Quotes of the Day:

"Live simply that others might simply live." 

– Elizabeth Seaton

“Yet the greatest tragedy of the twenty-first century may be that we have learned so little from the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century. Apparently catastrophe lessons need to be experienced firsthand by each generation. So, here are some refreshers: Nuclear conflict may mean the end of life on this planet. Mass dehumanization can lead to genocide. The death of an independent press can lead to tyranny and render a population helpless to protect itself against a government that disdains law and conscience.”

– Lesley M.M. Blume, Fallout: The Hiroshima Cover-up and the Reporter Who Revealed It to the World

“[Writers] are feared by every tyrant--who shows his fear by burning the books and destroying the individuals.”

– E.B. White, On Democracy

MG Robert Scales Passing: This was posted on LinkedIn. It is the only notice I have found so far. MG Scales was truly one of our Army 's intellectual giants as well as a soldier's soldier.

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7152666124898246656/

Army Heritage Center Foundation

The board and staff of the Army Heritage Center Foundation are saddened by the passing of MG (R) Robert Scales, former Chairman of our Board and former Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, on January 12, 2024. MG Scales had a tremendous impact on the Foundation, as well as the Carlisle community, and will be deeply missed.

1. A Guide for Measuring ResiliencyA Guide for Measuring Resiliency

2. Why the United States Had to Strike Yemen by Joseph L. Votel

3. Four retired Marine generals on how to rebuild America’s crisis response force

4. The Decatur Option (countering anti-ship attacks)

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2024

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 15, 2024

7. Female Hamas Hostage Who Pleaded for Life on Bike Is Forced to Reveal Fate of 2 Fellow Israeli Captives in Sick Video

8. Iran 'Escalates' Middle East Tensions With Ballistic Missile Attack Near US Consulate in Iraq

9. Austin released from hospital after cancer surgery complications

10. Russia losses 2 aircraft, 30 artillery systems and 1,110 soldiers in one day

11. Hamas fights with a patchwork of weapons built by Iran, China, Russia and North Korea

12. U.S. forces recovered Iranian warheads in Navy SEAL mission gone awry

13. Operational Art Reborn – Part Two

14. Deterring War without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-averse Approach to Deterrence

15. Pentagon’s industrial strategy describes the problem, not the solution

16. The Houthis Have Backed Iran Into a Corner

17. The Military’s Insistence on Owning Commercial Intellectual Property is Limiting Innovation

18. Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear StabilityArtificial Intelligence and Nuclear Stability

19. Trust But Verify: US Troops, Artificial Intelligence, and an Uneasy Partnership

20. The Humiliation of Davos Man

1. A Guide for Measuring Resiliency

It is the Joint Special Operations University in partnership with Special Operations Command Europe that has been leading the intellectual way in resistance and resilience. The author, Dr. Robert Burell, is one of the leading scholars on these concepts. These two concepts are critical to national security strategy in the 21st century.

Please go to the link to view the graphics and charts. https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-guide-for-measuring-resiliency/https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-guide-for-measuring-resiliency/

Excerpts:

Three major publications in 2023 and 2024 showcase these research methods. The first is an essay titled “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance,” published in Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal on 14 December 2023 and features Moldova as a case study. This journal essay outlines Phase One (or the first five steps). The second essay is titled “Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy,” published in Expeditions of Marine Corps University Press on 9 January 2024 and features the Communist Chinese Party and Taiwan as a case study. This essay covers Phases Two, Three and Four (or steps 6-12). The third publication is a book titled Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Irregular Warfare, Competition and Deterrence, scheduled for publication by Joint Special Operations University Press in mid-2024. The book will illustrate all 12 steps of the process (and features so much more). It also demonstrates how these specific methodologies can be applied to the case of China and Taiwan with all four phases.

In summation, the 12-step analysis process outlined above enables planners, statesmen, or practitioners to frame a country or region in terms of resilience and resistance using data-centric tools that emphasize human conditions normally unaccounted for in military science. In the current landscape of competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare, a thorough analysis of a state’s resilience and resistance potential remains vital. The prescribed resilience and resistance assessment serves as an initial step in developing a more comprehensive understanding of intrastate conflict, providing insights applicable for policy formulation and guiding effective military strategy.Three major publications in 2023 and 2024 showcase these research methods. The first is an essay titled “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance,” published in Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal on 14 December 2023 and features Moldova as a case study. This journal essay outlines Phase One (or the first five steps). The second essay is titled “Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy,” published in Expeditions of Marine Corps University Press on 9 January 2024 and features the Communist Chinese Party and Taiwan as a case study. This essay covers Phases Two, Three and Four (or steps 6-12). The third publication is a book titled Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Irregular Warfare, Competition and Deterrence, scheduled for publication by Joint Special Operations University Press in mid-2024. The book will illustrate all 12 steps of the process (and features so much more). It also demonstrates how these specific methodologies can be applied to the case of China and Taiwan with all four phases.

In summation, the 12-step analysis process outlined above enables planners, statesmen, or practitioners to frame a country or region in terms of resilience and resistance using data-centric tools that emphasize human conditions normally unaccounted for in military science. In the current landscape of competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare, a thorough analysis of a state’s resilience and resistance potential remains vital. The prescribed resilience and resistance assessment serves as an initial step in developing a more comprehensive understanding of intrastate conflict, providing insights applicable for policy formulation and guiding effective military strategy.

A Guide for Measuring Resiliency - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Robert S. Burrell · January 16, 2024

A portion of this article was previously published in Small Wars and Insurgencies journal.

The question of state resiliency remains essential to the three biggest U.S. foreign policy questions of today. Why did Afghanistan fall so rapidly to the Taliban in 2021? Why, in contrast, has Ukraine stood firm against Russian aggression since 2014? And what will the Republic of China (Taiwan) do in the face of the Chinese Communist Party’s coercion and, perhaps, military force tomorrow? In military doctrine, accurately framing the operational environment is crucial. While existing analytical tools like PMESII-PT and ASCOPE offer valuable insights, the primary focus of the military planning process tends to be on assessing the physical characteristics of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. These are vital for planning conventional campaigns, yet they often provide an incomplete picture by not fully encompassing the equally decisive social, economic, and political dimensions of human environments. In reality, tools like PMESII-PT comprise operational assessments supporting conventional campaign design, while one that focuses on resilience and resistance offers a methodology better suited for assessing the enduring requirements faced in competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare. In analogous terms, reading resistance graffiti can provide a better awareness for stabilizing partners or inspiring change in adversaries than counting tanks (photo by NoonIcarus from wikicommons).

Illustration 1: Graffiti in Venezuela (2017) “Bread for our town. Elections now!”

Quite frankly, the military’s current design process lacks sufficient interdisciplinary considerations beyond military science for measuring the governing authority’s resilience or resistance to the same. In contrast, we (myself and my partner in developing these methods – John Collison) suggest a more innovative human-centric model specifically for assessing resilience and resistance within nation-states. In this short article, I present a straightforward guide to measure resiliency in terms of will, potential, and sustainability of authority in opposition to subversion, coercion and aggression.

Conceptual Framework

A dynamic and polarizing relationship exists between governmental and/or societal resilience and to resistance movements potentially opposed to that very same authority. In fact, every human society contains forms of resistance to current governance or foreign occupation. Resistance can span a spectrum of activities from nonviolent and legal forms of protest to illegal or violent means. In contrast, each regime attempts to brace the resolve of the population against political, economic, or social change – and even revolution. To visualize this relationship ofResilience and Resistance, we leverage a reconceptualization of Gordon McCormick’s model, originally published in 1987 to explain the Shining Path Insurgency.

Illustration 2: The Resilience and Resistance Model

In this model (as shown in illustration 2), there are four primary nodes: (a) the population, (b) the resilience node, (c) the resistance node, and (d) the external support node. The resistance and resilience nodes perform five basic actions in opposition to each other: (1) attempt to gain support from the population; (2) disrupt the other’s efforts to garner support from the population; (3) perform violent and/or nonviolent actions directly against one another; (4) attempt to interrupt their opponent’s attempts to garner international support; and (5) attempt to garner international support. Both the population and the external support nodes have agency and can initiate actions to influence the resilience and/or the resistance nodes as well. The power of the Resilience and Resistance Model is that it applies in nearly every intrastate conflict, no matter the scale or level of violence.

Resiliency Measurement

The methodology for measuring state resiliency is partly inspired by David Hastings’ research compiling an international human security index over the past decade. In short, Hastings used publicly available datasets to quantify the United Nations’s seven factors of human security in nation-states. Similarly, the resiliency of a state or population can be assessed by its ability to resist subversion, coercion, and aggression from internal or external threats. Some key factors to consider when measuring resiliency include: (a) the physical aspects of the nation or region in question, (b) the fragility of current governance, (c) cultural resilience to change, (d) the will of the population to fight, and (e) the perceived effectiveness of current governance.

General characteristics to consider include the size and makeup of the population in terms of ethnicity, linguistics, religion, type of governance, and socioeconomic classes. One place to get a general idea of this type of data is from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook. This database covers relevant metrics regarding geography, population, natural environment, type of government, economy, energy, communications, transportation, military capabilities, and even food security.

Subsequently, when finding real data, another key criterion involves analyzing the fragility of current governmental systems. Obviously, by utilizing information from economic, academic, non-governmental organizations, and other government agencies sources, this portion of the data-driven product approach to measuring resilience remains much more of a whole-of-government product than the ones offered in military planning. The Fund for Peace has established one such a database which considers multiple metrics binned into four categories: (a) cohesion, (b) economic, (c) political, and (d) social. Finally, analyzing resiliency requires a comprehensive study of governance. Some of the factors include the regime’s accountability to the people, stability of the regime, how effective the regime’s activities and efforts are, the types of regulations in place and how they are enforced, rule of law, and government corruption. Fortunately, the World Bank maintains such a database for nations and investors to consider but works equally well for resiliency metrics.

Two additional sources are worthy of consideration. One reference with insights into cultural resilience includes Swiss Re Institute’s resilience index. This index ranks thirty-one nations in their ability to absorb a range of challenges, including natural disasters. It measures nations against nine benchmarks. While this index provides a good example of investigation, it contains only a fraction of states worthy of analysis. Another source from Journal of Advanced Military Studies provides a methodology to estimate national morale during violent conflict. This scholarship provides methods for evaluating both the state’s and the military’s confidence and ability to maintain combat operations. Another study from RAND defines national will to fight as “the determination of a national government to conduct sustained military and other operations for some objective even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases.” So, both military morale and national will to fight prove useful metrics for analysis. Illustration 3 shows these previously described methodologies for measuring resilience in a consolidated table.

Case Study

In this section, I use Venezuela as a case study to measure resiliency in a succinct, one-paragraph overview. This analysis relies on internationally recognized and publicly available statistics. The essence of Venezuela’s value as a case study stems from evaluating the resilience of the Nicolas Maduro regime, especially in light of the support it has received from competitor states like Cuba, Russia, China, and Iran over the past decade.

Illustration 4: Map and Location of Venezuela

General Context

Venezuela, one of three countries born from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830 alongside Columbia and Ecuador, experienced a pivotal change after the discovery of oil in 1914. Since then, the state has been ruled by caudillos (strong men). Initially, these leaders maintained strong ties with the United States, but this shifted when Hugo Chavez took power in 2002. Chavez attempted to enforce a form of popular socialism and state-managed economy similar to that employed by Fidel Castro. Venezuela shares borders with Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana, and its porous border is home to nonstate groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (commonly referred to as the Spanish acronym, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (or ELN, also the Spanish acronym). In terms of size, the country is large, about twice the size of California, with a population of 28 million, roughly half that of Colombia. Since 2015, an estimated 7 million people have left Venezuela, creating a large diaspora in neighboring countries, as well as the United States. The Venezuelan population resembles that of many Latin American countries and reflects centuries of colonial rule with a mix of European and indigenous people, including immigrants from Italy, Portugal, Germany, Africa, and the Middle East. The majority language is Spanish and Catholicism is the predominant religion, practiced by 96% of the population.

Illustration 5: Data-Centric Analysis of Resilience

Data-Driven Analysis

As depicted in Illustration 5, these numbers rank Venezuela on a percentage bases with all other countries in the world, with 0% being the worst and 100% being the best. Venezuela ranks 29th out of 179 countries (or 16.2% in comparison with others) in terms of state fragility. The national will to fight is subjectively evaluated as low (or 33.3%), due to corruption, government incompetence, and lack of public trust. I also evaluate social resilience as low (33.3%), with diffused political loyalties, substantial social class competition, and ethnic disparities. According to the World Bank, and in comparison with other nations, Venezuela ranks 6.8% in government accountability, 12.3% in political stability, 5.2% in government effectiveness, 2.4% in regulation efficiency, .5% in rule of law, and 1.9% in control of corruption. Tallying all the factors equally, as shown in Illustration 5, Venezuela’s overall resiliency to coercion, subversion, or revolution remains one of the lowest at 12.4% compared to other nations. In contrast, neighboring Costa Rica scores 76.43%.

Providing a Comprehensive Examination

Phase One. If simply providing a percentage-based estimate of state resiliency seems a bit dissatisfying, that might be because this is only step one in a 12-step process designed to fully analyze a state in terms of both resiliency and resistance. Phase One, or steps one through five, provides a comprehensive and data-driven analysis to measure state resiliency and resistance, as well as the potential success or failure of external support to either. It leverages publicly available data produced by U.S. government agencies, global organizations, and academia.

Phase Two. In Phase Two, our methodology leverages globally produced research from non-governmental organizations and international universities (including Carnegie Endowment of Peace, Harvard, and Uppsala University) to identify prevalent or influential resistance organizations within the state and then categorize these organizations along the resistance continuum to classify their general nature as either nonviolent legal, nonviolent illegal, rebellion, insurgency, or belligerency.

Phase Three. In Phase Three, the methodology conducts a detailed analysis of one or more resistance movements identified in the previous phase, examining their leadership, motivation, operating environment, organization, and activities. This approach incorporates methods recognized by John Hopkins University – Applied Physics Laboratory and U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Phase Four. Finally, in Phase 4, we subjectively assess the information gathered to make recommendations concerning potential external support in another state’s intrastate conflict consisting of three primary options: to (a) support the resiliency of current governance, (b) support resistance to the same, or (c) do nothing. At a minimum, the comprehensive analysis consists of all twelve steps.

Conclusion

Three major publications in 2023 and 2024 showcase these research methods. The first is an essay titled “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency and Resistance,” published in Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal on 14 December 2023 and features Moldova as a case study. This journal essay outlines Phase One (or the first five steps). The second essay is titled “Assessing Resistance for the Purpose of Informing International Policy,” published in Expeditions of Marine Corps University Press on 9 January 2024 and features the Communist Chinese Party and Taiwan as a case study. This essay covers Phases Two, Three and Four (or steps 6-12). The third publication is a book titled Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Irregular Warfare, Competition and Deterrence, scheduled for publication by Joint Special Operations University Press in mid-2024. The book will illustrate all 12 steps of the process (and features so much more). It also demonstrates how these specific methodologies can be applied to the case of China and Taiwan with all four phases.

In summation, the 12-step analysis process outlined above enables planners, statesmen, or practitioners to frame a country or region in terms of resilience and resistance using data-centric tools that emphasize human conditions normally unaccounted for in military science. In the current landscape of competition, deterrence, and irregular warfare, a thorough analysis of a state’s resilience and resistance potential remains vital. The prescribed resilience and resistance assessment serves as an initial step in developing a more comprehensive understanding of intrastate conflict, providing insights applicable for policy formulation and guiding effective military strategy.

Dr. Robert S. Burrell is an award-winning military historian and teaches interdisciplinary studies at Joint Special Operations University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including Joint Special Operations University and US Special Operations Command.

Main image: Staff Sgt. Chad Hume and Capt. Wes Cooler, 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade, pitch their proposal to fellow SFAB members taking part in simulated scenario during training conducted by the West Point Negotiation Project July 2. The SFAB Soldiers went through training with the negotiation project to help them better prepare for future deployments. (Brandon O’Connor via United States Military Academy at West Point)

irregularwarfare.org · by Robert S. Burrell · January 16, 2024

2. Why the United States Had to Strike Yemen by Joseph L. Votel

Why the United States Had to Strike Yemen 

Joseph L. Votel

Former Commander of United States Central Command and a Distinguished Fellow in National Security at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC.

https://english.aawsat.com/opinion/4790996-why-united-states-had-strike-yemen%C2%A0

Last Thursday, military forces from the United States and the United Kingdom struck nearly thirty different locations across Western Yemen to degrade Houthi military capabilities and dissuade the rebel group from further attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. It will take a bit more time to assess the actual damage caused to Houthi radars, missiles, drone launch bases, and command and control facilities and even longer to determine a change in behavior by the Houthis.

Still, these strikes will unlikely have the full effect the International Coalition intended. That is why a follow-up round of strikes occurred the next day, and Operation Prosperity Guardian remains prepared for further military action.

The United States and its partners had no option but to conduct these strikes. Freedom of navigation and uninhibited flow of commerce through international waters are fundamental rights and long-standing US and international security interests. Not acting would be a reprehensible failure to enforce international norms and standards, one that would only encourage more bad behavior on the part of the Houthis and their primary backers – the Iranian regime.

These strikes came after a rather lengthy period of warnings, including a joint public statement by ten nations, as well as what was surely back-channel communications and threats to the Houthis and Iran. The United States and its partners deployed ships and other resources that effectively protected international shipping by destroying dozens of missiles, drones, and attack boats before they could reach their targets. Defensive measures are not enough.

It is not the first time we have had to do this. In October of 2016 – Houthis attempting to attack the USS Mason with coastal defense missiles felt the wrath of US strikes on radar sites that supported their attacks. Quick action by the US Navy brought this relatively short period of provocation to an end. It was easier to do then because the Houthis were not as capable or as well supplied by their principal benefactor – the Iranian regime. Still – over the next couple of years following those attacks, we saw Houthi mining in the Yemeni port of Hodeidah that threatened international aid ships and posed grave danger to commerce through the Bab al-Mandeb. These actions became significant discussion points in the UN-led negotiations to deliver badly needed humanitarian aid to the people of Yemen and bring the civil war raging across the country to an end.

My point is this. Military action, while decisive and satisfying, is seldom solely sufficient to create deterrence or cause a behavior change. Other elements of national power must complement the military means that the United States and its international partners have mustered. We also need partners in the region to bring their capabilities to bear. If not through direct military action to punish and deter the Houthis, then in a way to protect and restore confidence by international shipping that operates in this critical waterway.

A more comprehensive approach means that we must now double down on diplomatic efforts to apply more pressure on the Houthis and the Iranian regime to stop these attacks. We must leverage regional partners with more open and direct relationships with the Houthis – countries like Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Our continued efforts to bring the Gaza conflict into another phase is also a vital corollary effort we must continue actively pursuing.

It also means we must actively use the information space and attribute clear accountability for these attacks to both the Houthis and the Iranian regime. The Houthis say they are attacking only ships that are coming to and from Israel – but the evidence conclusively proves otherwise. These Houthi attacks are indiscriminate, disproportional, and aimed at civilian mariners – all violations of the Law of Armed Conflict. We must do better at demonstrating the Iranian regime’s role in these attacks. Show the unambiguous evidence and hold the regime accountable in the court of public opinion.

We also must be prepared to leverage every tool we have to put a financial squeeze on the Houthis and the Iranian regime. We are already doing a lot – but more is available. Declaring the Houthis a terrorist organization and limiting the unregulated movement of military supplies from Iran is a good start.

In my view, it is not in the interest of the United States or the international community to become embroiled in a protracted conflict with the Houthis or Iran. That is not what I am arguing for in this opinion piece. An open-ended engagement would tie up precious resources and likely have a destabilizing effect on the region.

But the Houthi actions compel the United States and its international partners to act. And act we must – by bringing together the international community of nations, including partners in the region, to stop these unprovoked and unsafe attacks in the Red Sea. With a clear sense of urgency, we need to apply a skillful combination of all our tools to restore deterrence and make the Houthis understand that the cost of these attacks outweighs the supposed benefit they derive by being seen as a good member of the Iranian regime’s so-called “axis of resistance.”

We must also look to the source of all these issues – the Iranian regime. They are the provocateurs behind the instability in the region, and it appears they are prepared to continue the chaos indefinitely through their surrogate network consisting of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi and Syrian militia groups, and the Houthis. As the saying goes among US military officers experienced in the region – the Iranian regime will fight to their last proxy. They do not want a confrontation with the US because they know they will lose.

A practical and effective approach to stopping attacks in the Red Sea is not limited to the Houthis only – it must include the Iranian regime and their support, which fuels these actors on their behalf. A comprehensive campaign of military, diplomatic, informational, and economic actions directed at the Houthis and the Iranian regime will be the most successful approach to restoring the fundamental right of navigation and free flow of commerce in these critical international waters.

3. Four retired Marine generals on how to rebuild America’s crisis response force

I think this illustrates the trouble with the "pacing threat." While establishing it as the top priority it led to the single focus of all the military on it in the only way the military knows: focus directly on the designated threat. Since a main element of strategy is about allocating resources and identifying and accepting risk, the entire military began to develop capabilities nearly solely focused on the "pacing threat" in order to ensure scarce and declining resources would be allocated to its units while "accepting risk" (or perhaps in reality neglecting) in all the other areas of revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary powers and violent extremist organizations solely to focus on the "pacing item." Our culture is if you are not focused on the "pacing threat" you are no longer relevant. And we know the response of the pacing threat as well as all the other threats: Do not fight the US in the way that it is preparing to fight.

Excerpts:

But wait, you may be thinking — the nation previously had such a force! It was the United States Marine Corps, which possessed all the capabilities needed to respond quickly and effectively to any threat, worldwide. The Marine Corps was once America’s premier 911 force.

Unfortunately, this national treasure has been dismantled, divested, purpose-designed and reoriented into a static, missile-based reconnaissance and surveillance force focused on a single threat and region. The number of amphibious and prepositioning ships that supported U.S. Marines in peace and in war has been greatly reduced, and those remaining are in a poor state of readiness. America no longer has the full-time (24/7) presence of forward-deployed expeditionary units in strategically important regions, nor the air readiness units needed to rapidly reinforce them.

Recent Marine Corps leaders purposely neglected some combatant command requirements and cherry-picked those the Marines would, or could, fill. These leaders created single-mission units at the expense of balanced combined-arms teams. This past leadership abandoned the Corps’ primary and unique purpose of being the nation’s 911 force to instead chase the “pacing threat.”

Meanwhile, we see crises in other parts of the world that were very predictable, and we scramble to find a 911 force to deal with them — crises that, if tasked, the Marine Corps would be hard-pressed to meet with current capabilities.

National security and military dilettantes, plus some members of Congress misled by a few defense officials, have lured us down this garden path. We now have new leadership in the Corps. It is critically important to undo the damage done and return the Marines to their traditional role. The new leadership working with an engaged Congress must begin the process of rebuilding a Marine Corps that our national security requires.

Four retired Marine generals on how to rebuild America’s crisis response force

BY CHARLES KRULAK, CHARLES WILHELM, ANTHONY ZINNI & JAMES CONWAY, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 01/15/24 1:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4408627-four-retired-marine-generals-on-how-to-rebuild-americas-crisis-response-force/?utm

The U.S. national security establishment has identified China as America’s “pacing threat” and has reoriented military capabilities toward that threat. So be it. But identifying a primary threat does not mean the United States does not also need a “911” force to deal with fast-developing crises.

Thoughtfully designed, such a force would also be able to contribute to a major war effort. If asked to design the ideal “911” force for our nation, we would build it with six distinct capabilities.

First, it would be an expeditionary force-in-readiness, capable of rapidly deploying to a crisis area by sea and air. The seaborne component would consist of forward-deployed amphibious forces, continuously on patrol in key areas around the world. They would be backed up by strategically positioned squadrons of prepositioning ships, which would be loaded with tailored supplies and equipment. Each maritime prepositioning squadron would be linked with trained and packaged fly-in forces that could quickly marry up with the equipment to form powerful and sustainable combat brigades. For reinforcements, additional amphibious ships located at our East Coast, West Coast and overseas bases could rapidly load customized combat forces to join the forward-deployed units. At the home bases of these forces, air-alert and air-contingency units would also be at the ready and prepared to augment the forward forces. Where appropriate, land prepositioning sites would be established and maintained to strengthen this force.

Second, it would be a force of balanced combined arms, optimized to operate in austere environments. Its aviation elements would be capable of operating from expeditionary airfields or would include vertical take-off and landing aircraft that did not require existing airfields at all. The amphibious ships coupled with the at-sea offload capabilities of the prepositioning ships would negate the initial requirement for an existing port and airfield.

Third, this expeditionary force would be capable of task-organizing for any mission, consisting of flexible forces that could easily converge and composite into larger combat formation. It would not be “purpose designed” for any specific or narrow role or mission, but would be a general purpose force.

Fourth, the force would have a global focus and be capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict. It would not be overly focused on a single threat or region, nor chase a “pacing threat.” It could operate in any “clime and place.” It would not be restricted to any domain such as air, land, sea or littorals. 

Fifth, this 911 force would be oriented to meet the requirements of all combatant commands, not a narrow few. Its service component commands would actively seek ways to contribute to all combatant commanders’ requests for forces.

And sixth, this premier emergency response force would have a training, education and concepts base for its doctrine, organization and equipping that emphasized maneuver, close combat, adaptability and flexibility. Its ethos would be built around a strong sense of these attributes, plus individual leadership traits such as trust, honor, discipline and initiative.

But wait, you may be thinking — the nation previously had such a force! It was the United States Marine Corps, which possessed all the capabilities needed to respond quickly and effectively to any threat, worldwide. The Marine Corps was once America’s premier 911 force.

Unfortunately, this national treasure has been dismantled, divested, purpose-designed and reoriented into a static, missile-based reconnaissance and surveillance force focused on a single threat and region. The number of amphibious and prepositioning ships that supported U.S. Marines in peace and in war has been greatly reduced, and those remaining are in a poor state of readiness. America no longer has the full-time (24/7) presence of forward-deployed expeditionary units in strategically important regions, nor the air readiness units needed to rapidly reinforce them.

