Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Find the deepest pleasure in absorbing knowledge and information. Feel like you never have enough."

- Robert Greene

"The absence of war is not peace."

- Harry Truman, 1884-1972, American President [1945-1953]

"'Freedom from fear' could be said to sum up the whole philosophy of human rights."

- Dag Hammarskjold

1. What Is “Political Warfare”?

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 10, 2023

3. Austin ends the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate

4. U.S., Allies Prepare Fresh Sanctions on Russian Oil Industry

5. GOP pick to lead House China committee vows to win ‘new Cold War’

6. U.S., Japan set to announce shake-up of Marine Corps units to deter China

7. US Navy Seizes More Than 2,000 Iran Assault Rifles Bound For Yemen

8. Get used to wielding ‘hard power,’ US Army general at head of NATO command tells allies

9. Republicans name chairmen for Armed Services, Vet Affairs committees

10. After Ukraine invasion, NATO aligning strategy with 'regional plans': Former SACEUR

11. Digital defenders: A look at the evolution and elevation of America's Cyber National Mission Force

12. U.S. defeats China in simulated war over Taiwan, but costs are high, says new study on risks

13. To recruit Gen Z, the top Marine makes an appeal to older generations

14. In the 21st Century, China is Our Main Adversary and Japan is Our Most Important Ally

15. Dirty bomb fears as URANIUM is found in cargo at Heathrow

1. What Is “Political Warfare”?

Thank you Congressional Research Service. Finally someone in the US government with the guts to recognize the existence of political warfare.

We should not forget that as we follow the dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means, our adversaries believe politics is war by other means. Or as Mao said, "politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."

Here is my summarized way to think about this:

Relationships:

•Irregular Warfare is the military contribution to Political Warfare

•Political Warfare is the essence of the gray zone in strategic competition

•Competitive Statecraft at the national level is required for effective political warfare

The 3 page document can be downloaded here. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11127

What Is “Political Warfare”?

Background Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his seminal book On War that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” Historically, in Congress as well as in the broader policy community, the term political warfare described the synchronized use of any aspect of national power short of overt conventional warfare— such as intelligence assets, alliance building, financial tools, diplomatic relations, technology, and information dominance— to achieve state objectives. It was coined in the late 1940s by George F. Kennan, a key architect of U.S. strategy during the Cold War, as the United States began to come to grips with the challenge presented by the Soviet Union (USSR). As he wrote in his 1948 State Department memorandum Organizing Political Warfare:

We have been handicapped … by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war … and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations— the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war…. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations … range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

Popular terms used to describe this phenomenon in the current international security environment include strategic competition and gray zone competition or conflict. Yet political warfare, according to some scholars, is not mere rivalry or competition but is also a form of war: its objective, like that of every other form of war, is to impose one’s own will on the opponent in order to achieve strategic objectives, to conquer and destroy the opponent’s will to resist.

In the United States, the military dimensions of this competition garner significant attention and resources. Yet if political warfare is an adequate lens through which to view this strategic competition, the nonmilitary aspects of the competition might prove equally if not more important, particularly as competitors deploy robust political warfare strategies.

...

Diplomatic Tools

The Biden Administration appears to be increasing funding of at least one element of political warfare. Its FY2023 International Affairs budget, which supports U.S. embassies and diplomatic activities as well as foreign assistance, requested $66 billion—17% above the FY2022-enacted level—with increases across a wide range of programs and accounts, from global health security to climate change to development finance.

Read the entire report at the link: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11127

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 10, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian media reported on January 10 that Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, former commander of the Central Military District and Russian forces in Kharkiv and northern Donetsk oblasts during Russia's significant losses in September 2022, has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces.
The news of Lapin’s appointment is generating further schisms in the already-fragmented pro-war Russian information space.
Igor Girkin heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin from office, suggesting that a willingness to reduce self-censorship and directly criticize Putin may be growing among some milbloggers.
The Ukrainian General Staff deviated from its normal reporting pattern about Russian forces in Belarus and near Ukraine’s northern border on January 10, an indicator of possible Russian preparations for an offensive in northern Ukraine, though ISW assesses this course of action remains unlikely at this time.
Ukrainian forces continued to make gains along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar but have not captured the settlement, despite false claims.
The Kremlin continues to deny that Russian authorities are preparing for another wave of partial mobilization.
Russian occupation authorities are struggling to contain an effective partisan movement in occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 10, 2023

Jan 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Katherine Lawlor, and Mason Clark

January 10, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian media reported on January 10 that Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, former commander of the Central Military District (CMD) and Russian forces in eastern Kharkiv and northern Donetsk oblasts, has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces. Russian outlet URA, citing unidentified Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources, reported that Lapin took over from Colonel General Vasily Tonkoshkurov as Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces on January 9.[1] It is unclear why Tonkoshkurov was removed from this position and what his next role will be. While official Kremlin and MoD sources have not confirmed the claim, it was widely circulated and responded to as fact among military commentators in the Russian information space.[2] Lapin’s appointment is notably to the position of Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces (also known as the Russian Army), not the Russian Armed Forces as a whole. Army General Valery Gerasimov likely remains Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Russian Army is not a frontline command position, and while Lapin’s specific duties (in the currently fragmented Russian command structure) are unclear, he is unlikely to directly command troops in Ukraine.

Lapin’s previous role as commander of the "Central" group of Russian forces in Ukraine and commander of the Russian Central Military District (CMD) was checkered with controversy following the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that retook large swaths of territory in eastern Kharkiv and northern Donetsk oblasts in September 2022. The Russian MoD confirmed Lapin’s appointment as commander of the "Central" grouping on June 24, 2022, and noted he was responsible for operations in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area and likely the broader Luhansk-Donetsk Oblast border area.[3] Lapin went on to receive a "Hero of Russia" medal on July 4 for his role in the Russian capture of Lysychansk.[4] Lapin was also the commander responsible for Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, and received strong criticism from prominent voices in the Russian information space for his claimed responsibility for massive Russian losses following successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in mid-September of 2022 that pushed Russian forces to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[5] Following the disastrous Russian loss of most of Kharkiv Oblast and the critical settlement of Lyman, the Kremlin reportedly removed Lapin from both command of the "Central" grouping and CMD.[6] The pro-war information space’s response to Lapin’s perceived command failures served as a catalyst for a fracture between a faction led by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin—the siloviki—and the Russian MoD establishment that milbloggers widely claimed Lapin represented.[7] Kadyrov’s staunch and pointed criticism of Lapin at the time demonstrated that the siloviki faction saw itself as fundamentally at odds with the conventional Russian MoD and associated elements.[8]

Lapin’s appointment as army Chief of Staff may be intended to serve as a counterbalance to the growing prominence of the siloviki. Prigozhin and Kadyrov both have largely private armed forces at their disposal (Kadyrov’s Chechen fighters and Prigozhin’s Wagner Group) and are capitalizing on the gains made by these forces to promote themselves politically, as ISW has frequently reported.[9] As the anti-Russian MoD voices gain more relevance and support throughout the Russian pro-war information space, which perceives this faction as generally more competent, motivated, and effective than the Russian MoD, Russian military leadership may seek to rehabilitate and bolster Lapin’s reputation to establish the Russian MoD as a competent and structured wartime apparatus and balance out the growing influence of the Kadyrov-Prigozhin faction. Additionally, considering that the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army is more of a logistical and organizational oversight role than a command position, the Russian MoD may be using Lapin’s appointment to posture a commitment to the sound structuring of Russian ground forces in response to continued criticisms of the efficacy of the Russian army. While the Kremlin has at times distanced itself and even blamed the Russian MoD for military failures in Ukraine, the Kremlin likely maintains a vested interest in bolstering public perceptions of the MoD’s efficacy. The Russian military apparatus writ large likely benefits from the public perception that it is an appropriately managed wartime instrument. ISW has previously reported on the Kremlin’s attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of the Russian MoD and affiliated elements, including prior efforts to rehabilitate Lapin’s reputation.[10]

Lapin’s appointment may alternatively suggest that the Russian MoD increasingly must fill important leadership positions with previously disgraced—or at minimum heavily publicly criticized—general officers. Former Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) commander Colonel-General Alexander Chaiko, who led failed Russian efforts to take Kyiv in the early stages of the war, went on to serve as commander of Russian Armed Forces in Syria after he was replaced following the Kharkiv counteroffensive.[11] Colonel General Andrei Serdyukov, former commander of the Russian airborne forces (VDV) who was reportedly dismissed due to the poor performance of Russian paratroopers, now appears to have replaced Chaiko as commander of the Russian grouping in Syria.[12] The Russian MoD appears to be using previously disgraced and unpopular general officers to fill other, non-frontline command roles, suggesting that there is a systemic lack of general officers more suited to these positions.

The news of Lapin’s appointment generated further schisms in the already-fragmented pro-war Russian information space. Former militant commander and prominent milblogger Igor Girkin stated that Lapin’s new role must be a "misunderstanding" because Russian forces under Lapin’s command suffered major losses in Kharkiv Oblast.[13] Girkin concluded that Lapin represents a "boorish" attempt by the MoD to demonstrate their invulnerability.[14] A Wagner Group-affiliated Telegram group claimed that Lapin was also responsible for the disastrous May 5, 2022, Bilohorivka river crossing and additionally blamed Lapin for the loss of Lyman.[15] Other milbloggers responded more neutrally or even positively, with one suggesting that it was not Lapin but Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov who was responsible for the loss of Lyman.[16] A pro-Kremlin milblogger credited Lapin with stabilizing the front after the collapse of Russian operations in Kharkiv Oblast.[17] The lack of consensus on who commanded the Lyman front among the Russian milblogger community further indicates the convoluted state of the Russian chain of command. Lapin’s new role will likely further the divide between the siloviki and affiliated milbloggers and milbloggers who have historically been more favorable to the Kremlin and the Russian MoD. This decision will likely open to Russian MoD to more criticism of its intentions and capabilities instead of addressing these concerns.

Russian forces have not captured the entirety of Soledar despite several false Russian claims that the city has fallen and that Bakhmut risks imminent encirclement. Several Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group forces advanced into the west of Soledar on January 10.[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin refuted these claims, remarking that Wagner Group forces are still fighting against concerted Ukrainian resistance.[19] ISW has only observed visual confirmation of Wagner Group forces in central Soledar as of January 10.[20] The reality of block-by-block control of terrain in Soledar is obfuscated by the dynamic nature of urban combat, however, and Russian forces have largely struggled to make significant tactical gains in the Soledar area for months. Even taking the most generous Russian claims at face value, the capture of Soledar would not portend an immediate encirclement of Bakhmut. Control of Soledar will not necessarily allow Russian forces to exert control over critical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut, as ISW has previously assessed.[21]

Igor Girkin, former commander of Russian militants in Donbas and a prominent milblogger, heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin from office, his most direct criticism of Putin to date. Girkin criticized Putin for appointing and refusing to remove Russian military leaders who oversee frequent and disastrous military failures, in reference to Lapin’s appointment.[22] Russian milbloggers have historically criticized Russian military leaders and MoD officials while upholding Putin as an effective wartime leader, as ISW has previously reported.[23] Girkin extended his criticisms to non-military Putin appointees and advisors whose decisions negatively impacted Russia’s war performance and effort, noting that the common factor between these leaders is Putin’s decision to appoint them.[24] Girkin caveated his criticisms with an implied loyalty to the Russian state, softening his call for Putin to leave office by stating he is against a change of presidential leadership during the war, as it would lead to military and civil "catastrophe."[25] Girkin’s criticisms, which he said he hopes will spark change even if they have "suicidal" consequences, indicate that growing frustration with the state of the war may be reaching a boiling point after nearly a year of hostilities among some milbloggers, prompting some milbloggers to reduce their self-censorship.

