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Quotes of the Day:
“I would quarrel with both parties, and with every individual of each, before I would subjugate my understanding, or prostitute my tongue or pen to either.”
– John Adams
"Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does."
– Jean-Paul Satre
"Wisdom, properly so called, is nothing but this: the perfect knowledge of the truth in all matters whatsoever."
– Thomas Hoobes
1. Russia Is Using North Korean Missiles in Ukraine: What Happens Next?
2. N. Korea fires suspected IRBM toward East Sea: S. Korean military
3. N. Korea's foreign minister to visit Russia this week
4. N. Korea sends delegation to Non-Aligned Movement summit in Uganda
5. North Korea fires first ballistic missile of the year Sunday
6. Crisis management with North Korea
7. Biden gives greetings on Korean American Day
8. Training soldiers: ideology, discipline and geopolitics (South Korea)
9. Taiwan election result could put S. Korea-China relations to test
10. North Korea launches suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile that can reach distant US bases
11. A Lesson on Human Suffering from a Kibbutz
12. The Age of Middle Powers Has Arrived
13. Interview: How a North Korean defector’s daring escape led him to ROK politics
14. From Moscow to Pyongyang: How Russia’s anger toward West drove it to North Korea by Andrei Lankov
1. Russia Is Using North Korean Missiles in Ukraine: What Happens Next?
Two points to add to Dr. Bechtol's excellent and important analysis. One is that north Korea has its tentacles connected to malign actors around the world and it helps perpetuate chaos and conflict. Second is that we cannot compartmentalize the axis of authoritarians. We need to consider the threats from the revisionist, rogue, and revolutions powers and their actions from a holistic perspective and not ignore one while we try to address others because there is so much connectivity among them all. And this also includes violent extremist organizations because Iran and north Korea to a greater or lesser extent are providing varied levels of direction, advice, and support to them as well.
Conclusion:
What does all of this mean? It means we are now witnessing something no one predicted a year ago. North Korea, a former satellite of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, a state that could not develop its ballistic missile capability without Russian technology, is a crucial cog in supplying weapons that are an important part of Moscow’s plan to prosecute a horrible war against Ukraine. This is not a “game changer.” It is a “game augmenter,” a “game maintainer.” Not only is this happening now, it is likely to happen for the foreseeable future. In addition, this will have spillover effects in Northeast Asia. The technology and cash that Pyongyang receives in return is likely to exacerbate the threat North Korea presents to the South and the wider region.
Russia Is Using North Korean Missiles in Ukraine: What Happens Next?
During the first week of January 2024, American officials confirmed that North Korea had sold dozens of ballistic missiles as well as launchers to the Russians in stark violation of several UN sanctions.
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · January 12, 2024
During the first week of January 2024, American officials confirmed that North Korea had sold dozens of ballistic missiles as well as launchers to the Russians in stark violation of several UN sanctions. This is the first time—ever—that the Russians have purchased ballistic missiles from North Korea. The missiles were actually used in attacks on Ukraine at the end of December and the first week of January. U.S. National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, John Kirby, in a press briefing, predicted that the Russians would be using more of these missiles to target civilian infrastructure and personnel. Thus, the question arises: is this a game-changer in the Ukraine war?
What are these ballistic missiles? Based on assessments from many analysts, it appears that these missiles are what the Pentagon calls “KN-23s.” The North Koreans first started test launching the KN-23 in 2019, which looks remarkably similar to the Russian “Iskander.” A solid-fuel missile is also very accurate—much more accurate than other missiles with similar ranges that North Korea keeps in its arsenal. The “Iskander” is accurate to within thirty to seventy meters of circular error of probability (CEP).
In other words, it is nearly accurate enough to actually target buildings or compounds—making it the perfect weapon to destroy infrastructure or other civilian nodes. It is not known (at least in unclassified sources) how many of these ballistic missiles North Korea has manufactured and can export. But this is not the only effective ballistic missile that North Korea can sell to Russia for the fight in Ukraine. North Korea already has a large number of Scud missiles in its inventory. Pyongyang could ship hundreds of Scud missiles—tomorrow—to Russia. Though far less accurate than the Iskander look-alike, they would effectively target cities and large towns as the ongoing campaign to wear down Ukraine continues.
Now that Russia has received its first shipment of ballistic missiles and launchers from North Korea, it is also involved in a deal to import short-range rockets from Iran. Reportedly, the first deliveries of missiles will arrive this coming spring. Russia, in need of more missiles for the war, likely sought out both North Korea and Iran to help augment its wartime missile inventory. It is even possible that North Korea and Iran are coordinating their shipments of missiles to Russia to make the weapons transfers as efficient as possible. Also possible is that any ballistic missiles Iran transfers to Russia had their design and manufacturing genesis in North Korea—since that is where the majority of liquid fuel-designed systems in Iran’s inventory come from.
The disclosure that both North Korea and Iran are involved in arms deals with Russia to augment Moscow’s missile inventory is not only unprecedented, it is troubling. But it also raises the question, why now? The answer to that question should be obvious. Russia’s military is not a precision-guided force. It is a blunt instrument. Thus, Russia’s use of ballistic missiles has been fairly simple. While these missiles have targeted military targets and industrial infrastructure, they have also targeted cities and towns and any other civilian nodes that were vulnerable to attack. In other words, Russia aims its missiles at more than just strategic targets. They have been used to terrorize the Ukrainian people as well. But this uses up a great number of missiles—apparently more than Russia can replace quickly with its own military supply chain system. Enter Iran and North Korea.
The impact on the battlefield appears to be important but not a paradigm shift. In other words, the missiles that North Korea (and later Iran) are selling to Russia are there to augment what has become a dwindling force because of high-tempo combat operations. The Russians already had the Iskander missile, and whatever types of missiles and drones the Iranians sell them are already represented in their armed forces. But these missiles will allow Russia to continue a high rate of fire and attack on Ukrainian targets, and as such, are extremely important for the outcome of the war.
The next important question then becomes, how long can North Korea maintain the steady flow of missiles to Russia? The number of KN-23 missile systems that North Korea possesses is unknown—at least in unclassified data. But if they don’t have many left (they have already supplied “dozens” to Russia), the North Koreans could always switch to supplying Scud missiles to target cities and towns in Ukraine. Based on the estimated number of North Korean missiles, even without manufacturing new ones, Pyongyang has enough in stock to supply the Russians with dozens of missiles a month for at least thirty-six months. This means the steady flow of missile attacks on Ukraine is unlikely to end any time soon—no matter where the weapons are coming from.
What does all of this mean? It means we are now witnessing something no one predicted a year ago. North Korea, a former satellite of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, a state that could not develop its ballistic missile capability without Russian technology, is a crucial cog in supplying weapons that are an important part of Moscow’s plan to prosecute a horrible war against Ukraine. This is not a “game changer.” It is a “game augmenter,” a “game maintainer.” Not only is this happening now, it is likely to happen for the foreseeable future. In addition, this will have spillover effects in Northeast Asia. The technology and cash that Pyongyang receives in return is likely to exacerbate the threat North Korea presents to the South and the wider region.
About the Author: Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa. Email the author: [email protected].
Image: The main image is from North Korean state media. All others are from Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · January 12, 2024
2. N. Korea fires suspected IRBM toward East Sea: S. Korean military
The playbook remains in use by KJU.