Recent Marine Corps leaders purposely neglected some combatant command requirements and cherry-picked those the Marines would, or could, fill. These leaders created single-mission units at the expense of balanced combined-arms teams. This past leadership abandoned the Corps’ primary and unique purpose of being the nation’s 911 force to instead chase the “pacing threat.”

Meanwhile, we see crises in other parts of the world that were very predictable, and we scramble to find a 911 force to deal with them — crises that, if tasked, the Marine Corps would be hard-pressed to meet with current capabilities.

National security and military dilettantes, plus some members of Congress misled by a few defense officials, have lured us down this garden path. We now have new leadership in the Corps. It is critically important to undo the damage done and return the Marines to their traditional role. The new leadership working with an engaged Congress must begin the process of rebuilding a Marine Corps that our national security requires.

Gen. Charles Krulak USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commandant of the Marine Corps. Gen. Charles Wilhelm USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commander, United States Southern Command. Gen. Anthony Zinni USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commander, United States Central Command. Gen. James Conway USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commandant of the Marine Corps.

4. The Decatur Option (countering anti-ship attacks)

This is an excellent critique from Dr. Cohen. Note the  "utterly un-strategic ... terms, coined and polished in political-science-seminar rooms during the Cold War."

Excerpts:

the "Decatur Option":

And so, only days after ratifying the peace of Ghent that terminated the War of 1812, President James Madison and Congress declared war again, but acted in a very different mode than had Thomas Jefferson. They dispatched virtually the entire U.S. Navy, including its first ship of the line, USS Independence, to Algiers. Stephen Decatur, one of the finest naval officers of his generation, captured a large Algerian warship, blockaded Algiers, and demanded the abolition of all forms of tribute and the release of European as well as American hostages. The alternative, he informed the dey of Algiers, would be blockade, the destruction of his navy, and the bombardment of the city itself. And, Decatur insisted, negotiations would take place on his flagship, while the blockading force continued to take Algerine vessels entering or exiting the port.

In the face of effective force effectively employed, the dey of Algiers caved. John Quincy Adams, America’s foremost diplomat (in the 21st century mistakenly celebrated as a “restrainer” in American foreign policy), wrote to a colleague, congratulating the government for having “taken the Algerines in hand in the only proper manner.” He continued:

I hope they have secured to our country the honor of breaking up the whole of that nest of pirates on the shore of Africa, which have so long been the annoyance and disgrace of the maritime powers of Europe.

Dr. Cohen's recommendations:

If the United States wishes to bring the Houthi attacks to an end, then for every bomb and missile that falls on the Houthis, another should fall on their Iranian advisers in Yemen, or on the planes and ships that are delivering their supplies, or on the facilities and vessels that help them target ships off Yemen. People are harder to replace than things, and instilling fear is more effective than dreaming of deterrence.

No doubt for White House officials perplexed by war in Ukraine and Gaza, a Taiwan under increasing threat, and other challenges besides, this will seem terribly risky. What they should understand is that temporizing with such threats—and particularly when these take the form of direct attacks on American and allied vessels and personnel—is far more dangerous and will eventually breed far more violence. Contenting oneself with swatting at incoming missiles is, as the Israelis have discovered, a mug’s game, and an expensive one at that. Recreational bombing, as we keep on learning (and then forgetting), is mere self-soothing. If the U.S. wants to deal with the problem of the Houthis satisfactorily, it will have to turn to what John Quincy Adams understood as “the only proper manner.” In that respect, not much has changed in the past two centuries.

The Decatur Option

The U.S. knows how to put an end to attacks on shipping.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · January 15, 2024

Months after the first salvos of missiles from Yemen’s Houthi militias, the United States and its allies have thrown back at them some 150 warheads, hitting dozens of targets. With the self-satisfaction that tends to characterize such nearly bloodless strikes came a great deal of approving talk from the Biden administration and commentators alike about “sending a message,” “restoring deterrence,” “avoiding escalation,” and, above all, “proportionality.”

It was all utterly un-strategic.

Those terms, coined and polished in political-science-seminar rooms during the Cold War, had some relevance to a world in which two nuclear-armed superpowers faced off in various corners of the world. Over more than half a century, they have turned into a kind of pixie dust that puzzled officials sprinkle over seemingly intractable problems. They play to America’s penchant for therapeutic bombing in lieu of truly effective uses of military power. They are intentionally antiseptic words, to replace the realities of fear and death. They are in some ways absurd. For example, the truly proportional response to the Houthis would be to fire some missiles at their oil tankers (they have none) that could be shot down at considerable expense by their advanced warships (of which they also have none).

The strikes on Yemen no doubt took out some radar sites, diminishing Houthi warning times for another round of bombing, and a few missile launchers and storage sites. They seem to have been designed not to kill people, even though it is human beings who make war, not things. They gave the wild-eyed Houthi leadership the opportunity to strut at having taken a punch from a declining superpower and, one may expect, to continue undeterred, firing more missiles at merchant vessels or trying to take some from speed boats. The strikes were avowedly a one-off, perhaps the first move in a game of tit-for-tat headed nowhere in particular. Better, therefore, to think through the problem properly.

The first strategic question, the French marshal Ferdinand Foch once said, is De quoi s’agit-il, or, roughly, “What is it all about?” What kind of conflict is this?

One possibility is that it is a war with a pirate state, one that seeks not plunder so much as prestige, fame, and regional influence. The United States has been there before—twice, in fact. In the first Barbary War, waged from 1801 to 1805, the United States Navy achieved some remarkable feats, including a bombardment of Tripoli and a desert march that gave the Marine Corps both a phrase for its hymn and a distinctive sword for its fancy dress, but little else. After careful diplomacy and the discreet payment of tribute disguised as ransom, some American prisoners were released. But the problem did not go away. As they had for many years, the North African states, including Algiers, continued to prey on American commerce.

And so, only days after ratifying the peace of Ghent that terminated the War of 1812, President James Madison and Congress declared war again, but acted in a very different mode than had Thomas Jefferson. They dispatched virtually the entire U.S. Navy, including its first ship of the line, USS Independence, to Algiers. Stephen Decatur, one of the finest naval officers of his generation, captured a large Algerian warship, blockaded Algiers, and demanded the abolition of all forms of tribute and the release of European as well as American hostages. The alternative, he informed the dey of Algiers, would be blockade, the destruction of his navy, and the bombardment of the city itself. And, Decatur insisted, negotiations would take place on his flagship, while the blockading force continued to take Algerine vessels entering or exiting the port.

In the face of effective force effectively employed, the dey of Algiers caved. John Quincy Adams, America’s foremost diplomat (in the 21st century mistakenly celebrated as a “restrainer” in American foreign policy), wrote to a colleague, congratulating the government for having “taken the Algerines in hand in the only proper manner.” He continued:

I hope they have secured to our country the honor of breaking up the whole of that nest of pirates on the shore of Africa, which have so long been the annoyance and disgrace of the maritime powers of Europe.

The Red Sea and adjacent waters are no less important to maritime commerce today than the Mediterranean was in 1815, so point taken. If the analogy holds, an updated strategy might suggest a more sustained pounding that targets not just inanimate objects but also the leaders of the Houthis—keeping them on the move the way al-Qaeda’s leaders have been, and with similar results in terms of their life span. A promise to leave them alone when they stop attacking ships and America’s friends and allies would be the sole benefit they should derive from a similarly one-way negotiation, perhaps held on the deck of a U.S. aircraft carrier.

But an alternative reading of the situation is the more accurate one. The Houthis are a band of fanatics ruling an impoverished part of an impoverished country. They did not build those missiles and radars on their own. They have been supplied, trained, and guided—if not directed to the last detail—by Iran, for whom they act as proxies. In that case, better to think of them as one tentacle of an octopus sitting in Tehran. Other tentacles include Hezbollah, of course, but also the Shia militias that have bombarded American camps and injured American personnel in Syria and Iraq.

In that case, a different strategy is in order. The weakness of the Houthis is their lack of any economic base to speak of; the weakness of Iran is its fear of direct conflict with the United States. We have a history here, and this is where the abstractions of the social-scientized argot of strategic thought get in the way.

Iran has repeatedly pulled back from confrontation with the United States, despite periodic fears expressed in Washington of retaliation by the Islamic Republic when we respond to its misdeeds. Iran put its nuclear program temporarily on ice after the invasion of Iraq. When the U.S.-guided missile cruiser Vincennes mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger aircraft in 1988, the response was not violence directed against the U.S. but rather an acceleration of a cease-fire with Iraq. When, in 2007, after years of tolerating Iranian-supported attacks on American forces in Iraq, the United States nabbed five Iranians in Irbil—the U.S. says the men, operating as diplomats, were actually members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Iran pulled operatives out of the country. And when, in 2020, the U.S. had the gumption to kill Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force, the covert-warfare arm of the IRGC, the response was … nil.

If the United States wishes to bring the Houthi attacks to an end, then for every bomb and missile that falls on the Houthis, another should fall on their Iranian advisers in Yemen, or on the planes and ships that are delivering their supplies, or on the facilities and vessels that help them target ships off Yemen. People are harder to replace than things, and instilling fear is more effective than dreaming of deterrence.

No doubt for White House officials perplexed by war in Ukraine and Gaza, a Taiwan under increasing threat, and other challenges besides, this will seem terribly risky. What they should understand is that temporizing with such threats—and particularly when these take the form of direct attacks on American and allied vessels and personnel—is far more dangerous and will eventually breed far more violence. Contenting oneself with swatting at incoming missiles is, as the Israelis have discovered, a mug’s game, and an expensive one at that. Recreational bombing, as we keep on learning (and then forgetting), is mere self-soothing. If the U.S. wants to deal with the problem of the Houthis satisfactorily, it will have to turn to what John Quincy Adams understood as “the only proper manner.” In that respect, not much has changed in the past two centuries.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · January 15, 2024

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and severely damaged an Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14.
• A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Russian forces can generate forces at a rate equal to Russian monthly personnel losses, which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are able to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
• Skibitskyi indicated that international sanctions are constraining Russian missile and drone production as Russian forces likely continue to adapt their missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• German outlet BILD reported on classified German documents describing a hypothetical scenario to prepare for a possible future conflict between NATO and Russia. Developing such scenarios, which are usually classified, is a normal task for professional military staffs.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Switzerland on January 15 to discuss aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan and support for Ukraine with global leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum from January 15 to 19.
• A North Korean delegation including North Korean Foreign Minister Choi Song Hui arrived in Moscow on January 14 for an official state visit to Russia on January 15 to 17.
• Russia and Iran are preparing to sign a Grand Interstate Treaty to further develop Russian-Iranian military-technological cooperation.
• The Kremlin is intensifying censorship measures to limit criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances west of Donetsk City and near Krynky amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is reportedly forming a women’s drone operating detachment.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian resistance forces detonated a Russian military UAZ Patriot vehicle in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, injuring four Russian personnel and killing an unspecified number of personnel.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 15, 2024

Jan 15, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2024

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 15, 2024, 9:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on January 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and severely damaged an Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi posted flight tracking footage indicating that Ukrainian forces struck the A-50 and Il-22 over the Sea of Azov.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces were able to hit two targets while initially targeting the A-50.[3] Ihnat stated that the Ukrainian strike forced the Il-22 to land in Anapa, that the Il-22 is likely irreparable, and that there were wounded and dead among its crew. Ukrainian and Russian sources posted a photo of the damaged Il-22 at the airfield in Russia.[4] Ukrainian military officials, including Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk, stated that the A-50 directed Russian strikes against Ukrainian targets, such as air defense systems and aviation.[5] Humenyuk stated that the destruction of the A-50 will at least postpone future Russian missile strikes on Ukraine.[6] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 3 that Russia began constant sorties of A-50 aircraft due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure in Crimea, including Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets.[7] Valery Romanenko, a leading researcher at the Ukrainian State Aviation Museum of the National Aviation University, stated that the loss of the A-50 and members of its crew is “very painful” for Russia since a large part of the A-50's crew is highly specialized and must undergo several years of training.[8] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russia had only three A-50s in service out of a total of six prior to this strike.[9]

The Russian information space largely denied that Ukrainian forces struck the A-50 aircraft and instead strangely claimed that the aircraft was destroyed by friendly fire from Russian air defenses.[10] The A-50 is used to coordinate Russian air and possibly air defense activity, and the claim that Russian air defenses shot down the A-50 would amount to a calamitous failure on the part of Russian forces, if true. A Russian source that focuses on Russian aviation blamed Russian commanders who lack the proper background required for their positions.[11] The current commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Colonel General Viktor Afzalov, has an extensive background in Russian air defense operations.[12] Whether his lack of experience as a pilot poses any problems for Russian air operations, which is questionable, his experience as an air defender should have been appropriate to ensure that Russian forces do not shoot down their own airborne control aircraft. A Russian insider source claiming to be an employee of an unspecified Russian security structure claimed that unspecified Russian actors created a “duck” (a Russian term for a false claim) about how Russian forces shot down the A-50 to reassure Russian pilots that missions over the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are still safe and that human error was the cause of the incident.[13] It is unclear why Russian pilots should be more comfortable with the idea that their ground-based air defenders are so incompetent. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that he did not have any information about the downed aircraft and recommended that journalists clarify information about this with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14] The Russian MoD has not made an official statement about the incidents as of this publication.

A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Russian forces can generate forces at a rate equal to Russian monthly personnel losses, which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are able to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month, which the Russian military uses to replenish losses and form reserve regiments.[15] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk similarly assessed that Russia is able to replace about 25,000 to 27,000 personnel per month and has a small ready professional reserve of mechanized, naval infantry, and airborne (VDV) assault units staffed at 10 to 15 percent of its total capacity.[16] Skibitskyi and Chernyk’s figures are consistent with the ISW’s assessment that Russian forces can conduct operational level rotations in most sectors of the frontline.[17] Chernyk stated that Russia has between 1.5 million and seven million people in its general mobilizable reserve (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) composed of men that could be mobilized regardless of prior military experience, as distinct from the far smaller ready and professional reserve (“personnel mobilization reserve“) that should, in theory, be more militarily proficient on mobilization.[18] Skibitskyi stated Russia is highly unlikely to conduct any form of official mobilization prior to the March 2024 Russian presidential election.[19] Skibitskyi reported that Russia would need to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to large-scale mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[20] Skibitskyi stated that it is too early to comment on whether Russia intends to conduct “mobilization” after the March 2024 Russian presidential election, however.[21]

Skibitskyi indicated that international sanctions are constraining Russian missile and drone production as Russian forces likely continue to adapt their missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Skibitskyi stated that recent Russian strikes have targeted Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, military headquarters, and military control systems and units on the frontline, consistent with ISW’s observations.[22] Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces have recently started launching Shahed drones against frontline areas, whereas Russian forces previously used Shahed drones to target rear DIB enterprises.[23] ISW observed Russian forces using Shahed drones to target frontline areas starting in late December 2023, and Ukrainian forces intercepted a lower number of drones likely due to lower levels of Ukrainian air defense coverage or air defense coverage not optimized for intercepting drones near the frontline.[24] Skibitskyi noted that Russia can produce about 330 to 350 Shahed drones per month but that these numbers largely depend on Russia’s ability to acquire electronic components such as microchips and circuits abroad.[25] Skibitskyi reported that Russia is using Chinese-made engines in Shahed drones.[26] Skibitskyi also stated that Russian forces had not included Kh-101 or Kalibr cruise missiles in strike series since mid-September 2023 likely as part of efforts to build up a missile reserve.[27] Skibitskyi reported that the Russian DIB may be able to produce 115 to 130 missiles suitable for strategic strikes against Ukraine per month but that the actual monthly production output varies because Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles and Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles require many foreign components blocked under international sanctions.[28] Skibitskyi stated that Russia is unable to produce analogues of these foreign components domestically. ISW has assessed that Russia is likely attempting to acquire more ballistic missiles from abroad because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking Ukrainian targets in some circumstances.[29] Russia may also be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad due to increased difficulties in the Russian domestic production of Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles. Skibitskyi reported that Russia can produce Kh-31, Kh-34, Kh-29, and Kh-59 air-to-air missiles using mainly domestic components and that Russian forces use Kh-31 and Kh-59 missiles to target Ukrainian air defense systems and radar stations during large strike series.[30]

German outlet BILD reported on classified German documents describing a hypothetical scenario to prepare for a possible future conflict between NATO and Russia. Developing such scenarios, which are usually classified, is a normal task for professional military staff. BILD reported on January 14 that it obtained classified documents from the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) that outline “Alliance Defense 2025,” a scenario of a possible “path to conflict” between Russia and NATO that begins in February 2024.[31] BILD stated that the hypothetical scenario includes Russia’s movement of troops and equipment to Kaliningrad Oblast amid claims of an impending NATO attack and artificial Russian-created “border conflicts” and “riots” in states near the Suwalki Gap. A German MoD spokesperson accurately told BILD that “considering different scenarios, even if they are extremely unlikely, is part of everyday military business, especially training.”

Germany’s reported consideration of paths to a possible future conflict with Russia is not unwarranted given recent Russian threats towards NATO and the possibility of faltering Western aid to Ukraine. Russian officials and milbloggers largely dismissed the BILD report as rumors.[32] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, have recently and consistently threatened NATO, and Kremlin-affiliated actors appear to be attempting to sow instability and set information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO member states and their neighbors, although not on anything like the timeline suggested by the scenario BILD described.[33] ISW continues to assess that Western aid to Ukraine remains crucial as Ukraine’s inability to hold off the Russian military could allow Russian forces to push all the way to western Ukraine along the border with NATO states, which would very likely present NATO with challenging and expensive new defense requirements.[34]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Switzerland on January 15 to discuss aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan and support for Ukraine with global leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum from January 15 to 19. The World Economic Forum opened in Davos, Switzerland, on January 15, and Zelensky stated that he will hold bilateral meetings with representatives of NATO and European Union (EU) countries.[35] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Switzerland have begun preparations for the Global Peace Summit that could be held in Switzerland and that he wants China to be part of these discussions.[36] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak stated that the Ukrainian delegation to Davos met regarding five aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan: the withdrawal of Russian forces to Ukraine, Russian accountability for its violations of international law, environmental security, prevention of escalation and recurrence of war, and confirmation of the end of the war.[37] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov proposed on January 14 to create an international working group of defense ministers and national security advisors about a Russian military withdrawal from Ukraine.[38] The Ukrainian Ministry of Justice announced that Ukraine and Switzerland signed a joint communique on January 15 agreeing that Ukrainian security is an inseparable part of regional and global security and that the international community’s goal is to end the war and overcome the crises that the war caused.[39]

Ukrainian and Swiss officials also discussed reconstruction and repatriation efforts. Zelensky met with Swiss President Viola Amherd and various factional representatives of the Swiss Federal Assembly on January 15 about Swiss support for Ukraine, reconstruction efforts, and the Ukrainian peace plan.[40] Amherd announced that Switzerland will provide 1.5 billion francs ($1.75 billion) for Ukrainian reconstruction efforts in 2025-2028.[41] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets stated in Davos on January 14 that 517 Ukrainian children and 2,828 adults, including 150 civilians, have returned to Ukraine from Russia and called on the international community to help return all Ukrainians to Ukraine.[42]

A North Korean delegation including North Korean Foreign Minister Choi Song Hui arrived in Moscow on January 14 for an official state visit to Russia on January 15 to 17.[43] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Choi will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on January 16.[44] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia intends to develop a partnership with North Korea in “all areas” and that the Kremlin expects Lavrov’s and Choi’s negotiations to be fruitful.[45] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce enough artillery ammunition to sustain Russia’s pace of fire and that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia in September-November 2023.[46]

Russia and Iran are preparing to sign a Grand Interstate Treaty to further develop Russian-Iranian military-technological cooperation.[47] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Defense and Iranian Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani reportedly discussed bilateral military and military-technical cooperation during a phone call on January 15, and both sides are reportedly preparing to sign the Grand Interstate Treaty within an unspecified timeframe.[48] Both sides emphasized their commitment to the fundamental principles of Russian-Iranian relations – including unconditional respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – which will be confirmed in the upcoming Grand Interstate Treaty. Shoigu noted that Moscow and Tehran are consistently increasing their cooperation in the interest of building a “truly equal multipolar world.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian about the progress of the new interstate agreement and a number of bilateral cooperation topics involving trade, economy, transport, and logistics during a phone call on January 15.[49] Lavrov and Abdollahian reiterated that Russia and Iran are preparing to codify different fundamental principles of Russian-Iranian relations in the new Grand Interstate Treaty.[50] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview published on January 15 that Iran wants to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia and hopes to acquire Su-34 fighter aircraft, training aircraft, and radar stations.[51]

The Kremlin is intensifying censorship measures to limit criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 presidential election. Russian State Duma deputies from the ruling United Russia party proposed a draft bill that would allow the Russian government to confiscate property from individuals convicted of spreading “fake” information about the Russian military.[52] Russian opposition media sources reported on Russian investigations and arrests for allegedly spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, including specific cases targeting an opposition journalist and the wife of a mobilized individual.[53] The relatives of Russian mobilized personnel have increasingly complained about the Russian military’s treatment of mobilized personnel, and the Kremlin likely wants to silence concerned relatives to maintain good appearances ahead of the presidential election, as ISW has previously assessed.[54]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and severely damaged an Il-22 airborne command post aircraft on the night of January 14.
• A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Russian forces can generate forces at a rate equal to Russian monthly personnel losses, which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are able to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
• Skibitskyi indicated that international sanctions are constraining Russian missile and drone production as Russian forces likely continue to adapt their missile and drone strike packages in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• German outlet BILD reported on classified German documents describing a hypothetical scenario to prepare for a possible future conflict between NATO and Russia. Developing such scenarios, which are usually classified, is a normal task for professional military staffs.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Switzerland on January 15 to discuss aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan and support for Ukraine with global leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum from January 15 to 19.
• A North Korean delegation including North Korean Foreign Minister Choi Song Hui arrived in Moscow on January 14 for an official state visit to Russia on January 15 to 17.
• Russia and Iran are preparing to sign a Grand Interstate Treaty to further develop Russian-Iranian military-technological cooperation.
• The Kremlin is intensifying censorship measures to limit criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances west of Donetsk City and near Krynky amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is reportedly forming a women’s drone operating detachment.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian resistance forces detonated a Russian military UAZ Patriot vehicle in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, injuring four Russian personnel and killing an unspecified number of personnel.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area on January 15. Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka.[55] A Russian milblogger, allegedly citing unspecified Ukrainian analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.2 kilometers in width and 1.7 kilometers in depth in the Makiivka direction, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[56] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the ”Aida” group of the Chechen “Akhmat“ Spetsnaz forces are operating near Kreminna.[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued east and southeast of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Vesele on January 15.[58]

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on January 15, but there were no confirmed territorial changes in the area. Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Khromove; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[59]  Elements of the Russian 200th Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) continue to operate near Bakhmut.[60]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) position near Bakhmut. Footage published on January 14 shows a reported VDV position in Donetsk Oblast on fire following a Ukrainian strike, and a Russian soldier claimed that the strike destroyed everything, including supplies for frontline Russian soldiers, a vehicle, and his personal documents.[61]

Positional fighting continued near Avdiivka on January 15, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line. Positional fighting continued near Avdiivka; northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Stepove; and southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near the wastewater treatment facility northwest of Avdiivka, but ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[63] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that former remnants of the Wagner private military company (PMC) are operating in the Avdiivka direction.[64]

Footage published on January 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian vehicle carrying ammunition across a bridge on the E50 Avdiivka-Donetsk City highway northwest of Pisky (southwest of Avdiivka).[65] The strike detonated the ammunition in the Russian vehicle, collapsing one side of the bridge.

Russian forces marginally advanced west of Donetsk City as of January 15. Geolocated footage published on January 15 shows that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), and Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces advanced on Heorhiivka’s outskirts.[66] Positional fighting continued west and northwest of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Marinka, and Pobieda; and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[67] Elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Novomykhailivka.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 15, but there were no changes on the frontline.[69] Russian forces reportedly attacked west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka), near Chervone (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and in the direction of Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[70]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 15 despite poor weather in the area. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[71] North Ossetian “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions claimed that Russian forces made marginal gains near Verbove, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian drone activity in the Robotyne area decreased due to poor weather conditions but that Russian and Ukrainian artillery fire did not decrease.[73] Elements of the Russian BARS-11 “Kuban” detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Unmanned Rapid Response Unit “Bobr” are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[74] Drone operators of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Zherebyanky (30km northwest of Robotyne).[75]

Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on January 14 that there were unspecified explosions in occupied Melitopol.[76]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 15 shows that Russian forces advanced northward to the shoreline in western Krynky.[77] Ukrainian forces maintain their positions in east bank Kherson Oblast as of January 15, and limited positional battles continued near Krynky.[78] Russian sources claimed that freezing weather conditions are inhibiting Ukrainian boat movements and landings on the east bank because the Dnipro and Konka rivers and channels are frozen.[79]

Ukrainian Crimean-based partisan group “Atesh” reported on January 15 that its partisans successfully infiltrated the positions of the Russian 18th Guards Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (31st Air Defense Division) in occupied Feodosia, Crimea.[80] Ukrainian President’s Mission in Crimea reported on January 15 that Atesh partisans discovered Russian positions 15km from Yevpatoria, Crimea.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is reportedly forming a women’s drone operating detachment.[82] Commander of a DNR UAV detachment “Goodwin” announced on January 15 that the DNR has already recruited two women into the unnamed UAV detachment. “Goodwin” claimed that he and his fellow servicemen had already trained over 1,000 drone operators since 2015 and noted that he is recruiting women who demonstrate innate accuracy.