Key Takeaways

Russian media reported on January 10 that Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, former commander of the Central Military District and Russian forces in Kharkiv and northern Donetsk oblasts during Russia's significant losses in September 2022, has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces.
The news of Lapin’s appointment is generating further schisms in the already-fragmented pro-war Russian information space.
Igor Girkin heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin from office, suggesting that a willingness to reduce self-censorship and directly criticize Putin may be growing among some milbloggers.
The Ukrainian General Staff deviated from its normal reporting pattern about Russian forces in Belarus and near Ukraine’s northern border on January 10, an indicator of possible Russian preparations for an offensive in northern Ukraine, though ISW assesses this course of action remains unlikely at this time.
Ukrainian forces continued to make gains along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar but have not captured the settlement, despite false claims.
The Kremlin continues to deny that Russian authorities are preparing for another wave of partial mobilization.
Russian occupation authorities are struggling to contain an effective partisan movement in occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces continued to make gains along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 10. The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies confirmed that Ukrainian troops captured Pidkuichansk, 8km northwest of Svatove, on January 8.[26] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are conducting limited counterattacks near Svatove to regain lost positions in the area.[27] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian troops attacked near Stelmakhivka, 13km northwest of Svatove.[28] Geolocated footage shows a Russian tank from the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District firing on Ukrainian positions west of Ploshchanka and approximately 17km northwest of Kreminna, indicating that Ukrainian troops have advanced closer to R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[29] A Russian milblogger also remarked that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions in the Ploshchanka area, further confirming that Russian troops have lost ground near Kreminna.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[31]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Wagner Group forces made further gains in Soledar on January 10. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Serhiy Cherevaty reported that the Wagner Group has concentrated its most capable (likely special operations) forces in Soledar as of January 10.[32] The Wagner Group likely hopes to build on recent marginal tactical gains by committing more elite assets to the area. Geolocated footage posted on January 9 shows Wagner Group forces fighting in central Soledar.[33] A Wagner Group-affiliated Telegram group posted additional footage on January 10 of Wagner Group forces near the city administration building in central Soledar and claimed that the Wagner Group is working to consolidate positions in the area.[34] Certain Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces have moved into the western parts of Soledar and that Ukrainian troops have begun withdrawing from the settlement en masse.[35] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied these claims and stated that Ukrainian troops are still fighting fiercely for Soledar.[36] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Wagner Group is clearing Pidhorodne (just southwest of Soledar) and are moving on Krasna Hora and Paraskoviivka.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting in other settlements near Soledar, including Bilohorivka and Pidhorodne.[38]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on January 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled attacks on Bakhmut itself and south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest), Kurdiumivka (12km southwest), and Mayorsk (20km south).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops are fighting for control of Klishchiivka in order to push north and cut the T0504 Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops have advanced to the northern borders of Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut) and are now on the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[41] Russian sources additionally continued to discuss fierce fighting in the industrial zone on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[42]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 10. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Vodiane (on the northwestern outskirts) and Marinka and Pobieda (on the southwestern outskirts).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops attacked from near Novomykhailivka (just south of Donetsk City) toward Pobieda, about 4km directly south of Marinka.[44] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage of the 5th DNR Brigade reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Marinka.[45] Russian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk or eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and continued routine fire along the entire Avdiivka-Donetsk City and western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast frontline.[46]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine strikes across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 10. A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter near Kherson City.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a 200-person concentration of Ukrainian security personnel in Kherson City and inflicted high casualties.[48] ISW has not observed visual observation of this claim. ISW previously reported on January 8 that Russian military leadership is attempting to present similar claimed strikes on Ukrainian concentrations areas as "retaliation" for the December 31 Ukrainian strike on Russian positions in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, which reportedly killed up to 400 mobilized servicemen.[49] Russian forces shelled various areas of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, including the Kherson City area and areas 33km west of Kherson City near Stanislav and Shyroka Balka.[50] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Tavriisk, Nova Kakhovka, and Skadovsk Raion, Kherson Oblast.[51]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to focus on holding occupied lines in the Zaporizhia direction on January 10.[52] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Oleksandr Starukh stated on January 9 that severe winter weather increases the likelihood of intense Russian combat reconnaissance along the Zaporizhia Oblast front line.[53] Russian forces continued routine fire in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 10.[54] Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim stated on January 10 that Russian forces struck Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast six times within 24 hours, and Spokesperson for Ukraine's Southern Operational Command, Natalya Humenyuk, stated that Russian forces targeted Ochakiv in retaliation for Ukrainian military successes.[55]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue to militarize the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission Head Oleh Korkiv stated on January 10 that the Russian military established a military equipment and repair base at the ZNPP amid ongoing negotiations on the demilitarization of the ZNPP.[56] Korkiv also stated that Russian authorities have tried and failed multiple times to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid, and stated he is confident that further attempts will be unsuccessful.[57] The Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces, Yevhen Yerin, stated on January 8 that Russian forces continue to store military personnel and equipment at the ZNPP.[58]

Russian occupation authorities continued efforts to restore the Kerch Strait Bridge. Russian occupation authorities announced on January 10 that Russian authorities laid the first new span of the west (left) road bridge.[59] Occupation authorities claim that they plan to complete repairs to the road bridge by March 2023.[60] Russian forces have likely struggled to compensate for their diminished logistics capacity following the Kerch Strait Bridge attack, as ISW has previously reported.[61]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremin continues to deny that Russian authorities are preparing for another wave of "partial mobilization." Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied reports of a new wave of partial mobilization on January 9 and called on Russian citizens to ignore Telegram channels that speculate about new mobilization efforts.[62] As ISW continues to assess, discussion of a second wave of mobilization is erroneous to some extent because mobilization has never truly ceased and the Kremlin has conducted a greater, ongoing effort to recruit reservists and others into service since before February 2022.[63]

Russian occupation authorities continue mobilizing Ukrainian citizens in occupied Ukraine. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia posted a video on January 10 of LNR recruiters working with Luhansk Oblast residents who "volunteered" to fight in the Russian military.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities mobilized 30 people - including four people with disabilities - during a raid in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, on January 6, and sent these people to service with a military unit after only two days of training.[65]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are struggling to contain an effective partisan movement in occupied territories that is likely improving the targeting intelligence of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian Resistance Center claimed on January 10 that Ukrainian partisans were responsible for a January 8 explosion at a Russian ammunition depot near the Hidromash factory in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Partisans may have sabotaged the depot or provided intelligence on the location of the ammunition depot to enable Ukrainian strikes.

Russian occupation authorities continue to search for pro-Ukrainian civilians and partisans in occupied parts of Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported on January 10 that occupation authorities are conflating pro-Ukraine sentiments with partisan activity and are advertising social media forums for residents to report Ukrainian partisans or anyone with a pro-Ukrainian viewpoint to occupation authorities.[67] Fedorov reported that occupation officials are encouraging residents to anonymously report their neighbors in exchange for money and are intimidating Ukrainian civilians through "preventative talks" and torture. Fedorov reported that occupation officials who capture pro-Ukraine civilians deport them "outside of the occupied territories," likely to Russia. A senior official within the Zaporizhia Occupation Administration, Vladimir Rogov, announced on January 10 that Russian forces will search garages in Tokmak on January 13 for unspecified "dangerous contents."[68] Occupation authorities may intend such preemptive announcements to draw out Ukrainian partisans for arrest if Russian intelligence did identify a partisan storage site, but may instead be setting conditions for simple theft via seizures of allegedly suspicious vehicles. Russian occupation authorities have repeatedly stolen cars, appliances, and other valuables belonging to Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas to export and resell them within Russia for personal gain.[69]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

The Ukrainian General Staff deviated from its normal reporting pattern about Russian forces in Belarus and near Ukraine’s northern border on January 10 by excluding its usual statement that Ukraine has not observed Russian forces forming strike groups in Belarus or northern Ukraine.[70] This is the first time the Ukrainian General Staff has excluded this statement since it reintroduced discussing Russian forces in Belarus on November 20.[71] This could indicate that the Ukrainian military has observed Russian forces forming strike groups in northern Ukraine. Alternatively, the situation may not have changed, and the Ukrainian General Staff may have left it out of the daily report in an isolated incident. ISW will continue to monitor and assess the language of Ukrainian General Staff reports.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Reuters reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia is "gathering forces for another escalation" but did not specify where, when, or how the unspecified escalation could occur.[72]
Russian forces continue to deploy Russian elements to Belarus. Social media footage posted on January 10 reportedly shows likely Russian military equipment, including tube artillery with winter camouflage, on a train in Belarus moving west.[73] As ISW previously noted, applying winter camouflage to equipment is not wholly necessary for training activity and could indicate preparation for actual winter combat operations.[74]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://ura-news dot turbopages.org/ura.news/s/news/1052616949; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/10/01/2023/63bd09389a794708391c3120

[2] https://ura-news dot turbopages.org/ura.news/s/news/1052616949; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/10/01/2023/63bd09389a794708391c3120

[3] https://t dot me/mod_russia/17139; https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/847820; https://www.kommersant dot ru/amp/5433629; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2022/06/25/minoboroni-podtverdilo-izmeneniya-v-komandovaniyami-rossiiskimi-voiskami-v-ukraine-a21659

[4] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly4; https://t.me/mod_russia/17385; https... ru/politika/15116687; https://ria dot ru/20220704/geroi-1800093356.html

[11] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct7; https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=[email protected]; https://iz dot ru/1372851/2022-07-31/parad-v-chest-dnia-voenno-morskogo-flota-rossii-proshel-v-siriiskom-tartuse

[32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/10/soledar-najgaryachishyj-najvazhchyj-napryamok-na-donechchyni-sergij-cherevatyj/

[56] https://espreso dot tv/rosiyani-peretvorili-zaporizku-aes-na-viyskovu-ta-remontnu-bazu-derzhatomregulyuvannya

[57] https://espreso dot tv/rosiyani-peretvorili-zaporizku-aes-na-viyskovu-ta-remontnu-bazu-derzhatomregulyuvannya

[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/na-zaporizkij-aes-prodovzhuyut-perebuvaty-rosijski-vijskovi-ta-tehnika-agresora/

[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74878; https://russian.rt dot com/russia/article/1095815-krymskii-most-vozobnovlenie-dvizhenie-avtomobili

[60] https://russian.rt dot com/russia/article/1095815-krymskii-most-vozobnovlenie-dvizhenie-avtomobili

[62] https://ria dot ru/20230109/oproverzhenie-1843636447.html

[66] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/10/v-melitopoli-vybuhnula-vijskova-baza-rosiyan/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1155; https://twitter.com/GeoConfir... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

understandingwar.org

3. Austin ends the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate

Austin ends the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · January 10, 2023

The Defense Department will no longer require service members to get vaccinated for COVID-19, according to a memo signed Tuesday by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

The move comes weeks after President Joe Biden signed the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, and with it a plan to rescind Austin’s August 2021 memo directing the services to create a vaccination policy.

