Korea Regional Review

Quotes of the Day:

“Strategy is not about what we intend to do. It is about what we must be prepared to do.”

– Bernard Brodie

“The price of greatness is responsibility.”

– Winston Churchill

“Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction.”

– Ronald Reagan

Happy New Year

새해 복 많이 받으세요

I am pleased to announce the soft launch of our new project: The Korea Regional Review (KRR).

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Here is our vision:

The Korea Regional Review is a public platform dedicated to clear, timely analysis of security and strategy on and around the Korean Peninsula. We cover alliance dynamics, deterrence and defense, diplomacy, economic statecraft, human rights in north Korea, information and influence activities for the Korean people in the north, and the policies of neighboring states that shape stability in Northeast Asia and the wider Asia-Indo-Pacific. Our work bridges serious research and real world developments, with writing that is factual, disciplined, and useful to policymakers, analysts, scholars, journalists, and informed readers. The Review serves as a town square for a diverse range of scholars, practitioners, and authentic voices to publish research, share lived experience, and offer practical recommendations for policy and strategy. It also helps fill a critical gap for overseas audiences created by the loss of major U.S. international broadcasters, including Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, by providing accessible, sourced reporting and analysis on U.S. policy toward Korea and the region. We elevate the testimony of Korean escapees to help the outside world understand conditions inside the regime and the lived reality of its people. Ultimately, the Korea Regional Review seeks to be a voice for unification, supporting the Korean people’s aim of achieving a free and unified Korea and ending decades of division.

As it is our soft launch, it is still a work in progress so we value your feedback.

“Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go.”

T. E. Lawrence

1. A North Korean spring: evaluating the likelihood of political change in the hermit kingdom

2. North Korea’s Kim Welcomes 2026 With a Salute to Russia

3. China’s Wang Yi takes aim at Japan in call with South Korean foreign minister

4. Easing controls on North Korean media is long overdue. But it’s still risky.

5. [Column] Time for Korea to stop letting the US be the master of our fate

6. Lee vows active support as 'pacemaker' in potential N. Korea-U.S. talks this year

7. ED S. Korea is not America's pawn

8. Giving South Koreans access to North Korean media

9. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has little to say to South Korea, U.S. in New Year's speech

10. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un ’s Speech at New Year Celebration

1. A North Korean spring: evaluating the likelihood of political change in the hermit kingdom

Comment: I am pleased to present the work of my good friend and colleague Mathew Ha. He is an inaugural author in our new Korea Regional Review (KRR). His piece is appropriate and fitting for the first day of the KRR since it focuses on political change in north Korea which is something we all hope to see someday.

World News Dec. 31, 2025 / 4:18 PM

A North Korean spring: evaluating the likelihood of political change in the hermit kingdom

By Matthew Ha

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/31/perspective-north-korea-likelihood-political-change/8601767213165/

North Korea is Infamously known for its oppressive totalitarian state controlled by the continuous reign Kim family regime, now headed by Kim Jong Un, through a ruthless system of totalitarian control. Photo by Korean Central News Agency/EPA

Dec. 31 (UPI) -- Executive director's note: This paper is extracted from Mathew Ha's ongoing Ph.D. research.

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the overall social and political changes that have developed in North Korea following the development of underground black markets in response to the Arduous March famine in the 1990's. The objective of this paper is to provide an informed assessment of the revolutionary potential inside North Korea based on these major changes. To conduct this analysis, this paper primarily employs qualitative methods that comprehensively review and synthesize the relevant literature on political revolutions and social protest by leading experts such as Dr. Jack Goldstone. Upon conducting this literature review, the paper then juxtaposes these expert assessments to the historical narrative of what occurred inside North Korea to evaluate the significance of these major social and political changes induced by these developing markets. Overall, this paper finds that while North Korea experienced major social and political changes due to the development of these private markets. The populace is still far from reaching the capacity to initiate a political revolution, primarily due to the lack of elite defections to their cause.

Introduction

In the current global political landscape, a nation-state that truly stands out among all is the "hermit kingdom" of Northeast Asia, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or more simply, North Korea. Infamously known for its oppressive totalitarian state, controlled by the continuous reign Kim family regime through a ruthless system of totalitarian control. The regime boasts one of the most egregious human rights track records worldwide over its populace of 26 million people. The Kim regime has been in power for over 70 years, enduring multiple changes, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Arduous March famine that claimed the lives of millions of North Korean citizens, as well as Covid-19, which many anticipated could lead to a collapse of the ruling family regime. Yet despite these major events political change has not occurred. The question that looms is whether political change is possible in North Korea.

Most earlier assessments focused on external factors, such as geopolitical and economic shocks. However, the focus of this paper will be on providing a precise but speculative evaluation for the possibility of long-term political change induced by internal factors, such as a popular revolution, considering how North Korea's domestic political environment has drastically changed in the last two plus decades. A critical event that will be this paper's central focus is the grassroots-led popular uprising in 2009 that was a direct response to the regime's policy of a revaluation of the currency. North Korea experienced a brief moment of domestic backlash that saw limited acts of protest and even small but violent skirmishes against authorities. It surprised many to see these open acts of defiance in such an infamously politically closed regime.

This paper will then answer the following question: Why was this act of political protest in 2009 only limited to these minor skirmishes and limited acts of hostility, rather than an armed uprising despite the dramatic changes to the underlying social and political components defining North Korean citizens?

The paper will be organized in the following way. First, it will provide a concise but comprehensive literature review on extant scholarship evaluating the necessary conditions conducive to fomenting revolutions. Second, it will then provide a brief overview of the vast socioeconomic and political changes attributed to the development of grassroots markets and the dissemination of foreign media that has been brought in thanks to North Korean defectors, which drastically changed the social and political environment inside North Korea that led to this critical event in 2009. Upon establishing this contextual overview, the paper will then provide the overall evaluation based on the established conditions laid out in the literature review and the contextual summary surveying the overall evolution of modern-day North Korea. The intent is to evaluate what limited these acts of political protest in 2009, despite the vast changes that affected North Korea's populace.

Methods

Primarily, this paper will rely on qualitative methods of conducting a comprehensive literature review of the extant academic scholarship on revolutionary theory and the key variables impacting political change. The key findings of this review will be then applied to a comprehensive understanding of the historical narrative of what social and political changes occurred inside North Korea following the development of these markets. Overall, the application of these key theoretical findings will allow for the evaluation of these past events to understand the broader revolutionary implications of these major historic changes,

Literature Review

In the extant scholarship focused on evaluating the likelihood of political revolutions, Dr. Jack Goldstone of George Mason University is a leading scholar. In his renowned text: Revolutions: A Very Short Introduction, Goldstone identifies five critical components for a revolution to emerge. He adds that one can compare revolutions to earthquakes because one may identify these general mechanisms conducive to facilitating a revolution, but this information alone will not predict when these cataclysmic political events occur. Moreover, the five components that Goldstone establishes include the following. First is a sense of economic and fiscal strain. Second is alienation and opposition among the ruling regime's elite. Third is widespread popular anger over injustice, and fourth is a persuasive unifying ideology to unite the masses and elite. Fifth and finally is favorable international relations. Among these five listed critical components Goldstone does not suggest that one amongst them is the most important, but he also adds how beyond these underlying components, there must also be five structural conditions allowing for those five aforementioned components to have a more formative impact because these five structural conditions are long term trends that build up over time to create unstable equilibrium. An unstable equilibrium is essential because it is in these environments that a populace turns against its own ruling regime.

These five structural conditions are: First, demographic change. Second, a shift in the pattern of international relations. Third is uneven or dependent economic development. Fourth is newly developing patterns of exclusion/or discrimination within the populace. And fifth is the evolution of a ruling personalist regime. Moreover, these five structural conditions, as well as the aforementioned five critical components, serve as helpful indicators to identify the precursors to revolutions and events of major political change. Identifying these conditions alone is not enough to predict when revolutions precisely occur, as these events are unpredictable, but one can use these as early signs to anticipate the possibility of political change.

Goldstone' work will provide the basis for the evaluation of potential poltical change in North Korea.

