified and unwarranted" and could hurt American interests in Hong Kong - including 1,400 US companies and 85,000 US citizens in the city.
"The act will create a lot of uncertainties that will damage business confidence and, in turn, business prospects in Hong Kong," she said.
The city's pro-establishment camp also issued a statement saying "we strongly object to the House of Representatives' attempt to grossly interfere in the domestic affairs of Hong Kong and to promote the political interests of their proxies in Hong Kong". It also accused US Congress members of listening to "biased and one-sided" testimonies.
But it was good news for others in Hong Kong.
"It could make some noise in the international arena and put pressure on Beijing," said a 30-year-old executive assistant and anti-government protester who identified herself as Yeung.
Civic Party lawmaker Tanya Chan, convenor of the pan-democratic lawmakers in Hong Kong, highlighted the bill's bipartisan support. "For them to have a mutual and clear stance [on Hong Kong], it is important recognition for those who have taken part in the protests," Chan said.
Meanwhile, IT sector lawmaker Charles Mok called on the city's government to respond to the protesters' demands. "What's the point of expressing regret over the bill?" Mok said. "You should do better instead to regain public trust - and that is by addressing the demands of the people."
Reporting by Sarah Zheng, Denise Tsang, Minnie Chan, Kristin Huang, Catherine Wong, Jun Mai, Echo Xie, Jeffie Lam, Sum Lok-kei, Owen Churchill and Kimmy Chung
6. United Nations Backslides on Human Rights in Counterterrorism
Excerpt:
It is essential that all states in the HRC and the General Assembly reassert the importance of human rights in counterterrorism and not discard human rights as readily as in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Global human rights protection is now so precarious in a world of great power realignment, including an emboldened Russia and a resurgent China. Traditional U.S. leadership on human rights is in retreat and some other historical champions of rights are in disarray (such as Brexit Britain). Indiscriminate state violence is commonplace, from Syria to Saudi Arabia, and impunity for it is rife. The current General Assembly is yet another test for states whether to allow human rights to decline unabated or to push back against the rising tide of impunity for state violence.
United Nations Backslides on Human Rights in Counterterrorism
Human rights and counterterrorism have been dramatically politicized and undermined at the United Nations over the past 18 months. In a spate of recent resolutions, the 47-member Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva and the General Assembly in New York have both retreated markedly from many of the hard-won normative gains in their earlier resolutions after 9/11, following concerted lobbying by the likes of Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia-regimes not known for respecting rights in counterterrorism. The rot started in the HRC in 2017 and then spread to the General Assembly in 2018 and was repeated in the HRC in September 2019. The issues will erupt again at the General Assembly at its 74th session, with a new resolution expected in December 2019.
The critical change was brought about by General Assembly
Resolution 73/174 on "[t]errorism and human rights," adopted on Dec. 17, 2018, which drastically undermines the detailed human rights standards established in earlier General Assembly resolutions on counterterrorism between 2002 and 2017. The new resolution differs from preceding ones in three key respects: (a) It omits or dilutes many earlier references to protecting specific rights when countering terrorism; (b) it is focused more on the "detrimental effects" of
terrorism on human rights than on state violations of rights by
counterterrorism measures; and (c) many provisions are not about human rights at all but, instead, are concerned with suppressing terrorism-and thus detract from a much-needed emphasis on respect for rights precisely to correct the prevailing emphasis on suppression, including from the Security Council, often at the expense of rights.
The resolution has received little comment so far, perhaps because the General Assembly's annual resolutions on the subject are normally routine and a radical departure from earlier consensus is unexpected. Its shift in emphasis away from human rights in counterterrorism not only harms human dignity and basic values but also threatens international and national security. This is because the links between state violations of human rights in counterterrorism and terrorist radicalization, recruitment and violence are well recognized, including in the U.N.'s own
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006, which states have committed to implement.
A Brief History of Human Rights and Counterterrorism Resolutions
Understanding the current regression on human rights requires a little background on human rights, terrorism and counterterrorism at the U.N. Before the shift in 2018, there were two distinct-and quite different-chains of General Assembly resolutions addressing human rights in this area: resolutions on "human rights and terrorism" from 1993 to 2005, and resolutions on human rights and
counterterrorism from 2002 to 2017.
