Quotes of the Day:

We know what the birth of a revolution looks like: A student stands before a tank. A fruit seller sets himself on fire. A line of monks link arms in a human chain. Crowds surge, soldiers fire, gusts of rage pull down the monuments of tyrants, and maybe, sometimes, justice rises from the flames.

– Nancy Gibbs

"Defeat is simply a signal to press onward." 

– Helen Keller

A creative man is motivated by the desire to achieve, not by the desire to beat others.

– Ayn Rand

1. The Axis of Totalitarianism Threatens a Disastrous World Order

2. Can Donald Trump Really End the Russia-Ukraine War?

3. Trump’s Fast-Track Ukraine Peace Plan: Why a Quick Fix May Not Last

4. Taiwan Crisis 2.0: Could China’s Coast Guard Seal the Island Off?

5. What Imperialist Game Is Donald Trump Playing with Greenland?

6. North Korean Air Defense System Revealed In Ukraine By Russian Friendly Fire Strike

7. Outgoing FBI director calls China and its cyber program the ‘defining threat of our generation’

8. New Aircraft Carrier To Be Named After Bill Clinton

9. China Officials Discuss Option of TikTok Sale to Elon Musk

10. TikTok Refugees Find an Alternative—in China

11. SECAF Kendall, looking out to 2050, predicts war winners will be combatants with the best AI

12. ‘28 Years Later’ uses the same creepy poem the military uses to scare SERE students

13. What Greenlanders might want from a deal with Trump

14. The Immigrants America Needs

15. Trends in Terrorism: What's on the Horizon in 2025?

16. Trump team is questioning civil servants at National Security Council about commitment to his agenda

17. US agencies warn of potential New Orleans copycat attack

18. A Blueprint for Digital Transformation at the Department of Defense

19. The Long Shadow of the Ladakh Crisis

20. How Biden Failed on Human Rights

21. America’s China Strategy Is Incomplete

22. The Battle Songs that Defined the Global War on Terrorism, According to Service Members and Veterans

23. Seizing the Initiative in the Gray Zone: The Case for a US Office of Strategic Disruption

1. The Axis of Totalitarianism Threatens a Disastrous World Order

Conclusion:

The rise of the axis, united by their authoritarian ideology and opposition to democracy, disrupts the existing world order. This emerging multipolarity isn’t just about power being distributed; it’s a clash of values that breeds a future rife with ideological confrontations. Anti-Western sentiment acts as the ideological glue that binds these actors, both state and non-state, and manifests in a variety of ways, from overt military alliances to covert support networks.

The axis countries frame their struggle as resistance against perceived Western imperialism. This narrative resonates with local populations through appeals to nationalism and religion. Iranian leaders like Ayatollah Khamenei and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah demonize the West, particularly the US, as the Great Satan. Similar narratives echo from President Putin, who portrays NATO as a threat, and North Korean propaganda, which depicts the US as an aggressor. China criticizes Western interference and yearns for a multipolar world order free from Western dominance.

The Axis of Totalitarianism Threatens a Disastrous World Order

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/14/the-axis-of-totalitarianism-threatens-a-disastrous-world-order/

by Ali Omar Forozish

|

01.14.2025 at 06:00am

Benito Mussolini, the then-dictator of Italy, coined the term totalitarianism in the early 1920s to describe his regime. It has become synonymous with a form of government wielding absolute control over society, seeking to regulate all aspects of public and private life. Totalitarian states concentrate power in a single entity and suppress dissent. These states maintain control through propaganda, surveillance, and state-sanctioned violence.

The term “axis of totalitarianism” captures the growing challenge posed by a collection of totalitarian states — Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia — whose alignment disrupts the democratic world order. Though not a formal alliance, these countries actively work to revise the US-led international order. Their strategic convergence extends beyond mere pronouncements, with coordinated actions demonstrating a concerted effort to erode the foundations of democratic systems. The axis further expands its reach by incorporating non-state actors — a myriad of terrorist groups, including various radical Islamic groups and Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Despite ideological and operational differences, these entities share a common antipathy towards democratic values and the Western order.

The axis doesn’t just criticize Western “decadence” — they actively propose an alternative global order. But beneath the surface lies a vision not of freedom, but of oppression. These regimes clamp down on individual liberties, ruthlessly crush dissent, and prioritize the rule of a select few elites over the rule of law. If the axis prevails, the world order fractures into competing spheres of influence, minority rights get trampled, and a far more chaotic and totalitarian order takes root.

The UN’s Achilles’ heel: How the axis powers support each other

The axis actively employs coordinated voting patterns within international organizations as a key strategy to weaken democratic values. This approach manifests in two primary tactics: synchronized voting blocs and mutual defense mechanisms. These tactics serve to shield the interests of both the Axis states themselves and their allies.

In the international arena, China and Russia have emerged as leading actors shielding themselves and their allies from human rights scrutiny. A prime example is their 2020 opposition to a UN resolution condemning North Korea’s abuses. The UN Commission of Inquiry documented horrific acts — arbitrary detention, torture, and executions — within North Korean prison camps. However, China and Russia’s votes thwarted the international community’s attempt at a unified stance against these atrocities.

Furthermore, in 2022, they actively opposed a UN Human Rights Council resolution condemning abuses against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Independent investigations and human rights reports documented systemic repression. This vote effectively shielded Beijing from condemnation, underscoring their commitment to mutual defense against human rights criticism.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle allows international intervention in mass atrocities. However, the axis consistently thwarts resolutions for R2P against authoritarian leaders. This undermines R2P, leaving civilians vulnerable to repressive regimes. In 2012, China and Russia wielded their veto power in the UN Security Council, blocking a resolution for sanctions against Syria’s violent suppression of protests. Ignited in 2011, the crackdown spiraled into a devastating civil war with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. China and Russia’s veto effectively crippled international action.

In 2011, Russia permitted the UN Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya. China, however, took a more nuanced approach, abstaining from the vote. This abstention signaled a strategic maneuver, avoiding opposition while withholding endorsement of the intervention. The resolution aimed to prevent a massacre in Benghazi by forces loyal to Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. China’s abstention, alongside Russia’s reluctant agreement, reflected a cautious strategy. This allowed them to maintain diplomatic flexibility while conveying disapproval of interventions seen as threats to authoritarian regimes.

The axis coordinates across specialized agencies and international bodies, significantly impacting global governance. In 2021, China and Russia opposed an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution criticizing Iran’s nuclear inspection restrictions. These restrictions significantly impeded the international community’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and ensure its peaceful character. By opposing the resolution, China and Russia shielded Iran and weakened the non-proliferation regime, which relies on robust inspections to prevent nuclear proliferation.

In 2023, these countries all abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution condemning North Korea’s latest ballistic missile test. Such tests violate existing UN resolutions and pose a threat to regional security. By abstaining from the vote, these countries signaled a tolerance for North Korea’s actions and undermined the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in deterring future tests.

The axis goes beyond voting patterns to actively defend each other’s actions on the international stage, using diplomatic and strategic means to counteract pressures from democratic nations. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, China demonstrably signaled its alignment by expressing ‘understanding’ of Russia’s actions. This stance solidified the burgeoning strategic partnership between the two nations.

China’s support for Russia continued through the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This included providing crucial diplomatic cover, such as calculated abstentions from critical UN votes condemning Russia’s aggression, prioritizing their alliance over international censure. Additionally, China offered rhetorical support throughout the lead-up to the invasion and since, blaming the United States and NATO for the war while refusing to assign any blame to Russia, and accusing the West of weaponizing supply chains and prolonging the conflict by providing Ukraine with arms..

North Korea aligned itself with Russia’s narrative, publicly assigning blame for the Ukraine crisis to the United States and NATO. Iran further bolstered Russia’s military capabilities by supplying them with critical equipment, including hundreds of drones used in the conflict. These coordinated actions by the axis highlight a concerning consolidation of authoritarian influence.

Non-state powers are the shadow bloc of the axis

The alliance bypasses state actors and actively extends its influence to support terrorist organizations and radical Islamic groups. Their support for these non-state actors strengthens their geopolitical position as they actively antagonize Western powers, particularly the United States and its allies.

Acting as a patron Iran lavish the Axis of Resistance. Iran exerts influence by supplying military aid, funding training, and implementing social programs. This bolsters the group’s skills and public support, solidifying their local dominance.

Hezbollah, a potent Lebanese Shia militia and political party, is a central figure in Iran’s proxy groups. Designated a terrorist organization, Hezbollah has a track record of launching attacks against both Israel and US targets throughout the region. In Iraq, Shia militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah are accused of targeting US forces and destabilizing the fragile Iraqi government. Notably, Iran also offers support to Hamas, a Sunni Palestinian group classified as a terrorist organization. This incongruous move underscores Iran’s strategic pragmatism: they actively support any group that aligns with their broader regional goals, irrespective of sectarian affiliations.

China actively supports the Axis of Resistance through strategic economic and diplomatic channels, despite typically exercising greater restraint in direct involvement. This support is demonstrably provided through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has extended significant infrastructure investments to countries like Iran and Syria. These investments act as economic lifelines, helping to sustain both the regimes and their affiliated militant groups.

Moreover, Russia does not engage haphazardly with non-state actors. Rather, it cultivates relationships with them as strategic tools to achieve its geopolitical goals. This approach goes beyond simply siding with one party in a conflict. These groups come in different forms. Separatist movements and insurgents in Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria challenge pro-Western governments and destabilize strategic regions. Additionally, Russia backs authoritarian regimes vital to its interests, like the Assad regime in Syria, which strengthens its Middle Eastern foothold and counters US influence. Their intervention, alongside the support by Iranian proxies, has bolstered the regime and allowed them to crack down on opposition groups.

Russia utilizes private military contractors (PMCs) like the Wagner Group. In Ukraine, Wagner mercenaries fought alongside Russian troops, bolstering their forces and undertaking covert operations. This enables Russia to achieve its objectives while maintaining plausible deniability. Known for widespread human rights abuses and operating with impunity, Wagner’s actions in Ukraine not only destabilized the region but also amplify their role as a psychological weapon, aligning with Russia’s covert objectives. This pattern extended to Africa and the Middle East, where Wagner operatives protected resource-rich territories for allied governments, quelled insurgencies, and countered Western influence. Their documented presence in Libya and the Central African Republic has been linked to both internal conflict and human rights abuses.

Furthermore, North Korea’s engagement in the arms trade transcends mere competition with South Korea. It constitutes a deliberate strategy to bolster anti-Western actors globally, operating clandestinely and circumventing sanctions. Though less conspicuous than Russia or Iran in the Middle East, North Korea has demonstrably provided weapons and expertise to militant groups in both that region and Africa. A prime illustration is North Korea’s supply of arms to the Syrian government during the civil war. This incident, alongside sales to Hamas and Hezbollah, exposes how North Korea’s opaque arms trade fuels conflict and strengthens those challenging Western influence.

Building an economic counterweight to the West

The Axis of Totalitarianism has established a robust anti-Western economic bloc, actively working to undermine Western dominance and create an alternative economic order. A key pillar is the BRICS economic bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Founded in 2009, BRICS provides a platform for these emerging economies to collaborate on economic issues and financial mechanisms outside the Western sphere. Despite diverse political and economic systems, China and Russia leverage BRICS to promote alternative financial frameworks, seeking to reduce reliance on the US dollar and diminish Western economic influence.

BRICS actively counters Western influence in development finance through the New Development Bank (NDB). Established in 2014 with a US$50 billion initial capital, the NDB directly finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS members and other emerging economies. This competes with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are criticized for prioritizing developed nations and strict loan conditions. Unlike these institutions, the NDB operates on a “one country, one vote” principle, ensuring greater representation for emerging economies in decision-making. The bank prioritizes projects aligned with BRICS’s development needs — clean energy, infrastructure, poverty reduction — and has approved over US$30 billion in loans by 2021.

BRICS further disrupts Western dominance in financial governance with the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a US$100 billion mutual currency swap established in 2014 alongside the NDB. Directly challenging the IMF’s role as crisis lender, the CRA allows BRICS members to contribute to a pooled fund. During a liquidity crisis, a member can request a swap to bolster their foreign exchange reserves. It stabilizes their currency and avoids IMF austerity measures.

Furthermore, BRICS emphasizes South-South cooperation, a concept that promotes collaboration and knowledge exchange among developing countries, standing in contrast to the traditional North-South model where developed nations dictate terms to developing nations. The recent inclusion of new members under the BRICS+ banner suggests a potential expansion of the alliance’s influence and a further reshaping of the global economic landscape.

A long-term strategic goal for BRICS is the establishment of a common currency. This new currency could be a basket of currencies from member countries or a completely new unit. This offers several advantages to the bloc, including reduced transaction costs for intra-bloc trade and greater financial stability. Moreover, it signifies BRICS’ vision for a multipolar financial world order and weakens the grip of the US dollar on international trade.

Axis countries leverage bilateral trade agreements in local currencies. Russia and China spearhead this effort, conducting a growing share of their trade with each other directly in yuan and rubles. This cuts out the US dollar as a middleman and slashes transaction costs. China further expands its influence by establishing currency swap agreements with over 40 countries, facilitating trade settlements directly in yuan.

Axis countries are actively pursuing the diversification of currencies used for oil sales. In the face of extensive US sanctions, Iran has pivoted its oil trade, conducting a substantial portion of transactions with China in yuan, while the euro enjoys increasing use for trade with other partners. This two-pronged approach allows Iran to continue exporting oil even under the US sanctions. Axis countries are exploring similar currency diversification arrangements with other countries like India, which further marginalizes the role of the US dollar in global energy trade.

Axis countries are also actively developing alternative payment systems. China’s aims (CIPS) and Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) aim to facilitate secure financial transactions between member countries and new partners, bypassing the US-controlled SWIFT system. Though still under development, these alternative systems have the potential to become a significant force in de-dollarization efforts in the long run.

Moreover, Russia has embarked on an aggressive strategy to increase its gold reserves, becoming one of the world’s largest holders of gold. This bolsters their economy by providing a valuable alternative store of wealth and shielding them from sanctions. Russia can leverage its substantial gold reserves to bolster the ruble’s value or facilitate international transactions.

China’s Silk Road fuels its global ambitions

Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the BRI has become a cornerstone of the Axis economic strategy. This ambitious infrastructure development project dwarfs any in history, with over US$4 trillion invested across more than 140 countries as of 2023. BRI creates a vast network transforming regional connectivity. High-speed rail lines crisscross participating nations, modern highways link economic hubs, and upgraded ports facilitate efficient trade. This comprehensive approach promises to reduce travel times and transportation costs for both goods and people.

The China-Europe Land Bridge, a key BRI corridor, dramatically cuts travel times for freight trains between China and Europe compared to traditional sea routes. The BRI further promotes energy security by constructing oil and gas pipelines. These pipelines directly transport resources from energy-rich regions to energy-hungry markets, reducing reliance on traditional suppliers. The Power of Siberia pipeline exemplifies this strategy, delivering natural gas from Russia to China and solidifying their energy partnership.

The BRI also actively fosters digital connectivity. It achieves this by developing fiber optic networks and advanced telecommunication infrastructure across participating countries. This strategy bridges the digital divide by deploying advanced infrastructure, boosting internet access for citizens, and facilitating communication across borders. In turn, it strengthens economic and social ties between BRI nations.

The large scale of investments undertaken by China creates economic dependence amongst recipient countries, particularly those with less developed economies. China seeks to advance its economic and political objectives by exploiting this dependence. BRI projects in key partner nations such as Iran provide China with a strategically important economic foothold in the Middle East, thereby offering it political leverage within the region. China employs a strategy of debt-trap diplomacy, whereby it leaves countries greatly in debt, potentially pressuring them to comply with its interests.

The axis powers’ pursuit of military might

The axis powers have been pursuing military modernization and strategic initiatives, ostensibly to augment their capabilities and potentially challenge the pre-eminent position of the United States and its allies.

Since the early 2000s, Russia has embarked on a determined course to revitalize its military, shedding the shadow of its Soviet-era predecessor. This modernization effort transcends mere equipment upgrades; it’s a strategic recalibration aimed at reclaiming Russia’s position as a major power player.

Russia prioritizes developing advanced air defense systems to revitalize its military. The S-400 Triumf system, nicknamed the “Growler” by NATO, possesses a demonstrably long-range, high-altitude interception capability, posing a significant threat to modern aircraft and missiles. Its successor, the S-500 Prometheus, promises even greater range and altitude coverage, rendering hypersonic weapons ineffective and solidifying Russia’s aerial defense.

Moreover, Russia pushes development of stealth technology for its fighter jets. The Su-57 Felon, a fifth-generation fighter, integrates radar-absorbent materials and a unique design to minimize its radar signature. Still under testing, the Su-57 signifies Russia’s ambition to challenge US F-35 dominance and other advanced stealth fighters.

Russia boasts the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, a cornerstone of its national security strategy. However, modernization goes beyond quantity. Russia develops new delivery systems, including next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and Yasen-M class submarines, to guarantee their nuclear deterrent remains effective against evolving missile defenses.

China’s military modernization program is the most concerning aspect of the Axis’s growing power. Aiming to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class force by 2049, China heavily invests in cutting-edge tech, including J-20 fighter jets that rival US capabilities and threaten air dominance. Their rapidly expanding aircraft carrier fleet, with modern escorts, signals global power projection and a challenge to naval supremacy.

Hypersonic missiles with their extreme speed and maneuverability raise concerns about potential first-strike capabilities and complicate regional deterrence. Investments in space and cyberwarfare capabilities further strengthen China’s military. The BeiDou system lessens reliance on GPS, while advancements in cyberwarfare raise the specter of disruptive attacks on critical global infrastructure. China plans to double its nuclear arsenal by 2030, marking a significant shift from its minimum deterrence posture. These advancements not only bolster China’s military but also serve as a blueprint for its Axis partners.

Iran’s military power prioritizes an asymmetric defense strategy. This strategy centers on a demonstrably advanced and expanding missile arsenal, wielded as a deterrent against regional rivals possessing superior conventional military capabilities. Furthermore, Iran maintains a robust naval presence in the Persian Gulf, spearheaded by the well-equipped and highly motivated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy. These fast attack boats and advanced mine warfare capabilities pose threats to commercial shipping, disrupting critical energy supplies.

Iran’s true power projection, however, extends beyond its own military. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) utilizes a network of well-funded and highly trained proxy groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, with approximately 20,000 – 50,000 fighters, and various Shia militias in Iraq, collectively numbering around 120,000 fighters, to exert influence across the Middle East. This network includes groups such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (10,000 fighters), Kata’ib Hezbollah (7,000 – 10,000 fighters), and the Badr Organization (18,000 – 22,000 fighters). Additionally, the IRGC supports the Houthi rebels in Yemen, with an estimated 20,000 – 30,000 fighters, and has influence over Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, together comprising 20,000 – 40,000 fighters. These proxies act as a force multiplier, allowing Iran to project power and sow discord in strategic regions without directly committing its own troops.

Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) in 2015. It aimed to restrict Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. However, Iran’s ongoing nuclear activities now surpass the JCPOA’s limitations, raising concerns about weapons development and a disregard for international agreements. This defiance erodes trust and threatens the fragile nuclear non-proliferation framework. The JCPOA’s uncertain future creates a pathway for Iran to weaponize its program, destabilizing the Middle East and triggering a regional nuclear arms race. In 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, citing concerns about its effectiveness and Iran’s ballistic missile program.

Shifting focus to East Asia, North Korea’s military strategy focuses on a different kind of power — deterrence through a potent nuclear arsenal. Despite its economic woes, North Korea maintains a large and well-equipped standing army, particularly in its artillery forces positioned along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) bordering South Korea. This massive concentration of artillery poses a constant threat to South Korean civilians and military installations. Notably, Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement following President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024. The agreement reportedly includes a mutual defense pact, raising concerns about a potential new nuclear axis forming in opposition to the West.

North Korea’s most concerning development is a two-pronged approach: advancing ballistic missiles and developing cyberwarfare. They’ve miniaturized nuclear warheads for long-range missiles capable of striking South Korea, Japan, and the US mainland. These advancements solidify their de facto nuclear state status and heighten the risk of accidental or deliberate attacks. Additionally, North Korea’s cyberattacks target critical infrastructure and financial institutions, posing a significant threat to regional stability and the global economy.

Conclusion

The rise of the axis, united by their authoritarian ideology and opposition to democracy, disrupts the existing world order. This emerging multipolarity isn’t just about power being distributed; it’s a clash of values that breeds a future rife with ideological confrontations. Anti-Western sentiment acts as the ideological glue that binds these actors, both state and non-state, and manifests in a variety of ways, from overt military alliances to covert support networks.

The axis countries frame their struggle as resistance against perceived Western imperialism. This narrative resonates with local populations through appeals to nationalism and religion. Iranian leaders like Ayatollah Khamenei and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah demonize the West, particularly the US, as the Great Satan. Similar narratives echo from President Putin, who portrays NATO as a threat, and North Korean propaganda, which depicts the US as an aggressor. China criticizes Western interference and yearns for a multipolar world order free from Western dominance.

Tags: alliances, Economic strategy, military technology, Totalitarianism

About The Author

• 
  
• Ali Omar Forozish
• Ali Omar Forozish is an economics student at Anadolu University in Turkey. He has been a commissioning editor and author for Fair Observer and is a World Literacy Foundation Ambassador. Ali has participated in an exchange program in Kassel, Germany, and earned diplomas from HSE University in Russia and Osmangazi University in Turkey.

2. Can Donald Trump Really End the Russia-Ukraine War?

Excepts:

Without a concerted effort to reshape the warring sides’ calculations, a solution remains elusive in the near term. It might also be that strictly behind-the-scenes diplomacy will not bring the desired results. Washington may need to secure a public commitment from both sides to a formula that appears fair to Ukraine and acceptable to Russia. Achieving this would demand consistent, high-level attention from Washington—and a willingness to risk public refusals by any party unwilling to accept the proposed terms.

Ultimately, the success or failure of Trump’s mediation efforts will hinge on whether all parties can be guided toward a realistic compromise—one that acknowledges the core interests of Ukraine, pays tribute to Russian security concerns where legitimate, and solidifies U.S. credibility in guiding the process.

The stakes are high, and so is the potential payoff if a just and lasting peace can be found.

Can Donald Trump Really End the Russia-Ukraine War?

19fortyfive.com · by Mikhail Troitskiy · January 13, 2025

Mediating in Public and Private: Can Donald Trump Achieve Peace in the Ukraine War?: The prospects for brokering a just peace in Ukraine will depend on the Trump Administration’s willingness and ability to undertake a sustained, focused effort in the coming months.

Success will require strategically backing personal diplomacy through incentives and threats, effectively using Washington’s leverage through sanctions, coordinating with allies, and maneuvering with other stakeholders such as China, India, and key Middle Eastern countries.

Brokering a Ceasefire in the Ukraine War

Attempts to reach a ceasefire have likely already happened numerous times. President-elect Donald Trump’s position has been marked by his stated understanding of Russia’s grievances and his readiness to meet with Vladimir Putin, balanced against his top Ukraine advisor’s promise to find an “equitable” and “fair” solution for Kyiv. According to reliable sources, soon after the November election, Trump asked Putin by phone to refrain from escalating the war. Members of Trump’s team also reached out to Ukraine, and the president-elect himself hinted that he prefers to keep any negotiation details private for now.

Ukraine has shown flexibility regarding territorial issues and has dropped any insistence on an immediate return to its December 1991 borders. At the same time, Kyiv expects justice and reliable post-war security guarantees. Both positions align broadly with the broad approach to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that any U.S. administration is likely to follow.

By contrast, Moscow—which one might expect to welcome the prospect of a Trump-Putin meeting—has so far reacted in baffling ways. When Donald Trump was elected in 2016, the Kremlin openly expressed enthusiasm and agreed to “play ball” (Putin notably did not retaliate after the expulsion of Russian diplomats that December). This time, however, Russia’s response has not indicated a willingness to explore a ceasefire or peace deal, nor has it seized the favorable opportunity presented by Trump’s interest in a quick resolution.

Trump’s request that Moscow avoid escalating the war was met with a test of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and renewed threats. Since the November 2024 election, Moscow has continued to insist on maximalist demands that would likely be unacceptable to Trump. On nearly every key issue—territorial changes, their legal recognition, and the possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine—there remains a substantial gulf between Ukraine’s and Russia’s positions. It is questionable whether a comprehensive deal can be reached if neither side is willing to compromise on any individual point.

Moscow Holding Out

Moscow has only expressed lukewarm interest in a Trump-Putin meeting after the January 20 inauguration. Even in that case, it would be for Washington to “make the first move,” according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who recently exposed France for supposedly inviting Russia to negotiate an end to the war behind Ukraine’s back. Such an approach is seemingly at odds with a coordinated message of goodwill toward a discreetly brokered settlement. Surprisingly, Russia’s stance risks squandering the opening Trump created with his November phone call.

Historically, when faced with mounting difficulties and sanctions, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has eventually sought off-ramps. In August 2008, Russian forces halted their advance on Tbilisi within days. In 2014–15, the annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine led to the Minsk agreements. When President Biden proposed an in-person meeting in April 2021, preparations began promptly, and Russia temporarily pulled back troops from Ukraine’s border.

