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Quotes of the Day:
"Be at war with your vices, at peace with your neighbors, and let every new year find you a better man."
- Benjamin Franklin
"History is not there for you to like or dislike. It is there for you to learn from it. And if it offends you, even better. Because then you are less likely to repeat it. It's not yours to erase. It belongs to all of us."
- Unknown
"In their moral justification, the argument of the lesser evil has played a prominent role. If you are confronted with two evils, the argument runs, it is your duty to opt for the lesser one, whereas it is irresponsible to refuse to choose altogether. Its weakness has always been that those who choose the lesser evil forget quickly that they chose evil."
- Hannah Arendt
1. Ukraine Rings In New Year With Hopes of Russia’s Defeat
2. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN December 30, 4.30 pm EST The three hundred and tenth day of the russian large-scale invasion.
3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 31
4. Full Text: 2023 New Year Address by President Xi Jinping
5. Troubles aside, Xi says China on 'right side of history'
6. Moscow's Invasion Of Ukraine Triggers 'Soul-Searching' At Western Universities As Scholars Rethink Russian Studies
7. Joint Forces and Integrated Deterrence: Rebalancing China in the Western Pacific
8. Resilience and Resistance in Ukraine
9. Second Russian Defense Sector Bigwig Dies in Two Days
10. Ukraine War: Why The Optimists May Be Correct – Analysis
11. China and the US: On collision course for war over Taiwan
12. Covid Is China’s Price for Rejoining Humanity
13. Forced to fight your own people: How Russia is weaponizing passports
14. Zelenskyy Condemns Russia's New Year's Attacks
15. U.S. Pours Money Into Chips, but Even Soaring Spending Has Limits
16. EMP: The Biggest Military Threat America Faces Today?
1. Ukraine Rings In New Year With Hopes of Russia’s Defeat
Photos at the link below.
Ukraine Rings In New Year With Hopes of Russia’s Defeat
Optimism is tempered by economic pain as President Zelensky honors sacrifices
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrainians-ring-in-new-year-with-hopes-of-russias-defeat-11672527663?mod=hp_lead_pos3
By Alistair MacDonaldFollow and Oksana Pyrozhok
Updated Dec. 31, 2022 8:23 pm ET
KYIV, Ukraine—Ukrainians greeted 2023 with drinks, air raids and a firm belief that their country will fully reverse the Russian invasion that marked the past year with disruption and death.
Their optimism for the new year comes with around 20% of the country still in Russian hands; military and civilians still dying in the thousands; and the economy suffering lasting damage from a war that few Western experts see ending soon, or outside a negotiating table.
In a video address, released shortly before midnight, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky paid tribute to the sacrifices made by Ukrainians from all walks of life since the conflict began in February. “It was our year,” he said. “Year of Ukraine. Year of Ukrainians.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in his address saluted the sacrifices made since the Russian invasion.
PHOTO: UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE/REUTERS
“On February 24, millions of us made a choice,” Mr. Zelensky added. “Not a white flag, but a blue and yellow flag. Not escaping, but meeting. Meeting the enemy. Resisting and fighting.” He said further sacrifices would be needed to liberate all of Ukraine, including the regions Russia occupied in 2014.
Shortly after midnight, sirens sounded throughout Kyiv.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual speech to criticize the West for what he said were its attempts to use the war to divide Russia and diminish its influence.“The moral, historical truth is on our side,” he said, as he sought to justify last February’s invasion and signal thaMoscow would continue the fight despite a flurry of battlefield reverses over the past few months.
In more subdued celebrations than usual, Ukrainians headed home early to beat curfews through streets that were dark because of blackouts. Many didn’t feel like celebrating, not least after a fresh wave of missile attacks hit cities on New Year’s Eve. But almost all appeared to believe that Ukraine will win this war and reclaim all its territory.
In the past, Nadia Oliinyk, 67 years old, would prepare traditional year-end meals, such as Olivier salad and kutya, a sweet-tasting grain dish, to host neighbors and her family at home in Kyiv. This time she planned to do little to celebrate. Her son-in- law died in battle, and her daughter and grandson have fled to Germany.
“We expect a victory for sure,” she said. “But this is going to be a tough year.”
The streets of Kyiv near Independence Square were nearly empty shortly after midnight Sunday.
PHOTO: FELIPE DANA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Even before the country’s recent successes, which saw its forces push Russian units farther south and east, Ukrainians were confident of victory. More than 90% of those polled in August predicted that Ukraine would win the war, according to the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, a Ukrainian think tank. The majority defined victory as the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory, including that seized in 2014.
Yet the war has already taken a deadly toll on Ukraine. Kyiv doesn’t release data on its casualties, but U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in November that the Ukrainian military has had an estimated 100,000 deaths or injuries.
As of Dec. 23, the United Nations recorded 6,884 civilian casualties, including 391 children, and 10,947 injured. Most estimates for civilian deaths are in the tens of thousands. Ukrainian officials have said that at least 25,000 died in the siege of the southern city of Mariupol alone, according to the British Broadcasting Corp.
A neighborhood in central Kyiv was lacking the usual holiday kiosks and decorations.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Almost eight million Ukrainians have fled the war to register as refugees in Europe, though some might have returned, according to the U.N. The U.S. and Canada have taken tens of thousands of refugees, the U.N. said.
Cities and towns in the east and south, such as Mariupol, Bakhmut and Izyum, have been leveled, their historic and once-elegant downtowns all but destroyed.
The damage stretches throughout the country. As of November, the total amount of documented damage to residential and nonresidential real estate and other infrastructure in unoccupied Ukraine amounted to $135.9 billion, if replaced at current costs, according to the Kyiv School of Economics.
Major centers, including Kyiv, continue to be hit by drone and missile fire that has been mainly aimed at energy infrastructure. As of New Year’s Eve, around 40% of the high- voltage energy grid that distributes electricity around the country wasn’t working, according to Ukrenergo, the state-owned grid operator.
Such damage threatens a long-term impact on the economy.
An area of the southern city of Mykolaiv, Ukraine, is heavily damaged after a Russian missile strike.
PHOTO: OLEKSANDR RATUSHNIAK/REUTERS
The World Bank expects the Ukrainian economy to contract by 35% in 2022. Agriculture accounts for 20% of Ukraine’s gross domestic product. Now almost a quarter of the industry has been lost or damaged, with many fields left unsown, according to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food.
Many U.S. and European officials remain skeptical that Ukraine can fully expel the Russian army on its own.
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There are some experts, though, who argue Ukraine can do it, with support from the West.
“Enough new weapons systems and ammunition, and Ukraine could retake all of its territory,” said Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.
The leadership of Ukraine’s main current backers, such as the U.S., the U.K. and Poland, continue to pledge their support. But Mr. Zelensky will need to start the year shoring up foreign backing.
House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy has signaled growing skepticism among Republicans about military spending on Ukraine Populations in some parts of Europe, sick of the inflation and influx of refugees caused by the war, might push their governments to stop teir financial and military support.
On the front line in eastern Ukraine, Andrii Mahomet, an infantry man, said he won’t celebrate the new year.
Emergency workers at a residential area of Kyiv that was hit during a Russian attack.
PHOTO: ROMAN HRYTSYNA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
“I’m not in the mood for a celebration, people are tired,” he said. “We will have an even bloodier year ahead of us than the previous one.”
In northeastern Ukraine, Oleksandr Kud, also in the infantry, reminisced about the previous New Year’s celebration, when there were poets and musicians and everyone dressed in a 1920s theme.
Now, “I would be just happy if there were no missile threats on New Year’s Eve…the best option to welcome the new year,” he said.
Off the front line, most Ukrainians couldn’t gather in public past 10 p.m., given the curfews in place. Fireworks were banned. Blackouts have plunged homes, cities and towns into periods of darkness while shutting off heating and often water.
People are trying to adapt. An invitation for a dance party on New Year’s Day in Kyiv contained an “important note,” informing people that the nearest air-raid shelter was at the local subway station.
A Christmas tree was lighted earlier this week for a short period in central Kyiv.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Around 200 people gathered around a Christmas tree in the central Kyiv square where people usually come to see in the new year, a fraction of the normal numbers who would typically come.
At the Drunk Cherry bar, manager Yevhen Avramenko closed early at 7:30 p.m. because of concern for further missile attacks and because of the blackout. In the past there were so many people that a line stretched down the road to get in. This time 15 or so headed out into the dark.
Standing near an apartment block that had been struck by a missile, killing one and injuring at least five, Diana Manaevai, a local resident, said it would be hard to celebrate because of her fear that missiles could return at any time.
Ms. Manaevai said that she still believed in a Ukrainian victory.
“Ukrainians have a strong spirit,” she said.
The remains of Russian military vehicles on display near St. Michael’s Monastery in Kyiv.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com
2. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN December 30, 4.30 pm EST The three hundred and tenth day of the russian large-scale invasion.
Also posted on Small Wars Journal here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/war-bulletin-december-30-430-pm-est-three-hundred-and-tenth-day-russian-large-scale-invasion
Embassy of Ukraine in the USA
WAR BULLETIN
December 30, 4.30 pm EST
During the day, Russia carried out 16 airstrikes, 15 of which hit civilian infrastructure. In particular, the enemy used 8 Shahed-136 UAVs, all of them were shot down. In addition, the enemy launched 17 attacks from rocket salvo systems.
Russia continues to conduct offensive actions in the Lyman and Bakhmut directions and tries to improve the tactical position in the Kupyansk and Avdiivka directions.
In the new year Ukrainian air defense will become stronger, more effective – address of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak discussed with Ukrainian defenders released from Russian captivity the work of the Coordination Headquarters on the treatment of prisoners of war.
WAR ROOM
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The total combat losses of the Russian forces from 24.02 to 30.12:
personnel ‒ about 105250 (+690) killed,
tanks ‒ 3026 (+8),
APV ‒ 6059 (+12),
artillery systems – 2010 (+6),
MLRS – 423,
Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 212,
aircraft – 283,
helicopters – 268,
UAV operational-tactical level – 1740 (+23),
cruise missiles ‒ 711 (+58),
warships / boats ‒ 16,
vehicles and fuel tankers – 4683 (+8),
special equipment ‒ 180 (+1).
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jfeZ9fNA9BUDrFxeasWm1snSa2pP7D2sMjqGYwgcTUj2hQB8VKHrrX8uGqrpvZkl
The three hundred and tenth day of the russian large-scale invasion.
During the day, the Russian invaders carried out 16 airstrikes, 15 of which hit civilian infrastructure. In particular, the enemy used 8 Shahed-136 UAVs, all of them were shot down. In addition, the enemy launched 17 attacks from rocket salvo systems. Civilians died from artillery fire by the Russian occupiers of peaceful settlements.
The enemy continues to conduct offensive actions in the Lyman and Bakhmut directions and tries to improve the tactical position in the Kupyansk and Avdiivka directions.
The situation is stable in the Volyn, Polisiya, Siversk and Slobozhansk directions. No signs of formation of enemy offensive groups were detected. The areas of Semenivka and Zaliznyi Myst settlements of Chernihiv region were shelled in the last two directions; Zapsillia and Velyka Rybytsia - Sumy, as well as Morokhovets, Ternova, Staritsa, Vovchansk, Bochkove, Chugunivka and Zarubinka in Kharkiv Oblast.
In the Kupyansk direction, the impact of fire was recorded near the settlements of Kamianka, Dvorichna, Vilshana, Kupyansk, Kotlyarivka and Tabaivka in the Kharkiv region and Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka in the Luhansk region.
In the Lyman direction, the enemy fired at Nevsky and Dibrova in the Luhansk region, as well as Chervonopivka and Torske in the Donetsk region.
In the Bakhmut direction, the areas of the settlements of Spirne, Berestov, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Pidgorodne, Bakhmut, Kostyantynivka, Bila Gora, Kurdyumivka, Druzhba, Mayorsk and New York of the Donetsk region were affected by the fire of the occupiers.
Vesele, Avdiivka, Nevelske, Maryinka and Novomykhailivka in Donetsk region came under enemy fire in the Avdiivsk direction.
In the direction of Novopavlivsk, the enemy fired at Vugledar, Prechistivka, and Vremivka in the Donetsk region.
In the Zaporizhia direction, Temyrivka, Gulyaipole, Dorozhnyanka, Novoandriivka, Stepove, Kamianske and Stepnohirsk in the Zaporizhia region and Nikopol and Prymiske in the Dnipropetrovsk region were affected by enemy fire.
In the Kherson direction, in particular, the civilian infrastructure of Kachkarivka and Kherson was damaged by shelling from MLRS systems.
As of December 29 of this year, the hospital in Bilovodsk, Luhansk region, is full of wounded russian servicemen.
Up to 10 armed occupiers were wounded and destroyed in the Donetsk region. In addition, 2 units of military equipment were destroyed, and another 3 were damaged.
Our aircraft made 5 strikes on areas where the occupiers were concentrated. Also, during this day, an enemy reconnaissance UAV of the "Orlan-10" type was shot down.
At the same time, units of missile troops and artillery of the Defense Forces of Ukraine hit 6 areas of concentration of enemy manpower and military equipment, 5 ammunition warehouses and a radar station.
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AXZxsQX6iUUS9dbHwu2NFhCyGJR7ZD4R8azDznETFnFVECFNLUyyZwAXmg9E2k4Pl
POLICY
President of Ukraine
In the new year Ukrainian air defense will become stronger, more effective – address of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
Dear Ukrainians, I wish you health!
I held another meeting of the Staff – already the 45th this year.
The main thing is Donetsk region, Luhansk region – our Donbas, where the fiercest battles are going on. Bakhmut, Soledar, Kreminna... In general, we hold our positions. There are also areas of the front where we are slowly advancing. And I thank all our soldiers who ensure this. You are real heroes!
We discussed the situation in the south, on our border, the supply of weapons, and the further strengthening of air defense.
This year, we not only maintained our air defenses, but we made them stronger than ever. But in the new year Ukrainian air defense will become even stronger, even more effective.
Ukrainian air defense can become the most powerful in Europe, and this will be a guarantee of security not only for our country, but also for the entire continent.
After the meeting of the Staff, at a separate meeting we discussed the situation in the energy industry, what we are preparing for.
We have a clear strategy for ensuring the generation and supply of electricity. It takes time to implement it. It takes a lot of effort. But it will be. It will be mandatory. It is one of the most important tasks for the next year, and I have no doubt that we will accomplish it.
Today I spoke with the Prime Minister of Greece. We summarized the year, and I thanked Greece for supporting our country. We agreed for next year how we can make cooperation even more meaningful.
I held a meeting with our diplomats. There are many questions, but the main thing is the measures we are preparing to strengthen Ukraine already in January and February.
Ukraine will retain the achieved leadership in foreign policy and will be even more active, that's for sure.
And one more.
Today, for the first time, the ceremony of awarding our volunteers with the Golden Heart took place.
It is fair and honest – at the end of the year, to recognize those who help our defense, help people and our entire state all year long.
Thank you to everyone who fights for our country. Who helps Ukrainians. Who works for Ukraine and our future.
Glory to all our people!
Glory to Ukraine!
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-novomu-roci-ukrayinska-ppo-stane-she-silnishoyu-she-rezult-80185
Andriy Yermak discussed with Ukrainian defenders released from Russian captivity the work of the Coordination Headquarters on the treatment of prisoners of war
30.12.2022 12:25 CET
Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak visited the Coordination Headquarters on the treatment of prisoners of war and held a meeting with Ukrainian defenders who were released from Russian captivity.
