Quotes of the Day:

“We must develop and maintain the capacity to forgive. He who is devoid of the power to forgive is devoid of the power to love. There is some good in the worst of us and some evil in the best of us. When we discover this, we are less prone to hate our enemies.”

– Martin Luther King, Jr.

"There are two cardinal sins from which all others spring: Impatience and Laziness." 

– Franz Kafka

"It's not the hours you put in your work that counts, it's the work you put in the hours." 

– Sam Ewing

1. N. Korea claims to have successfully launched solid-fuel hypersonic IRBM

2. Nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan condemn N. Korea's missile launch

3. N.K. foreign minister leaves for Russia amid deepening military cooperation

4. S. Korea considering support measures for safe passage in Red Sea

5. North says it launched IRBM carrying hypersonic warhead

6. N. Korea to convene key parliamentary meeting amid animosity toward S. Korea

7. U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launch as breach of UNSC resolutions

8. North Korea’s New Unification Policy: Implications and Pitfalls

9.  North Korea broke now-defunct military pact with South 3,600 times: JCS

10. Moon government accused of lax oversight of NK guard post demolition

11. Korea unveils plan to build $472 bil. mega chip cluster in Gyeonggi Province

12. North Korea tests first solid-fuel ‘hypersonic’ missile

13. A new year, same old story on the Korean Peninsula in 2024

14. Explainer: Why is North Korea testing hypersonic missiles and how do they work?

15. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government implements wage hike of more than 10 times (3)　Wages are paid with cards as part of efforts to force people to buy food from the state

1. N. Korea claims to have successfully launched solid-fuel hypersonic IRBM

(3rd LD) N. Korea claims to have successfully launched solid-fuel hypersonic IRBM | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 15, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 13-17; ADDS photo)

By Kim Soo-yeon and Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, Jan. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Monday it successfully test-fired a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) carrying a hypersonic warhead the previous day as part of regular activities to develop powerful weapons systems.

The missile loaded with a hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead was launched Sunday afternoon in a bid to verify the warhead's gliding and maneuvering capabilities and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). It did not disclose the missile's flight distance or time and other details.

The Missile General Bureau said the test is part of the agency and its affiliated defense science institutes' "regular activities for developing powerful weapon systems," according to the KCNA.

North Korea also said the test-fire "never affected the security of any neighboring country and had nothing to do with the regional situation."

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 15, 2024, shows the North's launch of a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) carrying a hypersonic warhead the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

South Korea's military said Sunday it detected the launch from an area in or around Pyongyang at about 2:55 p.m., and the missile flew approximately 1,000 kilometers before splashing into the sea.

It marked the North's first missile launch since the firing of a solid-fuel Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile on Dec. 18.

In an interview with Yonhap News Agency last week, South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said North Korea could test-fire a new type of IRBM as early as this month after the repressive regime staged solid-fuel engine tests for a new IRBM in November.

Solid-fuel missiles are known to be harder to detect ahead of launch than liquid-fuel ones that require more preparations, such as fuel injection.

Seoul military officials believe Pyongyang's solid-fuel IRBM under development is capable of targeting U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam. IRBMs have a range of 3,000-5,500 km.

Guam, approximately 3,000 km southeast of North Korea, hosts key U.S. naval and air force bases.

A hypersonic missile is among the list of high-tech weapons that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed to develop at a party congress in 2021 as part of the country's key military projects.

In January 2022, North Korea claimed it had successfully launched hypersonic missiles, about three months after it first test-fired the new weapons system, called a Hwasong-8 missile. South Korea's defense ministry rejected the North's claim as "exaggerated."

South Korea's military did not elaborate further on the specifications of the latest launch, noting that a detailed analysis is under way.

"A comprehensive analysis is still being conducted, so there aren't a lot of details to explain," Col. Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a regular briefing Monday.

He also said Seoul, Washington and Tokyo shared warning data on the North's missile in real time through the data-sharing system they fully activated last month in a joint effort to counter the North's military threats.

Meanwhile, Seoul's defense ministry called the Sunday firing a "clear act of provocation" that violates U.N. Security Council resolutions banning the regime from using ballistic missile technology.

It warned of an "overwhelming" response in the event of any direct North Korean provocation against the South.

At a year-end party meeting, Kim urged stepped-up war readiness to deter what he called "unprecedented" acts of U.S.-led confrontation against his country.

Last week, the North's leader said he has no intention of avoiding war with South Korea and threatened to annihilate the South if Seoul attempts to use force against the North.

Experts said North Korea is expected to further raise tensions with provocative acts ahead of South Korea's parliamentary elections in April and the U.S. presidential election in November.

A set of photos carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows the North firing what it claimed to be hypersonic missiles. A photo (L) carried by the KCNA on Jan. 15, 2024, shows the North's test-firing of a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile carrying a hypersonic warhead the previous day. The two other photos show the country's launch of liquid-propellant hypersonic missiles in January 2022 (C) and September 2021, respectively. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

This image, captured from footage of North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Jan. 10, 2024, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on an inspection tour of munitions factories on Jan. 8-9. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 15, 2024

2. Nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan condemn N. Korea's missile launch

Nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan condemn N. Korea's missile launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 15, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 15 (Yonhap) -- The top nuclear envoys of South Korea, the United States and Japan have condemned North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch during their phone talks earlier this week, Seoul's foreign ministry said Monday.

The North test-fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile into the East Sea on Sunday in its first ballistic missile launch this year, according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff. It came after North Korea fired hundreds of artillery shells near the inter-Korean maritime border in the Yellow Sea from Jan. 5 to 7.

Kim Gunn, South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, spoke by phone on Sunday to discuss the latest provocation with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Jung Pak and Hiroyuki Namazu, respectively, the ministry said.

The envoys denounced the launch as a violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions that threatens the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region.

Pointing out the North's illicit provocations as the "root causes" of instability in the region, the three sides emphasized their trilateral cooperation will bolster even further as North Korea escalates its provocations.

They also agreed to keep close tabs on North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui's visit to Russia this week amid deepening military cooperation between the two countries.

People watch a TV report at Seoul Station in the capital on Jan. 14, 2024, on North Korea's firing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile into the East Sea earlier in the day in its first ballistic missile launch this year. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 15, 2024

3. N.K. foreign minister leaves for Russia amid deepening military cooperation

What can be done to stop this growing cooperation? I would like to see the white board scribblings within various agencies and organizations.

(LEAD) N.K. foreign minister leaves for Russia amid deepening military cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 15, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in last 2 paras)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, Jan. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui has left for Russia for an official visit at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, state media reported Monday, amid deepening military cooperation between the two nations.

Choe is scheduled to visit Russia from Monday to Wednesday at Lavrov's invitation, and her delegation was seen off at the airport Sunday by Vice Foreign Minister Pak Chol-jun and Russia's Charge d'Affaires ad Interim Vladimir Topeha, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

Her visit appears to be a reciprocal trip following Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang in October and comes amid suspicions that North Korea has provided weapons to Russia for use in its war with Ukraine in return for Russia's technical assistance for Pyongyang's weapons programs.

Pyongyang and Moscow have denied any arms deals so far.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Oct. 19, 2023, shows North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (R) and her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, talking to each other at a banquet held the previous day to celebrate his visit to Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Last week, the White House said Russia recently fired additional North Korean ballistic missiles into Ukraine following earlier such launches on Dec. 30 and Jan. 2.