Now, the war has dragged on for almost three years. While the initial blitzkrieg approach resembled Russia’s past tactics in the post-Soviet space, the current, open-ended continuation does not. If the Kremlin were genuinely ready to negotiate, we would see signs of domestic preparations for compromise. So far, there are none. Instead, the conflict seems to be unfolding in a more unpredictable, freewheeling way. Declaring a goal of unconditional victory seems imprudent for Russia, especially given U.S. assurances—such as those from General Keith Kellogg—and a conservative think tank report claiming that Ukraine’s defeat would be more costly for Washington than a negotiated fair solution.

Indeed, the United States appears unimpressed by Russia’s missile test—unlike the fall of 2022, when officials seriously considered the threat of a nuclear strike on Ukraine. The Biden Administration has now introduced new and potentially devastating sanctions, seemingly coordinated with the incoming team. In a similar way, the first Trump Administration imposed significant tariffs on imports from China, which the Biden Administration chose to keep. Meanwhile, Russia’s economy faces a more complex situation now than in December 2021—grappling with inflation, currency fluctuations, and the cost of funding a large mercenary army. Despite these challenges, Moscow seems determined to raise the stakes even more.

Whether Trump can succeed in mediating a settlement depends mainly on Washington’s ability to understand the sources and dynamics of Moscow’s behavior. Russia’s recent shifts—briefly exploring negotiations, denying contact with the president-elect, then issuing unrealistic settlement terms—suggest factions in Moscow are divided, with some open to talks and others preferring to wait, even at the risk of alienating Donald Trump.

Russian Tanks in Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Without a concerted effort to reshape the warring sides’ calculations, a solution remains elusive in the near term. It might also be that strictly behind-the-scenes diplomacy will not bring the desired results. Washington may need to secure a public commitment from both sides to a formula that appears fair to Ukraine and acceptable to Russia. Achieving this would demand consistent, high-level attention from Washington—and a willingness to risk public refusals by any party unwilling to accept the proposed terms.

Ultimately, the success or failure of Trump’s mediation efforts will hinge on whether all parties can be guided toward a realistic compromise—one that acknowledges the core interests of Ukraine, pays tribute to Russian security concerns where legitimate, and solidifies U.S. credibility in guiding the process.

The stakes are high, and so is the potential payoff if a just and lasting peace can be found.

About the Author:

Mikhail Troitskiy is a visiting scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, and a visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

19fortyfive.com · by Mikhail Troitskiy · January 13, 2025

3. Trump’s Fast-Track Ukraine Peace Plan: Why a Quick Fix May Not Last

Excerpts:

Resolving the violent conflict initiated by Russia against Ukraine requires admitting that the lines between war and peace are often blurred, and negotiations are the beginning of a problematic non-linear process away from armed confrontation. Building a positive peace that restores the territorial integrity of Ukraine, significantly minimizes the threat of future invasion by Russia, and supplies security for all Ukrainian people will require a long-term commitment from the US that is likely to extend beyond the political window of the Trump administration.

Washington has greater chances of success if it does not act alone but coordinates its strategy with allies and partners.

Trump’s Fast-Track Ukraine Peace Plan: Why a Quick Fix May Not Last

19fortyfive.com · by Mariya Omelicheva · January 13, 2025

During his 2024 presidential campaign, Donald Trump had vowed to settle the Russia-Ukraine war in a day. Following the election, the President-elect and his team pushed back the war termination deadline to a longer time horizon.

At the same time, Trump-nominated special envoy for Russia and Ukraine – Keith Kellogg – proposed a shorter timetable of 100 days for ending the conflict.

As Russia’s ill-conceived invasion reaches the end of its third year, overshadowed by the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail, can the Trump administration bring an end to the bloodiest European conflict since the Second World War?

Those who share a narrow and negative conception of peace – as the absence of large-scale violence – may be cautiously optimistic about the Trump administration’s possible approach to the conflict. Trump’s threat to withhold American assistance to Ukraine at a time when it is struggling in multiple battlefield locations may strongarm the embattled Kyiv into a peace agreement with Moscow.

A maximum pressure strategy may be less effective for Putin, emboldened by the military gains throughout 2024. Still, the prospect of America’s increased assistance to Ukraine and the growing support for peace negotiations among the Russian people may bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table.

Such a “peace” agreement brokered by the Trump team may see a reduction in hostilities and stabilization of the frontline. However, “freezing” the conflict, as envisioned in the special envoy’s peace plan, does not directly address the underlying core issues – viable security guarantees to Ukraine and its membership in NATO, war reparations, and justice for war crimes committed by the Russian military and leaders. Accepting such a negative peace for a conflict resolution will earn political dividends for the President-elect. However, it will be counterproductive for achieving enduring and positive peace in Ukraine.

Beyond the risk of renewed fighting, a peace strategy that narrowly emphasizes the end of hostilities may have several harmful effects. It gives a false impression of achieving a major goal – resolving a violent dispute – that prompts redirecting political, diplomatic, and other resources to other issues.

Reducing political, military, and other forms of assistance may be detrimental to Ukraine’s expeditious and complete integration into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Support for demobilization, disarmament, demining, and rehabilitation efforts, rebuilding economic infrastructure, protecting human rights, and political reforms might be compromised by how the end of hostilities is achieved.

To be fair to President-elect Trump and his team, no administration can resolve intractable differences in values, interests, and positions that fuel a violent dispute. President George W. Bush’s announcement of the end of the US war with Iraq did not forestall the rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. Neither did the 2020 “agreement for bringing peace” between the US and the Taliban result in stability and security for the Afghan people.

Decades of research on war termination suggest that interstate wars, including those ending in ceasefire agreements, rarely end. Instead, a decline in hostilities typically follows the stage of the “hot” conflict. Furthermore, wars give rise to new types and forms of violence that shoot up with war termination. Interpersonal and domestic violence, for example, spikes in societies afflicted with the post-traumatic stress of violent conflict. The proliferation of arms trafficking in the “trophy” weapons risk stoking up hostilities in remote locations. Individuals from different countries often join conflicts abroad. Susceptible to radicalization and excluded from reintegration programs, foreign fighters can also pose unforeseen security challenges post-war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin. Image Credit: Russian Government.

Resolving the violent conflict initiated by Russia against Ukraine requires admitting that the lines between war and peace are often blurred, and negotiations are the beginning of a problematic non-linear process away from armed confrontation. Building a positive peace that restores the territorial integrity of Ukraine, significantly minimizes the threat of future invasion by Russia, and supplies security for all Ukrainian people will require a long-term commitment from the US that is likely to extend beyond the political window of the Trump administration.

Washington has greater chances of success if it does not act alone but coordinates its strategy with allies and partners.

About the Author:

Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva is a Professor of Strategy at National War College. She holds a PhD (2007) in Political Science from Purdue University and JD in International Law (2000) from Moscow National Law Academy. Dr. Omelicheva’s research and teaching interests include international and Eurasian security, counterterrorism and human rights, democracy promotion in the post-Soviet territory, Russia’s foreign and security policy, gender and security, and crime-terror nexus in Eurasia.

4. Taiwan Crisis 2.0: Could China’s Coast Guard Seal the Island Off?

Excerpts:

In a possible early sign of a quarantine tactic, China’s coast guard in February 2024 intercepted a Taiwanese sight-seeing ferry that was sailing around Kinmen’s main island during a period when cross-strait tensions were running high. Chinese coast guard officers boarded the Taiwanese boat and asked to inspect the documentation of the crew, before disembarking a while later. Then, in mid-May, the Chinese state media outlet China Daily said, ‘In the future, this ‘Kinmen model’ of law enforcement inspections can also be applied to Matsu and Penghu islands, and even the entire Taiwan Strait.’

Among the difficult options for Taiwanese and Western response might be beefing up of Taiwan’s own coast guard, which is vastly smaller than China’s, and training it to respond to such tactics.

The US could also impose financial sanctions on China if it imposed a quarantine and persuade other democracies to join in. In doing so, the West would be hitting back at China using tactics that, like China’s quarantine, fall short of war. This might also meet the incoming Trump administration’s goal of weakening China, which it views as an economic competitor.

Whatever the response will be, plans are needed. Quarantine is so attractive a measure for China that Taiwan and its friends must be prepared.

Taiwan Crisis 2.0: Could China’s Coast Guard Seal the Island Off?

19fortyfive.com · by Jane Rickard · January 13, 2025

Key Points and Summary: China could impose a nominally civil “quarantine” on Taiwan, using its coast guard to enforce restricted shipping to the island and stifling key imports. Unlike a full blockade, this approach reduces the chance of war while still pressuring Taiwan economically and undermining its morale.

-If Taipei or its allies challenge the coast guard, they risk appearing to escalate militarily. China’s tactic could erode Taiwan’s de facto autonomy in a “salami-slicing” manner, steadily tightening restrictions.

-Experts suggest the West and Taiwan prepare a coordinated response—ranging from bolstering Taiwan’s coast guard to imposing sanctions—to counter China’s gray-zone strategy without sparking outright conflict.

From ‘Blockade’ to ‘Quarantine’: How China May Tighten Its Grip on Taiwan

The West had better think carefully about how it would handle China imposing a nominally civil quarantine on Taiwan, because that’s the tactic that increasingly looks like an opening move for Beijing in taking control of the island.

A quarantine, imposing limited controls on access to the island, offered strong advantages for China even before Taiwan said in October that a blockade, surrounding it with forces to cut off all access, would be an act of war. Taiwan’s statement means China is even more likely to choose quarantine as a first step.

This use of the word ‘quarantine’ was coined in an important Center for Strategic and International Studies report last year. The authors foresaw that the Chinese government might ban only certain types of goods from entering Taiwan, or it could forbid ships from using a certain port. The measures would be enforced by nominally non-military forces, such as the China Coastguard.

Conceivably, China could see whether it could get away once with a quarantine action, then, noting success in asserting its authority, do it again and gradually tighten restrictions until they turned into a blockade—salami slicing, as it does in so many areas of international affairs.

First among the inherent advantages of quarantine for Beijing is that, unlike more warlike action, it brings no commitment to go all the way, to conquer or be defeated. It would raise no great expectation among the highly nationalist Chinese people of imminent conquest of Taiwan. So if the measure met stiff resistance, the Chinese Communist Party could back away from it, declaring that some civil administrative objective had been achieved.

Yet forcing it to back down would be difficult for Taiwan and its friends, which is another advantage of the quarantine tactic. They would have to escalate with warships and possibly armed force to stop a China Coast Guard ship from intercepting a freighter, for example. This would put Taiwan and the West in the unfortunate position of looking like the initiators of military conflict. On the other hand, if Taiwan and the West did nothing, and intimidated shipping companies mostly went along with the quarantine, China’s narrative that it had control over Taiwan would be strengthened.

Taiwanese Minister of National Defence Wellington Koo said in October that Taiwan would consider a blockade an act of war and would respond on a war footing after massive Chinese military drills were held near the island.

A quarantine would probably cause little or no disruption to China’s own trade, whereas the risk of military confrontation in a blockade could frighten ship owners into avoiding the Taiwan Strait and Chinese ports near it. This would severely affect China’s economy: most shipments that pass through the Taiwan Strait are Chinese imports and exports

Missile Launcher in Taiwan. Image: Creative Commons.

A quarantine would probably involve no dramatic announcements from Beijing. Instead, China could claim it merely needed to expand customs procedures in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters where China believes it has jurisdiction. This might involve the Chinese coast guard carrying out inspections of ships and boarding non-Chinese vessels to inspect their paperwork. Vessels that refuse to comply could be forced to turn back or even be hit with water cannons. The coast guard could then restrict vital imports that enter Taiwan, such as energy products. This could cripple the Taiwanese economy and have the effect of shattering the Taiwanese people’s morale and willingness to resist Beijing.

Throughout 2024, China’s coast guard increased intrusive patrols in waters around Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen archipelago, which is close to China.

In a possible early sign of a quarantine tactic, China’s coast guard in February 2024 intercepted a Taiwanese sight-seeing ferry that was sailing around Kinmen’s main island during a period when cross-strait tensions were running high. Chinese coast guard officers boarded the Taiwanese boat and asked to inspect the documentation of the crew, before disembarking a while later. Then, in mid-May, the Chinese state media outlet China Daily said, ‘In the future, this ‘Kinmen model’ of law enforcement inspections can also be applied to Matsu and Penghu islands, and even the entire Taiwan Strait.’

Among the difficult options for Taiwanese and Western response might be beefing up of Taiwan’s own coast guard, which is vastly smaller than China’s, and training it to respond to such tactics.

PHILIPPINE SEA (Oct. 3, 2021) The U.S. Navy Nimitz-class aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) transit the Philippine Sea during a photo exercise with multiple carrier strike groups, Oct. 3, 2021. The integrated at-sea operations brought together more than 15,000 Sailors across six nations, and demonstrates the U.S. Navy’s ability to work closely with its unmatched network of alliances and partnerships in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski) 211003-N-LI114-1208.

The US could also impose financial sanctions on China if it imposed a quarantine and persuade other democracies to join in. In doing so, the West would be hitting back at China using tactics that, like China’s quarantine, fall short of war. This might also meet the incoming Trump administration’s goal of weakening China, which it views as an economic competitor.

Whatever the response will be, plans are needed. Quarantine is so attractive a measure for China that Taiwan and its friends must be prepared.

About the Author: Janes Rickards

Jane Rickards, a journalist and frequent contributor to The Economist, has lived in Taiwan since 2004. This first appeared in ASPI’s The Strategist.

19fortyfive.com · by Jane Rickard · January 13, 2025

5. What Imperialist Game Is Donald Trump Playing with Greenland?

Greenland is fading a little bit from the headlines this week.

What Imperialist Game Is Donald Trump Playing with Greenland?

The New Yorker · by John Cassidy · January 13, 2025

The Financial Page

The President-elect’s brand of America First isolationism has always sat awkwardly with his Napoleonic tendencies.

January 13, 2025

Source photograph by Ritzau Scanpix / Sipa / AP

Vladimir Lenin famously wrote that imperialism is the “highest stage of capitalism,” by which he meant that a global economy based on the profit motive would inevitably end up with rich capitalist countries subjugating less developed territories and exploiting their resources. As Donald Trump prepares to return to the White House, he seems determined to put fresh life into this subversive description. In an online post last month, Trump said it was an “absolute necessity” for the United States to take ownership of Greenland, the vast and resource-rich island in the Arctic. A couple of weeks later, at a press conference, he refused to rule out using military force to seize Greenland in addition to taking control of the Panama Canal, a key trade route, which the late Jimmy Carter agreed to transfer to its home country in 1977.

As often with Trump, the question arises of how serious he really is. The Democratic senator Elizabeth Warren suggested that his comments were designed to shift the spotlight away from his controversial cabinet selections and their upcoming confirmation hearings. Other observers speculated Trump was directing attention to smaller and weaker countries because as President he will likely encounter difficulty in facing down stronger opponents, particularly China. But one thing is certain: when Trump posted online a map of the U.S. occupying the entirety of the North American continent north of the Rio Grande, he knew that many of his most ardent supporters would cheer.

Still, it may be a mistake to dismiss his statements entirely as bluster. The idea of expanding the United States to include Greenland and parts of Canada has long appealed to some American hyper-nationalists, such as Pat Buchanan. And Trump’s brand of America First isolationism has always sat awkwardly with his Napoleonic tendencies. Then, there are economic considerations. As climate change lengthens the shipping season, Greenland occupies an important strategic location. Moreover, the island and its offshore territories are believed to contain large untapped stores of fossil fuels and rare minerals that are so potentially valuable that they would attract the attention of any modern-day reincarnation of Theodore Roosevelt or Cecil Rhodes. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the offshore areas surrounding the island contain up to 17.5 billion barrels of oil and a hundred and forty-eight trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Among the minerals that Greenland possesses in significant quantities are many so-called rare-earth metals used in green-energy technologies, such as electric batteries, wind turbines, and high-power transmission lines.

This wasn’t the first time Trump has suggested that the U.S. should acquire Greenland. In August, 2019, during his first term, the Wall Street Journal reported that he had ordered his aides to look into the idea of buying the island from Denmark, which has colonized it since the eighteenth century. When the Danish government dismissed the idea as absurd, he cancelled a state visit to Copenhagen. In an interview for the 2022 book “The Divider,” by my colleague Susan B. Glasser and the New York Times reporter Peter Baker, Trump said, “I love maps. And I always said: ‘Look at the size of this. It’s massive. That should be part of the United States.’ ”

Even after the rebuff from Denmark, Trump took steps to build up the American presence in Greenland. In June, 2020, his Administration opened a consulate in Nuuk, the capital. That diplomatic move didn’t create many headlines, but Europeans took notice. As a self-ruling territory of Denmark, Greenland is classified as a European Union Overseas Country and Territory. Although it’s not technically part of the E.U., it does, however, receive some funding from the union, primarily for education and economic development. Policymakers in Brussels, the political headquarters of the E.U., are well aware of Greenland’s strategic importance.

In November, 2023, officials from the E.U. and Greenland announced a strategic partnership to develop a value chain for sustainable raw materials. In recent years, the E.U. has committed to shifting rapidly to a low-carbon economy, and a memorandum of understanding about the agreement acknowledged that the E.U. “needs to secure a sustainable supply of raw materials, especially critical raw materials, as an essential prerequisite for delivering on green and clean energy objectives.” The release also noted: “25 of the 34 critical raw materials identified by the Commission as strategically important for Europe’s industry and the green transition can be found in Greenland.” Then, in March of last year, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, visited Nuuk to open a new office and establish a permanent E.U. presence. Standing alongside Greenland’s Prime Minister and his Danish counterpart, von der Leyen hailed “the beginning of a new era of the EU-Greenland partnership.”

It’s hard to imagine Trump closely following E.U. diplomacy from Palm Beach. But the agreements between Brussels and Nuuk underscore the importance that Europe attaches to peacefully developing Greenland’s resources, and it helps explain why senior officials from France and Germany, the two most powerful countries in the union, reacted immediately to Trump’s statements. Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, said the inviolability of borders applied to every country, “no matter whether it’s a very small one or a very powerful one.”

To find out more about how Europeans were reacting to Trump’s provocations, I contacted Florian Vidal, a French political scientist at the Arctic University of Norway, who studies geopolitical and economic developments throughout the region. Speaking over Zoom, Vidal told me that in 2019 many people took Trump’s suggestion about buying Greenland as a joke. Not this time. “In the power game that is developing over Greenland, there is one big potential loser, and it’s the European Union,” Vidal said. “It needs the resources for its energy transition. It’s heavily reliant on Greenland. And it faces the potential danger of being squeezed out.”

Vidal also pointed out that, though many Europeans regard Trump as sui generis, U.S. governments have expressed strategic interest in Greenland for more than a century. During the Second World War, U.S. forces occupied the island to prevent Nazi Germany from seizing control of it. After the war ended, President Truman offered to buy the island for a hundred million dollars, but Denmark said no. The U.S. established a permanent military presence on the northwest coast of Greenland, Thule Air Base, which operated as a ballistic-missile early-warning station during the Cold War. (It’s now run by the U.S. Space Force, which Trump created in 2019, and was renamed Pituffik Space Base.)

As warming temperatures have been melting the Arctic, thus creating a shorter route from northern Europe to Asia than the Suez Canal route, China has also made economic overtures toward Greenland. In January, 2018, Beijing announced its goal to develop a “polar Silk Road” by building transport infrastructure in the Arctic. Later that same year, a Chinese-owned company emerged as a finalist in the bid to expand and refurbish three airports in Greenland. By that stage, an Australian mining firm in which a Chinese company held a significant stake announced plans to dig for rare earths at the southern tip of the island. Neither project went ahead. Citing environmental concerns, the Greenland government refused to give the Australian firm a mining license. And it chose Denmark rather than China as its partner in the airport projects.

Although these developments represented setbacks for Beijing, they didn’t really undermine China’s over-all economic prospects, or its ambitions in the Arctic region, Vidal noted. It still controls the vast majority of the world’s supplies of rare earths, and, as of late, it has started constructing docks at five Russian ports in the Arctic. From Beijing’s perspective, coöperating with Russia represents an alternative Arctic strategy to developing ties with Greenland. For Brussels and Washington, that option isn’t really available—unless, of course, Trump were to reach some sort of strategic accommodation with Vladimir Putin.

“Geographically speaking, Greenland is part of the North American landmass,” Vidal said. “I can understand the strategic logic of building up a U.S. presence there, but of course we are in the twenty-first century, no longer the nineteenth.” Vidal also suggested that Trump might be talking tough to bolster his position in subsequent negotiations. Last week, Denmark’s foreign minister said that his government was “open to dialogue” with the United States on how the two countries could coöperate in the Arctic region, including Greenland. “I presume the idea is not to start a war or to invade,” Vidal said. “But over time there could well be significant economic and military deals that would bring Greenland a lot closer to the United States. That is the most likely outcome, in my opinion.”

It is the nature of imperialist ventures that Indigenous peoples rarely have much say in what happens to their lands. In this instance, the government of Greenland, which represents its fifty-six thousand residents, most of whom are Indigenous Inuits, has already rejected Trump’s overtures. In 2008, the population voted in a referendum for greater autonomy from Denmark, and eventual independence. “Greenland is for the Greenlandic people,” Prime Minister Múte Egede said at a press conference last week. “We do not want to be Danish, we do not want to be American. We want to be Greenlandic.”

In principle, developing Greenland’s natural resources could enrich its people and make it less dependent on Denmark, which currently subsidizes the island to the tune of about six hundred million dollars a year—or roughly ten thousand dollars a person. But any large-scale economic exploitation of Greenland’s resources would require a big injection of capital from somewhere. “Right now, you only have two active mines,” Vidal said. “You would need to build everything. You would need workers. You would need infrastructure. You would need to satisfy environmental standards. To set up and operate any big project could take ten or fifteen years.”

Trump’s attention span isn’t that long, of course. Perhaps he is all talk, but comparisons to the age of empire are hard to avoid. Last month, Trump invoked William McKinley, as he often does, saying that he would rename a mountain in Alaska after the twenty-fifth President. (In 2015, the Obama Administration changed the name to Mt. Denali.) Until now, Trump has mainly championed McKinley as a promoter of tariffs. (Before McKinley entered the White House, he served in the House of Representatives where he sponsored the Tariff Act of 1890, which raised duties on many imports to fifty per cent.) But McKinley is also famous for launching a colonial war with Spain, which ended with the U.S. acquiring the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. McKinley also annexed Hawaii by signing into law the Newlands Resolution.

Last week, the President’s son, Donald Trump, Jr., travelled to Greenland, cameras in tow, where he claimed Greenlanders “love Trump” and support the idea of their island becoming part of the United States. A few days later, a senior Greenland politician, Pipaluk Lynge, told Politico that Trump, Jr.,’s trip was “staged,” and that, though some locals had expressed curiosity in his arrival, others had given him the finger. Vidal is right: this isn’t the nineteenth century. But Greenlanders and the E.U. aren’t the only ones with grounds for concern about the implications of Trump’s imperialist rhetoric.

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John Cassidy has been a staff writer at The New Yorker since 1995. He writes The Financial Page, a column about economics and politics.

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6. North Korean Air Defense System Revealed In Ukraine By Russian Friendly Fire Strike

Photos at the link.

https://www.twz.com/land/north-korean-air-defense-system-revealed-in-ukraine-by-russian-friendly-fire-strike?utm

North Korean Air Defense System Revealed In Ukraine By Russian Friendly Fire Strike

A North Korean-made surface-to-air missile system, broadly analogous to the Russian Tor, has appeared for the first time in combat in the Kursk region.

Thomas Newdick

Posted 17 Hours Ago

172

twz.com · by Thomas Newdick

A North Korean-made mobile surface-to-air missile system has appeared for the first time in the Ukraine conflict. While the official name of the air defense system remains unknown, it’s among the latest examples of Pyongyang’s military assistance for Moscow’s war. Ironically, however, its presence in the fighting was disclosed by a video shared by Russian military bloggers, showing it being attacked by a Russian drone, in an apparent ‘blue on blue’ friendly fire mishap.

A previously unidentified air defense system seen in the footage of a strike released by the Russian side appears to be a North Korean analog of the Russian Tor short-range SAM system.

The vehicle could've been mistakenly hit by a Russian drone operator.

The original source of… pic.twitter.com/Nnv1b9PQ5O

— Status-6 (Military & Conflict News) (BlueSky too) (@Archer83Able) January 12, 2025

The video in question seems to have first been published on Telegram by the Russian channel Povernutye na Voynie, which described the footage as showing a Russian drone strike on “a Western-supplied air defense radar system” in Ukrainian service. The system was claimed to be destroyed and, while this cannot be confirmed, a large pall of smoke can be seen rising after the engagement.

The original post published on Telegram by the Russian channel Povernutye na Voynie.

The same source claims that the incident took place in the Kursk region of Western Russia, where a Ukrainian campaign has been underway since last August and where Kyiv launched a new offensive just last week.