The first chain of resolutions sprang out of the 1993
Vienna Conference on Human Rights, which declared that terrorism "aimed at the destruction of human rights" (paragraph 17). Regular General Assembly resolutions from
that year until
2005 accordingly addressed the human rights effects of
terrorism, not
counterterrorism.
These General Assembly resolutions were controversial. Western states (particularly the United States and members of the European Union) protested that terrorists could not technically "violate" human rights because only states bear legally binding human rights obligations. Under human rights treaties, states have detailed duties to respect, protect and fulfill rights, and to provide remedies for violations. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups, are not bound by comparable legal duties (unless they are de facto state authorities), even if terrorist acts self-evidently have adverse effects on rights in a descriptive, nonlegal sense. The focus in the early General Assembly resolutions on the effects of terrorism on human rights thus distracted from efforts to hold states themselves accountable for violations of their human rights obligations when countering terrorism.
The General Assembly's approach shifted as counterterrorism operations expanded after 9/11. From
2002 to
2017, the General Assembly regularly adopted a thematic resolution on "protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism." Mexico initiated the 2002 resolution (co-sponsored by various Latin American states plus Canada, Liechtenstein, Croatia, New Zealand and Switzerland) and has sponsored them ever since. These resolutions overlapped with the earlier ones on "terrorism and human rights" until 2005, when those ceased.
These newer resolutions shift the emphasis toward ensuring that states comply with their human rights obligations while countering terrorism. The annual resolution became progressively stronger and more detailed over time in its elaboration of human rights standards specific to counterterrorism, in response to concerns about state practices. By 2017, the
resolution (72/180) had matured to contain a "mini-charter" on human rights when countering terrorism, comprising 23 subparagraphs, each devoted to a specific issue (explained below). These resolutions made only passing, preambular reference to terrorist acts as being "aimed at the destruction of human rights" or "detrimental" to human rights, but they did not characterize them as "violations."
The change in emphasis that began in 2002 was driven by concerns about excessive state counterterrorism measures and a sentiment that Security Council resolutions had paid insufficient attention to human rights (including in
Resolution 1373 of 2001, the quasi-legislative response to the 9/11 attacks, which required all states to pass and enforce extensive new counterterrorism laws). While a third chain of annual resolutions on "[m]easures to eliminate international terrorism" has also cursorily urged states, from
1994 to
the present, to respect human rights when countering terrorism, the dedicated resolutions on human rights and counterterrorism provided much-needed elaboration of that basic premise.
Politicization From 2017 to Today
Drastic regression is evident, however, in last year's
sui generis Resolution 73/174 on "[t]errorism and human rights," which fits the mold of neither the 1993-2005 resolutions (on "human rights and terrorism") nor the 2002-2017 resolutions (on counterterrorism). The 2018 resolution still generically urges states to comply with their human rights (and refugee and humanitarian law) obligations in countering terrorism (paragraph 2), and expresses concern at state violations (paragraph 5), but backslides on human rights in three key respects: (a) It weakens the human rights standards in the previous resolutions, (b) it shifts the emphasis to rights abuses by terrorists rather than states and (c) it downplays the importance of human rights in counterterrorism.
The about-face originated in the HRC in 2015, when Egypt (leading a group of mainly Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Libya, plus Cuba, Venezuela and Sierra Leone) successfully sponsored HRC
Resolution 28/17 on the "effects of terrorism on the enjoyment of human rights." Similar resolutions were adopted in 2016 and 2017. These resolutions presented a rival narrative to the predominant focus of HRC resolutions since 9/11 on human rights in counterterrorism (which also continued after 2015, until 2017). The 2015 resolution was divisive in the HRC, with 25 votes in favor, 16 against, and 6 abstentions.
