Quotes of the Day:

“Spiritualize your warfare. Every day you face battles—that is the reality for all creatures in their struggle to survive. But the greatest battle of all is with yourself—your weaknesses, your emotions, your lack of resolution in seeing things through to the end. You must declare unceasing war on yourself. As a warrior in life, you welcome combat and conflict as ways to prove yourself, to better your skills, to gain courage, confidence, and experience. Instead of repressing your doubts and fears, you must face them down, do battle with them. You want more chal-xx lenges, and you invite more war. You are forging the warrior’s spirit, and only constant practice will lead you there.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies Of War

"One's philosophy is not best expressed in words; it is expressed in the choices one makes... and the choices we make are ultimately our responsibility."

- Eleanor Roosevelt

“Resistance to the organized mass can be effected only by the man who is as well organized in his individuality as the mass itself.” 

- Carl Jung

1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 10, 6.00 pm EST and Ukraine's Ten Steps for Peace

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 11, 2023

3. Congress announces commission to review National Defense Strategy

4. Three steps toward a ‘whole of nation’ approach for national security

5. Gallagher: Time to Push Back on CCP Aggression in Bipartisan Fashion

6. New US Congress agrees on one thing: China threat

7. 65 Dems vote against new China committee - who were they?

8. Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

9. Opinion | Japan’s prime minister warns of a historic — and dangerous —moment in Asia

10. Japan’s Shift to War Footing

11. Russia names Valery Gerasimov new commander of Ukraine invasion

12. Discussing "leadership" around "information warfare" with Asha Rangappa, plus other stuff

13. What Does It Mean to Provide ‘Security Guarantees’ to Ukraine?

14. Russia Replaces Commander for Ukraine War, as Signs of Dissension Grow

15. With F.B.I. Search, U.S. Escalates Global Fight Over Chinese Police Outposts

16. China's authorities are quietly rounding up people who protested against COVID rules

17. As China Reopens, Online Finger-Pointing Shows a Widening Gulf

18. Iran Hangs Two Protesters While 109 Face Prospect of Execution

19. Launch of #WithoutJustCause Political Prisoners Initiative - United States Department of State

20. Gamers Beware: The CCP Is Coming for You

21.  New nation, new ideas: A study finds immigrants out-innovate native-born Americans

22. Analysis | The war in Ukraine tests how cyberattacks fit into rules for war crimes

23. Analysis | There are TikTok bans in nearly two dozen states

1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 10, 6.00 pm EST and Ukraine's Ten Steps for Peace

Also posted on the Small Wars Journal here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-january-10-600-pm-est-and-ukraines-ten-steps-peace

The Ten Steps for Peace is pasted below.

Embassy of Ukraine in the USA

WAR BULLETIN

January 10, 6.00 pm EST

WAR ROOM

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.2022 to 10.01.2023 were approximately:

personnel ‒ about 112470 (+710) persons,

tanks ‒ 3084 (+4),

APV ‒ 6154 (+7),

artillery systems – 2073 (+4),

MLRS – 434 (+0),

anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 217 (+0),

aircraft – 285 (+0),

helicopters – 275 (+0),

UAV operational-tactical level – 1860 (+4),

cruise missiles ‒ 723 (+0),

warships / boats ‒ 17 (+1),

vehicles and fuel tanks – 4817 (+8),

special equipment ‒ 183 (+0).

Data are being updated.

Russian occupants continue their full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine. To support the offensive and replenish its losses in manpower, the adversary continues the mobilization activities.

The enemy does not cease to launch missile and air strikes, artillery shelling of critical infrastructure and civilian residences on the territory of Ukraine. Doing so is a blatant violation of the rules of International Humanitarian Law, the laws and principles of war.

During the day of January 10, the adversary launched 2x missile strikes and 7x MLRS attacks, including on the civilian infrastructure of Donetsk and Kherson oblasts.

The threat of air and missile strikes on critical infrastructure facilities across all of Ukraine remains high.

The adversary continues shelling the positions of Ukrainian troops and civilian targets all along the line of contact.

Sivershchyna axis: the vicinities of settlements of Syn’kivka (Chernihiv oblast) and Pokrovka (Symy oblast) were shelled with mortars and artillery.

Slobozhanshchyna axis: the adversary shelled the positions of Ukrainian troops in the vicinities of 13x settlements, in particular: Sosnivka, Zelene, Vovchans’k, Khatnje, Krasne Pershe, and Dvorichna (Kharkiv oblast).

Kup’yans’k axis: the enemy fired tanks and entire range of artillery in the vicinities of settlements of Vil’shana, Orlyanka, Kyslivka (Kharkiv oblast), Novoselivs’ke, and Stel’makhivka (Luhansk oblast).

Lyman axis: the vicinities of settlements of Makiivka, Nevs’ke, Chervonopopivka (Luhansk oblast), Terny, and Serebryanka (Donetsk oblast) were shelled with tanks, mortars, artillery and missile systems.

Bakhmut axis: the adversary fired tanks and artillery of various types at the positions of Ukrainian troops in the vicinities of settlements of Bilohorivka, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Bila Hora, Druzhba, Paraskoviivka (Donetsk oblast).

Avdiivka axis: the enemy fired tanks, mortars, artillery and missile systems in the vicinities of settlements of Avdiivka, Vesele, Nevel’s’ke, Heorhiivka, Mar’inka, and Pervomais’ke (Donetsk oblast).

Novopavlivka axis: the adversary fired tanks and the entire spectrum of artillery at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the vicinities of settlements of Vremivka, Velyka Novosilka, and Vuhledar (Donetsk oblast).

Zaporizhzia axis: the enemy fired tanks, mortars, artillery and missile systems at the positions of Ukrainian troops and civilian infrastructure in the vicinities of 18x settlements, in particular: Vil’ne Pole, Novopil’ (Donetsk oblast); Ol’hivs’ke, Zaliznychne, Hulyaipole, Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Bilohir’ya (Zaporizhzhia oblast).

Kherson axis: the adversary keeps shelling the settlements along the right bank of the Dnipro river. Artillery shelling has damaged civilian infrastructure of 12x settlements, in particular: Antonivka, Vesele, Dudchany, Mylove, Zolota Balka (Kherson oblast), and the city of Kherson, there are civilian casualties.

The adversary continues to suffer losses. According to the available information, hospitals in the city of Berdyans’k (Zaporizhzhia oblast) have exceeded their capacity to take in the wounded. This caused the russian occupation troops to set up 3x more military hospitals over the past week.

During the day of January 10, the Ukrainian Air Force launched 14x air strikes on the concentrations of enemy personnel, weapons, and military equipment, as well as 4x air strikes on the positions of anti-aircraft missile systems.

During the day of January 10, Ukrainian missile and artillery troops attacked

2x command posts, 2x positions of missile troops and artillery and 5x concentrations of manpower and military equipment of the russian invaders.

POLICY

President of Ukraine

Free world has everything necessary to stop Russian aggression; it is important for global democracy - address by the President of Ukraine

Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!

Today is a new stage of our diplomatic marathon. Four more conversations with European leaders: President of the European Council, Prime Minister of Belgium, President of Estonia and Prime Minister of Ireland.

I informed them about the situation on the battlefield - about the difficult situation in the Donetsk region, about the constant Russian attacks and the fact that Russia does not count its people, does not spare the locals and does not stop before any criminal actions.

This can - and must! - be countered only by a new level of modern military equipment that Ukraine can receive from partners. I thank all the leaders who help us for understanding that now is the time for new powerful decisions, for new powerful support.

The free world has everything necessary to stop Russian aggression and bring the terrorist state to a historic defeat. And it is important not only for us. It is important for global democracy, for all those who value freedom. It is even more important now, when Russia is gathering forces for another escalation.

Together with our partners, we must do - and we are doing! - everything to make it clear to Russia's masters that no escalation will help them. The defeat of the Russian aggression must remain unalterable, no matter who and what Russia tries to throw into the battle.

I am grateful to the President of the European Council for understanding how important it is to maintain the unwavering support of Ukraine. In this confrontation, in which Russia is trying to exhaust all of us - Ukrainians, Europeans, other partners - there must be clarity of signals. Signals that we will go all the way to the defeat of Russian terror. We will go together and with the preservation of stability in Ukraine - financial and social. And that is why financial support was one of the main topics of my conversation with Charles Michel, as well as weapons and further European integration of Ukraine.

I thank the Prime Minister of Belgium for supporting our diplomatic efforts, in particular our Peace Formula, all its fundamental elements: restoration of security, restoration of our territorial integrity, restoration of justice.

I am confident that the leadership of Belgium will help us achieve a fair peace. And I am thankful for the willingness to really bring peace closer by increasing the armed support for our state. The already provided Belgian defense assistance has significantly strengthened our state, and we agreed today that our teams would work on a new supply.

I am grateful to the President of Estonia and all Estonians for new decisions to strengthen our defense. We have also discussed with Mr. President our further steps in the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. I thank Estonia for a very strong representation of Ukraine's interests in Europe. Even when someone doubts, Estonia finds arguments to support Ukraine and to increase sanction pressure on Russia.

I am grateful to the new Prime Minister of Ireland for the willingness to continue the course of Ireland's comprehensive support for Ukraine. We have agreed on a powerful energy support. And I thanked Ireland for freezing Russian assets - we will work together to ensure that these funds are used for the restoration of Ukraine.

In general, since my visit to Washington, I have already held about thirty talks with leaders and representatives of partner states. And I literally feel every day how the world's determination to overcome Russian aggression is growing.

I thank everyone who helps us defend Ukraine and freedom!

I thank everyone who fights for independence!

Today, I would like to pay special tribute to the warriors of the 46th separate airmobile brigade for their bravery and steadfastness in the defense of Soledar! Thank you, warriors!

I thank everyone who works to strengthen Ukraine!

And one more thing.

Based on the materials prepared by the Security Service of Ukraine and the State Migration Service of Ukraine, and in accordance with the Constitution of our state, I have decided to terminate the citizenship of four persons: Andriy Leonidovych Derkach, Taras Romanovych Kozak, Renat Raveliyovych Kuzmin and Viktor Volodymyrovych Medvedchuk.

If people's deputies choose to serve not the people of Ukraine, but the murderers who came to Ukraine, our actions will be appropriate.

And these are not the last such decisions. The services are working.

Glory to Ukraine!

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vilnij-svit-maye-vse-neobhidne-shob-zupiniti-rosijsku-agresi-80305

UKRAINE’S TEN STEPS FOR PEACE

Ukraine’s battlefield victories, strong stance by international community and Russia’s depleting military capabilities force Kremlin to seek for operational pause at any cost.

Russian occupier forces would then use it to re-group, replenish supplies and relaunch the armed attack against Ukraine on an even wider scale.

All the calls by Russia, either directly or through the third countries, to start peace negotiations serve to that goal.

Kremlin does not want peace. It needs instead a respite.

Russia continues blackmailing Ukraine and the world to reach its goals and to deny Ukraine from its sovereignty and statehood.

Ukraine, to the contrary, is very precise in our vision of future just and sustainable peace.

On 15 November, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s position on this issue at the G20 summit.

He proposed a clear plan of ten steps to peace that should end the war.

These steps, implemented one by one, or simultaneously, will bring long-awaited and long-lasting peace to Ukraine, Europe and entire world.

The first step is radiation and nuclear safety.

We emphasize that any form of nuclear blackmail is unacceptable. Russia’s aggressive rhetoric and actions in the territory of Ukraine threaten the global nuclear security.

Russian leaders must stop their threats of use of nuclear weapons.

Russia must immediately withdraw all its military from the territory of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The station must be transferred to the control of the IAEA and the Ukrainian personnel. The normal connection of the station to the power grid must be restored immediately so that nothing threatens the stability of the reactors.

Ukraine proposed that IAEA missions are sent to all Ukrainian active nuclear plants and to the Chornobyl plant, which has been shut down and is under conservation. Such missions can verify that any hostile activity against Ukrainian nuclear facilities has indeed ceased.

The second challenge is food security.

The right to food is a fundamental right of every person in the world.

We are grateful to Türkiye, the UN and other partners for their support of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which was extended for a further 120 days period on November 19. It helped to improve situation with the global food security.

Since July, Ukraine has exported over 15 million tons of food by sea. We can increase exports, including to the countries which have problems with food security.

Russia must refrain from attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and grain initiative should be expanded to Ukrainian ports in the Mykolaiv region.

The third issue is energy security.

Russia carries out terrorist attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, blowing up power plants, transformers, and electricity supply lines. It is trying to deprive millions of Ukrainians of electricity, heating, water and communication.

Russia wants to turn the cold into a weapon during the winter season. Another goal of this terror is to prevent the export of Ukrainian electricity to neighboring countries, as Russia is interested in the energy

crisis.

One of the key tasks for Ukraine is to protect our territory from these attacks. We are grateful to our partners for the supply of air defence and missile defence systems. We insist that Russia must stop its terror campaign in order to prove that it is interested in the peace process. At the same time Russia must abandon the use of energy factor as a tool of hybrid aggression against Europe.

The fourth challenge is the release of all prisoners and deported persons.

Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians are being held in the Russian captivity. They are being tortured and executed – such policy of Russia is illustrated by the terrorist act in Olenivka and mass graves, which we have found on the liberated territories near Kyiv, in Kherson and Kharkhiv regions.

More than 11 thousand children, whom we know by name, were forcibly deported to Russia.

Ukrainian citizens are being held as political prisoners in Russia and in the temporarily occupied territory, in particular in Crimea.

We will never leave our people to suffer in aggressor’s hands, and we demand the release of all of them.

The fifth point is the implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the world order.

Russia must respect the Article 2 of this document and refrain from use of force against Ukraine.

It must reaffirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the applicable international legally binding documents.

The sixth challenge is withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities.

Russia must withdraw all its troops and armed formations from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

Ukraine's control over all sections of state border with Russia must be restored.

The crimes of the aggressor, discovered in the liberated territories, demonstrate threats which our people face under occupation.

Ukraine will not leave them alone: we have an absolute consensus on this issue in Ukrainian society.

The seventh point is restoration of justice.

Russian political and military leaders committed the crime of aggression against a sovereign state. Russian soldiers committed countless atrocities and war crimes in the territory of Ukraine. Thousands of civilians were killed by Russia’s rocket strikes and artillery fire, tortured and executed in the temporarily occupied territories. Russian aggression brings not only death to Ukrainian people, but the destruction to Ukrainian economy and infrastructure. That was the reason why we proposed establishment of the Special Tribunal on the crime of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and creation of an international mechanism to compensate for all the damages caused by this war.

The eighth challenge is countering ecocide.

Russian aggression caused large-scale destruction of Ukrainian nature. Almost two hundred thousand hectares of our land are contaminated with mines and unexploded shells. Dozens of coal mines in the territories of Ukraine, which have been under occupation since 2014, are flooded, including the mine in which an underground nuclear test explosion was carried out in 1979.

We must find common responses to all environmental threats created by the war, which is a challenge for the whole world. Ukraine needs support from our partners to solve this problem.

The ninth step is the preventing escalation.

We need effective security guarantees. On 30 September, Ukraine signed an application for accelerated accession to NATO. Ukraine also suggests implementing our proposals on the security guarantees (“Kyiv Security Compact”) aimed at mobilizing necessary political, financial, military, and diplomatic resources for Ukraine’s self-defense. We propose to hold an international conference to agree upon the key elements of the post- war security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine. The main outcome of the conference should be the signing of the “Kyiv Security Compact”.

The tenth point is the confirmation of the end of the war.

In the end, we need an official document signed by the parties.

This will become possible after all above mentioned antiwar measures are implemented, and when security and justice start to be restored.

Summing up.

Ukraine is not ready for “peace at any price”.

We will not make any concessions or compromises that would involve the continuation of the occupation of Ukrainian territories. This is our unequivocal position and we expect Russia to fulfill the announced conditions.

Only real actions – the cessation of terrorist attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, the withdrawal of troops from Ukrainian territory, the release of all prisoners and deportees – can open the way to peace.

Currently, we do not see such readiness from the Russian side.

Moreover, it has already openly admitted that its missile attacks on critical infrastructure of Ukraine are carried out with the aim of forcing our country to negotiations. But Putin's regime miscalculated - it will not force Ukrainians to give up their freedom and independence.

Ukraine is ready to continue fighting until victory.

Only Ukrainians will determine when and how to negotiate with the aggressor.

We are grateful to our partners for repeatedly confirming their agreement with this position and demonstrating unity. We hope for continued support of Ukraine and increased pressure on Russia. This is the only way to force the Kremlin to end the war and restore peace.

If anyone is tempted to try to force us to negotiate on the basis of compromises regarding our territorial integrity and sovereignty, they should immediately tell their societies that at the same time they are offering compromises regarding their own security. Any concessions to Russia will definitely encourage aggressor to the next steps.

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 11, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2023

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 11 that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov will take over as theater commander as part of a major reshuffle of the Russian command structure for the war in Ukraine.
• Gerasimov’s appointment is likely intended to support an intended decisive Russian military effort in 2023, likely in the form of resumed Russian offensive operations.
• The elevation of Gerasimov and the Russian MoD over Surovikin, a favorite of Prigozhin and the siloviki faction, is additionally highly likely to have been in part a political decision to reassert the primacy of the Russian MoD in an internal Russian power struggle.
• Gerasimov will likely preside over a disorganized command structure plagued by endemic, persistent, and self-reinforcing failures that he largely set into motion in his initial role before the invasion of Ukraine.
• The Russian defense industrial base’s inability to address munitions shortages will likely hinder the ability of Russian forces to sustain offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in 2023.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that a renewed Russian offensive operation from Belarus remains highly unlikely.
• Russian forces have not yet fully captured Soledar despite recent Russian advances, and the possible capture of Soledar is unlikely to enable Russian forces to capture Bakhmut.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly issued secret and preemptive pardons to Russian convicts fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, potentially further empowering Wagner to operate with impunity in the theater.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks near Svatove as Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna and struck rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian claims about Wagner Group and conventional Russian military formations’ operations in the Soledar area likely reflect competing claims over the responsibility for the most recent notable Russian tactical advances in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are withdrawing key assets and restructuring logistics networks in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a plan to improve the Russian defense industrial base.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 11, 2023

Jan 11, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

January 11, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 11 that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov will take over as theater commander as part of a major reshuffle of the Russian command structure for the war in Ukraine. The Russian MoD officially announced Gerasimov as Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces and named three deputies under Gerasimov’s command: previous theater commander in Ukraine from October 8 to January 11 Army General Sergei Surovikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces; Army General Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces; and Colonel General Alexei Kim, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff.[1] Surovikin has served as commander of the Aerospace Forces since October 2017 and commanded the "Southern" group of forces in Ukraine from June to October 2022, before his appointment as overall theater commander.[2] Salyukov has served as commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces since 2014, and Kim has served as Deputy Chief of the General Staff since September 2022 following several positions in Russian military higher education institutions.[3]

The Russian MoD’s public announcement of this restructuring framed the change as necessary to both improve Russian command and control and to intensify Russian operations in Ukraine. The official MoD readout of the appointment states that these changes were made in association "with the expansion of the scale of tasks solved in [the special military operation’s] implementation, the need to organize closer interaction between the services and branches of the Armed Forces, as well as improving the quality of all types of support and the effectiveness of command and control."[4] Putin’s decision to have the Russian MoD publicly announce the changes and their intent, unlike several previous changes to the Russian command structure that were not officially announced, indicate the Kremlin intends Gerasimov’s appointment as a major shift—both in actual conduct of the war, as well as the framing of the Russian MoD’s role. Gerasimov’s appointment and the overall command restructure are likely in part intended to signal, both internationally and domestically within Russia, the Kremlin’s dedication to the traditional power structures of the Russian MoD and Putin’s willingness to fight a long war in Ukraine.

Gerasimov’s appointment as theater commander likely advances two Kremlin efforts: an attempt to improve Russian command and control for a decisive military effort in 2023, and a political move to strengthen the Russian MoD against challenges from the Russian millbloggers and siloviki, such as Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who have criticized the Kremlin’s conduct of the war.

Gerasimov’s appointment is likely intended to support an intended decisive Russian military effort in 2023, likely resumed Russian offensive operations. Putin has repeatedly demonstrated he misunderstands the capabilities of Russian forces and has not abandoned his maximalist war aims in Ukraine. Putin may have appointed Gerasimov, the highest-ranking officer in the Russian military, to succeed a series of theater commanders to oversee a major offensive that Putin—likely incorrectly—believes Russian forces can accomplish in 2023. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces appear to be preparing for a decisive military effort, possibly in Luhansk Oblast.[5] ISW has also forecasted a most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) of a new Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus into northern Ukraine, though this remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone.[6] Ongoing Russian force generation efforts are likely intended to support some form of further offensive operations, and Gerasimov, who approved and did not push back on Russia’s disastrous February 2022 war plan, is unlikely to begin resisting Putin now.[7] Putin may alternatively (or additionally) perceive the threat of further Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2023 and intend for Gerasimov to strengthen Russian forces against these likely attacks.

The elevation of Gerasimov and the Russian MoD over Surovikin, a favorite of Prigozhin and the siloviki faction, is additionally highly likely to have been in part a political decision to reassert the primacy of the Russian MoD in an internal Russian power struggle. The Russian MoD and the siloviki faction, often most publicly represented by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, have feuded throughout 2022 on Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin has increasingly criticized the Russian MoD’s conduct of the war since late 2022.[8] Igor Girkin, former commander of Russian militants in Donbas and a prominent milblogger heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin from office in his most direct criticism of Putin to date on January 10.[9] Surovikin, the previous theater commander in Ukraine, was a public favorite of Prigozhin, and Ukrainian intelligence reported Surovikin is a rival of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[10] It is unclear why Putin implicitly demoted Surovikin in favor of Gerasimov, unlike previously replaced Russian theater commanders who were blamed for battlefield setbacks. Gerasimov’s elevation is likely in part a political move to weaken the influence of the broadly anti-MoD siloviki faction and a signal for Prigozhin and other actors to reduce their criticism of the MoD.