(2nd LD) N. Korea fires suspected IRBM toward East Sea: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 14, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; CHANGES headline)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Jan. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) toward the East Sea on Sunday, South Korea's military said, in its first missile launch this year.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from an area in or around Pyongyang at about 2:55 p.m., without providing further details, pending an analysis.
"While sharing information related to the launched 'North Korean missile' with U.S. and Japanese authorities, our military is maintaining a full readiness posture," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.
In an interview with Yonhap News Agency last week, South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said the North could test-fire new IRBMs as early as this month after the country claimed to have staged solid-fuel engine tests for a new type of IRBM in November.
An IRBM, which has a range of up to 5,500 kilometers, would place the U.S. territory of Guam within range if fired from Pyongyang.
Solid-fuel missiles are known to be harder to detect ahead of launch than liquid-propellant ones that require more prelaunch preparations, such as the injection of fuel.
This file photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 18, 2022, shows what the North claims to be a tactical guided missile being launched the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The North has pressed ahead with its missile development program, firing a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile at a lofted trajectory into the East Sea on Dec. 18.
The latest launch comes amid heightened tensions after North Korea fired artillery shells near the maritime border in the Yellow Sea from Jan. 5 to 7, prompting the South to stage live-fire drills from its northwestern border islands.
Last week, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said he has no intention of avoiding war with South Korea, and threatened to annihilate the South if it attempts to use force against the North.
South Korean officials have said the North is likely to stage provocative acts early this year and escalate tensions ahead of South Korea's general elections in April.
The launch also came just before North Korean state media said its Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui will visit Russia from Monday through Wednesday in the latest sign of growing bilateral ties.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 14, 2024
3. N. Korea's foreign minister to visit Russia this week
Two members of the axis of authoritarians.
(LEAD) N. Korea's foreign minister to visit Russia this week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · January 14, 2024
(ATTN: CHANGES photo; ADDS details)
SEOUL, Jan. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui will visit Russia this week, state media said Sunday, amid indications of growing military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow.
"Choe Son Hui, minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, will pay an official visit to the Russian Federation from January 15 to 17 at the invitation of its Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov," the North's official Korean Central News Agency said in a one-line dispatch.
The visit will come as North Korea and Russia have been accused of exchanging weapons and military technology in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions since a September summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a Russian spaceport.
Last week, the White House said Russia recently fired additional North Korean ballistic missiles into Ukraine following earlier such launches on Dec. 30 and Jan. 2.
Both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied any such arms transfers.
Choe is expected to meet with Lavrov during her visit to Russia, which will come three months after they last met in Pyongyang in October.
This file image captured from the North's Korean Central Television shows North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (R) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a meeting in Pyongyang on Oct. 19, 2023. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · January 14, 2024
4. N. Korea sends delegation to Non-Aligned Movement summit in Uganda
I think one of the liens of effort for Kim is to assert a role in the Non Aligned Movement.
N. Korea sends delegation to Non-Aligned Movement summit in Uganda | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · January 14, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has sent a government delegation to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Uganda, state media said Sunday.
According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), a delegation headed by Kim Son-kyong, vice foreign minister for international organizations, departed Pyongyang on Saturday to attend the summit scheduled for Jan. 15-20.
The NAM is a forum of 120 countries not aligned with any major power bloc, and North Korea has been an active member since the days of its founding leader Kim Il-sung.
While in Uganda, the delegation will also attend the Third South Summit, the top decision-making forum of the Group of 77 developing nations, according to the KCNA. The meeting will be held Jan. 21-23.
North Korea's attendance at the series of summits is seen as a fulfillment of leader Kim Jong-un's new year instructions to strengthen relations with anti-United States forces.
Kim Son-kyong (L), North Korea's vice foreign minister for international organizations, departs Pyongyang to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Uganda in this photo captured from the website of the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · January 14, 2024
5. North Korea fires first ballistic missile of the year Sunday
Sunday
January 14, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 14 Jan. 2024, 16:27
Updated: 14 Jan. 2024, 17:08
North Korea fires first ballistic missile of the year Sunday
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-14/national/northKorea/North-Korea-fires-first-ballistic-missile-of-the-year-Sunday/1958123
In this footage released by Pyongyang's state-controlled Korean Central Television on Dec. 19, a North Korean Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile is launched from an unspecified location toward the East Sea the previous day. [YONHAP]
North Korea fired its first ballistic missile of the year toward the East Sea on Sunday, South Korean military authorities said.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch on Sunday afternoon and that it believes the missile in question was an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
The last missile fired by the North was a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which landed in the East Sea on Dec. 18.
The latest missile launch came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said his regime should recalibrate its approach to South Korea, which he said should be considered the North’s “main enemy,” not “a partner in unification and reconciliation.”
The North on Saturday appeared to have halted transmissions from Pyongyang Radio, a radio station previously used to send encrypted messages to its spies in the South.
Pyongyang Radio is best known for broadcasting mysterious numbers, which are believed to be coded directives to its agents in the South.
The North resumed the cryptic broadcasts in 2016 after a 16-year suspension.
Pyongyang’s state media reported on Saturday that the regime also decided at a meeting held the previous day to disband organizations in charge of civilian exchanges with the South.
According to the state-controlled Korean Central News Agency, participants at the meeting also called for a new inter-Korean approach that pursues the “complete elimination” of “South Korean puppets,” whom it described as seeking the collapse of the North Korean regime and its unification by absorption into the South.
Related Article
State media also reported that North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui led discussions earlier this month to dismantle the United Front Department in charge of relations with the South.
North Korea has ramped up acts seen as provocative by the South since Kim characterized ties between the two Koreas as relations “between two states hostile to each other” and called for preparations to “take over the whole territory of South Korea” at a key meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party held at the end of last month.
During a two-day inspection of major munitions factories from Jan. 8 to 9, Kim also said his regime does “not have any intent to avoid war” with the South should it “conspire to use armed force” against the North, warning it “will not hesitate to annihilate” the South using “all means and forces available” in the event of an armed conflict.
The previous weekend, the North fired hundreds of artillery shells from its western coast into the Yellow Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which serves as the de facto inter-Korean maritime border.
In response, the South Korean military said on Jan. 8 it will restart live artillery exercises and drills near the border, adding the North’s recent exercise had effectively scrapped the buffer zone where such drills were banned.
Under the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, all provocative actions, including firing coastal guns and conducting naval exercises, were prohibited in a buffer zone that extended 85 kilometers (52.8 miles) south and 50 kilometers north of the NLL, as well as a separate 80-kilometer-wide zone in the East Sea.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
6. Crisis management with North Korea
Excerpts:
Defense Minister Shin Won-sik shows a strong determination to retaliate against the North’s provocations “immediately, powerfully and to the last minute.” But the government must not ignore the need for crisis management at the same time. If the presidential office and all security-related ministries only raise strong voices, it will certainly help escalate the likelihood of a regional military clash or a bigger conflict.
President Yoon Suk Yeol needs to send messages more prudently. Shortly after the presidential election in Taiwan, U.S. President Joe Biden started crisis management saying he doesn’t want Taiwan’s independence.
Our Foreign Ministry must demonstrate flexibility, and the Unification Ministry must find its appropriate role and solutions to address the North Korean leader’s declaration of “two different states at war.” The government also must reinforce the Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and advance the extended deterrence.