Then, in 2017, emboldened by its success in the HRC, Egypt successfully sponsored (along with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco) General Assembly
Resolution 72/246, which similarly focused on the effects of terrorism (not counterterrorism) on human rights. This too was divisive, with 95 states in favor, one against (South Africa) and 58 abstentions. Those in favor were mostly Middle Eastern, African, and Asian states (including China); some Latin American countries; and the United States and Russia. Those against included most of Europe; some of Latin America; and Japan, Britain, Turkey, Canada and Australia. In contrast, the last General Assembly resolution on human rights and counterterrorism, also in 2017, was adopted by consensus.
In March 2018, the two competing HRC resolutions from 2017 were merged into a single new resolution,
Resolution 37/27 on "terrorism and human rights," with Mexico compromising with Egypt to co-sponsor it. Far from reflecting a balanced hybrid of the two approaches, Egypt's concerns appear to have prevailed over Mexico's. The emphasis in the resolution is thus more on terrorism as a threat to human rights than on counterterrorism measures violating rights. This merger, and its emphasis, duly spilled over into the General Assembly (via the Third Committee) in Resolution 73/174 of 2018, co-sponsored by Egypt, Mexico, Belize and Monaco, which deemphasized state accountability for human rights violations and focused instead on the suppression of terrorism.
Most recently, in late September 2019, the HRC again adopted a weakened resolution, setting the scene for the General Assembly to follow suit at its current 74th session with a probable resolution in December 2019. This
latest HRC resolution is even worse, since it requests the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights and
counterterrorism to now report on the "negative effects of
terrorism" on human rights-thereby diluting her focus on holding states accountable for violations. In this context, it comes as no surprise that the resolution was co-sponsored by states with very poor human rights records in counterterrorism-Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan-in addition to Tunisia, Georgia and Mexico. Concerned states and civil society organizations will need to make a concerted effort to reverse course at the General Assembly.
Weakening of Human Rights Standards
The 2018 resolution substantially weakened the human rights protections in the preceding resolutions. As mentioned earlier, by 2017 the annual General Assembly
resolution had evolved to include a detailed "mini-charter" of rights (paragraph 5) comprising 23 subparagraphs. Some of these issues are still mentioned (some in a similar level of detail) in the 2018 resolution, including access to justice and remedies, criminal justice standards (equality, nondiscrimination, fair trial/due process and judicial review of detention), the prohibition on torture, civil society freedoms, nondiscrimination in all counterterrorism matters, and privacy.
However, many detailed rights mentioned in the operative paragraphs of the earlier resolutions are omitted altogether in Resolution 73/174, including those on derogation in emergencies; non-refoulement (that is, the right of individuals not to be returned to countries where they would be at risk of serious harm); minorities; deprivation of liberty; surveillance and interception of communications, and data protection; economic, social and cultural rights; rights concerning border controls; safeguards in interrogation; remotely piloted aircraft (drones); and recruitment and use of children. Specific references to many treaties also vanished in the 2018 resolution (such as the Convention against Torture [1984], the Convention on Enforced Disappearances [2006], the Geneva Conventions [1949] and Protocols [1977], and the Refugee Convention [1951] and Protocol [1967]). The resolution further omits the earlier preambular references (in the context of non-refoulement and torture) to diplomatic assurances, memoranda of understanding, and transfer agreements and arrangements.
Other earlier provisions are diluted in the 2018 resolution, such as a much briefer mention of the principle of legality in the criminal law, as well as safeguards in detention. Whereas the 2017 resolution positively urges states to "respect their international obligations regarding humanitarian actors and to recognize the key role" they play (paragraph 7), the 2018 resolution frames the issue negatively, and in a more limited fashion, by merely urging states not to "impede humanitarian and medical activities or engagement" (paragraph 13).
Human Rights Implications of Terrorism Framing
The 2018 resolution is also much more focused than earlier resolutions on addressing the human rights effects of
terrorism than
counterterrorism. In this respect, it signals a partial reversion or regression to the resolutions of 1993-2005. Whereas the 2017 resolution does not refer to the effects of terrorism on human rights, the 2018 resolution expresses concern at the "detrimental effects" of terrorist acts on human rights and at the targeting of communities or individuals by terrorists on the basis of religion, belief or ethnicity; and it condemns "systematic and widespread abuses of human rights" by terrorist groups (paragraphs 1, 19 and 2, respectively). This focus on the effects of terrorism on human rights distracts from violations of human rights in counterterrorism committed by states, which have the primary legal responsibility to protect those rights.