The Ukrainian President’s Mission in Crimea reported on January 15 that Russian forces established a training camp at an old winery in occupied Crimea that has been closed for a long time.[83] The mission noted that there are up to 120 personnel inside the training camp, up to five trucks transporting Russian personnel and ammunition, and two other trucks.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) 

Russian Eastern Group of Forces personnel are reportedly testing unspecified new strike and reconnaissance first-person view (FPV) drones in Ukraine.[84] An unnamed Russian defense industrial base (DIB) representative noted that it is important to test new drones in combat to see how they interact with Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).[85] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian military will soon transfer these drones to the frontline.[86]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin announced on January 15 that the Russian government approved a program to expand domestic aircraft, engine, and flight instrument production.[87] Mishustin stated that the Russian government will draw funds from the National Welfare Fund to finance expanding aircraft production, increasing the production capacity of existing factories, and creating a new materials and electronic component base.[88]

Ukrainian military researcher Andriy Tarasenko stated on January 13 that Russian defense enterprise Uraltransmash is unlikely to begin serial production of Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled guns due to limited production capacity.[89] Tarasenko stated that Uraltransmash will likely focus on repairing and modernizing Msta-S self-propelled guns and finishing its work on Koalitsiya-SV system prototypes.[90] Russian sources claimed that Russian state-owned defense enterprise Rostec delivered an unspecified number of Koalitsiya-SV systems to the Russian military at the end of 2023.[91] Russian state-affiliated outlet Top War stated on January 13 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov visited unspecified Russian defense enterprises in Sverdlovsk Oblast to check their progress on producing Koalitsiya-SV systems.[92]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries and the Estonian Defense and Aerospace Industry Association signed a cooperation agreement on January 14 that covers the development and transfer of new technology between both countries and will allow for direct access between the Estonian defense industry and Ukrainian state institutions.[93] The Estonian Defense and Aerospace Industry Association stated that 10 Estonian defense industry companies are already operating in Ukraine.[94]

Ukraine’s “Army of Drones” initiative announced on January 15 that Ukrainian engineers developed armor-piercing EFP-S ammunition for first-person view (FPV) drones that is effective against lightly armored vehicles.[95] The EFP-S ammunition reportedly weighs 165 grams, has a speed of 1,800 meters/second, and a blast radius of eight meters.

Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on January 10 that the Ukrainian government’s Brave1 platform developed the UTE MT-1 mobile firing point with a mounted large-caliber machine gun that Ukrainian operators can remotely control. Fedorov stated that Ukraine has already tested the mobile firing point at Ukrainian training grounds and that a Brave1 grant will finance the production of two improved versions of the UTE M-1.[96]

United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary Grant Shapps stated on January 15 that the UK has trained over 60,000 Ukrainian military personnel since 2014 and that over 20 countries have joined the UK’s and Norway’s naval coalition “to defend Ukraine’s maritime flank” since December 2023.[97]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian resistance forces detonated a Russian military UAZ Patriot vehicle in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, injuring four Russian personnel and killing an unspecified number of personnel.[98]

Russian authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia’s education system, society, and culture. Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravstov stated during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 15 that Russia plans to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian education system as much as possible between 2024 and 2026. Kravstov stated that Russian authorities have supplied libraries in occupied Ukraine with 1.3 million Russian books and have renovated 683 schools.[99] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on January 15 that the Russian Presidential Grant Fund will provide 58 million rubles ($661,200) to 22 Sevastopol non-profits to implement programs, including those aimed at the patriotic education of children.[100] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on January 15 that the Russian Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives provided about 740 million rubles ($8.4 million) to 956 cultural and sports institutions in occupied Luhansk Oblast in 2023.[101]

Kremlin-affiliated organizations and Russian federal subjects continue to establish patronage networks with territories in occupied Ukraine. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz stated in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on January 15 that Bryansk Oblast has invested 1.2 billion rubles ($13.6 million) in the restoration of occupied Bryanka, Luhansk Oblast since 2022.[102] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on January 15 that United Russia’s “People‘s Program“ and the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic supported the construction of a medical facility in occupied Mykhailivka, Kherson Oblast.[103]

Russian authorities continue efforts likely aimed at collecting data on Ukrainian citizens and boosting alleged voter numbers in the March 2024 presidential election. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on January 15 that residents do not need a Russian passport to vote in the upcoming Russian presidential election and that a Ukrainian passport, identification card, residential registration, or other official Ukrainian documents are sufficient.[104]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin continued their efforts to court Russian constituencies that are affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine ahead of the March presidential elections. Putin spoke at the “Together We Will Win” forum for veterans of the Russian war in Ukraine on January 15 and emphasized the importance of developing a veterans’ movement, strengthening social guarantees for veterans, and expanding medical and rehabilitation programs.[105] Putin also noted the importance of involving veterans in educating the Russian youth as well as promoting humanitarian, educational, outreach, and volunteer projects. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that the second forum of the Russian Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation dedicated to helping veterans return to civilian life occurred in Moscow on January 15.[106] The milblogger claimed that First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko and Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Social Policy, Labor, Health, and Pension Provision Tatyana Golikova attended the forum.[107]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reiterated its usual false accusations that the United States and the West are involved in military-biological activities as part of ongoing efforts to spread conspiracy theories about pharmaceutical companies.[108] The Russian MoD claimed that the US Executive Branch is forming a legislative framework to finance military-biological research from the federal budget with Big Pharma companies and to attract funding from non-governmental organizations. ISW has previously reported on the Kremlin’s use of Covid-19 pandemic information operations to advance its political objectives in Ukraine, the West, and around the globe.[109]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 15 that unspecified Belarusian military personnel are undergoing training in Russia to learn from Russian forces’ experience fighting in Ukraine.[110] The Belarusian MoD stated that these Belarusian military personnel will train other Belarusian troops after returning from Russia.[111]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 15, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-15-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are trying to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker as part of their ongoing campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.
• Israeli forces have continued targeting the remaining Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
• The IDF announced that it withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
• The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Nuseirat in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
• The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas’ “Khan Younis Brigade is gradually disintegrating as a fighting force.”
• The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, large-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.
• The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel.
• The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the establishment of a “military council” to plan attacks on Israeli targets “in every corner of the Earth.”
• Two West Bank residents conducted a car-ramming attack in Raanana, killing one civilian and wounding 17 others.
• Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters five times across the West Bank, compared to the weekly average of nine attacks per day.
• Lebanese Hezbollah conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech detailing the state of the Israel-Hamas war and ongoing Iranian-backed escalation against the United States throughout the region.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on three US positions in Iraq and Syria.
• The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 15, 2024

Jan 15, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, January 15, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are trying to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker as part of their ongoing campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.
• Israeli forces have continued targeting the remaining Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
• The IDF announced that it withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
• The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Nuseirat in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
• The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas’ “Khan Younis Brigade is gradually disintegrating as a fighting force.”
• The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, large-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.
• The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel.
• The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the establishment of a “military council” to plan attacks on Israeli targets “in every corner of the Earth.”
• Two West Bank residents conducted a car-ramming attack in Raanana, killing one civilian and wounding 17 others.
• Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters five times across the West Bank, compared to the weekly average of nine attacks per day.
• Lebanese Hezbollah conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech detailing the state of the Israel-Hamas war and ongoing Iranian-backed escalation against the United States throughout the region.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on three US positions in Iraq and Syria.
• The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are trying to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker as part of their ongoing campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. Iraqi parliamentarians voted for a new speaker on January 13, but no candidate won the 165 votes required.[1] Parliament has had an acting speaker since the Federal Supreme Court dismissed Mohammad al Halbousi in November 2023.[2] The following candidates won the highest number of votes:

• National Progress Alliance (headed by Mohammad al Halbousi) candidate Shaalan al Karim: 152 out of 165 votes;
• Sovereignty Alliance (headed by Khamis al Khanjar) candidate Salem al Issawi: 97 out of 165 votes;
• Azm Alliance (headed by Muthanna al Samarrai) candidate Mahmoud al Mashhadani: 48 out of 165 votes.[3]

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—is maneuvering to prevent Karim from becoming parliament speaker. Iranian-backed Badr Organization member and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) spokesperson Yousef al Kalabi and Fatah Alliance member Faleh al Khazali filed a lawsuit to the Federal Supreme Court on January 13 to invalidate Karim’s candidacy for parliament speaker.[4] Several representatives, including a member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s (AAH) political wing, separately called for Karim to be referred to the Accountability and Justice Commission for “promoting and glorifying Saddam Hossein’s regime.”[5] The Accountability and Justice Commission was formed in 2008 to prevent “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices.”[6] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani promised Sunni politicians in October 2022 that he would dissolve the commission when he came to power because Sunni politicians had accused Shia political actors of using the commission to sideline them from decision making.[7] The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission recently prevented former Ninewa Governor Najm al Jubouri from running in the provincial council elections due to corruption charges brought up against him by the Accountability and Justice Commission.[8]

The Shia Coordination Framework likely views blocking Karim as necessary to expel US forces. AAH-controlled outlet Al Ahad interviewed a “political analyst” on January 13 who implied that the election of Karim as parliament speaker would impede efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.[9] An independent Iraqi outlet reported on January 13 that former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and AAH Secretary General Qais al Khazali want Mashhadani to become parliament speaker.[10] Maliki and Khazali may regard Mashhadani as more amenable to pursuing the expulsion of US forces than Karim. The Iranian-backed Badr Organization announced on January 13 the submission of a draft law that requires the removal of US forces from Iraq, which CTP-ISW assessed was meant to increase pressure on Sudani to facilitate a US exit.

The Shia Coordination Framework also appears to be maneuvering to consolidate its control over the Iraqi Parliament. Unspecified members of the Shia Coordination Framework submitted a request to interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi on January 13 to “limit” the parliament speaker’s powers.[11] It is unclear exactly what these proposed limitations involve. Mandalawi is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework. Iraq has an informal sectarian power-sharing system, in which the parliament speaker is always Sunni, the prime minister is always Shia, and the president is always Kurdish.[12] Iranian-backed actors already control large parts of Iraq’s executive, judiciary, and legislative branches and security services.[13] Diluting the authorities of the parliament speaker may further facilitate Iranian encroachment into Iraq.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces have continued targeting the remaining Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 13 that it activated its joint special operations multidimensional unit in the northern Gaza Strip.[14] The unit uses advanced drones and a combination of technological capabilities to identify targets and direct fire. It has destroyed dozens of anti-tank positions, observation posts, and weapons warehouses, and killed Hamas fighters. Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on January 15.[15]

Palestinian militias, including Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, are not destroyed in the northern Gaza Strip and maintain a presence there, however. The military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, claimed six attacks on Israeli forces around Gaza City on January 15, using a man-portable air-defense system, mortars, and an unspecified explosive.[16] The military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, fired rockets at Israeli positions in the northern Gaza Strip.[17]

The IDF announced on January 15 that it withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.[18] Israeli media began reporting in December 2023 that the IDF would transition to a third phase of operations that includes securing a buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids.[19] Israeli media reported that the IDF will decide where the 36th Division will deploy after a period of rest and training.[20] The 36th Division, which includes the Golani Infantry Brigade and 188th Armored Brigade, operated in several neighborhoods of Gaza City and the central Gaza Strip for over 80 days.[21] The 36th Division is normally assigned to the IDF Northern Command, which oversees Israel's northern borders. The withdrawal follows the IDF’s confirmation on December 31 that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip.[22] Three IDF divisions remain in the Gaza Strip.

CTP-ISW warned on January 2 that the third phase of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, as described, will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[23] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units in the Gaza Strip. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time. Palestinian militias continue to operate across the Gaza Strip and have targeted Israeli forces in areas where Israel has degraded the local Hamas units.

The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Nuseirat in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 15.[24] Israeli forces located facilities for constructing mortar shells and rockets. The IDF also located eight Hamas fighters hiding in a school area and a nearby weapons storage facility. The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli forces east of Bureij.[25] The National Resistance Brigades fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at an advancing Israeli vehicle northeast of Nuseirat and mortared Israeli armor and dismounted infantry elsewhere in the central Gaza Strip.[26]

The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip on January 15. The 7th Armored Brigade raided a Hamas operational headquarters and confiscated small arms, grenades, RPGs, and diving equipment belonging to Hamas’ naval force.[27] Fighters of the 98th Division directed an airstrike on two Hamas operatives loading ammunition onto a truck in Khan Younis.[28] Israeli forces also destroyed two weapons depots and attacked Hamas military buildings in Khan Younis.[29] Four Palestinian militias claimed to attack Israeli forces with RPGs, mortars, small arms, and anti-personnel shells on January 15, which is consistent with the weaponry Israeli forces have located during clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip.[30]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on January 15 that Hamas’ “Khan Younis Brigade is gradually disintegrating as a fighting force.”[31] Gallant added that the IDF’s “intensive phase” in the southern Gaza Strip will end soon and that the IDF is focused on targeting Hamas leadership there.[32] The al Qassem Brigades claimed five attacks on Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis.[33] Hamas and other Palestinian militias are conducting a deliberate defense in Khan Younis, conducting daily attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry since December 3.[34]

Current and former Israeli and Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Israel informed Egypt that it is planning a military operation to secure the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.[35] The IDF refers to the 14-kilometer stretch of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip as the “Philadelphi Corridor.”[36] The operation would involve replacing Palestinian border authorities with Israeli ones. The Wall Street Journal reported that the timing of the Israeli operation will depend on negotiations with Egypt regarding Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and a ceasefire.[37] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Israel must control the border area to block Hamas from smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip.[38] Unspecified Egyptian sources told Reuters on January 9 that Egypt rejected an Israeli proposal for greater Israeli oversight over the buffer zone on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.[39]

Hamas resumed issuing Israeli hostage propaganda on January 14 and 15. The al Qassem Brigades published a series of videos of three Israeli hostages that raise questions about whether the hostages are alive.[40] The final video revealed that two of the hostages had died from what Hamas claimed were Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, while the third sustained a head injury. The remaining hostage, Noa Argamani, narrated how she purportedly survived two Israeli airstrikes with help from al Qassem Brigades fighters and appealed to the Israeli government to “stop this madness and bring us home to our families.”[41] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said Hamas’ claim that the IDF targeted a building where three Israeli hostages were being held is a lie.[42] Al Qassem Brigades military spokesperson Abu Obeida similarly spread hostage propaganda on January 14, claiming that the al Qassem Brigades had lost track of many of its hostages in tunnels in the Gaza Strip due to Israeli airstrikes.[43] Hamas last issued these types of videos and other hostage related propaganda during hostage negotiation talks in mid-December 2023.[44]

Hamas’ video campaign is likely intended to generate public pressure on the Israeli government to stop operations in the Gaza Strip and agree to a hostage/prisoner swap. Palestinian militias’ demands for a renewed hostage-for-prisoner deal include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and an end to the war, neither of which are compatible with stated Israeli war aims.[45] The newly issued propaganda is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that both Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and Hamas’ external political leaders seek to use their Israeli hostages as leverage to maintain their influence in negotiations.[46] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on January 15 that only military pressure will enable Israel to free the hostages held by Hamas.[47]

The IDF published on January 15 a data set summarizing its operations in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Lebanon since the war began.[48] Israeli forces have killed over 9,000 Palestinian fighters in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ military force is approximately 40,000.[49] The data shows that Israeli forces have killed two Hamas brigade commanders, 19 battalion commanders, and over 50 company commanders as part of its effort to destroy Hamas’ command-and-control network in the Gaza Strip. 188 Israeli troops have died in the ground offensive and 1,113 sustained injuries.[50]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, large-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 15 that telecommunications have been offline in the Gaza Strip for over 72 hours.[51]

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel on January 15.[52]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the establishment of a “military council” on January 14 to plan attacks on Israeli targets “in every corner of the Earth.”[53] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it would exact a severe cost on Israelis and that the United States would not be able to intervene. The militia also warned that its fighters would target Israeli civilians living in settlements until they all leave or are killed. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades reaffirmed its coordination with all other Palestinian militias and called on Palestinian political factions to unite against Israel.

Two West Bank residents conducted a car-ramming attack in Raanana on January 15, killing one civilian and wounding 17 others.[54] The driver of the vehicle stabbed one woman and hijacked her vehicle before conducting the ramming attack. The driver crashed the vehicle, hijacked a second vehicle, and continued to target civilians. No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack. Hamas celebrated the attack and framed it as a “natural response” to Israeli activity in the West Bank.[55] Hamas frequently characterizes similar acts of violence as a consequence of Israeli activity in the West Bank.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters five times across the West Bank, compared to the weekly average of nine attacks per day.[56] Palestinian militias in the West Bank did not claim any of the attacks.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[57] LH targeted Israeli forces and military infrastructure along the Israel-Lebanon border.

LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on January 14 detailing the state of the Israel-Hamas war and ongoing Iranian-backed escalation against the United States throughout the region.[58] Nasrallah claimed that Israel has failed to achieve any of its objectives in the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah added that Palestinian militias are still present in the Gaza Strip and that Hamas continues to administer the northern Gaza Strip as a governing body.[59] The United States reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel will launch a war if attacks into northern Israel do not stop according to Nasrallah.[60] He stated that LH attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel will continue. Nasrallah claimed the Houthi anti-shipping attack campaign in the Red Sea has dealt a severe blow to the Israeli economy.[61] He argued that the US and UK strikes on Houthi targets on January 11 will not deter this campaign.[62] Nasrallah reiterated the false, Houthi claim that the United States is threatening freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, not the Houthis.[63] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Houthis have conducted ”hundreds” of attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian military and intelligence assistance.[64]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on three US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 14 and 15.[65] The militia claimed that its fighters fired drones and rockets targeting Erbil International Airport in Iraq and Rmelan Landing Zone Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria on January 14.[66] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted a second attack targeting the Conoco Mission Support Site in eastern Syria on January 15.[67]

The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea on January 14 and 15. US fighter aircraft shot down an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fired from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen toward the USS Laboon in the southern Red Sea on January 14.[68] The ASCM did not cause any injuries or damage. Houthi militants also fired an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) toward the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned and operated Gibraltar Eagle on January 15.[69] This attack marks the first time the Houthis have successfully attacked a US-owned or operated commercial vessel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[70] The ASBM struck the port side of the vessel but did not cause significant damage.[71] US forces detected a separate anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) fired toward commercial shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea on January 15.[72] The ASBM failed in flight and did not cause any injuries or damage.

These attacks followed the US and UK combined airstrikes on Houthi military facilities on January 11, which destroyed 20-30 percent of the Houthis’ offensive capability.[73] Houthi officials have vowed to continue attacking Israeli-owned and Israel-bound vessels following the airstrikes. Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdul Salem stated on January 15, for example, that US “threats and attacks” will not deter the Houthis from targeting Israel-linked ships.[74]

Two US Navy SEALs went missing on January 11 due to a mishap while searching for smuggled Iranian weapons intended for the Houthis in Yemen, according to two US officials familiar with the incident.[75] The two service members were preparing to board a ship off the coast of Somalia when one of them slipped from a ladder and another jumped into the water to help.[76] Two current and two former Pentagon officials told the New York Times on January 15 that the whereabouts of the two service members are still unknown.[77] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby told CBS News on January 14 that the United States is working to disrupt Iran’s shipment of weapons to the Houthis.[78] Iran has provided technology, equipment, intelligence, and information to the Houthis for attacks targeting shipping in the Red Sea.[79] CTP-ISW assessed on December 31 that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance, which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.[80]

7. Female Hamas Hostage Who Pleaded for Life on Bike Is Forced to Reveal Fate of 2 Fellow Israeli Captives in Sick Video

Let us not forget the brutality of Hamas.

Excerpt:

Hamas has released several videos of this kind, in an apparent effort to pressure Israel to agree to its demand of ending the war ahead of negotiations on a possible release of all hostages in exchange for most or all Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.

Hamas took roughly 250 hostages during their surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7, in which 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Hamas is believed to still be holding more than 100 hostages after a series of exchanges in November.

Female Hamas Hostage Who Pleaded for Life on Bike Is Forced to Reveal Fate of 2 Fellow Israeli Captives in Sick Video

Noa Argamani, who was kidnapped from the Supernova Music Festival, said two other hostages were killed in Israeli airstrikes

Published 01/15/24 01:10 PM ET|Updated 13 hr ago

Luke Funk

themessenger.com · January 15, 2024

Hamas has released a new propagandistic video in which a hostage who became the face of the Oct. 7 abductions was forced to announce the deaths of two fellow hostages.

The Monday video features Noa Argamani, 26, reporting that Yossi Sharabi, 53, and Itai Svirsky, 38, had been killed, the Jerusalem Post reports.

Argamani is believed to still be alive, according to the report.

In the video, recorded under apparent duress, Argamani said a building they were being held in was bombed by an IDF airstrike.

"After the building we were in was hit, we were all buried under rubble. Al Qassam soldiers saved my life and Itai's. Unfortunately, we were not able to save Yossi’s.”

Argamani said that while she and Itali were being moved, he allegedly died in another IDF airstrike.

“Stop this madness and bring us home to our families. While we are still alive, bring us home,” she said under the watchful eye of her Hamas captors.

Noa ArgamaniN12; Handout

Yossi Sharabi, Itai Svirsky and Noa ArgamaniHamas

Hamas had previously released videos of the three hostages on Sunday. Each said their name and then read statements dictated to them by Hamas

The Hamas video then teased details about the fate of each hostage, suggesting that some had died and some were still alive

Hamas has released several videos of this kind, in an apparent effort to pressure Israel to agree to its demand of ending the war ahead of negotiations on a possible release of all hostages in exchange for most or all Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.

Hamas took roughly 250 hostages during their surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7, in which 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Hamas is believed to still be holding more than 100 hostages after a series of exchanges in November.

Argamani became one of the faces of the Oct. 7 massacre. Argamani's abduction from the Supernova Music Festival was captured on video. She could be heard screaming, “Don’t kill me! No, no, no,” while being forced onto a motorcycle by members of Hamas.

themessenger.com · January 15, 2024

8. Iran 'Escalates' Middle East Tensions With Ballistic Missile Attack Near US Consulate in Iraq

Excerpts:

“This is the first time Iran has fired ballistic missiles at targets in Iraq since the regime launched what it characterized as a retaliatory strike against US bases in Iraq following the assassination of former IRGC Commander Qassem Solemani (in early 2020).”

“The target of the attack in northern Iraq tonight is unclear, though missiles are said to have impacted near the U.S. consulate in Erbil. If the consulate was the target, this would be a significant escalation that would require a response from the United States,” he added.

The attacks come days after the U.S. and the U.K. launched two airstrikes in Yemen targeting the Houthis, the Iran-backed militant group that has been disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea with missiles and drones aimed at cargo vessels in what it says is an act of solidarity with Palestinians.

Iran 'Escalates' Middle East Tensions With Ballistic Missile Attack Near US Consulate in Iraq

There were no initial reports of American casualties, or damage to American facilities, a senior American intelligence official told The Messenger

Published 01/15/24 05:43 PM ET|Updated 11 hr ago

James LaPorta  and Nikhil Kumar

themessenger.com · January 15, 2024

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRCG) claimed responsibility for ballistic missile attacks near the U.S. consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Erbil Monday — a move described by a senior American intelligence official as an “escalation” in the conflict in the Middle East.

The IRCG, Iran’s most powerful military force, took responsibility for the attack on what it said were “espionage centers and gatherings of anti-Iranian terrorist groups” near Erbil, in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, according to Iranian state media.

There were no initial reports of American casualties, or damage to American facilities, a senior American intelligence official told The Messenger.

View post on Twitter

The attacks nonetheless constituted what the official described as an “escalation” in the conflict in the region amid the continuing war in Israel and Gaza.

The attacks in northern Iraq came shortly after news of IRCG attacks in Syria, where the Iranian group said it had struck what it described as “terrorist” targets in retaliation for recent suicide bombings inside Iran. The Islamic State terror group had claimed responsibility for those attacks.

"The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps… has identified locations of gathering places of commanders and main elements related to recent terrorist operations, in particular, ISIS, in the occupied territories of Syria and destroyed them by firing a number of ballistic missiles," the Guards' Sepah News website said, according to the AFP news agency.

Alex Plitsas, an analyst at the Atlantic Council, told The Messenger that much remained unclear about the Iranian attacks in Iraq — but if the U.S. consulate was in fact a target, it could trigger a response from Washington.

“Iran has only used proxies to attack U.S., Israeli, and coalition targets in the region since the War in Gaza began following Hamas’ October 7th terrorist attack in Israel that killed 1,200 Israelis,” he said.

“This is the first time Iran has fired ballistic missiles at targets in Iraq since the regime launched what it characterized as a retaliatory strike against US bases in Iraq following the assassination of former IRGC Commander Qassem Solemani (in early 2020).”

“The target of the attack in northern Iraq tonight is unclear, though missiles are said to have impacted near the U.S. consulate in Erbil. If the consulate was the target, this would be a significant escalation that would require a response from the United States,” he added.

The attacks come days after the U.S. and the U.K. launched two airstrikes in Yemen targeting the Houthis, the Iran-backed militant group that has been disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea with missiles and drones aimed at cargo vessels in what it says is an act of solidarity with Palestinians.

themessenger.com · January 15, 2024

9. Austin released from hospital after cancer surgery complications

I hope he has a clean bill of health and can return to full duty without any further complications.

Austin released from hospital after cancer surgery complications

militarytimes.com · by Lolita Baldor · January 16, 2024

WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was released from the hospital on Monday, after spending two weeks there to treat complications from surgery for prostate cancer he kept secret from senior Biden administration leaders and staff for weeks.

Austin will be working from home as he recovers, and his doctors said he “progressed well throughout his stay and his strength is rebounding.” They said in a statement the cancer was treated early and his prognosis is “excellent.”

In a statement, Austin expressed thanks to the medical staff and said that “as I continue to recuperate and perform my duties from home, I’m eager to fully recover and return as quickly as possible to the Pentagon.”

Austin, 70, was admitted to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center on Dec. 22 and underwent surgery to treat the cancer, which was detected earlier in the month during a routine screening. He developed an infection a week later and was hospitalized Jan. 1 and admitted to intensive care.