Sunday
January 14, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 14 Jan. 2024, 20:00
Crisis management with North Korea
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-14/opinion/editorials/Crisis-management-with-North-Korea/1958222
Lai Ching-te, the presidential candidate from Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive party, won the election on Saturday. Lai, a pro-U.S. politician, advocates for Taiwan’s independence and even wants to use English as the country’s official language. Upon his nomination as the presidential candidate of the party, China called him a “traitor” and “trouble maker” in the same context as President Xi Jinping’s emphasis of “One China” in December. If China-Taiwan relations deteriorate, it will likely heighten the tensions in U.S.-China relations and Northeast Asia security.
The problem is the possibility of North Korea pushing the security situation to the limits. At the year-end full meeting of the Workers’ Party, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called the two Koreas “two hostile countries at war,” not the previous “same people countries.” His declaration violates the 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges, which defined the inter-Korean relations as “special ones.” Kim’s proclamation translates into a rejection of unification based on the principle “one people and one nation, and two political systems and two governments.” In the 2000 summit in Pyongyang, his father Kim Jong-il signed the June 15 Joint Declaration which recognized commonalities between the South’s proposal for a loose association of the two states and the North’s proposal for a low-level federal system.
Kim Jong-un’s portrayal of the South-North relations as “countries at war” and his pledge to “conquer the entire territory of South Korea” means a threat to unify the divided land with nuclear weapons. North Koran experts like Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker evaluated the peninsula situation as the most tense since the Korean War.
Defense Minister Shin Won-sik shows a strong determination to retaliate against the North’s provocations “immediately, powerfully and to the last minute.” But the government must not ignore the need for crisis management at the same time. If the presidential office and all security-related ministries only raise strong voices, it will certainly help escalate the likelihood of a regional military clash or a bigger conflict.
President Yoon Suk Yeol needs to send messages more prudently. Shortly after the presidential election in Taiwan, U.S. President Joe Biden started crisis management saying he doesn’t want Taiwan’s independence.
Our Foreign Ministry must demonstrate flexibility, and the Unification Ministry must find its appropriate role and solutions to address the North Korean leader’s declaration of “two different states at war.” The government also must reinforce the Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and advance the extended deterrence.
7. Biden gives greetings on Korean American Day
Biden gives greetings on Korean American Day
The Korea Times · January 14, 2024
President Joe Biden speaks in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, Oct. 4, 2023, in Washington. AP-Yonhap
U.S. President Joe Biden issued a message to celebrate Korean American Day on Saturday, highlighting Korean Americans' "immense contributions" to the United States and their efforts to "enrich" the country.
Korean American Day honors the Korean American community's contributions and marks the arrival of the first Korean immigrants to the U.S. on Jan. 13, 1903. In 2005, both the House of Representatives and Senate passed resolutions for celebration of the day.
"Through their steadfast devotion to family and community and their willingness to serve a cause greater than any one person, the strength and spirit of the Korean American community have propelled this land of opportunity toward a brighter future for all," he said in the message.
Biden stressed that Korean Americans continue to enrich the U.S. as entrepreneurs, lawyers, public servants and service members among many others.
"As we celebrate this wonderful occasion, we are reminded of the importance of honoring and reflecting on our roots no matter where we are," he said.
"The immense contributions of Korean Americans everywhere demonstrate that, in our great nation, there is nothing beyond our capacity when we work together," he added. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · January 14, 2024
8. Training soldiers: ideology, discipline and geopolitics (South Korea)
Excerpt:
In conclusion, the transformation in military training over the centuries reflects a broader shift in societal values, technological advancements and geopolitical challenges. The question of "why we fight" has evolved from a straightforward command to a complex narrative encompassing national identity, global security and moral responsibility. As the world continues to change, so too will the narratives that shape the minds and actions of those who defend it.
Training soldiers: ideology, discipline and geopolitics
The Korea Times · January 14, 2024
By Chun In-bum
Chun In-bum
The Prussian Army, renowned for its strict discipline, laid the foundation for military training that evolved over centuries. From the 18th century to the end of World War I in 1918, the Royal Army of Prussia was a beacon of military discipline in Europe. This legacy of discipline set the stage for military training during the 20th century, particularly during the two World Wars and the Cold War era.
Unquestioning obedience, a hallmark of the Prussian military tradition, was crucial for maintaining large, conscript armies. However, in democratic societies, where individualistic thinking flourishes, simply commanding a soldier isn't enough. One must explain the reasons behind the orders to gain compliance. This nuance, while integral to the democratic spirit, poses challenges in training citizen-soldiers.
During World War II, the U.S. Army's “Troop Information” programs used films, radio, pamphlets and lectures to instill patriotism and shape perceptions of the enemy. This period marked a significant shift from strict discipline to ideological education, continuing until the end of conscription in 1973.
In contrast, communist regimes relied on a simple, yet powerful message of equality, freedom and fairness, often overshadowing individual identity. This approach, effective until its promises proved hollow, was a potent tool against young democracies struggling with everyday problems. The fall of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in China to communist forces is a stark example of the power of ideological warfare. In response, Chiang established the Political Operations Bureau and School in Taiwan to uphold the Republic of China's ideals and protect its political system.
Similarly, the Republic of Korea's “Troop Information and Education" (TIE) service represents a modern iteration of ideological training. Comprising a separate branch with educated officers, the TIE ensures soldiers understand their purpose in serving. This understanding is vital for a country with a history of complex relations with neighbors like Japan and ongoing threats from the North.
The "Why We Fight" narrative is primarily the responsibility of unit commanders, supported by TIE officers. The Korean Ministry of National Defense provides materials to aid in this educational effort. However, sensitivities arise, as seen in the recent controversy where the Ministry’s publication omitted Dokdo, sparking public and presidential criticism. This incident underscores the delicate balance in ROK-Japan relations, marred by historical grievances yet necessitated by mutual security interests against North Korea's military threat and an aggressive Chinese.
President Yoon’s administration in South Korea, while taking considerable hits in approval ratings, exemplifies the tough decisions leaders must make in prioritizing long-term geopolitical stability over short-term popularity. The challenges faced by Korea and Japan won’t disappear, and mutual understanding is essential. Especially Japan must understand, from this incident, the level of challenge that the relationship faces.
This also extends to the realm of soldier training, where understanding "why we fight" is as crucial as knowing "how to fight." This intricate web of historical legacy, ideological indoctrination and geopolitical necessities shapes not just the soldier but also the society from which they come. The present-day South Korean military not only trains but also recruits soldiers, which requires a more nuanced approach to instilling commitment and understanding the larger geopolitical context. This necessitated a more comprehensive and appealing narrative that went beyond the simplistic dichotomy of us versus them.
In countries with ongoing conscription, like South Korea, the ideological component of military training remains critically important. The existential threat posed by North Korea requires a consistent reinforcement of the reasons for service, going beyond mere nationalism. It involves creating a deep understanding among the soldiers of the fragile geopolitical balance on the Korean Peninsula and the role they play in maintaining it. This is especially true of the importance of understanding the ROK-Japan relationship despite the difference in interpretation of history regarding comfort women and forced labor by segments of Japanese society, as well as territorial claims.
Furthermore, the role of technology in military training cannot be overstated. With advancements in virtual reality, simulation and artificial intelligence, soldiers are now trained in environments that closely mimic real-world scenarios, yet another dimension in understanding the "why" of their fight. This technological leap has also influenced the ideological aspects of training, as soldiers must now understand and engage with complex, often abstract threats in the digital realm.