Relatedly, the 2018 resolution promotes "solidarity" with the victims of terrorism and the importance of protecting their rights (paragraph 7). This rhetorical commitment to victims of terrorism falls far short, however, of endorsing the detailed, rights-based "
[f]ramework principles for securing the human rights of victims of terrorism" advocated by former UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson, which states have been reluctant to seriously embrace. Further, U.N. member states have not backed their rhetorical commitment by creating and funding an international funding mechanism to compensate victims of terrorism. Because nonstate terrorist groups may not bear human rights obligations, it is usually impossible or impractical to obtain remedies (including compensation) directly from them.
Emphasis on Counterterrorism
The 2018 resolution's emphasis on the ways in which terrorism adversely affects human rights is also reflected in its many provisions concerned with the prevention and suppression of terrorism in general, rather than with human rights. Whereas the first paragraph of the 2017 resolution reaffirmed that states must comply with human rights while countering terrorism, the 2018 resolution instead leads with a condemnation of terrorist acts as criminal and unjustifiable-a statement usually found in the General Assembly's separate chain of resolutions on "[m]easures to eliminate" terrorism. Many other provisions of the resolution then squarely tackle terrorism rather than the human rights implications of counterterrorism, introducing provisions not found in the earlier human rights resolutions. For example, the 2018 resolution calls on states to:
Protect people in their territory from terrorist acts (paragraph 4).
Recognize the roles of religious leaders and institutions, local communities and community leaders, and women in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism (paragraphs 15-16).
Prevent terrorists from benefitting from ransom payments or political concessions; prevent political, material or financial support from reaching terrorists (including by criminalizing terrorist financing), deny terrorists safe haven, freedom of movement, operation and recruitment, and bring to justice or extradite terrorists (paragraph 20).
Refrain from supporting terrorists or terrorist entities (paragraph 21).
Adopt rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign fighters (paragraph 22).
Prevent the use of information and communications technology (particularly the internet and media) for terrorist purposes (including propaganda, advocacy, incitement to violence, recruitment, financing, preparation, planning, and commission of terrorism) (paragraphs 30-31).
Promote a culture of peace, justice, development, tolerance, respect for diversity, pluralism, inclusion, dialogue among civilizations and interfaith and intercultural understanding (paragraphs 26-27).
Cooperate to address the threat of foreign fighters and prevent their transit, the conditions conducive to terrorism, and the drivers of radicalization (preamble).
While some of these measures are qualified by injunctions to respect human rights, the provisions invariably privilege the importance of counterterrorism measures, addressing them more prominently at the start of the relevant paragraph, with human rights compliance coming as an afterthought. Many of these provisions would be more appropriately located in the General Assembly's resolutions on "[m]easures to eliminate" terrorism, drafted through the General Assembly's Sixth (legal) Committee since the 1970s, than in a resolution supposedly dedicated to protecting human rights and adopted through the Third Committee.
Why the General Assembly's Commitment to Human Rights Matters
Unequivocal normative signals from the General Assembly on the necessity of respecting human rights when countering terrorism are vital. The Security Council, and most states, are still very much focused on law enforcement to suppress terrorism and are continually testing the limits of human rights obligations in certain areas of counterterrorism. While Security Council resolutions now often briefly refer to respect for human rights, as the UN special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism
observes, "[T]he actual impact of such generic mentions, without clear and explicit human rights guidance contained in the text, is questionable."
In principle, such mentions should be sufficient to refer states to the applicable human rights norms binding them under treaties and customary international law. In practice, however, the continuous development of new international counterterrorism norms leaves much room for uncertainty, ambiguity, error or inadvertent failure to protect rights. Certain states have also flatly rejected the interpretation of certain norms, such as on the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. Further, the "soft" monitoring functions of the (under-resourced) Geneva-based human rights bodies may encourage some states to view them as more marginal, or lower in status, than the Security Council and its binding security powers.