Dr. John Maddox, the trauma medical director, and Dr. Gregory Chesnut, the director of the Center for Prostate Disease Research at Walter Reed, said that during Austin’s hospitalization he underwent medical tests and was treated for lingering leg pain. They said he has physical therapy to do but there are no plans for further cancer treatment other than regular checks.

RELATED

Lawmakers launch investigation into Austin’s health secrecy

The House Armed Services Committee will look into how senior leaders mishandled the defense secretary's hospitalization earlier this month.

President Joe Biden and senior administration officials were not told about Austin’s hospitalization until Jan. 4, and Austin kept the cancer diagnosis secret until Jan. 9. Biden has said Austin’s failure to tell him about the hospitalization was a lapse in judgment, but the Democratic president insists he still has confidence in his Pentagon chief.

During Austin’s time at Walter Reed, the U.S. launched a series of military strikes late last week on the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, targeting dozens of locations linked to their campaign of assaults on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Working from his hospital bed, Austin juggled calls with senior military leaders, including Army Gen. Erik Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command, and White House meetings to review, order and ultimately watch the strikes unfold over secure video.

The lack of transparency about Austin’s hospitalization, however, has triggered administration and Defense Department reviews on the procedures for notifying the White House and others if a Cabinet member must transfer decision-making authorities to a deputy, as Austin did during his initial surgery and a portion of his latest hospital stay. And the White House chief of staff ordered Cabinet members to notify his office if they ever can’t perform their duties.

Austin’s secrecy also drew criticism from Congress members on both sides of the political aisle, and Rep. Mike Rogers, an Alabama Republican who is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said he has opened a formal inquiry into the matter. Others openly called for Austin to resign, but the White House has said the Pentagon chief’s job is safe.

It is still unclear when Austin will return to his office in the Pentagon or how his cancer treatment will affect his job, travel and other public engagements going forward. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks has been taking on some of his day-to-day duties as he recovers.

About Tara Copp, AP

Tara Copp is a Pentagon correspondent for the Associated Press. She was previously Pentagon bureau chief for Sightline Media Group.

10. Russia losses 2 aircraft, 30 artillery systems and 1,110 soldiers in one day

Russia losses 2 aircraft, 30 artillery systems and 1,110 soldiers in one day

Over the past day, 94 combat clashes took place at the front, Ukrainian troops repelled almost a hundred attempts of Russia's offensives in seven key areas and eliminated another 1,110 Russian military personnel

global.espreso.tv

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported this in a morning briefing on January 16.

The total combat losses of the Russian Federation from 24.02.22 to 16.01.24 are estimated at:

• personnel - about 372,090 (+1110) people.
• tanks - 6,113 (+24)
• armored combat vehicles - 11,358 (+36)
• artillery systems - 8,801 (+30)
• MLRS - 961 (+3)
• air defense systems - 653 (+3)
• aircraft - 331 (+2)
• helicopters - 324 (+0)
• UAVs of operational and tactical level - 6,877 (+12)
• cruise missiles - 1,816 (+1)
• ships/boats - 23 (+0)
• submarines - 1 (+0)
• motor vehicles and fuel tankers - 11,731 (+33)
• special equipment - 1,365 (+9)

Situation at the frontline: Ukraine repelled over 90 Russian attacks within the last day, Russia still tries to encircle Avdiivka and advance in the Lyman sector

Thus, according to Ukraine's General Staff, the operational situation has not changed in the area of the northern Ukrainian border with Belarus.

In the northeastern border area, the Russian army maintains a military presence, conducts active sabotage activities to prevent the deployment of Ukrainian troops to threatened areas, and increases the density of minefields along the state border in the Belgorod region.

In the area of responsibility of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group in the Kupyansk direction, Ukrainian defenders repelled two Russian attacks near Synkivka, Kharkiv region.

In the Lyman direction, Ukraine's troops repulsed 13 hostile attacks near 3 localities in Donetsk region and another 19 in two more areas in Luhansk region and near 3 settlements in Donetsk region.

In the Bakhmut direction, Ukrainian soldiers fought off seven Russian attacks near Ivanivske, Klishchiivka and Andriivka in the Donetsk region.

In the Avdiivka direction, in the area of responsibility of the Tavria operational-strategic group, Ukrainian defenders continue to hold back the Russian enemy, who keeps trying to surround Avdiivka. Ukrainian soldiers are steadfastly holding the line, inflicting significant losses on the occupation forces. Thus, over the past day, Ukraine's Defense Forces repelled 18 attacks in the areas of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka and another 16 attacks near Sieverne, Pervomaiske and Nevelske in the Donetsk region.

In the Marinka direction, Ukrainian forces are holding back the Russian enemy in the areas of 4 localities in the Donetsk region, where 12 attacks were repulsed.

In the Shakhtarsk direction, the Russian troops did not conduct any offensive (assault) actions.

In the Zaporizhzhia direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces fended off three Russian attacks west of Verbove and Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia region.

In the area of responsibility of the Odesa operational-strategic group in the Kherson direction, Ukrainian soldiers continue to expand their foothold. Despite significant losses, the Russian troops keep trying to drive Ukraine's units out of their positions. Over the past day, they made one unsuccessful assault on Ukrainian troops' positions.

At the same time, Ukrainian soldiers continue to actively inflict losses in manpower and equipment on the occupation forces, depleting the Russian enemy along the entire front line.

Ukraine's defense forces hit Russian troops' concentration areas 25 times, as they shelled over 110 Ukrainian settlements

Over the past day, the aviation of the Defense Forces struck 22 areas of personnel, weapons and military equipment concentration, as well as 1 Russian anti-aircraft missile system.

Missile troops hit 3 areas of personnel concentration, 8 artillery units, 1 air defense system and 2 Russian radar stations.

In total, the Russian Federation launched 1 missile and 68 air strikes, fired 78 times from multiple launch rocket systems at the positions of Ukrainian troops and populated areas. Unfortunately, Russian terrorist attacks have resulted in deaths and injuries among the civilian population. Residential buildings and other civilian infrastructure were destroyed and damaged.

Two settlements in Kharkiv region; two in Luhansk region; seven in Donetsk region; one in Zaporizhzhia region; and three in Kherson region were hit by air strikes.

More than 110 settlements in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kherson and Mykolaiv regions were subjected to artillery fire.

• On Monday, January 15, Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi and the Air Force confirmed the destruction of Russian A-50 and Il-22 aircraft.

global.espreso.tv

11. Hamas fights with a patchwork of weapons built by Iran, China, Russia and North Korea

The revisionist and rogue powers of the Axis of Authoritarians in support of one of the worst violent extremist organizations. 

Hamas fights with a patchwork of weapons built by Iran, China, Russia and North Korea

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

Iranian sniper rifles. AK-47 assault rifles from China and Russia. North Korean- and Bulgarian-built rocket-propelled grenades. Anti-tank rockets secretly cobbled together in Gaza.

An Associated Press analysis of more than 150 videos and photos taken in the three months of combat since Hamas launched its Oct. 7 surprise attack on Israel shows the militant group has amassed a diverse patchwork arsenal of weapons from around the world – much of it smuggled past a 17-year blockade that was aimed at stopping just such a military buildup.

Those weapons have proved deadly during weeks of intense urban warfare in Gaza, where Hamas fighters are typically armed only with what they can carry and employ hit-and-run tactics against lopsided Israeli advantages in arms and technology. Hamas propaganda videos posted over the past few weeks appear to show the shootings of Israeli soldiers recorded through the scopes of sniper rifles.

“We are searching everywhere for weapons, for political support, for money,” Hamas spokesman Ghazi Hamad recently said in an interview with the AP, declining to discuss specifically who has been providing its weapons or how they were snuck into Gaza.

Experts who reviewed the images for AP were able to identify distinguishing features and markings that show where many of the weapons wielded by Hamas fighters were manufactured. But such an analysis does not provide evidence of whether they were provided by the governments of those countries or purchased in a thriving Middle East black market, with weapons and components listed for sale on social media in such war-torn countries as Iraq, Libya and Syria.

What is clear, however, is that many of the images show Hamas militants toting weapons that appear to be relatively new, evidence the group has found ways of getting arms past the air-and-sea blockade of the Gaza Strip — possibly by boat, through tunnels or concealed in shipments of food and other goods.

“The majority of their arms are of Russian, Chinese or Iranian origin, but North Korean weapons and those produced in former Warsaw Pact countries are also present in the arsenal,” said N.R. Jenzen-Jones, an expert in military arms who is director of the Australian-based Armament Research Services.

Despite the buildup, Israel maintains a massive advantage, with a powerful array of modern tanks, artillery, helicopter gunships and an air force of U.S.-made fighter jets. Israel’s military says it has killed more than 7,000 Hamas militants, compared to the deaths of at least 510 of its own soldiers, more than 330 of whom were killed in Hamas’ initial attack. The Health Ministry in Hamas-run Gaza says more than 23,000 Palestinians have died in the fighting, though it does not differentiate between civilians and combatants.

Imagery reviewed by the AP showed a Hamas arsenal featuring weapons ranging from small arms and machine guns to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and craft-produced anti-tank projectiles.

Among the most distinctive is the oversized AM-50 Sayyad (Arabic for “hunter”), an Iranian-made a sniper rifle that fires a .50- caliber round powerful enough to punch through up to an inch of steel. It has previously been spotted on battlefields in Yemen, Syria, and in the hands of Shia militias in Iraq.

Hamas fighters have also been seen carrying an array of Soviet-era weapons that have been copied and manufactured in Iran and China. They include variants of the Russian-designed 9M32 Strela, a portable heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile system.

Jenzen-Jones said a grip stock on one of the missile launchers a fighter was seen holding is distinctive to a variant manufactured in China and used by the Iranian military and its allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, a group closely aligned with Hamas.

Weapons recovered from Hamas fighters by the Israel Defense Forces include what appear to be Italian-designed TC/6 anti-tank mines. However, Seán Moorhouse, a former British Army officer and explosive ordinance disposal expert, said it too had been copied by Iran’s arms industry.

The Israel Defense Forces and U.S. officials have long accused Iran of supplying money, training and weapons to Hamas and allied militants in Gaza, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Iranian representatives at the United Nations did not respond to emails from the AP about whether their government supplied weapons to Hamas, including AM-50 Sayyad sniper rifles. However, a week after AP sought comment, Hamas posted a video purporting to show militants in Gaza using machining equipment to make their own copies of the rifle.

Master gunsmith Don Fraley reviewed that Dec. 20 video and said it would be nearly impossible for Hamas to manufacture a safe and accurate .50-caliber sniper rifle with the rudimentary equipment shown.

“You’re going to have to be a rock star at machine shop work. And I didn’t see any of that," said Fraley, a former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier and sniper for the Kentucky State Police. "These folks are just trying to cover their tracks.”

An Israeli military official familiar with Hamas’ arsenal said the group uses a combination of smuggled “off-the-shelf” weaponry, including AK-47s, RPGs and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a large collection of home-grown weapons often made with easily accessible civilian materials.

For instance, the official said, the group uses lathes to shape metal into rockets and mortars, and fits them with explosives manufactured from fertilizers. Other home-made weapons include a launcher capable of firing 14 rockets simultaneously and the “Zuwari” drone, an explosives-laden aircraft that was used to strike Israeli observation towers and knock out cameras on Oct. 7.

“There is a huge military/defense industry inside the Gaza Strip,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity under military briefing rules.

The official said most of the smuggled weapons are believed to have been brought in through Egypt and are generally easy to purchase and did not need to be supplied by the country of origin.

One such weapon seen in the hands of Hamas fighters is a version of Chinese machine guns known as the Type 80, a model that has also been copied by the Iranians and renamed as the PKM-T80.

Jonathan Ferguson, the curator of firearms at the Royal Armouries Museum in England, said from what he could see from the photos and videos, versions of the gun made in China and Iran were so similar as to be indistinguishable.

Ferguson was also able to identify a rocket-propelled grenade with marks showing it was made in Bulgaria. AP previously reported Hamas used RPGs with a distinctive red stripe indicating they were made in North Korea.

Among the more sophisticated Hamas home-grown weapons is a copy of a Russian anti-tank rocket called the PG-7VR, which is specifically designed to defeat reactive-armor systems like those used on Israel’s Merkava Mark VI main battle tanks. Such tanks are covered with explosive-filed plates that explode outwards to disrupt incoming projectiles.

In propaganda videos posted in October, masked militants are seen assembling a version of the Russian rocket that Hamas has renamed the Al-Yasin 105, in honor of the group’s founder killed in an Israeli air strike in 2004. While the original Russian version can melt through up to two feet of steel armor, experts say it’s not clear whether the home-brewed explosives in the Hamas knock-off are as potent.

Hamas has posted multiple videos of fighters firing the rockets at Israeli tanks and armored personal carriers. Those videos are typically cut off after the warhead explodes, making it impossible to independently verify whether the target was destroyed.

Also, in a tactic borrowed from the battlefields of Ukraine, Hamas appears to have obtained or copied Iranian-designed drones that pack warheads that explode when crashed into their targets. Off- the-shelf, Chinese-made quadcopter drones have also been adapted to drop explosives on tanks and troops.

“The availability of commercial off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles, these light consumer drones, has radically changed warfare in recent years,” Jenzen-Jones said. “We’ve seen them, obviously, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq, in Ukraine, and now in Gaza.”

___

Biesecker reported from Washington. AP writer Josef Federman contributed from Jerusalem.

___

Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org or https://www.ap.org/tips/

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

Iranian sniper rifles. AK-47 assault rifles from China and Russia. North Korean- and Bulgarian-built rocket-propelled grenades. Anti-tank rockets secretly cobbled together in Gaza.

An Associated Press analysis of more than 150 videos and photos taken in the three months of combat since Hamas launched its Oct. 7 surprise attack on Israel shows the militant group has amassed a diverse patchwork arsenal of weapons from around the world – much of it smuggled past a 17-year blockade that was aimed at stopping just such a military buildup.

Those weapons have proved deadly during weeks of intense urban warfare in Gaza, where Hamas fighters are typically armed only with what they can carry and employ hit-and-run tactics against lopsided Israeli advantages in arms and technology. Hamas propaganda videos posted over the past few weeks appear to show the shootings of Israeli soldiers recorded through the scopes of sniper rifles.

“We are searching everywhere for weapons, for political support, for money,” Hamas spokesman Ghazi Hamad recently said in an interview with the AP, declining to discuss specifically who has been providing its weapons or how they were snuck into Gaza.

Experts who reviewed the images for AP were able to identify distinguishing features and markings that show where many of the weapons wielded by Hamas fighters were manufactured. But such an analysis does not provide evidence of whether they were provided by the governments of those countries or purchased in a thriving Middle East black market, with weapons and components listed for sale on social media in such war-torn countries as Iraq, Libya and Syria.

What is clear, however, is that many of the images show Hamas militants toting weapons that appear to be relatively new, evidence the group has found ways of getting arms past the air-and-sea blockade of the Gaza Strip — possibly by boat, through tunnels or concealed in shipments of food and other goods.

“The majority of their arms are of Russian, Chinese or Iranian origin, but North Korean weapons and those produced in former Warsaw Pact countries are also present in the arsenal,” said N.R. Jenzen-Jones, an expert in military arms who is director of the Australian-based Armament Research Services.

Despite the buildup, Israel maintains a massive advantage, with a powerful array of modern tanks, artillery, helicopter gunships and an air force of U.S.-made fighter jets. Israel’s military says it has killed more than 7,000 Hamas militants, compared to the deaths of at least 510 of its own soldiers, more than 330 of whom were killed in Hamas’ initial attack. The Health Ministry in Hamas-run Gaza says more than 23,000 Palestinians have died in the fighting, though it does not differentiate between civilians and combatants.

Imagery reviewed by the AP showed a Hamas arsenal featuring weapons ranging from small arms and machine guns to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and craft-produced anti-tank projectiles.

Among the most distinctive is the oversized AM-50 Sayyad (Arabic for “hunter”), an Iranian-made a sniper rifle that fires a .50- caliber round powerful enough to punch through up to an inch of steel. It has previously been spotted on battlefields in Yemen, Syria, and in the hands of Shia militias in Iraq.

Hamas fighters have also been seen carrying an array of Soviet-era weapons that have been copied and manufactured in Iran and China. They include variants of the Russian-designed 9M32 Strela, a portable heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile system.

Jenzen-Jones said a grip stock on one of the missile launchers a fighter was seen holding is distinctive to a variant manufactured in China and used by the Iranian military and its allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, a group closely aligned with Hamas.

Weapons recovered from Hamas fighters by the Israel Defense Forces include what appear to be Italian-designed TC/6 anti-tank mines. However, Seán Moorhouse, a former British Army officer and explosive ordinance disposal expert, said it too had been copied by Iran’s arms industry.

The Israel Defense Forces and U.S. officials have long accused Iran of supplying money, training and weapons to Hamas and allied militants in Gaza, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Iranian representatives at the United Nations did not respond to emails from the AP about whether their government supplied weapons to Hamas, including AM-50 Sayyad sniper rifles. However, a week after AP sought comment, Hamas posted a video purporting to show militants in Gaza using machining equipment to make their own copies of the rifle.

Master gunsmith Don Fraley reviewed that Dec. 20 video and said it would be nearly impossible for Hamas to manufacture a safe and accurate .50-caliber sniper rifle with the rudimentary equipment shown.

“You’re going to have to be a rock star at machine shop work. And I didn’t see any of that," said Fraley, a former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier and sniper for the Kentucky State Police. "These folks are just trying to cover their tracks.”

An Israeli military official familiar with Hamas’ arsenal said the group uses a combination of smuggled “off-the-shelf” weaponry, including AK-47s, RPGs and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a large collection of home-grown weapons often made with easily accessible civilian materials.

For instance, the official said, the group uses lathes to shape metal into rockets and mortars, and fits them with explosives manufactured from fertilizers. Other home-made weapons include a launcher capable of firing 14 rockets simultaneously and the “Zuwari” drone, an explosives-laden aircraft that was used to strike Israeli observation towers and knock out cameras on Oct. 7.

“There is a huge military/defense industry inside the Gaza Strip,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity under military briefing rules.

The official said most of the smuggled weapons are believed to have been brought in through Egypt and are generally easy to purchase and did not need to be supplied by the country of origin.

One such weapon seen in the hands of Hamas fighters is a version of Chinese machine guns known as the Type 80, a model that has also been copied by the Iranians and renamed as the PKM-T80.

Jonathan Ferguson, the curator of firearms at the Royal Armouries Museum in England, said from what he could see from the photos and videos, versions of the gun made in China and Iran were so similar as to be indistinguishable.

Ferguson was also able to identify a rocket-propelled grenade with marks showing it was made in Bulgaria. AP previously reported Hamas used RPGs with a distinctive red stripe indicating they were made in North Korea.

Among the more sophisticated Hamas home-grown weapons is a copy of a Russian anti-tank rocket called the PG-7VR, which is specifically designed to defeat reactive-armor systems like those used on Israel’s Merkava Mark VI main battle tanks. Such tanks are covered with explosive-filed plates that explode outwards to disrupt incoming projectiles.

In propaganda videos posted in October, masked militants are seen assembling a version of the Russian rocket that Hamas has renamed the Al-Yasin 105, in honor of the group’s founder killed in an Israeli air strike in 2004. While the original Russian version can melt through up to two feet of steel armor, experts say it’s not clear whether the home-brewed explosives in the Hamas knock-off are as potent.

Hamas has posted multiple videos of fighters firing the rockets at Israeli tanks and armored personal carriers. Those videos are typically cut off after the warhead explodes, making it impossible to independently verify whether the target was destroyed.

Also, in a tactic borrowed from the battlefields of Ukraine, Hamas appears to have obtained or copied Iranian-designed drones that pack warheads that explode when crashed into their targets. Off- the-shelf, Chinese-made quadcopter drones have also been adapted to drop explosives on tanks and troops.

“The availability of commercial off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles, these light consumer drones, has radically changed warfare in recent years,” Jenzen-Jones said. “We’ve seen them, obviously, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq, in Ukraine, and now in Gaza.”

___

Biesecker reported from Washington. AP writer Josef Federman contributed from Jerusalem.

___

Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org or https://www.ap.org/tips/

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

12. U.S. forces recovered Iranian warheads in Navy SEAL mission gone awry

I hope our SEALs can still be recovered.

This operation begs the question of why are we going after Iranian shipping and not north Korean shipping? (That we know of)

U.S. forces recovered Iranian warheads in Navy SEAL mission gone awry

The U.S. military said the arms shipment, intercepted off the coast of Somalia, was destined for militants in Yemen blamed for attacks in the Red Sea

By Alex Horton

Updated January 16, 2024 at 5:30 a.m. EST|Published January 15, 2024 at 7:57 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · January 16, 2024

American military personnel recovered Iranian-made missile warheads and related components during a ship-boarding mission near Somalia last week that disrupted the weapons resupply of militants in Yemen but left two elite Navy SEALs lost at sea, U.S. defense officials said.

A massive search-and-rescue operation is ongoing in the Arabian Sea, where the incident occurred Thursday. The SEALs moved to board the vessel, described by officials as a dhow lacking proper identification, amid suspicions that there were arms on board.

As The Washington Post and other media previously reported, Thursday’s nighttime operation, backed by helicopters and drones, took place in rough seas. When one of the SEALs slipped from a ladder while attempting to climb aboard the dhow, the second, having witnessed their comrade fall into the water, dove in to help, officials have said. Both were swept away by the powerful swells. Neither has been publicly identified.

As rescue operations began, other troops carried out a search of the boat, which had a crew of 14, according to a Tuesday statement by U.S. Central Command. They were taken into custody. The dhow was deemed “unsafe” and was sunk, according to the statement.

The seized items included Iranian-made ballistic and cruise missile warheads, propulsion and guidance systems, and air defense components. An “initial analysis” indicates the weapons match those the Houthis have used to target ships on the Red Sea, according to the statement, which accuses Iran and others involved of violating international law and a related U.N. resolution.

It is unclear where the vessel originated and who was on board. “Disposition of the 14 dhow crew members is being determined in accordance with international law,” the statement said. The operation marked the first U.S. Navy seizure of advanced Iranian-made ballistic components since 2019, the statement added. The Associated Press first reported some details of the seizure.

The episode has underscored a persistent challenge facing the Biden administration and its international partners as they vow to hold Yemen’s Houthis — and the militant group’s chief backer, Iran — accountable for a steep rise in attacks that have significantly disrupted commercial shipping in the region. U.S. and British forces struck dozens of Houthi targets in Yemen last week, hoping to discourage additional attacks, but the Pentagon acknowledged afterward that the group will probably remain a threat.

The Houthis have said that their actions are in protest at Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. The Biden administration has not ruled out future military action in Yemen but has sought to tread carefully, fearful that an overreaction could engulf the Middle East in violence.

U.S. forces in the region reported separately Monday that an American-owned container ship was hit with a ballistic missile in the Houthis’ latest alleged provocation. The ship sustained no “significant damage” and its crew was uninjured, officials said in a statement. A missile launched from Yemen earlier in the day came down before it reached the coast.

Senior U.S. officials blame Tehran for having “aided and abetted” the crisis, which has principally affected commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. The Houthis, officials contend, would be incapable of threatening these shipping routes without Iran’s technological and intelligence support.

The SEALs launched their mission from the USS Lewis B. Puller, which acts as a floating base, and headed toward the dhow in a smaller craft, according to a U.S. official. The dhow’s crew lacked official documentation, which allowed the U.S. boarding team to search the vessel, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive military mission.

Interdicting suspicious or adversarial vessels, known as visit, board, search and seizure, or VBSS, is among the most difficult and dangerous missions undertaken by highly trained troops. Such operations typically involve approaching the suspect vessel in smaller boats and using ladders and climbing tools to get aboard, which can be complicated by violent waves and hostile crew members. U.S. forces routinely partner with other nations’ militaries to blunt piracy and weapons smuggling in the region.

Though it has been days since the two SEALs went missing, the Pentagon remains hopeful that they will be found alive. The gulf’s waters are warm, officials have said, noting that powerful swells and exhaustion are more of a concern than hypothermia.

“We are conducting an exhaustive search for our missing teammates,” Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, head of Central Command, said in the statement.

The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · January 16, 2024

13. Operational Art Reborn – Part Two

The first article (part 1) can be accessed here: https://wavellroom.com/2023/06/07/operational-art-reborn-part-one/

​Excerpt:

In the final telling, the Ukrainian military’s adept campaign planning likely owes more to the successful application of operational art enabled by significant western intelligence support. The famed theorist of manoeuvre warfare, Richard Simpkin, was deeply impressed by Soviet military thought but doubted their ability to employ it in practice for reasons such as low standards of training and officer education. Interestingly, General Zaluzhny has hinted that he believes Ukraine’s success has come from synthesising the western style of mission command at the tactical level with the Soviet military science on which its senior officers were raised. This synthesis has not been without its issues, but such cultural struggles are common occurrences for rapidly expanding armies in wartime. It is therefore worth considering if western military assistance to Ukraine and the resulting synthesis of western emphasis on empowering junior commanders may be slowly, falteringly allowing Ukraine to unlock the potential offered by operational art.

Operational Art Reborn – Part Two » Wavell Room

wavellroom.com · by Chris Hughes · January 12, 2024

Experimental Feature: Audio Read Version

“I was raised on Russian military doctrine, and I still think that the science of war is all located in Russia.”

General Valerri Zaluzhny, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

The first article outlined the theory and history of operational art, arguing that Russia failed to demonstrate proficiency in this vital component of conventional warfighting during its operations in Ukraine. This article will argue, perhaps unsurprisingly, that Ukraine has performed much more impressively. A firm grasp of the temporal element of operational art has characterised Ukrainian campaign design. Ukrainian commanders have demonstrated patience, generally sound timing for executing operational decisions and masterful sequencing to ensure that actions far removed in space achieve compounding effects upon their enemy. Of course, the Ukrainians are not without fault. Russia is too often portrayed as a bumbling colossus, but the two-dimensional characterisation of Ukraine as infallibly cunning, agile and adaptable also requires some qualification. That Ukraine’s errors are much harder to see, especially above the tactical level, speaks to the relative effectiveness of their influence operations and operational security. Perhaps the most consequential was the initial disposition of ground forces at the outset of the invasion.