Putin’s elevation of Gerasimov and the highly criticized Russian MoD may prompt siloviki like Prigozhin to further carve up the Russian information space and push back on the Kremlin’s conduct of the war, however. Prigozhin has relentlessly promoted the Wagner Group at the expense of the Russian MoD’s reputation and may double down on his flashy advertisements on Russian social media and state-affiliated outlets to assert the superiority of his forces.[11] Gerasimov's centralizing efforts will additionally likely face resistance from Prigozhin and other actors eager to retain their private stakes in the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin may have known of Putin’s decision to reappoint these commanders and attempted to preempt this news by amplifying information about Wagner’s efforts to seize Soledar in the past several days to claim a victory.[12] Putin’s decision to elevate the MoD may also signal Putin’s departure from attempts to appease siloviki-affiliated milbloggers in an effort to regain control over the dominant narrative. ISW will continue to monitor the sentiment among different milblogger factions regarding their ability to criticize the Russian MoD or Russian military commanders.

Gerasimov is unlikely to rapidly revitalize and reform Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine to achieve Putin’s maximalist objectives. Gerasimov signed off on Putin’s fundamentally flawed initial invasion plans before February 24 and largely faded into obscurity following the collapse of Russia’s flawed initial planning assumptions. Gerasimov is highly unlikely to successfully meet Putin’s unrealistic expectations for his performance. The Russian MoD announcement of the command restructure did not specify how the command chain under Gerasimov will function other than to name Gerasimov’s three "subordinates" and the Russian command structure will likely remain fractured without a considerable pause to adjust Russia’s conduct of the war. Gerasimov will likely preside over a disorganized command structure plagued by endemic, persistent, and self-reinforcing failures that he largely set into motion in his initial role before the invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian defense industrial base’s inability to address munitions shortages will likely hinder the ability of Russian forces to sustain offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in 2023. US and Ukrainian officials told CNN on January 10 that Russia’s daily rate of artillery fire has decreased in some areas by 75%, a historic low since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.[13] These officials noted that Russian forces may be rationing artillery shells as a result of dwindling supplies, or could be reassessing their tactics. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces previously depleted their reserves of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells and other reserves over the summer of 2022 under an assumption that excessive artillery fire would lead to faster results.[14] Cherevaty noted that Russian forces must now transfer additional shells from rear areas in Russia and purchase additional munitions from foreign countries to counteract such shortages, resulting in a reduced rate of fire. Cherevaty added that Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots and logistics have also inhibited Russia’s ability to unload munitions close to the frontlines, reducing the intensity of Russia’s artillery fire.[15]

Russian sources are increasingly also acknowledging that Russia’s ammunition and supply shortages are decisively impeding the ability of Russian forces to advance. A prominent Russian milblogger (and member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mobilization working group) stated on a federal TV program that Russian force generation efforts such as mobilization are not sufficient, noting that Russia’s success on the frontlines is contingent upon its economy and military-industrial complex.[16] ISW had previously assessed that the Kremlin’s force generation campaigns are unlikely to decisively affect the course of the war unless Russia addresses its fundamental problems with supplying its war effort in Ukraine. Russian forces achieved some victories in the first stages of the invasion due to Russia’s rapid use of its manpower and reliance on artillery superiority, and the Kremlin’s inability to replace expended personnel and munitions may further undermine its ability to wage protracted combat.

Russian forces have not yet fully captured Soledar despite recent Russian advances, and the possible capture of Soledar is unlikely to enable Russian forces to capture Bakhmut. ISW assesses that Russian forces have not yet captured Soledar, despite numerous claims from Russian sources.[17] Russian claims about Russian advances in Soledar continue to generate discussion amongst Russian sources about the likelihood of Russian forces capturing Bakhmut.[18] Some Russian sources have begun discussing an implausible collapse of the current Ukrainian frontline and a Ukrainian retreat as far back as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[19] The Russian discussion about the imminent capture of Bakhmut and the collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines are divorced from the current operational reality in the Bakhmut area, where Russian forces remain far from severing Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) needed to encircle Bakhmut.[20] Russian offensive operations to capture Bakhmut have likely culminated due to degraded operational capabilities.[21]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly issued secret and preemptive pardons to Russian convicts fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, potentially further empowering Wagner to operate with impunity in the theater. Russian Human Rights Council member Eva Merkacheva told Russian outlet RIA Novosti on January 9 that prisoners recruited by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group to fight in Ukraine receive pardons before they are released from penal colonies for deployment.[22] Under the Russian Criminal Code and Article 89 of the Russian Constitution, only the Russian President may issue a pardon.[23] Merkacheva stated that the presidential decree on pardoning convicts who participated in combat in Ukraine contains information that is classified as an official state secret per existing Russian legislation.[24] Prigozhin earlier announced pardons for the first group of Wagner Group returnees on January 5, and ISW noted at the time that Prigozhin has no legal authority under Russian constitutional or criminal law to grant such pardons himself.[25] However, the existence of the secret presidential pardons suggests that Prigozhin announced the pardons for merely performative reasons, to continue to promote the Wagner Group, and to legitimate its recruitment practices.

Preemptive presidential pardons are likely further driving Wagner Group recruitment within penal colonies and empowering Wagner Group fighters to operate with a large degree of impunity in Ukraine. The promise of a legal pardon for criminal activity likely incentivizes convicts to sign contracts with the Wagner Group, knowing that if they survive operations in Ukraine, they will be released back into Russian society following their deployment with clean records. ISW has previously observed that Wagner Group fighters recruited from prisons are deployed to the frontline in Ukraine chiefly as an expendable attritional force, and often show incredibly lax discipline in the theater. A Russian milblogger circulated imagery on January 10 of Wagner Group fighters in Soledar wearing Ukrainian uniforms in what likely constitutes a resort to perfidy in violation of international law.[26] Wagner continues to build out its reputation as a brutal and attritional fighting force through instances such as this apparent war crime, and Prigozhin is likely empowering Wagner Group forces to continue similar conduct in the expectation that if they survive, they will return to Russia as free and respected men and without accruing further criminal records through actions in Ukraine. Putin’s guarantee of a legal carte blanche for Wagner Group fighters will likely allow Prigozhin to use the promise of a pardon to drive recruitment efforts, therefore lending more untrained and unprofessional personnel as an attritional force that often perpetrates atrocities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that a renewed Russian offensive operation from Belarus remains highly unlikely. Zelensky stated during a coordination meeting on the security of Ukraine’s northwestern borders on January 11 that Ukraine does not see any inflections in Belarus "apart from strong statements."[27] Zelensky noted that Ukraine needs to prepare its northwestern borders and regions on the Ukraine-Belarus border for any situation. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine had not observed any formation of assault groups in Belarus on January 11, after deviating from its normal reporting pattern on Russian forces in Belarus on January 10.[28] ISW continues to assess that a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv remains unlikely.

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 11 that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov will take over as theater commander as part of a major reshuffle of the Russian command structure for the war in Ukraine.
• Gerasimov’s appointment is likely intended to support an intended decisive Russian military effort in 2023, likely in the form of resumed Russian offensive operations.
• The elevation of Gerasimov and the Russian MoD over Surovikin, a favorite of Prigozhin and the siloviki faction, is additionally highly likely to have been in part a political decision to reassert the primacy of the Russian MoD in an internal Russian power struggle.
• Gerasimov will likely preside over a disorganized command structure plagued by endemic, persistent, and self-reinforcing failures that he largely set into motion in his initial role before the invasion of Ukraine.
• The Russian defense industrial base’s inability to address munitions shortages will likely hinder the ability of Russian forces to sustain offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in 2023.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that a renewed Russian offensive operation from Belarus remains highly unlikely.
• Russian forces have not yet fully captured Soledar despite recent Russian advances, and the possible capture of Soledar is unlikely to enable Russian forces to capture Bakhmut.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly issued secret and preemptive pardons to Russian convicts fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, potentially further empowering Wagner to operate with impunity in the theater.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks near Svatove as Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna and struck rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian claims about Wagner Group and conventional Russian military formations’ operations in the Soledar area likely reflect competing claims over the responsibility for the most recent notable Russian tactical advances in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are withdrawing key assets and restructuring logistics networks in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a plan to improve the Russian defense industrial base.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near Svatove on January 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Hrianykivka, Kharkiv Oblast (53km northwest of Svatove) and Stelmakhivka, Luhansk Oblast (16km west of Svatove).[29] Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces retreated after suffering losses in attacks near Hrianykivka.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces began conducting "active operations" along the Kreminna-Svatove line but did not clarify the nature of those operations.[31]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations around Kreminna on January 11. A Russian source published footage on January 11 purporting to show Russian forces fighting against a Ukrainian assault in the vicinity of Kreminna.[32] A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) commander claimed that Ukrainian forces have probed Russian defenses in the Kreminna area for the past month, but that Russian artillery units have prevented larger Ukrainian formations from conducting counteroffensive operations in the area.[33] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces have begun to deploy more experienced military personnel, rather than more mobilized personnel, to fight in the Kreminna area due to fears that Russian forces may lose the settlement.[34] Geolocated Russian drone footage posted on January 11 shows Ukrainian forces in forests closer to Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Kuzmyne (2km southwest of Kreminna) and Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[36] The BARS-13 commander claimed that Ukrainian forces are particularly active near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and plan to cut off Kreminna by surrounding it from the south, although ISW does not make assessments about specific Ukrainian operations.[37]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast on January 11. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear areas near Chornukhyne (65km northeast of Donetsk City) and Zolote (43km southeast of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[38]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured the majority of Soledar as fighting in the settlement continued on January 11, though ISW cannot confirm the complete Russian capture of the town. Geolocated footage posted on January 10 and 11 shows Russian forces reached western Soledar and have likely interdicted Soledar’s main supply roads.[39] Some Russian sources claimed Russian forces fully captured Soledar, while others claimed Ukrainian forces still hold positions on the Western outskirts and suburbs of the settlement.[40] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have completely surrounded the remaining Ukrainian grouping in Soledar and are conducting sweeps in the settlement, though one prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to encircle the Ukrainian forces defending the settlement.[41] Ukrainian officials denied Russian claims about the full capture of Soledar and reported that Ukrainian forces are still engaged in heavy fighting in the settlement.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar on January 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 19km northeast of Soledar near Spirne, Rozdolivka, and Vesele.[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured Pidhorodne (6km southwest of Soledar) and that Russian Airborne (VDV) units have surrounded Soledar from the north and the south.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian VDV units continued offensive operations in the vicinity of Paraskoviivka (6km southwest of Soledar) and Krasna Hora (6km southwest of Soledar) from the direction of Pidhorodne.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have established defensive lines north of Soledar, near Rozdolivka and Vesele, and west of Soledar, near Paraskoviivka and Blahodatne (5km west of Soledar).[46]

Outlets and milbloggers variously affiliated with the Wagner Group and Russian Armed Forces are issuing contradictory attempts to claim credit for tactical Russian successes. ISW assesses that Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing to use reports of the Wagner Group’s success in Soledar to frame the Wagner Group as an effective fighting force that can achieve the tactical advances conventional Russian forces cannot.[47] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers sympathetic to the Russian MoD are likely claiming that VDV units are also involved in the operations around Soledar so that the Russian MoD can assert that it has some level of responsibility for the first notable tactical advances in Ukraine in months. The Russian MoD likely aims to insulate itself from further criticism that its forces are unable to secure tangible battlefield gains, as well as to prevent Prigozhin from further elevating his influence through being able to claim sole responsibility for the potential Russian capture of Soledar.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and in the Avdiivka-Donetsk city area on January 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Mayorsk (22km southwest of Bakhmut).[48] Geolocated footage posted on January 10 shows that Russian forces have made minimal advances in Opytne (4km south of Bakhmut).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also repelled Russian assaults within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka.[50]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault in western Donetsk Oblast on January 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Prechistivka (60km southwest of Donetsk city) in western Donetsk Oblast.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[52]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are withdrawing key assets and restructuring logistics networks in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on January 11 that Russian forces withdrew Shahed-136 drone launch points from occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea and Krasnodar Krai and suggested Ukrainian forces have struck Russian drone training centers in southern Ukraine.[53] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces previously intended to establish Melitopol as a logistics hub to move forces and equipment to the front lines, likely to compensate for the diminished capacity of the Kerch Strait Bridge, but instead now use the city as a center for destroyed equipment and personnel casualties.[54] Fedorov stated that Russian forces are using local social infrastructure as makeshift morgues and hospitals across Zaporizhia Oblast and transported over 200 dead from Tokmak to Russia, and full rail cars of destroyed equipment from Melitopol to Crimea, suggesting that existing infrastructure is not sufficient for Russian forces to process casualties and damaged equipment.[55] Fedorov stated that Russian forces in rear Mykhailivka are terrified that they "will be sent to be slaughtered" in Vasylivka.[56]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted routine fire across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 11. The Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces, Yevhen Yerin, stated that Ukrainian forces have the Dnipro River delta islands and the Kinburn Spit under fire control.[57] Yerin stated that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating on the islands to identify Ukrainian firing positions. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian Airborne (VDV) artillery elements on the east (left) continue to shell Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[58] This claim indicates that some Russian VDV elements continue to operate close to the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. Russian forces continued to strike Kherson City and its environs.[59] Russian forces conducted routine fire against areas in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 11.[60]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a plan to improve the Russian defense industrial base on January 11. Shoigu told Russian media that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will work to "improve the mechanisms for responding to civil initiatives, some of which, of course, deserve great attention;" and modernize the work of military registration and enlistment offices by digitizing databases; establish interaction with local and regional authorities and industry; and update the system of civil and territorial defense.[61] Shoigu stated that these plans are all to strengthen Russian combat capabilities.[62] Shoigu‘s announcement, which was likely made in tandem with the appointment of Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov as commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, indicates the Kremlin is likely launching a concerted effort to mobilize the Russian economy for a long war. ISW continues to assess the Russian defense industrial base will struggle to replace massive Russian losses in 2022.

Russian officials continue to set conditions for a reported second wave of mobilization. Russian Federation Council for International Affairs member Sergei Tsekov suggested on January 9 that conscripted soldiers over 21 years old should be able to participate in the war in Ukraine with voluntary consent and six months of training.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 11 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) issued an order to all Russian border departments banning Russian citizens fit for military service from leaving Russia starting January 9.[64] GUR reported that this border closure is intended to support a second wave of mobilization which will prioritize "quantity not quality."[65] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov previously told Russian citizens to ignore speculation surrounding a second wave of mobilization and called these most recent official Ukrainian reports "information sabotage."[66] ISW maintains that mobilization is ongoing despite Russian claims otherwise, and a second wave of mobilization will simply continue ongoing efforts.[67]

Russian occupation authorities continued mobilizing Ukrainian citizens in occupied territories of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 11 that Russian occupation authorities have resorted to mobilizing residents of Donetsk Oblast with disabilities, addiction problems, and criminal records to meet Kremlin-imposed quotas.[68] The report stated that Russian occupation officials are forcibly mobilizing disabled citizens to serve as drivers for the Russian military.[69] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that residents are resisting mobilization efforts, prompting Russian occupation officials to seek alternatives.[70] Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan also stated that Russian occupation officials are conducting mobilization measures on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast by identifying and recording the names of people of draft age.[71] The Russian-appointed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, visited a Crimean unit that will soon deploy to the frontlines on January 11 and claimed that the unit is not going to fight Ukrainian forces, but NATO.[72] Prominent Russian milblogger—and a recent addition to the Russian Human Rights Commission—Alexander "Sasha" Kots also reportedly opened a new training camp for a new unit in Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) as part of Russian NGO The Popular Front’s "Everything for Victory!" project.[73]

The aftereffects of the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on the Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31 continues to degrade Russian morale. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shared intercepted audio on January 10 of a Russian soldier claiming that Russian forces lost over 600 soldiers in the Makiivka strike, rather than the Russian MoD’s claimed figure of 63 deaths.[74] The soldier stated that Russian authorities intentionally minimized the number of dead Russians out of fear that the number might incite a riot.[75] The Russian civilian group Council of Mothers and Wives published an appeal from a woman who claimed she has been unable to contact her three mobilized sons who reportedly were serving in Makiivka, Donetsk, during the Ukrainian HIMARS strike.[76] The resistance group "Samara Against the War" created a petition to the Russian government to release the names of those killed in action in Makiivka that reached over 50,000 signatures as of January 10.[77] Samara military enlistment official Colonel Alexander Vdovin refused to release the list, claiming that foreign intelligence agencies could use it.[78] The Makiivka strike generated discontent within the Russian information space and incited further blaming of Russian military leadership for poor training, dispersal, and discipline of personnel, as ISW has previously reported.[79]

The Russian information space circulated news on January 11 of a Russian mobilized servicemember, Alexander Leshkov, who received a five-and-a-half-year penal colony sentence for confronting his commanding officer, fueling further discussion on the responsibility of Russian command for training failures and personnel problems.[80] Russian sources re-circulated November footage of Leshkov confronting his commanding officer over poor training and equipment failures after news broke on January 11 that Odintsovo Garrison Military Court charged and sentenced Leshkov.[81] One prominent Russian milblogger responded to news of the sentencing by stating that servicemembers should not be blamed for the problems created by their commanders’ lack of competence and overabundance of inaction.[82] The milblogger stated that the commanding officers cannot hold their subordinates to a standard that they never embodied and that it would be a different story had military leadership initially provided mobilized with effective "training, equipment, weapons, and normal commanders."[83] The milblogger concluded that Leshkov is not an enemy of the state for criticizing his commander and that it would be much worse to ignore what is going on and watch as nothing changes.[84] Another prominent Russian milblogger stated that the Russian state has committed crimes against Russian servicemembers, including not paying them and "sending conscripts to the front without proper training or equipment."[85] The milblogger argued that the Russian legal system should punish the Russian authorities who have wronged servicemembers, not just the servicemembers who speak up.[86] Russian milblogger and Russian Human Rights Commission member Alexander "Sasha" Kots also called for the prosecution of the Russian authorities and military bureaucrats who wronged mobilized personnel by issuing airsoft "bulletproof" vests, who did not train them for battle, who failed to prevent the Makiivka strike, and who boasted of intelligence capabilities that did not exist.[87]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

President Vladimir Putin discussed measures to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian Federation in a video meeting with Russia’s Cabinet of Ministers on January 11.[88] Putin discussed problems emerging in the occupied territories and emphasized that Russia must promote investment and support local businesses in occupied territories, as well as involve occupied territories in national state projects.[89] Putin claimed that civilians in occupied territories must understand the full value of joining the Russian Federation and that their lives will change for the better, acknowledging that life is presently difficult in occupied territories.[90]

Russian officials discussed measures to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian social support system on January 11. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova discussed social support to occupied territories on January 11. Golikova stated that the Russian Social Fund is working to make necessary payments to residents in occupied territories after occupation authorities implemented the Russian minimum wage in occupied territories on January 1.[91] Golikova also stated that the payroll fund for state employees in occupied territories rose 20 percent since January 1.[92] Golikova stated that pregnant women and families with children will receive a single allowance without proof of income and that residents in occupied territories will receive maternity and family capital, a method of Russian state support for families with more than one child, suggesting that Russian officials seek to incentivize citizens of occupied territories to increase the population.[93] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik announced on January 11 that Russia restored 100 schools, 20 hospitals, and 500km of road after the LNR formally joined the Russian Federation.[94] Pasechnik announced the implementation of maternity capital in Luhansk Oblast on January 11 and claimed that Russian officials pay great attention to children in the occupied territories.[95] The implementation of maternity capital in occupied territories is not a new social support in Russia or the post-Soviet space more broadly, having previously been used for population growth programs. However, the use of these programs in occupied areas may be a method by which the Russian occupation administration seeks to increase the population of occupied areas, as well as the social and economic integration of said population into the Russian system.

Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle to coerce residents in occupied territories to accept Russian passports. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksander Starukh reported on January 11 that Russian occupation authorities are looking for more employees to work at the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), as approximately 1,500 ZNPP workers refused to accept Russian passports and sign a contract with Rosatom to receive passes to access the ZNPP.[96] Starukh also stated that Russian occupation authorities plan to use nationalized housing in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, to house new ZNPP employees.[97] Russian occupation authorities continue to import Russian citizens to serve in civilian roles in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 11 that Russian occupation authorities continue to import doctors from Russia to staff hospitals in occupied territories as local doctors grow increasingly resistant to treating wounded Russian servicemen.[98] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 11 that Russian occupation authorities imported a new rotation of doctors from Russia in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[99]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to use coercive means in an effort to consolidate economic control of occupied territories. Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on January 11 that the Russian Federal Taxation Service is threatening to prohibit entrepreneurs in Kherson Oblast from conducting business if they do not submit their enterprises into the Russian tax record.[100] Russian forces and occupation authorities are intensifying efforts to identify possible partisan activity in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 11 that Russian forces are escalating measures to strengthen regime control in Kherson Oblast and are regularly checking the mobile phones and other property of residents.[101]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to target Ukrainian children to consolidate societal control in occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevheniy Balitsky stated on January 11 that the primary branch of the ultra-nationalist Russian youth group "Movement of the First" is operating in Zaporizhia Oblast. Balitsky stated on January 11 that "Movement of the First" leaders work with Ukrainian children in Zaporizhia Oblast in the spheres of education, culture, sports, volunteerism, patriotism, and preservation of the Russian historical memory.[102]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Russian and Belarusian elements continue to conduct joint exercises in Belarus. Elements of the Belarusian 11th Mechanized Brigade deployed with unspecified Russian elements to an unspecified training ground in Belarus on January 11.[103] Tank elements of the Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade conducted exercises at an unspecified training ground in Belarus on January 11.[104] A peacekeeping company of Belarusian the 103rd Airborne Brigade conducted field exercises at the Losvido Training Ground in Vitebsk, Belarus on January 11.[105]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that a renewed Russian offensive operation from Belarus remains highly unlikely on January 11.[106]
• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 11.[107] The Ukrainian General Staff’s deviation from its reporting pattern regarding Russian forces in Belarus on January 10 was likely an isolated incident. [108]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-gu... gov.ru/Document/View/0001202012100012; https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5760644

[14] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/11/nejmovirna-intensyvnist-vijny-vysnazhyla-zapasy-boyeprypasiv-rosiyan-sergij-cherevatyj/

[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/11/nejmovirna-intensyvnist-vijny-vysnazhyla-zapasy-boyeprypasiv-rosiyan-sergij-cherevatyj/

[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/16592 ; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27451/4704411/?from=tg; https://t.me/sashakots/37985 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10156 ; ...