Historical Narrative: North Korea's Socio-Political Evolution Since 1994

1994 served as a major year for North Korea. This was the year the nation's founding leader, Kim Il Sung, and the heart of the regime's cult of personality, passed away, which also followed the collapse of North Korea's largest foreign benefactor, the Soviet Union. Specifically, North Korea experienced both major internal and external political shocks that also coincided with major natural disasters that devastated North Korea's agricultural sector and laid the seeds for a major famine that would contribute to the death of millions of North Koreans. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to North Korea losing a major source of economic support which forced the regime to close several of its key programs and services, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS) that provided food and everyday needs for the populace, thus aggravating the conditions induced by the famine. This led to this period being dubbed as the Arduous March by the ruling regime. While the regime still claims these events only claimed the lives of 225,000 to 235,000 people, experts at the Wilson Center estimate that the total number of deaths was more likely to be between 2.5 and 3.5 million people.[1] Amidst this devastating situation, the North Korean populace responded to the loss of the PDS by creating their own markets where farmers would sell their excess crop yields. These private market practices in fact occurred before these famines and the PDS collapse. Research by South Korean think tanks such as the Korean Institute for National Unification shows these markets initially emerged as early as the 1970s when farmers had the capability to produce excess crops to sell.[2] The major events of the 1990s saw a drastic expansion and growth in these markets in terms of their size and importance, directly as a result of the collapsed PDS.[3]

From these humble beginnings in the early 1990s, North Korea's grassroots market system drastically expanded in size and geographic scope across the whole country, based on satellite imagery analysis that found these markets emerging in at least 12 provincial capital cities. These markets were becoming more critical to North Korean everyday life.[4] More specifically, Daily NK, a digital news publication based in South Korea operated by North Korean defectors, conducted a comprehensive study of North Korea's underground markets in 2017 from which they found that by 2017 North Korea operated 387 underground market facilities across 14 different provinces.[5] The leading experts of North Korean political economy Steph Haggard and Marcus Noland argue that the overall the political significance of this expansion of grassroots markets is that market expansion reflects a significant decline in regime influence and a fraying of state political control. These markets not only provide economic benefits but also sociopolitical benefits, as they offer citizens an autonomous social space for civil society.[6] Additionally these markets serve as an opportunity for North Korean citizens to practice a limited degree of entrepreneurialism. Dr. Victor Cha of Georgetown University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues this entrepreneurialism tied directly to a sense of individualistic thinking that poses a direct threat to the ruling regime's control over its populace.[7]

Victor Cha's initial assessment of the social and political impact of these market developments proved to be true based on subsequent polling data surveying both recent North Korean defectors and those still inside North Korea. In 2008, South Korea's Seoul National University conducted a series of surveys with North Korean defectors who resettled in the South. These surveys found that there has been a growing sense of dissatisfaction against the Kim regime over time.[8] In addition to polling data of North Korean defectors leading think tanks such as CSIS conducted a groundbreaking poll in 2016 inside North Korea with 36 different correspondents who came from eight different provinces. The CSIS poll found that five of the 36 surveyed correspondents expressed open discontent with the ruling Kim Jong Un regime. Also, all of the correspondents stated they no longer relied on the regime's public services such as the revived PDS but rather used these grassroots underground markets for their everyday survival. Along those lines, the survey also found that these correspondents expressed the most frustration and anger over the regime's attempted interference with these market-based activities.[9] These survey data findings then tie directly into Victor Cha's assessment that North Korea's private markets have become entrenched as a fixture of life that now is virtually impossible to uproot.[10]

The greatest source of frustration from North Korean citizens was regime interference with private market activity, according to survey findings. This anger became most clearly demonstrated in November 2009, when the regime enacted a redenomination of North Korean currency that essentially wiped out the earnings and savings of North Korea's private market traders and operators that drastically impacted the markets. Additionally, the regime followed up on this currency policy by temporarily and forcibly closing down the markets in an effort to restore regime control over its populace. These policy decisions, however led to an unprecedented reaction by the North Korean populace, who responded with anger and hostility rather than passive obedience. While there was no violent overthrow or coup, there were limited and contained acts of protest and hostility that included increased suicides, isolated disputes between citizens and police authorities, and the spread of anti-regime political graffiti. Although these limited acts of protest do not come close to be characterized as a political revolution, they demonstrate early signs of political change inside North Korea, which was made more obvious by the ruling regime's reaction to these 2009 protests. The regime not only rolled back these earlier policies and reopened these markets but also purged and executed one of its own leading cadres, Park Nam Gi, who became the scapegoat and source of blame as the mastermind of these reforms.[11]

In addition to these limited acts of protest other examples of the regime's decay in influence is evident in the weakening of regime monitoring institutions, such as its neighborhood watch system known as the Inminban system. This system served as the regime's security apparatus' internal monitoring mechanism that forced citizens to live in designated closed neighborhoods and monitor one another to report political crimes, which was monitored by a regime-appointed neighborhood leader. However, the growth and entrenchment of these markets provided North Koreans with their own reserves of cash from their market-based activities. This allowed citizens to use these extra forms of cash reserves as bribes for regime security officials such as the neighborhood watch leaders to turn a blind eye towards normally punishable actions, such as relocating homes, which is strongly prohibited under North Korean law. This evidence shows how there have been movements inside the country as North Korean citizens try to undercut this regime-mandated neighborhood watch program.[12] Specifically, Ken Gause, writing for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, found that in the city of Pyongsung nearly one fourth of its Inminban have moved out to other locations, according to defector testimony.[13] Moreover, the growing influence of cash bribes serves as an example of a critical tool of resistance for North Korean citizens to undermine the ruling regime's tools of control.

Overall, this act of political protest in 2009 in direct response to the regime's targeted action against these markets, as well as the ongoing impact on regime security practices and institutions such as the neighborhood watch system, serve as signs of major political change inside North Korea, which warrants a closer evaluation of what the trajectory of this political change will be.

Discussion: Evaluating the Long-term Prospects for Change

Applying Jack Goldstone's five critical components can help one evaluate why this act was limited to only disparate acts of resistance rather than a full-scale armed uprising that has revolutionary implications, as well as anticipate the longer-term likelihood of political change. Among Goldstone's five outlined components, this event only saw two out of the five outlined components defining the protesting group of citizens. These two components were a widespread popular anger over an act of injustice, which here was the currency revaluing policy and the forced closure of the markets. The second was to an extent the economic and fiscal strain which motivated the Kim regime to enact this policy. Several other components were missing.

Most notably missing was the structural component of alienation/opposition among regime elites. This missing component of the lack of alienation among elites, particularly within the military, is what undermined the potential magnitude of this rebellious response. This component is important because it can help strengthen multiple aspects of a revolutionary body of protesters. Specifically, elite defectors could serve as critical leaders who have access to necessary resources and tools and the political charisma to form a unifying ideology to organize and unify the masses. Additionally, Goldstone explains how elite defections are essential for revolutions to occur because if military elites defect away from the incumbent leadership to side with the masses, these elite defectors can serve as the effective leaders to properly equip and mobilize these aggravated masses to forcibly change and target the regime. However, in 2009, North Korea saw no dissatisfaction among the regime elite, which left the populace without effective leadership and without the resources to organize to orchestrate a more organized and cohesive means of rebellion, which resulted in only limited forms of protests.

Moreover, then, for the continuous development of political change and to strengthen the prospect for more revolutionary conditions, the next step would be for North Koreans to exacerbate the development of more disunity within the political and military elites, which could be possible through these emerging markets by increasing the reserve of cash to use as bribes to attract elites away from depending on the regime for their livelihood. There has been evidence that common North Korean citizens can further exploit these emerging markets to widen elite fissures to increase the chance for potential defections, because there is growing evidence that members of North Korea's political and economic elite are also dependent on the private markets more than the regime's provisions. This is because, since 1994 when North Korea's regime-led command economy collapsed after the fall of the Soviet Union, the North Korean regime enacted a new policy to force all of its government agencies to independently fund themselves due to the regime's lack of resources to finance their activities.[14]

This cut off of regime financial subsidies forced these government leaders to seek alternative monetary sources, as the regime still demanded mandatory "loyalty funds."[15] This in turn forced these government officials to rely on private market activities to generate the revenue to operate their agencies as well as pay these mandatory funds. As the ruling regime remains economically strained due to the impact of international economic sanctions, it may be more limited in offering the pay and sustenance to its elite, thereby inserting an exploitable wedge for the populace to use with cash bribes to gain support among members of the elite to seek their defection to their greater political cause.

Beyond the lack of elite defections, another missing component is the lack of a unifying narrative and ideology to collectively mobilize the masses, which speaks also to the lack of an effective and influential leader, which may be addressed with more elite defections. Consequently, without this unifying ideology and a vision for what the populace seeks to change those seeking political change lack an achievable long-term goal, which in turn has limited the development of more organized forms of rebellion that has revolutionary potential in response to the events of 2009.

Conclusion

In sum, North Korea indeed has demonstrated significant signs of internal political change, but a closer evaluation of the internal social and political conditions reveal that it is still far from seeing any kind of revolutionary act of that will cause political change. This is mainly due to the lack of elite defections and the lack of leadership, which in turn underscores the importance of the aspects of individual agency in impacting the likelihood of revolutions beyond just the structural factors, as the major social changes initiated by these emerging markets initiated key structural developments that allowed North Koreans to exercise a degree of independence. Yet, to see a leap to more organized and effective forms of political change, the next step would be to cultivate the development of these leaders and organizing ideologies, which is tied to the key structural component of increasing elite defections. It is only then that one will likely see a more organized form of political opposition then what was witnessed in 2009.

Author's bio: Mathew Ha is an adjunct fellow with FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI). He is also a Ph.D. student at George Mason University's Schar School of Government and Policy Studies focusing on political science, international relations, and comparative politics. He completed his master's in Asian studies at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service with a concentration on the politics and security of Asia. Previously, Mathew served as a research analyst with FDD's North Korea and East Asia programs, where his research focused on North Korean sanctions evasion and illicit economic schemes as well as the Kim regime's evolving cyber capabilities and U.S. policies on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. His research expertise at FDD focuses on issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the threats posed by Pyongyang.