“The Department will continue to promote and encourage COVID-19 vaccination for all Service members,” Austin wrote. “The Department has made COVID-19 vaccination as easy and convenient as possible, resulting in vaccines administered to over two million Service members and 96 percent of the force ― Active and Reserve ― being fully vaccinated.”

From early 2020 to early 2022, after the service’s mandates went into effect, 96 active and reserve service members died of COVID-19 complications. Of those, 93 were unvaccinated.

But tens of thousands of requests for religious exemptions plagued the services, resulting in multiple lawsuits that as of the end of 2022 left the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force under injunctions preventing the involuntary separation of any service members who had been denied a waiver.

Pentagon worries repealing COVID vaccine mandate will affect readiness

Democratic House leaders now support the change, which has been a priority for congressional Republicans for months.

Congressional Republicans pushed back against the mandate, as thousands of troops were discharged for refusing vaccination, arguing that the separations were harming readiness and possibly hurting recruiting.

Some lawmakers requested the Pentagon reinstate, with backpay, any troops involuntarily discharged over their vaccination refusal. That provision did not end up in the final version of the defense policy bill. Instead, the law’s language specifically required Austin to rescind his memo creating a mandate.

Austin’s memo directs the services to remove any flags on the personnel records of troops who are not yet vaccinated and to rescind any letters of reprimand.

Still, any troops who are unvaccinated may be barred from certain assignments or deployments, Austin wrote, “including when vaccination is required to travel to, or entry into, a foreign nation.”

Service members who received general discharges for failing to obey orders to get vaccinated may petition their service’s discharge review board or board for correction of records to upgrade their discharge characterizations, he added.

Additional guidance will come from the Pentagon’s personnel chief, he wrote.

“The Department’s COVID-19 vaccination efforts will leave a lasting legacy in the many lives we saved, the world-class Force we have been able to field, and the high level of readiness we have maintained, amidst difficult public health conditions,” Austin wrote.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

4. U.S., Allies Prepare Fresh Sanctions on Russian Oil Industry

Excerpt:

An important reason the crude cap hasn’t upset oil markets so far is because of ships from the so-called shadow fleet of tankers. These boats from outside Western jurisdictions carry a sizable portion of Russian crude exports to destinations in Asia that aren’t part of the sanctions—a dynamic acceptable to U.S. officials.

U.S., Allies Prepare Fresh Sanctions on Russian Oil Industry

Treasury officials are in Europe this week discussing price caps that go into effect next month

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-allies-prepare-fresh-sanctions-on-russian-oil-industry-11673432088?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Andrew DuehrenFollow

Jan. 11, 2023 5:30 am ET

WASHINGTON—The U.S. and its allies are preparing their next round of sanctions on Russia’s oil industry, aiming to cap the sales prices of Russian exports of refined petroleum products in a step some market watchers warn could squeeze global supply.

In meetings across Europe this week, Treasury officials are discussing the details of the coming sanctions on Russian oil products, which are set to go into effect on Feb. 5. The penalties will set two price limits on Russian refined products: one on high-value exports such as diesel and another on low-value ones such as fuel oil, according to people familiar with the plans.

The new limits will follow moves last month by the U.S., European Union and their allies in the Group of Seven advanced democracies to cap the price of Russian crude exports at $60 a barrel. Those sanctions have had a relatively muted impact on global prices, encouraging Western officials who want to pressure Russia’s budget while minimizing volatility in critical global energy markets.

New penalties on petroleum products will apply to Western companies that finance, insure or ship seaborne cargoes of Russian products.

PHOTO: ALEJANDRO MARTÍNEZ VÉLEZ/ZUMA PRESS

But the penalties on refined products could have bigger economic consequences, particularly since they will take effect on the same day the EU will ban the import of Russian diesel and other refined products. Market watchers and some Western officials expect that Russia will have a harder time reorienting its exports of refined products, which could weigh on global prices.

Without access to the European market and facing Western sanctions on shipments elsewhere, Russian refining production could decline, reducing global supply.

“The price cap for oil: It was an unpleasant exercise but not so difficult. But for oil products, it is a much bigger problem,” said Tatiana Mitrova, a research fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP

What’s News

Catch up on the headlines, understand the news and make better decisions, free in your inbox every day.

Preview

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies have tried to degrade the Russian economy, which generates tax revenue that funds the military—while minimizing the collateral damage to their own economies. Russia’s lucrative oil industry has been the most challenging target of the West because of its importance to global energy markets, which are a factor in the inflation that has plagued much of the world.

As with the price cap on Russian crude, the new penalties on petroleum products will apply to Western companies that finance, insure or ship seaborne cargoes of Russian products. Businesses based in the G-7 and Australia will face penalties if they facilitate the trade of Russian petroleum products unless those products are sold below the price caps.

An important reason the crude cap hasn’t upset oil markets so far is because of ships from the so-called shadow fleet of tankers. These boats from outside Western jurisdictions carry a sizable portion of Russian crude exports to destinations in Asia that aren’t part of the sanctions—a dynamic acceptable to U.S. officials.

How a Cap on Russian Oil Prices Could Affect U.S. Consumers

GOP pick to lead House China committee vows to win ‘new Cold War’

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · January 10, 2023

WASHINGTON — The House on Tuesday voted 365-65 to establish a special committee on China, and the lawmaker Republicans tapped to lead the bipartisan panel has vowed that Congress will use it to “win the new Cold War.”

Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin — who served as the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee’s personnel panel in the last Congress — has laid out an agenda for the China committee that includes several key defense priorities. The 16-member committee will consist of nine Republicans and seven Democrats.

Gallagher told Defense News that while the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees as well as the Appropriations Committee’s defense panel would take the lead on defense-related issues, the China committee would serve as “an incubator or accelerator for [Chinese Communist Party]-related legislation.”

“As someone who’s spent a lot of the last six years focusing on how we restore deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and deter hot war over Taiwan, I think a lot of what we can do on the select committee is tease out sort of the why,” Gallagher said. “Why does this matter? Explain to the American people about why they should care about helping Taiwan defend itself and arming Taiwan to the teeth.”

He said that will entail hearings and reports aimed at outlining the ”repercussions on global financial markets if China attacked Taiwan” and “stitching together those pieces in a way they’re currently not stitched together.”

The committee could hold its first hearing as soon as February.

In addition to Taiwan, Gallagher intends to use the committee to address Beijing’s military modernization efforts and the U.S. defense-industrial base’s dependence on China.

“That’s not just purely a hard-power defense question,” he said. “You have to tease out the economic and financial implications of that.”

“As China uses its growing economy to modernize its military, we must also develop new weapons and stockpiles to project power, preserve our global influence, and protect our forces, including in space and cyberspace,” Gallagher wrote on Sunday in a Fox News op-ed that framed Sino-U.S. competition as a 21st century Cold War.

He wrote that the “first step is to restore our supply chains and end critical economic dependencies on China,” noting that it produces “90% of the world’s rare earth metals, alloys and permanent magnets.”

Congress made onshoring defense supply chains a priority last year, passing $52 billion in subsidies and other tax incentives for companies to produce semiconductors — which are needed to produce everything from Javelin anti-tank missiles to F-35 fighter jets — within the United States.

The fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act also doubled the net worth of the National Defense Stockpile — the U.S. strategic reserve of critical minerals — injecting it with $1 billion after years of atrophy and neglect. The stockpile includes critical minerals that are largely obtained from China, including antimony — a mineral needed to produce bullets and ammunition.

“We’re dangerously dependent on China for basic building blocks of our economy, resulting in shortages of critical products like semiconductors and rare earth minerals, both of which are largely produced in China today,” House Rules Committee Chairman Tom Cole, R-Okla., said ahead of the vote.

In addition to traditional defense issues, the committee will have a wide remit that includes Republican priorities such as China’s role in exporting fentanyl and investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. Other initiatives that could garner bipartisan support include nascent efforts to ban the Chinese-owned social media app TikTok and investigations into Chinese influence at U.S. universities.

Much of the legislation aimed at wrestling defense supply chains away from China emerged as proposals from House Republicans’ China Task Force in the last Congress. That partisan task force produced numerous bipartisan proposals among its more than 400 recommendations. It also liaised closely with Taiwan’s’ diplomatic office in Washington to address a multibillion-dollar backlog of arms sales to Taipei.

Gallagher said the China committee’s work will make it easier for the Foreign Affairs Committee to address the backlog of weapons that “have been approved but not delivered to Taiwan.”

Democrats opted to boycott the China Task Force shortly before its formation in 2020, accusing former President Donald Trump of scapegoating Beijing for his mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

While many House Democrats expressed reservations about working with Republicans to establish the China committee, most voted in favor of establishing the panel amid assurances from GOP leaders that it would remain a bipartisan endeavor.

Rep. Jim McGovern of Massachusetts, the top Democrat on the Rules Committee, voted to form the China panel but warned against turning it into a venue for “Republican conspiracy theories and partisan talking points” or “a place that perpetuates anti-Asian hate.”

Some Democrats who have served on the House Armed Services Committee expressed more confidence that the China committee would produce serious bipartisan work, including Reps. Ro Khanna of California and Ruben Gallego of Arizona.

Gallego, who chaired the intelligence and special operations panel last year, told Defense News in an interview on Tuesday that he would like to join the China committee.

“I think I could bring a lot of experience that I’ve gained — the experience I’ve taken from my subcommittee — as well as other experiences on the committee dealing in the [Indo-Pacific] area, as well as the Huaweis of the world and even things like TikTok,” Gallego said, referring to the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei, which has been the target of scrutiny by the U.S.

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., noted that he spoke with Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, D-N.Y., about “what this committee will be and who we’ll be putting on it,” while praising Gallagher as a “focused and studied” lawmaker who would lead the panel in a bipartisan manner.

“We want serious lawmakers,” McCarthy said on the House floor. “This isn’t for somebody to go in and [go] viral because they want to make some point.”

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

6. U.S., Japan set to announce shake-up of Marine Corps units to deter China

Excerpts:

“This is about Japan essentially aligning with the United States, in many ways like a NATO ally,” said a senior administration official, who like several other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Spokespersons for the State and Defense departments declined to comment.

This week, the two allies will announce the repurposing of a Marine Corps regiment based in Okinawa to be able by 2025 to rapidly disperse to fight in austere, remote islands, according to several U.S. officials. The Marine Corps plans to equip the regiment with advanced capabilities, such as anti-ship missiles that could be fired at Chinese ships in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

This is one of the most significant advances in U.S. force posture in the region in at least a decade, said the officials. “Japan is substantially improving its capacity, but also providing more capacity for the United States,” said the administration official. “This reflects a Japan that is much less ambivalent, a Japan that is prepared to play a more substantial role in its own defense.”