[22] https://ria dot ru/20230109/zaklyuchennye-1843702450.html

[23] https://base.garant dot ru/12125251 ; https://www.advgazeta dot ru/novosti/vladimir-putin-utverdil-novyy-poryadok-pomilovaniya/

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ru/20230109/zaklyuchennye-1843702450.html

[27] https://www.president dot g.ua/news/u-lvovi-prezident-proviv-naradu-shodo-bezpekovoyi-situaciyi-80309

[42] https://t.me/annamaliar/495 ; https://suspilne dot media/356412-zaavi-rosijskih-vijskovih-pro-zahoplenna-soledara-ne-vidpovidaut-dijsnosti-cerevatij/

[53] https://suspilne dot media/356808-rosia-peredislokuvala-punkti-zapusku-sahediv-do-krasnodarskogo-krau-cerez-nebezpeku-gumenuk/

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/01/11/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-prodovzhuye-rujnuvaty-czyvilnu-infrastrukturu-ta-inshi-krytychno-vazhlyvi-obyekty/

[61] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/10/01/2023/63bd3a519a79471c303d36f2?from=from_main_10

[62] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/10/01/2023/63bd3a519a79471c303d36f2?from=from_main_10

[63] https://ura dot news/news/1052616860

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xET6z3xWkYtpb8zHbjP... https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-rf-z-9-sichnia-obmezhyly-vyizd-z-krainy-viiskovozoboviazanym-v-tomu-chysli-obmezheno-prydatnym-do-sluzhby.html; https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/pfbid0nKYuZg...

[65] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-rf-z-9-sichnia-obmezhyly-vyizd-z-krainy-viiskovozoboviazanym-v-tomu-chysli-obmezheno-prydatnym-do-sluzhby.html; https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/pfbid0nKYuZg...

[66] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/11/eto-utka-i-informatsionnaya-diversiya-kreml-otritsaet-sluhi-o-zaprete-na-vyezd-iz-rossii-muzhchinam-prizyvnogo-vozrasta; https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/25015; https://ria dot ru/20230109/oproverzhenie-1843636447.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[68] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/11/na-donechchyni-okupanty-mobilizuyut-lyudej-z-invalidnistyu/

[69] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/11/na-donechchyni-okupanty-mobilizuyut-lyudej-z-invalidnistyu/

[70] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/11/na-donechchyni-okupanty-mobilizuyut-lyudej-z-invalidnistyu/

[74] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/on-lychno-perevozyl-tela-yz-makeevky-hovoryt-610-v-makeevke-pohybshykh-12-kamazov-hovoryt-vyvez.html

[75] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/on-lychno-perevozyl-tela-yz-makeevky-hovoryt-610-v-makeevke-pohybshykh-12-kamazov-hovoryt-vyvez.html

[93] https://sfr dot gov.ru/en/matcap/; https://t.me/government_rus/5974

[98] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/11/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-rotacziyu-likariv-na-tot/

[99] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/11/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-rotacziyu-likariv-na-tot/

[106] https://www.president dot g.ua/news/u-lvovi-prezident-proviv-naradu-shodo-bezpekovoyi-situaciyi-80309

understandingwar.org

3. Congress announces commission to review National Defense Strategy

​The one common characteristic all these commissions have had over the years to include this one: No one with any real experience in irregular warfare​.

Our nation wil continue to pay lip service to irregular and political warfare.

Congress announces commission to review National Defense Strategy

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · January 11, 2023

WASHINGTON — A congressional bipartisan commission will examine President Joe Biden’s 2022 National Defense Strategy and craft recommendations for its implementation, Congress announced Wednesday.

The bipartisan leaders of the Senate and House Armed Services committees named eight commissioners who will develop a report to Congress over the next year on “the assumptions, objectives, defense investments, force posture and structure, operational concepts and military risks” of the National Defense Strategy.

The commission is required under the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act and mirrors a similar panel that reviewed former President Donald Trump’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. Defense hawks in Congress seized on the 2018 commission’s findings to argue for higher military spending.

Democrats have selected former Rep. Jane Harman, D-Calif., to chair the 2022 commission, while Republicans have picked former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman as its vice chairman.

“I am very impressed with these appointments with two highly experienced and respected leaders in Jane Harman and Eric Edelman,” Arnold Punaro, the former Democratic staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Defense News. “The other members are also recognized thought leaders in the national security area.”

Punaro said the commissioners “will call it as they see it.”

“This is another indication that in divided government, the national security leadership in the Congress will continue to ensure that we get the policy and funding support required,” he added.

Harman previously served as the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. After that, she went on to become the first female CEO of the Wilson Center, a security focused think tank in Washington, and currently chairs the board of Freedom House — a nonprofit dedicated to advancing democracy and human rights.

Edelman is counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He has also served as former Vice President Dick Cheney’s principal deputy assistant for national security affairs as well as U.S. ambassador to Turkey in the Bush administration and ambassador to Finland in the Clinton administration.

Edelman is one of four members of the current National Defense Strategy Commission who also served on the analogous 2018 panel. The other members returning from the 2018 commission are Jack Keane, Thomas Mahnken and Roger Zakheim.

Keane is a retired four-star general who served as the former vice chief of staff for the Army and regularly appears on Fox News. Mahnken is president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense of policy planning in the Bush administration. Zakheim is the Washington director at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and previously served as the Republican deputy staff director on the House Armed Services Committee.

Three other members, Mara Rudman, Mariah Sixkiller and Alissa Starzak, will be serving on a National Defense Strategy commission for the first time.

Rudman is the executive vice president for policy at the Center for American Progress and previously served as deputy assistant for national security affairs to both former presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton. Sixkiller is strategic defense affairs officer at Microsoft’s defense business unit and has previously served as national security adviser to former House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-Md. Starzak is a vice president at the cybersecurity firm Cloudflare and previously served as general counsel for the Army.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

4. Three steps toward a ‘whole of nation’ approach for national security

The three:

Update and empower the defense industrial base:

Empower allies and partners through collaboration:

Defend the homeland against cyber threats:

Three steps toward a ‘whole of nation’ approach for national security

BY MIKE ROGERS AND KEOKI JACKSON, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 01/11/23 11:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3806237-three-steps-toward-a-whole-of-nation-approach-for-national-security/?utm_source=pocket_saves

In October, the Biden administration released its full National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). The documents outline the overall national security strategy for the United States and for the Department of Defense (DOD). Both strategies note the rise of China and the belligerence of Russia, especially in light of its invasion of Ukraine. The NSS and NDS emphasize the need for the U.S. to secure its supply chain and industrial base, protect its critical infrastructure, empower allies, and strengthen its position in advanced research and technology.

There is an urgency of now, and it’s a key lesson from Ukraine’s preparation to further defend itself after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. After 2014, the Ukrainians mobilized all national resources and capabilities to counter the growing Russian threat and were prepared when hostilities commenced in February 2022.

Like Ukraine, we must ensure the same sense of urgency at home, taking advantage of every minute to increase deterrence and create capability against China, both in competition and for potential future conflict. To match the urgency of the threats, we must embrace timely, flexible cross-government approaches to match the complexity of the challenges. As two national security professionals with decades of experience, we propose the following recommendations to jumpstart and operationalize a “whole-of-nation” approach to ensure our nation’s security for decades to come.

Update and empower the defense industrial base: As Ukraine’s conflict with Russia has shown, a nation’s path to victory is often helped or hindered by its ability to deliver capability to its warfighters. The capabilities needed are often provided by a strong and innovative defense industrial base. The U.S. defense industrial base has been the world’s leader in providing capability but is challenged by China and its strategy of “military-civil fusion.” China’s end-goal is to “leapfrog” the United States to become the predominant military power in the world.

For the U.S. to maintain its decisive military advantage, it must procure capability at a much faster rate and at scale while increasing the resiliency of its supply chain. One approach to procure capability is to use the Defense Production Act (DPA), established in 1950 at the onset of the Korean War to prioritize specific capabilities during times of national crisis. DPA authorities were used to secure and produce resources such as masks and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Recently, DPA authorities allowed the Department of Defense to secure many of the elements needed for domestic production of large lithium batteries, which are critical components in domestic and national security products. In August, the DOD used the DPA to launch an innovative partnership in Texas to accelerate production of inert gasses for military and commercial applications. The U.S. government should expand the use of the DPA to create capacity in areas such as casting, forging and tooling, as well as additive manufacturing.

In addition to expanding DPA, Congress and the White House must work together to allow the DOD to purchase critical items efficiently through multi-year procurement. An amendment recently was introduced in the National Defense Authorization Act to allow multi-year contract authorities to procure munitions on behalf of the DOD and NATO allies. Senior leaders should examine which critical areas will benefit most from enhanced multi-year contract authorities to procure components that are essential in a high-intensity and protracted engagement against a sophisticated adversary.

Empower allies and partners through collaboration: The 2022 NDS notes that “the Department will prioritize interoperability and enable coalitions with enhanced capabilities, new operating concepts, and combined, collaborative force planning.” The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made clear the value of alliances and partnerships, particularly NATO, in the European theater. To build future capability, NATO has launched an initiative, the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is focusing on developing warfighting technologies through partnerships with allied countries, the private sector and academia. DIANA is an international organization modeled on DOD’s legendary Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

U.S. decision-makers should use the DIANA model to establish a sister organization with allies in the Indo-Pacific Command theater. An Indo-Pacom innovation organization would develop advanced capabilities in theater focusing explicitly on the most critical challenges and could provide support to important initiatives such as the recently signed AUKUS Agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. AUKUS will provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia and increase the advanced technology capabilities of these three nations in the Indo-Pacific region.

An innovation organization would benefit from enhanced procurement authorities such as the DPA mentioned above. These authorities should be coupled with recent IndoPacom investments outlined by DOD’s strengthening the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which supports key capabilities and grows interoperability between the U.S. and its allies in the region.

In addition, the U.S. government must streamline and reform as necessary its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and export control processes to encourage information-sharing, interoperability, and co-production of arms among like-minded allies. For example, the U.S. government could create a single database for all ITAR decisions and make the results easily accessible to industry and partner nations.

Given the focus on developing new capabilities, AUKUS would benefit from a DIANA-like organization empowered with both funding and program flexibility to foster collaboration between allies on cutting-edge technology and innovation.

Defend the homeland against cyber threats: Defending the homeland, paced to the growing threat posed by China, is listed as the number one priority in the NDS. While China continues to modernize and grow their conventional and strategic forces, they are also engaged in non-kinetic actions against the U.S., as evidenced by the OPM cyber intrusion in 2014 and continued corporate espionage against major U.S. defense contractors and technology companies. China has targeted companies across multiple sectors to accelerate and build its military and economic strength with the goal of displacing the United States on the world stage.

The 2019 NDAA established the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission to make recommendations on securing the United States from cyber threats. In its findings, the commission noted, “The United States needs a whole-of-nation approach to secure its interests and institutions in cyberspace.” The U.S. government has implemented many of the commission’s recommendations but, given the evolving nature of the threat, we must relentlessly pursue a comprehensive cyber approach to secure public sector and private industry assets.

The U.S. has made great strides in detecting cyber threats, but it has not made significant progress in deterring hostile cyber actors. As the Solarium Commission recommended, the government and the private sector must work to build a layered cyber deterrence strategy across critical areas such as the economy and elections. Government must put urgency into its own reforms to become more agile, and industry must strengthen their own security posture.

To better facilitate private sector and government cooperation, we need to identify and empower organizations such as nonprofits and federally funded research and development centers to bridge the gaps between the private and public sectors. Only with a unified approach can we secure our nation from those who wish us harm in the cyber domain.

Budowsky: A post-McCarthy deal of the century

Mr. President, stop freezing the conflict in Ukraine for Putin

The recent National Security Strategy noted the United States is “in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.” In this competition, we face adversaries who take a long-term comprehensive approach in assessing our vulnerabilities to exploit them. To build the needed capabilities and defenses to secure our nation, we need to embrace the mentality that we, as a country, are stronger when we work together and focus on innovative and flexible paths forward to strengthen our common defense.

Former Congressman Mike Rogers is chairman of the board of trustees for MITRE. An adviser on emerging technologies, geopolitics and cybersecurity, he chaired the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and authorized and oversaw a $70 billion budget to fund the country’s 17 intelligence agencies.

Keoki Jackson, Sc.D, is senior vice president and general manager, MITRE National Security Sector, responsible for the strategic growth and execution of its programs, including support to the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Intelligence Community. He also leads the National Security Engineering Center.

BY MIKE ROGERS AND KEOKI JACKSON, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 01/11/23 11:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3806237-three-steps-toward-a-whole-of-nation-approach-for-national-security/?utm_source=pocket_saves

In October, the Biden administration released its full National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). The documents outline the overall national security strategy for the United States and for the Department of Defense (DOD). Both strategies note the rise of China and the belligerence of Russia, especially in light of its invasion of Ukraine. The NSS and NDS emphasize the need for the U.S. to secure its supply chain and industrial base, protect its critical infrastructure, empower allies, and strengthen its position in advanced research and technology.

There is an urgency of now, and it’s a key lesson from Ukraine’s preparation to further defend itself after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. After 2014, the Ukrainians mobilized all national resources and capabilities to counter the growing Russian threat and were prepared when hostilities commenced in February 2022.

Like Ukraine, we must ensure the same sense of urgency at home, taking advantage of every minute to increase deterrence and create capability against China, both in competition and for potential future conflict. To match the urgency of the threats, we must embrace timely, flexible cross-government approaches to match the complexity of the challenges. As two national security professionals with decades of experience, we propose the following recommendations to jumpstart and operationalize a “whole-of-nation” approach to ensure our nation’s security for decades to come.

Update and empower the defense industrial base: As Ukraine’s conflict with Russia has shown, a nation’s path to victory is often helped or hindered by its ability to deliver capability to its warfighters. The capabilities needed are often provided by a strong and innovative defense industrial base. The U.S. defense industrial base has been the world’s leader in providing capability but is challenged by China and its strategy of “military-civil fusion.” China’s end-goal is to “leapfrog” the United States to become the predominant military power in the world.

For the U.S. to maintain its decisive military advantage, it must procure capability at a much faster rate and at scale while increasing the resiliency of its supply chain. One approach to procure capability is to use the Defense Production Act (DPA), established in 1950 at the onset of the Korean War to prioritize specific capabilities during times of national crisis. DPA authorities were used to secure and produce resources such as masks and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Recently, DPA authorities allowed the Department of Defense to secure many of the elements needed for domestic production of large lithium batteries, which are critical components in domestic and national security products. In August, the DOD used the DPA to launch an innovative partnership in Texas to accelerate production of inert gasses for military and commercial applications. The U.S. government should expand the use of the DPA to create capacity in areas such as casting, forging and tooling, as well as additive manufacturing.

In addition to expanding DPA, Congress and the White House must work together to allow the DOD to purchase critical items efficiently through multi-year procurement. An amendment recently was introduced in the National Defense Authorization Act to allow multi-year contract authorities to procure munitions on behalf of the DOD and NATO allies. Senior leaders should examine which critical areas will benefit most from enhanced multi-year contract authorities to procure components that are essential in a high-intensity and protracted engagement against a sophisticated adversary.

Empower allies and partners through collaboration: The 2022 NDS notes that “the Department will prioritize interoperability and enable coalitions with enhanced capabilities, new operating concepts, and combined, collaborative force planning.” The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made clear the value of alliances and partnerships, particularly NATO, in the European theater. To build future capability, NATO has launched an initiative, the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is focusing on developing warfighting technologies through partnerships with allied countries, the private sector and academia. DIANA is an international organization modeled on DOD’s legendary Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

U.S. decision-makers should use the DIANA model to establish a sister organization with allies in the Indo-Pacific Command theater. An Indo-Pacom innovation organization would develop advanced capabilities in theater focusing explicitly on the most critical challenges and could provide support to important initiatives such as the recently signed AUKUS Agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. AUKUS will provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia and increase the advanced technology capabilities of these three nations in the Indo-Pacific region.

An innovation organization would benefit from enhanced procurement authorities such as the DPA mentioned above. These authorities should be coupled with recent IndoPacom investments outlined by DOD’s strengthening the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which supports key capabilities and grows interoperability between the U.S. and its allies in the region.

In addition, the U.S. government must streamline and reform as necessary its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and export control processes to encourage information-sharing, interoperability, and co-production of arms among like-minded allies. For example, the U.S. government could create a single database for all ITAR decisions and make the results easily accessible to industry and partner nations.

Given the focus on developing new capabilities, AUKUS would benefit from a DIANA-like organization empowered with both funding and program flexibility to foster collaboration between allies on cutting-edge technology and innovation.

Defend the homeland against cyber threats: Defending the homeland, paced to the growing threat posed by China, is listed as the number one priority in the NDS. While China continues to modernize and grow their conventional and strategic forces, they are also engaged in non-kinetic actions against the U.S., as evidenced by the OPM cyber intrusion in 2014 and continued corporate espionage against major U.S. defense contractors and technology companies. China has targeted companies across multiple sectors to accelerate and build its military and economic strength with the goal of displacing the United States on the world stage.

The 2019 NDAA established the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission to make recommendations on securing the United States from cyber threats. In its findings, the commission noted, “The United States needs a whole-of-nation approach to secure its interests and institutions in cyberspace.” The U.S. government has implemented many of the commission’s recommendations but, given the evolving nature of the threat, we must relentlessly pursue a comprehensive cyber approach to secure public sector and private industry assets.

The U.S. has made great strides in detecting cyber threats, but it has not made significant progress in deterring hostile cyber actors. As the Solarium Commission recommended, the government and the private sector must work to build a layered cyber deterrence strategy across critical areas such as the economy and elections. Government must put urgency into its own reforms to become more agile, and industry must strengthen their own security posture.

To better facilitate private sector and government cooperation, we need to identify and empower organizations such as nonprofits and federally funded research and development centers to bridge the gaps between the private and public sectors. Only with a unified approach can we secure our nation from those who wish us harm in the cyber domain.

The recent National Security Strategy noted the United States is “in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.” In this competition, we face adversaries who take a long-term comprehensive approach in assessing our vulnerabilities to exploit them. To build the needed capabilities and defenses to secure our nation, we need to embrace the mentality that we, as a country, are stronger when we work together and focus on innovative and flexible paths forward to strengthen our common defense.

Former Congressman Mike Rogers is chairman of the board of trustees for MITRE. An adviser on emerging technologies, geopolitics and cybersecurity, he chaired the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and authorized and oversaw a $70 billion budget to fund the country’s 17 intelligence agencies.

Keoki Jackson, Sc.D, is senior vice president and general manager, MITRE National Security Sector, responsible for the strategic growth and execution of its programs, including support to the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Intelligence Community. He also leads the National Security Engineering Center.

5. Gallagher: Time to Push Back on CCP Aggression in Bipartisan Fashion

As an eminent China hand constantly counsels me when I imply that the CCP is the enemy: China would likely be acting in the same way even if there was not a CCP. That may be the first error of this committee in that the title of the committee illustrates a lack of understanding of Chinese history, culture, politics, etc. From our perspective we think it is a good idea to separate the CCP from the people. But it is the CPP's actions that are in accordance with Chinese culture and not a result of communist party ideology.  As we attack CCP actions people in Chinese me perceive that we may be attacking Chinese culture 

Gallagher: Time to Push Back on CCP Aggression in Bipartisan Fashion

gallagher.house.gov · January 10, 2023

WASHINGTON, D.C.-- Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) today released the following statement after the House voted in overwhelming bipartisan fashion create the Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party by a vote of 365-65.

Gallagher, who serves on the House Armed Services and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, was selected by Speaker McCarthy to serve as the Committee's Chairman.

"It is time to push back against the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression in bipartisan fashion, and today’s overwhelming bipartisan vote to create the Select Committee on the CCP is an important step in that direction. The next step is to populate the committee with serious members on both sides and get to work with a sense of urgency.

"I thank Speaker McCarthy for the opportunity to lead this committee and for laying out a compelling vision for how we can defend American interests and American sovereignty."

In a floor speech urging his colleagues to support the committee, Gallagher said the Committee will focus on reclaiming U.S. economic independence in key areas and on exposing the Chinese Communist Party's coordinated, whole-of-society strategy to undermine American leadership. He also stressed the importance of ensuring the Committee's work is bipartisan and that the committee draws a distinction between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people.

Click HERE to watch Gallagher's floor speech in full.

Click HERE to read an op-ed from Speaker McCarthy and Chairman Gallagher outlining their vision for the committee.

gallagher.house.gov · January 10, 2023

6. New US Congress agrees on one thing: China threat

Regarding bipartisan support, note that 65 Democrats voted against the Select Committee.

​Excerpts:

The National Defense Authorization Act passed in December made clear congressional concerns, likely warranting oversight hearings and other investigations, about buttressing US military capacities in the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative and a variety of other programs. Taiwan got special attention, given the growing and threatening Chinese military power.

Other likely congressional actions involve investigating and curbing Chinese espionage, penetration of US government high technology laboratories and advanced university facilities unauthorized activities of Chinese government security agents in the United States and covert and overt Chinese influence operations involving universities, media, think tanks and related public policy organizations.

The new leadership of the House of Representatives and its proposed China Select Committee promise opposition to Chinese purchases of US agricultural land and to Beijing’s involvement in the fentanyl epidemic plaguing America, as well as attention to ongoing issues of concern regarding supply-chain risks and deceptive trade practices.

The Republican leaders have avowed a strong interest in continued bipartisanship in dealing with China-related issues. It remains to be seen if Democrats will be permitted and will be willing to join the China Select Committee.

...

In sum, congressional-administration efforts to defend America from often very serious challenges and dangers posed by Chinese government behavior have momentum and will advance in 2023, reinforced by some initiatives by the Republican-led House of Representatives and distracted by others.

​

New US Congress agrees on one thing: China threat

Momentum of congressional-executive symbiosis seeking to defend US from Chinese challenges is stronger than ever and growing

asiatimes.com · by Robert Sutter · January 12, 2023

The dramatic display of factional politics and personal ambitions seen among Republicans in the selection of House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-California) marred the start of the 118th Congress. They reflected the realities of divisive domestic politics impacting US policy in recent years.

Despite this background, the resolve and momentum of bipartisan congressional majorities has grown over the past five years to be an enduring and driving force in defending America against dangers posed by China.

Continuity

Since 2018, Congress has become more important than ever in making US China policy, with a focus on defending America from wide-ranging and often very serious security, economic and governance challenges posed by the Chinese government

In this five-year period, Congress did not follow what had been common practice since Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972: resisting administration initiatives in relations with China.

Also in this five-year period, a past pattern of Congress competing with the administration for control of foreign policy was overshadowed by close symbiosis between bipartisan congressional majorities and a Republican and a Democratic president resisting China’s challenges.