Works Cited

How did the North Korean famine happen?" Wilson Center April 30, 2002, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/how-did-the-north-korean-famine-happen

Park, Hyeong-jung, and Choi, Sahyun, "Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea." Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)-Study Series 14-05, May 2014, 14-16

Lankov, Andrei. "The Resurgence of a North Korean Market Economy" Carnegie Moscow Center (January 2016), 5-6

[1] Katzeff Silberstein, Benjamin. "Growth and Geography of Markets in North Korea: New Evidence from Satellite Imagery" US Korea Institute at SAIS, (October 2015)

[1] Daily NK. The Creation of the North Korean Market System. Green People Publishing Company, (Seoul, 2017)

Stephen Haggard, and Marcus Noland. Witness to transformation: refugee insights into North Korea. 100-101

Cha, Victor The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, (New York: Ecco 2012), 445.

Fifield, Anna. "What do North Korean's think about Kim Jong UN? This survey tries to find out." The Washington Post. November 12, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/what-do-north-koreans-think-about-kim-jong-un-this-survey-tries-to-find-out/2016/11/01/2a2cc357-34a9-464c-b32f-1291d16dd1b0_story.html

Park, Hyeong-jung, and Choi, Sahyun, "Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea." Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)-Study Series 14-05, May 2014

Beyond Parallel, "Meager Rations, Banned Markets, and Growing Anger Towards Government." Center for Strategic and International Studies, Korea Chair. October 3, 2016, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/view-inside-north-korea-meager-rations-banned-markets-and-growing-anger-toward-govt/

Cha, Victor The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, (New York: Ecco 2012),

Choe, Sang-Hun. "As Economy Grows, North Korea's Grip on Society is Tested." The New York Times, April 30, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-economy-marketplace.html

Ken E. Gause. Coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment: an examination of the North Korean police state. Washington D.C: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea-2013. 43-50

Hastings, Justin V. A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.

Mathew J Ha, "A compromise for control: understanding North Korea's private Market economy" Georgetown University, May 8, 2017.

[1] "How did the North Korean famine Happen?" Wilson Center April 30, 2002, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/how-did-the-north-korean-famine-happen

[2] Park, Hyeong-jung, and Choi, Sahyun, "Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea." Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)-Study Series 14-05, May 2014, 14-16

[3] Lankov, Andrei. "The Resurgence of a North Korean Market Economy" Carnegie Moscow Center (January, 2016), 5-6

[4] Katzeff Silberstein, Benjamin. "Growth and Geography of Markets in North Korea: New Evidence from Satellite Imagery" US Korea Institute at SAIS, (October 2015)

[5] Daily NK. The Creation of the North Korean Market System. Green People Publishing Company, (Seoul, 2017), 26

[6] Stephen Haggard, and Marcus Noland. Witness to transformation: refugee insights into North Korea. 100-101

[7] Cha, Victor The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, (New York: Ecco 2012), 445.

[8] Fifield, Anna. "What do North Korean's think about Kim Jong Un? This survey tries to find out." The Washington Post. November 12, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/what-do-north-koreans-think-about-kim-jong-un-this-survey-tries-to-find-out/2016/11/01/2a2cc357-34a9-464c-b32f-1291d16dd1b0_story.html

[9] Beyond Parallel, "Meager Rations, Banned Markets, and Growing Anger Towards Government." Center for Strategic and International Studies, Korea Chair. October 3, 2016, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/view-inside-north-korea-meager-rations-banned-markets-and-growing-anger-toward-govt/

[10] Cha, Victor The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, (New York: Ecco 2012), pp. 447

[11] Choe, Sang-Hun. "As Economy Grows, North Korea's Grip on Society is Tested." The New York Times, April 30, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-economy-marketplace.html

[12] Mathew J Ha, "A compromise for control: understanding North Korea's private Market economy" Georgetown University, May 8, 2017.

[13] Ken E. Gause. Coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment: an examination of the North Korean police state. Washington D.C: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea-2013. 43-50

[14]Park, Hyeong-jung, and Choi, Sahyun, "Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea." Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)-Study Series 14-05, May 2014, 7-38

[15] Hastings, Justin V. A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016. 105

2. North Korea’s Kim Welcomes 2026 With a Salute to Russia

Summary:

Kim Jong Un opened 2026 by praising an “invincible alliance” with Russia and saluting north Korean troops deployed to Russian battlefields, underscoring how the Ukraine war has bolstered his regime. Moscow has provided Pyongyang an economic lifeline and, through troop deployments and arms transfers, a real-world testing ground that is shaping modernization of aging conventional forces. Kim largely highlighted domestic gains in construction and agriculture, promising improved living standards, while continuing a steady drumbeat of weapons development. He avoided discussing the U.S. despite POTUS signaling interest in renewed talks. Kim is expected to formalize next steps at a Workers’ Party Congress early in 2026.

Comment: How emboldened is Kim by his relationship with Russia and the CRInK? Is 2026 going to be a year of provocations or worse? Will he be influenced by whatever concessions Putin receives from the US and the world?

North Korea’s Kim Welcomes 2026 With a Salute to Russia

WSJ

In New Year’s speech, leader celebrates an alliance that has bolstered his regime

By Dasl Yoon

Dec. 31, 2025 11:44 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-koreas-kim-welcomes-2026-with-a-salute-to-russia-238af7af

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a New Year’s Day event in Pyongyang. KCNA/Reuters

SEOUL—North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ushered in 2026 by hailing an “invincible alliance” with Russia and saluting his troops deployed to Russian battlefields—invoking a partnership that has fueled his growing defiance and confidence on the global stage.

In a New Year’s address delivered in Pyongyang, Kim called 2025 an unforgettable year in which he believed in nothing but the “people’s patriotism and loyalty,” according to a transcript published by North Korean state media.

Kim was looking back on a year during which the alliance with Moscow provided him with an economic lifeline and a battlefield testing ground, as Pyongyang sent roughly 15,000 troops to fight alongside Russia in its Ukraine war.

In a separate message, Kim praised his troops for their “remarkable feats” overseas. “Thanks to your self-sacrificing and devoted struggle, the militant fraternity and friendship and invincible alliance between our country and Russia grow firmer,” he said, according to state media.

Kim made no mention of policy toward the U.S. in his New Year’s speech, after a year in which President Trump suggested he would like to meet again with Kim, calling North Korea “sort of a nuclear power.”

Pyongyang has refused to engage in dialogue since the two last met in 2019, instead focusing on building up its weapons program and moving to cement its nuclear status, leveraging a period of close alignment with Moscow.

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In his speech, Kim largely focused on domestic achievements in construction projects and agricultural harvest as he looked back on the year. He spent the final weeks of 2025 visiting factories and a new hospital, vowing to improve living standards for his people.

But he didn’t become lax about the military buildup. In December, Kim inspected a nuclear-powered submarine, oversaw missile-launch drills and called for a modernized weapons industry.

In 2025 Kim ordered the mass production of munitions, as North Korea exports missiles and artillery shells to Russia, while unveiling his largest-ever warship and newest intercontinental ballistic missile.

The conflict in Ukraine has served as a testing ground for the Kim regime, identifying a need to modernize its aging Soviet-era military equipment. In September, Kim hinted that upgrading conventional capabilities would be a priority for 2026 and beyond.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

What are your impressions of Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day speech? Join the conversation below.

North Korea and Russia demonstrated increased military and economic cooperation in 2025, as Kim deployed troops and military engineers to support the war in Ukraine—and held a ceremony for some North Korean soldiers who died on the battlefield and returned to Pyongyang in coffins.

Kim and Russian leader Vladimir Putin exchanged New Year’s messages in December looking back on their military partnership. Putin said 2025 proved the “invincible friendship” between the two countries while Kim said their alliance would endure “generation after generation.”

Pyongyang has traded munitions and troops for Moscow’s technical and financial assistance, which could help revitalize a defense industry hampered by global sanctions. Kim is expected to lay out his foreign-policy and military goals for the next five years at a Workers’ Party Congress early in 2026.

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

WSJ

3. China’s Wang Yi takes aim at Japan in call with South Korean foreign minister

Summary:

China’s top diplomat Wang Yi used a call with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun to press Beijing’s Taiwan line and criticize Japan ahead of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s upcoming summit visit to China. Wang invoked Japan’s colonial history and warned of “political forces” in Tokyo he said were whitewashing past aggression, urging Seoul to uphold “international justice” by adhering to the one-China principle. China said Cho reaffirmed South Korea’s unchanged one-China position, while Seoul has publicly emphasized maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The ministers agreed to prepare concrete outcomes for Lee’s visit and also discussed the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Comment: Interesting reporting by Orange Wang. Again, I think we can see China's cognitive warfare emanating from its unrestricted warfare and three warfares. Clearly China is trying to ensure that the political factions within South Korea will pressure the Lee administration to stay out of Taiwan affairs and not support US or Japan efforts in the region toward China and Taiwan.