U.S., Japan set to announce shake-up of Marine Corps units to deter China

In a deepening of the two countries’ strategic alliance, a Marine regiment on Okinawa will be able to fire missiles at Chinese ships in the event of a Taiwan conflict

By Ellen Nakashima and Dan Lamothe

January 10, 2023 at 7:19 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · January 11, 2023

Japan, already Washington’s most important ally in the Indo-Pacific, is deepening its strategic partnership with the United States in an effort to counter China — a development that will be showcased this week with a shake-up of U.S. Marine Corps units in Okinawa and a White House embrace of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

Kishida’s visit to Washington comes as his political standing is wavering, his poll approval ratings often below 40 percent, and with President Biden wanting to give a stalwart partner a boost. It comes, too, on the heels of Japan announcing a major hike in defense spending, and a new national security strategy that calls for “counterstrike” or long-range strike capability — enabling it to reach targets in mainland China.

“The meeting between President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida will highlight the pivotal moment we are in for the US-Japan alliance,” White House officials said in a statement to The Post.

Japan, which occupies the presidency of the Group of Seven industrial democracies this year, has also taken significant steps to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine — becoming the first country in Asia to join Western democracies in sanctioning Moscow. Kishida, risking China’s anger, has spoken out publicly about the dangerous potential of a conflict in Asia over Taiwan. Perhaps most noteworthy of all, Tokyo has set aside decades of self-imposed constraints on the military as it confronts increasing security threats and risk of war in the Indo-Pacific.

“This is about Japan essentially aligning with the United States, in many ways like a NATO ally,” said a senior administration official, who like several other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Spokespersons for the State and Defense departments declined to comment.

This week, the two allies will announce the repurposing of a Marine Corps regiment based in Okinawa to be able by 2025 to rapidly disperse to fight in austere, remote islands, according to several U.S. officials. The Marine Corps plans to equip the regiment with advanced capabilities, such as anti-ship missiles that could be fired at Chinese ships in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

This is one of the most significant advances in U.S. force posture in the region in at least a decade, said the officials. “Japan is substantially improving its capacity, but also providing more capacity for the United States,” said the administration official. “This reflects a Japan that is much less ambivalent, a Japan that is prepared to play a more substantial role in its own defense.”

In the past, the administration official said, Japan would have resorted to “a kind of checkbook diplomacy, and basically asked the United States to take care of” security in the region. “What they’re doing now is something quite different and quite substantial, which is essentially to say, ‘Count us in.’ And that’s a big deal.”

Kishida last May promised Biden that Tokyo would embark on a substantial increase in defense spending, which Japan announced last month, officials said. Tokyo specifically asked Washington to reserve the announcement of the Marine regiment for the “Two-plus-Two” meeting of the two countries’ defense and foreign secretaries this week so that it would come after Japan’s rollout of its budget and national security and defense strategies — in synchronized fashion, they said.

“Japan is stepping up big-time and doing so in lockstep with the United States,” the White House officials said.

But the Kishida-Biden meeting is about “more than specific deliverables or topics,” it said. “It is a chance to take stock of the last year and how we have taken this alliance to unprecedented heights and what’s next.”

Some policymakers, such as Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chairman of the new Select Committee on China, are supportive but want to see more action. Neither this administration nor the previous one, he said, seems to have moved with the requisite “sense of urgency” to build a credible deterrent to China.

“I shall praise it when it becomes a reality,” Gallagher said, when told of the coming announcement.

But administration officials say the changes Japan has pledged to make are meaningful. Its planned increase in defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product over 5 years would make its defense budget the world’s third-largest. Its decision to build its own long-range missiles and in the meantime to buy U.S. Tomahawks as an interim step is a major advance in counterstrike capability and a signal to China that aggressive moves in the region will not go unanswered, they said.

Japan’s endorsement of the Marine Corps restructuring comes as China continues a sweeping military buildup, including expansion of its Navy — already the world’s largest — and its nuclear program, all part of Beijing’s goal of becoming the world’s preeminent military by 2049.

Japan and China also have been engaged in a long-running territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea northeast of Taiwan, where an escalation could draw the United States — which has pledged to defend Japan under a security treaty — into a conflict with China.

When it comes to the security partnership, Japan stands out, a second U.S. official said. “The British, the Australians, are very, very important to us, but none of them provide the capabilities to us that Japan offers. None of them host the forces that they host. None of them have the economy the size that Japan has,” he said.

Senior U.S. military officials in both Washington and the Pacific have been discussing for several years a restructuring of the U.S. military — and the Marine Corps, in particular — to counter rising concerns about the Chinese military’s growth and unpredictable actions.

The heavy concentration of the U.S. military on Okinawa — about half of American troops in Japan are stationed there — and a number of criminal incidents over the years have long been a sore point with the Japanese, and the Okinawans in particular. “The fact that they’re doing this anyway shows how much the relationship has changed and that support for the alliance extends to Okinawa as well,” said Christopher Johnstone, Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former White House director for East Asia. “It speaks to political evolution in Okinawa and the urgency of the threat.”

Though the overall number of personnel assigned to Marine units on Okinawa will generally hold steady, at about 18,000, “it’s not just about the bodies, it’s about the capabilities,” the second official said. “They’ll move quicker. With more firepower.”

Over the next several years, the goal is to provide the regiment with ground-launched anti-ship missiles, part of the military’s plan to be able to target adversaries from multiple “domains” simultaneously — air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-sea, sea-to-ground, and so on, the official said.

The Pentagon additionally wants to be able to rotate Marines to some of the more remote islands southwest of Okinawa, where they will train and perhaps position equipment there, to develop the ability to rapidly deploy should China attack Taiwan, officials said. Some of the southwestern islands, known collectively with Okinawa as the Ryukyus, are only about 100 miles from Taiwan — roughly the same distance that separates the self-governed island from mainland China.

The Marine regiment “reinforces Japan’s status as by far the most important ally in preparing for a Taiwan crisis,” Johnstone said. “That really is the center of what we’re doing here.”

On Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin warned that “U.S.-Japan military cooperation should not harm the interests of any third party or undermine peace and stability in the region.”

The shake-up on Okinawa follows the establishment of a similar unit in Hawaii. There, the Marine Corps took an existing infantry headquarters — the 3rd Marine Regiment — and turned it into the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment. In Okinawa, the Marine Corps will repurpose the 12th Marine Regiment, an artillery headquarters, to create the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment. The service also plans to transfer an infantry headquarters now on Okinawa, the 4th Marine Regiment, to Guam, where it could serve as the basis of the third littoral regiment beginning in 2027, a third U.S. official said. That unit will be called the 4th Marine Littoral Regiment.

The units include up to about 2,200 military personnel each and are designed to rely on amphibious ships and other naval vessels to carry out strikes using long-range missiles, coordinate air and missile defense, and support other ground troops in the region. Among the weapons they are expected to use is an anti-ship weapon known as the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, which is launched from the back of combat vehicles.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · January 11, 2023

7. US Navy Seizes More Than 2,000 Iran Assault Rifles Bound For Yemen

I do wonder where these weapons came from.

US Navy Seizes More Than 2,000 Iran Assault Rifles Bound For Yemen

eurasiareview.com · by Eurasia Review · January 10, 2023

U.S. naval forces intercepted a fishing vessel in the Gulf of Oman, Jan. 6, and discovered it smuggling 2,116 AK-47 assault rifles while transiting international waters along a maritime route from Iran to Yemen.

According to the Navy, a boarding team from patrol coastal ship USS Chinook (PC 9) initially discovered and seized the weapons with support from USS Monsoon (PC 4) and guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG 68). The intercepted vessel, which was sailing on a route historically used to traffic illicit cargo to the Houthis in Yemen, was crewed by six Yemeni nationals.

The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons to the Houthis violates U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 and international law. The transfer of the vessel and its crew for repatriation is in progress.

“This shipment is part of a continued pattern of destabilizing activity from Iran,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. “These threats have our attention. We remain vigilant in detecting any maritime activity that impedes freedom of navigation or compromises regional security.”

In the past two months, U.S. 5th Fleet has also intercepted two other fishing vessels in the Gulf of Oman smuggling lethal aid from Iran to Yemen.

Forces operating from expeditionary sea base USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) seized more than 50 tons of ammunition rounds, fuses and propellants for rockets, Dec. 1. Weeks earlier on Nov. 8, The Sullivans, USS Hurricane (PC 3) and U.S. Coast Guard ship USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC 1146) intercepted more than 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate, a powerful oxidizer commonly used to make rocket and missile fuel, as well as 100 tons of urea fertilizer.

The U.S. 5th Fleet operating area includes 21 countries, the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, parts of the Indian Ocean and three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb and Suez Canal.

eurasiareview.com · by Eurasia Review · January 10, 2023

8. Get used to wielding ‘hard power,’ US Army general at head of NATO command tells allies

It is what the Army/military is built for.

Excerpts:

For NATO, implementing its overarching strategy, known as Defense and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area, is central to its efforts as allies prioritize collective territorial defense, Cavoli said.

The work revolves around tailoring military plans by region with updated details on how strategic areas will be defended.

“Of course, these plans are going to go ahead and drive a tremendous amount of change in the alliance,” Cavoli said.

For example, command and control structures responsible for putting defense plans into action will have to be altered to “make them fit for a new purpose,” he said.

A new force model to produce larger and more combat-ready forces also is in the works. That will involve having troops ready on a standing basis, as opposed to the rotational, schedule-based model allies have had the luxury of using during the past 20 years.

The new force model, which Cavoli described as “promising,” is now being fleshed out with troop commitments from member states.

Get used to wielding ‘hard power,’ US Army general at head of NATO command tells allies

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · January 10, 2023

U.S. Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli talks to troops in March 2022 in Adazi, Latvia. Cavoli, speaking at a security forum in Sweden on Jan. 9, 2023, outlined the steps NATO allies are taking in reaction to how Russia’s war on Ukraine is unfolding. (Ryan Gay/U.S. Army National Guard)

STUTTGART, Germany — Drastic changes are coming for NATO, and the U.S.-led alliance’s top American officer in Europe says members must face this fact: “Hard power is a reality.”

Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Christopher Cavoli, speaking at a security forum in Sweden on Monday, outlined the steps allies are taking, many of which stem from how Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine is unfolding.

“The scale of this war is out of proportion with all of our recent thinking, but it is real,” Cavoli said. “And we must contend with it.”

The implication is that while “soft power” diplomacy and economic measures favored by some allies in recent years have a role, being skilled with tanks, artillery and all manner of firepower must take precedence to defend against Russia.

For NATO, implementing its overarching strategy, known as Defense and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area, is central to its efforts as allies prioritize collective territorial defense, Cavoli said.

The work revolves around tailoring military plans by region with updated details on how strategic areas will be defended.

“Of course, these plans are going to go ahead and drive a tremendous amount of change in the alliance,” Cavoli said.

For example, command and control structures responsible for putting defense plans into action will have to be altered to “make them fit for a new purpose,” he said.

A new force model to produce larger and more combat-ready forces also is in the works. That will involve having troops ready on a standing basis, as opposed to the rotational, schedule-based model allies have had the luxury of using during the past 20 years.

The new force model, which Cavoli described as “promising,” is now being fleshed out with troop commitments from member states.

On top of that, a new force structure will be installed that will specify the amounts and types of equipment needed across the alliance to conduct operations, he said.