However, analysis of the available imagery indicates the target is in fact the same type of North Korean mobile surface-to-air missile system that first appeared in a major military parade in Pyongyang in October 2020, as you can read about here.

The as-yet-unnamed North Korean mobile surface-to-air missile system on parade in Pyongyang in October 2020. North Korean state mediaAnother view of the North Korean mobile surface-to-air missile system. North Korean state media

The North Korean system is thought to be broadly analogous to the Russian Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) low-to medium-altitude, short-range air defense system (SHORADS), a piece of equipment that is in widespread Russian service, with much smaller numbers in Ukrainian use.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces 9K330 Tor seen before the full-scale invasion that began in 2022. VoidWanderer/Wikimedia Commons

In terms of appearance, the North Korean system has some similarities with the wheeled Tor-M2K version developed in Belarus by the MZKT company, although the North Korean vehicle has five axles, rather than three. In the North Korean system, the missile module, complete with radar, is carried in the center of a semi-trailer.

A Belarusian wheeled Tor-M2K short-range air defense system. Belatom

Ukraine only employs the tracked 9K330 version of the Tor, in very small numbers. So far, Russian units in the Ukraine war have also only been noted using tracked versions of the Tor, including the improved 9K331 Tor-M1 and the 9K332 Tor-M2, and subvariants of these, all of which also are mounted on a tracked chassis.

This suggests Russian drone operators who attacked the vehicle likely also assessed that it was a Western-supplied air defense radar system, based on its unfamiliarity, and perhaps were also unaware of the North Korea-made system being deployed in the area. Regardless, friendly fire incidents are by no means uncommon in the war in Ukraine.

Imagery captured by a Russian drone shows the North Korean air defense system moments before it was targeted. via X

Aside from the manner in which its presence was revealed, the appearance of the North Korean air defense system in the conflict is notable.

First, it’s indicative of additional and more varied types of North Korean heavy weapons entering the fighting.

There are several reasons why the system might have been used in the fighting in the Kursk region.

It could be in Kursk for use by Pyongyang’s own forces, providing an organic air defense capability that they otherwise badly lack. The Ukrainian Air Force has been known to be very active over the Kursk region, including attacking ground targets with Western-provided standoff air-launched munitions. Given the extensive employment of North Korean troops in the Kursk counteroffensive, the system appearing here is also not entirely surprising.

North Koreans in Kursk region sleeping#Ukraine #Russia #NorthKorea pic.twitter.com/PAI0JMrkKJ

— The Global 202 (@theglobal202) November 22, 2024

There is also the possibility that Russia is using the system to bolster its own air defense capabilities. If that were the case it would suggest that Moscow has a particular need for these types of weapons, reflecting the fact that it has taken heavy losses in terms of this type of equipment and is struggling to make good attrition, or at least to replace equipment in a timely fashion. The ability of Russia to produce required quantities of especially higher-end military equipment is something that has been repeatedly questioned since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amid the strict sanctions that are now in place.

Since it’s a relatively new system, the North Korean SHORADS could possibly have been involved in some kind of combat evaluation, to test its capabilities and further improve it. Operational trials of this kind could also have been run in conjunction with Russia, with a view to potentially procure it for themselves.

“There should be no doubt left in the world that the Russian Army is dependent on military assistance from North Korea,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wrote in a recent post on social media, which also pointed to the capture of North Korean troops by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky offered to hand over these soldiers in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war held by Russia.

In addition to the first captured soldiers from North Korea, there will undoubtedly be more. It’s only a matter of time before our troops manage to capture others. There should be no doubt left in the world that the Russian army is dependent on military assistance from North… pic.twitter.com/4RyCfUoHoC

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) January 12, 2025

Aside from the thousands of troops North Korea has now committed to the conflict, especially in the Kursk region, North Korea has already supplied Russia with huge amounts of weaponry, including badly needed artillery rounds and various kinds of other ammunition, amounting to millions of individual projectiles.

Late last year, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), drawing upon intelligence provided by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR), listed North Korean weapons collected from the battlefield, including “122mm and 152mm shells, Bulsae-4 anti-tank missiles, short-range ballistic missiles such as the KN-23, and RPG anti-tank rockets.”

Since then, TWZ has also reported on the appearance of North Korean 170mm M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery pieces being deployed in the Ukraine war. Again, it’s not clear if these are being used exclusively by North Korean troops or whether they have been supplied to Russia.

Examples of the North Korean-made M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery system under transport in Russia, last November. via X via X

Russian ground-based air defense technologies are far in advance of those that North Korea has developed, with point defense, especially, being one of Pyongyang’s weakest military capability sets. As a whole, however, North Korea has made some important strides in ground-based air defenses in recent years, although the longer-range KN-06 surface-to-air missile system has been the main focus of its efforts.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches a test launch of the KN-06 surface-to-air missile. North Korean state media

At the same time, the burgeoning military relationship between the countries has led to reports of Russia providing North Korea with some of its own high-end, ground-based air defense systems, as you can read about here.

Considering that, it might be surprising if Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with SHORADS from its own stocks, but it remains a possibility.

Whatever the case, as long as this cooperation continues, the likelihood of North Korea benefiting from Russian weapons and expertise also increases. As well as suggestions that Pyongyang might receive new Russian combat aircraft to overhaul its seriously outdated air force, and there have also been concerns that Moscow might provide it with technologies to help accelerate its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile programs.

All told, however, the appearance of a previously unseen North Korean surface-to-air missile system in the conflict underscores the fact that North Korea is becoming ever more entrenched in the conflict.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

twz.com · by Thomas Newdick

7. Outgoing FBI director calls China and its cyber program the ‘defining threat of our generation’

Outgoing FBI director calls China and its cyber program the ‘defining threat of our generation’

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · January 13, 2025

Christopher Wray, who's served as FBI director since 2017, is set to step down before President-elect Donald Trump is inaugurated on Jan. 21, 2025. (FBI)

China’s cyber program has already infiltrated critical American infrastructure and is poised to “wreak havoc” at a whim, the outgoing FBI director told “60 Minutes” on Sunday.

Christopher Wray, who plans to resign as President-elect Donald Trump takes office later this month, described the Chinese government as “the greatest-long-term threat” and the “defining threat of our generation,” due in part to its massive, state-funded cyber program.

During the interview with CBS’s Scott Pelley, Wray said Beijing can leverage those programs to target water treatment plants, the electrical grid, natural gas pipelines, telecommunications and other systems.

China has already pre-positioned malware to “lie in wait on those networks,” where it can “inflict real-world harm at a time and place of their choosing,” he told “60 Minutes.”

The FBI also believes that Beijing has already listened in on communications by high-level officials.

Wray didn’t confirm whom he suspects China has surveilled, but “60 Minutes” said it independently confirmed Beijing spied on communications from Donald Trump, Kamala Harris’ presidential campaign and U.S. national security figures, according to the televised interview.

The program did not disclose how it confirmed those statements.

China has been accused of multiple state-sponsored hacking campaigns aimed at the United States and other countries, but it routinely denies involvement. (Pixabay)

China is the “most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks,” according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s annual threat assessment released Feb. 5.

“If Beijing believed that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it would consider aggressive cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure and military assets,” the report said.

A cyber strike of that scale would aim to impede the deployment of U.S. troops, induce societal panic and otherwise interfere with U.S. military actions, according to the report.

China over the past decade has been accused of multiple state-sponsored hacking campaigns aimed at the U.S. — as well as European and Asian countries — but it routinely denies involvement.

The U.S. Treasury on Jan. 3 sanctioned Integrity Technology Group Inc., a Beijing-based cybersecurity company, for its alleged involvement in multiple hacking attempts against the U.S.

The hacks were connected to Flax Typhoon, which the Treasury described as “a Chinese malicious state-sponsored cyber group that has been active since at least 2021, often targeting organizations within U.S. critical infrastructure sectors,” according to the Treasury news release announcing the sanctions.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiakun Guo at a Jan. 6 news conference denied any involvement and said Beijing firmly opposes hacking.

“We urge the U.S. to stop using the issue of cybersecurity to vilify and smear China. For quite some time, the US has been trumpeting so-called ‘Chinese hacking’ and even using it to impose illegal and unilateral sanctions on China,” he said, according to a transcript of the news conference.

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson covers the U.S. Navy and other services from Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. Originally from Knoxville, Tenn., he holds a journalism degree from the University of North Florida. He previously covered crime and the military in Key West, Fla., and business in Jacksonville, Fla.

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · January 13, 2025

8. New Aircraft Carrier To Be Named After Bill Clinton

New Aircraft Carrier To Be Named After Bill Clinton

After the USS William J. Clinton, the next Ford class super carrier slated to be named USS George W. Bush.

Howard Altman

Posted 11 Hours Ago

282

twz.com · by Howard Altman

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In his last week in office, President Joe Biden on Monday named the Navy’s next unnamed future Ford-class aircraft carriers President William J. Clinton. The super carrier that will follow it will be named after George W. Bush. However, it will be years, even under the current plans, before either ship is delivered to the Navy.

If all goes according to the Biden administration’s wishes, the USS William J. Clinton (CVN-82) and USS George W. Bush (CVN-83) will join the USS Gerald R. Ford and future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), the USS Enterprise (CVN-80), and USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) as part of the Navy’s newest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier class. There are 11 aircraft carriers in the current fleet, 10 of them are earlier Nimitz class ships.

The USS Gerald R. Ford is the lead ship in the Navy’s newest class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Anderson W. Branch)

“The future USS William J. Clinton honors President William J. Clinton, 42nd President of the United States of America, serving two terms from 1993 to 2001,” Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said in a statement. “The future USS George W. Bush honors President George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States of America, serving two terms from 2001 to 2009. This will be the first Navy vessel named for either president. The names follow the Navy tradition of often naming aircraft carriers after U.S. presidents.”

Bush served in the Texas Air National Guard from 1968 to 1973 and flew F-102 Delta Dagger fighters, while Clinton was never in the military.

Then-President William J. Clinton visited the USS Independence aircraft carrier with the First Lady while anchored in Yokosuka. (Photo by © Wally McNamee/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images) Wally McNamee

“I am honored that my name will be associated with the United States Navy and a symbol of our Nation’s might,” Bush was quoted as stating in the Del Toro release. “I have a special admiration for the men and women of our Navy – including my dad – and ask God to watch over this ship and those who sail aboard her.”

This is the second aircraft carrier to bear the Bush family name. The last Nimitz-class carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), is named for his father. This means that two carriers with the namesake Bush will be in the fleet operating at the same time.

ATLANTIC OCEAN (June 10, 2012) Former President George W. Bush and former first lady Laura Bush tour the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Samantha Thorpe/Released)The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) transits the Mediterranean Sea, Jan. 24, 2023.(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas Avis) USS George H.W. Bush transits the Mediterranean Sea, Jan. 24, 2023 during Juniper Oak 23.2. Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nicholas Avis

It’s one thing to name a ship, but quite another to procure it, begin construction, finish, and deliver it. The Ford-class program is already facing serious delays, according to a July 2024 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report.

The Navy’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget submission “proposes deferring the procurement” of the Clinton, the fifth ship in the Ford class, by two years,” from Fiscal Year 2028 to Fiscal Year 2030, “with advance procurement (AP) for the ship beginning in” Fiscal Year 2027, CRS noted. The future Bush is not even on the books yet for procurement.

As an example of how long it takes to get a new aircraft carrier to the fleet, the Ford, the lead ship in the class was procured in Fiscal Year 2008, commissioned in July 2017, and didn’t make its first deployment in October 2022, more than a decade after the Navy procured it. It had massive teething issues, some of which were due to it being the first in its class.

The USS John F. Kennedy, meanwhile, was procured in Fiscal Year 2013 and scheduled for delivery this July, according to Navy documents.

The third ship in the class, the USS Enterprise, was procured in Fiscal Year 2018, however, its scheduled delivery has been delayed until September 2029, or 18 months later than the March 2028 date shown in the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 budget, CRS explained.

The Doris Miller, procured in Fiscal Year 2019, is not scheduled for delivery to the Navy until February 2032.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (Chester William Nimitz, 1885-1966) pins the Navy Cross (medal for heroism in combat) onto Doris “Dorie” Miller, USS Enterprise (CV-6), Pearl Harbor, May 27, 1942. He was killed in action in 1943. (Photo by Archive Photos/Getty Images) Archive Photos

Naming ships after the living is not unheard of, but it deprives new administrations, Navy secretaries, and Congresses of the chance to honor people or ideas of their choosing. It’s possible that plans could change.

That’s gonna be a nope from me, dog. We have two centuries of good names for these ships, pandering to still living former politicians ain’t it. https://t.co/dSm8GL5D4q

— Blake Herzinger (@BDHerzinger) January 13, 2025

It’s happened before. In 2020, then Navy Secretary William Modly wanted a new class of frigates named Agility, according to USNI News. It was eventually changed to Constellation class. But considering the now relatively established practice of naming carriers after U.S. presidents, the next in line are the ones announced today, so changing those names may be harder than swapping out the class name of frigate.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

9. China Officials Discuss Option of TikTok Sale to Elon Musk

China Officials Discuss Option of TikTok Sale to Elon Musk

Beijing’s leaders have denounced U.S. ban threat and said any forced divestiture would be like robbery

https://www.wsj.com/tech/china-officials-internally-discuss-option-of-tiktok-sale-to-musk-bac0a224?mod=hp_lead_pos3

By Stu Woo

Follow

Jan. 14, 2025 1:43 am ET

Elon Musk is one of Donald Trump’s closest allies. Photo: brian snyder/Reuters

SINGAPORE—Chinese officials, facing a looming U.S. TikTok ban, have internally discussed options including the possibility of allowing a trusted non-Chinese party such as Elon Musk to invest in or take control of TikTok’s U.S. operations, people familiar with the discussions said.

China has protested a U.S. law that would ban TikTok in the U.S. unless its Beijing-based parent, ByteDance, divests itself of the operation. The Supreme Court last week seemed inclined to let the law stand. It goes into effect on Sunday unless the court issues a stay. 

It couldn’t be determined whether the Chinese officials had presented the Musk idea to top leadership.

The law is one of many issues straining U.S.-China relations ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration on Jan. 20. Top leadership in Beijing views openness on TikTok as one possible card to play, with confrontations expected over tariffs and other issues, the people said. 

Trump has said he wants to find a way to let TikTok remain in the U.S.

In discussions to date, officials concluded that it was best to let the ban take effect and keep TikTok under ByteDance’s ownership so that negotiations could continue after Trump takes over, the people said.

In preparing the tool kit for possible options after Trump’s inauguration, officials have examined possible openness to a deal with Musk, one of Trump’s closest allies, the people said. Tesla, the electric-vehicle maker headed by Musk, has a factory in Shanghai, and China is one of its biggest markets.

TikTok says the U.S. ban would violate free-speech protections, while the U.S. government cites the need to protect national security. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Bloomberg News

Musk has frequently met top Chinese officials and expressed favorable views about the country and its leadership. He owns X, another social-media app. 

Still, any willingness to make a deal would run counter to Chinese leaders’ position that they need to stand up to what they view as an unacceptable American law. 

“It is sheer robbers’ logic to try every means to snatch from others all the good things that they have,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman said last year.

The Chinese government hasn’t communicated with ByteDance about the contingency plans it has considered, the people said. Beijing wouldn’t order ByteDance to sell the app to a specific investor, they said, but it has a key role to play in the discussions because China’s export controls require government approval for the sale of domestically developed algorithms for recommending content to foreign entities. 

The core of TikTok’s video-sharing app is the algorithm containing software code originally written by its parent, ByteDance, for figuring out what users want to watch and delivering relevant content to them. 

Chinese officials have in recent months asked ByteDance about its plans for responding to the U.S. law. ByteDance employees have answered that the company was focusing on the legal battle and was confident it would win, without mentioning other backup plans such as a divestiture, people familiar with the matter said.

Beijing’s potential involvement in a deal to help TikTok avert a U.S. ban could undermine the company’s assertion that it operates independently of Chinese authorities.

“For some, an official move to protect TikTok could suggest that the Communist Party or Chinese government have some particular equity in the firm,” said Ja Ian Chong, a National University of Singapore professor who studies Chinese foreign policy. “This could raise further debate about whether TikTok is a tool” for Beijing.

TikTok says the U.S. law violates First Amendment protections for speech, while the U.S. government says the law is justified by the need to protect national security. Supreme Court justices expressed sympathy for the government’s view, though they also shared some of the speech concerns. A decision is expected as soon as this week. 

Bloomberg earlier reported on Beijing’s discussions about the possibility of a deal with Musk. Asked about that report, a TikTok representative told The Wall Street Journal, “We cannot be expected to comment on pure fiction.”

Last month, TikTok Chief Executive Shou Chew met Trump at the president-elect’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, people familiar with the matter said. Chew, who has known Musk for years, has also talked to the X owner to seek his opinions about the incoming administration, The Wall Street Journal reported in November.

Write to Stu Woo at Stu.Woo@wsj.com

10. TikTok Refugees Find an Alternative—in China

I just learned about this from my daughter last night. This is catching on among American twentysomethings. She said that many on social media are gravitating toward this as a statement against the US government. Even some of her friends who are IT professionals who I would think would know better are downloading this app. The joking on social media is that "China can have my data but I am not giving it to the US government." They like being given a Chinese name in Chinese characters (that they do not even understand). Some say they now want to learn to speak and read Chinese. I am reminded of the satire about getting tattoos of supposed Chinese philosophy that turn out to say profound things such as "don't eat yellow snow" or worse.

Isn't political warfare (and unrestricted warfare and the three warfares) great?

TikTok Refugees Find an Alternative—in China

Chinese users of Xiaohongshu, or Little Red Book, welcome Americans fleeing a feared TikTok ban

https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-refugees-find-an-alternativein-china-0b0418f6?mod=latest_headlines

Signage at the Xiaohongshu Technology Co. headquarters in Shanghai. Photo: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News

By Shen LuFollow and Hannah MiaoFollow

Jan. 13, 2025 11:10 pm ET

They call themselves TikTok refugees—and the app they are fleeing to is a lot more Chinese than the video-sharing app whose U.S. fate now hangs in the balance.

After Supreme Court justices Friday seemed inclined to let stand a law that would shut down TikTok in the U.S., the Chinese social-media platform Xiaohongshu, translated in English as Little Red Book, received a flood of American TikTok users. They are looking for a sanctuary or a way to protest the potentially imminent TikTok ban—never mind that they don’t speak Chinese.

Charlotte Silverstein, a 32-year-old publicist in Los Angeles, downloaded Xiaohongshu on Sunday night after seeing videos on TikTok about migrating to the app, which Americans dubbed “RedNote.” She described the move as a “last act of defiance” in her frustration about the potential TikTok ban.

“Everyone has been super welcoming and sweet,” said Silverstein, who has made three posts so far. “I love the sense of community that I’m seeing already.”

By Monday, TikTok refugees had pushed Xiaohongshu to the top of the free-app chart on Apple’s App Store.

“I’m really nervous to be on this app, but I also find it to be really exciting and thrilling that we’re all doing this,” one new Xiaohongshu user said in a video clip on Sunday. “I’m sad that TikTok might actually go, but if this is where we’re gonna be hanging out, welcome to my page!” Within a day, the video had more than 3,000 comments and 6,000 likes. And the user had amassed 24,000 followers. 

Neither Xiaohongshu nor TikTok responded to requests for comment. 

Xiaohongshu on Monday reached the top of the free-app chart on Apple’s App Store.

The flow of refugees, while serving as a symbolic dissent against TikTok’s possible shutdown, doesn’t mean Xiaohongshu can easily serve as a replacement for Americans. TikTok says it has 170 million users in the U.S., and it has drawn many creators who take advantage of the app’s features to advertise and sell their products. 

Most of the content on Xiaohongshu is in Chinese and the app doesn’t have a simple way to auto-translate the posts into English.

At a time of a strained U.S.-China relationship, some new Chinese-American friendships are budding on an app that until now has had few international users. 

“I like that two countries are coming together,” said Sarah Grathwohl, a 32-year-old marketing manager in Seattle, who made a Xiaohongshu account on Sunday night. “We’re bonding over this experience.”

Grathwohl doesn’t speak Chinese, so she has been using Google Translate for help. She said she isn’t concerned about data privacy and would rather try a new Chinese app than shift her screentime to Instagram Reels.

Another opportunity for bonding was a photo of English practice questions from a Chinese textbook, with the caption, “American please.” American Xiaohongshu users helped answer the questions in the comments, receiving a “thank u Honey” from the person who posted the questions.

By Monday evening, there were more than 72,000 posts with the hashtag #tiktokrefugee on Xiaohongshu, racking up some 34 million views.

TikTokers livestreaming while outside the Supreme Court last week. Photo: Jacquelyn Martin/AP

In an English-language post titled “Welcome TikTok refugees,” posted by a Shanghai-based Xiaohongshu user, an American user responded in Chinese with a cat photo and the words, “Thank you for your warm welcome. Everyone is so cute. My cat says thanks, too.” The user added, “I hope this is the correct translation.” 

Some Chinese users are also using the livestreaming function to invite TikTok migrants to chat. One chat room hosted by a Chinese English tutor had more than 179,900 visits with several Americans exchanging cultural views with Chinese users. 

ByteDance-owned TikTok isn’t available in China but has a Chinese sister app, Douyin. American users can’t download Douyin, though; unlike Xiaohongshu, it is only accessible from Chinese app stores. 

On Xiaohongshu, Chinese users have been sharing tutorials and tips in English for American users on how to use the app. Meanwhile, on TikTok, video clips have also multiplied over the past two days teaching users the correct pronunciation of Xiaohongshu—shau-hong-SHOO—and its culture.

Xiaohongshu may be new to most Americans, but in China, it is one of the most-used social-media apps. Backed by investors like Chinese tech giants Tencent Holdings and Alibaba Group, Xiaohongshu is perhaps best described as a Chinese mix of Instagram and Reddit and its users increasingly treat it as a search engine for practical information.

Despite its Little Red Book name, Xiaohongshu has little in common with the compilation of Mao Zedong’s political writings and speeches. In fact, the app aspires to be a guidebook about anything but politics. 

Conceived as a shopping guide for affluent urbanites in 2013, Xiaohongshu has morphed into a one-stop shop for lifestyle and shopping recommendations. Every day, its more than 300 million users, who skew toward educated young women, create, share and search for posts about anything from makeup tutorials to career-development lessons, game strategies or camping skills.

Over the years, Xiaohongshu users have developed a punchy writing style, with posts accompanied by images and videos for an Instagram feel. 

Chinese social-media platforms are required to watch political content closely. Xiaohongshu’s focus on lifestyle content, eschewing anything that might seem political, makes it less of a regulatory target than a site like Weibo, which in 2021 was fined at least $2.2 million by China’s cyberspace watchdog for disseminating “illegal information.”

“I don’t expect to read news or discussion of serious issues on Xiaohongshu,” said Lin Ying, a 26-year-old game designer in Beijing.

The American frenzy over a Chinese app is the reverse of a migration in recent years by Chinese social-media users seeking refuge from censorship on Western platforms, such as X, formerly known as Twitter, or, more recently, BlueSky.

Just like TikTok users who turn to the app for fun, Xiaohongshu users also seek entertainment through livestreams and short video clips as well as photos and text-posts on the platform.

Influencer Tera Feng prepares before hosting a livestream sales session on Xiaohongshu from her Shanghai apartment. Photo: casey hall/Reuters

Xiaohongshu had roughly 1.3 million U.S. mobile users in December, according to market-intelligence firm Sensor Tower, which estimates that U.S. downloads of the app in the week ending Sunday almost tripled compared with the week before.

Sensor Tower data indicates that Xiaohongshu became the top-ranked social-networking and overall free app on Apple’s App Store and the 8th top-ranked social app on the Google Play Store on Monday, “a feat it has never achieved before,” said Abe Yousef, senior insights analyst at Sensor Tower.

Run by Shanghai-based Xingin Information Technology, Xiaohongshu makes money primarily from advertising, according to a Xiaohongshu spokeswoman. The company was valued at $17 billion after its latest round of private-equity investment in the summer, according to research firm PitchBook Data.

Not everyone is singing kumbaya. Some Chinese Xiaohongshu users are worried about the language barrier. And some American TikTok users are concerned about data safety on the Chinese app.

But many are hoping to build bridges between the two countries. 

“Y’all might think Americans are hateful because of how our politicians are, but I promise you not all of us are like that,” one American woman said on a Sunday video she posted on Xiaohongshu with Chinese subtitles. 

She went on to show how to make cheese quesadillas using a waffle maker.

The video collected more than 11,000 likes and 3,000 comments within 24 hours. “It’s so kind of you to use Chinese subtitles,” read one popular comment posted by a user from Sichuan province. 

Another Guangdong-based user commented with a bilingual “friendly reminder”: “On Chinese social-media platforms please do not mention sensitive topics such as politics, religion and drugs!!!”

Jiahui Huang contributed to this article.