China’s Wang Yi takes aim at Japan in call with South Korean foreign minister

In countdown to summit, Wang and Cho Hyun talk Taiwan, Tokyo and the Korean peninsula

Orange Wang

Published: 5:06pm, 1 Jan 2026

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3338403/chinas-wang-yi-takes-aim-japan-call-south-korean-foreign-minister

With less than a week to go until a presidential summit, China’s top diplomat has used talks with his South Korean counterpart to reassert Beijing’s stand on Taiwan and take aim at Tokyo.

In a phone call with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun on Wednesday, China’s Wang Yi raised the spectre of Japan’s colonial past to get support for his country’s position on Taiwan.

Wang accused “certain political forces in Japan” of trying to “reverse the course of history and whitewash [the country’s] crimes of aggression and colonialism”, according to the Chinese foreign ministry.

“It is believed that the South Korean side will uphold a responsible attitude towards history and people, adopt the correct stance and safeguard international justice, including adhering to the one-China principle on Taiwan,” Wang told Cho.

A day earlier, Wang warned that “Japan’s current leader publicly challenged China’s sovereignty” and the world “must stay highly vigilant to the resurgence of militarism in Japan”.

People’s Liberation Army holds second day of live-fire exercises around Taiwan

Tokyo has been critical of drills by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan this week, adding to the tensions that followed Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s suggestion last month that an attack on Taiwan by the PLA could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, justifying military intervention from Tokyo.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the United States, South Korea and Japan, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to arm Taiwan.

Noting the talks were at Cho’s request, the Chinese foreign ministry said the South Korean foreign minister assured Wang that his country’s commitment to the one-China principle remained unchanged.

The phone conversation on Wednesday took place just four days before South Korean President Lee Jae-myung will make a state visit to China next week, with Beijing looking to Seoul for more backing on Taiwan and Tokyo.

Lee has been trying to balance Seoul’s relations with Beijing and its ties with Washington and Tokyo, shifting to a more pragmatic foreign policy approach from his predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol’s tilt towards the United States and Japan.

Lee is expected to visit Japan in mid-January for talks with Takaichi after his trip to Beijing.

Wang said that Beijing expected the South Korean leader’s visit to the Chinese capital to “promote new progress” in bilateral relations.

“China-South Korea relations have emerged from a low point and returned to the right track, showing a steady and positive development trend,” Wang was quoted as telling Cho.

In New Year’s speech, Xi urges growth and vows ‘unstoppable’ Taiwan reunification

Meanwhile, in his annual televised New Year’s speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping described the island’s reunification with the mainland as “a trend of the times” that would be “unstoppable”.

Wang also raised the issue during a speech at an event organised by the China Institute of International Studies think tank on Tuesday.

“We are seeing more and more countries stand with China,” Wang said.

“They not only reaffirm their commitment to the one-China principle and recognise Taiwan as China’s territory, but also unequivocally oppose all separatist activities for ‘Taiwan independence’ and support China’s reunification cause.”

The comments showed that Beijing had moved beyond reinforcing its previous position on Taiwan to working to “forge a new consensus” on the issue, according to an article posted on Wednesday on Yuyuan Tantian, a social media account controlled by state broadcaster CCTV.

Still, the South Korean government has called for “continued peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait.

Asked about this week’s PLA drills around Taiwan, South Korean foreign ministry spokesman Park Il said on Tuesday that Seoul hoped for “cross-strait relations to develop peacefully through dialogue and cooperation”.

He added that South Korea’s fundamental position on Taiwan remained unchanged.

In its statement on Wednesday’s talks, the South Korean foreign ministry said Cho and Wang agreed to “ensure the success of [Lee’s] state visit”, an event that will be the first high-level diplomatic engagement of the year for both countries.

“They agreed to … meticulously prepare concrete and practical outcomes that citizens of both countries can directly experience,” the South Korean foreign ministry said, without mentioning Taiwan or Japan.

The two ministers also exchanged views on the situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia, it added.

Orange Wang

Based in Beijing, Orange covers a range of topics including China's economy and diplomacy. He previously worked in Hong Kong and had a stint in Washington. Before joining the Post, Orange worked as a Shanghai Correspondent for ET Net, a Hong Kong financial news agency.

4. Easing controls on North Korean media is long overdue. But it’s still risky.

Summary:

Rob York argues South Korea’s decision to ease access to north Korean state media is overdue and defensible on civil-liberties grounds, since reading Rodong Sinmun is unlikely to convert citizens or meaningfully compete with South Korea’s democratic and economic reality. He notes north Korean propaganda is often crude and unpersuasive, and exposure can even backfire. The risk, he warns, is not ideological conversion but modern disinformation dynamics. In a social-media environment, authoritarian messaging can be coordinated, amplified, and laundered through online networks, possibly with Chinese or Russian support, to erode trust in institutions, weaken support for the U.S. alliance, and polarize society. He urges media literacy, monitoring, and defector protection.

Comment: Sure there are risks but they pale in comparison to what we can gain from it in the long run. I agree with his diagnosis especially concerning social media exploitation but I also agree with his prescription.

Easing controls on North Korean media is long overdue. But it’s still risky.

While reading the Rodong Sinmun won’t turn South Koreans into communists, Seoul will need to be wary of disinformation

Rob York January 1, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/easing-controls-on-north-korean-media-is-long-overdue-but-its-still-risky/

Image: Rodong Sinmun, KCNA and Canva, edited by NK News

Editor’s note: The following article is an opinion piece by Rob York, director for regional affairs at the Pacific Forum. Views expressed in opinion articles are exclusively the author’s own and do not represent those of NK News.

South Korea announced this week that it will allow all citizens to read North Korea’s main newspaper at select locations without requiring verification steps, a welcome if exceedingly modest first step toward easing decades-old restrictions on DPRK state media.

On the one hand, opening access shows just how far the Republic of Korea has come, now confident enough in its economic might and the superiority of its democratic system to discard the hardline anti-communist policies of the past.

But while this change is long overdue, there are still real risks associated with improving access to North Korean propaganda in an age of widespread disinformation campaigns, and Seoul must take steps to mitigate these potential perils if it hopes to protect and sustain its democracy against authoritarian influences.

POOR PROPAGANDA

When voicing support for plans to roll back controls on state media, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung ridiculed opponents of the move for thinking that the general public is so gullible as to become communists due to exposure to the Rodong Sinmun. His scorn is not totally without justification.

South Korea won the economic argument with North Korea decades ago, and South Koreans are largely indifferent to their northern neighbor, as well as broadly supportive of the alliance with the U.S. Even the incumbent progressive administration is staffed largely by individuals who want to keep the U.S. engaged on the peninsula.

Furthermore, Kim Jong Un has officially sworn off hopes of unification entirely.

As someone who has read more North Korean state media than may be healthy, I can attest that it is far from a masterclass in persuasion. It is chock full of mundane celebrations about new translations of the Supreme Leaders’ works and histrionic celebrations of leaders’ birthdays, not to mention off-the-wall criticisms of South Korea and the U.S. as untrustworthy, hostile and generally Hitleresque.

South Koreans are hardly ideal targets for such messaging. In fact, the effect might be the opposite of what anti-communists fear: The scholar Andrei Lankov told me over a decade ago that reading North Korean state media only made citizens of the former Soviet Union more critical of the North due to its outlandishness.

In truth, the argument for permitting access made even more sense two decades ago. South Korea had consolidated its democracy and swiftly recovered from the Asian Financial Crisis (though not without help). North Korea was famine-ridden, isolated and hemorrhaging people, while liberal democracies such as South Korea remained on a clear upward trajectory. The arc of the moral universe appeared to be bending especially quickly in their direction.

The civil liberties case for allowing South Koreans to access such materials remains strong. South Korea is supposed to be a “free” society, and free societies uphold the right to arrive at conclusions after considering all viewpoints, no matter how unhinged.

As the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights puts it: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung | Image: Blue House

DANGEROUS MESSAGING

That said, before implementing changes, it’s important to acknowledge the headwinds that now confront liberal democracy and the serious danger that authoritarian propaganda still presents in the world today.

First, the underlying justification of liberal democracies today faces questioning, and even strong proponents of this form of government should acknowledge as much.

Since the global financial crisis of 2008-09, citizens of liberal democracies have shown greater awareness of inequalities of outcome and opportunity that contentious deliberation has not resolved.

Populist movements, strongman leaders and one-party states have capitalized on such discontent, from Hungary’s Viktor Orban to Beijing’s “capitalism with Chinese characteristics.” Whether such authoritarians are “left” or “right” is irrelevant. Orban touts his “illiberal Christian democracy” and opposition to “totalitarian progressivism,” even as he plays up close ties with a Chinese government that is not only atheistic but totalitarian and leftist.

All such governments promote themselves as able to solve problems that democrats and liberals are too weak to address — whether its joblessness or soaring housing costs, both of which plague South Korea.