Also drawing attention is the issue of whether Choe and Lavrov will discuss a possible trip by Putin to North Korea, as the Russian leader accepted Kim's invitation to visit the North during their summit at Russia's Vostochny spaceport in September last year.

In April 2019, the North's state media said Putin had accepted Kim's proposal to visit Pyongyang during their first summit in Vladivostok. But at that time, the Kremlin did not confirm it, nor did Putin visit the North.

At a year-end party meeting, the North's leader vowed to strengthen solidarity with countries standing against the United States. He is seeking to bolster ties with China and Russia vis-a-vis the strengthening of security cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.

South Korea's unification ministry warned against "illegal" cooperation of the suspected arms trade between Pyongyang and Moscow following the Kim-Putin summit.

"North Korea and Russia should be clearly aware that (the international community) is keeping close tabs on Choe's visit to Russia," Koo Byoung-sam, spokesperson at the ministry, told a regular press briefing.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 15, 2024

4.S. Korea considering support measures for safe passage in Red Sea

If South Korea depends on commerce passing through the Red Sea (and it does), then as a global pivotal state it should contribute to ensuring freedom of navigation as it has been doing off the Horn of Africa against piracy there.

S. Korea considering support measures for safe passage in Red Sea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 15, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 15 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is considering various measures to secure safe passage for cargo ships in the Red Sea amid rising tensions on the major shipping route, the defense ministry said Monday.

Tensions in the Red Sea have escalated as the United States and Britain conducted strikes on military targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen last week following more than two dozen attacks by the rebels since mid-November.

"The defense ministry is making all efforts to ensure Korean vessels' safe shipping in the Red Sea. Various support measures are under consideration, taking into account various factors," ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyu said in a regular press briefing, without elaborating.

A 300-member strong Cheonghae unit has been operating in the Gulf of Aden and nearby waters to conduct maritime security missions, including escorting civilian ships and anti-piracy operations.

Last week, South Korea and nine other countries issued a joint statement in support of precision strikes that the U.S. and Britain conducted against Iran-backed Houthis in response to their repeated attacks in the Red Sea.

Oceans and Fisheries Minister Kang Do-hyung (L) speaks with the skipper of a South Korean vessel passing near the Red Sea over the phone at the ministry's situation room in the government complex in Sejong, 112 kilometers south of Seoul, on Jan. 12, 2024, following U.S. and British strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen in response to Red Sea attacks by the Houthis. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 15, 2024

5. North says it launched IRBM carrying hypersonic warhead

Monday

January 15, 2024

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 15 Jan. 2024, 11:41

Updated: 15 Jan. 2024, 11:47

North says it launched IRBM carrying hypersonic warhead

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-15/national/northKorea/North-says-it-launched-IRBM-carrying-hypersonic-warhead/1958597

In this photo released on Monday by Pyongyang's state-controlled Korean Central News Agency, North Korea launches a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile the previous day. [YONHAP]

North Korea said Monday it successfully tested a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) bearing a hypersonic warhead the previous day.

According to Pyongyang’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the purpose of the missile test carried out on Sunday afternoon was to verify the gliding and maneuvering capabilities of a “hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead” and the missile’s newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.

The regime’s Missile General Bureau, which, according to the KCNA, conducted the test, said the launch was part of “regular activities for developing powerful weapon systems.”

The North also claimed the test “never affected the security of any neighboring country and had nothing to do with the regional situation.”

Sunday’s missile was the first to be launched by the North this year. The last launch conducted by the North was that of a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile on Dec. 18.

The launch was met with fresh condemnation from Kim Gunn, South Korea’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, as well as from his U.S. and Japanese counterparts Jung Pak and Hiroyuki Namazu during phone talks held by the trio on Sunday, according to Seoul’s Foreign Ministry on Monday.

South Korean military officials believe the North Korean solid-fuel IRBM under development has a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers (1,864 to 3,106 miles) and is capable of targeting U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam, located approximately 3,000 kilometers south of North Korea.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un previously identified a hypersonic warhead as one of the key items on his wish list of advanced military assets at a meeting of the regime’s ruling Worker’s Party in 2021.

In November, the North’s state media reported that the regime had conducted successful ground-based tests of multi-stage solid-fuel engines to power a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

Multi-stage missiles use two or more stages, each with its own engine and propellant, that are jettisoned when they run out of fuel, thereby decreasing the mass of the remaining missile. This process enables the thrust of the remaining stages to more easily accelerate the missile to its final speed and height.

Staging is used to both fire missiles across long distances and launch satellites into orbit.

The KCNA at the time said the tests “provided a sure guarantee for reliably accelerating the development of the new-type IRBM system.” 

Solid-fuel missiles can remain in storage for an extended period, allowing them to be deployed and launched in a shorter time frame than liquid-fuel missiles.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

6. N. Korea to convene key parliamentary meeting amid animosity toward S. Korea

Remember that any problem can be made insoluble if enough meetings are held to discuss. Must be the north Korean way.

But we must not overreact to this seeming change in rhetoric. While it sounds threatening, it very well could be due to internal stresses and that Kim Jong Un must emphasize an external threat to continue to justify the sacrifices and suffering of the Korean people so that he can continue to oppress them to remain in power. Again, as much as we observe for preparations for war, we must also observe for indicators of internal instability and potential threats to the regime. 

N. Korea to convene key parliamentary meeting amid animosity toward S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 15, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is scheduled to convene a key parliamentary meeting Monday amid key attention over whether its rubber-stamp parliament will approve a constitutional revision on inter-Korean unification.

The meeting comes as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other" at a year-end party meeting, saying there is no point seeking unification with South Korea.

The North earlier announced its plan to hold the 10th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) on Monday to discuss the state budget of 2024.

North Korean state media has not reported whether the SPA session started. The session is widely expected to last for at least two days, and its outcome could be made public Wednesday.

This file photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 31, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un attending a year-end plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The SPA is the highest organ of state power under the North's constitution, but it actually only rubber-stamps decisions by the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

Drawing keen attention is whether North Korea's parliament will revise the Constitution or related acts to take into account its leader Kim's new definition of inter-Korean relations.

North Korea has maintained a blueprint for unification that the country's late founder Kim Il-sung unveiled in 1980.

North Korea has claimed the only realistic way to achieve unification is the federation system, which calls for respecting each other's differences in political ideology and government system in the form of "one state and two systems."

Lee Kyu-chang, a senior research fellow at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, said North Korea is expected to take measures to provide legal grounds for setting inter-Korean relations as the state-to-state relationship.

"In a follow-up to the WPK's plenary meeting, North Korea is likely to push to delete or revise clauses related to unification under the Constitution and revise the nationality law to regard South Koreans as foreigners," Lee said in a recent report.

In September, the SPA stipulated the policy of the country's nuclear force in the constitution, after the North's leader called for an "exponential" increase in the nation's nuclear arsenal at a year-end party meeting in 2022.

Kim is not one of the deputies to the SPA, but he may attend the parliamentary meeting to deliver his hawkish stance against South Korea or the United States.

In an SPA session in April 2019, Kim voiced his willingness to hold his third summit with then U.S. President Donald Trump following the no-deal second summit in early 2019. In a meeting in September 2021, Kim said he would restore the severed inter-Korean communication channel.

During an SPA meeting in September 2022, the North's leader publicly announced the legalization of nuclear weapons, as its parliament approved a new law that allows for a preemptive nuclear strike.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 15, 2024

7. U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launch as breach of UNSC resolutions

Of course we do.