Write to Shen Lu at shen.lu@wsj.com and Hannah Miao at hannah.miao@wsj.com

11. SECAF Kendall, looking out to 2050, predicts war winners will be combatants with the best AI

SECAF Kendall, looking out to 2050, predicts war winners will be combatants with the best AI

“It is likely these areas of advanced military technology will be manifest through the increasingly widespread use of autonomy and automation, in all domains, but especially in space, in cyberspace, and in the air,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall wrote in a new report.

By

Mikayla Easley

January 13, 2025

defensescoop.com · by measley · January 13, 2025

Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems will likely play an even more significant role in determining the outcome of future conflicts as the technology continues to evolve over the next 25 years, according to outgoing Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall.

In a congressionally-mandated report submitted to lawmakers in December and set to be published Monday, Kendall outlined his prediction on what security environments and technological advancements will contribute to what both the Air and Space Forces will look like in the year 2050. The document covers a broad range of emerging capabilities that will shape future warfare, many of which are underpinned by an expanded use of AI and autonomy.

“It is likely these areas of advanced military technology will be manifest through the increasingly widespread use of autonomy and automation, in all domains, but especially in space, in cyberspace, and in the air,” Kendall wrote in the report, titled “The Department of the Air Force in 2050.”

The assessment comes at a critical inflection point for AI and autonomy, especially their use by the Defense Department as it looks to counter emerging threats from adversaries such as China and Russia. During Kendall’s tenure at the helm of the DAF, both the Air and Space Forces have made strides in leveraging the technologies — from using artificial intelligence to assist personnel in day-to-day tasks to the development of the Air Force’s robotic wingmen known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

As the technology proliferates in the coming decades, Kendall believes the department’s greatest challenge will be understanding what the right mix of manned and unmanned capabilities will be for specific warfighting functions.

“The hardest thing, I think, for us to come to grips with is going to be the human-machine interface and how the decision making takes place,” Kendall said Monday during an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We’re going to have to figure out how to manage this in a way which is cost effective, which is consistent with our values [and] which is militarily competitive. I think that’s going to be a tough problem to solve.”

Kendall predicted in the report that AI-assisted decision making and support tools will be at the center of many military functions and capabilities by 2050. In particular, he highlighted that AI will likely inform battle management platforms to quickly inform mission planning and also help extract relevant target identification and tracking information from multi-sensor databases.

“Victory or defeat in the air or in space at the human scale is likely to be determined by which combatant has fielded the most advanced AI technology in the areas most crucial to achieving victory,” Kendall wrote.

At the same time, autonomous systems will likely become even more common in warfare by 2050 than they are today in Ukraine and the Middle East, Kendall noted. While space systems have always carried a significant degree of autonomous capability, aerial platforms and weapons are also expected to operate with less human intervention.

The Air Force is on a path to introduce more intelligent autonomous systems into the force with its planned fleet of CCA drones, expected to fly alongside the service’s manned fighter jets to conduct various missions. Contractors General Atomics and Anduril are gearing up for first flights of their respective Increment 1 CCA prototypes in 2025, and the Air Force is already in planning stages for the follow-on Increment 2.

Kendall said at CSIS that he expects the Air Force to use a mix of manned and unmanned platforms “for a long time” — pushing back on recent comments made from tech titan and top Trump advisor Elon Musk that urged the U.S. military to stop buying manned aircraft.

“We’ve got to think through the command and control, and I think for the foreseeable future crewed fighters are going to be managing the formation that includes CCAs,” Kendall said.

Introduction of more autonomy and artificial intelligence will also require a significant culture change within the Department of the Air Force, which is another battle all in itself, Kendall noted.

“The culture and the history and the legacy of the Air Force, which I have been steeped in — particularly for the last few years, but also for my whole life — really is about the role of the pilot,” he said. “Letting go, to some degree of that, I think is an incredibly difficult, emotional thing for people to do.”

Written by Mikayla Easley

Mikayla Easley reports on the Pentagon’s acquisition and use of emerging technologies. Prior to joining DefenseScoop, she covered national security and the defense industry for National Defense Magazine. She received a BA in Russian language and literature from the University of Michigan and a MA in journalism from the University of Missouri. You can follow her on Twitter @MikaylaEasley

defensescoop.com · by measley · January 13, 2025

12. ‘28 Years Later’ uses the same creepy poem the military uses to scare SERE students

More like 38+ years later for me. When this trailer cma on the TV this weekend, I had immediate flashbacks to SERE school and hearing this poem repeated over and over again. Boots, boots, boots. Every Special Forces soldier (and all those who attend SERE) has this poem ingrained into him or her - earworm is a good description - it was long dormant in my ear until I heard this movie trailer.

‘28 Years Later’ uses the same creepy poem the military uses to scare SERE students

How Rudyard Kipling’s “Boots” became a tool to build psychological fortitude.

Nicholas Slayton, Jeff Schogol

Posted 14 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton, Jeff Schogol

Service members who have gone through Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training, or SERE may get flashbacks from the trailer for the upcoming zombie horror film by Danny Boyle, “28 Years Later,” which features a 1915 reading of the Rudyard Kipling poem “Boots.”

In the past, troops who went through SERE were forced to repeatedly listen to a reading of the 1903 poem, which is written to mimic the cadence of British troops marching: “Boots—boots—boots—boots—movin’ up and down again!”

SERE trains service members on how to avoid capture and what to do in the event they are taken prisoner. Much of the course focuses on how to resist interrogation and keep a level head during capture. There are some physical elements, but the school emphasizes psychological misery. Playing “Boots” ad nauseam is meant to test a service member’s fortitude.

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“My initial reaction was that it was some weird silly little song that was played on repeat,” a Special Forces soldier told Task & Purpose. “Midway through the course while we were in the camp it quite literally became this soundtrack to our suffering. I would argue that most guys who have attended the course when hearing this song are able to recall those incidents with a sense of dread.”

“You just don’t want to hear it anymore”

In 1984 now-retired Navy Cmdr. Ward Carroll was an F-14 radar intercept officer when he went through Navy SERE training in Maine near the Canadian border. He and his fellow sailors were “captured” by forces of the fictional “People’s Republic of North America”

While Carroll was in an isolation cell, he said his captors piped in a variety of sounds including an unnerving reading of “Boots” that went from being quiet to loud.

“By the time you’ve heard it a dozen times, you’re like: ‘This is really starting to be an unpleasant earworm,’” Caroll told Task & Purpose. “It really starts to screw with your head.”

His captors would then make him listen to propaganda, followed by a wailing saxophone without any sort of meter, and then they would repeat the “Boots” poem, said Carroll, who estimated that the entire experience lasted about 12 hours.

Combined with the other aspects of SERE, being forced to listen to “Boots” over and over again made Caroll feel that he was actually in captivity, he said.

“You just don’t want to hear it anymore,” Carroll said. “You’re like: ‘I’m begging for some other thing.’ And so, they’re just trying to wear you down. It’s sort of a form of torture. It was effective in that you totally lost any sort of training scenario perspective. You really felt like you were a prisoner of war.”

A Navy spokesperson declined to say whether the service’s SERE school still uses “Boots” as part of the course.

“Due to the sensitive nature of SERE training, we do not discuss tactics, techniques, or procedures,” the spokesperson told Task & Purpose.

The history of “Boots”

Kipling was a war correspondent during the Second Boer War, which lasted from 1899 to 1902, said Andrew Scragg, chairman of The Kipling Society. In early 1900, a force of 60,000 British troops carried out a series of physically and mentally punishing forced marches in South Africa.

“Kipling’s writings, generally, strongly identify with and celebrate the common soldier, demonstrating a possibly unique civilian understanding and sympathy for their situation both at peace and in war,” Scragg told Task & Purpose. “As a writer who drove himself to the point of breakdown, Kipling identified closely with men under strain, and it is this constant pressure on the soldier to march, fight and march again, in adverse weather conditions and with little rest, that Kipling identifies with and encapsulates in this poem.”

Kipling deeply sympathized with British foot soldiers, and “Boots” is meant to capture the mental strain of military duty, said John McBratney, professor emeritus of English at John Carroll University in Ohio.

“The poem does culminate in a declaration that: ‘I’ve been through hell; and it’s not the fire; it’s not the devil; it’s not the dark or anything — it’s the boots,’” McBratney said. “And the fact that those marching boots signify for him that this type of experience is going to go on for forever: There’s no discharge of the war.”

The rhythmic pattern of “Boots” and descriptions make it unnerving on its own. But the poem gained a new life and some of its legacy 12 years later in 1915 thanks to American stage and film actor Taylor Homes. Holmes is the voice behind the anguished, scared pleas of madness heard in the trailer for “28 Years Later.”

“Those of us who have never been engaged in actual warfare, have very little idea of some of its worst horrors,” the introduction to the recording says. “One of the most terrible being the agonized impression made on the minds of infantry soldiers during the long forced marches. Soldiers have been known to go absolutely insane with the everlasting sight of marching feet all around.”

In the trailer, Holmes’ rising cries of “Four—eleven—seventeen—thirty—two the day before” quickly establish a haunting tone. It turns out Kipling’s words work just as well for testing the willpower of troops as they do for scaring moviegoers.

As the title implies, “28 Years Later” takes place nearly three decades after the initial outbreak of the “rage virus,” which introduced the “fast zombie” to horror movie-goers in 2002’s “28 Days Later.” That first film was followed by “28 Weeks Later” in 2007, which answered the question: How well would the military fare against a zombie apocalypse? The answer, by the way, is not well.

“28 Years Later” hits theaters on June 20.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Storied Marine infantry battalion to be transformed into Littoral Combat Team
• Soldiers are turning to social media when the chain of command falls short. The Army sees it as a nuisance.
• Marine recruit uniforms were photoshopped on at boot camp
• Army doctor pleads guilty on first day of trial in largest military abuse case
• Air Force ‘standards update’ includes more inspections and review of ‘waivers and exceptions’

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton, Jeff Schogol

13. What Greenlanders might want from a deal with Trump

Mr. Bremmer thinks Greenland will remain in the news for some time.

Excerpts:

Now, the Danes, in addition to all the European leaders, are squashing any idea that Greenland is for sale, but that is very different from Greenland might well go independent. And there's no question that Greenland is important, particularly in terms of national security. Russia has put billions of dollars into Arctic infrastructure, including its Northern Fleet, and they're the only country in the world that's really actively trying to seize the Arctic's economic and strategic potential. That's going to become much more important as the ice cap melts, with transit routes, with exploitation of resources. The United States did have some troops on the ground, a meaningful number, in Greenland, something like 10,000. It's now down to 200. They've reduced that. They could certainly expand it with a new relationship with an independent Greenland.

Of course, they could also expand it with a new relationship with Denmark, of which Greenland is a part, Trump not all that interested in that because it doesn't make spectacular headlines, and also because he likes real estate. Let's face it, you look at him personally, and he loves putting his names on pieces of property that are iconic and that have a large visual footprint in the minds of people. And historically, he almost lost his economic empire a few times by holding on to iconic real estate for too long. So is that a factor in how Trump thinks about Greenland? You'd have to imagine it plays a role. So I think we are going to be talking about this actually a lot more over the coming months, and it's going to have a lot more to do with what 55,000 Greenlanders decide to vote for. And then how the Americans negotiate with them.

What Greenlanders might want from a deal with Trumphttps://www.gzeromedia.com/quick-take/what-greenlanders-might-want-from-trump

Ian Bremmer

Jan 13, 2025

Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: a Quick Take to kick off your week.

Let's talk about Greenland. First time I ever encountered it was when I was playing Risk in school, and it was this big island between North America and Europe that connected you with Iceland. But it was part of North America, at least on the Risk map, and that's how you got your five armies if you owned the whole thing. So you always threw a couple up there, a lot of big, big territory. And now we're visiting, and Donald Trump Jr. taking Air Trump One last week and landing in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. Landed for a few hours, did some social media stuff, and then got back to Mar-a-Lago, where he's probably more comfortable. What's happening? Why do the Americans say that they are going to buy it, incoming President Trump, and what does it mean for American alliances and the future of the global order and all of that?

Well, first, let's recognize that as much as it sounds crazy, Trump is not the first president to offer to buy Greenland. He's actually the third. The first was Andrew Johnson. His Secretary of State, William Seward, who was down for Alaska, also offered 5.5 million to buy Greenland. This was back in 1868. The timing is interesting, of course. There's no historic claim on Greenland. The US troops did briefly occupy it in World War II for defensive purposes, but it's not as if the United States has any reason to believe that this should be American. It's not like, say, what the Russians say about Crimea.

And the Greenlandic government, which is itself, it represents all of 55,000 people, despite the size, is led by a separatist political party. They want independence. Independence is popular in Greenland. They've had a few polls, and people generally say that they'd like to be Greenlanders and not part of Denmark. And they are clearly leveraging all of this spotlight from Trump to advance having an independence referendum during parliamentary elections coming up real soon, like in April. And frankly, given that Denmark is a tiny country and spends about $500 million a year on Greenland, that if the Americans came over the top and said, "Well, we'd make you an ally. We'd put troops on the ground and we'd pay you more, not taking it over, Greenland would be an independent state." I think it would be much more likely that Greenland would actually vote for independence. And then, Trump would say, "We've got a new ally, and we've got everything we wanted. And we have these basing rights for the Arctic," and all of that.

It's pretty significant in terms of talking about the Nordics. Denmark has had Greenland as part of its territory since 1830. And Greenland is autonomous, they have their own parliament, which means they are right now in charge of their own domestic affairs, but not foreign or security affairs. So in that regard, also much like Crimea under Ukraine. But they have moved more towards an independence movement over the past decades. In part, self-determination is what people generally are aiming for around the world, with better understanding of others, post-colonial, being able to achieve it for themselves. Also, because there's a difficult history with Denmark. A lot of forced integration, taking Greenlanders from their homes, from their families, to put them in Danish schools and make them more Danish. Even forced birth control to reduce the Greenland explosion of population. Those things are not happening now, but that is a history that was exploitative and makes a lot of Greenlanders feel about the Danes the way that a lot of Native Americans feel about the United States. So, it's understandable why there would be an independence movement.

Now, the Danes, in addition to all the European leaders, are squashing any idea that Greenland is for sale, but that is very different from Greenland might well go independent. And there's no question that Greenland is important, particularly in terms of national security. Russia has put billions of dollars into Arctic infrastructure, including its Northern Fleet, and they're the only country in the world that's really actively trying to seize the Arctic's economic and strategic potential. That's going to become much more important as the ice cap melts, with transit routes, with exploitation of resources. The United States did have some troops on the ground, a meaningful number, in Greenland, something like 10,000. It's now down to 200. They've reduced that. They could certainly expand it with a new relationship with an independent Greenland.

Of course, they could also expand it with a new relationship with Denmark, of which Greenland is a part, Trump not all that interested in that because it doesn't make spectacular headlines, and also because he likes real estate. Let's face it, you look at him personally, and he loves putting his names on pieces of property that are iconic and that have a large visual footprint in the minds of people. And historically, he almost lost his economic empire a few times by holding on to iconic real estate for too long. So is that a factor in how Trump thinks about Greenland? You'd have to imagine it plays a role. So I think we are going to be talking about this actually a lot more over the coming months, and it's going to have a lot more to do with what 55,000 Greenlanders decide to vote for. And then how the Americans negotiate with them.

14. The Immigrants America Needs

Thoughtful logic here.

We need the continued rocket fuel of immigration. But we need to do it right and protect our borders.

The Immigrants America Needs

Limit asylum claims, reduce welfare and open the door to highly skilled foreign nationals.\

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-immigrants-america-needs-policy-reform-8bf8c942?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By Phil Gramm

Jan. 13, 2025 2:25 pm ET

Members of the U.S. Armed Forces are sworn in as they become U.S. citizens at a naturalization ceremony at Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles, Aug. 29, 2022. Photo: Mario Tama/Getty Images

My wife’s grandmother, Soon Nam Char, was a picture bride. Orphaned in Korea when the Japanese killed her stiff-necked parents, she came to America in the early 20th century as part of an arranged marriage. My wife’s grandfather, who had come to Hawaii from Korea as a contract laborer, picked Soon Nam’s picture out of a book and signed a contract committing to work in the sugarcane fields in Hawaii for 13 months to pay her passage. Soon Nam arrived in a strange country, whose language she didn’t speak, to marry a man she had never met.

Ruth Cymber was my chief of staff when I served in the House and Senate. She was born in a relocation camp in Germany after World War II and came to America with her parents, who were Holocaust survivors. The immigration agent suggested that her family change her first name from Ruchla to Ruth and drop the “knopf” from their last name, Cymberknopf. They did.

Immigration has always been a tough issue for me because my life and the life of the nation have been and continue to be enriched by immigrants.

When the Senate was debating the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, I felt obligated to point out that if I were in Mexico with my two little sons and they were hungry, you would have to kill me to stop me from coming across the U.S. border. Still, I was committed to dealing with illegal immigration and the 3.2 million illegal migrants in the country at the time. The problem was that I couldn’t see how the legislation could fail to expand illegal immigration—which it did. By granting amnesty to illegal immigrants while failing to secure the border sufficiently, the legislation effectively erected a giant neon welcome sign across the southern border. By January 2007, the illegal-immigrant population had swelled to 11.8 million. The problem persists today: According to July 2024 Congressional Budget Office projections, from 2021 to 2026 the illegal-immigrant population in the U.S. will surge by 8.7 million more than it would have had pre-2020 trends continued.

The first step to ending the flood of illegal immigrants is to stop allowing people to come to the U.S. from anywhere and apply for asylum. The 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees developed the principle of nonrefoulement, which dictated that refugees fleeing events that took place prior to 1951 may not be forced back to countries in which their lives or freedom were threatened. This agreement emerged in part out of Western nations’ collective guilt for failing to shelter Jews fleeing the Holocaust. Though the U.S. didn’t ratify the 1951 convention, it did ratify a subsequent 1967 protocol adopting an amended principle of nonrefoulement with no time constraints. The Refugee Act of 1980 codified that standard into national law.

But we live in a different world today, and the crisis on our border shows it. We must amend the Refugee Act of 1980 to require that, rather than applying for asylum at the border, refugees must apply at the American Embassy in their home country or in the country to which they have fled. This single action would stem the flood of asylum seekers who have overwhelmed our borders. It would also allow border-patrol agents to focus on protecting the border from non-asylum-seekers trying to enter illegally.

A second policy that cries out for reform is the Biden administration’s use of loopholes to grant special “legal status” to millions of illegal immigrants, undercutting the 1996 prohibition on welfare benefits for illegal aliens. According to a March 2023 report from the Federation for American Immigration Reform, the annual net costs of illegal immigration for American taxpayers exceed $150 billion.

With the average work-age household in the bottom 20% of income recipients receiving some $64,700 in government benefits annually (in 2022 dollars), the U.S. is in danger of perpetuating a welfare magnet so powerful that it will be hard to build a wall high enough to keep welfare-seekers out. We should deny all but temporary emergency welfare benefits to immigrants. We have room in the U.S. for people who come to work, but not for those who don’t want to work. Legal immigrants who work and pay Social Security and Medicare taxes qualify for those programs, but they should be ineligible for other means-tested programs. Their children born here would be citizens.

A vibrant program to attract the most ambitious and talented legal immigrants must also be a key element in any rational immigration reform. Hundreds of millions of people dream about coming to the U.S. They can’t all come. We should begin by reforming the H-1B visa program for highly skilled foreign workers by expanding the cap on the total number of visas, ending lottery selection and instituting a workable merit-based selection system. The world’s best and brightest want to come here, and we should welcome them.

From 2000 to 2023, 40% of Nobel Prizes won by Americans in chemistry, medicine and physics were won by immigrants. In 2023, that share was 67%. Forty-six percent of Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants or their children. Jonas Salk, a son of Russian immigrants, invented the polio vaccine. George Mitchell, a son of Greek immigrants, developed hydraulic fracturing.

Denying immigrants the ability to come to the U.S. illegally and ask for asylum is the foundation on which any workable immigration system must rest. A vibrant legal immigration policy based on opening the “Golden Door” to the world’s best and brightest would enrich America’s economy and culture and raise the nation’s living standards.

Mr. Gramm, a former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

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Journal Editorial Report: The new president promotes a new manifest destiny. Photo: Patrick Pleul/Zuma Press

Appeared in the January 14, 2025, print edition as 'The Immigrants America Needs'.

15. Trends in Terrorism: What's on the Horizon in 2025?

Violent extremist organizations (and their influence) are not going away.

Excerpts:

With the assassination of a healthcare CEO by a lone actor late last year—and the seeming groundswell of support enjoyed by the attacker—it is not inconceivable that a palpable anti-capitalist streak motivates a copycat action. The attacker was also apparently impressed by the writings of Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, and what his manifesto had to say about the creeping ubiquity of technology, an aversion shared by neo-Luddites and so-called technophobes who have attacked 5G cell towers and are pushing back against the encroachment of artificial intelligence.

Far-right domestic extremism also looms large, especially when considering the polarization and hyper-partisanship infecting US domestic politics. Moreover, with the immigration debate likely to heat up even further, it is not unreasonable to foresee animosity between immigrant communities and those opposed to their presence. In August 2019, a white supremacist walked into an El Paso Walmart and killed twenty-three people because of his hatred of Mexicans and his obsession with the Great Replacement Theory, a conspiracy positing that there is an ongoing replacement of the native-born white population in the United States, primarily orchestrated by a nefarious cabal of Jews and political elites. Some far-right extremists, particularly racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, could be emboldened by careless mainstream violent political rhetoric.

In both 2024 and 2025, the years have begun with high-profile terrorist attacks committed by ISIS. The trends indicate another concerning year, with a complex array of threat actors and advanced capabilities. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, Israel’s military campaign in the Middle East, and a rising China all demand great power attention. Yet, as the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023 and the takeover of Syria by HTS demonstrated, violent non-state actors, especially terrorist groups, still play an outsized role in geopolitics.

Expect this year to be no different. The United States and its allies face no shortage of challenges, compounded by a change in administrations, with no time for Trump to ease back into the job. On the contrary, a bevy of “Day One” problems await his arrival

Trends in Terrorism: What's on the Horizon in 2025?

By Colin P. Clarke

January 14, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/14/trends_in_terrorism_whats_on_the_horizon_in_2025_1084453.html?mc_cid=55873ab787

Sitting down to write my annual assessment on trends in terrorism in early 2025, I am struggling more than usual, fresh off the horrors of an Islamic State (ISIS)-inspired terrorist attack in New Orleans that killed fourteen people and injured dozens more. It is always a challenge to look beyond the immediate, to take a step back and weigh myriad factors and variables that impact which trends may accelerate and which may disappear.

It is impossible to know whether the New Orleans attack suggests a “new wave” of ISIS-inspired attacks in the West and in the United States in particular. Rather, the attack is another data point that demonstrates what many in the counterterrorism community have been saying ad nauseum for years—the threat posed by ISIS is consistent, enduring, and likely to ebb and flow over time in response to geopolitical events and counterterrorism pressure. Still, the threat is enduring and will remain an uncomfortable truth for policymakers as they attempt to right-size the resources provided to counter-terrorism agencies with their agreed-upon level of risk tolerance.

Predicting when and where terrorists will strike is among the most difficult tasks an intelligence analyst has. This requires assessing the combination of capabilities, intent, and operational environment, overlayed with public statements and propaganda of terrorist groups to understand their grievances and discern possible target selection.

Terrorism does not always proceed in a linear fashion. In other words, sometimes what seem to be the most obvious or pressing threats fail to materialize, while others that appear to have faded reemerge again. Before the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, few counterterrorism analysts outside of Israel dedicated any bandwidth to analyzing the group. And before Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) December offensive that saw the group topple longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad and seize control of Syria, the organization was something of an afterthought, outside of a small circle of committed scholars and experts.

As HTS looks to assume power in Syria, disaffected hardliners within the group, including jihadists belonging to the Turkestan Islamic Party and other Central Asian battalions, could seek to splinter off and continue their violent campaign. Both Syria and Afghanistan are now governed by terrorist groups (HTS is formally designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, while the Taliban is not, although elements of the Taliban are designated through their affiliation with the Haqqani Network).

So, while Hamas and HTS were mostly under the radar, the group that many were most concerned about—Islamic State Khorasan, or ISIS-K—also launched several high-profile attacks (Iran in January 2024 and Russia in March 2024) while a flurry of plots was disrupted, including a plan to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna, Austria over the summer. The perpetrators in the Swift plot were extremely young, reflecting another trend—youth radicalization—that remains a constant challenge for counterterrorism authorities.

ISIS attacks in Dagestan and Oman showed the group’s geographic expanse, a trend likely to continue in the coming year as it seeks to resurge from Syria to Somalia. The group inspired a plot to attack the United States on Election Day in November. Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi was arrested by the FBI before he was able to put his plan into action, in which he intended to murder civilians with AK-47 rifles.

The ISIS-K presence in Afghanistan, which the Taliban has failed to attenuate, will continue to destabilize South Asia, where militant groups including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Baluchistan Liberation Army also remain growing threats to monitor. The former has directly threatened the government in Islamabad while the latter continues to target Chinese nationals and disrupt security along Beijing’s signature foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road infrastructure project.