Second, the internet, and particularly social media, have changed the rules as to how propaganda and disinformation spread. Eastern Europe and the U.S. have well-documented struggles with malign online actors from Russia, and the Asian democracies of Taiwan and the Philippines wrestle daily with state-sponsored disinformation campaigns out of China.

Such campaigns are coordinated, involving online actors who spread false information. Other fake accounts amplify these accusations by reposting and commenting on the original posts, then engaging with both critics of the original sentiment and sympathizers.

This creates the illusion of popular traction and allows sentiments to spread further than they otherwise would, warranting the label of “propaganda.”

Third, not only can North Korea learn from Russian and Chinese messaging strategies — which is in truth not much more absurd than the DPRK’s — but it can count on them to amplify its messaging.

Experts believe that Russia and China already do this for one another, and Beijing has likely amplified North Korean messages to an extent. With their support, it’s not hard to imagine North Korean state media critical of Seoul, Washington and Tokyo making the rounds among South Korea’s online discontents, including students disillusioned by their job prospects and ethnic nationalists looking for someone to blame for why unification never happened.

Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping at bilateral talks in Beijing in Sept. 2025 | Image: KCTV (Sept. 6, 2025)

THE NEED FOR VIGILANCE

All of this brings us to the most important point: Reading North Korean state media may not turn South Koreans into communists, but it does not have to do so to cause major problems.

DPRK propaganda only needs to convince a critical mass of politically active South Koreans to devalue the U.S. alliance, lose faith in their own institutions or wonder if having a Supreme Leader would be preferable for solving their country’s thornier problems.

The case of Taiwan is instructive: While China and unification are less popular there than ever, there’s evidence that Beijing’s disinformation campaigns have convinced large swaths of opposition party voters that the ruling camp is corrupt, dictatorial and pushing the island toward a disastrous military confrontation — and that such a conflict suits the U.S. just fine. It’s not hard to imagine that this has contributed to the island’s current constitutional standoff.

There may well be constituencies in South Korea still susceptible to such messaging. If North Korean propaganda can convince enough ROK citizens that it is not in their national interests to spend more on the military, back the U.S. alliance, support defectors or seek cooperation with Japan, this may serve Pyongyang’s interest for better outright unification, which would bring a host of its own challenges.

It could produce a neutered South Korean state that offers no threat to the North in military or ideological terms, and which allows the North’s influence to grow on the peninsula and beyond.

South Korea should therefore accompany its decision to allow more access to North Korean state media with public education campaigns, including on media literacy, critical thinking and key historical events that are in dispute between the North and South.

ROK intelligence services will also need to monitor DPRK media, as well as social media discourse in South Korea (while respecting privacy rights), to track emerging narratives and dispel disinformation campaigns before they can take root.

Finally, it must expand protections for North Korean defectors, who are already targets, in case online disinformation is used to provoke action against them.

5. [Column] Time for Korea to stop letting the US be the master of our fate

Summary:

Jung E-gil argues South Korea must shed “American determinism,” the belief that Washington ultimately decides Korea’s political, economic, and security fate. He acknowledges the United States was central to South Korea’s founding, the Korean War outcome, and Cold War era development, but contends that the U.S.-led order is fading and the second Trump administration is shifting toward a Western Hemisphere focus and an offshore balancing posture. He cites pressure on allies for defense costs and investment, tariffs used coercively, and U.S. handling of Ukraine, Taiwan, and Venezuela as evidence Washington is prioritizing spheres of influence over hegemony. Seoul, he argues, should act with greater agency, slow or reshape major commitments that do not serve national interests, and treat projects like shipbuilding support and nuclear submarines as leverage rather than obligations.

Comment: It is important to understand how opponents of the ROK/US alliance think. This may seem laughable to those who believe in and understand the reality of alliance, but there are those in orea who believe this type of rhetoric. But it is not hard to see how this perception can be generated and perpetuated. We would be wise in recognizing and not discounting it out of hand but rather examine how words and actions can be interpreted to support this view.

[Column] Time for Korea to stop letting the US be the master of our fate

english.hani.co.kr

On both sides of the political spectrum, the tendency to see America as having the final say about Korea is only holding the country back

By Jung E-gil, senior international affairs writer

https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1237526.html

US President Donald Trump attends a signing of a peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the US Institute for Peace on Dec. 4, 2025 (local time). (AFP/Yonhap)

By Jung E-gil, senior international affairs writer

A certain mindset transcends political boundaries within South Korea: the belief that the US has the final say in issues related to Korea’s society, economy and politics — not to mention the fate of the Korean Peninsula.

If we follow that logic, Korea is no more than a pawn for the US to play with. As such, conservatives believe that Korea needs to do everything in its power to stay in the US’ good graces, while progressives argue that Seoul needs to become independent of Washington, once and for all. Either way, both parties believe that the US is the crucial decision-maker in many issues related to South Korea.

The fact that even individuals who held high-level public office posts and members of the ruling party have parroted crackpot theories and unfounded claims shows the extent to which American determinism within Korea has reached a level of psychosis.

For example, there is the conspiracy theory that Chinese spies conducting election fraud at the National Election Commission training center after the martial law declaration on Dec. 3, 2024, were arrested by US forces and sent to Okinawa, or that President Donald Trump would send an aircraft carrier to rescue former President Yoon Suk-yeol.

In modern Korean history, America has indeed been a definitive presence. The Republic of Korea was established because the US stationed forces in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula after World War II. The Korean War broke out and ended in an armistice due to US withdrawal and intervention. During the Cold War, America’s containment policy and alliance revitalization strategy comprised the conditions for Korea’s economic development. Without the US, the Korea we know today would certainly not exist.

Yet in the present, the international order led by the US that made modern Korea possible is fading. Since the launch of the second Trump administration, the US has abandoned its role as hegemon. A hegemon must fulfill its obligations within the international order it leads. This includes opening its own markets and protecting its allies. The Trump administration, however, has not only demanded that allies bear greater defense costs, but has also wielded tariffs as weapons to coerce massive investments, even resorting to outright cash extraction.

And now, the US seeks to retreat to the American continent. The National Security Strategy released by the Trump administration on Dec. 4 demonstrates that Trump seeks to continue the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, defining the Western Hemisphere as the top priority for US foreign strategy. Trump’s NSS during his first term labeled China and Russia as “revisionist powers” seeking to alter the existing international order, and described the Indo-Pacific as a crucial zone for their containment. This time, such references to China and Russia have vanished.

The Trump administration is pressuring Europe to accept Russia’s terms for ending the war in Ukraine. While Japan and China clash over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on a “Taiwan contingency,” Trump advises Japan not to provoke China. Meanwhile, the US is tightening its grip on Latin American nations, mobilizing military force in an attempt to overthrow Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

Trump’s America seeks to position itself not as a global hegemon but as a great power whose sphere of influence is the American continent. It has signaled a willingness to recognize other great powers as its counterparts in other regions. Whether the world will move toward the multipolar order advocated by China and Russia, or revert to the 19th-century imperialist order of divided spheres of influence remains unclear. Looking at the situation surrounding Ukraine, Taiwan, and Venezuela, one wonders if the US, China, and Russia are now carving up separate spheres of influence.

One thing is certain. To use the lofty terminology of international politics, the US now has no choice but to employ an offshore balancing strategy. This means the US will avoid direct intervention and instead leverage its allies to seek equilibrium in different regions. The Trump administration is making a retreat while demanding concessions from its allies and pushing them to the forefront.

Paradoxically, this also means greater dependence on its allies. This is evident in the pressure for massive investments from Korea and Japan, the “MASGA” initiative demanding shipbuilding support from Korea, and the US authorizing South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines.

Korea’s growth was driven not only by the conditions of the US-led international order but also by its own agentive willpower and capabilities. If the underlying international order evaporates, those characteristics will become even more crucial. The outcomes of our massive investments, the MASGA project, and the nuclear submarine construction program depend entirely on how we as a nation respond. If these massive investments do not align with our national interests, we must do everything within our power to delay their execution until Trump leaves office. This is not impossible. We can also keep the nuclear submarine program as a card to be played or not, as the situation requires.

Within the Korean government, there are bureaucrats who still prioritize reporting to the US and seeking its approval to advance their careers. A fierce debate is raging between the faction prioritizing independence and the one focused on maintaining alliance over whether issues like North Korea’s nuclear program must be discussed with the US first.

However, the conservative right’s American determinism — the belief that Korea must follow the US, come what may — became obsolete long ago. The progressive camp’s deterministic view, which claims all deals and negotiations with the US deepen Korea’s subordination, is equally outdated. Given the shifting power dynamics unfolding in East Asia, progressives too must break free from this fatalistic determinism.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

english.hani.co.kr

6. Lee vows active support as 'pacemaker' in potential N. Korea-U.S. talks this year

Summary:

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung said he will act as a “pacemaker” to support any renewed north Korea–U.S. talks in 2026 and will keep pursuing steps to restore inter-Korean relations, despite Pyongyang showing little interest amid deepening north Korea–Russia military cooperation. Lee framed peace as essential to growth, saying Seoul is working to reduce military tensions, rebuild trust, and coordinate with partners including the U.S. and China on peninsula stability. He reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic alliance” with the U.S. and stronger self-reliant defense, highlighting a trade deal with Washington and U.S. approval to pursue nuclear-powered submarines plus expanded nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. Domestically, he outlined a shift toward balanced regional development, broader opportunity beyond major conglomerates, stronger workplace safety, and investment in cultural industries.