Partisanship remained secondary as far as China policy was concerned. Congressional action against China was driven by the calculations of congressional members. They persevered despite little support and poor understanding of the need for such dramatic change from public opinion and media until 2020; they offset resistance from strong domestic interests.

The members were notably more resolved than President Trump and Democratic Party candidate Joseph Biden in countering China’s challenges.

US President Joe Biden wants more advanced semiconductors produced in America as part of his push to compete with China. Image: Twitter

Recent momentum

Entering office, President Biden soon put aside past ambivalence about Chinese dangers and brought his views in line with congressional majorities. He supported a US$1.2 trillion infrastructure bill, warning of China’s ambitions to dominate the fourth industrial revolution and advising, “We can’t let them win.”

The warning meshed well with Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer’s concurrent extraordinary legislation to advance American technology to counter China. Schumer said the alternative was a world where “the Chinese Communist Party determines the rules of the road.”

The infrastructure bill and another bill curbing US imports of products coming from “forced labor” in concentration camps in Xinjiang had bipartisan congressional support. Many provisions targeting China in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Consolidated Appropriation Act for FY 2022 added momentum.

The year 2022 was even more consequential. Just before the congressional recess in August, Schumer’s initiative, the $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act, became law supporting US competition with China in high technology industries and military forces dependent on high technology. Seventeen Republican senators and 24 Republican representatives voted for the bill.

Concurrently, Senate Democrats compromised differences allowing passage of a $369 billion climate change and tax package, called the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Though not supported by Republicans for reasons unrelated to China, the bill’s many provisions targeting China reflected bipartisan congressional preferences.

In October, the Biden government imposed sweeping export restrictions designed to hobble China’s ability to manufacture or acquire high-technology computer chips, helping to meet congressional concern about China’s advances in high technology threatening the United States.

Other measures explicitly defending America against Chinese threats that garnered general congressional approval were initiating and strengthening the Quad alignment of Australia, India and Japan with the United States; the AUKUS alliance involving Great Britain and Australia; the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) involving 13 regional governments; the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) led by the G7 countries; and the Blue Pacific Partners including regional powers, the United States and Great Britain focused on the Pacific Islands.

American policy toward Taiwan prompted strong debate for several weeks leading up to the visit of House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan on August 2 and over four days of provocative Chinese military shows of force surrounding the island.

The Biden government remained in step with Congress as it reacted with firm resolve, avoiding weakness in the face of Chinese pressure.

Then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (L) waving beside Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen last August. Photo: handout

Administration and congressional efforts to defend Taiwan went forward, creating circumstances that, along with other developments, appeared to prompt China to adopt a more positive posture toward the United States at and after the summit meeting of the two presidents on November 14.

The new Chinese posture included resumption of high-level China-US communications halted because of the Pelosi visit.

Administration-congressional differences over the requirements and wording of the Taiwan Policy Act introduced at this time were met by moderating the requirements and language and including the provisions in the broad-ranging National Defense Authorization Act passed at the end of the year.

China reacted to the bill with one day of unprecedented warplane activity around Taiwan – registering strong opposition without reversing Beijing’s new flexibility toward the Biden government.

Outlook for 2023

The momentum of congressional-executive symbiosis seeking to defend America from Chinese challenges is stronger than ever and growing, which argues for continuity in the coming year and more.

Possible challenges that may complicate but are unlikely to upset recent momentum include partisan attacks by the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives; weakened, but still important, influence of America First advocates in the Republican Party who seek to withdraw from costly international involvement; and as yet not evident growth in Chinese moderation leading to differences among US strategists on the strengths and weaknesses of China’s challenges and appropriate US responses.

Heading the list of current congressional priorities are oversight and implementation of recent initiatives. The large expenditures targeting China in the Chips and Science bill and the Inflation Reduction Act as well as the administration’s export curbs on high technology chips to China warrant careful oversight to ensure money is well spent, resulting innovations are not stolen by China and promised export curbs are not weakened by exceptions.

In addition, the Biden administration and congressional leaders seek to monitor and likely curb large-scale US investment in China. US portfolio investment was $368 billion up to the end of 2016 but was $781 billion over the next four years.

The National Defense Authorization Act passed in December made clear congressional concerns, likely warranting oversight hearings and other investigations, about buttressing US military capacities in the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative and a variety of other programs. Taiwan got special attention, given the growing and threatening Chinese military power.

Other likely congressional actions involve investigating and curbing Chinese espionage, penetration of US government high technology laboratories and advanced university facilities unauthorized activities of Chinese government security agents in the United States and covert and overt Chinese influence operations involving universities, media, think tanks and related public policy organizations.

The new leadership of the House of Representatives and its proposed China Select Committee promise opposition to Chinese purchases of US agricultural land and to Beijing’s involvement in the fentanyl epidemic plaguing America, as well as attention to ongoing issues of concern regarding supply-chain risks and deceptive trade practices.

The Republican leaders have avowed a strong interest in continued bipartisanship in dealing with China-related issues. It remains to be seen if Democrats will be permitted and will be willing to join the China Select Committee.

Offsetting bipartisanship are likely moves seen as partisan. For example, Republicans are expected to investigate the implications of the involvement of Biden’s son in past business deals with China.

To conclude, another avowed Select Committee priority is to investigate and highlight Chinese malfeasance in handling the initial outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan, with the chairman of the Committee believing that Covid emerged from a laboratory in Wuhan that had engaged in dangerous research and that was funded by the US government.

In sum, congressional-administration efforts to defend America from often very serious challenges and dangers posed by Chinese government behavior have momentum and will advance in 2023, reinforced by some initiatives by the Republican-led House of Representatives and distracted by others.

Robert Sutter (sutterr@gwu.edu), professor of practice of international affairs, George Washington University, served as lead China analyst and later director of the Foreign Affairs Division during 24 years with the Congressional Research Service.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · by Robert Sutter · January 12, 2023

7. 65 Dems vote against new China committee - who were they?

65 Dems vote against new China committee - who were they?

americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · January 11, 2023

Sixty-five Democrats were the only representatives to vote against forming a committee dedicated to China, rejecting a resolution that still overwhelmingly passed in the House of Representatives on Tuesday.

The motion to create a “Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party” passed 365-65, with 146 Democrats supporting joining the Republican-led effort, according to the House Clerk website.

Among the Democrats who voted against the committee are progressive “Squad” Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, and Ayanna Pressley. Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN), also a “Squad” member, broke with her longtime allies to vote in favor of the committee.

Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA) – who as a toddler immigrated from Taiwan, an island China claims as its own – also voted against forming the committee.

Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), a top Democrat who was until recently House Speaker, voted for the committee. Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA) – whose campaign operation was infiltrated by a Chinese spy, according to Axios – also voted in favor of it.

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) is set to chair the committee, which he has said will inform people of the CCP’s growing power and put forward ways to contain it amid a “new Cold War.” China has come to be considered a top rival superpower as U.S. concerns grow over its longstanding claim over Taiwan and the global influence of the authoritarian ruling party.

Being tougher on Beijing has the potential for broad bipartisan support in Washington, D.C., with lawmakers across the political spectrum calling for stiffer competition from the U.S., as reported by NBC News. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) said the committee’s work won’t be mired in U.S. political issues, The Hill reported.

“This is an issue that transcends political parties,” McCarthy said on the House floor Tuesday. “We want the very best ideas, and it doesn’t matter where they come from. … We’ll just need one philosophy, with one principle, and America will be stronger for the future to come.”

The resolution requires the committee to submit its policy recommendations by Dec. 31, 2023, and submit all its reports by Dec. 31, 2024.

Here’s a complete list of the 65 Democrats who voted against the committee:

• Rep. Becca Balint of Vermont
• Rep. Nanette Diaz Barragán of California
• Rep. Suzanne Bonamici of Oregon
• Rep. Jamaal Bowman of New York
• Rep. Shontel Brown of Ohio
• Rep. Cori Bush of Missouri
• Rep. Troy Carter of Louisiana
• Rep. Gregorio Casar of Texas
• Rep. Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick of Florida
• Rep. Judy Chu of California
• Rep. Yvette Clarke of New York
• Rep. Gerald Connolly of Virginia
• Rep. Jasmine Crockett of Texas
• Rep. Danny Davis of Illinois
• Rep. Diana DeGette of Colorado
• Rep. Mark DeSaulnier of California
• Rep. Veronica Escobar of Texas
• Rep. Dwight Evans of Pennsylvania
• Rep. Lois Frankel of Florida
• Rep. Maxwell Frost of Florida
• Rep. Jesús García of Illinois
• Rep. Robert Garcia of California
• Rep. Dan Goldman of New York
• Rep. Jimmy Gomez of California
• Rep. Jared Huffman of California
• Rep. Glenn Ivey of Maryland
• Rep. Jonathan Jackson of Illinois
• Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas
• Rep. Pramila Jayapal of Washington
• Rep. Henry Johnson of Georgia
• Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove of California
• Rep. Barbara Lee of California
• Rep. Summer Lee of Pennsylvania
• Rep. Ted Lieu of California
• Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California
• Rep. Doris Matsui of California
• Rep. Gregory Meeks of New York
• Rep. Grace Meng of New York
• Rep. Gwen Moore of Wisconsin
• Rep. Kevin Mullin of California
• Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York
• Rep. Richard Neal of Massachusetts
• Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York
• Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. of New Jersey
• Rep. Mark Pocan of Wisconsin
• Rep. Katie Porter of California
• Rep. Ayanna Pressley of Massachusetts
• Rep. Mike Quigley of Illinois
• Rep. Delia Ramirez of Illinois
• Rep. Deborah Ross of North Carolina
• Rep. Linda Sánchez of California
• Rep. John Sarbanes of Maryland
• Rep. Janice Schakowsky of Illinois
• Rep. Robert Scott of Virginia
• Rep. Melanie Stansbury of New Mexico
• Rep. Mark Takano of California
• Rep. Dina Titus of Nevada
• Rep. Rashida Tlaib of Michigan
• Rep. Jill Tokuda of Hawaii
• Rep. Paul Tonko of New York
• Rep. Lauren Underwood of Illinois
• Rep. Juan Vargas of California
• Rep. Nydia Velázquez of New York
• Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman of New Jersey
• Rep. Nikema Williams of Georgia

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americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · January 11, 2023

8. Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

defense.gov

Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi, and Minister of Defense Hamada (referred to collectively as "the Ministers") convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, D.C., on January 11, 2023.

Recognizing the convergence of their nations' new national security and defense strategies toward bolstering deterrence in an integrated manner, the Ministers provided a vision of a modernized Alliance postured to prevail in a new era of strategic competition.

The Ministers firmly reiterated their commitment to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific region, heralding the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone of regional peace, security, and prosperity. They resolved to advance bilateral modernization initiatives to build a more capable, integrated, and agile Alliance that bolsters deterrence and addresses evolving regional and global security challenges. The Ministers affirmed that the Alliance is stalwart in the face of these challenges and steadfast in support of shared values and norms that underpin the international rules-based order. They renewed their commitment to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo by force regardless of the location in the world.

The Ministers welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals. This forms a solid foundation for their efforts to constantly modernize the Alliance in order to address the increasingly severe security environment.

Japan reiterated its resolve, under its new strategies, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike, through a substantial increase of its defense budget. Japan also reaffirmed its determination to lead in its own defense and to expand its roles, in cooperation with the United States and other partners, to actively engage in maintaining regional peace and stability. The United States expressed its strong support for Japan's updated national security policies as a significant evolution that bolsters Alliance deterrence.

The United States expressed its determination to optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific, including in Japan, by forward-deploying more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities. Japan supported the U.S. plan to optimize its force posture and welcomed its strong commitment to maintain a robust presence in the region.

The United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. The Ministers held an in-depth discussion on U.S. extended deterrence for Japan, as well as on the recently released U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, and reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient, bolstered by Japan's capabilities. They reiterated both countries intend to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings.

In accordance with their new strategies, the Ministers decided to accelerate work on evolving Alliance roles and missions and to employ interoperable and advanced capabilities, to address current and future security challenges. The Ministers also resolved to jointly strengthen Alliance activities with allies and partners within and beyond the region.

A New Era of Strategic Competition

The Ministers concurred that China's foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order to its benefit and to employ China's growing political, economic, military, and technological power to that end. This behavior is of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community, and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to China's intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. The United States reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Ministers condemned China's dangerous and provocative military activities around Japan, including China's ballistic missile launches in August 2022, during which some missiles landed in waters near Japan's Sakishima Islands. They shared their continuing concerns regarding China's ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is also characterized by its lack of transparency.

They also reiterated their strong objections to China's unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for unimpeded lawful commerce and full respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. In this context, they recalled with emphasis that the July 12, 2016, Award in the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China), constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), is final and legally binding on the parties to that proceeding. They confirmed, also in this context, that they will work together closely to address non-market policies and practices as well as economic coercion. The Ministers stated that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community. They encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. They expressed serious concerns about the state of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms as well as human rights issues, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Ministers strongly condemned North Korea's unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year, including of multiple intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class missiles, and of the ballistic missile that overflew Japan. They expressed strong concern over North Korea's stated policy to enhance its nuclear arsenal at maximum speed, both in quality and quantity, and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. The Ministers urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and confirmed the need for an immediate resolution of the abductions issue. The Ministers also committed to deepen cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, which is critical to addressing the grave threat North Korea presents and to promoting security, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. They recognized that Russia's violation of the UN Charter and its attempts to unilaterally change borders by force, including through its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, present a serious security threat for the European region and shake the foundation of the international order. The Ministers condemned Russia's reckless nuclear rhetoric and its attacks against civilian infrastructure, and they reiterated the need for Russia to be held accountable for its atrocities in Ukraine. The Ministers also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with China, including through joint operations and drills in the vicinity of Japan.

Modernizing the Alliance

In light of evolving Alliance roles and missions, and enhancing interoperable capabilities to meet the aforementioned security challenges, the Ministers decided to accelerate their consultations, including on the following areas:

1. Alliance Coordination
2. The Ministers reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. In this context, the United States welcomed Japan's decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters. They committed to exploring more effective Alliance command and control relationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness. The Ministers also shared the need to improve effective coordination with partner countries for more robust policy and operational cooperation.
3. Allied Efforts in Peacetime
4. The Ministers underscored the critical importance of joint efforts in peacetime to deter an armed attack against Japan and destabilizing activities in the region. They decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options. They welcomed the U.S. deployment of MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles to Kanoya Air Base and the launch of the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell to increase intelligence sharing. In order to maximize the effects of these efforts, they decided to further expand their cooperation in the field of asset protection missions, broader engagement of partners, and strategic messaging. They welcomed the joint/shared use of additional facilities on Kadena Ammunition Storage Area by JSDF. They also committed to expand joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and to increase bilateral exercises and training in areas including Japan's Southwest Islands.
5. 
   
6. The Ministers stressed the importance of flexible use of air and seaports to ensure the resiliency of defense assets and their operational effectiveness in a contingency. Accordingly, they decided to work together through exercises and planning to enable such use.
7. Allied Capability to Deter and Respond
8. The Ministers concurred that Alliance efforts, consistent with new strategy documents, should focus on mission areas such as integrated air and missile defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious and airborne operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT), logistics, and mobility. They decided to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective employment of Japan's counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States. The Ministers welcomed the steady progress on bilateral planning for contingencies as well as on realistic training and exercises such as Keen Sword 23, Resolute Dragon 22, Orient Shield 22, and MV-22 low altitude training.
9. 
   
10. The Ministers underscored the critical importance of strengthened cross-domain capabilities, particularly integrating the land, maritime, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains.
11. Space, Cyber, and Information Security
12. Recognizing the growing importance of outer space to the peace, security and prosperity of the Alliance, the Ministers renewed their commitment to deepening cooperation on space capabilities to strengthen mission assurance, interoperability, and operational cooperation, including through enhanced collaboration in space domain awareness after the operationalization of Japan's Space Situational Awareness system scheduled in 2023.
13. 
    
14. The Ministers consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Ministers also affirmed that a decision as to when such an attack would lead to an invocation of Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.
15. 
    
16. The Ministers emphasized the foundational importance of cybersecurity and information security for the Alliance. They welcomed the establishment of JSDF Cyber Defense Command in March 2022, and concurred to intensify collaboration to counter increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats. The United States welcomed Japan's initiatives to bolster its national cybersecurity posture such as the creation of a new organization to coordinate whole-of-government cybersecurity policies, and the introduction of a risk management framework, which would provide a foundation for a wider range of U.S.-Japan cooperation. The Ministers welcomed progress in strengthening industrial cybersecurity, including Japan's efforts to establish the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry. Lastly, the Ministers highlighted important progress made so far under the bilateral information security consultations.
17. Maintaining the Technological Edge
18. Emphasizing the importance of integrating technological developments into Alliance capabilities, the Ministers committed to bolster technology cooperation and joint investments in emerging technologies to further sharpen the competitive edge of the Alliance. The Ministers also emphasized that resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains of defense equipment are essential to ensure national security.
19. 
    
20. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects and the Security of Supply Arrangement as well as the substantial progress on the Reciprocal Government Quality Assurance.
21. 
    
22. With these achievements as well as steady progress on defense science and technology cooperation, including discussions on joint research projects on high-power microwaves and autonomous systems, the Ministers concurred to further promote their efforts toward joint research and development of defense equipment. Based on the progress of joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology, the Ministers concurred to begin joint research on important elements including advanced materials and hypersonic testbeds. The Ministers also concurred to begin discussion on potential joint development of a future interceptor. The Ministers also shared the importance of deepening technological cooperation with like-minded allies and partners, which complements bilateral efforts.

Expanding Alliance Partnerships

The Ministers renewed their commitment to further advance their partnership with Australia by building on outcomes from the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in August 2022 and Trilateral Defense Ministers Meeting in June and October 2022 and by taking advantage of the expanding activities under the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed in October 2022. In this context, they highlighted the successful completion of the first coordinated asset protection mission among the three countries in November 2022. They also expressed their determination to increase trilateral training and exercises to enhance interoperability, including on ISR, as well as to explore opportunities for technological cooperation. In this context, they reaffirmed the importance of increasing trilateral training opportunities including in northern Australia, based on the Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations issued in December 2022. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to supporting quality, transparent infrastructure development that addresses the needs of Indo-Pacific partners and welcomed the renewal of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership MOU with Australia.

The Ministers also emphasized the importance of further deepening their cooperation with the Republic of Korea and exploring opportunities for multilateral and trilateral exercises and other activities, including in areas such as ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, maritime security, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

The Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. They acknowledged the importance of further promoting economic and security cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries through such activities as joint training, capacity building, and potential transfers of defense equipment. The Ministers welcomed further cooperation under the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which will support the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of the Quad, which has made positive contributions to the region through promoting practical cooperation in various fields.

Noting that likeminded nations are facing similar, and mutually-reinforcing threats to the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, the Ministers welcomed greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific by Euro-Atlantic partners—both bilaterally and through multilateral entities such as NATO and the EU. They expressed support for expanded exercises and deployments, facilitated by Japan's new bilateral agreements including forthcoming Reciprocal Access Agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom. The United States endorsed Japan's efforts to finalize its NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Program, and welcomed Japan's enhanced emphasis on European security through its provision of assistance to Ukraine. The United States likewise hailed Japan's increased cooperation with NATO, and Japan's leadership role in NATO's Asia Pacific partners' group. From this perspective, the United States welcomed Prime Minister Kishida's attendance at the NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022—the first time a Japanese Prime Minister has participated in a NATO Summit.

Optimizing Alliance Posture

The Ministers affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan.

Facing a severely contested environment, they confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities.

In line with such policy, the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa. The 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, and confirmed that these readjustments do not affect the lands scheduled to be returned in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, nor continued progress for the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to achieve an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap as revised in 2012.

The Ministers also confirmed that these readjustments do not require any changes to Japan's cash contribution and construction projects based upon the amended Guam International Agreement.

To further strengthen Alliance maritime mobility in Japan, the Ministers welcomed the establishment of the Composite Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock scheduled in 2023.

The Ministers affirmed that these initiatives demonstrate the steadfast commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan and share the same direction with Japan's fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. They confirmed that the optimized posture of the U.S. forces in Japan, with enhanced JSDF capabilities and posture in areas including the Southwestern Islands, would substantially strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.

The Ministers decided to continue close consultation on these initiatives and ways to further optimize U.S. force posture in Japan.

The Ministers also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities. The Ministers underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The Ministers welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the SDF facility on Mageshima, which will be used for purposes including Field Carrier Landing Practice. They confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Ministers affirmed the importance of continued bilateral coordination for sharing timely information on incidents and accidents, enhancing environmental cooperation, as well as mitigating impacts on, and supporting strong relationships with, local communities while communicating with them about the importance of Alliance activities.

defense.gov

9. Opinion | Japan’s prime minister warns of a historic — and dangerous —moment in Asia

When will America ever pivot to Asia?

Excerpt:

“I would like to ask the American people to be more interested and to be engaged in the Indo-Pacific region,” the prime minister told me. “And I’m convinced by doing so, that would ensure the peace and prosperity of this region.”

Opinion | Japan’s prime minister warns of a historic — and dangerous —moment in Asia

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · January 11, 2023

TOKYO — As fears of war grow in East Asia, the United States’ chief Pacific ally, Japan, is moving away from decades of self-imposed restraint and launching its largest military buildup since World War II. As regional tensions increase, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is urging the United States to grasp the urgency and gravity of this historic but dangerous moment.

“The global security environment is going through a major change,” Kishida told me in a long interview in his official residence just before departing for a five-country tour that will end with him meeting President Biden at the White House on Friday. “Japan has made a major, huge decision to strengthen our defensive capability. And for that purpose, we also wish to deepen the bilateral cooperation with the United States even further.”

Emerging from three years of covid isolation, Japan confronts a neighborhood where China and North Korea are expanding their military arsenals and advancing their missile capabilities, the prime minister told me. Adm. John C. Aquilino, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has described Beijing’s expanding armament as “the largest military buildup in history.” North Korea fired more than 90 cruise and ballistic missiles in 2022, often sending Japanese citizens scrambling for cover.

In December, Kishida’s government completed the rewriting of three core documents that make up Japan’s national security strategy. For the first time since 1976, Japan will no longer limit its defense spending to 1 percent of gross domestic product. Under the accompanying five-year defense budget plan, Japan is now set to nearly double its defense outlay to 2 percent of GDP by 2027. This would make Japan’s military budget the world’s third largest, behind only the United States and China.