The General Assembly's universal membership, and its sweeping constitutional mandate under the U.N. Charter (including on international security), gives it special normative authority to push back against excessive counterterrorism measures that violate human rights. This includes instances when Security Council measures implicitly facilitate state violations of human rights when they implement council measures, or when the 47 elected states of the HRC veer off-mission.
However, even a return to the reasonably good pre-2018 General Assembly resolutions would not be enough to ensure real-world
compliance with human rights. As the special rapporteur rightly notes, Security Council resolutions are able to impose highly prescriptive counterterrorism obligations on states-from the arcane detail of its ever-expanding anti-terrorist financing regime (most recently in Resolution
2462 of 2019) to the highly invasive travel data collection demanded to address foreign terrorist fighters in Resolution
2396 of 2017. These obligations are backed by intensive procedural machinery established by the Security Council to monitor state implementation. The Security Council should similarly utilize its quasi-legislative and monitoring powers to require states to take rights just as seriously as suppressing terrorism.
This is not just because human rights are fundamental values under the U.N. Charter that the Security Council must uphold. The drafters of the charter were acutely aware that security and human rights are independent, and they framed prospective powers under the charter accordingly. From a security standpoint, it is also because state violations of rights, including in counterterrorism, are "conditions conductive" to violent extremism and terrorism-and thus make it harder to secure the world from terrorism. The General Assembly's own
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy has, since 2006, squarely acknowledged this and was itself a response to an excessive post-9/11 emphasis on suppression of terrorist actors at the expense of human rights. The secretary-general's 2015
Plan of Action to Combat Violent Extremism draws similar conclusions, stating (at paragraph 27) that:
Violations of international human rights law committed in the name of state security can facilitate violent extremism by marginalizing individuals and alienating key constituencies, thus generating community support and sympathy for and complicity in the actions of violent extremists. Violent extremists also actively seek to exploit state repression and other grievances in their fight against the state. Thus, Governments that exhibit repressive and heavy-handed security responses in violation of human rights and the rule of law, such as profiling of certain populations, adoption of intrusive surveillance techniques and prolongation of declared states of emergency, tend to generate more violent extremists. International partners that are complicit in such action by States further corrupt public faith in the legitimacy of the wider international system.
It is essential that all states in the HRC and the General Assembly reassert the importance of human rights in counterterrorism and not discard human rights as readily as in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Global human rights protection is now so precarious in a world of great power realignment, including an emboldened Russia and a resurgent China. Traditional U.S. leadership on human rights is in retreat and some other historical champions of rights are in disarray (such as Brexit Britain). Indiscriminate state violence is commonplace, from Syria to Saudi Arabia, and impunity for it is rife. The current General Assembly is yet another test for states whether to allow human rights to decline unabated or to push back against the rising tide of impunity for state violence.
7. How the U.S. Military Will Carry Out a Hasty, Risky Withdrawal From Syria
How the U.S. Military Will Carry Out a Hasty, Risky Withdrawal From Syria
The Pentagon will have to disassemble combat bases that were built to stay for a mission that was supposed to last, and protect the troops as they withdraw amid a chaotic battlefield.
KABUL, Afghanistan - President Trump's decision - made in the span of a week - to withdraw about 1,000 American troops from northern Syria caught the Pentagon, and the forces on the ground, off guard.
To carry out the "endless wars" since Sept. 11, 2001, which Mr. Trump has vowed to wrap up, the American military has perfected the ability to build complex logistics pipelines that can funnel everything from armored vehicles to satellite internet access to gym equipment directly to combat outposts throughout the Middle East.
Now, American troops are making a hasty withdrawal from Syria - under pressure from encroaching Turkish proxy forces, Russian aircraft and columns armored by the Syrian government. This means the Pentagon will have to disassemble combat bases and other infrastructure that were built to stay for a mission that was supposed to last, all while protecting the troops as they withdraw amid a chaotic battlefield.
Where did U.S. troops operate before the Turkish offensive?