In conclusion, the transformation in military training over the centuries reflects a broader shift in societal values, technological advancements and geopolitical challenges. The question of "why we fight" has evolved from a straightforward command to a complex narrative encompassing national identity, global security and moral responsibility. As the world continues to change, so too will the narratives that shape the minds and actions of those who defend it.
Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.
The Korea Times · January 14, 2024
9. Taiwan election result could put S. Korea-China relations to test
Taiwan election result could put S. Korea-China relations to test
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung;Kim Arin · January 14, 2024
By Son Ji-hyoung, Kim Arin
Published : Jan. 14, 2024 - 18:28
Taiwan President-elect Lai Ching-te, of Democratic Progressive Party's gestures as he attends a rally following the victory in the presidential elections, in Taipei, Taiwan on Jan. 13. (Reuters-Yonhap)
The victory of Lai Ching-te of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party in the presidential election on Saturday will put the relationship between South Korea and China to the test, given Seoul's unique geopolitical position and the need to strike a balance between Beijing and Washington, according to experts in Seoul on Sunday.
As China effectively refused to accept the result of the high-stakes election, concerns are mounting as South Korea's Yoon Suk Yeol administration has been openly tilting toward cooperation with the United States and Japan to handle nuclear provocations on the Korean Peninsula.
In particular, Yoon has reiterated his stance of opposing China's attempt to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force, unlike previous South Korean administrations.
An expert said that the new Taiwanese leader’s emphasis on closer alignment with the pro-democracy bloc was something he has in common with the current South Korean administration.
“Lai touched on the message of democracy versus authoritarianism in his speech to a victory rally, which resonates with our administration’s efforts to strengthen the alliance with countries with shared values such as the US and Japan,” said Cho Hyung-jin, a Chinese studies professor at Incheon National University.
Although Biden said after Saturday's election that he "(does) not support independence (of Taiwan)," in line with China's stance, geopolitical concerns in the region surrounding the Taiwan Strait are mounting. Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office was quoted as saying by Xinhua News Agency that Lai's victory "cannot represent the mainstream public opinion on the island."
South Korea's government official was quoted as saying by the Yonhap News Agency that Seoul "expect(s) peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait to be maintained and the peaceful development of cross-strait relations."
Moreover, from South Korea's standpoint, the country cannot ignore the Taiwan Straits' significance as a vital shipping route for South Korean trade, as nearly half of all container ships to and from South Korean ports travel along the strait between China's mainland and Taiwan.
A fishing boat sails at the north end of Pingtan Island, the closest point in China to Taiwan's main island, in China's southeast Fujian province on Jan. 14, the morning after Taiwan's presidential election. (AFP-Yonhap)
An eruption of geopolitical conflict in the region might not only make it difficult for Seoul to find a middle ground, but also hamper the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, because China's role in the process is crucial, another expert said.
"Korea will be worse off in handling the situation on the Korean Peninsula should the conflict between China and the United States deepen," said Kang Jun-young, professor of China studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
"Putting diplomatic pressure on China could never be a top priority from South Korea's perspective, unlike the US and Japan."
Seoul has long sought to improve its relationship with China by inviting Chinese President Xi Jinping to South Korea for talks -- via either a bilateral meeting or a three-way meeting with the Japanese leader. This was in hopes of improving ties with its largest trade partner.
Separately, Yoon's office said in September that Seoul is working to invite Xi to South Korea, after Xi was quoted as saying by a South Korean senior government official that he had floated his intention to visit Seoul during his meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo in Hangzhou, China.
Yoon last met Xi during a three-minute encounter in November, just before the APEC formal session began in San Francisco.
But it takes both sides to improve the momentum in bilateral relations, and this is unlikely for now, Kang said.
"China has been far from enthusiastic in restoring ties with South Korea, believing that it can manage (diplomatic pressure from) South Korea," he said.
"South Korea is unlikely to go further than repeatedly calling for the widely accepted international standards such as liberal democracy and a market-oriented economy."
Lee Sang-man, director of the China Research Center at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies, said China may choose to work to improve its relationship with South Korea "as long as Seoul maintains the status quo" on its diplomatic front.
"The fate of South Korea's ties with China lies in how the relations of China and the United States unravel," Lee said.
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung;Kim Arin · January 14, 2024
10. North Korea launches suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile that can reach distant US bases
Political warfare and blackmail diplomacy.
Excerpts:
Experts say Kim likely wants to see South Korean liberals win the election and pursue rapprochement with North Korea, and for former U.S. President Donald Trump to be elected again. They say Kim may believe he could win U.S. concessions like sanctions relief if Trump returns to the White House.
Negotiations over North Korea’s advancing nuclear arsenal have been dormant since the Kim-Trump diplomacy broke down in 2019. Kim has since focused on enlarging his nuclear and missile arsenals in what foreign analysts is an effort to boost his leverage. In recent months, North Korea has also been expanding its military and other cooperation with Russia.
The U.S. government said it has evidence that missiles provided by North Korea to Russia had been used in the war in Ukraine. In a joint statement last week, the U.S., South Korea and their partners said the missile transfer supports Russia’s war of aggression and provides North Korea with valuable technical and military insights.
North Korea and Russia announced Sunday that North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui will visit Russia from Monday to Wednesday at the invitation of her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.
“Pyongyang’s show of force should be of concern beyond Seoul, as its military cooperation with Moscow adds to the violence in Ukraine, and because it may be more willing to challenge the U.S. and its allies while global attention is fixed on the Middle East,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.
North Korea launches suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile that can reach distant US bases
The Washington Post · by Hyung-Jin Kim | AP · January 14, 2024
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea fired a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile into the sea on Sunday, South Korea’s military said, two months after the North claimed to have tested engines for a new harder-to-detect missile capable of striking distant U.S. targets in the region.
The launch was the North’s first this year. Experts say North Korea could ramp up its provocative missile tests as a way to influence the results of South Korea’s parliamentary elections in April and the U.S. presidential election in November.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement that it detected the launch of a ballistic missile of an intermediate-range class from the North’s capital region on Sunday afternoon. It said the missile flew about 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) before landing in the waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff called the launch a provocation that poses a serious threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula. It said South Korea’s military will maintain its readiness to overwhelmingly respond to any provocations by North Korea.
The South Korean assessment suggests North Korea could have launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, whose solid-fuel engine it said it had tested in mid-November.
The missile is mainly designed to hit U.S. military bases in the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam, which is about 3,400 kilometers (2,110 miles) from Pyongyang, the North’s capital. With a range adjustment, the missile can also be used to attack closer targets — the U.S. military installations in Japan’s Okinawa island, according to Chang Young-keun, a missile expert at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy in Seoul.
Built-in solid propellants make missile launches harder to detect than liquid-fueled missiles, which must be fueled before launch and cannot last long. North Korea has a growing arsenal of solid-fuel short-range missiles targeting South Korea, but its existing Hwasong-12 intermediate-range missile is powered by liquid-fuel engines.
Japan’s Defense Ministry said its analysis showed the missile traveled at least 500 kilometers (300 miles) at the maximum altitude of 50 kilometers (30 miles), data that suggest North Korea may have fired a short-range and not an intermediate-range missile.
Japan and South Korea said they closely exchanged information about the launch with the United States, but they didn’t immediately explain the discrepancy in data.
