Quotes of the Day:

“We must develop and maintain the capacity to forgive. He who is devoid of the power to forgive is devoid of the power to love. There is some good in the worst of us and some evil in the best of us. When we discover this, we are less prone to hate our enemies.”

– Martin Luther King, Jr.

"There are two cardinal sins from which all others spring: Impatience and Laziness." 

– Franz Kafka

"It's not the hours you put in your work that counts, it's the work you put in the hours." 

– Sam Ewing

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 14, 2024

3. Ukraine’s Long-Term Path to Success: Jumpstarting a Self-Sufficient Defense Industrial Base with US and EU Support

4. Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’

5. The Greater Goal in Gaza

6. Readiness Redefined, But Not Measured

7. Why Philanthropists Should Become Heretics

8. U.S. Intercepts Cruise Missile Attack on Its Warship in Red Sea

9. U.S. tech companies prepare for drone attacks with new defenses

10. Biden sent private message to Tehran amid airstrikes: ‘We’re well-prepared’

11. Philippines hits back at China, says joint patrols with US not ‘provocative’

12. US tops public distrust in innovation on eve of Davos, survey shows

13. Ukrainian Sources: We Just Shot Down Two Of Russia’s Best Command Planes

14.  Resistance groups claim capture of 2 Myanmar cities

15. Navy SEALs lost at sea were searching for Yemen-bound weapons shipment

16. Special Operations News - January 15, 2024 | SOF News

17. How Hamas fooled gullible donors to fund its billion-dollar terror tunnel system

18. China Opts for Isolation of Taiwan After Democratic Vote

19. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower captain posts dog photo after strikes on Yemen

20. Why The World Is Betting Against American Democracy

21. US military academies focus on oaths and loyalty to Constitution as political divisions intensify

22. The Next Battle in Higher Ed May Strike at Its Soul: Scholarship

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.
• The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg.
• Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Moscow-based international exhibition-forum “Russia” opened the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) “Army of Children” exhibit on January 14 to educate children about the military and careers in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Swedish Defense Materiel Administration announced on January 14 that it had signed an agreement with Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to increase the production and deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to support Ukraine’s needs.
• The Kremlin is funding select non-profit organizations operating in occupied areas that propagate Kremlin social narratives.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14, 2024

Jan 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2024

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 14, 2024, 5:30 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on January 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian literary critic and alternative historian Sergey Pereslegin claimed on January 12 that Russian forces will launch a large-scale offensive effort in Ukraine sometime between January 12 and February 2 after the ground freezes and likely after Ukrainian forces grow “exhausted” of defending their positions in Avdiivka and east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[1] Pereslegin claimed that Russians should be more concerned about Russia launching its offensive at the wrong time or making the same “mistakes” that Ukraine made during its 2023 counteroffensive than of a renewed Ukrainian offensive effort in 2024.[2] Pereslegin also expressed concern that Russia does not have enough manpower to conduct the large-scale offensive effort he is anticipating.[3] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on January 14 that the number of Russian military personnel on the frontline allows Russian forces to conduct localized tactical maneuvers but is unlikely to support operationally significant ”breakthroughs.”[4] The milblogger claimed that freezing weather is impacting Russian and Ukrainian ground activity and artillery and drone systems throughout the front, particularly in the Kherson direction.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that freezing weather conditions are preventing Russian forces from conducting ground operations and advancing north of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian aviation is unable to operate in southern Ukraine due to freezing weather conditions.[7] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin claimed on January 14 that the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast is “buzzing like a bee hive” due to the large number of Ukrainian drones operating, however.[8] Rogozin claimed that Ukrainian forces devote half a dozen drones to striking each valuable target in western Zaporizhia Oblast and that intense Ukrainian drone use is complicating Russian personnel rotations.[9] ISW previously assessed that freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely currently constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely try to sustain or intensify localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative regardless of winter weather and terrain conditions.[11] ISW also assesses, however, that Russian forces will be unable to make operationally significant breakthroughs.

Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have recently been launching strikes against Ukraine using a variety of missile types, including hypersonic Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles.[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched unspecified air decoys and Shahed drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems so that Russian forces could conduct successful missile strikes.[13] ISW has observed Russian forces experimenting with various combinations of drone and missile strikes in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems as Ukrainian forces have adapted to Russian strike patterns.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on January 14 that sanctions are likely reducing the quality of Russian missiles.[16] The reported decrease in quality of Russian missiles may further hinder Russia’s ability to conduct successful strike series against Ukraine.

Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak also met with Romanian State Secretary Julian Fota to discuss bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, making Romania the 9th country to begin bilateral security negotiations with Ukraine.[18] Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis and Yermak noted the importance of involving China in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[19] Cassis argued that the West “must find a way to include Russia” in the peace process and stated that “there will be no peace if Russia does not have its say.”[20] It is unclear what Cassis meant by the call for Russia to “have its say.” ISW has long assessed that Putin does not intend to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s goals in Ukraine — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain unchanged.[21]

The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian Tatar activist and political scientist Ruslan Aisin reported that Russian officials cut funding for the state program for preservation, study, and development of Tatarstan’s state languages by 12.5 percent in 2023.[22] Aisin stated that officials originally planned to spend 126.8 million rubles (around $1.4 million) on the program but cut the funding by 15.8 million rubles (about $180,000). Aisin argued that these cuts are likely related to the Kremlin’s efforts to finance the war effort in Ukraine and undermine Tatarstan’s identity. Aisin observed that Tatarstan backed away from its state policy on strengthening its identity alongside the country-wide Russian identity in the fall of 2023 and argued that the Kremlin likely had seen an opportunity to save money on Tatarstan’s efforts to preserve its culture, language, and identity. Aisin also implied that the Kremlin is favoring an all-Russian identity. The Kremlin directed Tatarstan officials in January 2023 to abolish the title of the republic’s president and refer to Tatarstan’s leader as “glava” (regional head).[23] Tatarstan has been supporting the Russian war effort by forming and financing the recruitment of regional volunteer battalions, some of which suffered tremendous losses on the battlefield in 2022 and 2023.[24] BBC’s Russian Service and independent Russian outlet Mediazona also confirmed that at least 922 servicemen from Tatarstan died in Ukraine — a number that is likely significantly higher — as of January 11.[25]

The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin ordered the Investigative Committee to look into the fire and investigate Wildberries managers for abuse of power and violations of fire safety compliance rules.[26] St. Petersburg–based outlet Fontanka reported that Wildberries has been unable to establish contact with at least 66 employees who were at the warehouse during the fire.[27] Russian authorities have otherwise not offered additional information about the circumstances of the fire, which some Russian sources suggested may have broken out the day after a fight between migrant workers and a subsequent mobilization raid on the warehouse.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.
• The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg.
• Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Moscow-based international exhibition-forum “Russia” opened the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) “Army of Children” exhibit on January 14 to educate children about the military and careers in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Swedish Defense Materiel Administration announced on January 14 that it had signed an agreement with Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to increase the production and deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to support Ukraine’s needs.
• The Kremlin is funding select non-profit organizations operating in occupied areas that propagate Kremlin social narratives.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 14. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka, southwest of Svatove near Makiivka, west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area and near Bilohorivka.[29] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on January 13 that cold weather in the Kupyansk-Kreminna direction is influencing Ukrainian activities on this sector of the front and suggested that Russian forces may be surrendering more often in this area due to extreme weather conditions.[30] Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District), including its 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade, continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements in the Siversk direction (northeastern Donetsk Oblast) on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional battles continued near Verkhnokamyanske (6km east of Siversk) and Vesele (14km southeast of Siversk).[32] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces withdrew from the outskirts of Spirne (12km southeast of Siversk).[33] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic’s [LNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Spirne.[34]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements near Bakhmut on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm this claim.[35] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Bakhmut near Khromove and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Niu York (west of Horlivka).[36] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces have increased the number of troops in the Bakhmut direction to about 80,000 personnel, and that units of the Russian “Volunteer Corps” are conducting assaults in the Bakhmut direction.[37]

Positional fighting continued near Avdiivka on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces reportedly advanced in an area up to 260 meters wide and 120 meters deep east of the Avdiivka Coke Plant (northwest of Avdiivka), and elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic’s [DNR] Army Corps) and 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) advanced southeast of the Avdiivka waste heap (northwest of Avdiivka).[38] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka), while Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces remain in the western part of the settlement.[39] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any Russian advances in Stepove as of January 14. Positional battles continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Berdychi, and the Avdiivka Coke Plant; and south and southwest of Avdiivka near the Avdiivka industrial zone, Sieverne, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Krasnohorivka.[40] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka).[41]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City), and elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly advanced north of Novomykhailivka.[42] ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm these claims. Positional engagements are ongoing west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Marinka, Novomykhailivka, and Heorhiivka.[43] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka.[44] ISW previously observed claims at the end of December 2023 that elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade were operating near Horlivka (southeast of Bakhmut and northeast of Avdiivka).[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured unspecified positions north of Kermenchyk and Staromlynivka (both south of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[46] Positional fighting continued south of Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka), south of Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and near Chervone (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[47]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful drone and missile strikes against occupied Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast and Berdyansk in Zaporizhia Oblast.[48]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Robotyne and Kamianske (northwest of Robotyne) and southwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[49] One Russian milblogger claimed, citing unspecified Ukrainian sources, that Russian forces advanced west of Verbove up to 1.9 kilometers wide and 500 meters in depth.[50] ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims. Positional fighting continued near Kopani (northwest of Robotyne), Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), Verbove, and Novofedorivka (northeast of Robotyne).[51] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove and elements of the newly formed 49th Separate Air Assault Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[52] ISW previously reported claims that Russian forces are forming air assault brigades within combined arms ground formations and that the one of these brigades, the 49th Separate Air Assault Brigade, is already active in the Zaporizhia direction.[53]

Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional fighting on January 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements near Krynky and Pishchanivka in east bank Kherson Oblast.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on January 13 that the Russian 20th Air Defense Regiment (4th Guards Air and Air Defense Forces Army, Southern Military District) repelled a Ukrainian HIMARS strike in Kherson Oblast.[55]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Moscow-based international exhibition-forum “Russia” opened the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) “Army of Children. City of Professions. The future of the country” exhibit on January 14 to educate children about the military and careers in the Russian Armed Forces.[56] The exhibit allows children to visit a virtual command post, an interactive combat medicine zone, and a drone operations section to learn how to operate drones. The exhibit also has zones dedicated to teaching children about programming, cybersports, and “professions in the Russian MoD.”[57]

Russia continues to recruit personnel via crypto mobilization schemes and coercion. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military registration and enlistment offices resumed their recruitment of men interested in signing contracts for voluntary service within the Russian forces.[58] The milblogger added that there are many Russian servicemen interested in leaving combat operations in Ukraine to serve in Africa but noted that such transfers are impossible. Head of the independent Russian human rights organization “Rus Sidyashchaya” (Russia Behind Bars) Olga Romanova claimed that Russian officials are deliberately turning off heating in prisons to coerce more prisoners to volunteer to fight in Ukraine.[59]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that different Russian irregular armed formations continue to have discrepancies in their compensations, legal statuses, and eligibility for state benefits – a complaint that is at odds with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent efforts to reassure his constituencies that the Kremlin is attempting to resolve these problems.[60] The milblogger claimed that volunteers who sign voluntary military service contracts with Moscow Oblast have different legal statuses from volunteers who sign similar contracts with private military companies (PMCs).[61] The milblogger claimed that volunteers who signed contracts with Moscow Oblast qualify for government benefits and compensation but that fighters in state-run Redut PMC only receive payments from Redut beause these volunteers do not sign contracts with the Russian MoD. Redut volunteers and elements of other irregular formations such as the “Nevsky” detachment are reportedly not eligible for government support. Another prominent Russian milblogger observed that there are ongoing debates about the differences in one-time enlistment bonuses that Russian federal subjects offer to volunteers.[62]

The Russian MoD announced on January 11 that the Project 22350 Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate arrived at its permanent base in Severomorsk, Murmansk Oblast after it was accepted into the Russian Northern Fleet on December 25, 2023.[63]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces will soon need devices that can warn them about the approach of enemy drones as part of their personal armor protection equipment.[64] The milblogger called on Russian military officials to conduct tests, select suppliers, and open assembly lines for drone detector devices. The milblogger's comments highlight the increased prevalence of drones throughout the combat zone in Ukraine and assessed that Russian forces will need to technologically innovate in order to remain competitive in a drone-dominated battlefield.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient defense industrial base (DIB) with US and European support.

The Swedish Defense Materiel Administration announced on January 14 that it signed an agreement with the Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to increase the production and deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to support Ukraine’s needs.[65] The agreement seeks to increase investment in artillery ammunition production in Sweden and aims to shorten ammunition delivery times. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark signed an agreement on the joint procurement of ammunition to support Ukraine within the Nordic Defense Cooperation and signed the first contract for Nammo to produce 155mm artillery ammunition for Ukraine in October 2023.[66]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Kremlin is funding select non-profit organizations operating in occupied areas to propagate Kremlin social narratives. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on January 14 that the Russian Presidential Grants Fund, a Kremlin-run organization that issues grants to "socially-oriented" non-profit organizations, is awarding several non-profit groups in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast grant funding.[67] Balitsky reported that the Presidential Grants Fund awarded the Zaporizhia Oblast branches of the National-Cultural Autonomy of Belarusians, the National-Cultural Autonomy of Greeks, the All-Russian Society of the Deaf, and the Southern Center for Sociocultural and Patriotic Work.[68] Balitsky noted that the National-Cultural Autonomy of Belarusians will introduce youth in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to the history of the Great Patriotic War (Second World War), which the Kremlin frequently invokes to further informational narratives about Russian exceptionalism. The Kremlin is likely seeking to empower ideologically aligned organizations in occupied areas to further spread social control.[69]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to convince the Russian public that the Russian economy is resilient and in fact is becoming stronger despite international sanctions and the fallout of the war in Ukraine.[70] Putin claimed on January 14 that Russia’s economy is the first in Europe and fifth globally in terms of purchasing power parity and that Russia is becoming increasingly technologically and economically independent.[71]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Assistant to the Belarusian Defense Minister and Head of the International Military Cooperation and Assistance Department, Colonel Valery Ravenko, reiterated Belarusian commitment to cooperation with Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on January 14.[72] Ravenko stated that Belarus held 623 events relating to international cooperation, of which over 300 were with Russia. Ravenko claimed that Belarusian–Russian cooperation is an “equal relationship” and that Belarus is interested in developing partnerships with countries in southwestern and southeastern Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel Defense Forces units in the central Gaza Strip are isolating Maghazi.
2. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City.
3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip around Atatra and Beit Lahia.
4. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel will continue its fight against Hamas until the IDF achieves a “complete victory.”
5. Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s al Quds Brigades each conducted one rocket attack targeting southern Israel.
6. Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in five locations across the West Bank.
7. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks on US forces in northwestern Syria.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 14, 2024

Jan 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 14, 2024

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

CTP-ISW published abbreviated updates on January 13 and 14, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, January 15, 2024.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel Defense Forces units in the central Gaza Strip are isolating Maghazi.
2. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City.
3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip around Atatra and Beit Lahia.
4. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel will continue its fight against Hamas until the IDF achieves a “complete victory.”
5. Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s al Quds Brigades each conducted one rocket attack targeting southern Israel.
6. Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in five locations across the West Bank.
7. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks on US forces in northwestern Syria.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units in the central Gaza Strip are isolating Maghazi. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on January 14 showed flattened terrain north, east, and south of Maghazi, indicating that Israeli armor and bulldozers operated in the area. The IDF Golani Brigade directed an airstrike targeting two Palestinian fighters who were moving toward Israeli troops in a building in Maghazi.[1]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 14. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on January 14 showed flattened terrain southeast of Khan Younis City and within the city, indicating that Israeli armor and bulldozers operated in the area. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) captured a tunnel shaft in Khan Younis City on January 14.[2] Palestinian media reported IDF forces fighting south of Khan Younis City on January 13 and 14.[3]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip around Atatra and Beit Lahia on January 14. The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) destroyed rocket launch sites near Atatra on January 14.[4] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on January 14 showed flattened terrain northwest of Beit Lahia, indicating that Israeli armor and bulldozers operated in the area.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated on January 14 that Israel will continue its fight against Hamas until the IDF achieves a “complete victory.”[5] Netanyahu said that he told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that the Israel-Hamas War is also the United States’ war because Israel is fighting Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Netanyahu’s stated war aims are destroying Hamas as a governing body and military force, rescuing the Israeli hostages, and “deradicalizing Palestinian society.”

Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s al Quds Brigades each conducted one rocket attack targeting southern Israel on January 14.[6]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in five locations across the West Bank on January 14.[7] The al Qassem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion and the Jenin Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed multiple shooting and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[8]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 14.[9] LH fighters killed an Israeli civilian and a member of the local security forces in Kfar Yuval.[10] Islamic Azz Brigades fighters, which may be front for LH, infiltrated into northern Israel under the cover of dense fog and clashed with Israeli forces at close range.[11] Five IDF soldiers were injured in the clashes and three infiltrating fighters were killed.[12]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks on US forces in northwestern Syria on January 13.[13] The group fired rockets at Rumaylan Landing Zone in Hasakah Province and launched drones at al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province.

3. Ukraine’s Long-Term Path to Success: Jumpstarting a Self-Sufficient Defense Industrial Base with US and EU Support

Key point from the conclusion:

The United States will not need to send large security assistance to Ukraine indefinitely if Ukraine manages to produce its weapons in Ukraine and through joint production in Europe—assuming Ukraine can liberate strategically vital areas currently occupied by Russian forces. The Ukrainian strategy to reduce its dependency on Western security assistance in the long term depends on Ukraine liberating its southern territory and setting conditions for a more sustainable defense, as ISW has discussed at length elsewhere.[125] The current frontlines are not sustainable in the long term. Ukraine must therefore still get over an immediate hurdle: liberate strategically critical territory in Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and ideally liberate much of occupied Donbas, where Ukraine’s resource extraction and related industrial facilities are located.[126] Ukraine will very likely remain dependent on high levels of Western security assistance so long as Russia occupies much of this territory.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base

UKRAINE’S LONG-TERM PATH TO SUCCESS: JUMPSTARTING A SELF-SUFFICIENT DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE WITH US AND EU SUPPORT

Jan 14, 2024 - ISW Press

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Ukraine’s Long-Term Path to Success: Jumpstarting a Self-Sufficient Defense Industrial Base with US and EU Support

Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan with Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Christina Harward

January 14, 2024

Ukraine is dramatically expanding its defense industrial capacity to develop the ability over time to satisfy its military requirements with significantly reduced foreign military assistance. Ukraine is pursuing three primary lines of effort to achieve this goal: increasing its domestic defense industrial base (DIB), building bilateral and multilateral partnerships with European states, and pursuing industrial joint ventures with the United States and other international enterprises to co-produce defense materials in Ukraine and elsewhere. Ukraine will require considerable Western military assistance for several years, and its ability to reduce its dependence on such assistance depends in part on whether it can liberate strategically vital areas currently occupied by Russian forces, among other factors. But Ukraine and its Western partners are executing a realistic plan to create a sustainable basis for Ukraine to be able to defend itself over the long term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance.

Ukraine’s prospects for sustaining its military forces with limited assistance over the long term are excellent. Ukraine is heavily industrialized with a highly educated and technically sophisticated population. It had a massive arms industry during the Soviet period and continued to be a significant arms exporter after independence. The Russian occupation of key industrial areas and destruction of important centers of weapons production, especially the Kharkiv tank factory, has degraded but not eliminated the solid base on which Ukraine can build a viable DIB to support its military forces in the future.

Ukrainian Domestic Arms Production

Ukraine has been expanding its DIB domestically and abroad since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion. Ukraine’s domestic arms industry at the start of 2024 produces a higher volume of weapons than it did before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, despite Russian efforts to cripple Ukraine’s DIB.[1] Kyiv intensified its efforts to expand its DIB in 2023. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated in June 2023 that Ukraine could become the “center of modern weapons production in Europe” through cooperation with international industry to localize arms production in Ukraine.[2] Shmyhal stated in October 2023 that Ukraine understands that it must produce weapons in Ukraine to offset global ammunition and gunpowder shortages affecting all states’ weapons procurement.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced in December 2023 that Ukraine’s task is to make itself “so strong and effective” that it can resist Russian aggression – a goal that Zelensky said Ukraine can only accomplish through the “sufficient production of domestic weapons.”[4] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov Stated in December 2023 that Ukraine has developed a strategy for domestic defense production and has launched programs to reduce the risk of shortages of ammunition, missiles, and other military equipment.[5] Umerov identified the goal of increasing Ukraine’s domestic production of weapons and military equipment as a priority for 2024.[6] This effort is advancing a short-term objective of immediately supplying Ukrainian troops on the battlefield and a long-term objective of ensuring that Ukraine can be more self-sufficient and less reliant on external security assistance in the future.

Ukraine has been expanding its DIB capabilities domestically and abroad since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion to offset ammunition and weapon shortages, repair military equipment, and develop new weapons. Ukraine’s domestic arms industry in 2024 now produces a higher volume of weapons than it did before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, despite Russian efforts to cripple Ukraine’s DIB.[7] Zelensky stated on December 27, 2023, that Ukraine produced three times as much equipment and weapons in 2023 as it did in 2022.[8] Ukroboronprom (Ukrainian Defense Industry) - the Ukrainian state-owned joint-stock company that holds Ukraine’s defense industry companies - increased its production by 62 percent in 2023 compared with 2022.[9]

Ukraine’s DIB is currently producing the following weapons and munitions (this list is partial):

Artillery and heavy munitions. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on December 27 that Ukraine increased the production of mortar rounds by a factor of 42 and the production of artillery shells by a factor of 2.5 in 2023.[10]

Ukraine resumed production of its home-grown Vilkha Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) missiles in 2022 or 2023. Vilkha-M rockets have a longer range (130 km) and heavier payload than the GMLRS rockets fired by US-supplied M142 HIMARS, which have a range of 77 km.[11] Ukrainian Forbes reported on March 10, 2023, that Ukrainian forces used Vilkha-M rockets to strike rear areas in occupied Ukraine, indicating that Ukrainian industry has resumed production of the missiles that had stopped after 2021.[12] Ukrainian Forbes noted that Ukraine is planning to produce a Vilhka rocket version with an increased range of up to 150 km.[13]

Ukraine began domestically producing 155mm shells in small volumes in Ukraine no later than September 2023.[14] These shells are a NATO-standard munition type used by Western-supplied 155 mm guns that Ukraine’s BID had never produced before (the equivalent Soviet round is 152 mm).[15] Ukraine’s domestic production of 155mm artillery will likely expand over the next three years. Ukrainian officials confirmed in December 2023 that Ukraine signed agreements with two unnamed US companies for the joint production of 155mm ammunition in Ukraine and that the implementation of these deals will take two-to-three years.[16] Ukraine now produces its own 155mm self-propelled howitzer as well, the 2S22 Bohdana.[17] The 2S22 Bohdana started development in 2018, entered full production in January 2023, and began confirmed field deployments no later than May 2023.[18] Ukraine produced six Bohdana howitzers per month as of December 2023.[19]

Ukrainian arms manufacturers established new serial production lines for Soviet-era 82mm and 120mm mortars, 122mm artillery shells, and 125mm tank ammunition for T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks outside of Ukraine with NATO allies in 2022-2023.[20] European states with Soviet-style ammunition stores had largely run out of 122mm and 152mm shells before January 2023.[21] Ukrainian-made 152mm shells were first visually confirmed to have been used on the frontline in January 2023.[22] Ukraine’s domestic production of Stuhna-P and RK-3 Corsar anti-tank missiles has also increased by unspecified amounts following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[23]

Armored vehicles. Ukraine’s defense manufacturing vehicle output is increasing. Ukrainian officials reported in December 2023 that Ukraine’s production of armored personal carriers (APC) increased 3.4 times between 2022 and 2023 and that Ukraine’s APC production increased five times between spring 2023 and December 2023.[24] International aid has helped Ukraine resume the production of tank undercarriages, even though Ukraine can no longer produce complete tanks.[25] Ukraine repairs damaged tanks in Ukraine, however.[26] Ukrainian workers reportedly repaired over 3,000 armored vehicles in rear areas near the front in 2022.[27]

Drones. Ukraine’s drone production has increased more than one-hundredfold between the start of Russia's full-scale invasion and November 2023.[28] Only 35 Ukrainian companies manufactured drones in 2022.[29] Ukraine had over 200 companies (most of which are privately owned) producing various drones for the Ukrainian military as of October 2023.[30] Over 50 Ukrainian state and private companies currently manufacture drone munitions weighting between 300g and 10kg.[31] Ukraine manufactured 50,000 FPV drones in December 2023, and Ukrainian officials project that Ukraine‘s drone industry will manufacture one million FPV drones in 2024 (or about 83,000 FPV drones per month).[32]

Ukraine is developing indigenous long-range strike capabilities. Ukrainian officials announced that Ukraine tested a kamikaze strike drone with a range of 1,000 km in January 2023.[33] A Ukrainian official reported in November 2023 that this long-range drone entered production with international partners (likely based in Europe), and Ukrainian officials claim that Ukraine will produce 1,000 such drones by the end of 2024.[34] Ukraine is also working to upgrade its Neptune cruise missiles to extend their range from 300 km.[35] Ukrainian volunteers are developing an inexpensive “Trembita” surface-to-surface cruise missile with a range of 140km to mass produce to overwhelm Russian air defenses.[36]

Air defense. Ukraine is working to launch production of its own indigenous anti-aircraft missile systems. Ukrainian officials reported in July 2023 that Ukraine is developing two new anti-aircraft missile systems (one possibly based on the design of Neptune missiles) and had already conducted missile test flights.[37]

Electronic warfare. Ukraine has experience manufacturing electronic warfare systems (EW) dating back to 2014 and has been investing in further developing specialized EW systems since Russia’s full-scale invasion.[38] Ukraine currently produces several specialized EW systems – though not at scale – some of which are reportedly better than Russian EW systems.[39] Ukraine is developing specialized EW systems to protect Ukrainian forces against Russian drones.[40]

Tactical equipment. Ukraine is increasingly self-sufficient in military body armor. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated in November 2023 that Ukrainian manufacturers produce “practically the entire volume of protective equipment” that the Ukrainian MoD procures, and that Ukraine strives to have all of Ukraine’s body armor, helmets, tactical equipment, clothing, and food rations manufactured domestically in Ukraine.[41]

Ukraine seeks to expand its domestic DIB even further to scale up defense manufacturing production in the short and the long term. Ukraine seeks to reinforce its progress in tripling defense output in 2023 to sextuple Ukraine’s domestic defense industry capacity in 2024.[42] Ukrainian defense manufacturers going into 2024 are prioritizing the manufacturing of ammunition, drones, and armored vehicles in that order, while also prioritizing the production of anti-tank missile and air defense systems.[43] Shmyhal announced on January 3, 2024, that Ukraine plans to spend more than 265 billion Ukrainian hryvnia (about $7 billion or 3.5 percent of Ukraine’s pre-invasion GDP) in 2024 on arms production, repairs, and purchases alone.[44]

Ukrainian Efforts to Combat Corruption in the DIB

Corruption is endemic to rapid wartime industrial mobilization in any country, and its presence in Ukraine is neither anomalous nor surprising. Kyiv has focused considerable energy on mitigating if not solving this problem rather than concealing it. It has harnessed Ukraine’s civil society and free press in this regard rather than stifling it.