Sub-Saharan Africa, especially the Sahel region, will continue to be a hotbed of terrorism, as failed states and ungoverned spaces provide sanctuary to a range of jihadist groups associated with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin operates with near impunity in Western Africa, even conducting a massive attack last year that killed more than 600 people in Burkina Faso. The security situation continues to deteriorate as jihadist groups push out toward coastal West Africa, threatening previously stable countries like Ghana and expanding their reach from Cameroon to Nigeria.

Along with Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have employed private military contractors from Russia’s Wagner Group (now rebranded as Africa Corps) to help with coup-proofing, and the mercenaries have behaved predictably, engineering a scorched earth counterinsurgency approach that has exacerbated the terrorist threat, rather than mollifying it. Elsewhere in Africa, both al-Shabaab and ISIS threaten Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa, while the Islamic State’s presence has ebbed and flowed in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among other states in the region.

The incessant reverberations of October 7^th and the collapse of the Assad regime mean that geopolitical events in the Middle East will still be a significant driver of terrorism this year.

Lebanese Hezbollah has been attenuated to a degree many could not have imagined just one year ago. Israel’s devastating pager and walkie-talkie attack in September left the group reeling, killing more than a dozen and injuring thousands more. As the centerpiece of a relentless military campaign in Lebanon, the Israel Defense Forces assassinated Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in September.

While Hezbollah has no doubt been severely degraded, the group remains dangerous and could seek to revert to its roots as a purely terrorist organization. The last time Israel killed a Hezbollah leader, as occurred with Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, the group responded by launching bombing attacks against Israeli targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Its global network remains intact, and in the past, it has demonstrated reach with attacks in Panama, Saudi Arabia, and Bulgaria and plots disrupted in Cyprus, Egypt, and Singapore. Hezbollah could look to strike US and/or Israeli interests, including embassies, in countries throughout Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere based on perceived security vulnerabilities.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas has also been crippled. Israel’s scorched earth approach in Gaza and the resulting humanitarian catastrophe—45,000 Palestinians have been killed so far—will make it easier for Hamas to recruit the next generation of militants. Hamas will also look to spread its influence in the West Bank. But the group’s capabilities will be limited for the foreseeable future. Still, even if Hamas remains limited in Gaza, the conflict itself has spilled across borders and catalyzed protests, demonstrations, and acts of violence abroad, including in Europe, North America, and Australia.

If Hamas decided to do so, it could likely leverage pro-Palestinian sentiment and anti-Israeli grievances to inspire attacks in the West among its supporters or these individuals could take action on their own. This could take many forms, including attacks or plots to attack Israeli embassies or consulates, as occurred in Serbia in June and almost occurred against the Israeli Consulate in New York City in December. Following the attacks of October 7^th, there has been a massive spike in both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism globally, with spillover impacting many Western countries.

Of all the proxies belonging to Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” the Houthis in Yemen may be the most difficult to deter. The United States, United Kingdom, and Israel have all taken turns bombing Houthi positions in an effort to blunt the group’s ability to launch attacks and disrupt commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Between the Houthis, which the Trump administration will seek to redesignate as a foreign terrorist organization, and an array of Iraqi Shia militia groups, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, elements of the Axis present an omnipresent threat in the Middle East.

Upon scanning the horizon, looking ahead it seems plausible that a terrorist group will seek to command the spotlight through a spectacular attack, which could feature the use of an emerging technology like drones, 3-D printing, or involve the use of a weapon of mass destruction. The more lethal or high-profile an attack, the more prestige it garners, and the more mileage an individual or group can get out of propaganda geared toward supporters, followers, and potential new recruits.

There is also a growing trend in cooperation between terrorist groups, including the case of the Houthis working with al-Shabaab in Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula expanding cooperation with the Houthis. There is also a state sponsorship element present, with both Russia and China assisting the Houthis with targeting data and weapons, respectively.

With President-elect Donald Trump taking office in just a few weeks, there are a host of other terrorism-related issues to consider. The Trump administration could look to designate one of the leading Mexican cartels—the Sinaloa Cartel or Los Zetas—as a foreign terrorist organization, a move which would facilitate more kinetic action against drug traffickers south of the border. As part of its border security policies, the Trump team will be looking to severely curb the flow of fentanyl into the United States, which is facilitated by individuals in China who work hand in glove with criminal organizations in Mexico.

On the domestic terrorism front, Trump has discussed the possibility of pardoning some of the January 6^th insurrectionists, a move that “could trigger a renaissance for militant extremists, sending them an unprecedented message of protection and support,” according to a recent article in ProPublica. 2025 could bring a spike in far-left extremism from those groups, networks, and individuals who see Trump’s presidency as existential. This includes violent anarchists and the most extreme members of Antifa, in addition to single-issue terrorists motivated by a range of issues, including the environment, animal welfare, and access to abortion.

With the assassination of a healthcare CEO by a lone actor late last year—and the seeming groundswell of support enjoyed by the attacker—it is not inconceivable that a palpable anti-capitalist streak motivates a copycat action. The attacker was also apparently impressed by the writings of Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, and what his manifesto had to say about the creeping ubiquity of technology, an aversion shared by neo-Luddites and so-called technophobes who have attacked 5G cell towers and are pushing back against the encroachment of artificial intelligence.

Far-right domestic extremism also looms large, especially when considering the polarization and hyper-partisanship infecting US domestic politics. Moreover, with the immigration debate likely to heat up even further, it is not unreasonable to foresee animosity between immigrant communities and those opposed to their presence. In August 2019, a white supremacist walked into an El Paso Walmart and killed twenty-three people because of his hatred of Mexicans and his obsession with the Great Replacement Theory, a conspiracy positing that there is an ongoing replacement of the native-born white population in the United States, primarily orchestrated by a nefarious cabal of Jews and political elites. Some far-right extremists, particularly racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, could be emboldened by careless mainstream violent political rhetoric.

In both 2024 and 2025, the years have begun with high-profile terrorist attacks committed by ISIS. The trends indicate another concerning year, with a complex array of threat actors and advanced capabilities. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, Israel’s military campaign in the Middle East, and a rising China all demand great power attention. Yet, as the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023 and the takeover of Syria by HTS demonstrated, violent non-state actors, especially terrorist groups, still play an outsized role in geopolitics.

Expect this year to be no different. The United States and its allies face no shortage of challenges, compounded by a change in administrations, with no time for Trump to ease back into the job. On the contrary, a bevy of “Day One” problems await his arrival.

16. Trump team is questioning civil servants at National Security Council about commitment to his agenda

Professionals will support the nation's agenda regardless of who is the President in accordance with their oath to the Constitution.

The simple and smart way forward is for career civil servants on the NSC staff to rotate naturally. Cabinet officials (the NSC principles appointed by the President) can assign career civil servants from their agencies in coming months. There needs to be an orderly transition. 

But if the NSC staff is going to operate in a way to "prevent future Vindmans" then it is on the path to failure which means failure for our national security.

Trump team is questioning civil servants at National Security Council about commitment to his agenda

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · January 13, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — Incoming senior Trump administration officials have begun questioning career civil servants who work on the White House National Security Council about who they voted for in the 2024 election, their political contributions and whether they have made social media posts that could be considered incriminating by President-elect Donald Trump’s team, according to a U.S. official familiar with the matter.

At least some of these nonpolitical employees have begun packing up their belongings since being asked about their loyalty to Trump — after they had earlier been given indications that they would be asked to stay on at the NSC in the new administration, the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive personnel matters.

Trump’s pick for national security adviser, Florida Rep. Mike Waltz, in recent days publicly signaled his intention to get rid of all nonpolitical appointees and career intelligence officials serving on the NSC by Inauguration Day to ensure the council is staffed with those who support Trump’s agenda.

A wholesale removal of foreign policy and national security experts from the NSC on Day 1 of the new administration could deprive Trump’s team of considerable expertise and institutional knowledge at a time when the U.S. is grappling with difficult policy challenges in Ukraine, the Mideast and beyond. Such questioning could also make new policy experts brought in to the NSC less likely to speak up about policy differences and concerns.

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Monday that he has not been told by Waltz or Trump transition team officials that the incoming team has conducted or planned on conducting such vetting.

But Sullivan in recent days has made a robust case for the incoming Trump administration to hold over career government employees assigned to the NSC at least through the early going of the new administration. He called the career appointees “patriots” who have served “without fear or favor for both Democratic and Republican administrations. ”

“And many of them have raised their hands to say, ‘I’m ready to stay and keep serving,’” Sullivan told reporters.

The NSC staff members being questioned about their loyalty are largely subject matter experts who have been loaned to the White House by federal agencies — the State Department, FBI and CIA, for example — for temporary duty that typically lasts one to two years. If removed from the NSC, they would be returned to their home agencies.

Vetting of the civil servants began in the last week, the official said. Some of them have been questioned about their politics by Trump appointees who will serve as directors on the NSC and who had weeks earlier asked them to stick around. There are dozens of civil servants at the directorate level at the NSC who had anticipated remaining at the White House in the new administration.

A second U.S. official told the AP that he was informed weeks ago by incoming Trump administration officials that they planned on raising questions with career appointees that work at the White House, including those at the NSC, about their political leanings. The official, who was not authorized to comment publicly, however, had not yet been formally vetted.

Waltz told Breitbart News last week that “everybody is going to resign at 12:01 on January 20.” He added that he wanted the NSC to be staffed by personnel who are “100 percent aligned with the president’s agenda.”

“We’re working through our process to get everybody their clearances and through the transition process now,” Waltz said. “Our folks know who we want out in the agencies, we’re putting those requests in, and in terms of the detailees they’re all going to go back.”

A Trump transition official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss personnel matters, said the incoming administration felt it was “entirely appropriate” to seek officials who share the incoming president’s vision and would be focused on common goals.

The NSC was launched as an arm of the White House during the Truman administration, tasked with advising and assisting the president on national security and foreign policy and coordinating among various government agencies. It is common for experts detailed to the NSC to carry over from one administration to the next, even when the White House changes parties.

Sullivan has also said it was “up to the next national security adviser to decide how they want to play things. All I can say is how we did it and what I thought worked.”

“When they are selected to come over, they’re not selected based on their political affiliation or their policy opinions, they’re selected based on their experience and capacity and so we have a real diversity of people in terms of their views, their politics, their backgrounds,” Sullivan said of those assigned to the NSC, during a reporters roundtable hosted by the White House on Friday. “The common element of all of it is we get the best of the best here” from agencies including the State Department, the intelligence community, the Pentagon and the Homeland Security and Treasury departments.

Sullivan noted when Biden took office in 2021, he inherited most of his NSC staff from the outgoing Trump administration.

“Those folks were awesome,” Sullivan said. “They were really good.”

Virginia Rep. Gerry Connolly, the top Democrat on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, said such vetting “threatens our national security and our ability to respond quickly and effectively to the ongoing and very real global threats in a dangerous world.”

Trump, during his first term, was scarred when two career military officers detailed to the NSC became whistleblowers, raising their concerns about Trump’s 2019 call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in which the president sought an investigation of Biden and his son Hunter. That episode led to Trump’s first impeachment.

Alexander Vindman was listening to the call in his role as an NSC official when he became alarmed at what he heard. He approached his twin brother, Eugene, who at the time was serving as an ethics lawyer at the NSC. Both Vindmans reported their concerns to superiors.

Alexander Vindman said in a statement Friday that the Trump team’s approach to staffing the NSC “will have a chilling effect on senior policy staff across the government.”

He added, “Talented professionals, wary of being dismissed for principled stances or offering objective advice, will either self-censor or forgo service altogether.”

The two men were heralded by Democrats as patriots for speaking out and derided by Trump as insubordinate. Eugene Vindman in November was elected as a Democrat to represent Virginia’s 7th Congressional District.

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · January 13, 2025

17. US agencies warn of potential New Orleans copycat attack

US agencies warn of potential New Orleans copycat attack

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-agencies-warn-potential-new-orleans-copycat-attack-2025-01-13/

By Jasper Ward

January 13, 20254:48 PM ESTUpdated 15 hours ago

Messages and tributes for the victims killed by a U.S. Army veteran who drove a truck into a crowd celebrating New Year's Day, are written on the wall at a memorial in New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S., January 4, 2025. REUTERS/Octavio Jones/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

WASHINGTON, Jan 13 (Reuters) - The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on Monday warned of a potential public safety threat from violent extremists who might try to copy the New Year's Day attack in New Orleans that killed 14 people.

The warning comes a week before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's Jan. 20 inauguration.

"The FBI and DHS are concerned about possible copycat or retaliatory attacks due to the persistent appeal of vehicle ramming as a tactic for aspiring violent extremist attackers," the agencies said in a statement.

Early on New Year's Day, more than a dozen people and a dozen others injured about when a man rammed a rented pickup truck into a crowd of revelers along Bourbon Street in New Orleans.

The man who carried out the attack was a U.S. Army veteran who had pledged allegiance to Islamic State and appeared to have made recordings condemning music, drugs and alcohol.

The agencies said such attacks, inspired by foreign "terrorist" organization, have been carried out in the U.S. and abroad using rented, stolen and personally own vehicles.

Attackers could also attempt to use improvised explosive devices to supplement a vehicle attack, they said.

The agencies said past targets have included pedestrians, law enforcement or military members, and crowded public venues that are accessible from roadways.

"We ask that the public remain vigilant regarding possible copycat or retaliatory attacks and report any suspicious activity to law enforcement," they said.

Get weekly news and analysis on U.S. politics and how it matters to the world with the Reuters Politics U.S. newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by Jasper Ward; Editing by David Gregorio

18. A Blueprint for Digital Transformation at the Department of Defense

Excerpts:

Ultimately, the objective is to create a federated ecosystem that has the right technical foundation, is accessible to the best developers, and delivers timely solutions to the warfighters. To that end, within our office we have leveraged the acquisition authorities granted by Congress to develop a streamlined competitive selection process through the Tradewinds Solutions Marketplace. We created a single front door to the commercial sector through a formal partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit. And we have shared this information routinely with industry through quarterly industry days.

While Open DAGIR is an important step in linking the technical requirements, capability delivery, and acquisition processes, it is dependent on evolving the Defense Department’s underlying approach to technology. In addition to the hardware-centric rigor, the department should apply a software-centric mindset to major acquisition programs such that the principles of interoperability and replaceability are built in from the beginning. Applying the Open DAGIR tenets across a spectrum of future procurements will enable the department to have access to best-in-breed technology solutions critical to the warfighter while also driving responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars through competition within industry and leveraging the massive scale of the defense enterprise.

A Blueprint for Digital Transformation at the Department of Defense - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Radha Iyengar Plumb · January 14, 2025

At a roundtable with industry and academia at the Defense Innovation Unit, I met a CEO whose company had developed a language translation app that was providing critical support across the Department of Defense. He shared that the department was paying high prices at the last minute across multiple siloed vehicles and customers. It was, he frankly said, a poor business model. He couldn’t plan for the support the department clearly needed, and the department couldn’t leverage enterprise scale and predictability to drive down the cost. It was bad for the taxpayer and bad for the company to be on this unpredictable seesaw of demand. In parallel, in August 2023, the department highlighted a critical shortage of translators impacting some key missions. So, in November, my office onboarded this company across our platforms on an enterprise vehicle with enough ceiling to support demand across the department. It is critical that this type of speed of execution matching AI and digital solutions with real mission impact moves from episodic to routine.

AI and digital solutions are increasing the pace of change and advancement across key sectors of American society, including the Department of Defense. Advanced data applications that leverage AI are a critical part of defense modernization efforts, whether we are looking at tools that support warfighting, data management, or anything in between. In physical platforms like fighter jets, ground vehicles, or autonomous vehicles, and in functions from logistics to health care to financial management, these digital solutions are not merely layered on to military hardware — they are part and parcel of a weapon system or enterprise tool. Foundational to justified confidence in AI-enabled systems is ensuring they are equitable, traceable, secure, reliable, and governable, and can be responsibly used by both operators and leaders. The United States has world-class talent, innovating in an open society and with access to the free market of cutting-edge solutions. As part of U.S. defense modernization, the Department of Defense should continue to leverage these national assets and ensure a lead not only measured in speed and scale, but in responsibility.

As the head of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, I have been focused on driving advances not only in these critical areas but in changing how our office procures software to better comport with the principles of interoperability and replaceability. This will allow best-in-breed technologies to enable our warfighters and business systems. As AI rapidly matures, this office should be structured with the right investments to adapt to shifts in technology, and the underlying infrastructure and offices to enable, speed, and scale growth and adoption. While I will be departing government in January, capitalizing on the advances in AI and technology on behalf of the warfighter and the taxpayer is a clear imperative. I hope our Open DAGIR has set the foundation for successful procurement of advanced technologies for years to come.

Become a Member

Hardware Solutions in a Software-Driven Environment

The Department of Defense has not yet fully realized the promise of AI capabilities. Technical solutions have not been fielded at scale due to three primary challenges: the hardware-centric procurement processes favored within the Department of Defense, proprietary network-centric approaches to procurement that stifle future interoperability, and a bias towards risk aversion that leads to inaction and, conversely, may be creating bigger risks. The department should down-risk and say “yes” when it counts, starting with these three challenges.

Software Procurement in a Hardware-Centric Department

First, the Department of Defense continues to orient around hardware-centric procurement processes that support its major platforms and weapon systems. These processes are critical tools for fielding platforms and systems that may be used for decades to come and stand the test of time. However, these same processes are often not well-suited to the rapid fielding of more software-centric capabilities. The department rightfully procures hardware based on extensive (and thus long-lead-time) planning, and those acquisitions and subsequent sustainment programs need to essentially build towards a specific technical capability that is relatively static. In contrast, software-defined functionality is often rapidly evolving and developed iteratively. This means major program acquisitions, that focus on a linear, longer-run capability-development approach, create impediments to using the agile frameworks more common in commercial emerging technology settings. Moreover, because the software in major program acquisition is embedded in proprietary hardware solutions, changes and upgrades critical to enhanced functionality and performance can be difficult to incorporate without major changes to the underlying hardware.

The United States needs a different way to buy these much more rapidly evolving, but less enduring capabilities. In line with that need, in 2020, the Department of Defense aligned the range of processes and approaches into a more tractable acquisition framework, the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, with six acquisition pathways, including one for software. The software pathway emphasized modern software development practices, but applying these at scale, especially with legacy programs, remains a challenge.

Moving From Network-Centric to Data-Centric

As part of the traditional design process, each platform, sensor, or weapon system had its own proprietary network which leveraged specific data that adhered to custom-defined sets of standards. For example, the Aegis Weapons System has Cooperative Engagement Capability, the F-35 has Multifunction Advanced Data Link, and the F-22 has Intra-Flight Data Link. Even systems that communicate over Link 16, which adheres to “Military Standard” 6016, have more than 50 message formats for different data types used in surveillance, targeting, weapons management, electronic warfare, and more. This approach to data sharing would be like AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile deciding to each provide a specialized device and cell network with unique data formats depending on whether you want to make a phone call, send a text message, or browse the web. You can’t have it all, can’t easily switch, and would have to choose based on which kind of medium you (and your friends!) may use most.

This kind of approach may be necessary for the last tactical mile, where fire-control quality and safety are paramount. But for every other function, especially command and control, it creates a web of options that are not optimized for joint (involving multiple U.S. armed services) or combined (involving allies and partners) warfare. It makes the integration of new data sources and interoperability with other platforms — especially across military services — a complicated and expensive effort. The solution to this is for the government to establish an architecture that is open, modular, and data-centric. This would require systems to be able to make use of data from any source over any network. Instead of relying on proprietary “ontologies,” which require the data be in specific standards or formats, systems should be able to send and receive the right data fields for the mission. If built into requirements and procurements on new platforms and incorporated into legacy systems, this would shift the burden from the government having to define the integrations to the vendor and their technology within any network (proprietary or not) having to be agnostic to the data regardless of origin or type.

A Unidirectional View of Risk

The adoption and scaling of AI-enabled solutions are hobbled by a pervasive culture of risk aversion in the defense enterprise. Risk-minimization culture is in part necessary because the government cannot sustain a level of risk akin to the private sector, given the number of no-fail missions and responsibility for stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Additionally, the Department of Defense faces a wide range of risks that need to be considered and mitigated to ensure critical capabilities are securely and reliably available during all contingencies. At the same time, this risk aversion is premised on the notion that integration and deployment of new technology increases risk. That unidirectional view of risk, perversely, may increase overall risk through tech debt and lack of key new capabilities. To be explicit, there are risks from not adopting technology that are often ignored. There are a number of efforts to address this generally, and specifically as it relates to “authority to operate,” including reciprocity and continuous authority to operate processes. Authority to operate indicates a technology meets certain criteria to be allowed on and/or exchange data with a Department of Defense system and can take months or even years to achieve. Efforts surrounding reciprocity and continuity aim to ensure that technologies that have been determined to meet these criteria by one departmental organization do not have to be re-certified to be used in another area of the department. While these have helped create policy support for a more balanced risk management approach, the streamlined approaches to authorization ought to be “productized” into repeatable processes to enable scale.

Given the complexity of the problem and the scale required for true digital transformation, there is no silver bullet or single solution. Addressing and overcoming these three primary challenges and getting to a legal, ethical, and meaningful “yes” on all three will accelerate this transformation and deliver true next-generation AI capabilities to both the boardroom and the battlefield. Much has been written about activities that will need to occur to address these issues and, to that end, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office has introduced our framework for Open DAGIR to drive progress.

Open DAGIR

In May 2024, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office launched an initiative focused on improving how the Department of Defense ensures reliable access to new technologies that form the department’s digital foundation. Open DAGIR is not a single procurement or program — rather it is a combination of principles and processes necessary to acquire, build, and manage modern data and AI technology at scale. The foundation has 5 principles: clear and accessible acquisitions pathways; government-owned technology infrastructure and services; clear requirements, policies, and processes to balance the department’s cyber security needs with the imperative to develop and deploy prototypes; rules and tools pertaining to standardized data, analytics, and an AI marketplace; and a transparent experiment-based operating model.

The Open DAGIR framework is grounded in the principles of interoperability and replaceability — the Department of Defense needs different technologies to seamlessly interact with one another and with its data, agnostic to the underlying infrastructure. This allows the Department of Defense to take advantage of its federated data ecosystem and diverse set of use cases by utilizing the right data architecture (e.g., relational or object-oriented) while ensuring that use cases can draw from multiple stacks (e.g., logistics use cases can leverage both relational and object-oriented data). Second, it separates procurement of the data from the development of applications, where appropriate, to ensure that applications can seamlessly leverage a variety of infrastructure solutions and data infrastructure can be leveraged by a more diverse set of applications. The first two aspects are critical to resist a natural tendency for technology to fracture into silos by allowing applications and data infrastructure to become more interchangeable.

Marketplace Environment

Open DAGIR breaks apart the vertically integrated tech stack that the Department of Defense has an unfortunate habit of buying in its entirety, at great cost and lack of agility. Imagine you bought a phone with a set of applications, and then every time you wanted a new application, you bought an entirely new phone. It would be exorbitantly expensive, inefficient, and frustrating. Instead of buying the entirely new phone (or tech stack) you should be able to buy individual applications, retain individual applications, and remove individual applications, all with the same hardware and underlying infrastructure. When you want a new phone, you should be able to port these applications over — this is “interoperability.” To enable this, we have developed rules and tools to promote standardized digital tools and products in an AI marketplace environment. Think of it as being able to have the same app on multiple types of phones and being able to move all your apps over to a new phone and seamlessly access your distributed data (e.g., contacts and emails). This is the type of flexibility required to move at speed and scale for digital solutions to warfighter problems.

Acquisition Pathways

However, this flexibility only becomes a strategic advantage when paired with the acquisition pathways to deliver at enterprise scale. The next principle of Open DAGIR is clear and accessible acquisition pathways to allow both existing and new vendors to build prototypes and deliver services with pathways to production and scale. Open DAGIR offers clear pathways to pitch, test, and when applicable deploy at scale applications from third party developers who previously may have been “boxed out” of locked, proprietary ecosystems. By offering a wider ecosystem of digital solutions the opportunity to deploy their technologies into an ecosystem that protects their intellectual property, while offering access to Department of Defense data, there is greater commercial incentive for developers to create technology for the department.

Experiment-Based Approaches to Scale

Further, the Open DAGIR model allows for an app to be scaled if there is sufficient demand. This is based on the principle that the best way to arm the warfighter and senior leaders with the technology they need is through a transparent experiment-based operating model and a clear process for vendors and government users to navigate application options. For example, an app may be initially fielded as a prototype through small business innovation research funding or other transaction authorities. Through experimentation with real users on live, operational data, the department can then assess performance and the size and scope of demand. Where applicable, this may scale to enterprise license contract solutions. These types of enterprise licenses allow the government to leverage its unique scale to drive down cost and ensure good stewardship of taxpayer dollars, while also providing industry with a more consistent and scalable solution to a software as a service offering that previously may have been purchased in a scattershot manner or in independent siloes.

