Quotes of the Day:

"All the great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope." 

– Winston Churchill

“What is success?

To laugh often and much; to win the respect of intelligent people and the affection of children; to earn the appreciation of honest critics and endure the betrayal of false friends; to appreciate the beauty; to find the best in others; to leave the world a bit better, whether by a healthy child, a garden patch or a redeemed social condition; to know even one life has breathed easier because you have lived. This is to have succeeded!” 

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

“We call them leaders because they go first, because they take the risk before anybody else does, because they will choose to sacrifice, so that people will be safe and protected.” 

– Simon Sinek

1. Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy

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1. Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy

A very important essay. We really must understand the theory and application of resistance and resilience in the 21st Century.

Please go to the link to view the charts, tables, and graphics and the proper paper format.

https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Assessing-Resistance-for-the-Purpose-of-Informing-International-Policy/

Also view the PDF at this lnk: https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/EXP_Burrell_Collison_Assessing%20Resistance_PDF.pdf

Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy

Robert S. Burrell, PhD; and John Collison

9 January 2024

https://doi.org/10.36304/ExpwMCUP.2024.01

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Abstract: This article details an applied methodology to operationalize an irregular approach to conflict and competition—in particular, external support to intrastate resilience or resistance. It introduces two foundational learning concepts: the resilience and resistance model and the resistance continuum. Using the resistance continuum, analysts can categorize the general nature of resistance movements across a spectrum from nonviolent protest through belligerency. Subsequently, this article offers several ways to identify and then assess resistance organizations. It then prescribes methods to make recommendations concerning potential external support in another state’s intrastate conflict consisting of three primary options: to support current governance, to support opposition to governance or occupation, or to do nothing. Finally, it provides practical application with a real-world case study—China and Taiwan—which demonstrates the utility of this methodology in understanding intrastate conflict and the possibilities offered to external sponsors of change.   

Keywords: resilience, resistance, irregular warfare, competition, deterrence   

Introduction

In the twenty-first century, irregular conflicts have caused the United States a great deal of angst.1 As recently demonstrated in the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and Israel’s response, irregular threats continue to prevail globally.2 Fortuitously, the U.S. Congress in 2021 demanded that the U.S. Department of Defense develop education to prepare for future irregular struggles.3 In response, to address the academic gap in preparing for irregular forms of conflict, the Small Wars and Insurgencies journal published an article entitled “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance,” which analyzes nation states in more advanced human-centric terms to assess current levels of governmental and societal resiliency to subversion and coercion, as well as internal and/or external aggression.4

Measuring state resiliency and potential for resistance comprises only phase one of a comprehensive approach to addressing irregular threats. Phase two includes identification of resistance movements and categorizing their nature according to their typology on the resistance continuum. Phase three describes resistance movements in terms of leadership, cause, environment, organization, and actions. Finally, phase four examines potential external support options to partners in intrastate conflict. This article provides a compendium to the state-centric resilience and resistance analysis model that was articulated in the Small Wars and Insurgencies article (i.e., phase one). As an extension, it introduces methodologies to facilitate deeper understanding of resistance movements themselves (i.e., phases two and three). This improved methodology provides a more informed approach to assist decision and policy makers in considering irregular approaches to competition, deterrence, and war (i.e., phase four).5 Throughout the proposed methodology, interdisciplinary methods remain vital, as military science cannot alone prepare practitioners for future conflict.

Every human society contains forms of resistance to current governance or foreign occupation. Resistance can span a spectrum of activities, from nonviolent and legal forms to illegal or violent means. In contrast, each regime attempts to brace the resolve of the population against internal political, economic, or social change, and even revolution. This article explains how resistance movements and recognized authorities conceptually interact with one another, with their shared population, and among international benefactors. While external sponsors can choose to support resiliency or resistance in other societies, identifying the nature of resistance movements remains critical to ascertaining the most appropriate and effective support. Using the resistance continuum, analysts can categorize the general nature of resistance movements across a spectrum, from nonviolent protest through belligerency. Subsequently, this research offers several ways to identify and assess resistance organizations. It also prescribes methods to make recommendations concerning potential external support in another’s intrastate conflict. External sponsors can make a deliberate choice to help stabilize another nation’s governance through support to resilience; aid aggrieved populations against other state through support to resistance; or not directly interfere in the sovereignty of another state. Finally, this article includes a practical application of the methodologies with a real-world case study involving China and Taiwan.

The Resilience and Resistance Model

As introduced in “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance,” an important framework to consider is the resilience and resistance model, which is based on Gordon McCormick’s model for insurgency.6 This model was modified so that it includes the full spectrum of the resistance continuum, from peaceful demonstration to belligerency. The resilience node represents recognized governance and authority, and the resistance node represents opposition to existing governance or occupation. The resistance and resilience elements are directly confronting each other while simultaneously struggling to garner both domestic and international support. Concurrently, they each attempt to counter the efforts of the other.

Figure 1. Diagram of the resilience and resistance model

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

In this model, there are four primary nodes: the population node, the resilience node, the resistance node, and the external support node. The resistance and resilience nodes perform five basic actions in opposition to each other: they attempt to gain support from the population, disrupt the other’s efforts to garner support from the population, perform violent and/or nonviolent actions directly against one another, attempt to interrupt their opponent’s attempts to garner international support, and attempt to garner international support. Both the population and external support nodes have agency and can initiate actions to influence the resilience and/or resilience nodes as well (hence the dual arrows on lines 1 and 5). The power of the resilience and resistance model is that it applies in nearly every intrastate conflict, no matter the scale or level of violence.

External Support to Resilience or Resistance

An external partner has three options in regard to another nation’s internal conflict: to support a regime’s resilience in order to free and protect its society from such threats as subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; to support indigenous resistance against an adversary’s governance to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the regime; or to choose to do nothing. In the first two cases, the external sponsor can employ a combination of several methods to support a partner or surrogate. In terms of military aspects, support to resilience normally includes activities such as foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stabilization actions. The means might include arms, equipment, and training. In contrast, the military way to support resistance is typically referred to as unconventional warfare or special warfare, depending on the national doctrinal variances. The military way of supporting resistance includes covert and/or overt military assistance to enhance the subversion of the opposing state. Nonetheless, military ways and means comprise only one approach to support a partner.

For simplicity, this discussion is narrowed to four types of support relating to the major instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).7 In each situation, the DIME “cocktail” provided by an external sponsor will likely have ingredients of varying sizes based on desired outcomes. As legitimacy can be a deciding factor in achieving victory for either a resistance movement or current regime, diplomatic support from a recognized sovereign partner can prove quite valuable. As a population-centric struggle, the battle for narrative and information activities can also prove important. Economic support can assist in stabilizing a partner and enhancing their legitimacy, including facets of food, medical care, and/or employment opportunities.

There are several factors to consider when evaluating resistance movements in a particular region, including religion, demographics, ethnicities, and social hierarchies. However, understanding the distinct categories of resistance can help determine what types of military support—if any—are appropriate for external support to any resilience partner or resistance movement.

The Resistance Continuum

Within the resilience and resistance model, particular care should be taken in assessing the resistance node. Human populations inherently develop opposition to indigenous governance or foreign occupation. Simultaneously, each regime has supporters who wish to steel the resolve of the population from reform. Although resistance is a commonality around the globe, resistance movements themselves are quite distinct. The purpose of a movement might rely on factors of social injustice, ethnic tensions, or ideologic or religious differences. Consequently, resistance movements develop unique approaches to motivate regime change. Essentially, no resistance movement is the same.

Nevertheless, resistance generally occurs along a continuum (figure 2). This continuum indicates a scale of protest and conflict, though resistance movements often employ more than one of these methods over time.

Figure 2. Diagram of the resistance continuum

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

Resistance can comprise nonviolent protest that is conducted legally or at least within established international norms. In fact, the United Nations recognizes lawful assembly and protest as a universal human right.8 One notable example of this is the civil rights movement in the United States during the 1950 and 1960s to protest Jim Crow laws and achieve voting equality for African Americans.9 Another form of protest is nonviolent but remains inherently illegal. Those who supported the antebellum Underground Railroad network that helped enslaved African Americans escape into the Northern United States and Canada in the early to mid-nineteenth century fall into this category because the Underground Railroad directly opposed congressional law pertaining to the rights of American slave owners.10

When protest turns violent, it becomes rebellion. Small outbreaks of violence, such as Nat Turner’s revolt against slave owners in Virginia in 1831, exemplifies rebellion.11 This category is generally defined by the scale of violence, meaning that in most cases the government can attempt to counter the violence with available means such as law enforcement. In contrast, insurgency is also violent, but the government can no longer address the resistance through rule of law. During the period called “Bleeding Kansas” (1854–61), pro-slave and free-state communities in the United States employed coercion and violence against one another with the objective of controlling voting outcomes and securing their disparate visions of statehood.12 In belligerency, the resistance demonstrates such autonomy that it resembles its own nation state. Typically, belligerency results in a bloody civil war, with the resistance and the regime fighting through conventional military tactics for the ultimate stakes of controlling the future state.

These terms—nonviolent legal, nonviolent illegal, rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency—were introduced by Erin N. Hahn and W. Sam Lauber, both lawyers working at John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.13 Hahn and Lauber attempted to create legal categories for participants in, and external actors supporting, resistance activities. From the perspective of external support to intrastate conflict, these legal categories consist of an important advancement for discussion. However, these five categories do not neatly fit within the taxonomies of social movements, law, or military science. They do, however, offer a construct from which all three disciplines can perhaps combine into a cohesive understanding and a subsequently useful application for constructing military strategy or foreign policy. To further understand and operationalize the resistance continuum, a brief example of all five categories follows.

Nonviolent Legal

Nonviolent legal and nonviolent illegal forms of protest are often lumped together and treated the same. As one example, in 1973 American political scientist Gene Sharp created 198 ways to perform nonviolent action without any distinction to legality.14 However, mixing these two methodologies, one legal and other illegal, ultimately makes the entire resistance organization an illicit one and subject to arrest and prosecution. Legal forms of protest have unique advantages in moral and ethical supremacy. Careful consideration should be followed before negating this benefit.

A quintessential example of nonviolent legal resistance comes from Mahatma Gandhi and his protest methods used in South Africa and India. A religious guru, Gandhi rose in the political ranks and eventually became a national symbol of resistance to foreign influence, particularly that of the United Kingdom. One of his most frequent means of protest included hunger strikes, but perhaps the most iconic was his Salt March in 1930. Brilliantly, Gandhi meant to protest the British monopoly on salt. At the time, the United Kingdom placed taxes on salt, which all Indians of every social class paid. To make this monopoly lucrative, the British outlawed the making of salt by Indians. While other Indian nationalists found Gandhi’s protest idea ridiculous, opposing the exploitation of salt quickly grew into a symbolic demonstration with shared national interest across all of India’s diverse populations.15

Nonviolent Illegal

A premier example of nonviolent illegal resistance comes from Nelson Mandela and his campaign against racial segregation. The White South African government had instituted a system of exclusion of Blacks and other non-Whites from representative government and equal opportunities, a system called apartheid. Through the African National Congress, Mandela employed several methods to resist authority, primarily through nonviolent legal methods characterized by Gandhi and American civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. However, in 1961, the Umkhonto we Sizwe paramilitary group, headed by Mandela, began planning acts of sabotage in South Africa. These specifically targeted infrastructure to avoid loss of life.16

This category of nonviolent illegal probably best serves as also embracing social movement terms such as nonviolent insurrection and warfare terminology such as subversion and sabotage. Nonviolent insurrection (or unarmed insurrection) refers to a general uprising against a regime or occupying power, but largely without the use of violent means. This is best described by Stephen Zunes as activities such as “strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations, the popular contestation of public space, tax refusal, destruction of symbols of government authority (such as official identification cards), refusal to obey official orders (such as curfew restrictions), and the creation of alternative institutions for political legitimacy and social organization.”17 One recent example of nonviolent insurrection is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2003–4. The protests were massive, including a large segment of the Ukrainian population. While these demonstrations remained nonviolent, protestors brought the capital city of Kyiv to a halt, effectively—and unlawfully—shutting down the government.18 Another example of nonviolent illegal includes the Umbrella Movement, which sought change to Chinese policies in Hong Kong in 2014, an interesting case study that stands apart in terms of innovation by leveraging technology and social media in modern resistance.19

Rebellion

On the resistance continuum, rebellion clearly indicates a marked change in methodology that includes lethality. However, any movement embracing the use of violence might also include the nonviolent forms of protest discussed previously. The distinction regarding rebellion is that the resistance either deliberately employs lethality or lethality evolves from what was originally intended as a nonviolent form of protest. Violence can result as a choice made to evade capture or to protect oneself or others from the reprisal of authority. Violence may also comprise a deliberate method planned for and used to achieve desired ends.

The key constraint in rebellion remains the extent of the violence and how it is addressed by authority. Hahn and Lauber explain rebellion as violence that a “state’s law enforcement mechanisms are able to suppress”—in other words, military force is not mobilized to suppress it.20 This creates an excellent threshold for consideration. Consequently, lethality remains limited, either by choice, in the case of a large demonstration preferring other nonviolent methods, or simply by the limited size of the participants, even if lethality remains the primary tool.

In rebellious organizations of limited size, the movement can form an armed component that is dedicated to the use of violence as its primary means of resistance. Employing a small armed force against a large state apparatus rarely achieves dramatic success if done directly. For instance, in 1831, Virginia state authorities found and executed slave rebellion leader Nat Turner and his followers in just six weeks.21 Often, enduring organizations attempt asymmetric methods familiar to military science, such as raids, ambushes, and assassination. The state, in turn, may label a violent movement a terrorist organization, after which the state can justifiably use its military to destroy it. As a result, terrorism must be included in the same category as insurgency, as will be discussed later.

Large-scale social revolts without a major armed component have become more prevalent in the twenty-first century.22 Beginning in late 2010, the Arab Spring encompassed revolutions in more than a dozen countries in the Arab world. In each case, the resistance fell into various categories, to include nonviolent illegal, insurgency, and belligerency. However, the resistance in Egypt most likely fits the case of rebellion because deaths were fewer than 1,000 and the military did not directly intervene. In fact, when security forces could not contain the crowds, the Egyptian military refused orders to put down the protests and actually interjected forces only to save the resistance from harm.23 Consequently, the Arab Spring in Egypt fits the category of a rebellion, where violence did occur but on a limited scale despite very large numbers of protestors. Another similar example of a large resistance movement using limited violence is the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014. During four months of conflict, the numbers killed remained minor in comparison to the number of protestors and security forces participating, and no military response was used to put down the rebellion.24 Rebellion includes methods that intentionally or unintentionally cause fatalities as a result of resistance activities. For instance, the unintended result of a protest could be its development into a destructive riot.

Insurgency

The barrier between rebellion and insurgency is the use of a nation’s military to address the resistance. Once a military commences operations against a resistance movement, the threshold has been crossed from rebellion to insurgency. The classification of insurgency has a long history in military science. What needs further reconciliation, however, is that terrorism can also comprise a resistance organization being addressed with military force.

In terms of legal status, insurgent groups do not clearly differentiate from terrorist organizations in terms of the law. Both can be argued as using illegal lethal means against the state, either against the nation’s military or against its citizens. Ethically, there are distinct differences in these two methodologies, as one method can avoid killing noncombatants and the other can completely dehumanize the use of violence.25

The bifurcated approach and resulting confusion between terrorism and insurgency has an extended historiography, and no consensus exists on the topic within any discipline. Lawyer Ranbir Singh argues that “there is a very thin line of distinction between ‘terrorism,’ ‘insurgency’ and ‘belligerency’; and in almost all cases these are terms donating the various stages of the same process.”26 This blur between terrorism and insurgency is also illustrated in the case of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front), which fought against the French in Algeria in 1954–62.27 Additionally, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which fought to end British rule in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 2005, also offers a good example of a movement comprising both an insurgent group and a terrorist organization.28 The proposed methodology considers that insurgency and terrorism both use illegal forms of lethal violence against a state and/or its citizens to attain political goals or regime change and creates a threat to the government’s sovereignty that is considered grievous enough to require the government to address it with military force.

Belligerency

In belligerency, a resistance organization emerges to make conventional war against a state. Sometimes, belligerency occurs when a successful insurgency evolves to maintain state-like functions in a region and sustains human security responsibilities over a segment of the population. Unfortunately, belligerency as a resistance category does not have international agreement, primarily because sovereign nation states do not want to recognize lethal forms of resistance as anything but illegal.

Nevertheless, belligerency, or civil war, has a long history of resistance developing into a sovereign power. The formulation of the United States is case in point, as the American Revolution gained legitimacy after recognition from France in 1778. Because the current global order only recognizes the legitimacy of sovereign states, despite the fact that belligerency can and has opposed such states, it is extremely difficult for revolutions to gain belligerent status. Simultaneously, foreign powers have conducted “military interventions in civil wars despite constituting the de jure interference in another state’s internal affairs.”29

A classic example of belligerency is the American Civil War, during which the Confederate States of America met most of the preceding conditions. Try as it might, the Confederacy could not receive its desired recognition by Great Britain.30 However, both Great Britain and France gave the Confederacy belligerent status to enable the contract and sale of weapons and goods. In a modern context, violent resistance stemming from an insurgency must receive official recognition by an existing nation state to be considered a belligerent. In such cases, it is best to receive recognition from as many states as possible, or even from an international or regional body.

Identifying Resistance Movements

This article outlines methods to leverage current scholarship and research carried out by some of the top universities and nonprofit organizations that study resistance to help practitioners identify existing resistance movements and trends of success or failure within nation states. The organizations acknowledged herein include Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania; Harvard University; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC; the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a nonprofit organization; and Uppsala University in Sweden. The data generated by these organizations remains publicly available on the internet.

Once an analyst identifies resistance movements, the general nature of each can be categorized along this typology as nonviolent legal, nonviolent illegal, rebellion, insurgency, or belligerency. Fortunately, there are many ways to identify resistance movements in any country or region. As a starting point, several recommended sources are offered below.

A quick search of a nation state in the Global Nonviolent Action Database, originally created by researchers at Swarthmore College, can provide excellent results on the activities of nonviolent organizations that are regularly updated.31

Similarly, Harvard University maintains a database called the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project, though this data currently appears generally limited from 1900 to 2013. Compiled by dozens of separate researchers, the project contains several datasets that show durations of conflicts, the number of participants, the relative percentage of participants to the population, and the success or failure rates.32  

Harvard also maintains a website called Mass Mobilization Protest Data. This downloadable dataset illustrates protests internationally with dates, numbers of people mobilized, and the purposes for the protest. However, the dataset does not directly identify the organizations participating, though these could be quickly surmised with a subsequent search about the event on the internet.33

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace maintains a Global Protest Tracker with locations, dates, size, and durations of mass protests around the world. This data requires no downloads and is entirely web-based. It expands in more detail about particular events, providing information on such factors as triggers, motivations, key participants, and outcomes.34

The nonprofit Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project offers data on violence in every country in terms of battles, riots, explosions, and violence against civilians. More detailed information requires downloading the available datasets.35

Finally, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) illustrates organized violence around the world, particularly intrastate conflict. It contains an interactive map, which allows a researcher to click on a state and retrieve a summary of a conflict, its history, and the number of deaths. At least 25 battlefield-related deaths taking place between a recognized government and an armed group are required for categorization. This website is continually updated by Uppsala University’s Department of Conflict and Peace Research.36

These recommended websites are not all-inclusive for identifying resistance movements within a state or region, but they provide a good start for research.37 Once identified, a student, scholar, or practitioner can bin these movements along the resistance continuum, using the descriptions prescribed previously, as a means of categorizing the general nature of activities preferred by each organization.

Assessing Resistance Movements

After identifying resistance movements along the resistance continuum, an assessment can summarize the potential of each one. Several studies and theories attempt to define ways of deconstructing and assessing political movements, insurgencies, or resistance organizations in general.38 This article incorporates the typology of resistance introduced by Jonathon B. Cosgrove and Erin N. Hahn in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command study Conceptual Typology of Resistance.39 Essentially, in assessing a resistance movement, this article recommends further operationalizing the research of Cosgrove and Hahn. Cosgrove and Hahn argue that a resistance has five attributes: actors, causes, environment, organization, and actions. Cosgrove and Hahn define these characteristics in the following terms.

• Actors: the individual and potential participants in an organized resistance, as well as external contributors and either competing or cooperating resistance groups.
• Causes: the collectively expressed rationales for resistance and the individual motivations for participation.
• Environment: the preexisting and emerging conditions within the political, social, physical, or interpersonal contexts that enable or constrain the mobilization of resistance, directly or indirectly.
• Organization: the “internal characteristics of a movement: its membership, policies, structures, and culture.”40
• Actions: the means by which actors carry out resistance as they engage in behaviors and activities in opposition to a resisted structure; [this] can encompass both the specific tactics used by a resistance movement and the broader characteristics or repertoires for action (i.e., strategy).41

Actors

The actor category consists of leaders, participants, the population, other resistance movements, and external support.42 Leaders can be categorized as either agitators, prophets, reformers, statesmen, or administrators. Each can be evaluated as to their potential in comparison with others of their type. For instance, Martin Luther King Jr. might be considered a nearly perfect architype of a reformer in this sense. Participants are either full-time members, such as those in the armed component or underground, or part-time supporters, such as those in the auxiliary. The population can be evaluated generally as having one of three tendencies: those who support the government, those who support change through resistance, and those who prefer to remain uncommitted. The U.S. Army War College’s Study of Internal Conflict has demonstrated that support from 15 percent or more of the population can prove decisive.43 Other resistance movements that share desired change and can collaborate with one another can have more potential than when evaluated separately. External support, either material or nonmaterial, can prove extremely important for a successful resistance. As described previously, external supporters can consist of multiple organizations, not simply governments. Table 1 outlines the basic tenets for actor analysis.

Table 1. Assessing potential of resistance actors

Actors

Components

Qualifiers

The individual and potential participants in an organized resistance, as well as external contributors and either competing or cooperating resistance groups.

Type of leader

Agitator, prophet, reformer, statesman, or administrator

 Categorize the type of leader or leaders who hold sway over this movement. Assess their potential by comparing them with historical examples of the same. Are they recognized nationally or internationally?

Participants

Full time members and part-time supporters

 Evaluate the loyalty, enthusiasm, and popularity of the cadre in the inner circle as well as other supporters with the organization. What is the potential that their commitment might exponential effects on the outcomes of the movement?

Population

Who supports the government? Who support change through resistance? Who prefer to remain uncommitted?

 What percentage of the population actively or passively supports resistance? Remember, 15 percent or more support of resistance by the population could prove decisive.

Other resistance organizations

The sum of resistance organizations can add up to a more powerful and united whole.

 Are there any other resistance movements that, when organized together, could more effectively contribute to a shared desired change? Conversely, are there other movements with incompatible goals? If so, assess the advantages or disadvantages that this support could have on resistance efforts.

External support

Which types of organizations outside the geographic boundaries of the country support this resistance movement?

 Assess the totality of external support organizations who favor the resistance and could provide substantial material or nonmaterial support. Could this support prove decisive?

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

Causes

Resistance supports a cause that represents the collectively expressed rationales for opposition to authority, as well as the individual motivations for participating in such a group. The rationale for resistance consists of either a desire for sweeping change in authority or society or specified changes for individual groups or communities.44 A scholar or practitioner should identify the stated public narrative of an organization that normally delegitimizes the current authority and legitimizes its own claims.

The second key component to analyzing the cause includes the motivations of the participants. A group of scholars at the Artis International research institution, particularly Scott Atran, have conducted several studies on the differences between “devoted actors” and those motivated by self-interest during conflict. A cause that fuses participants’ culture-defining values, spiritual formidability, and trust in the group and/or leader can inspire actors to endure long periods of discomfort and well as personal sacrifice.45 Consequently, the rationale of particular causes can inspire a greater will to fight. Table 2 outlines the basic tenets for causation analysis.

Table 2. Assessing the cause of resistance

Causes

Components

Qualifiers

The collectively expressed rationales for resistance and the individual motivations for participation.

Rationale

The rationale for resistance consists of either a desire for sweeping change in authority or society or specified changes for individual groups or communities.

 Identify and restate the prevailing rationale of the resistance, including ends, ways, and means used to attain success. Use this rationale when analyzing its power of motivating the core values of a population below.

Motivations

What motivations are used by the resistance to recruit and maintain its supporters through sacrifice and difficulty?

 Does the stated rationale of the movement identify with sacred values in the population? If so, what percentage of the population identifies with those values? Remember, 15 percent or more could prove decisive.

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

Environment

One analogy that highlights the environment’s relationships with resilience and resistance is that the environment represents the chessboard on which the king, rook, bishop, queen, knight, and pawn compete. Assessing the environment’s influence or constraints on both resilience and resistance activities requires an interdisciplinary approach but should include at a minimum an evaluation of environmental, governmental, sociopolitical, technological, and relationship factors.

The environment consists of geographic limitations such as maritime boundaries, mountainous terrain, urban terrain, and space and cyberspace. One could describe the environment in terms of domains—land, maritime, air, space, and the information environment—such as those articulated in military doctrine.46 Governance represents the current rule of law, or lack thereof, as a system of control of the nation state. For instance, in Western nations, the accepted rule of law can facilitate nonviolent action, wherein opposition to an authoritarian regime may require more secrecy or violence to implement. There are five prevalent forms of government: monarchy, democracy, oligarchy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism.47

In addition to governance, every society has socioeconomic factors that determine accepted norms. Challenging these norms or accepting them will affect the ways in which resistance activities take place. Further, a society’s access to technology provides various means to communicate with or influence these norms, and also provides platforms for nonviolent or violent action.48 As one example, communicating with a resistance group in North Korea may require primarily face-to-face interaction, whereas Joshua Wong’s resistance in Hong Kong relied on web-based platforms.49 Finally, resistance takes place in human terrain, in addition to the domains listed previously, and “preexisting and emerging relationships among individuals, organizations,” and social groups have proven fundamental to how resiliency and resistance interact with one another.50 Table 3 outlines the basic tenets for environmental analysis.

Table 3. Environment in which resistance takes place

Environment

Components

Qualifiers

The preexisting and emerging conditions within political, social, physical, or interpersonal contexts that enable or constrain the mobilization of resistance, directly or indirectly.

Domains

Land, maritime, air, and space domains and the information environment

 Explain how the land, maritime, air, and space domains, as well as the information environment, provide opportunities or constraints for this particular movement.

Governance

What type of governance exists in the state?

 Assess the rule of law in the state as best catagorized as a monarchy, a democracy, an oligarchy, authoritarianism, or totalitarianism. What are the secondary effects of that governance structure on resistance?

Sociopolitical aspects

Full time members and part-time supporters

 Evaluate the loyalty, enthusiasm, and popularity of the cadre in the inner circle as well as other casual supporters within the organization. What is the potential of their commitment that could effect the outcomes of the movement?

Technology

Technological capabilities of the society

 Describe the communication platforms dominant in the society as well as access to smartphones and the internet. Will any platforms enable clandestine means of communication? What is the capacity of authorities to monitor and detect resistance? What commercial off-the-shelf platforms might support resistance activities (e.g., radios, medical supplies, or UAVs)?

Relationships

Preexisting or emerging relationships

 Describe any ongoing relationships between members of the resistance or the organization itself with other influencers inside the state or internationally. What potential could these relationships have on the success of the movement?

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.   

Organization

One study completed by John Hopkins University generally categorizes resistance organizations into two bins: mass organization and elite organizations. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Mass organizations have few bars to entry for recruiting, taking advantage of size to compete with authority. These can be excellent archetypes for forms of nonviolent protest, such as social movements or unions, or as a belligerent organization in a civil war. However, mass organizations are difficult to train and control, are easier for authorities to infiltrate, and contain members who can prove undisciplined. In contrast, elite organizations take advantage of extensive vetting, selective recruiting, superior training, and a high degree of motivation. These types of movements are normally secretive, operating with undergrounds or, when overt, maintaining covert or clandestine activities. An elite organization can influence mass organizations and even hijack or control their behaviors. Elite organizations designed to blossom into a mass organization given the right circumstances are called elite-fronts; these include traditional communist parties.51

Resistance movements can be suborganized in a myriad of ways. In most military doctrines, these can include an underground, an armed component, an auxiliary, and a public component.52 However, nonviolent resistance organizations might forego the need for an underground and an armed component, opting for an overt organization without violent means. Consequently, resistance movements may contain all or some of the four components listed. Each component can be described in terms of who comprises its membership, what types of policies guide the members, the structure of each component (e.g., a cellular or hierarchal organization), and the prevailing culture, values, and motivations guiding each. Table 4 outlines the basic tenets for organizational analysis.

Table 4. Organizational structure of resistance

Organization

Components

Qualifiers

The internal characteristics of a movement; its membership, policies, structures, and culture.

Org.anization type

Mass organization or elite organization

 Does this organization require large numbers to oppose authority, or does it require secrecy to maintain a small elite group? Describe how and why the organization operates and the advantages and disadvantages of that choice.

Resistance components

Underground, armed component, auxiliary, and public component

 How many of the above components does this resistance movement have? Describe each of the above components in terms of membership, policies, structures, and culture.

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

Actions

Much of the discussion of ways, or actions, of varying types of resistance movements has been discussed previously in this article. These ways help define movement along the resistance continuum. The methods of action typical to a particular resistance should be restated in the formal assessment (i.e., nonviolent protest, assassination, etc.). Additionally, methods of fundraising and equipping should be analyzed. Procurement can consist of the legal market, the black market, battlefield recovery, theft, taxes (or fundraising), manufacturing raids, and external partners outside of the state.53 One should determine if the movement uses self-procurement for most needs, or if it relies primarily on external sponsorship. Table 5 outlines the basic tenets for actions or ways analysis.

Table 5. Actions carried out by resistance

Actions

Components

Qualifiers

The means by which actors carry out resistance as they engage in behaviors and activities in opposition to a resisted structure. This can encompass both the specific tactics used by a resistance movement and the broader characteristics or repertoires for action (i.e., strategy).

Ways of resistance

The resistance continuum consists of nonviolent legal, nonviolent illegal, rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency.

 Qualify the ways used for resistance in terms of nonviolent protest, illegal protest, rebellious lethal activities, insurgency, or belligerency. Provide examples.

Funding and procurement

Which methods does the resistance use to sustain its activities?

Of these methods, which are use by the resistance: legal market, black market, battlefield recovery, theft, taxes (or fundraising), manufacturing raids, and external partners?

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

In summation, this article recommends assessing resistance organization with the typology of five central components: actors, causes, environment, organization, and actions.54 An assessment of a resistance might be as short as five paragraphs, each one devoted to one of these subcomponents. As a given, such an assessment proves subjective. Quantifying aspects of this approach remains under further research and analysis.

Providing a Comprehensive Examination

The first three phases in a comprehensive analysis include the following: measuring the resiliency and resistance potential at the state level (as published previously in Small Wars and Insurgencies), identifying prevalent or influential resistance organizations within the state using the methods prescribed and categorizing them along the resistance continuum to classify their general nature; and assessing one or more of those resistance movements by taking a deeper look at their actors, causes, environment, organization, and actions (using the acronym ACEOA).55 The final phase includes subjectively assessing the information gathered to make recommendations concerning potential external support in another state’s intrastate conflict consisting of three primary options: to support a governing authority’s resilience, to support resistance to current governance or occupation, or to do nothing. At a minimum, the comprehensive analysis consists of the 12 steps shown in table 6.

Table 6. The 12-step resilience and resistance analysis process

Phase

Steps

One

1. Measure the state’s resiliency.

2. Identify the potential for a state-sponsored resistance strategy.

3. Measure the potential for external support to resiliency.

4. Measure the potential for resistance to current authority.

5. Measure the potential for external support to resistance.

Two

6. Identify the prevalent resistance groups within the state and place them on the resistance continuum.

Three

7. Assess one or more resistance groups in terms of leadership.

8. Assess one or more resistance groups in terms of cause.

9. Assess one or more resistance groups in terms of environment.

10. Assess one or more resistance groups in terms of organization.

11. Assess one or more resistance groups in terms of actions.

Four

12. Make a recommendation concerning potential external support to resiliency or resistance, which normally proposes one of three options: to support resiliency of current governance, to support resistance to it, or to do nothing.

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

Practical Application

For the sake of saving space, this article will forgo phase one (the RSSRS acronym and the methodology published previously in the Small Wars and Insurgencies journal, which frames the state’s operational environment in terms of resiliency and resistance).56 That means skipping steps 1–5 seen in table 6. It is, however, recommended to complete phase one prior to completing steps 6–12. This case study examines the People’s Republic of China, as it illustrates a substantial number of strong resistance organizations along the resistance continuum.

Phase Two: Identifying China’s Resistance Movements

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retains various powerful state means of control for curtailing protest and nonviolent action. Still, according to Harvard’s Mass Mobilization Protest Data information, 6 million people mobilized to protest in China between 1990 and 2020. While some groups mobilized in the hundreds, 18 events occurred with hundreds of thousands of people. Most of these large protests occurred in Hong Kong, with an estimated 5.4 million people mobilized between 1997 and 2020.57 Of the multiple organizations, the pan-democracy camp, made up of multiple political parties in Hong Kong, represents the most influential group. The CCP has charged the young and popular Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong, leader of the student activist group Scholarism, multiple times for subversion, and he has served time in prison. The political party formed by Wong in 2016, Demosisto, was disbanded in 2020. Another important nonviolent action party in China consists of Tibetan monks, who have maintained various forms of protest against the CCP since the Chinese People’s Liberation Army occupied Tibet in 1950.58 The spiritual ruler of Tibet, the Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, maintains essentially a government in exile in Dharamsala, India. Since 2009, 131 Tibetan men and 28 Tibetan women have conducted public self-immolation as an act of protest to the CCP’s infringement on civil rights, particularly religious freedom. Another religious group under CCP repression, and thereby illegal, is Falun Gong. In 1999–2000, at least 14,000 members of Falun Gong protested in 10 marches to oppose the CCP’s policies, primarily in the capital of Beijing.59 Finally, labor protests and strikes remain frequent in China but are generally sporadic, grassroots, and unorganized.

Nonviolent protests under the CCP’s authoritarian regime have not gone well so far. Harvard’s NAVCO project lists three major protest campaigns since 1989: the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing in 1989, the Kirti Monastery protests in Tibet in 2012, and the prodemocracy protests (or Umbrella Movement) in Hong Kong in 2014–19.60 NAVCO evaluated all of these as failures. After review, identifiable nonviolent legal protest groups in China include the pan-democracy camp, while nonviolent illegal protest groups include an active underground and public component of remaining members of the Tiananmen Square protests, an active underground (possibly in the millions) and public component of Falun Gong, and both an underground and public component of Tibetan Buddhist monks.61

In western China, conflict with Islamic groups abounds, particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. According to Uppsala University’s UCDP, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is aligned with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and has established base camps in Afghanistan and Syria during the past two decades. ETIM violence in Xinjiang is associated with 65 deaths since 1990. The Muslim majority of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang remains opposed to the CCP’s Sinicization policies and Han immigration. UCDP categorizes their activities as “organized violence,” with more than 25 battle-related deaths in 2009.62 Of the 11 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the CCP has imprisoned 1 million “in reeducation camps” since 2017.63 The most recent significant protest in 2023 includes more than 1,000 Muslims in China’s Yunnan Province protesting Communist dictates on Islam, but this did not include violence.64 One could surmise that the CCP has committed to programs that equate to cultural genocide against Islam in Xinjiang. In terms of violent resistance, one could categorize the ETIM as an insurgency and the seemingly unorganized (at least currently) Muslim Uyghur activities as rebellion.