U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launch as breach of UNSC resolutions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 15, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Sunday condemned North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch as a violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, while reiterating America's "ironclad" security commitment to South Korea and Japan.

The North fired an apparent intermediate-range ballistic missile into the East Sea on Sunday (Korea time) in its first missile launch this year, according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The United States condemns the DPRK's January 14 ballistic missile launch," a State Department spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency via email. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"This launch, like the other ballistic missile launches (by) Pyongyang in recent years, is in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. It poses a threat to the DPRK's neighbors and undermines regional security," the official added.

The spokesperson also restated Washington's openness to diplomacy.

"We remain committed to a diplomatic approach to the DPRK and call on the DPRK to engage in dialogue," the official said. "Our commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad."

In a separate statement, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) said that the U.S. has been consulting closely with its allies and partners over the North's launch.

"While we have assessed that this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies, the missile launch highlights the destabilizing impact of the DPRK's illicit weapons program," USINDOPACOM said.

"The U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad. The ROK, Japan, and the U.S. trilaterally coordinated operations to ensure protection of their respective nations," it added. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

A ballistic missile is launched toward the East Sea from Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province on March 14, 2023, in this file photo released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 15, 2024

8. North Korea’s New Unification Policy: Implications and Pitfalls

Interesting and useful analysis. However, I do not think it addresses the actual nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. It may say it is giving up on unification but I think that is unification as most outside the regime view it. What it has not given up on is domination of the peninsula under its rule in order to keep the regime in power. Furthermore it seems perfectly logical to us that the north would want normalization and the establishment of embassies in the north and South. However, we must nor forget that a key line of effort for the regime is to keep the north isolated and most especially isolated from information from the outside world and most especially from the South. I do not think Kim seeks any kind of normalization as we would describe it.

Conclusion:

Finally, the new North Korean approach of treating South Korea as a regular state theoretically opens the way to diplomatic relations, mutual recognition, and even the establishment of embassies. As North Korea’s bilateral relations with the United States and Japan have shown, the availability of such an option does not automatically mean immediate progress; but Rome was not built in a day. 

North Korea’s New Unification Policy: Implications and Pitfalls

• https://www.38north.org/2024/01/north-koreas-new-unification-policy-implications-and-pitfalls/
• BY: RUEDIGER FRANK
• JANUARY 11, 2024

At the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Eighth WPK Central Committee in late December 2023, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un declared a “new stand on the north-south relations and the reunification policy.” This marked a significant departure from previous policies and carries profound implications:

• Kim Jong Un has not given up national unification. However, the official North Korean approach now allows a more aggressive official position toward the South, including the promotion of a public uprising and a destabilization of society. This will substantially weaken progressive forces in South Korea that have advocated for cooperative inter-Korean relations.
• South Korea is now categorized as just another foreign state, eliminating the special treatment of inter-Korean relations based on pan-nationalism. This opens the door to regular interstate relations, including both diplomatic normalization and potential conflict.
• Kim Jong Un’s declaration of the failure of the previous approach toward South Korea carries implicit criticism of his two predecessors, especially Kim Il Sung. This could be a step toward solidifying his own independent claim to legitimacy and setting the stage for leadership succession.
• The redefinition of the relationship with South Korea is not an isolated tactical move, but another component of North Korea’s broader de-risking strategy.
• North Korea has effectively relinquished the “ownership” of pan-Korean nationalism. South Korea is given the golden opportunity to portray itself as the sole supporter of Korean unity, thereby undermining one of the few ideological strengths North Korea had in the bilateral struggle for ideological supremacy. This is reminiscent of the ill-fated strategy applied by East Germany in the early 1970s, making unification by absorption much easier for West Germany in 1990.

The consequences of Kim Jong Un’s evolving stance toward inter-Korean relations are numerous and multi-faceted and will trigger a cascade of changes across inter-Korean relations and regional dynamics. In the end, it seems that South Korea, especially its conservative forces, will benefit more than the North Korean leader intended.

What Did Kim Jong Un Say?

The North Korean leader’s full speech is not yet available. However, Kim Jong Un’s remarks on unification have been quoted in a Rodong Sinmun report. Nowhere in that document did he give up on the goal of national unification as such, as some headlines in Western media suggested. Nevertheless, he did announce a new paradigm, starting with a negative assessment of his own country’s past unification policies.

For a long period spanning not just ten years but more than half a century…the idea, line and policies for national reunification laid down by our Party and the DPRK government…has [not] brought about a proper fruition and the north-south relations have repeated the vicious cycle of contact and suspension, dialogue and confrontation.

The term “more than half a century” implies a date before 1973. With a look at unification, this can only be a reference to Kim Il Sung’s Three Principles of National Reunification of 1972. These have since become the gold standard for all further North Korean official positions on that issue.[1] The principles are Independence (without interference by any foreign country), Great National Unity (in Korean: 우리 민족끼리 or uri minjokkkiri), transcending differences in ideologies and systems), and Peacefulness (no unification by military means).

Kim Jong Un now argues that this approach has not worked and needs to be replaced. The narrative is “we acted in good faith, but the other side cheated,” as the next quote implies.

If there is a common point among the “policies toward the north” and “unification policies” pursued by the successive south Korean rulers, it is the “collapse of the DPRK’s regime” and “unification by absorption”. And it is clearly proved by the fact that the keynote of “unification under liberal democracy” has been invariably carried forward although the puppet regime has changed more than ten times so far.

This confirms the year 1972 as Kim’s reference point when South Korea under Park Chung-hee introduced the Yushin Constitution. Key aspects of that constitution have indeed remained unchanged until the present day. The formal claim to sovereignty over North Korea is still included in article three: “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.” Article four states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.” These two principles can be interpreted as code for a Western-style economic and political system and, therefore, as the aim to replace the state socialist planned economy and the one-party dictatorship in North Korea.

Kim Jong Un’s argument is that the South’s policy toward the North has been hostile regardless of who was in charge. It would be naïve for us to assume this is a new insight. As the very cautious and minimalistic reform policy and the repeated cycle of dovish and hawkish behavior in terms of foreign policy and propaganda messaging have shown, the North Korean leadership has never harbored too many illusions about the other side’s true intentions. However, this sense of realism has not been fully reflected in public relations. For tactical reasons and in the hope of extracting concessions, Pyongyang treated progressive administrations in Seoul, like those of Kim Dae-jung, Roo Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, more favorably than conservative presidents like Lee Myung-bak or Park Geun-hye.

Therefore, what is new about Kim Jong Un’s approach is not the insight as such but the public declaration of the fundamental similarity of all South Korean administrations since 1972 and the continuity of their hostile intentions. This dampens hopes for improving inter-Korean relations after the end of the current conservative president Yoon Seok-yeol’s term.

I think it is a mistake we should no longer make to regard the clan, who publicly defined us as the “principal enemy” and is seeking only the opportunity of “collapse of power” and “unification by absorption” in collusion with foreign forces, as the partner of reconciliation and reunification…South Korea at present is nothing but a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state whose politics is completely out of order, whole society tainted by Yankee culture, and defence and security totally dependent on the U.S.

These quotes include a certain conditionality, as Kim Jong Un talks about South Korea “at present” and attacks a somewhat ambiguous “clan.” However, since the latter includes all administrations since 1972, it is difficult to imagine a regular future South Korean government that would not fall under this definition.