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The objective is to raise deterrence against China and North Korea, in the hopes of stopping leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang from contemplating the use of violent aggression of the kind Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed in Ukraine.

“This was a major a decision that we had to make,” Kishida said. “We have had to question whether we will be able to defend the lives, the livelihood and the industry of the Japanese people and the country.”

Japan had previously pursued a conciliatory policy toward Russia, hoping to resolve long-lingering territorial disputes. Yet after Moscow’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, Kishida has completely reversed that approach; Japan is now the Asian country most supportive of Ukraine. Russia’s unprovoked attack and nuclear threats should send a warning to those facing the growing aggressiveness of dictatorships in Asia, the prime minister told me.

“Ukraine today may be Asia tomorrow,” Kishida said. “Unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force are not acceptable.”

Although it is not explicitly stated in the strategy documents, Tokyo’s primary concern is a possible attack by China on Taiwan. Japan’s military reorganization shifts resources toward Japan’s southwest islands, near Taiwan. The Japanese military reform is focused not on buying lots of ships or planes, but rather on getting Japan’s already large Self-Defense Forces (Tokyo’s name for its armed forces) ready to fight in a Taiwan-related scenario.

Kishida emphasized the importance he places on peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait directly to Chinese President Xi Jinping in their November meeting in Bangkok. In his meeting with me, Kishida said that “the peace and stability of Taiwan are also extremely important for the global community.”

U.S. Ambassador Rahm Emanuel told me that the Biden administration is helping Japan modernize and integrate with the U.S. military, boosting cooperation on the coast guard, cyberwarfare, space and undersea security. Washington and Tokyo are also pursuing more sophisticated coordination on economic security, in part by moving supply chains and onshoring critical manufacturing to ensure China can’t use its economic power to pressure democracies. Many in the region vividly recall how Beijing used its monopoly on critical public health supplies to blackmail other countries during the pandemic.

“Covid, coercion and conflict have all made everybody reassess their assumptions,” Emanuel said.

Japan is attempting to build up its diplomatic role along with that of its military. Kishida is hosting the Group of Seven Summit in May in his hometown of Hiroshima, where many of his own family members died in the United States’ nuclear attack there in August 1945. He is visiting five of the G-7 capitals this week to prepare for the summit.

When Kishida and Biden meet in Washington on Friday, they will likely discuss the plan for Japan to become only the second U.S. ally (after the United Kingdom) to be sold Tomahawk cruise missiles, which will give Japan the ability to strike ground targets. Tokyo intentionally avoided acquiring this “counterstrike” or “standoff” capability for decades — but no more.

Speaking with Japanese officials and experts in Tokyo, I repeatedly heard a solemn acknowledgment that Japan is sacrificing some of the soft power that came from its identity as a country that voluntarily gave up the ability to wage offensive war. But most Japanese genuinely fear that if China, Russia and North Korea are not shown a serious response to their escalating antagonism, conflict will come to Asia.

“Unfortunately, it’s an arms race,” said Yoichi Funabashi, founder of the Asia Pacific Initiative, part of the International House of Japan, a Tokyo think tank. “But, if you cannot acquire sufficient deterrence, you will end up paying more in the long run when the deterrence fails.”

There is irony in that Kishida, the leader of the more dovish wing of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, is in power at the moment Japan emerges from its pacifist postwar stance. In fact, his liberal bona fides likely account for the lack of significant domestic opposition to these plans, which were set in motion by hawkish former prime minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated last July.

“The reality is that the leader of a country cannot choose the era in which the person takes that leadership position,” Kishida told me.

Japan has concluded that preparing for conflict is the only way to maximize the chance to avoid it. As a neighbor of both Russia and China, it doesn’t have the luxury of choosing to focus only on Europe or Asia. From Tokyo’s perspective, the fates of the two sides of the globe are interconnected and inseparable.

The biggest open question in Tokyo is this: Can a worried Japan count on a distracted and divided United States to increase its focus on Asia while preoccupied with a war in Europe? The truth is that nobody knows. But Japan has now bet its future on the hope that the United States will rise to stand beside it.

“I would like to ask the American people to be more interested and to be engaged in the Indo-Pacific region,” the prime minister told me. “And I’m convinced by doing so, that would ensure the peace and prosperity of this region.”

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · January 11, 2023

10. Japan’s Shift to War Footing

Conclusion​:

These steps appear to be the beginning, not the end, of a series of initiatives intended to bolster deterrence by enhancing U.S.-Japan posture and capabilities. Expected announcements on efforts with the Philippines, Australia, and others hold the promise of what Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner called “the biggest year for posture in a generation.” There is much more work to be done to implement these reforms, but this is notable progress and deserves to be commended.

This broader regional framework reinforces the point that changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance are not happening in a vacuum. South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and others are tightening ties with the United States in response to China’s more assertive behavior. These efforts will have to be closely coordinated to reinforce one another. Yet there are real opportunities to include third parties in this new approach, as is occurring with Japan and the United States conducting training in Northern Australia.

If Japan can boost its defense spending, modernize its command-and-control arrangements, and upgrade its defense posture, that would set Tokyo on a major new path. Washington should welcome Kishida’s bold vision and robust contribution to regional security. Japan’s transition from pacifism to regional protector is not yet complete, but there is now no denying it is well underway.

Japan’s Shift to War Footing - War on the Rocks

ZACK COOPER AND ERIC SAYERS

warontherocks.com · by Zack Cooper · January 12, 2023

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Japan focused on the threat from the Soviet Union, but with tensions increasing around Taiwan, Tokyo has turned to its south, adopting principles that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed for before his death.

This week’s events are the latest in this trend, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington marks a significant change in the U.S.-Japan alliance. For the first time in decades, Tokyo and Washington are seriously preparing for the possibility of a major conflict in the near term. As Japan’s new National Security Strategy warns: “The possibility cannot be precluded that a serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia.” Yesterday, alliance leaders announced a set of defense posture changes, updated command relationships, and new training arrangements. In short, the U.S.-Japan alliance is shifting to a war footing.

It might seem obvious that Japan and the United States should be preparing to fight a war in the Indo-Pacific region. After all, the allies face mounting challenges from three nuclear-armed adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. Over the last decade, the United States and Japan have responded by slowly but deliberately reinforcing military capabilities to deter conflict. But President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and General Secretary Xi Jinping’s growing pressure on Taiwan have reminded leaders in Tokyo and Washington that even carefully crafted deterrence efforts can fail, and the consequences can be dire. A more robust set of responses in the face of new uncertainty has become necessary.

America’s Top Ally in Asia

Japan is in a unique position to deter regional conflict. Tokyo commands the world’s third-largest economy, has been gradually increasing defense spending in recent years, and took major steps to modernize its alliance with the United States under Abe’s leadership. Japan is also home to more U.S. troops than any other country in the world. And Japanese leaders have been stepping up their contributions on a wide range of issues, from penalizing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and providing aid to Kyiv to cooperating on semiconductor supply chains and supporting the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Become a Member

Experts have rightly noted that this is not a revolutionary rejection of pacifism but rather a more modest set of evolutionary changes in Japanese security policy. Indeed, major elements of Abe’s transformational agenda remained unaccomplished at the time of his assassination last year. But many of the limits introduced by Japan’s pacifist constitution and history are now being relaxed or adjusted. Japan’s increased defense spending and adoption of counterstrike capabilities are just two examples of the shift that is occurring under Kishida’s leadership.

Indeed, Japan’s preparation for conflict has heretofore lagged that of America’s other top allies. South Korea and the United States have a combined command and experience responding together to frequent provocations from North Korea. Australia has fought alongside America in every major conflict in the last century. And the NATO allies are facing war on their doorstep; fought together in Afghanistan; and were active in the Balkans conflicts after the end of the Cold War. The U.S.-Japanese alliance, by comparison, has some catching up if it is to be fully prepared for a major contingency.

This week therefore marks the beginning of a major — and remarkably rapid — shift in Japan’s approach. Some of the details have already been announced by the Security Consultative Committee, the bilateral meeting of defense and foreign ministers/secretaries known colloquially as a 2+2 Meeting. These announcements show that three major transformations are underway simultaneously: 1) a defense spending surge in Tokyo, 2) reimagined command relationships, and 3) substantial posture and capability changes. Each is important on their own, but together they amount to a wholesale change in the U.S.-Japan alliance’s approach to deterrence and warfighting.

An Ambitious Agenda

First, Japan is increasing its defense spending and building the military stockpiles demanded by modern warfighting. For decades, Japanese defense spending has been stuck at or under 1 percent of its gross domestic product. Now Kishida is looking to nearly double defense spending to 2 percent over five years. If fully executed, this would bump Japan from the ninth-largest spender on defense to the third largest, after only the United States and China.

Of course, there are real challenges to increasing defense spending. The Japanese public will have to be convinced to pay more in taxes, and the details are still being debated in the Diet. Moreover, new capabilities cannot be acquired overnight. As the United States is learning in Ukraine, stockpiles can only be refilled slowly given the limited industrial capacity for many key weapons systems. New missiles, such as Tomahawks or an upgraded version of Japan’s indigenous Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, will take years to be delivered. This will therefore require close cooperation not only between governments but allied defense industries as well.

Second, the United States and Japan are both updating their command-and-control arrangements. Tokyo has announced that it will create a permanent joint headquarters in Japan to command the Japanese Self-Defense Forces during a crisis. If fully implemented, this would give Japan its own version of a combatant command and simplify its coordination with U.S. forces in a major contingency. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has required establishment of a new joint force headquarters in the Indo-Pacific to do the same for American military forces.

These changes will, of course, take time. But once in place they will provide the U.S.-Japan alliance the beginnings of an architecture needed for wartime command and control. Unlike the NATO or the U.S.-South Korea military alliance, Washington and Tokyo have never had a truly combined command structure. This was evident during Operation Tomodachi in 2011, when the allies initially struggled to respond to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. Establishing joint headquarters should be a first step, ultimately toward a joint and combined command that will be capable of allied wartime command and control, even in the most stressing scenarios.

Third, the allies are adjusting their military posture by shifting more capabilities to Japan’s Southwest Islands, a critical geographic region that stretches from mainland Japan south to just 100 miles off the coast of Taiwan. Throughout the Cold War, Japan focused more on the Soviet Union in the north, before turning primarily to North Korea in the east during the post-Cold War period. As a result, China in the south had not been a top priority until this past decade. Today, the prospects of a serious conflict over Taiwan are growing, forcing the allies to fundamentally shift their approach. With this in mind, the allies are announcing a major step: the creation of a U.S. Marine Littoral Regiment in Okinawa, which will be operational by 2025.

This unit will be capable of conducting sea denial operations since it includes both an infantry battalion and an anti-ship missile battery armed with the Marine Corps medium-range NMESIS launcher. Such a unit will likely operate from Okinawa but will also be present around Ishigaki, Yonaguni, and Miyako as well, providing new capabilities close to the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. Army will also play a role by relocating watercraft to enable a variety of operations in and around Japan. There is also the possibility of increased training and exercises of allied forces in Japan’s Southwest Islands. All these steps will send a clear signal to China that the Washington and Tokyo are routinely upgraded their alliance for a contingency, including one in the waters around Taiwan.

Conclusion

These steps appear to be the beginning, not the end, of a series of initiatives intended to bolster deterrence by enhancing U.S.-Japan posture and capabilities. Expected announcements on efforts with the Philippines, Australia, and others hold the promise of what Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner called “the biggest year for posture in a generation.” There is much more work to be done to implement these reforms, but this is notable progress and deserves to be commended.

This broader regional framework reinforces the point that changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance are not happening in a vacuum. South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and others are tightening ties with the United States in response to China’s more assertive behavior. These efforts will have to be closely coordinated to reinforce one another. Yet there are real opportunities to include third parties in this new approach, as is occurring with Japan and the United States conducting training in Northern Australia.

If Japan can boost its defense spending, modernize its command-and-control arrangements, and upgrade its defense posture, that would set Tokyo on a major new path. Washington should welcome Kishida’s bold vision and robust contribution to regional security. Japan’s transition from pacifism to regional protector is not yet complete, but there is now no denying it is well underway.

Become a Member

Zack Cooper is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a partner at Armitage International. He hosts the Net Assessment podcast for War on the Rocks and previously served in various roles at the Pentagon and White House.

Eric Sayers is a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a managing director at Beacon Global Strategies. He previously was a special assistant to the commander of Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Zack Cooper · January 12, 2023

11. Russia names Valery Gerasimov new commander of Ukraine invasion

Russia names Valery Gerasimov new commander of Ukraine invasion

Axios · by Jacob Knutson · January 11, 2023

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced Wednesday that Valery Gerasimov, head of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, is taking over as the commander of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Why it matters: Gerasimov replaces General Sergei Surovikin, who was appointed to the post just three months ago. Surovikin has been demoted to one of Gerasimov's deputies.

What they're saying: The ministry said in a statement that Gerasimov's promotion was in part to address the "need to organize closer interaction between the branches and arms of the Armed Forces" and improve the support and effectiveness of "command and control of groupings of troops."

• The U.K.'s Defence Ministry said in an intelligence update on Wednesday that Gerasimov assuming the position "is a significant development in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approach to managing the war."
• "The move is likely to be greeted with extreme displeasure by much of the Russian ultra-nationalist and military blogger community, who have increasingly blamed Gerasimov for the poor execution of the war," the update reads.
• "In contrast, Surovikin has been widely praised by this community for his championing of a more realistic approach. As a now deputy commander, his authority and influence is almost certainly hugely reduced."

The big picture: Surovikin was appointed Russia's commander in Ukraine in October after Russian forces faced several setbacks in the war.

• But those setbacks largely continued under Surovikin's leadership. In November, Russian forces withdrew from Kherson, the only provincial capital its military captured since invading Ukraine.

State of play: Russian forces and fighters with a private Russian mercenary group known as the Wagner Group are locked in an intense battle over the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

• U.S. officials said last month they believe a power struggle may be emerging between the Russian military and the Wagner Group over influence with the Kremlin.

Editor's note: This story has been updated with the U.K.'s Defence Ministry intelligence update.

Axios · by Jacob Knutson · January 11, 2023

12. Discussing "leadership" around "information warfare" with Asha Rangappa, plus other stuff

One of the key messages I always receive from Matt Armstrong when we discuss political warfare, information warfare, and influence operations is that we are only successful in these areas when we have national level leadership driving thse activities and asupporting the organizations with respsobility for executing them

An hour long video at the link: https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/discussing-leadership-around-information?isFreemail=true&publication_id=773227&utm_source=pocket_reader

Discussing "leadership" around "information warfare" with Asha Rangappa, plus other stuff

Including: if GEC becomes a bureau, what of R?

mountainrunner.substack.com · by Matt Armstrong

While most of my posts focus on a single topic, this one features multiple items.

Last month,

Asha Rangappa

invited me to speak to her virtual class under the banner “Why Can't the U.S. Get Its Act Together When It Comes to Information Warfare?” We recorded the live event with her subscribers on 20 December 2022 but my holiday schedule with family coming to Switzerland for Christmas and other requirements (like my PhD) means I’m just now posting this.

The discussion was part of an end-of-the-year theme, at least for me. On 6 December 2022, I participated in a plenary panel discussion, “What is Strategic Influence?” to open a Joint Special Operations University event entitled “Future of SOF Forum: Strategic Influence and Communication Paradigms in a Compound Security Environment.”* On 14 December, I participated in an Information Professionals Association podcast with my co-author Chris Paul to discuss issues that brought about and surrounding our article, The Irony of Misinformation: USIA Myths Block Enduring Solutions, which I posted here last week.

Combined with the desperate and ill-informed calls to “bring back USIA,” it is good the broad community is seeking knowledge, it’s just unfortunate that it’s 2023, and we’re still trying to figure out why and how we should organize to do something. Well, while the best time to plant a tree is yesterday, the second best time is today. Then again, it looks like we’re planning for maybe tomorrow.

Back to the conversation with Asha. The basic outline of our discussion went like this:

Some discussion on terms, like comparing Information warfare to political warfare, describing political warfare and disinformation.

There was some discussion about the bureaucracy of foreign policy as it relates to this subject, followed by the idea of a strategy. Some people strive for a big-s strategy, like something that is clear and defined. I’d be happy with a vision and direction, which I call the little-s strategy. We don’t have either by the way. (At some point, I should post the big-s strategy I proposed for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, now the US Agency for Global Media, when I was on the board and why, though it had apparent broad support, it never moved.)

There was also some discussion about the lack of oversight and broad attention to these issues, an issue that needs more attention. Asha highlighted this in her description of the video, noting that I said, “we had it more together — at least in terms of congressional attention and public awareness” in the past. That past, by the way, that I referred to was the mid-1940s through the early 1960s.

Audience questions took us into domestic issues, which is not my focus. Regardless, I still opined. Political actors and disinformation entrepreneurs inside and outside the country have found these political warfare tactics to be politically expedient, effective, and financially rewarding.

Have a watch or listen and share your comments. I’d like to hear them, even if (especially if) it’s a critique or pushback on something I said.

Share

The Congressional Research Service just released a two-pager called What is “Political Warfare”? Leaving aside what I feel is an obligatory recitation of Kennan, I appreciate this paragraph:

Popular terms used to describe this phenomenon in the current international security environment include strategic competition and gray zone competition or conflict. Yet political warfare, according to some scholars, is not mere rivalry or competition but is also a form of war: its objective, like that of every other form of war, is to impose one’s own will on the opponent in order to achieve strategic objectives, to conquer and destroy the opponent’s will to resist.

This paragraph echoes what I’ve been saying for the past year. I said something similar to the first sentence in my Congressional testimony this summer. The second sentence is a direct reference to my preferred definition, or perhaps “description of” is better, I’ve shared many times over the past few years, including in my testimony this summer and several times in discussions around this topic on a listserv where one of the authors is also a member (and whom I know and have talked with over the years). That said, I can’t say I’m one of the “some scholars,” though it’s nice to think I am.

I’ve heard rumors the Global Engagement Center (GEC) at the State Department may be elevated to a bureau. Whether this means it’ll be renamed the Bureau of Global Engagement or something else is to be determined and only somewhat relevant. Leaving that aside, a change may have something to do with the appointment (finally) of someone to head of GEC: James Rubin. What then of GEC? Will it be a coordinating hub? An operational office? A policy and planning shop? All the above or some combination? If so, how will the matter of operational management and coordination across the State Department and the inter-agency be managed? A directive from the President or Secretary of State (S) will only go so far as to kick-start a process and is no substitute for actively supporting and holding the necessary coordination, collaboration, integration, and accountability.

If GEC does become a bureau, does the “Special Envoy and Coordinator” position leading GEC to become an Assistant Secretary position (which requires a Senate confirmation)? This will put the A/S for GEC on equal footing with the A/S’s of the regional bureaus, but still below the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P).

What of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R), an office without a confirmed appointee this entire administration and 45% of the days since the position was first occupied in October 1999? Will GEC remain under R, which it is nominally now? For the bureaucratic umph (aka “firepower”) within the department and across the inter-agency, an Under Secretary would be preferred. I’ve long argued that the best solution to our leadership challenges in “information warfare” is to fix R, even if it is destroying and rebuilding it, which I mentioned in the IPA podcast.

Or will GEC move to P, my second recommendation for the “public diplomacy” leadership, as the stand-alone leadership under R has gone nowhere for over two decades? Just integrate the darn thing with the running of foreign policy. This would place GEC alongside and with the same boss as the regional bureaus. The remnants of R are just that. The pillaging of the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) by the Bureau of Public Affairs, an office that has never truly reported to R but notionally under it, to form the Bureau of Global Public Affairs means R has little under it now. Yes, there is the policy & planning shop, but that could go with GEC. There’s also the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), but long ago ECA declared independence of R. (IIP, by the way, was the largest rump of USIA when you exclude BBG’s capital costs. IIP was a massive operation functioning globally, but it slowly atrophied though several leaders unintentionally accelerated its irrelevance and destruction.

If GEC stays under R, will we see the appointment of an actually qualified person to the position and not “hey, this person created an international tv network” or “this person produced news programs” or “this person was an editor of a US magazine” or “this person ran a political convention well” or “this person sold me Uncle Ben’s rice”?

If R is remade – I can’t make any reference to being “reborn” or “like a phoenix” as that would imply some glorious past to be recalled, which doesn’t apply to this office save a few exceptions that prove the rule – then how long will that last? Will S (the Secretary of State) actually and actively support R in battles that will happen with P and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources (formerly M, is it still M?… basically the COO), not to mention with the NSC and inter-agency partners, which is broader than “merely” the Defense Department (DOD) and the intelligence community (IC)?

I don’t know what we will see as a new org chart. What “it” is, and whether the new box is a coordinating office (aka whip or perhaps czar), an operational entity (the worst idea, in my opinion, as it encourages a “not my job” reaction by others), some hybrid, or something else, success will wholly depend on the visible support of POTUS and S of the model, including holding offices and people accountable, in the days and months and years after the tree is planted. Fundamentally, we don’t have an organizational problem, we have a leadership problem. We shall see. Too many hope that just making a new box will magically manifest a strategy and leadership, but hope isn’t a strategy.

Lastly, I found this interesting: The Filing Cabinet: A Vertical History of Information.

That’s it for now. What are your thoughts on any of this?

*I’m not aware of a publicly available video for this, nor do I expect one to be available, especially since my short presentation before the discussion included showing the UNICEF-sponsored video about carpet bombing smurfs. This event may be the first time I spoke to a nearly exclusively SOF conference since I showed the same video as a wrap-up speaker for an event put on by SOCCENT about 14 years ago, so it may be my last time before a SOF audience for at least a dozen years.

mountainrunner.substack.com · by Matt Armstrong

13. What Does It Mean to Provide ‘Security Guarantees’ to Ukraine?

Excerpts:

Even now, individual NATO countries refuse to send troops to aid Ukraine militarily, so why would they do so in the future? he asked.

One could imagine a settlement now where Ukraine loses part of its territory, and a later Kyiv government provokes Russia in order to get it back and then seeks to drag these guarantors into a conflict. What would they do then?

“Even if Ukraine gains NATO membership, it’s a defensive alliance and comes with restraints,” Mr. Stefanini said.

Still, he said, it would be a mistake to underestimate the cynical creativity of diplomats. One could arrive at a point where negotiations produce a commitment for Ukrainian neutrality, but not disarmament, with language about security guarantees, “even if anyone not a politician would call them unrealistic,” he said.