The largest and most significant resistance movement against China is the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The ROC has been in a state of conflict with Communist China since 1927. In 1949, Communist China gained control of the mainland and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the ROC relocated to Taiwan. The United Nations recognized the ROC as the legitimate Chinese government until 1971. However, only 13 sovereign states today continue to recognize the ROC as a legitimate government.65 Both the ROC and PRC recognize a “One China” policy, but both claim legitimacy over it. Based on the resilience and resistance methodology, the ROC should be categorized as a well-established belligerency. Figure 3 illustrates significant Chinese resistance movements across the resistance continuum.

Figure 3. Diagram of China’s resistance continuum

Source: courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.

To complete a full analysis, one should employ the ACEOA acronym methodology to analyze other prevalent Chinese resistance movements, not simply the ROC. A comprehensive analysis allows an external sponsor to resilience or resistance in China to better evaluate threats and partnerships for instilling desired change. However, for the sake of brevity, this article simply uses the ROC as an example of assessing a resistance.

Phase Three: Assessing China’s Resistance Movements: The Republic of China

Actors

The ROC was formed by the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) political party in 1919. Its most influential leader has been Chiang Kai-shek, who formed an alliance with the United States and the British Empire during World War II. Following military and political defeats on mainland China from 1949 onward, the KMT generally retained power in Taiwan until the year 2000. Currently, the island is governed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with a nationalist approach led by President Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai is recognized internationally, but her engagements have been limited to developing nations, including Eswatini, Guatemala, Belize, Palau, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, and Paraguay.66 International engagement is essential for legitimacy, but the lack of involvement from middle or major world powers indicates a reluctance to advocate for Taiwan, which would certainly anger China. The United Nations also does not recognize Taiwan.67 Still, in the last Taiwanese elections, the DPP received nearly 7 million of the 12 million total votes, double that of the KMT.68 The DPP retains control over the presidency as well as the nation’s legislature.

The Taiwanese population’s opinion in favor of reunification with China is at record lows. A census in 2022 showed that 28.6 percent desired the status quo to last indefinitely; 25.2 percent wanted to move toward independence; 5.2 percent wanted the status quo to remain for now and to decide on reunification at a later date; and only 1.3 percent desired to reunify with China immediately. When asked about identity, 63.7 percent identified as Taiwanese; 30.4 percent identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese; and only 2.4 percent identified as Chinese.69 These numbers indicate significant favor toward continued support for the ROC and opposition to the PRC, but certainly not a unified opinion on the matter.

While most nations do not recognize the ROC as a sovereign state, many share economic and national security interests with the independent island. The United States dubs its own relationship as “unofficial.”70 Ironically, the PRC is the ROC’s largest trading partner, accounting for 25 percent of its total trade in 2021. Other major partners include Japan (10 percent), Hong Kong (8 percent), and South Korea (6 percent).71 The United States continues to sell weapons to the ROC—about $500 million recently—and also conducts freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait, despite vehement PRC protest.72 In the face of strong resistance, the PRC has successfully and doggedly attacked the legitimacy of the ROC during the past two decades. For example, the CCP lobbied the International Olympic Committee to remove the ROC flag and anthem from the Olympics; athletes from the ROC must compete under the “Chinese Taipei” designation.73 Ultimately, the ROC attempts to secure its legitimacy through international support, while the PRC consistently threatens and erodes its status.

Causes

At its heart, the rationale for the continued existence of the ROC remains a compelling countervision for Zhongguo (greater China) to that of the CCP—essentially a democratic and free China. Another lesser cause includes an independent ROC, recognized as a sovereign state and not part of the PRC. However, that vision interferes with the objectives of Zhongguo, and these two ideas compete with one another. For the CCP, both causes cause a great deal of angst. The official position of the DPP is “establishing the Republic of Taiwan as a sovereign, independent, and autonomous nation” (i.e., the lesser vision).74 Meanwhile, the KMT continues to support Taiwan as part of greater China and as the legitimate choice opposed to the CCP (i.e., the greater vision). Based on the latest polling data presented, about two-thirds of the Taiwanese population agrees with one or both causes, but there remains no consensus. With a population of 23.5 million, Taiwan represents less than 2 percent of the total 1.4 billion people in the PRC.75 Consequently, achieving the greater vision appears increasingly less likely, but achieving the lesser vision remains possible.

Environment

The environment in which the ROC persists has some distinct advantages and disadvantages. The islands of Taiwan are separated from mainland China by a maritime border of about 160 kilometers. However, the ROC remains entirely dependent on sea lines of communication. While the maritime domain facilitates a degree of security, the loss of sea control around Taiwan could potentially spell its demise. For similar reasons, control of the air domain around Taiwan remains critical for its safety. In terms of authority, the ROC remains a democracy. This form of governance starkly clashes with the authoritarian nature of the PRC and comprises a visible internal threat to the CCP. On Taiwan, nearly 90 percent of people polled oppose the attempts of the CCP to integrate the islands into the PRC, and 75 percent stated that they were willing to pick up arms and fight for their independence.76 This indicates serious support to resistance efforts led by the DPP. In terms of technology, the ROC has access to—and Taiwan even produces—some of the most advanced products.77 The expertise on Taiwan for employing technology in support of resistance has real potential, not only in terms of defense but for disruption of the CCP on mainland China. In terms of external support, the ROC continues to officially attract recognition from smaller states, most recently Lithuania.78 Moreover, the potential is great for other supporters, including the United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Support from the United States to legitimize the ROC is the lynchpin for a greater umbrella of nation states. A poll in August 2023 showed that 38 percent of Americans would support using the U.S. military to defend Taiwan.79

Organization

As is the case in most belligerencies, the ROC has all the trappings of statehood, including governance, rule of law, and a uniformed military. Its governance and leaders are veritably overt, without the need for an underground. The DPP is a mass organization, giving it legitimate weight. However, it is also easy to penetrate, and the threat of CCP infiltration into every major Taiwanese organization is very real and difficult to block. The military component of Taiwan, the ROC Armed Forces, consists of 169,000 active-duty uniformed personnel and 1.66 million reservists.80 In comparison, the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army consists of around 2 million regulars.81 The ROC spent $19 billion dollars on defense in 2023.82 In comparison, the CCP spent $200 billion.83 The ROC has 474 military aircraft.84 In comparison, the PLA wields 2,500.85 While the PRC has a substantial advantage over the ROC in terms of military power, the ROC has perhaps one of the most developed and capable armed components of resistance in the world. As far as an auxiliary, the ROC can leverage its entire economy to support resistance. Its greatest weakness is in food security; food self-sufficiency on Taiwan was 31 percent in 2021.86 Other important commodities, such as petroleum, ammunition, medical supplies, and equipment, all require the use of the air or sea domains for delivery. In so far as a public component, the DPP maintains an active campaign plan for legitimizing Taiwan as a nation state. Major Taiwanese influencers include nonprofit organizations such as Keep Taiwan Free, public organizations such as the Taiwanese American Council of Greater New York, and artists groups such as Shen Yun Performing Arts.87 In sum, the DPP wields a comprehensive resistance organization, and should armed conflict reinitiate with the PRC, the ROC has potential for increased international support.

Actions

The DPP pursues its aims of maintaining an independent state on Taiwan through international engagement, military defense, and economic prosperity. The last major battles between the ROC and PRC occurred during the Taiwan Straits Crises in 1954–55 and 1958, although artillery barrages continued through the early 1970s.88 From the time the PRC achieved legitimacy from the United Nations in 1971, hostilities have consisted mostly of provocative actions, such as violating air or sea space, rather than outright violence. While the ROC continues its military buildup and modernization, it has simultaneously embarked on a campaign for international recognition. For instance, the ROC “attended the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer from 2009 to 2016 and it attended the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Assembly in 2013.”89 Generally, the DPP lost some international recognition between 2000 and 2016, but the recent U.S. National Security Strategy in 2022, which lists the PRC as a threat to the international order, will likely create new opportunities for President Tsai to find support.90 To fund its resistance and independence, Taiwan has developed a robust economy and designed the production of technological goods that integrate into global supply chains. It is rated as the sixteenth largest world exporter in the world with gross domestic product of $33 billion in 2021, commensurate with Poland or Sweden.91 Considering these facts, one should surmise that the DPP represents a well-established belligerency to the rule of the CCP, as it seeks international recognition of its own legitimacy to rule over the islands of Taiwan, and it does so through international engagement, military defense, and economic prosperity.

Through the lens of the prescribed resistance identification methodology, this article has uncovered seven resistance organizations to the CCP, which it divides along the resistance continuum ranging from nonviolent protest to belligerency. These movements include the pan-democracy camp in Hong Kong, Tiananmen Square protesters, Falun Gong, Tibetan monks, Muslim Uyghurs, the ETIM, and the ROC. Following this identification, the article has evaluated Taiwan to provide meaningful analysis to one of China’s resistance organizations, the ROC, regarded as a belligerency. However, an assessment should be used for each major resistance organization, in addition to the ROC, for a comprehensive study.

Phase Four: Strategic Options in Support of Resilience or Resistance

To provide adequate analysis and a recommendation in support of foreign policy options for an external sponsor, this entire 12-step process should be used to illustrate a wholistic overview of a nation state in terms of resilience and resistance potential (steps 1–5), a deeper understanding of each major resistance organization (steps 6–11), and recommendations for action (step 12). The typical suggestion for action proposes one of three options: to support resilience of the current governing authority, to support resistance to it, or to do nothing. A full proposal should also consider the underlying factors of resistance movements that have given space for adversaries to operate; how to counter the frames and narratives of the adversary, either an external actor, a state authority, or the resistance; consideration of timings for various aspects of the response; measures of effectiveness; and risk assessment and mitigation.

Support Resilience

Supporting resilience in a partner nation state could involve numerous supporting packages that address the sources of instability within a state or even external threats to sovereignty. In the short term, this might include countering the objectives and means of each of the major resistance movements or their external sponsors, while long-term stability requires addressing the root grievances of the population—essentially subverting resistance. Several U.S. government publications help outline these approaches, such as the Department of State’s Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas and the Department of Defense’s Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-22; Stability, JP 3-07; and Security Cooperation, JP 3-20.92 The Resistance Operating Concept, published by Joint Special Operations University Press, articulates one type of irregular strategy.93

Support Resistance

Proposals to support a particular resistance movement, or several of them, should begin with an interagency feasibility assessment. A resistance movement should have compatible goals with those of the sponsor and behave within acceptable norms of behavior. In terms of nonviolent struggle, the doctrine developed by Gene Sharp could prove a useful approach to advocate.94 If the external sponsor desires to include military support to an indigenous insurgency or to the armed component of an occupied state, the U.S. Army’s Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level, Army Techniques Publication 3-05.1, provides the best guide.95

Do Nothing

Doing nothing should be the result of a conscious choice following a full evaluation of the options. In many cases, the direct involvement of an external sponsor in intrastate conflict might be regarded with a low likelihood of achieving the desired results. Simultaneously, finding an appropriate partner for resilience or resistance might not be possible. Additionally, overt support has foreign policy considerations, and covert support has risks to the same.

Conclusion

This article argues for a human-centric approach to conflict versus a conventional military analysis and indicates multiple options for either countering or supporting resistance movements to align with foreign policy objectives. This approach makes obvious that external support to resilience or resistance across diplomatic, information, military, and economic lines of effort offer substantial opportunities in shaping international relations, sometimes with irregular methods. By using the entire process, analysts can provide assessments to military leaders and policy makers that better recognize partners and adversaries and provide options to support a partner’s resilience or to support resistance(s) to inspire changes in an adversary’s behavior.

In terms of a case study, this article explores China—both the CCP and opposing domestic resistance movements—and offers an analysis regarding resilience and resistance typologies. The result comprises human-centric insights not currently present in either conventional war plans or foreign policy documents. Using publicly available datasets, it identifies seven prevalent resistance movements in China and aligns them according to their typology along the resistance continuum. Subsequently, it conducts a deeper analysis into one of those resistance movements—the ROC. By employing the prescribed approach to create this assessment, irregular methods for competition and conflict with China can be gleaned and leveraged to reinforce national policy objectives—either to support the CCP’s resiliency, to subvert the CCP’s legitimacy by supporting a resistance movement, or to do nothing. Conducting this type of analysis can assist military planners, foreign policy officers, and aid organizations to inform policies, campaign design, and diplomacy.

Practitioners can operationalize the resilience and resistance model and the resistance continuum to identify the most appropriate partner and subsequent complimentary support packages in intrastate conflicts. Each resistance movement is best countered or supported by unique methods. For instance, providing lethal force to a resilience or resistance partner is not always the best method of fomenting desired change. In contrast, the type of external support offered can also deliberately change the methods employed by a resistance and the nature of a conflict. Consequently, external partners can deliberately or incidentally change the nature of the intrastate conflict through the means delivered.

This research provides methodologies to complete a comprehensive analysis of resiliency and resistance for the purposes of influencing external support options for international policies. It recommends several methods to identify resistance movements by leveraging publicly available research from prominent scholastic institutions and then categorizing them by typology along the resistance continuum. After this, one might use the ACEOA methodology to subjectively provide a deeper understanding of one or more resistance organization(s). Finally, the scholar or practitioner must determine if external support to resilience or resistance comprises a viable strategy. Ultimately, such an irregular approach to address warfare, competition, and deterrence is long overdue. 

Dr. Robert S. Burrell is the academic program director for support to resilience and resistance studies at Joint Special Operations University at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3920-0939.

John Collison is a contractor with Huntington Ingalls Industries and works in J59 Concept Development and Integration (CD&I) at U.S. Special Operations Command.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.   

Endnotes

1. David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, “Redefining Irregular Warfare: Legitimacy, Coercion, and Power,” Modern Warfare Institute, 18 October 2022.
2. Josef Federman and Isaam Adwan, “Israel Strikes and Seals off Gaza after Incursion by Hamas, which Vows to Execute Hostages,” AP News, 9 October 2023.
3. Consortium to Study Irregular Warfare Act of 2021, H.R. 5130, 117th Cong. (2021).
4. Robert S. Burrell and John Collison, “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance,” Small Wars and Insurgencies (2023), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2292942.
5. For a description of irregular competition, see Robert S. Burrell, “How to Integrate Competition and Irregular Warfare,” Modern War Institute, 5 August 2021.
6. Gordon McCormick, The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1987). See also Burrell and Collison, “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance.”
7. The acronym DIME has been used for many years. See Donald M. Bishop, “DIME, not DiME: Time to Align the Instruments of U.S. Informational Power,” Strategy Bridge, 20 June 2018.
8. “UN Human Rights Committee Provides New Guidance on the Right of Peaceful Assembly,” United Nations, 15 December 2020.
9. “The Modern Civil Rights Movement and the Kennedy Administration,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed 18 April 2023.
10. Janell Hobson, “Harriet Tubman: A Legacy of Resistance,” Meridians 12, no. 2 (2014): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.2979/meridians.12.2.1.
11. Patrick H. Breen, The Land Shall Be Deluged in Blood: A New History of the Nat Turner Rebellion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
12. Brie Swenson Arnold, “ ‘To Inflame the Mind of the North’: Slavery Politics and the Sexualized Violence of Bleeding Kansas,” Kansas History 38, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 22–39.
13. Erin N. Hahn and W. Sam Lauber, Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2013).
14. Robert L. Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals (East Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004).
15. Kwabena P. Slaughter, “The Nonviolent Imagination: Trickster Gandhi Revisited,” Philosophy and Social Action 29, no. 3 (2003): 41–50.
16. Simon Stevens, “Violence, Political Strategy and the Turn to Guerrilla Warfare by the Congress Movement in South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 47, no. 6 (2021): 1011–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2021.1974224. Also see Thula Simpson, “Mandela’s Army: Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964,” Journal of Southern African Studies 45, no. 6 (2019): 1093–1110, https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2019.1688619.
17. Stephen Zunes, “Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World: A New Kind of Revolution,” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1994): 403, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599408420388.
18. Mark R. Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (August 2013): 574–92, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000294.
19. Colin Agur and Nicholas Frisch, “Digital Disobedience and the Limits of Persuasion: Social Media Activism in Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella Movement,” Social Media + Society 5, no. 1 (January–March 2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119827002.
20. Hahn and Lauber, Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance, 49.
21. Breen, The Land Shall Be Deluged in Blood.
22. See Zunes, “Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World.” See also Sahan Savas Karatasli, “The Twenty-First Century Revolutions and Internationalism: A World Historical Perspective,” Globalizations 16, no. 7 (2019): 985–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2019.1651525.
23. Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 24–35, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2011.0069.
24. Andrii Gladun, “Impact of Repression on Mobilization: The Case of the Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine,” Social Justice 46, no. 2/3 (2019): 29–50. See also Winter on Fire: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom, directed by Evgeny Afineevsky (Los Gatos, CA: Netflix, 2015).
25. Gjorjji Veljovski, “Terrorism or Insurgency?: The Most Common Strategic Fallacy,” Contemporary Macedonian Defense 20, no. 39 (2020): 107–19.
26. Ranbir Singh, “Insurgency and International Law and Its Legal Consequences,” National Law School of India Review, 18 June 2012.
27. Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).
28. Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Penguin, 2002).
29. Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “The Geopolitics of Major Power Interventions in Civil Wars,” Political Research Quarterly 75, no. 1 (2022): 20–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920976910.
30. Henry Clews, “Great Britain and the Confederacy,” North American Review 149, no. 393 (August 1889): 215–22.
31. Global Nonviolent Action Database, accessed 13 September 2023.
32. “Mapping Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO),” Harvard University Dataverse, accessed 13 September 2023.
33. “Mass Mobilization Protest Data,” Harvard University Dataverse, accessed 13 September 2023.
34. “Global Protest Tracker,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 13 September 2023.
35. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, accessed 13 September 2023.
36. “Uppsala Conflict Data Program,” Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed 13 September 2023.
37. As one example, the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) project offers both raw data as well as analysis on events around the world since 2013 and “monitors the world’s broadcast, print, and web news from nearly every corner of every country in over 100 languages and identifies the people, locations, organizations, themes, sources, emotions, counts, quotes, images and events driving” social change. With so much data, this website can become overwhelming, but it provides good resources for compiling a more comprehensive narrative. See GDELT Project, accessed 13 September 2023.
38. See David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, “Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor,” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 1 (March 2012): 217–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912912437162.
39. Jonathon B. Cosgrove and Erin N. Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2018). This excellent study remains worthy of a fuller examination than is offered here.
40. Cosgrove and Hahn use the definition in Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 19, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808654.
41. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 4–6.
42. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 7–16.
43. For more information, see Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (website); and M. Chris Mason, “COIN Doctrine is Wrong,” Parameters 51, no. 2 (2021): 19–34, https://doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3065.
44. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 17–24.
45. See Scott Atran, “The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures,” Current Anthropology 57, no. S13 (June 2016): 192–203, https://doi.org/10.1086/685495.
46. See Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication (JP) 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023).
47. For a brief explanation of these, see Sociology: Understanding and Changing the Social World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing, 2016), 515–19.
48. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 25–34.
49. See Dan Garrett, “Superheroes in Hong Kong’s Political Resistance: Icons, Images, and Opposition,” Political Science and Politics 47, no. 1 (January 2014): 112–19, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096513001637.
50. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 29.
51. Paul J. Tompkins Jr., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 10–12.
52. See Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021).
53. Tompkins, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, 75–87.
54. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 4–6.
55. Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 4–6.
56. Burrell and Collison, “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance.”
57. See “Mass Mobilization Protest Data.” 
58. “Tibetan Monks Protest Chinese Rule (Lhasa Protests), 2008,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, accessed 3 October 2023.
59. See “Mass Mobilization Protest Data.”
60. See “Mapping Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO).”
61. The CCP has issued arrest warrants for the 21 leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing. Many of these persons remain active and vocal in public resistance efforts. See Eddie Cheng, Standoff at Tiananmen: How Chinese Students Shocked the World with a Magnificent Movement for Democracy and Liberty that Ended in the Tragic Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 (blog), 28 November 2020. See also Sarah Cook, “Falun Gong: Religious Freedom in China,” Freedom House, 2017.
62. See “Uppsala Conflict Data Program.”
63. Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022.
64. See “Mapping Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO).”
65. See “Countries that Recognize Taiwan, 2023,” World Population Review, accessed 28 September 2023.
66. See “Steadfast Diplomacy: Foreign Visits,” Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan), accessed 3 October 2023.
67. Sigrid Winkler, “Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be,” Brookings, 20 June 2012.
68. Sean O’Connor and Ethan Meick, “Taiwan Opposition Party Wins Presidency and Legislative Majority in Historic Elections,” U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission Issue Brief, 28 January 2016.
69. John Feng, “Taiwan’s Desire for Unification with China Near Record Low as Tensions Rise,” Newsweek, 14 July 2022.
70. “Taiwan,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 3 October 2023.
71. “Taiwan: Country Commercial Guide,” International Trade Administration, 15 September 2022.
72. Matthew Lee, “U.S. Approves New $500M Arms Sale to Taiwan as Tension from China Intensifies,” AP News, 23 August 2023.
73. “Why Is Taiwan Not Called Taiwan at the Olympics?,” France 24, 27 July 2021.
74. “Party Platform,” Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan), accessed 4 October 2023.
75. See “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 4 October 2023.
76. “Growing Majority in Taiwan Reject the CCP’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and Oppose Beijing’s Military and Diplomatic Suppression,” Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), Press Release no. 94, 24 October 2019. See also “Special Report Taiwan: Cognitive Warfare,” Economist, 11 March 2023, 8.
77. For example, Taiwan is a world leader in producing microchip semiconductors. See “Special Report Taiwan: Chips with Everything,” Economist, 11 March 2023, 7.
78. See, “Special Report Taiwan: Help Wanted,” Economist, 11 March 2023, 10.
79. He Hong-ju and Chao Yen-hsiang, “Poll Shows 38% Americans Back Direct Military Intervention over Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan (CNA English News), accessed 4 October 2023.
80. Chad de Guzman, “Taiwan Is Extending Conscription. Here’s How Its Military Compares to Other Countries,” Time, 6 January 2023.
81. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), 7.
82. De Guzman, “Taiwan Is Extending Conscription.”
83. China Military Power, 21.
84. De Guzman, “Taiwan Is Extending Conscription.”
85. China Military Power, 83.
86. Hsing-Wei Lin and Wan-Yu Liu, “How to Enhance the Food Self-sufficiency Rate of Taiwan?: Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior to Decision Making for Food away from Home,” Journal of Agriculture and Food Research 12 (June 2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jafr.2023.100629.
87. Liu Tzu-hsuan, “Taiwanese in New York March for UN Inclusion,” Taipai Times, 19 September 2022; and Alberto Mingardi, “Shen Yun and Advocacy,” Econlib, 11 April 2023.
88. “The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958,” Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed 4 October 2023.
89. Jessica Drun, “Taiwan’s Engagement with the World: Evaluating Past Hurdles, Present Complications, and Future Prospects,” Atlantic Council, 20 December 2022.
90. See Joseph R. Biden Jr., National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2022).
91. “Economy,” Government Portal of the Republic of China (Taiwan), accessed 4 October 2023.
92. See Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas (Washington, DC: Department of State, USAID, Department of Defense, 2018); Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-22 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021); Stability, JP 3-07 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022); and Security Cooperation, JP 3-20 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022).
93. Otto C. Fiala, Resistance Operating Concept (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020).
94. See Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict.
95. Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level, ATP 3-05.1 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2021). 

2. Elections and Disinformation Are Colliding Like Never Before in 2024

We should ask ourselves- do we want to protect our democracy or do we want to fight against our own political enemies at home and in doing so create the conditions for our adversaries to successfully subvert the American political system and way of life? Who is the greater threat – our domestic political "other" or the Chinese, Russians, Iranians, and north Korea? If we think the former then we are at best useful idiots for the latter. Do we hate our opposition political parties in America more than we fear the revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary parties who seek to subvert and destroy the American political syste\m. Just asking - you decide.

Please go to the link to view the interactive graphics: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/09/business/media/election-disinformation-2024.html

Elections and Disinformation Are Colliding Like Never Before in 2024

By Tiffany Hsu, Stuart A. Thompson and Steven Lee Myers

Jan. 9, 2024

Updated 2:31 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · January 9, 2024

A wave of elections coincides with state influence operations, a surge of extremism, A.I. advances and a pullback in social media protections.

Jan. 9, 2024Updated 12:04 p.m. ET

Billions of people will vote in major elections this year — around half of the global population, by some estimates — in one of the largest and most consequential democratic exercises in living memory. The results will affect how the world is run for decades to come.

At the same time, false narratives and conspiracy theories have evolved into an increasingly global menace.

Baseless claims of election fraud have battered trust in democracy. Foreign influence campaigns regularly target polarizing domestic challenges. Artificial intelligence has supercharged disinformation efforts and distorted perceptions of reality. All while major social media companies have scaled back their safeguards and downsized election teams.

“Almost every democracy is under stress, independent of technology,” said Darrell M. West, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution think tank. “When you add disinformation on top of that, it just creates many opportunities for mischief.”

It is, he said, a “perfect storm of disinformation.”

The global calendar includes at least 83 elections, the largest concentration for at least the next 24 years, according to the consulting firm Anchor Change.

Those elections are spread around the world, including in Europe, where 27 member countries of the European Union will vote in its parliamentary election this June.

That amounts to more than four billion people, by some estimates.

Circles sized by voting-age population

January alone has at least seven elections. Taiwan, which is trying to ward off Chinese disinformation campaigns, votes for a new president on Jan. 13.

Pakistan and Indonesia — the most populous Muslim countries, which have both fought to balance freedom of speech with efforts to combat disinformation — hold elections a week apart in February.

In India, where the prime minister has warned about misleading A.I. content, general elections are scheduled for the spring.

Elections for the European Parliament will take place in June as the European Union continues to put into effect a new law meant to contain corrosive online content.

A presidential election in Mexico that same month could be affected by a feedback loop of false narratives from elsewhere in the Americas.

The United States, already in the thick of a presidential race marked by resurgent lies about voting fraud, goes to the polls in November.

National elections are also planned in places where democracy has struggled to take root. Russia and Ukraine, which both scheduled presidential elections, are issuing dueling narratives about their continuing war.

In Africa, one of the most critical elections on the continent will take place in South Africa, which has faced xenophobic disinformation campaigns in the past.

Note: Total population is shown for countries where the voting age population was not available. E.U. member countries are shown twice in cases where they have elections in more than one month. Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (voting age population); European Parliament (E.U. elections); Association of World Election Bodies (election dates); International Forum for Electoral Systems (election dates); American University (election dates).

The stakes are enormous.

Democracy, which spread globally after the end of the Cold War, faces mounting challenges worldwide — from mass migration to climate disruption, from economic inequities to war. The struggle in many countries to respond adequately to such tests has eroded confidence in liberal, pluralistic societies, opening the door to appeals from populists and strongman leaders.

Autocratic countries, led by Russia and China, have seized on the currents of political discontent to push narratives undermining democratic governance and leadership, often by sponsoring disinformation campaigns. If those efforts succeed, the elections could accelerate the recent rise in authoritarian-minded leaders.

Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s presidential candidate, waves to supporters at an election campaign event in Taipei this month. Taiwan, which is trying to ward off Chinese disinformation campaigns, votes for a new president on Jan. 13.Credit...Ann Wang/Reuters

Fyodor A. Lukyanov, an analyst who leads a Kremlin-aligned think tank in Moscow, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, argued recently that 2024 “could be the year when the West’s liberal elites lose control of the world order.”

The political establishment in many nations, as well as intergovernmental organizations like the Group of 20, appears poised for upheaval, said Katie Harbath, founder of the technology policy firm Anchor Change and formerly a public policy director at Facebook managing elections. Disinformation — spread via social media but also through print, radio, television and word of mouth — risks destabilizing the political process.

“We’re going to hit 2025 and the world is going to look very different,” she said.

Aggressive State Operatives

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf supporters gather at a rally in support of Prime Minister Imran Khan in Islamabad last year. The country will hold elections in February.Credit...Saiyna Bashir for The New York Times

Among the biggest sources of disinformation in elections campaigns are autocratic governments seeking to discredit democracy as a global model of governance.

Russia, China and Iran have all been cited in recent months by researchers and the U.S. government as likely to attempt influence operations to disrupt other countries’ elections, including this year’s U.S. presidential election. The countries see the coming year as “a real opportunity to embarrass us on the world stage, exploit social divisions and just undermine the democratic process,” said Brian Liston, an analyst at Recorded Future, a digital security company that recently reported on potential threats to American race.

The company also examined a Russian influence effort that Meta first identified last year, dubbed “Doppelgänger,” that seemed to impersonate international news organizations and created fake accounts to spread Russian propaganda in the United States and Europe. Doppelgänger appeared to have used widely available artificial intelligence tools to create news outlets dedicated to American politics, with names like Election Watch and My Pride.

Disinformation campaigns like this easily traverse borders.

Conspiracy theories — such as claims that the United States schemes with collaborators in various countries to engineer local power shifts or that it operates secret biological weapons factories in Ukraine — have sought to discredit American and European political and cultural influence around the world. They could appear in Urdu in Pakistan while also surfacing, with different characters and language, in Russia, shifting public opinion in those countries in favor of anti-West politicians.

The false narratives volleying around the world are often shared by diaspora communities or orchestrated by state-backed operatives. Experts predict that election fraud narratives will continue to evolve and reverberate, as they did in the United States and Brazil in 2022 and then in Argentina in 2023.

A Cycle of Polarization and Extremism

In India, where the prime minister has warned about misleading A.I. content, general elections are scheduled for the spring.Credit...Deepak Sharma/Associated Press

An increasingly polarized and combative political environment is breeding hate speech and misinformation, which pushes voters even further into silos. A motivated minority of extreme voices, aided by social media algorithms that reinforce users’ biases, is often drowning out a moderate majority.

“We are in the middle of redefining our societal norms about speech and how we hold people accountable for that speech, online and offline,” Ms. Harbath said. “There are a lot of different viewpoints on how to do that in this country, let alone around the globe.”

Some of the most extreme voices seek one another out on alternative social media platforms, like Telegram, BitChute and Truth Social. Calls to pre-emptively stop voter fraud — which historically is statistically insignificant — recently trended on such platforms, according to Pyrra, a company that monitors threats and misinformation.

The “prevalence and acceptance of these narratives is only gaining traction,” even directly influencing electoral policy and legislation, Pyrra found in a case study.

“These conspiracies are taking root amongst the political elite, who are using these narratives to win public favor while degrading the transparency, checks and balances of the very system they are meant to uphold,” the company’s researchers wrote.

A.I.’s Risk-Reward Proposition

Elections for the European Parliament will take place in June while the European Union puts in place a new law meant to contain corrosive online content.

Artificial intelligence “holds promise for democratic governance,” according to a report from the University of Chicago and Stanford University. Politically focused chatbots could inform constituents about key issues and better connect voters with elected officials.

The technology could also be a vector for disinformation. Fake A.I. images have already been used to spread conspiracy theories, such as the unfounded assertion that there is a global plot to replace white Europeans with nonwhite immigrants.

In October, Jocelyn Benson, Michigan’s secretary of state, wrote to Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York and the majority leader, saying that “A.I.-generated content may supercharge the believability of highly localized misinformation.”

“A handful of states — and particular precincts within those states — are likely to decide the presidency,” she said. “Those seeking to sway outcomes or sow chaos may enlist A.I. tools to mislead voters about wait times, closures or even violence at specific polling locations.”

Lawrence Norden, who runs the elections and government program at the Brennan Center for Justice, a public policy institute, added that A.I. could imitate large amounts of materials from election offices and spread them widely. Or, it could manufacture late-stage October surprises, like the audio with signs of A.I. intervention that was released during Slovakia’s tight election this fall.

“All of the things that have been threats to our democracy for some time are potentially made worse by A.I.,” Mr. Norden said while participating in an online panel in November. (During the event, organizers introduced an artificially manipulated version of Mr. Norden to underscore the technology’s abilities.)

Some experts worry that the mere presence of A.I. tools could weaken trust in information and enable political actors to dismiss real content. Others said fears, for now, are overblown. Artificial intelligence is “just one of many threats,” said James M. Lindsay, senior vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

“I wouldn’t lose sight of all the old-fashioned ways of sowing misinformation or disinformation,” he said.

Big Tech Scales Back Protections

In countries with general elections planned for 2024, disinformation has become a major concern for a vast majority of people surveyed by UNESCO, the United Nation’s cultural organization. And yet efforts by social media companies to limit toxic content, which escalated after the American presidential election in 2016, have recently tapered off, if not reversed entirely.

Meta, YouTube and X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, downsized or reshaped the teams responsible for keeping dangerous or inaccurate material in check last year, according to a recent report by Free Press, an advocacy organization. Some are offering new features, like private one-way broadcasts, that are especially difficult to monitor.

The companies are starting the year with “little bandwidth, very little accountability in writing and billions of people around the world turning to these platforms for information” — not ideal for safeguarding democracy, said Nora Benavidez, the senior counsel at Free Press.

Newer platforms, such as TikTok, will very likely begin playing a larger role in political content. Substack, the newsletter start-up that last month said it would not ban Nazi symbols and extremist rhetoric from its platform, wants the 2024 voting season to be “the Substack Election.” Politicians are planning livestreamed events on Twitch, which is also hosting a debate between A.I.-generated versions of President Biden and former President Donald J. Trump.

Meta, which owns Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, said in a blog post in November that it was in a “strong position to protect the integrity of next year’s elections on our platforms.” (Last month, a company-appointed oversight board took issue with Meta’s automated tools and its handling of two videos related to the Israel-Hamas conflict.)

YouTube wrote last month that its “elections-focused teams have been working nonstop to make sure we have the right policies and systems in place.” The platform said this summer that it would stop removing false voter fraud narratives. (YouTube said it wanted voters to hear all sides of a debate, though it noted that “this isn’t a free pass to spread harmful misinformation or promote hateful rhetoric.”)

Such content proliferated on X after the billionaire Elon Musk took over in late 2022. Months later, Alexandra Popken left her role managing trust and safety for the platform. Many social media companies are leaning heavily on unreliable A.I.-powered content moderation tools, leaving stripped-down crews of humans in constant firefighting mode, said Ms. Popken, who later joined the content moderation company WebPurify.

“Election integrity is such a behemoth effort that you really need a proactive strategy, a lot of people and brains and war rooms,” she said.

Tiffany Hsu reports on misinformation and disinformation and its origins, movement and consequences. She has been a journalist for more than two decades. More about Tiffany Hsu

Stuart A. Thompson writes about how false and misleading information spreads online and how it affects people around the world. He focuses on misinformation, disinformation and other misleading content. More about Stuart A. Thompson

Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is also the author of “The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin.” More about Steven Lee Myers

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · January 9, 2024

3. How Ukraine Must Change If It Wants to Win

Excerpts:

None of these tasks is simple, and any of them could trip up larger, richer, and less embattled countries. Russia has a much larger population but has made a mess of mobilization, which it now does by stealth, forcing ethnic minorities and even foreigners with work visas into their army. European democracies have so far failed to rapidly ramp up domestic military production, even in the face of a growing, existential threat from Russia. The U.S., meanwhile, is incapable of any kind of decompression: Americans have hardly any debates that are calm, apolitical, and “focused on the objectives.” All of our conversations about Ukraine, just to take one relevant example, are now fully politicized: a part of the Republican Party is opposing aid to Ukraine simply because that harms Joe Biden.

But then, we don’t face the same stakes. Ukraine’s battle against Russia has always been a civilizational clash, between an open society and a closed one, a rule-of-law society and a dictatorship. Ukrainians are still betting that their version of democracy is not just more attractive than Russian autocracy but more effective. On the way out of Umerov’s office, I met some of his younger colleagues, who were joking about how confusing expressions like “institutional transformation” can sound to many Ukrainians, especially the older employees of the massive apparatus that is the Defense Ministry. But they weren’t suggesting that they won’t try to explain, or that they won’t eventually implement an institutional transformation and win the war. If they believe in Ukraine’s future, so should we.