During the meeting, Andriy Yermak reminded that the Headquarters was established on the instructions of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy in March this year. The need for the establishment of such a structure was due to the fact that with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the number of prisoners in the aggressor country from among Ukrainian servicemen of various units and law enforcement agencies was growing. Many specialists from law enforcement agencies and ministries were involved to organize the quality work of the Headquarters.
At the same time, the Head of the Office of the President emphasized the importance of involving servicemen who had been captured in the work of the Headquarters. According to him, their life experience will contribute to the establishment of proper and efficient work of the Headquarters, improvement of communication with relatives and friends of the persons still in captivity in Russia or on the temporarily occupied territories.
"Your expertise is very important for us - how well it is done. Because you went through this hell, you were directly aware of all the details, every part of the exchange process, you know best what was right, what was wrong," he said.
According to the Head of the President's Office, it is necessary to improve the work of the Headquarters in such a way that both the Ukrainian society and every warrior who defends Ukraine today understand that they are under the protection of the Ukrainian state.
"And if a warrior is in captivity, the state is engaged in his return 24/7 and informs his family about it," he also noted.
In addition, Andriy Yermak stressed the importance of providing everything necessary for Ukrainians who returned home from captivity, their rehabilitation, family support, etc. After all, being in captivity is difficult both physically and psychologically, so they need help in recovery and adaptation.
The Head of the President's Office said that more than a month ago, while communicating with the liberated soldiers and their families, he heard about the bureaucratic difficulties with the restoration of documents that sometimes arise for the liberated warriors. Therefore, Andriy Yermak appealed to Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, and after discussing this problem, it was decided to add special functionality for former prisoners of war to Diia.
According to Mykhailo Fedorov, the "Personal Manager" solution was developed, thanks to which the released from captivity will be able to receive assistance in restoring passports, marriage certificates, driver's licenses, etc. A personal card will be created for each prisoner of war in Diia and a support manager will be assigned to him/her.
Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and Head of the Coordination Headquarters Kyrylo Budanov, in his turn, noted that all servicemen who remained in service in various military and law enforcement agencies after the captivity can be involved in the work of the Headquarters on a voluntary basis.
Andriy Yermak emphasized the importance of the work of the Headquarters in the context of the fact that today there is virtually no international organization that can visit places of detention of Ukrainian prisoners, monitor their health, control the conditions of stay.
"We do not accept what we hear from the ICRC. It is impossible that in the XXI century there are concentration camps in the center of Europe, and they are waiting for months for approval to get there and check the conditions," he stated.
The Head of the Presidential Office also emphasized the importance of involving mass media representatives and the information center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in the work of the Headquarters in order to enhance communication with the public, spread information on the activities and contacts for citizens' appeals.
During the visit to the Coordination Headquarters on the treatment of prisoners of war Andriy Yermak got acquainted with the work of the public reception, where people can get professional advice from representatives of ministries and agencies. Also, psychologists and lawyers work here on a permanent basis to help families of prisoners of war and persons who went missing in special circumstances.
In addition, the Coordination Center has a counseling telephone line designed to provide legal, social and psychological support to families of Ukrainian defenders who were captured or went missing. Branches of the Coordination Center already operate in Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Vinnytsia.
According to Kyrylo Budanov, as a result of the work of the Coordination Headquarters, 1456 Ukrainian defenders have already been released from the captivity of the aggressor state.
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/andrij-yermak-obgovoriv-zi-zvilnenimi-z-rosijskogo-polonu-uk-80165
Prime Minister of Ukraine
As a result of 2022, amid the war, Ukraine has been granted five "visa-free regimes" with the EU: Denys Shmyhal
Integration into the EU is not about some vast future that will give results someday. Integration into the EU is the transformation of our country right now. It means business opportunities, state stability, strengthening of our institutions, fair rules, opportunities and freedoms for all Ukrainians. Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal emphasized during a Gov’t session on December 30.
“The milestone in our history was obtaining the EU candidate status in June this year. In record time for all countries, we have completed the questionnaire for obtaining this status. We have already managed to implement the Association Agreement with the EU by more than 70%. Next year we expect to start negotiations on accession to the European Union,” accentuated the Head of Government.
According to the Prime Minister, this year, amid the war, Ukraine has been granted five so-called "visa-free regimes" with the EU. What was planned to be done for years, we have done in 10 months.
“Energy visa-free regime was granted in March, when we joined the European energy grid. Transport visa-free regime - in June, thanks to which Ukrainian business no longer needs permits for road freight transportation. Economic visa-free regime abolished for a year all duties and quotas on Ukrainian goods exported to the EU. Customs visa-free regime started to function in October and allows us to integrate our customs into the European one. Digital visa-free regime, thanks to which Ukraine is now a member of the Digital Europe Programme,” explained Denys Shmyhal.
The Prime Minister added this was only the tip of the whole work. Hundreds of regulations have already been adopted to make Ukrainian legislation fully compliant with the European one. Hundreds more are being prepared for adoption next year: “Our strategic goal is to meet the accession criteria by the end of 2024”.
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/za-2022-rik-v-umovakh-viiny-ukraina-otrymala-piat-bezviziv-iz-ies-denys-shmyhal
During the full-scale war, the Government has allocated more than UAH 1.2 trillion for the security and defense sector: Denys Shmyhal
Next year, as well as this year, building a strong army will be the main task of the Government, announced Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in his opening statement during a regular session of the Government on December 30.
“The resources we spent in 2022 and budgeted for 2023 clearly demonstrate this. During the full-scale war, the Government has allocated more than UAH 1.2 trillion for the security and defense sector. We have significantly increased payments to all military personnel. More than UAH 250 billion were allocated for the purchase and modernization of weapons and equipment that effectively destroys the occupiers,” stressed Denys Shmyhal.
According to the Prime Minister, there have been created new mechanisms of security support for Ukraine, among which the key place was occupied by the Ramstein format that united 50 countries.
Moreover, a number of long-term contracts for the production of weapons for Ukraine have been concluded, to be financed by the governments of the United States, Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and other our partner countries over the next 2-3 years. Denys Shmyhal emphasized Ukraine continued to actively produce its own weapons.
“We have applied for NATO membership. We are introducing the best standards of the Alliance in logistics, planning, and accountability. The Ukrainian army, without exaggeration, is now one of the strongest in Europe and the world. And our army will bring us victory. And we will work to ensure that it is provided in the best possible way,” noted the Head of Government.
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/za-chas-povnomasshtabnoi-viiny-uriad-vydilyv-na-sektor-bezpeky-i-oborony-bilsh-nizh-12-trln-hrn-premier-ministr
3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 31
Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual New Year’s Eve address continued to illustrate that Putin is uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space and remains focused on justifying the war in Ukraine and its cost to his domestic audience.
- Putin delivered his address from the headquarters of the Southern Military District (SMD) as part of his ongoing efforts to portray himself as an effective wartime leader.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu demonized Ukraine and announced that Russian victory is inevitable in his New Year’s Eve speech.
- Russian forces are likely depleting their stocks of artillery ammunition and will struggle to support their current pace of operations in Ukraine as a result.
- Russian forces launched another round of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure but at a reduced intensity compared to previously massive waves of strikes.
- Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners but differed in their reporting on the number of exchanged personnel.
- Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City on December 31.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost connection to its last functioning backup power line on the evening of December 29.
- Russian forces continue operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and along the southern axis.
- Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on December 31 that he knew “for a fact” that the Kremlin plans to close its borders for men, declare martial law, and begin another wave of mobilization in “one week or so.”
- Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories in response to Ukrainian partisan activities.
- Russian occupation officials continue to create unbearable living conditions for residents of occupied territories.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 31
understandingwar.org
Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Madison Williams, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 31 7:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Note: ISW and CTP will not publish a campaign assessment (or maps) tomorrow, January 1, in observance of the New Year's Holiday. Coverage will resume on Monday, January 2.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual New Year’s Eve address continued to illustrate that Putin is uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space and remains focused on justifying the war and its costs to his people. Putin stated that “Russia’s sovereign, independent, and secure future depends only on us, on our strength and determination” and that 2022 “was a year of difficult, necessary decisions, of important steps toward achieving the full sovereignty of Russia and the powerful consolidation of our society.”[1] He added that the events of 2022 “became the milestone that laid the foundation of our new common future, our new true independence.” He continued: “That is what we are fighting for even today, we are defending our people on our own historical territories in the new Russian Federation Subjects [the illegally annexed territories of Ukraine].” This speech continued Putin’s rhetorical claims not only that Russia has historical rights to Ukraine, but also that Russia’s independence and sovereignty depend on regaining control of Ukraine. Putin thereby attempts to cast victory in the war as essential to Russia’s continued existence as an independent state.
These comments were likely meant in part to justify the costly war and to appeal to the ultra-nationalist pro-war community that routinely cites the defense of illegally annexed territories as reason to pursue even more aggressive goals and to pay even higher prices for them in Ukraine.[2] They also indicate, however, that Putin remains unwilling to contemplate a meaningful peaceful resolution of the war he began other than on terms he dictates to Ukraine and the West. Putin is unlikely to accept any lesser outcome unless Ukraine, with the help of its Western supporters, can inflict additional large-scale defeats on Russian forces and liberate considerably more of its occupied land.
Putin did not use his annual speech to make any announcements about how the Russian military intends to reverse its setbacks in Ukraine and achieve his maximalist goals. The banality of most of the speech is consistent with previous ISW assessments that Vladimir Putin may have postponed his annual address to the Russian Federation Assembly because he was uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space amidst increasing criticism of his conduct of the war.[3]
Putin delivered his address from the headquarters of the Southern Military District (SMD) as part of an ongoing effort to portray himself as an effective wartime leader actively in control of the war effort. Putin delivered his address from the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don with Russian military personnel in combat uniforms behind him.[4] Putin also reportedly presented battle banners to the Donetsk People‘s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps and the Luhansk People’s Republic 2nd Army Corps, as well as state awards to Russian servicemembers who participated in combat missions in Ukraine.[5] Russian sources reported that Putin also awarded the Cross of Saint George to the commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin.[6] Putin likely staged these events at the SMD headquarters to bolster Kremlin efforts to portray Putin as being deeply involved in the conduct of the war and an effective wartime leader.[7] The award to Surovikin signals Putin’s continued support of the overall commander of the war despite the fact that Surovikin‘s tenure has not yet seen any significant territorial gains and the fact that the wide-scale deliberate attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure that Surovikin likely recommended and prepared have not brought Russia any closer to victory.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu used his New Year’s celebratory address to demonize Ukraine and to announce that Russian victory is as “inevitable” as the coming of the new year. Shoigu falsely credited Russian soldiers with defending civilians suffering “genocide and violence” for “the right to speak Russian,” which is an officially recognized national minority language in Ukraine. Shoigu further described the war as a struggle against neo-Nazism, terrorism, and those who idolize war criminals. Shoigu framed Russian victory as the way to prevent attempts to blot out Russia's “glorious history and great achievements” and to protect civilians freed from “Nazis” in an apparent attempt to motivate Russian soldiers.
Russian forces are likely depleting their stocks of artillery ammunition and will struggle to support their current pace of operations in certain sectors of the frontline in Ukraine as a result. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov reported on December 31 that Russian forces in Ukraine are experiencing significant issues with artillery ammunition that will become more pronounced by March of 2023.[8] Budanov stated that Russian forces had previously used 60,000 artillery shells per day (as of some unspecified date) and now only use 19,000 to 20,000 shells.[9] Budanov stated that Russian forces have also removed all remaining artillery ammunition from Belarusian military warehouses to support their operations in Ukraine.[10] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on December 24 that Russian forces currently lack the necessary stockpile of artillery munitions to support large-scale offensive operations and that sustaining defensive operations along the lengthy frontline in Ukraine requires the Russian military to expend a significant number of shells and rockets daily.[11] ISW assesses the constraints on munitions will likely in part prevent Russian forces from maintaining a high pace of operations in the Bakhmut area in the near term.[12] The depletion of the Russian military’s artillery ammunition stocks will likely impact their ability to conduct a high pace of operations elsewhere in Ukraine as well. This Ukrainian report that the Russians have already depleted ammunition stockpiles in Belarus is a further indicator that a renewed large-scale Russian offensive from Belarus in the coming months is unlikely.
Russian forces launched another round of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure on December 31, but this round was of reduced intensity compared to previous rounds.[13] Official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces launched over 20 air-launched cruise missiles (of which Ukrainian air defenses reportedly shot down 12) and used 10 Shahed-136 drones and an Orlan-10 surveillance drone (all of which Ukrainian forces reportedly downed).[14] ISW cannot assess at this time whether the decreased intensity of this barrage resulted from Russian missile shortages or whether Russia can continue to conduct intense waves of strikes. Russian milbloggers continued to describe the scope of the attack using similar reporting and reactions as they used for previous rounds of missile strikes despite the reduced intensity and impact.[15]
Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners on December 31, but reports differed on the number of prisoners exchanged. A senior aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Andriy Yermak, posted that 140 Ukrainian soldiers returned to Ukraine and an unspecified number of Russian soldiers returned to Russia.[16] Several Russian sources claimed that 82 Ukrainian soldiers returned to Ukraine and 82 Russian soldiers returned to Russia.[17]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual New Year’s Eve address continued to illustrate that Putin is uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space and remains focused on justifying the war in Ukraine and its cost to his domestic audience.
- Putin delivered his address from the headquarters of the Southern Military District (SMD) as part of his ongoing efforts to portray himself as an effective wartime leader.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu demonized Ukraine and announced that Russian victory is inevitable in his New Year’s Eve speech.
- Russian forces are likely depleting their stocks of artillery ammunition and will struggle to support their current pace of operations in Ukraine as a result.
- Russian forces launched another round of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure but at a reduced intensity compared to previously massive waves of strikes.
- Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners but differed in their reporting on the number of exchanged personnel.
- Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City on December 31.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost connection to its last functioning backup power line on the evening of December 29.
- Russian forces continue operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and along the southern axis.
- Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on December 31 that he knew “for a fact” that the Kremlin plans to close its borders for men, declare martial law, and begin another wave of mobilization in “one week or so.”
- Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories in response to Ukrainian partisan activities.