Before the Turkish offensive, American troops, mostly Special Operations forces, operated in
an archipelago of about a dozen bases and outposts across northeastern Syria, mostly living alongside their Syrian Kurdish partners. They were divided into two main headquarters, known by their cardinal directions, East and West.
The outposts are often a mixture of blast-resistant walls known as Hesco barriers, rudimentary structures and all-weather tents. The large air base in the city of Kobani is replete with a small tent city and some container housing units.
The western headquarters, known as Advanced Operational Base West, oversaw roughly half a dozen smaller outposts that covered cities like Manbij and Raqqa. Roughly 500 troops are dedicated to the area overseen by A.O.B. West.
The eastern headquarters, known as A.O.B. East, is closer to the Iraqi border and helps monitor around 500 troops in the Euphrates River Valley, with several smaller outposts around Deir ez-Zor and some near the Iraq-Syria border in towns like Bukamal and Hajin.
Where are those troops moving now?
As the troops withdraw, they first will collapse inward by abandoning the outposts closest to the line of advancing foreign troops, in this case the Turkish military and its ill-disciplined Syrian militia proxies, along with Russian and Syrian regime forces. That strategy was made clear in a video posted online Tuesday, showing a Russian journalist standing in an abandoned American outpost west of Manbij and closest to Syrian government troops.
Col. Myles B. Caggins III, a spokesman for the American-led coalition based in Baghdad, confirmed in a Tuesday message on Twitter, "We are out of Manbij."
The troops are likely to be repositioned to Iraq or potentially to Jordan. Some may return to the United States, officials said.
What routes will the troops use in exiting Syria?
The western and eastern headquarters are likely to withdraw independently of each other. In the west, American forces will, according to American military officials, most likely leave through the Kobani airfield, known as the Kobani Landing Zone. That base, with its long dirt runaway, can support C-17 transport aircraft and has a large Air Force contingent of maintenance staff. In the east, those forces will most likely exit overland and into Iraq in convoys, with some traveling via helicopter airlift.
Are there risks in the withdrawal?
The risk of confrontation with the medley of different ground forces - both state-led and proxy - is undoubtedly higher than it was several weeks ago.
Convoys moving through contested territory and aircraft making repeated landings all might contribute to an accidental confrontation or a staged attack, especially from any Islamic State leftovers that might want to take advantage of the sudden withdrawal.
One of the biggest risks to the remaining American troops as they pull back will most likely be attacks from Turkish-backed Syrian militia called the Free Syrian Army, which has spearheaded the Turkish offensive in many places along the border. Those troops are supported by Turkish army artillery and mortar fire, and Turkish air force strikes.
American officials say these Turkish-backed militia are less disciplined than regular Turkish soldiers, and deliberately or inadvertently have fired on retreating American troops. Another emerging threat comes from Islamic State fighters, who had gone underground after the defeat of the final shards of the terror group's caliphate, or religious state, in northern Syria earlier this year.
The hasty, risky nature of the withdrawal might actually require that the number of American troops in Syria be increased, at least temporarily. The military's Central Command is preparing to send hundreds of additional American forces to help secure bases where American Special Forces have been operating with their Syrian Kurdish partners - many of whom have now left to fight the Turks - and safely evacuate those Americans in the coming weeks.
"We are repositioning additional forces in the region to assist with force protection as necessary," Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper told reporters at the Pentagon on Friday.
In a sign of the concern over the safety of the remaining American troops in Syria, Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke Monday with his Russian counterpart about the deteriorating security in the country's northeast.
And last Friday, the American military logged an attempt to attack a Marine KC-130 transport aircraft landing in Kobani with "surface-to-air fire," according to military documents obtained by The New York Times. The aircraft discharged flares as a defensive measure. The flight was unharmed and continued its approach, landing at the airfield.
Will any American troops stay in Syria?
Yes, there are roughly 150 troops at al-Tanf, a small base in southern Syria near the Jordanian border. While billed as a Special Operations mission to train local forces and go after the Islamic State, the base serves as a tollbooth of sorts for Iranian, Russian and Syrian forces in the region that have to navigate around its kilometers-wide defense bubble. The presence of American forces there gives the United States visibility on the movement and actions of those other military forces.