How Ukraine Must Change If It Wants to Win

A beleaguered country needs more than volunteerism and chutzpah to protect its version of democracy.

By Anne Applebaum

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · January 9, 2024

This article was updated at 9:45 a.m. ET on January 9, 2024

On December 29, Russia launched the largest missile attack against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion. On January 2, another attack of the same magnitude hit schools, hospitals, and apartment blocks across Ukraine. Early yesterday morning—the day after Orthodox Christmas—the Russians hurled yet another missile barrage at Ukraine. Together, these attacks sent a message: Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in negotiations, cease-fires, or swapping land for peace. Although he cannot overwhelm Ukraine militarily, Putin now believes that he can keep up the pressure, destroy Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, wait for Ukraine’s allies to grow tired, goad the Ukrainian public into turning against the government, and then win by default.

Often, this new phase of fighting is described as a “war of attrition,” as if the only thing that will determine the outcome is the number of bullets. But although the number of bullets does matter, the war has an important narrative and psychological component too. Alongside the bombings, Kremlin officials are now telegraphing to everyone—to Western politicians and journalists, to Ukraine, to the Russian people—that they can absorb 300,000 casualties and massive equipment losses, that their country’s economy is thriving, that they are willing to devote half of the national budget to defense production indefinitely. At the same time, the Russians and their supporters in the United States and Europe describe Ukraine as corrupt, politically divided, and, above all, certain to lose. In Washington, some Republicans justify their (so far) successful attempt to block American aid to Ukraine by using this language. Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister who courts investment from Russia and China, does the same when blocking European aid.

From the June 2023 issue: The counteroffensive

Ukrainians know that negotiations with Russia are fruitless, and in any case not on offer. They also know that military loss still means the same thing that it meant when Russia invaded in February 2022: occupation, mass repression, concentration camps, and the end of an independent Ukraine. They also know that the Russians are much weaker than they claim. Their soldiers still stumble into traps; their commanders still seem to be improvising. The Russian public is tired of the war and of the falling living standards it has created. Nevertheless, to beat the Russians militarily and psychologically, to undermine the Russian propaganda repeated by Orbán and the MAGA right, to maintain their alliances and defend their territory until the Russians have had enough, they have to change.

Two years ago, in the weeks that followed the full-scale invasion, ordinary people pitched in to buy night-vision goggles, the managers of chic bistros mobilized to feed troops, men drove their children to the border and then went home to fight in the territorial army. Now the volunteerism, chutzpah, and wild energy that carried the army and the society forward for the past two years have to be transformed into systems, institutions, and rules. Ukraine needs not just the most enthusiastic army, but the best-managed. Ukraine needs not just clever engineers who build innovative sea drones, but the most modern defense industry in Europe, if not the world. Finally, Ukraine’s government needs to eliminate any remaining corruption and mismanagement—and convince its allies that it has done so as well.

I did not invent these recommendations. I heard them in Kyiv, late last month, from Rustem Umerov, Ukraine’s new defense minister.

To outsiders, Umerov might seem an odd choice for this job. Born in 1982 in Uzbekistan because Stalin had sent Umerov’s Crimean Tatar family into exile there in 1944, Umerov returned to Crimea with his parents only in 1991, when Ukraine became independent from Moscow’s control. When he was still very young, Umerov told me, he “understood how to be what is now known as a refugee.”

His memories of resettlement and his membership in Ukraine’s Muslim Tatar minority might have led him to feel excluded or alienated. Instead, he drew for me a clear line from his childhood experience of exile to his present role in defending Ukraine. From the time he was a student, he understood that the Tatars are only safe when Crimea is part of a democratic, tolerant Ukraine—but a democratic, tolerant Ukraine is only guaranteed if Ukraine is part of Europe. He was an advocate of Ukrainian membership in NATO and the European Union when that position wasn’t particularly popular. “We want to be a part of the civilized world,” Umerov now says, “part of the rule-of-law world … What Russia proposes is no rule of law, no development, aggression towards all their neighbors.”

Following the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, when many Tatars were expelled from their homes once again, Umerov became an advocate for Crimean political prisoners, directly negotiating for their release. Starting in February 2022, he served again several times as one of Ukraine’s intermediaries with Russia, as well as with Turkey and the Gulf States, both formally and informally.

Along the way, he obtained a reputation for competence. When I asked others about him in Kyiv, they mentioned the languages he speaks (which include Turkish as well as English, Russian and Ukrainian) as well as his wide range of contacts, lack of pretension, and absence of drama. I met him in the same featureless conference room where I had previously met his predecessor, Oleksiy Reznikov, a personable lawyer who forged good relationships with his foreign counterparts but retired amid a series of news stories about Defense Ministry corruption. Reznikov was not personally implicated: Since 2022, in fact, there has been no suggestion of misused foreign aid or of high-level corruption in the Ukrainian army. But there has been overcharging and waste, just like in the U.S. military—the difference being that if the Ukrainian army has a shortage of winter uniforms because someone has written a bad contract, people might die.

Ending both the reality and the impression of sloppiness is now Umerov’s second-most important task. It’s also part of a larger problem, he told me. Ukraine needs everything, all the time: artillery rounds, winter shoes, F-16s. Prioritizing the army’s needs, translating that into concrete purchases and coordinating with both Western companies and Ukraine’s growing defense industry is a complicated managerial problem that needs more than one solution. Umerov mentioned several, including the creation of 10-year contracts that will help both domestic and foreign companies plan long term, and investment conferences designed to encourage Western companies to cooperate directly with Ukraine. When talking about these changes, he makes frequent reference to “OECD rules” and “NATO standards.” He also talks about “systems” and “transparency.” These are not buzzwords. Ukraine’s continued existence depends on making them mean something real.

Read: Can Ukraine clean up its defense industry fast enough?

Umerov’s more important task—Ukraine’s most important task—involves people, not shoes and bullets. Ukraine needs to recruit and train more soldiers, as well as to give veterans a rest from combat. Fear and paranoia about military service are growing; there are reports of people being pressed into the army and of others trying to sneak across borders and swim across rivers in order to dodge mobilization. Umerov understands this, again, both as a narrative problem and a real one. He wants to change the tone of the conversation: “This is not a punishment,” he says of military service. “It’s an honor.” But everyone is afraid of the unknown, he told me, and right now military service involves a lot of unknowns. “People should understand how they will be trained, how they will be fed, how they will be taken care of during the operation. And then how they will exit.” The details are still a matter of debate, but he wants to end the uncertainty, negotiate new rules with the military and with Parliament, create a national military-service database and then give all military-age citizens a clear set of options.

For Ukraine to weather Russia’s narrative war, Umerov also thinks that the Ukrainian political debate needs a “decompression.” The purported rivalry between the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and the chief of the army, Valery Zaluzhny, has had a lot of airtime in the Ukrainian media. Umerov is widely thought to be one of the people who bring the two men together. When I asked him about the friction between them, he replied that he just wants these discussions to become less exciting: “It’s also normal, you know, for there to be disagreements between people. I mean, okay, there’s general unity, everybody wants to win the war, but there can be different opinions.” Instead of politicizing disagreements or making a fetish of them, “we should be focused on the objectives, strategic objectives, military objectives.”

None of these tasks is simple, and any of them could trip up larger, richer, and less embattled countries. Russia has a much larger population but has made a mess of mobilization, which it now does by stealth, forcing ethnic minorities and even foreigners with work visas into their army. European democracies have so far failed to rapidly ramp up domestic military production, even in the face of a growing, existential threat from Russia. The U.S., meanwhile, is incapable of any kind of decompression: Americans have hardly any debates that are calm, apolitical, and “focused on the objectives.” All of our conversations about Ukraine, just to take one relevant example, are now fully politicized: a part of the Republican Party is opposing aid to Ukraine simply because that harms Joe Biden.

But then, we don’t face the same stakes. Ukraine’s battle against Russia has always been a civilizational clash, between an open society and a closed one, a rule-of-law society and a dictatorship. Ukrainians are still betting that their version of democracy is not just more attractive than Russian autocracy but more effective. On the way out of Umerov’s office, I met some of his younger colleagues, who were joking about how confusing expressions like “institutional transformation” can sound to many Ukrainians, especially the older employees of the massive apparatus that is the Defense Ministry. But they weren’t suggesting that they won’t try to explain, or that they won’t eventually implement an institutional transformation and win the war. If they believe in Ukraine’s future, so should we.

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · January 9, 2024

4. US and Allies Met Secretly With Ukraine on Peace Plan

Excerpts:

The previously undisclosed Dec. 16 meeting of national security advisers was held in Saudi Arabia and followed larger, publicized gatherings aimed at countering Moscow’s attempts to divide and paint Ukraine and its allies as unwilling to negotiate an end to the war.

The secrecy was aimed in part at making participant countries feel more comfortable about joining. The smaller format allowed for a freer, more frank discussion on Ukraine’s so-called peace formula and plans for moving that process forward as well as principles for potentially engaging with Russia in future, the people said.

US and Allies Met Secretly With Ukraine on Peace Plan

• Russia wasn’t invited to meeting in Riyadh and China didn’t go
• Allied efforts to win support for Kyiv’s approach sputtering
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-09/ukraine-and-allies-secret-riyadh-meeting-tried-to-rally-support-for-peace-talks?sref=hhjZtX76

By Alberto Nardelli, Samy Adghirni, and Jennifer Jacobs

January 9, 2024 at 6:06 AM EST

A secret meeting took place last month between Ukraine, its Group of Seven allies and a small group of Global South countries to try to rally support for Kyiv’s conditions for holding peace talks with Russia, according to people familiar with the matter.

The previously undisclosed Dec. 16 meeting of national security advisers was held in Saudi Arabia and followed larger, publicized gatherings aimed at countering Moscow’s attempts to divide and paint Ukraine and its allies as unwilling to negotiate an end to the war.

The secrecy was aimed in part at making participant countries feel more comfortable about joining. The smaller format allowed for a freer, more frank discussion on Ukraine’s so-called peace formula and plans for moving that process forward as well as principles for potentially engaging with Russia in future, the people said.

A missile launched from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkiv, Ukraine on Jan. 7.Photographer: Vadym Bielikov/AFP/Getty Images

But the allied push has sputtered in recent months as Russia’s invasion heads toward its third year. In the US and the European Union, more than $100 billion in vital aid stalled in approval processes in Washington and Brussels, while Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year failed to deliver a major battlefield breakthrough.

Meanwhile, some EU states are falling short in fulfilling pledges they made to provide Kyiv with more weapons and artillery ammunition just as Ukraine is facing repeated waves of Russian missile attacks. The Israel-Hamas war has also fueled differences with the Global South.

Little Headway

There was no major progress at the latest meeting, held in Riyadh, according to people familiar with the session who asked for anonymity to discuss matters that aren’t public. Ukraine and its G-7 allies continued to resist calls from the Global South nations to engage directly with Russia, they said.

Moscow has denounced the allied efforts — to which Russia hasn’t been invited — as a farce.

While top officials from India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey joined the December meeting in Riyadh, other major Global South nations who had come to some of the previous larger sessions — notably China, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates — didn’t send their representatives, the people said.

Beijing is seen by many of the participating countries as key to influencing Moscow given close ties between the two. Brazil, which is presiding over this year’s Group of 20, contributed a written statement, the people said.

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Kyiv and its G-7 allies reaffirmed their view that a just peace needs to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goals hadn’t changed and he’s shown no sign of being serious about wanting substantive negotiations and has failed to respect past agreements. The allies made clear they will continue backing Ukraine, and the EU and the US said they were confident that the support packages would be agreed.

Read more about the peace formula meetings:Israel-Hamas War Overshadows Ukraine’s Overture to Global SouthUkraine Courts Global South as War in Black Sea FlaresG-7 Tells Global South Just Peace Requires Russia Leave Ukraine

Spokespeople for the White House National Security Council declined to comment. Both the Ukrainian and Saudi governments didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Next Steps

Ukraine and its allies have planned another meeting of the broader group in Switzerland next week ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos and invited more than 100 countries, the people said. Previous sessions were held in Copenhagen, Jeddah and Malta last year.

Kyiv wants to hold a leaders’ summit on the blueprint early this year and use that as a springboard to establish a plan based on a set of agreed principles as the basis for any future talks with Moscow.

Some nations believe a leader-level summit in the coming months is premature, while others want to immediately involve Russia in the process.

Putin visited Saudi Arabia for wide-ranging talks earlier in December, a rare foreign trip amid the international isolation his invasion has brought.

Putin Makes Rare Foreign Trip to Gulf With Oil, War in Focus

One person close to the Kremlin suggested at the end of last year that there have been some contacts, probing interest in a cease-fire deal, but didn’t provide any details. There’s been no confirmation of that and Ukraine and its allies suspect any such outreach is a disingenuous Kremlin ploy to undermine support for Kyiv and buy time.

Vladimir Putin in Riyadh on Dec. 6, 2023.Source: Getty Images

Putin has expressed willingness to end the conflict, but “only on our terms.” His conditions have included the removal of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government and a massive reduction in Ukraine’s defense capabilities.

“Peace will come when we achieve our goals,” Putin said at an end-of-year media event in December. “It means the denazification, demilitarization of Ukraine and its neutral status.”

A withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory is a core pillar of Ukraine’s peace formula. Other points include returning deported children and prisoners of war as well as ensuring food and energy security.

All participants in the Riyadh discussion acknowledged Ukraine’s right to defend itself and agreed on the need to uphold key United Nations principles — including respecting the territorial integrity of states — and international law, said the people.

— With assistance from Daryna Krasnolutska, Sam Dagher, and Matthew Martin

5. CNO Franchetti's Warfighting Priorities

CNO Franchetti's Warfighting Priorities - USNI News

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · January 9, 2024

The following is the Jan. 9, 2024 message to the U.S. from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti on her warfighting priorties.

AMERICA’S WARFIGHTING NAVY

Who We Are. We are the United States Navy, the most powerful navy in the world. We are the Sailors and Civilians who have answered our Nation’s call to service. We are Americans who embody character, competence, and dedication to our mission. Our identity is forged by the sea and we serve with honor, courage, and commitment.

What We Do. We are here to preserve the peace, respond in crisis, and win decisively in war. We operate far forward, around the world and around the clock, from the seabed to space, in cyberspace, and in the information environment to promote our Nation’s prosperity and security, deter aggression, and provide options to our nation’s leaders. We deliver power for peace, but are always postured and ready to fight and win as part of the Joint Force and alongside our Allies and partners.

Where We Are Going. The threats to our nation and our interests are real and growing. The strategic environment has changed; gone are the days of operating from a maritime sanctuary against competitors who cannot threaten us. The National Defense Strategy makes clear that we must defend our homeland, deter strategic attack, deter and be prepared to prevail in conflict against the People’s Republic of China, and meet the acute challenge of an aggressive Russia and other persistent threats. Our adversaries have designed their militaries to overcome our traditional sources of strength. We must move rapidly to stay ahead and continuously create warfighting advantages. We must think, act, and operate differently, leveraging wargaming and experimentation to integrate conventional capability with hybrid, unmanned, and disruptive technologies. Tomorrow’s battlefield will be incredibly challenging and complex. To win decisively in that environment, our Sailors must be the best warfighters in the world with the best systems, weapons, and platforms to ensure we can defeat our adversaries. We will put more players on the field-platforms that are ready with the right capabilities, weapons and sustainment, and people who are ready with the right skills, tools, training, and mindset.

Our Priorities. We will focus on Warfighting, Warfighters, and the Foundation that supports them.

Warfighting: Deliver Decisive Combat Power. We will view everything we do through a warfighting lens to ensure our Navy remains the world’s preeminent fighting force. We will prioritize the readiness and capabilities required to fight and win at sea, and the logistics and shore support required to keep our Navy fit to fight. We recognize that we will never fight alone. We will advance naval integration with the Marine Corps, and synchronize and align our warfighting efforts with the Joint Force. We will design and drive interoperability with our Allies and partners to deliver combined lethality. Warfighters: Strengthen the Navy Team. We will use the principles of mission command to empower leaders at all levels to operate in uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environments, ready to take initiative and bold action with confidence. We will build strong warfighting teams, recruiting and retaining talented people from across the rich fabric of America. We will provide world-class training and education to our Sailors and Civilians, honing their skills and giving them every opportunity to succeed. We will ensure our quality of service meets the highest standards, and we will look after our families and support networks, who enable us to accomplish our warfighting mission.

Foundation: Build Trust, Align Resources, Be Ready. We will earn and reinforce the trust and confidence of the American People every day. We will work with Congress to field and maintain the world’s most powerful Navy and the infrastructure that sustains it. We will team with industry and academia to solve our most pressing challenges. We will cooperate with the interagency to bolster integrated deterrence. We will align what we do ashore with the warfighting needs of our Fleet.

Our Charge. America is counting on us to deter aggression, defend our national security interests, and preserve our way of life. With the right tools, a winning mindset, and the highest levels of integrity, we will operate safely as a team to deliver warfighting excellence.

I am proud to serve alongside you. I thank you and your families for your continued commitment to ensuring we are always ready.

We have taken a fix and set our course. Together we will deliver the Navy the Nation Needs. The time is now to move with purpose and urgency: ALL AHEAD FLANK!

[signed]

Lisa M. Franchetti

Admiral, United States Navy

33rd Chief of Naval Operations

Related

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · January 9, 2024

6. Readout of 2024 U.S.-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks

I wonder how heated the discussions were.

Readout of 2024 U.S.-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks

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DOD Spokesperson Lt. Col. Martin Meiners provided the following readout:

Dr. Michael Chase, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Major General Song Yanchao, Deputy Director of the Central Military Commission Office for International Military Cooperation, at the Pentagon for the 17th U.S.-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks from January 8-9, 2024.

The two sides discussed U.S.-PRC defense relations, and Dr. Chase highlighted the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication in order to prevent competition from veering into conflict. He also discussed the importance of operational safety across the Indo-Pacific region; reaffirmed that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows; and underscored that the U.S. commitment to our allies in the Indo-Pacific and globally remains ironclad.

The two sides also discussed regional and global security issues. Dr. Chase underscored the importance of respect for high seas freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law in light of repeated PRC harassment against lawfully operating Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. He also discussed Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine and expressed concerns about recent provocations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Dr. Chase also reiterated that the United States remains committed to our longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and he reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Strait.

This week's talks follow President Biden's November 15, 2023 summit with PRC President Xi Jinping, as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr.'s call via video teleconference with his People's Liberation Army counterpart on December 21, 2023. The Department will continue to engage in active discussions with PRC counterparts about future engagements between defense and military officials at multiple levels.

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7. Kleptocrats in democracy’s clothing: Beijing and Moscow talk anti-corruption at the UN

Excerpts:

In dire need of an honest conversation

Adopting the popular and valuable language of Western liberal democracies by redefining terms like anti-corruption, human rights, democracy, and integrity — even when self-evidently disingenuous — provides China the cover to mimic the mechanisms of good governance while blunting efforts to hold authoritarian regimes accountable.

A BRI document titled “Achievements and Prospects of Belt and Road Integrity Building,” argues that “integrity is the moral ‘bottom line’ and the legal ‘red line’ for Belt and Road cooperation.” 

Later in the same document, we see why China’s notion of integrity lacks meaning: “We need to … respect the right to choose one’s own way of fighting corruption.”

In other words, no country can judge another country’s methods for fighting corruption, even if those methods achieve nothing at all.

To be clear, bashing a UN agency will not undo the ongoing whitewash of the global anti-corruption agenda. It is past time for governments to call out the double-speak. 

For the UNCAC to have real weight — and generate outcomes that are good enough for the local nightly news — it’s time for UNCAC signatories to hold themselves and each other accountable, starting with an honest conversation.

Euroviews. Kleptocrats in democracy’s clothing: Beijing and Moscow talk anti-corruption at the UN

By Elaine Dezenski

Published on 09/01/2024 - 13:37Share this article

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

https://www.euronews.com/2024/01/09/kleptocrats-in-democracys-clothing-beijing-and-moscow-talk-anti-corruption-at-the-un?utm

Redefining terms like anti-corruption, human rights, democracy, and integrity — even when self-evidently disingenuous — provides China the cover to mimic the mechanisms of good governance while blunting efforts to hold authoritarian regimes accountable, Elaine Dezenski writes.

Representatives from hundreds of countries assembled last month at a UN conference in Atlanta, Georgia, to talk about global efforts to combat corruption. 

While the event of more than 3,000 attendees hardly made the local news, it proved to be a brilliant opportunity for authoritarian regimes to muddle an issue that negatively affects the lives and livelihoods of billions of people.

Disingenuous objections by Azerbaijan were meant to limit the participation of anti-corruption activists, while representatives from China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia spoke about the importance of transparency and even denying safe havens for illicit financial flows.

There were entertaining moments — a Russian panel on anti-corruption devoted its entire hour to discussing the difficulty of choosing a winner of its 1990s-style youth contest for the best anti-corruption poster or video. 

China handed out “little red boxes” to the other panellists after a particularly bland discussion of how academics can assist anti-corruption efforts — a panel where the Russian moderator appeared to make an overt request for greater China “funding”. 

It all adds up to a worrying and much larger trend on full display — the democratisation of kleptocracy.

Beijing pats itself on the back

The highlight for authoritarian double-talk, however, was unquestionably China and its self-congratulatory presentation on integrity within its notoriously corrupt Belt and Road Initiative. 

It was a sixty-minute tour de force, touting the various “high-level principles” and the “firm stances” on integrity building without ever providing a single concrete action to practically address — or even admit to — the massive corruption scandals caused by China’s opaque disbursal of a trillion dollars in BRI spending.

Instead of action, the China panel pushed weak and non-credible platitudes: “Every construction project will be completed with integrity. Each penny of public funds will be well spent. Every corrupt person will be brought to justice.” 

Apparently, the Chinese Communist Party is now available to help the world unwind China’s bad behaviour over the last decade of the BRI.

Security officials walk with dogs in Tiananmen Square during the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, October 2023Suo Takekuma/AP

Apparently, the Chinese Communist Party is now available to help the world unwind China’s bad behaviour over the last decade of the BRI.

Beijing gave no support for its claims, though they did note that "an opinion poll shows that 97.4% of the Chinese people are satisfied with the progress in the fight against corruption." 

• An empire on its deathbed can still cause pain and suffering
• Should China’s rapid pace in the space race prompt concerns in Europe?

To bolster the claims of integrity in global BRI projects, public officials from Cambodia, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia shared the stage with the Chief Inspector from China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), who offered that the state-owned company "show[s] zero tolerance to acts such as corruption, fraud, and colluding," despite widespread allegations of corruption against CSCEC in BRI projects in Zambia, Guyana, Georgia, the Philippines, Pakistan, or Hungary.

The World Bank’s debarment of CSCEC in 2019 seems to stand alone as an appropriate and effective multi-lateral act of courage.

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The nonsense narrative deepened with the BRI Integrity panel keynote address of Ghada Waly, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN agency that oversees and safeguards the implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 

More than 180 countries have signed the convention, including China’s adoption of it in 2006. 

Waly, the UN’s top anti-corruption official, shared the stage with Chinese officials to announce that “the Belt and Road Initiative charts a road towards a more equitable and prosperous world for all.” 

While it is understandable that UN discussions reflect a level of diplomacy and respect, surely it is not impossible to speak the truth, or at least refrain from appearing oblivious to reality.

A motorcyclist drives past sheep on a newly built road in Haripur, Pakistan, December 2017AP Photo/Aqeel Ahmed

Given the astounding levels of corruption reported in BRI countries, Waly missed the opportunity to call out the BRI for what it has come to represent — a decade of questionable deals, large-scale corruption, vanity projects, opaque terms and conditions, and failing infrastructure, including in her home country of Egypt. 

While it is understandable that UN discussions reflect a level of diplomacy and respect, surely it is not impossible to speak the truth, or at least refrain from appearing oblivious to reality.

• Cash, corruption, crumbling dams — that's China's Belt and Road Initiative, 10 years in
• Italy is about to say to Beijing, 'Hit the road, Xi'

China’s integrity double-talk is, of course, part of a broader push to extend political and economic influence by bending the UN and other international bureaucracies toward more empty platitudes that allow China (and others) to continue its export their own set of deal terms, rules, norms, and standards around the world.

In dire need of an honest conversation

Adopting the popular and valuable language of Western liberal democracies by redefining terms like anti-corruption, human rights, democracy, and integrity — even when self-evidently disingenuous — provides China the cover to mimic the mechanisms of good governance while blunting efforts to hold authoritarian regimes accountable.

A BRI document titled “Achievements and Prospects of Belt and Road Integrity Building,” argues that “integrity is the moral ‘bottom line’ and the legal ‘red line’ for Belt and Road cooperation.” 

Later in the same document, we see why China’s notion of integrity lacks meaning: “We need to … respect the right to choose one’s own way of fighting corruption.”

In other words, no country can judge another country’s methods for fighting corruption, even if those methods achieve nothing at all.

To be clear, bashing a UN agency will not undo the ongoing whitewash of the global anti-corruption agenda. It is past time for governments to call out the double-speak. 

For the UNCAC to have real weight — and generate outcomes that are good enough for the local nightly news — it’s time for UNCAC signatories to hold themselves and each other accountable, starting with an honest conversation.

Elaine Dezenski is Senior Director and Head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

At Euronews, we believe all views matter. Contact us at view@euronews.com to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

8. Understanding AFSOC’s Adaptive Airborne Enterprise

Understanding AFSOC’s Adaptive Airborne Enterprise

afsoc.af.mil · January 5, 2024

• Published
• By Senior Airman Alexcia Givens
• 27th Special Operations Wing Public Affairs

CANNON AIR FORCE BASE, N.M. --

The 27th Special Operation Wing’s Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) community and industry partners completed several capability demonstrations throughout December 2023 as part of Air Force Special Operations Command’s Adaptive Airborne Enterprise (A2E) development.

As directed in the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, AFSOC has shifted its priority from Counter-Violent Extremist Organization operations to also being capable of countering near-peer and peer adversaries in contested or denied environments. A2E is a result of that shift, marking an evolution beyond using the MQ-9 exclusively for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and strike operations.

“Adaptive Airborne Enterprise is vital to thickening the Joint Force kill web throughout the spectrum of conflict and continues to be AFSOC’s #1 acquisition priority,” said Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind, AFSOC commander. “Our Air Commandos are incredibly innovative, capable, and driven…they are bringing A2E to life. We will continuously develop the concept to full capability through multiple demonstrations over the next few years.”

A2E is broken into five phases, with the first three phases currently underway.

In phase one, AFSOC aims to transition to a government-owned Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS) command and control interface, replacing the stationary RPA control system. The new A2E interface will shrink a traditional RPA crew’s deployed footprint and provide operators with the flexibility and mobility to fly various aircraft from austere locations – whether operating from the back of an AC-130, home station, or even urban environments.

“In the future, we’d like to take this from where we’ve fought in the past, a more permissive environment, to contested and denied spaces,” said U.S. Air Force Maj. Lindsay Scott, AFSOC Headquarters Rapid Capabilities Development Chief of Autonomous Capabilities. “Our goal is to ensure we are always bringing effects to the battle space.”

In phase two, AFSOC’s objective is creating the capability for a single crew to fly multiple MQ-9s. According to the director of the 27th Special Operations Group’s RPA Operations Center, U.S. Air Force Maj. Joshua Radford, AFSOC plans to evolve past the historical standard of one crew operating one aircraft, the status quo for MQ-9 operations.

“We’re moving towards a crew or a single operator controlling multiple aircraft,” Radford said. “And it doesn’t necessarily need to be the same platform.”

Phase three entails a single crew controlling multiple types of UASs, ranging from Group 1 small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) like the RQ-11B Raven, to larger Group 5 UASs like the MQ-9A Reaper.

In phase four, a single crew will control formations of UASs from mobile and austere locations, leading into the final phase: creating new effects-based ISR units. These units could be comprised of UASs, forward deployed ground forces, cyber operators and space operators that can collaboratively employ UAS capabilities in permissive, contested or denied environments.

The A2E demonstrations conducted in 2023 at Cannon AFB successfully validated many of the capabilities described in phases one through three. In June, the 27th SOW hosted Exercise Talon Spear, AFSOC’s first A2E sUAS collaboration exercise.

"The goal of Talon Spear was to build a continuous improvement exercise," said U.S. Air Force Capt. Mitch, the exercise coordinator assigned to the 27th SOG. "Throughout the exercise, several industry and DOD partners integrated various systems, to include weapon systems, specific cameras, onboard computer systems and tactical situational awareness tools.”

During December’s demonstrations, a single 27th SOW RPA crew successfully exhibited two novel capabilities: controlling three MQ-9s utilizing a single common control interface and attaching and air-launching a Group 2 sUAS from an MQ-9A. The next A2E demonstration is planned for Summer 2024.

As the MQ-9 and its crews acquire the capability to direct sUASs carrying standoff sensor payloads, crews will be able to control swarms of air vehicles from anywhere. Additionally, AFSOC aims to continue developing and procuring A2E-compatible platforms, allowing the MQ-9 to act as a “mothership” for sUAS and loitering munition command and control, as well as a data transport node for mesh networks.

These mesh networks, in concert with Artificial Intelligence technologies and an advanced Human Machine Interface, will allow AFSOC crews to operate multiple large and small UASs simultaneously, covering more terrain and prosecuting more targets in environments that are not currently accessible.

“We depend on our innovative Air Commandos and industry experts to develop, experiment and grow this concept,” said Bauernfeind. “AFSOC is committed to advancing this capability and we appreciate the support of our defense partners and decision makers in prioritizing this acquisition.”

By collaboratively pathfinding alongside defense industry partners and innovative Air Commandos, A2E will transform the current AFSOC MQ-9 enterprise into the robust UAS architecture required to deliver specialized airpower to current and future fights: any place, anytime, anywhere.

afsoc.af.mil · January 5, 2024

9. Ten Lessons from Ten Years in the Army: Advice for Junior Leaders

Some of this advice applies to more than junior officers. I wonder if I was this knowledgeable and self aware after 10 years in the Army. I am often intimidated when I meet young officers today because it seems to me they are much more competent and knowledgeable than I was at their time in service.

Ten Lessons from Ten Years in the Army: Advice for Junior Leaders - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brandon Morgan · January 9, 2024

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Touring the West Point campus under the drizzling, early-winter rain during my ten-year reunion, I was struck by the passage of time. It felt like yesterday that the class of 2013, shivering under spring showers, tossed our covers into the air in Michie Stadium, jubilantly anticipating our follow-on service throughout the world. And indeed, not long after that day I found myself leading an infantry platoon in Iraq. Then, before I knew it I was pinning captain, deploying to Europe, writing my first MWI article, commanding an infantry company, and making a leap into the foreign area officer career field. Ten years passed, all seemingly in the blink of an eye. As I transition from company-grade to field-grade officer, I would like to share some lessons I learned in those ten years to help current and future company-grade leaders find their versions of success and personal satisfaction throughout their careers as military professionals. I offer this from the perspective of officership but hope that these insights can broadly apply to service members of all stripes. From a decade of opportunities, successes, struggles, and camaraderie I offer ten pieces of advice.

1. Put first things first.

As a newly commissioned officer, it can be tempting to focus on future, highly selective opportunities ahead of the more mundane and immediate. As a young lieutenant, a member of my IBOLC (infantry basic officer leaders course) class eagerly asked an instructor what we needed to do as infantry officers to best set ourselves up for a career in Special Forces. “Triumph at IBOLC and graduate,” replied the instructor. His response, while not likely what most of us expected (or wanted) to hear, was exactly what we needed. It highlighted the fact that the gateway to special opportunities begins with excellence in the basics. If you are initially assigned to serve on staff before platoon leadership or company command, focus on being a great staff officer. You will benefit tremendously from understanding how your higher headquarters operates. You will build relationships of trust and respect with your commander and other experienced officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers who will be critical in supporting your future platoon or company’s success. Strive to be the best officer you can be where you are now and seize the next opportunity when it arrives.

2. Get your systems in order.

As a new platoon leader or company commander, there will be no shortage of events that seemingly require your immediate attention. Perhaps you arrive to your office determined to write your unit operation order for an upcoming training exercise. You turn on your computer and open last year’s order to use as a template—so far so good. Then emails begin trickling into your inbox. Motivated squad leaders stop by your office. Your cell phone is ringing—it’s the boss (again). Before you know it, it’s meeting time at the battalion. You look at your watch, the day’s hours are running out, and you haven’t changed a word from last year’s training order. Where did the day go?

Time management is one of the most challenging yet important skills for a new leader to develop. This is where developing a battle rhythm can help. This document provides a predictable series of operations, key meetings, and events tracked at daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies. Battle rhythms inform subordinate leaders of expectations during physical readiness training, command maintenance, training meetings, and other key events—to include dedicated time for troop-leading procedures and the military decision-making process. Leaders should ensure that important cyclical events of higher headquarters are reflected in their own battle rhythm so their unit actions are properly aligned. Of course, surprises occur and Murphy will always take his share of the day. However, establishing and enforcing a battle rhythm will help to create order from chaos and much-needed predictability for both you and your subordinate leaders.

3. Delegate and do your part.

Now that you’ve managed your time, how are you managing tasks? There are several techniques, but I believe that all leaders can benefit from the Eisenhower matrix. When a task arrives, ask yourself whether it is truly important, and if it requires urgency or not. This should clue you in to whether you should either immediately do the task yourself, plan to accomplish it, delegate it, or eliminate it entirely. For tasks that are important but not urgent, for example, once you’ve conducted your initial planning you can delegate it to a subordinate by giving clear guidance. As a commander, this approach enabled me to focus on items that centered on my duties. This included training week management, short- and long-range training calendar updates, troop-leading procedures, and corresponding with my higher headquarters. As a battalion assistant operations officer, this enabled me to complete essential planning efforts and liaise with both brigade and company elements. To be sure, there are many factors that shape how you will conduct task management, to include the experience, talent, and preferences of your subordinates. Adjust your approach as the mission and circumstances require, and you will be able to manage your tasks and not let your tasks manage you.

4. Have the hard conversation.

Another critical challenge for officers, especially new lieutenants, is assessing the competence and character of their noncommissioned officer counterparts. From my experience, the vast majority are outstanding leaders who are experts in their craft. Personally, I owe my success in platoon and company leadership time to these phenomenal soldiers. That said, over my ten years I’ve seen a small handful of peers who had difficult relationships with their noncommissioned officer counterparts due to issues of character or competence. The most important thing new officers can do in recognizing and alleviating this problem is to ensure that they are of high character and competence themselves. If you know what right looks like, it’s easier to spot it (or its absence) elsewhere. Secondly, seek out other senior noncommissioned officers and officers that you trust to discuss your observations and to receive professional feedback. Perhaps it’s just a personality clash that will ease over time. But perhaps it’s something more. While initiating the conversation can be particularly difficult, early, candid, and professional dialogue is key to salvaging success from potential disaster. You owe it to him or her, your soldiers, and yourself to ensure your unit is one of high competence and strong character.

5. Write about your thoughts and experiences.

“The palest ink is better than the best memory.” The Chinese proverb reminds us of the imperative behind writing down our experiences—for yourself and those that follow in your footsteps. Whether you just finished a tour in command or staff, your successor will be very grateful for your notes and reflections upon your experience. Where did you succeed? Where could you have improved? What surprised you? Who, or what, were the key resources to your success? Answering a few questions like these is a great way to provide helpful guideposts to your successors as they navigate the journey you just completed. Never doubt the value of your experience or the ability of your writing to positively affect other service members. With renewed senior Army leader emphasis and grassroot efforts such as the Harding Project, there has rarely been a better time to write for the profession. I have had the opportunity to write about my experiences as a staff officer, as a company commander, and as a liaison officer, and I hope those articles were as useful to others preparing for those roles as they were in helping me to identify and reflect on the lessons I learned during each.