Ukraine is reinforcing its efforts to combat corruption in its defense industries and reestablish international confidence to support future investment. Ukraine’s defense industry has faced several corruption scandals over the course of the Russian full-scale invasion.[45] Three Ukrainian arms exporting firms (which turned into arms importers at the start of Russia‘s full-scale invasion) were involved in a large-scale embezzlement scheme after the Ukrainian MoD granted these state-owned companies a ”complete carte blanche” to find and supply the necessary weapons and supplies in spring-summer 2022.[46] These three companies were reportedly involved in various corrupt practices, the scale of which is still unknown. The development of Ukraine’s DIB jointly with US and European firms based in Europe compels Ukrainian entities involved in such joint ventures to meet EU compliance regulations and will thus help increase transparency in Ukraine’s defense industry. This phenomenon is mutually reinforcing with the broader efforts of the Ukrainian government and especially MoD to bring Ukraine up to NATO standards, which also impose significant compliance and transparency obligations on defense contractors.

The Ukrainian government is leveraging the robust and expansive Ukrainian NGO community to assist with its anti-corruption efforts. Corruption is a deeply rooted problem in Ukraine, but Ukrainian officials are actively and openly identifying and resolving corruption problems specifically related to Ukraine’s DIB sector. Kamyshin stated in October 2023 that Ukroboronprom launched a new anti-corruption initiative as part of its interim strategy for 2023-2024, under which Ukroboronprom held its first open competition for a DIB factory CEO appointment with oversight from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and embassies to combat the lack of transparency in the DIB leadership.[47] Kamyshin added that Ukroboronprom also established internal procurement procedures and is involving NGOs to oversee external procurement. Ukroboronprom is also reportedly instituting competitions and auctions to develop a transparent way to allocate assets. Ukraine dismissed several Ukroboronprom and MoD officials implicated in procurement corruption scandals and even dismissed Ukroboronprom director Yuriy Husev after he reportedly failed to complete state orders.[48]

Ukrainian defense materiel is arriving at the frontlines despite the Ukrainian DIB’s simultaneous growing pains and corruption. The documented deliveries of domestically and jointly produced military equipment to the frontlines in Ukraine indicate that Ukraine‘s DIB is getting equipment it reports that it produces to the frontlines. Open sources have confirmed the delivery and employment of several newly Ukrainian-made weapons to the battlefield, including Ukraine's first-ever domestically produced 152mm shells, 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and drones.[49] Ukraine’s robust civil society and free press hold Ukrainian officials to account and regularly expose corruption schemes. Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov established a special commission to oversee the issues of overdue state procurement orders in October 2022 and later created a public Anti-Corruption Commission following a large-scale scandal that Ukrainian journalists exposed about the Ukrainian MoD graft in food procurement.[50]

Expanded Multilateral DIB

Ukraine’s efforts to establish defense industrial self-reliance are also strengthening the European DIB as Ukraine works to integrate itself with European partners. Ukraine established in late 2023 a Defense Industries Alliance, an association allowing international defense manufacturers to work with the Ukrainian DIB, and 38 companies from 19 countries joined the alliance by the end of the First International Defense Industries Forum in Kyiv on September 29, 2023.[51] Ukraine hosted over 250 defense companies from more than 30 countries during the forum to establish the joint production of weapons in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian production of weapons abroad.[52] Ukraine signed at least 20 agreements and memorandums with foreign partners on the manufacture of drones, repair of military equipment, and armored vehicles and ammunition joint production, technology exchanges, and components supplies.[53] Zelensky announced during the forum that Ukraine will reduce red tape to incentivize investment in Ukraine’s defense industry and establish a defense fund that will be replenished through defense enterprises’ dividends and the sale of confiscated Russian assets.[54]

Ukraine is bringing together an international coalition to develop Ukraine’s defense industrial base in Ukraine and in Eastern and Central Europe. Ukraine has been establishing different partnerships with international actors since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to attract foreign production or the refurbishment of weapons in Ukraine; establish joint production, research and development, and repairs of weapons abroad; and incentivize countries to finance joint production in Europe or Ukraine.[55] Ukraine’s joint production initiatives abroad involve Ukrainian technology transfers and deploying Ukrainian specialists to foreign facilities and allow Ukraine to produce equipment in locations safe from Russian attack.[56]

European states and companies are taking the lead on developing Ukraine’s DIB and have been pledging and opening manufacturing plants in Ukraine to support Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall and Ukroboronprom concluded a strategic agreement on May 13, 2023 for the maintenance and repairs of German-provided armored vehicles and registered a joint venture on October 18, 2023.[57] Rheinmetall announced in July 2023 that it is establishing a repair center in Ukraine for Leopard tanks and other German-provided equipment and was already training Ukrainian specialists in Germany to staff this center.[58] Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to launch production of German armored vehicles such as TPz Fuchs armored personnel carriers and Lynx armored fighting vehicles in Ukraine in 2024-2025.[59] Rheinmetall’s CEO Armin Papperger stated on February 10, 2023 that Rheinmetall is ready to build a tank factory in Ukraine.[60] Another German manufacturer, Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft, is building a repair hub for armored vehicles and Leopard 1 tanks in western Ukraine.[61]

Zelensky and United Kingdom Prime Minister Rishi Sunak signed a security cooperation agreement on January 12, 2024, which specifies that the UK will continue to provide support to Ukraine during a 10-year period.[62] The agreement specifies that the UK will work with Ukraine to reduce existing supply chain bottlenecks that prevent the development of both countries’ arms and ammunition production. The agreement will also encourage the UK’s DIB to work with Ukraine to support the localization of UK military equipment repairs, maintenance, and production in Ukraine.[63] British multinational arms, security, and aerospace company BAE Systems announced on August 31, 2023 that it had established a local office in Ukraine and signed agreements with Ukrainian officials to facilitate the production of 105mm Light Guns in Ukraine.[64] Kamyshin stated on October 4 that Ukraine is working with an unnamed British company on the production of howitzers in 2024 in Ukraine.[65]

Ukraine and Sweden declared their intent in August 2023 jointly to produce CV90 infantry fighting vehicles in Ukraine and have discussed the production, repair, and maintenance of VS90s in Ukraine.[66] NATO member Turkey is building a new drone production facility and service center in Ukraine. Turkey’s leading drone maker, Baykar, announced in September 2023 that Turkey would open a drone production facility and service center for Bayraktar TB2 drones, which reportedly should become operational by early 2025.[67] Construction for this Ukraine-based plant was already underway as of September 2023.[68]

At least 10 European countries have established joint production, weapons development, or military equipment repair partnerships with Ukraine. Ukroboronprom announced in November 2023 that it will jointly produce and develop heavy weapons and military equipment with at least six NATO countries including France, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, and several other unspecified states.[69] Ukroboronprom also stated that it is creating joint defense enterprises, establishing production lines for closed-loop ammunition, jointly producing armored vehicles and rocket launchers, and jointly developing new high-tech capacities by using existing capacities and creating new measures.[70]

Eastern and Central European countries are leveraging their existing heavy industry manufacturing bases and further investing in joint weapons production with Ukraine. Ukroboronprom and Polish arms manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa agreed in April 2023 on the joint production of 125mm tank shells in Poland.[71] As of this writing Ukraine jointly produces 155mm artillery shells with Poland and at least one other unnamed NATO country.[72] Ukroboronprom also signed an agreement with Polish manufacturer Bumar Ladedy in April 2023 for refurbishing Ukrainian Leopard-A4 and T-64 tanks in Glywice, Poland.[73] Canada, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States reportedly plan to build a new NATO repair and logistics center in Rzeszow, Poland, for the repair of Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles.[74]

Czech President Petr Pavel announced on April 28, 2023, that Czech companies Sellier & Bellot, SwAero Vodochody, Czechoslovak Group, and Vojensky opravarensky podnik are participating in six joint projects with Ukraine on the production of ammunition and small arms, the repair of T-64 and T-72 tanks, and joint production of F/A-259 Striker Light Attack Aircraft.[75] Czech weapons manufacturers CZUB and Sellier & Bellot signed an agreement in July 2023 to deepen DIB cooperation, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Czech MoD signed a memorandum on July 7, 2023 to establish support for military-technical cooperation and joint weapons and ammunition production.[76] A joint Ukrainian-Czech company called “UAC” is producing Ukrainian Leleka LR drones at a factory in the Czech Republic.[77] Ukroboronprom also signed agreements with Czech military equipment manufacturer VOP CZ in February 2023 on the joint production, repair, and development of armored vehicles, and on the establishment of supply chains for parts and products.[78] Ukroboronprom also signed an agreement on November 10, 2022, with the Czech MoD’s Intergovernmental Defense Cooperation Agency (AMOS) on the creation of a “joint defense cluster,” which involves the production of military equipment, increasing ammunition production in a variety of calibers, technological cooperation, and maintenance and repair for air defense systems.[79]

The Ukrainian Kramatorsk Heavy Duty Machine Tool Building Plant signed an agreement in June 2023 with Slovak state company Konstrukta-Defense to jointly develop a new 155mm howitzer.[80] The Ukrainian, Czech, and Slovak MoDs also signed a memorandum of intent on June 15, 2023, to cooperate on the procurement and operation of CV90 infantry fighting vehicles.[81] A Rheinmetall factory in Hungary is already producing Lynx armored fighting vehicles at the Zalaegerszeg plant in Hungary and at unspecified plants in Germany in cooperation with Ukraine.[82] Rheinmetall restarted ammunition production of previously discontinued 35mm Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft ammunition for Ukraine at a plant in Lower Saxony in early 2023.[83] Germany had not produced 35mm Gepard ammunition in several years since the Gepard was retired from Bundeswhr service around 2010.  Ukraine and Romania signed a memorandum on October 18, 2023, on the expansion of mutual military-technical cooperation between the two countries, and Romania announced its intent in March 2023 to build a new gunpowder plant in cooperation with the United States and South Korea.[84]

The Baltic States are repairing Ukrainian military equipment, increasing their domestic ammunition production to support Ukraine, and working on joint research and development with Ukrainian companies. Lithuania repairs Western-provided Leopard tanks and is reportedly Europe’s sole country repairing Leopard 2 A6 and A5 tanks.[85] Estonian robotic vehicle manufacturer Milrem Robotics signed an agreement with Ukroboronprom during the First Defense Industries Forum in Kyiv to develop Ukraine’s capabilities for manned and unmanned vehicles across multiple domains.[86] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur announced on November 14, 2023, that Estonia will invest 30 percent of its defense budget to produce ammunition for Ukraine over the next four years (2024 to 2028).[87] Umerov announced on December 5 that Latvia and Ukraine will increase the production of drones and develop joint drone production projects.[88] The Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Estonian Defense and Aerospace Industry Association signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at supporting the development and production of drones and electronic warfare systems on January 11, 2024.[89]

The Nordic States are ramping up the regional production of ammunition, and Norway has allowed Ukraine to directly purchase military equipment from its manufacturers. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark signed an agreement on the joint procurement of ammunition to support Ukraine within the Nordic Defense Cooperation in October 2023 and signed the first contract for the Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to produce 155mm artillery ammunition for Ukraine.[90] The Norwegian government adopted a policy change on January 1, 2024, allowing the direct sale of weapons and defense-related products from the Norwegian DIB to Ukraine.[91]  

Western European countries are similarly incentivizing arms sales to Ukraine and are developing joint production initiatives to support anticipated increased European defense manufacturing. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated in November 2023 that France is currently negotiating with Ukraine to have Kyiv order howitzers from French manufacturers, as opposed to France giving Ukraine materiel from existing stocks.[92] Lecornu also stated in October 2023 that France plans to triple the number of 155mm shells it sends to Ukraine from 1,000 to 3,000 shells per month.[93] These numbers are small - conservative estimates indicate that Ukraine fired 6,000 - 7,000 shells per day in summer 2023.[94] But they are part of the much larger effort Ukraine is making to produce shells and source them from many different suppliers. Lecornu also stated that France allocated €200 million (nearly $220 million) for a special support fund for Ukraine.[95] French General Armaments Engineer Jean-Francois Doc stated in November 2023, that France is using its support fund to try to cover part of Ukraine’s cost of purchasing some spare parts and weapons. It noted that France will increase the supply of ammunition to satisfy Ukrainian needs in 2024.[96] French company Turgis & Gaillard Group signed a contract with Ukrainian aeronautics company Antonov in October 2023 to jointly produce a modern drone based on the French MALE-class AAROK drone, and both sides are discussing the possibility of localized production in Ukraine.[97] Ukraine signed a contract with French weapons company Cybergun for the delivery of small arms and grenade launchers.[98] Five Italian weapon and military equipment manufacturers (Leonardo SpA, Fincantieri, Elettronica, Iveco Defense Vehicles, and FAE Group SpA) joined the Ukrainian Defense Industries Alliance on November 16, 2023.[99]

Denmark and the Netherlands – wealthy European countries without strong manufacturing bases – are financing weapons manufacturing in Central Europe to support the effort to develop the European DIB supporting Ukraine. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced in November 2022 that the US and the Netherlands would split costs to refurbish 90 Czech T-72B tanks for Ukraine.[100] The Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands signed an agreement at Ramstein Air Base, Germany in September 2023 to supply further deliveries of mainly Czech-made weapons to Ukraine with the financial support of Denmark and the Netherlands.[101] Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated in September 2023 that Denmark, in cooperation with partner countries, will purchase 45 tanks to transfer to Ukraine: 30 Leopard 1 tanks and 15 T-72s.[102] The Czech MoD announced in October 2023 that Czechia and Denmark will deliver almost 50 infantry fighting vehicles and combat tanks, heavy weapons, 2,500 pistols, 7,000 rifles, 500 light machine guns and 500 sniper rifles, EW and reconnaissance equipment, and other Czech-made equipment to the Ukrainian military.[103] The Danish MoD announced in October 2023 that Denmark will contribute 100 million Danish kroner (over $14.7 million) to purchase ammunition for Ukraine to be delivered in 2024.[104] Czech officials announced in February 2023 that a Dutch fundraising effort raised money to finance the production of 100 Czech-made modified Toyota SUVs, refurbished with anti-aircraft guns, to be sent to Ukraine.[105]  

Several other European states are in discussions to join the international coalition manufacturing weapons with or in Ukraine. Finnish media reported in August 2023 that Finland is exploring the possibility of manufacturing Finnish armored vehicles in Ukraine after Zelensky expressed interest in a joint Ukrainian-Finish production venture.[106] Belgian Defense Minister Ludivin Dedonder and Umerov discussed in December 2023 “Ukraine-Belgian defense industry cooperation” and the possibility of Ukraine hosting Belgian defense industry representatives in Ukraine in early 2024.[107] Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob stated in March 2023 that Slovenia wants to participate in joint ammunition production with Ukraine.[108]

European states are also pursuing a strategic multi-year effort to expand European DIB manufacturing capacity and output to satisfy Ukrainian and Western demand for weapons and military equipment. European actors are likely preparing their DIBs to support the long-term replacement of European aging military systems, sustain support to Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression, and rebuild NATO’s arsenals to enhance readiness. President of the European Council Charles Michel stated on November 30, 2023, that the European Union’s (EU) military spending in 2023 totaled about €270 billion (about $296 billion), with €60 billion euro (about $66 billion) allocated to defense investment. Michel stated that the EU can invest at least €600 billion (about $657.5 billion) over the next 10 years to improve its DIB in an effort to boost European and transatlantic defense.[109] Michel stated that he is advocating for the European Union to create a “true defense single market” in part by increasing the predictability of public orders to help European industry access private financing and to "send a very clear message: produce and we will buy. We will ensure long-term contracts because our security and stability will require long-term investment.”[110]

Large European arms manufacturers are signaling readiness to scale up industrial output to support European defense. Rheinmetall assessed in January 2023 that it is ready to rapidly increase its production of tank and artillery munitions production to satisfy high Ukrainian and Western demands and has been advancing and completing numerous production orders for 155mm artillery shells, infantry fighting vehicles, anti-aircraft ammunition, and drone reconnaissance systems for Ukraine.[111] Rheinmetall also partnered with US-based manufacturer Lockheed Martin to develop a European-made GMARS system based on the American HIMARS in Germany, after signing a memorandum on April 20, 2023, and noted that the new weapons production would integrate existing German components.[112] Poland also signed a framework agreement with Lockheed Martin on September 11, 2023, for Homar-A Rocket Artillery System Program, which will allow Poland to integrate key HIMARS components with the Polish Jelcz 6x6 truck.[113]

Expanding US Industry Support to Ukrainian DIB

The United States is supporting the development of Ukraine's DIB. Zelensky announced in September 2023 that the US and Ukraine made a “historic decision” on the joint production of weapons, particularly air defense systems, and that Ukraine’s Ministry for Strategic Industries signed cooperation agreements with three US defense associations with over 2,000 members on future possible work in Ukraine.[114] Kamyshin later clarified in October 2023 that Ukraine and the US will jointly produce air defense systems and ammunition within Ukraine.[115] Zelensky announced on November 17, 2023, that Ukraine is actively moving with the US towards joint production of weapons and attended a meeting with top US defense manufacturing companies in Washington, D.C. on December 11, 2023, to discuss joint production, including establishing Ukraine as a “defense manufacturing hub in Europe.”[116] The US DoD announced that the US and Ukraine signed a statement of intent on December 6, 2023 regarding the “co-production of critical weapons and on prioritizing technical and data exchange.”[117] A Senior Ukrainian official confirmed in December 2023 that two US companies signed agreements with Ukraine on the joint production of 155mm artillery ammunition in Ukraine and that the implementation of these deals will take two to three years.[118] A US DoD technology transfer enabled Ukraine to field FrankenSAMS - systems merging advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers – in 2023.[119] The Wall Street Journal Reported on January 4, 2024, that the US Army is restarting production of the M777 howitzer because of the system’s use in Ukraine.[120] The Wall Street Journal reported that this effort is focused on producing new parts, manufactured by British BAE Systems, to repair and refurbish M777 howitzers deployed in Ukraine.[121] BAE Systems stated that it expects contracts for whole M777 guns.[122] Private US-Ukrainian cooperation in establishing joint manufacturing will likely reduce the cost of US security assistance for Ukraine.  

Continued Western investment in Ukraine’s DIB and joint production in Europe will allow Ukraine to become self-sufficient over time and integrate Ukraine into the broader Western security network. Strategic investment in European states’ collective DIB will increase Europe’s ability to support Ukraine, internalize European defense requirement costs, and reduce European dependency on US defense assistance in the long term. Ukraine’s strategic effort to expand its DIB is de facto bringing Ukraine closer to NATO standards.[123] Ukraine is gradually modernizing its DIB and production lines to meet NATO interoperability standards necessary for Ukraine‘s future security cooperation within the existing and growing production capacity being established in Ukraine and Europe. Ukraine’s effort to build its DIB will support not only Ukraine but also the rest of the NATO alliance. Kamyshin told the Associated Press in November 2023 that he is focusing on making Ukraine the “arsenal of the free world,” suggesting that Ukraine seeks to use its planned large manufacturing base to support international allies.[124] Ukraine has also become a key binding agent bringing France, Germany, and the United Kingdom together on common goals to bolster European security by significantly increasing European defense spending and defensive industrial capacity. 

Conclusion

The United States will not need to send large security assistance to Ukraine indefinitely if Ukraine manages to produce its weapons in Ukraine and through joint production in Europe—assuming Ukraine can liberate strategically vital areas currently occupied by Russian forces. The Ukrainian strategy to reduce its dependency on Western security assistance in the long term depends on Ukraine liberating its southern territory and setting conditions for a more sustainable defense, as ISW has discussed at length elsewhere.[125] The current frontlines are not sustainable in the long term. Ukraine must therefore still get over an immediate hurdle: liberate strategically critical territory in Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and ideally liberate much of occupied Donbas, where Ukraine’s resource extraction and related industrial facilities are located.[126] Ukraine will very likely remain dependent on high levels of Western security assistance so long as Russia occupies much of this territory.

Ukraine cannot liberate these strategically critical territories without increased Western support in the short term, especially while Ukraine is still actively defending against an improving Russian military. Insufficient and poorly timed equipment deliveries in 2022 and 2023 contributed to the disappointments of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Ukraine must receive sufficient security assistance in higher volumes than it did in 2022 and 2023 to be able to retake its strategically critical territories and liberate its people before any discussion about reducing aid to Ukraine in the long term can responsibly begin.