- Russian occupation officials continue to create unbearable living conditions for residents of occupied territories.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[18] The Ukrainian National Police reported that Russian forces struck a police department building in Lyman, Donetsk Oblast with an S-300 missile.[19]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on December 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut; within 22km northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar, Bilohorivka, Bakhmutske, and Pidhorodne; and within 31km southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Niu York.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Wagner Group attacked the southeastern outskirts of Soledar.[21] Geolocated footage posted on December 31 shows Russian forces further west of Zelenopillia (4km northeast of Bakhmut).[22] Geolocated footage posted on December 31 shows Ukrainian forces conducting strikes on advancing Russian forces in Bakhmut.[23] Geolocated footage posted on December 31 shows Ukrainian forces repelling an attack further into Klishchiivka.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces remain in close contact near Klishchiivka.[25]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka, Kamianka, and Marinka.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) and tried to move towards Vesele (7km northeast of Avdiivka).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[28]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian sources are likely attempting to exaggerate Russian victories and Russian military power in southern Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 31 that Russian forces captured Dorozhnyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defensive lines near Dorozhnyanka on December 30.[30] It is unclear whether Russian forces have captured the settlement, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled Dorozhnyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 31.[31] A pro-Russia journalist posted a video of lines of Russian military vehicles on December 30 and falsely claimed that the video was taken in an unspecified location in southern Ukraine.[32] This purported footage from southern Ukraine is actually old footage of Russian forces in Belarus.[33] Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian settlements along the front lines in southern Ukraine.[34]
Russian forces continued defensive operations along the Southern Axis. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported on December 31 that Russian forces began to construct fortifications in the vicinity of Rozivka, Zaporizhia Oblast in front of the entrance from Donetsk Oblast.[35]
Ukrainian forces continued to target concentrations of Russian soldiers and equipment. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 31 that Ukrainian strikes wounded 115 Russian soldiers and destroyed an anti-aircraft missile complex, an ammunition depot, and five pieces of military equipment in the vicinity of Polohy and Velyka Bilozerka, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 29.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Ukrainian strikes killed around 200 Russian soldiers in the vicinity of Fedorivka, Kherson Oblast on December 29.[37] Several Russian open-source intelligence aggregators amplified reporting that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike from December 27 hit a Russian army-level command post in Kherson Oblast and killed 12 Russian officers.[38]
A local Telegram channel reported that Russian air defenses in Russian-occupied Crimea were activated on December 31.[39] The channel also reported explosions in an unspecified location in Crimea and provided video with audible popping and two visible smoke trails in the sky.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces shot down an unspecified number of Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) near occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea.[41] ISW cannot independently verify any of these claims.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost connection to its last functioning back-up power line during the evening of December 29.[42] Continued shelling within the vicinity of the ZNPP continues to pose a threat to the restoration and maintenance of back-up power lines to the ZNPP, although IAEA experts have not reported direct shelling of the ZNPPP in the past month.[43] The IAEA stated that the ZNPP lost connection to the 330-kilovolt Ferosplavna 1 power line due to damage caused by shelling on the right bank (west side) of the Dnipro River, the opposite side of the ZNPP.[44] The IAEA reported that efforts to repair the Ferosplavna 1 power line are underway.[45] All six ZNPP reactors are currently in shutdown and continue to receive electricity from the sole remaining power line of four initial external power lines.[46]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Official Ukrainian sources warned on December 31 of an upcoming second wave of Russian mobilization. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov appealed to Russian citizens in a New Year's address and warned them that he knew “for a fact” that the Kremlin plans to close all Russia’s borders to men, declare martial law, and begin another wave of mobilization in “one week or so.”[47] Reznikov stated that Belarus‘ borders will also be closed.[48] A Russian milblogger labeled Reznikov’s claims as a Ukrainian propaganda scheme aimed to scare Russians.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on December 31 that Russian military recruitment offices in occupied Crimea have compiled lists of persons of unspecified citizenship subject to mobilization in January 2023.[50]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of the regular autumn 2022 conscription cycle on December 31. The Russian MoD stated that 120,000 people were conscripted into military service in the Russian Armed Forces during autumn conscription and that it is now officially over.[51] The Russian MoD stated that the Russian Armed Forces paid particular attention to staffing the scientific and industrial industries, sending 450 conscripted men to scientific and industrial companies.[52]
The Russian state could keep autumn 2022 conscripts in the field as a part of force generation efforts for the war in Ukraine under current Russian law after their yearlong conscription period is over; all former conscripts are reservists, and all reservists are eligible for mobilization as ISW has previously reported.[53] The Kremlin may also deploy conscripts to occupied Ukraine since the Kremlin has illegally declared that Ukraine’s Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts are parts of the Russian Federation.
Russian sources continued efforts to present Russian-led forces as a single military structure. Russian sources framed Russian President Vladimir Putin's presentation of battle banners to the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) on December 31 as an announcement that the DNR and LNR 1st and 2nd Army Corps are officially a part of the Russian Armed Forces.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not yet formally announced that the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the DNR and LNR are officially a part of the Russian Armed Forces. One Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger noted that the 1st and 2nd Army Corps are already under the operational command of Russia’s Southern Military District (SMD).[55]
Russian officials continue to severely punish Russians who refuse to fight. An independent Russian media outlet, ASTRA, shared reported on December 30 that Russian military leadership took five officers who sent an official refusal to fight to their military leadership to an abandoned basement unit in Luhansk Oblast and did not provide them with food or water in July of 2022.[56] ASTRA stated that no one has heard from these five Russian officers since.[57] The outlet reported that there are many similar cases in which Russian military personnel who refuse to fight are ”morally humiliated, insulted, threatened,” beaten, and tortured by their leadership.[58]
Six armed Wagner Private Military Company mercenaries recruited from Russian prisons escaped from a Wagner training center in Sorokyne Raion, Luhansk Oblast on December 30. One Russian source warned residents in Rostov Oblast to be vigilant and ”pay special attention to people in military camouflage uniforms” as the Wagner fugitives may have crossed into Rostov Oblast.[59] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to minimize the story and claimed that he was in control of the situation on December 31.[60] Prigozhin claimed that he knew more than the press does about the current situation; that the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), the police, and Wagner security service have extensive experience catching various kinds of armed people; and that they have worked to "detain a lot of scoundrels that [Russian citizens] do not even need to know about,” starting from the front lines of Luhansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, and Russian borders.[61]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories in response to Ukrainian partisan activities. The Ukrainian Resistance Center posted a map on December 31 of the reported locations of Ukrainian partisan attacks on Russian occupation administrations throughout Ukraine over the course of 2022, listing Chornobaivka, Kherson City, Melitopol, Enerhodar, Mykhailivka, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Mariupol, Luhansk City, Kreminna, Starobilsk, and Velykyi Burluk as locations where successful partisan activities occurred.[62] This map represents a conservative subset of actual confirmed Ukrainian partisan activities.[63] Russian occupation officials reportedly continue to repress residents in occupied territories in an attempt to quell these Ukrainian “saboteurs.”[64] Russian occupation officials conducted raids on December 26 and 27 in Pavlivka and Stohanivka, Kherson Oblast under the guise of a search for members of the longstanding pro-Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) partisan group who have taken part in pro-Ukraine operations in Donbas since 2014 and conducted another raid in Zaporizhia Oblast on December 18.[65] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupation officials continue to kidnap civilians out of fear of Ukrainian partisan activity. Russian officials have reportedly imported Rosgvardia and Russian security forces into occupied territories due to the failure of previous attempts to “tame“ residents.[66] There are reportedly 500 policemen imported from Russia in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast alone.[67] A Russian news source claimed on December 31 that Russian special services found a cache of weapons and ammunition belonging to supposed Ukrainian saboteurs in Luhansk City and that Russian special services also eliminated a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) agent in Lysychansk, Luhansk who was planning an attack on the main Luhansk Oblast government building at the end of the year. [68] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian occupation officials have strengthened police presence in occupied territories for New Year’s.[69]
Russian occupation officials continue to create unbearable living conditions for residents of occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials are unable to provide basic necessities to those living in occupied territories including water and heat.[70] The Russian proxy leader of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin, reportedly pled with Putin for assistance in solving occupied Donetsk Oblast’s severe water shortages and received permission to construct a new waterline from the Don River to Donetsk City.[71] The Ukrainian Resistance Center assessed that this waterline would still not solve the water shortage issues in Donetsk but will lower the water level in the Don River.[72] The Ukrainian Mayor of Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, Dmytro Orlov, further reported on December 31 that Russian forces have contributed to food and medical supply shortages because they have established many roadblocks and often do not allow humanitarian aid into the city.[73] The Ukrainian advisor to the Mariupol Mayor, Petro Andryushchenko, stated that Russian occupation officials have failed to meet public promises, including the repair of houses, provision of heat, construction of 1,500 apartments for displaced residents, provision of a form of public transportation, the launching of a ferry in Yeysk, or compensation for destroyed houses.[74]
ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.
ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.
Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- Nothing significant to report.
Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on December 31 purporting to show combat coordination exercises between Russian and Belarusian servicemembers at an unspecified training ground in Belarus that are a part of the combined Regional Grouping of Forces.[75]
Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated on December 31 that Russian forces have also removed all remaining artillery ammunition from Belarusian military warehouses to support their operations in Ukraine.[76]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of December 31.[77]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70315
[2] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70315
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WO7HsYLtR0 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16728063
[6] https://t.me/readovkanews/49981 ; https://tass dot com/world/1558305
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne.media/349... com.ua/2022/12/31/u-rosiyi-zapasy-boyeprypasiv-vpadut-do-bereznya-nyzhche-30/
[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne.media/349... com.ua/2022/12/31/u-rosiyi-zapasy-boyeprypasiv-vpadut-do-bereznya-nyzhche-30/
[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne.media/349... com.ua/2022/12/31/u-rosiyi-zapasy-boyeprypasiv-vpadut-do-bereznya-nyzhche-30/
[13]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KnZ9XAvykfwWSYzCKw... com.ua/2022/12/31/sogodni-derzhava-teroryst-rf-znovu-zavdala-masovanogo-raketnogo-udaru-po-czyvilnym-ob%ca%bcyektam-nashoyi-krayiny/; https://suspilne dot media/349830-ostannij-den-2022-roku-311-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1672498419&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[14]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KnZ9XAvykfwWSYzCKw... com.ua/2022/12/31/sogodni-derzhava-teroryst-rf-znovu-zavdala-masovanogo-raketnogo-udaru-po-czyvilnym-ob%ca%bcyektam-nashoyi-krayiny/; https://suspilne dot media/349830-ostannij-den-2022-roku-311-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1672498419&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[16] https://t.me/ermaka2022/1860; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/31/cze-chergovyj-velykyj-obmin-yakyj-vdalosya-zdijsnyty-140-lyudej-povertayutsya-dodomu/; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1609201758881910784?cxt=HHwWgMC4oa...
[59] https://rostov dot tsargrad.tv/news/v-rostovskoj-oblasti-objavili-v-rozysk-shesteryh-vooruzhennyh-zekov-iz-chvk-vagner_696610
[62] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/31/rik-sprotyvu/
[64] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/30/okupanty-provely-rejd-v-poshukah-uchasnykiv-ato/
[65] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/30/okupanty-provely-rejd-v-poshukah-uchasnykiv-ato/
[66] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/31/okupanty-boyatsya-partyzaniv-ta-ne-mozhut-yih-znajty-oglyad-z-tot/
[67] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/31/okupanty-boyatsya-partyzaniv-ta-ne-mozhut-yih-znajty-oglyad-z-tot/
[70] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/31/okupanty-bezuspishno-namagayutsya-vyrishyty-problemu-z-vodopostachannyam-u-doneczku/
[71] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/31/okupanty-bezuspishno-namagayutsya-vyrishyty-problemu-z-vodopostachannyam-u-doneczku/
[72] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/31/okupanty-bezuspishno-namagayutsya-vyrishyty-problemu-z-vodopostachannyam-u-doneczku/
[76] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU; https://suspilne.media/349... com.ua/2022/12/31/u-rosiyi-zapasy-boyeprypasiv-vpadut-do-bereznya-nyzhche-30/
understandingwar.org
4. Full Text: 2023 New Year Address by President Xi Jinping
Domestic focus on a "big country" (that according to the CCP includes Taiwan)
Excerpt:
Going forward, China will be a country that draws its strength from unity. Ours is a big country. It is only natural for different people to have different concerns or hold different views on the same issue. What matters is that we build consensus through communication and consultation. When the 1.4 billion Chinese work with one heart and one mind, and stand in unity with a strong will, no task will be impossible and no difficulty insurmountable. The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are members of one and the same family. I sincerely hope that our compatriots on both sides of the Strait will work together with a unity of purpose to jointly foster lasting prosperity of the Chinese nation.
Full Text: 2023 New Year Address by President Xi Jinping
fmprc.gov.cn
On New Year's eve, President Xi Jinping delivered his 2023 New Year Address through China Media Group and the Internet. The following is the full text of the address:
Greetings to you all. The year 2023 is approaching. From Beijing, I extend my best New Year wishes to all of you.
In 2022, we successfully convened the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). An ambitious blueprint has been drawn for building a modern socialist country in all respects and advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts through a Chinese path to modernization, sounding a clarion call of the times for us forging ahead on a new journey.
The Chinese economy has remained the second largest in the world and enjoyed sound development. GDP for the whole year is expected to exceed 120 trillion yuan. Despite a global food crisis, we have secured a bumper harvest for the 19th year in a row, putting us in a stronger position to ensure the food supply of the Chinese people. We have consolidated our gains in poverty elimination and advanced rural revitalization across the board. We have introduced tax and fee cuts and other measures to ease the burden on businesses, and made active efforts to solve the most pressing difficulties of high concern to the people.
Since COVID-19 struck, we have put the people first and put life first all along. Following a science-based and targeted approach, we have adapted our COVID response in light of the evolving situation to protect the life and health of the people to the greatest extent possible. Officials and the general public, particularly medical professionals and community workers, have bravely stuck to their posts through it all. With extraordinary efforts, we have prevailed over unprecedented difficulties and challenges, and it has not been an easy journey for anyone. We have now entered a new phase of COVID response where tough challenges remain. Everyone is holding on with great fortitude, and the light of hope is right in front of us. Let's make an extra effort to pull through, as perseverance and solidarity mean victory.
Comrade Jiang Zemin passed away in 2022. We pay high tribute to his towering achievements and noble demeanor, and cherish the great legacy he left behind. We will honor his last wishes and advance the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.
Wave upon wave, the mighty river of history surges forward. With the persistent efforts of one generation after another, we have taken China to where it is today.
Today's China is a country where dreams become reality. The Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games concluded with a resounding success. Chinese winter sports athletes gave their all and achieved extraordinary results. Shenzhou-13, Shenzhou-14 and Shenzhou-15 soared into the heavens. China's space station was fully completed and our "home in space" is roving in the deep-blue sky. The people's armed forces marked the 95th birthday and all service members are marching confidently on the great journey of building a strong military. China's third aircraft carrier Fujian was launched. C919, China's first large passenger aircraft, was delivered. And the Baihetan hydropower station went into full operation... None of these achievements would have been possible without the sweat and toil of the numerous Chinese people. Sparks of talent are coming together, and they are the strength of China!
Today's China is a country brimming with vigor and vitality. Various pilot free trade zones and the Hainan Free Trade Port are booming, innovations are gushing out in the coastal areas, development is picking up pace in the central and western regions, the momentum for revitalization is building in the northeast, and there is greater development and affluence in the border regions. The Chinese economy enjoys strong resilience, tremendous potential and great vitality. The fundamentals sustaining its long-term growth have remained strong. As long as we stay confident and strive for progress while maintaining stability, we will realize the goals we have set. On my visit to Hong Kong earlier this year, I was deeply glad to see that Hong Kong has restored order and is set to thrive again. With determined implementation of One Country, Two Systems, Hong Kong and Macao will surely enjoy long-term prosperity and stability.
Today's China is a country that keeps to its national character. In the course of 2022, we encountered various natural disasters including earthquakes, floods, droughts and wildfires, and experienced some workplace accidents. Amid those disconcerting and heartbreaking scenes, there have emerged numerous touching stories of people sticking together in face of adversity or even sacrificing their lives to help others in distress. Those heroic deeds will be forever etched in our memories. At every turn of the year, we always think of the great character of resilience that the Chinese nation has carried forward through millennia. It gives us still greater confidence as we continue our way forward.
Today's China is a country closely linked with the world. Over the past year, I have hosted quite a few friends, both old and new, in Beijing; I have also traveled abroad to communicate China's propositions to the world. Changes unseen in a century are unfolding at a faster pace, and the world is not yet a tranquil place. We cherish peace and development and value friends and partners as we have always done. We stand firm on the right side of history and on the side of human civilization and progress. We work hard to contribute China's wisdom and solutions to the cause of peace and development for all humanity.
After the 20th CPC National Congress, my colleagues and I visited Yan'an. We were there to relive the inspiring episode in which the Party's central leadership overcame extraordinary difficulties in the 1930s and 1940s, and to draw on the spiritual strength of the older generation of CPC members. I often say, "Just as polishing makes jade finer, adversity makes one stronger." Over the past 100 years, the CPC has braved wind and rain, and forged ahead against all odds. That is a most difficult yet great journey. Today, we must press on courageously to make tomorrow's China a better place.