6. Tackle your weaknesses.

I have a confession to make. Remember the infantry lieutenant too eager to join Special Forces? It was me. I was too focused on what kind of workout would best prepare me for Special Forces selection to be bothered with mastering the infantry basics. Sure, I graduated and knew how to brief an operation order—but I was still struggling to properly lead an infantry patrol. Don’t take my word for it, though. Ask the Ranger School commander who kicked me out of Darby Phase on my first attempt. It was a really rough day, but I had no time to feel sorry for myself. I had to figure out how to improve my patrolling competence and confidence—fast. I had one month before the next class and the stakes couldn’t have been higher. An officer from my follow-on unit informed me that no tab meant no platoon. And no platoon meant no deployment. I printed off all the ranger patrol cards, laminated them, and reviewed them everywhere I went for the next month. I mentally rehearsed my actions on contact, leader’s reconnaissance, and actions on the objective until I knew that I could pass all graded patrols in Ranger School. And thanks to those efforts in tackling my weaknesses (and thanks to my Ranger buddies), I passed—but I did it the hard way.

7. Take care of those who take care of you.

As a new army leader, you will likely find both challenges and opportunities spread across some good days, some tough ones, and everything in between. You may be surprised, though, at just how many people are invested in your success. From the soldiers in your platoon to your family at home, your peers, and senior officers, all have an interest in your professional success. Try finding out what they value and see if there’s any way you can give them a token of your appreciation. Perhaps your soldiers really value their time (who doesn’t?). When you anticipate a hard week of training, plan an appropriate period of down time once recovery operations are complete. Be sure to brief your boss at your training meeting. He or she will likely approve, commending your desire to reward hard work and your ability to forecast this in advance. Be sure to say thank you to the peers who got you out of a hot situation (on multiple occasions). Call home and thank the ones who are supporting you on this journey. Send them the photos you’ve been taking and you will likely make their day.

8. Foster a culture of cooperation.

I have one last confession. The company battle rhythm I previously mentioned wasn’t my idea. I adopted it from a fellow commander who was achieving great success through his organizational skills. In the initial weeks of my command, I was dousing daily (or hourly) fires while he was reserving land and ammunition months in advance. Touring his office one day, I noticed his battle rhythm product, and suddenly his organizational dominance all made sense. He deliberately set aside one afternoon a week to complete troop-leading procedures for the various operations his company was conducting. Knowing how much I could benefit from his system, I asked for his product and adjusted my processes accordingly—ultimately to the benefit of my soldiers and leaders.

Another peer had an excellent company maintenance system. From fault to fix, he had a detailed system for tracking broken vehicles, ordering parts, and ensuring their expedited repair. He invited me and my executive officer to observe his weekly maintenance meetings. From this opportunity we adjusted our processes, which resulted in greater predictability, more efficiency, and ultimately a higher level of operational readiness. And of course, I shared my own innovations as well.

Perhaps the most important takeaway is how much more effective and enjoyable it was to work in an environment of cooperation. Everyone had each other’s backs and was eager to help. Of course, we were always highly competitive (and sometimes cutthroat) when it came to certain events like battalion physical training competitions. But in terms of collective readiness, we were always willing to help out our peers to our left or right. Among company commanders, no one was unwilling to give out a product or share advice, afraid that a peer’s success would negatively affect his or her own evaluation. In a matter of just eighteen months, my brother and sister commanders became some of my best friends. As we each passed down our guidon, we were all able to celebrate a successful journey together as company-grade officers with amazing follow-on opportunities, the privilege to promote to field-grade ranks, and unforgettable memories together.

9. Have an open mind.

When one door closes, be ready to open all the others. You may be all the happier for the outcome. Personally, I was a bit disappointed that after my career course I was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley and not Fort Hood. I wasn’t too keen on the upcoming Atlantic Resolve deployment to Europe, and I definitely did not want to serve as a liaison in Lithuania away from the unit. And yet, I am infinitely grateful for each of those experiences. My time serving at the US embassy in Vilnius inspired me to compete for the foreign area officer program. My peers at Fort Riley became my best friends. I commanded an amazing company—filled with outstanding officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. Of course, one could suggest that I was incredibly lucky. I would agree. But I would also say that keeping an open mind and doing the best I could went a long way toward finding that luck. When one door closes, be ready and willing to open the other.

10. Take photos.

I saved perhaps the easiest recommendation for last. When training conditions permit, take as many photos as possible—especially with the friends you make along your Army journey. The only photos I regret are the ones I didn’t take. Each photo tells a unique story of soldiers, colleagues, and experiences of a lifetime. My favorite feature is to scroll across a map of the globe and review the incredible places my Army journey has taken me. Through infantry training and parachute jumps at Fort Liberty to Bradley operations at Fort Riley and deployed experiences around the world, the photos are a reminder of how lucky I am to have had such amazing experiences, and to have met the best friends in the world. I’m really looking forward to capturing photos of what the next few years will bring, and I hope you are too.

Captain Harrison (Brandon) Morgan is a US Army foreign area officer for the Middle East and North Africa. As an infantry officer, he served in command and staff roles overseas in Iraq, Lithuania, and the Republic of Korea. He also served as an MWI nonresident fellow between 2019–2020 and 2021–2022.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Staff Sgt. Scott Fletcher, US Army National Guard

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brandon Morgan · January 9, 2024

10. China makes preparations for a war that the Pentagon says is not inevitable

Ely Ratner versus Jim Fannell.

Excerpts:

Ely Ratner, assistant defense secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs, acknowledged at the hearing with Gen. McGee that China is waging a campaign of military, political and economic pressure against Taiwan.

Mr. Ratner said the risk of a U.S.-China war is minimal despite the warning signs. “We do not believe that conflict is imminent or inevitable because deterrence across the strait today is real and strong,” he said.

Retired Navy Capt. Jim Fanell, a former Pacific Fleet intelligence director, said taking over Taiwan is a key element of Mr. Xi’s strategy of national “great rejuvenation.”

Mr. Xi’s recent appointment of Dong Jun as defense minister makes him the first PLA senior officer with experience in joint command and control over such an operation.

Conquering Taiwan “would appear to be a ‘capstone’ event for Xi, culminating three years of intense effort to prepare the PLA for such an operation.”

China prefers to take over Taiwan peacefully, but “the indicators are that they are prepared to execute an invasion,” Capt. Fanell said.

Presidential elections in the United States and Taiwan are likely to be critical factors influencing Chinese calculations on the timing of an invasion.

If the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party retains its hold on Taiwan’s presidential office and Donald Trump is returned to the White House, “then it seems increasingly likely that Xi will see his window of opportunity to take Taiwan closing sometime in early 2025,” he said.

A Biden reelection might forestall a Taiwan invasion for a few more years “as America’s national defense capabilities continue to be degraded by the current administration,” Capt. Fanell said.

China makes preparations for a war that the Pentagon says is not inevitable

Increased drills, resource stockpiling, new appointments signal Beijing is bracing for conflict

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jan/9/china-makes-preparations-for-war-that-pentagon-say/?utm

Military salute at the Chinese flag during the opening ceremony of the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, Saturday, Sept. 23, 2023. (AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko) more >

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By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Tuesday, January 9, 2024

China is preparing for a conflict with the United States by taking steps that include military reforms and drills, a stockpiling of oil and food, increased spying and military appointments.

Despite what critics say are the mounting danger signs, the Pentagon insists that conflict with China is neither imminent nor inevitable.

The Defense Department’s assurances are increasingly tough to sell to many in Congress. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, Alabama Republican, said U.S. military commanders and intelligence officials warn that Chinese military forces are getting ready for military action as soon as 2027.

CIA Director William J. Burns, whose agency’s primary mandate is to ferret out foreign threats over the horizon, said the Chinese military has doubts about a successful invasion of Taiwan. Still, he warned in a recent speech that “the risks of conflict are likely to grow the further out you get into this decade and beyond it.”

An open-source analysis of war preparation measures indicates a conflict with China may not be imminent, but indicators that war can be avoided indefinitely are more obscure. Large-scale Chinese military exercises near Taiwan have triggered one warning light.

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“I’m very concerned these escalatory military exercises are a pretense for an invasion,” Mr. Rogers said in a recent hearing.

Nerves are clearly on edge in the region. On Tuesday, China launched a satellite atop a rocket that passed over Taiwan and set off warnings throughout the island after some of the alerts mistakenly identified the craft as a Chinese missile.

The provocative launch was carried out days before Taiwan’s presidential election, which U.S. officials say is a target of Chinese influence operations to boost more Beijing-friendly candidates in the field.

Worrisome signs

Retired Navy Capt. Carl Schuster, a China expert with intelligence experience in the Pacific, compiled a list of what he sees as troubling indicators that China’s People’s Liberation Army will be prepared for warfare soon, topped by a surge in China’s intelligence-gathering operations.

“The expanded intelligence collection is the most serious” indicator, said Capt. Schuster, who teaches Chinese military doctrine at Hawaii Pacific University.

Since Dec. 7, China has dispatched five surveillance balloons that traveled over Taiwan airspace, according to the Taiwan Defense Ministry. Capt. Schuster said the balloons are part of an intimidation campaign and serve as “a significant intel-gathering operation.” PLA balloons could be what China calls “near-space” reconnaissance for targeting hypersonic missiles.

The People’s Liberation Army is also rapidly building up conventional and nuclear forces at a pace that U.S. military officials say is unprecedented in size and technical sophistication. Pentagon officials say the key factor in China’s military buildup is to support operations against Taiwan.

The Taiwan operation could take many forms, including cyberattacks, a naval blockade and multiple types of kinetic military attacks, according to the Pentagon’s latest annual report on the Chinese military.

China’s objective in war would be to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification with the mainland or to compel Taiwanese leaders to negotiate on Beijing’s terms before the U.S. and its allies can come to Taipei’s defense, the report said. China’s large-scale nuclear buildup of up to 1,500 nuclear warheads would deter Washington from any major move to aid Taiwan.

Flashpoints

Large military exercises around Taiwan and growing friction with the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally in the South China Sea, are two flashpoints that could set a U.S.-China conflict into motion.

In 2018, the PLA began conducting exercises around the island democracy that incorporated China’s rocket force. Missiles fired in 2021 and 2022 during exercises near Taiwan were integrated with a drill that the Pentagon said was practice for a blockade of Taiwan and maneuvers to prevent foreign forces from intervening.

China has increased the use of chartered merchant ships in military exercises to facilitate the movement of Chinese troops across the 100-mile Taiwan Strait in the event of a shooting war.

Capt. Schuster said recent appointments signal that military planners are putting China on a war footing to challenge the U.S. and its allies in the region. The appointments include a new defense minister with extensive experience in joint operations and specialists in the South China and East China seas, where Beijing is pressing maritime claims.

A new navy commander has an extensive background in submarine and anti-submarine warfare. The selection is aimed at fixing weaknesses in those warfare areas.

On the economic front, China has been expanding its state-held petroleum reserve since 2016 — a possible sign of shoring up supplies to withstand a cutoff of oil shipments during a conflict. Reserves of crude oil in China reached the highest levels in three years, according to industry reports. Large purchases and storage of pork and beef have strengthened food supply chains.

Capt. Schuster said whether the Chinese are stockpiling rice and wheat reserves is unclear, but “I suspect they may be locking down sources.” He noted China’s diplomatic outreach to Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and other countries.

China is also acquiring strategic materials, such as cobalt, needed to prevent a disruption of industry during a conflict and increasing pipeline use to reduce dependence on vulnerable sea-lane oil and natural gas shipments. Drilling for energy has been expanded in offshore fields in the Bohai Gulf and Pearl River Basins. China is working to lock down oil and natural gas exploration and production in the disputed South China Sea.

China has been shifting electric power production to nuclear and back to coal-fired power plants after attempting to transition to natural gas and renewables from 2005 to 2015.

On the cyberspace front

Capt. Schuster said a key war indicator is a marked increase in cyberespionage and cyberattacks in the past five years. China has also begun dispersing data storage hubs around the country to reduce their vulnerability to attack and exploring the use of underwater data storage hubs.

In preparation for space warfare, the PLA is expanding its satellite networks and experimenting with orbital debris removal and “soft kill” options for disrupting satellites — a key U.S. military advantage.

Capt. Schuster said China is expanding its intelligence gathering in the Western Hemisphere from a base in Cuba and could seek intelligence gathering bases in Venezuela or Nicaragua.

Pentagon officials say China faces significant weaknesses in a direct fight with the U.S.

Army Maj. Gen. Joseph McGee, vice director for strategy, plans and policy for the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, told Congress that Beijing’s current forces would have difficulty crossing the Taiwan Strait.

Still, the two-star general warned that “the risk of a [People’s Republic of China] attempt at forceful unification with Taiwan is a significant threat against which we must be prepared.”

The PLA would have to mobilize tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of troops. That “would be a clear signal” of an attack, Gen. McGee said in House testimony in October.

China recently launched its fourth Type 075 large-deck helicopter assault ship in three years, yet another indicator of growing readiness for a cross-strait assault.

President Xi Jinping, who also chairs the ruling Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, has set the tone for war preparations in a string of speeches to the PLA, including a call for more realistic training and exercises. China’s harsh rhetoric depicting the United States as an aggressive troublemaker has been only modestly toned down since Mr. Xi’s November meeting in California with Mr. Biden.

In June, the Chinese leader told a national security commission, “We must adhere to bottom-line thinking and worst-case-scenario thinking and get ready to undergo the major tests of high winds and rough waves, and even perilous, stormy seas.”

Ely Ratner, assistant defense secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs, acknowledged at the hearing with Gen. McGee that China is waging a campaign of military, political and economic pressure against Taiwan.

Mr. Ratner said the risk of a U.S.-China war is minimal despite the warning signs. “We do not believe that conflict is imminent or inevitable because deterrence across the strait today is real and strong,” he said.

Retired Navy Capt. Jim Fanell, a former Pacific Fleet intelligence director, said taking over Taiwan is a key element of Mr. Xi’s strategy of national “great rejuvenation.”

Mr. Xi’s recent appointment of Dong Jun as defense minister makes him the first PLA senior officer with experience in joint command and control over such an operation.

Conquering Taiwan “would appear to be a ‘capstone’ event for Xi, culminating three years of intense effort to prepare the PLA for such an operation.”

China prefers to take over Taiwan peacefully, but “the indicators are that they are prepared to execute an invasion,” Capt. Fanell said.

Presidential elections in the United States and Taiwan are likely to be critical factors influencing Chinese calculations on the timing of an invasion.

If the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party retains its hold on Taiwan’s presidential office and Donald Trump is returned to the White House, “then it seems increasingly likely that Xi will see his window of opportunity to take Taiwan closing sometime in early 2025,” he said.

A Biden reelection might forestall a Taiwan invasion for a few more years “as America’s national defense capabilities continue to be degraded by the current administration,” Capt. Fanell said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024

Key Takeaways:

• A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war.
• A new independent poll from the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains strong domestic support for his regime and his war in Ukraine, despite relatively poor economic conditions and living standards in Russia.
• Russian ultranationalist vitriolic responses to gender integration in the Ukrainian military highlight Russia's ongoing shift towards a cultural-ideological worldview that seeks to restore rigid and traditional gender roles and exposes gaps between Russia and Ukraine's respective abilities to mobilize their own societies.
• Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukraine has a shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles after several recent large Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.
• Russian sources continue to complain about persistent command and communication problems that degrade Russian combat capability in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian sources are reviving longstanding calls for a large-scale Russian offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to create a “buffer zone” with Belgorod Oblast despite the Russian military’s likely inability to conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term.
• Recent Kremlin and Russian media rhetoric aimed at threatening Moldova likely continues to embolden pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moldova to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.
• Bloomberg reported that officials from Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified countries held a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 16 to build support for Ukrainian conditions to negotiate with Russia.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances southwest of Donetsk City, and positional engagements continued along the entire frontline.
• The Russian military is reportedly abusing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue the systematic oppression of residents of occupied Crimea using law enforcement and administrative means.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 9, 2024

Jan 9, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2024

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 9, 2024, 7:35pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:10pm ET on January 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) published a survey on December 18, 2023, that it conducted between November 29 and December 9, 2023, that shows that 96 percent of respondents support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 88 percent trust Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and 66 percent trust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[1] 84 percent of respondents in a previous KMIS poll conducted in December 2022 expressed trust in Zelensky, and trust in many Ukrainian institutions experienced a similar decline between December 2022 and 2023 – an unsurprising development given the protracted war.[2] The Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the Ukrainian National Police, and Ukrainian volunteers did not see similar decreases in polled public trust during this time.[3]

Ukrainian sentiments in December 2022 were likely more optimistic than in November and December 2023 because Ukrainian forces had recently liberated large portions of occupied territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts during successful counteroffensive operations in the fall of 2022. Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive operations in 2022 liberated the strategic regional capital city of Kherson, pushed the frontline away from several major Ukrainian population centers, and turned these cities into near rear and rear areas, which may have allowed more Ukrainians to focus on domestic issues of local governance throughout 2023 instead of the imminent existential threat of Russian military activity and occupation they faced in 2022.

The KMIS poll also shows that the majority of respondents support both Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi and that only 15 percent held polarized opinions supporting one and not the other.[4] Russian sources have widely promoted Kremlin information operations alleging a serious rift between Ukrainian military and civilian leadership and have routinely attempted to portray domestic issues in Ukraine as significantly undermining the Ukrainian will to fight.[5] These Russian information operations aim to break Ukrainians‘ trust in their leadership and weaken Ukrainian morale while also decreasing Western support for Ukraine by falsely portraying Ukrainian society as demoralized and divided. The KMIS poll suggests that these Russian information operations are far from reality and that the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine remains highly unlikely to break Ukrainian support for Ukraine‘s military and civilian leadership and the Ukrainian will to fight.

A new independent poll from the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains strong domestic support for his regime and his war in Ukraine, despite relatively poor economic conditions and living standards in Russia.[6] The NORC poll surveyed 1,046 Russian adults living in the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied Crimea using data from Russian mobile service providers.[7] The poll found that 67 percent of participants approve of how Putin has conducted foreign policy and 58 percent approve of his domestic policy, but that 66 percent plan to vote for Putin in the upcoming March 2024 Presidential Election.[8] Putin's relatively high ratings appear to persevere even though the NORC poll found that Russians are unhappy with rising prices causing a general decline in living conditions.[9] The NORC poll also noted that 63 percent of participants support the war in Ukraine and that 64 percent of respondents see the war as a "civilizational struggle between Russia and the West."[10]  This result contrasts with other recent independent Russian polling that showed decreased support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[11]

Russian ultranationalist vitriolic responses to gender integration in the Ukrainian military highlight Russia's ongoing shift towards a cultural-ideological worldview that seeks to restore rigid and traditional gender roles and exposes gaps between Russia and Ukraine's respective abilities to mobilize their societies. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January 8 that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) purchased 50,000 sets of uniforms specifically for female servicemembers for the first time.[12] Several ultranationalist Russian milbloggers inaccurately took Umerov's statement to mean that Ukraine would be conscripting women, with one saying that the purchase of uniforms for women means "the time has come for everyone to think," and another milblogger claiming that Ukraine is now preparing to "exterminate" 50,000 Ukrainian women.[13] Ukraine has not been conscripting women, and neither current law nor proposed bills provide for conscripting Ukrainian women.[14] Women have been volunteering to serve in the Ukrainian military, and Umerov's statement instead reflects recent Ukrainian efforts to further increase gender integration in the Ukrainian Armed Forces by developing uniforms and body armor suited to the unique needs of female servicemembers.[15]

The negative Russian responses illuminate not only the ongoing Russian information operation designed to undermine Ukrainians’ will to fight, but also the archaic and misogynistic views shaping the worldviews of Russia’s leadership and the ultranationalist community.  They also reflect the Russians’ ongoing failure to understand exactly how broadly and deeply Ukrainian society has mobilized to defend against the Russian invasion. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported in October 2023 that nearly 43,000 female servicemembers are serving in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a 21 percent increase in female servicemembers from 2021.[16] The Ukrainian Military Media Center and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Nataliia Kalmykova stated that over 5,000 female servicemembers were actively serving in frontline combat zones as of November 2023.[17]

By contrast, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in March 2023 that 1,100 Russian women were serving in frontline combat positions of the 39,000 Russian women serving in the Russian Armed Forces, mostly in non-combat roles such as combat medics and cooks.[18]  Russian opposition media began reporting in 2023 that Russian authorities were increasingly relying on mass forced recruitment of women from penal colonies to fill force generation requirements, suggesting that recruitment of women in Russia takes place on a much more coercive basis than the voluntarism of Ukraine’s female servicemembers.[19] Kremlin officials and Kremlin mouthpieces have recently emphasized the importance of instilling and concretizing traditional gender roles and family values as a fundamental part of Russian domestic policy, with Russian officials calling for the institution of large families with a working father and a stay-at-home mother.[20] Russian President Vladimir Putin defined 2024 as the "Year of the Family" during his New Year's Eve address and has recently placed great weight on the role of Russian women as performing their expected role of "motherhood."[21] The increasing Russian social reliance on traditional gender roles, as defined and encouraged by the state, is likely heavily impacting Russian social expectations for women to fight in the military, thereby impacting Russia's ability to mobilize a significant portion of society, whereas Ukrainian society continues to be galvanized by a popular desire to defend Ukraine strong enough to bring so many Ukrainian women near and onto the battlefield of their own accord.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukraine has a shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles after several recent large Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.[22] Ihnat stated that Ukraine has rationed air defense equipment and ammunition and has used a considerable amount of Ukraine’s existing air defense missile stockpile in defending against the past three large series of Russian strikes.[23] US Administration officials reported on January 8 that they met with leaders from venture capital firms and technology and defense industries to discuss providing Ukraine with US systems and equipment.[24] The meetings reportedly focused on providing Ukraine with drones, demining equipment, and means to counter Russian drones.[25]  

Russian sources continue to complain about persistent command and communication problems that degrade Russian combat capability in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian commanders have less frequently ordered units to conduct attritional assaults in the past two months since Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Colonel General Oleg Makarevich as the commander of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces.[26] The milblogger claimed that many problems have persisted and worsened in this area, however. Russian forces operating near Krynky are reportedly unable to target Ukrainian aircraft and helicopters because the Russian command does not give them timely permission to shoot targets down.[27] Russian commanders also reportedly take several hours to approve artillery strikes and require units to send target coordinates and video or photo confirmation of targets before approving strikes.[28] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces do not have enough electronic warfare (EW) systems to combat the number of Ukrainian drones operating in the area.[29] Another milblogger called on Russian forces to stop moving equipment to Krynky and nearby areas because Ukrainian forces destroy up to 90 percent of Russian equipment there.[30] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), reportedly deployed southeast of Krynky, are literally “burning with desire“ to conduct heavily attritional attacks, suggesting that the command of this regiment is still relying on attritional frontal assaults as a favored attack tactic.[31] Russian forces, especially elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division, have reportedly suffered significant losses in operations near Krynky.[32] ISW has consistently observed Russian complaints of inadequate command, inter- and intra-unit coordination, air defense, fire support, and EW since November 2023 but continues to assess that these reported tactical problems do not always translate into significant operational effects.[33]

Russian sources are reviving longstanding calls for a large-scale Russian offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to create a “buffer zone” with Belgorod Oblast despite the Russian military’s likely inability to conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on January 9 that Russian forces will do everything to prevent Ukrainian indirect fire in Belgorod Oblast.[34] Russian sources seized on Peskov’s comments to call on Russian forces to create a “buffer zone” up to 15 kilometers in depth in Kharkiv Oblast to push Ukrainian MLRS and artillery away from the international border with Belgorod Oblast.[35] Russian ultranationalists routinely called for a similar operation in summer 2023 amid widespread discontent about limited cross-border raids by pro-Ukrainian forces into Belgorod Oblast.[36] A Russian incursion 15 kilometers in depth and several hundred kilometers in width would be a massive operational undertaking that would require a grouping of forces far larger and significantly better resourced than what Russian forces currently have concentrated along the entire international border with Ukraine, least of all in Belgorod Oblast.[37] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, in the coming weeks and that the Russian grouping in the Kupyansk direction appears more well-suited to conduct an intensified offensive effort than elsewhere in Ukraine or along the international border.[38] The Russian military is likely currently able to conduct only tactical-level actions into Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast, which at most would serve as feints to draw and fix Ukrainian forces away from a possible Russian operational effort in the Kupyansk direction.

Recent Kremlin and Russian media rhetoric aimed at threatening Moldova likely continues to embolden pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moldova to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova. Vadim Krasnoselsky, the president of the Russian-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria, claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on January 9 that Moldova’s increased military budget, joint exercises with NATO, and military subsidies and supplies from European states are evidence of Moldova’s “militarization,” which threatens Transnistria.[39] Krasnoselsky claimed that Transnistria does not threaten Moldova and dismissed the idea that Moldova’s force generation efforts stem from a desire to defend itself, despite the fact that Russian troops have occupied Transnistria since 1992 after the Russian Federation intervened on behalf of separatist Transnistria on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations.[40] Krasnoselsky also affirmed in 2018 his commitment to ensuring that Transnistria eventually becomes part of Russia.[41] Krasnoselsky claimed that Moldova “treacherously attacked [Transnistria’s] peaceful cities in the past” and has committed ”massive” human rights violations. Krasnoselsky blamed Moldova for stopping dialogue with Transnistria and abandoning previously reached agreements. Krasnoselsky claimed that Moldova is “consistently following the path of escalation” and threateningly stated that Moldova “bears the responsibility for further inevitable consequences.” ISW previously assessed that Russia is setting information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future campaigns by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova--an approach that closely parallels debunked Russian narratives used to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[42]

Krasnoselsky's anger with a recent change to the Moldovan Customs Code likely motivated him to further the Kremlin’s efforts to set such information conditions and sow instability in Moldova. CTP has previously assessed that Krasnoselsky is closely related to Moldovan-Russian businessman Viktor Gushan, who effectively controls Transnistria’s government and a large part of its economy.[43] The Kremlin likely conducted a false flag operation in April 2022 intended to draw Transnistria into its invasion of Ukraine, but ultimately failed to win Gushan‘s support as Gushan‘s businesses benefited from ties to the West and Ukraine.[44]  Moldova passed a new Customs Code in March 2023 that went into effect on January 1, 2024, and requires companies in Transnistria to pay import customs duties to Moldova.[45] Krasnoselsky claimed on January 5 that the change came as a “surprise” to Transnistria.[46] Moldovan investigative journalists reported in 2020 that two Transnistrian companies tied to Gushan’s Sheriff Enterprises imported cigarettes worth about $22 million to Transnistria without paying taxes.[47] Krasnoselsky claimed on January 9 to TASS that Moldova’s introduction of duties starting January 1, 2024, is an “unreasonable” policy that violates the trade agreement between Transnistria and the EU and that Moldova is pushing Moldovan-Transnistrian relations towards “greater confrontation.”[48] Krasnoselsky highlighted that Transnistria is striving to build direct communication with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and emphasized Transnistria’s “extensive” bilateral cooperation frameworks with Russia as means to ”help avoid risks provoked by” Moldova’s policy.[49]

Bloomberg reported that officials from Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified countries held a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 16 to build support for Ukrainian conditions to negotiate with Russia.[50] Unspecified individuals familiar with the meeting told Bloomberg in an article published on January 9 that officials from China, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not attend the meeting, although Brazil submitted a written statement.

Key Takeaways:

• A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war.
• A new independent poll from the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains strong domestic support for his regime and his war in Ukraine, despite relatively poor economic conditions and living standards in Russia.
• Russian ultranationalist vitriolic responses to gender integration in the Ukrainian military highlight Russia's ongoing shift towards a cultural-ideological worldview that seeks to restore rigid and traditional gender roles and exposes gaps between Russia and Ukraine's respective abilities to mobilize their own societies.
• Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukraine has a shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles after several recent large Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.
• Russian sources continue to complain about persistent command and communication problems that degrade Russian combat capability in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian sources are reviving longstanding calls for a large-scale Russian offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to create a “buffer zone” with Belgorod Oblast despite the Russian military’s likely inability to conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term.
• Recent Kremlin and Russian media rhetoric aimed at threatening Moldova likely continues to embolden pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moldova to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.
• Bloomberg reported that officials from Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified countries held a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 16 to build support for Ukrainian conditions to negotiate with Russia.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances southwest of Donetsk City, and positional engagements continued along the entire frontline.
• The Russian military is reportedly abusing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue the systematic oppression of residents of occupied Crimea using law enforcement and administrative means.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman and west of Kreminna near the Serebyranske forest area and east of Terny.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional fighting near Bakhmut on January 9. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces retreated to the northern outskirts of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed any evidence of this claim.[52] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Khromove and towards Ivanivske, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[53] The press officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces are trying to capture Ivanivske before the Russian presidential election in March 2024, likely to cast its capture as a significant victory for political purposes.[54] Russian sources characterized the localized Russian offensive around Bakhmut as a “creeping” offensive towards Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut), acknowledging that potential Russian gains in the area will likely continue to be gradual and that a rapid advance up to Chasiv Yar is unlikely.[55] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[56]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements near Avdiivka on January 9. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Novobakhmutivka, and Stepove; in northwestern Avdiivka near the Avdiivka Coke Plant; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[57]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City, and both Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly made additional gains west and southwest of Donetsk City on January 9. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) on December 26.[58]  Russian milbloggers claimed on January 9 that Russian forces made marginal gains on the southeastern outskirts of Novomykhailivka and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Novomykhailivka and pushed Russian forces out of unspecified positions in the area.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured the St. George and All Saints Church in Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City) and advanced 500 meters in width and 300 meters in depth in the area.[60] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Heorhiivka with select sources claiming that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[61] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of the claimed Russian advances near Heorhiivka or reported Ukrainian advances near Novomykahilivka. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 14 Russian assaults near Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryyutne and Chervone (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain the tactical initiative south of Velyka Novosilka, and that Ukrainian forces have almost entirely ceased offensive activity in this area.[64] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in this area.[65]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked north of Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne) and regained some previously lost positions, bringing the frontline slightly closer to Novoprokopivka itself.[66] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these Ukrainian advances, however. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional fighting continued near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka, and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[67] Several Russian milbloggers noted that weather conditions are deteriorating in this area and that cold weather and wet snow are complicating tactical engagements.[68] Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD), 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and "Osman" 100th Reconnaissance Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in this area.[69]

Geolocated footage posted on January 9 confirms that Russian forces hold positions along the Konka River northwest of Oleshky on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[70] Russian and Ukrainian sources also reported that positional engagements continued in and around Krynky, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline on the east bank.[71]

Russian forces reportedly continue to draw military assets to occupied Crimea. Ukrainian state body Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea noted on January 8 that Ukrainian partisans have located several military objects near Zaozerne in the Yevpatoria district in western Crimea, as well as an influx of artillery and cluster munitions at the railway station near Biyuk-Onlar in central Crimea, which is reportedly being directed to Russian forces in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[72] Ukrainian partisans also reported that Russian forces transferred the lead Ivan Gren-class large amphibious landing ship from Novorossiysk to Sevastopol.[73]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military is reportedly abusing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine. A Serbian volunteer reportedly serving in the separate “Wolf” unit of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) claimed that Russian commanders order Serbian fighters to conduct assaults under threat of violence and withhold provisions and ammunition from them.[74] ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military had recruited up to several hundred Serbian nationals to the separate “Wolf” unit and that Cuban and Nepali nationals are serving in VDV formations, including the 106th VDV Division.[75] Elements of the 106th VDV Division have been operating near Bakhmut since at least April 2023 and have likely suffered heavy personnel losses.[76] The Russian military may have assigned foreign volunteers to the 106th VDV Division to offset these losses.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps claimed on January 8 that its personnel deployed to unspecified areas of Africa as it continues recruitment in Russia.[77] The Africa Corps previously suggested that it would operate in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.[78]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

The Russian military reportedly started recently using new Shahed-238 drones (Russian name: Geran-3) to conduct strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian sources stated on January 8 that Ukrainian forces recently shot down a jet-powered Shahed-238 drone traveling at about 500 kilometers per hour.[79] Several Russian sources claimed that Shahed-238s can fly at that speed and have warheads weighing up to 300 kilograms, in comparison to Shahed-136s (Russian name: Geran-2), which can fly at speeds up to 200 kilometers per hour and have warheads weighing up to 50 kilograms.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Shahed-238 can vertically dive from a height of about 10 kilometers.[81] Another milblogger claimed that Shahed-238s are more expensive to produce and have a slightly shorter range than older Shahed models.[82]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue the systematic oppression of residents of occupied Crimea using law enforcement and administrative means. Ukrainian state body Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea stated that as of January 8, the Russian occupation administration in Crimea has illegally imprisoned 204 people, including 123 Crimean Tatars, and are considering 625 cases against Crimean residents for violations of the Russian Code of Administrative Offenses.[83] Russian occupation authorities are likely in part using small-scale administrative sentences that result in fines to collect personal data on residents of Crimea, which can be used against them in the future.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

A Russian milblogger reiterated that Russia’s expansionist maximalist goals in Ukraine extend beyond the previously announced annexation of four Ukrainian Oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts – territories that Russian forces do not wholly control). The milblogger claimed on January 9 that Russia needs to capture Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts in order to better protect Russia’s border areas from Ukrainian artillery and rocket strikes and to fully implement the tasks of Russia’s “special military operation.”[84]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives on January 9 about Ukrainian personnel and equipment losses, Ukraine’s lack of agency as a pawn of the West, and the combat readiness of Russia’s nuclear triad. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin falsely frames Ukraine as a pawn of the West to mask Russia’s expansionist and maximalist goals of establishing full effective Russian control of Ukraine and uses nuclear rhetoric to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine to negotiate.[85]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Wagner Group personnel reportedly continued to train Belarusian forces in Belarus as of December 2023. Independent Belarusian monitoring group the Hajun Project reported on January 1 that an unspecified number of Wagner personnel trained personnel of the “Tornado,” “Storm,” and “Taifun” special purpose detachments (all of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]) and personnel of the Belarusian 51st Artillery Brigade.[86] Wagner personnel also reportedly train cadets in one-month and three-week courses at the Internal Troops Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy.[87] The Hajun Project reported that satellite imagery shows that the number of military vehicles at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast decreased by 30 percent in November and December 2023 and assessed that Wagner forces could have taken the equipment back to Russia or transferred it to the regular Russian military.[88]

A Belarusian source reported that Russia delivered about five million rounds of ammunition to Belarus in December 2023. The Belarusian Community of Railway Workers stated on January 8 that a train carrying the ammunition left Barnaul, Altai Republic on December 10 and reached its destination in Golynets, Mogilev Oblast on December 22.[89]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

12. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 9, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-9-2024

Key Takeaways:

1. A Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization invited Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to deliver a major speech at its General Assembly in Doha. Haniyeh laid out his most comprehensive argument to date about Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel and appealed for donations and weapons transfers.
2. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
4. Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in some urban areas of southern Khan Younis City. Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis.
5. Israeli and Egyptian delegations met in Cairo to discuss resuming talks on the release of hostages and a ceasefire agreement.
6. Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.
7. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank.
8. Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a one-way drone and rocket attack targeting the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed, Israel. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine other attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
9. The Israel Defense Forces killed Lebanese Hezbollah Air Force Commander for Southern Lebanon Ali Hussein Burji in an airstrike in southern Lebanon.
10. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that Israel’s top priority is enabling displaced Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel in a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
11. The Iraqi federal government continues to fail to protect US forces, who are deployed to fight the Islamic State, from Iranian-backed militia attacks while also rejecting the United States’ right to defend its servicemembers in Iraq. Politico reported that senior advisers to the Iraqi prime minister privately told US officials that he seeks to keep US forces in Iraq.
12. Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jafar al Husseini warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would help Lebanese Hezbollah fight Israel if war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah.
13. The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria. This airstrike is part of growing Jordanian operations against these smuggling networks.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 9, 2024

Jan 9, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 9, 2024

Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. A Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization invited Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to deliver a major speech at its General Assembly in Doha. Haniyeh laid out his most comprehensive argument to date about Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel and appealed for donations and weapons transfers.
2. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
4. Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in some urban areas of southern Khan Younis City. Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis.
5. Israeli and Egyptian delegations met in Cairo to discuss resuming talks on the release of hostages and a ceasefire agreement.
6. Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.
7. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank.
8. Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a one-way drone and rocket attack targeting the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed, Israel. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine other attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
9. The Israel Defense Forces killed Lebanese Hezbollah Air Force Commander for Southern Lebanon Ali Hussein Burji in an airstrike in southern Lebanon.
10. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that Israel’s top priority is enabling displaced Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel in a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
11. The Iraqi federal government continues to fail to protect US forces, who are deployed to fight the Islamic State, from Iranian-backed militia attacks while also rejecting the United States’ right to defend its servicemembers in Iraq. Politico reported that senior advisers to the Iraqi prime minister privately told US officials that he seeks to keep US forces in Iraq.
12. Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jafar al Husseini warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would help Lebanese Hezbollah fight Israel if war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah.
13. The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria. This airstrike is part of growing Jordanian operations against these smuggling networks.

A Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization invited Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to deliver a major speech at its General Assembly in Doha on January 9.[1] Haniyeh spoke at the International Union of Muslim Scholars’ “Al Aqsa Flood and the Role of the Ummah” conference.[2] A senior Muslim Brotherhood scholar founded the International Union of Muslim Scholars in 2004 in Dublin. The scholar later moved the organization to Qatar.[3]  Anti-Muslim Brotherhood countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, have listed the organization’s founder on their terror lists before his death.[4]  Hamas released pictures of Haniyeh seated beside the organization’s president, highlighting Haniyeh’s prominence at the conference.[5]

Haniyeh laid out his most comprehensive argument to date about Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel and appealed for donations and weapons transfers during his speech.[6] He claimed that Hamas was forced to employ “non-traditional means” against Israel due to 1) the local and international marginalization of the Palestinian issue, 2) the election of an “extremist” Israeli government that wanted to further displace Palestinians and control the al Aqsa Mosque, and 3) the regional normalization and integration of Israel.[7] Other Hamas officials have made similar arguments about the regional and international marginalization of the Palestinian issue since October 7.[8] Haniyeh framed supporting Hamas as a religious duty and asked the international audience at the conference to give Hamas financial and military support[9] He also called for the conference attendees to form delegations to lobby governments in their respective countries to support Hamas.[10]

Haniyeh also reiterated Hamas’ negotiating position. Haniyeh said that Hamas’ hostage negotiation position remains “all for all,” meaning that Hamas wants Israel to release all its Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Hamas releasing the Israeli hostages.[11] He also claimed Israel that had not freed a single hostage alive through military means in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have repeatedly emphasized that Israel’s ground and air campaign in the Gaza Strip is killing Israeli hostages rather than freeing them.[13] Haniyeh asserted that Hamas’ command-and-control networks remain strong and cohesive.[14] CTP-ISW has contrastingly assessed that Hamas faces command-and-control issues with its fighters in some areas of the Gaza Strip.[15] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it has ”dismantled” 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip, and an Israeli “surgical strike” killed Haniyeh’s deputy, Saleh al Arouri, in Beirut on January 2.[16] Haniyeh claimed that Israel’s objective to destroy Hamas is unattainable, primarily because ”Hamas exists in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and in the diaspora.”[17]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 9. The al Qassem Brigades fired small arms, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in Zaytoun.[18] The group published an undated video on January 9 that showed an al Qassem Brigades fighter detonating an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) from a tunnel, targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[19] The al Qassem Brigades also said that it exploded two tunnel entrances south of Zaytoun as Israeli forces approached them.[20]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 9. The IDF Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) directed an airstrike in Maghazi targeting al Qassem Brigades fighters in Hamas’ Central Gazan Brigade.[21] The al Qassem Brigades said that it fired sniper rifles targeting Israeli forces east of the Bureij refugee camp.[22] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of PIJ—claimed separately that it fired RPGs targeting Israeli forces east of the Bureij refugee camp.[23] The al Quds Brigades also published a video on January 9 that shows its fighters firing mortars targeting Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in the eastern and northern areas of the central Gaza Strip.[24]

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in some urban areas of southern Khan Younis City on January 9. The al Qassem Brigades began claiming attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry south of Khan Younis City on January 9.[25] Commercially available satellite footage shows flattened terrain that is consistent with the movement of Israeli armor in southern Khan Younis City. Israeli forces frequently use bulldozers to clear terrain to establish defensible positions in urban environments in the Gaza Strip. The IDF published videos on January 9 that showed its troops “deepening the operational grip in the south of the Gaza Strip” on January 9.[26] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on January 9 that the IDF would intensify its operations in the southern Gaza Strip until it frees hostages and kills Hamas leaders.[27] 

Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis destroyed Palestinian militant infrastructure and weapons on January 9. The IDF 98th Division killed approximately 40 Palestinian fighters and located tunnel shafts and weapons caches during clearing operations in Khan Younis.[28] The IDF Givati Brigade captured Hamas ammunition, small arms, and paraphernalia during a raid targeting the Islamic University in Khan Younis.[29] The brigade also located near the university weapons caches that contained about 100 mortars, four EFPs, grenades, and Hamas battle maps.[30] The 900th Kfir Brigade Combat Team ([BCT] Assigned to the 99th Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters as the BCT raided buildings containing weapons.[31] The Maglan Unit captured small arms, grenades, ammunition and Hamas intelligence and military manuals in civilian homes in Khan Younis.[32]

Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 9. The al Qassem Brigades claimed attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry south and east of Khan Younis City.[33] The spokesperson of the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—said on January 9 that its fighters had conducted 25 ”combat missions” with a range of weapons against Israeli forces in central and eastern Khan Younis.[34] The al Quds Brigades mortared an Israeli field headquarters northeast of Khan Younis.[35] The al Quds Brigades also targeted Israeli infantry in a house with thermobaric grenades and small arms.[36] The National Resistance Brigade—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces during fighting in central Khan Younis.[37]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet in Tel Aviv on January 9.[38] Blinken stressed the need to avoid civilian harm and protect civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. Blinken and Netanyahu also discussed efforts to release Israeli hostages and increase humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.

Israeli and Egyptian delegations met in Cairo on January 9 to discuss resuming talks on the release of hostages and a ceasefire agreement.[39] Indirect talks between Israel and Hamas froze on January 2 after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut.[40]

Three senior Egyptian officials told Reuters on January 9 that Egypt rejected an Israeli proposal for combined Israeli-Egyptian monitoring of the Philadelphi Corridor, which is a narrow land route dividing Egypt from the Gaza Strip.[41] Israeli officials “asked to participate“ in monitoring the corridor with Egypt using new, Israeli-procured monitoring technology. The Egyptian sources said that Egypt is prioritizing a new ceasefire agreement as “the necessary foundation for discussions about post-war Gaza,“ including discussions on the corridor.

The Egyptian position on a ceasefire is similar in some respects to Hamas‘ position on negotiations in that both seek a ceasefire before further discussions on the post-war Gaza Strip. Hamas has repeatedly demanded that Israel agree to a ceasefire and to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip before any further discussions on Israeli hostages and the war. The ceasefires proposed by both Hamas and Egypt are incompatible with Israel’s stated war aims, which includes the destruction of Hamas, demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and “deradicalization of Palestinian society.”[42] The ceasefire proposed by Egypt would leave room for Hamas to insert itself into discussions on the post-war Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW assessed on December 28, 2023, that previous Egyptian peace efforts would allow Hamas to influence a post-war Gaza Strip.[43]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 9. The National Resistance Brigades fired rockets barrages at unspecified locations in southern Israel.[44] Israeli media separately reported a rocket attack on Sderot.[45]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank.[46] The IDF conducted raids in Tulkarm overnight on January 9.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters ambushed Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp, killing and wounding an unspecified number of Israeli soldiers.[48] The Tulkarm Battalion and Rapid Response unit of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Tulkarm refugee camp during the raids.[49] The al Quds Brigades similarly said that its fighters attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp. The brigades also claimed that it damaged at least one military vehicle during the fighting.[50] The IDF reported that it killed several Palestinian fighters who attacked Israeli troops in Tulkarm on January 9.[51] Several hundred Palestinian men demonstrated during a funeral procession for the fighters. The Palestinian Authority identified the fighters as members of the al Quds Brigades.[52]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted a one-way drone and rocket attack targeting the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed, Israel, on January 9.[53] LH said that the attack was retaliation for Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri and LH Radwan Unit Deputy Commander Wissam Hassan al Tawil on January 2 and 8, respectively.[54] IDF Army Radio acknowledged that a drone exploded at the IDF Northern Command headquarters but caused no casualties.[55]

Iranian-backed militias, including LH, conducted nine other attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 9.[56] LH targeted Israeli forces and military infrastructure and surveillance equipment with anti-tank guided munitions and other unspecified weapons. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting LH headquarters and other unspecified military infrastructure in Yaroun and Kafr Kila in southern Lebanon.[57]

The IDF killed LH Air Force Commander for Southern Lebanon Ali Hussein Burji in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on January 9.[58] The airstrike targeted Burji while he attended the funeral for LH Radwan Unit Deputy Commander Wissam Hassan al Tawil.[59] Israeli media reported that Burji was responsible for dozens of drone attacks into northern Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began, including the January 9 LH attack on the IDF Northern Command headquarters.[60] 

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that Israel’s top priority is enabling displaced Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel in a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on January 9.[61] Gallant warned on January 4 that there is little time left for Israel and LH to find a diplomatic solution that would satisfy Israel’s security concerns around the Israel-Lebanon border and allow Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel.[62]  Israeli officials have said repeatedly that they aim to find a diplomatic solution to push LH forces north of the Litani River, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, but that Israel will resort to military force if diplomatic efforts fail.[63]

Lebanon’s caretaker prime minister, Najib Mikati, told senior UN officials on January 9 that he is ready for talks regarding long-term stability along the Israel-Lebanon border.[64] The Lebanese government has thus far failed to compel LH to implement UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-LH war and mandates LH’s withdrawal north of the Litani River.[65]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Iraqi federal government continues to fail to protect US forces, who are deployed to fight the Islamic State, from Iranian-backed militia attacks while also rejecting the United States’ right to defend its servicemembers in Iraq.

• The United States struck a rocket launcher in al Baghdadi, Anbar Province on January 8 to thwart an attempted Iranian-backed attack on US forces at Ain al Asad airbase.[66] The rocket launcher had at least two rockets prepared to launch toward the base.[67] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed responsibility for 28 attacks targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase since October 2023.
• Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid met with US Ambassador Alina Romanowski on January 9 to discuss the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq.[68] Rashid stated that the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq “must be within the framework of supporting the [Iraqi] Security Forces in the areas of training and providing consultations.” Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, have frequently accused the United States of exceeding its advisory capacity and conducting “military actions” that “violate” Iraqi sovereignty.[69] These claims ignore the fact that the United States has the right to act in self-defense to protect its forces deployed in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[70] The United States ended its combat mission in Iraq in December 2021 and currently provides operational and logistical support to the Iraqi Security Forces.[71]

Politico reported on January 9 that senior advisers to the Iraqi prime minister privately told US officials that he seeks to keep US forces in Iraq.[72] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani formed a committee on January 5 to facilitate the expulsion of US-led coalition forces from Iraq. Politico reported that it “obtained” a January 6 US State Department cable that said that senior Sudani advisers told US officials that he was trying “to satisfy domestic political audiences,” which likely referred at least in part to Iranian-backed militias and political factions. but that Sudani sought to negotiate the US-led coalition’s continued presence in Iraq.[73]

US Department of Defense Press Secretary Major General Patrick Ryder stated on January 8 that the Iraqi federal government has not notified the department about any decision to expel US forces from Iraq.[74] Ryder added that the United States does not have any “plans to plan” for the withdrawal of its approximately 2,500 troops from Iraq. Ryder emphasized that the United States remains “very focused on the defeat-ISIS mission.” US forces are present in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government.[75] CTP-ISW previously assessed that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[76]

Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jafar al Husseini warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would help LH fight Israel if war erupted between Israel and LH during an interview with LH-affiliated outlet al Maydeen on January 9.[77] Husseini stated that Iraqi militias would be “present in the field in numbers and equipment” and stand “shoulder to shoulder with the Lebanese people” in the event of an Israel-LH war.[78] Husseini also warned the United States against attacking the Houthis in Yemen.

Husseini added that Iraqi militias will continue to confront US forces in the region even after the end of the Israel-Hamas war.[79] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to fulfill Iran’s longstanding strategic objective of forcing a US military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.[80]

Husseini discussed the expansion of the Axis of Resistance in the coming years. Husseini said that “resistance” groups in Bahrain will play a “clearer” role in the Axis of Resistance in the coming years and “upcoming confrontations.” Husseini also indicated that unspecified countries in East Asia and the Caucasus may join the Axis of Resistance in the “next decade.” Husseini may have been referring to Azerbaijani Shia militants, such as those in the IRGC-affiliated Husseiniyoun Brigade, when he mentioned the Caucasus.[81] Husseini finally claimed that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “confront” the United Arab Emirates for playing a “malicious role” in helping Israel establish a transit corridor between Haifa and Dubai.

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh expressed support for the transfer of security responsibilities from the Defense Ministry to the Interior Ministry in a statement on January 9.[82] The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff recently announced that the Iraqi army will complete the transfer of security responsibilities from the Defense Ministry to local police in 2024.[83] Fayyadh additionally praised the Iraqi federal government for its efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.

The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria on January 8.[84] The strikes targeted a farm that Jordanian officials suspected of storing drugs in Malah, Suwayda Province and Iran-linked drug smugglers in Shaab and Arman, Suwayda Province.

This airstrike is part of growing Jordanian operations against these smuggling networks. Jordanian forces have clashed with Iranian-backed smugglers along the Jordan-Syria border twice in recent weeks—once in December 2023 and again on January 6, 2024.[85] The Jordanian Royal Air Force has similarly conducted three strikes targeting Iranian-backed smuggling operations in southern Syria since May 2023, including a strike on January 4.[86] A strike in May 2023 targeted an LH member responsible for smuggling Captagon into Jordan.[87] Western and Jordanian officials blamed LH and other Iranian-backed militias for increased drug smuggling into Jordan.[88] The Syrian regime, LH, and other Iranian-backed militias mass produce Captagon in Syria and smuggle it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states. This smuggling and distribution cartel generates billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[89] 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on January 9 for punishing the “real perpetrators and those behind the scenes” of the December 3 Islamic State terrorist attack.[90] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, known as Islamic State Khorasan Province, claimed responsibility for the attack on January 5.[91] The Supreme Leader’s website re-emphasized the false regime narrative that United States and Israel created the Islamic State.[92] Khamenei also reiterated his commitment to expelling the United States from the region and destroying the Israeli state.

Iraqi Kurdish media reported that the Iranian naval forces detained an Emirati tanker heading to Iraq.[93] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media and officials has not reported on this purported event. Iraq’s only major port is near Basra, which is along the Persian Gulf. Shafaq additionally reported that Iranian naval forces are scrutinizing the tanker’s documents.

13. US-China defense talks resume as two sides meet in Washington

US-China defense talks resume as two sides meet in Washington

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · January 9, 2024

WASHINGTON — Senior Chinese military officials visited Washington this week for two days of meetings with their American counterparts — the latest communication channel between the two nations to restart after more than a yearlong lapse.

The meetings — officially called the Defense Policy Coordination Talks, or DPCT — offered a chance for each country to share concerns and schedule other meetings throughout the year.

“They’re an opportunity for us to be frank and candid with the PRC about how we see the relationship and any concerns that we have,” said a senior American defense official, who spoke with reporters last week on the condition of anonymity.

Starting Jan. 8, the forum occurred for the first time since 2021, after China severed military talks following former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. China’s government considers Taiwan a rogue province that will one-day reunite with the mainland.

Since then, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has grown more aggressive around the Taiwan Strait and across the region. In the last two years, PLA jets have buzzed past American aircraft some 180 times, according to the Pentagon. Whereas Chinese ships and planes used to carefully avoid crossing the midline between the mainland and Taiwan, since Pelosi’s visit they now regularly do so.

This change in behavior added to the urgency with which Pentagon officials called for the two militaries to start talking again.

President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed while meeting in San Francisco late last year to resume senior-level military communications. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. CQ Brown officially reopened talks after speaking with PLA Gen. Liu Zhenli, his Chinese counterpart, in December.

This week will be the 17th DPCT, which has historically been held annually, alternating between Beijing and Washington.

On the American side were Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Taiwan and Mongolia Michael Chase, leading a team mostly made up of Pentagon officials. Major Gen. Song Yanchao, the Deputy Director of the China’s Central Military Commission’s Office for International Military Cooperation, will lead the Chinese delegation.

A quarter of the meetings focused on scheduling other talks while the rest covered policy, the official said.

In a readout, the Pentagon said that the delegations discussed operational safety, the war in Ukraine, recent behavior from North Korea and U.S. policy toward Taiwan, among other topics.

The next channel to resume will likely be the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings, during which the two countries’ navies discuss operating near each other safely, the official said.

Despite the talks restarting, the official acknowledged China has a history of cutting off communication to signal displeasure, and there’s nothing preventing that from happening again.

“We’re … clear-eyed about the prospects in that respect,” the official said.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

14. Marco Rubio: U.S. Steel Sale Is Bad News for National Security

Excerpts:

Congress has long recognized this fact. It's why both Democrats and Republicans worked together under President Ronald Reagan to empower CFIUS to reject foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that threaten national security. But CFIUS has been missing in action in recent years. In 2008, for instance, Reuters reported that Russia had acquired nearly 10 percent of American steel production—and that CFIUS had done nothing to stop it. Many of those factories and steelyards ended up getting liquidated. If we're going to keep our defense industrial base strong, we need CFIUS to do its job.

We also need a broader understanding of national security. Today, few policymakers would dispute the need to fortify our critical supply chains. But most are happy to hide behind the Biden administration's "small yard, high fence" formulation, which claims only cutting-edge technologies are worthy of federal protection. In reality, we need much broader safeguards. As COVID-19 revealed, depending on foreign companies for everything from medicine to missiles may not seem dangerous in peacetime, but in a time of crisis, it can throw the whole country off balance.

The time has come to take basic sectors like steel as seriously as microchip manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and other buzz-worthy industries. In a time of major conflict, we will need American steel—and lots of it—to remain free.

Marco Rubio: U.S. Steel Sale Is Bad News for National Security

Newsweek · by Marco Rubio · January 5, 2024

In 1901, J. P. Morgan formed U.S. Steel from Andrew Carnegie's Carnegie Steel Company. It was an immediate corporate powerhouse, the product of two great American businessmen: the king of Wall Street and the rags-to-riches immigrant-industrialist. And it swiftly became the largest steel producer in the world.

Fast forward a hundred years, and things look very different. The United States' share of global steel production has shriveled, as the governments of various countries have intervened to export underpriced materials. U.S. Steel in particular has fallen from first place to 27th in international rankings of productivity. More importantly, it is no longer "U.S." Steel. Just a few days before Christmas, the company was auctioned off by its board of directors to the highest bidder, which in this case was a Japanese firm, Nippon Steel.

It's hard to think of a more poignant metaphor for the deindustrialization of America. But the sale of U.S. Steel isn't just symbolic. It also presents real danger to our long-term economic and national security—danger enough that Senators J. D. Vance (R-Ohio), Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), and I have requested that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) block the acquisition, a request belatedly echoed by the Biden administration.

Some of our fellow conservatives scoff at our concerns. They note that Japan is a close ally to the United States. What objection could one possibly have to allowing a friend to control one of our most important steel companies?

Of course it is true that Japan is an ally. Our friendship with Tokyo is beyond dispute and essential as we confront the threat of communist China together. But even the best of friends don't see eye to eye on everything—to argue otherwise in the dangerous realm of national security would be foolish. It is common sense that there are some things you shouldn't entrust to others when you can do them yourself. Managing America's steel factories, which manufacture the fundamental building blocks of modern civilization, is one of those things. It's no insult to Japan to say so.

Other critics argue that U.S. Steel is of little consequence to our national security. The editors of National Review write, "Even if U.S. Steel totally disappeared, the U.S. would still have production capacity to meet defense needs." They cite former secretary of defense Jim Mattis, who estimated the military to require only three percent of domestic steel production to function.

This picture taken on July 29, 2019 shows the US Steel Kosice steel-mill in Kosice, eastern Slovakia. - The United States Steel Corporation's Slovakian unit which is one of Slovakia's biggest employers recently announced cuts of 2500 jobs by the end of 2021. VLADIMIR SIMICEK / AFP/Getty Images

It is strange to see defense hawks argue for the adequacy of the U.S. defense industrial base––and forget that defense needs increase dramatically when a nation switches from peace to a war footing. During World War II, for example, the U.S. government devoured roughly 60 percent of domestic steel, and that was with much greater production numbers than those of today. If we were to return to a conflict of that magnitude, the Department of Commerce is certain that "existing domestic steel production capacity would be unable to meet national security requirements."

And conflict is not hypothetical. Consolidation pushed by the Clinton administration has atrophied our defense industrial base to the point where the "arsenal of democracy" is now struggling to aid allies in two international wars, even though the United States is not a direct participant in either of them. Any number of further conflicts could arise in the years to come, including with communist China. God forbid that we should be forced to fight protracted battles with modern industrial enemies—but are we prepared for that contingency?

Right now, the answer is clearly no. To change course, we must abandon the "short-termism" and naïve globalism so prevalent on both Left and Right. Far too many seem to think that immediate profits matter, while long-term strength and sovereignty do not. But there is a difference between tending to the present and forgetting about the future, just as there is a difference between domestic and foreign companies.

Congress has long recognized this fact. It's why both Democrats and Republicans worked together under President Ronald Reagan to empower CFIUS to reject foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that threaten national security. But CFIUS has been missing in action in recent years. In 2008, for instance, Reuters reported that Russia had acquired nearly 10 percent of American steel production—and that CFIUS had done nothing to stop it. Many of those factories and steelyards ended up getting liquidated. If we're going to keep our defense industrial base strong, we need CFIUS to do its job.

We also need a broader understanding of national security. Today, few policymakers would dispute the need to fortify our critical supply chains. But most are happy to hide behind the Biden administration's "small yard, high fence" formulation, which claims only cutting-edge technologies are worthy of federal protection. In reality, we need much broader safeguards. As COVID-19 revealed, depending on foreign companies for everything from medicine to missiles may not seem dangerous in peacetime, but in a time of crisis, it can throw the whole country off balance.

The time has come to take basic sectors like steel as seriously as microchip manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and other buzz-worthy industries. In a time of major conflict, we will need American steel—and lots of it—to remain free.

Marco Rubio, a Republican, is the senior U.S. senator from Florida.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · by Marco Rubio · January 5, 2024

15. The US Steel deal is a test of friendshoring—and the US is failing

Excerpts:

Finally, there is one concern regarding foreign acquisitions in critical industries that is worth considering. Because Nippon Steel is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, this deal would likely cause US Steel to delist from the New York Stock Exchange, which would limit the power of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the company. Many Japanese-listed companies that have acquired US businesses voluntarily provide annual financial disclosures to the SEC, as should Nippon Steel.

More importantly, because Nippon Steel is listed in Japan, it is subject to Japanese corporate governance rules rather than US ones. The US government may worry about the national security implications if the company acquires US Steel and then is subsequently acquired by a more problematic third party, such as a Chinese entity. If Japan had weak corporate governance practices, this would be a more relevant concern. However, Japanese corporate structures are notorious for guarding against hostile takeovers, making this scenario exceedingly unlikely. Still, other countries don’t always have as strong protections; rather than blocking transactions with close allies, the United States should be engaging in greater outreach to allies and partners with weaker corporate governance structures to encourage reforms that alleviate these kinds of worries.

The US Steel deal is a test of friendshoring—and the US is failing

By Sarah Bauerle Danzman

atlanticcouncil.org · · January 8, 2024

In mid-December 2023, US Steel announced that it agreed to be bought by Nippon Steel for approximately $14.1 billion, a 40 percent premium over its stock price at the time of the announcement. The deal would quickly catapult the Japanese company to second place in the global steel production league charts, accounting for 4.5 percent of annual global crude steel production, behind China Baowu Group’s 7 percent. Such a merger could unlock efficiency-promoting technology—including advances in green production techniques—while providing Nippon Steel with the size and resources necessary to act as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in the global steel industry. Six of the largest ten steel producers are Chinese, as are twenty-four of the forty-six companies worldwide that produce at least ten million tons of steel per year.

One might think that US policymakers would welcome this announcement. It is a “win” for policies that have protected domestic production through tariffs; Nippon Steel’s offer to US Steel reflects its desire to expand steel production capacity in the United States to serve North American markets through domestic (and therefore tariff-free) production. Those concerned about industry consolidation and antitrust issues should prefer this deal to other potential buyers, such as Cleveland-Cliffs and Nucor, which are both major domestic competitors of US Steel. In contrast, Nippon Steel has very few production capabilities in the United States.

If Washington won’t allow this transaction—involving a buyer from a G7 country—then what foreign buyer would it see as a permissible owner?

The acquisition will preserve more than fourteen thousand US jobs, and Nippon Steel is better positioned than was US Steel to invest in advanced technologies necessary to keep production profitable and growing. The company has ambitious goals to increase its global production to one hundred million tons a year, and therefore will likely invest in plant expansions that will create new jobs for US workers. The prospect of job creation and the fact that US Steel would retain its name and Pittsburgh headquarters would usually be seen positively in an election year. The outcome might, for example, be viewed as a sign of a booming domestic steel industry with lucrative employment opportunities in the industrial Midwest, an area of the country with outsized influence over presidential election outcomes.

The transaction is also a “win” for “friendshoring” policy objectives, which were first announced by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in April 2022 at the Atlantic Council. These objectives emphasize cultivating closer trade and investment connections with reliable geopolitical allies, especially for critical supply chains. There is very little risk that Nippon Steel would offshore production, as the business rationale for the acquisition rests on serving North American markets and low US production costs due to low energy prices compared to prices in Europe or Japan. Instead, the company’s expansion into the US market can help provide both the United States and other countries the ability to further diversify their steel supply needs away from China. As Biden administration officials have repeatedly admitted, the United States cannot reduce its reliance on Chinese-made critical inputs alone.

Despite all the benefits of the deal, some policymakers have voiced vociferous opposition to it, arguing that the deal is bad for union workers and also a danger to US national security. Several members of Congress have requested that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review and potentially block the transaction. The Biden administration has also expressed wariness, saying that the deal needs “serious scrutiny.”

A CFIUS prohibition would be a mistake. First, CFIUS is supposed to be narrowly focused on national security risks, not broad economic competitiveness or national prestige concerns. It is very hard to credibly argue that a Japanese owner of a US business would suddenly stop selling steel to US buyers, particularly since the business rationale for the acquisition is so that Nippon Steel can more competitively serve the North American market. Washington blocking such a sale to a close Group of Seven (G7) partner would indicate that CFIUS has veered from narrow national security concerns to the business of broader economic protection. This would invite retaliation against US companies abroad and undermine US messages about the importance of an open, market-oriented, and rules-based economic system.

Second, US leaders are understandably concerned about China’s willingness to use its control over critical supply chains to engage in coercive economic practices. To address these concerns, the United States needs other countries—and particularly its closest allies—to trust that it remains an open and welcoming place for their businesses. If Washington won’t allow this transaction—involving a buyer from a G7 country—then what foreign buyer would it see as a permissible owner? A block would communicate that the steel industry is completely closed off to foreign investors. Allied and partner countries and their companies would understandably lose confidence that the US market will remain open to them. A lack of trust has the potential to frustrate efforts to invest resources in restructuring these critical supply chains at global volume to effectively insulate the United States and its friends from coercive Chinese trade practices.

A block would communicate that the steel industry is completely closed off to foreign investors.

Finally, there is one concern regarding foreign acquisitions in critical industries that is worth considering. Because Nippon Steel is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, this deal would likely cause US Steel to delist from the New York Stock Exchange, which would limit the power of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the company. Many Japanese-listed companies that have acquired US businesses voluntarily provide annual financial disclosures to the SEC, as should Nippon Steel.

More importantly, because Nippon Steel is listed in Japan, it is subject to Japanese corporate governance rules rather than US ones. The US government may worry about the national security implications if the company acquires US Steel and then is subsequently acquired by a more problematic third party, such as a Chinese entity. If Japan had weak corporate governance practices, this would be a more relevant concern. However, Japanese corporate structures are notorious for guarding against hostile takeovers, making this scenario exceedingly unlikely. Still, other countries don’t always have as strong protections; rather than blocking transactions with close allies, the United States should be engaging in greater outreach to allies and partners with weaker corporate governance structures to encourage reforms that alleviate these kinds of worries.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a 2023-2024 scholar-in-residence at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative and an associate professor of international studies at Indiana University, Bloomington.

16. Ukraine’s War Effort Is Stuck. This Heroic Battlefield Failure Shows Why.

Stories from the human domain of warfare.

These excerpts are the extent of the analysis in this piece. Ukraine needs more weapons and ammunition and equipment. And the right weapons and equipment.

Excerpts:

Ukraine had turned the world’s expectation on its head in 2022 by repelling a Russian assault on Kyiv and reclaiming some lost territory. The failure of its counteroffensive in 2023, on the other hand, has led to a number of bleak realizations as the war approaches the start of its third year. 

The biggest problem may be that Ukraine is insufficiently armed to penetrate Russian defenses. The U.S. and allies were willing to provide armored vehicles for the counteroffensive—but not modern fighter jets that are central to the way Western militaries attack. That left Ukraine mismatched with its opponent. The derring-do of Ukrainians like those in Kharchenko’s company that brought victories in 2022 is no longer enough against entrenched defenses.

“This isn’t World War II and Guderian,” said a senior Ukrainian security official, referring to German Gen. Heinz Guderian, a pioneer of Blitzkrieg. “This is World War I and trenches.”

It’s unclear whether Ukraine and its allies can craft an alternative approach. Ukraine has lost thousands of troops, including some of its most skilled and best-motivated fighters, like the men from Kharchenko’s company. The counteroffensive fizzled with an advance of only a few square miles to show for it.

Ukraine’s top military officer says it needs better technology to defeat an enemy with a population more than three times larger, but support from the U.S., Ukraine’s most critical ally, is wobbling amid domestic political squabbles. 

“I understand the West’s reasoning not to give us everything they have,” said Kharchenko. “But what will they do when there’s no one left to give to?”

Ukraine’s War Effort Is Stuck. This Heroic Battlefield Failure Shows Why.

Rout of elite Ukraine forces in counteroffensive is a lesson in why the war effort is stalled

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-counteroffensive-5b309595?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By James MarsonFollow and Oksana Grytsenko

Jan. 10, 2024 12:01 am ET

The planners of Ukraine’s counteroffensive against the country’s Russian invaders last year envisioned that elite forces, like the unit led by Capt. Anatoliy Kharchenko, would sweep in to deliver the final blows of a D-Day-like triumph. 

But by the time paratroopers in Kharchenko’s company entered the battle on a moonless night last August, the counteroffensive was already skidding toward failure—and his men were about to learn all of the deadly reasons why. 

As the company crept along the edge of a field in southeastern Ukraine, the operation’s objectives had already been severely downsized. Because the West had dithered for months over the provision of tanks and other armored vehicles, the Russians were ready. They had dug in on the flat farmland of southeastern Ukraine, laying hundreds of thousands of mines and setting up firing positions for machine guns and antitank missiles.

The first wave of Ukrainian brigades, launched in June, had barely advanced and suffered heavy losses. A switch to small, infantry assaults had been stymied as well, advancing just a short distance and seizing only one village. Now Kharchenko’s company came in not as closers, but as a final roll of the dice.

Their initial goal, assaulting a hill near the village of Verbove, was modest. But things went badly wrong within minutes. 

Just after dawn on Aug. 12, drones swept overhead as they approached the target along a line of trees between farm fields. Kharchenko’s men had been told Russian drones would be downed by Ukrainian jamming equipment and assumed they were their own. Then the drones began dropping explosives. The trees exploded with machine-gun fire. Grenades lobbed from automatic launchers burst around them. 

The platoon was incapacitated. More than half of its 20 or so men were dead or wounded within minutes, including the medic.

“What shall we do with the injured? F—!” Senior Sgt. Maksym Serheyev, commander of the first platoon, yelled over the radio to his commander. “There are more of them than us.”

A Russian soldier appeared suddenly, just yards away, and opened fire. Serheyev shot back, and the Russian fell down, apparently dead. Serheyev realized he had been hit, too. A bullet had grazed his right cheek and sliced through his ear lobe. As he fell down, a second bullet had pierced his CamelBak water pack. He had been millimeters from a fatal wound.

Senior Sgt. Maksym Serheyev, known by his call sign Cannoli, is evacuated after being ambushed by Russian soldiers. PHOTO: MAKSYM SERHEYEV

The Ukrainian assault was over before it had even begun. Kharchenko’s desperate new mission was to retrieve their dead and rescue as many as possible of those who remained alive.

“We really landed in it,” Serheyev said later. 

Ukraine had turned the world’s expectation on its head in 2022 by repelling a Russian assault on Kyiv and reclaiming some lost territory. The failure of its counteroffensive in 2023, on the other hand, has led to a number of bleak realizations as the war approaches the start of its third year. 

The biggest problem may be that Ukraine is insufficiently armed to penetrate Russian defenses. The U.S. and allies were willing to provide armored vehicles for the counteroffensive—but not modern fighter jets that are central to the way Western militaries attack. That left Ukraine mismatched with its opponent. The derring-do of Ukrainians like those in Kharchenko’s company that brought victories in 2022 is no longer enough against entrenched defenses.

“This isn’t World War II and Guderian,” said a senior Ukrainian security official, referring to German Gen. Heinz Guderian, a pioneer of Blitzkrieg. “This is World War I and trenches.”

Ukraine’s push southward

Front line Aug. 1, 2023

Russian-controlled area Dec. 31

UKRAINE

Dnipro

Detail

Velyka Novosilka

Zaporizhzhia

Orikhiv

Robotyne

Verbove

Tokmak

Melitopol

Berdyansk

20 miles

Sea of Azov

20 km

Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Andrew Barnett/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

It’s unclear whether Ukraine and its allies can craft an alternative approach. Ukraine has lost thousands of troops, including some of its most skilled and best-motivated fighters, like the men from Kharchenko’s company. The counteroffensive fizzled with an advance of only a few square miles to show for it.

Ukraine’s top military officer says it needs better technology to defeat an enemy with a population more than three times larger, but support from the U.S., Ukraine’s most critical ally, is wobbling amid domestic political squabbles. 

“I understand the West’s reasoning not to give us everything they have,” said Kharchenko. “But what will they do when there’s no one left to give to?”

Capt. Anatoliy Kharchenko visits the gravesites of his fallen soldiers at a cemetery outside of Kyiv. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

‘Always first’

Kharchenko—the 45-year-old commander better known by his call sign Khorol, the name of his ancestral hometown—was the leader of a company from Ukraine’s air-assault forces.