Ukraine’s defense requirements to liberate its land and people are increasing with time as the Russian military is learning from its mistakes and becoming more capable. Russian forces have regained the initiative across the theater (except in Kherson Oblast) as of January 2024, and the Russian military is now able to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.[127] Russian drone and cruise missile production has surpassed their pre-2022 levels.[128] Russia has partially mitigated Western sanctions through evasion tactics.[129] Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion on the morning of December 29, 2023.[130] The Russian military is amid a long-term force restructuring to significantly increase the size of Russia’s military with 12 new maneuver divisions over several years.[131]

The US will need to continue supporting Ukraine for several years as Ukraine’s DIB in Ukraine and Europe spins up and Ukraine liberates key areas, but Ukraine’s intensive efforts to expand its own DIB and establish deep and broad defense industrial partnerships will decrease international security assistance requirements for Ukraine in the long run. Europe is taking the lead in investing in Ukraine’s DIB and establishing joint production in Europe, but Europe cannot achieve these goals without US and international support. Europe is challenged to meet 155 mm shell production targets on time and is working to replace equipment given to Ukraine, let alone increase it substantially to enable Ukraine to retake critical territory[132] It will likely take significant time for European and Ukrainian firms to fully mobilize their industries. Mobilizing any country’s defense industry for mass wartime production is a lengthy undertaking and Ukraine will continue to be vulnerable as it gets its DIB up and running. (It took American industry several years to fully mobilize its industry for wartime production in the Second World War between 1939 and 1943).[133] Ukraine needs more air defense systems and sufficient ammunition to protect Ukrainian cities, frontline forces, and new industrial facilities. Ukraine will continue to depend on foreign military assistance to procure more tanks.[134] Ukraine’s DIB has many longstanding structural reforms it must tackle to unlock its full potential.[135]

Ukraine’s and Europe’s defense industries will likely be able to significantly increase output and become more self-sufficient over several years if given proper US support now. The Ukrainians know how to run a major arms industry as noted above. Ukraine had a thriving arms manufacturing and export industry before Russia invaded the country. Ukraine was the world’s fourth largest arms explorer in 2012 and the ninth largest arms exporter by 2015 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014.[136] Ukraine was still the 12th largest global arms exporter by 2019 despite the degradation of its industrial capacity from five years of a protracted (partially frozen) war.[137] Ukraine has the intellectual capital to run an arms industry. Ukraine’s defense industry as of 2023 employs 300,000 workers within about 500 different companies, of which almost 400 are private companies.[138] Ukraine’s homegrown weapons manufacturing in 2024 is rife with innovation. Ukraine’s defense industry is pioneering systems integration between NATO and Soviet-era equipment, electronic warfare weapons development, and all domains of drone warfare in unmanned aerial, naval, and ground vehicles.[139] Ukraine has a chance to stand on its own two feet in the future if it is decisively empowered now.

Note for readers: ISW will launch a new section within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be forming its assessments of Ukraine’s and international DIB efforts based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements. ISW will not report news about Ukraine’s defense manufacturing not already discussed by open sources.

4. Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’

Excerpts:

In the past, Russian observers expressed confidence that China would move cautiously in using PMCs for any broader political goals, though they were open to the idea that such Chinese actions might benefit Moscow by generating widespread chaos (Ia-centr.ru, March 25, 2021). Western specialists have followed in their wake, assuming that China will invariably take the longer-term view and not take risks when it has reason to believe that history is moving in its direction. This perspective contrasts sharply with Russia, whose leaders have become embroiled in numerous troubles due to overreach in places such as Afghanistan or Ukraine (Voice of America, March 31, 2023). Nevertheless, the words coming out of China regarding PMCs over the past month and Beijing’s actions on the ground suggest that China has decided to change course and that it has concluded now is an appropriate time to press forward and use PMCs in ways experts only a few years ago thought would happen in the distant future (Current Time TV, February 2, 2019).

If that proves to be the case, then Chinese PMCs with names few in the West even know may soon displace Russia’s Wagner Group as objects of primary geopolitical concern. The very public nature of Beijing’s actions suggests that this is highly likely. These entities may prove even more dangerous than Russian PMCs, especially because the rise and expanded use of Chinese PMCs has so often been downplayed until now.

Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 4

By: Paul Goble

January 11, 2024 06:24 PM Age: 3 days

jamestown.org · by Paul Goble · January 11, 2024

For more than a decade, China has been using its own private military companies (PMCs) to guard Chinese facilities abroad, preferring to use them rather than rely on protection from local firms or PMCs from other countries. On occasion, Beijing will employ PMCs to put pressure on governments in other countries (see EDM, March 25, 2021). Until now, it has always done so without much fanfare. Chinese officials typically deny that PMCs play a role greater than merely defending Chinese interests. Beijing often chooses to call these entities by various other names to hide their true nature (Window on Eurasia, August 25, 2022, December 28, 2023). This approach has led Western analysts to stress the limited and defensive nature of Chinese PMCs in contrast to what they and others admit are the larger and more strategic actions of Russian and American PMCs (Voice of America, March 31, 2023; Sukhankin, “An Anatomy of the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry,” January 3, 2023). In the words of one Moscow commentator, Chinese PMCs have “come out of the shadows.” The analyst referred to a recent meeting in Beijing in December 2023 during which officials from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and officers of various Chinese security companies took part. Discussions during the event alluded to the broader role for these paramilitary forces in taking on a more assertive posture globally (Fondsk.ru, December 25, 2023).

The session in Beijing featured speakers who declared that China has no choice but to deploy even more PMCs around the world. They asserted that this is sorely needed as currently there are more than 47,000 Chinese companies employing 4.1 million people, including 1.6 million Chinese citizens, in some 190 countries. The meeting was followed by the publication of what can be described as a programmatic discussion of Chinese PMCs in the South China Morning Post (SCMP). The article suggested that Beijing plans to expand its use of PMCs to pursue broader political goals (SCMP, December 24, 2023). This public stance indicates that China feels that it can now use PMCs more openly due to the growth of Chinese power abroad and the declining influence of Russia and the United States. This, in turn, suggests that Chinese officials will deploy these entities more frequently and more broadly than in the past, allowing Beijing to defend its infrastructure on foreign soil and put additional political pressure on other countries.

These developments have attracted the attention of Central Asian countries that may become the targets of Beijing’s broader use of PMCs (Inbusiness.kz, December 25, 2023). Moscow is also keeping a close watch, as, in the past, it has seen Chinese PMCs as allies and helpmates. The Kremlin must now confront the very real possibility that these Chinese entities are becoming competitors or even active opponents to Russian PMCs (TASS; Kommersant, December 24, 2023;Vedomosti, December 25, 2023).

China’s recent activities and other powers’ reactions are the outgrowth of developments over the past five years. Mission creep on the part of Beijing has increasingly focused on protecting economic interests, leading those entities deployed to fulfill related objectives to become more involved in political issues. This has elevated the nervousness of outside powers regarding China’s increased willingness to flaunt its growing power. (On the emergence of these trends, see China Brief, May 15, 2020). The US reaction has been limited thus far. It will almost certainly intensify in the coming weeks, given rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan, US concerns that Chinese PMCs may threaten American partners, and a growing interest in seeing how Chinese assertiveness may undermine Beijing’s cooperation with Moscow.

Central Asia and Africa represent the two areas where the role of Chinese PMCs appears likely to expand most rapidly in the near term (Sukhankin, “Chinese PSCs: Achievements, Prospects, and Future Endeavors,” November 20, 2023). In these two regions, some governments are weak. Outside groups like PMCs can play a major role at minimal cost, permitting those behind them to maintain a veil of deniability. (On Chinese moves in Central Asia, see EDM, December 7, 2021, and Window on Eurasia, February 15, 2022; on similar moves by Beijing in Africa, see Sukhankin, “The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa,” January 10, 2020, and EDM, June 29, 2021.) As highlighted in the December meeting, given the breadth of Chinese involvement globally, Beijing may use its PMCs in similar ways elsewhere as well—wherever and whenever it senses weakness on the part of host governments or their Western supporters.

In the past, Russian observers expressed confidence that China would move cautiously in using PMCs for any broader political goals, though they were open to the idea that such Chinese actions might benefit Moscow by generating widespread chaos (Ia-centr.ru, March 25, 2021). Western specialists have followed in their wake, assuming that China will invariably take the longer-term view and not take risks when it has reason to believe that history is moving in its direction. This perspective contrasts sharply with Russia, whose leaders have become embroiled in numerous troubles due to overreach in places such as Afghanistan or Ukraine (Voice of America, March 31, 2023). Nevertheless, the words coming out of China regarding PMCs over the past month and Beijing’s actions on the ground suggest that China has decided to change course and that it has concluded now is an appropriate time to press forward and use PMCs in ways experts only a few years ago thought would happen in the distant future (Current Time TV, February 2, 2019).

If that proves to be the case, then Chinese PMCs with names few in the West even know may soon displace Russia’s Wagner Group as objects of primary geopolitical concern. The very public nature of Beijing’s actions suggests that this is highly likely. These entities may prove even more dangerous than Russian PMCs, especially because the rise and expanded use of Chinese PMCs has so often been downplayed until now.

jamestown.org · by Paul Goble · January 11, 2024

5. The Greater Goal in Gaza

Excerpts:

Moreover, if it chooses to continue the occupation, Israel’s challenge won’t just be internal. The country is also confronting an emerging younger generation in the United States and many other Western countries that has shown it is far more supportive of Palestinians and the issue of equal rights than its predecessors. As this generation rises to positions of power, the world will become increasingly critical of the Israeli occupation, and the focus will shift from defining an illusory peace settlement to tackling the problem of deep injustice in indefinitely occupied lands. It is also likely to make Israel increasingly isolated on the world stage.

This is where a continuation of the status quo will likely end. The international community is certainly partly to blame for all the violence that is unfolding today. By abandoning any serious attempt to address the underlying causes of conflict in recent years, Western leaders, as well as governments in the region, have helped create the untenable situation that now exists. It is possible that another process will be initiated along the lines of many earlier ones. If that happens, it, too, will fail, and violence will continue to define the world of the Israelis and Palestinians. Either the United States and its international partners must make a historic decision to end the conflict now and move both sides swiftly toward a viable two-state solution, or the world will have to contend with an even darker future. For soon, it will no longer be a question of occupation but the more difficult issue of outright apartheid. The choice cannot be clearer.

The Greater Goal in Gaza

For Lasting Peace, Israel Must End Its Occupation of Palestinian Land

By Marwan Muasher

January 15, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Marwan Muasher · January 15, 2024

As Israel’s war in Gaza enters its fourth month, an intensifying debate has unfolded about who should rule the territory when the fighting stops. Some have suggested an Arab force, a notion already rejected by Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states. Others have proposed a reconstructed Palestinian authority, ignoring the fact that less than ten percent of Palestinians would support such an outcome, according to a recent Palestinian poll. Yet a third idea is to put Gaza under international control, an approach that has already been rejected by Israel, which does not want to set such a precedent.

But there is a larger reason these envisioned solutions are doomed to fail: they all treat Gaza in isolation, as if it can be addressed without regard to the broader issue of Palestinian statehood and self-determination. In this way of thinking, once Hamas is made to disappear and once the question of who rules Gaza is answered, there can be a return to the status quo ante. Both assumptions are fundamentally flawed, and any policy based on them will lead to disaster.

To be truly durable, a solution for the future of Gaza must be framed within a larger endgame for all Palestinians under Israeli control. It must finally address the root cause of unending violence: the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. Years of failed negotiations have also made clear what such a plan will require in order to succeed: unlike so many of its predecessors, it must be credible and time-bound, and the endgame itself must be well defined at the outset.

Establishing such a comprehensive process will require extraordinary effort. But the alternative is far worse. The current war has already led to the killing of huge numbers of civilians, the destruction of Gaza, the undermining of Israel’s security and international support, the creation of another 1.5 million Palestinian refugees, and the looming threat of a further mass transfer of Palestinians out of their ancestral lands. Any attempt to resolve the day-after problem by reverting to the old paradigms will simply invite these catastrophes to be repeated again.

THE MISSING ENDGAME

To understand the true scope of the day-after problem, it is first necessary to recognize that the current conflict did not begin with Hamas’s attack on October 7. Nor is it limited to Gaza alone. Although the Palestinian question begins with the 1948 war, in which an estimated 750,000 were dispossessed of their homes, the best starting point for today’s crisis is the 1967 war. That conflict led to Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem and produced an estimated 300,000 new Palestinian refugees. It also marked the beginning of decades of efforts to end the occupation and establish a viable Palestinian future.

The first such attempt was UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967. Although the resolution referred to “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” it did not envisage a separate Palestinian state. Instead, Gaza was supposed to revert to Egyptian control and the West Bank to Jordanian control. Nor did the resolution define a time frame for ending the occupation, calling only for a political process that was open and not binding. Indirect negotiations among the Jordanian, Egyptian, and Israeli sides were held through a UN mediator, without any results.

Two and a half decades later, the Madrid conference—launched by President George H. W. Bush in 1991 after the first Gulf War—finally brought the Palestinians directly to the negotiating table. Once again, however, the process left the endgame unclear beyond referring to Resolution 242, which was interpreted by Israel in a drastically different way than by the international community. (Although the resolution called for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories, Israel interpreted this to mean not withdrawal from all such territories but only to so-called safe borders it never specified.) Even after the Palestinians started negotiating separately with Israel once the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin came to power in June 1992, the process never defined a separate Palestinian state as the objective of negotiations.

Negotiations were often open-ended or failed to specify the objective.

Then came the Oslo accords in 1993, perhaps the most well known of all of these peace efforts. In this case, not only did the two sides mutually recognize each other and establish a Palestinian interim authority in Gaza and parts of the West Bank, they also set up a five-year negotiations process toward a durable peace. But although the process was supposed to result in a lasting solution to the conflict, the parties failed to specify what that solution is: in other words, the endgame was not clear at the outset. Moreover, the Oslo accords did not freeze settlement activity, meaning that the two sides were negotiating over the future of the occupied territories even as one of them—the Israelis—was continuing to change these territories’ geography and demographics. Indeed, Rabin, in his last speech to the Knesset in September 1995, where the parliament ratified the second part of the Oslo accords, declared that Israel’s objective was a Palestinian “entity which is less than a state.”

In fact, the conflict’s main players did not agree on a two-state model until 2000, near the end of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s tenure. At the time, Clinton presented the two sides with an overall framework based on a Palestinian state, largely defined by the 1967 borders, that would be established alongside the state of Israel, with special arrangements for Jerusalem, refugees, and security. When last-minute negotiations over these parameters failed and the second intifada broke out, both parties became convinced that they had no partners for peace at the other end of the table. Successive efforts since then, including the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the Middle East Road Map of 2002–2003, the 2007 Annapolis conference, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy in 2013—the last official effort by the U.S. to help negotiate a settlement—have all failed.

Although there are many reasons why each of these rounds of negotiations ran aground, there were larger shortcomings that were common to most of them: they were almost always either open-ended or did not specify the endgame at the outset. They also lacked a credible monitoring mechanism to make sure the parties were meeting their stepwise obligations on the road to a permanent settlement. Moreover, on numerous occasions, negotiations broke down over what the endgame should be, rather than on the steps needed to reach that goal.

FROM FAILURE TO CATASTROPHE

For Palestinians, the consequences of these failures have been devastating. Israel has been able to continue settlement activity, illegal under international law, in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem (and, until 2005, in Gaza), absorbing Palestinian land and rendering the establishment of a viable Palestinian state increasingly difficult. Since the signing of the Oslo accords, the Israeli settler population has grown from about 250,000 to more than 750,000, almost a quarter of the population in the entire West Bank and East Jerusalem, while the relentless expansion of settlements has steadily broken up contiguous Palestinian territory.

Amid these failed negotiations, Gaza suffered a particularly harsh fate. In 2005, then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza, ending Israel’s direct military presence. But the Israeli government built a security barrier around the territory to isolate it, and Israel continued to control who went in and out of the strip. Israel also prevented its Palestinian inhabitants from having an airport or a seaport, effectively cutting off Gaza from the world. As a result, Israel’s occupation effectively continued, with brutal consequences. After Hamas gained full control of the strip following a split with the Palestinian Authority in 2007, living conditions further deteriorated to the point where the per capita income of Gazans has been reduced to a fraction of that of Palestinians in the West Bank.

Then, when the Obama administration ended, the United States gave up on negotiations between the two sides entirely. First under U.S. President Donald Trump and then under U.S. President Joe Biden, Washington replaced peacemaking efforts with the Abraham Accords, a series of bilateral treaties among several Arab states and Israel that are not based on the “land for peace” formula derived from Resolution 242. The Palestinians had no involvement at all. The Biden administration, in particular, assumed that if it encouraged regional cooperation, peace between Israelis and Palestinians could wait for better times. In turn, the Israeli government used the accords to argue that it was no longer necessary to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, since they could forge separate agreements with Arab states in the region.

This is the context in which the October 7 attacks took place. Targeting civilians is abhorrent in any scenario, regardless of which side is the perpetrator. But it is impossible to ignore the reality that Gaza had become a giant, walled-off prison over the last ten years, with millions of inmates who no longer had any reason to think that the occupation would end.

PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE

The Biden administration has recognized that there will need to be a political process after the war in Gaza ends. Guided by the October 1973 war, which ultimately led to peace between Egypt and Israel, and the first Gulf War of 1991, which led to the Madrid conference, the Biden administration has started to discuss plans for the day after for Gaza. But if that thinking is limited to who rules Gaza after Hamas, or if Washington commits to an open-ended process that simply repeats the mistakes of earlier ones, the prospects for success are practically nonexistent. Overwhelmingly, Palestinians today feel that they were taken for a ride, engaging in peaceful efforts to end the occupation while Israel was creating facts on the ground that make a two-state solution impossible. Thus, any political process for Gaza has to be credible, time-bound, and with a clearly defined endgame—before any negotiations start. Otherwise, it will simply be a waste of time.

As of now, it is crucial to acknowledge that the elements necessary for a serious U.S.-led process are absent. The United States is entering an election year in which the chances for launching a peace process that requires applying pressure on all sides—particularly Israel—are remote. The current right-wing Israeli government has also repeatedly and publicly declared that it has no intention of ending the occupation or helping establish a Palestinian state. And although it is true that a majority of Israelis hold the current government responsible for the security lapses on October 7—and polls indicate that the opposition would handily win new elections if they were held tomorrow—the public divide in Israel today is no longer between pro-peace and anti-peace camps, as it was decades ago. Instead, it is merely between pro- and anti-Netanyahu camps, with both sides holding a hard-line, almost identical stance against a Palestinian state.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority has lost much of its credibility and legitimacy. It has not held elections since 2006, and its approval rating was very low, even before October 7. In a poll conducted during the brief cease-fire in Gaza in late November, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 88 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza want Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to resign. Only seven percent want the PA under Abbas to rule Gaza after the war. No side can claim to represent the Palestinians in any political process without elections, but the PA, Israel, and the United States will almost certainly oppose such elections in the near term, given that Hamas might get a plurality of votes, as the poll suggests. While the same poll indicates that figures like Marwan Barghouti enjoy wide support among both Fatah and Hamas publics, it is doubtful that Israel would agree to his release, precisely because the current government is not interested in a political deal.

The reconstruction of Gaza must be a step toward a final settlement.

But despite these difficulties, it is worth setting down the specific elements that a credible process would require so that Washington can avoid the pitfalls of past negotiations. First, the United States should present a political plan that would lay out a clearly defined objective of ending the occupation within a specified time frame, say three to five years. Precise borders on the basis of the 1967 lines with minor and reciprocal land swaps to accommodate the settlements along the border would be subject to negotiations. The United Nations would issue a resolution recognizing a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 border, with details to be worked out through negotiations. New settlement construction would be completely frozen.

Then, to carry out this plan, negotiations would be focused on the steps needed to reach the objective rather than on what the endgame looks like. Many of the necessary possible steps are already in view. Referendums on the plan should be held in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza to establish and ensure popular support: voters would go to the polls based on the plan’s clearly defined political horizon, which might break the impression on both sides that a two-state solution is no longer possible. In this framing, the issue of who rules Gaza would become a step on the road to ending the occupation, rather than an endgame in itself: in questions of governance, Gaza and the West should be treated as one.

Once such a process is underway, both sides will have an incentive to reconsider solutions that were rejected in the past because of the absence of an overall political framework or a concrete timeline. For example, the reconstruction of Gaza could become a step along the road to a final settlement, with parties such as Gulf states, the European Union, and the World Bank ready to take part in ways they are not today. (The case of Syria offers a useful lesson here: although the civil war has been effectively over for nearly five years, little reconstruction has taken place in the absence of a comprehensive plan for the future of the country.) An international fund could be set up to help Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank stay on their land to alleviate fears among Palestinians they will be mass transferred outside of their historic territory. The Arab Peace Initiative, which offered collective peace treaties and collective security guarantees for Israel by all Arab states, could be then revived, giving Arab states a political, security, and economic role in the Palestinian territories and a strong incentive for Israelis to embrace the plan.

Although this outline may seem ambitious, it is grounded in realism: its purpose is to show what a serious political process will entail and to make clear that the failed processes of the past cannot simply be resurrected. It is worth noting that this plan leaves aside the still more difficult issue of what to do with the existing settlements. Even if the political will exists on both sides to end the occupation and adopt a two-state solution, coming up with an ingenious solution to the settlement question will still be a daunting task. If the international community decides this overall plan is too unrealistic to achieve, they should weigh the costs of the alternatives.

FROM BAD TO WORSE

If, at the end of the war in Gaza, a serious political process proves impossible to put into play, three alternative scenarios could unfold. First, the parties could revert to waiting for a quieter, better time—much as the United States did for years leading up to the October 7 attacks. This strategy, if returned to now, would certainly fail. It assumes that a two-state solution is ultimately the preferred outcome for all parties and that it is simply a matter of having the right political forces in power to make it happen. But in Israel, support in the Knesset for a peace agreement to share the land has dropped from a majority of members 30 years ago to no more than 15 members today. Moreover, the logic of waiting assumes that there is a static status quo, which is clearly not the case given Israel’s continued expansion of settlements. If the number of settlers today already makes it extremely difficult to separate the two communities into two states, the situation could become irreversibly worse in a few years, once the settler population exceeds one million.

A second alternative, in the absence of a serious political process, could be even worse: a mass transfer of Palestinians out of their historic land either through force or by making Palestinian life in the occupied territories untenable or unbearable. The reason that such a drastic outcome needs to be taken seriously is the demographic reality Israel now faces: the number of Palestinian Arabs in areas under Israel’s control is now 7.4 million—greater than the 7.2 million Israeli Jews inside Israel and the occupied territories. Given that Israel at present does not want to end the occupation and accept a two-state solution, and given that it does not want to become a minority ruling over a majority in what many human rights organizations describe as apartheid, then its preferred option will be to transfer huge numbers of Palestinians out of territories under Israeli control: from Gaza into Egypt and from the West Bank into Jordan.

Already, the Israeli government has made clear that it is thinking along these lines. Large parts of Gaza have been rendered practically uninhabitable, and several Israeli cabinet ministers, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, have directly or indirectly promoted the idea of moving Palestinians to other countries. Several Israeli and international commentators have also portrayed the Egyptian and Jordanian decisions to close their borders to Palestinians as an inhumane act, perhaps to pressure both states into letting Palestinians flee. But it is clear that the Israeli government would then bar them from coming back.

But any attempt at mass transfer will not be easy to implement. Jordan and Egypt have already drawn international attention to this scenario, to the point where the United States and other countries have publicly come out in strong opposition. Palestinians themselves also appear uninterested in leaving, having learned from 1948, when 750,000 were forced to leave their land and were never permitted to return.

That leaves a third and most likely alternative: continued Israeli occupation, but now under even more unsustainable conditions. Palestinians have a birth rate higher than that of Jewish Israelis, and as they increasingly lose hope for the prospect of a Palestinian state, their demands for equal rights with Israelis will grow louder and more insistent. The conflict could then become more violent. According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll, 63 percent of Palestinians today say they would support armed resistance to end the occupation. In fact, such resistance had already started in the West Bank in the months before October 7, with young, leaderless youth taking up arms and shooting at Israelis.

Moreover, if it chooses to continue the occupation, Israel’s challenge won’t just be internal. The country is also confronting an emerging younger generation in the United States and many other Western countries that has shown it is far more supportive of Palestinians and the issue of equal rights than its predecessors. As this generation rises to positions of power, the world will become increasingly critical of the Israeli occupation, and the focus will shift from defining an illusory peace settlement to tackling the problem of deep injustice in indefinitely occupied lands. It is also likely to make Israel increasingly isolated on the world stage.

This is where a continuation of the status quo will likely end. The international community is certainly partly to blame for all the violence that is unfolding today. By abandoning any serious attempt to address the underlying causes of conflict in recent years, Western leaders, as well as governments in the region, have helped create the untenable situation that now exists. It is possible that another process will be initiated along the lines of many earlier ones. If that happens, it, too, will fail, and violence will continue to define the world of the Israelis and Palestinians. Either the United States and its international partners must make a historic decision to end the conflict now and move both sides swiftly toward a viable two-state solution, or the world will have to contend with an even darker future. For soon, it will no longer be a question of occupation but the more difficult issue of outright apartheid. The choice cannot be clearer.

• MARWAN MUASHER  is Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was Foreign Minister of Jordan from 2002 to 2004 and Deputy Prime Minister from 2004 to 2005.

Foreign Affairs · by Marwan Muasher · January 15, 2024

6. Readiness Redefined, But Not Measured

Excerpts:

Individuals determine the outcome of combat, and individual readiness determines the likelihood of that outcome, but the Air Force’s method of determining the readiness of its pilots is flawed, which reduces the probability of victory in the next air war. To be prepared for major combat operations against a peer threat, the Air Force needs to be able to understand the readiness of its pilots continuously, and at a more detailed level than is currently available.