The last time North Korea performed a missile launch that was publicly announced was Dec. 18, when it test-fired its Hwasong-18 solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile, the North’s most advanced weapon. The Hwasong-18 is the country’s only known solid-fuel ICBM and it’s designed to strike the mainland U.S.
On Jan. 5, North Korea fired a barrage of artillery shells near the disputed western sea boundary with South Korea, prompting South Korea to conduct similar firing exercises in the same area. South Korea accused North Korea of continuing similar artillery barrage in the area for the next two days. The site is where the navies of the two Koreas have fought three bloody sea battles since 1999, and attacks blamed on North Korea killed 50 South Koreans in 2010.
In recent days, North Korea has also been escalating its warlike, inflammatory rhetoric against its foes ahead of an election year in South Korea and the U.S. Leader Kim Jong Un, during visits last week to munitions factories, called South Korea “our principal enemy” and threatened to annihilate it if provoked.
Experts say Kim likely wants to see South Korean liberals win the election and pursue rapprochement with North Korea, and for former U.S. President Donald Trump to be elected again. They say Kim may believe he could win U.S. concessions like sanctions relief if Trump returns to the White House.
Negotiations over North Korea’s advancing nuclear arsenal have been dormant since the Kim-Trump diplomacy broke down in 2019. Kim has since focused on enlarging his nuclear and missile arsenals in what foreign analysts is an effort to boost his leverage. In recent months, North Korea has also been expanding its military and other cooperation with Russia.
The U.S. government said it has evidence that missiles provided by North Korea to Russia had been used in the war in Ukraine. In a joint statement last week, the U.S., South Korea and their partners said the missile transfer supports Russia’s war of aggression and provides North Korea with valuable technical and military insights.
North Korea and Russia announced Sunday that North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui will visit Russia from Monday to Wednesday at the invitation of her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.
“Pyongyang’s show of force should be of concern beyond Seoul, as its military cooperation with Moscow adds to the violence in Ukraine, and because it may be more willing to challenge the U.S. and its allies while global attention is fixed on the Middle East,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.
___
Associated Press writer Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Hyung-Jin Kim | AP · January 14, 2024
11. A Lesson on Human Suffering from a Kibbutz
Excerpts:
The last house I entered was a house of a slain young couple that were due to be married very soon. Instead, flies, a splattering of blood, and the smell of death. The celling was riddled with holes from a terrorist grenade.
When I left the house, I was confronted by the parents of a young man who died in the house. I was not ready for that. As a parent, what do you say to a parent who’s lost a piece of themselves in this way? I froze up.
“I am sorry for your loss,” I said, peering into both the father and mother’s eyes to see their eternal pain. I put my hand over my heart and tried to express my condolences. I then walked away.
A moment later, talking to my IDF escort, the father approached me.
He said “please, please don’t let people forget.”
It was a refrain those of us of my generation, who lived through 9/11 and fought in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, heard often. But it has gone out of style. Most of us barely even pause to reflect on 9/11 anymore. We’ve moved on.
When something so horrific a nation, the initial shock gives way to outrage but after those emotions burn out, a kind of apathy sets in.
I'll never forget what I saw in Kfar Aza—the smell, the hovering flies. I hope others should not either.
A Lesson on Human Suffering from a Kibbutz
BY JOHN SPENCERJANUARY 12, 2024 1:47 PM EST
Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project and host of the “Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He served for 25 years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book “Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War” and co-author of “Understanding Urban Warfare.” The views expressed in this commentary are his own.
TIME
Flies will feast on human remnants long after the bodies have been removed. They hover like vultures, the last witnesses to death.
I never get used to seeing them. Or the distinct smell of death. It conjures up an image of a crematorium—or a slaughterhouse.
I saw—and smelled the burnt taste of death—the aftermath of Bucha, where Russians slaughtered Ukrainian civilians on the outskirts of Kyiv. I witnessed the aftermath of massacres of civilians carried out by al-Qaeda forces in Baghdad.
But nothing quite prepared me for Kfar Aza, a kibbutz in southern Israel that had the beauty of the most imaginable oasis—palm trees, colorful flowers and plants, a flowing breeze. The dichotomy of seeing that beauty and the familiar visuals, carnage, smells, flies of a massacre site were overwhelming.
Even several months after October 7, the smell of death lingers, especially inside the squat and otherwise plain-looking houses where civilians were slain, many of them in their sleep.
Strolling through the kibbutz, I noticed markings on all the homes familiar to anyone who has fought in a war zone. These were signs notifying a house has been cleared.
But I also spied a circle with a dot in it—like the Target logo. I was told it is the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) sign for a civilian body still present in the house.
I saw circles with a dot almost everywhere I looked.
Kfar Aza was the site of a pre-planned, pre-meditated slaughter of an entire village. It was not, as I had seen in the dumpsters of social media, civilians accidentally caught in Hamas’ crossfire, as they attacked military sites.
Bullet holes are seen in a window where militants attacked during the October 7th massacre on January 04, 2024 in Kfar Aza, Israel. Noam Galai-Getty Images
At the U.S. Army’s elite Ranger School, I taught soldiers how to conduct sophisticated raids and pull off ambushes with clock-like precision. What I saw at Kfar Aza was a highly planned and executed attack.
The first Hamas terrorists arrived by paraglider. A few dozen at first, then more, quickly moved to seal the village’s perimeter. Snipers moved to support by fire positions on key high ground to cut the armory in the village off from the men in the village.
Another platoon of Hamas fighters edged their way deeper into Israel to establish ambushes along key roads to Kfar Aza where any outside military support would come.
They acted methodically and with a level of care that would make any commander envious. They planted anti-tank and anti-personnel mines to established a deliberate defense of the village’s perimeter. They brought pint-size medical kits to care for their wounded, including morphine. They packed their own food—dates and figs, mostly.
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Once isolated, they went house to house, methodically killing, mutilating, and kidnapping. Their tools were the familiar stuff of asymmetric warzones: AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a variety of grenades, kidnapping kits of plastic flex cuffs. They even had specially designed incendiary grenades (to burn houses).Less familiar to modern warzones was the large butcher knives they left behind.
Many of the terrorists were reportedly high on the drug captagon, an amphetamine like speed with hallucinogenic features. Each of the death squads had its own guidebook including instructions like —take the tires from the Israelis’ vehicles, light the tires on fire and throw them into the houses, it will kill and burn them at the same time. There was little thought given on which house to burn first. The randomness of evil is part of its sickness.
As I walked through the village, I saw scene after scene of this evil sickness—children’s rooms riddled with bullets, blood splattered LEGOs. Entire families slaughter and their bodies burned clutching each other. The most awful were the safe rooms.
Every house in the kibbutz has what, in effect, resembles a bomb shelter. Many turned into nurseries or kids rooms. They had windows and thin doors that could not lock. When the alarms sounded, most civilians entered these underground bunkers thinking they were safe. Yet they became the scenes of some of the most horrific acts.
I heard stories of parents clutching the door shut by hand, as bullets strayed by. A terrorist appeared suddenly at the window—like something out of a bad horror film. A father or mother full of bullet holes holding the door closed with their last breaths as the terrorist yanked it open.
They sprayed the bunkers with bullets or tossed in a grenade, smoke from burning tires filled the room. All life was soon exterminated.
The killing continued for hours. Over time what appeared to be non-Hamas Gazans arrived and scavenged the houses for loot, stepping over dead women, children, elderly. Some spirited Israelis back into Gaza.