Government-Owned Infrastructure and Services

Underlying Open DAGIR is our managed technology infrastructure and services that are interoperable across platforms and can integrate applications at scale. Government-owned technology infrastructure and services should be interoperable across platforms with clear mechanisms to define, protect, and compensate use of commercially available vendor intellectual property to align with Open DAGIR. This includes ensuring clear lines on what intellectual property belongs to which company and what are government-owned elements and creating clear business processes for customers across the Department of Defense to find, acquire, and integrate new software into their programs. The principles are translated into procurements to ensure that moving forward, key technology providers are held to a standard of modularity that will allow third party vendors to compete, and the government to choose between vendors to ensure the best fit, rather than being locked into a particular technology stack.

Balancing Security with the Imperative to Develop and Deploy

A critical objective of Open DAGIR is enabling the shift to data-centric enterprise architecture. Interoperability is defined by ensuring that defense networks can store, transform, and access data regardless of standards or formats and by using zero-trust architectures. This shifts the focus from data compliance with fixed standards to a meaningful assessment of whether applications and digital technology within the network can process and use of all the data regardless of origin or type. In that context the work is to establish a government-owned environment in which the development, security, and operations activities can occur. This enables the government to conduct a robust risk management process with integrated cyber security work in a way that is agile enough to allow capability experimentation, adoption, and operations. Therefore, rather than a process based on fixed standards, we can do a more iterative identification of, mitigation of, and recovery from threats or vulnerabilities. Part and parcel of this is the streamlined authority to operate process which can accelerate deployment onto department-owned networks. While this does not fully address the issues that arise from often slow processes, the integration of the risk management framework into the DevSecOps pipeline creates a streamlined and ultimately more predictable pathway.

Continuing Digital Transformation Progress

Ultimately, the objective is to create a federated ecosystem that has the right technical foundation, is accessible to the best developers, and delivers timely solutions to the warfighters. To that end, within our office we have leveraged the acquisition authorities granted by Congress to develop a streamlined competitive selection process through the Tradewinds Solutions Marketplace. We created a single front door to the commercial sector through a formal partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit. And we have shared this information routinely with industry through quarterly industry days.

While Open DAGIR is an important step in linking the technical requirements, capability delivery, and acquisition processes, it is dependent on evolving the Defense Department’s underlying approach to technology. In addition to the hardware-centric rigor, the department should apply a software-centric mindset to major acquisition programs such that the principles of interoperability and replaceability are built in from the beginning. Applying the Open DAGIR tenets across a spectrum of future procurements will enable the department to have access to best-in-breed technology solutions critical to the warfighter while also driving responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars through competition within industry and leveraging the massive scale of the defense enterprise.

Become a Member

Radha Iyengar Plumb, PhD, is the chief digital and artificial intelligence officer at the Department of Defense. Prior to serving in this role, she served as the deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, and as the chief of staff to the deputy secretary of defense. She also led technical organizations within Google and Meta prior to her most recent government service.

Image via StockCake

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Radha Iyengar Plumb · January 14, 2025

19. The Long Shadow of the Ladakh Crisis

Excerpts:

The Ladakh crisis of 2020–2024 will cast a long shadow over India’s national security and threat perceptions for the foreseeable future. While the recent military disengagement between India and China along the Line of Actual Control is welcome news, it will not automatically resolve the long-term challenges borne by the Ladakh crisis.

India still faces diabolical challenges in establishing deterrence on its northern border, realigning its strategic posture, and managing its bilateral relationship with China. Nevertheless, the October 2024 disengagement deal offers Indian government officials and military planners, and their American partners, an opportunity to re-examine and recalibrate their approach to these priorities. How India handles them will determine the long-term significance of the Ladakh crisis, and India’s role as a strategic force in the Indo-Pacific.

The Long Shadow of the Ladakh Crisis - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Arzan Tarapore · January 14, 2025

Peace seems to have broken out between India and China. On Oct. 23, 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had their first bilateral meeting since 2019. Statements from the foreign ministries of both countries declared a “resolution of issues that arose in 2020,” referring to the crisis that began when Chinese troops launched a number of incursions across the Line of Actual Control — the disputed border between the two countries — in Ladakh. Under the terms of a new “disengagement” agreement, China withdrew its forces from the remaining places where they had crossed the border in 2020, and both sides’ militaries have resumed patrolling in the same areas as they had before the Chinese incursions.

However, despite the apparent easing of tensions between the two countries, the Ladakh crisis of 2020–24 will cast a long shadow over India’s security and role in the region. The period of acute crisis itself was a valuable learning experience for both sides: China likely gleaned important tactical and strategic insights on India, while India developed a new understanding of the threat posed by China. The October deal does not, therefore, restore the status quo ante — there is no going back. But how, exactly, has the crisis affected India’s national security over the long term?

The lasting impact of the Ladakh crisis should be measured in three dimensions. First, the crisis compelled India to intensify its military balance on the Line of Actual Control, but it remains unclear whether that has strengthened its conventional deterrence against China. Second, the crisis compelled India to reinforce its northern border at the expense of military modernization and naval force projection in the Indian Ocean. It remains to be seen whether that change will be reversed. Finally, the Ladakh crisis cratered India’s relationship with China and nudged it towards closer cooperation with the United States. The trajectory of India’s relations with both Beijing and Washington also remains an open question.

In each of these dimensions, the effects of the crisis between India and China that began in 2020 will be felt for many years.

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A New Phase of an Entrenched Rivalry

The Ladakh crisis began in May 2020, when India discovered multiple, near-simultaneous Chinese incursions across the Line of Actual Control and into the Indian-administered territory of Ladakh. A skirmish at one of the incursion points, the Galwan river valley, killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops — the first loss of life on the border in nearly half a century. In the weeks that followed, the two sides scrambled to gain positional advantage in a series of moves and countermoves. Front lines were reinforced with massive troop build-ups on both sides, warning shots were fired, and tensions mounted. India in effect froze the bilateral relationship, suspending most diplomatic mechanisms, banning some Chinese apps from Indian smartphones, and tightening rules governing Chinese investment in India, especially in sensitive sectors such as telecommunications. New Delhi argued that the broader relationship could not continue while the border remained under threat by Beijing. Then, stepping back from the brink, the two countries’ militaries “disengaged” their forces from a number of friction points between 2020 and 2022, and imposed new buffer zones to keep their soldiers at arm’s length. Despite the partial disengagement, two Chinese incursions, at Depsang and Demchok, remained impervious to round after round of inconclusive military talks — until now.

The October 2024 agreement resolves those last two sticking points at Depsang and Demchok. India and China have agreed to dismantle their encampments from 2020 and restore each other’s access to patrolling points that had been blocked during the crisis. The Indian official statement heralded a “complete disengagement and resolution of issues that arose in 2020.” In this framing, the border crisis is over, and the two countries have now opened a pathway to normalization. New Delhi and Beijing immediately announced the reopening of diplomatic mechanisms at ministerial and officials levels, and in multilateral organizations. Their respective foreign and defense ministers implemented that order quickly, meeting on the sidelines of the November G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, and announcing further tentative steps to ease relations. And in December, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval travelled to Beijing, resuming “special representative” talks that had been suspended since the crisis began and pledging to restore other cross-border engagement such as trade and religious pilgrimages. After four years of suspended diplomacy, these discussions are all important steps towards normalization.

With this nominal resolution to the crisis, India and China have entered a new phase in their relationship. No longer overshadowed by Ladakh, there are now opportunities for mutual gain, especially in trade and investment. The official Chinese statement repeatedly underscored the line that the two countries are both major developing economies that need to cooperate. Despite the latest easing of tensions, however, the relationship will not return to the status quo ante. New Delhi, for its part, has developed a healthy distrust of Chinese strategic intent and compliance with past or future border agreements. But for now, both sides have agreed to a marginally more stable border, characterized by renewed diplomatic contact and the prospect of reinvigorated economic cooperation.

Many of the specific details of the new deal remain uncertain or undecided. It appears, for example, that the buffer zones at earlier disengagement sites such as Galwan and Pangong Tso will remain in place, although it is unclear if patrolling will eventually return to pre-crisis patterns there. Similarly, some reporting suggests the deal also sets terms for other disputed points of the border beyond Ladakh — such as Yangtse, the site of another scuffle in December 2022 — although the exact scope of the deal is not fully known. Neither side has addressed whether India and China will seek to codify their agreement with a new confidence-building agreement or revert to the earlier agreements signed between 1993 and 2005, which New Delhi accuses China of violating. And while India may have declared “disengagement” to be completed, there are no indications of when or even whether it will be followed by de-escalation and de-induction of forces, as prescribed by India’s crisis policy. A permanent settlement of the contested border is a different and currently implausible proposition, requiring agreement on its demarcation and delineation that has eluded the two countries since they began negotiations in the 1950s.

Nevertheless, disengagement should be cautiously welcomed. It reduces the risk of accidental escalation, gives India an opportunity to relax its resource-intensive posture on the border, and opens channels of communication for managing the broader bilateral relationship. But the context also matters. The real impact of the October deal will not depend on how the deal was struck or its implementation, but on the future military balance and diplomatic ties between India and China.

Deterrence on the Contested Border

The first key factor determining the long-term implications of the Ladakh crisis is the military balance on the Line of Actual Control. Both sides quickly reinforced their forward-deployed positions, built or upgraded significant new infrastructure such as air fields and roads, and introduced an array of new technologies, from drones to portable field hospitals. India has significantly reinforced its positions on the contested border, reassigning one of its three Pakistan-focused Strike Corps on China, and reassigning other formations to a border security role. The build-up has occurred not only near the sites of China’s 2020 incursions into Ladakh, but all along the Line of Actual Control, including the eastern sector in and around the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its own.

The impact of the military build-up on both sides of the border remains unclear. It is an open question whether India is any better postured to deter Chinese aggression than it was in 2020, when it offered no meaningful deterrence. Some episodes before and during the Ladakh crisis may offer some insight here. First, in an incident at Doklam in 2017, Indian forces impeded a Chinese attempt to build a road in disputed territory, and forced the Chinese to back down after a stand-off lasting over two months. But in the months and years that followed, China garrisoned significant forces and supporting infrastructure on its rear areas near the stand-off site, in effect creating a far more potent military threat at a strategically sensitive area of the Line of Actual Control. Separately, at the height of the Ladakh crisis in August 2020, Indian forces surprised Chinese troops by occupying previously vacant heights in the Kailash range. The new positions offered Indian forces better observation and lines of fire. Yet, they were subsequently relinquished in a deal for local disengagement. This instance of “quid pro quo,” according to the Indian Army — an offensive maneuver to gain bargaining leverage — demonstrated a willingness to take operational risk under certain circumstances. In another episode, at Yangtse in 2022, Indian forces mobilized rapidly to interdict a Chinese incursion, leading to another fracas. Significantly, the Indian forces received early warning of the Chinese movement, probably from the United States, and responded quickly — exhibiting newfound capabilities to monitor and secure the Line of Actual Control.

With the October 2024 deal appearing to resolve the Ladakh crisis, India and China will both continue to adjust their military posture near the shared border. If New Delhi has learned anything from the crisis, it is that India’s national security cannot depend on Chinese goodwill. While a positive sign, one-on-one meetings alone cannot impose stability — India needs reliable conventional deterrence on the border. China will very likely continue to probe the Line of Actual Control in the future, as it has done regularly in the past. The military balance that has emerged on the border since 2020 may allow India to preempt Chinese probing more effectively. On the other hand, the added military power and readiness may shorten the escalation ladder and make skirmishes more likely.

India’s Competing Strategic Priorities

The second key factor determining the Ladakh crisis’ long-term effects is India’s overall strategic posture, namely the extent to which defending the Line of Actual Control continues to dominate Indian strategic planning. The motivations for China’s 2020 incursions remain a mystery, but their effect has been clear: The seriousness of the threat prompted India to heavily reinforce its military presence on its northern border. This build-up came at the cost of Indian investments in military modernization, especially in force-projection capabilities in the Indican Ocean. New Delhi’s closest regional security partners, such as Australia and the United States, rely on India being more capable and active to deter Chinese aggression and provide security in the Indian Ocean region. To secure these expanding national interests, India had invested more in its naval capabilities from 2000 to 2020, including in various types of major surface combatants and advanced maritime patrol aircraft.

Since the Ladakh crisis began in 2020, those investments slowed drastically. In the face of a suddenly urgent threat on the Line of Actual Control, New Delhi calculated that military readiness on the border was a higher priority than modernization. The government therefore approved no new major naval initiatives after 2020, in contrast to a comparatively higher rate of new initiatives in the previous two decades. The Indian navy continues to be undeniably active, for example in countering piracy and exercising with partners. Moreover, long-running procurement programs that began years or even decades before the Ladakh crisis, including new drones and its indigenous aircraft carrier, continue to bear fruit. But without new programs since 2020, the Indian fleet will struggle to compete with a growing Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

The new deal over Ladakh offers New Delhi an opportunity to rebalance its strategic priorities. With reduced tensions on the border, India could adjust the balance between readiness and modernization. Indian political and military leaders would have to reconcile these imperatives for modernization and projection with the imperative of establishing a robust military deterrent on the border. In some cases, such as building naval capability, this will require tough trade-off decisions. But in other cases, for example from electronic warfare to the long-mooted integrated rocket force, modernization would significantly improve India’s deterrent on the border.

The Broader Indian-Chinese relationship

The final factor of the long-term implications of Ladakh is the broader bilateral relationship between India and China. The crisis immediately cratered whatever trust New Delhi had in Chinese motives and behavior and hardened Indian elite opinion about China’s role as the country’s primary strategic competitor. That is unlikely to change. At the same time, the Indian public grudgingly acknowledges the reality that China is a next-door neighbor with a huge economy that India cannot ignore — certainly not if it seeks to fulfill its own great-power ambitions. Thus, despite the trade and investment restrictions the Indian government imposed, two-way trade increased to unprecedented levels during the crisis. Some Indian businesses — and even some public institutions — had been urging the government to normalize relations to facilitate greater economic exchange. These overtures resonated with Chinese narratives, which insisted the two countries should focus on their shared interest in mutual growth and development, and not be distracted by territorial disputes.

At the same time, the crisis also underscored the value to India of its growing strategic partnership with the United States. Not only does cooperating with Washington help India to build national power, but it also helps India to manage relations with China in very specific and concrete terms. In February 2024, India’s then-defense secretary, Giridhar Aramane, unguarded in a closed-door meeting, bluntly admitted that India had depended on U.S. intelligence during the Ladakh crisis and would “expect” close coordination if a similar scenario unfolds in the future. The burgeoning technology-sharing relationship between India and the United States has emerged as a core element of the partnership, because it has the potential for long-term economic and military benefits for both countries. Alas, skepticism about America’s intentions will persist in some quarters in India, as it always has. However, the national security interests-based foundations of the partnership — designed to build Indian power and bolster the regional status quo — remain firm. Many Indian analysts anticipate that the new Trump administration will continue to strengthen ties with New Delhi. More broadly, the Ladakh crisis also renewed Indian enthusiasm for “minilateral” groupings such as the Quad — comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States —– as a preferred mechanism to advance a shared policy vision for the region, including on security.

In the months and years ahead, the challenges for India — and any other country managing a complex relationship with China — will be one of policy coordination. New Delhi will have to grapple with the tension between deepening bilateral engagement with Beijing for mutual benefit, while simultaneously limiting engagement for national security reasons. India will likely cordon off some critical sectors such as telecommunications, but beyond setting those uncontroversial limits, it will need some coordinated national strategy to ensure its different policy imperatives do not undermine each other.

Looking Beyond Ladakh

The Ladakh crisis of 2020–2024 will cast a long shadow over India’s national security and threat perceptions for the foreseeable future. While the recent military disengagement between India and China along the Line of Actual Control is welcome news, it will not automatically resolve the long-term challenges borne by the Ladakh crisis.

India still faces diabolical challenges in establishing deterrence on its northern border, realigning its strategic posture, and managing its bilateral relationship with China. Nevertheless, the October 2024 disengagement deal offers Indian government officials and military planners, and their American partners, an opportunity to re-examine and recalibrate their approach to these priorities. How India handles them will determine the long-term significance of the Ladakh crisis, and India’s role as a strategic force in the Indo-Pacific.

Become a Member

Arzan Tarapore is a research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and a visiting research professor at the China Landpower Studies Center at the U.S. Army War College.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any other entity of the U.S. government.

Image: Government of India via Wikimedia Commons.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Arzan Tarapore · January 14, 2025

20. How Biden Failed on Human Rights

If Biden abandoned the human rights mantle perhaps President Trump will pick it up.

From my own limited experience in human rights, the organization I belong to, The Committee For Human RIghts in North Korea (HRNK) , received approximately $1.2M and 800K in grants from the Obama and Trump administrations and absolutely NOTHING from the Biden administration.

Human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue as well.

Excerpts:

Why Biden abandoned human rights as a tenet of U.S. foreign policy will be a question for historians and biographers. It could be that he never truly believed that protecting human rights abroad was a central U.S. interest—but he did make the issue a centerpiece of his presidential campaign and his promises after inauguration. Perhaps he arrived in the Oval Office only to realize the world was even more complex than he expected and decisions harder to make. But after decades working on foreign policy, he must have known the realities.

Whatever the reason, Biden’s inconsistencies on human rights and the rule of law have left these principles vulnerable to further erosion under future presidents and other world leaders. If the United States continues to lower the standards to which it holds its partners, allowing many of them to commit human rights abuses and face no repercussions, there will be few defenders of the rules-based order left. This outcome plays right into the hands of China and Russia, both of which have been trying to pry open cracks in the rules-based international system. Washington’s comparative advantage has been its willingness to throw its weight behind the defense of human rights and thus keep intact a global order that is highly favorable to U.S. interests. By declining to deploy U.S. power when it counted most, Biden ceded that advantage.

The forfeit brings the United States down to the level of its adversaries, relying on economic and military deals to shape outcomes abroad and minimizing the very democratic values that Biden himself said make the United States what it is. It endangers people both in the United States and around the world who are supposed to be protected by the web of norms that make up the international system. After a long career of public service, Biden made his bid for the presidency with pledges to mount a strong defense of human rights. Yet when he reached the United States’ highest office and took charge of the power it holds, Biden backed away from the fight for a more principled foreign policy and a more humane world.

How Biden Failed on Human Rights

Foreign Affairs · by More by Sarah Yager · January 14, 2025

The Moral and Strategic Costs of Abandoning an Ideal

Sarah Yager

January 14, 2025

U.S. President Joe Biden and other senior officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, July 2022 Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

Sarah Yager is Washington Director at Human Rights Watch. She worked on human rights under three U.S. presidents and from 2016 to 2018 served as the first Senior Adviser on Human Rights to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the U.S. Department of Defense.

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If Donald Trump’s second term is anything like his first, the incoming U.S. president will not advance the cause of human rights. His foreign policy is more likely to harm democratic values around the world than it is to protect them. But as bleak as the next four years may become, the past four have hardly been a boon for human rights. President Joe Biden, who came into office promising that his administration would be different, ended up chipping away at these ideals himself.

On the campaign trail in 2020, Biden disparagingly quipped that Trump had embraced “all the thugs in the world,” from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Earlier, in 2019, Biden had pledged to make Saudi Arabia a global “pariah” for the part that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, played in the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. When he entered the Oval Office, Biden claimed he would match his words with actions by making human rights a foreign policy priority. In his second week as president, Biden told staffers gathered at the State Department that “upholding universal rights” was the “grounding wire of our global policy, our global power”; rights, he said, were the United States’ “inexhaustible source of strength.” Biden was a seasoned politician, and he knew that the world was complicated. But he didn’t present rights as values to be promoted only when world events allowed. Instead, in his view, advancing them was itself a way to meet the country’s greatest foreign policy challenges.

Biden initially lived up to his promises, issuing dozens of executive orders in just his first month to reverse steps Trump had taken to diminish the United States’ commitment to international human rights. Biden rejoined the UN Human Rights Council and the Paris climate accord. He removed Trump’s sanctions on the International Criminal Court. He directed federal agencies to promote protections for LGBTQ people abroad and issued the first comprehensive U.S. strategy to prevent atrocities.

Then something changed. Instead of treating the U.S. commitment to its values as a source of strength, the administration behaved as though its own stated principles were an albatross around its neck. Instead of leveraging U.S. power to advance human rights abroad, Biden hesitated to confront allies about their abuses. The administration downplayed concerns about international legal norms, and by the end of his term, Biden was sending antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine—even though a global ban on the weapons had been in place for decades—and sending arms to Israel’s government despite its serious violations of the laws of war in Gaza.

Biden returned to themes of human rights and justice in two notable cases—when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and when Hamas and other armed groups killed more than 1,200 people in Israel on October 7, 2023. Both events warranted Biden’s condemnation. Yet although he remained outspoken in his criticism of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, supporting efforts by international institutions such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court to intervene, he ignored or defended similar conduct by Israel as it launched a military campaign in Gaza, and he blocked international efforts at accountability. Biden’s inconsistent application of purported U.S. values did not go unnoticed. Neither did the seeming disappearance of human rights, once a central component of Biden’s stated strategy, from the administration’s rhetoric. When Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, wrote in Foreign Affairs about “the sources of American power” in the fall of 2023, he focused on economic and military strength. Human rights were absent from the discussion.

U.S. presidents often fall short on their human rights commitments. Some outside the United States—especially in non-Western countries that have long seen hypocrisy in Washington’s promotion of liberal values—will even find it refreshing if Trump drops the pretense of caring about those ideals. But excising human rights from U.S. foreign policy—as many of Biden’s decisions have done and as Trump has proved willing to do even more decisively—will seriously damage U.S. interests and the international system. When the United States selectively applies internationally accepted rules, it undermines its credibility and loses influence in the rest of the world. And because Washington has been the architect of the modern global order, its behavior carries extra weight. If the United States flouts the rules, authoritarians and other illiberal leaders need no further excuse to break them at will, inflicting horror on their own people and inciting instability beyond their borders.

The damage Trump may do to the cause of human rights could create a temptation to look back on the Biden era with nostalgia. But those rose-colored glasses would obscure the real picture. As global power shifts, democratic values are the United States’ enduring comparative advantage. Biden claimed to understand this, but he abandoned his own strategy at a critical time. In doing so, he paved the way for a race to the bottom, as future U.S. presidents and their foreign counterparts, democrats and autocrats alike, face fewer consequences for disregarding international law and degrading human rights.

DANGEROUS BEDFELLOWS

States that deny human rights often create chaos. They can be unstable partners. Their populations eventually agitate, sometimes violently, for freedom. When human rights abuses go unchecked, they precipitate cycles of conflict that disrupt the global economic system and make defense efforts such as countering terrorism more difficult. Biden, at first, seemed to recognize this, criticizing Trump’s penchant for dictators and pledging to create a stronger alliance among democracies. He famously vowed to shun the Saudi crown prince for his rights abuses.

But by 2022, halfway through his presidency, Biden was flying to Saudi Arabia and offering MBS a fist bump. The visit was intended to convince Riyadh to lower oil prices amid a global energy crunch caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but Biden came home empty-handed. And even though Biden said human rights concerns would be “on the agenda,” autocrats aren’t swayed by quiet conversation. They need to face serious consequences, which Biden was unwilling to impose. In fact, after Biden’s visit, the Saudi government increased its repression, imposing measures such as decades-long prison sentences for online activism. And far from keeping Saudi Arabia at arm’s length, the Biden administration hitched the United States’ reputation to the autocratic state. By 2023, Washington was negotiating a defense alliance with Saudi Arabia that would pledge U.S. resources and forces to protecting the country, similar to U.S. commitments to NATO. Saudi Arabia would have been the first nondemocracy invited into the club of U.S. treaty allies in decades.

Biden’s inconsistent application of purported U.S. values did not go unnoticed.

Biden’s recent dealings with the United Arab Emirates struck a similar chord. For years, the UAE government has fueled what the U.S. State Department has called genocide in Sudan by sending weapons to the Rapid Support Forces, one of the factions in the country’s civil war. But in September, Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed was welcomed to Washington on a state visit; during MBZ’s trip, Biden announced an upgrade to Washington’s bilateral defense cooperation with the UAE. As MBZ dined at the White House, Biden’s own special envoy to Sudan was desperately but fruitlessly trying to stop Sudanese generals from massacring civilians with Emirati weapons.

Washington may well have strategic interests in reinforcing the U.S.-Emirati defense relationship, but the UAE’s desire for a deal also gave the United States leverage—leverage Biden did not use by, for instance, conditioning new terms on the UAE stopping its flood of weapons into Sudan. From a strictly pragmatic point of view, it makes little sense for the United States to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on humanitarian aid to contain the fallout of a festering conflict when it could prevent further starvation and suffering through less costly diplomatic means.

What makes Biden’s unwillingness to use such leverage particularly disappointing is that when he did take a tough stand on human rights, he got results. After he labeled Saudi Arabia a pariah and subsequently got elected, MBS implemented some reforms during the transition period, including the release of political prisoners such as women’s rights defender Loujain al-Hathloul. In 2021 and 2022, after Biden withheld a small amount of security assistance from Egypt for failing to meet congressionally mandated human rights benchmarks, that country released political prisoners, too. But in 2024, Biden used a waiver to reinstate the full $1 billion in U.S. assistance to Egypt to reward the country’s humanitarian efforts in Gaza—efforts Egypt may have undertaken regardless, as they were in its own interest. At home, meanwhile, the Egyptian government’s human rights record is the worst it has been in a decade.