The Air Force needs to create an Ascension-to-Retirement Competency Profile for every pilot, connecting the pilot’s skill growth in undergraduate pilot training and the formal training unit to the pilot’s skill retention in operations, for every skill. Unit leaders need this to make accurate training and combat manning decisions, instructors need this to individualize training, and Air Force leaders need this to understand the readiness of their force. Furthermore, for future AI and analytic breakthroughs measuring and predicting pilot performance to be actionable, they will require this foundational technology to already be in place. To increase readiness immediately, and to prepare for the future, the Air Force should create the analytic backbone to track training readiness continuously for every pilot.

Readiness Redefined, But Not Measured - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Matthew Ross · January 15, 2024

Immediately after I completed my upgrade to F-15E multi-ship flight lead in 2017, my squadron deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. A flight lead is trusted to command a four ship of fighter jets and, as part of this upgrade training, I had spent the previous six months learning how to lead counter-air and contested air-to-ground missions against a peer threat. Put simply: I was trained to fight and defend against other fighter jets. However, when I deployed for combat, the focus was entirely on close air support, a mission set I had not recently practiced, against an enemy with no jets to fight against. My most recent training to fight a peer adversary was not relevant.

Immediately following that deployment, I started the instructor upgrade, where I taught the advanced flying skills emphasized in the flight lead upgrade, but which I once again had not recently accomplished during the six-month combat deployment. Twice in one year, the Air Force had me fly missions that were misaligned with my readiness. The Air Force’s leadership believed I was mission-ready because I had flown the “required” number of sorties each month to stay current. Yet, in each instance the skills necessary for success in each mission had decayed at precisely the wrong time. And leadership had no manner in which to determine or track that skill decay.

In this case, the Air Force fell short of answering Richard Bett’s three key questions: Ready for what? Ready for when? What needs to be ready? The Air Force could not determine what mission set I needed to be ready for: high-intensity conflict or uncontested close air support. The Air Force could not determine when I needed to be ready to fight each mission set: Should I be training for close air support before the deployment instead of high-intensity counter air? The Air Force could not determine what skills needed to be upgraded and which could be allowed to decay in preparation for the deployment or the instructor upgrade.

Become a Member

The Air Force’s leadership understands that two decades of low-intensity air conflict in the Middle East has resulted in a force unprepared for major combat operations against a peer threat. In September 2023, Secretary Frank Kendall ordered a comprehensive review of readiness across the Air Force, stating that “every person and organization in the Department, starting today, needs to consider these questions; If asked to go to war today against a peer competitor, are we as ready as we could be? What can we change in each of our units and organizations to be more ready?”

The Air Force cannot currently measure the readiness of its individual pilots because it relies on one-size-fits-all training metrics. It asks squadron commanders to only report the readiness of the entire squadron, and only on a subjective scale.

As a former fighter pilot who implemented analytics into fighter pilot training while on active duty, a current member of the Air National Guard, and a civilian working for a dual-use AI company, I have a personal and professional interest in this issue. My experience makes me believe that it is important for the Air Force to implement the foundational technology necessary to determine pilot readiness based on individual performance, or as scholar Todd Harrison would describe it, outcome-based readiness. While the Army has implemented individualized skill tracking in their virtual training, and the Navy has adopted individual sailor competency tracking across entire careers, the Air Force lags behind both of its sister services. To accurately determine the readiness of its pilots, the Air Force should create an Ascension-to-Retirement Competency Profile that tracks every pilot’s attainment of skills through training, and then the retention of those skills while serving in operational units. This will enable higher individual readiness levels, objective squadron readiness assessments and more effective training.

The Air Force Cannot Measure Pilot Readiness

Two years ago, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Brown and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger argued in these pages that the Department of Defense needed to redefine readiness: “The joint force requires a holistic, rigorous, and analytical framework to assess readiness properly.” However, their focus was on modernizing equipment, not training. In June 2023, Berger and then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness Kimberly Jackson proposed to redefine readiness at the strategic level by evaluating the holistic readiness of the joint force. They argued that “historically, the department has defined readiness by measuring personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance at the unit level to ensure each is ready for its assigned missions. This definition is useful but not entirely sufficient to fully understanding the military’s preparedness to execute its missions.”

While the Department of Defense attempts to evaluate readiness at the strategic level, and believes they can evaluate readiness at the unit level, the Air Force additionally should develop the capability to determine the readiness of its individual airmen. The Air Force cannot determine the readiness of its squadrons if it cannot determine the readiness of each pilot. Squadron leaders cannot make decisions on who should fly which training and combat missions if they do not have the foundational technology tracking the readiness of each pilot. A fundamental axiom of analytics and AI is that “garbage in leads to garbage out,” and the metrics taken into the current training readiness model are inadequate: Squadron commanders do not have access to accurate, detailed, objective metrics on their pilots. Therefore, commanders report the readiness of their squadrons based on superficial metrics and an obsolete Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandum, resulting in a subjective output for the most important military metric — warfighter readiness.

A Subjective Process

Each month, every squadron commander must report the readiness of the squadron in the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the centralized and authoritative web-based software that U.S. Code Title 10 requires all military branches to use to report unit-level readiness. The report is broken down into four parts, three of which are objective (personnel, equipment availability, and equipment readiness), and one which is subjective (training). Personnel readiness is defined as a ratio that compares available deployable personnel versus all assigned personnel. Equipment availability is a ratio comparing the amount of equipment in the squadron’s possession versus the amount of equipment it is authorized to possess. Equipment readiness measures how many mission-capable aircraft a squadron currently has versus the total number of authorized aircraft. The personnel, equipment availability, and equipment readiness metrics are objective numerical inputs, leading to objective numerical outputs. For example, an individual F-15E jet has 30-plus years of maintenance records that include scheduled inspections, depot maintenance, pilot debriefs, and jet modifications, all so that the Air Force can understand that specific jet down to its individual rivets.

Conversely, according to the Congressional Research Service’s The Fundamentals of Military Readiness, “The final assessed resource area — training — allows for the most subjectivity. Training readiness does not lend itself to quantifiable evaluation as easily as personnel and equipment readiness; it relies more heavily on the commander’s professional military judgment.” The Air Force’s most important resource, the readiness of its pilots, is the only resource that the service has opted out of objectively quantifying. Training readiness is a commander’s subjective assessment of how well the entire unit performs certain mission essential tasks. The possible assessments are “trained” (T), “needs practice” (P), or “untrained” (U).

The Congressional Research Service report explains how this process works: “The methodology assigns a weight of 3 to each “T,” 2 to each “P,” and “1” to each U. These figures are summed and then divided by the product of 3 multiplied by the number of [mission essential tasks]. The resulting quotient is multiplied by 100 to produce a percentage, which is interpreted according to a published scale.” The four ratings (three objective, one subjective) are then combined into a 1 to 5 “C-scale” declaring how ready the squadron is to deploy (1 = ready, 5 = not prepared). This process is, quite obviously, not intuitive. In simple terms: The Defense Readiness Reporting System has three high quality quantitative metrics and one qualitative assessment. It then attempts to combine these into a 1 to 5 scale for ease of use. This approach results in three problems. First, the methodology is statistically specious. Second, the data is subjective. And third, the reporting is not timely. As a result, the Air Force is not truly capturing readiness rates.

Imprecise Reporting

The Defense Readiness Reporting System translates subjective assessments of skills into a ratio. Ratios are based on equal spacing between numbers (50 percent is equally separated from 40 percent as it is from 60 percent) and a true zero. But in this case, “trained” versus “needs practice” is not mathematically separated (it is an ordinal scale), and “untrained” does not mean zero percent trained. Therefore, these metrics are not conducive to a ratio. Worse, the Defense Readiness Reporting System recognizes this fallacy, but instead of correcting it, the report combines the three quality ratios that are statistically valid (personnel, equipment availability, and equipment readiness) with this fourth invalid ratio into an ordinal scale to create the C-scale. This method reduces the quality of the data for the first three readiness ratios to align with the qualitative training data. Put simply: The Defense Readiness Reporting System is construing a subjective assessment as an authoritative objective metric.

Second, the three objective ratings (personnel, equipment availability, and equipment readiness) are all based on objective data. However, training is a subjective judgment made by the commander. This is because the Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandum and aircrew tracking systems were designed as a one-size-fits-all solution to continuation training. The memorandum states that each inexperienced pilot must fly nine sorties and conduct three simulator events per month (with certain exceptions), along with currency requirements (i.e., the pilot must drop a simulated weapon every 60 days). After each sortie, the pilot then fills out a training accomplishment report that states what the pilot accomplished in that sortie.

When filling out the Defense Readiness Reporting System report, the squadron commander uses those training accomplishment reports to see how many of the squadron’s pilots flew the required number of sorties that month, and how many did not. The commander can also see how many of a specific mission set (for example, defensive counter-air) the squadron flew, and make a judgment call on the squadron’s capability. It is even possible for the commander to view on which days specific pilots flew specific missions. As a result, the commander could decide to declare, on a per pilot basis, who is mission-ready for each mission. However, unless a commander has intimate knowledge of every skill of every pilot, then these determinations are — at best — a guess. The commander does not currently have access to the tools required to make either better subjective determinations of proficiency or entirely objective determinations. With updated tools, commanders would gain insight into the outcome-based readiness of the squadron’s individual pilots, which is crucial to understanding if the force is prepared to fight.

The third problem with the current system is that the commander fills out this report once a month. A hypothetical example is useful to explain the problem: If Capt. Stephens flew defensive counter-air on Oct. 3, is he still mission ready a month later? Does that subjective assessment of readiness change if, instead of an inexperienced wingman, it was the Weapons School graduate? How does the commander compare the readiness of these two pilots? Currently, the Air Force’s only recognition of skill decay is the basic recognition that fighter pilot skills do decay, that they decay faster for inexperienced pilots than experienced, and therefore inexperienced pilots are required to fly one more sortie per month than experienced pilots. Because of these limitations, the commander has no option but to assert the readiness of his squadron as a whole, subjectively, on just one day of each month. The readiness of individual pilots, and therefore of the squadron as a whole, fluctuates on a daily basis but the squadron can be called to war on any day, so the commander needs to have real-time insight into his pilots’ ability to execute every assigned mission essential task. Before advanced analytics and AI, this manner of declaring readiness was laudable, but now we can do better.

How to Fix It

The Air Force recognized the ability of analytics to assist in maintaining its aircraft and therefore whole-heartedly embraced predictive maintenance to increase equipment readiness. To revolutionize training readiness, the Air Force should move ahead with predictive training.

The Army, via the Synthetic Training Environment Experimental Learning for Readiness program, has proven that predicting skill decay in individual skills for operational personnel is possible and useful. Likewise, the goal of the Navy’s Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum program is to track combat skills of operational sailors throughout their careers. In each case, the program objectively measures the readiness levels of individual warfighters, with the goal of doing so over years of training.

The Air Force should take the lessons learned from the Army and Navy. Specifically, once a pilot becomes mission-ready, artificial intelligence can use the pilot’s past performance to predict how quickly their knowledge and skills will decay, and then recommend how often the pilot should train and which knowledge and skills the pilot should practice during each training event. At the highest level, some inexperienced fighter pilots will require more than nine sorties per month, while others will require fewer. But the real power of an Ascension-to-Retirement Competency Profile is that squadrons will know exactly what skills have decayed for each pilot to the point that the pilot would be unable to reach the mission outcomes necessary for victory. For instance, Capt. Stephens may not be ready for a defensive counter-air mission because his flight leadership skills have deteriorated, while Lt. Smith may not be ready for the same mission set because her defensive timeline knowledge has decayed. The squadron can then schedule those pilots for the appropriate training. Then, throughout the pilot’s career, these skill-decay curves will shift as the pilot becomes more proficient generally, and each curve will shift as the pilot masters some skills faster than other skills.

This skill decay per mission set will become even more powerful when connected to 19th Air Force Pilot Training Transformation’s initiative to track skill growth in every competency from the student’s first day in Undergraduate Pilot Training to the student’s final flight in fighter/bomber fundamentals by combining the skill-growth curve for every competency in a pilot’s undergraduate training with the student’s performance in his assigned aircraft in the formal training unit and mission qualification training, AI will better plot and predict the skill decay of every skill and mission set on the individual level. These metrics will be continuous, so that commanders will have a complete view of the readiness of every pilot in every mission set on every day. With individualized readiness training, pilots can maintain a level of readiness in alignment with AFFORGEN, the Air Force’s acronym for the force sustainment model that places squadrons in a 24-month deployment cycle so that readiness requirements can be increased as the squadron nears its “available to commit” phase, and then decreased in its “reset” phase. For instance, commanders can determine the level of readiness they require from each assigned pilot depending upon which phase of the cycle the squadron is in and the expected mission sets the squadron will fly in that phase. Squadrons will be able to individualize training and track readiness based on their needs, and the needs of the Air Force.

The first iteration of this process involves mostly subjective data and the training data remains reliant on the instructor’s judgment of a student’s performance. The operational data is dependent on what a pilot records after flight. However, creating the tool to collect, analyze, and report on that data would already dramatically improve current training readiness reporting. In the near term, novel approaches to collecting and evaluating pilot performance via telemetric data, including from the Air Force’s Quick Reaction Instrument Package will allow automated evaluators to determine pilot performance continuously and objectively. By combining automated evaluation with career-long competency tracking, the Air Force can reach Harrison’s vision of output-based readiness metrics with a feedback loop.

When the Air Force tracks individualized skill growth and decay curves over the course of a career, they can unlock the secrets behind pilot performance. Discovering which students most quickly gain knowledge and skills, and which operational pilots increase their skills and decrease their decay curves the fastest, will allow the Air Force to determine what led to success and failure. In the F-15E formal training unit, we barely scratched the surface of this when we linked failure in the unit back to specific tasks in the beginning of the same student’s training in undergraduate pilot training, and then pushed those insights to undergraduate pilot training to influence syllabus changes at the beginning of a pilot’s career. If officers in the Air Force had access to the data and resources described above, they could have discovered numerous actionable insights into pilot success, resulting in individualized training and predictive ascension testing.

Ready Pilots Win Air Wars

Individuals determine the outcome of combat, and individual readiness determines the likelihood of that outcome, but the Air Force’s method of determining the readiness of its pilots is flawed, which reduces the probability of victory in the next air war. To be prepared for major combat operations against a peer threat, the Air Force needs to be able to understand the readiness of its pilots continuously, and at a more detailed level than is currently available.

The Air Force needs to create an Ascension-to-Retirement Competency Profile for every pilot, connecting the pilot’s skill growth in undergraduate pilot training and the formal training unit to the pilot’s skill retention in operations, for every skill. Unit leaders need this to make accurate training and combat manning decisions, instructors need this to individualize training, and Air Force leaders need this to understand the readiness of their force. Furthermore, for future AI and analytic breakthroughs measuring and predicting pilot performance to be actionable, they will require this foundational technology to already be in place. To increase readiness immediately, and to prepare for the future, the Air Force should create the analytic backbone to track training readiness continuously for every pilot.

Become a Member

Matthew Ross is a former F-15E evaluator pilot with over 1500 flight hours, including over 350 combat hours, and is a current member of the Air National Guard. As an instructor in the F-15E formal training unit, he implemented AI-based human performance processes into fighter pilot training. He is currently the Director of Government Solutions at Eduworks.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the U.S. Air Force or the Eduworks Corporation.

Image: Mark Hybers

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Matthew Ross · January 15, 2024

7. Why Philanthropists Should Become Heretics

Excerpts:

There is a legitimate role for philanthropy in troubled times, but one that has to reflect them. No longer is it enough for established figures to use foundations and other philanthropies to prop up an existing order. The world of Hoffman or Bundy, let alone that of Carnegie and Rockefeller, no longer exists. Today, the sector will only find legitimacy in its ability to help confront the manifold crises in ways others cannot.

In his 2018 book Just Giving, the political scientist Rob Reich brought a skeptical eye to the question of whether foundations have any valid purpose in liberal democracies but concluded that they can indeed be beneficial by fulfilling roles that only they can take on, through their distinctive constitutions. Reich identified two in particular: pluralism (foundations can challenge orthodoxies by pursuing idiosyncratic goals without clear electoral or market rationales) and discovery (foundations can serve as the “risk capital” for democratic societies, experimenting and investing for the long term). Precisely because entities in the philanthropic sector do not answer to voters or shareholders, they can be both radically urgent and radically patient: moving faster than other actors in response to a crisis or opportunity but also possessing far greater staying power, thus the ability to back projects whose success is judged in decades rather than months.

This approach demands that those who were once secular priests—the leaders of the philanthropic sector—abandon their cassocks and accept the mantle of the heretic. Only by challenging the system and agitating on its fringes can they realize their full potential in today’s crisis-bound world.

Why Philanthropists Should Become Heretics

Donors Must Challenge, Not Comfort, the Existing Order

By Mark Malloch-Brown

January 15, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Mark Malloch-Brown · January 15, 2024

Philanthropy and power have always been closely intertwined. Wealthy men in ancient Athens paid for public goods and services, such as naval defenses, under the so-called liturgical system, in which the richest citizens financed some functions of the state. In many Islamic societies, propertied Muslims have ceded parts of their fortunes to charitable waqf entities that have funded services such as soup kitchens and hospitals. In early-modern Europe, the Medicis and other potentates created what were the microfinance schemes of their time, lending small sums of money to poor citizens.

Those philanthropists faced an abiding tradeoff between embracing an existing order and seeking to challenge it. As the above examples suggest, they most commonly have opted for the former choice, working within prevailing structures while trying to mitigate their shortcomings. There have, however, been exceptional moments when philanthropists contributed to systemic change: merchants helped the theologian Martin Luther spread his ideas in the early Reformation, for example, and prosperous nineteenth-century British radicals, such as the economist Thomas Attwood, championed the expansion of the democratic franchise.

The outcome of this tradeoff almost always influences the political order more broadly, and with it, international relations. From the liturgical system’s role in the rise of Athens to the part played by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and others in trying to fund a more equitable global distribution of vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic, the strategies pursued by philanthropists have shaped wider events.

That matters all the more in a world as chaotic as today’s. As the 2024 World Economic Forum gathers in Davos, it does so against the backdrop of dauntingly complex and interlocking crises. This tumultuous global moment is also an inflection point for philanthropy. Wealthy donors can sometimes achieve what other entities cannot; they have greater freedom than most states and businesses to experiment and pursue unorthodox solutions to common problems. But in a time of such intense rupture and flux, philanthropy must adopt a more disruptive role, moving out from under the tumbling pillars and walls of the old order and helping to lay the foundations of a new, better one.

FROM GILDED AGE TYCOONS TO TECH MOGULS

The philanthropic tradition of the current era begins with Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, and other Gilded Age titans of industry of the late nineteenth century. As Carnegie wrote in his 1889 book, The Gospel of Wealth, the purpose of such giving was not “to feed our egos, but to feed the hungry and help people to help themselves.” These endeavors, however, were fundamentally paternalistic: rich men giving back to the societies in which they had accumulated their fortunes, and grandly decreeing how their grants should be used.

Over subsequent decades, this credo would face challenges, including from New Deal-era progressives wary of rich men ascribing to charity what was properly the realm of the state and of McCarthyite conservatives targeting philanthropic foundations as part of anticommunist fearmongering. But the paternalistic approach—recycling the income earned within a certain civic order back into that same order—would continue well into the second half of the twentieth century.

Take the Ford Foundation, founded in 1936 by Henry Ford’s son, Edsel. In 1950, it appointed as its president Paul Hoffman, fresh from his role as administrator of the Marshall Plan in Europe, a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the immediate postwar era. He later adopted the same title, administrator, as the inaugural head of the United Nations Development Program, a position that I would later hold myself. One of Hoffmann’s successors at Ford was McGeorge Bundy, who led the foundation from 1966 to 1979 after five years as U.S. national security adviser in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a post in which he was one of the leading architects of the escalation in Vietnam. Under Bundy’s presidency, the foundation supported Johnson’s agenda by backing civil rights causes and even offered grants to the staff of the presidential candidate Robert Kennedy after Kennedy’s assassination in 1968.

Look, too, at the Rockefeller Foundation and Ford Foundation roles in the agricultural “Green Revolution” in South Asia, a development program closely tied to the Cold War imperatives of the United States (the “green” in its name an explicit contrast with “red,” as in communist). They were as much loyal partners of a U.S. policy agenda abroad as they were allies of power at home.

In a time of rupture and flux, philanthropy must adopt a disruptive role.

In retrospect, the likes of Hoffman and Bundy resemble secular bishops, legitimized by their social standing, the fortunes behind the philanthropies they ran, and their various trips through the revolving door between the political world of Washington and the foundation world of New York. The foundation leaderships ranked at the pinnacle of social and professional life; I still recall when one foundation president confided to me some 20 years ago that he had resisted nomination as a U.S. cabinet secretary to keep his name in the ring for the job he now held.

The crises of the 1970s—the oil shock, the Watergate scandal, and the bloody denouement of the Vietnam War—would take their toll on philanthropies along with other liberal institutions. But these organizations flourished again in the immediate post-Cold War era. This was the time when George Soros, whose philanthropy the Open Society Foundations I today run, started to scale up his giving: opening the Central European University in 1991, funding myriad organizations in post-apartheid South Africa, and giving its first grants to groups in Israel and the Palestinian territories, along with much other work elsewhere.

In their 2008 book, Philanthrocapitalism, the journalists Matthew Bishop and Michael Green document what might be considered the ceremonial high point of that new golden age of Western philanthropy. They describe how, at a grand event in June 2006 at the New York Public Library, the celebrated investor Warren Buffett signed a series of letters pledging swaths of his fortune to foundations run by his children and to the Gates Foundation. As if that alone did not crystallize the kinship between the titans of the new Gilded Age and those of the original one, Buffett had much earlier encouraged Gates on his philanthropic path by giving him a copy of Carnegie’s The Gospel of Wealth.

The 2006 gathering at the library, however, now looks like the end of an era. The global financial crisis that began the following year brought a rapid decline in public trust in all kinds of political, social, and cultural institutions. In this new environment, philanthropies have found themselves subject to unparalleled degrees of suspicion and doubt—as well as outright conspiracy theories, such as those that have targeted the Gates Foundation and Open Society Foundations.

Partly in reaction to this trend, philanthropies have begun to cast aside the old paternalistic way of working and more frequently let their grantees decide what to do with their money. This “trust-based” philanthropy is epitomized by givers such as MacKenzie Scott, the former wife of the Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, who provide funds without strings attached on the grounds that practitioners know best where such resources can have the greatest impact. It puts the grantees first and reduces the active involvement of the philanthropist—a humbler profile for a more skeptical era.

The Open Society Foundations have always embraced what Soros calls “political philanthropy”—an orientation that is keenly alert to the realities of power and people’s agency—and have therefore been able to play a pioneering role by giving large sums to change-making institutions. In September, for example, we committed $109 million to a new foundation to champion the rights of Roma people in Europe—an organization led by people from the Roma community. In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, we made a $220 million investment in emerging organizations and leaders who are building power in Black communities across the United States.

IN SEARCH OF THE NEW

Clearly, this trust-based giving is a better match for the moment than the old top-down paternalism. Yet the sector needs to go further still. The global dashboard is flashing red. Halfway through the implementation period of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, only 15 percent are on track, 48 percent are moderately or severely off track, and the remaining 37 percent are stagnating or in regression. Around 60 percent of low-income countries are in or at high risk of debt distress. In 2022, the number of annual deaths in state-based conflicts surpassed 200,000 for the first time since 1986. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports that the number of people currently displaced by force surpassed a record 114 million in September, up from 108 million at the start of the year alone. Closely related to all of this, of course, is the alarming reality that 2023 was the hottest year on record, a reminder of the urgency of addressing the climate crisis.

The prevailing paradigms of power and government are failing. Both the New Deal order that arose after World War II and the neoliberal order that succeeded it in the 1970s and 1980s had their intellectual roots in a narrow cluster of think tanks within a few blocks of one another in Washington and London. The successor paradigm will probably comprise neither a return to the heavy-handed state intervention of the former nor to the market fundamentalism of the latter, but rather new syntheses of society, markets, and government that may today be hard to imagine, especially from major Western power centers. It will emerge from an array of social institutions, universities, street movements, and field experiments around the world, often in the global South.