On the Jordanian side of the border, the American military keeps a quick reaction force staged there, including extra troops and artillery, in case anything were to go awry at the al-Tanf base.
The base also watches over a nearby refugee camp that is run by the United Nations.
What U.S. combat equipment will be left behind?
That is unclear. Some of the various bases' hard structures, tents, tables, gym equipment and larger construction machinery might be left behind. What won't be abandoned is anything sensitive, such as radios, weapons, armored vehicles and important documents.
American military officials say the hastier the withdrawal, the more equipment will be left behind or have to be destroyed. Much depends on the security conditions on the ground.
Eric Schmitt reported from Washington. Carlotta Gall contributed reporting from Ceylanpinar, Turkey
Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a reporter in the Washington bureau and a former Marine infantryman.
@tmgneff
Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who has traveled the world covering terrorism and national security. He was also the Pentagon correspondent. A member of the Times staff since 1983, he has shared three Pulitzer Prizes.
@EricSchmittNYT
8. Naval Academy midshipmen seek Satanic Temple space
Naval Academy midshipmen seek Satanic Temple space
A group of
U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen who follow
The Satanic Temple religion recently asked for the storied naval institution to accommodate their faith like any other.
But in a nod to internet virality and pushing a message before the boss has signed off, officials in Annapolis have been doing a little clarifying since an Oct. 8 internal email leaked out proclaiming that "Satanic services" would soon be offered on the campus.
That email was, of course, posted to the military-themed
"drunkoldgrad" Instagram account and you can probably imagine what happened next.
Cmdr. Alana Garas, an academy spokeswoman, has been tasked with clarifying.
Those midshipmen who follow The Satanic Temple - an IRS-recognized, tax-exempt religion - were just asking for a "study group space," not for a sacrifice stage or to burn a pentagram into Ingram Field or to erect a giant horned icon in front of the Zimmerman Bandstand.
"A group of Midshipmen with beliefs aligned with those practiced by The Satanic Temple...requested a space where they could assemble to discuss and share their common beliefs," Garas said in an email. "The request was for a 'study group' space, not for holding 'satanic services.'"
Garas added that the email went out prematurely before Chaps signed off on it.
She also cautioned students who follow the "politically active" religion from participating in its political side, lest it appear that their actions are endorsed by the Pentagon.
"Midshipmen have the right to assemble to discuss their beliefs as they choose, but, to be clear...military members will not engage in partisan political activities, and will avoid the inference that their activities may appear to imply DoD approval or endorsement of a political cause," she said.
Before the eager official fired off the "satanic services" email, "arrangements were being made to provide the Midshipmen with a designated place to assemble as chaplains facilitate the beliefs of all service members, a responsibility outlined by Navy instructions," Garas said.
FORT BENNING, Ga. - A little more than a year ago, the
Army kicked off a pilot program that looked to add eight weeks to the infantry One Station Unit Training, all in an effort to
make new soldiers more lethal.
At the time,
Maneuver Center of Excellence commander Maj. Gen. Gary Brito said the goal was to build infantry soldiers that were combat deployable from "day one."
Well, the numbers are in and new soldiers look to be hitting the mark.
In a briefing at Fort Benning, Georgia during the annual Maneuver Warfighter Conference in September, Col. Dave Voorhies of the 198th Infantry Brigade shared data from the first seven battalions that had completed the infantry 22-week OSUT by late August.
By this month, 10 battalions had completed the new 22-week course. They expect 18 by January and a total of 10 battalions and two brigades by next summer, Voorhies said.
The soldiers are showing a 98 percent pass rate on combat lifesaver, 96 percent pass rate on basic combatives and 97 percent pass rate for individual day and night land navigation.
They're conducting 74 miles of foot marches in their period of instruction and a total of more than 100 foot miles marched in the course.
Each trainee has fired 2,475 live rounds by OSUT's end. That's compared to 1,355 under the 14-week model, Voorhies said. Their cadre-to-trainee ratio stood at 1:12 as of September.