He made the comparison to the Dayton Accords that concluded the Bosnian war, “an awkward acrobatic architecture that only served to end the war.” Even this war will end, he said, and probably in negotiations.

“Total victory for anyone seems unlikely,” he said. So at some point, the diplomats will have to get creative, providing Ukraine some solid prospect of peace and security somehow underwritten by its allies.

What Does It Mean to Provide ‘Security Guarantees’ to Ukraine?

nytimes.com · by Steven Erlanger · January 10, 2023

A postwar Ukraine will want to ensure that Russia does not attack again. But is there anything short of full NATO membership that will satisfy Kyiv and deter Moscow?

Ukrainian soldiers heading to the front line in the Donetsk region of Ukraine last month. Without some form of security guarantee for Ukraine after the war, experts say, it is hard to imagine the country will be able to rebuild and avoid future conflicts.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

BRUSSELS — One day the war in Ukraine will be over. How and when remain the field of prophecy. But one of the most important questions will be how to ensure the future security of Ukraine — and by whom.

The possible answers are not easy and will depend on the outcome of the war. But what seems clear is that short of a Russian collapse and defeat, with Ukraine winning back all of its territory, any security guarantees are likely to be both partial and fragile.

But without something, officials and analysts suggest, it is hard to imagine investors pouring back into Ukraine to rebuild the country — or that another war would not flare in the future.

Much pivots on the hesitancy of the West itself, which wants to protect Ukraine but has shown that it does not want to fight for it, and that it does not want a direct military confrontation with Russia. Instead it has sought to thread a course between deterring Russia but not provoking it.

There will be “a lot of risks around the corner for European and trans-Atlantic unity,” said Nathalie Tocci, director of the Institute for International Affairs in Rome. If Ukraine manages to regain even the territory lost since Russia’s invasion last year, she said, then there would be mounting voices in Europe and Washington saying, “Look at the ongoing costs, civilian and military — hey, compromise.”

But Ukraine will want solid security commitments in return, she said, and that could divide the West — with Central and Eastern European countries demanding NATO membership for Ukraine, and Western European allies refusing.

While NATO and the European Union have promised Ukraine membership, there is no deadline, and it is not certain those pledges will be fulfilled. The West’s embrace of Ukraine was one reason cited by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for his invasion in the first place.

As long as territorial disputes remain, there is little likelihood that even a Ukraine in some sort of cease-fire agreement with Russia would win the unanimous support needed to join either institution.

How the war ends will be crucial, said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, who helped write a paper detailing the knotty issues involved in Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Even before last year’s invasion, he noted, Ukraine’s sovereignty was already compromised by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The neatest outcome now would be if Ukraine won back all of its lost territory, though that is far from certain.

The State of the War

• Battling for Bakhmut: Ukraine and Russia are going toe to toe in the key eastern city. That stands in contrast to Ukraine’s strategy elsewhere along the front line, where it succeeded by avoiding direct confrontations.
• New Equipment: The Western allies’ provision to Ukraine of infantry fighting vehicles signals their support for new offensives in coming months.
• Sexual Crimes: After months of bureaucratic and political delays, Ukrainian officials are gathering pace in documenting sexual crimes committed by Russian forces during the war.
• Adapting to Survive: The war has taken a severe toll on Ukraine’s economy. But it has also pushed Ukrainians to restructure parts of the economy at lightning speed.

“If it’s a complete Russian defeat, then you solve the Crimea problem and you have a different Russia,” he said. NATO membership would then be easier to envision for Ukraine and it would create a kind of untouchability, even by another revisionist Russian leader, he said. “But the price to get to total victory is very high, and then what?”

The prospect of a complete defeat of Russia, which could undermine Mr. Putin and his circle, embodies risks of Russian escalation that many NATO country leaders, including President Biden, seem unwilling to hazard.

Should Mr. Putin’s leadership collapse, key European states like France and Germany worry about what a chaotic, nuclear-armed Russia could portend, and even about a return to a “time of troubles,” the years of lawlessness, infighting and anarchy that Russia experienced at the start of the 17th century.

But anything short of NATO membership would involve promises that Kyiv already considers hollow. Those were tried before, in 1994, when the United States, Britain and Russia itself promised Ukraine territorial integrity and security “assurances” in return for giving up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons under an agreement called the Budapest Memorandum.

Those assurances came with no commitments — from Russia, of course, but also from Washington and London — and proved worthless.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary-general, has tried to square the circle in “The Kyiv Security Compact,” a proposal he and his colleagues drafted in the autumn with Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

It aims to provide something workable between the hollow assurances of 1994 and full NATO and E.U. membership. The core recommendation is for Ukraine’s allies to turn the country into a kind of hedgehog or a porcupine, one so well-armed that Russia would not try to swallow it again.

To get there, it urges a “strategic partnership” between Ukraine and key Western countries, on a bilateral basis, for a “multi-decade effort” to make Ukraine impregnable and capable of its own defense.

Mr. Rasmussen has compared his proposal to the relationship between the United States and Israel, with lots of defense cooperation but no formal defense treaty.

In essence, the proposal is alliance without membership, less a security guarantee to Ukraine than a major disincentive to Moscow.

“The irony is that non-membership in NATO would require more of the West than membership, and for longer,” said Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff.

Others suggest that individual allies, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Poland, put their own troops into Ukraine postwar, the way NATO has put forward-based multinational brigades into NATO members states that border Russia.

But significant troop presence in a non-NATO member would be seen in Moscow as a further provocation and more evidence to fit Russia’s narrative that NATO is trying to rip Ukraine away from the Russian sphere.

As Ben Hodges, a retired general who commanded the U.S. Army Europe points out, the United States, Canada and other countries had troops in Ukraine, training the Ukrainian army, right up until Russia’s invasion, when they were withdrawn to avoid a NATO-Russian confrontation. “What would be their mission?” he asked.

Mr. Hodges believes that Ukraine, with the right longer-range weapons from a currently reluctant Washington, can defeat Russia and take back all occupied territory, including Crimea, by the end of August.

“There is no way Ukraine will be safe and secure so long as Russia controls Crimea,” he said. Crimea allows Russia to block the Sea of Azov, isolate Mariupol, hit Odesa and dominate the Black Sea, while claiming an exclusive economic zone around Crimea, limiting fishing and gas exploration, he said.

The only real security guarantee for Ukraine is eventual NATO membership, Mr. Hodges argued. But whatever the outcome, he said, “it must be based on the assumption that Russia won’t respect it unless they’re forced to.”

“Russia cannot be rewarded and think that what they did has paid off with territorial gain or leverage,” he said.

But for many, like Camille Grand, a former NATO assistant secretary-general now with the European Council on Foreign Relations, it remains likely the war will end with Russia having “achieved partial objectives.” A full defeat of Russia and Ukraine joining NATO “is only one scenario, and an optimistic one,” he said.

While anything short of NATO membership “would be difficult to sell to the Ukrainians,” he said, Russia would assume in its war plans that Ukraine would be effectively part of NATO, much as it has always done with Sweden and Finland.

A post-conflict Ukraine “would provide NATO the best-equipped, best-trained and most capable army in Europe — in a way providing NATO security guarantees,” not the other way around, he said.

In a way, the whole idea of security guarantees is outdated, said Stefano Stefanini, a former Italian diplomat in Russia and former ambassador to NATO.

The only real guarantee of Ukrainian security is NATO membership, he said, however complicated. Security guarantees from major countries would be tantamount to NATO membership in any case, he said, and would inevitably carry risks when put to the test.

Even now, individual NATO countries refuse to send troops to aid Ukraine militarily, so why would they do so in the future? he asked.

One could imagine a settlement now where Ukraine loses part of its territory, and a later Kyiv government provokes Russia in order to get it back and then seeks to drag these guarantors into a conflict. What would they do then?

“Even if Ukraine gains NATO membership, it’s a defensive alliance and comes with restraints,” Mr. Stefanini said.

Still, he said, it would be a mistake to underestimate the cynical creativity of diplomats. One could arrive at a point where negotiations produce a commitment for Ukrainian neutrality, but not disarmament, with language about security guarantees, “even if anyone not a politician would call them unrealistic,” he said.

He made the comparison to the Dayton Accords that concluded the Bosnian war, “an awkward acrobatic architecture that only served to end the war.” Even this war will end, he said, and probably in negotiations.

“Total victory for anyone seems unlikely,” he said. So at some point, the diplomats will have to get creative, providing Ukraine some solid prospect of peace and security somehow underwritten by its allies.

nytimes.com · by Steven Erlanger · January 10, 2023

14. Russia Replaces Commander for Ukraine War, as Signs of Dissension Grow

Russia Replaces Commander for Ukraine War, as Signs of Dissension Grow

Allies of President Vladimir V. Putin contradicted each other about battlefield progress, as a war command shake-up put another Kremlin loyalist in charge.

nytimes.com · by Anatoly Kurmanaev · January 11, 2023

Ukrainians firing a mortar toward Russian positions near Bakhmut on Wednesday.Credit...Evgeniy Maloletka/Associated Press

Russia has replaced the general in charge of its trouble-plagued war against Ukraine, amid signs of dissension among President Vladimir V. Putin’s top allies — a shake-up that critics said would not address what ails the Russian military.

Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, whose appointment the Defense Ministry announced on Wednesday, is a longtime Kremlin ally, chief of the military general staff since 2012, and an executor of the failed plan for the initial invasion in February. It was the second time in just three months that the ministry replaced the chief of the war effort.

Outside analysts and hawkish Russian war bloggers said the change was a far cry from the radical overhaul the Russian armed forces need to become more effective.

“The sum does not change, just by changing the places of its parts,” wrote one prominent blogger who goes by the name Rybar.

The reshuffling of commanders came as the Kremlin sharply contradicted a key Putin ally about the pitched combat for Soledar, a small town in eastern Ukraine.

On Tuesday, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force, said that his troops had seized control of Soledar, posted online a photo of himself with some of the soldiers in what he said was the town’s famous salt mine, and made a point of claiming that only Wagner fighters had been battling there on behalf of Russia.

But both the Russian Defense Ministry and Ukrainian commanders contradicted those claims on Wednesday, saying that combat continued in Soledar and that the town had not yet fallen. The Russian ministry also said its own troops were fighting there.

Dmitri S. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, urged journalists to wait for official announcements about whether the city had been captured, adding that “tactical successes are certainly very important as they come at a rather expensive price.”

Neither he nor the ministry mentioned Wagner or its head by name, but their statements amounted to a rebuke of Mr. Prigozhin, who on Wednesday reiterated his claim that his forces had taken control of Soledar.

• In the East: The head of the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary force, claimed that his fighters had seized the town of Soledar, which has become a focal point in Russia’s monthslong campaign to gain control of the key eastern city of Bakhmut. If the claim were true, it would be the first significant Russian victory in months.
• Western Escalation: A cease-fire proposal seemingly aimed at splintering Western unity has instead been met with an escalation of military involvement by Ukraine’s allies.
• New Equipment: The Western allies’ provision to Ukraine of infantry fighting vehicles signals their support for new offensives in coming months.

Starting with the failed attempt to seize Kyiv in a lightning assault in February and March, the Russian war effort has been marked by missteps, reversals and heavy casualties.

It shifted to a slow, grinding offensive concentrating on the eastern Donbas that succeeded in capturing several cities at high cost, but then stalled. Then in late summer came a swift Ukrainian counteroffensive that reclaimed a significant amount of occupied territory, and forced a chaotic Russian retreat from the northeastern Kharkiv region.

That prompted the appointment in October of a new Russian commander for the war in Ukraine, Gen. Sergei Surovikin, who had previously headed Russian forces in Syria, where he gained a reputation as a ruthless but effective commander.

General Surovikin revamped a disjointed military structure in Ukraine and ordered construction of defensive lines to slow Ukrainian advances. He also advocated and organized the orderly retreat from the southern city of Kherson and surrounding areas west of the Dnipro River, a move that military analysts said was necessary but that Mr. Putin was said to have previously forbidden.

Now General Surovikin has effectively been demoted, becoming one of three deputies to General Gerasimov. Analysts said the change showed that Mr. Putin remains focused on projecting stability and maintaining the power balance among key allies, rather than correcting the military’s fundamental flaws.

“They have taken someone who is competent and replaced him with someone who is incompetent, but who has been there a long time and who has shown that he is loyal,” said Dara Massicot, senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation in Washington. “Whatever is happening in Moscow, it is out of touch with what is happening on the ground in Ukraine.”

In an intelligence assessment, the British Defense Ministry said the switch was “a clear acknowledgment that the campaign is falling short of Russia’s strategic goals.” But it said the move would meet with “extreme displeasure” among pro-war ultranationalists “who have increasingly blamed Gerasimov for the poor execution of the war.”

Russian setbacks slowed under General Surovikin, but did not stop. Ukrainian forces, armed with increasingly sophisticated Western weapons, made more gains in Kherson Province and in the Donbas region in the east, and repeatedly struck targets far behind the front lines. A monthslong Russian drive to capture the small city of Bakhmut, in the Donbas, has cost many lives but gained little ground.

A concerted effort destroy Ukraine’s energy systems has failed to bombard the country into submission, while leaving Russia short of precision munitions. And after Mr. Putin ordered the draft of 300,000 additional troops, new conscripts reported being thrown into the fight with minimal training and inadequate equipment. Some were killed after just days in uniform.

The most striking recent failure came on New Year’s Day, when Ukrainian artillery struck a complex housing new Russian soldiers in the Donbas city of Makiivka. The Defense Ministry acknowledged that 89 were killed, but Ukraine claimed casualties in the hundreds.

The hawkish Russian military bloggers — a major source of information on the war in a country where the Kremlin controls the media — blamed Russian commanders: They had concentrated the troops rather than spreading them out, had housed them next to an ammunition depot, and had not prevented soldiers from using cellphones, whose signals the Ukrainians apparently used to zero in on their location.

The criticism leveled at uniformed Russian commanders has created an opportunity for Mr. Prigozhin to portray himself and Wagner as indispensable to the war effort. He seems to be trying to raise his political profile within Russia, though to what end is unclear.

Abbas Gallyamov, a former speechwriter for Mr. Putin who has broken ties with the president, said that Mr. Prigozhin was angling to replace Defense Minister Sergei K. Shoigu, a longtime Putin confidant.

Wagner has become a kind of shadow army for Russia, deployed in support of the Kremlin’s military campaigns in Africa and the Middle East.

A former convicted criminal, Mr. Prigozhin became a restaurateur and befriended Mr. Putin years ago, parlaying that relationship into a varied business empire, including the Wagner Group. He has been indicted in the United States, where he is accused of orchestrating Russian online meddling in the 2016 presidential election.

This year, Mr. Prigozhin has cast off the modest profile he once tried to maintain.

After long denying any role in election meddling, he recently boasted of it. He has criticized the regular military. And, after saying for years that he had no connection to Wagner — he even questioned whether it existed — he acknowledged in September that he was its founder, and has embraced its role in Ukraine.

Mr. Prigozhin has supplemented Russia’s decimated fighting ranks with tens of thousands of prison inmates recruited to his mercenary force, awarded medals, visited military cemeteries and, according to his frequent videos, appeared unexpectedly at the toughest sections of the front line.

In late December, Wagner fighters released a profanity-laden video addressed to the military high command, accusing it of withholding ammunition and causing the deaths of their comrades. Mr. Prigozhin responded to the video by saying “when you’re sitting in a warm office, the frontline problems are hard to hear,” in apparent reference to the generals.

nytimes.com · by Anatoly Kurmanaev · January 11, 2023

15. With F.B.I. Search, U.S. Escalates Global Fight Over Chinese Police Outposts

We need to recognize Chinese strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack it with a superior political warfare and information and influence activities strategy. 

It is hard for me to accept analyses that minimize this threat and problem.

Excerpts:

“The Chinese government wants to have more influence and to extend their transnational policing,” said Chen Yen-ting, a Taiwan-based researcher who worked on the Safeguard Defenders report. “It’s a long-arm power to show their own citizens inside China that their government is so strong. We have the power to reach globally, and even if you go out, you’re still under our control.”

The Chinese cities appear to be taking steps to conceal their efforts. Márton Tompos, a Hungarian lawmaker, said he visited a Chinese police center in Budapest last year. “There were three signs saying Qingtian Police Overseas Service Station,” he said in an interview. After he spoke about the visit, he said, the signs were removed.

Not everyone is convinced that the outposts present a major threat. Jeremy Daum, a scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School, said that though government harassment of Chinese nationals is a serious problem, for the most part these personnel appear focused on arranging administrative tasks by providing video links between Chinese people abroad and police departments back in China.

In theory, a person could carry out the same video chat process, he said, using a smartphone.

“The processing and activity seems to be happening in China,” Mr. Daum said, referring to examples cited in the Safeguard Defenders report.

Chinese dissidents in Europe see things differently. “Those are things you can get done at the embassy,” said Lin Shengliang, a Chinese dissident in the Netherlands. He said people fear the police are keeping tabs on them.

“I am extremely anxious about them,” he said by phone. “There are no channels to report this, and there’s nothing we can do about it.”

With F.B.I. Search, U.S. Escalates Global Fight Over Chinese Police Outposts

nytimes.com · by William K. Rashbaum · January 12, 2023

Beijing says the outposts aren’t doing police work, but Chinese state media reports say they “collect intelligence” and solve crimes far outside their jurisdiction.

F.B.I. agents searched a suspected Chinese police outpost located at this glass building on East Broadway in New York’s Chinatown.Credit...Hilary Swift for The New York Times

The nondescript, six-story office building on a busy street in New York’s Chinatown lists several mundane businesses on its lobby directory, including an engineering company, an acupuncturist and an accounting firm.

A more remarkable enterprise, on the third floor, is unlisted: a suspected Chinese police outpost operating without jurisdiction or diplomatic approval — one of more than 100 such outfits around the world that are unnerving diplomats and intelligence agents.

F.B.I. counterintelligence agents searched the building last fall as part of a criminal investigation being conducted with the U.S. attorney’s office in Brooklyn, according to people with knowledge of the inquiry. The search represents an escalation in a global dispute over China’s efforts to police its diaspora far beyond its borders. Irish, Canadian and Dutch officials have called for China to shut down police operations in their countries. The F.B.I. raid is the first known example of the authorities seizing materials from one of the outposts.

Those who discussed the F.B.I. search did so on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter. The Chinese Embassy in Washington on Wednesday played down the role of the outposts, saying they are staffed by volunteers who help Chinese nationals perform routine tasks like renewing their driver’s licenses back home.

But Chinese state news media reports reviewed by The New York Times cite police and local Chinese officials by name describing the operations very differently. They tout the effectiveness of the offices, which are frequently called overseas police service centers. Some reports describe the Chinese outposts “collecting intelligence” and solving crimes abroad without collaborating with local officials. The public statements leave it murky who exactly is running the offices. Sometimes they are referred to as volunteers; other times as staff members or, in at least one case, the director.

Some of those online articles have been deleted recently as Western officials and human rights groups have called attention to the police offices.

Western officials see the outposts as part of Beijing’s larger drive to keep tabs on Chinese nationals abroad, including dissidents. The most notorious such effort is known as Operation Fox Hunt, in which Chinese officials hunt down fugitives abroad and pressure them to return home.

At least four Chinese localities — Fuzhou, Qingtian, Nantong and Wenzhou — have set up dozens of police outposts, according to state media accounts and public statements published in China. They identify sites in Japan, Italy, France, Britain, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other nations.

“It’s extremely worrying from the human rights perspective. We’re essentially allowing the Chinese diaspora to be controlled by the P.R.C. rather than subject to our national laws,” said Igor Merheim-Eyre, an adviser to a Slovakian member of the European Parliament, using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China. “That obviously has a huge impact — not only for our relations with the Chinese diaspora across Europe, but also has huge implications for national sovereignty.”

More on China

• Covid Outbreak: Since China abandoned its strict “zero Covid” policy, the intensity and magnitude of the country’s outbreak has remained largely a mystery. But a picture is emerging of the virus spreading like wildfire.
• Economic Recovery: Years of Covid lockdowns took a brutal toll on Chinese businesses. Now, the rapid spread of the virus after a chaotic reopening has deprived them of workers and customers.
• Youth Unemployment: With youth unemployment high in China, millions will soon take the Civil Service exam. But for those who get entry-level government jobs, the reality can be monotonous work that blurs the line with personal lives.
• Space Program: Human spaceflight achievements show that China is running a steady space marathon rather than competing in a head-to-head space race with the United States.

The New York outpost, which was set up by the city of Fuzhou, is based in the offices of a Chinese community organization, the America Changle Association NY, according to the state-run China Youth Daily, which last year published a document listing various police outposts. Changle is a district in the city of Fuzhou. The article has since been deleted. Other addresses of Chinese police outposts match locations of private businesses, including Chinese restaurants and commercial associations. The Chinese embassy in Washington described the spaces as “provided by local overseas Chinese communities who would like to be helpful.”

America Changle is headed by Lu Jianshun, known as Jimmy Lu, a donor to Mayor Eric Adams of New York. It is unclear whether he is a focus of the F.B.I.’s investigation. A spokesman for Mr. Adams said the mayor does not know him.

Mr. Lu, asked during a brief phone conversation about the F.B.I. search, said he would call back but did not. He did not respond to telephone and text messages seeking comment. Spokesmen for the F.B.I. and the U.S. attorney’s office in Brooklyn declined to comment, but the F.B.I. director, Christopher Wray, told lawmakers in November that he was aware of and concerned by the outposts, which he called police stations.

The Chinese Embassy in Washington said the sites are not police stations. “They are not police personnel from China,” said the embassy spokesperson, Liu Pengyu. “There is no need to make people nervous about this.”

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

It is not automatically inappropriate for police officers to work overseas. The F.B.I., for example, posts agents abroad. But they typically declare themselves to the foreign government and work out of American embassies. If they perform law enforcement duties, it is with the permission of the local authorities. China has made similar arrangements for joint patrols in places like Italy, a popular destination for Chinese tourists.

That makes the off-the-books operations all the more curious.

China’s Foreign Ministry has said little in response to the criticism, but back in China, police departments have trumpeted their reach and information-gathering powers both in official statements and in the state news media.

One article in a newspaper associated with the propaganda department of China’s Qingtian County describes a Chinese woman who said she had money stolen in Budapest. Instead of calling the local authorities, she sought help from the Chinese police outpost there. The people in charge of the police center, the article said, used surveillance footage from a convenience store to identify the thief, a Romanian, and recovered the money through “negotiation and education.”