Fewer than half of the around 100 soldiers were battle-tested veterans like Khorol. He had taken part in a daring mission to stop the Russians from landing reinforcements at a Kyiv airport on the very first day of the war, then took charge of the company, which chased Russians out of forests in the northeast. His first platoon was led by Serheyev, a 44-year-old former sports journalist who acquired the call sign Cannoli after bringing a box of the Sicilian pastries from his coffee shop to a militia he joined early in the full-scale war.

The rest were total newcomers stepping in for those who have died in battle. The closest these soldiers had come to a battlefield was in their training programs in places like the U.K.

The men included Grizzly, a broad-shouldered 30-year-old from a farming family in northern Ukraine, and 43-year-old Taler, a coin collector who had been deputy director of a construction company. There was a tattoo artist known as Ink, a teacher from occupied Berdyansk on the Azov coast, and a children’s entertainer from an amusement park called “Happy Kids.”

The motto of Ukraine’s air-assault forces is “Always first!” But much of this company’s hardware was developed decades ago when Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union, including lightly armored scout cars and three motorbikes with sidecars produced in the 1960s. It also uses the soldiers’ own vehicles or ones provided by donors, which are constantly in need of repairs.

The age of the scout vehicles hardly mattered—they would serve little purpose on the booby-trapped battlefield Khorol’s company entered on the morning of Aug. 12. To avoid detection, they had to leave the vehicles miles away and walk in. (“We’d never drive closer because the vehicles would just be destroyed,” Cannoli had explained to his French instructors a few weeks earlier.)

The unit stuck to thin trenches recently seized from the Russians because everything around them was mined. That meant walking over enemy corpses decomposing in the heat. At midnight Cannoli called a halt, because it was hard to see where they were going in the pitch black. They rested for three hours in the trenches, then set off again. 

Senior Sgt. Maksym Serheyev attends the funeral ceremony of his lost comrade known as Berdyansk in Kyiv. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The final stretch took them south along a line of shrubs and trees at the edge of a field. The Russians held the eastern edge of the field. The target was a hill that lay beyond an intersection between treelines.

That’s when the Russians launched their surprise assault. Two company members were killed immediately from grenade blasts: Ink, the 32-year-old tattoo artist, and Forty-Five, the platoon medic known by his age. Another, a man known as Bull was wounded by an explosion close to Cannoli and died later. Several men froze in fear. They’d had plenty of training, Grizzly said, “but when bullets whistle over your head and slap into branches above you, it’s something different.”

Cannoli, his face badly bleeding, called on his remaining men—only about half of the original 20—to pull back. Hearing Russians closing in and calling on them to surrender, Grizzly tossed a couple of grenades. Only a handful of healthy men remained to help the injured and find a way out. 

“Come on, crawl!” Cannoli called to those lying with injured legs. “Guys, we can’t drag you out. We’re injured ourselves. Crawl!”

‘They are your guys’

The company’s path out was the same as the way in, along the edge of the field back to a place where a vehicle might be able to pick them up. Khorol sent his personal jeep to evacuate the wounded but it got stuck in a hole in the road, the remnant of a mortar bomb. He dispatched an armored vehicle, which was pummeled by a machine gun.

So the job fell to one of the company’s Soviet-era motorbikes. Cannoli squeezed into the sidecar with another soldier whose leg was bound by a tourniquet, and the driver set off across a field that they knew was mined. The bike’s engine kept dying, so Cannoli, nearly fainting from blood loss, and his wounded companion would slide out every few hundred yards or so and push it to get it rolling again. He eventually made it to a medical-aid station, where a medic sewed his face up with 40 stitches. The motorbike shuttled back for more wounded.

Taler, meanwhile, had been hit by shrapnel in the leg, heel and shoulder by grenades dropped from drones. Nearby lay Berdyansk, the teacher from that port city, who was mortally wounded. As the Russians closed in, Taler could barely move after cinching a tourniquet on his thigh. 

Sure he was done for, Taler rolled into the field and lay on his side, playing dead. He buried his telephone so it wouldn’t wind up in enemy hands and fumbled for a grenade; he had no intention of surrendering alive. At that moment, Ukrainian artillery began firing and the Russians withdrew.

Russian drones hovered overhead. Over the next half-hour or so, two swooped in and dropped grenades nearby, but missed Taler. Realizing he needed to move, Taler loosened the tourniquet to get some feeling back in his leg, but he was still bleeding, so he tightened it again. A third drone buzzed toward him and dropped a grenade, which also missed. “This is my last chance,” Taler said to himself.

After being hit by grenade shrapnel, a soldier known as Taler had played dead on the battlefield to stay alive. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

When the drone flew off, he loosened the tourniquet. There was a bit less bleeding. He began to crawl. Soon he was deep in the field under the cover of tall grass and weeds that had grown on the unfarmed land. He dragged his body two miles in about six hours under the beating sun. When he arrived at a Ukrainian trench in the next treeline, he drained most of a 5-liter water bottle in huge gulps.

By the end of the day, only three of 22 men in the first platoon remained fully fit.

The following day, Khorol met with some of the men and showed them images from a drone showing where their four dead comrades lay. “Grizzly, they are your guys,” he said.

Grizzly headed back with a rescue team, but they were beaten back by heavy gunfire and took more casualties. The company medic was killed when half his head was blown off by a mortar bomb.

“You walk, you crawl, you run, then you walk, you crawl just to get there. And then you get back the same way. You drag your comrades,” Grizzly said.

The next day, Khorol ordered artillery to lay down a smoke curtain to disorient the enemy. Russian drones couldn’t see the Ukrainians’ movement, and the Russians in the trenches were busy pulling on gas masks, fearing a gas attack of the kind the Russians themselves employed. There was no wind, and by the time the smoke dispersed the Ukrainians were in the trench. The Russians ran away, and the Ukrainians hit them with cluster bombs.

An exhausted Grizzly provided supporting fire from a ditch because his rifle “was on its last legs,” he said. “It was spitting rather than firing.”

Serheyev sees a Russian soldier during the battle. PHOTO: MAKSYM SERHEYEV

After a hard day of fighting, the company had achieved its original aim of taking the hill. But the cost was high. It was turning dark around 8:30 p.m. when Grizzly went to help a group carrying a dead soldier out. There was little noise, as both sides had stopped shooting out of exhaustion. Another soldier, sensing Grizzly’s fatigue, offered to take the handle of the canvas stretcher. Grizzly tossed the dead man’s machine gun over his shoulder and led the way. The men stumbled and cursed.

Grizzly turned and saw the men had stopped to rest. A mortar bomb exploded just in front of him, about where they would have been if they hadn’t stopped. Grizzly was knocked down. He had a sharp pain in his leg and no feeling in his hand. He picked himself up, scraped the dirt from his mouth and checked his leg and arm were still there. They were, but he’d been peppered with shrapnel, most worryingly in the groin.

He applied a tourniquet to his leg and began to limp through the field, as he knew he’d be too heavy for the others to carry. He followed the track marks of an armored vehicle on the assumption there would be no mines and radioed Khorol, who sent the buggy to fetch him from the evacuation point.

It took him about an hour to lumber 500 yards to meet the buggy, which took him to a medical-aid station. Nurses pulled off his boots and cut off his clothing.

‘When bullets whistle over your head and slap into branches above you, it’s something different, ’ said the junior sergeant known as Grizzly. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“Doc, if I’ve been hit in the balls, just finish me off,” Grizzly cried to the surgeon.

The doctor told him everything was where it should be.

“Thank god I have small balls,” Grizzly said. The doctor and his aides laughed.

They recovered two of the four bodies that day, but they were in a pitiful state, discolored and bloated from the summer heat and with their faces disfigured, apparently mutilated after death by the Russians. Cannoli received their photos while in hospital and had to identify them by their tattoos and clothes.

Inching forward

Despite the deadly setbacks, Khorol’s company tweaked its tactics and pressed on toward Verbove. New recruits replaced the dead and injured.

Khorol deployed assault teams often numbering as few as five to avoid drawing the attention of Russian drones or artillery. Small support teams would bring ammunition and water to assault teams, and help them deal with any wounded. 

When they suffered casualties, the Ukrainians would throw more men into attempts to save their wounded or recover bodies. But the Russians would often leave their dead and injured where they fell, avoiding additional losses but leaving a stench of rotting flesh in the trenches.

“That’s their attitude to their own people,” Khorol said. “It’s cynical, but it’s rational.”

Khorol’s company could tell they were advancing through the Russian lines as the nature of the trenches changed. At first, the trenches were littered with dead Russian soldiers and abandoned weapons. As they approached Verbove, they found trenches with rudimentary kitchens, sinks and toilets.

On Aug. 25, the unit assaulted a trench network on the eastern edge of Verbove. Another airborne unit had tried to break through there on armored vehicles but the Russians had hit them with antitank missiles. So a team from Khorol’s company went on foot.

‘We really landed in it,’ Serheyev said of the battle. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Around 4 a.m. Khorol had moved his command post forward when a blast caused by a mine or another kind of explosive fired out shrapnel, injuring his hand, killing one soldier and wounding several others. Khorol was taken to a medical-aid station.

The assault squad of a dozen men were angry and pumped up by the losses. Led by a sergeant known as Hrom, or Thunder, a huge man who liked to carry a PKM machine gun rather than a rifle, they thrust into the trench.

A 20-year-old soccer fan known as Maliy, or Kid, and 28-year-old children’s entertainer Syava remained at the entrance to stand guard. The rest pushed on, sending the Russians fleeing despite being outnumbered. They ran out of ammunition but they picked up weapons and bullets from Russians they had killed and pressed further. Suddenly, Hrom emerged from the trench and found himself on the edge of Verbove, well behind Russian lines. He was cut down by a machine gun. The men pulled back under heavy bombardment, dragging Hrom. In the chaos, they didn’t see exactly what had happened to Syava and Maliy.

Returning to his company the next day, Khorol struggled to raise a rescue team.

“I don’t blame you,” he told his men. “You’re all shook up as it is.”

In the end, he offered to reward volunteers with seven days off.

The rescuers found the men buried under a mound of earth near the entrance to the trench. A 152-millimeter mortar round had scored a direct hit. Maliy, who was taller, was most likely killed immediately by the blastwave. Khorol believes Syava must have survived the initial explosion as he appeared to have started unfastening his body armor to remove it but couldn’t and succumbed to a shrapnel wound around his collarbone.

“It’s hard for me to think about,” said Khorol.

Names and numbers

It was a snowy day in early December when Cannoli, Taler and a dozen other soldiers gathered at a crematorium in Kyiv to bid farewell to the soldier they knew as Berdyansk, the man from that occupied city who died on Aug. 12. By the time his body was recovered it was unrecognizable and took months for his identity to be confirmed by DNA testing.

According to Ukrainian tradition, the mourners touched the coffin to say farewell. There was Cannoli, whose hearing was damaged after he was wounded. He had just received a hearing aid and is hoping to become an instructor in air-assault forces. And there was Taler, who had recovered from his injuries and joined a unit focused on electronic warfare.

Taler attends Berdyansk’s cremation ceremony.. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A photo of Berdyansk is displayed at his cremation. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The funeral officiant addressed the gathering: “Russia is sending its scum here, and we are losing our best children.”

After a three-volley salute ended the ceremony, soldiers quickly piled into their vehicles. They had a long drive back to Zaporizhia.

Verbove remains in Russian hands. Further infantry assaults by Khorol’s men led to further small gains, but more losses and no significant breakthrough.

On a recent visit to a cemetery in Kyiv, Khorol visited the graves of Maliy and Syava. He recalled parachute training with Maliy and letting Syava, who he’d promoted to sergeant, have days off to visit his pregnant wife. Both men had been with him on the successful operation in forests in the northeast.

Khorol held one cross after the other, leaning forward and whispering a few words.

“I gave you that badge, buddy,” he said to the portrait of Maliy, a fresh-faced youth flashing a smile.

“I hate this tradition of touching crosses,” he added. “I’ve done it too many times.”

Khorol is handing over command of his company. A promotion is in the cards. He wants it, he said, less for the prestige than because he would no longer have to lose soldiers he knew so well.

“I want to know people as numbers,” he said, “not by names.”

Soldiers from the summer counteroffensive commemorate a lost brigade member at Baikove Crematorium and Cemetery in Kyiv. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com

17. Israeli Special Forces Stake Out Mideast Terror Hotspots In Case Hostages Are Smuggled From Gaza: Report

Israel should not be alone in this effort.

Israeli Special Forces Stake Out Mideast Terror Hotspots In Case Hostages Are Smuggled From Gaza: Report

Israel suspects Hamas may use tunnels under the border with Egypt to move the remaining hostages

Published 01/10/24 06:59 AM ET|Updated 10 min ago

Peter S. Green

themessenger.com · January 10, 2024

Fearing that Hamas could smuggle the remaining 110 or so hostages still thought to be alive out of Gaza as Israel presses its assault on the region, Israeli special forces are reportedly operating in Egypt’s Sinai desert, Libya, and Sudan, areas where Islamist groups or governments could shelter Hamas leaders and hostages, according to a report in the Lebanese news site Al-Akhbar.

Citing unnamed sources in Egypt, the newspaper said Hamas may be intending to transfer hostages and leaders to Egypt “in preparation for transferring them to other places in the region, specifically to Iran or Lebanon.”

The newspaper said Israel officials in Cairo for talks with Egypt told their hosts they suspect Hamas is using tunnels under the border with Egypt to smuggle weapons into Gaza and demanded access to check for signs of underground passages.

Egypt has reportedly refused to grant Israel access and said it would perform the checks itself.

The Israel Defence Forces did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment on the Akhbar report.

Some 112 living hostages and the bodies of about two dozen more are thought to remain in Gaza. But not all are in the hands of Hamas, with some hostages being held by the rival Palestinian Islamic JIhad group and others believed to be held by local crime families.

Israel is under growing internal pressure to retrieve the remaining hostages, but most of its military operations to rescue them have failed — most spectacularly last month, when three hostages who’d escaped their captors in the battle for Gaza City and walked toward Israeli troops shirtless and waving a white flag while shouting in Hebrew that they were hostages. An Israeli sniper shot all three.

Earlier this week, reports emerged that Israeli forces believe that Hamas' most senior leader in Gaza, Yahiya Sinwar, is hiding in a network of tunnels under his hometown of Khan Younis surrounded by hostages to protect him from Israeli raids.

Multiple local press reports say Israeli forces know exactly where Sinwar is, but fear the hostages could be killed if they try to extract the terrorist leader, one of the masterminds of the Oct. 7 attacks.

themessenger.com · January 10, 2024

18. 3 things China, Russia learned from Secretary Austin's secret hospitalization

I don't know. What went wrong with US national security? "Did we choke?" as the journalist assesses Putin's thinking. Did we not still strike targets? Did operations not continue? Maybe the lesson to be learned is that the national security apparatus conintues to function even if the head of the agency is incapacitated.

And the other lesson learned is to look at how the American political system divides the public and exploits an incident like this to further sow division in the US.

But this may be the real problem and it does not make the American people have confidence in their leadership.

Let me just add, it still looks like Team Biden prefers to hide its national security business from the American people. Remember the giant Chinese spy balloon? Recently, it was revealed that Pentagon officials had discussed the balloon for almost a week before it became news. And they delayed further before an F-22 fighter plane from Virginia finally shot it down off the North Carolina coast on Feb. 4, 2023.

Most of Biden’s national security team was chosen for their longstanding connections to Biden dating back to his vice presidency (Austin) and time in the Senate (Blinken.) They came into office hoping to put military issues on the back burner and let diplomacy step forward. Then came Afghanistan, Ukraine, Taiwan, Gaza and the Red Sea. Despite all these overlapping crises, the Pentagon cannot handle a simple, temporary transfer of authority.

Rhode Island Democrat Sen. Jack Reed, who chairs the Armed Services Committee, said this week, "This lack of disclosure must never happen again."

I wholeheartedly agree.

3 things China, Russia learned from Secretary Austin's secret hospitalization

You can bet Russia's Putin and China's Xi gleaned important information from the Biden administration's latest national security fumble

  By Rebecca Grant Fox News

Published January 10, 2024 2:00am EST

foxnews.com · by Rebecca Grant Fox News

The Pentagon is finally releasing details about Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s multi-day hospitalization related to prostate cancer. However, the incident has left me wondering: what did China's Xi Jinping and Russia's Vladimir Putin learn from this embarrassing fumble?

"The event reflected a disorderly US government," cackled China’s state-run mouthpiece Global Times on Jan. 8.

Sadly, Austin’s image came down a peg. Not because of any medical procedures, we all wish him a full recovery from prostate cancer, but because he’s not running a tight ship.

DEFENSE SECRETARY LLOYD AUSTIN DIAGNOSED WITH PROSTATE CANCER

Austin was a natural choice for Secretary of Defense because Biden’s team knew him well when he was the commander of U.S. Central Command. He’s been a huge success at keeping together the 50 nations who support Ukraine and he’s also been deeply engaged with Israel.

But this slip was costly for the USA.

Video

First, Xi and Putin will be wondering if American nuclear command and control was ever compromised. The standard procedure is to swap in a replacement for the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command if the SecDef is briefly unavailable. You can understand why the Joint Staff and the Pentagon don’t like to go into details.

t took a week to figure out how to handle Austin’s medical emergency. The Pentagon won’t have a week if China goes hostile against Taiwan.

But secondly, the basics are simple. President Joe Biden can access military command and control at all times. That’s why he flies on Air Force One. The president, Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders travel often. If they have to launch nuclear weapons, they convene a threat conference – like a phone call – to execute the orders. Honestly, they can do it from anywhere, which is why they have military aides with super-secret cell phones and other gear.

Video

Anywhere, except the back of an ambulance or the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) if one key leader is in severe pain.

WHITE HOUSE LAUNCHING REVIEW OF CABINET PROTOCOLS AFTER DEFENSE SECRETARY'S SECRET HOSPITALIZATION: MEMO

Officials in the military chain of command and control don’t get the same medical privacy rights as ordinary people. Especially when their duties include nuclear weapons. Rank and file military members who serve on nuclear-armed submarines, sit alert for the ICBMs, or man the bomber force are already in very strict programs where their conduct and medical status is monitored. Captains of nuclear submarines can’t go off and have mystery medical emergencies. They have to make plans, and hand over command.

Even if nuclear command and control remained intact during Austin's secret hospitalization, Xi and Putin saw that U.S. national security decision-making can choke. According to the Global Times, "due to the suddenness, fast pace, and high intensity of modern warfare, the efficiency of command and control directly affects the operation of war." Wordy, but accurate.

Video

This is a crucial tactical indicator for Xi Jinping, who will look to blindside Biden if he tries a military move against Taiwan this year. It took a week to figure out how to handle Austin’s medical emergency. The Pentagon won’t have a week if China goes hostile against Taiwan.

CLICK HERE FOR MORE FOX NEWS OPINION

Third, Austin’s team is not proactive. This is hardly a surprise to anyone who has watched American foreign policy over the last 2 ½ years. What I mean is, they have no instinct for looking down the football field and reading the defense. They aren’t trying to stay one step ahead of China, Russia, or anybody else.

Despite overlapping crises around the world, the Pentagon cannot handle a simple, temporary transfer of authority.

How easy it would have been to release a statement before Christmas saying that Secretary Austin would be on medical leave for several days over the holidays while another official assumed his duties. America can’t afford to be so clumsy when China is racing to topple us as a global superpower.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin remains hospitalized a week after suffering severe pain following an elective procedure related to prostate cancer, the Pentagon shared on Tuesday. (Ian Waldie/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

Let me just add, it still looks like Team Biden prefers to hide its national security business from the American people. Remember the giant Chinese spy balloon? Recently, it was revealed that Pentagon officials had discussed the balloon for almost a week before it became news. And they delayed further before an F-22 fighter plane from Virginia finally shot it down off the North Carolina coast on Feb. 4, 2023.

Most of Biden’s national security team was chosen for their longstanding connections to Biden dating back to his vice presidency (Austin) and time in the Senate (Blinken.) They came into office hoping to put military issues on the back burner and let diplomacy step forward. Then came Afghanistan, Ukraine, Taiwan, Gaza and the Red Sea. Despite all these overlapping crises, the Pentagon cannot handle a simple, temporary transfer of authority.

Rhode Island Democrat Sen. Jack Reed, who chairs the Armed Services Committee, said this week, "This lack of disclosure must never happen again."

I wholeheartedly agree.

foxnews.com · by Rebecca Grant Fox News

19. America Will Have to Heavily Arm NATO’s Six Frontline States If Ukraine Falters—Especially Finland

And the American people will ask why. Why can't they army themselves?

Excerpts:

Given its long border with Russia, Finland is also a logical candidate for M1A1 Abrams tanks. The M1A1 is superior to any tank fielded by the Russian military.

Thankfully, Ukraine is still holding its own and not backing down in the face of Russian aggression. It is focusing much of its efforts on ousting the Russian army from the country’s easternmost regions, and has gained a foothold on the eastern side of the Dnipro River. Even Russian military leaders have admitted to this being the case. Maintaining this foothold will likely be the deciding factor in Ukraine’s ability to recapture Crimea, which was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014.

However, there are also reports that the Ukrainian army has sustained heavy losses. And though they have made these strides ahead of winter, this year’s winter is predicted to be harsher than the last. Their fortunes could turn, and their progress could be reversed under the wrong mix of circumstances.

This is the wrong moment for members of Congress to reduce arms transfers to Ukraine on the table. Conditions of war are changeable, and Congress cannot afford to assume that if Ukraine is lost, the cost of defending the West will not become far greater.

America Will Have to Heavily Arm NATO’s Six Frontline States If Ukraine Falters—Especially Finland

By Sarah White

January 10, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/10/america_will_have_to_heavily_arm_natos_six_frontline_states_if_ukraine_faltersespecially_finland_1003940.html

Amid the chaos of last year’s House of Representatives Speaker fight, Congressional aid to Ukraine became a casualty. When Kevin McCarthy, a supporter of the Ukraine war effort, was ousted, that support was not shared by his successors and several of his colleagues. Since then, aid to Ukraine has become more divisive and stuck in limbo.

Likely contributing to this are perceptions of Ukraine’s chances of victory. While Ukraine is still resilient against Russian attacks, its stamina is not infinite; the average age of its soldiers is 40, and it has a much smaller population than Russia. There are some on Capitol Hill who are calling for reductions in armaments sent to Ukraine, while others believe the U.S. has already failed to adequately equip Ukraine to defend itself. This is consistent with the fact that globally, aid to Ukraine has gradually decreased in the last year.

But what that faction in Congress fails to acknowledge or understand is that it is infinitely more dangerous for Ukraine to be defeated and have Russia on the doorstep of the West. If Ukraine’s efforts are exhausted and Russia prevails, the U.S. will have to heavily arm the six countries that make up NATO’s eastern flank—Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania—unless it wants to send troops and fight its allies’ war for them.

The frontline state that has received the most assistance thus far is Poland, due to its large, shared border with Ukraine. Poland has upheld its two percent of GDP commitment to defense spending and has been the United States’ most indispensable NATO partner since the war in Ukraine began. Likewise, the United States has signed five-year defense cooperation agreements with each of the three Baltic countries, which include “integrated air and missile defense... participation in international military operations and exercises, infrastructure development and training,” according to the Pentagon.

However, Finland’s recent accession to NATO doubled the alliance’s border with Russia overnight, providing a buffer against the vulnerability of the three small Baltic countries. But as a result, Moscow has escalated the rhetoric it used for years to dissuade Finland from joining NATO in the first place, graduating from implicit threats of aggression to overt ones. As Vladimir Putin commented as early as 2016: "What do you think we will do in this situation? We moved our forces back [from the border], 1500 kilometers away. Will we keep our forces there?"  

Now, Russia’s permanent diplomat to international organizations, Mikhail Ulyanov, has stated that Finland would be the “first to suffer” in the event of a war between Russia and NATO. “Since they are our neighbors, if, God forbid there is some escalation, they will be the first to suffer,” Ulyanov told RIA Novosti, a state-owned news outlet.

He also described the defense cooperation agreement between Finland and the United States, in which Finland allowed U.S. troops to be stationed and military equipment to be stored at Finnish bases, right on Russia’s doorstep, as “already a serious challenge” to Moscow.

In response to the defense agreement with the U.S., Finland’s ambassador to Russia was also warned that Moscow will "not leave unanswered the buildup of NATO military potential on our border, which threatens the security of the Russian Federation, and would take the necessary measures to counter the aggressive decisions of Finland and its NATO allies."

Given those threats, Finland is likely the most urgent candidate to receive new U.S. equipment. In preparation for the need to defend a massive NATO border with Russia, Helsinki is already scheduled to receive 64 of the F-35A, the most advanced combat aircraft currently available. The F-35A is an invaluable asset to the U.S. and its NATO allies for its ability to collect and share more information than other tactical aircraft due to its virtual invisibility to enemy radar, and for its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Given its long border with Russia, Finland is also a logical candidate for M1A1 Abrams tanks. The M1A1 is superior to any tank fielded by the Russian military.

Thankfully, Ukraine is still holding its own and not backing down in the face of Russian aggression. It is focusing much of its efforts on ousting the Russian army from the country’s easternmost regions, and has gained a foothold on the eastern side of the Dnipro River. Even Russian military leaders have admitted to this being the case. Maintaining this foothold will likely be the deciding factor in Ukraine’s ability to recapture Crimea, which was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014.

However, there are also reports that the Ukrainian army has sustained heavy losses. And though they have made these strides ahead of winter, this year’s winter is predicted to be harsher than the last. Their fortunes could turn, and their progress could be reversed under the wrong mix of circumstances.

This is the wrong moment for members of Congress to reduce arms transfers to Ukraine on the table. Conditions of war are changeable, and Congress cannot afford to assume that if Ukraine is lost, the cost of defending the West will not become far greater.

Sarah White, M.A. is Senior Research Analyst and Editor at the Lexington Institute.

20. Lawmakers Push for More Nuclear Microreactors in INDOPACOM

First priority should be to support US forces in austere bases and perhaps even in permanent pbases to reduce the burden on the host nation. But if these are rapidly deployable they could be useful for operations in north Korea during stability operations following post conflict or post regime collapse.

Lawmakers Push for More Nuclear Microreactors in INDOPACOM

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · January 9, 2024

Jan. 9, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

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Reps. Rob Wittman and Jen Kiggans, members of the House Armed Services Committee, are pressing U.S. Indo-Pacific Command boss Adm. John Aquilino to ask for more procurement for nuclear micro-reactors in the fiscal 2025 budget request, as a way to ease the logistics of powering forward bases in his command.

“Many of our most critical military installations in your theater are heavily dependent upon imported fuel for their enduring energy needs,” wrote the two Virginia Republicans in a Jan. 8 letter. In particular, they noted that nuclear microreactors could be transported aboard C-17s.

“Fuel was a dominating consideration in our last great contest in the Pacific, and will likely play a similar role in any potential conflict with a well-equipped and determined adversary,” they added. “It would be unwise to expend such a precious resource on demands that could be so easily met by an extremely capable and reliable alternative that is impervious to mercurial weather patterns or the perils of threatened logistical lines.”

The Pentagon has multiple plans to test nuclear microreactors in the near future. Project Pele, being developed by the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office, awarded a contract to BWX Technologies of Lynchburg, Va., in 2022, and the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency are working on a test program to build a unit at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska.

Such systems could be crucial for the Air Force’s operational concept of Agile Combat Employment, as a way to avoid having to deploy large numbers of resupply aircraft to far-flung Pacific bases with fuel—under ACE, small detachments of aircraft would deploy to an established or austere base, then quickly pick up and move to another location to prevent China from being able to target all USAF assets in theater with tactical ballistic or cruise missiles.

Wittman, who chairs the tactical air and land forces subcommittee, and Kiggans, a former Navy helicopter pilot, wrote that they “believe the strategic and tactical value of these systems providing durable power to military facilities, long-range missile defense systems, and command and control centers is invaluable, considering the operational imperatives of a contested logistics environment.”

They asked for Aquilino’s “assessment of the strategic benefit to INDOPACOM if increased procurement of the microreactor” being pursued under Project Pele “was funded in the forthcoming Fiscal Year 2025 budget.” If he thinks more reactors would be a benefit, they urged that he request the powerplants, “considering the planning required for serial production of micro-nuclear reactors coupled with the lead time for fuel preparation.”

Project Pele remains on pace, but the joint Air Force-DLA effort has slowed. In September, DLA Energy rescinded its “notice of intent to award” a microreactor contract to Oklo, a California-based startup. The agency said it needed to comply with a law requiring post-award negotiations if the value of the contract exceeds $100 million. An “intent to protest” the award based on that law was filed by Ultra-Safe Nuclear Corp. of Seattle, Wash.

A DLA spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the Eielson generator is “an ongoing and active procurement and all respondents are still being considered.” The program calls for a 5-megawatt reactor that would supplement Eielson’s 15-megawatt coal plant.

The spokesperson said the DLA intends to “meet all deadlines” for the Eielson program, which calls for operational capability in 2027.

Overall interest in microreactors still remains strong. Companies attending an industry day session about microreactors in 2023 included Rolls-Royce, Seimens and Westinghouse. And just a year ago, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the first micro-reactor design—called a Small Modular Reactor—developed by NuScale Power of Portland, Ore.

Congress

National Security

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · January 9, 2024

21. America's Veterans Are Civic Assets — Let's Stop Fearing Them as 'Violent' | Opinion

Conclusion:

When we think about veterans, we should see the local leaders organizing crisis response during a flood, the poll workers ensuring the integrity of our elections, and the parents coaching sports for kids from different neighborhoods. These are America’s veterans and it’s time we told more of their stories.

America's Veterans Are Civic Assets — Let's Stop Fearing Them as 'Violent' | Opinion

Published 01/09/24 09:30 AM ET

Dan Vallone

themessenger.com · January 9, 2024

The “violent veteran” narrative is as old as war itself. Odysseus, when he finally returns to Ithaca after enduring an epic series of trials in Homer’s epic poem Odyssey, kills more than 100 people who were dishonoring his home. In the War on Terror era, this narrative took hold, with stories about veterans as “ticking time bombs,” for example. And in the aftermath of January 6, an ideological imprint was added to the mix with concerns raised about extremism within the active-duty military and among veterans.

A new study proves yet again that such concerns are unfounded, however. The Institute for Defense Analysis found “no evidence that the number of violent extremists in the military is

disproportionate to the number of violent extremists in the United States as a whole.” This report comes just months after a comparable study by RAND found “support among military veterans for extremist groups and extremist ideals appears similar to or less than levels seen among the U.S. public in general.” Together, these reports should be more than sufficient evidence to put the narrative of violence by veterans to bed — but that’s not enough.

We need to change the narrative. As with habits, changing a narrative requires that we do more than just stop perpetuating a harmful one; we must replace it with a positive one. The narrative we should lift up is that of veterans as civic assets.

Veterans long have played an outsized role in American civic life. As democracy scholar Theda Skocpol has noted, veterans were the “mainstays of voluntary membership federations” throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. For example, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) started as a group of 12 Union veterans of the Civil War in 1866 and grew to a membership of more than 400,000 Americans in 1890, becoming one of the nation’s largest civic organizations. The GAR included five presidents as members and, among other things, started Memorial Day as a national moment for remembrance. Similarly, the American Legion, a veterans organization founded in 1919, has offered its civic education program Boys State since 1935 and the American Legion Auxiliary has run Girls Nation program since 1947.

Veterans’ propensity for civic service remains strong today. The 2021 Veterans Civic Health Index — an in-depth analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data — found that veterans were more likely than their non-veteran peers to vote, volunteer and spend time with neighbors (among many civic behaviors). This is evident with civic organizations founded by the post-9/11 generation of veterans, such as The Mission Continues, Team Red, White and Blue, and More Perfect Union, that regularly bring thousands of Americans together, veteran and non-veteran, for civic and service activities.

Elevating the work of such organizations, and lifting up the narrative of veterans as civic assets, would benefit both veterans and our society more generally. The more veterans feel valued as civic assets, the more likely they will be to join groups and contribute to civic life. As James Clear, author of Atomic Habits, notes, “the more pride you have in a particular aspect of your identity, the more motivated you will be to maintain the habits associated with it.” This would generate a positive feedback loop: more veterans serving in civic life reinforces the positive narrative and creates further incentive for veterans to join. This cycle would bolster America’s civic fabric during a time of profound polarization and social isolation.

The good news is that there exists a solid bedrock of positive thought about veterans among the American public. It’s not clear, however, that this sentiment translates into seeing veterans as civic assets and engaging with them as such. The situation is complicated by the fact that fewer Americans have direct connections to the military and veteran community. This means we need intermediating organizations, especially news and cultural media, to lift up stories of veterans as civic assets if a new narrative is to take hold.

But the burden is not entirely on the media or non-veterans. All of us, regardless of our connection to the military, can take action. Veterans organizations can place greater emphasis on programming that brings veterans and non-veterans together for civic work. Civil society organizations can prioritize partnerships with local veterans organizations and reach out to the Veterans Affairs system to create new opportunities to engage veterans. And military families play a vital role in shaping this narrative. The nonprofit Blue Star Families, for example, organizes Welcome Weeks in communities across the country to welcome the hundreds of thousands of military families that relocate each year.

When we think about veterans, we should see the local leaders organizing crisis response during a flood, the poll workers ensuring the integrity of our elections, and the parents coaching sports for kids from different neighborhoods. These are America’s veterans and it’s time we told more of their stories.

Dan Vallone, an Army and Operation Enduring Freedom veteran, is founding principal at Polarization Risk Advisory, a strategy and communications consulting firm.

themessenger.com · January 9, 2024

22.  A Post-Election Risk Assessment for the Taiwan Strait

Excerpts:

Ideally, Beijing would shift to a cross-strait approach that is more responsive to Taiwanese sentiment, taking into account the way in which its coercion undercuts its goal of unification. But such a shift is unlikely, placing much of the onus of maintaining stability and discipline on Taipei and Washington. At a minimum, Beijing should communicate its intentions ahead of time — including around a potential military exercise — to inject a degree of predictability into events, as it did before Pelosi’s visit.

A potential President Lai has every interest in beginning his term with the moderation that he campaigned on. For one, he will need to reassure the significant part of the population that did not vote for him that he will be a steady hand at the wheel. Second, for his administration’s cross-strait and foreign policy approach to succeed, he will need to win Washington’s trust by dispelling questions over whether he will pursue a more radical cross-strait approach. To this end, Lai, if elected, should make clear through backchannels with Beijing that he is interested in finding a path to resuming cross-strait dialogue and cooperation that has been frozen since 2016. While he cannot politically endorse the 1992 consensus, he should, like Tsai, call in his inauguration speech for cross-strait affairs to be conducted in accordance with Taiwan’s constitution. As the constitution has “one China” elements, this would meet Beijing’s political conditions part way without abandoning Lai’s party’s position.

Washington for its part should make explicit its continued adherence to its “one China” policy and lack of support Taiwan’s independence. The Biden administration should seek to maintain open lines of communication with Beijing on Taiwan. Even if an election year makes public statements on the issue too risky for Biden, private assurances can still be conveyed. The administration should also do what it can to coordinate with members of Congress — Republicans will be difficult to influence but working with the Democrats remains important — to minimize the risk that the legislative branch undercuts efforts to signal continuity on cross-strait policies. This is a tall ask in a politically charged year, but it is important that Washington’s stance remain steady amidst the post-election political changes in Taipei.