The last house I entered was a house of a slain young couple that were due to be married very soon. Instead, flies, a splattering of blood, and the smell of death. The celling was riddled with holes from a terrorist grenade.
When I left the house, I was confronted by the parents of a young man who died in the house. I was not ready for that. As a parent, what do you say to a parent who’s lost a piece of themselves in this way? I froze up.
“I am sorry for your loss,” I said, peering into both the father and mother’s eyes to see their eternal pain. I put my hand over my heart and tried to express my condolences. I then walked away.
A moment later, talking to my IDF escort, the father approached me.
He said “please, please don’t let people forget.”
It was a refrain those of us of my generation, who lived through 9/11 and fought in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, heard often. But it has gone out of style. Most of us barely even pause to reflect on 9/11 anymore. We’ve moved on.
When something so horrific a nation, the initial shock gives way to outrage but after those emotions burn out, a kind of apathy sets in.
I'll never forget what I saw in Kfar Aza—the smell, the hovering flies. I hope others should not either.
TIME
12. The Age of Middle Powers Has Arrived
Excerpts:
Rather than being excessively selective in choosing regional partners, the focus should be identifying active regional powers willing to collaborate on specific issues. Viewing all regionally hegemonic ambitions as threats risks alienating middle powers and turning entire regions against the West. The key lies in fostering partnerships with at least one ambitious middle power in each region amenable to collaboration. While acknowledging the potential risks of increasing regional hegemony, the reality of a prolonged power transition demands a nuanced approach. Carefully cultivating friendships with regionally ambitious and assertive middle powers remains a preferable strategy to outright confrontation, considering the inevitability of clashing interests in this period of global instability.
The expanding role of middle powers in the evolving multipolar world presents challenges and opportunities for global players. As the dynamics continue to shift, adapting strategies to engage with middle powers becomes imperative. The world is in flux, and embracing a flexible and inclusive approach to international relations is essential to navigate this complex landscape.
The Age of Middle Powers Has Arrived
The expanding role of middle powers in the evolving multipolar world presents both challenges and opportunities for global players.
The National Interest · by Ali Mammadov · January 13, 2024
At the dawn of the new year, the geopolitical landscape underwent a transformative shift with the expansion of the BRICS to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia. This development has brought fresh attention to the reconfiguration of the global order, the ascent of multipolarity, and the increasingly influential role of middle powers. Despite their limited capabilities compared to great powers, middle powers strategically leverage the evolving global power distribution to secure opportunities for themselves.
Acknowledging that great powers rely on them for global influence, middle powers engage in power games, oscillating between collaboration and opposition to further their own interests. Generally, intensive high-stakes competition among great powers and sporadic collaboration present fertile grounds for middle powers to assert their influence. This prompts a critical examination of the evolving dynamics in international relations and the necessity for a nuanced approach in the face of an increasingly multipolar world.
In the aftermath of World War II, the globe was divided into two poles of power, compelling middle powers to align with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Genuine independent foreign policy for middle powers was nearly non-existent. The collapse of the Soviet Union presented a less binary choice: align with the U.S.-led world order or pursue an independent path. However, opting against the sole global superpower risked forgoing the security guarantees and economic benefits that accompanied alignment. Consequently, many middle powers aligned with the U.S.-led order, actively participating in international organizations.
The unipolar moment gradually waned as the relative global influence of the United States diminished. Factors such as the rise of China's economic power and its ability to attract allies, the 2008 global financial crisis, the substantial costs incurred during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and the overall empowerment of middle powers contributed to this paradigm shift. This diminishing influence posed challenges for the United States and its allies in advancing collective interests worldwide, creating a cadre of middle powers more inclined to take bold actions.
While the world still exhibits elements of bipolarity, with the United States maintaining unchallenged superpower status in certain aspects and the rise of China, it has begun to take a distinctive shape. The increasing relevance and confidence of middle powers signify a shift toward multipolarity. A rising China-led bloc provides middle powers with alternatives, reducing their dependence on the United States. In a multipolar world, middle powers gain even more options, independence, and, consequently, more leverage. This translates into increased assertiveness and a departure from unquestioning obedience to one side. The notion that a world with multiple global powers fosters bold and assertive actions is exemplified by several middle powers. Powerful middle powers in various regions are displaying heightened interest in regional hegemony.
Turkey's recent activity in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa, and its active role in Ukraine and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; Brazil's aspirations to be the voice of Latin America and the Global South; and India's expanding global and regional ambitions exemplify this trend. Turkey's strategic U-turn, transitioning to a more independent and assertive actor in the Middle East, perfectly illustrates the impact of multiple poles of power on middle power behavior. Theoretically, the relative decline of hegemony has contributed to increased nationalist surges, regional crises, global weakening of institutions, and a pursuit of more independent foreign policies by middle powers.
Addressing the evolving world order requires the United States and its allies to acknowledge the changing dynamics realistically. Middle powers are gaining leverage in choosing their partners, potentially presenting new challenges for the United States. These powers are also more likely to become even more assertive in their demands and ambitions. The era where the United States could effortlessly secure compliance and support is fading, as evidenced by recent UN voting patterns. The United States needs a more nuanced strategy to navigate this shifting landscape.
Rather than being excessively selective in choosing regional partners, the focus should be identifying active regional powers willing to collaborate on specific issues. Viewing all regionally hegemonic ambitions as threats risks alienating middle powers and turning entire regions against the West. The key lies in fostering partnerships with at least one ambitious middle power in each region amenable to collaboration. While acknowledging the potential risks of increasing regional hegemony, the reality of a prolonged power transition demands a nuanced approach. Carefully cultivating friendships with regionally ambitious and assertive middle powers remains a preferable strategy to outright confrontation, considering the inevitability of clashing interests in this period of global instability.
The expanding role of middle powers in the evolving multipolar world presents challenges and opportunities for global players. As the dynamics continue to shift, adapting strategies to engage with middle powers becomes imperative. The world is in flux, and embracing a flexible and inclusive approach to international relations is essential to navigate this complex landscape.
Ali Mammadov is a recent graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies with a focus on the economics and security of the Eurasia region. Follow him on Twitter: @alimammadoov.
Image: sefayildirim / Shutterstock.com
The National Interest · by Ali Mammadov · January 13, 2024
13. Interview: How a North Korean defector’s daring escape led him to ROK politics
Interview: How a North Korean defector’s daring escape led him to ROK politics
https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/interview-how-a-north-korean-defectors-daring-escape-led-him-to-rok-politics/?utm
Park Choong-kwon went from studying missiles in DPRK to working at Hyundai Steel and advising the South’s ruling party
Joon Ha Park January 12, 2024
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Park Choong-kwon at a welcoming ceremony for new recruits of the People Power Party at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul. | Image: People Power Party (Jan. 8, 2024)
When Park Choong-kwon made the decision to flee North Korea, he had no idea where his risky attempt to escape would lead, only that he could not stay in the country he had always called home.
Fifteen years later, he has a Ph.D. in materials engineering from South Korea’s top university and a job as a senior researcher at Hyundai Steel, specializing in automotive components.
His stunning success — going from studying ballistic missile technology at the DPRK’s National Defense University to working for one of the ROK’s biggest companies — has not gone without notice, and last month, South Korea’s ruling People Power Party recruited Park to join and serve as an adviser on inter-Korean relations, defector issues and the manufacturing industry ahead of elections this spring.