Comment: So what kind of pacemaker are we talking about? One that keeps a weak heart (of peace and stability) beating or one that is the "rabbit" out to set a pace that will cause one participant to win the race (of peace and stability) at record speed?

But on a slightly more serious not serious note and to continue the analogy, the pacemaker seems like it could be a useful concept except for one thing: It requires Kim wanting to be allowed to be "paced" in the race and that all parties are participating in the same race with the same finish line.

Lee vows active support as 'pacemaker' in potential N. Korea-U.S. talks this year | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 1, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251231007400315?section=national/politics

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Jan. 1 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Thursday that he will actively support potential talks between North Korea and the United States this year as a "pacemaker," adding that he will also continue to keep up facilitating ways to restore relations with Pyongyang.

In an annual New Year's speech, Lee said he "will actively support the resumption of North Korea-U.S. talks and continue pursuing the restoration of inter Korean relations this year."

Last year, Lee held summit talks with U.S. President Donald Trump, who expressed his hope to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un -- a move that Lee supported by pledging to become a "pacemaker" to help Trump play a role as a "peacemaker."

Still, North Korea has shown little signs of returning to the dialogue table, but analysts have suggested that Pyongyang may pursue diplomacy after it holds a key party congress early this year.

Inter-Korean tensions have remained high as Pyongyang has snubbed Seoul's peace overtures as North Korea and Russia were deepening their military cooperation, particularly after the North's dispatch of its troops in support of Moscow's war against Ukraine.

Lee also stressed the importance of diplomacy despite stalled talks with North Korea.

He said the government is implementing measures to ease military tensions and restore trust between the two Koreas and is building consensus with the international community, including the U.S. and China, on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

"We will replace unstable growth constrained by the threat of war with stable growth supported by peace," he said. "Steadfast peace is synonymous with growth, and robust security is the driving force behind prosperity."

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a Cabinet meeting at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Dec. 30, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

In the speech laying out his agenda for 2026, Lee vowed to pursue his peace vision on the basis of what he called a "comprehensive strategic alliance" with the U.S. and strong "self-reliant" national defense.

He said Seoul's recent trade deal with Washington has helped ease economic uncertainty, adding that the Korea-U.S. alliance is now entering a "new renaissance." Lee expressed hope that Washington's approval of Seoul's push to build nuclear-powered submarines, along with efforts to expand uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities, will serve as a solid backbone for the nation's economic recovery.

President Lee Jae Myung (C) heads to his office at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Dec. 29, 2025, to begin his first day at the compound, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

On the domestic front, Lee said his administration will shift away from a growth model centered on the Seoul metropolitan area and move toward more balanced and sustainable development nationwide.

Plans are in place for customized strategies across five regional hubs -- the Seoul metro area, the southeast, northeast, central and western regions -- along with three special self-governing provinces: Jeju, Gangwon and North Jeolla.

The transition to the new development framework, he said, "is not a favor to the provinces" but "an essential strategy for national resurgence."

He also said the government will look for ways to spread economic opportunities and benefits beyond a small number of large conglomerates to start-ups, venture firms and small and mid-sized companies.

Addressing the high number of fatal industrial accidents, Lee pledged to strengthen workplace safety, and promised greater investment in the cultural sector to promote various kinds of Korean content across the world.

"Culture itself is the economy and a future growth engine, and it has become a linchpin of national competitiveness," he said.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 1, 2026

7. ED S. Korea is not America's pawn

Summary:

The Korea Times warns that UNC/CFC/USFK commander Gen. Xavier Brunson’s remarks risk framing South Korea as an instrument of U.S. regional strategy rather than a sovereign democracy. While Brunson stressed Korea’s central role in Northeast Asia and noted U.S. forces may appear to Beijing as an “adjacent force,” the editorial argues this blurs alliance defense of the peninsula into expectations of wider contingencies, potentially involving China. It cautions such rhetoric could make South Korea a prime target in conflicts it did not choose. The piece emphasizes Korea’s war trauma and democratic consent over war decisions, criticizes proposals like a Seoul-based Northeast Asia combatant command, and urges modernization focused on deterring war on the peninsula, not expanding battlefields.

Comment: Our provocative comments and proposals have ushered in the New Year with some controversy. To those of us who were there, we can see how the Korea Times has misinterpreted General Brunson's remarks. He was describing the reality of the situation in the region and in no way advocating Korea being a pawn of the US. But we need to be sensitive to how every remark and proposal can be taken out of context and used to reinforce a problematic narrative. But that must not deter us from taking the hard right of actions to strengthen the security of both nations and our alliance. Also included below are two very interesting comments to the Korea Times OpEd.

ED S. Korea is not America's pawn

Text Size

Published Jan 1, 2026 3:30 pm KST
Updated Jan 1, 2026 4:19 pm KST

USFK commander's remarks reveal problematic framing

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20260101/ed-s-korea-is-not-a-strategic-instrument

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), speaks during the 2nd ROK-US Combined Policy Forum in Seoul, Monday. Courtesy of CFC

Recent remarks by Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, deserve careful scrutiny. This is not because alliance cooperation is misguided, but because the language Brunson used risks recasting South Korea as a mere tool of U.S. regional strategy rather than a sovereign democracy with its own history, interests and public sentiments.

Speaking at the ROK-U.S. Combined Policy Forum, Brunson argued that South Korea is “not merely an entity that responds to threats on the Korean Peninsula,” but a central actor at the “intersection of broader regional dynamics” in Northeast Asia. He emphasized Korea’s geography, capabilities and readiness as forming the “central axis” of regional stability. Taken at face value, this sounds like strategic realism. In context, however, it implies an expectation that South Korea should shoulder an expanded military role well beyond deterrence of North Korea, potentially including conflicts involving China.

This framing is problematic for several reasons.

First, it risks blurring the line between alliance and instrumentalization. The Korea-U.S. alliance was established to deter war and defend peace on the Korean Peninsula, not to position South Korea as a launchpad or staging ground for confrontations between great powers of the world. When Brunson noted that U.S. forces at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, appear to Beijing as an “adjacent force capable of producing immediate effects,” he inadvertently highlighted the danger that Korea’s territory and population could become primary targets in a conflict that it neither initiated nor endorsed.

Second, this rhetoric underestimates the weight of Korea’s historical experience. War on the peninsula is not a theoretical exercise. The 1950-53 Korean War devastated the country, killing millions and leaving deep, unresolved wounds, particularly among civilians who suffered mass killings under the pretext of wartime security. These traumas remain part of Koreans’ collective memory. Later overseas military involvement, most notably in Vietnam, has also left enduring moral and social legacies, including unresolved questions about civilian harm and veterans’ suffering. Against this backdrop, suggestions — explicit or implied — that Korea should prepare for a “next war” beyond its own defenses have understandably provoked public anxiety and resistance.

Third, there are democratic concerns. Decisions about war and peace must ultimately rest with the Korean people and their elected representatives. When senior U.S. commanders publicly articulate an expanded regional role for South Korea, especially amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, they risk creating expectations that precede and constrain democratic debate in Seoul. Strategic alignment cannot be assumed; it must be reaffirmed continually through consent, not pressure.

This concern is amplified by proposals aired at the same forum, such as the creation of a Northeast Asia Combatant Command headquartered in Seoul. While presented as a measure of efficiency in response to overstretched U.S. command structures, these ideas further entrench the perception of South Korea as a permanent operational hub for U.S.-led regional warfare. That perception alone could heighten tensions and reduce — rather than enhance — stability.

None of this denies the reality of North Korea’s increasingly dangerous posture, including its nuclear ambitions, constitutional declaration of the South as an enemy and growing cyber capabilities. Nor is it an argument against alliance modernization or cooperation with partners such as Japan. Deterrence matters. Readiness matters. But modernization should prioritize preventing war on the peninsula and managing crises responsibly, not expanding the geographic scope of conflict in ways that expose Koreans to risks they did not choose to shoulder.

True stability in Northeast Asia will not be achieved by normalizing the idea that South Korea must serve as a strategic tool in the U.S.-China rivalry. Peace is not preserved by widening the map of potential battlefields, but by respecting sovereignty, historical memory and democratic agency.

South Korea is an ally, not an instrument. Any alliance that forgets that distinction risks eroding its moral legitimacy and, ultimately, the very stability it claims to defend.