Kim Jong Un has declared an end to unification-oriented talks with any South Korean administration that operates under the current constitution and based on the current principles of liberalism and democracy. This could even be interpreted as an implicit call for an uprising and regime change in South Korea, reminding of Kim Il Sung’s logic on the eve of the Korean War in 1950 when he tried to get Soviet approval for an attack by arguing that “the people of South Korea trust me and rely on our armed might.”[2]

The repeated identification of South Korea as a “state” and the use of the term “Republic of Korea” (대한민국) without quotation marks ends the treatment of relations with Seoul as a special, inner-Korean affair. Accordingly, we would expect an eventual shifting of responsibility for relations with South Korea to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following quote points in that direction:

The conclusion…stressed the need to take measures for readjusting and reforming the organizations in charge of the affairs related to the south including the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee and to fundamentally change the principle and orientation of the struggle.

The United Front Department had de facto operated as a ministry of inner-Korean affairs. This role is likely to be replaced by a more proactive and aggressive posture with the aim of undermining social stability in South Korea “for keeping pace with the powerful military actions of the Korean People’s Army to subjugate the whole territory of the south” as Kim Jong Un said in his speech.

Emancipation from His Predecessors?

So far, North Korea analysts regard the country’s first leader, Kim Il Sung, as the only primary source of political legitimacy for any of his successors, based on the much-touted “Paektu bloodline.” North Korea does not have a formalized process of power transfer, for example, through general elections or appointment by the Politburo. And unlike a monarchy, the Paektu bloodline is a relatively ambiguous instrument without clearly defined rules for hereditary succession. Nevertheless, it seems to have functioned so far, even in the case of Kim Jong Un, who is “only” a grandson of Kim Il Sung and “only” the third son of Kim Jong Il.

Against this background, North Korea has typically been very reluctant to criticize decisions by its founder, who is associated with super-human characteristics, including great wisdom and the ability to look through the enemies’ tactics. This is not to say that the North Korean leadership has never admitted any mistakes or crises. However, it assigned responsibility to external factors such as the American imperialists or officials like Pak Nam Gi in the case of the 2009 currency reform. The “creative principle” of the official Chuch’e ideology also allows policy adjustments if “the environment changes,” as exemplified by Kim Jong Il`s speech in January 2001 when he demanded a departure from the methods of the 1950s and 1960s due to new circumstances.[3]

In his December 2023 report, Kim Jong Un did mention the machinations of the enemies and the new geopolitical situation. Both would have been sufficient to explain a new approach. But, as shown above, he went much further and declared that the unification policy developed by Kim Il Sung since 1972 has been a failure.

Considering that any criticism of Kim Il Sung amounts to political and ideological heresy in North Korea, why would a leader take such an unnecessary risk? One possible option would be the desire to build his own independent legitimacy to become a new and fresh primary source of power. The merger of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il into a new entity, which can be observed since 2012, points in that same direction.[4] Perhaps Kim Jong Un considers all this necessary to ensure a smooth transfer of power to one of his own offspring, all merely great-grandchildren of Kim Il Sung. If true, this would also put the recent emergence of his young daughter into this context.

De-risking Continued?

The “new Cold War,” a term Kim Jong Un himself used at the SPA session in late September 2023, led to a review of the many risks North Korea had taken since the collapse of the socialist block in the early 1990s. Indeed, the WPK Plenum report explicitly puts the leader’s remarks on unification and relations with South Korea in a larger geopolitical context.

The General Secretary made a detailed analysis of the gigantic geopolitical changes in international geo-political situation and balance of forces in 2023, the main features of present international situation and the external environment of the Korean peninsula… The field of external affairs should actively…cope with the changing and developing international situation…

If we analyze the new unification policy from the perspective of North Korea’s de-risking strategy, the new approach fits nicely into that logic. Major measures trading risk for actual or expected concessions, such as the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations (UN) in 1991 and the subsequent inter-Korean agreement, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project since 1998, the first inter-Korean summit in 2000 and the groundbreaking for the Kaesong Industrial Zone in 2004 all happened in that context.[5]

If Pyongyang has decided to reduce the number of its embassies abroad to minimize the risk of infiltration, defection and intelligence leaks, then it is only consequential that it re-evaluated the cost-benefit equation of its relations with Seoul as well. It is not difficult to put this in the context of repeated complaints by Kim Jong Un about instances of ideological contamination, for example, at the recent fifth National Conference of Mothers in early December 2023, where he complained about a growing problem of anti-socialist behavior among young people.

A Golden Opportunity for South Korea: Sole Ownership of Pan-Korean Nationalism

A central argument against drawing direct lessons from the German case of unification for Korea has been the large number of substantial differences between the two. Now, one of these differences is being removed.

German unification in 1990 showed how badly prepared both the political elite and the population of East Germany were for that process. This had complex legal reasons. The German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) went from officially supporting German unification at the time of its foundation to effectively treating it as anti-state thought in the last two decades of its existence.

The first GDR constitution of 1949, in article 1, maintained that Germany is one. The constitution of 1968 still included in article 8 the desire to “overcome the… division of Germany.” However, the constitutional change of 1974 deleted this formulation and all other references to German unity.[6] Even years before, the GDR leadership discouraged the singing of the national anthem with the phrase “Germany, united fatherland” and began eliminating most instances of the use of the word “Germany,” which soon became synonymous with only West Germany.[7]

Accordingly, the East had no official plans and blueprints for a unified Germany. Apart from a general desire for free travel and a convertible currency, neither the elite nor the population had any solid ideas on the goals and methods of unification.[8] Therefore, West Germany not only had an ideological monopoly on German unification for decades, but was also the only side with specific concepts. This helps in understanding why it took only eight weeks to negotiate the German Unification Treaty—a document of about 1,000 pages.

By abandoning all established Northern concepts for Korean unification, including the Three Principles for National Reunification, the Koryo Confederation (Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo) and the Ten-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country, Kim Jong Un is now taking the same step as East Berlin did in the early 1970s.[9] His less than thinly veiled statement that Korean unification can only be achieved by forcibly taking over the South or by affecting regime change there will make any preparation by North Korea for an alternative, peaceful option close to impossible.

Why Kim Jong Un is giving such a gift to South Korea at this point is unclear and subject to speculation. As a matter of fact, it leaves South Korea as the only Korea with a formal concept for peaceful unification.[10] We have yet to see how far the implementation of the new policy will go. Still, it is fair to assume that the South will be given much more room to portray itself as the sole supporter of Korean unity, thereby undermining one of the few ideological strengths North Korea had in the bilateral struggle for ideological supremacy.

Who Wins?

The main benefit Kim Jong Un can expect from the new unification policy is that it significantly reduces the risk of an ideological infiltration of North Korea on all levels, from officials to teenagers.[11] However, this same goal could have been achieved by simply discontinuing inter-Korean cooperation, which has been the case for many years already. This only leaves the worrisome explanation that Kim Jong Un found it necessary to prepare his subjects for a much more hardline approach toward South Korea, which bodes ill for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. With a look at the historical experience of the pre-Korean War period, we can expect more robust and more open North Korean efforts at an internal destabilization of South Korea’s society.

Ironically, the clear winner of this new policy seems to be South Korea, particularly its conservative forces. Unlike in the past, when Pyongyang used a divide-and-conquer approach to hold only the conservatives responsible for the failure of rapprochement, Kim Jong Un’s remarks are grist to the mill of those who accuse progressives of being naïve and irresponsible. Kim Jong Un’s new policy might end up unifying, rather than dividing, South Korea’s society and lead to a more proactive, hardline policy, including campaigns for breaking the North’s isolation from outside information, active encouragement of defections, and international accusations of human rights violations.