In an interview with NK News, Park recounts the story of his escape from his hometown of Hamhung back in April 2009 and explains why the decision to enter South Korean politics was more difficult than his decision to defect.
The 37-year-old Park also discusses his views on inter-Korean and human rights policy and his “dual identity” as a South Korean citizen from the North.
The following interview has been edited for readability, clarity and style.
NK News: Why did you decide to defect?
Park Choong-kwon: By the time I graduated from university, I had realized how completely wrong and corrupt the North Korean regime was and decided that I had to defect.
I couldn’t share my plan with my family because I believed it would put them in danger. The planning took about a year and 6 months and there were many tasks involved, such as finding a broker and planning the best route for defection.
In April 2009, the timing finally seemed right. North Korea had declared a launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, ostensibly carrying a satellite. This launch coincided with my defection date, and North Korea was in a celebratory mood. Taking advantage of this celebratory atmosphere, I proceeded with my defection in the early hours of the next day.
There was a route that was more expensive but allowed for a faster departure, and another route that was less costly but could take 3 to 5 months. According to the broker, the risk levels were similar for both. Considering that time was more crucial [to avoid being caught], I chose the first route and ended up paying more than 10 million won.
The brokers had prepared a South Korean passport for me, but surprisingly, the photo in the passport wasn’t even my own face. However, during the border checks, the Chinese police who stamped my passport didn’t even bother checking. It became evident that even those individuals were part of a connected network.
Park Choong-kwon studied intercontinental ballistic missile technology at North Korea’s National Defense University before defecting to South Korea. | Image: Photo courtesy of Park Choong-kwon
NK News: What have been your most memorable moments since settling in Seoul?
Park: One of my most memorable moments was when I acquired South Korean citizenship. It was an incredibly proud and fulfilling experience. When I decided to defect from North Korea, it was a challenging and sorrowful decision. The sense of loss I felt at that time amplified the pride I felt upon gaining South Korean citizenship.
Crossing the Tumen River marked the moment I became an international orphan, losing my nationality. From that moment, I transformed from someone who couldn’t confidently declare their North Korean origin to a proud young individual from a country recognized as an advanced nation.
NK News: In an interview with South Korean media, you mentioned that you have a “dual identity.” What did you mean by that?
Park: I have a relatively high understanding and deep affection for both North and South Korea because I left at an age when I understood North Korean society well but it was also relatively easy for me to adapt to a different society.
If you defect at a very young age, it might be challenging to comprehend the intricacies of North Korean society. Conversely, if you defect at an older age, it might be challenging to assimilate into South Korean society.
After arriving in South Korea, I pursued a doctorate in engineering, leveraging my expertise. I worked in the manufacturing industry for four years, gaining firsthand experience of the challenges faced by companies in South Korea.
When I talk about feeling affection for North Korea, it is toward my family, relatives and friends there.
On the other hand, from the moment I arrived in South Korea, people warmly welcomed and supported me, propelling me from nothing to my current state.
NK News: The ruling People Power Party (PPP) named you as a recruit for this year’s general elections. How did you respond when you heard the news?
Park: It was honestly quite overwhelming for me. I questioned what they saw in me. Until now, I’ve led a relatively stable life while working for a company, earning a decent income and engaging in hobbies during my free time. So contemplating whether to give up this comfortable life for a challenging path was a significant internal struggle.
On one hand, I felt a sense of gratitude toward the PPP for offering me this opportunity, but making this decision felt even more challenging than when I decided to defect from North Korea because back then I only had one option — to leave.
This time, there were two options — whether to join or not. I started to think that maybe it was time to think beyond my personal objectives and acknowledged that I’ve received a lot of help since coming to South Korea, and thus, decided to join the party.
Someone once said that people have both public and personal motives, and while I can’t deny personal motives, the urge to repay the help I’ve received is a decisive factor in this decision.
NK News: Are there any specific goals you would like to achieve with the PPP?
Park: My goal is to contribute to healing the societal wounds caused by division and conflicts and fostering social integration. I can’t predict the exact nature of the tasks, but if given the opportunity, I will undertake actions in this direction.
This commitment is rooted in my personal growth story, which is not a story of constant conflict but one of growth with significant support. It highlights the necessity of bringing warmth back to our society. We are all citizens of our nation beyond political affiliations, and this unity can only be achieved by acknowledging this reality.
Park Choong-kwon (center) poses with People Power Party interim leader Han Dong-hoon (right) and floor leader Yun Jae-ok (left) during a welcoming ceremony for new party recruits at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul. | Image: People Power Party (Jan. 8, 2024)
NK News: What are your views on the current government’s policy on North Korea and unification?
Park: I think the current government’s policy toward North Korea can be seen as adhering to principles while maintaining compassion for North Korean residents.
However, in my view, there are some undeniable facts that we must acknowledge.
First, the Kim Jong Un regime has completed or nearly completed its nuclear capabilities. Second, North Korea is a neighboring country that possesses nuclear weapons. Third, the Kim Jong Un regime and nuclear weapons are inseparable, and therefore, achieving complete denuclearization is impossible as long as the regime remains intact.
Fourth, the Kim Jong Un regime will not cease weapons development under any circumstances. Fifth, the regime does not desire peace or reunification, as this would threaten its existence. And lastly, the regime is currently facing the challenge of maintaining control and seeking an exit strategy.
NK News: You have said knowing Kim Jong Un’s motives can help prevent provocations. What are Kim’s main motives, in your view?
Park: One is regime cohesion and the other is attracting attention as a negotiation card. Understanding these purposes and responding accordingly is key.
Even if the Kim Jong Un regime continues to threaten and undermine international order, it would be ideal for us to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean residents and compatriots to at least ensure their basic needs are met.
We should develop various strategies to normalize the abnormality of the regime, guide North Koreans into the international community and address their issues.
NK News: As a defector, what are your plans to address North Korea’s human rights problems?
Park: The human rights issues in North Korea are undeniably clear, with ongoing repression and a lack of improvement. North Korean residents struggle to secure even basic rights, facing difficulties in their livelihoods, including hunger.
There have been fundamental differences in the approaches of both progressive and conservative governments on this issue.
The conservative government aimed to help North Korean residents better understand their society, highlighting the lack of basic rights and the challenging living conditions, in a bid to bring about change from within North Korea.
On the other hand, the progressive government chose a route rooted in nationalist sentiment when addressing the issue of the two Koreas. This rhetoric often blurred the line between North Korean residents and the North Korean regime, portraying them as one entity. It can be argued that this approach may have inadvertently contributed to the further isolation of North Korean residents.
Regardless of the different approaches, the efforts for awareness and advocacy for the improvement of human rights in North Korea have been ongoing.
NK News: Do you believe North Korean defectors should play a bigger role in South Korean politics?
Park: I believe that politics is an essential area that every citizen should take an interest in. But at the same time, North Korean defectors are in the process of integrating into society and adapting, building the foundations of their own lives.
When I received the proposal to join the [PPP] at that time, I did think about whether too many of us were entering and I wondered if I needed to be one of them.
However, I believe there is a role for me to play, and I don’t regret it at this point. North Korean defectors like us must defend the superiority of [South Korea’s] democratic system and play a clear role in how we view and resolve North-South relations.