Going forward, China will be a country that performs miracles through hard work. Here I want to quote Su Shi, a renowned Chinese poet, "Charge at the toughest and aim at the farthest." It means to take on the biggest challenges and go after the most ambitious goals. Long as the journey is, we will reach our destination if we stay the course; difficult as the task is, we will get the job done if we keep working at it. As long as we have the resolve to move mountains and the perseverance to plod on, as long as we keep our feet on the ground and forge ahead with our journey by making steady progress, we will turn our grand goals into reality.
Going forward, China will be a country that draws its strength from unity. Ours is a big country. It is only natural for different people to have different concerns or hold different views on the same issue. What matters is that we build consensus through communication and consultation. When the 1.4 billion Chinese work with one heart and one mind, and stand in unity with a strong will, no task will be impossible and no difficulty insurmountable. The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are members of one and the same family. I sincerely hope that our compatriots on both sides of the Strait will work together with a unity of purpose to jointly foster lasting prosperity of the Chinese nation.
Going forward, China will be a country that has great expectations of its younger generation. A nation will prosper only when its young people thrive. For China to develop further, our young people must step forward and take on their responsibilities. Youth is full of vigor and is a source of hope. Youngsters should keep their country in mind, cultivate keen enterprise, and live youth to the fullest with great drive, to prove worthy of the times and the splendor of youth.
To the many people who are still busy working at this very moment, I salute you all! We are about to ring in the New Year. Let us welcome the first ray of sunshine of 2023 with the best wishes for a brighter future.
May our country enjoy prosperity and our people live in harmony. May the world enjoy peace and people of all countries live in happiness. I wish you all a happy New Year and may all your wishes come true.
Thank you.
fmprc.gov.cn
5. Troubles aside, Xi says China on 'right side of history'
Troubles aside, Xi says China on 'right side of history'
AP · December 31, 2022
BEIJING (AP) — China “stands on the right side of history,” the country’s leader Xi Jinping said Saturday in a New Year’s address that came as questions swirl over his government’s handling of COVID-19 and economic and political challenges at home and abroad.
Speaking on national television from behind a desk in a wood-paneled office, Xi largely avoided directly addressing issues confronting the country, pointing instead to successes in agricultural production, poverty elimination and its hosting of the Winter Olympics in February.
However, he later turned somewhat obliquely to the challenges facing the world’s most populous country and second-largest economy, saying, “The world is not at peace.”
China will “always steadfastly advocate for peace and development ... and unswervingly stands on the right side of history,” he said.
Recent weeks have seen street protests against Xi’s government, the first facing the ruling Communist Party in more than three decades.
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Xi’s speech follows a stunning U-turn on China’s hard-line COVID-19 containment policy that has sparked a massive surge in infections and demands from the U.S. and others for travelers from China to prove they aren’t infected.
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Meanwhile, the economy is fighting its way out of the doldrums, spurring rising unemployment, while ties with the U.S. and other major nations are at historic lows.
Setting aside their uncertainty, people in Beijing and other cities have returned to work, shopping areas and restaurants, with consumers preparing for January’s Lunar New Year holiday, the most significant in the Chinese calendar.
Xi, who is also head of the increasingly powerful armed forces, was in October given a third five-year term as head of the almost 97 million-member Communist Party.
Having sidelined potential rivals and eliminated all limits on his terms in office, he could potentially serve as China’s leader for the rest of his life.
China has also come under pressure for its continued support for Russia, and on Friday, Xi held a virtual meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which he was quoted as describing the events in Ukraine as a “crisis.”
The term marked a departure from China’s usual references to the “Ukraine situation,” and the change may reflect growing Chinese concern about the direction of the conflict.
Still, in his remarks to Putin, Xi was careful to reiterate Chinese support for Moscow. China has pledged a “no limits” friendship with Russia and hasn’t blamed Putin for the conflict, while attacking the U.S. and NATO and condemning punishing economic sanctions imposed on Russia.
AP · December 31, 2022
6. Moscow's Invasion Of Ukraine Triggers 'Soul-Searching' At Western Universities As Scholars Rethink Russian Studies
Excerpts:
The war is forcing scholars, departments, and university officials to question how they teach the history of Russia, the former Soviet Union, and the region, what textbooks and sources they use, whom they hire, which archives they mine for information, and even what departments should be named.
The Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) has made "decolonization" -- which it describes as "a profoundly political act of re-evaluating long-established and often internalized hierarchies, of relinquishing and taking back power" -- the theme of its 2023 conference.
"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread calls for the reassessment and transformation of Russo-centric relationships of power and hierarchy both in the region and in how we study it," the association says in a notice on the convention.
"The war is really an earth-moving event and academia -- as part of that world -- has been shaken," Edward Schatz, the director of the Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES) at the University of Toronto, told RFE/RL. "I feel like it is impossible to do things the way we have done it all along. Something has to change. The question is how much changes and along what dimensions."
Moscow's Invasion Of Ukraine Triggers 'Soul-Searching' At Western Universities As Scholars Rethink Russian Studies
January 01, 2023 10:14 GMT
rferl.org · by Todd Prince
When more than 2,000 Slavic, East European, and Eurasian studies specialists from around the world gather in Philadelphia later this year for their largest annual conference, Russia's invasion of Ukraine will dominate the discussion -- or loom large over the proceedings, at the very least.
In Ukraine, Moscow's unprovoked war has killed tens of thousands of people and laid cities and towns to waste. At universities across the West, it has thrust Russia's history of imperialism and colonialism to the forefront of Slavic and Eurasian academic discussion -- from history and political science to art and literature.
The war is forcing scholars, departments, and university officials to question how they teach the history of Russia, the former Soviet Union, and the region, what textbooks and sources they use, whom they hire, which archives they mine for information, and even what departments should be named.
The Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) has made "decolonization" -- which it describes as "a profoundly political act of re-evaluating long-established and often internalized hierarchies, of relinquishing and taking back power" -- the theme of its 2023 conference.
"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread calls for the reassessment and transformation of Russo-centric relationships of power and hierarchy both in the region and in how we study it," the association says in a notice on the convention.
"The war is really an earth-moving event and academia -- as part of that world -- has been shaken," Edward Schatz, the director of the Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES) at the University of Toronto, told RFE/RL. "I feel like it is impossible to do things the way we have done it all along. Something has to change. The question is how much changes and along what dimensions."
Schatz says the CERES faculty will hold a two-day meeting in January to discuss a host of issues including the curriculum and whether to change the center's name. Some faculty have questioned why an institution covering a region that spans two continents and reaches from the Atlantic to the Pacific should have only one country -- Russia -- in its name.
In Britain, meanwhile, the University of Cambridge is holding a series of lectures under the banner "Rethinking Slavonic Studies." Among other examples, scholars in North America are working on a book of essays that will focus on "decolonizing Eastern European and Eurasian art and material culture."
Trauma 'Overlooked'
Many scholars say the Russian state receives too much focus in academia at the expense of the colonized nations, regions, and groups, including Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as ethnic minority communities in Russia itself. The view from St. Petersburg and Moscow -- the capitals of Russia since the tsarist era and of the Soviet Union -- dominates.
Proponents of decolonization or "decentering" are calling for a greater inclusion of voices from those nations and regions in the curriculum of Russian, Soviet, and Eurasian history, literature, culture, political science, and economics.
Oxana Shevel, a professor of political science at Tufts University in Massachusetts and president of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies, says many scholars of the region feel that academia has "overlooked to a large extent" the trauma caused by Russian imperialism and colonialism.
The focus, instead, tends to be on the Moscow-centric view that the Russian and Soviet states brought "modernization, education, and industrialization" to those communities.
"Scholars who study non-Russian regions of the former Soviet space are basically speaking with one voice for the need to decolonize Soviet and post-Soviet studies," Shevel told RFE/RL.
That voice is not being heard -- or heeded -- by everyone in the field. Scholars calling for change say they are facing resistance from some academics whose primary focus is Russia.
The potential impact of the shift that has begun goes beyond the need to rewrite lectures and incorporate new material. It could also affect current and future research projects and reach back in time, as well, leading to greater scrutiny of past works.
'Misjudged And Misunderstood'
Decolonization "is not a very comfortable conversation for most of my colleagues, but I think it is an unavoidable one given the circumstances," Valentina Izmirlieva, the director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern European Studies, told RFE/RL.
"This is still a developing situation and it is difficult to know how things will change a year from now," Izmirlieva said.
Erica Marat, a professor of political science at the National Defense University in Washington and a Central Asia expert, says the push by scholars of Ukraine to challenge the status quo in academia has inspired those studying other regions ruled by Moscow. "The war in Ukraine and just how Ukrainian scholars are speaking out is really opening up a lot of space for the rest of us," she told RFE/RL.
Vitaly Chernetsky, a Ukrainian-born professor of Slavic and Eurasian languages and literatures at the University of Kansas, says that the works of experts from non-Russian regions and communities are not taken seriously enough by peers, a view shared by Marat and others.
Vitaly Chernetsky
Ukraine has been "misjudged and misunderstood" in the West in part because scholars of Russia dominate the discussion, Chernetsky said.
As a case in point, he says one reason many in the field expected Kyiv to fall quickly following the Russian invasion in February was that they bought into the narrative that Ukraine was a "divided" nation with a weak sense of national identity.
Universities rarely offer courses in the history or culture of Ukraine, Europe's largest country by size and its seventh-largest by population. A major reason has been a lack of student demand -- which scholars say is a result of the entrenched focus on Russia, though the war has led to a spike in interest.
In the academic curriculum, Ukraine has been "part of a larger laundry list of 15 post-Soviet countries or countries of Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia," said Chernetsky, who will become vice president of ASEEES next year.
The Ukrainian diaspora has played a major role in keeping Ukrainian studies going in the West, funding visiting professors and language classes at select universities, scholars told RFE/RL.
John Vsetecka, a 33-year-old graduate student who will defend his thesis on Ukrainian history next year, says it's hard for scholars like himself studying former Soviet republics other than Russia to find faculty positions on the tenure track.
"Few ever move out of temporary jobs" as researchers or visiting professors, Vsetecka said. The result, he added, is a "brain drain" of regional expertise from academia.
Emigre Influence
Scholars say studies of the Eurasian regions of Russia and Soviet studies in the United States has historically been taught from a Moscow-centric perspective because of the outsized influence of Russian-born scholars who helped found the field.
Clarence Manning, chairman of the Department of Slavic Studies at Columbia University and one of the few Ukraine experts of his time, made this argument in a 1957 scholarly article.
A dominant school of thought within U.S. academia held that "every person within the old Russian empire is a Russian," he wrote. These scholars, described as "Russia Firsters," repeated "old traditional formulas set out by Russian scholarship before the [1917] Revolution" and treated Russia and later the Soviet Union "as a single, unified country."
The lack of attention to "non-Russian Slavic tongues and histories" was "unfortunate, for it tended to give instruction in the major centers a Russian, if not Soviet, orientation, a fact which would cause repercussions in the following period."
Sixty-five years later, those repercussions continue to be felt.
Susan Smith-Peter, a professor of Russian history at the College of Staten Island in New York, says that the teachings of Vasily Klyuchevsky, an imperial-era scholar and one of the founders of modern Russian historiography, were essentially transplanted to the United States.
Susan Smith-Peter
Klyuchevsky, who died in 1911, denied the existence of Ukraine as a people and a culture distinct from Russia, she says. His students in Moscow included Michael Karpovich, who would go on to teach generations of Russia scholars over three decades at Harvard University, from 1927 to 1957.
Kyiv, Rus, And Russia
Karpovich "rejected the historiographical legitimacy of a separate Ukrainian history," Smith-Peter wrote in a blog post this month, adding that as a result, the works of Ukrainian scholars "were often not integrated into the work of Russian historians."
Vasily Klyuchevsky
One key narrative passed on from imperial-era historians by emigres, and still widely taught in the United States today, is that Russia is the direct and sole successor to Kievan Rus -- also known as Kyivan Rus, from the city's Ukrainian name -- a state that reached the peak of its power a century before Moscow was founded.
Putin, who has falsely claimed that Ukrainians and Russians are "one people" and has suggested in numerous historically inaccurate written and spoken remarks that Ukraine has no right to exist as a fully sovereign state, has used that vastly simplified notion of continuity in attempts to justify his war.
His skewed version of history appears to be at the center of what numerous analysts have said is Putin's obsession with dominating Ukraine.
Members of the clergy mark the 1031st anniversary of the Christianization of Rus by a monument to St. Vladimir in Borovitskaya Square in Moscow in 2019.
The large-scale invasion has "led to a period of soul-searching within Russian studies" and is forcing scholars to reconsider how they do things, Smith-Peter said.
She said she will "fundamentally change" how she teaches Russian and Soviet history to include the perspectives of colonized people and question the simplified continuity between Kievan Rus and Russia.
She suggests that scholars of Russia, especially those doing work on the Soviet period, should learn Ukrainian in order to use Ukrainian archives.
'People Are Dying Over This'
Mark Steinberg, professor emeritus of Russian history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the co-author with the late Nicholas Riasanovsky of the widely used textbook A History Of Russia, told RFE/RL the current debate isn't new.
Academia has been grappling with questions of Russian and Soviet imperialism and colonialism and how to teach it since fall of communism in the late 1980s, Steinberg says. He says that the field has changed over the years, with universities now seeking scholars who specialize in the Russian Empire rather than the state and who know a second regional language besides Russian.
Nonetheless, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has "pushed the field to understand empire and colonialism as probably never before," Steinberg said. "Previously it was all academic discussion but now people are dying over this."
The challenge academics now face is understanding how Russian imperialism and colonialism impact the way they think about or approach their subjects. "I think that is the most interesting shift, and probably the most controversial," he said.
As for the textbook A History Of Russia, Steinberg said he has made "some significant changes in the direction of questioning simple assumptions about Kyiv-Moscow continuities and will develop these further in the 10th edition."
While some institutions and professors have been making changes to their classes and curricula, Chernetsky said, the field still needs "deep, structural" change.
"The important thing here is not to lose momentum, because big academic institutions tend to be inert," he said.
rferl.org · by Todd Prince
7. Joint Forces and Integrated Deterrence: Rebalancing China in the Western Pacific
Interesting perspective.
Small SOF teams as a "platform."
Excerpts:
One partial solution to the “math problem” is to rethink the potential deterrent capacity provided by elements of the US Army and Marine Corps. It has become widely known that Ukraine’s “surprise” success has been driven in part by ‘train, advise and assist’ efforts by the 10th Special Forces Group since 2014 (when Russia easily annexed the Crimea and occupied parts of the Donbas that are presently being contested by both sides). Likewise, conventional US Army and National Guard forces were deeply involved in training Ukrainians on weapons systems and battlefield maneuver prior to February 2022. Certainly, the Russians performed poorly during the first 100 days of the war due to chronic problems with training, logistics, equipment, and morale. However, those are the very same warfighting fundamentals that Ukraine has vastly improved on because of NATO assistance. In Asia, the basic “Ukraine Model” is one that 1st Special Forces Group has already been implementing in its Foreign Internal Defense (FID) activities for decades.
Furthermore, for several years the conventional Army has been developing a concept called Multi-Domain Operations, or MDO:
“MDO provides commanders numerous options for executing simultaneous and sequential operations using surprise and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains to present multiple dilemmas to an adversary in order to gain physical and psychological advantages and influence and control over the operational environment.”