Such plans will play a role in NATO being able to reinforce eight battlegroups that have been set up along NATO’s eastern flank. Other changes on the way include a more integrated air and missile defense posture in the east, Cavoli said.

U.S. Army Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, supreme allied commander Europe, right, talks with Ukraine Defense Contact Group delegates at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Sept. 8, 2022. Cavoli recently discussed NATO's force structure at a security forum in Sweden. (Edgar Grimaldo/U.S. Air Force)

The Russia-Ukraine war has shown the West that it needs to produce weaponry and munitions at a large scale, he added. In Ukraine, the Russians have expended on average well over 20,000 artillery rounds per day, Cavoli said.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians have fielded 37 front-line brigades plus dozens more territorial brigades. For comparison, the U.S. Army has 31 regular Army brigade combat teams.

For decades, NATO’s focus was on “out of area” operations such as the war in Afghanistan, while territorial defense fell by the wayside during a post-Cold War era that took peace in Europe as a given.

The jarring effect of Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine has put in motion changes almost unthinkable a year ago, such as Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to shift from military nonalignment to NATO membership.

Regarding Sweden’s accession, delayed because of objections from Turkey, Cavoli said incorporating the Nordic country into allied defense plans would be easy given the quality of the country’s military.

“It’s good if it’s easy, because I think the future looks hard,” Cavoli told his Swedish audience. “The NATO you are planning to join is in a new world, one shaped by Russia’s illegal war on Ukraine.”

Cavoli, an Army officer who also serves as head of the Stuttgart-based U.S. European Command, said that future means prioritizing hard power, a comment that could go against the grain of the sensibilities of some member states such as Germany.

In Berlin’s previous dealings with Moscow, fostering economic ties and downplaying Russia’s military threat was the norm in the years leading up to the 2022 invasion.

That mindset held firm for German leaders in spite of the Kremlin’s armed annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the assassination of a Chechen refugee in Berlin by a former colonel in Russia’s security services in 2019.

But soft power isn’t sufficient in deterring adversaries like Russia, Cavoli said.

“The great irreducible feature of warfare is hard power. And we have to be good at it,” he said.

He added that in the military realm, cyber and information operations are also valuable.

“But if the other guy shows up with a tank, you better have a tank,” Cavoli said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · January 10, 2023

9. Republicans name chairmen for Armed Services, Vet Affairs committees

Representative Rogers did seem to physically defend the Speaker on the House floor during the speaker vote. (apologies for the attempt at humor).

Note this fact:

The new session of Congress opens with 97 members who have military experience, the most since 2015.

Republicans name chairmen for Armed Services, Vet Affairs committees

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · January 10, 2023

House Republicans on Tuesday named Alabama Rep. Mike Rogers as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and Illinois Rep. Mike Bost as chairman of the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee as part of their leadership plans for the 118th Congress.

Both moves were expected, but the official designation allows both committees to now begin their work. Chamber operations have been stalled for the last week as Republican lawmakers debated who would serve as the next House speaker.

Both Bost and Rogers served as the ranking members on their respective committees last year, and neither faced opposition in taking over as the leader of the respective panels.

As chairman of the military panel, Rogers said his committee will focus on “lethality and capability” in military operations, as well as threats posed by China, Russia and North Korea.

“Over the next two years, the House Armed Services Committee will provide our warfighters with the resources and weapons they need to deter and, if necessary, defeat any adversary anywhere in the world,” he said in a statement.

“The committee will also hold the [President Joe] Biden administration accountable for misguided policies that distract from the core mission of the Department of Defense. Initiatives that service a social agenda but don’t advance our national security will be scrutinized.”

Rogers, 64, has served in the House since 2003. Bost, 62, is a Marine Corps veteran who has been in Congress since 2015.

Breaking down the number of veterans in the 118th Congress

The new session of Congress opens with 97 members who have military experience, the most since 2015.

In a statement announcing his priorities for the upcoming session, Bost said the lawmakers have “made great progress for veterans and their families over the past few years” and need to continue that focus into the future.

“In order to do that, we need to hold the Biden administration accountable and restore regular order,” he said. “This will help us bring [the Department of Veterans Affairs] into the 21st century with commonsense legislation and oversight for the next generation of warfighters, without leaving behind today’s veterans.”

Committee members and subcommittee chairs for the various congressional panels are expected to be announced in coming days.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

10. After Ukraine invasion, NATO aligning strategy with 'regional plans': Former SACEUR

After Ukraine invasion, NATO aligning strategy with 'regional plans': Former SACEUR - Breaking Defense

NATO likely will maintain a "semi-permanent" presence in Eastern Europe for many years to come, said retired Gen. Tod Wolters, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · January 10, 2023

French soldier scans the area in front of the French weapon system during exercise Ramstein Legacy 22, a NATO large-scale live-fire air defence exercise. Seventeen Allied and partner countries trained in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland with aircraft, missile defence systems and electronic warfare systems from 6 to 10 June 2022. (NATO)

WASHINGTON — As NATO continues to adjust to the new geo-strategic reality in Europe in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a next step is for the alliance to work out plans for responding to aggression that will help better align member military postures to implement them, according to former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and retired US Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters.

“[W]hat will occur are graduated response plans that take into account the NATO Military Strategy, the NATO Strategic Concept, and regional plans. And that allows for better alignment with military activity as it connects to whole-of-government activity throughout NATO. I think that is very, very important,” he told the Mitchell Institute today.

The new NATO Strategic Concept was agreed at the alliance’s summit in Madrid in June 2022, and was aimed at taking into account the new geopolitical landscape including Russia’s multi-faceted aggression in Europe and China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific.

As part of that force realignment, he elaborated, NATO likely will maintain a “semi-permanent” presence along its Eastern front for many years to come, said Wolters, who retired just after the summit in July 2022.

He explained that the 30 NATO member nations have been beefing up their presence, via mixed nation rotational deployments in Eastern Europe starting before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

In 2017, NATO established four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States. Following Russia’s move into Ukraine, the allies reinforced those battlegroups, and established four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.

“When you take a look at the NATO military posture in the vicinity of Eastern Europe, pre-invasion and post-invasion, you can see that we’ve comfortably doubled in size with respect to the number of battalion-size battlegroups that possess all domain capability from a command and control perspective,” Wolters said.

During NATO’s summit in Madrid in June, the allies also “agreed to enhance the multinational battlegroups from battalions up to brigade-size, where and when required,” according to a NATO fact sheet.

Asked about his comments in March during a House Armed Services Committee hearing citing the need for a permanent NATO air and land presence in Eastern Europe, Wolters explained that forces are provided to the current battlegroups on a “rotational” basis, with a mix of NATO member nations contributing. He noted that, in his view, those deployments should continue along the same lines for the foreseeable future.

“[T]he context of the question in the hearing had to do with permanent and rotational, and my response was, yes, to both,” he said.

“[F]rom a posture perspective for NATO militaries, we needed to construct battalion-sized battlegroups in southeastern Europe, with the same architecture that we had in the Baltics, and that is more in line with a semi-permanent basing, if you will, because … we rotate forces from nations into those battalion-sized battlegroups today in all eight of those countries,” Wolters elaborated. “I contend that that is something that … will probably remain for a very, very long time.”

11. Digital defenders: A look at the evolution and elevation of America's Cyber National Mission Force

Everyone wants to be like JSOC :-)

Excerpts:

Becoming the ‘JSOC’ of the cyber realm

Upon elevation, officials stated that while not exactly perfect, the closest and most analogous arrangement within the Defense Department to CNMF sub-unified command was Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under the umbrella of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Many former officials said there had been caution not to exactly equate CNMF to JSOC, but that was essentially the model.

“I don’t think it’s changed very much from the original vision of what the Cyber National Mission Force was supposed to be. It was always envisioned, honestly, to be the JSOC of the cyber realm,” said the former official involved in the creation of the cyber mission force.

“The Cyber National Mission Force … this is where the JSOC analogy comes in pretty well. It’s comparable to the special ops national mission force for strategically significant national-level missions of consequence. In the case of SOCOM and JSOC, that’s counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, etc. In the case of U.S. Cyber Command, that’s counter cyberattack against the nation. There was a lot of argument initially over what exactly that meant and how that would be executed,” the former official added.

The JSOC analogy also rings true for CNMF given the unique mission set it holds, which requires a certain skillset that differs from the other types of cyber mission force teams. Additionally, the longer deployment cycles on the CNMF are similar to the longer tours members of JSOC often had relative to others in the special ops community.

Digital defenders: A look at the evolution and elevation of America's Cyber National Mission Force

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · January 10, 2023

In December, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin elevated U.S. Cyber Command’s Cyber National Mission Force to a sub-unified command, which current and former officials say was an endorsement of the important role that cyber warriors play within the Department of Defense and their contribution to defending the nation from digital threats.

The CNMF — formerly one of Cybercom’s headquarters elements — is made up of 39 joint teams and thought to have the DOD’s most talented cyber operators at the cutting-edge of their profession. It is aligned in task forces organized against specific threat actors. They have been on the front lines of defending elections from foreign influence, protecting critical infrastructure and, most notably, for conducting so-called hunt forward operations which involve physically sending defensively-oriented cyber protection teams to foreign countries to hunt for threats on their networks at the invitation of host nations.

Former officials described a natural evolution in the elevation to a sub-unified command for CNMF, highlighting the importance in continued maturation for the still young U.S. Cyber Command.

“It’s a great indicator of the continued maturation. It’s a great testament to the hard work of those men and women and the strong leadership they have,” Michael Rogers, who served as commander of Cybercom from 2014 to 2018, told DefenseScoop. “It’s an endorsement by the Department of Defense, I think, of the importance of the mission and the need to generate structures that are optimized to execute the mission … It shows the department believes that that’s the right direction, too, as well. It isn’t just the cyber guys going, ‘We need to do this.’ It’s the whole department thinking, ‘Yeah, it’s the appropriate thing for us to do.’”

He added that sub-unified commands are normally joint organizations within a combatant commander’s area of responsibility and typically created because missions are believed to be both a higher level of priority and of a sustained nature.

Austin’s decision clarifies and codifies the unique missions and functions of the CNMF to defend the nation from cyber threats, George Franz, cybersecurity lead for Accenture Federal Services and the first CNMF commander, told DefenseScoop.

Several former officials who spoke with DefenseScoop explained that sub-unification was always the plan at some point down the road for CNMF when it, and the broader cyber mission force, was created around 2012. The broader cyber mission force consists of 133 total teams that conduct cyber ops for Cybercom, including the 39 CNMF teams.

“Early on, there was the idea that eventually CNMF was going to be a force with a unique mission,” Franz said.

However, that wasn’t something that officials put emphasis on initially because they had little capacity. They only had 12 people in the headquarters and shared an office with two desks at the beginning.

“The idea was you’ve got to build the force, deploy the force, start to demonstrate capacity and eventually … there’s a time when the decision ultimately needs to get made about alignment,” Franz said.

A former CNMF staff member who is now part of the Association of U.S. Cyber Forces (AUSCF) said the discussion regarding sub-unification really began to gain steam following the Russia Small Group, a joint CNMF-NSA task force established in 2018 to thwart election interface by Russia and other foreign actors after the perceived failures surrounding the 2016 election.