Finally, the new North Korean approach of treating South Korea as a regular state theoretically opens the way to diplomatic relations, mutual recognition, and even the establishment of embassies. As North Korea’s bilateral relations with the United States and Japan have shown, the availability of such an option does not automatically mean immediate progress; but Rome was not built in a day. 

1. [1]
2. These include, most prominently, the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (1980) and the Ten-Point Programme for Reunification of the Country (1993). Both have been authored by Kim Il Sung himself.
3. [2]
4. Shen Zhihua, “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East,” Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (2000): 52, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925062.
5. [3]
6. “Things are not what they used to be in the 1960s. So no one should follow the way people used to do things in the past.” See Kim Jong Il, “The 21st Century Is a Century of Great Change and Creation,” Rodong Sinmun, January 4, 2001.
7. [4]
8. Rudiger Frank and Phillip H. Park, “From Monolithic Totalitarian to Collective Authoritarian Leadership? Performance-Based Legitimacy and Power Transfer in North Korea,” North Korean Review 8, no. 2 (2012): 32–49, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43910311.
9. [5]
10. Few analysts had doubts about North Korea’s motives regarding Mt. Kumgang: “North Korea’s main reasons for pursuing the development of the tourism industry was to acquire hard currency in a short period of time without causing severe damage to its system.” (Jeong-Yong Kim, “The Utilization of Business-Track Diplomacy: The Hyundai Group’s Mt. Kumgang Tourism under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” International Studies Review 5 no.1 [2004]: 80).
11. [6]
12. This change had to do with the new leadership under Erich Honecker, Soviet concerns over potential pan-German nationalism, and the desire of the GDR to be recognized as a sovereign state. As a result of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, East and West Germany joined the UN as two separate states in 1973. For the full text of the 1968 GDR constitution, including amendments made in 1974, see https://www.verfassungen.de/ddr/verf68.htm.
13. [7]
14. The national anthem was played only in its instrumental version. The radio station “Deutschlandsender” was renamed “Stimme der DDR.” The noun “Deutschland” (Germany) was hardly ever used, while the adjective “Deutsch” (German) continued to exist in terms like the country’s official name, “Deutsche Demokratische Republik,” or the railway company “Deutsche Reichsbahn.”
15. [8]
16. The memoirs of East German elites show how desperately they tried to develop such concepts once the peaceful revolution had started—and how they were too slow to keep pace with actual events. See Segert, Dieter, Das 41. Jahr: Eine andere Geschichte der DDR (Wien: Böhlau, 2008); and Egon Krenz, Herbst ’89 (Berlin: Neues Leben, 1999).
17. [9]
18. Koh, Byung Chul. “KOREAN REUNIFICATION FOMULAE: A SYNTHESIS.” Asian Perspective 11, no. 2 (1987): 285–300. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42703899.
19. [10]
20. South Korea’s unification concept proposes a gradual approach and consists of three phases: 1) reconciliation and cooperation, 2) establishment of a Korean Commonwealth, and 3) unified Korea as one nation and one state. See Young Ho Park, “South and North Korea’s Views on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Relations,” paper presented at the second conference on “Security and Diplomatic Cooperation Between the ROK and the US for the Unification of the Korean Peninsula, January 21, 2014 in Seoul, South Kore, p. 6, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/park-young-ho-paper.pdf.
21. [11]
22. It often takes knowing and seeing something to desire it. Officials who are potentially willing to cooperate with the enemy for the sake of material gains or because they realize the lack of freedom in their life, or who think about reforming their country first need to have a chance to get in touch with the outside world. The Chinese are a great risk in this regard, but South Korean partners in joint ventures, tourism or development projects provide even easier access without a language barrier. Teenagers who like South Korean pop music from BTS (방탄소년단, Bangtan Sonyeondan) better than the North’s Moranbong Band, who use Seoul slang and dye their hair, will go beyond mere appearances and prefer the ideological components of South Korea’s culture over their own. They will be harder to convert into the type of revolutionary youth that the North Korean system wants and needs. The German example suggests that they are also a potential source of unrest and disturbance, like the punks of East Berlin were before 1990. SeeEds. Ronald Galenza and Heinz Havemeister, Wir wollen immer artig sein: Punk, New Wave, HipHop, und Independent-Szene in der DDR 1980-1990 (Berlin: Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 1999. It is no coincidence that Kim Jong Un has repeatedly been publicly complaining about non-socialist and anti-socialist behavior, especially of the younger generation, in the past years. North Korea seems to have a massive problem here, and the leader has realized that.

9. North Korea broke now-defunct military pact with South 3,600 times: JCS

North Korea broke now-defunct military pact with South 3,600 times: JCS

americanmilitarynews.com · by Asia News Network · January 14, 2024

North Korea breached the recently scrapped 2018 inter-Korean military accord approximately 3,600 times, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said Monday.

The number of violations by North Korea, counted from the time the deal was reached six years ago, was announced following three consecutive days of North Korean provocations along the sea boundary.

The JCS in Seoul told the press that due to North Korea’s firing of artillery shells near South Korean border islands over the past three days, there are now no areas where military measures are halted.

“Rather than reacting to the enemy actions on a case-by-case basis, our troops will be carrying out drills according to our own plans in the northwestern islands,” it said.

South Korea staged a drill of its own Friday afternoon in response to North Korea firing some 200 rounds into waters north of their western sea boundary earlier in the day. The North Korean drills sparked an evacuation order across nearby islands, forcing residents there to seek shelter.

Then on Saturday and Sunday, the frontline firing of artillery shells by North Korea continued in the sea.

In a statement over the weekend, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, denied that artillery shells had been fired, claiming that the South Korean military had instead been “fooled” by the sounds of explosives detonating.

She added that “even a slight provocation from the enemy” would be met with an “immediate strike” by the North Korean military.

The South’s JCS said that the latest statement from Kim appears to be “part of Pyongyang’s psychological warfare efforts” and issued “stern warnings” against conducting provocative drills around the maritime borders.

Yang Uk, a senior researcher at the Asan Institute of Policy Studies in Seoul, said Kim’s statement serves two aims: to find out the extent of South Korean capabilities to detect North Korean military activities and to discredit South Korean government announcements in the international arena.

“Kim Yo-jong’s remarks are propaganda for portraying South Korean assessment as an overreaction,” he told The Korea Herald.

Rep. Tae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat now with the South Korean ruling party, agreed that the Kim Yo-jong claims of having “fooled” Seoul were “low-level propaganda” and “psychological warfare tactics” by the Kim siblings in Pyongyang.

The 2018 inter-Korean military accord was originally set up with the aim of reducing tensions around the shared border. North Korea withdrew from the deal in November, after the launch of its first military reconnaissance satellite led to South Korea resuming surveillance operations in the border area.

Seoul officials have said North Korea will likely escalate weapons tests in time for the April general election in South Korea and the November presidential election in the US.

___

(c) 2024 the Asia News Network

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

americanmilitarynews.com · by Asia News Network · January 14, 2024

10. Moon government accused of lax oversight of NK guard post demolition

Moon government accused of lax oversight of NK guard post demolition

The Korea Times · January 15, 2024

A North Korean guard post is seen from Imjingak Park on the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, July 20, 2023. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk

Pyongyang speculated to have preserved underground facilities: defense minister

By Lee Hyo-jin

The previous Moon Jae-in government is facing accusations of lax monitoring regarding the 2018 demolition of North Korean guard posts, after the current defense minister suggested that North Korea may not have fully destroyed its guard posts as stipulated in the inter-Korean military tension reduction pact.