Initial disposition of forces

While a detailed understanding of Ukrainian defensive plans eluded western observers in the lead-up to the invasion, it has become apparent in hindsight that Ukraine misjudged the true scope of the Russian plan. Despite western warnings, Ukraine appears to have downplayed the possibility that Putin would seek to subjugate the entire country and instead assessed that the primary objective was to complete the conquest of the Donbas. Ironically, Ukraine discounted Russian forces set to attack Kyiv from Belarus as a diversionary force due to their poor readiness. Consequently, Ukraine kept most of its most able manoeuvre brigades in the Donbas, thereby playing into Russia’s hands. This initial misreading of the Russian scheme of manoeuvre and the resulting disposition of forces at the outset has heavily shaped the course of the conflict since.

The night before the invasion commenced, Ukraine recognised this shortcoming and ordered a redeployment, leading to meeting engagements between Russian columns and Ukrainian forces rushing to occupy unprepared positions. The poor preparation on the northern axis is perhaps exemplified by the desperate defence of Antonov Airport by an initially small force of reservists despite the Ukrainian command having received prior warning from CIA Director William Burns that it would be the target of a Russian air assault. For all the focus on and myth-making around Kyiv, perhaps the successful defence of Chernihiv by Ukraine’s 1st Tank Brigade had the most significant effect at the operational level. The tactical success of this formation and those territorial defence units that supported it achieved operational results by denying the Russians a third axis of advance on Kyiv. Crucially, in conjunction with the continued resistance of Sumy, it also rendered the long approach march on Kyiv from Sumy Oblast logistically untenable over the longer term. This success enabled the Ukrainian command to focus its forces on the defence of Irpin on the north-western outskirts of Kyiv. Considering these examples, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that close-run tactical success by individual formations and smaller units staved off the Russian coup de main on the capital. Unfortunately, the same was not true in the south.

Kyiv-Chernihiv-Sumy axes, 06 March 2022, demonstrating the operational impact of 1st Tank Brigades dogged defence of Chernihiv

Here, Ukraine gifted the invaders a relatively favourable correlation of forces, enabling a rapid breakout from Crimea. Given its strategic importance, the decision not to pre-position more troops to defend the line of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast is notable. This observation is tempered by the requirement to deter or even protect against the threat of an amphibious operation further west in the vicinity of Odessa. Nonetheless, the specific failures to destroy the Antonovsky Bridge with an explosive reserve demolition even after temporarily reclaiming it in a counter-attack and the fall of the crossing point at Nova Kakhovka without a fight are particularly troubling. While the Russians were eventually expelled from the right bank of the Dnipro in November, the effort came at a significant cost when they may have been blocked at a significant geographic barrier in the first instance. Any peace settlement that had seen Russia retain this foothold would have threatened future Ukrainian sovereignty and access to the Black Sea. Even allowing for an approach of accepting penetration on some axes to encourage the Russians to over-extend themselves a more robust plan to leverage the Dnipro should have been expected from the outset.

Russian breakout from Crimea demonstrating seizure of crossing points over the Dnipro and impending encirclement of Mariupol, 28 February 2022

Embracing attrition in the Donbas

For all the flaws in Ukraine’s initial defensive plan, they proved sufficient to weather the storm. With Russia’s change in focus to the Donbas, Ukraine was finally able to fight the war it had been preparing for since 2015. Throughout March, while the eyes of the international community remained focused on Kyiv, the desperate see-sawing battle in and around Izyum brought vital weeks of delay and slowed the Russian attempt to envelop the Donbas from the north to a crawl. Far to the south, the heroic defence of Mariupol tied down another significant group of forces. In some ways, the Mariupol garrison served a function not dissimilar to the surrounded 6th Army in Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43, whose continued refusal to surrender without any hope of relief at least enabled Army Group B to withdraw from the Caucasus.

As the Russians committed, forces redeployed from the Kyiv and Sumy directions piecemeal, an exceedingly well-timed counter-offensive in Kharkiv Oblast in early May largely succeeded in pushing Russian tube artillery out of range of the city. More importantly, from an operational perspective, it forced the Russians to reconsider their flank security on the Izyum axis, where they had massed significant forces in preparation for a renewed attempt to envelop Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the northwest. These developments effectively forced the Russians to abandon the wide envelopment of the Donbas. These events may help to explain the timing for President Zelensky’s authorisation for the defenders of the Azovstahl Plant in Mariupol permission to surrender in early May, a full two to three weeks before they did so. Even as these events unfolded, the Russians prepared to achieve a shallower envelopment, specifically of the Ukrainian salient around Severodonetsk-Lysychansk.

Kharkiv & Donbas fronts, 13 May 2022, demonstrating Russia’s attempt to advance south from Izyum and Ukrainian counterattack in the environs of Kharkiv (course of the Siversky Donets River in purple).

The defeat of the multiple assault river crossings, most famously with the destruction of significant portions of a brigade at Bilohorivka in early May, also denied a shallower double envelopment of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk salient by protecting its northern flank along the middle Siverski-Donets River. Having thus defeated or delayed increasingly less ambitious Russian attempts at enveloping a well-fortified area, Ukraine forced their impatient enemy to conform to their design for battle. For all this success in shaping their foe, the AFU remained in the fight of its life. Thanks to artillery and electronic warfare overmatch, the Russians achieved a grinding advance against the southern flank of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk following the capture of Popasna. Although the Russians achieved tactical victories, notably culminating in the eventual capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, these proved pyrrhic given their out-of-proportion cost in men, equipment and munitions. The attrition inflicted during late spring and summer sapped Russian strength and set conditions for Ukraine’s counter-offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv Oblasts from August onwards. Crucially, Ukraine avoided any repeat of Mariupol by executing numerous well-timed withdrawals in locations such as Lyman, Severodonetsk, Zolote and Lysychansk.

A masterclass of sequencing

Initially, as the Russians neared the point of culmination in the Donbas, the AFU contemplated a broad offensive across the entire southern front in Zaporizhia and Kherson. Wargaming and analysis with American and British counterparts quickly determined that the plan was overly ambitious and needed to be reduced in scope. That the Ukrainians were willing to do so is demonstrative of a more realistic appreciation for the means at their disposal and sits in stark contrast to Russia’s recent winter-spring offensive. Consequently, the first use of the strategic initiative by the Ukrainians took the form of a long series of shaping and interdiction operations in preparation for the much-anticipated manoeuvre phase of the Kherson Offensive commanded by General Kovalchuk. Crucial to the Ukrainian plan of bisecting the Russian-held west bank with a drive to the Dnipro, this included securing a small bridgehead over the Inhulets River near Lozove. The actual manoeuvre, when it came, occurred falteringly. The attempted expansion of the small Lozove bridgehead over the Inhulets River and fixing attacks against the oblast borders in the directions of Mykolaiv and Kriviy Rih stalled reasonably quickly.

In contrast, the later Balakliya Offensive in Kharkiv Oblast forced a breakthrough and rapidly unhinged a Russian defence that had diverted considerable forces to the defence of Kherson. The offensive rapidly seized the vital rail hubs of Izyum and Kupyansk before pre-empting any Russian attempt to use the north-south line of the Oskil River on which to reform a coherent front. One of the hallmarks of Soviet operational art during the later years of the Eastern Front was the deliberate planning for offensives to conclude with the seizure of a bridgehead over the final river line, thus setting the conditions for the next offensive. Breakout from these bridgeheads, culminating in the battle for Lyman that followed, were more hard-fought engagements nonetheless characterised by a Ukrainian ability to avoid enemy strongpoints and inflict severe attrition on Russian forces that came perilously close to being encircled.

Balakliya-Kupiansk Offensive, 09 September 2022, the Oskil River can be seen running south from Kupyansk into the Oskil Resevoir

With hindsight, the initial Ukrainian push in Kherson during August was almost certainly an abortive attack with genuinely ambitious aims in its own right, rather than just a deliberate shaping action. As General Syrsky, the original mastermind of the Balakliya-Kupiansk Offensive commented “in the history of wars, there have been many cases when an attack on a diversionary axis — that is, on a secondary axis — turns into the main axis”. Nonetheless, exactly how opportunistic the Balakliya-Kupiansk offensive is of less consequence than examining the sequence in which they occurred and the resulting cascade of self-defeating decisions it forced upon the invaders. Since wresting the initiative from the Russians, this facet of Ukrainian planning has been remarkably effective. Here, comparison with a historical example from the same region, though at a much grander scale, from almost eighty years ago, reinforces the point.

By June of 1944, a weakened Wehrmacht faced an increasingly mechanised Red Army and anticipated a major Soviet offensive at some point along the Eastern Front. Soviet deception operations, referred to in doctrine as maskirovka, convinced German intelligence that the initial blow of the campaign would fall against Army Group North Ukraine. Consequently, the Germans rushed most of their armoured reserves and reinforcements to this portion of the front. However, the weakened Army Group Centre in Belarus was the actual target of the Soviet attack. After the near destruction of Army Group Centre during Operation Bagration drew all available German reserves north, the sequel operation Lvov-Sandomierz fell against Army Group North Ukraine. Parallels are readily apparent in the linked relationship between the Kherson Offensive and the Balakliya-Kupiansk Offensive. Viewed holistically, the AFU used interior lines and deception operations to wrongfoot their enemy.

By November, sustained pressure in Kherson Oblast finally prompted another relatively well-executed Russian retrograde operation to abandon the right bank of the Dnipro. The destruction of bridges and interdiction of Russian logistics across the Dnipro River using long-range fires achieved disruption. It may have gradually choked units at the front of ammunition and supplies. This is an archetypal example of the indirect approach. It leveraged long-range fires and precision that Mick Ryan has termed ‘corrosion’ to achieve operational and strategic goals at lower cost. For this approach to succeed, attritional fighting was equally important to achieve a high rate of consumption to ensure that Russian stockpiles dwindled over a sustained timeframe, with the prospect of a winter freeze of the Dnipro likely to disrupt Russian ferry operations heavily. Despite the obvious political and humanitarian benefits of allowing Russia to begin withdrawing without a gruelling urban fight for the city of Kherson, the failure to destroy sizeable Russian units through aggressive manoeuvre in the final days of the campaign was a notable missed opportunity.

Kherson offensive, 5 October 2022, the triangular salient resulting from the initial Ukrainian attempt to bisect the Russian grouping around Bezemenne and Davydiv Brid

Winter and the double-edged sword of Bakhmut

Having landed two successive blows, the AFU proved unable to land a third during early winter when the potential to breach the line running Svatove to Kremmina and unhinge the defence of northern Luhansk appeared tantalisingly close. Given the increasingly evident Russian preparations for a winter offensive by January, the decision to abandon the offensive was ultimately wise. General Zaluzhny demonstrated a keen understanding of the longer-term implications, saying “may the soldiers in the trenches forgive me, now it is more important to focus on accumulating resources for more protracted and heavy fighting that may begin next year”. In electing to receive Russia’s offensive, Ukraine’s primary aim was to inflict as much attrition as possible while preserving its force for future operations.

On most axes, the Russians suffered significant attrition and made marginal, if any, gains, essentially validating this approach. At Bakhmut, the situation was more complex. The Russian capture of Soledar allowed incremental advances on the city’s northern flank that threatened ground lines of communication and wrested control of tactically significant heights. At this point,p the beneficial attritional exchange gained from defending Bakhmut no longer held true. Leaked documents reveal that General Budanov, the Chairman of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, described the Ukrainian position in the city as ‘catastrophic’ during the same period. The commitment of reserves succeeded in salvaging the situation and drawing out the battle at the tactical level. Still, this likely came at the cost of using resources earmarked for the counteroffensive. Russia’s eventual capture appears pyrrhic and devoid of any strategic meaning. The same seems true for Ukraine after the beginning of March when a withdrawal to more defensible ground and prepared positions to the west appeared militarily advisable. This argument can fairly be criticised for ignoring the alleged political benefits of denying a Russian victory in Bakhmut.

Indeed, the drawn-out fighting in Bakhmut appears to have been instrumental to the Wagner insurrection of late June. This argument is counterfactual, however. Basing the development of military plans on some hoped-for and self-flagellating political collapse amongst the enemy is notoriously tricky. Linking tactical and operational operations to such a strategic end state is a potentially fraught endeavour. The Battle of Verdun, where General Falkenhayn hoped to bleed the French Army white and break their national will, is a crucial example. Instead, the German High Command became so enraptured with their objective that they persisted through a mutually destructive bloodbath well beyond the point it could reap any operational or strategic dividend. Given Bakhmut’s lack of strategic value, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Ukraine repeated this folly to some, more limited, extent. In the words of one battalion commander fighting in Bakhmut, “here, we are using up too much of the offensive potential that we’ll need for a breakthrough once Ukraine’s black earth dries up”.

Accounting for Ukrainian success by way of conclusion

Though strong after their initial misstep in force deployment, Ukrainian performance has not been perfect. Fortunately, in warfare everything is relative. Ukraine has held a clear advantage in the moral and intellectual components of fighting power almost without interruption. One facet of this trend has been their markedly superior application of operational art. One reason for this asymmetrical performance is the political nature of the two systems and the resulting impact on managing command appointments. The Putin regime appears to have fallen into a classic pattern apparent in some, though not all, dictatorships, rewarding political loyalty at the expense of competence. Russia has adopted something of a revolving door policy, removing commanders who are viewed negatively in the information space for a time before reappointment to similar frontline commands.

In contrast, General Zaluzhny had personally removed ten underperforming generals as of December 2022. General Kovalchuk, the original commander of the Kherson Counteroffensive, was quietly replaced in August by another officer for advancing too cautiously. As Ukraine’s situation around Bakhmut deteriorated in February, President Zelensky also removed General Eduard Moskalyov as the commander of the JFO in a single-line communique. Zelensky and Zaluzhny’s subtle approach closely follows the advice of Thomas Ricks in his excellent expose of American generalship about the dangers of failing to remove lacklustre commanders for fear of negative political optics. Throughout a protracted conflict, the results of these contrasting policies should be obvious to anyone familiar with Darwin’s theory of evolution.

In the final telling, the Ukrainian military’s adept campaign planning likely owes more to the successful application of operational art enabled by significant western intelligence support. The famed theorist of manoeuvre warfare, Richard Simpkin, was deeply impressed by Soviet military thought but doubted their ability to employ it in practice for reasons such as low standards of training and officer education. Interestingly, General Zaluzhny has hinted that he believes Ukraine’s success has come from synthesising the western style of mission command at the tactical level with the Soviet military science on which its senior officers were raised. This synthesis has not been without its issues, but such cultural struggles are common occurrences for rapidly expanding armies in wartime. It is therefore worth considering if western military assistance to Ukraine and the resulting synthesis of western emphasis on empowering junior commanders may be slowly, falteringly allowing Ukraine to unlock the potential offered by operational art.

Postscript: Counteroffensive Disclaimer

This article has deliberately omitted analysis of the ongoing counter-offensive. Some commentators have claimed that the first phase of the counteroffensive has already failed. Another more optimistic viewpoint is that the AFU is deliberately proceeding cautiously to inflict lopsided attrition on the enemy before introducing the breakthrough force to the decisive point(s). Others can point to predictions made well in advance that due to increased Russian field fortifications and force density, this offensive was far more likely to resemble the Kherson Offensive than the Balakliya-Kupiansk Offensive. As always, the importance of current events will reveal themselves only in hindsight.

About the author Related Posts

Chris Hughes

Captain Hughes is an infantry officer in the Australian Army who has served in the 8th/9th Battalion, 1st Battalion and at the Royal Military College Duntroon as an instructor.

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• Operational Art Reborn - Part One

wavellroom.com · by Chris Hughes · January 12, 2024

14. Deterring War without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-averse Approach to Deterrence

We need to get this right.

Conclusion:

As it did during the Cold War, the West must learn to regard how it handles a crisis as either sending a signal to, or setting a precedent for, other potential foes. It must appreciate what consequences its rivals wish to avoid and ensure those outcomes are incorporated into its future deterrence strategies. The West must also realize the efficacy of the classic model of deterrence is eroding. Deterring war by threatening war is growing too risky. Developing a deterrence model based on manipulating risks and consequences, rather than simply costs and benefits, will help because it encourages applying pain across a broader spectrum. Regardless, deterrence, particularly against irresponsible major powers, can never be guaranteed.

Deterring War without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-averse Approach to Deterrence - Military Strategy Magazine

Antulio J. Echevarria II - US Army War College

militarystrategymagazine.com

Shortly after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, defense scholars began asking why the West’s approach to deterrence had failed. Some critics claimed the West never had an official deterrence policy regarding Ukraine, or at least not a consistent one; others maintained the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took military force “off the table” too soon, relying too much on the coercive power of sanctions.[i] In truth, the West had both a deterrence policy and a supporting deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine. US President Joseph Biden and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reinforced the policy and the strategy by repeatedly warning Russia’s President Vladimir Putin not to attack Ukraine. However, the West’s approach was too risk-averse to succeed against a major power armed with military capabilities comparable to NATO’s own. It attempted to deter war without threatening war, which in turn rendered it vulnerable to Russian deterrence. By attempting to minimize the risk of a major war, the West made the right call, even though it resulted in the failure of its own deterrence measures. The “value of the political object,” to borrow Clausewitz’s expression, did not warrant risking a potentially ruinous war.[ii] The question now is whether it is possible to rehabilitate the West’s approach to deterrence without requiring NATO to act as irresponsibly with military force as did Putin’s Russia.

This article does two things. First, it provides a detailed account of the deterrence policy and supporting strategy the United States and its NATO allies had in place to deter Russian aggression. Second, it offers a brief outline of a more consequentialist approach to deterrence, one Western leaders can adopt to rehabilitate their own risk-averse model, and thereby improve its prospects of success. A consequentialist model entails moving beyond the traditional “costs versus benefits” calculus to one based on “risks and consequences,” where costs are defined as expenditures and consequences are defined as effects or results, such as tipping the balance of power by adding new members to an alliance.

Traditionally, the way to deter an actor was to ensure the costs of an action exceeded the benefits, thereby dissuading the actor from taking the action. But the costs an actor was willing to pay and the benefits it hoped to gain were often unknown. A risk-consequence model, in contrast, seeks to dissuade an actor by increasing the likelihood an action will fail and the certainty that severe consequences will follow.

To be clear, the West represents a community of responsible international actors and, therefore, has an obligation to act responsibly on the world’s stage; hence, it needs a risk-averse approach to deterrence for situations in which it desires to deter an action, but its interests do not justify risking a major war. Unfortunately, the classic model of deterrence, which is based on intimidating without provoking, is not well suited for such situations since the line between intimidating and provoking is not necessarily known. Yet, if as Thomas Schelling noted, “international relations often have the character of a competition in risk taking,” then the West surely needs to discover a remedy for its risk-aversion, otherwise it will find itself deterred by more bellicose major powers.[iii]

Of course, deterrence does not always work: no model can guarantee the dissuasion of major powers willing to take irresponsible or reckless risks to get something they want. In such cases, deterrence must yield to defense.

The US-NATO Deterrence Policy

For the purposes of this article, deterrence is defined as “measures taken to dissuade actors from pursuing certain actions.”[iv] As per Schelling, these measures can be active or passive and typically include both threats and assurances, implicit and explicit.[v] The United States and NATO took at least three measures after 2014, in the wake of Putin’s seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donbas, to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine: (a) the establishment of the European Reassurance Initiative/European Deterrence Initiative, (b) granting Ukraine security force assistance through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) and making it an Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP), and (c) a series of explicit threats and warnings to the Kremlin by high-level US and NATO officials as the crisis over Ukraine intensified.

“European Reassurance Initiative/European Deterrence Initiative.” Regarding the first measure, a formal US deterrence policy known initially as the “European Reassurance Initiative” (ERI) did exist for Kyiv, even though Ukraine was not a member of NATO and, hence, did not enjoy the protection of Article 5 of the NATO Charter.[vi] US President Barack Obama established the ERI in 2014, allocating $1 billion USD to ERI as start-up funding in fiscal year 2015. In 2018, the ERI was renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which made its purpose more explicit. US funding for the EDI reached a total of $29.7 billion USD by fiscal year 2022, or about $4.2 billion USD per year over seven years.[vii] Importantly, NATO trained more than 10,000 military personnel under the auspices of EDI.[viii] EDI also brought Ukraine’s average annual military spending to just over $10 billion USD, an amount comparable to Ukraine’s neighbor, Poland, which averaged $12 billion USD in defense spending per year from 2017 to 2021, and yet more than those of Norway and Finland, both of whom have traditionally taken the Russian threat seriously.[ix]

The funding levels for that period may seem low, but they were commensurate with the threat priorities the West had established at the time, namely, “gray-zone” or “hybrid” wars. NATO’s 2017 Strategic Foresight Analysis went so far as to describe Putin’s seizure of Crimea as evidence of an “evolution of hybrid warfare” and of a “paradigm shift in the use of power.”[x] The “risk of major conflicts” had declined, while that of “hybrid warfare” and actions “short of major war” had increased.[xi] Academics, too, pondered the seeming demise of major war.[xii] No fewer than 900 books; 3,700 articles; and 780 reports were published on hybrid warfare between 2016 and 2022.[xiii] Against this backdrop, preparing for a conventional war seemed unjustified. In hindsight, the West chose to invest in defending against threats from only one portion of the spectrum of conflict and was caught ill-prepared.

“Comprehensive Assistance Package” and “Enhanced Opportunities Partner.” The second measure, enhancing Ukraine’s defensive capabilities occurred via two NATO partnership-building programs. The first opened in the summer of 2016, when NATO created a “Comprehensive Assistance Package” (CAP) for Ukraine.[xiv] This package aimed at enabling Ukraine to “become more resilient, to better provide for its own security and to carry out essential reforms.” National resilience, as events were to prove, became vitally important to Ukraine in 2022. To be sure, the CAP was also designed to encourage Ukraine to develop better “democratic oversight and civilian control of the security and defense sector.” But such reforms were also prerequisites to NATO membership for Kyiv.[xv]

The second partnership-building program occurred in 2020, when Ukraine received the status of an “Enhanced Opportunities Partner” as part of NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII). This program aimed “to maintain and deepen cooperation between Allies and partners who have made significant contributions to NATO-led operations and missions.”[xvi] The UAF, readers will recall, participated alongside NATO forces in Kosovo and elsewhere. The EOP is a special status granted only to five other non-NATO states at the time: Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. It, too, recognized Kyiv’s intended political and military reforms and set the UAF on a course to achieve greater interoperability with NATO forces, which meant quality upgrades in equipment as well as closer military-to-military relations.[xvii] Both partnership programs, therefore, brought Kyiv closer to NATO, and enhanced its defensive capabilities and, by extension, its deterrence capabilities.

Threats and Warnings. The third deterrence measure consisted of a series of warnings by NATO’s senior leaders and the Biden administration in the months before the Russian assault. On November 26, 2021, for instance, ahead of a meeting of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers, Stoltenberg warned Russia of “costs” and “consequences” if it invaded Ukraine.[xviii] On December 7, 2021, December 30, 2021, and February 12, 2022, Biden spoke directly with Putin telephonically, warning the Russian leader of severe sanctions if he took military action against Kyiv.[xix] Similarly, US Vice President Kamala Harris issued a threat to Moscow on February 19, 2022, stating Washington intended to impose sanctions on those complicit in any military assault on Ukraine.[xx] Also, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken repeatedly announced the purpose of Washington’s planned sanctions was to “deter Russia from going to war.”[xxi] Likewise, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, added his voice to the administration’s chorus of threats, while also dispatching more US troops to Europe to strengthen America’s deterrence posture.[xxii] Shortly thereafter, NATO’s intelligence communities began disclosing information about Russian military intentions, thereby sending another kind of warning. In fact, CIA Director William J. Burns flew to Moscow to deliver a personal warning from Biden, saying in effect: “We know what you’re up to, and if you invade, there will be severe consequences.”[xxiii] When high-level officials put their credibility on the line in this way, an informal policy is in place.

In sum, the West had established a formal policy of deterrence via ERI/EDI, which it augmented with at least two NATO partnership programs. As the crisis intensified, the West sent explicit threats and warnings to Moscow not to attack. These three measures add up to more than general deterrence.