Then Brig. Gen. Timothy Haugh, who was the commander of CNMF and is now the three-star deputy commander of Cybercom, assigned personnel to begin working on a package to make CNMF a sub-unified organization in the 2019 timeframe, the former staff member said, adding it took a couple of years to negotiate it and get it right.

Sub-unification isn’t something the command could do on its own. It had to present a plan and get it approved by the secretary of defense.

Sub-unification also doesn’t come with a direct set of new authorities or resources or an increased budget. In fact, officials said they will not be getting an increase in personnel or funding as a result of the elevation. Sources indicated the command was careful to pitch elevation to department leadership as “resource neutral,” though, at some point in the future, they might come back with more requests.

The former staff member posited that it’s possible in the future that CNMF will get more control over procurement, allowing them to modify or change the toolkits they need.

Sub-unification demonstrates maturation and the potential to take more delegated authorities that rest at the four-star level, experts say.

“If you look at how authorities get delegated from SecDef to combat command as sub-unified, so that does allow, I would say, agility, freedom of movement, a little … autonomy. But it gives that commander more of the responsibility for mission command of things,” Franz said. “They haven’t been limited by the lack of sub-unification, but that designation just makes it a lot easier. They will be able to test and codify things over time to make that even more efficient now that because it’s formal. You’ve got all the processes that go around formal command are now available to the CNMF commander.”

The former staff member said section by section, things can be delegated down such as funding or procurement authority, especially since prior to sub-unification, CNMF was essentially living as a staff element on Cybercom’s budget.

Authority to conduct an operation could also be delegated, depending on the risk profile or mission, they said. However, certain actions might require additional permissions.

Defending the nation in cyberspace

Officials have noted that the CNMF elevation was not done in response to some crisis.

While it has always been charged with defending the nation from foreign cyberspace threats, the DOD has been on a long journey to figure out exactly how it performs that role and fits with other government entities.

For years, there were debates both inside and outside government as to how the DOD would protect the country in the digital realm. It was clear the U.S. military had responsibility to defend the United States from kinetic attacks such as missile salvos, but tackling cyber threats was a trickier problem.

Following a series of executive policy changes, congressional legal changes and clarifications and conceptual revamps, DOD and Cybercom developed the frameworks of “defend forward” and “persistent engagement.”

The 2018 DOD cyber strategy directed Cybercom to “defend forward,” which involves operating on networks outside the United States in order to confront threats before they ever reach domestic networks. It executes that directive under its operational concept of persistent engagement, which means challenging adversary activities daily and wherever they operate.

“Elevation [of the CNMF] to a sub-unified command means that it now takes on additional authorities and responsibilities for conducting that mission, that counter cyberattack mission, to support the defend-the-nation role that it has. Over time, I think what that became was continuous reconnaissance and positioning to understand priority cyber threat capabilities, which we all know openly now are China, Russia, Iran, North Korea” and violent extremist organizations, a former official involved in the creation of the cyber mission force told DefenseScoop.

“You’ve seen the strategy, the DOD strategy, move from a focus on just building the force structure and building the capabilities now, to moving from less of a reactive posture to more of a proactive posture and process — which you recognize in the strategy of defend forward and persistent presence,” the former official added.

Maj. Gen. William Hartman, commander of the Cyber National Mission Force, provides remarks at Fort Meade during a Dec. 19, 2022 ceremony officially making CNMF a subordinate unified command under U.S. Cyber Command. (Photo credit: U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer Jon Dasbach/ U.S. Cyber Command)

While this was always the vision, it took the department and U.S. government a long time to get there, especially given the sensitivities involved in defending privately owned networks.

The vision of the first Cybercom commander, Gen. Keith Alexander, “was always that CNMF would defend the nation and it would do that outside of the [DOD Information Network] and frankly, outside of the borders of the United States,” Franz said. “In order to defend in cyberspace, you had to defend forward of the targeted areas.”

Despite all the debate over the years, Franz noted that sub-unification really codifies this mission within DOD and the U.S. government because the secretary of defense has approved it and the national command authority has signed off on its mission.

Becoming the ‘JSOC’ of the cyber realm

Upon elevation, officials stated that while not exactly perfect, the closest and most analogous arrangement within the Defense Department to CNMF sub-unified command was Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under the umbrella of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Many former officials said there had been caution not to exactly equate CNMF to JSOC, but that was essentially the model.

“I don’t think it’s changed very much from the original vision of what the Cyber National Mission Force was supposed to be. It was always envisioned, honestly, to be the JSOC of the cyber realm,” said the former official involved in the creation of the cyber mission force.

“The Cyber National Mission Force … this is where the JSOC analogy comes in pretty well. It’s comparable to the special ops national mission force for strategically significant national-level missions of consequence. In the case of SOCOM and JSOC, that’s counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, etc. In the case of U.S. Cyber Command, that’s counter cyberattack against the nation. There was a lot of argument initially over what exactly that meant and how that would be executed,” the former official added.

The JSOC analogy also rings true for CNMF given the unique mission set it holds, which requires a certain skillset that differs from the other types of cyber mission force teams. Additionally, the longer deployment cycles on the CNMF are similar to the longer tours members of JSOC often had relative to others in the special ops community.

When it comes to skillsets, the former staff member noted that on the defensive side, CNMF operators must possess extremely deep threat-specific knowledge. They’ll have a high level of expertise on a particular actor such as Russia’s foreign intelligence service or China’s ministry of state security — and thus be able to understand how those actors operate in a network and where they’re going to go once they gain access.

On the offensive side, the former staff member noted that CNMF operators have different characteristics of what they must gain access to relative to their counterparts conducting offensive ops for theater combatant commands. A combat mission team for a combatant command might be working the same target that won’t change for some years whereas a national mission team for CNMF will be looking at targets that are more dynamic and require a different mindset, understanding and approach to crack it.

However, a former senior DOD cyber official stated they didn’t like the JSOC analogy as it tended to created a tiered model for quality and readiness.

Maintaining momentum

Former officials noted that the sub-unification is just one part of the journey for both CNMF and Cybercom, cautioning that there is still more work to be done going forward.

Officials used to use the metaphor that Cybercom was building the proverbial airplane while they were flying it in trying to stand up a new organization — with forces, procedures, capabilities and policies — while also conducting operations. The command continues to mature its structures and there will likely be more change in the coming years.

When it comes to sustaining the CNMF post-sub-unification, experts said there probably will need to be a separate readiness model for the Cyber National Mission Force.

“I think you’ve got to design the readiness model to meet the circumstance and the requirements of missions. They are going to have a different looking readiness model just because their mission profile is different, organization is different, different set of skills,” Franz said. “That’s what the sub-unification designates — they do have a unique functional mission recognized by DOD and so readiness has got to meet the requirements for that.”

Given the need for longer deployment cycles and different skillsets on CNMF, they will need to work with the services — which providing the training and forces — to develop a slightly different model.

“At some point, CNMF does become that uniquely trained, resourced force, on the road to becoming what is the equivalent of a special mission unit in cyber,” Franz said. “They just literally have a different mission, they have a different mission profile, they operate differently.”

The CNMF commander, currently Maj. Gen. William Hartman, has more of a voice now to set training and readiness requirements that they can start to articulate to the services.

“What this lets him do is formally put him in a position where he can establish the training and readiness requirements, establish the force posture, the types of people. Frankly, there’s things like tour lengths, all the administrative readiness and training stuff that comes with running that command. He can start to tailor that to the unique mission requirements of CNMF,” Franz said. “The institutional processes now [are] more behind him, because as a sub-unified commander, he’s just in a position to articulate those more clearly, with more authority, trying to drive things in a more effective way.”

Others said they will likely also be able to select their own members somewhere down the line.

“Where it probably will head is, I think, that eventually CNMF gets just like JSOC [and] gets its own selection and assessment criteria for the force,” the former staff member said.

A former top official said that culture is extremely important, just as it is in the special ops community.

“The special operations culture and values are very unique, but they are what sustains the organization and its ability to accomplish what it’s chartered to do,” the former official said. “I think the same thing is really true of the entire cyber mission force, but especially the Cyber National Mission Force.”

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · January 10, 2023

12. U.S. defeats China in simulated war over Taiwan, but costs are high, says new study on risks

It is interesting how different news outliers spin the CSIS report (or at least the headline editors)

U.S. defeats China in simulated war over Taiwan, but costs are high, says new study on risks

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

A sophisticated new study of a simulated war between China and the U.S. over Taiwan reveals Chinese forces would be defeated in the conflict but with a high cost in casualties and heavy losses of U.S. and allied large ships and aircraft, according to a think tank report made public Monday.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted 24 separate war game scenarios involving an amphibious assault by China across the 100-mile Taiwan Strait, setting off a war with Taiwan, the United States and Japan. U.S. military officials say Chinese strategists see a military “window” for action against Taipei in the next few years.

“In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan,” the report concludes. “However, this defense came at high cost.”

The cost, even in the “optimistic scenarios,” according to the report: “The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services.”

“China also suffers heavily,” the report noted. “Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war.”

With Chinese President Xi Jinping defining the retaking of Taiwan as a “core interest” of his government, the 165-page report states that a U.S.-Chinese conflict over Taiwan remains “the most dangerous potential flashpoint in bilateral relations.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned several months ago that China appears to be speeding up its timetable for action against Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a breakaway province despite the island having a separate government for more than 70 years. U.S. military commanders also have warned that a Chinese military operation against Taiwan could take place before the end of the decade.

Adm. Philip S. Davidson, who stepped down as head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in April 2021, told Congress that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was possible in the next six years.

The U.S. military frequently conducts simulated war games against China. The results of the exercises are kept secret to avoid alerting China to U.S. military weaknesses and vulnerabilities, but analysts and game organizers have said in the past that China is often victorious in the simulated conflicts.

The CSIS report said it conducted the war games and made the results public to enhance debate on the topic. CSIS simulators said they tried to cast a wider lens to describe the multinational conflict that is most likely to occur.

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is rooted in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for supporting a defense of Taipei but stops short of saying U.S. forces would intervene in a conflict.

Chinese forces since August have stepped up provocative military exercises around Taiwan, including missile firings that were part of a simulated practice for an island takeover campaign. Just over the weekend, a fleet of Chinese military jets again crossed into Taiwan’s defensive airspace in the Taiwan Strait, the latest violation of the long-respected boundary line.

Military analysts say U.S. military forces remain focused on Army forces needed for the post-9/11 war on terrorism and not enough has been done to refocus the military toward deterring China in the Pacific theater.

To meet the challenge of China’s increasingly aggressive military, the United States needs to transform forces to boost naval and air power.

Learning from history

The CSIS report said conflict scenarios were developed from historical data and operations research that modeled a Chinese invasion in 2026. Simulators gathered information from the Normandy invasion in World War II and amphibious warfare campaigns by U.S. Marines in Okinawa and the British-Argentine conflict over the Falkland Islands.

“The invasion always starts the same way: An opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities,” the report said. “Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island.”

During the invasion, tens of thousands of Chinese troops cross the 100-mile-wide strait on military amphibious craft and civilian cargo ships. Air attacks are followed using airborne troops landing behind beachheads.

In the CSIS war games scenarios, the Chinese military attack “quickly founders,” the report said. Intervention by U.S. submarines, bombers and fighter bombers, backed by forces from the Japan Self-Defense Forces, quickly cripple” the Chinese amphibious force.