The challenge before philanthropies is to identify and support those needles in haystacks. Doing so will require a strong sense of the different directions the world might take. Program officers working in the philanthropic sector must seek out the leaders, campaigners, and thinkers pioneering that change, then help them to get on with it on their own terms.

HERETICS, NOT PRIESTS

There is a legitimate role for philanthropy in troubled times, but one that has to reflect them. No longer is it enough for established figures to use foundations and other philanthropies to prop up an existing order. The world of Hoffman or Bundy, let alone that of Carnegie and Rockefeller, no longer exists. Today, the sector will only find legitimacy in its ability to help confront the manifold crises in ways others cannot.

In his 2018 book Just Giving, the political scientist Rob Reich brought a skeptical eye to the question of whether foundations have any valid purpose in liberal democracies but concluded that they can indeed be beneficial by fulfilling roles that only they can take on, through their distinctive constitutions. Reich identified two in particular: pluralism (foundations can challenge orthodoxies by pursuing idiosyncratic goals without clear electoral or market rationales) and discovery (foundations can serve as the “risk capital” for democratic societies, experimenting and investing for the long term). Precisely because entities in the philanthropic sector do not answer to voters or shareholders, they can be both radically urgent and radically patient: moving faster than other actors in response to a crisis or opportunity but also possessing far greater staying power, thus the ability to back projects whose success is judged in decades rather than months.

This approach demands that those who were once secular priests—the leaders of the philanthropic sector—abandon their cassocks and accept the mantle of the heretic. Only by challenging the system and agitating on its fringes can they realize their full potential in today’s crisis-bound world.

• MARK MALLOCH-BROWN is President of the Open Society Foundations.

Foreign Affairs · by Mark Malloch-Brown · January 15, 2024

8. U.S. Intercepts Cruise Missile Attack on Its Warship in Red Sea

U.S. Intercepts Cruise Missile Attack on Its Warship in Red Sea

Navy destroyer targeted days after American-led strikes on Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-intercepts-cruise-missile-attack-on-its-warship-in-red-sea-363300da?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Benoit Faucon

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 and Costas Paris

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Jan. 15, 2024 8:16 am ET

Houthi fighters and tribesmen staged a demonstration near San’a on Sunday over the U.S.-led strikes last week. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

The U.S. military said its forces shot down a cruise missile fired from Houthi rebel areas toward an American Navy destroyer in the Red Sea, days after the U.S. led air and naval strikes against the Iran-backed militants in Yemen. 

The Houthis, who haven’t commented on the Sunday afternoon launch, have vowed to continue their campaign against U.S. and international targets in the region in response to Israel’s actions in Gaza, despite last week’s U.S.-led strikes against dozens of Houthi targets that were designed to prevent further attacks. 

The Houthi actions in the Red Sea, initially directed against Israeli-linked vessels, have become increasingly indiscriminate, rattled global markets and upended international shipping routes. As Western powers have retaliated, the Red Sea has become a new flashpoint between the U.S. and Iran-backed allies lined up around the region. 

“The American strikes threaten the militarization of the Red Sea,” Abdulmalik Al-Ajri, a member of the Houthi political bureau, told The Wall Street Journal. He warned that the escalation would pose a danger to ships unrelated to the conflict in Israel. The U.S. and its allies say the strikes were intended to reduce the Houthis’ capacity to attack ships transiting the Red Sea.

U.S. Central Command said the intercepted missile was launched toward the USS Laboon, pictured in 2015. PHOTO: JEFFREY RICHARDSON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The Houthis have launched dozens of missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea, mostly against commercial ships, since the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas and other militants from Gaza that prompted Israel to respond with an air and ground campaign in the Palestinian enclave. 

The economic effects of the Houthi attacks are slowly growing and, for now, mainly affecting Europe. Danish shipper 

A.P. Moller-Maersk has already rerouted its ships and Tesla said Friday it would halt production at its Berlin factory for two weeks as the Red Sea violence has hit its supply chains.Qatar, which has acted as a mediator for the Houthis in the past, is the latest to pause the use of the Red Sea route for its liquefied-natural-gas exports for fear of being caught in the conflict, according to a Qatari energy official and shipping trackers. Officials in the Qatari Foreign Ministry and at state-run LNG producer Qatar Energy didn’t return requests for comment.

Tanker owners said after the U.S.-led strikes that a number of captains of chartered vessels heading for Europe via the Suez Canal refused to enter the Red Sea, forcing them to sail a lengthy route around Southern Africa. The Singapore ship registry and Intertanko, an industry lobby group, said that the waterway should be avoided.

Houthi supporters in San’a with the coffins of rebel fighters after last week’s airstrikes on Houthi sites. PHOTO: YAHYA ARHAB/SHUTTERSTOCK

“The shipping industry involves such a maze of stakeholders it’s difficult to assign a single nationality to a vessel,” said Ami Daniel, chief executive of shipping intelligence provider 

Windward. The missile launched toward the USS Laboon on Sunday afternoon was shot down in the vicinity of the coast of Hudaydah by U.S. fighter aircraft, said U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East. There were no injuries or damage reported, Centcom said. 

The Houthis have said their action will only stop if Israel ends its military campaign in Gaza.

Strikes last week conducted by U.S. and British forces and supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands targeted radar and air-defense systems as well as storage and launch sites for the Houthis’ cruise and ballistic missiles, according to Centcom. The Houthis have used their arsenal, with the assistance of Iranian intelligence, to launch successive attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Costas Paris at costas.paris@wsj.com

9. U.S. tech companies prepare for drone attacks with new defenses

Excerpts:

Now, dozens of tech companies are working on systems to thwart possible drone attacks, including within the U.S., where civilian sites might potentially be targeted, according to academics and industry analysts.

“The fact that we haven’t had any serious domestic incidents is a blessing and really comes as a surprise due to the potential impact,” said Jamey Jacob, an engineering professor at Oklahoma State University and director of the university’s Oklahoma Aerospace Institute for Research and Education.

Products in development in the drone defense sector range from communications-jamming equipment to guns that shoot rapidly expanding nets to experimental lasers. Some of these products are quietly going through testing sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security at remote sites in Oklahoma and North Dakota, and analysts expect demand to grow rapidly, with potential customers including police departments, airports and sports stadiums.

The companies working on drone countermeasures range from major defense contractors such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to tech startups producing “GPS spoofers” that convince a drone it’s somewhere else. Other products rely on concentrated microwave bursts to fry a drone’s electronics or hacking tools to take over a drone’s operation.

Jacob estimated there are at least 100 companies actively working in the sector.

U.S. tech companies prepare for drone attacks with new defenses

Dozens of tech companies are working on systems to thwart possible drone attacks, including within the U.S., where civilian sites could be targeted.

NBC News · by David Ingram

U.S. tech companies and government agencies are racing to develop defenses against potential terrorist drone attacks, a threat that has security experts increasingly concerned as they’ve watched the rise of drone warfare in Israel, Ukraine and Yemen.

Since Oct. 7, Israel and Hamas have used drones against each other in Gaza, including in a video released by Hamas appearing to show a small drone dropping an explosive on a squad of Israeli soldiers. Yemen’s Houthi rebels have used swarms of drones to target shipping in the Red Sea, launching at least 21 in one attack this month. And for months, Russia and Ukraine have been launching coordinated mass drone attacks at each other, with one Russian swarm in November numbering 75 drones.

The drones used in the attacks have often come in the form of small, remote-controlled aircraft popular among hobbyists. They’re either outfitted with a small explosive to be dropped on the target, or are simply crashed into a target as a self-detonating, one-way drone.

Now, dozens of tech companies are working on systems to thwart possible drone attacks, including within the U.S., where civilian sites might potentially be targeted, according to academics and industry analysts.

“The fact that we haven’t had any serious domestic incidents is a blessing and really comes as a surprise due to the potential impact,” said Jamey Jacob, an engineering professor at Oklahoma State University and director of the university’s Oklahoma Aerospace Institute for Research and Education.

Products in development in the drone defense sector range from communications-jamming equipment to guns that shoot rapidly expanding nets to experimental lasers. Some of these products are quietly going through testing sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security at remote sites in Oklahoma and North Dakota, and analysts expect demand to grow rapidly, with potential customers including police departments, airports and sports stadiums.

The companies working on drone countermeasures range from major defense contractors such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to tech startups producing “GPS spoofers” that convince a drone it’s somewhere else. Other products rely on concentrated microwave bursts to fry a drone’s electronics or hacking tools to take over a drone’s operation.

Jacob estimated there are at least 100 companies actively working in the sector.

“We probably aren’t even aware of all of them right now,” he said.

The anti-drone tech sector is known among insiders as counter-unmanned aircraft systems, or C-UAS. Bard College researchers found in a 2019 report that there was already major investment in the sector, with 277 manufacturers working on some type of drone countermeasures. A review by NBC News found that dozens are marketing products on their websites. DHS said that 33 U.S. and international companies responded to a procurement notice last year.

Some drone countermeasures, at least for detecting them, are already being deployed at airports in Europe, experts said. The Federal Aviation Administration has been testing systems at U.S. airports, too.

The Department of Homeland Security has tried to speed up the research into products and prototypes, forming partnerships with at least two universities — Oklahoma State and the University of North Dakota — to help evaluate different drone countermeasures.

Last summer, in what Jacob called a first-of-its-kind event, about a dozen companies were invited to demonstrate and test their drone-defense products at a dedicated facility just east of Oklahoma State’s campus in Stillwater. Jacob said they have sent a confidential scorecard to the DHS and they plan a second, similar event this year.

“As with every other industrial commercial product, claims don’t necessarily line up with how they do in the field,” Jacob said.

“What we essentially do is throw threats at that detection system and determine how well it works and what areas need to be improved upon,” he said.

An ideal system, he said, would not only detect and identify a drone but also defeat it if necessary by jamming its signals, disabling it or destroying it.

A separate, smaller round of testing took place last summer in North Dakota. Teams of researchers at the University of North Dakota tested four systems specifically on the potential for collateral damage when a hostile drone falls back to earth, said Mark Askelson, the university’s associate vice president for research in national security.

“If you crash an aircraft, there’s potential for fires, and if it’s a battery aircraft, it could be a battery fire,” he said.

The Biden administration has encouraged the push in the anti-drone sector in multiple ways, issuing a call last year for universities, private companies and other researchers to come up with fresh ideas to address the threat. The administration has also pushed for legislation to expand who can legally force down a drone — an authority that under current law is generally limited to federal agents. That legislation is pending in Congress.

While the specter of drone terrorism has been around for years, the wars in Israel, Ukraine and Yemen have added to the urgency by demonstrating how the technology has progressed.

“There’s been an explosion of interest because of the Ukraine war,” said Zachary Kallenborn, an adjunct fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a bipartisan policy organization in Washington.

Kallenborn and two other researchers wrote an academic paper in 2022 about terrorism involving multiple, coordinated drones — an idea they compared to a “plague of locusts.” Now, Kallenborn said that the prospect is getting closer as drones become cheaper, faster, better able to carry weapons and more autonomous.

By contrast, much of the security architecture built in the U.S. in the past 30 years was designed around preventing airplane hijackings like the Sept. 11 attacks or truck bombings like the 1995 attack on the Oklahoma City federal building.

“Putting bollards everywhere made sense at a time when terrorists were using car bombs,” Kallenborn said.

There’s already been at least one likely attempt at a drone attack within the U.S.: In July 2020, someone sent a drone over a Pennsylvania power substation with the likely intent of short-circuiting the electric grid, according to an intelligence bulletin reported by ABC News. The attempt failed, and no one has been charged.

Since then, federal preparations have ramped up. In 2022, the White House released a plan for countering domestic drone threats including the creation of a database to track incidents, the founding of an anti-drone training center, and the proposed expansion of legal authority so that state and local law enforcement — or even power plant operators, potentially — are allowed to shoot down drones in certain circumstances.

But federal resources haven’t matched the demand for protection. The Wall Street Journal reported last month that although the DHS gets thousands of requests a year from event organizers who want drone protection, it grants “only a few dozen.” The newspaper also said the FBI has only three agents dedicated to drone defense.

In a statement to NBC News, the FBI did not say how many agents it has working on drone threats. The FBI said it has “an experienced team of headquarters-based agents and professional staff solely dedicated” to countering drone threats, and that the headquarters agents work closely with FBI field offices and other government agencies “to ensure the US government efficiently maintains its defensive posture with regard to UAS.”

A DHS spokesperson said that the department was working to release more specific information about requests from event organizers. Resources are limited, she said, and the focus is on high-risk events. Anti-drone coverage at events increased 22% in 2023, according to the department.

DHS authority for detecting and taking down drones flying illegally in U.S. airspace has also been at risk of expiring, possibly as soon as Feb. 3, without further congressional action.

“We have to have the capability to defend against the adverse use of drones,” Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said at an event last year.

At the local level, the New York Police Department has announced its use of drone countermeasures at major events such as the U.S. Open.

Sports leagues are among those pushing for protection.

“The unauthorized use of drones (whether malicious or otherwise) presents a significant and rising threat to all large gatherings of people, including major sporting events,” the NFL, MLB, NCAA and NASCAR said in a joint letter to Congress last year. They want local police to have authority to shoot down or disable drones flying illegally.

There have been thousands of close calls where drone pilots presumably didn’t intend to cause a collision. There were 2,300 incidents at airports alone over a recent two-year period, often causing flight delays, according to the DHS.

A California man was charged and pleaded guilty after he used a drone to drop leaflets over two NFL games in 2017. People have been charged criminally with flying drones too close to a local fire station in Virginia and a Coast Guard helicopter. A recurring issue is drone deliveries of contraband to prisons.

And in 2015, a small drone crashed on the White House lawn after a federal employee who was operating it several blocks away lost control of the device, causing a temporary lockdown.

But none of those was a determined attack aimed at terrorizing civilians.

Bryan Stern, a former Navy SEAL who’s now a security consultant, said that domestic drone defense will look a lot different from systems that the U.S. military is buying to protect the armed forces from drone attacks at home and abroad. One military system from Anduril Industries, named Roadrunner, is in effect a mini autonomous fighter jet.

“What are you going to do? Take M16 machine guns and start hosing down the sky?” Stern said. “You can do that if you’re in the U.S. Navy in the middle of the Red Sea. You’re not doing that in Alexandria, Virginia,” he said. He said he has conducted training sessions for law enforcement on how to respond to possible terrorist drone attacks.

But there would also be downsides to putting drone defense systems at every sports stadium, concert venue, government building, power station and other sensitive sites, experts said.

“It could actually be quite harmful to release the beast and have radio frequency jammers everywhere,” Kallenborn said, noting that such devices can disrupt radio communications across a wide area.

Michael German, a former FBI special agent who’s now a fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice, a civil liberties organization, said he questioned the need for law enforcement to have new authority to take down drones, or the need to have expensive new defense systems when it’s still impossible to say how likely a drone terrorist attack is.

“We have to be careful about how we’re empowering the government,” he said. “It’s very easy to scare the public with hypotheticals and then implement policies that actually do more harm than good.”

German said a more immediate threat is people using cars and trucks to hit civil rights demonstrators. That happened 104 times during the summer 2020 protests after the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, according to USA Today — a number that German called “astonishing.”

David Ingram

David Ingram covers tech for NBC News.

NBC News · by David Ingram

10. Biden sent private message to Tehran amid airstrikes: ‘We’re well-prepared’

Biden sent private message to Tehran amid airstrikes: ‘We’re well-prepared’ | Joe Biden | The Guardian

After second night of US-UK strikes in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthis, fears of wider regional conflict grow

Edward Helmore and David Smith

Sat 13 Jan 2024 13.16 EST

amp.theguardian.com · by Support the Guardian

Show caption

US president Joe Biden speaks to the press before flying to Camp David, on the south lawn of the White House on 13 January 2024 in Washington DC. Photograph: Samuel Corum/Getty Images

Joe Biden

Biden sent private message to Tehran amid airstrikes: ‘We’re well-prepared’

After second night of US-UK strikes in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthis, fears of wider regional conflict grow

Sat 13 Jan 2024 13.16 EST

Joe Biden said on Saturday that the United States has sent a private message to Tehran that “we’re confident we’re well-prepared”, following a second night of US and British strikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Speaking to reporters on the White House lawn on Saturday morning, on his way from Washington to Camp David in Maryland, the US president declined to go into further detail and switched to answering questions about the Taiwan election.

‘Unacceptable’: Biden denounced for bypassing Congress over Yemen strikes

His comments came after a fresh round of airstrikes hit a Houthi radar facility, raising further fears of a wider regional conflict. This came amid concerns about the world economy as well as security and civilian safety, and further backlash in the US from progressives in the Democratic party who have decried Biden’s executive decision to launch strikes on Yemen without seeking the backing of Congress.

In a statement from the US military, the US Central Command said the “follow-on action” early Saturday local time against a Houthi radar site was conducted by the Navy destroyer USS Carney using Tomahawk land attack missiles.

That came a day after strikes on Friday hit 28 locations and struck more than 60 targets; the US said the strikes were designed to “de-escalate tensions”.

The latest strike came after the US navy on Friday warned American-flagged vessels to steer clear of areas around Yemen in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden for the next 72 hours after the initial airstrikes. The Houthi leadership, who say they are acting in solidarity with Gaza and targeting Israeli-linked shipping, later vowed fierce retaliation across the Red Sea trade route.

“All American-British interests have become legitimate targets” following the strikes, the rebels’ supreme political council said on Friday.

At an emergency session of the United Nations security council on Friday in New York, the US ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield warned that no ship was safe from the Houthi threat in the Red Sea.

US military strategists warned Saturday that the so-called “triple-h” threat (Hamas-Houthi-Hezbollah) could require a significant increase in US military capabilities to protect US national security interests and military personnel in the region and support a commitment to freedom of navigation.

Retired Lt Gen David Deptula, now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, told CNN that protecting business was “secondary” to the priority of security in the region.

But, he added: “The implications of the restrictions on shipping is having a significant impact already and that could reverse the downward trend in inflation and reverse it to going up.”

The US economy will be a central issue in the presidential election this November as Biden seeks a second term in the White House on the back of a relatively strong economy and an effective programme so far of reducing sky-high inflation.

After the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England all held interest rates steady in mid-December and cautiously signaled that the fight to tamp down soaring prices may be coming to an end, the latest events in the Red Sea are causing fresh nerves.

Deptula warned that deterrence may not be possible by co-ercion alone and an international coalition “may need to completely destroy the Houthis’ means of power projection”.

Protests against the US-led airstrikes on 12 January 2024, in Sana’a, Yemen. Photograph: AP

Oil prices have risen above $80 per barrel. Still, according to energy industry expert Ed Hirs, unless the conflict spreads to the point of directly affecting shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, current tensions are unlikely to have a dramatic impact on oil prices.

“The impact is minimal on oil, it’s just a re-routing of the supply chain,” Hirs said. “The Red Sea doesn’t matter with oil because you can spend another 14 days and go around Africa.”

“The real issue is the strait of Hormuz,” Hirs added. “If you take 1% of supply off the market, you’ll see a 20%-25% price increase.”

Meanwhile, in an interview on MSNBC on Saturday, Pramila Jayapal, the chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, urged the Biden administration, on the airstrikes authorized by the government’s executive branch without the inclusion of the congressional branch: “Come explain it to Congress.”

Jayapal, a Democratic representative from Washington, said: “Let us have that conversation, because in my mind this is about how we protect our shipping routes but it is also about the war in Gaza and how do we make sure that does not expand?”

She added: “There are serious consequences here, and that is why I’ve been calling for a ceasefire because violence does beget violence, and we have to stop ourselves from getting pulled into these conflicts with more violence because it will have long-term ramifications. That is what happened in the Vietnam war, in other conflicts, and that is why in 1973 Congress said we are going to reassert our constitutional authority.”

View on theguardian.com

amp.theguardian.com · by Support the Guardian

11. Philippines hits back at China, says joint patrols with US not ‘provocative’

I think China is the "provocateur." 

Excerpts:

“These exercises send the message that the Philippines is not alone in the West Philippine Sea, but must be considered by potential adversaries as part of a network of military allies and partners,” Powell told BenarNews on Friday.

Two weeks earlier, the Philippines said it intended to expand multinational patrols in the South China Sea. He said France, Canada, India, the U.K. and New Zealand had expressed an interest in joining such patrols.

All these nations support the 2016 arbitration court’s ruling that invalidated China’s sweeping claims to the sea.

In recent months, China has been harassing Filipino forces delivering supplies to its forces at its military outpost in Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal. Last month, a civilian-led convoy carrying Christmas gifts to forces there was forced to turn back after a Chinese ship shadowed it relentlessly.

Philippines hits back at China, says joint patrols with US not ‘provocative’

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · January 14, 2024

This article was originally published by Radio Free Asia and is reprinted with permission.

The Philippines on Friday defended its joint South China Sea patrols with the United States against a Chinese claim that they were “provocative,” saying the maneuvers took place within its territorial waters and were consistent with international law.

But Manila remains open to “diplomatic discussions” with China, Filipino National Security Adviser Eduardo Año said, a day after the Philippine and U.S. militaries completed a second joint patrol in the disputed waterway.

“We wish to clarify that the joint maritime activities between the Philippines and the United States were clearly conducted within our exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and are consistent with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), so how can they be deemed provocative?” Año said in a statement.

“The Philippines is merely exercising its sovereign right to engage in such activities within its territory.”

On Thursday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin had called the Philippine-U.S. patrols “irresponsible,” saying they were “detrimental to management and control of the maritime situation and related disputes.”

Other nations must respect “efforts of countries in the region to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea,” he said.

The Philippine national security adviser said Manila was committed to maintaining regional peace.

“Our joint patrols with the United States and potential future activities with other allied countries shows our mutual commitment to a rules-based international order and for promoting peace and stability of the region,” Año said in a statement.

The national security adviser said Manila wanted to maintain a cordial rapport with all countries.

“The Philippines remains open to diplomatic discussions with China and reaffirms its commitment to fostering good relations with all nations,” Año said. “We believe that through peaceful dialogue and adherence to international law, we can achieve a resolution that serves the best interests of all parties involved in the region.”

In 2016, the Philippines won a landmark ruling in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that threw out China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. Beijing, however, has ignored the ruling and carried on with its military expansionism in the strategic waterway, including building artificial islands.

As was the case with the first round of joint patrols, which were launched in late November, this week’s patrols took place in the waters and skies of the Philippines’ EEZ.

The first joint sea and air patrols between the two allies, a three-day program, was meant to demonstrate bilateral muscle-flexing in the face of perceived Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

Those maneuvers involved three navy ships and three fighter-jets from the Philippine military, and one littoral combat ship and an aircraft from the American side.

The governments of both nations have been allies since they signed their Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951.

Message that ‘Philippines is not alone’

On Friday, Filipino military spokesman Col. Xerxes Trinidad said the second patrol, a series of operations held Wednesday and Thursday, required “complete coordination between Philippine and U.S. assets to enhance the operational capabilities and interoperability of both forces.”

For the activity, the Philippine military sent four ships, a multi-role helicopter, and an anti-submarine helicopter, while the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, deployed an aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, and its strike group that included a cruiser, and two destroyers.

Maritime security expert Ray Powell, a retired U.S. Air Force officer, said the joint activity increased “Manila’s leverage” internationally.

“These exercises send the message that the Philippines is not alone in the West Philippine Sea, but must be considered by potential adversaries as part of a network of military allies and partners,” Powell told BenarNews on Friday.

Two weeks earlier, the Philippines said it intended to expand multinational patrols in the South China Sea. He said France, Canada, India, the U.K. and New Zealand had expressed an interest in joining such patrols.

All these nations support the 2016 arbitration court’s ruling that invalidated China’s sweeping claims to the sea.

In recent months, China has been harassing Filipino forces delivering supplies to its forces at its military outpost in Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal. Last month, a civilian-led convoy carrying Christmas gifts to forces there was forced to turn back after a Chinese ship shadowed it relentlessly.

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · January 14, 2024

12. US tops public distrust in innovation on eve of Davos, survey shows

US tops public distrust in innovation on eve of Davos, survey shows

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-tops-public-distrust-innovation-eve-davos-edelman-2024-01-14/?utm

By Megan Davies

January 14, 20246:06 PM ESTUpdated 15 hours ago

A logo is pictured in the Congress Center ahead of the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, January 13, 2024. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse/File Photo Acquire Licensing Rights

DAVOS, Switzerland, Jan 15 (Reuters) - Business and governments are doing a poor job of managing and regulating new technologies, a survey of people ahead of this week's World Economic Forum's annual meeting has found.