The state-run China News Service said Qingtian’s overseas police centers gathered information on public opinion and the sentiment of Chinese people living abroad.

And an article posted by a Communist Party body in Jiangsu province said that Nantong City Overseas Police Linkage Service Centers had helped capture and persuade more than 80 criminal suspects to return to China since February 2016. The human rights group Safeguard Defenders said in a report late last year that the police stations carried out similar operations in Serbia, Spain and France.

It is not clear what the F.B.I. was investigating during its search, but it comes amid a broader Justice Department effort to rein in Fox Hunt. In October, prosecutors in Brooklyn — the same office that searched the New York office — charged seven Chinese nationals with harassing a U.S. resident and his son, pressuring the man to return to China to face criminal charges.

“It’s outrageous that China thinks it can come to our shores, conduct illegal operations and bend people here in the United States to their will,” Mr. Wray said in 2020, after the authorities charged eight others with being part of Fox Hunt.

The Chinese government has also surveilled and pressured ethnic minorities abroad, including Uyghurs and Tibetans, as well as their families. Human rights groups and government officials fear that the outposts could be bases for these kinds of operations.

Current and former law enforcement officials in New York say that the Chinatown outpost, like others elsewhere in the United States, date to the middle of the last decade. Police officials in at least one Chinese province tried then to arrange for their officers to train with the New York Police Department and other departments in cities that are home to large Chinese communities, the law enforcement officials said.

The Chinese officials wanted the N.Y.P.D. to sign a memorandum of understanding to outline the training program and make it official. But senior commanders and New York F.B.I. officials had serious concerns. They feared that the training program could legitimize the presence of Chinese officers and potentially make the N.Y.P.D. an unwitting partner in a campaign of surveillance and harassment, the officials said.

“The Chinese government wants to have more influence and to extend their transnational policing,” said Chen Yen-ting, a Taiwan-based researcher who worked on the Safeguard Defenders report. “It’s a long-arm power to show their own citizens inside China that their government is so strong. We have the power to reach globally, and even if you go out, you’re still under our control.”

The Chinese cities appear to be taking steps to conceal their efforts. Márton Tompos, a Hungarian lawmaker, said he visited a Chinese police center in Budapest last year. “There were three signs saying Qingtian Police Overseas Service Station,” he said in an interview. After he spoke about the visit, he said, the signs were removed.

Not everyone is convinced that the outposts present a major threat. Jeremy Daum, a scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School, said that though government harassment of Chinese nationals is a serious problem, for the most part these personnel appear focused on arranging administrative tasks by providing video links between Chinese people abroad and police departments back in China.

In theory, a person could carry out the same video chat process, he said, using a smartphone.

“The processing and activity seems to be happening in China,” Mr. Daum said, referring to examples cited in the Safeguard Defenders report.

Chinese dissidents in Europe see things differently. “Those are things you can get done at the embassy,” said Lin Shengliang, a Chinese dissident in the Netherlands. He said people fear the police are keeping tabs on them.

“I am extremely anxious about them,” he said by phone. “There are no channels to report this, and there’s nothing we can do about it.”

Benjamin Weiser and Zixu Wang contributed reporting. Susan C. Beachy contributed research.

nytimes.com · by William K. Rashbaum · January 12, 2023

16. China's authorities are quietly rounding up people who protested against COVID rules

If you carry a blank sheet of white paper you are vulnerable.

China's authorities are quietly rounding up people who protested against COVID rules

NPR · by Emily Feng · January 11, 2023

Students hold up placards including blank white sheets of paper on the campus of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, in solidarity with protests held on the mainland over Beijing's COVID-19 restrictions, on Nov. 28. Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images

The police need a theory to explain away the protests.

A friend of a detained vigil participant

Her gaze is steady and her voice barely quivers in the video as she remembers what brought her out onto the Beijing streets in late November, and the consequences she knew she likely faced for her decision.

"I have delegated some friends to publicize this video after I disappear. When you see this video, I will have been arrested too," the 26-year-old woman states calmly.

On Christmas Eve, the woman, an editor at a Beijing publishing press, was arrested at her family home in Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, and taken into police custody in Beijing, according to three people who know her.

She is one of eight people NPR was able to confirm had been arrested in connection to peaceful demonstrations held across the country last November. The protests began after a deadly fire in the western city of Urumqi, where at least 10 people died after they were unable to escape their blazing apartment due to pandemic lockdown measures.

Infuriated by nearly three years of stringent COVID-19 policies, residents of nearly every major Chinese city held vigils commemorating the lives of the those who had died while trapped under lockdown conditions or because they were denied potentially life-saving care.

Many attendees held up blank white sheets of paper to represent the lack of agency and freedom of expression they felt under the pandemic rules. Since then, the demonstrations have been dubbed "the A4 protests," named after the A4 paper size used internationally.

The demonstrations were also a powerful rebuke of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who has become closely associated with a suite of regulations loosely termed "zero COVID" and meant to keep coronavirus infection numbers near zero.

Less than two weeks after the A4 protests first began, Chinese authorities announced they were rolling back nearly all of their zero-COVID policies. They eliminated extensive contact-tracing and quarantine systems, as well as mandatory coronavirus testing once required every two to three days.

By then, China's security ministries were already hunting down people they believed were behind the vigils.

"The police need a theory to explain away the protests and they are trying to find an organizer to blame," says a friend of one of the vigil participants arrested. NPR is not using the names of protesters and others interviewed for this story for their safety.

That blame would be pinned on the Beijing editor and other journalists and writers, many of them young women, in the weeks ahead.

They came together for a vigil

On Nov. 26, passersby spontaneously began laying bouquets of flowers near the sign for Urumqi Road, a major commercial thoroughfare in the metropolis of Shanghai, in remembrance of the victims of the apartment fire in the city of Urumqi that the road was named after.

Residents also shared pictures of the bouquets on social media, bringing even more people onto the street. Hours later, hundreds of people had gathered, and the atmosphere grew rowdier, according to two people NPR interviewed after the demonstration. One person began shouting for Xi to step down, a call echoed by dozens of other demonstrators.

At dawn, riot police charged the crowd, dragging several of them away and dispersing the remaining demonstrators, but not before videos and pictures of the protest were shared with people living in other cities.

In Beijing, the editor and some of her friends were hoping to remember the victims of the Urumqi fire. They decided to join a vigil they had heard would be held along the Liangma River, which runs across central Beijing and through a ritzy commercial boardwalk.

Protesters hold up their mobile phones during a protest against Chinas strict zero-COVID measures on the Liangma River on Nov. 27 in Beijing. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

Around 8 p.m. on Nov. 27, a features writer for a state-run newspaper arrived at the river. Her boyfriend, the co-owner of a bar, gave her a ride on his motorcycle to the vigil. They brought some flowers, several of the writer's favorite poems handwritten on sheets of paper, and some candles.

They soon met up with two more friends.

Also at the riverside vigil was a former journalist who was pursuing a master's degree in film.

"She often feels guilty for her family's more affluent circumstances and that other people still live in poverty and pain," says a friend of the film student.

During an extreme lockdown of Shanghai last spring, the graduate student volunteered to find transportation for doctors and dialysis patients and also remotely coordinated online requests for help from Wuhan, when it was under lockdown in 2020.

The Beijing publishing editor came too, joining a crowd of several hundred people who slowly gathered as the frigid evening turned to dawn.

Other vigil participants held up blank paper and chanted against mandatory coronavirus testing, which was required to enter all public spaces including grocery stores and the metro, and shouted in favor of greater civil liberties and freedom of speech.

Most of the attendees wore face masks to both hide their identities but also to protect themselves against the coronavirus, which was already spreading more quickly through Beijing and the southern city of Guangzhou.

Very few of those at the Liangma River that night thought they would face serious legal consequences for showing up — perhaps a police reprimand or, at worst, a day of detention, according to the people who were there. Almost none of the attendees were activists or even politically active, but simply engaged young professionals who saw the vigil as a humane gesture toward their fellow citizens.

"If we are arrested for expressing our sympathy, then how much space do our opinions have in this society?" the editor remembered thinking at the time.

They were tracked down and detained

The crackdown came swiftly.

Using phone tower data, police were able to roughly triangulate who had been near the Liangma River the night of Nov. 27. They called in vigil attendees or visited their homes at night. Most participants were let go after a few hours of questioning, but the editor watched with a growing sense of dread as her friends were detained one by one.

The newspaper journalist was asked repeatedly which feminist organizations and events she had participated in. Police were especially aggressive when questioning a woman who works as an accountant at a multinational firm, who frequented live rock music events.

The accountant had been in a chat group on the encrypted messaging app Telegram about the vigil. Since she happened to be the administrator of the chat group, she must be the demonstration organizer, police reasoned.

Some had been at the vigil purely by accident. A 31-year-old techno enthusiast happened to be drinking with friends at a bar along the Liangma River. The German magazine Der Spiegel later ran a cover story with a picture of her holding a blank sheet of white paper aloft that night.

"I drink every weekend, but the police didn't believe that I was just drinking there. They think I am the organizer," the techno fan says. Police eventually let her go after 24 hours of questioning, but they confiscated her cellphone.

On Nov. 30, police released the editor and her friends and said they could go home. The group of friends thought the worst had passed. China's leader Xi, in meetings with European diplomats soon after, reportedly dismissed the vigils as the product of a few "frustrated student protesters."

But by mid-December, the public narrative in China about the protests — previously largely unmentioned in official channels — was beginning to change. Nationalist bloggers online posited, without any factual basis, that foreign meddling was responsible for instigating the unrest. Some Chinese officials encouraged the speculation that foreign countries were responsible.

"At first, people took to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with how local governments were unable to completely and accurately implement measures introduced by the central government, but the protests were quickly exploited by foreign forces," said Lu Shaye, China's ambassador to France, according to a Chinese Foreign Ministry transcript of remarks he gave at a reception shortly after the demonstrations.

Starting Dec. 18, many of those briefly detained earlier were formally arrested, including the editor and her friends. The woman on the Der Spiegel cover was arrested as well, according to a friend.

In her video, the editor says they were forced to sign arrest notices but the space next to what crime they were being charged with, along with when and where they would be detained, had been left blank. The families of those detained were unable to keep a copy of the arrest warrants, according to two people close to them.

NPR reached out to the Beijing police departments that made the arrests, but they declined to comment, saying the case was a national security matter.

Some of the vigil participants have been charged with the "crime of gathering a crowd to disrupt public order," which carries a maximum five-year sentence, according to Teng Biao, a human rights lawyer and visiting professor at the University of Chicago.

"According to the definition of this crime, this should target only the people who played a leading role," not ordinary vigil participants, Teng says. "The Chinese government is trying to punish the people who are active in human rights activities like LGBTQ issues or the feminism movement."

In her last video, the editor pleads for help, and she wonders why, out of the hundreds of people who were present that night, a group of young, largely female professionals was singled out. "We want to know why we were charged and what evidence there is for these charges," she says.

Three days after the vigil held near Beijing's Liangma River, the Chinese Communist Party's top security body, the Central Legal and Political Affairs Commission, vowed to "resolutely crack down on infiltration and sabotage activities by hostile forces and illegal and criminal acts that disrupt social order."

"Now, the security forces' working theory seems to be that a group of feminists influenced by Western ideas organized the demonstrations," says a friend of several of the vigil attendees who were arrested.

Attendees denied such allegations, emphasizing the vigils were merely held to express how frustrated they were by nearly three years of China's zero-COVID policy that had left people literally starving or trapped in their own homes and destroyed the economy.

"If even ordinary people like my friends who peacefully participated in a vigil can be arrested," the friend says, "anyone can be taken."

NPR · by Emily Feng · January 11, 2023

17. As China Reopens, Online Finger-Pointing Shows a Widening Gulf

"Collapse of public trust?" How can that be exploited?

Excerpts:

A key factor in the mutual infighting was the “collapse of public trust,” said Mr. Xiang of Oxford, who is also the director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Germany. “Government data, policies and experts’ opinion lost credibility.”

In a recent post on social media, Hu Xijin, the nationalist former editor of the Communist Party newspaper, Global Times, suggested that the party could afford to be more open to debate.“Our society can have problems and difficulties, but there should not be too many things deemed ‘sensitive,’” he wrote.

“In other words, this country is very trustworthy and has the internal motivation to correct mistakes. ‘Sensitivity’ should not belong to China.”

As China Reopens, Online Finger-Pointing Shows a Widening Gulf​

The Communist Party’s efforts to limit discord over its sudden “zero Covid” pivot are being challenged with increasing rancor, including from its own supporters.​

nytimes.com · by Amy Chang Chien · January 11, 2023

Passengers pushing their luggage through the international arrivals hall at Beijing Capital International Airport in January after China lifted its quarantine requirement for inbound travelers.Credit...Thomas Peter/Reuters

A furious, wide-ranging argument is unfolding on the internet in China over the reversal of the government’s strict pandemic policies and the massive Covid surge that followed. The divisions are challenging the Communist Party’s efforts to control the narrative around its pandemic pivot.

Since the party abandoned “zero Covid” last month, many online commenters have staked out opposing positions over seemingly all manner of questions. Who should be blamed for the explosion of cases and deaths? Is a top government-appointed health expert trustworthy? Is Omicron really less severe, as Chinese officials now say, when hospitals seem to be filling up with sick patients? They are even arguing over whether people should be allowed to set off fireworks during the upcoming Spring Festival holiday, after many did so during the New Year.

The digital finger-pointing reveals a country that is deeply polarized, with each side distrustful and skeptical of the other — and, to varying degrees, of the party and its proxies. In some cases, the party’s own supporters are indirectly questioning its decisions, complicating efforts by the party’s censors and propaganda outlets to push its messaging.

“The sudden 180-degree turn from ‘zero Covid’ has precipitated a new crisis for which the government needs to explain to the people,” said Minxin Pei, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College who studies Chinese politics. The party now needs to contain Covid infections, rescue an economy dragged down by its “zero Covid” policy, and repair the damage to its image caused by the chaotic reopening, Mr. Pei said.

If Beijing moves too hard to quash discord, it could further alienate many who had long defended “zero Covid” and who have been confused or disappointed by the sudden policy U-turn. But if it lets the arguments escalate, it risks muddying its message and seeding more uncertainty.

“It’s very damaging for Chinese society if society is divided into very antagonistic groups — who are equally powerless, equally helpless — and they accuse each other,” said Xiang Biao, a Germany-based expert on social issues in China.

Understand the Situation in China

The Chinese government cast aside its restrictive “zero Covid” policy, which had set off mass protests that were a rare challenge to Communist Party leadership.

• Rapid Spread: Since China abandoned its strict Covid rules, the intensity and magnitude of the country’s outbreak has remained largely a mystery. But a picture is emerging of the virus spreading like wildfire.
• Rural Communities: As Lunar New Year approaches, millions are expected to travel home in January. They risk spreading Covid to areas where health care services are woefully underdeveloped.
• Economic Recovery: Years of Covid lockdowns took a brutal toll on Chinese businesses. Now, the rapid spread of the virus after a chaotic reopening has deprived them of workers and customers.
• A Failure to Govern: China’s leadership likes to brag about its governance of the country, but its absence in a moment of crisis has made the public question its credibility.

By far, the more vocal side is made up of those who supported “zero Covid” — a mix of nationalist online influencers, conservative academics, and a number of trolls. Some saw the stringent policy as necessary to save lives in a country where medical services are uneven. Others adopted the party’s argument that “zero Covid” was a measure of China’s superior political model.

Some voices in the so-called “zero Covid faction” have sought to blame the protesters opposed to lockdowns for the current outbreak and rising deaths, even though the virus had been spreading wildly before the policy U-turn. They call those who supported the end of “zero Covid” “tangfei,” or “lying flat bandits,” an insulting variation of “lying flat,” a term used to refer to a slacker lifestyle that had earlier been co-opted by Chinese state media to criticize Western approaches to coexisting with Covid.

Implied in some of the criticism is that by undoing “zero Covid,” the party has empowered its detractors at home and in the West, and weakened its position even among its own loyalists. For a time, online influencers such as Sima Nan, a nationalist, even took to denigrating government-appointed experts such as Zhang Wenhong, a top epidemiologist in Shanghai who had argued against excessive lockdowns, suggesting that Dr. Zhang had misled the public about the severity of Omicron. The vitriol was so great that state media outlets soon called for such personal attacks to stop.

On the other side are those who have welcomed the resumption of school, work, business and travel as not merely a relief from lockdowns but a much-needed retreat by the Communist Party from everyday life. Many identify themselves as part of the “opening up” or “lift lockdowns” faction associated with the university students, migrant workers, residents and small-business owners who protested against “zero Covid” in November.

Even Xi Jinping, the country’s top leader, made a rare acknowledgment of the public disagreements, saying in a New Year’s address: “It is only natural for different people to have different concerns or hold different views on the same issue.”

He emphasized, though, that he expected Chinese people to fall in line, and to “think in one direction, work in one direction. The strength of tomorrow’s China comes from unity,” he said.

For much of the past three years, Mr. Xi had brooked no opposition, brandishing the “zero Covid” policy as proof of the authoritarian party’s superiority in protecting people over that of chaotic Western democracies. Now, along with a mounting public health crisis, the authorities find themselves having to rein in their own usual defenders, those who had helped prop up “zero Covid” as the only way forward.

Tao Siliang, a member of China’s Communist elite, recently criticized Sima Nan’s attacks for contradicting the party’s new direction. On Thursday, Weibo, a social media site, moved quickly to shut down or suspend more than 1,000 accounts, including that of a prominent nationalist, Kong Qingdong, for waging personal attacks against experts and scholars.

“At this moment, what we need most is to abide by the 44-year-old parable: ‘Look forward in unity,’ do not challenge, tear apart, especially denounce or abuse,” the official newspaper of Zhejiang Province, in China’s east, wrote in a recent editorial.

But some “zero Covid” defenders, apparently disillusioned by the turn of events, rejected the call for conformity.

“Please tell me, why do I have to unite?” read a post that was liked 30,000 times and was written by a blogger on Weibo who described losing an uncle to complications caused by Covid. “On what basis should I be forced to accept the lone societal argument that everything is going great?”

Some see the opposition to reopening as mostly posturing by online personalities interested in attracting more followers, and predict that the anger will blow over once outbreaks peak and pass, and the economy recovers.

To Wu Qiang, an independent political analyst in Beijing, the online backlash is a sign of a deeper challenge to Beijing. Mr. Xi’s New Year address, he said, was a “rare recognition that he is facing objections, criticism and dissatisfaction inside and outside the party.”

At the same time, Mr. Wu said, Mr. Xi’s “zero Covid” policy of top-down control pushed people to question the party’s authoritarian approach, fanning a new political fervor that could, over time, gain momentum. “In some ways, if you look at things from the vantage point of the future, the current ‘lying flat’ faction is a broad foundation for a future Chinese opposition party,” Mr. Wu said.

If there is one issue that both sides seem to agree on, it is that the government is hurting its credibility by not providing reliable data on the extent of Covid outbreaks and deaths across the country. The official Covid death toll is widely ridiculed on Chinese social media as absurdly low. The World Health Organization and several countries have urged Beijing to share more data on hospitalizations and deaths. The information vacuum has fueled speculation by influencers and bloggers who have pushed their own conclusions and conspiracies around the policy pivot.

A key factor in the mutual infighting was the “collapse of public trust,” said Mr. Xiang of Oxford, who is also the director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Germany. “Government data, policies and experts’ opinion lost credibility.”

In a recent post on social media, Hu Xijin, the nationalist former editor of the Communist Party newspaper, Global Times, suggested that the party could afford to be more open to debate.

“Our society can have problems and difficulties, but there should not be too many things deemed ‘sensitive,’” he wrote.

“In other words, this country is very trustworthy and has the internal motivation to correct mistakes. ‘Sensitivity’ should not belong to China.”

nytimes.com · by Amy Chang Chien · January 11, 2023

18. Iran Hangs Two Protesters While 109 Face Prospect of Execution

Iran Hangs Two Protesters While 109 Face Prospect of Execution

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · January 11, 2023

Latest Developments

Executions in Iran — and threats of further regime bloodshed — persist. In the wake of Tehran’s hanging on Saturday of two Iranian protesters, 22-year-old Mohammad Mehdi Karami and 39-year-old Sayed Mohammad Hosseini, “at least 109 protesters are currently at risk of execution, death penalty charges or sentences,” the Norway-based non-profit Iran Human Rights reported. Two men in particular — 19-year-old Mohammad Boroughani and 22-year-old Mohammad Ghobadiou — reportedly face imminent execution, prompting protests this week outside their prison. Since nationwide demonstrations began in September 2022, Iranian security forces have killed some 500 protesters, including dozens of women and children.

Expert Analysis

“My own experience as a political prisoner with the Islamic Republic’s judiciary, Judge Abolghassem Salavati in particular, taught me that in political and security cases the judiciary works as an agent of the regime’s intelligence organizations. It does not seek truth; it only follows orders. As a result, outside pressure on the regime is one of the few viable options to slow down the judiciary’s killing machine in the coming weeks and months.” — Saeed Ghasseminejad, FDD Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor

Unjust Executions

Saturday’s executions reportedly occurred on the basis of coerced confessions after brief trials devoid of due process. The judiciary refused to allow the defendants to choose their own independent counsel, instead appointing lawyers tied to the regime. The Center for Human Rights in Iran, a New York-based non-profit, reported on Tuesday that Tehran has arrested at least 44 defense attorneys since September.

International Outcry

United Nations human rights chief Volker Türk said on Tuesday that the “weaponization of criminal procedures to punish people for exercising their basic rights — such as those participating in or organizing demonstrations — amounts to state sanctioned killing.” Meanwhile, key European governments, including France and Germany, say they are considering designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Paris also stated on Tuesday that the European Union has not ruled out the idea. The United Kingdom will reportedly announce its own designation of the IRGC in the coming weeks. The United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2019.

Supreme Leader Khamenei Blames the West for Protests

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, shows little sign of heeding protesters’ demands. On the contrary, he has lambasted the demonstrations as a foreign conspiracy aimed at weakening the Islamic Republic. “The most important tool that the enemy used in these riots was propaganda and the enticement of people through cyberspace and the Western, Arabic and Hebrew media,” Khamenei said in a speech on Monday.

The supreme leader has expressed similar sentiments in the past. The protests “were designed by America, the fake Zionist regime, those who are on their payroll and some traitorous Iranians abroad who helped them. Their main problem is with a strong and independent Iran and the progress of the country,” said Khamenei in October 2022.