“China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous,” the report said.

Even in the think tank’s “base scenario,” the losses on both sides would be extraordinary, with Japan and the U.S. losing nearly 450 combat aircraft and 40 ships. China would lose 155 combat aircraft and nearly 140 ships.

A key condition for success in repulsing the Chinese attack is that Taiwan’s government and military must successfully resist and not surrender.

If Taiwan gives up before U.S. forces take part in the defense, the island would be lost to the Chinese, the report said.

Even if a Chinese attack is repulsed, the heavy losses of troops, ships and aircraft would damage American power for many years. Taiwan’s military, while surviving, would be severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy and lost electrical power and basic services.

China’s navy would be severely weakened with tens of thousands of Chinese troops taken as prisoners of war.

“The challenges confronting China in an invasion are severe,” said Matthew Cancian, a senior researcher at the Naval War College who helped organize the war games exercise.

China’s amphibious military operations were found to be vulnerable to U.S. and allied attack, a key to preventing a Chinese takeover, Mr. Cancian said at a panel discussion coinciding with the release of the report.

Eric Heginbotham, a research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a participant in the study, said U.S. casualties would be similar to those in World War II with around 10,000 casualties. U.S. bases on the U.S. island of Guam also would be hit by Chinese missiles and destroyed in the first hours of a war. In all but five of the war simulations, China attacked U.S. bases in Japan, Mr. Heginbotham said.

The study did not argue for or against defending Taiwan, but “the potential costs of such a defense need to be part of the debate,” he said.

Conditions for success

The report identifies several conditions for success, including strengthening Taiwan’s ground forces, which need better-combined arms training and equipment.

Also, there is no “Ukraine model” of indirect warfare where the U.S. and its allies supply the weapons and the Taiwanese do the bulk of the fighting. Supplying arms as is being done to Ukraine in its war with Russia will not work in Taiwan since China could isolate the island for weeks or even months.

“In peacetime, the United States and Taiwan must work together to provide Taiwan with the weapons it needs; in wartime, if the United States decides to defend Taiwan, U.S. forces must quickly engage in direct combat,” the report said.

Another key to defeating a Chinese invasion will be the use of American military bases in Japan as the jumping-off point for combat operations. To that end, the report urges deepening diplomatic and military relations with Japan.

The government of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who visits President Biden in Washington on Friday, announced recently that it will adopt a defense strategy that includes the use of offensive Tomahawk cruise missile strikes.

Another essential requirement for defeating a Chinese attack on Taiwan will be the ability to strike Chinese navy ships rapidly through large-scale salvos from longer ranges outside Chinese defense zones. To meet that requirement, the CSIS report urges increasing the arsenal of U.S. long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and bombers with long-range anti-ship missiles.

“Procuring such missiles and upgrading existing missiles with this anti-ship capability needs to be the top procurement priority,” the report said.

The war game simulations showed the United States would win but could end up suffering more in the long run than the Chinese who would be defeated.

Also, threats of high costs of a Taiwan conflict might undermine deterrence since China could attack based on the belief that the United States is unwilling to pay the cost of the war.

“The United States should therefore institute policies and programs to make winning less costly in the event of conflict,” the report said, including clarifying war plans, avoiding attacks on the Chinese mainland and preparing for an extended war despite high casualties.

The report projected that U.S. forces in three weeks would sustain about half the casualties that resulted from 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. About 6,800 U.S. troops were killed in those two wars, along with more than 59,000 wounded.

U.S. policy should seek to persuade Taiwan to shift its air and naval forces in the direction of asymmetric warfare capabilities – weapons and tactics that allow a weaker force to better confront China’s military superiority — and air bases in Japan and Guam should be hardened against Chinese missile attacks.

The Pentagon is building new Aegis missile defense on Guam in addition to Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense anti-missile systems already in place.

U.S. forces also should avoid overflying China during a future conflict as China’s integrated air defenses have been bolstered.

For weapons reforms, the U.S. military should transform forces with small, more survivable ships and better systems to deal with crippled ships and warships that will be sunk during combat. Submarine power also should be emphasized.

During the war simulations, “submarines were able to enter the Chinese defensive zone and wreak havoc with the Chinese fleet, but [the] numbers were inadequate,” the report said.

The U.S. military also needs to ramp up its hypersonic missile campaign, but with the projected high costs of the missiles there will not be enough to counter large numbers of Chinese and air and naval forces.

Bomber fleets should be given priority over fighter jets because the bombers armed with long-range missiles “presented the People’s Liberation Army with daunting challenges” during war games, the report said.

Instead of building expensive F-35s, the military should produce large numbers of less-expensive fighters to offset the expected losses of aircraft early in a conflict, the report said.

The report said the study and recommendation do not seek to imply that a Chinese attack on Taiwan is inevitable or probable. Instead of military options, the Chinese might conduct a non-military pressure campaign to achieve their goal of a Taiwan takeover, including diplomatic isolation, non-kinetic warfare and economic coercion. Beijing has long used economic and other incentives to entice the small number of states that still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Use of military force by China also could involve a blockade rather than invasion.

“However, the risk of invasion is real enough and potentially so destructive that analysis is worthwhile,” the report said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

13. To recruit Gen Z, the top Marine makes an appeal to older generations

To recruit Gen Z, the top Marine makes an appeal to older generations

marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · January 10, 2023

Amid a recruiting crisis throughout the military, the top Marine general thinks young people need to hear more about the value of serving. And not just from him.

“As a nation, we need more parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, teachers and coaches to have candid conversations with young people about the value of military service,” Commandant Gen. David Berger wrote in a opinion piece Saturday in The Dallas Morning News.

Berger’s op-ed provides a blueprint of sorts for adults who haven’t served to address youth’s questions about the military. Does service teach you the skills needed for success in the civilian workforce? Does it instill good values? Can it even heal national divisions?

As Berger sees it, the answer to these questions is “yes.”

The military can teach specialized technical skills, as well as less tangible ones like leadership and discipline, he wrote. Its values are noble, he continued. And military service, which necessitates getting thrown together with people from a variety of backgrounds, is, in Berger’s view, “perhaps one of the most effective antidotes to national divisiveness.”

Some conservatives have argued that the very heightened political divisions that Berger describes have themselves hampered recruiting; in their view, the military has moved too far to the left, dissuading young people on the right from serving. But Berger’s op-ed implies an alternative perspective on the supposed politicization of the military.

“During the most formative time of a young person’s life, the experience of military service moderates views and opens minds to alternative viewpoints,” Berger wrote.

The general also framed military service — which, he acknowledged, can be hard — as a way to build resilience.

“The experience of service builds self-confidence and prepares young people to approach the inevitable adversities in life with composure and a sense of conviction about who they are and what they can accomplish,” he wrote.

The Pentagon has consistently found that “influencer” adults (parents, grandparents and others with influence in young people’s lives) are less likely to recommend or even support youth joining the Marine Corps, as compared to the other branches. In summer 2021, only 33% of influencer adults said they would recommend the Marine Corps to a young person, compared to 46% who would recommend the Air Force, according to a Pentagon study.

Berger isn’t the first military leader to write an op-ed in response to recent recruiting shortfalls. The secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force in October 2022 penned a Wall Street Journal op-ed, ostensibly aimed at young people rather than middle-aged and older adults, encouraging military service.

Berger’s point about resilience comes as some commentators have insisted that more challenges are exactly what Gen Z needs.

Today’s youth, some like social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argue, have become anxious and emotionally fragile because they are spend too much time scrolling through social media and not enough taking healthy risks.

Berger doesn’t address one of young people’s top reservations about serving: the possibility of physical injury or death, which 65% of young people in a 2021 Pentagon survey identified as a reason they would not want to join the military. When the op-ed does refer to deployments, it mentions “the opportunity to serve as an ambassador of American values” while “working and living among our allies and partners” — not the prospect of combat.

For now, of course, those who enlist or commission are entering a peacetime military, not the same one that many younger veterans entered after 9/11.

The Marine Corps barely made its recruiting numbers for the 2022 fiscal year, but only after lowering its goals because of higher-than-expected retention.

All of the services had difficulties recruiting in 2022, with leaders blaming everything from low test scores to high obesity rates to the tight labor market as reasons that young people can’t or won’t serve. Berger himself has said that the now-overturned COVID-19 vaccine mandate added to the Corps’ recruiting woes.

Some have also pointed to the recent rollout of a medical screening system, MHS Genesis, which flags prospective recruits’ past health issues, temporarily or permanently blocking some from enlisting.

It is true that young people’s propensity to serve is low: Only 9% of young people in the 2021 Pentagon study said they would definitely or probably join the military, the lowest rate since 2007. In contrast, nearly half of teenagers with a parent serving in the military intend to follow in their parents’ footsteps, a 2022 survey by the National Military Family Association found.

But service members, veterans and military spouses are increasingly unlikely to recommend military service to young people, in large part because of the financial difficulties they have faced. And the commandant has previously stated that the military can’t rely only on youth with family ties to the military for its recruits.

“While the military will continue to attract those who are acquainted with the military and its lifestyle, we must do more to reach those who are unfamiliar,” he wrote in November 2022 for the U.S. Naval Institute. “Failing to do so risks reinforcing an increasingly closed system and its related pathologies.”

With a combined 144,631 digital and print subscribers as of the end of September 2022, the Morning News is one of the top regional newspapers in the South — the area of the country that has produced the most military recruits per capita. Forty-six percent of the military’s recruits in fiscal year 2019 hailed from the South, according to Center for Naval Analyses data.

Now in his final year as commandant, Berger entered Tulane University’s NROTC program in 1977, two years after the end of the Vietnam War. That means he has personally experienced hesitance about military service from the adults in his life, he wrote in the Morning News op-ed.

“While I was eager to serve my country and become a U.S. Marine, not all my teachers and coaches shared my enthusiasm,” he wrote.

Read the (paywalled) op-ed on the Dallas Morning News website: https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/01/07/its-time-for-conversations-about-the-value-of-military-service/

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

14. In the 21st Century, China is Our Main Adversary and Japan is Our Most Important Ally

Why do they always leave out north Korea? *(yes that is my bias I am one of the "some"). While nK is not aligned in the European heartland it is aligned with all three powers. It will at least be a wild card or a disruptor in a conflict with any of these powers (or all of them).

Excerpts:

The United States, however, cannot and should not confront all three powers simultaneously. Contemporary strategists call this approach “strategic sequencing,” and the logic behind such a strategy is to concentrate resources on the most significant challenge and, if fighting breaks out, to avoid a multi-front war. Strategic sequencing harkens back to Walter Lippmann’s prudent advice for ensuring that commitments do not exceed resources. As Hal Brands has noted, today China, Russia, and Iran, even though not formally allied, “are aligned in a critical area--the Eurasian heartland.”

Brands compares today’s strategic predicament to the global threat faced by the United States in the period before World War II. “The basic pattern of geopolitics,” he writes, “look painfully familiar.” Although the Axis powers in the 1930s--Germany, Italy and Japan--signed the Tripartite Pact at the end of the decade, Brands describes their association as a “loose agreement to blow up the existing order and build separate empires amid the rubble.” But even that “loose agreement” created what Brands describes as “a deep, destructive synergy” for expansion. And therein lay the global threat.