As per the Sept. 19 military agreement, also known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), signed in 2018 by then-President Moon and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, both Koreas demolished 10 out of 11 guard posts in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), respectively, as part of measures to prevent military clashes near the border.

The demolition process took place in November 2018 and was verified by mutual parties in December of that year.

However, controversy has arisen following incumbent Defense Minister Shin Won-shik's recent remarks speculating that North Korea might not have completely demolished the guard posts back then.

"It seems that North Korea has only destroyed the guard posts visible aboveground, leaving the rest of the underground facilities untouched. It appears that the guard posts can be easily repaired and accessed once the repairs are made," he was quoted as saying during an interview with Yonhap News Agency, Jan. 10.

Shin mentioned that North Korea appears to have preserved the underground facilities, given the swift deployment of soldiers and equipment shortly after restoring the aboveground facilities recently amid heightened inter-Korean tension.

Following the nullification of the Sept. 19 agreement, the Kim regime vowed to resume military activities near the border and began restoring the dismantled guard posts in late November, according to the South Korean military.

Surveillance photos taken by cameras and thermal optical devices in the DMZ captured images of armed North Korean soldiers repairing the facilities.

North Korean soldiers are spotted near a guard post inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas in this photo provided by South Korea's defense ministry, Nov. 27, 2023. Courtesy of Ministry of National Defense

Suspicions that the North has maintained its underground guard post facilities have led to speculations that the previous Moon administration, which pursued peaceful ties with Pyongyang, may not have monitored the demolition adequately at that time.

On Monday, the conservative newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that the Moon administration's announcement of the demolition of the North's guard posts lacked verification processes for crucial underground facilities.

"During the on-site verification process at that time, it appears that our military did not properly confirm whether the underground facilities of the North Korean guard posts were actually destroyed," the newspaper wrote, citing multiple soldiers who participated in the verification procedures.

The report speculated that back then, South Korean military officials concluded that North Korea had effectively destroyed the underground facilities based on visual observation and North Korea's claims, instead of technical assessments.

This contradicts the military's earlier announcement in 2018.

"Both parties confirmed faithful adherence to the trial withdrawal of guard posts as stipulated in the Sept. 19 military agreement," Suh Wook, then chief director of operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), had said during a briefing in December 2018.

The JCS said a verification team comprised of 77 personnel confirmed the withdrawal of firearms, military equipment and personnel from the guard posts, as well as demolition of both aboveground and underground facilities, which include connective tunnels and entrance barricades.

The defense ministry said Monday that it is looking into the issue.

"We are currently verifying the facts related to the issue," ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyu said during a briefing.

In response to an inquiry on the basis by which the Moon administration had announced the demolition of the North's guard posts, Jeon replied, "We would need to look into the data from that time. It is difficult to provide an exact definition (of demolition) right now."

The Korea Times · January 15, 2024

11. Korea unveils plan to build $472 bil. mega chip cluster in Gyeonggi Province

Korea unveils plan to build $472 bil. mega chip cluster in Gyeonggi Province

The Korea Times · January 15, 2024

President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks about the government's support plan for the semiconductor industry during a townhall meeting at Sungkyunkwan University's Natural Science Campus in Suwon, Gyeonggi Province, Monday. Yonhap

Samsung, SK to construct 16 new fabs, generate 3 mil. jobs by 2047

By Ko Dong-hwan

Korea will build the world's biggest semiconductor cluster in Gyeonggi Province by 2047 as Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and other chip companies plan to invest a total of 622 trillion won ($472 billion) to build 16 new fabs, creating more than 3 million jobs, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Monday.

By expanding the existing mega cluster with 19 production fabs and two research fabs across adjoining cities in the province, the new mega chip cluster spanning 2,102 square meters will produce 7.7 million wafers each month starting in 2030.

The ministry unveiled the plan to bolster the nation's chip industry by providing support for relevant infrastructure and fostering experts in the field. Emphasizing that every country with a sophisticated semiconductor industry is actively seeking global dominance, the focus is on establishing public-private chip clusters.

Inside the new cluster, Samsung Electronics is set to construct six new fabs at a national industrial complex in Yongin, investing 360 trillion won. Additionally, the company plans to establish three fabs in Pyeongtaek with an investment of 120 trillion won and three research fabs at an R&D center in Giheung District at a cost of 20 trillion won. Meanwhile, SK hynix will spend 122 trillion won to build four fabs at another industrial complex in Yongin.

In this joint effort by the industry ministry, the Ministry of Science and ICT and the private chip giants, the new cluster is designed to provide a conducive environment for the production of cutting-edge memory chips, such as high bandwidth memory (HBM) and system semiconductors measuring 2 nanometers or less in size.

The industry ministry said that with the new cluster, the country aims to capture 10 percent of the global system semiconductor market and enhance self-sufficiency in the supply chain of key materials to 50 percent by 2030, up from the current 30 percent.

An image shows the planned SK hynix semiconductor cluster with four fabs at an industrial complex in Yongin, Gyeonggi Province / Courtesy of SK hynix

The ministry said it will make sure the new mega cluster will be supplied with enough electricity and water for operation and benefit from new tax exemptions for certain key chip technologies. Pangyo, where fabless firms are now concentrated, will be the hub of low-powered, high-performance AI chips. Suwon will be a central testbed for compound semiconductors, while Pyeongtaek will see a new semiconductor R&D center open at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology's new campus to be completed by 2029.

"Nuclear power plants in the country will provide stable power supplies to the new chip cluster," President Yoon Suk Yeol said at a townhall meeting announcing the government's plans at Sungkyunkwan University's Natural Science Campus in Suwon. "We are already witnessing overseas investment firms flocking in to explore potential business opportunities associated with the emerging chip cluster. This trend represents a continuation of last year's record-breaking influx of foreign investments into the country."

In tandem with the establishment of the new cluster, the government plans to streamline the national chip research infrastructure currently dispersed across Suwon, Daejeon, and Pohang through an online service named MoaFab. Additionally, the authorities aim to cultivate local talent dedicated to the industry and facilitate the entry of foreign experts into the country by adjusting visa regulations.

The construction of new fabs inside the mega cluster will create 70,000 jobs as well as 40,000 new positions at companies supplying parts and materials. Taking into account additional job-creation effects from the cluster, the ministry said the project will generate employment opportunities for 3.46 million people.

"We will make efforts to see outbound shipments of semiconductors, the country's No. 1 export, reach $120 billion this year," Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Ahn Duk-geun said. "The new mega cluster's success will further spread to other parts of the nation and become the world's leading chip hub."

Referring to semiconductors as the "backbone of the country's economy" and recognizing their pivotal role in key technologies for AI, digital, communication, quantum, and bio industries, Minister of Science and ICT Lee Jong-ho emphasized that the new cluster will "position the country to surpass others in the industry where ultra-precision technology is crucial."

The Korea Times · January 15, 2024

12. North Korea tests first solid-fuel ‘hypersonic’ missile

North Korea tests first solid-fuel ‘hypersonic’ missile

Financial Times · by Christian Davies · January 15, 2024

North Korea has said it successfully fired a solid-fuel “hypersonic” missile for the first time, demonstrating Pyongyang’s increasingly sophisticated missile capabilities as the regime deepens defence co-operation with Russia.

The intermediate-range ballistic missile was launched from a site near Pyongyang on Sunday afternoon and flew eastward on a lofted trajectory for less than 12 minutes before splashing down in waters between North Korea and Japan, according to the South Korean and Japanese militaries.