Popular Comments

Brightbright
Jan 2, 2026
Arrogant US GI. U are a useless war trigger. The US troops, the evil exis of the world, the killer of Native Americans, Black slaves, Vetnameses, and Korean civillians, now is the time U go home. Go away. Korea should ally with Russia, China, India and N. Korea ane decouple US, the gangster of the world. Go away from my country, U peace breaker !
1
like count
Unwoke125
Jan 2, 2026
Again we see Korean arrogance. Korea should like any top country be helping other countries with aid and soldiers yet all Korea does is take take take. I wish the US did what most Americans want and pull all troops out and let Korea deal with China Russia and North Korea on their own. Then US could use its resources to help good countries like Japan and Taiwan.

8. Giving South Koreans access to North Korean media

Summary:

Jeon Su-mi argues South Korea is a mature, resilient democracy and no longer needs Cold War era censorship of north Korean media. She says conservative backlash reflects insecurity and distrust of citizens’ judgment, since crude Pyongyang propaganda is unlikely to destabilize a society that is economically strong and globally connected. Limited, managed access, she contends, would expose north Korean narratives to open scrutiny and defang them by bringing them into a transparent public sphere. She also calls conservatives hypocritical, noting some previously backed similar ideas but later blocked them for partisan reasons. Jeon adds that online disinformation is a greater modern threat than Rodong Sinmun, and frames the Lee administration’s “pragmatic peace” approach as holistic security that pairs alliance strength with broader engagement.

Comment: The most important thing about the decision to allow north Korean propaganda is the discussion that it is generating. The more discussion there is about the decision the less likely there will be a negative impact of the propaganda on the Korean people in the South.

There needs to be a good discussion on north KOrea's propaganda strategy as well as its overall strategy that the propaganda is supporting. There must be recognition of the strategy, understanding of the strategy, exposing (or explaining the strategy, and then an attack of the strategy using support information.

Giving South Koreans access to North Korean media

Text Size

By Jeon Su-mi

Published Jan 1, 2026 10:20 am KST
Updated Jan 1, 2026 3:03 pm KST

Jeon Su-mi

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/columns/guestcolumns/20260101/giving-south-koreans-access-to-north-korean-media

South Korea is no longer a fragile democracy struggling for survival. It stands as the world’s 10th-largest economy, a global cultural powerhouse fueled by the soft power of K-culture, and a nation whose democratic institutions have proven remarkably resilient through successive political upheavals.

Yet, the recent domestic furor over easing restrictions on the South Korean public’s access to North Korean media suggests that the conservative camp remains psychologically anchored in a Cold War mindset. Their insistence on maintaining an information blockade reflects a worldview that prioritizes state-led censorship over the systemic confidence that should define a modern liberal democracy.

When the Lee Jae Myung administration announced that it would partially lift the decades-old ban on North Korean broadcasts and publications, some conservatives were swift to denounce the move, calling it a dangerous concession to Pyongyang. However, these visceral reactions reveal less about actual security vulnerabilities and more about a profound lack of faith in South Korea’s own democratic maturity. To argue that a country capable of impeaching a president or leading global cultural trends is susceptible to crude 1950s-style propaganda is not only a logical fallacy but a dismissal of the cognitive autonomy of the South Korean people.

The fundamental assumption underlying these criticisms is that exposure to North Korean narratives could somehow destabilize South Korean society. This approach to information is fundamentally flawed in the digital age. In contrast to the current total ban, the government’s proposed limited and managed access serves a sophisticated strategic purpose: it deconstructs Pyongyang’s propaganda by subjecting it to the rigorous scrutiny of a free and critical public discourse. By moving these narratives from the dark corners of illicit websites into a transparent public square, the government allows the sheer absurdity of the Kim Jong-un regime’s cult of personality to be exposed to the collective common sense of our citizens. Openness, in this context, is not a sign of vulnerability; it is a proactive tool for neutralizing ideological influence through transparency.

What makes the current conservative outcry particularly hypocritical is that the idea of helping South Koreans have access to the North Korean media was once championed by their own leaders. During the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration, Kwon Young-se, then unification minister, publicly proposed allowing access to North Korean broadcasts. He said it is a vital step toward restoring national homogeneity and demonstrating the South's overwhelming superiority. This vision was echoed by Tae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat who later served as a lawmaker of the conservative People Power Party. He argued that South Korea’s resilience in the face of North Korean media would deliver a "psychological shock" to the North Korean elite.

But the initiative was ultimately thwarted — not by public opposition, but by internal pushback from within the conservative party itself. By sabotaging their own minister’s pragmatic policies, the conservatives have proven that their primary interest lies in partisan gatekeeping.

Furthermore, South Koreans have decades of experience navigating complex misinformation and ideological confrontations. It is intellectually dishonest to argue that the anachronistic narratives of North Korea’s state-controlled Rodong Sinmun newspaper pose a greater threat to our social fabric than the sophisticated digital disinformation and "fake news" currently circulating on the internet. Treating the public as "manipulable subjects" is an insult to educated citizens. Democracy thrives on the marketplace of ideas.

The Yoon administration’s "peace through strength" strategy failed to materialize; Instead, it resulted in North Korea’s return to hostile tactics, as exemplified in the "trash balloon" incidents, and a deepening “Korea risk.” The era we are living in demonstrated that a security policy based solely on hostility and the suppression of information is a failed experiment that leaves the nation more anxious and less strategically flexible.

The Lee administration’s emphasis on “pragmatic peace” is a direct response to these systemic failures. This vision represents a shift toward “pragmatic holistic security,” where South Korea’s ironclad alliance with the U.S. is harmonized with strategic economic engagement across the Eurasian continent. By creating structural interdependence and shared prosperity through this framework, the administration seeks to fundamentally resolve nuclear threats and mitigate regional tensions. In this context, free access to external information is a key pillar. By allowing citizens to see North Korea as it truly is — an impoverished, totalitarian state struggling for relevance — the government reinforces the legitimacy of our own liberal democratic order. Seeing the reality of the North is the most potent vaccination against any lingering ideological delusions.

Ultimately, the debate over North Korean media access is not about the capabilities of Pyongyang; it is about the identity of Seoul. It asks whether South Korea believes its democracy is strong enough to withstand exposure to hostile narratives and whether its leaders are willing to trust the very citizens they claim to represent. True conservatism should prioritize institutional resilience, prosperity and freedom.

South Korea has already won the systemic competition. Acting as if we are still engaged in a fragile ideological struggle only undermines our democratic confidence at home and sends a signal of insecurity abroad. Moving beyond outdated ideological reflexes and engaging in forward-looking discussions on peace and economic stability is not a concession. It is a declaration of strength — a testament to the fact that our democratic light is far too bright to be dimmed by the fading shadows of Pyongyang’s propaganda.

Jeon Su-mi is a spokesperson of the Democratic Party of Korea. She is also a lawyer and professor at Soongsil University. Her work focuses on constitutional law, democratic governance and peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The views expressed in this article are her own and do not reflect those of The Korea Times.

9. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has little to say to South Korea, U.S. in New Year's speech

Summary:

Kim Jong-un’s New Year speech avoided the expected messages to South Korea and the United States, instead emphasizing domestic cohesion and achievements under his “20×10 Regional Development Policy,” which aims to build modern factories across 20 cities and counties annually for a decade. He portrayed 2025 as a year of rising national “strength and dignity,” and used the address to elevate the military as a driver of national transformation. Kim singled out troops deployed overseas, especially those supporting Russia, praising their sacrifices and publicly highlighting their families to legitimize the deployment and frame any benefits as national prestige. Analysts see the speech as mobilization messaging ahead of the Workers’ Party’s Ninth Congress. Coverage of Xi’s greeting was muted compared with extensive Russia-focused messaging.

Comment: This is the report of Kim Jong Un's speech in the Joong Ang Ilbo. The next message with be the text of the actual speech reported by KCNA in north Korea.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has little to say to South Korea, U.S. in New Year's speech

Published: 01 Jan. 2026, 17:34

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-01-01/national/northKorea/North-Korean-leader-Kim-Jongun-has-little-to-say-to-South-Korea-US-in-New-Years-speech/2491160

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un gives a speech on Jan. 1 at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang. [RODONG SINMUN]

North Korea's state leader, Kim Jong-un, attended a New Year celebratory event on Thursday and delivered a speech, but refrained from issuing much-anticipated messages directed at South Korea or the United States.

Instead, Kim highlighted achievements from his signature initiative, the “20×10 Regional Development Policy,” encouraged the public for its hard work and made a point of praising soldiers deployed overseas.

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Analysts say the move reflects an intention to tighten internal unity and push ahead with planned achievements across sectors while focusing on preparations for the Workers’ Party’s upcoming Ninth Congress.

North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported that the 2026 New Year celebratory performance took place “with splendor” at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang. The event appears to have taken place around midnight on Wednesday. Kim attended the performance accompanied by his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, and his wife, Ri Sol-ju.

In his speech, Kim stressed last year’s accomplishments, placing particular emphasis on internal cohesion.

“We can feel proud that we boosted the strength and dignity of our country that year,” he said. “We rounded off everything perfectly, writing great events on every page of the year.”