At its core, multi-domain operations are like playing chess on three boards at a time. It is highly complex and requires a significant amount of synchronization to achieve success. But because of the centrality of joint operations in MDO, the Army is a potential greater contributor to solving the Navy’s “math problem” than the Navy envisions today.
Joint Forces and Integrated Deterrence: Rebalancing China in the Western Pacific
By Douglas A. Borer and Shannon C. Houck
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-forces-and-integrated-deterrence-rebalancing-china-western-pacific
Since the mid-1970s, defending the Asia-Pacific Area of Responsibility has fallen primarily to the US Navy. Having no war to fight in theater since Korea and Vietnam, the conventional US Army and Marine Corp assumed a supporting role for intermittent troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, during the last twenty years, the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been highly active in the counter-terrorism fight throughout Asia while simultaneously building foreign partnership capacity across the region. Today, in late 2022, with the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a Naval power, the conventional US Army, Marine Corps, and SOF must all show their relevance to the Navy-lead Joint Force as it prepares for a peer-to-peer fight with a PRC that now has more ships than the U.S. Distributed and networked land-based forces, mostly consisting of very small units, should be seen as platforms of integrated deterrence in the same manner that surface ships, submarines, and aircraft are viewed today.
‘Geography is destiny’ has driven military force planning for ages. On 7 December 1941, Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor, aiming to dismantle America’s power-projection capability in the Pacific. The attack succeeded in destroying what was then perceived the premier strategic warfighting platform: the battleship. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the main power projection platform was actually the aircraft carrier. Luckily, all the American carriers were at sea when the attack came. In the ‘war of platforms’ American industry simply overwhelmed the enemy, building over 100 carriers by end of the conflict. In comparison, Japan produced and lost 25 carriers before surrendering. This numerical imbalance, combined with similar ratios of airplanes and submarines (not to mention superior American intelligence and logistics) set the stage for the ultimate expression of superior American power: the two atomic bombs which ended the war on 2 September 1945. Aircraft carriers and submarines have since been the locus of American military strategy in the Pacific.
Fast forward to the present. On 14 April 2022, a tiny Ukrainian land-based military unit sank the Russian cruiser Moskva with a pair of land-based Neptune anti-ship missiles. The Neptune is a weapon produced by the Ukrainians by upgrading Soviet-era Kh-35 anti-ship missiles. The two missiles were launched from a TZM-360 transport truck combined with an RCP-360 mobile control vehicle. The Moskva was sunk despite being equipped with layered anti-missile defense systems. Reportedly, the Ukrainians distracted the Russians using a Turkish-built ‘Bayraktar’ drone – the same system that has been wreaking havoc on Russian armor, artillery, and other targets since the beginning of the war in February. The diversion may have worked, but a technical assessment is perhaps more persuasive in explaining the success of the strike. In sum, the Neptune flies too low the water for the radars of Russian anti-missiles missiles to easily detect, and it moves too fast for the AK-360 Close-In Cannon to effectively counter (very much like the US Navy’s Phalanx 20mm gatling gun). Bottom line: a pair of relatively low-cost land-based missiles destroyed the most advanced (and expensive) platform in the Russian Fleet. What does this mean for U.S. military operations in the INDOPACFIC? Are U.S. Navy surface platforms similarly vulnerable?
The short answer is: Yes. In wargame after wargame and exercise after exercise in the Western Pacific, Joint-Force commanders are forced to weigh their surface warfare platforms’ (e.g., carrier battle groups) likely survival against a growing arsenal of Chinese anti-ship missile systems and surface combatants that can disrupt the American kill chain. The kill chain is a process that occurs on the battlefield or wherever militaries compete. It involves understanding what is happening (intelligence); decision-making based on that intelligence; and taking actions that create desired effects (ranging from deterrence to destruction of enemy forces). While it is true that U.S. submarines are much less vulnerable than surface ships, the massive sunk cost in the surface fleet amounts to billions of dollars of investment – an investment which may rapidly go the way of the Moskova if war ever breaks out. The reality of their vulnerability was succinctly summarized by defense analyst Dr. Michael Noonan who referred to carriers as the “Fabergé eggs of the sea.” Noonan’s view is echoed in the best-selling book “The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare.” The author, Christian Brose, former senior policy advisor to Senator John McCain, argues that America is at grave risk of losing a future war because the PRC is already a peer, and one that possibly holds the advantage in the areas of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and other emerging technologies. Indeed, these new technological capabilities may be poised to overwhelm the existing platform-centric American operational model for defending the Western Pacific. Brose observes, “What will be so essential about these technologies, taken together, is that they will transform the entire kill chain – not just in how militaries act but also the character of their understanding and decision-making.”
As a result, US Admirals must be hyper-focused on any first strike actions against their platforms. This is even more salient because of the growing “math problem” for the American side. The PRC is building ships, aircraft and missiles at a rate that is rapidly outstripping America’s traditional numerical advantage. Thus, as each year progresses, there is a growing “platform imbalance.” Historically the U.S. maintained both a quality and quantity advantage. That is no longer the case.
Solving the Math Problem: A Network of Small Teams
One partial solution to the “math problem” is to rethink the potential deterrent capacity provided by elements of the US Army and Marine Corps. It has become widely known that Ukraine’s “surprise” success has been driven in part by ‘train, advise and assist’ efforts by the 10th Special Forces Group since 2014 (when Russia easily annexed the Crimea and occupied parts of the Donbas that are presently being contested by both sides). Likewise, conventional US Army and National Guard forces were deeply involved in training Ukrainians on weapons systems and battlefield maneuver prior to February 2022. Certainly, the Russians performed poorly during the first 100 days of the war due to chronic problems with training, logistics, equipment, and morale. However, those are the very same warfighting fundamentals that Ukraine has vastly improved on because of NATO assistance. In Asia, the basic “Ukraine Model” is one that 1st Special Forces Group has already been implementing in its Foreign Internal Defense (FID) activities for decades.
Furthermore, for several years the conventional Army has been developing a concept called Multi-Domain Operations, or MDO:
“MDO provides commanders numerous options for executing simultaneous and sequential operations using surprise and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains to present multiple dilemmas to an adversary in order to gain physical and psychological advantages and influence and control over the operational environment.”
At its core, multi-domain operations are like playing chess on three boards at a time. It is highly complex and requires a significant amount of synchronization to achieve success. But because of the centrality of joint operations in MDO, the Army is a potential greater contributor to solving the Navy’s “math problem” than the Navy envisions today.
Likewise, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, is reshaping the Marine Corps to become lighter, more lethal, and focused on enabling the Naval Force alongside SOF. His Concept for Stand-in Forces (SIF), a describes a Marine Corps force that fill the gaps across the islands that SOF cannot cover:
“SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary.”
At present the Marine Corps is still working to find the right balance of command, control, and mass required to meet the requirements of a small but lethal force. However, the fundamental weakness of these efforts is that both joint and combined (those with partners and allies) are largely a sideshow in American planning for war with China. Green Berets do not plan and train with Marines, who do not actively plan and train with the big Army and Air Force. Many American ground units cannot even communicate directly with the Navy and Airforce, and neither can American allies and partners. Ground forces are not presently a significant component of America’s deterrent posture.
Let’s get back to the basics. Deterrence has three elements: capability, credibility, and communication. In terms of naval capability, the historic US advantage is now gone. As a result, deterrent credibility is eroded. President Biden has publicly stated the US will defend Taiwan from China, but what can militaries do to make this communication more credible? Certainly, the American side could simply shift combat assets directly to Taiwan, similar to what we do in NATO. However, such an escalatory act might result in the very war it was meant to deter. The challenge here is how to improve deterrence without triggering war.
We suggest the forward deployment in the Pacific islands of a widely distributed network of micro-sized joint units. These units (3 or more personnel) would be equipped with a communications capability to gather and share intelligence and call down remote strikes, but also be armed with weapons like those being used in Ukraine to threaten enemy ships and combatants. The ideal make-up of these units is yet to be determined, but we imagine some combination of SOF and SIF would be logical. Collectively, a hundred or more such units would give the PRC something new to worry about, and deterrence is all about making the other side worry.
If war does break out, like Russia’s Moskva, many of America’s primary warfighting platforms will be destroyed. But if we think of aggregate SOF units dispersed across the Pacific as a human platform, then unlike a carrier, it is an unsinkable platform. Certainly, these island-based land forces can be struck as well, but their survivability is much higher than any capital ship.
______________________________________________________________________________
Disclaimer: This paper is a scholarly expression of its authors. It does not represent the official viewpoint of the Naval Postgraduate School, US Navy or any other element of American Defense Department and Government.
About the Author(s)
Douglas A. Borer
Dr. Douglas A. Borer is an Associate Professor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.
Shannon C. Houck
Dr. Shannon C. Houck is an Assistant Professor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.
8. Resilience and Resistance in Ukraine
A long read. Please go to the link to read the entire essay. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/resilience-and-resistance-ukraine
Resilience and Resistance in Ukraine
By Otto C. Fiala
In 2014, immediately prior to the Russian invasion of Crimean, US Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) began an effort to examine the concept of resistance, based on the vulnerable exposure of the three Baltic NATO allies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This vulnerability centered on the lack of NATO conventional forces in that northeast corner of NATO to offer ground-based deterrence to a possible Russian incursion. The question became; what was available, besides the unlikely use of nuclear weapons, to deter and if necessary to defend those nations in case of Russian invasion? The short answer, soon to be further developed, was resistance. Then, within several months, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. The resistance effort quickly moved from an academic thought exercise to resurrecting a form of irregular warfare, resulting in a written Resistance Operating Concept (ROC).[1] Though with northern European roots, it has geographically broader application as a form of irregular warfare.[2] This article will examine resilience and resistance in Ukraine primarily from a ROC based perspective and also identify new developments based on events in Ukraine and how they fit into the concept of resistance.
For over a decade, Putin has questioned the historical legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. He has many times publicly stated that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” He has stated that Ukraine illegally occupies ancestral Russian lands and that the border separating Russia and Ukraine was poorly drawn by the post revolution Bolsheviks. He has publicly lamented the fall of the USSR, not due to a fondness for its ideology Marxism-Leninism, but due to the dramatic loss of Russia's international status in the wake of the fall. Another major problem he identifies with that fall is that tens of millions of Russians were left living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. The former Soviet Republic with the deepest ties to Russia and the largest ethnic Russian population is Ukraine.[3]
Practically concurrent with Putin’s taking of Crimea in 2014, he used Russian proxies in Ukraine’s Donbas region in an attempt to detach it from Ukraine, and foil potential NATO accession. This initiative left the Donbas in turmoil because of stronger than expected local opposition from Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriots. Putin’s proxies had a relatively small foothold, while fighting between the Ukrainian military and Russian separatists along loosely defined demarcation lines continued as Ukraine attempted to reclaim the region and Russia defended its foothold.
Control over Crimea and the Donbas allowed Putin to keep Ukraine destabilized but fell short of his objective to re-establish Russian control over Ukraine. Eight years of fighting on the ground, while suffering international sanctions, failed to achieve a decisive outcome. During those years, Putin watched as Ukraine moved closer to the European Union and hosted NATO troops in Ukraine at training centers. Finally, Putin decided to use the full force of his military to obtain control over Ukraine and re-unite Russians and Ukrainians as “one people,” and launched his “special military operation” (invasion) on 24 February 2022.[4] However, his hope for a quick and decisive victory fell flat, as did the prediction by US intelligence that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours of the Russian invasion.[5] Instead, Putin ran up against a bedrock of Ukrainian resilience which provided the foundation for its resistance.
Ukrainian Resilience
National resilience has many aspects to it, among them are national identity, psychological preparation, identification and reduction of vulnerabilities, and identification of and preparation against the threat. Here we consider the case of Ukraine, preparing itself or hardening its society against a hegemonic neighbor while limiting our review of resilience to national identity and preparation against the threat in the form of resistance planning.[6]
Most generally, a society’s resilience contributes to deterring an adversary from invading its territory and supports national defense planning, to include engaging in resistance to regain national sovereignty. Generally, it’s a description of a society’s survivability and durability. Essentially, resilience is the will of the people to maintain what they have; the will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.[7]
9. Second Russian Defense Sector Bigwig Dies in Two Days
Life expectancy for Russian "bigwigs" is dropping quickly.
Second Russian Defense Sector Bigwig Dies in Two Days
46AM ET / Published Dec. 29, 2022 9:25AM ET ANOTHER ONE?!
The former army general previously commanded Russia’s ground troops, and died just two days after Vladimir Putin abruptly canceled a planned visit.
Allison Quinn
News Editor
Updated Dec. 29, 2022 9:46AM ET / Published Dec. 29, 2022 9:25AM ET
The Daily Beast · December 29, 2022
via Wikimedia Commons
The former commander-in-chief of Russia’s ground forces died in a military hospital earlier this week—the second bigwig in the country’s military industrial complex to die in just two days.
They are just the latest senior Russia military or political elites to drop dead unexpectedly in recent months.
Alexei Maslov, a retired army general, was serving as a special representative of military-technical cooperation for Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s largest tank manufacturer, when he died “unexpectedly” last Saturday, the company announced in a statement.
No cause of death was given.
Maslov, who was appointed as Russia’s military representative to NATO in 2008, died just two days after Vladimir Putin abruptly canceled his first visit to Uralvagonzavod since 2019.
The Russian leader was expected to fly into Yekaterinburg last week before heading to Nizhny Tagil to meet with staffers at the tank factory, where workers have been enduring 12-hour days, six days a week due to fulfill orders for the war against Ukraine.
Local authorities in Yekaterinburg went to ridiculous lengths for his impending visit, reportedly banning drivers of local public transportation from letting passengers out anywhere near Putin’s motorcade. Authorities in Nizhny Tagil reportedly forbid student drivers from using the streets.
But then Putin’s visit was abruptly canceled at the last minute, local media reported.
Maslov’s death came just a day after Alexander Buzakov, the director general of Admiralty Shipyards, died suddenly and “tragically” from unknown causes.
Buzakov, who St. Petersburg Gov. Alexander Beglov credited with making sure Russia’s military was “prepared for confrontation with the West,” had previously told Russian state media the shipyard was preparing to fulfill a Defense Ministry order for diesel-powered submarines capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles—the same ones Moscow has been using for months to launch attacks on Ukraine.
The Daily Beast · December 29, 2022
10. Ukraine War: Why The Optimists May Be Correct – Analysis
Excerpts:
Even though there is a significant overlap between the preferred scenarios of the optimists and those of the revisionists, there are a number of reasons to be more skeptical of the latter’s vision. On the one hand, as alluded previously, the revisionists may be overestimating the degree to which regular Russians are supportive of the war as well as the chances for any ethnically-driven separatist movement to succeed in Russia, at least in short-term. Furthermore, given the Western countries’ pronounced reluctance to make any moves that could be perceived as escalatory, which is one of the main reasons a direct NATO intervention in the conflict appears to be highly unlikelyat this stage, encouraging protest movements that strive for greater territorial autonomy inside Russia may be deemed to be an overly risky endeavor due to the potential for such actions to be viewed as a “red line,” even by an eventual successor of Putin who may hold less bellicose and more liberal views.
Thus, barring a monumental shift in the nature of the events on the ground, the optimists so far appear to be on track when it comes to their predictions for the eventual resolution of the war in Ukraine.
Ukraine War: Why The Optimists May Be Correct – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by Geopolitical Monitor · December 30, 2022
By Dr. Philip Dandolov
Almost a year has passed since the beginning of what experts have characterized as the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War, so it seems natural to ponder the viability of a number of potential scenarios that could bring about an end to the war in Ukraine.
Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev identifies three distinct camps with regard to the underlying philosophies in relation to the desired endpoint of the crisis. The realists generally express a belief that Russia’s actions are attributable to valid security concerns and also raise the alarm pertaining to the prospect of an apocalyptic end game in Ukraine, possibly entailing a nuclear exchange, unless a quick diplomatic solution to the conflict is prioritized, even if it ultimately turns out to be at the expense of some core Ukrainian national interests. The optimists profess that there are many signs that a decisive Ukrainian victory is on the horizon, which may conceivably also spell the end of Vladimir Putin’s regime. The revisionists go a step further, apportioning blame for the war not only to the Putin administration but also to wider Russian society, and thus advocate for policies (in the aftermath of the war) that would knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers and bring about a disintegration of the country.
While at this stage it would still be premature to make any definitive assessments or predictions, there seem to be solid grounds to assume that the scenario envisioned by the optimists (even though optimism can be a bit of a misnomer given the terrible price being paid in terms of human casualties by the Ukrainians) is likely to materialize.
The first reason to subscribe to the views of the optimists is due to the major players like the United States and other Western countries appearing to still be very much on course in terms of their willingness to provide vital material and financial resources to Ukraine. Even Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has since February 2022 been regarded as a pro-Putin outlier, is gradually changing his tune on the topic of the provision of aid to Ukraine, albeit largely for instrumental purposes. At the same time, Russophile political organizations in Central & Eastern European states, such as those in Slovakia, have had to contend with a reduction in electoral support while parties with strong pro-Russian factions, to take the example of Bulgaria, have seen internal dissent, resulting in prominent members willing to break with the party line and even face expulsion due to their outspoken sympathy for Ukraine. All in all, the signs are clear that not only mainstream pro-EU parties, but also those considered to be anti-establishment and of right-wing populist persuasion, especially in Western Europe, have as a rule preferred to distance themselves from the Putin apologists.
An examination of the political and social dynamics inside Russia itself also lends credence to the views of the optimists. Even though a number of opinion polls indicate that most Russian citizens are supportive of the “special military operation,” viewing the conflict as a proxy war against the West, what is arguably a more nuanced recent study suggests that the ‘doubters’ (who are quite detached from the war and rather amenable to changing their minds, which makes it likely that at some stage they may join one of the other two camps) are more numerous than the supporters and opponents. Thus, the Russian public’s continued support for the war is by no means guaranteed, with further spillovers of the conflict into their country, as in the cases of Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod oblasts that are located near Ukraine, possibly entrenching the perception that the Putin government is unable to guarantee the security of its citizens inside Russia’s own borders.
In contrast to the 2008 small and victorious Russo-Georgian war, during which the Russian public was largely shielded from the events, the lack of major successes in Ukraine actually forced Putin to tear up the unwritten Russian ‘social contact,’ according to which the people who do not involve themselves in politics are essentially guaranteed a peaceful and stable life. The partial mobilization declared by Putin in September 2022 highlighted how the regular people’s tacit approval of the Putin regime was no longer sufficient – most Russians could suddenly find themselves in a situation of having to prove their loyalty by taking up arms and risking their life and well-being in actual combat. Another mobilization, which could see most of the middle class in Moscow directly affected, may be an even greater threat to the regime in terms of its potential for protest mobilization.
Furthermore, the criticism of the Russian military’s approach to the war unleashed by pro-Putin figures such as Chechen Republic leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin has also been regarded as an indication that the Kremlin is no longer well-placed to maintain a single media space and subscribe to a common trope regarding the war, which could provide further openings to dissenting voices.
To compound matters, a number of statistics suggest that crimes involving the use of weapons have risen in Russia for the period since the start of the invasion of Ukraine. While it remains to be seen whether these trends will continue over the course of 2023, such reports will likely play a role in eroding the legitimacy of the Putin administration, which has for a long time taken pride in providing a high level of domestic security and predictability, especially in contrast to the crime-ridden and chaotic years associated with the Boris Yeltsin era during the 1990s. The past precedents need to be taken into account as well, with notorious crimes such as the 2010 Kushchyovskaya massacre serving to tarnish the image of the Putin regime.
In addition to becoming a harbinger of insecurity for Russian society as a whole, with one study suggesting that during the year 2022 anxiety about the war managed to override all other concerns for ordinary Russians, the sheer brutality of the conflict in Ukraine coupled with the stepping up of repression inside Russia against any forces expressing opposition to the government narrative, may also work against the Russian leader on another level. Part of Putin’s appeal to many Russians arguably stemmed from his ability to convey an image of a competent strongman while at the same time managing not to conjure up an association with a propensity for gratuitous violence in the popular mind, unlike Soviet era leaders such as Joseph Stalin. Once the pendulum swings in the direction of excessive state coercion, this is often a sign that the authoritarian regime in question is entering a phase of greater vulnerability. American journalist David Remnick in his coverage of the August 1991 coup d’état attempt, which was organized by Soviet hardliners against then President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, hypothesized that the Communist reactionaries orchestrating the events at the time had an aversion to some of the Stalinist excesses from the past and were not fully prepared to sacrifice the lives of too many Russian civilians for their cause. In a reverse fashion, it is not inconceivable that Putin’s reabsorption of a number of elements of Stalinist totalitarianism, his prior gripes with Stalin notwithstanding, and the Russian president’s decision to revert to an anachronistic ‘Soviet’ archetype has caused even formerly loyal supporters to view him in a less magnanimous light compared to before.
Even though there is a significant overlap between the preferred scenarios of the optimists and those of the revisionists, there are a number of reasons to be more skeptical of the latter’s vision. On the one hand, as alluded previously, the revisionists may be overestimating the degree to which regular Russians are supportive of the war as well as the chances for any ethnically-driven separatist movement to succeed in Russia, at least in short-term. Furthermore, given the Western countries’ pronounced reluctance to make any moves that could be perceived as escalatory, which is one of the main reasons a direct NATO intervention in the conflict appears to be highly unlikelyat this stage, encouraging protest movements that strive for greater territorial autonomy inside Russia may be deemed to be an overly risky endeavor due to the potential for such actions to be viewed as a “red line,” even by an eventual successor of Putin who may hold less bellicose and more liberal views.
Thus, barring a monumental shift in the nature of the events on the ground, the optimists so far appear to be on track when it comes to their predictions for the eventual resolution of the war in Ukraine.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com
eurasiareview.com · by Geopolitical Monitor · December 30, 2022
11. China and the US: On collision course for war over Taiwan
Will Ms. Flournoy be the next SECDEF.
Excerpts:
Can tensions be defused?
For Flournoy, the priority for US policy is clear. "Deterrence is the name of the game here," she said. "I think the key thing is for Beijing to recognize that if you go to war to seize Taiwan, you lose."
The stakes of a conflict over Taiwan could even surpass Russia's war on Ukraine, says Kevin Rudd.
"A general war involving at least three or four countries, including the three largest economies in the world, the US, China and Japan. Secondly, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese civilians dead. Thirdly, unknown American and Chinese combatants. And finally, the crashing of the global economy."
As China grapples with the collapse of its zero-COVID regime, 2023 looks more uncertain than ever. A world already shaken by war may have to brace for even more turmoil.
China and the US: On collision course for war over Taiwan – DW – 12/29/2022
DW
"We can only avoid a war by preparing for a war," said Taiwan's president, Tsai Ing-wen, approaching the end of 2022 with a stern message for her people.
"Taiwan needs to strengthen our ability to defend ourselves," Tsai said, announcing that from 2024, compulsory military service would be extended from four months to a full year.
"No one wants war," she said. "But, my fellow countrymen, peace will not fall from the sky."
The Chinese threat
The Taiwan dispute has festered since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the defeated nationalists fled to the island. The victorious Communists have been determined to take it ever since.
Now, the threat of war has seemed closer than at any time in decades.
In August 2022, China launched its largest military exercises in a generation — seen by many as a rehearsal for a blockade or even invasion.
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu says China has been preparing for an invasionImage: DW
"They fired missiles to the waters near Taiwan. They conducted very large-scale air and sea exercises. They conducted cyber attacks," said Taiwan's foreign minister, Joseph Wu. "Put it all together. This is what they want to do to Taiwan when they want to invade Taiwan."
Wu spoke to DW as part of a new documentary that uncovers why the Taiwan dispute is so intractable — and explores whether a disastrous war can be avoided.
'We have to reunify with Taiwan'
Increasingly, China makes no bones about its goals.
"We in mainland China believe that Taiwan is part of China and we have to reunify with Taiwan," said Zhou Bo, a former senior colonel in China's military, now at Tsinghua University.
"The only question is through what means: whether they will be peaceful or whether we have to use force."
Addressing the Communist Party Congress in October, Chinese President Xi Jinping said he would "strive for the prospect of a peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and greatest efforts."
But "peaceful reunification" looks like a fantasy.
Just 6.4% of people in Taiwan seek it, either immediately or at some point in the future, according to the most recent survey data from Taiwan's National Chengchi University.
So if Xi really is determined to get Taiwan, force appears the only option.
Ukraine's terrifying, inspiring example
Far away in Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has provided a chilling demonstration that threats can turn into reality.
A great power invading a vulnerable neighbor, claiming it has no right to exist as an autonomous entity: the parallels have been obvious. And Ukraine has given an object lesson in fighting back.
"That is inspirational to the Taiwanese people," said Joseph Wu. "We want to show the international community that we are just about the same degree of bravery in fighting for our country."
This international messaging is key: Like Ukraine, Taiwan would have little chance of surviving an invasion without outside help. Above all, from the United States.
The US vs. China
US President Joe Biden rounded off 2022 signing a defense spending bill including up to $10 billion (€9.4 billion) in assistance for Taiwan.
On several occasions in recent months, Biden has become increasingly forthright, saying that the US would intervene if China mounted an unprovoked attack.
China expert and former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd described this as the "erosion of the American traditional doctrine of strategic ambiguity into strategic unambiguity."
This reflects a rare thing in US politics — consensus.
"There is a strong bipartisan consensus in seeing China as the pacing threat, economically, technologically, diplomatically and militarily," said Michele Flournoy, chair of the influential CNAS think tank.
The result is a cascade of measures from the Biden administration and Congress, aimed at supporting Taiwan, pushing back against China, or both — from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei, to export curbs on semiconductor technology, to the latest steps on military aid for Taiwan.
'Taiwan is caught in the middle'
On edge: Can tensions between the US and China be defused?Image: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images
For Shelley Rigger, a leading US authority on Taiwan, there are dangers in this trend. "A lot of the activity that we've seen, including the Pelosi visit, really escalates the danger that Taiwan is facing without providing any concrete benefit to Taiwan," she said.
From this vantage point, US support for Taiwan is double edged: both essential to its survival, and risking dragging Taiwan into a much bigger conflict.
"The US and China are in this spiral of threat and counter threat, and counter-counter threat, and Taiwan is caught in the middle," Rigger said.
In November 2022, Biden and Xi held their first talks since the former took office, meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali. The aim: restoring some stability to the relationship.
"I'm not looking for conflict, I'm looking to manage this competition responsibly," Biden told the press. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is due to visit China in early 2023 as part of this process.
But the biggest issue of all — Taiwan — presents a challenge that goes far deeper.
"Stabilizing the relationship for the short to medium term, to reduce the risk of unplanned, accidental crisis, conflict and war," Rudd stressed, "that's quite different from the long-term question of China's preparations for the 2030s, which is to have sufficient military and economic and technological power to wage war not by accident but by design to secure Taiwan."
So where does this leave Taiwan?
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu spoke to DW in TaipeiImage: DW
"The policy of this government is to safeguard the status quo," said Joseph Wu. "That Taiwan is already a democracy, the status quo is that the Taiwanese people have a say over Taiwan's future."
And yet Beijing rejects the status quo. "Then this kind of status quo of separation will last forever," said Zhou Bo.
Michele Flournoy said the timeline for any potential military action could be far shorter than previously thought. "We have to be prepared to deter China not just in 10 or 15 years, but in five years," she said.
Can tensions be defused?
For Flournoy, the priority for US policy is clear. "Deterrence is the name of the game here," she said. "I think the key thing is for Beijing to recognize that if you go to war to seize Taiwan, you lose."
The stakes of a conflict over Taiwan could even surpass Russia's war on Ukraine, says Kevin Rudd.
"A general war involving at least three or four countries, including the three largest economies in the world, the US, China and Japan. Secondly, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese civilians dead. Thirdly, unknown American and Chinese combatants. And finally, the crashing of the global economy."
As China grapples with the collapse of its zero-COVID regime, 2023 looks more uncertain than ever. A world already shaken by war may have to brace for even more turmoil.
Edited by: Rob Mudge
DW
12. Covid Is China’s Price for Rejoining Humanity
Perhaps China is not the authoritarian model that countries should aspire to emulate.
Covid Is China’s Price for Rejoining Humanity
Beijing botches a ‘reopening’ that many of its Pacific neighbors pulled off gracefully.
By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.Follow
Dec. 30, 2022 6:07 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-is-chinas-price-for-rejoining-humanity-mrna-variant-western-vaccines-quarantine-new-zealand-singapore-11672431753?mod=flipboard
The virus that established a home in the rest of humanity is now spreading in China, as had to happen sooner or later. The medical disaster that appears to be unfolding on the mainland was entirely predictable: China has 10 cities bigger than New York with perhaps a fifth the critical-care capacity. The treatment shortage is even worse in lesser cities and rural areas. And unlike youthful India, which underwent a similar ordeal two years ago, China’s population is more like a Western society’s in age and related vulnerability to severe Covid.
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The Communist Party government can rightly be criticized for not beefing up its health capacity, for not making better use of vaccines. One thing not to worry about is the suggestion that, because the virus is now rampant in China as everywhere else, it’s suddenly likely to sprout a dangerous mutation.
Anything is possible with evolution but SARS-CoV-2 has been circulating and recirculating among 6.5 billion non-Chinese for three years. We, not the Chinese, are the reason the virus has evolved vaccine- and immunity-ducking traits, causing it to spread more easily but perhaps also to produce milder disease.
One good result has come from China’s unwillingness to import Western mRNA vaccines. As 1.4 billion more people become part of the virus’s habitat, they won’t be a force driving it to greater mRNA resistance. In fact, the trajectory of the virus is likely to be comparatively benign now that it has made a home among us. Worry about other viruses that haven’t made the jump yet.
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Nonetheless the mutation warning has lately leapt from expert lips, for reasons best understood by the ancient Greeks, who pioneered the ritual lamentation, spoken to make sure the hearer knows the speaker very much disapproves of some ordeal that can’t be avoided. We saw this during our own Covid trial, prominent people trying to insulate their “brands” from the Covid moment by issuing exaggerated statements of blame and despair as well as unrealistic calls to action, many of them cataloged in this column.
Amid China’s dark hour, an eye-rolling moment was a recent government decision to cut the quarantine for international arrivals from seven days to five. A few days later China recognized the absurdity of this move, and eliminated quarantine altogether.
READ MORE BUSINESS WORLD
In the U.S. policy has gone in the opposite direction, requiring a negative Covid test for Chinese visitors, as if offended they might bring us a virus we already have in abundance and which the whole world is an evolutionary laboratory for. Unsurprisingly, when one country makes such a move, others have a hard time not following. Only the British seem to be resisting the scientifically inert step, though the U.K. may enact a travel ban anyway out of a fear that Chinese tourists will flood its perennially overburdened National Health Service seeking care they can’t get at home.
The U.S. requirement comes as the U.S. officially recorded its 100 millionth Covid case, news that was rightly ignored. Our media has finally grasped that the official measure is meaningless. The Covid virus is ubiquitous, causing millions of uncounted recurrent infections every month. If any epidemiological and data puzzle might be worth solving at this point, it concerns people like me: four times vaccinated and still thinking back to every sniffle or scratchy throat over three years and wondering whether I’ve been exposed or not.