A Post-Election Risk Assessment for the Taiwan Strait - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Amanda Hsiao · January 10, 2024

On Jan. 13, Taiwan will elect a new government whose decision-making will play an important role in shaping cross-strait dynamics for the next four years. Final polls in early January show the Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te as the favorite, marginally ahead of the Kuomintang candidate Hou You-yi, followed by the Taiwan People’s Party’s Ko Wen-je.

A Lai win will produce the most tensions in the near term because China sees this scenario as most threatening to its interests. In response, Beijing will likely increase its pressures on Taiwan even further, through a variety of coercive military and economic tools. A second milestone will come on May 20, 2024, when Taiwan’s new leader will give his inauguration speech. If Lai wins, he will not say that China and Taiwan belong to one political entity or “one China” as Beijing demands. In response, Beijing may react with a show of military strength. The level of escalation will depend on Beijing’s calculations, which will in part reflect the interactions and signals sent between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei from election day to inauguration.

Cross-strait tensions may also emerge following a Hou victory, even though this is Beijing’s preferred scenario. In this case, tensions may only appear post-2024, when Beijing may seek more political accommodation or economic integration than the Taiwanese population is willing to accept.

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A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains unlikely in the near term but careful management is required from all sides to mitigate the destabilizing potential of this transitional period. Beijing should move away from its coercive approach, recognizing that this puts its goal of unification further out of reach. However if, as is all too likely, Beijing instead escalates military pressures, possibly through a large exercise, it should at the very least communicate this ahead of time. Washington, in turn, should continue to signal to Beijing that it does not support Taiwan’s formal independence. Taipei should signal that it seeks to maintain the status quo. For Lai, this means indicating a desire to restart cross-strait dialogue and repeating current president Tsai Ing-wen’s 2016 middle-ground characterization of the cross-strait relationship.

Setting the Scene

The next president of Taiwan will be charged with navigating a precarious moment in the island’s relationship with Beijing. Preserving the status quo, in which Taiwan enjoys de facto autonomy while the two sides of the strait work to resolve Taiwan’s status peacefully, has become more difficult. The Chinese government has grown more intent on showing progress toward unification and is no longer content with merely deterring Taiwan’s formal independence (which remains impossible for the foreseeable future). To this end, Beijing has embraced a suite of coercive means to try to steer Taiwan in the direction that it prefers, even as the Taiwanese people remain steadfastly uninterested in unification. Washington and Taipei have pushed back by deepening their political relationship, accelerating Taiwan’s defense reforms, and seeking increased international backing.

This action-reaction spiral has triggered anxieties on all sides. For Beijing, it further deepens fears about permanently losing Taiwan. For Washington and Taipei, it deepens fears about a potential Chinese invasion.

All three parties nevertheless remain mutually interested in avoiding a direct military conflict in the near term. The shared desire to lower the temperature was evident in the choreography around the November 2023 summit between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden. In the days leading up to and following the meeting, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Taiwan’s National Security Council head, and Taiwan’s current president Tsai all expressed doubts over the prospect of a Chinese military assault on Taiwan in the near term. During the meeting itself, Xi reportedly said that there are no plans to take military action in 2027 or 2035, which American officials felt were possible years when China could launch an attack. A U.S. official said discussions had “matured a little bit.”

Importantly, the summit has led to the resumption of dialogue between the two militaries, which will be useful for communicating intentions in the year to come. Beyond Taiwan, the decision to hold the Xi-Biden summit was itself an indication of the other pressing priorities that the two major powers are dealing with. Beijing faces myriad economic challenges at home. Youth unemployment reached a 21.3 percent high in June 2023 while consumer confidence remains at historic lows. The property sector has yet to revive and foreign investment is leaving the country. The Biden administration faces not only its own elections but also the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts. These other priorities likely reduce the appetite for uncurbed escalation in the U.S.-Chinese relationship, even as Taiwan remains a key point of contention and focus for both.

Election Uncertainties

The campaign platforms of Taiwan’s presidential candidates reveal their views on cross-strait relations, but uncertainties over how they will govern remain. Two key measures of an effective cross-strait strategy will be the next president’s ability to keep a lid on tensions with Beijing while taking much-needed steps to continue strengthening Taiwan’s defense.

Lai pledges to continue the policies of Tsai, proposing to secure Taiwan by deepening its ties with a wide range of international actors and by shoring up the island’s defense. But in December Lai said that relying on Taiwan’s constitution to protect the island in cross-strait relations would court “disaster.” This diverges from Tsai’s formulation — that cross-strait affairs should be conducted in accordance with the constitution and other relevant laws. Because Taiwan’s constitution contains references to the idea that the two sides belong to “one China,” this formulation has served as a conveniently ambiguous framework to partially meet Beijing’s demands without being explicit. To manage the fallout Tsai subsequently repeated her formulation and said that Lai concurs. Nevertheless, questions remain over Lai’s cross-strait views and discipline when speaking publicly on the matter.

Hou’s policy is centered on engaging Beijing while also pushing Taiwan’s defense reform forward. But Hou says that the defense budget and the length of compulsory military service under his administration would be conditional on the level of threat China poses, raising questions over how that would be defined and balanced with his party’s more conciliatory approach to Beijing.

Regardless of presidential campaign promises, no one party is likely to win a majority in Taiwan’s 113-seat legislature. Whoever wins the presidency, parts of their agenda will have to undergo negotiation with the other two parties before becoming policy. For example, under a Lai administration, the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party would likely have a voice in shaping Taipei’s posture on defense spending and on agreements with China or the United States.

Uncertainties also surround the November U.S. presidential elections. Aside from the question of who will win, the campaign season will limit the options that the Biden administration has in response to cross-strait developments. The political cost of appearing weak in response to any moves that Beijing may adopt will rise, incentivizing shows of American resolve. Gestures that are meant to reassure Beijing that Washington is not fanning the flames of Taiwan independence will be harder to offer, as they could be painted as kowtowing to the Chinese Communist Party. Anti-China/pro-Taiwan posturing by Congress is likely to continue, for instance in the form of additional draft bills and resolutions whose content may contradict longstanding U.S. cross-strait policies. Few of these bills actually become law, but they contribute to Beijing’s distrust of American intentions.

Beijing’s Unyielding Position and Approach

China’s overall strategy and approach to Taiwan will stay consistent but tactics will vary according to what happens in Taipei. Beijing’s long-term strategy will continue to rest on the conviction that its growing economic and military power relative to Taiwan will eventually draw the island toward unification and deter independence, what Chinese scholar Xin Qiang calls a “self-reliant” approach. This understanding has led Beijing to adopt heavy-handed tactics despite the anti-China sentiment this stirs in Taiwan. It has also led Beijing to discount political changes on the island, in its belief that unification is inevitable. As China’s 2022 Taiwan white paper put it, “China’s development and progress are a key factor determining the course of cross-strait relations … No matter which political party or group is in power in Taiwan it cannot alter … the trend towards national reunification.”

If Hou wins, Beijing is guaranteed a variant of the formulation it prefers — the 1992 consensus, which facilitated cross-strait cooperation under the last Kuomintang administration. This is an ambiguous verbal understanding reached in 1992 between the then Kuomintang government and Beijing that only “one China” exists in the world. With a Hou government, China may temporarily ease some military and economic pressures to emphasize the point that adherence to the mainland’s line will produce benefits. However, Beijing is unlikely to revert to a carrots-only approach — it will likely maintain some pressures. Since 2014, when popular backlash in Taiwan emerged in response to efforts by the 2008–2016 Ma Ying-jeou administration to push forward economic integration with the mainland, Beijing’s expectations of what a Kuomintang government can deliver on cross-strait ties have been lowered. After an initial honeymoon phase, Beijing may seek more progress in the relationship — in the form of economic or other agreements — that a Hou administration will have difficulty selling to Taiwanese voters, renewing tensions once again.

On the other hand, Beijing will almost surely increase pressures in response to a Lai win and will engage in a “struggle” with what it believes are Lai’s pro-independence leanings and the inclination of external powers to support Taiwan’s pro-independence forces. In the lead up to and following Tsai’s election in January 2016, Beijing made clear its expectation that she uphold the 1992 consensus as the foundation for cross-strait relations. In March 2016, it restored diplomatic relations with Gambia, thereby marking the end of China’s diplomatic truce with Taipei under the Ma administration when Beijing stopped poaching Taiwan’s few diplomatic allies. When Tsai offered a formulation that fell short of Beijing’s demands in her inauguration speech, Beijing cut off dialogue in favor of economic punishments.

In line with his party’s position, Lai has said that accepting the 1992 consensus would be tantamount to giving up on Taiwanese sovereignty. For its part, China has already condemned Lai’s cross-strait position and labeled him a “golden grandchild of independence.” Lai’s statement in 2017 that he is a “political worker who advocates Taiwan’s independence” contributes to Beijing’s suspicions, as does the fact that his base in the party is inclined to emphasize Taiwan’s sovereignty.

A Lai win would be the first time that a Taiwanese political party has stayed in power for three consecutive terms. This may create impetus for Beijing to make a statement of strength, to try to undercut what it sees as political momentum for Taiwan moving further away from the mainland. In intensifying pressure, Beijing’s first goal would be to push Lai to move as close as possible to Beijing’s preferred characterization of the cross-strait relationship in his inauguration speech. Another goal would be to heighten the sense of risk for the Taiwanese population and for Washington. Importantly, Beijing hopes to compel Washington’s help in reining a Lai administration in. China believes that shows of military force can be effective in getting Washington to take Beijing’s concerns over Taiwan more seriously, a lesson learned during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Finally, Beijing would want to show its domestic audience that it is retaining the initiative on the cross-strait situation.

The tools of coercion that Beijing has at its disposal are numerous and varied. At the escalatory end of the spectrum, Beijing could choose to conduct a large-scale military exercise. Following then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, China’s military activities around Taiwan have steadily increased in frequency, variety, and proximity to the island. Beijing could further increase the number of aerial crossings of the median line — a tacitly agreed divide separating the two militaries in the Taiwan Strait for decades. More discreet tactics could include crossings that involve more time spent on Taiwan’s side of the line or that take place more frequently in narrower parts of the strait where Taiwan would have less time to respond. Circumnavigation of the island by Chinese military drones and pressures at the border of Taiwan’s contiguous zone — 24 nautical miles off its coast — could become more frequent. The Chinese military approached this sensitive area at least four times in November 2023, as did its marine research ships.

China could also challenge Taiwan’s sovereignty through non-military means. A Chinese commercial tugboat entered Taiwan’s territorial waters in November 2023 and in January 2024 Chinese balloons began to fly over the island proper. In April 2023 China conducted a “special patrol and inspection operation” during which Chinese law enforcement vessels patrolled the Taiwan Strait but did not board any vessels. A serious but less likely challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty would be if Chinese law enforcement vessels began to board and inspect vessels on Taiwan’s side of the median line, claiming that they fall under China’s jurisdiction. The cost of such a move — renewed attention to the global implications of instability in the Taiwan Strait — likely outweigh the benefits.

Economically, China has already threatened to impose punitive measures. In December 2023 China announced it would resume tariffs on 12 imports from Taiwan designated to be tariff-free under the bilateral Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Beijing could resume tariffs on additional items going forward. As it has in the past, Beijing could ban imports of individual agricultural and fishery products from regions that tend to be Democratic Progressive Party strongholds. It could also implement more sweeping bans, such as when it stopped the import of more than 2,000 of 3,200 food products from Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit.

An increase in Beijing’s coercive measures does not portend an invasion. Rather, the goal would be to put pressure on Taipei by creating new headaches for the government and the military. Beijing would also aim to deepen divisions and undermine confidence in the U.S. and Taiwanese governments within Taiwanese society. That said, an increase in military activities would inevitably increase the risk of an accident or unintended collision.

What Washington and Taipei Say and Do Matter

Even if a military assault is not around the corner, careful management of this transition period is important for ensuring that tensions do not spiral out of control. In the case of a Lai victory, how China calibrates its pressures on Taiwan will depend in part on what Taipei and Washington say and do. In contrast to the military exercises it conducted following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, for example, Beijing’s exercise after Tsai’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy — while significant — was more limited in duration and intensity. This was likely in response to Washington and Taipei’s efforts to de-escalate.

The assurances already conveyed during the November Xi-Biden summit should mitigate some of Beijing’s worst fears about a potential Lai presidency. Biden took the opportunity to directly tell Xi that America’s “one China” policy will not change, meaning that Washington will not support Taiwan independence. The check that a divided Taiwanese government would likely impose on a new Democratic Progressive Party executive should also reassure Beijing.

If Lai wins, an excessive response immediately after the election could work against Beijing’s interests. This would make it less likely for a Lai administration to adopt a moderate position on inauguration day and ruin the recently improved tone in U.S.-Chinese relations. As a result, it is possible China will initially increase pressures in relatively discreet ways and save a more forceful and overt response for the May 20 inauguration. Beijing’s response will depend partly on what Lai says that day, as well as U.S.-Chinese-Taiwanese interactions between Jan. 13 and May 20. This four-month period will be critical for all three parties to communicate intentions, concerns, and expectations.

Ideally, Beijing would shift to a cross-strait approach that is more responsive to Taiwanese sentiment, taking into account the way in which its coercion undercuts its goal of unification. But such a shift is unlikely, placing much of the onus of maintaining stability and discipline on Taipei and Washington. At a minimum, Beijing should communicate its intentions ahead of time — including around a potential military exercise — to inject a degree of predictability into events, as it did before Pelosi’s visit.

A potential President Lai has every interest in beginning his term with the moderation that he campaigned on. For one, he will need to reassure the significant part of the population that did not vote for him that he will be a steady hand at the wheel. Second, for his administration’s cross-strait and foreign policy approach to succeed, he will need to win Washington’s trust by dispelling questions over whether he will pursue a more radical cross-strait approach. To this end, Lai, if elected, should make clear through backchannels with Beijing that he is interested in finding a path to resuming cross-strait dialogue and cooperation that has been frozen since 2016. While he cannot politically endorse the 1992 consensus, he should, like Tsai, call in his inauguration speech for cross-strait affairs to be conducted in accordance with Taiwan’s constitution. As the constitution has “one China” elements, this would meet Beijing’s political conditions part way without abandoning Lai’s party’s position.

Washington for its part should make explicit its continued adherence to its “one China” policy and lack of support Taiwan’s independence. The Biden administration should seek to maintain open lines of communication with Beijing on Taiwan. Even if an election year makes public statements on the issue too risky for Biden, private assurances can still be conveyed. The administration should also do what it can to coordinate with members of Congress — Republicans will be difficult to influence but working with the Democrats remains important — to minimize the risk that the legislative branch undercuts efforts to signal continuity on cross-strait policies. This is a tall ask in a politically charged year, but it is important that Washington’s stance remain steady amidst the post-election political changes in Taipei.

Become a Member

Amanda Hsiao is International Crisis Group’s senior analyst on China, based out of Taipei.

Image: Flickr

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Amanda Hsiao · January 10, 2024

23. Taiwan’s Status Quo Election

Excerpts:

Beijing always favors the KMT candidate and this race is no exception, with China branding Lai a “destroyer of peace.” A Hou victory could be presented within China as evidence that unification is not moving out of reach, and China could then use the next four years to try to shape cross-strait dynamics in its favor. But even a Hou triumph would not reflect a turn toward favoring unification among the Taiwanese electorate: instead, it would more likely be a consequence of the electorate’s fatigue after eight years of DPP rule, a desire for change, and disappointment with how the government has handled domestic issues. This election cannot change the basic fact that, if unification were a company, it would have lost its market and would be on the brink of insolvency. Taiwan is dedicated to continuing to embed itself in the West, a process that is inimical to China’s interests. Ironically, a Hou victory could have the effect of signaling to Beijing that even the KMT cannot deliver the outcome that it seeks. The very fact that Taiwan is holding its eighth presidential election, an event that is now taken for granted as democracy has become a core component of its national identity, will be viewed in China as a risk to the CCP’s political narrative.

The question, then, is whether Xi decides that he can live with Taiwan’s trajectory or concludes that the trend lines are not moving in Beijing’s favor and that he should act to compel unification sooner rather than later. Entirely apart from Taiwan’s election, there are worrying signals that his thinking is moving in the latter direction. Xi has stated that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on to future generations and that achieving unification is the essence of the country’s rejuvenation. He has called unification a “historical inevitability,” and as Xi faces growing economic headwinds, he may seek to make unification a major part of his political legacy.

The outcome of Taiwan’s election may do little to change Xi’s calculus. Indeed, it may not even be the most important election of the year for the island’s security. Rather, that could be the U.S. presidential election in November. A victory for former U.S. President Donald Trump, who has criticized Taiwan for stealing the United States’ semiconductor industry and reportedly asked what benefit could be derived from defending Taiwan, could prompt Xi to conclude that he would not have to factor in U.S. intervention, which would dramatically alter his calculus. Such a development could well upend cross-strait stability.

Taiwan’s Status Quo Election

Why the Result Won’t Have Much Effect on Cross-Strait Relations—or U.S.-Chinese Tensions

By David Sacks

January 10, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by David Sacks · January 10, 2024

On January 13, Taiwan’s citizens will elect their next president. The candidates are framing the race in increasingly existential terms: for William Lai of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the choice facing voters is between democracy and autocracy. For Hou Yu-ih of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), the outcome will determine whether there will be war or peace in the Taiwan Strait. The third-party candidate, Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), has warned that only he can prevent war with China. Beijing has endorsed the KMT’s framing, and one official has ominously expressed the hope that Taiwan’s voters will “make the right choice between ‘peace and war.’”

Lai currently leads in the polls and is favored to win the race. Hou has, however, narrowed what was once a yawning gap and could pull off an upset. Despite their attacks on one another, the candidates are in fact broadly aligned on their foreign policy priorities. They largely agree on the need to invest more in defense, strengthen relations with the United States and Japan, and maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by eschewing either de jure independence or unification with China. The candidates all seek to secure Taiwan’s de facto independence but disagree on the best way to do so. Hou and Ko place more weight on restarting dialogue with Beijing, which China cut off following President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in 2016, whereas Lai prioritizes stronger ties with Taiwan’s partners.

This broad alignment is less surprising than it seems. An important consensus has emerged in Taiwan on national security issues since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Taiwanese, regardless of their political affiliation, do not want Taiwan to become the next Hong Kong or Taipei to become the next Kyiv. To that end, they largely agree that the best way to protect their island is to invest in defense and to strengthen ties with the United States and other democracies.

From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, however, Taiwan’s very existence as one of Asia’s strongest democracies, and by some measures the region’s freest society, is a threat. Taiwan’s success reveals—despite the CCP’s claims to the contrary—that democracy and a majority ethnically Chinese society are not incompatible. Moreover, as China and Taiwan’s political systems continue to diverge, there is little support on the island for unification. Taiwan is increasingly anchored to the West, and its population broadly favors strengthening relations with Japan, Europe, and the United States.

To be sure, political debates in Taiwan remain fierce. Only three years ago, lawmakers hurled pig intestines at their colleagues to protest Tsai’s decision to open Taiwan’s market to U.S. pork. But Taiwanese voters’ choice of one candidate or another is very unlikely to alter Taiwan’s basic approach to foreign policy. The real threat to Taiwan, instead, lies in what Xi does after the polls close—and in the outcome of another vote, the November presidential election in the United States.

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

During Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, which lasted from 2008 to 2016, Taiwan’s ability to deter a Chinese attack atrophied. Ma allowed defense budgets to stagnate, cut mandatory military service from one year to four months, and drastically reduced the size of Taiwan’s armed forces. Taipei continued to buy arms from the United States, but these purchases were made more for the political signal that they sent, of continued U.S. support for Taiwan, than for their contribution to the island’s combat readiness. As cross-strait exchanges grew, Taipei became complacent, believing that so long as the two sides were talking Beijing would not attack, so investing in defense was unnecessary and wasteful.

Two events, though, recently galvanized Taipei to take its defense more seriously. In 2020, Beijing passed a national security law for Hong Kong, which it has used to severely curtail civil liberties and political rights. The United Kingdom declared that this was in breach of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, in which Beijing pledged that Hong Kong would enjoy “a high degree of autonomy” after its return to China. Watching how Beijing ignored that promise and violated the “one country, two systems” framework, which it also proposes for Taiwan, left Taiwanese citizens with no illusions about what life would look like following unification. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated authoritarian leaders’ willingness to resort to force to pursue their territorial ambitions, as well as the ability of a smaller military to thwart them.

Tsai has taken bold steps to reverse her predecessor’s policies. She nearly doubled the defense budget, extended the length of mandatory military service to one year, and began an overhaul of Taiwan’s reserve force, which is intended to supplement the military during a conflict. Tsai also invested billions of dollars in Taiwan’s defense industry, developing an indigenous submarine and, taking lessons from the war in Ukraine, prioritizing the development and production of drones and missiles.

SAFETY FIRST

All three candidates have similar backgrounds, having entered politics after successful careers outside of elected office. Hou was Taiwan’s chief of police, and Lai and Ko are renowned doctors. There is a further similarity: all candidates largely lack foreign policy experience. Hou and Ko’s national security positions were mostly unknown prior to the race, and Lai was relatively uninvolved in managing foreign policy and cross-strait issues until he became the DPP’s nominee.

Despite their shared lack of experience, the candidates agree on the need to improve Taiwan’s defenses and are united in their support for most of Tsai’s defense policies. Lai has described the bolstering of Taiwan’s defenses as “the bedrock of our national security.” Hou, in a Foreign Affairs essay, introduced a framework of the “Three Ds”: deterrence, dialogue, and de-escalation. He concluded that “Taiwan’s most important priority should be to strengthen its national defense and deter the use of force by mainland China.” Ko’s party platform similarly asserts that “national defense is the cornerstone that upholds cross-strait and international relations.”

The candidates also broadly agree on how to best increase Taiwan’s defense capabilities. All three have emphasized the importance of pursuing an asymmetric approach that prioritizes the development and purchase of a large quantity of smaller systems and platforms, such as missiles, mines, and drones. Hou and Ko have both proposed increasing the defense budget to three percent of GDP, and Lai has stated that he would also oversee further increases to defense spending. Lai is in favor of one year of compulsory military service, whereas Ko has not challenged Tsai’s decision to extend conscription. He has even argued that one year may be insufficient for training specialized personnel. Hou’s position has been less consistent: although he initially called for undoing Tsai’s policy, he quickly reversed course. Notwithstanding that incident, Hou has put forward a robust defense policy platform. He has called for establishing a common operating picture across Taiwan’s military services that would better enable them to coordinate their operations. He has also proposed creating a cabinet-level All-Out Defense Mobilization Council, which would integrate planning across government with the goal of better enabling Taiwan’s civilian population to help defend the island.

This consensus on defense will be critical as the Chinese military threat continues to grow. Taiwan’s top national security priority should be ensuring that Xi does not have confidence that his military can achieve its objectives without paying such an unacceptable cost in blood and treasure that China’s continued modernization would be put at risk. Taiwan cannot prevent a war solely through dialogue with Beijing and it cannot bet its future on Xi’s goodwill. All three candidates know this, and they understand that Taiwan, accordingly, needs to do much more to deter aggression.

HANDS ACROSS THE WATER

The candidates also agree that Taiwan must deepen its ties to the United States, Japan, and other democracies. Under Tsai, the United States and Taiwan have drawn closer. In 2022, Washington and Taipei launched an ambitious bilateral trade initiative and subsequently reached agreement on the first phase, which Taiwan touts as the first trade deal that the Biden administration has negotiated. Security cooperation has deepened, with Washington reportedly increasing the number of troops deployed to Taiwan to train its military and expanding the training of Taiwanese soldiers in the United States. Taipei’s ties to European democracies have also strengthened during Tsai’s presidency. Taiwan has opened a representative office in Lithuania and a growing number of European officials have visited Taipei. In 2023, the Czech Republic’s president-elect even spoke with Taiwan’s president, becoming the first European head of state to do so.

Taiwan and Japan have also become closer. This trend may prove critical for Taiwan because, if a military conflict with China were to erupt, Japanese contributions to allied operations could prove decisive. Tokyo has already helped Taipei absorb the blow of China’s economic sanctions and supplied Taiwan with millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines. Japan has also become a full partner in the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, which the United States and Taiwan established in 2015 as a platform to leverage Taiwan’s expertise to address international challenges.

Lai has commented that “Taiwan and Japan are like a family.” To that end, he has vowed to pursue security cooperation with Tokyo if elected, and argued that Taipei should seek to join the Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the region’s premier trade pact. Hou shares this desire for closer ties with Japan and, symbolically, made it the first country he visited after securing the KMT nomination. He, too, has stated that he would attempt to join the CPTPP, which would help Taiwan diversify its economy away from China. Ko also visited Japan as a presidential candidate, and his party’s platform calls for establishing a “robust trilateral security dialogue platform involving the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.”

None of the three candidates have proposed a meaningful break from Tsai’s foreign policy. All have stated that the United States is Taiwan’s closest and most important partner and vowed to deepen relations with Washington. In practice, this will translate to ever greater security cooperation and closer economic ties. Hou has even proposed conducting joint military exercises with the United States and pursuing interoperability, which would better enable U.S. and Taiwanese soldiers to fight together and support one another during a conflict. Both are steps that Beijing has long opposed. Lai and Hou have pledged to work with Washington to pursue secure and resilient supply chains by supporting the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade and called for Taiwan to join the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

KEEPING BEIJING AT BAY

The candidates differ most on the question of how Taiwan should approach China. In particular, they disagree about the relative importance of communication with Beijing and the extent to which Taiwan should pursue greater economic, cultural, and other ties with China. All three candidates want to maintain the status quo, but they differ over the best way of doing so. This disagreement has led Hou to claim that Lai will pursue independence, triggering a war with China in the process, and Lai to counter that Hou will sacrifice Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty to China.

Neither charge is warranted. Lai has explicitly stated that he would continue Tsai’s approach to cross-strait relations, repeating her position that “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country” and that it is therefore unnecessary to declare independence. It is unlikely that Lai would provoke China by pursuing de jure independence, as he understands that doing so would likely prompt a forceful Chinese response and undermine Taiwan’s international support. Nevertheless, if elected, Beijing would be highly unlikely to pursue dialogue with Lai. There would, instead, be another four years without official communication between Taipei and Beijing, which raises the risk of miscalculation.

At first glance, Hou’s position on cross-strait issues seems like a throwback to the Ma era. He has endorsed the 1992 Consensus, which the KMT defines as an agreement between Taipei and Beijing that there is one China, with each side holding a different interpretation as to which government is its rightful representative. (For the KMT, it is the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China.) China, by contrast, interprets the 1992 Consensus as meaning that there is only one China, that Taiwan is a part of it, and that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China. Despite this disagreement on the meaning of the 1992 Consensus, it has nevertheless provided the political foundation for over two dozen agreements negotiated between Taiwan and China during Ma’s presidency. Hou has, however, attached important conditions to his cross-strait platform, including a rejection of “one country, two systems” and an insistence that any dialogue with Beijing would have to be consistent with Taiwan’s constitution. He has also pledged that “Taiwan’s future will be determined only by its own people” and acknowledged that “the majority of people in Taiwan want to maintain this status quo,” signaling that unification is not in the cards. Hou could, however, be constrained by the KMT’s deep-blue wing, which seeks closer ties to China, and to which Hou’s running mate and the candidate leading the party’s slate of legislators belong.

Ko, for his part, has said that Taiwan has no choice but to maintain the cross-strait status quo and that “there’s no point in even talking about unification or independence right now because you can’t achieve either.” Although Ko has not flatly rejected the 1992 Consensus, he has commented that “if the 1992 Consensus is a prerequisite, it is not going to lead us very far” and has suggested changing the name of the term. This comment shows just how unpopular the 1992 Consensus has become in Taiwan, and simultaneously suggests an openness to establishing a new framework that Beijing could live with. It is unclear, however, whether Ko could introduce a formula that Beijing would deem acceptable.

Unification has never been popular among Taiwanese voters and has become decidedly less so over time. Although a desire for independence has grown over the past three decades, most voters would prefer to maintain the status quo indefinitely. As seen from China’s perspective, the prospect of voluntary unification has all but disappeared, and no presidential candidate can hope to win on a platform favoring unification. Regardless of who wins the presidential election, Taiwan is all but certain to reject political negotiations with Beijing over the next four years.

CURSING THE TIDE

Other factors at play in this election will worry Beijing. In particular, the passage of time and the divergent political trajectories of Taiwan and China have led to a consolidation of a unique Taiwanese identity. Over 60 percent of the population now identifies exclusively as Taiwanese, with 30 percent identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 2.5 percent as Chinese. Reflecting these trends, for the first time ever, all of the presidential candidates are native Taiwanese, meaning that their families came to the island prior to the Chinese Civil War.

Beijing always favors the KMT candidate and this race is no exception, with China branding Lai a “destroyer of peace.” A Hou victory could be presented within China as evidence that unification is not moving out of reach, and China could then use the next four years to try to shape cross-strait dynamics in its favor. But even a Hou triumph would not reflect a turn toward favoring unification among the Taiwanese electorate: instead, it would more likely be a consequence of the electorate’s fatigue after eight years of DPP rule, a desire for change, and disappointment with how the government has handled domestic issues. This election cannot change the basic fact that, if unification were a company, it would have lost its market and would be on the brink of insolvency. Taiwan is dedicated to continuing to embed itself in the West, a process that is inimical to China’s interests. Ironically, a Hou victory could have the effect of signaling to Beijing that even the KMT cannot deliver the outcome that it seeks. The very fact that Taiwan is holding its eighth presidential election, an event that is now taken for granted as democracy has become a core component of its national identity, will be viewed in China as a risk to the CCP’s political narrative.

The question, then, is whether Xi decides that he can live with Taiwan’s trajectory or concludes that the trend lines are not moving in Beijing’s favor and that he should act to compel unification sooner rather than later. Entirely apart from Taiwan’s election, there are worrying signals that his thinking is moving in the latter direction. Xi has stated that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on to future generations and that achieving unification is the essence of the country’s rejuvenation. He has called unification a “historical inevitability,” and as Xi faces growing economic headwinds, he may seek to make unification a major part of his political legacy.

The outcome of Taiwan’s election may do little to change Xi’s calculus. Indeed, it may not even be the most important election of the year for the island’s security. Rather, that could be the U.S. presidential election in November. A victory for former U.S. President Donald Trump, who has criticized Taiwan for stealing the United States’ semiconductor industry and reportedly asked what benefit could be derived from defending Taiwan, could prompt Xi to conclude that he would not have to factor in U.S. intervention, which would dramatically alter his calculus. Such a development could well upend cross-strait stability.

• DAVID SACKS is a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
• MORE BY DAVID SACKS

Foreign Affairs · by David Sacks · January 10, 2024

24. How Ukraine Can Win Through Defense

Defense is the stronger form of war. But you cannot win without offense. But can defense achieve the political object? (e.g., an acceptable durable political arrangement that will serve, protect, and advance interests?)

And that may be the key to this conflict: Who can describe what is the acceptable durable political arrangement?

Excerpts:

Ultimately, a defensive strategy will not solve all of Ukraine’s problems. No matter what approach the country takes, it will almost certainly face another brutal winter of Russian drone and missile attacks on its energy infrastructure. And, of course, a defensive strategy requires Kyiv to abandon its maximalist goals of retaking all the territory it has lost to Russia. That means leaving the Ukrainians living in the occupied territories under Russian rule, a costly and wrenching choice even when the prospects for retaking this territory are so slim.

But if executed well, a defensive political and military strategy may well be able to persuade Putin that he has no prospects for further conquest in Ukraine, creating an off-ramp for negotiations. And even if this new strategy does not end the war, it will avoid the most catastrophic outcomes, will sustain Ukraine’s fighting capacity, and just might produce a stable equilibrium that allows a largely intact Ukraine to develop economically and integrate with Europe. For Western policymakers feeling stuck between domestic constraints and the prospects of a Ukrainian loss, that should count as a win.

How Ukraine Can Win Through Defense

A New Strategy Can Protect Kyiv and Stop Moscow From Winning

By Emma Ashford and Kelly A. Grieco

January 10, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Emma Ashford and Kelly A. Grieco · January 10, 2024

On December 12, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Washington to make an in-person request for military and economic aid for Ukraine, but he left empty-handed. For over a month, Republicans on Capitol Hill have been blocking an emergency spending bill that would provide about $60 billion in new funding for Ukraine. They will only approve the money, they have vowed, if Democrats make major concessions on immigration policy. Until then, funding for Ukraine remains in the balance.

Zelensky’s disappointing visit highlights the larger problems facing Ukraine. Its much-anticipated counteroffensive last year failed to retake territory lost to Russia, public support for Kyiv across the West is declining, and the conflict is at a stalemate. At the same time, the dilemma for Western policymakers appears stark. They can continue to pour resources into the war in search of an increasingly improbable version of victory: retaking every inch of Ukrainian territory. Or they can cut funding, put Kyiv on the defensive, and risk a Ukrainian loss. This striking dichotomy is no doubt the reason that the Biden administration publicly insists there will be no change in strategy if Congress doesn’t approve funding. But there is in fact another option, one that is being largely overlooked in Washington: victory through defense.

Much of the aid to Ukraine over the last two years has focused on offensive capabilities—advanced Western tanks, mine-clearing equipment, and long-range missiles—in a bid to push Russia back. But victory for Kyiv and its Western partners does not necessarily require gaining back specific chunks of territory. It simply requires that Russian President Vladimir Putin be denied his goal of subjugating Ukraine.

If Ukraine can defend the territory it controls in coming months by using capabilities such as anti-tank mines and concrete fortifications, it can deny Russia a path to complete victory and perhaps even open the door for negotiations. Putin evidently believes that time is on his side; a strong, sustainable Ukrainian defense would prove him wrong.

THEORIES OF VICTORY

The current predicament facing Western policymakers is the result of maximalist thinking. On one side of the debate are those who argue that Ukraine cannot be victorious until it retakes every square ­­­­­­­­­­inch of its territory, including the seven percent of its land that Russia has held since 2014. This could be called the “victory through rollback” argument. As Ben Hodges, the former commander of U.S. Army Europe, put it: “Victory for Ukraine means total restoration of all their sovereign territory,” including Crimea. On the other side are those who argue that the United States has spent too much already and that Ukraine should sue for peace now, in a traditional “peace, not victory” approach. “There are appropriate ways in which the U.S. can support the Ukrainian people, but unlimited arms supplies in support of an endless war is not one of them,” 19 Senate and House Republicans wrote in a letter to the White House last year, adding, “Our national interests, and those of the Ukrainian people, are best served by incentivizing the negotiations that are urgently needed to bring this conflict to a resolution.”

Neither of these options is good. There are genuine constraints on what the West can provide Ukraine to enable it to retake territory. Public opinion in the United States and Europe is turning against significant additional funding, and stockpiles of Western ammunition are running low. Ukraine made few concrete gains on the ground last year even with massive amounts of Western support and advanced weaponry. None of the equipment that Ukraine is now asking for, including a longer-range version of the Army Tactical Mission System (ATACAMS) or F-16 fighte­­­­r jets, is likely to change that reality in the coming year. That said, it is not an ideal time to seek peace negotiations, either. Despite the apparent stalemate on the battlefield, it is unlikely Putin would agree to a cease-fire until after the 2024 U.S. presidential election, which he surely hopes will deliver him a Trump presidency and thus a better deal. He is also undoubtedly aware of the grim math of land warfare: Russia has a larger military-age population to draw from than Ukraine and a stronger industrial base. On paper, time is on his side.