The US-NATO Deterrence Strategy

As the threat of invasion grew, Washington converted its deterrence policy into a deterrence strategy. This strategy relied predominantly on deterrence by punishment, though it also included an important element of deterrence by denial. Punishment, defined as imposing unacceptable costs on an opponent, was to be meted out through an intense sanctions’ regime, the West’s most comprehensive such package to date.[xxiv] Denial, defined as increasing the likelihood an opponent’s mission will fail, was to be achieved through the controlled release of critical intelligence concerning Putin’s plan, thereby denying it a chance to succeed.[xxv]

Punishment. Sanctions aimed to weaken Russia’s economic base by depriving it of critical technologies and markets, thus crippling its ability to wage war.[xxvi] The United States sanctioned some 1,705 Russian individuals; 2,014 entities; 177 vessels; and 100 aircraft.[xxvii] The European Council, for its part, adopted 11 packages of sanctions beginning in 2014 with Putin’s hybrid war against Ukraine.[xxviii] In total, Moscow has suffered more than 13,000 sanctions—more than Iran, Cuba, and North Korea combined—for its military aggression against Kyiv.[xxix]

In theory, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the ratio of economic power between those states executing the sanctions and those being sanctioned.[xxx] Ergo, the West ought to have enjoyed a significant advantage because Russia’s economy was only the 11th largest in the world, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.78 trillion USD, or 1.8% of the world’s total output in 2022.[xxxi] Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter, second-largest natural gas producer, and third-largest oil producer, but its GDP is less than 7% of the US GDP and less than 15% of the EU’s GDP.[xxxii] Experts boldly predicted the Russian economy would collapse within a matter of weeks or at most months, and recovery would take decades.[xxxiii] But the predictions proved grossly optimistic as Russia’s “fortress economy” weathered the storm of sanctions and shifted to a war footing with financial support from India and China.[xxxiv]

The West’s overoptimism regarding the coercive power of sanctions—which has declined in recent decades due to overuse, mis-targeting, and countermeasures—indicates just how much it desired a low-risk solution to Russian belligerence.[xxxv] Also, historical evidence suggests sanctions tend to reshape security environments in unintended ways, perhaps provoking aggression rather than deterring it, since adversaries sometimes feel compelled to choose between living with a cap on economic growth or attempting to use force to remediate the situation.[xxxvi]

Denial. As mentioned, NATO repeatedly released credible intelligence to cause the Russians to abort their invasion. The Russians, unfortunately, proved either too stubborn, too inept, or too overconfident to comply. NATO also released other information ranging from the positioning of blood and other medical supplies closer to the front, signaling an attack was imminent, to the Kremlin’s false-flag operations, designed to blame Ukraine for the war. NATO also disclosed information concerning Russia’s planned “decapitation” strikes and its use of “kill lists” of key Ukrainian officials.[xxxvii]

Importantly, Biden and Stoltenberg held back a key denial measure, military force.[xxxviii] As Stoltenberg stated when asked about the possibility of establishing no-fly zones over Ukraine, “we are not part of this conflict, and we have a responsibility to ensure that it does not escalate and spread beyond Ukraine, because that would be even more devastating and more dangerous.”[xxxix] Both leaders were roundly criticized for their reticence.[xl] But their call was the right one. Admittedly, NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the spearhead of the NATO Response Force (NRF) could have deployed quickly to Ukraine with follow-on forces close behind. However, little evidence exists to suggest how such a move would have been received politically, given Ukraine’s non-Alliance and non-democratic status; it was merely a “regime in transition.”[xli]

To be sure, the United States could have acted unilaterally and deployed a “tripwire” force, consisting perhaps of elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and/or units from the 82nd Airborne Division. Yet research into the use of tripwire-forces suggests they seldom prevent an aggressor from seizing its objective and subsequently establishing a strong defensive position; nor do such forces necessarily incur enough casualties to induce the rest of an alliance to intervene. Rather, the forces sent to deter “must be sufficiently substantial to shift the local balance of power” to succeed.[xlii] Even with the authority the US executive possesses to deploy US military force, such a move would have run up against stiff criticism and probably failed to gain political support, since neither the US Congress nor the American public wanted to put US troops in harm’s way during the crisis.[xliii] In any case, deploying military forces into Ukraine may have accelerated rather than deterred Putin’s assault. As some experts believe, he was undeterrable on this issue and planned to overrun Ukraine quickly, presenting the West with a fait accompli it could only reverse with great difficulty, if it had committed forces.[xliv]

To summarize, the West’s deterrence strategy was self-evidently risk averse. But it enabled the West to retain the “moral high ground” and to punish Moscow through sanctions and security force assistance to Ukraine without becoming involved in the conflict directly. Those types of measures can be replicated and serve as a model for a risk-averse, consequentialist deterrence strategy.

Rehabilitating a Risk-averse Deterrence Strategy

It is fair to say a combination of Russian deterrence and the West’s risk-aversion contributed to the failure of NATO’s deterrence strategy regarding Ukraine. Russia’s “formidable” military likely dissuaded the West from deploying its own military power, a form of general deterrence. While Russia’s military proved more inept than Western analysts anticipated, it could still inflict egregious casualties on NATO forces.[xlv] Determining precisely where the line is between Russian deterrence and the West’s risk-aversion would be an interesting but ultimately academic exercise. For our purposes, it is only necessary to appreciate what these influences are and how they work.

Deterrence, like any military strategy, is reciprocal in nature. So, we should expect opposing sides to react to each other’s actions. Admittedly, Russia was not deterred from invading Ukraine. But it may have been dissuaded from escalating vertically—to employing nuclear weapons—and from escalating laterally—to attacking one or more of Ukraine’s neighbors. By the same token, NATO held back on establishing “no-fly” zones and delayed delivering some of its advanced warfighting capabilities, including the high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) and dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs) to Ukraine. So, while deterrence failed in one respect, it continues in others.

Russian Deterrence. Russian strategic deterrence (sderzhiygnie) aims to “restrain,” “keep out,” or “hold back” an adversary.[xlvi] Moscow’s deterrence measures, including its military capabilities helped induce the West into a risk-averse deterrence strategy.[xlvii] Like Western militaries, the Russians also regard deterrence as a form of “coercion,” forcibly making an actor do something it does not want to do.[xlviii] Also, the Russians view deterrence by “denial” and by “punishment” much the same as the West does. However, they place rather more emphasis on another category, deterrence by “intimidation,” or by inducing fear.[xlix] The West’s fear of the Russian military may have declined due to its heavy losses, but hopefully it remains at a healthy level, as some reports expect Moscow to recover and try again.[l]

Consequential Deterrence. The West is already in “consequence mode,” so to speak, as it considers what observations major powers, such as China, are drawing from NATO’s failure to deter Russian aggression.[li] But the West currently lacks a clear definition and a practical theory around which to organize its efforts. By way of definition, if deterrence is “measures taken to dissuade actors from taking certain actions,” then consequentialist deterrence is “measures taken to increase the rival’s risks of suffering failure and negative outcomes, so it chooses not to take certain actions.” By way of theory, consequentialist deterrence is based on the premise that aggressors ask themselves not what it will cost them to take a certain action, but rather what their chances of succeeding are if they take the action. Risk is simply a function of probability, specifically, the probability any number of negative outcomes will occur. Severe consequences, to reiterate, must also follow if the aggressor’s intended action succeeds.

Obviously, we want to lower the risk to ourselves, while raising it for our rivals. One way to accomplish that is by transferring as much risk as possible to our rivals. Risk transfer can occur by arming our friends and partners through security force assistance and partnership programs, as NATO has done with Ukraine. We thus increase the adversary’s probability of failure by strengthening our partners and do so without directly committing ourselves to go to war on their behalf. Our rivals would thus have to face the West’s combined economic (and to some extent military) might, not just that of the party they wish to attack. We can also increase the negative consequences to our foe by, for instance, working to reduce its political power or influence, or by increasing its economic isolation. We can put such consequences into effect even if our rival’s planned action succeeds.

Other consequentialist actions might include adding new allies, as NATO did with Finland and (soon) Sweden. Once NATO’s production capacity for war material is revamped, it will be able to “make war without going to war” by extending the conflict as long as its proxies are willing and able to fight. In this way, it would have a viable response to aggression in situations where the “value of the political object” is decidedly not worth the risk of a major war. But NATO must go one step further and develop formal procedures for leveraging its proxy wars more consequentially, not only to tie down adversaries but also to showcase how such conflicts are shifting the global balance of power in a sense that puts the aggressor in a worse situation than the status quo ante.

Curiously, much of the literature on deterrence mentions the importance of risks and consequences in an actor’s decision calculus. Yet, when explaining different types of deterrence theories, such as punishment or denial, the bulk of the literature inexplicably claims manipulating an adversary’s perception of the “costs and benefits” of an action, making the former exceed the latter, is the core dynamic influencing an actor’s decision calculus.

Admittedly, the relationship between costs and benefits is easy to explain, particularly to a readership conditioned by a free-enterprise culture. But using this frame of reference is unwise for at least three reasons. First, it does not amplify the pain a would-be aggressor would feel because costs—as expenditures of blood and treasure—are merely a subset of consequences—the effects of an action. Changing the core dynamic to “risks and consequences” prompts us to search for second and third order effects and appropriate ways to integrate them into our strategy; it gives us a broader and richer array of methods and means from which to choose to accomplish our purposes.

Second, it puts us at a disadvantage because autocratic regimes do not balk at costs the way, or to the degree, leaders of liberal democracies do. Democracies typically cannot outspend autocracies in blood, which we value more than treasure. Leaders of democracies must account for the lives of their citizens in a way that autocratic leaders do not.

Third, a cost-benefit framework often results in conflating costs and losses, particularly in political discourse. Costs reflect expenses in manufacturing, transportation, employment, maintenance, and so on. Losses occur because of accidents or military action. The USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier cost the United States just under $14 billion USD to build; plus, $1 billion USD per year to maintain.[lii] Compare the cost of that vessel to the costs of the numerous anti-ship missile systems, which range from $40,000 to $3.5 million USD, capable of damaging or destroying it.[liii] Losing this vessel along with its crew in an accident or a combat mission would have severe psychological as well as physical ramifications for the United States and its allies. In a situation where an opponent owns a similarly costly vessel, a consequentialist deterrence strategy would leverage the psychological and material losses associated with that ship to exacerbate the “pain yet to come,” as Schelling would say.[liv] In other words, a consequentialist deterrence strategy does not eschew costs or losses, but rather seeks to find ways to compound them to the detriment of an adversary.

The intention of this section has been simply to offer a brief outline of a definition and a theory of consequentialist deterrence. More work needs to be done to address the full extent of the theory’s advantages and disadvantages.

Conclusion

The West’s efforts to deter Russia from invading Ukraine clearly failed. But that failure provides an opportunity to consider deterrence differently. After the Cold War, the West’s “overmatch” in national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—gave it a distinct advantage when deterring smaller states and violent non-state actors since it could accept the risk of war if deterrence failed, which sometimes did, and even if that failure resulted in an insurgency, as it often did. But the re-emergence of strategic competition among major powers has rebalanced the equation, making the West reluctant to risk going to war to deter aggression, except where it has firm alliance treaties in place, such as with Korea and NATO. The West can no longer count on achieving overmatch or brandishing it with confidence as it did against lesser threats. It needs another method to offset its risk-averse approach to deterrence without abandoning it altogether.

As it did during the Cold War, the West must learn to regard how it handles a crisis as either sending a signal to, or setting a precedent for, other potential foes. It must appreciate what consequences its rivals wish to avoid and ensure those outcomes are incorporated into its future deterrence strategies. The West must also realize the efficacy of the classic model of deterrence is eroding. Deterring war by threatening war is growing too risky. Developing a deterrence model based on manipulating risks and consequences, rather than simply costs and benefits, will help because it encourages applying pain across a broader spectrum. Regardless, deterrence, particularly against irresponsible major powers, can never be guaranteed.

References

[i] Bettina Renz, “Was the Russian Invasion of Ukraine a Failure of Western Deterrence?” Parameters 53, no. 4, (Winter 2023-24): 7-18, raises the pertinent questions; see also Liam Collins, Why the United States Failed to Deter Russia in Ukraine (foreignpolicy.com).

[ii] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 92.

[iii] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 92.

[iv] For other definitions compare: “the potential or actual application of force to influence the action of a voluntary agent,” in Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 26; and “the use of threats to manipulate behavior so that something unwanted does not occur,” in Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1.

[v] Schelling, Arms and Influence, 74-5.

[vi] FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners | whitehouse.gov (archives.gov). Article 5 considers an attack against one to be an attack against all, but it does not require every NATO member to respond militarily. NATO - Topic: Collective defence and Article 5.

[vii] Congressional Research Service (CRS), “The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview,” July 1, 2021; and https://comptroller.defense.gov/budget-materials.

[viii] NATO Has Been Training Ukrainian Forces for Years – Outside the Beltway.

[ix] https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/UKR/ukraine/military-spending-defense-budget. Ukraine Military Spending/Defense Budget 1993-2023. www.macrotrends.net. Retrieved 2023-11-18; https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/NOR/norway/military-spending-defense-budget. Norway Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2023. www.macrotrends.net. Retrieved 2023-11-18; https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/FIN/finland/military-spending-defense-budget. Finland Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2023. www.macrotrends.net. Retrieved 2023-11-18; https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/POL/poland/military-spending-defense-budget. Poland Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2023. www.macrotrends.net. Retrieved 2023-11-18.

[x] NATO, Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report (Norfolk, VA: Strategic Foresight Analysis Team, 2017), 26.

[xi] NATO, Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report, 59.

[xii] Raimo Väyrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[xiii] NATO Library and JSTOR searches.

[xiv] Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, July 2016, Fact Sheet, p. 1; compreh-ass-package-ukra Highlighted.pdf.

[xv] Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, July 2016, Fact Sheet, p. 2.

[xvi] NATO - News: NATO recognizes Ukraine as Enhanced Opportunities Partner, 12-Jun.-2020.

[xvii] NATO - Topic: Partnership Interoperability Initiative.

[xviii] NATO chief warns Russia of 'costs' if it moves on Ukraine | AP News.

[xix] White House reiterates that US is ready to act if Russia invades Ukraine | CNN Politics; Biden admin threatens harsh sanctions against Russia if it invades Ukraine (nbcnews.com).

[xx] Kamala Harris warns Russia of Ukraine invasion consequences - Los Angeles Times (latimes.com).

[xxi] Antony Blinken warns Russia of 'severe consequences' if it invades Ukraine ahead of Lavrov meeting | CNN Politics; Blinken announces US has delivered written responses to Russia over Ukraine crisis | CNN Politics.

[xxii] WATCH: Defense Secretary Austin asks Moscow to explain troop buildup near Ukraine | PBS NewsHour; Bing Videos.

[xxiii] U.S. Intelligence Sees Russian Plan for Possible Ukraine Invasion - The New York Times (nytimes.com); How the U.S. knew Russia would invade Ukraine - The Washington Post.

[xxiv] Congressional Research Service, Report R45415, US Sanctions on Russia, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 18, 2022; Congressional Research Service, In Focus, US Sanctions: Overview for 118th Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 27, 2023.

[xxv] How the U.S. knew Russia would invade Ukraine - The Washington Post.

[xxvi] EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014) - Consilium (europa.eu).

[xxvii] Russia Sanctions Database - Atlantic Council.

[xxviii] Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine - Consilium (europa.eu).

[xxix] Sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine - statistics & facts | Statista; How Sanctions Have Changed Russian Economic Policy - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[xxx] Anton Filipenko, Olena Bazhenova, Roman Stakanov, “Economic Sanctions: Theory, Policy, Mechanisms,” Baltic Economic Journal 6, no. 2 (May 2020): 69-80.

[xxxi] Economy of Russia - statistics & facts | Statista.

[xxxii] PolitiFact | Russia’s economy and Western sanctions: What you need to know. Comparing Russia and the European Union: GDP and population | FRED Blog (stlouisfed.org).

[xxxiii] The West's $1 trillion bid to collapse Russia's economy | CNN Business; Putin's Ukraine invasion will spur 30-year economic setback: experts (cnbc.com).

[xxxiv] Russia's Economy Hasn't Crashed, Even Though Wall Street Predicted It (businessinsider.com); Why sanctions against Russia aren't working — yet: Planet Money: NPR; China’s support for Russia has been hindering Ukraine’s counteroffensive - Atlantic Council.

[xxxv] Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (Yale University Press, 2022); Bruce W. Jentelson, Sanctions: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022); Bryan R. Early, Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Sanctions Fail (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

[xxxvi] Agathe Demarais, Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2022); Mulder, The Economic Weapon, 295.

[xxxvii] US reveals claims of Russian 'kill list' if Moscow occupies Ukraine (bbc.com).

[xxxviii] Biden pledges US forces "are not engaged and will not engage in the conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine" (cnn.com).

[xxxix] NATO rules out policing no-fly zone over war-hit Ukraine | AP News.

[xl] John Bolton, How Russia Is Beating the West at Deterrence | Time, Mar. 9, 2022; Nadia Schadlow, Why Deterrence Failed Against Russia - WSJ, Mar. 20, 2022.

[xli] Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) assigns democracy index scores based on: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. Democracy Index 2021 (eiu.com), p. 45; Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, ed., Sarah Repucci, et al, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021); FIW2020_book_JUMBO_PDF.pdf (freedomhouse.org), p. 1236.

[xlii] Dan Reiter and Paul Poast, “The Truth about Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments do not Deter Aggression,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 3 (Summer 2021): 34-53.

[xliii] Most Americans back sanctions, oppose military action in Ukraine (nypost.com). Toplines_Russia-Ukraine_Relations_20220124.Pdf (Yougov.Com).

[xliv] On Putin’s “un-deterrability,” see Daniel W. Drezner, Why did deterrence fail in Ukraine? - The Washington Post, March 27, 2023, accessed 18 NOV 2023; also, Robert Hamilton, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, unrecorded discussion. Zabrodskyi, et al, Preliminary Lessons, 7-12.

[xlv] Strange Debacle: Misadventures in Assessing Russian Military Power - War on the Rocks; How the West Got Russia’s Military So, So Wrong - The Atlantic.

[xlvi] Samuel Charap, Strategic Sderzhivanie: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to “Deterrence.” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/strategic-sderzhivanie-understanding-contemporary-russian-approaches-deterrence-). Cited from Graeme Herd, Russian Strategic Deterrence Frameworks, Strategic Multilayer Assessment, 15 September 2023, p. 5.

[xlvii] Although not germane to this discussion, some degree of self-deterrence probably was involved too. If deterrence is measures taken to persuade actors not to pursue certain actions, then self-deterrence is measures not taken when pursuing an action—provided deterrence by another party is not the cause. Self-deterrence can be difficult to distinguish from actions taken to conserve resources, or the practice of political prudence, or the exercise of self-discipline in a limited war. It also occurs to preserve one’s moral standing or reputation. An example is a state armed with nuclear weapons that refrains from employing them against an adversary who does not possess them. T.V. Paul, “Self-deterrence: Nuclear Weapons and the Enduring Credibility Challenge,” International Journal, 71, no. 1, (2016): 20-40. For further discussion see: Jeffery Michaels, “Self-Deterrence,” Parameters, forthcoming.

[xlviii] Dima Adamsky, “Russia’s New Nuclear Normal: How the Country has Grown Dangerously Comfortable Brandishing its Arsenal,” Foreign Affairs (May 19, 2023); https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-new-nuclear-normal.

[xlix] Michael Kofman, A. Fink, J. Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analysis, 2020); https://www.cna.org/I files/PDF/DIM-2020-U-026101-Final.pdf.

[l] Frozen war frees Russia to rearm, threaten NATO within 6 years, German military analysts warn (yahoo.com); Russia may need 10 years to rebuild military after Ukraine war (nypost.com).

[li] Zuo Xiying, “The U.S. Deterrence Strategy and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.” The U.S. Deterrence Strategy and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict - Interpret: China (csis.org); What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine? | Foreign Affairs; The Ukraine Invasion: What Lessons Is China Learning? – The Diplomat.

[lii] The Cost of the Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford Aircraft Carrier (businessinsider.com).

[liii] Here Is What Each Of The Pentagon's Air-Launched Missiles And Bombs Actually Cost (thedrive.com).

[liv] Schelling, Arms and Influence, 62.

militarystrategymagazine.com

​15. Pentagon’s industrial strategy describes the problem, not the solution

Conclusion:

America’s creativity and capacity in producing defense capabilities is central to our national security and to the economic vitality that supports it. Yet, for decades we have witnessed, analyzed, and misunderstood the struggles that created the crises we face today. The new strategy contains useful words about the problem. Those words must be quickly put into measurable and funded actions.

Pentagon’s industrial strategy describes the problem, not the solution

Defense News · by Elaine McCusker · January 12, 2024

Big changes are needed to fix America’s defense industrial base and supply chain challenges.

The Department of Defense on Thursday released what it labeled a first-of-its-kind National Defense Industrial Strategy. As with most such strategies, this one falls short in providing the unafraid look at root causes and specific actions needed for rapid, measurable and sustainable improvement. But within the pages there are rays of hope and seeds for the all-important implementation plans.

The strategy does a good job describing the problem in a way that acknowledges some culpability in creating it, something previous reports from the Pentagon did not do.

Unfortunately the more blunt and useful problem characterizations that appeared in a November draft of the report are now missing in the final version. For example, in that draft report, DOD acknowledged that, in part due to its own policy in the early 1990s encouraging consolidation among defense contractors, “today’s [defense industrial base] would be challenged to provide the required capabilities at the speed and scale necessary for the U.S. military and our allies and partners to engage and prevail in a major conflict.” This statement is missing from the final version of the report.

The strategy rightly concludes the current threat environment necessitates aggressive innovation of next-generation capabilities while also continuing to upgrade and produce large volumes of existing conventional systems.

It then makes the critical connection between the problem and the budget, noting the shrinking defense share of the nation’s gross domestic product has resulted in “corresponding contractions of defense-oriented companies and a reduction of nearly two-thirds of the associated workforce.” The document also clearly points to the uncertainty of DoD funding as inhibiting domestic production capacity necessary to meet the nation’s needs.

The strategy falls short by continuing to recast old solutions as new ones rather proposing the type of corrections to current buying practices that would support industrial vibrancy. It fails to update faulty assumptions about likely attrition of equipment during conflict and neglects to lay out new, actionable and measurable solutions within DoD’s scope of control. These failures also further highlight disconnects between policy, programming, and budgeting within DOD and the inadequacy of the budget in supporting the now dangerously outdated national security and defense strategies.

The Pentagon should update these strategies, propose budgets actually sufficient to support them, focus on its core functions, modernize its resourcing and acquisition processes and prioritize procurement of both capability and capacity.

For too long, DOD has tried to pretend it can keep doing what it has been doing and doing it within budgets it knows are too low. To cover for these deficiencies, it has tried to say it can reduce the force now in exchange for increasing capability later while still meeting strategic objectives. We can clearly see those tradeoffs don’t work. Not for the force. Not for the mission. And not for industry or the nation.

DOD then compounds the fiction in this new strategy by saying it needs to “optimize defense needs in the competitive landscape” rather than supporting industry in meeting its needs with defined and funded requirements. The strategy further focuses attention on elements of the problem that are either not within its purview to solve or that it should not even be focused on fixing — such as the fictitious stigma of industrial jobs.

As for next steps, DOD should rapidly complete the referenced implementation plans to include the following four basic measures of progress.

First, is the number of companies willing to do business with DoD growing or shrinking? If efforts are having a positive impact, industry will be clamoring to work with DoD, not running from it as they are doing now.

Second, is production capacity up? There are numerous supporting measures related to material stockpiles, munitions, people eligible to work in ship yards, and outputs of air, sea, ground and space platforms.

Third, is the budget for stated industrial base priorities up or down? If the strategy is not visible in the budget, where is the disconnect?

And, finally, the ultimate measure, is the force trained, equipped and ready with the right modern capabilities and a stockpile of munitions, missiles and supplies to carry out the missions and contingencies assigned to it?

America’s creativity and capacity in producing defense capabilities is central to our national security and to the economic vitality that supports it. Yet, for decades we have witnessed, analyzed, and misunderstood the struggles that created the crises we face today. The new strategy contains useful words about the problem. Those words must be quickly put into measurable and funded actions.

Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. She previously served as the Pentagon’s deputy undersecretary of defense (comptroller) as well as acting undersecretary of defense (comptroller).

16. The Houthis Have Backed Iran Into a Corner

Excerpts:

But if Tehran did indeed send such a message, the Houthis ignored it, and kept on with their attacks. On Tuesday, they fired 21 missiles and drones at U.S. and U.K. warships.

The Houthis have a tradition of fierce independence, despite the militia’s overall reliance on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its professed loyalty to Khamenei as the ultimate leader of the resistance. As a result, Tehran may be faced with a tough question: How much pressure is it willing to put on the Houthis to get them to stand down?

When the Houthis seized Sanaa in September 2014, their victory was hailed as a singular achievement for the IRGC and its chief of external operations, Soleimani, who had cultivated the Yemeni Shia militia, helping turn it into a disciplined and militarily sophisticated force. Tehran now had a powerful ally on the Arabian Peninsula, right next to its old foe, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis kept power despite close to a decade of a civil war and extensive interventions by Riyadh and other Arab countries: Soleimani’s bet on them seemed to have paid off. But as Iran finds itself threatened with a war it has long tried to avoid, many there will rightly worry about the consequences of this relationship.

The Houthis Have Backed Iran Into a Corner

A militia Tehran helped build may be dragging the country to war.

By Arash Azizi

The Atlantic · by Arash Azizi · January 12, 2024

Fridays are holy days of rest in the Middle East, but today the region braces itself for the awful possibility of broader conflict. Following repeated attacks on their warships, the United States and the United Kingdom have finally hit back at the Houthis, a Yemeni militia that holds power in the capital city of Sanaa and is recognized as the official Yemeni government by its main sponsor, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The attacks come after weeks of warning and a day after a United Nations Security Council resolution asked the Houthis to stop their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The recent skirmish has now heightened a fear that has preoccupied Middle Easterners since Hamas’s gruesome attacks on October 7 ushered in a new war with Israel: Could the war spread to an all-out conflagration involving Hamas’s main backer, Iran?

The leadership of the Islamic Republic has spent the past few months in a risky dance. On one hand, it affirms its full support for Hamas and reiterates its demand for the destruction of Israel. On the other, it works hard to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel or the United States, knowing full well that it might not survive such a clash. For years, the Iranian regime thought that it had perfected this dance. Its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, burnished a reputation as a shrewd strategist for his policy of “strategic patience”—dodging direct conflict with the U.S. or Israel while steadily improving the capabilities of the Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, and Yemeni militias that together form the Tehran-led Axis of Resistance.

Read: The Middle East conflict that the U.S. can’t stay out of

But the past few years have seen Khamenei’s bluffs called several times. The United States killed the Iranian regime’s foremost military hero and commander of its Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, in January 2020. Khamenei promised a “harsh revenge” that never materialized. Meanwhile, Israel has repeatedly operated on Iranian territory and has helped kill axis leaders in Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Many of the Iranian leader’s most ardent champions now openly criticize him as too cautious. From Tehran to Baghdad, such supporters are clamoring to be sent to Gaza to confront Israel directly. Yet even Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the jewel in the crown of Tehran’s axis, has been forced to give a very limited response to Israel. The much-anticipated speeches of Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s leader, have become an object of ridicule in the last few months for combining harsh rhetoric with a lack of any concrete action. The axis supporters will now surely want a response to the attacks on Yemen. What can Tehran do?