The first pilot started in late July 2018 with graduation in December, with two companies of 400 soldiers at Fort Benning.
Some of the changes also reflect a more stringent attitude toward even basic training, the first nine weeks of a soldier's life in the Army.
Then Sergeant Major of the Army Dan Dailey told Army Times in late 2018 that with what's been added to basic training, the Army might extend it.
Basic training was upgraded at Fort Jackson, South Carolina to a program of instruction that was more heavy on fitness and discipline. That flowed, in part, from a 2017 survey of operational unit leadership by the Center for Initial Military Training that found both fitness and discipline lacking when new soldiers arrived at their first units.
CIMT officials told Army Times that leaders were seeing new soldiers that had a sense of entitlement, questioned orders and were not listening to instruction.
Starting this month, the Armor School begins its own 22-week OSUT pilot program, with plans to expand the program after a year to all classes.
Brito told Army Times last year that the next look would be at engineer training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
After 10 years supporting Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Europe and many interactions with special operators both domestic and foreign, I quickly learned they had little time to understand process improvement methodologies and techniques like Lean Six Sigma, Kaizen and Total Quality Management (TQM). I looked at those methodologies and techniques as tools in the Knowledge Management (KM) toolbox. Customers just wanted their problems solved.
If you didn't solve their problem or make them more efficient, you were wasting their time.
KM at its core is People, Process and Technology. Even as a former software engineer, for me, KM has always focused on the process before technology. At United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), our KM team's most challenging role is that of the knowledge engineer. They are the jack of all trades; a bureaucratic hacker who can manage a project, improve a business process, act as an agile scrum product owner and scope out a requirement in the form of a project charter. As a software engineer, there's nothing worse than developing a solution that you're proud of, only to have it fizzle out in a year because it didn't meet user requirements.
We put all the risk of failure in process and knowledge engineering.
If we make the user more efficient without the need for web development, great! If we turn over a few stones and discover a project requiring web development, we also can make an impact. If the deliverable is a project charter that articulates a problem, the background, stakeholder requirements and recommended course of actions (COAs) and the end result is great analysis work but no web development, our knowledge engineers have done their job well.
We treat our requirement owners as stakeholders rather than customers. The distinction is that we determine the requirements based on stakeholder input. We then combine and tweak those requirements to address other related organizational needs and ultimately own the requirement ourselves and act as the customer.
From well-defined requirements in knowledge engineering to web development that not only meets requirements but also address user experience, organizational change occurs organically
When a project charter is approved and the selected COA involves web development, our knowledge engineers break down the agreed-upon requirements into digestible tasks for our developers. As an Agile web development team, we track our tasks in Jira, an issue-tracking system. Through customer engagement, we determine what tasks are part of a minimum viable product (MVP). The MVP decreases the risk of failure by giving the customers the most important features as quickly as possible. It then allows for our User Experience (UX) specialist to gather critical feedback on the app for future enhancements or features.
We kickoff web development with a scrum meeting. During the meeting the knowledge engineer runs down the list of prioritized tasks. Developers take ownership and assign story points to each tasks. Story points reflect the overall level of effort to completea task. We load up each developer with enough story points to cover a two-week sprint. During the sprint we execute a quick morning standup to state what we did in the last 24 hours, next 24 and to identify any impediments.
Some organizations focus on organizational culture (people) first. You can't change people's perception of KM just by talking, you need to execute. From well-defined requirements in knowledge engineering to web development that not only meets requirements but also address user experience, organizational change occurs organically.
With no military or SOF background, I have deployed to military exercises in Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Israel, etc. I went from assisting members of the Joint Operating Center (JOC) with routine information-management issues to rethinking how we track missions across the world. The end result was a quick-to-deploy application used for collaboration and mission tracking during contingency operations, affectionately known as the "JOC in a box".
A person with no SOF or military experience was invited and welcomed by our mission partners to their countries for exercises and visits is the same reason a green beret Major walked by my office to say hi, threw up his fist and in a serious tone said "PPT" (people, process and technology). We stopped trying to define KM and started doing it. My team and I are relentless pursuers of positive disruption.
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."