He went on to underscore progress under the “20×10 Regional Development Policy,” a plan launched in 2024 to build modern factories in 20 cities and counties each year over a decade.

“The civilization of the capital city transformed the regions, the transformation of the regions gave a spur to the development of the capital city, and all the regions, sectors and units across the country made progress in a competitive, balanced and simultaneous way,” said Kim. “In this way, the historic cause aspiring to overall development of socialist construction has successfully passed its first stage.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, poses for a commemorative photo with family members of commanders from overseas operations units attending the “2026 New Year celebratory performance” at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang on Jan. 1. [RODONG SINMUN]

Addressing the military, Kim said it “went against heavy odds to lead the drive for creation and transformation and achieve amazing successes,” describing its efforts as a “precious victory even at the cost of their lives, thereby creating a heroic age to be revered by the coming generations.”

Experts interpret Kim’s portrayal of the military as a “vanguard of our cause […] to lead the drive for creation and transformation and achieve amazing successes” rather than merely an armed force, as an attempt to glorify the sacrifices made by troops mobilized for various state-led projects.

Notably, Kim used both his speech and photo opportunities to single out North Korean troops deployed to Russia and their families.

“All of you have safeguarded heroically the dignity and honor of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” Kim said in a congratulatory message sent on Wednesday, adding that their “self-sacrificing and devoted struggle” had further solidified the “militant fraternity and friendship and invincible alliance between our country and Russia.” He underscored the point by declaring, “Behind you are Pyongyang and Moscow.”

Experts say these moves point to Pyongyang’s intention to justify and highlight the results of the North Korean military’s deployment to Russia, while framing any resulting economic or military gains as an elevation of national dignity.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter Kim Ju-ae, left, hold a child from the family of a commander in an overseas operations unit deployed to Russia at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang on Jan. 1. [RODONG SINMUN]

Kim’s remark that “The coming year 2026 will be another year of the great DPRK along with the remarkable feats you will perform on the overseas battlefields,” is seen as reinforcing this narrative.

Kim also emphasized public unity in his New Year’s speech, saying that “what we believed in was nothing but our people’s patriotism and loyalty, and they were the real driving force that propelled our unprecedented struggle throughout the year.”

Kim proceeded to list achievements by soldiers of the Korean People’s Army, workers and farmers, the women’s national football team, and laborers at underground mines and power plant construction sites. In his roughly 985-word speech, Kim reportedly used the word “people” around 15 times, underscoring his professed commitment to a “people-first” ideology.

“The speech strongly suggests a preparatory effort to instill a ‘conviction of victory’ among the population ahead of the Ninth Party Congress, paving the way for a new mobilization drive,” said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies.

Meanwhile, the Rodong Sinmun — the official newspaper of North Korea's ruling party — briefly reported on a New Year’s greeting card sent by Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife to Kim, bundling the news with similar greetings from other foreign leaders. This stood in contrast to the paper’s detailed coverage of congratulatory messages exchanged between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Analysts say the muted coverage of China reflects the lack of tangible progress on key issues Pyongyang seeks — including economic cooperation, trade and tourism — despite Kim’s visit to China in September of last year.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO, SHIM SEOK-YONG [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]

10. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un ’s Speech at New Year Celebration

Summary:

Kim Jong Un’s New Year speech casts 2025 as a “golden” year of national progress and frames 2026 as a mobilization year ahead of the Workers’ Party’s Ninth Congress. He emphasizes “people-first” legitimacy, repeatedly praising workers, farmers, scientists, and soldiers for strengthening the state’s “dignity” and for advancing his regional development drive, describing “balanced” progress between Pyongyang and the provinces. Kim elevates the Korean People’s Army as the vanguard of national transformation and pays special tribute to overseas-deployed units, portraying their sacrifices as foundational to the regime’s success. Notably, he offers no policy signals toward South Korea or the United States, focusing instead on unity, confidence, and continued struggle toward a “new future.”

Comment: This is the actual English translation of the text on the KCNA Watch web site (from NK News). I used my VPN to connect to a South Korea server and I was able to access (I am not sure if that means it is available to all Koreans in the South). But on the Rodong Sinmun page of KCNA Watch there is this notice:

Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un ’s Speech at New Year Celebration

Upgrade to NK PRO today to get full access to this content*. *except for users based in South Korea

I am not sure if this means those in South Korea can access this without having ot upgrade to NK Pro or if it means that those in South Korea cannot access it (and this is an old notice that I had just never seen before).

Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Speech at New Year Celebration

Date: 01/01/2026 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source

Pyongyang, January 1 (KCNA) -- The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un made a speech at a New Year celebration.

The full text of his speech is as follows:

Dear Pyongyang citizens,

Labour innovators and meritorious persons, who are invited to this meaningful new year celebration as representatives of our industrious and patriotic working people,

Faithful and courageous officers and soldiers of the Korean People’s Army,

Our students and artistes, who are adding more to the air of festivity of this night,

Comrades,

Happy New Year.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I extend new year greetings to the working people in all sectors, including the industrial and devoted agricultural workers and intellectuals, and other people across the country, who are greeting this meaningful moment at their workplaces, posts and streets, in their villages and houses, with high dignity and hopes.

And I send congratulations to the generals and other officers and soldiers of our heroic army, who are greeting the new year filled with the pride in having glorified the previous year with invaluable feats and with a pledge of sacred service. My militant salute goes to the officers and soldiers of the overseas operations units, who will be greeting the new year in the far-away alien land with deep yearning for their homeland.

I also convey warm greetings to the overseas compatriots, who are devoting themselves to the patriotic work for the development and prosperity of their motherland.

Comrades,

We have just seen off the unforgettable year 2025 with deep emotion.

It was a year filled with so fervent hopes and dear efforts.

We can feel proud that we boosted the strength and dignity of our country that year.

We rounded off everything perfectly, writing great events in every page of the year.

The civilization of the capital city transformed the regions, the transformation of the regions gave a spur to the development of the capital city, and all the regions, sectors and units across the country made progress in a competitive, balanced and simultaneous way. In this way, the historic cause aspiring to overall development of socialist construction has successfully passed its first stage.

Certainly, this is an honour that has resulted from our ideals and faith, our strength and strenuous efforts, and at the same time, it is clear proof that we are following the right path.

The year 2025 was a golden period of epochal significance and transformation that added value to the precious lives of our excellent people and their children, and it was a year, in which we saw in our mind’s eye the future of our state that will grow more powerful and beautiful thanks to their affection, wisdom and sweat.

I really appreciate everyone in this country for having worked hard all year round.

Last year, too, the service personnel of the People’s Army, who have always stood in the vanguard of our cause, went against heavy odds to lead the drive for creation and transformation and achieve amazing successes; they won precious victory even at the cost of their lives, thereby creating a heroic age to be revered by the coming generations.

We will always remember that the glory of this night has been brought by the ennobling sacrifice and exploits of the great sons of our country, and in the annals of our eternal victory, we will etch their names and images as ever-shining stars.

We entered the year 2025 with a heavy heart as we were confronted with huge tasks; what we believed in was nothing but our people’s patriotism and loyalty, and they were the real driving force that propelled our unprecedented struggle throughout the year.

So trustworthy were the workers at the Sangwon Cement Complex, who raised the torch of increased production ahead of others true to the Party’s intentions, so commendable were the agricultural workers, who reaped a bumper harvest by tilling their fields by the sweat of their brow in a display of patriotism, and really admirable were our young women footballers, who had the national flag of our Republic hoisted by winning international competitions.

All our people, irrespective of job or workplace – be it deep pit, construction site of a power station, school or scientific research institute –, gave full play to their self-respect, resourcefulness, strength and enthusiasm befitting Koreans, and they thus filled the pages of the chronicle for the great year with sincerity for the development and prosperity of their country.

Only a great people can write such a great chronicle for the times and history.

As this great people throw in their lot with the country and find their greatest honour and joy of life in devoting themselves to its victory and glory, our Party is invincible and our socialism is ever-prosperous.

I will never exchange for anything else the dignity and glory of living for our great people and waging the revolution for them, and live up to the expectations of all the people in the new year, too, by always remaining faithful to the socialism of their choice, to the sacred ideal of the people-first principle and to the dignity, rights and interests of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Comrades,

The year 2026 began a few minutes before.

A more strenuous struggle and a greater victory are awaiting us.

Let us all make another start full of confidence.

There is no dream we cannot fulfil as we have the confidence and will to live and prosper with dignity and the fighting mettle and creative strength we have assiduously cultivated and fostered.

Let us all unite more firmly on the strength of patriotism and advance more vigorously and courageously towards the new future to be indicated by the Ninth Congress of the Party.

I sincerely hope that love, harmony, delight and happiness will brim over at all the families across the country in the new year.

Dear comrades,

I propose that we all raise a cheer once again to express our warm affection for, and infinite dignity and pride in, our state.

Long live our great country, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea! -0-

www.kcna.kp (2026.01.01.)

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Executive Director, Korean Regional Review

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un ’s Speech at New Year Celebration

Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Speech at New Year Celebration