The Edelman survey, released as the WEF meeting is set to begin under the theme "Rebuilding Trust", found 39% of respondents asked if they trusted business and NGOs with introducing innovations and governments to regulate them, said it was poorly managed. Just 22% said it was well managed.

Still, business was the most trusted category to integrate innovation into society, ahead of NGOs, government and media.

The highest level of mistrust about the management of innovation among the countries surveyed by the public relations firm was in the United States, with 56% saying that innovation was poorly managed versus 14% saying it was well managed. The survey questioned 32,000 people in 28 countries during November.

The report said examples of pushback against technology included Beijing dropping COVID vaccine mandates in July 2022 after online pushback, U.S. Republican positions against electric vehicles and Hollywood writers' battle against the use of artificial intelligence in writing scripts.

Resistance to innovation is political, the survey said, with more resistance in politically right-leaning people particularly in the United States, Australia, Germany and Canada.

The survey found that businesses were the most trusted to introduce innovations into society, more than non-governmental organizations, government and media.

"Innovation is accelerating and should be a growth enabler, but it will be stymied if business doesn't pay as much attention to acceptance as it does research and development," Edelman'S CEO Richard Edelman said in a statement,

The report also found Britain was at the bottom of Edelman's Trust Barometer, which gives an average percent trust in NGOs, business, government and media, with a score of 39%.

Reporting by Megan Davies; Editing by Alexander Smith

13. Ukrainian Sources: We Just Shot Down Two Of Russia’s Best Command Planes

FORBESBUSINESSAEROSPACE & DEFENSE

Ukrainian Sources: We Just Shot Down Two Of Russia’s Best Command Planes

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/14/ukrainian-sources-we-just-shot-down-two-of-russias-best-command-planes/?utm&sh=d7e2a643adf7

David Axe

Forbes Staff

I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.

Follow

65

Jan 14, 2024,07:01pm EST

Ukrainian air-defenses reportedly shot down two of the Russian air force’s rarest and most valuable command aircraft on Sunday: a Beriev A-50 radar early-warning plane and an Ilyushin Il-22 airborne command post.

Ukrainian media has cited government officials confirming the purported shoot-downs, but there’s little hard evidence of the incidents.

Ukraine’s RBC Radio posted what it claimed was an audio recording of the Il-22’s crew radioing an S-O-S to controllers apparently in Anapa, on the Russian side of the Sea of Azov’s southern coast. “Urgently requesting ambulance and fire crew,” the crew radioed.

It seems, at the very least, that the Il-22 suffered damage. According to Kyiv Independent, the four-engine, propeller-driven Il-22—which carries up to 10 people and helps to relay radio signals and coordinate front-line operations—was struck along the Sea of Azov coast Sunday night.

The Russian air force had just 30 Il-22s and variants after mutinous Wagner Group mercenaries shot down one of the pricey aircraft over western Russia in June. The Ilyushin command post is only slightly less rare than the Beriev early-warning plane is.

The four-engine, jet-propelled A-50 is Russia’s answer to the United States’ own main early-warning plane, the Boeing E-3. The A-50’s top-mounted radome contains a rotating radar that scans 360 degrees, detecting aircraft as far away as 250 miles. The 15-person crew of an A-50 tracks enemy planes and coordinates the flights of friendly planes.

The Russian air force has just nine A-50Ms and upgraded A-50Us. Ukrainian forces, or their Belarusian agents, apparently damaged one of the A-50s at its base in Belarus back in February.

Kyiv Independent claimed an A-50 was shot down “immediately after it went on duty in the Kyrylivka area of Zaporizhzhia” in southern Ukraine. The alleged shoot-down reportedly occurred just 10 minutes after the Il-22 got hit.

If the Ukrainians indeed struck both the Il-22 and the A-50, Sunday would mark the single worst day for the Russian air force in the 23 months since Russia widened its war on Ukraine. Worse than the day, back in December, when the Ukrainians shot down three Russian Sukhoi fighter-bombers in a complex missile-ambush over southern Ukraine.

If the shoot-downs did occur, it’s worth asking how. While Ukraine’s best air-defenses—its American-made Patriot PAC-2s—can hit aircraft from 90 miles away, A-50s and Il-22s normally should fly at the very edge of that range.

It’s worth noting, however, that the command planes reportedly have struggled to overcome electromagnetic jamming. “Ukrainian forces have found [the] A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via electronic attack,” Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling explained in a 2022 report for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Did the Russian command planes venture closer to the front line so their radars and radios might overpower the jamming? Maybe, but that’s speculation. And no more possible to verify right now than the shoot-downs themselves are.

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David Axe

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I'm a journalist, author and filmmaker based in Columbia, South Carolina.

14. Resistance groups claim capture of 2 Myanmar cities

Resistance groups claim capture of 2 Myanmar cities

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · January 14, 2024

This article was originally published by Radio Free Asia and is reprinted with permission.

Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance claimed the capture of two cities, according to a statement released Monday. The resistance group announced they stormed two junta camps on Sunday, causing troops to withdraw.

The alliance reportedly captured Hseni in northeastern Shan state on Sunday morning. The junta camp there also acts as the army’s regional operational command headquarters, according to the alliance. Later that day, the allied forces moved to the city of Kutkai and seized it late at night, according to locals.

All junta troops from Hseni and Kutkai withdrew and fled to Lashio on Sunday afternoon, said one local who has been following military movements in the area.

The alliance comprises three resistance groups, including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Arakan Army, and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Since the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027 began in late October, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s fighters have claimed control of most major areas in Hseni.

The junta’s regional headquarters and smaller camps are located several kilometers away from the city. The area has been under a blockade for almost two months. Troops retaliated during Sunday’s attack using heavy artillery and airstrikes, a local told Radio Free Asia, asking to go anonymous to protect their identity.

The alliance attacked the camps in Kutkai multiple times earlier this month, they said, adding that junta troops responded with airstrikes on Sunday evening during the fighting.

One fighter involved in the ground battles told RFA Kutkai was entirely captured, despite the junta’s heavy defense. However, others said the status of Hseni could not be confirmed at this time.

“It is true that our forces captured the whole of Kutkai city last night,” said a spokesman for the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, asking to remain nameless for fear of reprisals. “As for Hseni, I can’t confirm it, because we are not there.”

Myanmar’s regime has not released any information about battles in Hseni and Kutkai. RFA was unable to reach junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment regarding junta injuries and fatalities.

On Thursday, the alliance also overtook a military command center in northern Myanmar, claiming control of the city of Laukkai according to a statement released Friday.

Since the launch of Operation 1027 more than two months ago, the Three Brotherhood Alliance has reportedly captured 14 townships in northern Shan state and seized control of more than 200 junta camps.

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · January 14, 2024

15. Navy SEALs lost at sea were searching for Yemen-bound weapons shipment

Boarding a ship has to be one of the most dangerous and complex operations.

Navy SEALs lost at sea were searching for Yemen-bound weapons shipment

The dangerous ship-boarding mission was ordered after U.S. officials suspected a vessel transiting the Gulf of Aden was transporting Iranian arms

By Alex Horton

January 14, 2024 at 7:44 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · January 15, 2024

The Navy SEALs lost at sea after a ship-boarding operation went awry near Somalia last week were dispatched to look for suspected Iranian weapons bound for militants in Yemen, which has become a staging ground for repeated attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, two U.S. officials familiar with the incident said Sunday.

The two service members who went missing were preparing to board the ship in rough seas when one of them slipped from a ladder. The second sailor, seeing their comrade fall into the water, dove in to help, the officials said on the condition of anonymity to describe early assessments. The incident occurred Thursday in the Gulf of Aden.

It was not immediately clear whether other military personnel successfully boarded the ship or, if so, whether any Iranian-made weapons were located.

Israel-Gaza war

(Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images)

Yemen’s Houthi militants vowed Friday to continue targeting ships in the Red Sea to protest Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip, following U.S.- and British-led strikes on Yemen.

For context: Understand what’s behind the Israel-Gaza war.

End of carousel

Search-and-rescue operations are ongoing in the gulf’s warm waters, where powerful swells and exhaustion are more of a concern than hypothermia as commanders hold out hope the two SEALs will be found alive, officials said. The missing personnel have not been publicly identified.

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby, asked about the operation during an appearance Sunday on the CBS News program “Face the Nation,” characterized it as part of the U.S. military’s ongoing work to disrupt Iran’s shipment of weapons to Yemen, where the Houthis, a militant group supported by Tehran, function as the de facto government in parts of the country. He sought to draw a distinction between that activity and the U.S.-led airstrikes targeting Houthi facilities there that same day, saying the two are “not related.”

Still, Thursday’s mishap underscores the persistent challenge facing the Biden administration and its international partners who have vowed to hold the Houthis and Iran accountable for a steep rise in attacks that have greatly disrupted commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Senior U.S. officials have blamed Tehran for having “aided and abetted” the crisis, saying the Houthis would be incapable of threatening the shipping route if not for Tehran’s technological and intelligence support.

The Houthis have said their actions are in protest of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

Thursday’s airstrikes in Yemen targeted numerous radar stations, missile launch sites and storage facilities used to stage the Red Sea attacks, but the Pentagon has said the group is likely to remain a threat. The Biden administration has not ruled out future military action there but has sought to tread carefully, fearful that an overreaction could engulf the Middle East in violence.

U.S. forces routinely partner with other nations’ militaries to blunt piracy and weapons smuggling in the region.

Interdicting suspicious or adversarial vessels, known as visit, board, search and seizure, or VBSS, are some of the most difficult and dangerous missions undertaken by highly trained troops. Such operations typically include approaching the suspect vessel in smaller boats and using ladders and climbing tools to get aboard, which can be complicated by violent waves and hostile crew members.

American Special Operations forces deployed in the region have faced other challenging missions. In November, five members of an elite aviation unit were killed during a air-refueling accident off the coast of Cyprus.

The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · January 15, 2024

16. Special Operations News - January 15, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News - January 15, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 15, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: East-Coast based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operators (SEALs) conduct visit, board, search, and seizure training with the 164th Romanian Naval Special Operations Forces near Constanta, Romania, Nov. 16, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Bill Carlisle)

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SOF News

Missing Navy Sailors. Central Command reported (12 Jan 2024) that two Navy Sailors are missing off the coast of Somalia (map NSI). Some news reports state that they are Navy SEALs who were conducting nighttime vessel boarding search and seizure operations (VBSS) on the evening of January 11th. Search and rescue missions are ongoing. According to the WP the Navy SEALs were boarding a vessel transiting the Gulf of Aden that was suspected of transporting Iranian arms. “Navy SEALs lost at sea were searching for Yemen-bound weapons shipment”, The Washington Post, January 14, 2024. (subscription) See “Two Navy SEALs missing after Thursday night mission off Somalian coast”, Military Times, January 13, 2024.

Trump on Miller. Here is an interesting article about former acting SECDEF Chris Miller (and former Green Beret) and being a pick for SECDEF if Trump wins again. “Trump hints at possible picks for Pentagon chief in second term”, by Lara Seligman, Politico, December 22, 2023.

GUNDAM 22 Final Report. The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) released a statement on Friday, January 12, 2024, indicating that recovery and salvage operations have ended for the CV-22 that crashed off the shore of Yakushima Island, Japan on November 29, 2023. The major parts of the aircraft have been recovered and the remains of seven of the eight crew have been recovered. An investigation into the mishap is ongoing. (Air Force Times, Jan 11, 2024)

SOF by the Numbers. How big is a SEAL team? How many Green Berets are there? “MARSOC, Navy SEALs, and Army Rangers: SOF by the numbers”, Task & Purpose, December 20, 2023. The author manages to get it mostly right.

Airmen and Ranger School. The U.S. Army’s Ranger School is filled with difficult physical training and exercises designed to educate participants on elite infantry squad and platoon tactics. The Air Force thinks its Airmen are a good fit for the two-month long course. “Wanted: Airmen and Guardians Urged to Apply to Grueling Army Ranger School”, Military.com, January 8, 2024.

Ghostriders’ Big Gun – Going Away? The U.S. Air Force may be taking its big 105mm gun off their gunships, possibly as soon as 2026. The change is part of its rethinking of what the aircraft is and how they are to be designed. (Business Insider, Dec 27, 2023) See also “Special Operations Command’s Commando Aircraft Are in Jeopardy”, SANDBOXX, January 3, 2024.

Swimming – Fins or Not? Stew Smith writes up on how to prepare for a future in military diving, special ops, and rescue swimming. “The Differences Between Swimming With and Without Fins”, Military.com, December 27, 2023.

Sgt. Maj. Thetford (Ret.). A former Senior Enlisted Leader at the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is profiled in this media release by CACI International, Inc. William Thetford served over 35 years in special operations. “Spotlighting Command Sgt. Maj. William F. Thetford, U.S. Army (Ret.)”, 3blmedia.com, December 21, 2023.

International SOF

Army Ranger Wing (Ireland). The ARW, the most elite and secretive unit of the Irish Defence Forces, is going through its largest expansion and restructuring in its 43-year history. There are going to be some dramatic changes to its command-and-control structure and refinement of the organization into distinct specialized units – air, sea, and ground. “Army’s elite special forces unit to be overhauled in major revamp”, Irish Times, December 30, 2023.

Finland’s SOF. Javier Sutil Toledano provides a detailed description of the SOF units of Finland. Origins, purpose, organization, training, selection, and more are described in this article. “FINSOF: Finland’s Special Operations Forces”, Grey Dynamics, December 25, 2023.

Canada’s Elite. The Canadian Special Operations Regiment is part of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). It conducts complex missions and is able to operate in harsh environments. “CSOR: The Canadian Special Operations Regiment”, Grey Dynamics, December 30, 2023. The 427 SOAS is an air force unit that supports CANSOFCOM. “Canada’s 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron”, Grey Dynamics, December 30, 2023.

SOF History

CIG Established. On January 22, 1946, President Truman directed the establishment of Central Intelligence Group, forerunner of CIA. (CIA)

OCPW Established. On January 5, 1951, the Army established the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) as a special staff division under the Deputy Chief of Staff and supervisory control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, headed by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure.

SEALs Established. On January 1, 1962, the first Navy SEAL teams were established by President Kennedy. The OSS Maritime Unit was the precursor to the SEALs. Learn more in the book First SEALs.

https://bookshop.org/a/753/9780306824142

MACV-SOG Established. On January 24, 1964, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) was established. It was a highly classified, multi-service U.S. special operations unit that conducted operations during the Vietnam War in Indochina. It conducted reconnaissance missions, capture of enemy soldiers, rescued downed pilots, and rescued POWs throughout Southeast Asia. Individuals assigned to MACV-SOF came primarily from U.S. Army Special Forces. However, members of the U.S. Navy SEALs, Air Force, Marine Corps, and CIA were present in the organization as well.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Assistance_Command,_Vietnam_%E2%80%93_Studies_and_Observations_Group

1/75th Activation. 25 January 1974. On this date General Creighton Abrams directed the activation of the first battalion-sized Ranger unit since World War II. HQ U.S. Army Forces Command issued General Orders 127 directing the activation of the 1st Ranger Battalion 75th Infantry with the effective date of January 31, 1974. The battalion was to be an elite, light, and very proficient infantry unit. (USASOC) https://www.soc.mil/rangers/1stbn.html

CASI and the CIA. The history books make many mentions of Air America in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War; but very little of Continental Air Services, Inc. Both flew for the Central Intelligence Agency. “Air America Was Not Alone: There Was CASI”, by Marc Yablonka, Hmong Daily News, December 21, 2023.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Phase Three. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is transitioning from phase 2 (operations throughout Gaza) to conducting more targeted operations – with a focus on the south of Gaza Strip. Hamas has been partially dismantled in the north – falling back on independent guerrilla warfare tactics. The fighting is expected to continue into 2024. IDF reservists are now being withdrawn from Gaza and are being discharged – returning to civilian life. The 98th Division (Wikipedia) is expected to take the lead in the conflict in Gaza. The 98th consists of two paratrooper brigades and one commando brigade. “IDF quietly transitions to phase 3 in the war against Hamas”, Jewish News Syndicate, January 13, 2024.

Hostages. January 14th (Sunday) marked 100 days of captivity for more than 130 people, including six Americans, who were taken hostage by Hamas during its brutal attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. “100 Days of Captivity in Gaza”, U.S. Department of State, January 14, 2024.

Theories of Victory. David Ucko provides his perspective on who is winning and who is losing in the Gaza conflict. “Israel, Hamas, and the Meaning of Victory in Irregular Warfare”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, December 30, 2023.

Lessons by RAND. This report tells the story of Israel’s military operations in Gaza from 2009 to 2014 – operations that show how Israel was forced to adapt to hybrid adversaries in complex urban terrain. Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza, RAND, 2017, PDF, 12 pages. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9975.html

Testimony Aftermath. Three elite university Presidents testified before Congress several weeks ago. Each was asked about university policy on hate speech towards Jews; and each ‘failed’ in their responses. Two university presidents have since resigned. The president of Harvard University, Claudine Gay, held out for a while on demands for resignation; however, what might have contributed to her resigning is her practice of ‘duplicative narrative’ in her academic writings; something others called plagiarism. “Harvard’s Claudine Gay should resign”, The Washington Post, December 23, 2023. (subscription) Some from the ‘left’ say it was a concerted effort by those on the ‘right’ to erode the advances made by Harvard in their DEI program. Gay, who is black, said in a parting statement that she was a victim of racism.

References:

Ukraine Conflict

The eastern front lines in Ukraine are somewhat stable. There are incremental gains made by both sides of the conflict. Casualties remain high. The U.S. Congress still has not settled whether it will allocate new funds for Ukraine’s defense. With its large population and industrial base Russia is favored in a conflict that is prolonged.

Paper – Russian Propaganda Tactics in Wartime Ukraine, The Russia Program, George Washington University, November 2023, PDF, 41 pages. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xdmk4Mn2G-jNSWhljjuv7sCqMbE-LT3Y/view

Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats.

On storymaps.arcgis.com

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Sudan Conflict and Evac of Foreign Nationals

Conflict Grinds On. International attention on the civil war in Sudan (maps, NSI) has waned . . . more eyes are on Ukraine and Gaza at the moment. But the fighting continues between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the humanitarian situation worsens as time goes on.

Egypt Involvement. The ongoing civil war in Sudan between the SAF and the RSF created a humanitarian disaster. Refugees from Sudan flooded into every neighboring state; many of them to Egypt (map NSI). With a downgraded credit rating, severe inflation and unsustainable debt, the Egyptian economy is on the rocks. Refugees only add to those pressures. It is little wonder then, that Egypt has a vested interest in the security architecture of Sudan and in particular the SAF. “Egypt’s Role in the Sudanese Civil War: a 6-month outlook”, by Alec Smith, Grey Dynamics, December 23, 2023.

Update on the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), ceasefire, humanitarian crisis, and evacuation of foreign nationals.

https://www.national-security.info/country/sudan/sudan-neo.html

Commentary

SOF and the Arctic. Joshua C. Huminski and Ethan Brown have collaborated on an article entitled “Into the Cold: Special Operations in the Arctic”, Wavell Room, December 20, 2023. Excerpt: “Russia and China are placing increased emphasis on the polar regions in their strategic calculus and future planning. Russia, prior to its expanded invasion of Ukraine, undertook demonstrative military exercises in the Arctic, and was building up its forces in the High North. In its 2018 arctic policy, China declared itself a ‘near-arctic state’, seeking to assert its regional interests. While much of this activity from Moscow and Russia is predicated on securing economic and commercial interests, military interests and strategic competition-related power projection are clearly not far behind.” Read more articles about special operations forces in the Arctic.

Cutting SOF Force Structure. The Department of Defense has mandated that USASOC cut its force levels by 3,000 personnel. The command plans to cut special operations support, civil affairs, and psychological operations units. “Cutting Army Special Operations Will Erode the Military’s Ability to Influence the Modern Battlefield”, by Cole Livieratos, War on the Rocks, January 9, 2024.

National Security

Report – Defense Primer: Special Operations Forces. The Congressional Research Service has updated its brief on U.S. SOF. CRS IF10545, updated January 8, 2024, PDF, 2 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10545

Report – Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces. The Congressional Research Service has updated its brief on the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. CRS IF10571, updated December 29, 2023, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10571

SECDEF Austin, ICU, and Not Informing the White House. The Pentagon did not tell President Joe Biden and other top officials about Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s presence in a hospital ICU (Politico, 6 Jan 2024) until he was there for three days. He first underwent surgery at Walter Reed Hospital for surgery for prostate cancer in mid-December. Although discharged in December, he returned to the hospital’s ICU unit for more hospitalization on January 1st.

• Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. C.Q. Brown was not informed of Austin’s presence in a hospital until Tuesday, Jan 2nd.
• Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks did not know his whereabouts until Thursday, Jan 4th and was on vacation in Puerto Rico. See “Pentagon No. 2 didn’t know why she was in charge for days as Austin furor mounts”, Washington Times, January 8, 2024.
• DoD didn’t notify the White House until Thursday, Jan 4th.
• DoD notified Congress 15 minutes before releasing a public statement at 5:00 pm on Friday, Jan 5th – a typical method of burying bad news over the weekend. As of Saturday, Jan 13, 2024, the SECDEF is still reported to be at Walter Reed.
• Fire the SECDEF? There are many national security commentators (not just Republicans) calling for the firing or resignation of Austin for his failure to inform his senior military leaders, the NSC, and the White House about his surgery in December, time in ICU in January, and his medical situation. See “Fire Lloyd Austin”, Lawfare, January 12, 2024. (Editorial note: his departure will probably take place in 3-4 months – a ‘graceful exit’ rather than fired or resigned).
• Still Hospitalized. As of January 14th, the Pentagon is reporting that SECDEF is still hospitalized.

Border Security.

• Migrant encounters at southern border hit record 302K in December 2023. This number includes only ‘documented encounters’, not the illegals that evade authorities crossing the border. (Fox News, Jan 1, 2024)
• Negotiations are underway between Republicans and Democrats on the border issue. It appears that some compromise is under way for both political parties to get at least ‘something’ that they want. Topics on the table include asylum, border security, increased deportation, Afghan evacuees from post-August 2021, and more. The Senate seems to have come up with a plan, but it is unlikely to be accepted by the House.
• Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ms. Melissa Dalton recently led a delegation to the Southwest border on January 11-12 to see firsthand how the DoD is supporting U.S. government efforts to secure the border. (DOD, Jan 12, 2024)

Finland Border Closure. Just after Finland joined the NATO alliance Russia shipped migrants without documentation to the border points advising them to cross into Finland and seek asylum. Finland has viewed this as a form of economic warfare – flooding the country with undocumented migrants who will need to be supported financially by the country’s 5.6 million people. Late last year Finland closed the border crossings with Russia. The country is extending this closure for another month -suspecting continued manipulation of undocumented migrants from Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. “Finland extends closure of Russian border for another month, fearing a migrant influx”, The Washington Post, January 11, 2024. (subscription)

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Asia

Taiwan Elections. The ruling party has held onto the country’s presidency; many observers citing this as a blow to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The winner is seen as independence-leaning. China has increased its rhetoric about Taiwan and increased its military and ‘gray operations’ in the region around Taiwan (map, NSI) in recent years. Taiwan is taking measures to that will enable it to resist an invasion and occupation by China (NSI).

IO and China. The People’s Republic of China has long used the information operations arena to influence the thoughts of people around the globe. This practice continues into the present day. Read more by Mark Scott in “China’s Kremlin-style disinformation playbook”, Politico.eu, January 11, 2024.

Western Hemisphere

Haiti. Gang violence continues to be the cause of a dire security crisis in Haiti (Google Maps). Transnational crime, economic slowdown, and other problems have plagued this nation for decades. It appears that Kenya will soon lead a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti under the auspices of the United Nations.

Troubles in Ecuador. On January 7, 2024, a notorious gang leader escaped from custody as he was about to be transferred to a maximum security facility. Gang members went on the offensive across Ecuador (map, NSI) – taking over prisons, attacking law enforcement, and seizing a television station. There are worries that the country may turn into a narco-state. Read more in “Explaining and Predicting Ecuador’s Security Crisis”, Global Americans, January 12, 2024.

Blacksmith Publishing is a media partner of SOF News. They are a book publishing firm, sell ‘Pinelander Swag’, have a weekly podcast called The Pinelander.