If successful, Sunday’s launch would have been the first time Pyongyang combined two recent milestones in its weapons development programme — solid-fuel missiles and missiles with a “manoeuvring re-entry vehicle”.

North Korea claims to have successfully tested solid-fuel and manoeuvrable missiles in separate launches in the past.

Solid-fuel missiles can be fuelled in secret before they are deployed, giving adversaries less time to conduct a preventive strike. The trajectories of manoeuvrable missiles, sometimes known as hypersonic missiles, can be changed mid-flight with fins or winglets, making them more accurate and harder for defence systems to intercept.

Experts said North Korean IRBMs were probably capable of striking US assets in Asia, including military installations in Guam and the western Pacific.

According to North Korea’s state Korean Central News Agency, the “intermediate-range hypersonic manoeuvrable controlled warhead” test on Sunday focused on its “gliding and manoeuvring characteristics” and the “reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines”.

Ankit Panda, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said an image published by the KCNA on Monday suggested the IRBM featured a re-entry vehicle capable of conducting “terminal-stage manoeuvres”.

He added that battlefield debris in Ukraine suggested Russia had used a North Korean KN-23 short-range ballistic missile in an attack on the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv this month. Such weapons can “conduct manoeuvres at hypersonic speeds throughout its flight”, foiling air defence systems.

Last week, the US government imposed sanctions on a Russian citizen and three companies allegedly involved in the transfer and testing of North Korean ballistic missiles, after the White House accused Russia of deploying North Korean short-range ballistic missiles in attacks on several Ukrainian cities between December 30 and January 6.

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Russia has dismissed the accusations, with the country’s UN ambassador Vassily Nebenzia accusing the US of “spreading information that is wrong, without going through the trouble of checking it beforehand” during a meeting of the UN Security Council last week.

North Korean foreign minister Choe Son Hui arrived in Moscow on Sunday for a three-day trip amid speculation that the countries were preparing for Russian President Vladimir Putin to pay a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang after Kim Jong Un travelled to Russia’s Far East in September.

Panda said Kim’s regime was unlikely to pay a substantive diplomatic price over its burgeoning weapons trade with Russia.

“Russia’s willingness to treat Pyongyang largely as a normal partner substantially lowers the coercive leverage that South Korea, the United States and other like-minded states possess in shaping North Korean behaviour,” he said.

Financial Times · by Christian Davies · January 15, 2024

13. A new year, same old story on the Korean Peninsula in 2024

Concur with the assessment in the subtitle.

A new year, same old story on the Korean Peninsula in 2024 | Lowy Institute

Kim Jong-un’s recent rhetoric reflects the status quo more than a radical departure.

lowyinstitute.org · by Khang Vu

It is only mid-January, but the Korean peninsula is already off to a rough start. North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un remarked at a year-end party that peaceful unification of the two Koreas was now “impossible”. More than that, he pledged a “decisive policy change” vis-à-vis South Korea, now the North’s “enemy” and a “separate state.” Guard posts have been quickly rebuilt inside the Demilitarized Zone, having scrapped the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement in November. There are also reports that North Korea has been redeploying landmines near the Gyeongui land route that connects South Korea’s Paju city to the shut-down Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea that had been removed back in 2000.

South Korea has been cautious, not nullifying the 2018 military agreement entirely, but it has resumed firing artillery and holding drills near the sea and land border with the North and effectively terminated the buffer zones between the two Koreas.

The road to inter-Korean peace is now literally paved with landmines.

There are some suggestions that the designation of South Korea as an “enemy” means North Korea is no longer interested in future inter-Korean engagement and such a title would justify the North’s use of nuclear weapons in a conflict because South Koreans are no longer brethren. Still, it would be an overstatement to consider recent developments as a fundamental change in relations. Even during years of high-profile diplomatic activities, North Korea considered the South an enemy state. Pyongyang’s 2022 law on the use of nuclear weapons calls for preemptive strikes against anyone that endangers its “fundamental” national interests, meaning Pyongyang has been ready to use nuclear weapons against the South before calling it an “enemy.” North Korea’s recent rhetoric reflects the status quo more than a radical departure.

From a broader perspective, North Korea’s aggressive rhetoric and behaviours are cyclical rather than linear. North Korea has often been friendly towards liberal South Korean presidents while hostile to conservative ones, such as incumbent South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. This is because of the expected payoffs from engaging with the liberals far outweighs those with the conservatives, and that Pyongyang wants to exploit the differences over North Korea policy between the United States and liberal South Korean presidents to weaken the adversarial alliance. As I predicted in a commentary in March 2022 shortly after conservative Yoon won the South Korean presidency (From Moon to Yoon: will the Korean peninsula see fire and fury return?), North Korea would respond to Yoon’s hardline policy with provocations because it no longer reaps any benefits from engagement.

North Korea’s foreign policy that shows it benefits from peace more than from war.

Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim Yo-jong made this logic clear in her own rebuttal to Yoon’s recent New Year’s speech. Kim Yo-jong praised Yoon’s liberal predecessor Moon Jae-in as “very smart and crafty” (contradicting Pyongyang’s past criticisms of him) while lambasting Yoon’s approach of “peace by force”.

But North Korea is wary of war. Despite Kim Jong-un’s latest remarks on “pacifying the entire territory of South Korea”, coupled with the US confirmation of Russian use of North Korea’s short range ballistic missiles against Ukraine, there are few indicators that North Korea is planning an invasion of the South anytime soon.

Nuclear deterrence from both Koreas renders a massive conventional attack prohibitively expensive to carry out, and North Korea cannot coerce the South with nuclear weapons because Seoul and Washington can dismiss those threats due to the high cost of a nuclear exchange and the imbalance of the conventional military power in the South’s favour. North Korea prefers Moon to Yoon because the former did not respond to North Korea’s provocations with a demonstration of military force and raised the risk of an accidental clash.

It is important to note other aspects of North Korea’s foreign policy that shows it benefits from peace more than from war. North Korea is making profits from the burgeoning arms trade with Russia and being able to test its weapons on Ukrainian battlefields without having to risk a war with the South. Although it closed several foreign embassies in late 2023 due to economic trouble, North Korea is reviving and expanding its trade with China and Russia and strengthening relations with traditional partners that are also at odds with the United States. There are also reports that North Korea is ready to reopen its border for tourists from Russia after having issued visas to Chinese investors and technicians in a bigger effort to develop its economy. These policy shifts require the maintenance, not destruction, of inter-Korean peace.

Kim’s speech illustrates most that progress towards peace is reversible – but that we already knew. North Korea scrapping the 2018 military agreement, the last achievement of Moon’s engagement policy, demonstrates the persistence of a lack of trust in a long-term peace building and nonproliferation process between the two Koreas. The year ahead will be a turbulent one in inter-Korean relations, but it will not mark an escalation to a point of no return.

lowyinstitute.org · by Khang Vu

14. Explainer: Why is North Korea testing hypersonic missiles and how do they work?

Explainer: Why is North Korea testing hypersonic missiles and how do they work?

By Hyonhee Shin

January 15, 202412:31 AM ESTUpdated 10 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/why-is-north-korea-testing-hypersonic-missiles-how-do-they-work-2024-01-15/?utm

Ballistic missile, said to be solid-fuel and hypersonic, launches during a test at an unspecified location in North Korea in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency on January 14, 2024. KCNA via REUTERS Acquire Licensing Rights

SEOUL, Jan 15 (Reuters) - North Korea said on Monday it had tested a new solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range, amid an intensifying race for the next generation of long-range rockets that are difficult to detect and intercept.