The regime has walked itself into this deadly dilemma. An entire generation of axis fighters has been brought up in Iran’s unique brand of Islamism, with its emphasis on the Islamic Republic as the headquarters of a multinational army that will supposedly one day bring about the downfall of Israel. At the same time, the Iranian regime has never wanted its shadow war with Israel and the United States to turn into the real thing—hence its humiliating inactivity in the face of the blows it has received. The Iranian regime’s arming, equipping, financing, and training of the militias has ensured their support. But it also risks dragging the country and the region into an all-out war.

Under Khamenei, Iran has attempted to hold its people apart from the international integration they mostly desire while still meeting the country’s basic economic needs. As the Iranian American analyst Karim Sadjadpour once said, Khamenei wants Iran to be “to be neither North Korea nor Dubai.” But as the embers of war glow in the region, this gambit becomes less and less tenable. Khamenei knows how unpopular his regime is and that its regional adventures have very little domestic support. Western sanctions have severely degraded the Iranian economy, destroying the country’s middle class. Life is much worse in Iran today than it was, say, 20 years ago, in just about every imaginable way. Things are also rough in the countries where axis forces hold sway: Syria is split up, Lebanon is bankrupt, Iraq faces its own domestic crises, and Yemen is desperately poor. These are not exactly the forces you can take to a war with the West.

Read: The axis of resistance has been gathering strength

As Israel’s war on Gaza continues piling up civilian casualties, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have gained some support among the Arab masses and beyond—even though those actually targeted are not Israelis but international maritime merchants. The militia initially said it was targeting ships going to Israel but has, in practice, fired indiscriminately at commercial ships, even those with no ties to Israel. On December 30, it attacked Maersk Hangzhou, a Danish-owned and Singapore-flagged commercial container. The attacks have already had a terrible effect, leading Maersk and several other international shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea and take South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope route, which is at least a week longer and much more expensive. Prices are then off-loaded to ordinary customers. Masoud Daneshmand, a board member of Iran’s own association of transportation companies, recently complained that maritime shipping costs have increased by 50 percent, putting further pressure on the country’s fragile economy. One can only imagine what a full-on war would do to the economies of the region.

Such calculations perhaps explain why Russia and China, on Wednesday, refused to veto the Security Council resolution that paved the way for the attacks on Yemen. A day before the vote, Iran’s top diplomat, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, complained to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, about the resolution, which the U.S. and Japan had jointly submitted. Yet neither Moscow nor Beijing came to Tehran’s rescue by vetoing the resolution. Instead they abstained, alongside Algeria and Mozambique.

If Tehran goes by its usual playbook, it will likely try to restrain the Houthis and avoid a direct clash. Amir-Abdollahian, the Iranian foreign minister, spoke with a leading Houthi figure in Tehran on January 1. The pro-Houthi media in Iran and Yemen reported that the meeting’s purpose was to confer lavish praise on the militia for standing up to Israel. But many experts believe that Amirabdollahian might instead have warned the Yemenis to tone it down. The foreign minister had received a stern phone call from his British counterpart, David Cameron, just the day before.

But if Tehran did indeed send such a message, the Houthis ignored it, and kept on with their attacks. On Tuesday, they fired 21 missiles and drones at U.S. and U.K. warships.

The Houthis have a tradition of fierce independence, despite the militia’s overall reliance on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its professed loyalty to Khamenei as the ultimate leader of the resistance. As a result, Tehran may be faced with a tough question: How much pressure is it willing to put on the Houthis to get them to stand down?

When the Houthis seized Sanaa in September 2014, their victory was hailed as a singular achievement for the IRGC and its chief of external operations, Soleimani, who had cultivated the Yemeni Shia militia, helping turn it into a disciplined and militarily sophisticated force. Tehran now had a powerful ally on the Arabian Peninsula, right next to its old foe, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis kept power despite close to a decade of a civil war and extensive interventions by Riyadh and other Arab countries: Soleimani’s bet on them seemed to have paid off. But as Iran finds itself threatened with a war it has long tried to avoid, many there will rightly worry about the consequences of this relationship.

The Atlantic · by Arash Azizi · January 12, 2024

17. The Military’s Insistence on Owning Commercial Intellectual Property is Limiting Innovation

Conclusion:

The U.S. government has won a Pyrrhic victory with its current posture on data rights. It gets the intellectual property it wants but not the interoperability and innovation it needs. Commercial companies are put in an untenable position and boxed out from providing their best capabilities to the nation’s hardest problems. If the U.S. government mandates interoperability requirements and protects the baseline intellectual property of commercial software, there is a win-win for all parties involved.

Importantly, this creates opportunities for the next generation of defense tech innovators who are keen to break into the defense domain. Unnecessarily onerous intellectual property requirements have been stifling an entire generation of budding defense tech firms eager to support the Department of Defense. By allowing these young firms to keep their intellectual property, it improves their ability to stay competitive, earn return, and most importantly contribute their innovative solutions to America’s warfighters.

The Military’s Insistence on Owning Commercial Intellectual Property is Limiting Innovation - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Shyam Sankar · January 16, 2024

In early December, the Department of Defense Intellectual Property Cadre hosted its inaugural “DoD IP Forum,” where government and industry leaders convened to debate the growing role of commercial software in national security and how the U.S. government can improve its intellectual property posture towards industry to achieve better outcomes for the department.

At first glance, the issue of commercial intellectual property rights may seem unrelated to how the U.S. government seeks to meet the needs of America’s warfighters, but Department of Defense leaders are beginning to recognize that intellectual property policy has become a serious obstacle to defense innovation. In the age of advanced software and AI, the U.S. government is coming to rely more on the procurement of dual-use commercial technology to give the armed forces a strategic, operational, and tactical edge. In fact, in the first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy released last week, the Department of Defense explicitly highlighted the importance of intellectual property and data rights policies as a pathway to flexible acquisition and sustainment.

Unfortunately, today, the U.S. government and the commercial software industry are frequently at odds in their vision for how much government intellectual property ownership is required for critical national security programs to succeed. There is a requirement for the secretary of defense to “define the legitimate interest of the U.S. government” when asking companies to give up their intellectual property. While this requirement is meant to protect commercial intellectual property, in practice many commercial vendors are subject to solicitation requirements for either “unlimited rights” or “government purpose rights.” Unlimited rights enable the government to use, modify, reproduce, release, or disclose technical data or computer software in whole or in part, in any manner, and for any purpose whatsoever, including to a company’s competitors. Government purpose rights are slightly more restrictive, but still allow the government to use the software within government without restriction and outside government if there is a government purpose.

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The result is that software providers eager to support the Department of Defense risk losing the very assets that sustain their business: company intellectual property. This not only dissuades commercial technology providers from seeking government contracts, it places a particularly onerous burden on younger non-traditional tech firms that are hoping to break into the defense industrial ecosystem — both of which limit the public-private partnerships necessary to ensure that the United States stays ahead of technologically advanced competitors.

As senior leaders at Palantir Technologies and Tangram Flex, software companies that do a great deal of business with the Defense Department, we have a direct interest in contracting outcomes. But we also bring a unique perspective that is formed by a cumulative 40 years of expertise working through the barriers of commercial software adoption by the U.S. government. Based on our experience, we believe that for the Department of Defense to vastly improve the speed and scale with which it acquires and fields emerging technology, it should rethink its current approach to intellectual property ownership.

Specifically, the government should stop conflating intellectual property rights with vendor lock and interoperability. One does not solve for the other, and thus commercial companies should not have to forfeit their core intellectual property — namely patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets — in the name of interoperability. This approach can serve as a win-win for defense and industry by effectively addressing the root cause of interoperability and vendor lock issues, incentivizing commercial companies to provide their most innovative solutions to the government and boosting the expansion and health of America’s budding defense tech start-up ecosystem.

The Current Landscape

What’s at stake in the data rights debate? What are potential points of tension between government and industry? And what opportunities exist to ensure mutual benefit that supports America’s warfighters?

What Does Government Want Out of Data Rights?

Data rights is a broad category that refers to both a company’s intellectual property and ownership of government data. While ownership of government data is self-explanatory, for software firms, intellectual property refers to the proprietary source code needed to recreate the software. Enterprise software-as-a-service companies are not advocating to own customer data, believing that the U.S. government should always exclusively own its data. Instead, disagreements between government and industry tend to revolve around rights to commercially financed and owned intellectual property.

It is critical that the Department of Defense be able to own and access its data for many reasons, including preparedness and the execution of war, the sustainment and improvement of existing capability, senior leader decision support, and more. As the 2020 Department of Defense Data Strategy explains, “DoD data is a high interest commodity,” and it “must be made available for use by all authorized individuals and non-person entities through appropriate mechanisms.”

While the department’s requirement to exclusively own its data is both reasonable and necessary, the claim to commercial intellectual property is more complex and controversial. Within the department, there is a general view that owning, not renting, a new capability or system — through requiring unlimited rights and government purpose rights requirements — will help avoid vendor lock with specific software providers and improve the interoperability of software-based systems. This term refers both to the government being locked into using a specific vendor (and therefore being susceptible to price extortion), as well as being locked in to a given vendor’s architecture that is not interoperable with the government’s current or future investments.

For example, the Department of Defense’s 2022 State of Competition in the Industrial Base concluded, “If a component or subsystem becomes vendor-locked, the process for acquiring, supporting, and upgrading the overarching system or subsystem can be subject to the pressure of that vendor lock, because the overall support for that system depends on the exclusive IP rights governing a critical subsystem or component.” While the department’s fear of vendor-lock tends to focus on software providers (versus hardware providers), the concern is universal. After all, the production of a plane, tank, or ship can include substantial vendor-lock as the government does not have the opportunity to switch providers until there is a new class of that platform.

Simply put, vendor-lock is the opposite of interoperability: It limits competition for government contracts, increasing costs; it undermines the government’s ability to engage in flexible modification and sustainment when software updates are needed, or during times of rapid change in requirements; and it ultimately prevents the government from acquiring the best new technologies.

What Does Industry Want Out of Data Rights?

While commercial software companies do not seek ownership over government data, the request by government buyers for unlimited rights and government purpose rights requirements on core commercial intellectual property is a difficult proposition. However, this preference is not related to commercial providers seeking to create vendor lock-in or undermine interoperability. In fact, we advocate that industry consent to unlimited rights or government purpose rights on non-core intellectual property, including all derivative logic, models, analysis, interface control documents, application programming interfaces to other government systems, and computer software configuration items.

Commercial software companies object to the sweeping terms stipulated in unlimited rights and government purpose rights because protection of core intellectual property — typically built with independent research and development dollars or outside funding like venture capital — is central to their ability to remain a viable company. If companies had to give up their intellectual property every time they sold to a customer, whether government or commercial, they would struggle to remain in business as it would be too easy for competitors to copy their product for free. American tech companies don’t want their intellectual property stolen by China, and they also don’t want to turn it over to the U.S. government as the price of entry to provide national security capabilities.

Why the Defense Department’s Approach Isn’t Working

While the battle for intellectual property ownership is perceived as existential by both the Department of Defense and commercial providers, a closer look at the origins of each actor’s preferences reveals greater compatibility. Industry wants to ensure a return on its investment, which doesn’t require promoting vendor lock or undermining interoperability. The military wants to limit vendor lock and promote interoperability, regardless of whether commercial firms earn a return on investment. The key question then is: Does department ownership of commercial intellectual property actually support its stated interests, justifying the harm it causes to commercial actors? The answer, in short, is no.

First, intellectual property ownership is not actually necessary to combat vendor lock and interoperability. For example, even if the department does not own a vendor’s baseline intellectual property, a legal precedent already exists so that no vendor can preclude the government from cloning the application programming interfaces of the function it wants and then re-competing the capability to the market.

Additionally, the issue driving vendor lock and high switching costs is proprietary interfaces, not proprietary code or intellectual property. As a former special advisor to the secretary of the Air Force, Tim Grayson, said about software solutions from traditional defense contractors: “When we have worked interoperability at the data level what we have found is the biggest problem is legacy programs and their vendors don’t know their own systems. We might have to have them spend three to six months effectively reverse engineering their systems and documenting what their interfaces are.” Ironically, the complexity and bespoke nature of many custom government off-the-shelf solutions drives outcomes that the government is trying to avoid: increased technical debt and vendor lock to the developer.

Second, regardless of who owns the intellectual property, the military can mandate application programming interfaces and interoperability with relevant government reference architectures. The department can also write into contracts mandatory data export or “burn down” requirements for key deliverables, which lowers the switching costs of changing vendors. This should be sufficient to meet most interoperability standards, and the department can always insist on a re-compete for any capability it feels does not pass muster.

Third, the Department of Defense has already authorized new approaches to maximize interoperability and avoid vendor lock. For example, in 2017, U.S. law mandated that all major defense acquisition programs must be designed and developed using a modular open systems approach, and a 2019 tri-service memo reinforced this approach. The modular open systems approach is a technical and business strategy designed in part to lower the switching costs of moving from one vendor to another by mandating open standards and interoperable systems. Unfortunately, when the Department of Defense encourages unlimited rights or government purpose rights in the name of interoperability or a modular open systems approach, they box out commercial companies, who, ironically, are the entities most likely to be compliant with this approach. By definition, dual-use commercial capabilities are trying to capture a large segment of the total addressable market, and thus commercial providers build their products to be as open and modular as possible to satisfy the widest possible set of requirements.

Fourth, we have heard officials express fears that during wartime conditions — where urgent changes and modifications must be made — the government will be unable to make system changes because it doesn’t own the source code and thus becomes reliant upon commercial actors. However, the ease with which a program can use and modify a technology is almost entirely divorced from “owning the source code.” To use a non-defense example, Windows users cannot modify their operating system source code, but there are limitless configurations and customizations they can build on top of this commercial baseline. Additionally, even if the U.S. government owned the source code, it likely would need a more upskilled workforce to modify, test, and deploy changes to the source code of a company’s commercial baseline under acute stress.

Finally, the requirement of unlimited data rights or government purpose rights for commercial software is resulting in the U.S. military missing out on innovation. When faced with such requirements, commercial companies are either forced to opt out completely, or they create a special-purpose version of their software with the desired rights — this version, or branch, of software is frozen in time from that point on. Companies will then release new features and innovations only in newer versions of their commercial software, a necessity for them to remain competitive in the marketplace and protect their product development investment. The Department of Defense misses out on the key benefit of buying commercial software — frequent new releases with additional features driven by feedback from a large customer base.

Over the past several years, the U.S. government has begun to wield new authorities, like the modular open systems approach, to avoid vendor lock and improve interoperability (perhaps an implicit acknowledgment that aggressive data rights are not yielding desired outcomes). Yet even with these new tools, the military persists on unnecessary claims to unlimited rights. The result is the worst of all worlds — interoperability issues persist, and commercial firms become disincentivized from pursuing the defense tech market altogether.

Recommendations

Given that the military can maximize interoperability without claiming maximum intellectual property rights, how can the Department of Defense and industry work together to ensure American warfighters have access to the best capabilities American industry has to offer?

First, and foremost, we recommend that procurements allow commercial software vendors to retain intellectual property rights to their commercial baseline. Second, to procure solutions that are configurable, flexible, and responsive — especially in wartime — the military should shift its evaluation criteria for software procurement from a heavy focus on intellectual property ownership to the outcomes of interoperability and responsiveness. The F-35 program is a clear case where focusing on data rights — as opposed to interoperability directly — lead to worse outcomes for the military. In this case, the government is on the hook to pay $500 million for Lockheed Martin to export data from the F-35, with the F-35 program executive admitting, “It’s not a matter of data rights, it’s matter of data delivery.” Despite the U.S. government having its desired data rights, it still has a dependency on Lockheed Martin for the data delivery needed to sustain the aircraft.

Third, to ensure vendors and capabilities will be sufficiently responsive in crisis situations, programs should include parameters and inputs that the program must be able to tune autonomously to be responsive to emergent needs, as well as service-level agreement requirements for modifications and new features. Programs can then hold a competition and see if commercial software companies, or government off-the-shelf providers, can ship features faster during operational exercises.

Commercial providers also have a responsibility to create a conducive environment for policy change. First, as there is still a strong cultural conflation between commercial intellectual property and government data ownership, industry should proactively demonstrate the ability for government customers to access and export their data outside of a company’s product, as well as be willing to be held to contractual obligations to the same effect. Second, companies should spend more time building trust with their Department of Defense customers by explicitly demonstrating how commercial companies build their product to be as open and interoperable as possible, for example with application programming interfaces, micro-services, and the use of open source components.

The benefits of acting on these recommendations will be clear. In addition to improving interoperability for military programs, allowing commercial software providers to own their intellectual property will help keep America’s industrial base strong, providing the best capabilities available to national security community. As a recent George Mason University report argued, “if DoD wants the best commercial firms solving military problems, it will have to respect their primary asset — intellectual property.” Furthermore, as a 2022 National Defense Industrial Association report asserts, “Intellectual Property (IP) rights are essential to the health of the [defense industrial base]. The perception of risks to IP rights shapes investor’s willingness to invest in research and development and commercialization activities.” This matters because the private sector invests in research and development at 3.5 times the rate of the U.S. government, and commercial software has a large customer base that helps drive innovation and new functionality.

Conclusion

The U.S. government has won a Pyrrhic victory with its current posture on data rights. It gets the intellectual property it wants but not the interoperability and innovation it needs. Commercial companies are put in an untenable position and boxed out from providing their best capabilities to the nation’s hardest problems. If the U.S. government mandates interoperability requirements and protects the baseline intellectual property of commercial software, there is a win-win for all parties involved.

Importantly, this creates opportunities for the next generation of defense tech innovators who are keen to break into the defense domain. Unnecessarily onerous intellectual property requirements have been stifling an entire generation of budding defense tech firms eager to support the Department of Defense. By allowing these young firms to keep their intellectual property, it improves their ability to stay competitive, earn return, and most importantly contribute their innovative solutions to America’s warfighters.

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Shyam Sankar is the Chief Technology Officer of Palantir Technologies.

Caitlin Dohrman is the Chief Executive Officer of Tangram Flex.

Madeline Zimmerman is a Department of Defense Deployment Strategist at Palantir Technologies.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Shyam Sankar · January 16, 2024

​18. Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear StabilityArtificial Intelligence and Nuclear Stability

Conclusion:

It is imperative that nuclear powers approach the integration of AI and autonomy in their nuclear operations thoughtfully and deliberately. Some applications, such as using AI to help reduce the risk of a surprise attack, could improve stability. Other applications, such as dead hand systems, could be dangerous and destabilizing. Russia’s Perimeter and Poseidon systems demonstrate that other nations might be willing to take risks with automation and autonomy that U.S. leaders would see as irresponsible. It is essential for the United States to build on its current momentum to clarify its own policies and work with other nuclear-armed states to seek international agreement on responsible guardrails for AI in nuclear operations. Rumors of a U.S.-Chinese agreement on AI in nuclear command and control at the meeting between President Joseph Biden and General Secretary Xi Jinping offer a tantalizing hint of the possibilities for nuclear powers to come together to guard against the risks of AI integrated into humanity’s most dangerous weapons. The United States should seize this moment and not let this opportunity pass to build a safer, more stable future.

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Stability - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Depp · January 16, 2024

Policymakers around the world are grappling with the new opportunities and dangers that artificial intelligence presents. Of all the effects that AI can have on the world, among the most consequential would be integrating it into the command and control for nuclear weapons. Improperly used, AI in nuclear operations could have world-ending effects. If properly implemented, it could reduce nuclear risk by improving early warning and detection and enhancing the resilience of second-strike capabilities, both of which would strengthen deterrence. To take full advantage of these benefits, systems must take into account the strengths and limitations of humans and machines. Successful human-machine joint cognitive systems will harness the precision and speed of automation with the flexibility of human judgment and do so in a way that avoids automation bias and surrendering human judgment to machines. Because of the early state of AI implementation, the United States has the potential to make the world safer by more clearly outlining its policies, pushing for broad international agreement, and acting as a normative trendsetter.

The United States has been extremely transparent and forward-leaning in establishing and communicating its policies on military AI and autonomous systems, publishing its policy on autonomy in weapons in 2012, adopting ethical principles for military AI in 2020, and updating its policy on autonomy in weapons in 2023. The department stated formally and unequivocally in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review that it will always maintain a human “in the loop” for nuclear weapons employment. In November 2023, over 40 nations joined the United States in endorsing a political declaration on responsible military use of AI. Endorsing states included not just U.S. allies but also nations in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

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Building on this success, the United States should push for international agreements with other nuclear powers to mitigate the risks of integrating AI into nuclear systems or placing nuclear weapons onboard uncrewed vehicles. The United Kingdom and France released a joint statement with the United States in 2022 agreeing on the need to “maintain human control” of nuclear launches. Ideally, this could represent the beginning of a commitment by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council if Russia and China could be convinced to join this principle. Even if they are not willing to agree, the United States should further mature its own policies to address critical gaps and work with other nuclear-armed states to strengthen their commitments as an interim measure and as a way to build international consensus on the issue.

The Dangers of Automation

As militaries increasingly adopt AI and automation, there is an urgent need to clarify how these technologies should be used in nuclear operations. Absent formal agreements, states risk an incremental trend of creeping automation that could undermine nuclear stability. While policymakers are understandably reluctant to adopt restrictions on emerging technologies lest they give up a valuable future capability, U.S. officials should not be complacent in assuming other states will approach AI and automation in nuclear operations responsibly. Examples such as Russia’s Perimeter “dead hand” system and Poseidon autonomous nuclear-armed underwater drone demonstrate that other nations might see these risks differently than the United States and might be willing to take risks that U.S. policymakers would find unacceptable.

Existing systems, such as Russia’s Perimeter, highlight the risks of states integrating automation into nuclear systems. Perimeter is reportedly a system created by the Soviet Union in the 1980s to act as a failsafe in case Soviet leadership was destroyed in a decapitation strike. Perimeter reportedly has a network of sensors to determine if a nuclear attack has occurred. If these sensors are triggered while Perimeter is activated, the system would wait a predetermined period of time for a signal from senior military commanders. If there is no signal from headquarters, presumably because Soviet/Russian leadership had been wiped out, then Perimeter would bypass the normal chain of command and pass nuclear launch authority to a relatively junior officer on duty. Senior Russian officials have stated the system is still functioning, noting in 2011 that the system was “combat ready” and in 2018 that it had been “improved.”

The system was designed to reduce the burden on Soviet leaders of hastily making a nuclear decision under time pressure and with incomplete information. In theory, Soviet/Russian leaders could take more time to deliberate knowing that there is a failsafe guaranteeing retaliation if the United States succeeded in a decapitation strike. The cost, however, is a system that risks easing pathways to nuclear annihilation in the event of an accident.

Allowing autonomous systems to participate in nuclear launch decisions risks degrading stability and increasing the dangers of nuclear accidents. The Stanislav Petrov incident is an illustrative example of the dangers of automation in nuclear decision-making. In 1983, a Soviet early warning system indicated that the United States had launched several intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, the duty officer at the time, suspected that the system was malfunctioning because the number of missiles launched was suspiciously low and the missiles were not picked up by early warning radars. Petrov reported it (correctly) as a malfunction instead of an attack. AI and autonomous systems often lack the contextual understanding that humans have and that Petrov used to recognize that the reported missile launch was a false alarm. Without human judgment at critical stages of nuclear operations, automated systems could make mistakes or elevate false alarms, heightening nuclear risk.

Moreover, merely having humans in the loop will not be enough to ensure effective human decision-making. Human operators frequently fall victim to automation bias, a condition in which humans overtrust automation and surrender their judgment to machines. Accidents with self-driving cars demonstrate the dangers of humans overtrusting automation, and military personnel are not immune to this phenomenon. To ensure humans remain cognitively engaged in their decision-making, militaries will need to take into account not only the automation itself but also human psychology and human-machine interfaces.

More broadly, when designing human-machine systems, it is essential to consciously determine the appropriate roles for humans and machines. Machines are often better at precision and speed, while humans are often better at understanding the broader context and applying judgment. Too often, human operators are left to fill in the gaps for what automation can’t do, acting as backups or failsafes for the edge cases that autonomous systems can’t handle. But this model often fails to take into account the realities of human psychology. Even if human operators don’t fall victim to automation bias, to assume that a person can sit passively watching a machine perform a task for hours on end, whether a self-driving car or a military weapon system, and then suddenly and correctly identify a problem when the automation is not performing and leap into action to take control is not realistic. Human psychology doesn’t work that way. And tragic accidents with complex highly automated systems, such as the Air France 447 crash in 2009 and the 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019, demonstrate the importance of taking into account the dynamic interplay between automation and human operators.

The U.S. military has also suffered tragic accidents with automated systems, even when humans are in the loop. In 2003, U.S. Army Patriot air and missile defense systems shot down two friendly aircraft during the opening phases of the Iraq war. Humans were in the loop for both incidents. Yet a complex mix of human and technical failures meant that human operators did not fully understand the complex, highly automated systems they were in charge of and were not effectively in control.

The military will need to establish guidance to inform system design, operator training, doctrine, and operational procedures to ensure that humans in the loop aren’t merely unthinking cogs in a machine but actually exercise human judgment. Issuing this concrete guidance for weapons developers and operators is most critical in the nuclear domain, where the consequences of an accident could be grave.

Clarifying Department of Defense Guidance

Recent policies and statements on the role of autonomy and AI in nuclear operations are an important first step in establishing this much-needed guidance, but additional clarification is needed. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states: “In all cases, the United States will maintain a human ‘in the loop’ for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment.” The United Kingdom adopted a similar policy in 2022, stating in their Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy: “We will ensure that — regardless of any use of AI in our strategic systems — human political control of our nuclear weapons is maintained at all times.”