Related Analysis

“Strategy for a New Comprehensive U.S. Policy on Iran,” edited by Mark Dubowitz and Orde Kittrie

“‘Adopt’ an Iranian Political Prisoner to Save a Life,” by Toby Dershowitz and Saeed Ghasseminejad

“Mapping the Protests in Iran,” edited by Mark Dubowitz

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · January 11, 2023

19. Launch of #WithoutJustCause Political Prisoners Initiative - United States Department of State

Launch of #WithoutJustCause Political Prisoners Initiative - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson

HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Launch of #WithoutJustCause Political Prisoners Initiative

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Launch of #WithoutJustCause Political Prisoners Initiative

Media Note

January 11, 2023

As political prisoners around the world begin another year behind bars, the United States announces the launch of the Without Just Cause initiative, which seeks to raise international awareness of the plight of political prisoners and their families, and to advocate for the release of all individuals worldwide who are detained unfairly.

The individuals highlighted in this initiative are emblematic of the many political prisoners held by governments in every region of the world. Many are subjected to torture, gender-based violence, inhumane conditions, enforced disappearance, or other forms of abuse. Some are held in reprisal for peaceful protest, exposing corruption, or critical reporting. Others are held because of their race, ethnicity, religion, language, gender identity, or for perceived or real LGBTQI+ status or conduct. Some governments abuse their legal systems to target peaceful protestors or government critics on contrived charges such as “terrorism,” “extremism,” “cybercrimes,” “fake news,” or “hooliganism.” Many are sentenced by courts that lack independence, in trials closed to outside observers, while others are detained without being afforded other applicable legal protections.

The Without Just Cause initiative will include diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy in Washington, DC and by U.S. embassies abroad. It reflects input from political prisoner advocates, family members, and nongovernmental organizations.

As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes clear, every person worldwide is entitled to respect for their human rights, including freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly, and association. The United States calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners, and invites all who believe in the universality of human rights and fundamental freedoms to support this initiative.

To learn more about this initiative, visit https://www.state.gov/withoutjustcause/.

For media inquiries, please contact DRL-Press@state.gov.

state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson

20. Gamers Beware: The CCP Is Coming for You

Note this is from the Epoch Times.

I received a brief from a risk analysis expert from Asia in 2019. He explained how China is seeking to dominate the game industry to control content to introduce China favorable themes and narratives to young gamers. Most people reading today's news have no idea how effective this might be because we do not play these games. More people are playing online games every minute of every day than watch the Super Bowl every year. Think about the size of that target audience.

Now for my hyperbole (not hypothesis!):

Is the exporting of COVID, fentanyl, TikTok, and gaming (and other potentially subversive activities) to the US and the free world a form of unrestricted warfare to create decay within societies so they crumble upon themselves?

Maybe since China has its "five poisons" (Uighurs, Tibet, Falun Gong, democracy movement, Taiwan) they want to export "four poisons" to the US (COVID, fentanyl, TikTok, and gaming).

Gamers Beware: The CCP Is Coming for You

theepochtimes.com · by Anders Corr · January 11, 2023

Commentary

Tencent Holdings and NetEase Inc.—both Chinese mega-tech companies deeply involved in gaming design and distribution—were hit hard over the last year and a half. Arbitrary rule in Beijing, decoupling, and a downturn in tech stocks walloped them, along with other Chinese companies that lost trillions of dollars from market selloffs.

But now big China tech is back. NetEase is the latest to grab international headlines. It plans to capture more international users with its global investment in design teams in the United States, Canada, Japan, and France.

In 2021 Beijing banned children from gaming more than three hours per week. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) saw it as a form of “spiritual opium.”

Now, the CCP wants to export that gamer opium—along with its infamous fentanyl—for ingestion in America and our allies. What makes us weaker, they appear to reason, makes the regime in Beijing stronger.

The CCP’s ban on gaming in China, while simultaneously supporting its export abroad, uses both push and pull factors to refocus Chinese gaming companies on export markets. The expansion of China’s gaming exports is a vehicle for CCP influence, as with TikTok and Hollywood, because the content can subtly favor CCP ideology. In the latter two conduits, for example, the regime’s many human rights abuses tend to be elided.

China’s Global Gamer Expansion

“NetEase’s global expansion drive kicked into high gear in 2022,” according to Deal Street Asia. The gaming company is based in Hangzhou and is China’s second largest after Tencent.

Last year it launched game design studios in Japan with Nagoshi Studio and GPTrack50, in the United States with Jackalope Games and Jar of Sparks, and in France with Quantic Dream. All were its first design forays in these countries.

The latest studio to fall into China’s orbit is Canada’s Skybox Labs, which has 250 employees. NetEase announced the acquisition of Skybox on Jan. 6. Skybox has participated in the design of hits such as Minecraft, Halo Infinite, Fallout 76, and Age of Empires.

China’s Tencent Holdings, the world’s biggest gaming company, is also on a global buying spree, with over a dozen gaming studios now acquired.

People visit Tencent’s booth at the World 5G Exhibition in Beijing on Nov. 22, 2019. The Chinese internet giant is complying with Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s edict to redistribute wealth in China. It is the largest holding in BMO’s Chinese ESG-focused ETF. (Jason Lee/Reuters)

National Security Risk

The increasing access of Chinese gaming companies to young gamers globally, including their personal data, is a national security concern given the CCP’s control of Chinese companies and Beijing’s adversarial attitude towards the United States and democracy.

The global reach of Tencent and NetEase, in both game design and customer base, gives them unprecedented and relatively below-the-radar access to youth and young adult demographics, as well as international information networks.

There have long been privacy concerns about Tencent and NetEase controlling the data of their international users, including personal chat data. Even when users attempt to delete data held by NetEase, they could be denied based on the NetEase privacy policy or its failure to follow its own policies. There is no way for users to confirm whether or not their data is safe with Chinese companies because the Chinese regime is opaque to all but the CCP’s elite.

With Tencent and NetEase’s design expansion, they will access international computer programmers and could insert hackers into data systems directly. Backdoors can be built into games that would allow full access to user computers.

To mitigate against this and similar risks, India banned 54 Chinese apps in February 2022, including from NetEase and Tencent.

NetEase’s long-standing partner, Activision Blizzard, parted ways with NetEase in November due to the failure of the company to share Chinese user data. Beijing knows the power of user data and is likely leaning on NetEase not to share. The same does not apply the other way, as Beijing wants to vacuum up as much as possible.

US Should Intervene

The United States should pass laws against companies like NetEase and Tencent acquiring U.S. and international game design companies, and user data, given that the two Chinese companies are based in an adversary nation. While they may claim not to share data with Beijing, they are required by law to do so whenever asked by the regime.

The U.S. government has been too soft on Chinese companies, given their weaponization by Beijing against democracies around the world. It’s time to step up and impose the penalty of decoupling on not only TikTok, Huawei, and ZTE, which we are finally starting to address, but on gaming companies like Tencent and NetEase as well.

There is precedent. In 2021, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investigated Tencent’s $1.3 billion takeover of Sumo Group. Sumo’s subsidiary has developed games such as Sackboy, Hood Outlaws & Legends, Team Sonic Racing, and Crackdown 3.

This is the right approach, but CFIUS must do more than investigate. It should end these investments in technologies that can influence and violate the privacy of the next generation of youth in our democracies.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Anders Corr

Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).

theepochtimes.com · by Anders Corr · January 11, 2023

21. New nation, new ideas: A study finds immigrants out-innovate native-born Americans

​No surprise here. We have seen plenty of anecdotal evidence do this.

New nation, new ideas: A study finds immigrants out-innovate native-born Americans

NPR · by Greg Rosalsky · January 10, 2023

An America flag flies near the Statue of Liberty on Liberty Island. Drew Angerer/Getty Images

Sergey Brin, co-founder Google; Satya Nadella, head of Microsoft; Hedy Lamarr, a Hollywood actress who, quite incredibly, was also a pioneering inventor behind Wi-Fi and bluetooth; Elon Musk; Chien-Shiung Wu, who helped America build the first atom bomb; Alexander Graham Bell, the inventor of the telephone; James Naismith, the inventor of basketball; Nikola Tesla, one of the most important minds behind the creation of electricity and radio.

What do all these innovators have in common? They were all immigrants to the United States.

Many studies over the years have suggested that immigrants are vital to our nation's technological and economic progress. Today, around a quarter of all workers in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields are immigrants.

But while there's plenty of evidence suggesting that immigrants play an important role in American innovation, a group of economists — Shai Bernstein, Rebecca Diamond, Abhisit Jiranaphawiboon, Timothy McQuade, and Beatriz Pousada — wanted to find a more precise estimate of how much immigrants contribute.

In a fascinating new working paper, the economists link patent records to more than 230 million Social Security numbers. With this incredible dataset, they are able to suss out who among patent-holders are immigrants (by cross-referencing their year of birth and the year they were assigned their Social Security number).

The economists find that, between 1990 and 2016, 16 percent of all US inventors were immigrants. More than that, they find that the "average immigrant is substantially more productive than the average US-born inventor." Immigrant inventors produced almost a quarter of all patents during this period. These patents were disproportionately likely to be cited (a sign that they were valuable to their fields) and seem to have more financial value than the typical native-born patent. The economists also find evidence suggesting that immigrant inventors help native-born inventors become more productive. All in all, the economists estimate that immigrants are responsible for roughly 36% of innovation in America.

As for why immigrant inventors tend to be so productive and innovative, the economists entertain various explanations. Immigrant innovators may be motivated to come — and are able to come — to the United States because there's something special about their character, intelligence, or motivation. Or maybe it's because they live, work, and think differently when they come here. The economists find these immigrants tend to move to the most productive areas of the country. They tend to have a greater number of collaborators when they work here. And, as the economists write, they also "appear to facilitate the importation of foreign knowledge into the United States, with immigrant inventors relying more heavily on foreign technologies and collaborating more with foreign inventors."

Immigrants, they suggest, help create a melting pot of knowledge and ideas, which has clear benefits when it comes to innovation.

It's Hard Being An Immigrant These Days

Many immigrants working in innovation sectors are here on H1-B visas, which allow around 85,000 people to come to the United States each year, and create a potential pathway for them to become legal permanent residents. These visas tether immigrants to a particular job. But, as our NPR colleague Stacey Vanek Smith reported last month, "if they lose that job, a countdown clock starts." They have 60 days to find a new job or they must exit the country.

With financial turmoil roiling the tech sector, companies have been laying off tons of workers. As Stacey reported, there are now thousands of unemployed H1-B visa holders frantically trying to find new jobs so they can stay in the country. But ongoing layoffs and hiring freezes are making that particularly difficult.

In a recent editorial, the editors of Bloomberg argue that the current struggle of immigrants in tech "underscores how a flawed system is jeopardizing America's ability to attract and retain the foreign-born talent it needs." This system, they argue, is "not only cruel but self-defeating... rather than expanding the pipeline for skilled foreign workers, the US's onerous policies are increasingly pushing them away, with pro-immigration countries like Canada and Australia becoming more attractive destinations for global talent."

With the United States taking an increasingly nativist turn in recent years, it's become more common to hear anti-immigrant rhetoric, about them taking jobs, committing crimes, and "replacing" us. The economists' new study serves as another potent reminder that immigrants have tremendous value for our economy. Not just as a cheap labor force, but as a group of innovators who help us build new businesses, create jobs, make our companies more productive, and produce products and ideas that enrich our lives and improve our standard of living. Call it the Great Enhancement Theory.

NPR · by Greg Rosalsky · January 10, 2023

22. Analysis | The war in Ukraine tests how cyberattacks fit into rules for war crimes

Analysis | The war in Ukraine tests how cyberattacks fit into rules for war crimes

The Washington Post · by Tim Starks · January 11, 2023

Welcome to The Cybersecurity 202! I’m back in business after getting an MRI yesterday. It is my earnest request to science that they figure out a way to make those less nightmarish to undergo. Even just, like, less noise would be a help.

Below: An investigation finds that Bangladesh bought surveillance tools, and a top TikTok executive visits Brussels. First:

Ukraine petitions International Criminal Court to investigate cyberattacks as war crimes

Ukrainian leaders in recent months have been sharing information about Russian cyberattacks with the International Criminal Court, hoping the organization will investigate them as war crimes.

It’s one of the first real chances to test whether and how cyberattacks fit into some of the laws governing war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is arguably the most prominent world conflict to date where coordinated, joint physical and cyber assaults are routine.

“When we observe the situation in cyberspace we notice some coordination between kinetic strikes and cyberattacks, and since the majority of kinetic attacks are organized against civilians — being a direct act of war crime — supportive actions in cyber can be considered as war crimes,” top Ukrainian cybersecurity official Victor Zhora told Shannon Van Sant of Politico in an interview that published this week, echoing past remarks.

Last spring, a group of human rights investigators and lawyers from the Human Rights Center at the University of California at Berkeley's School of Law also urged the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court to consider war crime prosecutions of Russian government Sandworm hackers over the Ukraine attacks.

The International Criminal Court did not respond to a request for comment. But Lindsay Freeman, the director of technology, law and policy at the Human Rights Center, told Andy Greenberg of Wired that the prosecutor's office said it was considering the request.

Can it happen?

There is a consensus among legal and military experts that cyberattacks could at least theoretically qualify as war crimes under the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court.

And the court is already investigating war crimes by Russia against Ukraine. “Ukraine is a crime scene,” the chief prosecutor for the court, Karim Khan, has said.

• Ukraine isn’t a party to the Rome Statute, but accepted its jurisdiction after Russia's annexation of Crimea. Sandworm hackers in 2015 attacked Ukraine’s power grid, leaving hundreds of thousands of people without power for hours.

Russian hackers have targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure, with Zhora pointing specifically to attacks on DTEK Group, Ukraine’s largest private energy conglomerate.

But there are reasons that prosecuting a cyberattack as a war crime would be complicated, said Paul Rosenzweig, a former DHS official who’s part of the cybersecurity law initiative at George Washington University.

“To be a war crime, it has to be totally directed at civilians, without any realistic possibility of military advantage,” Rosenweig told me. “The Russian argument would be, ‘By degrading their economy, we’re increasing the possibility that they’ll sue for peace, and that’s a significant military advantage.’”

• Ukraine could make stronger claims if Russian attacks targeted hospitals, or wastewater treatment facilities in cities that aren’t anywhere near the front lines, Rosenzweig said.

Furthermore, the court’s hands are full with clear war crimes, from allegations of civilian massacres to the torture and rape of women and children, Rosenzweig said.

But for a variety of reasons, “the idea has considerable merit,” David Scheffer, who served as the first U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, told me.

Russia targeting the energy grid “is an assault on the civilian population in a manner that is inhumane, particularly during winter in cold weather,” said Scheffer, now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

To argue that taking out a power plant was a move to gain military advantage, Russia would have to demonstrate via a “proportionality test” that the plant “has a direct and overbearing importance and significance to the military capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in that area,” Scheffer said.

While Scheffer said he didn’t know the extent of the court’s in-house cyber expertise, they could bring in consultants to assist.

“I would be confident in saying that prosecutor Karim Khan — who is a very, very intelligent and up-to-speed and modern lawyer — he would have this as one piece of the Ukraine situation that he’s investigating,” Scheffer said. “He would not ignore this type of evidence.”

Splitting the difference between Rosenzweig and Scheffer is John Hultquist, vice president of Google unit Mandiant Threat Intelligence.

“We need to be doing everything we can right now to prepare for Sandworm or deter them,” Hultquist told Wired. “If you're going to do this, now is the time.”

• On the other hand, “There's a stark difference between cyberattacks and attacks on the physical ground right now,” he told the outlet. “You simply cannot achieve the same effects with cyberattacks that you can when you're bombing things and tanks are rolling down streets.”

23. Analysis | There are TikTok bans in nearly two dozen states

Analysis | There are TikTok bans in nearly two dozen states

The Washington Post · by Aaron Schaffer · January 10, 2023

Good morning! Check out this piece by my colleague Tim Craig about former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro’s new life — as a Florida man.

Below: The Supreme Court declines to hear NSO Group’s appeal of a lawsuit, and a key House committee that deals with cybersecurity issues gets its chairman. First:

Inside the state bans on TikTok

The bans keep coming.

Over a five-week stretch, nearly two dozen state governors and officials have imposed government restrictions of TikTok in their states. Most are Republicans, but a few Democrats are joining them.

The bans range from prohibiting the device on government internet networks to restricting state employees from using or downloading the app on state devices.

Now, Wisconsin Gov. Tony Evers plans to ban the app. He would be at least the second Democratic governor to ban the app on state devices, after Kansas Gov. Laura Kelly announced a ban late last month. It’s not clear what Evers’s ban will look like; his office didn't comment on the specifics of the ban.

The office of another Democrat, New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy, also announced this week that state officials banned the app.

The pressure

TikTok faces growing pressure in Washington, where lawmakers last month banned TikTok on federal employees’ government devices.

Here’s more on TikTok and government officials’ concerns with the app from my colleague Shira Ovide, who wrote about the bans last month: “TikTok is owned by a Chinese internet giant, ByteDance. With more than 1 billion users globally, TikTok is (arguably) the first wildly popular app in the United States that comes from a Chinese company. U.S. elected officials and most Americans don’t trust China.”

“U.S. officials have said that because businesses in China are not truly independent from the government in Beijing, Chinese Communist Party officials might force TikTok to hand over data it has collected on American users, or TikTok might use the app to promote Chinese propaganda or censor material that Beijing doesn’t like,” Shira wrote. “TikTok says that U.S. officials have provided little evidence of TikTok being a patsy of Beijing.”

The company is working on a potential deal with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a secretive, interagency government committee. TikTok has agreed to cut off ByteDance’s decision-making abilities over TikTok’s U.S. operations and agreed to let U.S. authorities veto executives at the company and impose standards for TikTok’s hiring practices, my colleagues reported. But the talks remain unresolved.

TikTok faces criticism from nonpartisan national security officials. FBI Director Christopher A. Wray has warned about the app, telling a Michigan audience last month that the Chinese government’s ability to control TikTok’s algorithm or collect data for espionage “should concern us.” Some state bans have cited Wray’s concerns as a reason for banning the app.

Other national security officials have been more nuanced. In an October radio interview, Jeremy Fleming, the leader of U.K. signals intelligence agency GCHQ, was asked whether he’d be concerned about children's’ use of TikTok.

“No I wouldn’t,” he said, adding that he’d “speak to my child about the way in which they think about their personal data on their device” because people have to know that “there is no free good here.”

“Make the most of it, make those videos, use TikTok, but just think before you do,” he later said.

Inside the bans

The state bans began on Nov. 29, when South Dakota Gov. Kristi L. Noem (R) announced that she’d ban government officials and contractors from using the app on state devices.

Most of the other states’ bans were announced before Dec. 22, when ByteDance said it fired four employees after finding that they accessed data on U.S. users — including journalists — while trying to find the source of a leak at the company.

(TikTok, for its part, has previously told The Post that the bans “are largely fueled by misinformation,” and that it would be happy to discuss its security practices with state officials.)

Some of the bans are proactive. For example, Pennsylvania Treasurer Stacy Garrity (R) banned the app from being used on her office’s devices and networks. But Garrity’s office noted in a statement that her office had “conducted an internal security review this month and determined that TikTok had not been used on any Treasury-issued devices.”

Other bans appear to impact public universities.

Auburn University and the University of Oklahoma — which combined have around 60,000 students — have banned the app from being used on their internet networks. However, it appears that students can still get around the bans by using virtual private networks or data on their phones, for example.

The keys

Supreme Court rejects NSO Group appeal

The Supreme Court’s decision to not take up NSO Group’s appeal means that WhatsApp can continue with its long-running lawsuit against the Israeli spyware firm, Reuters’s Nate Raymond reports. NSO Group had argued that it deserved immunity from U.S. lawsuits because its clients are foreign governments.

In November, the U.S. solicitor general’s office argued that the court should reject NSO’s appeal.

In a statement, WhatsApp parent Meta, which also owns Facebook, said that it welcomed the decision. “NSO's spyware has enabled cyberattacks targeting human rights activists, journalists and government officials,” the company said. “We firmly believe that their operations violate U.S. law and they must be held to account for their unlawful operations.”

The Knight Institute, which in 2022 filed a lawsuit against NSO on behalf of journalists working for Salvadoran news outlet El Faro, also cheered the decision.

NSO’s lawyer didn’t respond to Reuters’s request for comment.

Rep. Mark Green (R-Tenn.) to chair Homeland Security Committee

Rep. Mark Green (R-Tenn.) previously served on the committee’s cybersecurity panel and he’s introduced cybersecurity legislation, as The Cybersecurity 202 previously reported. Green is a member of the House Freedom Caucus and has hinted about reorganizing the Department of Homeland Security, whose Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency plays a key role in the federal government’s cybersecurity efforts, Bloomberg Government’s Ellen M. Gilmer and Emily Wilkins report.

In a statement, Green said that he would prioritize border security, cybersecurity and other areas as chairman of the committee. “We will also work to secure our cyber border,” Green said in the statement. “In 2018, cyberattacks cost the federal government an estimated $13.7 billion, and recently the Department of Justice determined that 80 percent of all espionage cases and 60 percent of all trade secret cases are connected to China in some way. No community in America will be spared if we cannot secure this fourth, deeply vulnerable, border. These are two of the many priorities we will address — and we will not let the American people down.”

Cyber insecurity

Identity thieves bypassed Experian security to view credit reports (Krebs on Security)

San Francisco BART investigating ransomware attack (The Record)

Privacy patch

Researchers could track the GPS location of all of California’s new digital license plates (Motherboard)

Daybook

• The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosts an event on government policy relating to open-source software today at 10 a.m.
• Signal President Meredith Whittaker speaks at a Washington Post Live event today at 1 p.m.
• Rear Adm. Michael Studeman, the commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, speaks at an Intelligence and National Security Alliance event on Wednesday at 9 a.m.
• Gen. Paul Nakasone, who leads the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, speaks at a public forum on a government surveillance authority on Thursday. April Doss and Christopher Fonzone, the top lawyers at the National Security Agency and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, are also slated to speak at the event, which is hosted by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
• Cybersecurity practitioners meet with cybersecurity staffers on Thursday as part of Hackers on the Hill.

Secure log off

Working out together..  pic.twitter.com/jcckO2QNVN

— Buitengebieden (@buitengebieden) January 9, 2023

Thanks for reading. See you tomorrow.

The Washington Post · by Aaron Schaffer · January 10, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com