Policymakers in the West know they need a new strategy: the White House is increasingly pushing Ukraine to pivot to a defensive strategy in 2024, and Zelensky and his military commanders have slowly come to accept the need for this shift, announcing in November an expansion of defensive fortifications. Yet U.S. policymakers also need a new theory of victory. A pivot to defense is the right idea, but both Washington and Kyiv are pursuing it for the wrong reasons. On both sides of the Atlantic, defense is viewed largely as a stopgap measure to buy time to build capacity for future offensive operations. As Jack Watling wrote in Foreign Affairs recently, the West “faces a crucial choice right now: support Ukraine so that its leaders can defend their territory and prepare for a 2025 offensive or cede an irrecoverable advantage to Russia.” Similar views seem to hold in Kyiv, where defense seems to be viewed as a necessary evil that needs to be done while the military focuses on building up its reserve forces and continuing its deep-strike campaign against Russian logistics. General Valery Zaluzhny, commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, argued recently that “new, innovative approaches” could still turn the tide of the war. In both cases, the plan would see Ukraine rebuild its forces this year and resume counterattacks no later than in the spring of 2025.

Policymakers in the West know they need a new strategy.

So far, however, these theories of victory have failed the battlefield test. Neither Kyiv’s maneuver warfare campaign, in which Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian lines and quickly recapture territory, nor its attempts to undermine Russian popular support for the war through drone attacks on Moscow have succeeded. Putin is nowhere closer to conceding defeat because he still believes his army has a viable path to victory. He thinks he can outlast Western support for Kyiv and eventually defeat Ukraine through sheer attrition.

Even after two years of war, Putin’s exact objectives are unclear. The initial assault in February 2022 clearly aimed to decapitate and subjugate the Ukrainian state. When that failed, the Kremlin indicated that it sought the full conquest of four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhiya. At a strategic level, however, Putin’s political objectives are relatively clear: weaken Kyiv, seize as much territory as possible, and prevent Ukraine from further integration with Europe.

Defense, then, can itself be a path to victory if Ukraine and its Western backers can succeed in convincing Putin that there is no way for him to achieve these strategic objectives. Under this approach, Ukraine would build strong fortifications and defensive capabilities to demonstrate that the country can sustain a long war of attrition and prevent further Russian advances, even with reduced Western support. Over time, a consistent, sustainable Ukrainian defense could eventually convince the Kremlin that continued fighting is futile, opening the prospect of peace.

ON THE DEFENSIVE

If there is one clear lesson to draw from this war, it is that today’s battlefield favors defense. Modern weapons, especially drones, advanced artillery, and long-range antitank missiles, make it much easier to hold territory than to capture it. Mobile ground-based air defenses are hard to detect and destroy, giving defenders an advantage over modern air forces. A shift to defense in Ukraine would capitalize on these advantages and would require three specific elements to be successful.

First, Ukraine would need to construct a system of defensive lines consisting of deep trenches, prepared firing positions, ditches, antitank mines, and the concrete antitank pyramid barriers known as “dragon’s teeth”—a system not unlike the so-called Surovikin Line of fortifications that Russian forces so successfully defended last year. Ukrainian troops already have the right mantra: “If you want to live, dig.” Yet Ukraine’s defenses to date have consisted mainly of shallow trenches rather than fixed fortifications, as it has waged a mobile defense, launching hit-and-run attacks on Russian forces and supply lines.

Defenses must also be thick and layered, progressively sapping Russia’s military power should its forces dare cross them. The first line should be densely mined with antitank munitions and concrete barriers, behind which Ukrainian troops in bunkers and trenches would lay in wait with murderous firepower. The second defensive line, an insurance against a breakthrough, would offer more of the same, exacting a heavy price on any Russian attackers. These defensive works would offer Ukrainian troops significantly more protection and allow them to better withstand Russian offensive action than the mobile defense it has fought until now.

This could be surprisingly cheap to achieve. For example, Russia built its dragon’s teeth for about $130 for each pyramid, laying around 1,000 concrete pyramids in four rows to fortify just under a mile of front. At that cost, Ukraine could fortify the entirety of the Donbas front lines (about 260 miles) for about $54 million. Anti-tank mines are cheap too, at a cost of less than $10,000 each, and the U.S. military has many of them, including over 178,000 M21 mines slated to soon be replaced by new models. Though mines carry the potential for civilian harm even after a conflict is over, in this case, the benefits outweigh the risks. The United States should contribute not only the mines, but should also work together with its allies to plan for risk mitigation and future de-mining operations.

A newly dug trench near the Belarus border in Ukraine, December 2023

Gleb Garanich / Reuters

Second, Ukraine should prioritize keeping the skies contested, ensuring that neither side enjoys air superiority. Although Ukrainian commanders insist that even small numbers of Western fighter jets such as the F-16 would be enough to gain air superiority over the battlefield, that seems highly unlikely. Russian radar would spot these planes well before Ukrainian pilots came within weapons range to destroy Russian air defenses, especially the country’s S-400 missile systems.

As Ukraine has already shown in this war, however, it can succeed on defense so long as its ground-based air defenses remain a credible threat to Russian warplanes. Today, Western antiair missile stockpiles are running low, raising the risk that Kyiv will no longer be able to hold back the Russian air force. To avoid this prospect, Ukraine may need to make the unenviable choice to be more selective in employing its air defense capabilities. This may mean that its forces cannot attempt to intercept every Russian missile or drone fired into Ukraine, which would increase the potential for civilian casualties. Yet if Kyiv continues to try to shield its population rather than its air defenses, the country risks losing the air war. The West may be hard pressed to meet Ukraine’s current air-defense needs, but this is one area in which creative thinking can help: the launch of the FrankenSAM project, which aims to marry advanced Western missiles with Ukraine’s Soviet-era launchers and radar, offers one path toward addressing this critical shortage.

Third, Ukraine must expand its domestic weapons production, reducing its reliance on Western arms supplies. During the Cold War, Ukraine was a major arms manufacturer, and Kyiv’s efforts to ramp up defense manufacturing since the start of the war show promise. The number of Ukrainian companies producing drones, for example, has increased from seven to 80 in the last year. Other countries will be wary of sharing sensitive military technology, but much of what Ukraine needs for defense—artillery, drones, and antitank weapons—are cheaper, less sensitive, and relatively easy to produce. A more self-reliant Ukraine would signal to Moscow that even if Western support for Ukraine diminishes, Russian troops will face stiff military resistance.

A shift to defense is valuable not only because it could show the Kremlin that further territorial conquest is out of reach but also because it would help Ukraine address its two biggest problems: a shortage of soldiers and flagging Western support. A network of strong defenses would allow Kyiv to husband its resources, reducing the number of personnel and amount of artillery required to defend its frontlines. With a serious conscription crisis brewing in Ukraine, any strategy that requires fewer troops is a clear winner.

Going on the defense is also cheaper for Kyiv’s Western backers. A defensive strategy alleviates the need to arm Ukraine with expensive and scarce Western systems meant to give it a qualitative offensive edge, such as advanced fighter jets or tanks. Instead, the West could reorient aid around lower-cost munitions, construction supplies, and air defense systems while working to ramp up Ukraine’s defense industrial base.

THE MESSAGE

To shore up flagging Western support, however, it will not be enough to simply pivot to defense on the battlefield. If Western leaders continue to emphasize Ukraine’s winning back its territory yet struggle to pass massive new aid packages, Russia can maintain hope that Western funding will falter and the Kremlin’s prospects will improve.

Therefore, a new battlefield strategy must be accompanied by a corresponding political strategy from the White House, beginning with messaging. The Biden administration should make clear that it is not seeking to support Kyiv with future offensive operations, but rather focused on providing Ukraine with defensive capabilities. The message from the White House should be simple: Ukraine stands a better chance of holding onto its existing territory and sustaining the fight with a defensive playbook.

To make this strategy credible in Moscow, the White House would also need to engage in signaling. Rather than continuing the high-stakes push on Capitol Hill for a mammoth Ukraine aid bill, the White House should seek a smaller, compromise budget to fund less expensive defensive systems for Ukraine and help the country build its own defense industrial base. Money is perhaps the most obvious outward indicator of strategy. By dialing down its funding request, the White House can signal it has adopted achievable strategic goals: a cheaper war is a far more sustainable war.

The White House can also broadcast its intentions by applying pressure on Kyiv. Indeed, a central obstacle to this new strategy will likely be opposition in Ukraine itself. Ukrainian leaders may oppose a shift to defense, as it could lead to the war’s ending along current lines of control, similar to what happened at the end of the Korean War. Although that conflict never officially ended, the fortification and stabilization of the 38th parallel eventually produced a durable armistice that allowed South Korea to flourish. A defensive strategy in Ukraine might ultimately produce a similar outcome—and the White House should make clear that it would consider this a victory. Indeed, if there is one thing that would qualify as a loss for Putin in the long term, it would be a flourishing, independent Ukraine that is economically integrated with Europe.

A cheaper war is a far more sustainable war.

Finally, the Biden administration will need to build Western consensus around this new approach. This strategy should be appealing to European countries that are suffering their own shortfalls in public support for the war, including Germany. But it will be a much harder sell in Eastern Europe, where victory through rollback is popular. A common fear in Poland and the Baltic states is that any failure to reclaim all of Ukraine’s territory will send a message to the Kremlin that future aggression may be rewarded. To address these concerns, the Biden administration should lean not just on the idea that a defensive strategy is cheaper but also on the argument that it could be effective in preventing further Russian gains in Ukraine, making conquest elsewhere in Europe less attractive to Moscow. Such a stance can also help reassure allies: a defensive strategy is significantly more resilient to shifts within the Western coalition, future-proofing Ukraine’s defense against volatile U.S. politics.

If Congress falters in providing funding for Ukraine in 2024—or if Donald Trump is re-elected president—European states are far better positioned to provide defensive supplies than offensive weapons. Even basic construction materials—concrete, for example—are useful in creating fortifications; the German concrete industry has been hit hard by higher energy prices. Both German companies and Ukrainian forces would benefit from German government spending on material for fortifications.

Ultimately, a defensive strategy will not solve all of Ukraine’s problems. No matter what approach the country takes, it will almost certainly face another brutal winter of Russian drone and missile attacks on its energy infrastructure. And, of course, a defensive strategy requires Kyiv to abandon its maximalist goals of retaking all the territory it has lost to Russia. That means leaving the Ukrainians living in the occupied territories under Russian rule, a costly and wrenching choice even when the prospects for retaking this territory are so slim.

But if executed well, a defensive political and military strategy may well be able to persuade Putin that he has no prospects for further conquest in Ukraine, creating an off-ramp for negotiations. And even if this new strategy does not end the war, it will avoid the most catastrophic outcomes, will sustain Ukraine’s fighting capacity, and just might produce a stable equilibrium that allows a largely intact Ukraine to develop economically and integrate with Europe. For Western policymakers feeling stuck between domestic constraints and the prospects of a Ukrainian loss, that should count as a win.

• EMMA ASHFORD is a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University. She is the author of Oil, the State, and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates.
• KELLY A. GRIECO is a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center, a nonresident Fellow with the Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare, and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.

Foreign Affairs · by Emma Ashford and Kelly A. Grieco · January 10, 2024

25. With Tehran closer to nukes, Congress must end Biden’s Iran appeasement before it’s too late

Excerpts:

Congress has a duty to intervene.

The House has already passed bills to shut down the $10 billion for Iran, crack down on Chinese imports of Iranian oil and impose sanctions on Iran’s leaders for their abuse of women.

Senate Republicans should mount a pressure campaign on Senate leader Chuck Schumer to vote on all three measures.

Members of both parties in both chambers should also push the White House to ensure America’s military option remains credible and at the ready.

Biden’s Iran strategy of appeasement has failed.

America must course-correct quickly to stop the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran.

With Tehran closer to nukes, Congress must end Biden’s Iran appeasement before it’s too late

​by Richard Goldberg

Published Jan. 8, 2024, 8:46 p.m. ET

New York Post · by Social Links for Richard Goldberg View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · January 9, 2024

More On: iran

With every strike and counterstrike, Israel, the US and Iran’s allies inch closer to all-out war

Biden has dangerously decayed deterrence — and every American is at risk

Evidence shows Iran trained Hamas on how to produce, use precision-guided missles: Israel

We’re ‘effectively at war’ with Iran, media’s ludicrous defense of Gay and other commentary

President Biden’s three years of appeasing Iran has brought the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism closer than ever to developing a nuclear weapon.

While most Americans were on winter break, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog reported that Iran had tripled its production rate of near-weapons-grade nuclear fuel — 60%-high-enriched uranium — with a stockpile large enough to potentially produce one nuclear bomb in a week or six bombs in a month.

On Monday, former UN weapons inspector David Albright assessed Tehran could build a few crude weapons to marry with this nuclear material, mostly in secret, in just six months.

How did we get here?

By the end of 2020, Iran was down to just $4 billion in accessible foreign-exchange reserves due to the Trump administration’s imposition of maximum economic pressure on Tehran.

The regime’s terror mastermind, Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, had been killed in a US drone strike.

The godfather of its nuclear-weapons program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, had been assassinated (likely by Israel).

Nuclear-weapons scientists were being put on US sanctions lists while the president spoke openly about considering military strikes inside Iran.

see also

President Biden must face reality: It’s time to act vs. Iran

Tehran’s nuclear-escalation curve had been flattened for months.

But Biden and his closest aides, like horses wearing ideological blinders, could not accept a strategy that was successfully containing, if not destabilizing, one of America’s greatest adversaries.

Biden pledged to restore the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal that effectively offered Tehran hundreds of billions of dollars to merely delay its nuclear breakout by a few years.

The deal’s supporters argue the nuclear crisis at hand exists only because Donald Trump pulled America out of the agreement in 2018.

But the record shows that every major escalation in Iran’s nuclear program started in 2021: jumping from low-enriched uranium production to 20% enrichment; jumping from 20% enrichment to 60%; producing uranium metal, which is a key component in nuclear weapons; denying UN inspectors access to an advanced-centrifuge manufacturing plant; ending cooperation with a probe into four undeclared nuclear sites; expanding construction of a potentially impenetrable underground nuclear facility; harassing inspectors and denying their visas.

Any one of these escalations should have prompted Biden to restore pressure on Tehran and ensure the mullahs feared a potential military strike.

That the White House responded to the totality of them with continued offers of sanctions relief defies belief.

Nothing has been able to disabuse Biden of his almost-religious commitment to appeasement as the only viable path to containing Iran’s myriad threats.

Not the selection of Ebrahim Raisi, the so-called hangman of Tehran, as Iran’s president.

Not the transfer of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine.

see also

Biden is being played by Hamas, Iran and Qatar — with American and Israeli lives at stake

Not the daily crimes committed against Iranian women, which prompted a national uprising to bring down the regime.

Not the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

Not even assassination plots targeting former US officials, attempts to kidnap Iranian Americans from US soil, Iran-directed attacks on US troops in Iraq and Syria, injuring dozens of servicemembers — one critically — or the suicide-drone attacks on US destroyers in the Red Sea.

It should terrify every American that as the sands of nuclear time slip by, the Biden administration’s Iran policy remains as it was on Jan. 20, 2021.

Two weeks after the International Atomic Energy Agency’s startling report, there has been no American call for an emergency board meeting to censure Iran and refer its file to the UN Security Council.

Two months after the expiration of a UN missile embargo, with news that Russia may soon import Iranian ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine, there has been no American initiative to restore all international restrictions on Iran — a process that merely requires sending a letter to the Security Council.

Most concerning, Tehran today fears no threat of military force against its nuclear sites.

Washington appears helpless in the face of Iran-backed Houthis firing missiles at ships in the Red Sea, while the secretary of state tours the Middle East telling allies he’s doing everything possible to avoid a confrontation with Iran.

see also

With Israel under attack, Biden must fight UN anti-Semitism

Instead, a State Department sanctions waiver remains in effect, issued after the Oct. 7 Iran-backed Hamas massacre, to give Iran access to $10 billion.

Further, China keeps importing Iranian oil with no attempt by the White House to enforce US sanctions.

Clearly, the ayatollah sees a green light both to expand his ring of fire around Israel and to move closer and closer to a nuclear-weapons capability.

Congress has a duty to intervene.

The House has already passed bills to shut down the $10 billion for Iran, crack down on Chinese imports of Iranian oil and impose sanctions on Iran’s leaders for their abuse of women.

Senate Republicans should mount a pressure campaign on Senate leader Chuck Schumer to vote on all three measures.

Members of both parties in both chambers should also push the White House to ensure America’s military option remains credible and at the ready.

Biden’s Iran strategy of appeasement has failed.

America must course-correct quickly to stop the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Richard Goldberg, a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is a former National Security Council official and senior US Senate aide.

New York Post · by Social Links for Richard Goldberg View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · January 9, 2024

26. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: January

Access the FP tracker here:  https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/10/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-january/

January 10, 2024 | FDD Tracker: December 6, 2023-January 10, 2024

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: January

John Hardie

Russia Program Deputy Director

By John Hardie

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

In response to attacks against commercial vessels by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi terrorist group, the United States launched a multinational operation that has helped protect Red Sea shipping, although Houthi attacks have continued. The White House has so far declined to strike Houthi military assets in Yemen, likely fearing escalation.

The United States continued to supply military aid to Israel for its war against Hamas. At the same time, administration officials, including President Joe Biden, publicly pressured Jerusalem to reduce the number of civilian casualties in Gaza. Such casualties will likely decline as Israel shifts to lower-intensity operations in the coastal enclave. But U.S. officials now say they increasingly worry about potential escalation with Hezbollah or other Iran-backed terror groups.

Meanwhile, despite urging by administration officials and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Congress failed to reach a deal on supplemental funding for Ukraine aid before the holiday recess. U.S. officials have begun discussing a strategy to help Ukraine weather what will likely be a tough 2024, although it remains unclear whether Washington will fully commit to helping Ukraine eventually go back on offense.

Check back next month to see how the Biden administration deals with these and other challenges.

Trending Positive

Trending Neutral

Trending Negative

Trending Very Negative

Cyber

Indo-Pacific

Defense

Europe and Russia

Israel

Syria

Turkey

China

Gulf

International Organizations

Latin America

Sunni Jihadism

Iran

Korea

Lebanon

Nonproliferation and Biodefense

27. Ukraine special forces say they helped destroy a Russian weapons system that was blocking satellite comms

Ukraine special forces say they helped destroy a Russian weapons system that was blocking satellite comms

Business Insider · by Thibault Spirlet

Military & Defense

Thibault Spirlet

2024-01-08T13:37:26Z

Facebook Email Twitter LinkedIn Copy Link

Read in app

A missile appearing to hit a Russian Tirada-2 in Ukraine's Donetsk region in a video shared by Ukraine's special forces on Telegram on Monday.

Telegram/@Сили Спеціальних Операцій ЗС України

• Ukrainian special forces said they helped destroy a Russian weapons system in occupied Luhansk.
• A Telegram post said the electronic system, Tirada-2, was blocking satellite communications.
• Russia has been developing electronic-warfare systems to try to cut Ukraine's access to Starlink.

Ukraine's special-operations forces said they helped destroy a Russian military system that was blocking satellite communications.

A Telegram post on Monday said special forces spotted the Tirada-2 electronic-warfare system as part of reconnaissance operations in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region.

Using the coordinates, they then directed fire from a Ukrainian missile unit, which "completely destroyed" it, Ukrinform described the post as saying.

A video embedded in the post appears to show the missile strike.

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The Tirada-2, also known as Tirada-2S, is a portable radio-electronic suppression system designed to interfere with communication satellites, the defense and security publication Army Recognition reported.

Russia developed it in 2018, and it was sighted by Ukraine for the first time in the occupied region of Luhansk in 2019, Ukraine's special-operations forces said.

Ukraine has previously targeted Russia's electronic-warfare systems.

In July 2023, it appeared to destroy a Tirada and a "Leer-2" electronic system with drones in a video shared on Facebook by the command of the special-operations forces.

Access to satellites has played a critical role in Ukraine's defense against Russia, notably access to Elon Musk's Starlink satellite network.

In addition to keeping Ukrainians online and its companies running, satellite internet access has facilitated communication between soldiers on the front lines and even allowed weapons systems and drones to continue operating.

But Starlink has not always been available to Ukraine.

Musk cut Ukraine's access to Starlink during a Ukrainian attack on Russia's Black Sea Fleet in September 2022, citing concerns about the conflict escalating into a nuclear war.

The digital magazine SpaceWatch Global reported that Russia was trying to develop an arsenal of electronic-warfare systems aimed at jamming communication satellites.

Besides the Tirada-2, Russia was developing the R-330Zh Zhitel, a mobile truck-mounted jamming communication station, and Bylina-MM, a system designed to suppress communications satellites, the magazine reported.

The Washington Post reported in April 2023 that Russia had also been testing Tobol electronic-warfare systems in a bid to disrupt Starlink's transmissions in Ukraine, citing a classified US intelligence report.

Business Insider · by Thibault Spirlet

​28. Why the US Needs to Back Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

Send a B and 6 As and some weapons and cash and they could make a difference. An FOB in the Kingdom next door. 1st is well prepared for this mission.  

Excerpts:

The more assistance and sanctions the U.S. can muster in cooperation with its partners, the faster the junta will collapse, and the less suffering Myanmar people will endure from the junta’s scorched earth campaign against civilians. In the aftermath of Operation 1027, the junta has reaffirmed it will intensify attacks against civilians as it gets more desperate to stave off its inevitable defeat. Thailand is fully aware of this and has already approached Japan for more humanitarian aid for Myanmar refugees.

Just a little bit of support will go a long way in Myanmar, so this is essentially low-hanging fruit that the U.S. can grasp at little cost. At the same time, the rewards Washington would reap would be correspondingly high. In particular, it would advance U.S. interests by revitalizing democracy in the region and maintaining Washington’s substantial deterrence against Chinese adventurism.

In doing so, the U.S. would also engender enormous goodwill among the Myanmar people and position itself as a key player in Myanmar’s reconstruction and transition to democracy. As an added bonus, after years of declining influence in a region increasingly dominated by China, the U.S. would finally reestablish its influence in Southeast Asia – a fast-growing and strategically-located region that U.S. policymakers cannot afford to ignore.

Why the US Needs to Back Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

thediplomat.com

Recent rebel offensives have the military junta reeling. A little bit of outside support could hasten its collapse.

By Peter Morris

January 08, 2024

Soldiers from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) pose with the MNDAA flag after capturing a Myanmar military base at Magra-tapok hill in northern Shan State on October 27, 2023.

Credit: Facebook/The Kokang

While the United States is preoccupied with conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere, it is missing a golden opportunity to not only deter China from invading Taiwan, but also to score a major victory in President Joe Biden’s battle royale between democracy and autocracy.

Specifically, if the U.S. provided just a little more support to Myanmar’s resistance forces, which are poised to win their Spring Revolution against Myanmar’s brutal military junta, it would hasten the downfall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.

In the process, the U.S. would gain enormous strategic advantage vis-a-vis China. First, helping Myanmar’s resistance cross the finish line would mark a major global victory for democracy. This is because Myanmar sits at the geostrategic crossroads of China, India, and Southeast Asia, a region that has experienced democratic backsliding as China’s influence has expanded. Second, it would preserve Washington’s ability to deter the Chinese government by threatening to blockade the Straits of Malacca in the event of a conflict.

The “Malacca dilemma” – China’s heavy reliance on oil and other crucial imports through the narrow Straits, which can be easily blockaded by the U.S. and its allies – currently gives the U.S. enormous leverage over Beijing and deters it from invading Taiwan and embarking on other misadventures.

China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping is clearly obsessed with Taiwan and is on the verge of painting himself into a corner on this issue, at which point he might feel pressured by Chinese ultra-nationalists to attack the island even if he knows it would be foolish. The U.S. has no choice, therefore, but to maintain enough leverage to deter China from taking actions that could trigger nuclear war.

In this regard, Myanmar presents the U.S. with a unique opportunity. After the junta falls, Myanmar’s new government will not only be democratic, but also less willing to grant China what it most desires: unrestricted access to the Indian Ocean as a way around the Straits of Malacca.

Accordingly, Myanmar is now America’s single largest “strategic blind spot,” in the words of Burmese-American Myanmar specialist Miemie Winn Byrd, a retired U.S. Army officer who teaches at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. has avoided supporting the Spring Revolution because it would antagonize China and upset its delicate relationship with Thailand, its longtime treaty ally. However, both China and Thailand have recently changed their Myanmar policies for three reasons.

First, China and Thailand are finally realizing that the junta is “actively collapsing,” so they will eventually need to change their policies anyway; second, both countries now view the junta as the region’s greatest source of instability; and third, China and Thailand have concluded that coup-leader Min Aung Hlaing is unwilling and/or unable to tackle the forced cyber-scamming epidemic, which exploded along their borders with Myanmar during the COVID-19 pandemic and has severely harmed countless people from China, Thailand, and dozens of other countries.

Indeed, one of the reasons Beijing tacitly supported the Spring Revolution’s “Operation 1027”—a wildly successful military operation that Byrd views as the revolution’s tipping point—is that Min Aung Hlaing refused to crack down on forced scamming and other crimes which were harming Chinese citizens.

This also explains the recent confusion among policymakers in China, which is the junta’s primary source of weapons and funding. In effect, Beijing has been propping up a regime that is incapable of providing stability and profits from harming Chinese citizens.

The consensus among seasoned Myanmar analysts with armed conflict expertise, such as Matthew Arnold and Miemie Winn Byrd, is that the junta is “actively collapsing.” Long-time Myanmar conflict analyst David Mathieson has said the junta is “finished,” and Jane’s Defense Weekly analyst Anthony Davis, who has covered armed conflict in Southeast Asia for decades, has urged the international community to “prepare diplomatic, humanitarian, and judicial responses” for the aftermath of the junta’s collapse.

Despite this, Beijing somehow still refuses to accept the reality that democracy will soon be reestablished in Myanmar. As soon as China acknowledges this, the leadership in Beijing will realize that China’s best – and only – option is to support the Spring Revolution and try to salvage China’s relationship with the Myanmar people, who will ultimately decide how much access China has to the Indian Ocean.

It’s simply a matter of degree. The more access China has to the Indian Ocean, the less leverage the U.S. has to deter Xi (and Chinese citizens acting in his name) from attacking Taiwan, encroaching on foreign and contested territories, undermining the sovereignty of other countries, and embarking on other misadventures.

China’s flagship project to facilitate its access to the Indian Ocean – the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) – has seen little progress since the coup. The junta knows this and is now scrambling to convince China that it can provide the stability China needs to expand the CMEC.

But it’s too little, too late for the junta. The sooner Beijing realizes the Spring Revolution will prevail, the sooner China can attempt to resurrect its relationship with Myanmar. Anti-Chinese sentiment has a long history in Myanmar and has grown exponentially since the coup because China has been supporting the junta’s war against its own people.

To be sure, Beijing knows that increasing its support for the Spring Revolution – even if only by facilitating humanitarian aid distribution– would go a long way towards improving China’s negative image in Myanmar. Conversely, if China continues to support the junta it will only damage its long-term interests in the country.

Influential Myanmar commentator @Nicholas6284 summarized this current dynamic on Twitter/X recently, arguing that the “best option for China is to help the resistance win fast and normalize [its] relationship” with the new democratic Myanmar government.

In this regard, perhaps one way to convince China to accept the reality would be to remind Beijing of its good relationship with Myanmar’s previous civilian government under Aung San Suu Kyi, which signed the CMEC agreement with China and provided enough stability to kickstart the project.

Indeed, Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG) did just that on January 2, releasing a 10-point position paper entitled “The NUG’s Position on China,” which is designed to convince China that the NUG would be a better partner than the junta. Among other things, the NUG promised in the position paper that measures would be taken to “safeguard Chinese economic investments” and combat “online scams.”

Eventually, Beijing might realize that it is in China’s own best interest to cooperate with the U.S. or Thailand to expedite the inevitable downfall of the junta, at least by supporting the provision of humanitarian aid. To this end, former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel has suggested that Washington should consider cooperating with Beijing on Myanmar issues, and professor Tony Waters has even proposed the idea that cooperation on Myanmar could lead to a broader Sino-U.S. detente.

In fact, the U.S. and China have already cooperated to prevent the junta from representing Myanmar at the United Nations, so nothing is impossible. But even if greater U.S.-China cooperation on Myanmar is wishful thinking, policymakers in Washington need to wake up and realize that it’s in America’s interest to enhance support for the Spring Revolution regardless of what China does.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. would be foolish not to seize this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to support the impending victory of Myanmar’s brave revolutionaries, who have defied all odds against a well-armed Goliath and achieved spectacular successes largely on their own.

Even simply increasing U.S. humanitarian aid would, by itself, expedite the junta’s downfall because it would free up resources currently being used by resistance forces to support the millions of displaced people in need of food, medicine, and shelter.

Of course, the U.S. could and should do more to support the Spring Revolution, but at the very least the Biden administration should fast-track the full distribution of assistance authorized by the Burma Act passed by Congress in early 2023.

The more assistance and sanctions the U.S. can muster in cooperation with its partners, the faster the junta will collapse, and the less suffering Myanmar people will endure from the junta’s scorched earth campaign against civilians. In the aftermath of Operation 1027, the junta has reaffirmed it will intensify attacks against civilians as it gets more desperate to stave off its inevitable defeat. Thailand is fully aware of this and has already approached Japan for more humanitarian aid for Myanmar refugees.

Just a little bit of support will go a long way in Myanmar, so this is essentially low-hanging fruit that the U.S. can grasp at little cost. At the same time, the rewards Washington would reap would be correspondingly high. In particular, it would advance U.S. interests by revitalizing democracy in the region and maintaining Washington’s substantial deterrence against Chinese adventurism.

In doing so, the U.S. would also engender enormous goodwill among the Myanmar people and position itself as a key player in Myanmar’s reconstruction and transition to democracy. As an added bonus, after years of declining influence in a region increasingly dominated by China, the U.S. would finally reestablish its influence in Southeast Asia – a fast-growing and strategically-located region that U.S. policymakers cannot afford to ignore.

Authors

Guest Author

Peter Morris

Peter Morris is a lawyer, journalist, and aspiring linguist who has been involved with various Myanmar projects since 2008. He majored in politics and East Asian studies at Brandeis University, completed a master’s program in China Studies at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, and studied linguistics and several languages (including Burmese, Jingpo, Rawang, Sgaw Karen, and Shan) while enrolled in a combined JD/Tax LLM program at the University of Washington (Seattle) School of Law. Follow Peter’s tweets on X or his blogs on LinkedIn.

thediplomat.com

​29. Primer: The Army's Journals

Professional writing is a CSA priority. Get to work.

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/primer-the-armys-journals?utm

Primer: The Army's Journals

hardingproject.com · by Zachary Griffiths

Say you’re a first sergeant interested in contributing to the Army’s professional journals, but don’t know where to start. What publications are out there, and which are professional? This primer can help.

For more than 100 years, the Army has maintained a system of professional journals to inform and connect leaders engaged across all levels of war and in different specialties. The Army’s journals distinguish themselves from other outlets by offering military-focused commentary and have continuously renewed themselves to meet the needs of the day.

The Army’s Journals

The Army’s professional journals can be broadly defined by their focus on tactical, operational, or strategic issues, and by their audience (see Figure for “a view”). Each outlet fills a particular niche, helping the Army think harder about everything from combat engineering to warfighting doctrine to strategic landpower.

Parameters aims to be a “refereed forum for contemporary strategy and Landpower issues.” The Army War College founded Parameters in 1971 following debate about whether the Army needed a strategic-level journal beyond Military Review and an irregular pilot journal titled US Army War College Commentary. Parameters publishes on a quarterly basis in both print and online, and produces related podcasts.

Military Review is the professional journal of the United States Army. Published by the Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth, Military Review focuses on operational-level issues. Military Review has evolved over the last century from the Instructor’s Summary of Military Articles since publication began in 1922. Military Review publishes every other month in print and online, while also publishing “Online Exclusive” articles on a rolling basis or as response pieces. Army University Press also publishes the NCO Journal and Warrant Officer Journal focused on those communities.

At the tactical-level, the Army’s professional bulletins speak to branch or proponent issues. Department of the Army Pamphlet 25-40 defined them as directly supporting the preparing command’s specified mission and area of proponency. Currently, the Army has 15 professional bulletins ranging from Infantry to Army History to Army Sustainment.

Some of the Army’s professional bulletins have moved back-and-forth from unofficial publication by branch associations to official publication. As an example of this sometimes-convoluted history, Armor started as the Cavalry Journal of the United States Cavalry Association in 1888, changing names after World War II. In 1973, the US Army Armor Center absorbed and, subsequently continued, publishing Armor following a change in rules about uniformed editors working for associations. Whatever their history, the Army’s branch-focused professional bulletins host discourse related to branch issues.

Outside the professional bulletins, many Army institutions also publish journals. Examples of non-professional bulletin journal include Special Warfare, the Chaplain Corps Journal and The Medical Journal. Because these journals are not formally listed as professional bulletins, tracking them down is difficult. Fortunately, Army University Press maintains a list with some of them.

Outside the Army’s professional and academic journals, but within the Army, are a new cohort of web-first outlets. These outlets cover a wide range of topics, but with less depth than the branch-focused journals. The Modern War Institute out of West Point and the War Room out of the Army War College focus on professional topics in a web-first, mobile-friendly format with rolling publication, podcasts, and effective social media engagement.

All of these Army publications benefit from full-time staffs and institutional support. While staffing may have fallen over the last 40 years, small, largely civilian editorial teams solicit, screen, edit, and publish the Army’s professional journals today.

Army headquarters and units also publish a variety of newsletters. These newsletters often focus on specific communities of interest. For example, the XVIII Corps publishes the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Warfighting Forum Monthly Newsletter. Based on the June 2023 issue, this newsletter has been published for roughly the last 16 years. Additionally, the Army’s combat training centers often publish lessons learned products. As an example, the National Training Center’s aviation trainers publish the Eagle Eye newsletter based on insights from recent rotations with accompanying YouTube videos and podcasts.

The form and scope of these newsletters vary widely. Despite their important contributions, newsletters have two primary drawbacks. First, the costs of producing, publishing, and disseminating are borne by the unit without dedicated professional support. Second, newsletters are not systematically archived, suggesting their content may be lost if emphasis shifts. Generally, institutionally aligned Army journals should offer advantages with dedicated staff, established distribution mechanisms, and automated archiving.

Other outlets

This focus on the Army’s professional journals excludes un-official publications. While some like the Association of the United States Army’s ARMY have historically had a close relationship with the Army, ARMY’s content is copywritten and some content is held behind a paywall or requires a subscription. Likewise, the branch association journals often have close relationships with branch leadership, but these journals are also copywritten and typically closed to non-members. Both may offer important professional discourse within branch communities and connection with retired members still engaged with their branch, but their exclusive nature limits their impact on the Army.

Also excluded are unofficial, web-based outlets like War on the Rocks, From the Green Notebook, Task and Purpose, and Small Wars Journal. These types of outlets offer national security or military articles and podcasts that are generally free for anyone to access, often supported by advertisements or membership programs, and may be influential. Servicemembers acting in their personal capacities or former servicemembers often edit for these outlets. Despite the typical close connections of these outlets to the military, and while they are not Army professional journals, they are still, often, partners in professional discourse.

Share

Partners in discourse

Official and unofficial outlets foster professional discourse together—and help show the Army the way. Articles at War on the Rocks may reference Military Review articles that reference posts at the Modern War Institute. This is healthy; each outlet has a unique audience and focus.

Outlets like Small Wars Journal (started in 2005), From the Green Notebook (started in 2013) and War on the Rocks (also in 2013) showed the national security community the power of web-first, mobile-friendly outlets with social media support. Based on their example, the Army may consider creating a new platform, more like the Australian “The Cove” that offers a lower barrier to entry for new writers and rapid sharing.

Given the variety of official and unofficial outlets, everyone in the Army can find a place to contribute.

hardingproject.com · by Zachary Griffiths

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com