Afghanistan

Media Freedom in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC) has published its report on the state of journalists and media in Afghanistan in 2023. According to the report, journalists and media in Afghanistan faced severe restrictions and violations of their fundamental and legal rights throughout 2023, impeding their freedom and ability to work. (AFJC, Dec 29, 2023)

Learning from Afghanistan. The U.S. military must understand its failures in Afghanistan to succeed in strategic competition. Failure to learn and adapt could end in similar disaster with greater strategic consequences. “Learning from Failure: Afghanistan as a Microcosm for Strategic Competition”, by Paul Bailey, Irregular Warfare Initiative, January 4, 2024.

Office of the Special Coordinator for Afghanistan. The Department of Defense recently published a website with resources about Afghanistan. Afghan Report, January 8, 2024.

Middle East

Wider Conflict? The Houthis of Yemen (SOF News) have significantly stepped up their operations against commercial vessels in Middle Eastern waterways since November 19, 2023, shortly after the start of the Hamas-Israel conflict (SOF News). This includes seizing or attempting to seize vessels or launching missiles or drones against them. Most shipping is now traveling around the southern tip of Africa to avoid possible damage or seizure. The U.S. and other nations have been issuing warnings to the Houthis over the past month. The U.S. and United Kingdom struck hit more multiple targets in 16 locations in Yemen on Thursday, January 12, 2024. CENTCOM released a statement on Saturday that a follow-on strike took place against a Houthi radar site in Yemen – conducted by the USS Carney (DDG 64) using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. The Pentagon released a statement (DoD, Jan 12, 2024) saying that the strikes against Houthis are aimed at degrading the rebel group’s capabilities to carry out more attacks in the Red Sea (Google Maps).

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Books, Journals, Reports, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Book Review – Dead Hand. James Stejskal’s latest book, involves Cold War intrigue in current times. The book envisions an aggressive Russia that has won the war in Ukraine and now sets its sights on other countries in Eastern Europe. Cold War warriors are brought out of retirement to assist in a covert operation. Stejskal is a former Green Beret (some time with ‘Det A‘) and CIA operative – and uses his experience in crafting this espionage thriller. One of his earlier books is Read a review of Dead Hand in “Spies in Winter: A Tale of Russian Victory in Ukraine”, The Cipher Brief, December 28, 2023.

Special Warfare. The January 2024 issue of Special Warfare is now available. Articles on irregular warfare, U.S. Army’s Special Warfare Center and School, and SOF unmanned systems. PDF, 23 pages. https://www.swcs.mil/Special-Warfare/Special-Warfare-Archive/

Military Review. The January – February 2024 issue is now online, posted by Army University Press. This issue spotlights China and operations in mountainous areas and the Arctic. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/

CTC Sentinel. The December 2023 issue of the “CTC Sentinel” is now posted online. Articles on Iranian-backed militia and terrorist groups and terrorist use of IEDs. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/december-2023/

IWC Spotlight. The December 2023 issue has been posted by the Irregular Warfare Center. https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023-12-IWC-Spotlight.pdf

Report – Defense Primer: What is Irregular Warfare, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF12565, January 5, 2024, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12565

Report – Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy. By Dr. Robert S. Burrell and John Collison, Marine Corps University, January 9, 2024, PDF, 46 pages. https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Assessing-Resistance-for-the-Purpose-of-Informing-International-Policy/

Video – USSOCOM in Strategic Competition. A former CSEL for USSOCOM shares his unique perspectives on strategic competition and the United States Special Operations Command’s role in that environment. Joint Special Operations University, Think JSOU, January 9, 2024, YouTube, 36 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9CuZVHUi4k

Upcoming Events

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sof.news · by SOF News · January 15, 2024

17. How Hamas fooled gullible donors to fund its billion-dollar terror tunnel system

How Hamas fooled gullible donors to fund its billion-dollar terror tunnel system

Hamas' vast subterranean network of tunnels rivals the London underground and the Paris metro

By Ruth Marks Eglash Fox News

Published January 14, 2024 10:00am EST

foxnews.com · by Ruth Marks Eglash Fox News

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JERUSALEM — For the past three months, almost on a daily basis, Israeli ground troops fighting inside the war-weary Gaza Strip have been sending missives and images of tunnel shafts or underground complexes, including weapons dispensaries or bunkers, discovered beneath homes, schools, mosques and hospitals.

In some cases, the tunnels are simple warrens enabling Hamas fighters to ambush Israeli soldiers; in others, the shafts are vast, elaborate creations replete with elevators, electricity and full ventilation systems.

Some are even equipped with bedrooms, bathrooms and dining rooms, as well as command centers for Hamas to carry out its ongoing military operation against Israel. In one of those command centers, the IDF uncovered a video of Hamas’ Southern Brigade Commander, Mohammed Sinwar, brother of the group’s top leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, driving a car through a broad underground passage.

According to Israeli military estimates shared with Fox News Digital, Hamas, the Islamic terror group that sparked the war with Israel, has spent tens of millions of dollars — and the last 16 years as it governed Gaza — designing, digging and cementing an entire subterranean system rivaling London’s Underground or Paris’s Metro.

300 MILES OF HAMAS SUBTERRANEAN TERROR TUNNELS THE NEXT BIG CHALLENGE FOR IDF: 'GAZA METRO'

Israeli soldiers Dec. 15 in a tunnel the military says Hamas terrorists used to attack the Erez crossing in the northern Gaza Strip. (AP/Ariel Schalit)

A report sent by IDF troops Thursday said it was likely Hamas "used more than 6,000 tons of concrete and 1,800 tons of metal to build hundreds of miles of underground infrastructure."

While the existence of what Israelis refer to as the "Gaza Metro," which Palestinians call "Lower Gaza," has been well known about for years, with Hamas leaders even boasting about it, the question remains how, in one of the world’s most poverty-stricken territories, which relies largely on aid from U.N. agencies, regional and Western powers, the terror group had the financial means to invest in such an intricate and expansive terror tunnel network.

"I don’t know if anybody knows exactly how much money Hamas spent on building this tunnel system," Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, president of Shurat HaDin, the Israel Law Center, told Fox News Digital.

Darshan-Leitner, whose 2017 book "Harpoon" takes a deep dive into how terror groups, including Hamas, find their funding, said she did not believe that at this stage even the IDF understands the extent of Hamas’ underground metropolis.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shakes hands with Qatar's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani following their meeting and press conference in Doha Oct. 13, 2023. (Karim Jaafar/AFP via Getty Images))

"Every day they are surprised to find another tunnel; they are surprised by its length, its complexity, how many floors it has, how wide it is. I don’t think they have the whole picture yet," she said.

She added that building such an elaborate system would likely have cost "tens of millions of dollars, if not more. The question is where did the money come from?"

As the governing body in Gaza, Darshan-Leitner said a large bulk of Hamas’ funds were levied from the Strip’s 2.2 million residents via ordinary taxes, even as aid agencies such as the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA; the Palestinian Authority, which governs Palestinians in the West Bank; and regional powers like Qatar provided crucial humanitarian services or built key infrastructure projects in the coastal enclave.

A man walks in front of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency building as UNRWA personnel strike, demanding a salary increase because of the high cost of living in Gaza City, Gaza, Jan. 30, 2023. ( Ali Jadallah/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

"Hamas took taxes from its residents and let others pay for everything that, as a government, it was supposed to take care of," Darshan-Leitner said. She described how for most of the past two decades, Qatar supplied oil and funded humanitarian projects, the PA covered the costs of electricity, water, health and education, while UNRWA – including with funding from the U.S. – took care of a wide variety of needs for some 75% of the population considered refugees.

"Hamas does not need to pay a dime for the population. Everything is taking care of by others," she said. "This allows them to use their money for military purposes."

Juliette Touma, director of communications for UNRWA, told Fox News Digital the agency had no knowledge that its activities, which she said were mandated by the U.N. General Assembly, enabled Hamas the freedom to build the tunnels.

"We are a humanitarian United Nations agency," she said. "We provide, through UNRWA staff, screened and scrutinized humanitarian assistance to people. There is no third party."

UN TEACHERS CELEBRATED OCT. 7 ATTACK, PRAISED HAMAS TERRORISTS AS ‘HEROES’ ON TELEGRAM: WATCHDOG

Two of the rooms the IDF says were found in the tunnel in Khan Younis. (IDF)

However, Hamas leaders have admitted to taking advantage of the fact that the U.N. and others care for the civilians to build a vast tunnel network beneath the enclave. In a recent interview, Qatari-based Hamas leader Moussa Abu Marzouk said the reason Hamas built no bomb shelters for Gaza’s population — only tunnels for Hamas fighters to hide and fight — was because it was the U.N.’s responsibility to "protect" the majority of Gaza’s population.

Funding the tunnel project from inflated taxation and minimal governing responsibility, however, forms just a small portion of Hamas’ terror income, Dr. Ronnie Shaked, a researcher on Palestinian Affairs at the Truman Institute at Hebrew University, told Fox News Digital.

He said the U.S-designated terror group, like other Islamic organizations in the region, was closely aligned with Iran and clandestinely received millions of dollars a year, as well as weapons and military training from Tehran.

"It is all part of an Iranian doctrine," said Shaked, a former senior correspondent and commentator on Palestinian Affairs for the popular Hebrew daily Yedioth Aharanoth and author of a book studying the rise of Hamas within Palestinian society.

He said Hamas had not only invested billions of dollars in building the tunnels but also devoted a huge amount of manpower and effort to create an underground city, where the top Hamas leaders have been hiding for most of the past 100 days.

The entrance to what Israel's military says is the shaft of a Hamas underground tunnel uncovered during Israel's ground operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip Dec. 3, 2023. (Israel Defense Forces/Handout via REUTERS)

"In order to create a tunnel that is around 400 km (250 miles) over 15 years, then you need millions of dollars. You also need tools and tens of thousands of workers to dig and find ways to remove all the sand and dust from inside the tunnels," he said. "Then there’s the electrical system, ventilation system and special machinery needed to build it all."

Shaked said designing such tunnels and mapping them out in a coastal territory like the Gaza Strip would also have required top-notch engineers who could contend with the unique topography and proximity to the sea, as well as designers mapping out complex routes beneath the densely populated enclave.

According to the former journalist, Hamas’ tunnel project began in the early 2000s with underground passageways used to smuggle goods from Egypt into the enclave. The terror group quickly moved on to attack tunnels snaking beneath the border with Israel, which were used most notably in 2006 when Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was attacked and kidnapped back to Gaza. At that same time, Hamas also started creating its complex network of tunnels beneath the homes, schools and medical centers of its own people.

WATCH: ISRAEL'S FOUR-LEGGED SOLDIERS UNCOVER HAMAS TUNNEL IN GAZA CITY

Mohammad Sinwar in a car inside a Hamas terror tunnel near the Erez Crossing in the Gaza Strip. (IDF Spokesman's Unit)

While a large part of the covert funding came from Iran, Shaked also noted that, over the years, Qatar was also directly involved in sending millions of dollars into the Gaza Strip. In the early days, much of the funding arrived in cash-filled suitcases, first smuggled into Gaza via Egypt. But, later, after a special Mossad unit tasked with tracking and thwarting the flow of money to Hamas was disbanded, it arrived as part of a special arrangement with Israel.

Beginning in 2018, Qatar’s Special Envoy to Gaza, Mohammed Al Emadi, was permitted to enter the Strip and hand-deliver millions of dollars in cash meant for humanitarian projects. Now, it appears that money too went straight into the hands of Hamas.

"In recent years, instead of fighting the terror financing, Israel began to allow money to flow into Gaza, including enabling Qatar to give the cash straight to Hamas," Darshan-Leitner said. She described an official Israeli policy aimed at keeping the Palestinian leadership — Hamas in Gaza and the PA in the West Bank — divided and therefore preventing the creation of a cohesive Palestinian state.

"Israel also thought that if they gave money to Hamas and if they allowed Palestinians workers to enter Israel — if they allowed the people in Gaza just a little bit better quality of life — then they would have no reason to terrorize Israel," she said.

A Hamas tunnel (Israel Defense Forces)

That plan backfired Oct. 7 when thousands of highly trained Hamas terrorists stormed across the border massacring some 1,200 Israelis on army bases, in their homes and at a music festival in the area. That attack initiated the current war, and now Israeli forces are working hard to dismantle Hamas’ underground terror threat and locate more than 130 Israeli nationals who it believes are being held hostage in the tunnels.

Brig. Gen. (Retired) Yaakov Nagel, Israel’s former acting national security adviser and now a senior research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, said Hamas built "a full city beneath a city."

HAMAS LEADERS LIVED LIKE WEALTHY CELEBRITIES IN GAZA TERROR REIGN PRIOR TO OCT. 7 MASSACRE

"We knew about the tunnels, but we didn't know the width, the depth or the length of them," he said. "People estimated there was about 200 kilometers [125 miles], but it now looks like there’s thousands of kilometers.

"In some places, there are three layers of tunnels. And in other places it is wide enough to drive a jeep," Nagel said. He noted it was clear a large chunk of the Qatari money meant to help Gaza civilians rebuild the strip following a previous round of fighting in 2014 "went to the terrorist group’s programs, its tunnels, its missiles, its weapons production sites and into the pockets of corrupt leaders."

An infographic produced by the Israeli Defense Force shows where officials claim Hamas has created a command center under Al Shifa Hospital. (Israeli Defense Force)

Before Oct. 7, he said, the military’s focus was only on destroying the tunnels that crossed the border into Israeli territory. Following the 2014 war — and mass border protests in Gaza in 2018 — Israel ramped up its border defense system, investing $1 billion on an underground barrier to block those tunnels and develop new intelligence technology above ground to monitor what was happening on the other side.

"Unfortunately, we now know it was a mistake because it pushed them to attack the weakest part of our defense, the one that relied solely on technology," said Nagel. "We had the intelligence, but we did not fully understand or digest it. So, when 3,000 terrorists forced their way into Israel in 33 places along the border using heavy machinery, there were not enough people on our side of the border to physically stop them."

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

The IDF's Yahalom unit is part of its Combat Engineering Corps that specializes in underground warfare. (IDF Spokesman's Unit)

The surprise attack and now the surprises that the Israeli military is revealing inside Gaza are among the reasons, he said, that Israel is pushing for greater control of the Strip once the war is over.

"What we are dealing with now is so big, and it will be a lot of work to dismantle it all," Nagel said. "If Israel is not inside in the future, then it can’t control what is happening. And that is why Israel favors having greater control over Gaza the day after the war — so we don’t encounter any more surprises."

foxnews.com · by Ruth Marks Eglash Fox News

18. China Opts for Isolation of Taiwan After Democratic Vote

China Opts for Isolation of Taiwan After Democratic Vote

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-15/china-eschews-military-drills-opts-for-isolation-of-taiwan-over-democratic-vote?sref=hhjZtX76

By Jenni Marsh

January 15, 2024 at 5:59 AM EST

Welcome to Balance of Power, bringing you the latest in global politics. If you haven’t yet, sign up here.

Military drills, trade tariffs and harsh rhetoric were all ways Beijing was predicted to punish Taiwan for its democratic election. In the end, President Xi Jinping delivered his clearest response via a tiny Pacific Island of 13,000 people.

The government in Nauru announced today that it was severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, a shock move after its leader had congratulated current Vice President Lai Ching-te on his victory.

Taipei is now left with only a dozen official partners including the US to advocate for its interests at global bodies such as the United Nations, where it’s been banished by Beijing.

China’s Foreign Ministry was brazen about the timing. “Of course, we release the information after the election,” said spokeswoman Mao Ning. Taipei said the announcement was “retaliation” for its democratic values.

Taiwan’s tightest election in decades dealt a blow to Xi on Saturday. The two camps that favor dialogue with Beijing failed to capitalize on fatigue with the US-friendly ruling party, leaving room for a man China deems a “separatist” to take power.

Dangerously Close to Mainland China

An invasion of the Matsu and Kinmen Islands by Beijing would create a perilous dilemma for Taiwan and the US

Despite never having ruled Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party claims the global chip hub as its own and has vowed to bring it under its control one day, by force if necessary. That’s put huge focus on Xi’s potential military intentions toward the island of 23 million people.

Beijing has so far skipped major airspace incursions or economic curbs in the wake of the vote. Its ability to convince Nauru to ditch Taiwan was a reminder it has a range of tools for intimidation.

Still, Nauru’s departure is mostly symbolic. It’s a minuscule economy with close to zero diplomatic sway.

When it comes to Xi’s bigger goal of unifying with Taiwan, the weekend’s ballot exposed that his playbook of military force, banning Taiwanese fruit exports and bombarding the island with angry rhetoric isn’t bringing Taipei closer anytime soon.

Anti-landing barriers on a beach in Kinmen, Taiwan, with buildings in Xiamen on mainland China in the background.Photographer: An Rong Xu/Bloomberg

Global Must Reads

As the Israel-Hamas war enters 100 days, concern is mounting that it will spread from Gaza into a wider conflict. With the appetite growing in Israel for war against Hezbollah and US influence on its ally apparently waning, the time for a diplomatic resolution looks to be running short as Israel pushes the Iranian-backed group to retreat from the Lebanese border.

US lawmakers released a stopgap spending bill to avert a partial government shutdown on Jan. 20, greatly reducing the chances of a closure but risking the ire of conservative Republican hardliners against House Speaker Mike Johnson. The Senate will begin procedural votes on the bill, known as a continuing resolution, tomorrow and will require cooperation among the 100 senators to pass it before the deadline.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy heads to the World Economic Forum in Davos this week seeking to refocus global attention on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion and to unblock $100 billion in vital aid. The money is stalled in Washington and Brussels as allies grow weary of the expensive war effort with Ukraine’s months-long counteroffensive failing to deliver a breakthrough.

Ukrainian soldiers in the Serebryan Forest on Friday.Photographer: Kostiantyn Liberov/Libkos/Getty Images

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s trip to Russia today could facilitate a visit by Putin to Pyongyang and enhance arms transfers that have replenished the Kremlin’s arsenal to attack Ukraine. A flood of munitions that opened after Kim Jong Un’s visit in September is coming as Kyiv’s stocks of certain types of weaponry are running thin.

Furious disputes in the Guatemalan Congress delayed the inauguration of anti-corruption campaigner Bernardo Arevalo as president for more than 10 hours yesterday. For much of the day, the nation appeared to be on the brink of a constitutional crisis, keeping foreign leaders including the King of Spain and the presidents of Chile and Colombia waiting for the ceremony.

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will address Parliament today after his government said it’s ready to carry out further strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.

Polish President Andrzej Duda rejected the government’s decision to dismiss a top prosecutor, complicating Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s effort to overhaul the judiciary.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked his officials to skip this year’s meeting in Davos over the organizers’ stance on Israel’s war against Hamas, sources say.

Washington Dispatch

Voters in Iowa will gather today at hundreds of polling places to vote in the first contest of the 2024 Republican presidential nomination. They will be doing so as dangerous cold weather has descended on the entire US state, plunging temperatures well below zero — and that’s after a blizzard.

The National Weather Service warned of wind chills possibly falling “as low as 45F below zero.” That would be the coldest weather ever for the caucuses. Former President Donald Trump, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and ex-ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley yesterday implored their supporters to come out anyway, with Haley, in a post on X, encouraging voters: “Wear layers, and let’s do this.”

David Yepsen, a longtime Iowa political journalist now retired, said the outcome of at least one caucus, in 1972, was affected by the weather. A “huge storm” depressed turnout, putting off many supporters of Edmund Muskie, considered the most formidable Democrat. But anti-war activists who favored George McGovern showed up. Muskie still won, but not by as much as expected, and McGovern eventually became the nominee. As for today’s caucuses, Yepsen said: “The party regulars, the activist Republicans and the Trump people, I think will be there.”

One person to watch today: President Joe Biden plans to travel to Philadelphia for an event honoring the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. on the holiday commemorating the civil rights leader.

Sign up for the Washington Edition newsletter for more from the US capital and watch Balance of Power at 5pm ET weekdays on Bloomberg Television.

Chart of the Day

Most Iowa Republicans Still Like Trump

Candidate preference among Iowa Republican caucusgoers

Source: NBC News/Des Moines Register Iowa poll

Trump heads into the caucuses with a commanding 48% support in a closely watched poll that showed Haley moving into second place with 20%. The results of the NBC News/Des Moines Register poll suggest further trouble for DeSantis, who dropped to third with 16%. The Florida governor is banking on a strong showing in Iowa to bolster his challenge to the former president.

And Finally

A renewed volcanic eruption in Iceland destroyed homes for the first time in more than 50 years, as lava flows reached the edge of a fishing town, setting houses alight. While Iceland is used to such events, residents haven’t experienced a threat to inhabited areas at such a scale since 1973, when part of a town of some 5,000 people was buried under lava in the Westman Islands, off the country’s south coast.

Lava near Grindavík, Iceland, yesterday.Source: Icelandic Meterological Office

We apologize for not including the quiz in the email version of the newsletter on Friday. Here it is:

Pop quiz (no cheating!) Which country’s parliament passed a bill to do away with the consumption of dog meat through a rare unanimous vote? Send your answers to balancepower@bloomberg.net.

19. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower captain posts dog photo after strikes on Yemen

BZ Captain.  However, I do not think all commanders could pull this off.

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower captain posts dog photo after strikes on Yemen

Houthi militants promise retaliation for the attacks, but the commander of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower doesn't seem that worried online.

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED JAN 14, 2024 6:15 PM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · January 14, 2024

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The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower is a massive vessel and the lead ship in a carrier strike group. It’s currently in the Red Sea, taking part in operations meant to stop attacks on shipping routes by the Houthi movement out of Yemen. On Thursday, Jan. 11 it launched F/A-18 fighter jets that took part in joint U.S.-U.K. strikes on Houthi-controlled areas around Yemen. It was the largest action in the Red Sea since attacks on commercial ships started weeks ago. The exact number of casualties from the attacks is unknown, but the Pentagon said that 28 locations were hit, with more than 150 guided munitions used in the operation.

This weekend after all of that the Ike’s captain posted this to social media:

This captain only loves me for the snax. I was hoping for a more productive working relationship, perhaps a few team ups or something. Instead… just snax. pic.twitter.com/HWnLt7MU6k

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) January 13, 2024

That’s “Captain Demo,” a dog that regularly pops up on the captain’s social media posts. It turns out the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower is pretty active on social media, both as a whole and in posts from its commander, Capt. Christopher Hill. He’s regularly posting on the site X, formerly and better known as Twitter, under the handle @ChowdahHill. And if Hill is feeling anxious or tense amid the escalating violence in the Red Sea, he isn’t showing it.

That’s despite more than two dozen attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, months of tensions in the Middle East following the Oct. 7 terror attacks in Israel and the country’s subsequent war in Gaza and several back and forth air strikes and rocket attacks between U.S. forces and militants. Instead, the captain of the lead ship of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group keeps it pretty light online. If Hill posts about the ongoing operations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it’s mostly to retweet posts from U.S. Central Command. Instead of Hill posting his own updates about operations or the ongoing tensions, he’s sharing photos of his crew and his dog. He particularly likes to post photos of crew members sitting in the captain’s chair holding a cookie. The carrier’s presence on Instagram is also light on operational details, mostly video and photos of the crew at work with almost no mention of the combat operations it is involved in.

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Hill’s posts are also a pretty strong contrast to the media being shared by Houthis. The group has shared footage of armed helicopter raids on commercial ships, and last month the group’s leader threatened to target American battleships if any attacks were conducted against the organization in Yemen. The Houthis have spent two decades fighting the former Yemeni regime and then Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government of Yemen. It currently controls a large swath of the country, including the capital of Sana’a. On Dec. 30 U.S. ships in the region responded to a distress call from a commercial ship and a day later the Ike and the USS Gravely launched helicopters to repel Houthi boats trying to seize the merchant vessel. Amid all of that, Hill shared a light-hearted post about an aircraft launch.

Screwtop launch with mesmerizing dome action. Don’t stare too long… pic.twitter.com/rbxpTCyWxi

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) December 31, 2023

Hill is also apparently a big Star Wars fan. He regularly posts to social media with images of the titular character from The Mandalorian and the motto “this is the way,” also from the show. Captain Demo also has a harness with that on it.

The carrier strike group was originally sent to the Middle East region in October, as a deterrent against wider escalation following Oct. 7. Since then it has moved into the Red Sea area.