The world will rightly start asking why China failed to do what other zero-Covid societies, such as Australia and New Zealand, did. These were the original “let it rip” countries: Having been shielded from Covid, their people were initially slow to take up the vaccine just as many Chinese have been. But eventually they got with the program when their governments explained that the holiday from history would end on a date certain and the virus would be allowed to circulate.
The unreadiness of the Xi Jinping regime to do the same is the mystery. Many explanations are offered but the likeliest is that the government simply lost control of the virus while still figuring out how to frame its exit from zero Covid.
The paralysis that held things up: how to finesse the transition without derailing the propaganda story that Mr. Xi saved China from Covid. Beijing’s second biggest mistake, after declining to import superior Western vaccines, was not studying how Australia and New Zealand, as well as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, pulled this off. They did so by speaking honestly to their people about the need to let the virus circulate in order to rejoin humanity.
WSJ Opinion: The Real Risks of Long Covid
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Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews Dr. Marty Makary. Image: Nathan Posner/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
Appeared in the December 31, 2022, print edition as 'Covid Is China’s Price for Rejoining Humanity'.
13. Forced to fight your own people: How Russia is weaponizing passports
Forced to fight your own people: How Russia is weaponizing passports
Russia’s imposition of citizenship means Ukrainians in occupied territories may be drafted in the war against their own country.
Politico · by Lily Hyde · January 1, 2023
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Voiced by artificial intelligence.
KYIV — Imagine being Ukrainian and yet possessing only a Russian passport. And then being drafted into a war to fight your native country.
This is a reality currently facing thousands of Ukrainians. And some say it constitutes a war crime.
After Russia invaded Ukraine this past February, European countries welcomed Ukrainians seeking refuge. But when Russia announced its partial mobilization in September, thousands fled the draft. Countries that initially welcomed refugees hesitated or closed their borders to Russian citizens, sparking a debate in the EU about how — and if — countries should grant or withhold asylum for Russians fleeing mobilization.
But refugees from the draft don’t only come from Russia — many are from Russian-occupied territories. In swathes of Ukrainian territory it occupies, Russia has been issuing its own passports for nearly a decade while making it difficult to obtain or renew Ukrainian citizenship.
As the two nations fight a bloody war, Ukrainian citizens now find they may be drafted by Russia, Ukraine or both — yet be unable to prove they are actually citizens of either.
The mass naturalization of citizens in contested territories, known as passportization, is not merely an issue of who gets to fight in which army or cross which border. Turning Ukrainian citizens into Russian ones, willy-nilly and en masse, is a war crime, says Iryna Vereschuk, Ukrainian deputy prime minister and minister for reintegration of temporarily occupied territories.
“The Geneva conventions clearly ban forced passportization of inhabitants of occupied territories,” she told POLITICO. “It needs to be recorded as a war crime.”
Coerced into becoming Russian
Ernes, a car salesman, left Crimea for Georgia to escape Russia’s partial mobilization in September, taking his wife and three children with him (their names have been changed to protect their identities). The family is Crimean Tatar — an indigenous minority ejected from Crimea under the USSR, but who returned to their homeland after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s. Crimean Tatars largely opposed Russia’s annexation and have been heavily repressed; like many ethnic minorities in Russian territories, the partial mobilization also targeted them disproportionately.
Ernes wasn’t the only one with the idea to flee: The border to Georgia from Russia was swamped. Ernes’ family camped for days by the roadside, and eventually paid a bribe to jump the 16-kilometer queue of waiting vehicles.
But when they finally reached the Georgian side, they met an administrative obstacle. Along with many European countries, the Georgian border service had started denying Russians entry. While Ernes, his wife and the older children had Ukrainian passports, the youngest — 3-year-old Emil — had only a Russian birth certificate. The family could come in, border authorities deemed, but only if they left their youngest child behind.
“They said, ‘leave him there.’ As if he were a suitcase,’” Ernes later told his mother-in-law.
The family, having already spent a large chunk of their savings to get this far, had to turn around and return to Crimea.
Ukrainian citizens were told to leave Russia-occupied territories at the beginning of the conflict | Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images
Thousands of Ukrainians holding Russian or outdated Ukrainian documents ended up in similar situations. According to the Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar representative body now based in Kyiv, about 2,500 Crimean Tatars who fled to Kazakhstan — which allowed in anyone with Russian documents — have applied to the Ukrainian consulate there for Ukrainian documents so they can travel onward.
Forced passportization is a deliberate foreign policy practice being weaponized in Russia’s wars on its “near abroad,” say experts.
Initiated in territories in Georgia and Moldova in 2002 following armed conflicts, and then in Ukraine in 2014, Russia’s passportization policy has added several million new citizens to boost Russia’s declining population, while undermining the sovereignty of target countries and providing a spurious justification for Russian invasion and occupation.
After Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, it automatically transformed more than 2 million Crimeans into Russian citizens, providing just six weeks to reject the new passport. Even those who had already left Crimea, like Olha Skripnik — a human rights activist who now heads the Crimean Human Rights Group in Kyiv — found themselves Russian citizens against their will.
In 2016, Russia made it impossible for those without a Russian passport to get medical care, education or the health insurance mandatory for employment in Crimea. In 2020, Russia banned non-Russians from owning property in most of Crimea. When someone attempted to leave Crimea for mainland Ukraine, Russian border guards would demand a Russian passport and sometimes confiscate or damage Ukrainian ones, Skripnik told POLITICO.
In eastern Ukraine, where Russia has controlled two quasi-republics in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions since 2014, Ukrainians were offered fast-track Russian passports from 2019. About half a million Ukrainians from the desperately impoverished, internationally unrecognized republics took the passports, which allowed them to work and study in neighboring Russia.
In the lead up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the alleged “genocide of Russian citizens” in eastern Ukraine was repeatedly trotted out by the Kremlin as a justification for aggression.
In May 2022, passportization was introduced in newly occupied territories in southern Ukraine including Kherson and Mariupol. Although uptake has reportedly been minimal, Russia has applied pressure such as tying humanitarian aid, or keeping a job in the health or education sectors to having a Russian passport.
Since 2014, Ukrainian citizens in occupied areas have been able to renew or apply for Ukrainian documents if they travel to government-controlled territories. But that entails expensive, unpredictable journeys and long waiting times — Ukrainian birth certificates that are issued based on a Russian birth certificate from Crimea, for example, must be approved by a court.
This means that after eight years, thousands of Ukrainians in occupied territories either have lapsed Ukrainian documents or none at all.
Escaping occupied territories
Shortly after the announcement of the partial mobilization, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called on Ukrainians to exit occupied territories to evade the Russian draft. But these Ukrainians then became stuck in no man’s land — allowed to exit Russia but not to enter the next country — or ran out of funds in countries like Kazakhstan while trying to get new Ukrainian documents.
In late September, Crimean Tatar representative body the Mejlis started getting hundreds of desperate calls from Crimean Tatars seeking to flee.
“We were trying to deal with this problem round the clock,” said Refat Chubarov, head of the Mejlis.
Having a Russian passport from Crimea is hugely problematic in Europe | Sean Gallup/Getty Images
Ukrainian consulates may issue temporary permission for citizens without current documents to enter Ukraine and apply for new ones. But a birth certificate is not sufficient proof of identity, and young people from Crimea often only have a Russian passport or other documents that Ukraine does not recognize.
“Now that the full-scale war has started, men who tried to leave, especially those aged around 18 to 20, have so many problems,” said Skripnik.
Russia has also deported thousands of Ukrainians from newly occupied territories to Crimea and Russia, often under the guise of saving them from active fighting — and then tied receiving aid and benefits in Russia to having a Russian passport.
It may be close to impossible for such people to prove they are actually Ukrainian.
Having a Russian passport from Crimea is hugely problematic in Europe, says Usein (not his real name), a 31-year-old Crimean Tatar who left Crimea in September to avoid being drafted. He traveled through and exited Russia with a Crimea-issued Russian passport, then managed to enter Europe via Latvia with an out-of-date Ukrainian passport. He said he saw others denied entry based on the reasoning that they were Russian draft-dodgers who had chosen to live in Russian-occupied Crimea.
“It’s the biggest problem, because they just choose who to let in and who not,” he said. “Their argument is: ‘You have a Russian passport and citizenship. What were you doing in Crimea for eight years?’”
Usein headed to Poland, where he said that he was met mostly with sympathy and assistance. But one volunteer helping Ukrainian refugees told him he was a traitor because he had stayed in Crimea and not renewed his Ukrainian passport.
“I explained that I was just given Russian citizenship, and I left because of mobilization,” Usein said. “Crimea is my homeland. Why should I have left before? I didn’t want to leave now. All I want is to live in my homeland.”
Beside difficulties around documents, many refugees — fearing they could be fleeing one army for another — do not want to return to Ukraine during wartime at all.
“They escaped mobilization in Russia and wanted to find a safe place for themselves and their families,” Chubarov said. “If they came to Ukraine, they could be conscripted in the Ukrainian army.”
When Usein applied to the Ukrainian consulate in Warsaw, he was told to return to Ukraine for a new passport.
“They told me directly ‘Go to Kyiv to do it, why did you come here?’,” he said. “But if I go there to get documents, I won’t be able to leave again.”
Martial law bans most men between 18 and 60 from leaving Ukraine.
Hostages or collaborators?
Usein, unable to find work in Poland, is now in Belgium waiting for the consulate to confirm his Ukrainian identity while staying in a hostel for migrants going through the asylum system.
Ernes, who was turned back at the Georgian border with Russia, had to return to Crimea with his family. Many of those who appealed to the Crimean Tatar agency the Mejlis for assistance have exhausted their options and funds, and have since returned home, said Chubarov.
“Eighty percent who got to Europe and ran into these problems with documents just turned round and went back,” Usein agreed.
With rumors that Russia will announce a general mobilization in early 2023, those who had to turn back may end up in the Russian army after all, fighting their own people.
Ukrainian nationals in Przemysl, Poland | Omar Marques/Getty Images
Meanwhile, Ukrainians are calling on Europe to turn Russians away, saying that fleeing the draft is not equivalent to opposing the war.
The EU suspended a simplified visa deal for Russian citizens in September. The Baltic states, Finland and Poland banned Russian tourists in October, calling for an EU-wide ban; while Slovakia and Czechia stopped issuing humanitarian visas to Russians in September.
But Crimeans who were left with no choice but to take Russian passports should be treated differently from Russians, believes Chubarov. “If they’re from Crimea, they’re not a threat,” he said.
Yet defining who is a threat, and punishing collaboration with Russia, remains a thorny topic. “Ukrainian special services need to share information with their European counterparts on who has committed state treason and worked on the side of the Russian Federation,” said Skripnik.
Ukraine’s parliament is considering a draft law on collaboration that criminalizes forcing or enabling someone else to get a Russian passport. But holding a Russian passport in and of itself, Vereschuk said, should not be grounds for prosecution, and those trying to avoid Russia’s mobilization deserve assistance.
“They are hostages, and don’t want to fight, so we don’t see them as criminals but as Ukrainians, who want to return.”
“We want to help these people,” Vereschuk concluded.
Politico · by Lily Hyde · January 1, 2023
14. Zelenskyy Condemns Russia's New Year's Attacks
Zelenskyy Condemns Russia's New Year's Attacks
December 31, 2022 7:24 PM
UPDATE January 01, 2023 4:58 AM
voanews.com
In a video address on New Year’s Eve, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy condemned Russia’s missile barrage in Ukraine.
“Today, this Russian missile attack is not the end of the year, no matter how much the terrorists want it. It's the outcome of Russia's fate,” he said.
Reacting to the Russian air assault on Ukraine skies nationwide Saturday, Zelenskyy said, “The terrorist state will not be forgiven. And those who give orders for such strikes, and those who carry them out, will not receive a pardon. To put it mildly.”
“The explosions on February 24 stunned us,” the Ukrainian president said about the first day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “We were told you have no other option, but to surrender. We say we have no other option than to win.”
“We haven't lost anything,” Zelenskyy said. “It was taken from us. ... We did not lose our lands — they were occupied by invaders. The world did not lose peace — Russia destroyed it.”
Ukrainian soldiers share a toast to celebrate New Years Eve, in a military rest house, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in region of Donetsk, Ukraine, Dec. 31, 2022.
About 30 minutes into the new year, more explosions rocked Kyiv as Russia again launched missiles at the capital. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram that two districts of the city were hit, but there was no immediate word about casualties.
Witnesses reported to Reuters that air raid sirens were sounding again across the country. Kyiv and regional officials reported on Telegram that air defenses were working.
On Saturday morning, Russian missiles pummeled Ukraine. One person was killed and at least 30 were wounded across the country. Eight massive explosions rocked the capital, Kyiv, and other areas.
“At Easter, they made such attacks, at Christmas, at New Year ... They call themselves Christians, they are very proud of their Orthodoxy. But they are following the devil. They support him and are together with him,” Zelenskyy said.
SEE ALSO:
Russian Missiles Pummel Ukraine on New Year’s Eve
He then addressed the Russian people: “Your leader wants to show that he has the troops behind him and that he is ahead. But he is just hiding. He hides behind the troops, behind missiles, behind the walls of his residences and palaces,” he said.
“He hides behind you and burns your country and your future. No one will ever forgive you for terror. No one in the world will forgive you for this. Ukraine will never forgive,” he continued.
Putin’s New Year’s address
Earlier Saturday, in his own a video message broadcast on Russian state TV, Putin said Russia was fighting in Ukraine to protect its "motherland" and to secure "true independence" for its people.
He accused the West of lying to Russia and of provoking Moscow to launch what it calls a "special military operation" in Ukraine.
"The West lied about peace," Putin said. "It was preparing for aggression ... and now they are cynically using Ukraine and its people to weaken and split Russia. We have never allowed this and will never allow anybody to do this to us," Russian state-run news agencies quoted Putin as saying in a speech broadcast at midnight in Russia's Far East.
The Institute for the Study of War, a U.S. policy research organization, posted on Twitter that Putin’s address illustrates “that Putin is uncertain of his ability to shape Russia’s information space and remains focused on justifying the war in Ukraine and its cost to his domestic audience.”
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu vowed victory in Ukraine was "inevitable” as he praised the heroism of Russian soldiers fighting on the front lines and those who had died during the 10-month war.
SEE ALSO:
Britain: 'Intensive Wave' of Russia’s Strikes on Ukraine Expected to Continue
However, a rift appears to be growing between the notorious Russian mercenary company, the Wagner Group, and the Russian military. As the front-line Donbas city of Bakhmut has become the site of some of the fiercest fighting in Ukraine, Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin took aim at Russia’s military leadership and the stalling war effort, chiding officials about the lack of ammunition in their battles against Ukrainian forces.
“When you’re sitting in a warm office, it’s hard to hear about the problems on the front line, but when you’re dragging the dead bodies of your friends every day and seeing them for the last time — then supplies are very much needed,” he said in a video.
New Year’s Eve toll
Earlier Saturday, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said that during the missile strikes, one person was killed in the western Solomianskyi district of the city, and that a Japanese journalist was among the wounded in Kyiv. Another person was hospitalized in critical condition. Klitschko warned residents to remain in shelters.
In downtown Kyiv, missiles hit residential buildings, including a hotel, as well as the National Palace of Arts in the theater district and a concert hall.
Firefighters extinguish a fire next to houses destroyed during a Russian attack in Kyiv, Ukraine, Dec. 31, 2022.
Explosions were reported in other regions of Ukraine, including the eastern Donetsk oblast. Kramatorsk Mayor Oleksandr Honcharenko said that missiles hit targets in an industrial zone, but no casualties were reported.