THE COST OF GREAT-POWER POLITICS

Biden’s desire to draw middle powers away from China and Russia also came at the expense of human rights. Even as governments in places such as India and Thailand committed rights abuses, Washington avoided expressing serious disapproval, fearful that they would turn to Beijing or Moscow for defense, development, and trade deals. And these countries, knowing how the game was played, carried on with domestic repression while keeping channels open to the United States’ great-power rivals.

The White House rolled out the red carpet for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2023, even after U.S. intelligence had implicated Indian government agents in a conspiracy to kill a Sikh separatist activist on U.S. soil. At home, Modi’s government has discriminated against and stigmatized religious and other minority groups, leading in some cases to communal violence and the bulldozing of Muslim family homes. Yet Modi has faced little public criticism from U.S. officials. Other parts of the U.S. government have raised the issue of rights abuses: in both 2021 and 2022, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that India be listed as a “country of particular concern,” which is a status that triggers sanctions under U.S. law. Both times, the State Department declined to follow the recommendation, and in early 2024, the Biden administration cleared a $4 billion drone sale to India as part of a broader effort to keep a geopolitically important country onside. U.S. overtures, however, did not stop Modi from visiting Putin in Moscow a few months later, frustrating American officials.

In the case of Thailand, the Biden administration considered the country to be so indispensable to U.S. military planning in the Pacific theater that Washington could do no more than offer mild rebukes in response to the Thai government’s rights abuses. The abuses thus persisted without any consequences. Thailand used to be a safe haven for dissidents from Cambodia, China, Myanmar, and Vietnam, but no longer. The Thai government either ignores the threat of transnational repression or actively helps foreign governments target their citizens who have fled to Thailand. A former Cambodian opposition lawmaker was gunned down in Bangkok just last week. The administration has taken no meaningful action in response. Nor did the United States act when Thailand’s Constitutional Court disbanded the opposition party Move Forward, even though Washington had repeatedly urged the Thai government not to dissolve the party. The U.S.-Thai relationship is hardly a fragile one; Thailand has had diplomatic ties with the United States for more than a century and is unlikely to walk away now. Washington may not want to criticize Thailand so severely that it undermines U.S. military operations in the Pacific, but surely the Biden administration could have said and done more about human rights abuses than it did.

Excising human rights from U.S. foreign policy will seriously damage U.S. interests.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken, to his credit, raised human rights concerns in every diplomatic engagement, even if the autocrats he chastised knew there would be little pressure behind his words. Other senior officials and staff also tried to live up to Biden’s original vision of advancing human rights. There are former political prisoners in Vietnam who are free today because U.S. diplomats were willing to fight for them. The State Department cut U.S. assistance to Tunisia by nearly half when the president there dialed up his repression, and it created new sanctions against foreign companies that sell spyware to dictatorships. Guatemala is on a path to reform, albeit a steep one, because U.S. diplomats helped head off a coup before the swearing in of the president-elect. Courageous U.S. ambassadors, such as David Pressman in Hungary, took personal risks to challenge repression. And the administration levied sanctions on rights abusers in Haiti, Myanmar, Sudan, and Uganda, as well as on violent settlers in the West Bank.

But many of these efforts were of relatively low geopolitical consequence. When policy decisions had higher stakes, members of Biden’s senior team who tried to prioritize human rights were consistently overruled. At times no one was even in the room to remind the president that human rights were supposedly part of the administration’s strategy. The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor lacked an assistant secretary, its most senior position, for the first three and a half years of Biden’s term.

Without high-ranking officials to make the case for protecting human rights, even faltering progress was undermined by policy decisions at the top. The State Department, for instance, issued a formal atrocity determination in 2023 that named Ethiopian forces responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. U.S. officials undermined the determination just three months later by allowing foreign economic investment in Ethiopia and failing to issue alternative measures to address the abuses—even though some of the same forces remained engaged in atrocities. The White House also sought to tackle transnational repression by issuing a travel ban on Saudi citizens connected to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and by tasking federal agencies to reach out to diaspora communities across the United States. But senior decision-makers never held countries such as Egypt, India, or Rwanda accountable for targeting their critics inside the United States or for punishing those critics’ families at home.

BENDING THE RULES

The hypocrisy of Biden’s policies came into sharpest relief in his responses to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. International law was applied only in some cases, not all. When the president wanted to pursue justice for abuses, he could and did. His administration led the charge to kick Russia off the UN Human Rights Council and supported the International Criminal Court’s efforts to gather evidence of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine. In February 2023, a year into the war, Blinken powerfully detailed to the UN Security Council how Russia had violated international norms as it killed and displaced civilians, destroyed half of Ukraine’s energy grid, and used starvation as a weapon.

But the administration did not treat other injustices with the same clarity. Biden’s fervent support for the Israeli government’s campaign in Gaza was perhaps his most hypocritical position—and the one most damaging to international law. The UN secretary-general, world leaders, and human rights organizations accused the Israeli military of committing the very same war crimes in Gaza that Blinken charged Russia with committing in Ukraine. Yet Biden insisted on shipping weapons to Israel without imposing conditions on their use, declining to use the most powerful tool at his disposal to change the Israeli government’s conduct.

Biden’s State Department was able to consistently identify and publicly condemn specific Russian war crimes. In March 2022, just one month after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an official assessment reported that more than 2,400 civilians had been killed in Mariupol and detailed a Russian strike against a theater in the city that was marked with the Russian word for “children.” Yet eight months into the gut-wrenching conflict in Gaza, and despite extensive evidence of the Israeli government’s war crimes documented by human rights and humanitarian groups, the State Department said it could not verify any particular instance of Israel violating international law.

Even faltering progress was undermined by policy decisions at the top.

With the most sophisticated intelligence apparatus in the world, the Biden administration appeared to not register what the rest of the world could clearly see. Gaza has been destroyed more completely than almost any urban area in the history of modern warfare. Nearly 50,000 Palestinians are dead because of Israeli military operations, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, and many more are injured and traumatized. More than 90 percent of the population is displaced. Israeli authorities and forces have stopped the water piped into Gaza from Israel, cut off the territory’s electricity, and destroyed its essential infrastructure.

Even as evidence piled up showing the Israeli government’s disregard for the laws of war, Biden refused to use U.S. weapons shipments to Israel as leverage to change its behavior. Instead, he enabled persistent human rights abuses in Gaza and violated U.S. law to do so; several statutes, including Section 502B of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, prohibit arms transfers to countries that do not adhere to the laws of war. Another section of the same U.S. law bars the United States from sending weapons to any country that “prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” In April 2024, Samantha Power, the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, sent a memo to Blinken stating that Israeli authorities had interfered with the agency’s efforts to provide aid to Palestinians in Gaza, including by killing aid workers, bombing ambulances and hospitals, and repeatedly delaying or turning away trucks full of lifesaving supplies. But the Biden administration continued to transfer weapons, with seven shipments arriving in Israel the following month alone.

Overruling U.S. legislation gives future presidents license to do the same. The international rules designed to protect civilians are degraded, too, when a close U.S. partner can breach them and face few consequences. In an interview with The New York Times in January 2024, Blinken refused to answer repeated questions about whether Israel had followed international law in Gaza. Notably, the administration has all but stopped publicly condemning Russian war crimes, perhaps recognizing that it can no longer do so credibly.

The hypocrisy of Biden’s policies came into sharpest relief in Ukraine and Gaza.

The Biden administration’s decision to send antipersonnel land mines to Ukraine in November 2024 was another case of the United States disregarding supposedly universal norms. Because this type of weapon cannot discriminate between civilians and combatants, a ban has been in place for 25 years under a treaty negotiated among 164 countries. The United States never signed the treaty, but in 2022 the Biden administration prohibited the use of antipersonnel land mines outside the Korean Peninsula. When Trump in his first term lifted a previous U.S. ban, Biden had even called the move “reckless.” Biden defended his recent decision to export the weapons as breaking one rule to save another—specifically the right to sovereignty, which is now at risk in Ukraine. This was the same rationale the administration used in July 2023 when it started to send Ukraine cluster munitions, which are also banned by an international treaty (another that the United States has not signed). But neither weapon was going to be a game-changer for Ukraine, so Biden’s disregard for both treaties will only put more civilian lives at risk and further erode humanitarian norms.

By ignoring the law in some areas, the Biden administration also undermined its own efforts to strengthen protections elsewhere. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, for instance, tasked the Pentagon with developing an infrastructure to mitigate civilian harm in conflict, drawing on the lessons of the United States’ 20 years of counterterrorism operations. The Department of Defense now includes a staff fully focused on civilian protection and a new center created to develop training, doctrine, and investigation procedures to minimize and recognize civilian harm caused by U.S. operations. It is a historic effort that could save many lives in conflicts that involve either the United States or its partners. Austin aimed to bring U.S. security partners on board, too, to adopt a similar civilian protection ethos and set of standards. But after Washington overlooked war crimes to support Israel’s campaign in Gaza, other countries may no longer take the United States seriously on matters of civilian protection and adherence to international humanitarian law.

All conflicts have seen some violation of the laws of war. The United States itself has a checkered history, including most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the rules are worth preserving, even if their defenders do not always live up to the standards of conduct they espouse. These guardrails are meant to save lives and to hold violators accountable. Biden could have fortified these protections, using the United States’ influence and meeting its responsibilities as a superpower, one of the founders of international humanitarian law, one of the world’s largest arms suppliers, and the UN’s largest contributor. But he squandered the opportunity and allowed the norms that protect civilians in war to break down.

A TARNISHED LEGACY

Why Biden abandoned human rights as a tenet of U.S. foreign policy will be a question for historians and biographers. It could be that he never truly believed that protecting human rights abroad was a central U.S. interest—but he did make the issue a centerpiece of his presidential campaign and his promises after inauguration. Perhaps he arrived in the Oval Office only to realize the world was even more complex than he expected and decisions harder to make. But after decades working on foreign policy, he must have known the realities.

Whatever the reason, Biden’s inconsistencies on human rights and the rule of law have left these principles vulnerable to further erosion under future presidents and other world leaders. If the United States continues to lower the standards to which it holds its partners, allowing many of them to commit human rights abuses and face no repercussions, there will be few defenders of the rules-based order left. This outcome plays right into the hands of China and Russia, both of which have been trying to pry open cracks in the rules-based international system. Washington’s comparative advantage has been its willingness to throw its weight behind the defense of human rights and thus keep intact a global order that is highly favorable to U.S. interests. By declining to deploy U.S. power when it counted most, Biden ceded that advantage.

The forfeit brings the United States down to the level of its adversaries, relying on economic and military deals to shape outcomes abroad and minimizing the very democratic values that Biden himself said make the United States what it is. It endangers people both in the United States and around the world who are supposed to be protected by the web of norms that make up the international system. After a long career of public service, Biden made his bid for the presidency with pledges to mount a strong defense of human rights. Yet when he reached the United States’ highest office and took charge of the power it holds, Biden backed away from the fight for a more principled foreign policy and a more humane world.

Sarah Yager is Washington Director at Human Rights Watch. She worked on human rights under three U.S. presidents and from 2016 to 2018 served as the first Senior Adviser on Human Rights to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the U.S. Department of Defense.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Sarah Yager · January 14, 2025

21. America’s China Strategy Is Incomplete

Excerpts:

If the Trump administration is unwilling to consider joining CPTPP, it should pursue another ambitious trade project in order to put Beijing on its back foot. Washington could take the approach set out in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement global. The USMCA, negotiated during Trump’s first term, strengthened labor, environmental, intellectual property, and digital trade provisions in ways that aligned with U.S. business interests. It also improved access to Canadian and Mexican markets for the U.S. automobile and agricultural sectors, as well as for small and midsize American businesses. Trade and investment among the three countries increased significantly after the agreement was signed. To expand that model, the new administration could pursue a high-standard, allies-only trade deal—bringing in advanced economies such as Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—that would protect critical supply chains by giving U.S. and allied firms preferential access to trusted technology and secure supplies. Restricting the deal to advanced economies would also reduce the likelihood of high-quality manufacturing jobs leaving the United States, lowering the chances of a political backlash.

If a comprehensive multilateral trade agreement remains beyond the reach of the administration, an easier political sell would be bilateral trade deals. Taiwan presents one such opportunity. In a September 2022 congressional hearing on U.S.-Taiwanese trade, U.S. agricultural representatives argued for such a deal on the grounds that it would lower Taiwanese tariffs and boost U.S. exports to Taiwan. Another option would be a sector-specific approach, which could take the form of a “buyers club” for critical minerals. If members of the Minerals Security Partnership agreed to source only from mines and processing plants that meet certain requirements, that would drive business toward the non-Chinese enterprises coming online, as most Chinese projects do not adhere to high environmental or safety standards. Still, bilateral or sector-based trade deals are less efficient than a more sweeping arrangement, as it takes more time and resources to negotiate and monitor multiple small agreements than to manage one large deal.

Trump has the opportunity to put forward a bold economic policy to energize and protect the American economy. The across-the-board tariffs he seems to prefer will not realize these objectives—and could well undo recent progress, leaving the United States in a worse position than before. His administration should begin, instead, with a full review of the foundation of U.S.-Chinese economic policy that was created during his first term and expanded by the Biden administration. The Office of the United States Trade Representative has gathered more than 1,400 comments from industry as part of a four-year tariff review—the Trump team should now use this information to determine where tariffs are actually helping U.S. business and where they are not. And it will have to consider the full range of economic tools at Washington’s disposal. No single one can address the array of economic challenges China presents to the United States, and the job is far from done.

America’s China Strategy Is Incomplete

Foreign Affairs · by More by Elizabeth Economy · January 14, 2025

Putting Beijing on the Back Foot Requires Economic Tools Beyond Tariffs

Elizabeth Economy and Melanie Hart

January 14, 2025

The financial district in Shanghai, September 2024 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

Elizabeth Economy is Co-Director of the US, China, and the World Project and Hargrove Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. From 2021 to 2023, she was Senior Adviser for China at the U.S. Department of Commerce. She is the author of The World According to China.

Melanie Hart is Senior Director for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. From 2021 to 2024, she served as Senior Adviser for China and Economic Statecraft at the U.S. Department of State.

• More by Melanie Hart

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Growing the U.S. economy is at the top of President-elect Donald Trump’s agenda, and tackling the many challenges in the U.S.-Chinese trade and investment relationship will be central to realizing this objective. Much of Trump’s rhetoric has focused on the use of tariffs: tariffs to rebalance the bilateral trade deficit, tariffs to incentivize U.S. multinational firms to reshore their supply chains and reduce their reliance on Chinese manufacturing, and tariffs to prevent other countries from answering China’s call to de-dollarize the global economy.

But tariffs are only one tool in a much larger toolkit. And if the United States is to protect its economic strength and move its own critical supply chains and those of its partners out of China’s reach, it will need all its tools. During his first term, Trump and his team began an effort to disentangle the U.S. and allied economies from China. President Joe Biden’s administration built on that foundation, developing domestic programs and foreign partnerships to diversify U.S. supply chains and invest in critical industries.

Washington, however, is still competing with one hand tied behind its back, and progress, although significant, is moving too slowly. It will take a full suite of economic incentives, public-private partnerships, and investment and trade deals to reduce the United States’ and its partners’ reliance on China. U.S. partners, concerned about Chinese influence themselves, are eager to work with Washington. If Trump can embrace a more ambitious economic and trade policy, his second term can supercharge the global shift away from dependency on Chinese supply, bolstering the U.S. economy and enhancing U.S. national security.

LAYING THE FOUNDATION

The U.S. economy is one of the strongest in the world. According to the annual Asia Power Index, which is published by Australia’s Lowy Institute and tracks the resources and influence of countries across the Indo-Pacific region, the United States has overtaken China over the last few years in terms of general economic capability and projected future resources. The United States has also maintained its lead in overall resilience, a measure that includes indicators such as internal stability and energy security. But the index also shows that Washington is punching below its weight in the critical area of economic relationships, which measures a state’s ability to use economic interdependence to exercise influence and leverage over trade and investment partners. Here, the United States ranks a distant second to China. And if the United States is underperforming in this measure in Asia, the same is likely true in Africa and South America, regions where China is the largest trading partner and an increasingly dominant source of investment.

Beijing’s lopsided advantage reflects the global economy’s continued overreliance—both real and perceived—on China. For decades, China’s massive size and growth created a sort of gravitational pull. Countries and companies raced to take advantage of the opportunities China offered. Beijing used industrial policy, low-cost labor, intellectual property theft, and trade and investment barriers to shape those interactions and push Chinese firms to the center of global value chains. As a result, Chinese companies are now at the forefront of investing in and deploying the industries and technologies—such as mining, clean energy, and information and communications technology—that will drive economic growth and ensure economic security for the rest of the century.

Many countries and multinationals recognize that they are too reliant on China and are seeking other options. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the risk of overdependence on any single supplier, even a benevolent one. And Beijing has shown that it is not benevolent. Countries now worry about Chinese economic coercion reducing their exports and investments, Chinese overcapacity harming their domestic industries, and potential Chinese military action against Taiwan disrupting critical supply chains.

Tariffs are only one tool in a much larger toolkit.

Their collective concern presents an opportunity for Washington to shape global supply chains in ways that reduce Beijing’s influence and leverage, enhance the position of the United States, and make the world economy more resilient. Early steps in this direction began in the final months of the first Trump administration. In May 2020, U.S. officials initiated talks with semiconductor companies, including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the U.S.-based Intel, and the South Korean–based Samsung, about how best to incentivize these firms to build cutting-edge fabrication plants in the United States, whether through public-private partnerships, tax credits, or grants and loans. Biden built on these initial efforts when he signed—with bipartisan support—the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, which has so far awarded a total of more than $30 billion to 27 companies and catalyzed over $400 billion in private-sector investment for domestic semiconductor manufacturing.

The Biden administration has also laid other groundwork. In early 2021, it released an executive order that set priorities for supply chain diversification, focusing on critical minerals, semiconductors, advanced batteries, and active pharmaceutical ingredients. The order put the United States well ahead of its peers in reducing the exposure of critical sectors to China, and since its passage, Japan and the European Union have both announced their own economic security strategies that prioritize supply chain resiliency.

The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, like the CHIPS and Science Act, has also triggered a race to the top as companies diversify their manufacturing supply chains in order to benefit from manufacturing incentives and other clean energy subsides. In its first two years, the IRA attracted investments equaling more than $215 billion in the battery, electric vehicle, renewable energy, and nuclear energy sectors. The law includes strict local content requirements for companies to receive tax credits for electric vehicle production: 50 percent of the critical materials used must be sourced from the United States or a country with which the United States has a free-trade agreement. By 2027, that figure will rise to 80 percent. The emphasis on domestic spending is the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy. It signals to markets that there is money to be made in alternatives to Chinese goods, and it brings advanced manufacturing jobs back to the United States.

SUPPLY CHAINS AND SEMICONDUCTORS

The Biden administration has taken advantage of other countries’ interest in “de-risking” their economies to create a centripetal force, pulling allies and partners toward new, more secure and more resilient supply chains. One focus is critical minerals, an area in which China accounts for roughly two-thirds of global production. In this sector, Beijing has a near monopoly on graphite, a mineral needed to make electric vehicle batteries. Periodically, China has used its control of these supply chains to pressure other countries, cutting them off from much-needed supplies. In 2023, the Chinese government rolled out new export controls on graphite as well as gallium and germanium—minerals for which Western dependence on Chinese supplies is particularly high. The restrictions were a warning shot. The only way to reduce Beijing’s leverage is to bring new supplies to the global market. This requires considerable funding, both for mines and for processing plants that turn raw materials into final products.

Anticipating the problem, Washington launched the Minerals Security Partnership in 2022 to invest in sustainable critical mineral supply chains. The partnership now includes 14 countries (Australia, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union. The group also works with mineral-producing countries, such as Argentina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia, that are equally concerned about overdependence on China. Partnership countries do not want China to be their only source of critical minerals, and producing countries do not want Beijing to be their only source of investment. Both sides are looking to diversify. Two years in, this program is already moving markets. In May, the MSP announced a deal between the Belgian-based refiner Umicore and STL, a mineral processing company in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to bring new germanium supplies to market. In September, it announced the South Korean–based steel manufacturer POSCO would be teaming up with Australia’s Black Rock Mining to develop a graphite mine in Tanzania. These types of multinational, public-private partnerships enable the United States and its partners to compete with Chinese suppliers, making all countries involved—including the producers—more resilient.

Washington is making progress outside of the MSP, too. The U.S. Department of Defense is signing agreements with non-Chinese suppliers, which helps strengthen alternative supply chains by giving mines and processing plants guaranteed revenue. Pentagon purchases support a graphite project in Alaska, graphite and cobalt projects in Canada, and a graphite mine in Australia, among others. In Greenland, where Washington and Beijing have been jostling over access to the world’s largest rare-earth deposits, Critical Metals Corp, the U.S. subsidiary of European Lithium Limited, won the bid to acquire a controlling share in the Tanbreez Rare Earth Mine. A Chinese-invested competitor attempted and failed to secure a mining license to develop a neighboring site to tap into the same rare-earth deposits.

Many countries and firms recognize that they are too reliant on China.

For now, the United States and its partners in East Asia and Europe dominate the global semiconductor industry. But Beijing is estimated to be investing more than $150 billion over a decade and a half in an effort to catch up with the leading-edge chip designers and manufacturers and dominate this supply chain. Washington and its partners’ lead therefore needs shoring up, lest semiconductors go the way of telecommunication equipment, solar cells, electric vehicles, critical minerals, and other industries in which China’s overwhelming share gives it dangerous influence.

Some of this work has already started with the CHIPS and Science Act. As domestic semiconductor manufacturing ramps up, new plants will need access to upstream manufacturing inputs and downstream processing capacities that are free from Chinese control. The law therefore provides $500 million to the State Department for a fund to make smart international investments in those supply chains.

Downstream processing investments were the first out of the gate. After chips come off the high-end fabrication lines in the United States, much of the testing, packaging, and assembly will be done in lower-income countries, a system that keeps costs down but preserves production jobs at home. The U.S. government has directed funding to countries that are ready to get these processes up and running quickly. Costa Rica, for example, was a fast mover. Together with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Washington is working with the Costa Rican government to make the local regulatory system more attractive to private investors. With State Department funds, Arizona State University—which has a leading semiconductor program—will train Costa Rican workers. Intel also recently announced new investments in the country. And U.S. investments do not stop there: the State Department is also disbursing funds across the Americas and Asia, including to India, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

These types of on-ramps to the U.S.-centric chips supply chain provide partner countries the flexibility to ignore some of Beijing’s demands. In August 2023, for example, Costa Rica issued new cybersecurity regulations banning “untrusted vendors” from its telecom networks. (The Chinese company Huawei, a target of the ban, subsequently sued the Costa Rican government.) Access to the U.S. semiconductor supply chain likely helped assure the Costa Rican government that it could weather a backlash from Beijing. For other U.S. partners, funding programs open the door to a high-tech, U.S.-centric economic growth option. With the alternative being a lower-value-added, China-centric option, it is no surprise that they are racing to get in.

NEW DEALS

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), an initiative the Biden administration launched in May 2022, is taking supply chain diversification to the regional level. In early 2024, the United States and the framework’s other 13 members (Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam) began implementing an agreement that established a supply chain council to align policies and develop new initiatives, a crisis response network to share responsibility for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities, and a labor rights advisory board to represent workforce interests. The council already has plans to focus on three sectors that are core to economic competitiveness: semiconductors, chemicals, and critical minerals, particularly the minerals needed to manufacture electric vehicle batteries.

The framework also aims to energize U.S. and other investment in the region’s clean economy sector. In June, Singapore hosted an IPEF clean economy investment forum that drew 150 companies and investors and identified $23 billion in priority projects for sustainable infrastructure. U.S. companies such as Amazon Web Services, Bloom Energy, Google, and I Squared Capital also announced billions of dollars of new investment in clean energy and information and communications technology projects in the region. And together with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, the United States created an investment fund that is supporting a renewable energy platform in India, as well as projects in Indonesia and Vietnam.

In the Indo-Pacific and beyond, the International Development Finance Corporation, a U.S. agency created during the Trump administration, has been financing deals that help U.S. and foreign firms get a foot in the door in sectors dominated by China. The agency, for example, is investing $55 million to develop nickel and cobalt mining in Brazil and $50 million in a rare-earth processing facility in South Africa. Both projects reduce China’s stranglehold on critical minerals. A $50 million credit guarantee—which Japan matched, providing $50 million from its own development bank—enabled the Australian company Telstra to outbid a Chinese state-owned enterprise to acquire telecom assets in the Pacific Islands. The International Development Finance Corporation also financed the Greek company that won a shipyard bid near Athens and the Turkish firm that will expand and operate the Freetown International Airport in Sierra Leone. Both deals countered likely investments from Beijing. The state-owned China COSCO Shipping Corporation had expressed interest in the Greek shipyard; Sierra Leone canceled an existing loan agreement with Beijing that would have funded a more expensive airport project. The U.S. agency, furthermore, provided a $500 million loan to support a solar project in India that is using new technology to produce solar cells without the need for Chinese polysilicon. Project by project, the United States is creating alternatives to reliance on China.