The United States, China, Russia and other countries have also been developing hypersonic weapons in recent years.

HOW THE MISSILES WORK

Hypersonic missiles typically launch a warhead that travels at more than five times the speed of sound or about 6,200 km per hour (3,850 mph), often manoeuvring at relatively low altitudes.

Despite their name, analysts say the main feature of hypersonic weapons is not speed - which can sometimes be matched or exceeded by traditional ballistic missile warheads - but manoeuvrability.

North Korea's first hypersonic missile test in 2021 featured a glider-shaped warhead, while a 2022 launch used what South Korean military officials and analysts said was actually a conical manoeuvrable reentry vehicle (MaRV), or a ballistic missile warhead capable of manoeuvring to hit a target.

North Korean state media said Sunday's test was aimed at checking the reliability of new multi-stage, high-thrust solid-fuel engines and an intermediate-range hypersonic manoeuvrable controlled warhead.

Combining a glide vehicle with a missile that can launch it partially into orbit - a so-called fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) - could strip adversaries of reaction time and traditional defence mechanisms.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), by contrast, carry nuclear warheads on ballistic trajectories that travel into space but never reach orbit.

WHO LEADS THE RACE?

China launched a rocket carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle that flew through space in 2021, circling the globe before cruising down toward its target, which it missed by about two dozen miles.

Earlier that year, Russia successfully tested a Tsirkon (Zircon) hypersonic cruise missile, which President Vladimir Putin touted as part of a new generation of missile systems. Moscow also tested the weapon from a submarine and a frigate for the first time.

The United States said in September 2021 that it had tested an air-breathing hypersonic weapon - meaning it sustains flight on its own through the atmosphere like a cruise missile - marking the first successful test of that class of weapon since 2013.

NORTH KOREA'S HYPERSONIC GOAL

At a key ruling Workers' Party meeting in January 2021, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un singled out securing hypersonic weapons as one of five main tasks under a five-year plan to boost military power, alongside developing solid-fuel ICBMs and a nuclear submarine.

North Korea fired its first hypersonic missile in September 2021, calling it a "strategic weapon" designed to bolster its defence capabilities, though some South Korean analysts described the test as a failure.

In January 2022, Seoul officials reported that North Korea tested another potentially hypersonic missile that flew at relatively low altitudes at up to 10 times the speed of sound (12,348 kmh/7,673 mph).

Sunday's launch involved what would be Pyongyang's first such missile powered by solid fuel that would facilitate a quicker launch with little preparation.

During a rare trip to Russia last September, Kim inspected Moscow's hypersonic missiles, among other weapons.

WHY IT MATTERS

The global push for hypersonic weapons is part of an arms race in which smaller Asian nations are striving to develop advanced long-range missiles alongside major military powers.

Hypersonic weapons and FOBS could be a concern as they can potentially evade missile shields and early warning systems.

"North Korea appears to be trying to develop hypersonic missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles based on solid propellant rocket boosters," said Chang Young-keun, a professor at Korea Aerospace University.

"In particular, mid- to long-range hypersonic missiles would be useful for striking Guam while evading the U.S. missile defence system."

Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Ed Davies and Jamie Freed

​15. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government implements wage hike of more than 10 times (3)　Wages are paid with cards as part of efforts to force people to buy food from the state

Another indication that markets are a threat to the regime.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government implements wage hike of more than 10 times (3)　Wages are paid with cards as part of efforts to force people to buy food from the state

asiapress.org

This image of a North Korean soldier, taken with a telephoto lens in China, is evidence of the country's inability to acquire food. It is not clear when the photo was taken, but the soldiers are wearing masks and civilian clothes, suggesting it was taken between the summer of 2020 and recently. Taken from a video collected through "Eunhabyeol TV.”

Late last year, Kim Jong-un's regime raised wages for workers and government officials more than tenfold from the beginning of the year. The goal was to force people to go to work and use the increased wages to buy food from the government

. The regime also began paying workers with cards instead of cash. But is this new policy sustainable? Many questions have been raised among North Koreans. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆Rations and food from state-run stores not enough

The Hyesan Steel Factory is located in Hyesan, the capital of Yanggang Province. A reporting partner who investigated the "wage hike" and food rations in December 2023 told ASIAPRESS the following:

"In December, the Hyesan Steel Factory provided food for 10 days (8 kilograms) and raised wages to 50,000 won. With the new wage, I can buy about 10 kilograms of food (a mixture of white rice and corn) at state-run food stores, but it's still not enough to feed my family.

“A typical family of a husband, wife and three children needs 50-60 kilograms of food per month. In the past year, the local government-run grain stores have sold only about 7-10 days' worth of food per household. Even with the rations workers receive from their workplaces, it remains impossible to meet our needs with wages alone. Life is very difficult.”

※ The North Korean won is equal to about $0.1183.

◆Wages are paid with cards

At the Hyesan Steel Factory, workers were given wage payment cards along with the "wage increase.” With these cards, they can go to local grain stores and buy a certain amount of food. The reporting partner who conducted the survey described the situation at the end of December as follows:

"Not all factories and enterprises have started paying by card - some still pay in cash - but managers explained that in the future they plan to cover all food purchases by card. In the future, they plan to eliminate the use of cash, not just for food, but for all transactions."

It is unclear whether the cards can be used to make payments or withdrawals outside the state-run grain stores. This means that workers will not be able to spend their wages freely and will have to buy food from state-run shops. What will happen to the cash of people who are full-time housewives and earn money by working in the markets?

◆A lot of problems are on the horizon

In other words, the Kim Jong-un regime aims to: (1) centralize food distribution through a combination of rationing and monopolization; and (2) prevent people from engaging in private economic activities and ensure that they attend their assigned workplaces. Kim Jong-un's intention is to bring as many people as possible into the country's "organizational life" in order to strengthen collectivism. This is clearly part of the regime's broader anti-market policies.

But will Kim Jong-un's new policies work as intended? The biggest concern is that the amount of food rationed to those who go to work, along with the amounts sold at state-run food stores, will not be enough for the population to survive. There are also big questions about whether the regime can reliably continue to provide rations and food at state-run shops; in short, a key question is whether the state will be able to procure enough food to continue the new policy.

In North Korea, the "barley hump" - a period of lean food supplies - begins around March each year. By this time, the previous fall's harvest has already been consumed, leaving stocks low, people in rural areas hungry, and malnutrition rampant in the barracks due to the lack of food to feed the soldiers. This period repeats itself every year.

Presently, the regime faces the question of whether it can continue to pay the significantly increased wages. While the situation varies from company to company, many factories and businesses in North Korea are currently inoperable due to aging facilities and equipment and lack of raw materials and fuel. There are many reports of workers being sent to non-work related construction sites to make up for the lack of work.

The concept of "reigning over calories," in which a regime seeks to control and subjugate the population by centralizing food distribution, may not be sustainable in the North Korean case when viewed through the lens of economic rationality and profitability. The Kim Jong-un regime's new food management system will likely be tested in early spring, when the "barley hump" begins. (End of series)

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government implements wage hike of more than 10 times (1)　Wages increase for employees of state-run enterprises and government agencies

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government implements wage hike of more than 10 times (2)　What are the intentions and goals of the KJU regime? People’s incomes have risen, but discontent is still deep…Wage hike part of the regime’s “rule over calories”

asiapress.org

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com