...

This has led some commentators to label the China-Russia-Iran relationship (and some add North Korea) an “axis” that threatens the global balance of power.

In the 21st Century, China is Our Main Adversary and Japan is Our Most Important Ally

By Francis P. Sempa

January 11, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/11/in_the_21st_century_china_is_our_main_adversary_and_japan_is_our_most_important_ally_874995.html?mc_cid=04254c7f1b

What a difference a century makes. In the 20^th century, Germany and the Soviet Union were the main adversaries of the United States, and Great Britain was our most important ally. In the 21^st century--at least in its early stages--China is our main adversary and Japan is our most important ally. But the fundamental geopolitics underlying both centuries is remarkably similar despite the scientific and technological changes. And that is so because of the centrality of Eurasia to global politics.

In his book The Grand Chessboard (1997), Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that “Eurasia . . . is the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played.” Eurasia contains most of the world’s people and resources, and is “the location of most of the world’s politically assertive and dynamic states.” Brzezinski called it the “megacontinent” and wrote that America’s security depended upon the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia. And he described the most dangerous post-Cold War scenario as “a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran.”

A quarter-century later, that “grand coalition” is emerging. China’s economic and military power has grown faster than even Brzezinski thought likely. It has become a peer competitor of the United States and has formed a strategic partnership with a revived Russia that is flexing its muscles again in Eastern Europe. Iran, meanwhile, sees itself as the preeminent power in the Middle East and has formed strong economic and political ties to China and Russia. This has led some commentators to label the China-Russia-Iran relationship (and some add North Korea) an “axis” that threatens the global balance of power.

The United States, however, cannot and should not confront all three powers simultaneously. Contemporary strategists call this approach “strategic sequencing,” and the logic behind such a strategy is to concentrate resources on the most significant challenge and, if fighting breaks out, to avoid a multi-front war. Strategic sequencing harkens back to Walter Lippmann’s prudent advice for ensuring that commitments do not exceed resources. As Hal Brands has noted, today China, Russia, and Iran, even though not formally allied, “are aligned in a critical area--the Eurasian heartland.”

Brands compares today’s strategic predicament to the global threat faced by the United States in the period before World War II. “The basic pattern of geopolitics,” he writes, “look painfully familiar.” Although the Axis powers in the 1930s--Germany, Italy and Japan--signed the Tripartite Pact at the end of the decade, Brands describes their association as a “loose agreement to blow up the existing order and build separate empires amid the rubble.” But even that “loose agreement” created what Brands describes as “a deep, destructive synergy” for expansion. And therein lay the global threat.

With conflict raging in Eastern Europe, storm clouds gathering in the South China Sea, and Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and its perpetual meddling in the broader Middle East, the United States needs to sequence its responses to these multi-region challenges. This means “playing for time” in less important challenges while focusing resources and efforts in the most important region. And today, that region is the Indo-Pacific.

And that means that Japan today is our most important ally--more important than England, more important than Germany and France, and more important than Israel and Saudi Arabia. Japan, like Great Britain in the 20^th century, is the key island offshore of Eurasia. As Dan Goure of the Lexington Institute has noted, “It is impossible to overestimate the importance of Japan as a U.S. ally” due to its “unique role in the security of the Indo-Pacific region.” This is a result of geography, economics, and Japan’s increased military power. Japan is like an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which the United States--itself a global island power--can project power onto the Eurasian landmass against China, the main adversary.

American policymakers, of course, cannot control the actions of other countries. Although China is the main adversary and should receive the most attention from U.S. policymakers, if Iran, for example, acquires nuclear weapons and threatens the U.S. or its allies in the region, we would have to respond. Likewise, if Russia invaded or attacked a NATO ally, the U.S. would have to respond. But barring such developments, the Indo-Pacific should be the “first” region in our strategic sequencing.

And this strategic sequencing strategy could include efforts to exploit potential divisions within the China-Russia-Iran axis. We must not let our distaste for the nature of those regimes to prevent us from reaching an accommodation that may benefit us in our struggle with the main adversary. Vladimir Putin has waged a war of aggression in Ukraine while killing and imprisoning his political enemies within Russia. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States courted Mao Zedong’s China in order to combat the greater and more immediate challenge posed by the Soviet Union. At that time, Mao was providing military supplies that the North Vietnamese armed forces used to kill American soldiers and was killing and imprisoning his political enemies and ordinary Chinese citizens in the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution. Just as during the Second World War, when Germany was the main enemy, U.S. policymakers courted Stalin’s Soviet Union despite the fact that it had seized the Baltic States, half of Poland, parts of Finland, and was killing and imprisoning Stalin’s political opponents--real and imagined--by the millions.

Vladimir Putin’s crimes do not compare with those of Mao and Stalin. We can deplore what he has done and is doing in Ukraine, but sentiment and emotion should not guide our foreign policy. To paraphrase Britain’s Lord Palmerston, America has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.

Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21^stCentury, America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics and War, and Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: A Combat Soldier’s Journey through the Second World War. He has written lengthy introductions to two of Mahan’s books, and has written on historical and foreign policy topics for The Diplomat, the University Bookman, Joint Force Quarterly, the Asian Review of Books, the New York Journal of Books, the Claremont Review of Books, American Diplomacy, the Washington Times, The American Spectator, and other publications. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a former contributing editor to American Diplomacy.

15. Dirty bomb fears as URANIUM is found in cargo at Heathrow

Perhaps a shipment to a dentist's office? But seriously ... This obviously could be an indicator of bad things to come.

Dirty bomb fears as URANIUM is found in cargo at Heathrow

Dirty bomb fears as 'several kilos of URANIUM' is found in cargo at Heathrow: Package 'shipped from Pakistan to UK-based Iranians' is at centre of Met Police anti-terror probe after being discovered when it triggered airport alarms

Shipment of uranium has been seized at Heathrow airport, sparking terror fears
The undeclared material was discovered on December 29 on a passenger flight
It was destined for an Iranian business with a premises in the UK, sources say
The package originated from Pakistan and arrived on a flight via Oman

By DAVID BARRETT HOME AFFAIRS EDITOR FOR THE DAILY MAIL and BRITTANY CHAIN FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 17:34 EST, 10 January 2023 | UPDATED: 19:04 EST, 10 January 2023

Daily Mail · by David Barrett Home Affairs Editor For The Daily Mail · January 10, 2023

A major counter-terrorism investigation has been launched after several kilograms of uranium was seized at Heathrow airport.

The deadly nuclear material - which could potentially be used in a ‘dirty bomb’ - arrived on a flight from Oman, in the Middle East, on December 29.

The shipment was addressed to an Iranian-linked firm in the UK, it is understood.

Sources said the uranium was ‘not weapons-grade’ - and so could not be used to manufacture a thermo-nuclear weapon.

But the security services are understood to be investigating whether the undeclared package could have been destined for an improvised nuclear device, known as a ‘dirty bomb’.

Such a device - which has long been a nightmare scenario for counter-terror experts - combines conventional explosives with nuclear material to disperse a lethal radioactive plume.

The package originated in Pakistan before arriving at Heathrow’s Terminal Four aboard an Oman Air passenger jet from Muscat, sources told The Sun.

A shipment of uranium has been seized at Heathrow airport

The undeclared material was discovered on December 29 on a passenger flight which arrived from Oman

Police have not made any arrests.

A source told the Mail: ‘The package contained kilos of uranium - but it was not weapons-grade.'

Separately, a source told The Sun there is an overwhelming 'concern over what the Iranians living here wanted with non-disclosed nuclear material'.

An unnamed source told the publication: 'The race is on to trace everyone involved with this rogue non-manifested package.

'Security bosses are treating this with the seriousness it deserves. Protocol was not followed and this is now an anti-terror operation.'

Specialist scanners picked up on the undeclared parcel as it was transported to a freight shed.

Specialist scanners picked up on the undeclared parcel as it was transported to a freight shed

Border Force agents isolated the shipment in a radioactive room and, upon determining it was uranium, called in counter-terror police.

Met Police told MailOnline: 'We can confirm officers from the Met's Counter Terrorism Command were contacted by Border Force colleagues at Heathrow after a very small amount of contaminated material was identified after routine screening within a package incoming to the UK on 29 December 2022.'

Commander Richard Smith said: 'I want to reassure the public that the amount of contaminated material was extremely small and has been assessed by experts as posing no threat to the public.

'Although our investigation remains ongoing, from our inquiries so far, it does not appear to be linked to any direct threat.

'As the public would expect, however, we will continue to follow up on all available lines of enquiry to ensure this is definitely the case.

'However, it does highlight the excellent capability we and our partners have in place to monitor our ports and borders in order to keep the public safe from any potential threats to their safety and security that might be coming into the UK.'

'No arrests have been made at this time and officers continue to work with partner agencies to fully investigate this matter and ensure there is no risk to the public.

'The material has been identified as being contaminated with uranium.'

Specialist scanners picked up on the undeclared parcel as it was transported to a freight shed. Pictured: A nuclear storage facility

A Home Office spokesman said: ‘We do not comment on live investigations.’

Hamish De Bretton-Gordon, former commander of the UK’s nuclear defence regiment, said: ‘Uranium can give off very high levels of poisonous radiation. It could be used in a dirty bomb.

‘The good news is the system worked and it has been interdicted.’

Forensic teams are understood to still be examining the nuclear material.

As long ago as 2003 the then head of MI5 warned that it was ‘only a matter of time’ before a dirty bomb or chemical weapons attack was launched on a major Western city.

Eliza Manningham-Buller said intelligence reports suggested ‘renegade scientists’ had given terrorist groups the information they needed to create such weapons.

‘My conclusion, based on the intelligence we have received, is that we are faced with a realistic possibility of some form of unconventional attack that could include chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack,’ she said.

‘Sadly, given the widespread proliferation of the technical knowledge to construct these weapons, it will be only a matter of time before a crude version of a CBRN is launched on a major western city.’

In 2004 British security services arrested Dhiren Barot, a Muslim convert who planned to assemble and use dirty bombs in the UK and the US to kill members of the public.

He was jailed for 30 years.

Sources said the uranium was ‘not weapons-grade’ - and so could not be used to manufacture a thermo-nuclear weapon

The Home Office-backed ‘ProtectUK’ website, which offers advice on terror threats, currently says: ‘A UK attack plot using a radiological weapon is highly unlikely because there are significant challenges in acquiring suitable radioactive sources, which are subject to controls.’

Last year, Former Washington official Robert Joseph told MailOnline Iran is a nuclear weapons state with enough uranium to build 'one, if not two' bombs.

He said: 'The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented that Iran has 60% of enriched uranium, enough for at least one if not two bombs.

'We have been saying for years 'they're approaching this breakout point and we've really got to negotiate with them.' They're there.'

Joseph was the chief negotiator to Libya in 2003 and is credited with convincing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to give up his nuclear weapons programme.

MP Matthew Offord said at the time Iran were 'regularly testing ballistic missiles, and they are seeking to get enough uranium that they are able to produce a weapon'.

Daily Mail · by David Barrett Home Affairs Editor For The Daily Mail · January 10, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of DemocracPhone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website