Since Thursday’s attacks on Houthi installations in Yemen, the group did fire one more missile into the Red Sea on Friday, but no one was hurt. The USS Carney hit a radar site operated by the group on Saturday. A Houthi spokesman pledged a “a firm, strong and effective response” following the Thursday attacks, but the group has not launched any missiles or drones since Friday. If Hill or the Ike’s dog seem worried, they aren’t showing it.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• What is the oldest military equipment still in use today?
• Arkansas Air Guard wing commander resigns over abortion policy, Governor says
• Marine Security Guard dies in Republic of the Congo
• How the military celebrates the New Year, according to combat veterans
• The history of Thompson “Tommy” guns at war

Nicholas Slayton

Nicholas Slayton is a contributing editor for Task & Purpose, covering conflict for over 12 years, from the Arab Spring to the war in Ukraine. His previous reporting can be found on the non-profit Aslan Media, The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, The New Republic, The American Prospect, Architectural Digest, The Daily Beast, and the Los Angeles Downtown News. You can reach him at nicholas@taskandpurpose.com or find him on Twitter @NSlayton and Bluesky at @nslayton.bsky.social. Contact the author here.

Branch

Navy

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · January 14, 2024

20. Why The World Is Betting Against American Democracy

Excerpts:

Russia’s diplomats, meanwhile, are among those delighting in the U.S. chaos (and fanning it). The Eastern European ambassador said the Russians had long warned their counterparts not to trust or rely on Washington.

And now what do they say? “We told you so.”

So the world’s envoys are reconsidering how their governments can deal with this America for many years and presidents to come.

Some predicted that a Republican win in November would mean their countries would have to become more transactional in their relationship with the United States instead of counting on it as a partner who’ll be there no matter what. Embassies already are beefing up their contacts among Republicans in case they win back the White House.

“Most countries will be in defensive positions, because the asymmetry of power between them and the United States is such that there’s little proactively or offensively that you can do to impact that,” said Arturo Sarukhan, a former Mexican ambassador to the United States.

When I asked diplomats what advice they’d offer America’s politicians if they were free to do so, several said the same thing: Find a way to overcome your divisions, at least when it comes to issues that reverberate beyond U.S. borders.

“Please create a consensus and a long-term foreign policy,” said Santos, the former Colombian ambassador. “When you have consensus, you don’t let the internal issues create an international foreign policy crisis.”

Why The World Is Betting Against American Democracy

Ambassadors to Washington warn that the GOP-Democratic divide is endangering America’s national security.

By NAHAL TOOSI

01/15/2024 06:43 AM EST

Politico

Ambassadors to Washington warn that the GOP-Democratic divide is endangering America’s national security.

Foreign diplomats are aghast that so many U.S. leaders let their zeal for partisan politics prevent the basic functions of government. | Liesa Johannssen/AP

01/15/2024 06:43 AM EST

Nahal Toosi is POLITICO’s senior foreign affairs correspondent. She has reported on war, genocide and political chaos in a career that has taken her around the world. Her reported column, Compass, delves into the decision-making of the global national security and foreign policy establishment — and the fallout that comes from it.

When I asked the European ambassador to talk to me about America’s deepening partisan divide, I expected a polite brushoff at best. Foreign diplomats are usually loath to discuss domestic U.S. politics.

Instead, the ambassador unloaded for an hour, warning that America’s poisonous politics are hurting its security, its economy, its friends and its standing as a pillar of democracy and global stability.

The U.S. is a “fat buffalo trying to take a nap” as hungry wolves approach, the envoy mused. “I can hear those Champagne bottle corks popping in Moscow — like it’s Christmas every fucking day.”

As voters cast ballots in the Iowa caucuses Monday, many in the United States see this year’s presidential election as a test of American democracy. But, in a series of conversations with a dozen current and former diplomats, I sensed that to many of our friends abroad, the U.S. is already failing that test.

The diplomats are aghast that so many U.S. leaders let their zeal for partisan politics prevent the basic functions of government. It’s a major topic of conversations at their private dinners and gatherings. Many of those I talked to were granted anonymity to be as candid with me as they are with each other.

For example, one former Arab ambassador who was posted in the U.S. during both Republican and Democratic administrations told me American politics have become so unhealthy that he’d turn down a chance to return.

“I don’t know if in the coming years people will be looking at the United States as a model for democracy,” a second Arab diplomat warned.

Many of these conversations wouldn’t have happened a few months ago. There are rules, traditions and pragmatic concerns that discourage foreign diplomats from commenting on the internal politics of another country, even as they closely watch events such as the Iowa caucuses. (One rare exception: some spoke out on America’s astonishing 2016 election.)

But the contours of this year’s presidential campaign, a Congress that can barely choose a House speaker or keep the government open, and, perhaps above all, the U.S. debate on military aid for Ukraine have led some diplomats to drop their inhibitions. And while they were often hesitant to name one party as the bigger culprit, many of the examples they pointed to involved Republican members of Congress.

As they vented their frustrations, I felt as if I was hearing from a group of people wishing they could stage an intervention for a friend hitting rock bottom. Their concerns don’t stem from mere altruism; they’re worried because America’s state of being affects their countries, too.

“When the United States’ voice is not as strong, is not as balanced, is not as fair as it should be, then a problem is created for the world,” said Ronald Sanders, Antigua and Barbuda’s longtime ambassador in Washington.

Donald Trump’s name came up in my conversations, but not as often as you’d think.

Yes, I was told, a Trump win in 2024 would accelerate America’s polarization — but a Trump loss is unlikely to significantly slow or reverse the structural forces leading many of its politicians to treat compromise as a sin. The likelihood of a closely split House and Senate following the 2024 vote adds to the worries.

The diplomats focused much of their alarm on the U.S. debate over military aid to Ukraine — I was taken aback by how even some whose nations had little connection to Russia’s war raised the topic.

In particular, they criticized the decision to connect the issue of Ukrainian aid and Israeli aid to U.S. border security. Not only did the move tangle a foreign policy issue with a largely domestic one, but border security and immigration also are topics about which the partisan fever runs unusually high, making it harder to get a deal. Immigration issues in particular are a problem many U.S. lawmakers have little incentive to actually solve because it robs them of a rallying cry on the campaign trail.

So now, “Ukraine might not get aid, Israel might not get aid, because of pure polarization politics,” said Francisco Santos Calderón, a former Colombian ambassador to the United States.

Diplomats from many European countries are especially unhappy.

They remember how, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many Republicans downplayed concerns about the far-right fringe in their party that questioned what was then solid, bipartisan support. Now, as the debate over the aid unfolds, it seems the far-right is calling the shots.

There’s a growing sense among foreign diplomats that moral or national security arguments — about defending a country unjustly invaded, deterring Russia, preventing a bigger war in Europe and safeguarding democracy — don’t work on the American far-right.

Instead, some are stressing to U.S. lawmakers that funds for Ukraine are largely spent inside the United States, creating jobs and helping rebuild America’s defense industrial base (while having the side benefit of degrading the military of a major U.S. foe).

“If this doesn’t make sense to the politicians, then what will?” the European ambassador asked.

A former Eastern European ambassador to D.C. worried about how some GOP war critics cast the Ukraine crisis as President Joe Biden’s war when “in reality, the consideration should be to the national interests of the United States.”

Foreign diplomats also are watching in alarm as polarizing abortion politics have delayed the promotions of U.S. military officers and threaten to damage PEPFAR, an anti-AIDS program that has saved millions of lives in Africa. That there are questions about America’s commitment to NATO dumbfounds the diplomats I talked to. Then, there are the lengthy delays in Senate confirmations of U.S. ambassadors and other officials — a trend exacerbated by lawmakers from both parties.

“There was always a certain courtesy that the other party gave to let the president appoint a Cabinet. What if these courtesies don’t hold as they don’t seem to hold now?” a former Asian ambassador said. “It is very concerning.”

When Republicans and Democrats strike deals, they love to say it shows the system works. But simply having a fractious, lengthy and seemingly unnecessary debate about a topic of global security can damage the perception of the U.S. as a reliable partner.

“It is right that countries debate their foreign policy stances, but if all foreign policy issues become domestic political theater, it becomes increasingly challenging for America to effectively play its global role on issues that need long-term commitment and U.S. political capital — such as climate change, Chinese authoritarianism, peace in the Middle East and containing Russian gangsterism,” a third European diplomat warned.

The current and former diplomats said their countries are more reluctant to sign deals with Washington because of the partisan divide. There’s worry that a new administration will abandon past agreements purely to appease rowdy electoral bases and not for legitimate national security reasons. The fate of the Iran nuclear deal was one example some mentioned.

“Foreign relations is very much based on trust, and when you know that the person that is in front of you may not be there or might be followed by somebody that feels exactly the opposite way, what is your incentive to do long-term deals?” a former Latin American diplomat asked.

Still, there’s no ambassadorial movement to band together and draw up a petition or a letter urging greater U.S. unity or focus.

The diplomats’ countries don’t always have the same interests. Some have plenty of polarizing politics themselves. In other words, there will be no intervention.

Some of the diplomats stressed they admire America — some attended college here. They acknowledged they don’t have some magical solution to the forces deepening its political polarization, from gerrymandered congressional districts to a fractured media landscape.

They know the U.S. has had polarized moments in the past, from the mid-1800s to the Vietnam War, that affected its foreign policy.

But they’re worried today’s U.S. political divisions could have lasting impact on an increasingly interconnected world.

“The world does not have time for the U.S. to rebound back,” the former Asian ambassador said. “We’ve gone from a unipolar world that we’re familiar with from the 1990s into a multipolar world, but the key pole is still the United States. And if that key pole is not playing the role that we want the U.S. to do, you’ll see alternative forces coming up.”

Russia’s diplomats, meanwhile, are among those delighting in the U.S. chaos (and fanning it). The Eastern European ambassador said the Russians had long warned their counterparts not to trust or rely on Washington.

And now what do they say? “We told you so.”

So the world’s envoys are reconsidering how their governments can deal with this America for many years and presidents to come.

Some predicted that a Republican win in November would mean their countries would have to become more transactional in their relationship with the United States instead of counting on it as a partner who’ll be there no matter what. Embassies already are beefing up their contacts among Republicans in case they win back the White House.

“Most countries will be in defensive positions, because the asymmetry of power between them and the United States is such that there’s little proactively or offensively that you can do to impact that,” said Arturo Sarukhan, a former Mexican ambassador to the United States.

When I asked diplomats what advice they’d offer America’s politicians if they were free to do so, several said the same thing: Find a way to overcome your divisions, at least when it comes to issues that reverberate beyond U.S. borders.

“Please create a consensus and a long-term foreign policy,” said Santos, the former Colombian ambassador. “When you have consensus, you don’t let the internal issues create an international foreign policy crisis.”

POLITICO

Politico

21. US military academies focus on oaths and loyalty to Constitution as political divisions intensify

This should not need to be news. This is foundational for all Academies (and should be for all commissioning sources).

US military academies focus on oaths and loyalty to Constitution as political divisions intensify

The U.S. military isn't immune to the country’s deep political polarization and the service academies are trying to update how they teach future officers to navigate that divide

By GARY FIELDS Associated PressJanuary 14, 2024, 7:53 AM ET

• 7 min read

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

WEST POINT, N.Y. -- For 75 minutes, Maj. Joe Amoroso quizzed his students in SS202, American Politics, about civilian leadership of the military, the trust between the armed forces and the public, and how the military must not become a partisan tool.

There was one answer, he said, that would always be acceptable in his class filled with second-year students at the U.S. Military Academy. Hesitantly, one cadet offered a response: “The Constitution.”

“Yes,” Amoroso said emphatically.

His message to the students, known as yearlings, was simple: Their loyalty is “not about particular candidates. It’s not a particular person or personality that occupies these positions. It’s about the Constitution.”

The emphasis for the next generation of military officers that their loyalty must be focused on the nation’s democratic underpinnings rather than on any individual is a reflection of how the armed forces are being forced to deal with America's deep political polarization at a time when trust in traditional institutions is eroding.

The role of the military in particular has come under scrutiny as former President Donald Trump runs to reclaim the White House and has laid out an aggressive agenda should he win. It includes potentially using the military in ways other presidents have not. That could mean invoking the Insurrection Act to send units to the border or patrol the streets of predominantly Democratic cities.

Trump's rhetoric about top commanders also has raised concerns. While in office, Trump once referred to the military leaders in his administration as “my generals.” Earlier this year, he suggested that a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Army Gen. Mark Milley, be put to death for treason.

President Joe Biden, in his first campaign address of the year, warned about Trump's rhetoric on the military and its leadership.

With cadets and midshipmen drawn from across the United States, students at West Point and other service academies are aware of the national mood and the potential for political divisions to seep into the military.

They encounter an array of classes on the Constitution and, in some cases, the history of the civilian-military relationship. Each graduate who is commissioned takes multiple oaths at school and during their service. Milley emphasized the significance of the oaths in his retirement address last fall, appearing to take aim at Trump.

“We don’t take an oath to a king or a queen or to a tyrant or a dictator. And we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator,” he said.

At the Air Force Academy, the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol was a top subject of discussion in the Civil-Military Relations class when junior and senior-year cadets began the spring semester the next day.

The coincidental timing “brought introspection about their oath as future officers,” said the instructor, Marybeth Ulrich. One result was a cadet-driven initiative, the Oath Project.

“Instigation of potential uprising or any issues on Capitol Hill creates immediate concern for the military and for the larger public as a whole. So we were very aware of the events as they were unfolding,” said 1st Lt. Darrell Miller, now stationed with the Space Force at Buckley Space Force Base near Denver, and one of the 13 students in the class who started the project.

Dozens of former and active duty military members have been charged in the Jan. 6 assault, an attempt to stop Congress from certifying the 2020 presidential election that Democrat Biden won over Republican Trump. A recent Defense Department inspector general report showed that dozens of military members were suspected of extremist activities that included conspiring to overthrow the government, though the number represents a tiny fraction of the more than 2 million U.S. service members.

When the students examined the three oaths they had sworn to, Miller said they realized there had not been much education about them -- “a line by line breakdown. What does it mean? What are you really swearing your allegiance to essentially.”

The group suggested more emphasis on the history and purpose of their oaths and also “what you are actually swearing your allegiance to,” he said. One point was showing the distinction between countries where the military professed allegiance to sovereigns or individuals as opposed to the U.S. military's oath to the Constitution.

“We knew what it was and the do’s and don’ts, but we didn’t really go into the why,” said 1st Lt. Bryan Agustin, another of the students behind the Oath Project who is stationed at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas.

Although the seniors had a short time before graduation, they were able to change some of the language in their commissioning ceremony, adding more history about the oath before it was administered. The incoming basic class that fall also had the history added to their ceremony. According to copies provided by the academy, the phrasing in both cases noted that the oath had its roots in the Revolutionary War and was given to support “the democratic processes and civil liberties that our Founders enumerated in the Constitution.”

Since then, the Oath Project has been instrumental in further changes, including to basic training for new students and to their handbooks. The group's work also is integrated throughout cadets' academic and military training. Future plans include symposiums for other service academies and ROTC units.

At West Point, the Constitution and the oaths are not only embedded throughout the curriculum, they also permeate the campus.

Constitution Corner Monument is near student housing and a place cadets pass daily. Dedicated by members of the class of 1943 to their fallen classmates, it contains several markers that include inscriptions of their oaths and parts of the Constitution.

Inside Grant Hall, two of the alumni portraits that look down on diners and visitors loom large in the history of the oath and the civilian-military relationship. Ulysses S. Grant, who later became president, led the Union Army through the Civil War after an estimated 300 of his fellow graduates had rejected their oaths and fought for the Confederacy. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander in World War II who later became president and used the Insurrection Act to call on the 101st Airborne to help integrate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.

“The Constitution remains absolutely central to all the things that we teach, whether it’s expressly or it’s tangentially connected in the courses,” said Brig. Gen. Shane Reeves, dean of the academic board and a 1996 graduate.

The goal is training officers to win wars, but current events are intertwined, including Jan. 6, which routinely comes up in class discussions. Avoiding it would not be an option, said Reeves, whose family ties to West Point date to the 19th century. His son is due to graduate in May.

He said if newly minted officers cannot answer questions from their units about current events, “we would have failed.”

“We want the cadets to be thoughtful and to think through and to understand what their obligations are,” he said. “They have some really important obligations — trust of the American people, trying to stay nonpartisan.”

In Amoroso’s American Politics class, the only mention of Biden and Trump, who so far has dominated the 2024 GOP primary campaign, came up in scenarios he presented about service members -– even retired ones -– speaking out in support of candidates and how that can be interpreted as the position of the military as a whole. While individuals retain the right to express themselves, it’s important that the military not be seen as partisan, he said.

“Whether you like it or not, you’re going to be thrust into these political conflicts,” he told the cadets. No matter the circumstance, he added, their foundation should never change – loyalty to the Constitution.

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ABCNews.com · by ABC News

​22. The Next Battle in Higher Ed May Strike at Its Soul: Scholarship

The Next Battle in Higher Ed May Strike at Its Soul: Scholarship - The New York Times

nytimes.com · by Anemona Hartocollis · January 14, 2024

The Next Battle in Higher Ed May Strike at Its Soul: Scholarship

Cases involving Stanford, Harvard and M.I.T. are fueling skepticism over the thoroughness of research — even from the academic world’s biggest stars.

The next big battle over higher education promises to look at plagiarism.Credit…Sophie Park for The New York Times

By Anemona Hartocollis

Jan. 14, 2024

Marc Tessier-Lavigne, president of Stanford, resigned in August after an investigation found serious flaws in studies he had supervised going back decades.

Claudine Gay, president of Harvard, resigned as the new year dawned, under mounting accusations of plagiarism going back to her graduate student days.

Then Neri Oxman, a former star professor at M.I.T., was accused of plagiarizing from Wikipedia, among other sources, in her dissertation. Her husband, the hedge-fund billionaire Bill Ackman, was one of Dr. Gay’s most dogged critics. And he has vowed to scour the records of M.I.T.’s faculty, and its president, Sally Kornbluth, for plagiarism.

The attacks on the integrity of higher education have come fast and furious over the last few years. The federal Varsity Blues investigation, in which wealthy parents were accused of using bribery and fraud to secure spots for their children in résumé-building colleges, launched a debate over merit and the admissions game. The affirmative action lawsuit against Harvard exposed how Asian American students must perform at a higher standard to win entry. And the protests over the Israel-Hamas war opened administrators to charges that they tolerated antisemitism on their campuses.

Now the focus has moved into what may be the very soul of higher education: scholarship.

Marc Tessier-Lavigne, the former president of Stanford University.Credit…Carolyn Fong for The New York Times

There are differences among the cases — Dr. Tessier-Lavigne and Dr. Gay were the faces of their institutions, while Dr. Oxman is a former faculty member, who was well known in her field of computational design. Defenders of Dr. Gay and Dr. Oxman say that their lifting of words is minor, and that they were not accused of stealing ideas. And unlike Dr. Tessier-Lavigne, they have not had to retract any papers.

But the recent controversies have helped fuel the skepticism that some scholarship is not as rigorous as it purports to be.

“It does strike me that this is a problem of the universities’ own making,” said Ivan Oransky, co-founder of Retraction Watch, which keeps a database of retracted papers now numbering more than 46,000.

“They have tried every which way to avoid acknowledging just how common misconduct is in academia, and what that does is give ammunition to sometimes — let’s face it — bad-faith actors who want to undermine confidence or undermine the reputation of an institution,” Dr. Oransky said.

There is probably more to come. A congressional committee has announced that it would investigate a “hostile takeover” of higher education by “political activists, woke faculty and partisan administrators.”

A cottage industry of checking research papers had already sprung up in the last two decades, including Retraction Watch, the Center for Open Science and Data Colada, a blog dedicated to unmasking research based on bad data.

The number of retracted research papers has grown dramatically over time, to more than 10,000 retractions internationally in 2023, an annual record, according to the journal Nature, up from about 400 papers in 2010, when Retraction Watch began its work, Dr. Oransky said.

This may be in part because the scrutiny has intensified, he said. Nature also blamed the rise of paper-writing mills.

“What’s different this time is the levels at which this seems to be striking — Harvard and Stanford,” Dr. Oransky said. “These are cataclysmic events.”

Dr. Gay, a professor of government and African and African American studies, asked for a handful of corrections in citation and quotation in her dissertation and scholarly papers. But she stood by her work, and an outside panel cleared her of research misconduct.

A review panel found that Dr. Tessier-Lavigne, a neuroscientist, had not personally engaged in or known about data manipulation but that “there may have been opportunities to improve laboratory oversight and management.” He agreed to retract three papers and correct two more.

Dr. Oxman, a celebrated architect and designer, apologized on social media for some lapses in attribution in her dissertation.

Not everyone thinks academia is rife with deception.

Stephen Voss, an associate professor of political science at the University of Kentucky, said he was dismayed that in their attempts to defend Dr. Gay, some academics had suggested that plagiarism was commonplace within their ranks.

“I viewed some of these defenses of Claudine as being false confessions to misbehavior that actually is not taking place at the level her defenders wanted to suggest,” Dr. Voss said. “The ‘it goes on all the time’ argument.”

Dr. Gay is accused of copying, with only light paraphrasing, two passages from Dr. Voss’s work in her dissertation.

Dr. Voss said he was not troubled by it, since he had been her teaching fellow at Harvard, helping to teach her quantitative analysis, and later her colleague in the same lab. “It would have been quite natural for her to borrow ideas from me,” he said. “The Claudine Gay story is just going to force everybody to be a little more careful about citations.”

The internet and software like Turnitin, which targets academic publishing and research, may make it easier to detect plagiarism. And plagiarism watchers are waiting to see what the future of artificial intelligence will bring — more plagiarism or better detection?

But until now, that software has been used more against students than against professors and administrators.

Many scholars are worried that attacks on research will be used by politicians, donors and even other scholars as a pretext to go after their ideological enemies.

“A broad suspicion toward intellectuals and academics is a rich vein in American culture, and recent events have supported it,” Dr. Voss said.

Mr. Ackman, head of the hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management, was a vocal critic of Dr. Gay’s leadership at Harvard, from her handling of antisemitism on campus to her support for diversity, equity and inclusion policies. The accusations of plagiarism against her became part of his attack.

After Dr. Gay announced that she would resign from her presidency but remain on the faculty, Mr. Ackman posted on X: “There would be nothing wrong with her staying on the faculty if she didn’t have serious plagiarism issues. Students are forced to withdraw for much less.”

Mr. Ackman declined to comment for this article.

It’s this kind of attack that concerns Jonathan Bailey, a copyright and plagiarism consultant who also runs the website Plagiarism Today. “There’s a lot of worry that the heat has been turned up and the people who are doing the evaluations don’t necessarily have academic research or journalistic integrity in mind,” he said.

Just as new accusations dribbled out against Dr. Gay until the day before she resigned, they have continued against Dr. Oxman. On Thursday, Retraction Watch posted a blog item saying that her thesis lifted about 100 words without quotation or citation from an article published in Physics World in 2000. The blog said it learned of the overlap from Steve Haake, a sports engineer who wrote the original article.

“I have never intentionally presented someone else’s words or ideas as my own,” Dr. Oxman said in a statement emailed through a spokesman for her husband on Friday, the day after the Retraction Watch item appeared. “In the process of writing a 330-page dissertation, I missed a couple of footnotes and some quotation marks. Had A.I. software been available in 2009, I could have avoided these errors. The mistakes are simply a function of my humanity.”

Even so, the attacks on academic integrity are sure to continue. “While President Gay’s resignation is welcome news, the problems at Harvard are much larger than one leader, and the committee’s oversight will continue,” said Representative Virginia Foxx, a North Carolina Republican, who heads the House Education and the Workforce Committee, after Dr. Gay’s resignation on Jan. 2.

Representative Virginia Foxx promises to continue her investigation into higher education. Credit…Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times

There was a similar crisis of confidence in universities in the 1980s, as questions were raised about plagiarism and fabricated data in scientific research, including at Harvard. Al Gore, then a Democratic representative of Tennessee, and Representative John Dingell Jr., a Michigan Democrat, among others, held oversight hearings.

Academics argued that research misconduct was rare, and politicians contended it was underreported, according to a history published by federal agencies. Many of those testifying minimized the problem or said that criminalizing scientific fraud would create a climate of fear that would impede research.

In the current dispute, Harvard responded through a defamation lawyer when The New York Post first raised accusations of plagiarism against Dr. Gay. Mr. Ackman, writing on X, has invoked lawyers and demanded that Business Insider — which first reported the plagiarism accusations against Dr. Oxman — “suspend” its stories.

“I don’t want to say history is repeating itself, but there are shades of that,” Dr. Oransky said. Neither side, he predicted, is likely to back down. “These are really high stakes.”

Kirsten Noyes and Alain Delaquérière contributed research.

is a national reporter for The Times, covering higher education.

A version of this article appears in print on  , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Latest Battles Strike at Soul Of Academia. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

nytimes.com · by Anemona Hartocollis · January 14, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com