Mykolaiv oblast Governor Vitaliy Kim said at least six people were wounded in the southern city of Mykolaiv. Three of them were hospitalized, with one listed in critical condition.
Kyrylo Tymoshenko, deputy head of the president's office, said four people were wounded by a missile strike in the western city of Khmelnytskyi. In the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia, residential buildings were damaged, but information about casualties and destruction is being clarified, he added.
On Saturday afternoon, explosions were heard at the Dzhankoi airport in Russian-occupied Crimea, according to local Telegram channels. The Dzhankoi airport is a military air base operated by Russian occupying forces. Ukrainian armed forces also reported explosions at the airport.
Telegram channels monitoring launches of missiles reported that Dzhankoi was allegedly hit by a high-precision weapon.
Ukrainian authorities didn’t comment on the incident, and occupation authorities didn’t either.
A damaged car is seen at the scene of Russian shelling in Kyiv, Ukraine, Dec. 31, 2022. (
Fighting elsewhere
On the eastern front, Ukrainian forces said they killed or wounded up to 10 Russian troops, destroying two vehicles and damaging three more near the occupied city of Donetsk, according to the Ukrainian General Staff's evening briefing on Telegram.
Intense fighting continues in the region. A dozen towns near Bakhmut have been damaged by recent shelling. Russian forces are also continuing to hit the southern city of Kherson with multiple rocket launchers, aircraft and kamikaze drones.
In the weeks following the liberation of Kherson in November, Russia has intensified its attacks on the front line in Donbas, particularly around Bakhmut, where it has made incremental gains supported by mass artillery bombardments.
Some material for this article came from The Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France-Presse.
voanews.com
15. U.S. Pours Money Into Chips, but Even Soaring Spending Has Limits
Excerpts:
But Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, was forthright in a speech in November at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Attracting the world’s best scientific minds is “an advantage that is America’s to lose,” she said. “And we’re not going to let that happen.”
U.S. Pours Money Into Chips, but Even Soaring Spending Has Limits
Amid a tech cold war with China, U.S. companies have pledged nearly $200 billion for chip manufacturing projects since early 2020. But the investments are not a silver bullet.
By Don Clark and Ana Swanson
Don Clark reports on the semiconductor industry, and Ana Swanson reports on trade and international economics.
nytimes.com · by Ana Swanson · January 1, 2023
In September, the chip giant Intel gathered officials at a patch of land near Columbus, Ohio, where it pledged to invest at least $20 billion in two new factories to make semiconductors.
A month later, Micron Technology celebrated a new manufacturing site near Syracuse, N.Y., where the chip company expected to spend $20 billion by the end of the decade and eventually perhaps five times that.
And in December, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company hosted a shindig in Phoenix, where it plans to triple its investment to $40 billion and build a second new factory to create advanced chips.
The pledges are part of an enormous ramp-up in U.S. chip-making plans over the past 18 months, the scale of which has been likened to Cold War-era investments in the Space Race. The boom has implications for global technological leadership and geopolitics, with the United States aiming to prevent China from becoming an advanced power in chips, the slices of silicon that have driven the creation of innovative computing devices like smartphones and virtual-reality goggles.
Today, chips are an essential part of modern life even beyond the tech industry’s creations, from military gear and cars to kitchen appliances and toys.
Across the nation, more than 35 companies have pledged nearly $200 billion for manufacturing projects related to chips since the spring of 2020, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association, a trade group. The money is set to be spent in 16 states, including Texas, Arizona and New York on 23 new chip factories, the expansion of nine plants, and investments from companies supplying equipment and materials to the industry.
The push is one facet of an industrial policy initiative by the Biden administration, which is dangling at least $76 billion in grants, tax credits and other subsidies to encourage domestic chip production. Along with providing sweeping funding for infrastructure and clean energy, the efforts constitute the largest U.S. investment in manufacturing arguably since World War II, when the federal government unleashed spending on new ships, pipelines and factories to make aluminum and rubber.
“I’ve never seen a tsunami like this,” said Daniel Armbrust, the former chief executive of Sematech, a now-defunct chip consortium formed in 1987 with the Defense Department and funding from member companies.
Sanjay Mehrotra, Micron Technology’s chief executive, at Onondaga Community College in Syracuse, N.Y., in October. The company is building a new manufacturing site nearby.Credit...Kenny Holston for The New York Times
President Biden has staked a prominent part of his economic agenda on stimulating U.S. chip production, but his reasons go beyond the economic benefits. Much of the world’s cutting-edge chips today are made in Taiwan, the island to which China claims territorial rights. That has caused fears that semiconductor supply chains may be disrupted in the event of a conflict — and that the United States will be at a technological disadvantage.
More on China
The new U.S. production efforts may correct some of these imbalances, industry executives said — but only up to a point.
The new chip factories would take years to build and might not be able to offer the industry’s most advanced manufacturing technology when they begin operations. Companies could also delay or cancel the projects if they aren’t awarded sufficient subsidies by the White House. And a severe shortage in skills may undercut the boom, as the complex factories need many more engineers than the number of students who are graduating from U.S. colleges and universities.
The bonanza of money on U.S. chip production is “not going to try or succeed in accomplishing self-sufficiency,” said Chris Miller, an associate professor of international history at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and the author of a recent book on the chip industry’s battles.
White House officials have argued that the chip-making investments will sharply reduce the proportion of chips needed to be purchased from abroad, improving U.S. economic security. At the TSMC event in December, Mr. Biden also highlighted the potential impact on tech companies like Apple that rely on TSMC for their chip-making needs. He said that “it could be a game changer” as more of these companies “bring more of their supply chain home.”
U.S. companies led chip production for decades starting in the late 1950s. But the country’s share of global production capacity gradually slid to around 12 percent from about 37 percent in 1990, as countries in Asia provided incentives to move manufacturing to those shores.
Today, Taiwan accounts for about 22 percent of total chip production and more than 90 percent of the most advanced chips made, according to industry analysts and the Semiconductor Industry Association.
The new spending is set to improve America’s position. A $50 billion government investment is likely to prompt corporate spending that would take the U.S. share of global production to as much as 14 percent by 2030, according to a Boston Consulting Group study in 2020 that was commissioned by the Semiconductor Industry Association.
“It really does put us in the game for the first time in decades,” said John Neuffer, the association’s president, who added that the estimate may be conservative because Congress approved $76 billion in subsidies in a piece of legislation known as the CHIPS Act.
Still, the ramp-up is unlikely to eliminate U.S. dependence on Taiwan for the most advanced chips. Such chips are the most powerful because they pack the highest number of transistors onto each slice of silicon, and they are often held up a sign of a nation’s technological progress.
Intel long led the race to shrink the number of transistors on a chip, which is usually described in nanometers, or billionths of a meter, with smaller numbers indicating the most cutting-edge production technology. Then TSMC surged ahead in recent years.
But at its Phoenix site, TSMC may not import its most advanced manufacturing technology. The company initially announced that it would produce five-nanometer chips at the Phoenix factory, before saying last month that it would also make four-nanometer chips there by 2024 and build a second factory, which will open in 2026, for three-nanometer chips. It stopped short of discussing further advances.
In contrast, TSMC’s factories in Taiwan at the end of 2022 began producing three-nanometer technology. By 2025, factories in Taiwan will probably start supplying Apple with two-nanometer chips, said Handel Jones, chief executive at International Business Strategies.
TSMC and Apple declined to comment.
Whether other chip companies will bring more advanced technology for cutting-edge chips to their new sites is unclear. Samsung Electronics plans to invest $17 billion in a new factory in Texas but has not disclosed its production technology. Intel is manufacturing chips at roughly seven nanometers, though it has said its U.S. factories will turn out three-nanometer chips by 2024 and even more advanced products soon after that.
The spending boom is also set to reduce, though not erase, U.S. reliance on Asia for other kinds of chips. Domestic factories produce only about 4 percent of the world’s memory chips — which are needed to store data in computers, smartphones and other consumer devices — and Micron’s planned investments could eventually raise that percentage.
But there are still likely to be gaps in a catchall variety of older, simpler chips, which were in such short supply over the past two years that U.S. automakers had to shut down factories and produce partly finished vehicles. TSMC is a major producer of some of these chips, but it is focusing its new investments on more profitable plants for advanced chips.
“We still have a dependency that is not being impacted in any way shape or form,” said Michael Hurlston, chief executive of Synaptics, a Silicon Valley chip designer that relies heavily on TSMC’s older factories in Taiwan.
The chip-making boom is expected to create a jobs bonanza of 40,000 new roles in factories and companies that supply them, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association. That would add to about 277,000 U.S. semiconductor industry employees.
But it won’t be easy to fill so many skilled positions. Chip factories typically need technicians to run factory machines and scientists in fields like electrical and chemical engineering. The talent shortage is one of the industry’s toughest challenges, according to recent surveys of executives.
The CHIPS Act contains funding for work force development. The Commerce Department, which is overseeing the doling out of grant money from the CHIPS Act’s funds, has also made it clear that organizations hoping to obtain funding should come up with plans for training and educating workers.
Intel, responding to the issue, plans to invest $100 million to spur training and research at universities, community colleges and other technical educators. Purdue University, which built a new semiconductor laboratory, has set a goal of graduating 1,000 engineers each year and has attracted the chip maker SkyWater Technology to build a $1.8 billion manufacturing plant near its Indiana campus.
Yet training may go only so far, as chip companies compete with other industries that are in dire need of workers.
“We’re going to have to build a semiconductor economy that attracts people when they have a lot of other choices,” Mitch Daniels, who was president of Purdue at the time, said at an event in September.
Since training efforts may take years to bear fruit, industry executives want to make it easier for highly educated foreign workers to obtain visas to work in the United States or stay after they get their degrees. Officials in Washington are aware that comments encouraging more immigration could invite political fire.
But Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, was forthright in a speech in November at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Attracting the world’s best scientific minds is “an advantage that is America’s to lose,” she said. “And we’re not going to let that happen.”
nytimes.com · by Ana Swanson · January 1, 2023
16. EMP: The Biggest Military Threat America Faces Today?
EMP: The Biggest Military Threat America Faces Today?
19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · January 1, 2023
Back on August 20, 2022 (coincidentally my birthday), I was saddened to learn of the passing of a great American patriot, Dr. Peter Vincent Pry. While I didn’t know Peter quite well enough to call him a true friend, we definitely had a mutually respectful professional acquaintanceship. Dr. Pry’s passing was a devastating blow to patriotic Americans everywhere concerned about securing our nation’s grid infrastructure from the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) strike, as he was one of our most tireless advocates for this vital national security issue.
A successful EMP strike against the U.S. would be a catastrophe beyond measure or comprehension, essentially ushering in “The End of the World as We Know It” (TEOTWAWKI), Yet, the Biden Administration is failing to do anything about it.
EMP Defined and Explained
Michaela Dodge and her colleagues at the Heritage Foundation have provided us with a very useful breakdown of the EMP threat in layman’s terms:
(1) A thermonuclear weapon is detonated at an altitude of 25 miles or more above the Earth’s atmosphere, releasing a burst of gamma radiation;
(2) These gamma rays impact air molecules, stripping off electrons, and driving these negatively charged particles to approximately 90 percent the speed of light (at higher altitudes, the reduced air density enables the electrons to move more freely and maximize EMP intensity);
(3) the electrons are drawn by the Earth’s magnetic poles into a corkscrew pattern, unleashing enormous levels of electromagnetic radiation onto the Earth’s surface;
(4) the power grid, along with metal within electronic devices such as computers and radios, catch the full brunt of the EMP, which runs roughshod through the tiny circuits, likely destroying or severely damaging them.
In short, that means everything from your iPhone to your laptop to the electronic fuel injection systems (EFI) in your post-carburetor era automobile to your heating and air conditioning systems are totally fried. Modern post-agricultural and post-Industrial Revolution society ceases to function.
The Trump Administration Takes Action …
Whether you love Donald Trump or hate him, the cold heart reality is that his Presidential Administration has so far been the only one in American history to take serious action to address the threat of a deliberate EMP attack.
Now, in the sake of bipartisan objectivity, it should be noted that the Obama Administration, to its credit, did explore the need for protection against naturally-occurring EMP threats such as solar storms, the most famous historical example being the Carrington Event of 1859, but for whatever reason overlooked the manmade EMP threat.
Then-President Trump’s call for EMP security was manifested on March 26, 2019 in the form of Executive Order (E.O.) 13865. E.O. 13865 directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop quadrennial risk assessments of EMP and deliver the first risk assessment of the threat within the first year. Section 3, “Policy,” reads in part:
“To implement the actions directed in this order, the Federal Government shall promote collaboration and facilitate information sharing, including the sharing of threat and vulnerability assessments, among executive departments and agencies (agencies), the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. The Federal Government shall also provide incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners to encourage innovation that strengthens critical infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the development and implementation of best practices, regulations, and appropriate guidance.”
… And the Biden Administration Does Nothing
So then, what has the Biden Administration done about EMP since it seized power in the White House?
As I noted in an article I wrote for The Daily Torch (the online newsletter for Americans For Limited Government) back in December 2021, Joe Biden and his cronies have done jack-diddly squat.
As the late great Dr. Pry told me – among other things omitted herein due to spatial limitations – via email whilst I was conducting research for that op-ed piece:
“Chris—Biden has continued Trump’s ‘Executive Order Coordinating National Resilience Against Electromagnetic Pulses’ but suspended ‘Securing the United States Bulk Power System’ so the U.S. continues importing EHV transformers from China, making the U.S. potentially more vulnerable to EMP and cyber-attacks. The Infrastructure Bill has millions for additional studies on how to protect electric grids and other critical infrastructures from EMP, but not a penny to actually harden any of the critical infrastructures.”
My Personal Reasons for Wanting EMP Security
I first started taking an active interest in EMP threat back in roughly 2009 when a good friend of mine told me about William Forstchen’s bestselling novel One Second After. Nine years later, I got around to reading that book, and it scared me. F
ast-forward to the following year, when I took Dr. Ed Locke’s “Weapons of Mass Destruction and the New Terrorism” course as part of my online Masters in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) degree program at American Military University (AMU), I decided to do my research paper on EMP terrorism. (Peter Pry was a wonderful resource for that work as well; it’s how I made his acquaintance in the first place).
As I learned whilst researching the paper, Iran, Russia, and China alike all have EMP strike capabilities on America as part of their war plans. It also dawned upon me how much a successful strike would adversely impact me personally.
You see, dear readers, I currently hold a 90 percent disability rating from the Veterans Administration (V.A.). Without getting into too many sordid details about my medical situation, suffice it to say that one of the afflictions that earned me that rating is Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Three-to-four times per year, it flares up to the point where I need to take a sick day or two from work and get on antibiotics and prescription regimen. Three times in my life – including within the past month – it has manifested as full-blown pneumonia.
In a scenario where our entire modern society has ceased to function on account of an EMP attack, that means any pneumonia episode I suffer in the aftermath would most likely kill me, as (1) the pharmaceutical companies that produce the necessary medicinal treatments, (2) the highway infrastructure needed to transport the medicines, and (3) the medical facilities where I would receive such treatments would be totally non-functional.
This makes me resent the Biden Administration just that much more for refusing to do a thing to fight EMP.
Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). In his spare time, he enjoys shooting, dining out, cigars, Irish and British pubs, travel, USC Trojans college football, and Washington DC professional sports. If you’d like to pick his brain in-person about his writings, chances are you’ll be able to find him at the Green Turtle Pasadena in Maryland on Friday nights, singing his favorite karaoke tunes.
19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · January 1, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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