As the first official policies on AI in nuclear command and control, these are landmark statements. Senior U.S. military officers had previously emphasized the importance of human control over nuclear weapons, including statements by Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, then-director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center in 2019. Official policy statements are more significant, however, in signaling to audiences both internal and external to the military the importance of keeping humans firmly in charge of all nuclear use decisions. These high-level statements nevertheless leave many open questions about implementation.

The next step for Department of Defense is to translate what the high-level principle of human in the loop means for nuclear systems, doctrine, and training. Key questions include: Which actions are “critical to informing and executing decisions by the president”? Do those only consist of actions immediately surrounding the president, or do they also include actions further down the chain of command before and after a presidential decision? For example, would it be acceptable for a human to deliver an algorithm-based recommendation to the president to carry out a nuclear attack? Or does a human need to be involved in understanding the data and rendering their own human judgment?

The U.S. military already uses AI to process information, such as satellite images and drone video feeds. Presumably, AI would also be used to support intelligence analysis that could support decisions about nuclear use. Under what circumstances is AI appropriate and beneficial to nuclear stability? Are some applications and ways of using AI more valuable than others?

When AI is used, what safeguards should be put in place to guard against mistakes, malfunctions, or spoofing of AI systems? For example, the United States currently employs a “dual phenomenology” mechanism to ensure that a potential missile attack is confirmed by two independent sensing methods, such as satellites and ground-based radars. Should the United States adopt a dual algorithm approach to any use of AI in nuclear operations, ensuring that there are two independent AI systems trained on different data sets with different algorithms as a safeguard against spoofing attacks or unreliable AI systems?

When AI systems are used to process information, how should that information be presented to human operators? For example, if the military used an algorithm trained to detect signs of a missile being fueled, that information could be interpreted differently by humans if the AI system reported “fueling” versus “preparing to launch.” “Fueling” is a more precise and accurate description of what the AI system is actually detecting and might lead a human analyst to seek more information, whereas “preparing to launch” is a conclusion that might or might not be appropriate depending on the broader context.

When algorithmic recommendation systems are used, how much of the underlying data should humans have to directly review? Is it sufficient for human operators to only see the algorithm’s conclusion, or should they also have access to the raw data that supports the algorithm’s recommendation?

Finally, what degree of engagement is expected from a human in the loop? Is the human merely there as a failsafe in case the AI malfunctions? Or must the human be engaged in the process of analyzing information, generating courses of actions, and making recommendations? Are some of these steps more important than others for human involvement?

These are critical questions that the United States will need to address as it seeks to harness the benefits of AI in nuclear operations while meeting the human in the loop policy. The sooner the Department of Defense can clarify answers to these questions, the more that it can accelerate AI adoption in ways that are trustworthy and meet the necessary reliability standards for nuclear operations. Nor does clarifying these questions overly constrain how the United States approaches AI. Guidance can always be changed over time as the technology evolves. But a lack of clear guidance risks forgoing valuable opportunities to use AI or, even worse, adopting AI in ways that might undermine nuclear surety and deterrence.

Dead Hand Systems

In clarifying its human-in-the-loop policy, the United States should make a firm commitment to reject “dead hand” nuclear launch systems or a system with a standing order to launch that incorporates algorithmic components. Dead hand systems akin to Russia’s Perimeter would appear to be prohibited by current Department of Defense policy. However, the United States should explicitly state that it will not build such systems given their risk.

Despite their danger, some U.S. analysts have suggested that the United States should adopt a dead hand system to respond to emerging technologies such as AI, hypersonics, and advanced cruise missiles. There are safer methods for responding to these threats, however. Rather than gambling humanity’s future on an algorithm, the United States should strengthen its second-strike deterrent in response to new threats.

Some members of the U.S. Congress have even expressed a desire for writing this requirement into law. In April 2023, a bipartisan group of representatives introduced the Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Act, which would prohibit funding for any system that launches nuclear weapons without “meaningful human control.” There is precedent for a legal requirement to maintain a human in the loop for strategic systems. In the 1980s, during development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as “Star Wars”), Congress passed a law requiring “affirmative human decision at an appropriate level of authority” for strategic missile defense systems. This legislation could serve as a blueprint for a similar legislative requirement for nuclear use. One benefit of a legal requirement is that it ensures that such an important policy could not be overturned by a future administration or Pentagon leadership that is more risk-accepting without Congressional authorization.

Nuclear Weapons and Uncrewed Vehicles

The United States should similarly clarify its policy for nuclear weapons on uncrewed vehicles. The United States is producing a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, the B-21, that will be able to perform uncrewed missions in the future, and is developing large undersea uncrewed vehicles that could carry weapons payloads. U.S. military officers have stated a strong reticence for placing nuclear weapons aboard uncrewed platforms. In 2016, then-Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command Gen. Robin Rand noted that the B-21 would always be crewed when carrying nuclear weapons: “If you had to pin me down, I like the man in the loop; the pilot, the woman in the loop, very much, particularly as we do the dual-capable mission with nuclear weapons.” General Rand’s sentiment may be shared among senior military officers, but it is not official policy. The United States should adopt an official policy that nuclear weapons will not be placed aboard recoverable uncrewed platforms. Establishing this policy could help provide guidance to weapons developers and the services about the appropriate role for uncrewed platforms in nuclear operations as the Department of Defense fields larger uncrewed and optionally crewed platforms.

Nuclear weapons have long been placed on uncrewed delivery vehicles, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, but placing nuclear weapons on a recoverable uncrewed platform such as a bomber is fundamentally different. A human decision to launch a nuclear missile is a decision to carry out a nuclear strike. Humans could send a recoverable, two-way uncrewed platform, such as a drone bomber or undersea autonomous vehicle, out on patrol. In that case, the human decision to launch the nuclear-armed drone would not yet be a decision to carry out a nuclear strike. Instead, the drone could be sent on patrol as an escalation signal or to preposition in case of a later decision to launch a nuclear attack. Doing so would put enormous faith in the drone’s communications links and on-board automation, both of which may be unreliable.

The U.S. military has lost control of drones before. In 2017, a small tactical Army drone flew over 600 miles from southern Arizona to Denver after Army operators lost communications. In 2011, a highly sensitive U.S. RQ-170 stealth drone ended up in Iranian hands after U.S. operators lost contact with it over Afghanistan. Losing control of a nuclear-armed drone could cause nuclear weapons to fall into the wrong hands or, in the worst case, escalate a nuclear crisis. The only way to maintain nuclear surety is direct, physical human control over nuclear weapons up until the point of a decision to carry out a nuclear strike.

While the U.S. military would likely be extremely reluctant to place nuclear weapons onboard a drone aircraft or undersea vehicle, Russia is already developing such a system. The Poseidon, or Status-6, undersea autonomous uncrewed vehicle is reportedly intended as a second- or third-strike weapon to deliver a nuclear attack against the United States. How Russia intends to use the weapon is unclear — and could evolve over time — but an uncrewed platform like the Poseidon in principle could be sent on patrol, risking dangerous accidents. Other nuclear powers could see value in nuclear-armed drone aircraft or undersea vehicles as these technologies mature.

The United States should build on its current momentum in shaping global norms on military AI use and work with other nations to clarify the dangers of nuclear-armed drones. As a first step, the U.S. Defense Department should clearly state as a matter of official policy that it will not place nuclear weapons on two-way, recoverable uncrewed platforms, such as bombers or undersea vehicles. The United States has at times foresworn dangerous weapons in other areas, such as debris-causing antisatellite weapons, and publicly articulated their dangers. Similarly explaining the dangers of nuclear-armed drones could help shape the behavior of other nuclear powers, potentially forestalling their adoption.

Conclusion

It is imperative that nuclear powers approach the integration of AI and autonomy in their nuclear operations thoughtfully and deliberately. Some applications, such as using AI to help reduce the risk of a surprise attack, could improve stability. Other applications, such as dead hand systems, could be dangerous and destabilizing. Russia’s Perimeter and Poseidon systems demonstrate that other nations might be willing to take risks with automation and autonomy that U.S. leaders would see as irresponsible. It is essential for the United States to build on its current momentum to clarify its own policies and work with other nuclear-armed states to seek international agreement on responsible guardrails for AI in nuclear operations. Rumors of a U.S.-Chinese agreement on AI in nuclear command and control at the meeting between President Joseph Biden and General Secretary Xi Jinping offer a tantalizing hint of the possibilities for nuclear powers to come together to guard against the risks of AI integrated into humanity’s most dangerous weapons. The United States should seize this moment and not let this opportunity pass to build a safer, more stable future.

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Michael Depp is a research associate with the AI safety and stability project at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

Paul Scharre is the executive vice president and director of studies at CNAS and the author of Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Depp · January 16, 2024

19. Trust But Verify: US Troops, Artificial Intelligence, and an Uneasy Partnership

Excerpts:

Together, the results from these related surveys have key research, military modernization, and policy implications. In terms of research, my findings suggest the need for more study, especially in terms of the type of conflict; echelon of use; munition, including nuclear weapons; and target, ranging from personalities to physical structures to networks. As reflected by Erik Lin-Greenberg’s research on the escalatory potential of drones, it is possible that these considerations may also shape service members’ trust in partnering with AI-enhanced capabilities on the battlefield.

In terms of military modernization, my findings suggest that military leaders should further clarify the warfighting concepts encouraging the development of AI-enhanced military technologies; the doctrine guiding their integration, and across what domain, at what echelon, in what formations, and for what purpose(s); and the policies governing their use. Aligning concepts, doctrine, and policies that govern AI with service members’ expectations promises to encourage more trust in human-machine teaming. Finally, if service members’ trust in human-machine teaming is, in part, shaped by international oversight, policymakers should explain how US policies on autonomous weapons systems coincide or diverge from international law as well as the norms conditioning their use.

While military leaders claim that human-machine teaming is necessary for success during future wars and often assume service members will trust partnering with AI-enhanced military technologies, my analysis shows that trust is not a foregone conclusion. Trust, like personal integrity, is hard to gain and easy to lose. Amid dizzying developments of AI across sectors and use cases, including within the military, this first evidence provides a convenient roadmap for US political and miliary leaders to enhance service members’ trust in human-machine teaming. The costs of not heeding these insights for what shapes service members’ trust in human-machine teaming could be the difference between winning or losing in future wars, should analysts’ assessments of the implications of AI on the battlefield prove accurate.

Trust But Verify: US Troops, Artificial Intelligence, and an Uneasy Partnership - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Paul Lushenko · January 16, 2024

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Advancements in artificial intelligence have exacerbated the debate surrounding the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems. These killer robots can identify, track, and prosecute targets on their own, without human oversight, and have been used during conflicts in Gaza, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine. Critics caution against heightened autonomy in war, citing the potential for abuse that can lead to unintended consequences, including crisis escalation and civilian casualties. Advocates claim the opposite, emphasizing robotic agency in future conflict. They contend that AI-enhanced weapons will encourage human-machine teaming that helps countries maintain lethal overmatch of adversaries while doing so more justly than conventional weapons controlled by humans, particularly because AI is thought to minimize the potential for collateral damage.

Despite rapid advancements in AI and new technologies’ growing proliferation on the battlefield, it is unclear what shapes US service members’ trust in these technologies. Indeed, scholars have yet to systematically explore this topic, which is puzzling for two reasons. First, policymakers, academics, and military leaders agree that service members’ trust is integral for human-machine teaming, wherein they partner with AI-enhanced military technologies to optimize battlefield performance. Service members are responsible for testing, fielding, and managing the use of AI-enhanced military technologies and, notwithstanding the chain of command, there is no guarantee that they will trust AI. Second, research shows that military capabilities can underdeliver given a lack of user trust, creating vulnerabilities they are designed to overcome, such as prolonged approval for targeting that can have implications for war outcomes.

To determine what shapes service members’ trust in human-machine teaming, where they believe that a new AI-enhanced capability will perform as expected, I surveyed senior US miliary officers attending the US Army and Naval War Colleges in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and Newport, Rhode Island, respectively. These are specially selected officers from which the US military will draw its generals and admirals, meaning they will be responsible for adopting emerging capabilities during future conflict. Their attitudes toward human-machine teaming, then, matter.

Contrary to assumptions of service members’ automatic trust for AI, which are reflected in emerging warfighting concepts across the US military, I find that service members can be skeptical of operating alongside AI-enhanced military technologies on the battlefield. Their willingness to partner with these emerging capabilities is shaped by a tightly calibrated set of technical, operational, and oversight considerations. These results provide the first experimental evidence for military attitudes of trust in human-machine teaming and have implications for research, military modernization, and policy.

Three Ingredients of Trust

In 2017, Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled, “Why Don’t Troops Trust Drones: The ‘Warm Fuzzy’ Problem.” They found that soldiers’ preferences for drones covaries with operational risk, wherein they trust the use of manned over unmanned aerial vehicles when ground forces are under fire. Though these findings were contested, especially by drone operators themselves, the study benchmarked attitudes of trust among a cross section of the US military. This consisted of those responsible for integrating drones with ground forces, including joint terminal attack controllers and joint fires observers.

We lack comparable evidence relating to service members’ trust in partnering with AI on the battlefield. At most, scholars have studied public attitudes of trust toward AI, such as that used in driverless vehicles, police surveillance, or social media, and recommended further study of preferences among the military. While some scholars have researched Australian and Korean soldiers’ attitudes toward AI, these studies do not specifically address the trust that is integral to human-machine teaming and are more descriptive than experimental. Thus, scholars cannot draw conclusions for the causal relationships between factors of AI performance and soldiers’ trust in partnering with machines during war.

My approach is different. Drawing on extensive research for public attitudes toward drones and AI, I tested how varying nine attributes of AI-enhanced military technologies may shape service members’ willingness to partner with these capabilities on the battlefield. Specifically, I used a survey experiment to vary how these capabilities are used, for what outcomes, and with what oversight. To understand service members’ trust in partnering with AI in light of these considerations, I administered my survey in October 2023 at the war colleges in Carlisle and Newport. Respondents first read a randomized scenario asking them to consider a hypothetical war in which US military forces use a new AI-enhanced military technology with different attributes. I then asked them to gauge their trust in partnering with the technology using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 corresponds to “strongly distrust” and 5 corresponds to “strongly trust.” I analyzed the data using statistical methods, including by calculating respondents’ marginal mean willingness to trust AI-enhanced military technologies given variation in different attributes (Figure 1).

Of note, my sample is not representative of the US military, nor the US Army and Navy. It is a convenience sample that is helpful to draw extremely rare insights into how service members may trust manned-unmanned teaming. My survey returned nearly one hundred high-quality responses, resulting in over eight hundred unique observations, given my within-subject survey design, and offering strong statistical power. This means that respondents received nine randomized scenarios for AI-enhanced military technologies drawn from a pool of thousands of possible attribute pairings, and then gauged their trust for partnering with machines on the battlefield. This pool of officers also offers a hard test for my expectations. They are older, which suggests they may inherently distrust AI-enhanced capabilities. Thus, while I cannot draw sweeping generalizations from my results, I offer the first-ever account for how US service members trust AI-enhanced military technologies given variation in their use, outcomes, and oversight.

Overall, I find that service members question the merits of human-machine teaming in the context I study, which consists of the hypothetical but realistic possibility of a war between the United States and a near-peer adversary. Service members’ trust in partnering with AI-enhanced military technologies is based on a combination of three overarching factors. These consist of the technical specifications of machines, their perceived effectiveness, and regulatory oversight.

Figure 1 (click to enlarge): This figure shows the marginal means for the service members’ trust in human-machine teaming given varying features of AI-enhanced military technologies. In other words, it shows service members’ mean level of trust per feature of AI-enhanced military technologies, which is represented by the black dot, also called a point estimate. The horizontal bars present 95 percent confidence intervals about each black dot or point estimate, showing the full range of service members’ trust per feature of AI-enhanced military technologies. Respondents’ trust has been rescaled from 1 to 5 to 0 to 1, consistent with existing research.

First, I find that service members’ trust for partnering with machines can be heightened when they are used nonlethally, such as for intelligence collection; are not fully autonomous, meaning humans supervise their use; and are highly precise, implying a low false positive rate or minimal target misidentification. Consistent with other respondents, one service member noted that “for strike systems without a human to hold accountable, I want to see precision above 95% accuracy.” Indeed, the probability of service members’ trust in partnering with machines on the battlefield reduces sharply when they are used autonomously for lethal operations, such as strikes. Research shows that this consideration also reduces public support for killer robots more than other factors.

Second, I find that service members trust partnering with machines when they minimize civilian casualties, maximize the protection of friendly forces, and contribute the most to mission success. This result suggests that service members integrate different moral logics when determining their trust for human-machine teaming. One respondent explained that trust was a function of the “ratio of civilian casualties to US forces saved. I distrust fielding any system that can cause 1K-2K civilian casualties to save 0-2 soldiers. However, I am willing to accept civilian casualties if it saves at least as many US soldiers.” Another respondent added that trust was based on the “estimated civilian deaths compared to the estimated military deaths.”

These findings are important because they contradict scholars, including Neil Renic and Elke Schwarz at the University of Copenhagen and Queen Mary University, respectively, who argue that emerging technologies have resulted in riskless or post-heroic war. Instead, service members recognize a greater liability to be harmed during war, even when military action is shaped by AI that is thought to enhance troops’ protection. My findings also contradict a belief among some experts, such as TX Hammes at the US National Defense University and David Deptula at the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies, that such normative concerns are relatively inconsequential for the US military’s adoption of killer robots. My analysis shows that the probability of service members’ trust in human-machine teaming is shaped greatly by moral considerations.

Finally, I find that service members’ also trust partnering with AI-enhanced military technologies when their use aligns with international law. Similar to others, one respondent explained that “though I trust US regulation/oversight, it’s important for international oversight to ensure compliance to international laws rather than domestic law.” This result is consistent regardless of variation in the prospects for mission success and international competition. Even when AI-enhanced military technologies contribute more to the mission, service members demonstrate greater trust in partnering with them when their use comports with international law. A lack of oversight also reduces the probability of service members’ trust in human-machine teaming, even when they are informed that perceived adversaries, such as China or Russia, are also adopting AI-enhanced military technologies.

Trust in AI: Hard to Gain, Easy to Lose

These findings suggest that service members’ trust is complex and multidimensional. Trust can also be complicated by generational differences across the military ranks. In November 2023, I extended my survey experiment to cadets enrolled in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps across the United States, who are training to become officers. Nearly five hundred cadets completed the survey, resulting in over four thousand unique observations and offering extremely rare insights into how these so-called digital natives perceive human-machine teaming.

I find that cadets trust partnering with AI-enhanced military technologies more so than their future commanders, but not for the reasons scholars typically assume, including misplaced optimism. Crucially, cadets are more willing to partner with AI-enhanced capabilities that are less accurate, implying a greater degree of false positives or target misidentification, particularly when these capabilities contribute the most to mission success.

Together, the results from these related surveys have key research, military modernization, and policy implications. In terms of research, my findings suggest the need for more study, especially in terms of the type of conflict; echelon of use; munition, including nuclear weapons; and target, ranging from personalities to physical structures to networks. As reflected by Erik Lin-Greenberg’s research on the escalatory potential of drones, it is possible that these considerations may also shape service members’ trust in partnering with AI-enhanced capabilities on the battlefield.

In terms of military modernization, my findings suggest that military leaders should further clarify the warfighting concepts encouraging the development of AI-enhanced military technologies; the doctrine guiding their integration, and across what domain, at what echelon, in what formations, and for what purpose(s); and the policies governing their use. Aligning concepts, doctrine, and policies that govern AI with service members’ expectations promises to encourage more trust in human-machine teaming. Finally, if service members’ trust in human-machine teaming is, in part, shaped by international oversight, policymakers should explain how US policies on autonomous weapons systems coincide or diverge from international law as well as the norms conditioning their use.

While military leaders claim that human-machine teaming is necessary for success during future wars and often assume service members will trust partnering with AI-enhanced military technologies, my analysis shows that trust is not a foregone conclusion. Trust, like personal integrity, is hard to gain and easy to lose. Amid dizzying developments of AI across sectors and use cases, including within the military, this first evidence provides a convenient roadmap for US political and miliary leaders to enhance service members’ trust in human-machine teaming. The costs of not heeding these insights for what shapes service members’ trust in human-machine teaming could be the difference between winning or losing in future wars, should analysts’ assessments of the implications of AI on the battlefield prove accurate.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Lushenko, PhD is an assistant professor at the US Army War College, Council on Foreign Relations term member, and non-resident senior fellow at Cornell University’s Tech Policy Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Jaaron Tolley, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Paul Lushenko · January 16, 2024

20. The Humiliation of Davos Man

Excerpts:

Given this background, the Davos hills are alive with the sounds of failure. Davos conversations that used to be about how to take advantage of the level global playing field that U.S. presidents and allies sought to build after World War II and 1990 have shifted. The question now is how companies, and countries, can manage the risks of a disrupted world order. How do you manage supply chains in an era of U.S.-China rivalry? How do you adjust to the effective closing of the Red Sea, and perhaps the Strait of Hormuz, by Iran and its proxies? How does your country manage its security policy in a world where U.S. power seems to be waning and the comfortable assumptions of the past no longer hold?

The meeting’s “Rebuilding Trust” theme acknowledges that something has gone wrong. That is a good start, but it doesn’t go far enough. Lying Russian propagandists and Chinese attempts to influence American opinion are problems that need addressing, but people aren’t losing trust in their leaders because disinformation has muddled their brains. They are losing confidence because they sense that the establishment’s approach to the chief problems of the day isn’t working.

This isn’t, at its core, a crisis of trust. It is a crisis of competence. Why would voters expect an “expert class” that was so wrong for so long about Russia, China, Iran and Covid to know how to cope with a challenge as difficult and multifaceted as the energy transition? Why would they trust European and American politicians who are failing so woefully to handle massive illegal migration to manage the rise of artificial intelligence?

“The emperor has no clothes!” is the cry of populists everywhere. To render this message ineffective, Davos Man doesn’t need image consultants and disinformation specialists. He needs to get dressed.

The Humiliation of Davos Man

He isn’t taking over the world. He’s pleading with the world to trust him.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-humiliation-of-davos-man-leaders-plead-with-world-to-trust-them-war-populism-c03d54ac?mod=hp_trending_now_opn_pos2

By Walter Russell Mead

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Jan. 15, 2024 6:27 pm ET

The first day of the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 15. PHOTO: DENIS BALIBOUSE/REUTERS

Davos, Switzerland

It’s that time of year. Corporate chieftains, policymakers, NGO warriors, journalists and intellectuals are heading to the Swiss Alps for the 54th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. If the delegates are serious about this year’s theme, “Rebuilding Trust,” some hard conversations lie ahead.

On both the far left and the far right, conspiracy theorists see the WEF and its allies as an all-powerful network successfully imposing a nefarious agenda on the rest of the world. This reading gets Davos exactly wrong.

The real scandal of Davos isn’t that it’s taking over the world. It’s that it’s failing. The Davos agenda—a global security order, an integrated world economy and progress toward objectives including decarbonization, gender equality and the abolition of dire poverty—is controversial in some quarters and on some points but is neither secret nor particularly nefarious. But far from imposing this agenda on a captive world, the Davos elites are wringing their hands as the dream slowly dies.

Last year was another tough year for the Davos agenda. Russia’s war in Ukraine ground on, with Moscow holding an edge in what looks like a war of attrition. The Middle East erupted into chaos, with shipping disrupted in the Red Sea as the conflict escalates and expands. Relations between China and the West continued to deteriorate, with the Taiwan election results pointing toward further tensions in the coming year.

Conflict is bad for free trade, and the breakdown of the global security order is undermining the economic integration at the heart of the Davos agenda. The rift between China and the West is driving a decoupling on both sides. With both the European Union and the U.S. introducing restrictions on imports aimed at limiting the effect on domestic manufacturing of low-wage, low-regulation production in China and elsewhere, the goal of free trade recedes further into the distance every year.

Unsurprisingly, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are forecasting a slowdown in global economic growth. Predicting that global trade flows will be only 50% of the average in the pre-pandemic decade, the World Bank warns that the 2020s could be a lost decade for the world economy, with poor countries hardest hit.

As war spreads and the global economy slows, chances for progress on the Davos social agenda are fading. Topics like the energy transition and gender justice, however worthy and important, drop down the priority list when countries are waging or preparing for war. The number of desperate refugees, currently estimated at 114 million, inexorably grows. Violence against civilians accompanies the rising tide of war. Under these circumstances, human-rights groups and other social campaigners must focus on humanitarian crises rather than existing social problems.

Given this background, the Davos hills are alive with the sounds of failure. Davos conversations that used to be about how to take advantage of the level global playing field that U.S. presidents and allies sought to build after World War II and 1990 have shifted. The question now is how companies, and countries, can manage the risks of a disrupted world order. How do you manage supply chains in an era of U.S.-China rivalry? How do you adjust to the effective closing of the Red Sea, and perhaps the Strait of Hormuz, by Iran and its proxies? How does your country manage its security policy in a world where U.S. power seems to be waning and the comfortable assumptions of the past no longer hold?

The meeting’s “Rebuilding Trust” theme acknowledges that something has gone wrong. That is a good start, but it doesn’t go far enough. Lying Russian propagandists and Chinese attempts to influence American opinion are problems that need addressing, but people aren’t losing trust in their leaders because disinformation has muddled their brains. They are losing confidence because they sense that the establishment’s approach to the chief problems of the day isn’t working.

This isn’t, at its core, a crisis of trust. It is a crisis of competence. Why would voters expect an “expert class” that was so wrong for so long about Russia, China, Iran and Covid to know how to cope with a challenge as difficult and multifaceted as the energy transition? Why would they trust European and American politicians who are failing so woefully to handle massive illegal migration to manage the rise of artificial intelligence?

“The emperor has no clothes!” is the cry of populists everywhere. To render this message ineffective, Davos Man doesn’t need image consultants and disinformation specialists. He needs to get dressed.

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Appeared in the January 16, 2024, print edition as 'The Humiliation of Davos Man'.

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