THE MISSING PIECE

Efforts to de-risk the U.S. economy and the economies of U.S. allies and partners through supply chain diversification and targeted infrastructure investment have made real, measurable gains. Supply chains are moving. New projects are coming online. But progress is slow, labor-intensive, and expensive. If the goal is to secure U.S. and global supply chains and reduce China’s leverage over the United States and its partners, then Washington cannot holster the biggest weapon in its arsenal: trade.

For four years, the Biden administration considered trade deals to be off limits, a political third rail. But trying to rewire supply chains only with direct incentives, as the CHIPS and Science Act and the IRA offer, will not be enough. If the global market is set up in ways that make Chinese goods more attractive than others, subsidies and other direct incentives are rowing upstream. They can incentivize companies to build new mines and fabrication plants, but those companies still need to find buyers for their products. Doing so is difficult when Chinese alternatives are always cheaper—and Beijing can drop prices even lower if it chooses. As the Chinese government continues to subsidize both domestic manufacturing and overseas investment and sign new trade deals that further reduce the cost of trade with China relative to trade with the United States or its partners, Beijing will persistently undermine the progress Washington has made. The price of pivoting to non-Chinese supplies and suppliers will only go up. Critical minerals sourced outside China, for example, are now becoming available, but the viability of new projects is challenged as Beijing dumps minerals into the market at rock-bottom prices in a bid to drive U.S.-funded alternatives into bankruptcy. The U.S. and allied governments will need to step in to keep the new ventures afloat and to convince companies to pay a premium on manufacturing inputs instead of sticking with cheaper Chinese options.

Washington cannot holster the biggest weapon in its arsenal: trade.

Trade deals are the cost-effective solution. They are the most efficient way to make doing business with preferred partners cheaper. The best way for the United States to de-risk its economy would thus be to strike multilateral, high-standard trade deals that pull business away from China and toward friendlier destinations. After Beijing joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the resulting drop in cross-border trade barriers contributed to the shift of jobs and supply chains toward China. Signing new trade deals with allies and partners that lower tariffs and align environmental standards, cross-border data transfers, labor safeguards, intellectual property protection, and regulatory burdens would produce similar effects but in the opposite direction—toward near-shore and “friend-shore” alternatives, which would make the United States more secure.

One option would be to work through the 13-country Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. Joining the CPTPP would provide simplified customs and trade facilitation measures, alignment on the rules of origin, and regulatory efficiencies that would give the United States an advantage in trade and investment with fellow member countries and would thus help move supply chains out of China. This trade agreement was politically toxic in the United States due to the perception that it would mean losing American jobs to developing countries; Trump withdrew from its predecessor agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in early 2017. But soon the costs of remaining outside the CPTPP will start to bite. CPTPP tariff reductions are phasing in over time, and once they are fully implemented, parties to the deal will enjoy comparative advantages trading with one another, and U.S. exporters will be left on the sidelines. The Peterson Institute for International Economics has estimated that the United States’ failure to join the original TPP translates into an annual loss of $2 billion in real income and forgone potential gains of $131 billion. The U.S. agricultural sector has been particularly hard hit, losing an estimated $1.8 billion in exports annually. Signing onto CPTPP, in contrast, could increase U.S. exports of dairy, beef, and pork by almost $3 billion, according to the Purdue University Global Trade Analysis Project.

Washington and Beijing are in direct competition for the benefits of admission to the CPTPP. If China is admitted, membership will no longer be an option for the United States. As a member, China would be in the position to block other countries, including the United States, from joining. Even if China did support U.S. accession, Beijing’s membership in the pact would make Washington more hesitant to sign up, out of concern that China was not fully complying with existing standards and would be in a position to dominate future rule setting. Current signatories have thus far resisted the pressure to let Beijing in, largely based on the hope that the United States may eventually shake off its trade-deal paranoia and join. If that hope fades, China will pounce, and U.S. exporters will pay the price. China’s alternative multilateral trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, is already expected to harm U.S. businesses; the UN Conference on Trade and Development has estimated that the deal would reduce annual U.S. exports by more than $5 billion as trade is diverted to RCEP countries.

Trump has the opportunity to put forward a bold economic policy.

If the Trump administration is unwilling to consider joining CPTPP, it should pursue another ambitious trade project in order to put Beijing on its back foot. Washington could take the approach set out in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement global. The USMCA, negotiated during Trump’s first term, strengthened labor, environmental, intellectual property, and digital trade provisions in ways that aligned with U.S. business interests. It also improved access to Canadian and Mexican markets for the U.S. automobile and agricultural sectors, as well as for small and midsize American businesses. Trade and investment among the three countries increased significantly after the agreement was signed. To expand that model, the new administration could pursue a high-standard, allies-only trade deal—bringing in advanced economies such as Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—that would protect critical supply chains by giving U.S. and allied firms preferential access to trusted technology and secure supplies. Restricting the deal to advanced economies would also reduce the likelihood of high-quality manufacturing jobs leaving the United States, lowering the chances of a political backlash.

If a comprehensive multilateral trade agreement remains beyond the reach of the administration, an easier political sell would be bilateral trade deals. Taiwan presents one such opportunity. In a September 2022 congressional hearing on U.S.-Taiwanese trade, U.S. agricultural representatives argued for such a deal on the grounds that it would lower Taiwanese tariffs and boost U.S. exports to Taiwan. Another option would be a sector-specific approach, which could take the form of a “buyers club” for critical minerals. If members of the Minerals Security Partnership agreed to source only from mines and processing plants that meet certain requirements, that would drive business toward the non-Chinese enterprises coming online, as most Chinese projects do not adhere to high environmental or safety standards. Still, bilateral or sector-based trade deals are less efficient than a more sweeping arrangement, as it takes more time and resources to negotiate and monitor multiple small agreements than to manage one large deal.

Trump has the opportunity to put forward a bold economic policy to energize and protect the American economy. The across-the-board tariffs he seems to prefer will not realize these objectives—and could well undo recent progress, leaving the United States in a worse position than before. His administration should begin, instead, with a full review of the foundation of U.S.-Chinese economic policy that was created during his first term and expanded by the Biden administration. The Office of the United States Trade Representative has gathered more than 1,400 comments from industry as part of a four-year tariff review—the Trump team should now use this information to determine where tariffs are actually helping U.S. business and where they are not. And it will have to consider the full range of economic tools at Washington’s disposal. No single one can address the array of economic challenges China presents to the United States, and the job is far from done.

Elizabeth Economy is Co-Director of the US, China, and the World Project and Hargrove Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. From 2021 to 2023, she was Senior Adviser for China at the U.S. Department of Commerce. She is the author of The World According to China.

Melanie Hart is Senior Director for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. From 2021 to 2024, she served as Senior Adviser for China and Economic Statecraft at the U.S. Department of State.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Elizabeth Economy · January 14, 2025

22. The Battle Songs that Defined the Global War on Terrorism, According to Service Members and Veterans

And now for something seemingly on the lighter side, but that something is very important to soldiers.

We might not have a fife and drummer marching at the head of the column but soldiers are listening to their iphones/iPods before going into battle.

Some good songs, some not so good in my opinion. Some are timeless across generations with a couple popular before most soldiers were even born (and one from the Vietnam war)

The Battle Songs that Defined the Global War on Terrorism, According to Service Members and Veterans

military.com · by Blake Stilwell,Jared Keller · January 13, 2025

If you served in the U.S. military during the Global War on Terrorism, chances are high that there are a handful of battle songs you associate with your service. Whether you went on patrol to Drowning Pool's "Bodies," directed air operations to Outkast's "Bombs over Baghdad" or gave in to a moment of homesickness to John Michael Montgomery's "Letters from Home," everyone who served in the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (and well beyond) likely has a particular song that immediately conjures up memories of their time in the ranks. Sure, they may not be as iconic as "War" by Edwin Starr or "Fortunate Son" by Creedence Clearwater Revival, but they belong to the post-9/11 generation of American service members, and they are legendary in their own right.

So what battle songs in particular defined service in the U.S. military during the Global War on Terrorism? We asked service members and veterans to share their favorite tracks with us, and they did not disappoint. Here are some of the standouts:

"Bodies" by Drowning Pool

If you know, you know. "Bodies" by Drowning Pool, originally pulled from radio play following the Sept. 11 terror attacks over concerns over the lyrics, is considered the moto pump-up song for a significant number of Military.com readers who deployed in the early years of the Global War on Terrorism. While it's worth noting that repeated renditions of the song were used as a form of interrogation on detainees at Guantanamo Bay in 2003, the members of the band, well, didn't really care that much about that.

"People assume we should be offended that somebody in the military thinks our song is annoying enough that, played over and over, it can psychologically break someone down," bassist Stevie Benton told Spin magazine in 2006. "I take it as an honor to think that perhaps our song could be used to quell another 9/11 attack or something like that."

"Courtesy of the Red, White and Blue (The Angry American)" by Toby Keith

Toby Keith's beloved post-9/11 ass-kicking anthem was never supposed to make it to airwaves. While the late country star only ever intended to perform "Courtesy of the Red, White and Blue" at USO shows and military performances, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones told him that the track was "the most amazing battle song I've ever heard in my life" and convinced him to release it as a single. The rest, as they say, is history.

"Courtesy of the Red, White and Blue" "was a rallying call" after the 9/11 attacks, as one Military.com reader wrote; as another put it, the song "captured that moment of greatest outrage, when motives were pure and we had the high ground." That particular feeling may not have lasted as the Global War on Terrorism drew on, but even today, as one reader wrote, the song still evokes "powerful emotions" from the early days of the conflict.

"When I'm Gone" by 3 Doors Down

"When I'm Gone" was released in 2002, just as the United States began to fully commit to rebuilding Afghanistan following the initial ouster of the Taliban. Although the song has nothing to do with the U.S. military (it's about the band being on the road while on tour), the lyrics make it easy to see why troops identify with it. The song "captured the essence of the deployment experience in terms of the fears, loneliness, bonds, and hope," wrote one Navy vet.

3 Doors Down recognized the relationship after "When I'm Gone" was released. The official music video, filmed live aboard the USS George Washington in 2002, features clips of the U.S. military and is "dedicated to all the men and women serving our country."

"Bring Me to Life" by Evanescence

People tend to forget that early deployments in the Global War on Terrorism were not unlike deploying in the 1990s. We still had to wait in line to use the internet, we still used personal DVD players for TV and movies, and the iPod was still in its infancy. Without streaming, we were all still pretty much listening to the same hit songs, and in 2003, you could not escape Evanescence's debut single, "Bring Me to Life."

"Evanescence songs hit a nerve for me as the deployments wore on," wrote one Marine. "I still cannot help getting emotional when I hear these songs today."

The song was released when units were deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan and reserve units were mobilized to support combat operations throughout the conflict. American Forces Network (AFN) radio and television channels were playing it just as much as any other network.

"Being a reservist, we had to pull our unit out of a depot packing configuration to a deployable one," an Army veteran said. "In other words, we had to bring the unit to life. This song played constantly throughout the mobilization phase."

"America, F*** Yeah" by DVDA

It's hard to explain "South Park" creators Trey Parker and Matt Stone's 2004 film "Team America: World Police." It's a hard-rocking, tongue-in-cheek, Toby Keith-like anthem that can be interpreted along any ideological line. If you were a Republican, it was hilariously supporting all things America; if you were a Democrat, it was an ironic dig at America's post-9/11 values. In truth, it was neither: As Parker explained in 2005, it was simply a reaction to what it was like to be an American since the Sept. 11 attacks.

"America has this role in the world as a dick. Cops are dicks, you f**king hate cops, but you need 'em ..." Parker told Salon. "Because there are a**holes -- terrorists -- you gotta have dicks -- people who hunt down terrorists. And I think that that is a pretty strong thing to assert, actually."

And the "dicks" hunting down the terrorists loved the new, hilarious battle hymn provided by Parker and Stone, even if they were openly fighting for "porno," "Starbucks" and "Taco Bell."

"God Bless the USA" by Lee Greenwood

Lee Greenwood's 1984 patriotic anthem has been around for so long, people tend to think it's as old as "The Star-Spangled Banner." But whether you think it's smarmy red meat for would-be patriots or not, it endures because it still gives men and women in uniform the red, white and blue tinglies. I will swear to whatever God you believe in that U.S. troops in basic training during the Global War on Terrorism used to stand at attention for this song.

"'God Bless The USA' gives me so much comfort and yet brings tears to my eyes whenever I hear it," wrote one veteran and first responder who was at Ground Zero on Sept. 11, 2001. Others said "it captured my beliefs perfectly," and that it "defined the heart of America."

(And it wasn't just the Global War on Terrorism, either. One Army veteran said it became "[a] symbol for all of us deployed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm.")

"Thunderstruck" by AC/DC

There is nothing complicated about AC/DC songs, and that's what is so great about them. "Thunderstruck" starts with an iconic guitar riff that builds up to a driving, thunderous beat and is enough to get anyone pumped, even if they don't speak a lick of English. Only the second verse gives the listener any idea of what the song is about (spoiler alert: sex with strippers) while the rest of it can be applied to anything they might be doing at the time, from buffing the floors to fighting the Iraq War. It's no wonder it became a perennial favorite.

"It was hard and fast just like the U.S. military branches as we invaded Iraq," said one veteran. "Shock and awe baby!"

"War Pigs" by Black Sabbath

Black Sabbath's 1970 classic is also an anti-Vietnam War protest song, but the feeling that "generals gathered in the masses/just like witches at black masses" resonated with service members fighting the Global War on Terrorism as well. One Air Force veteran said it was a reminder of "the unnecessary chaos led by those back in D.C.," while one Army veteran said the song "opened my eyes to the horrors of war."

"Just listen to the lyrics!" said another Army veteran.

"We Gotta Get Out Of This Place" by The Animals

"We Gotta Get Out Of This Place" was first released in 1965 and was immediately popular with American troops in Vietnam, so far that it was one of the most requested songs on Armed Forces Radio, according to Adrian Cronauer of "Good Morning, Vietnam" fame. The song not only still resonates with Vietnam veterans, but appears to have transcended generations.

"We all felt that way," one post-9/11 Marine wrote, while one Air Force veteran said it applied because his unit was deployed continuously for 18 years. The enduring popularity of The Animals' hit just proves that a song doesn't need heavy drums or a driving beat to go to war.

"Letters from Home" by John Michael Montgomery

In the earliest days of the Global War on Terrorism, mobile phones were still iffy when traveling internationally, and email was something you could only do at work or at the base comms center (if they had one). Good ol' snail-mail letters were still the primary way to keep your family and loved ones up to date on what was going on in your life while deployed. They were also the only way your family could initiate contact with you.

So when country singer John Michael Montgomery released "Letters from Home" in 2004, it became ... well, a love letter to the deployed life. The music video even features American troops and the artist singing for them.

"All of us that have served overseas know the importance of mail call to our mind set during our time deployed," one Navy veteran said. "When I would go out on patrol, I carried the last letter from home in a pocket and I would read it while out on patrol, until I got the next one."

"My Dad wrote me a letter every week while I was deployed both times," wrote one Army veteran. "The last one, the last one he wrote, he told me he was proud of me. He past [sic] away 19 days later."

"Bombs over Baghdad" by Outkast

The reason "Bombs Over Baghdad" (or simply "B.O.B.") made this list should be obvious. But it was actually released in 2000, well before the Iraq War. At the time, the only U.S. operations were conducted by Operation Southern Watch, which simply enforced "No Fly Zones" inside Iraq. Outkast (which are actually anti-war) said it was partly a commentary on the United States' continued bombing inside Iraq and partly the group's view of the state of rap music at the end of the 1990s.

Whatever they intended didn't matter, because American troops rode the song into battle, regardless of its intended meaning.

"We played it before and during Direct Air Support Center-Airborne missions ... over Baghdad" wrote one Marine Corps vet.

"As a Tomahawk weapons technician, it was literally the thing we trained for and eventually executed," said a Navy veteran.

"Call Me Maybe" by Carly Rae Jepsen

Carly Rae Jepson's addictively catchy pop anthem came out in 2012, but it's apparently a popular choice among service members who served in the back half of the Global War on Terrorism. "I have literally returned fire with 'Call Me Maybe' on," one Army veteran who served in Afghanistan said.

Yeah, that's because it's an absolute banger.

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military.com · by Blake Stilwell,Jared Keller · January 13, 2025

23. Seizing the Initiative in the Gray Zone: The Case for a US Office of Strategic Disruption

My latest thought piece that is really on Political Warfare, a term no one in Washington or the Pentagon likes.

I really do not care what organization we develop as long as we can develop and execute a political warfare strategy and campaigns to effectively compete and win in the gray zone.

Seizing the Initiative in the Gray Zone: The Case for a US Office of Strategic Disruption

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/seizing-the-initiative-in-the-gray-zone-the-case-for-a-us-office-of-strategic-disruption/

19fortyfive.com · by David Maxwell · January 14, 2025

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, unrivaled in conventional and nuclear military might. This unparalleled dominance, however, inadvertently paved the way for a new era of conflict—one that operates in the shadows between peace and war, challenging traditional notions of warfare and national security. As we stand at this strategic crossroads, it becomes imperative to reassess our approach to global competition and conflict.

The “gray zone” warfare concept has gained prominence as adversaries like China and Russia have developed strategies to compete with the US without triggering large-scale military responses. China’s “Unrestricted Warfare” and Russia’s “New Generation” or “Non-linear Warfare” (also called hybrid warfare) exemplify these asymmetric approaches, designed to exploit vulnerabilities while remaining below the threshold of conventional war.

Today, we see two visions of war. The traditional Clausewitzian vision of war is “an extension of politics by other means” to which the US adheres. The revisionist and rogue powers believe that politics is war by other means. To quote Mao: “War is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed.” America’s adversaries believe they are in a war with the US and the free world. This is an example of political warfare.

The Problem

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has tried to apply conventional and nuclear deterrence concepts to asymmetric threats. By definition, asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, and gray zone activities cannot be deterred because they take place below the threshold of conventional war. They must be addressed with offensive political warfare capabilities that attack the adversaries’ strategies, create dilemmas, and exploit inherent weaknesses and contradictions of totalitarian regimes. The US has been unable to effectively execute such a strategy in the 21st Century because of a deterrence mindset, a fear of escalation, and being constantly in a defensive and reactive posture. The US has not yet adopted a winning mindset for activities in the gray zone.

The American Paradox: Strength and Vulnerability

While the United States has maintained its relative conventional and nuclear superiority, it has adopted a largely defensive and reactive stance in the gray zone. This approach stems from the assumption that forces optimized for high-intensity conflict can easily “scale down” to address asymmetric threats. However, this perspective has left America vulnerable to adversaries actively and offensively competing in this ambiguous space.

The “Dark Quad” of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – collectively described as the axis of upheaval, chaos, or tyranny – have been creating dilemmas and attempting to disrupt and undermine US national security strengths. In contrast, the US has struggled to develop an agile, flexible, and offensive capability for operations in the gray zone.

The US must work to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority because this offers the best chance of avoiding war. By doing so, it neutralizes these threats, allowing the US to make very modest investments in its national security apparatus to offensively and proactively compete and win in the gray zone.

A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier, assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), qualifies at a stress shoot range at Ft. Carson, Colorado, Mar. 3, 2016. The stress shoot was designed to test these soldiers for actions seen in combat operations. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Connor Mendez)

Historical Foundations

The concept of political warfare is not new to American statecraft. In 1948, George F. Kennan, head of the US State Department Policy Planning Staff, articulated the need for a more assertive and coordinated approach to advancing American interests. Kennan recognized that a nuanced strategy beyond traditional diplomacy and military action was necessary in a world where the United States held significant economic advantages but faced ideological challenges.

Paul Smith’s seminal work, “On Political War,” further developed this concept, defining political warfare as the use of “political means to compel an opponent to do one’s will, based on hostile intent.” This approach encompasses a range of tools, from propaganda and psychological operations to economic pressure and covert action.

Organizational Model: The Office of Strategic Services

A new US organization should draw inspiration from the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS, established in 1942, was a multifaceted agency that combined intelligence gathering, special operations, and psychological warfare. Its structure included:

1. Secret Intelligence Branch

2. Counter-Intelligence Branch

3. Research and Analysis Branch

4. Special Operations Branch

5. Morale Operations Branch

This comprehensive approach allowed the OSS to conduct various activities, from sabotage operations and support to resistance, intelligence collection and analysis, covert and clandestine activities, and psychological warfare, all in support of broader US strategic objectives.

Lessons from the Past: Kennedy’s Vision

This stance was the vision of President John F. Kennedy when he created the US Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps, authorized the Green Beret for US Army Special Forces, and established the US Navy SEALs. He significantly expanded the scope and capabilities of the US Information Agency that President Eisenhower established. He sought to develop national security tools and concepts that would allow the US to proactively and offensively compete below the threshold of large-scale combat operations. Sadly, he could not fully implement his vision, and his successors never fully embraced his concepts because they did not have his strategic foresight. However, Kennedy might be described as the father of the idea of harnessing the power of 3D – diplomacy, development, and defense.

Swedish soldiers fire their Stridsvagn 122 main battle tank gun while conducting offensive lane operations during the Strong Europe Tank Challenge, Grafenwoehr, Germany, June 7, 2018. The Swedish soldiers are assigned to the Wartofta Tank Company, Skaraborg Regiment. U.S. Army Europe and the German Army co-host the third Strong Europe Tank Challenge at Grafenwoehr Training Area, June 3-8, 2018. The Strong Europe Tank Challenge is an annual training event designed to give participating nations a dynamic, productive military partnerships, form soldier-level relationships and share tactics, techniques and procedures. Army photo by Gertrud Zach

Although the following quote from President Kennedy is often referred to, it is remarkably prescient with eerie parallels for today. It should be thoroughly analyzed, understood, and compared to the conditions of the 21st Century. The real question we should ask is if we have leaders (or speechwriters) today who have this depth of understanding of the strategic problems we face and the vision to develop a way ahead:

"We now see another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins: war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called “wars of liberation” to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. In those situations where we must counter it, these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training."

It was not until 1986, and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act’s Nunn Cohen Amendment, that there was an attempt to create a capability to compete in the gray zone effectively, or what was called at the time “low intensity conflict.” However, the vision of creating an organization responsible for all US national security operations in the gray zone of low intensity conflict was never fully realized despite the establishment of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the US Special Operations Command.

Reimagining National Security: A Call for Strategic Disruption

No US government agency currently can harness all elements of national power to conduct proactive offensive operations in the gray zone.

To effectively compete in the gray zone, the United States must consider a fundamental restructuring of its national security apparatus. While maintaining conventional and nuclear superiority to deter large-scale conflicts, America needs to develop offensive capabilities tailored for gray zone competition.

Creating an Office of Strategic Disruption (OSD) could provide a framework for orchestrating whole-of-government operations below the threshold of large-scale combat. This office would harness the 3D approach – diplomacy, development, and defense – along with information and intelligence operations to proactively engage adversaries in the gray zone.

Key Components of the Office of Strategic Disruption

The proposed OSD should integrate several critical components:

1. Intelligence and Analysis: A robust intelligence gathering and analysis capability is essential.

2. Information Operations: Developing and implementing strategies for countering disinformation and conducting influence operations.

3. Economic Warfare: Coordinating economic pressure and incentives to achieve political objectives.

4. Cyber Operations: Integrating cyber capabilities into broader political warfare strategies.

5. Special Activities: Conducting covert and clandestine operations supporting political objectives.

6. Interagency Coordination: Serving as a central hub for coordinating political warfare efforts across government agencies.

7. An integrated professional education structure to develop US government personnel to be experts in the gray zone.

Conclusion: Adapting to the New Battlefield

As we navigate the complexities of 21st-century warfare, the United States stands at a critical juncture. The challenge lies not in abandoning our strengths but in complementing them with new capabilities. By learning from historical examples and embracing innovative strategies, America can reclaim the initiative in the gray zone.

1st Lt. Ryan Rogers assigned to 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), fires the Javelin shoulder-fired anti-tank missile during platoon live fire exercise at Fort Campbell, Ky. Jan. 30, 2019. (U.S. Army Photo by Capt. Justin Wright)

The path forward requires a delicate balance: maintaining the military might that deters conventional warfare while developing the ability and agility to compete effectively in the shadows and gap between peace and war. Only by adapting to this new reality can the United States ensure its security in an increasingly complex global landscape.

And yes, the acronym “OSD” conflicts with the one for the Office of Secretary of Defense. To reduce confusion, perhaps DOD should return to its original name: The War Department. The president-elect is known as a disruptor who plays to win. Let’s give him the tools to win wars (a War Department) and create the tools to strategically disrupt our adversaries: an office of Strategic Disruption.

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

19fortyfive.com · by David Maxwell · January 14, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com