Edited by Alannah Hill
14. From Moscow to Pyongyang: How Russia’s anger toward West drove it to North Korea by Andrei Lankov
From Moscow to Pyongyang: How Russia’s anger toward West drove it to North Korea
https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/from-moscow-to-pyongyang-how-russias-anger-toward-west-drove-it-to-north-korea/?utm
Russia began to reengage the DPRK around turn of millennium, but decades of effort have only recently born fruit
Andrei Lankov January 12, 2024
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Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin summit at Cosmodrome Vostochny Sept. 13, 2023 | Image: Kremlin
Editor’s note: This is the fifth and final article in a multipart series examining the history of North Korea’s relationship with the Soviet Union and Russia and what it reveals about bilateral ties today.
Ever since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, bilateral ties with North Korea have appeared to go from strength to strength, culminating most recently in Moscow’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in multiple attacks.
But while the rapid development of their relationship may appear to have come out of the blue, a closer examination shows it is actually the consummation of a trend that began over 20 years ago.
Around the turn of the millennium, Russia’s initial post-communist enthusiasm for the West had begun to wane, and it started to refocus on ties with its traditional ally in Pyongyang after nearly a decade of neglect.
Despite this, the two sides repeatedly struggled to get proposals for bilateral exchange off the ground, thwarted by Moscow’s support for denuclearization and the DPRK’s moribund economy.
Following its sharp break away from the West, Russia now appears unencumbered by many of the concerns that had long inhibited ties with North Korea, but the past two decades also go to show that their grand plans to expand cooperation may not be as simple to execute as they seem.
Vladimir Putin is only Russian or Soviet leader to visit North Korea, doing so in July 2000. | Image: President of Russia (July 19, 2000)
PUTIN VISITS PYONGYANG
Relations between the DPRK and Russia reached their lowest point during the first post-Soviet decade from 1991 to 2000. But a pivotal moment came in July 2000 when Vladimir Putin traveled to Pyongyang, making him the first Russian leader to visit North Korea in person.
In the early 2000s, Russia was still very much a part of the Western community, although cracks had begun to appear as admiration for the West gradually gave way to resentment, envy and hostility.
Consequently, strategists in Moscow started to look for ways to increase Russia’s influence in North Korea, while maintaining the status quo in the region. Russia wanted neither a war nor a collapse of the regime.
This new worldview, eventually embraced by Vladimir Putin, was not limited to the elite: Many common people increasingly supported it as well.
For half a century, the Russian public had viewed North Korea as an object of ridicule. However, with the growth of new anti-Americanism, they increasingly viewed the DPRK as a brave David, ever ready to challenge and fight the evil American Goliath.
Admittedly, though, this was still a minority view: Most Russians still saw North Korea as a quintessential “Oriental dictatorship.”
A man carries bottles during the Rason International Trade Fair in 2019 | Image: NK News
INCOMPATIBLE ECONOMIES
North Korea was quite pleased by the changes in Moscow’s position. They were always eager to pit great powers against each other to gain the greatest possible advantage for Pyongyang.
The problem for Russia was that friendship with North Korea had never been free. A substantial increase in trade volume and economic cooperation with the DPRK was only possible if and when the Soviet side was willing to subsidize it.
However, the Russian and North Korean economies were essentially incompatible.
On the one hand, the few potential export items where North Korea had competitive advantages held little value for the Russian economy. On the other, while North Koreans might have been interested in purchasing goods produced in Russia, they had neither the intention nor the ability to pay for such goods and services at the standard prices of the international markets.
This made subsidies a necessary condition for improvement, but post-communist Russia was much smaller than the Soviet Union and had little desire to invest a significant amount of money to buy influence outside what it saw as its natural sphere of influence — largely the territory of the former USSR.
There were a few genuine attempts to restart large-scale economic exchanges with North Korea. The most significant of these attempts occurred in 2014-15 when the Russian side made a (predictably empty) promise to increase the meager volume of trade between the two countries to $1 billion dollars by 2020.
Russia also forgave 90% of the DPRK’s Soviet-era debt ($10 billion out of $11 billion) as a gesture to boost trade. Nonetheless, the attempt ended in predictable failure: The two countries simply had nothing to trade, or rather, North Korea had nothing to sell Russia.
A North Korean official walks past a train car in March 2017 | Image: NK News
A TRANSIT SPACE
It did not help that throughout the entire 2000-2020 period, Russia adhered to a highly critical stance on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Moscow, being cautious about proliferation, viewed Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons acquisition program as a challenge to its own security.
Given the difficulties of increasing trade, Russia and North Korea discussed transportation projects that would essentially treat the DPRK as a transit space of no economic value to traverse for access to the really profitable South Korean market.
A typical example was the much-discussed proposal to connect the South Korean and Russian railway networks. Given the sorry state of the antiquated North Korean railways, a new line would need to be built from scratch at significant cost. A similar project proposed a natural gas pipeline that would connect Siberian gas fields with South Korea via North Korean territory.
But despite some preliminary surveillance, no actual construction work has ever begun. This is understandable: Given the volatile nature of relations between the two Korean states, no sane investor would put money into such an expensive project.
With the introduction of U.N. Security Council sanctions in 2017-2018, and the outbreak of the Ukrainian War in 2022, all these grandiose plans about railways and pipelines have finally been relegated to the dustbin of history, where they probably should have been from the very beginning.
Cranes and containers at Rason Port in Aug. 2019 | Image: NK News
RUSSIA AND RASON
The only partial success among these transit projects was the Rason initiative that started in 2008. This project envisioned connecting the North Korean port city of Rason, located some 50 km from the border, to Russia’s railway network with a specially built line with the Russian broad gauge.
RasonConTrans, the joint Russia-DPRK company in charge of the project, rented a pier in Rason where cranes and other necessary facilities were installed. The company planned to use this transportation link to ship coal from Siberian mines to third countries, including South Korea.
The construction work was completed in 2013, and the first shipments took place the next year. But soon, another political crisis resulted in the project being frozen, though equipment and some personnel remain in Rason and ready to start work.
During the years 2000-2020, military cooperation was entirely off-limits, leaving the sale of North Korean labor to Russia as the sole commercially viable cooperative venture.
Throughout this period, the vast majority of North Korean workers in Russia were employed in the construction industry, although there was a small but gradually increasing number of individuals working in food processing and the textile industry. The number of workers reached its zenith at around 34,000 in 2015.
Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin tour the Vostochny Cosmodrome | Images: Rodong Sinmun (Sept. 14, 2023)
REENGAGEMENT ON A BUDGET
Analyzing the political dynamics of the Russia-North Korea relationship reveals two prominent trends in Moscow’s policy toward Pyongyang.
First, Russia sought to reassert its influence and reengage in North Korean affairs, albeit on a budget. Moscow did not deem the DPRK significant enough to justify substantial investments of money and effort.
As such, many of Russia’s activities were primarily symbolic, aimed at establishing a presence rather than enacting meaningful change. This is illustrated by the negligible Russian food aid to North Korea.
Second, Russia tended to align its stance with China. From the early 2000s, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing strengthened, gradually evolving into something akin to an unequal alliance. China’s significantly greater wealth, power and vested interest in the region around North Korea meant that, in practical terms, Russian diplomacy tended to follow in China’s footsteps.
At any rate, the deteriorating relations with the West that drove Moscow’s partial reconciliation with Pyongyang continued to work and led to the dramatic break with the West over its invasion of Ukraine.
This has made Moscow and Pyongyang allies once again, if only in an alliance of convenience.
Edited by Alannah Hill
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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