​Quotes of the Day:

"May we never confuse honest dissent with disloyal subversion."

– Dwight D. Eisenhower

"Old age and treachery will always beat youth and exuberance."

–David Mamet

"A diplomat is a man who always remembers a woman's birthday but never remembers her age."

– Robert Frost

1. John Ratcliffe Is Expected to Lay Out a Vision for a More Aggressive C.I.A.

2. Assembling the A-Team: Creating an Interagency Office to Counter Irregular Warfare

3. How Months of Geopolitical Upheaval Paved Way for Gaza Cease-Fire

4. How the Biden and Trump teams worked together to get the Gaza ceasefire and hostages deal done

5. China Has a $1 Trillion Head Start in Any Tariff Fight

6. Pax Polska: Poland is Primed to Become the Backbone of Europe’s Security

7. Hamas Ceasefire Deal Means One Thing: Israel Loses

8. Marco Rubio warns China is America's 'biggest threat,' affirms value of NATO alliance

9. Top Marine general says moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam ‘puts us going the wrong way’

10. Reported Trump ‘loyalty tests’ for national-security officials draw criticism

11. US Army Black Hawks to go autonomous, take-off with just a tap

12. Takeaways From Marco Rubio’s Senate Hearing

13.  Biotech Battlefield: Weaponizing Innovation in the Age of Genomics

14. Rewind and Reconnoiter: Why Women Scare Autocrats

15. Could the Fall of Assad and the Return of Trump Lead to a Better Deal with Iran?

16. Poland's leader accuses Russia of planning acts of sabotage against 'airlines around the world'

17. Special Operations Command eyes creating new tech-based MOS

18. Researcher: Hybrid tactics likely spreading from Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea

19. Japan and Philippines plan to convey to Trump the need for US engagement in Asia

Researcher: Hybrid tactics likely spreading from Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea

news.err.ee · by Helen Wright | ERR · January 14, 2025

Over the past 18 months, several pipelines and electricity and internet cables have been damaged in the Baltic Sea mostly connecting Finland with other countries in the region such as Estonia, Sweden and Germany. The most recent was on Christmas Day.

In at least two cases, ships dragging their anchors are thought to be the cause. Sabotage is suspected, but difficult to prove – as is typical of hybrid warfare.

Vessels have been flagged from Hong Kong, China and the Cook Islands in the South Pacific. There are also connections to Russia.

But these incidents are not unique. More than 30 fiber-optic data cables connecting Taiwan to surrounding islands have been broken – potentially deliberately – by Chinese ships as political relations have soured in recent years. The most recent was on January 3.

Toomas Hanso, junior research fellow at the International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS), said there are similarities and differences in both cases.

Toomas Hanso. Source: ICDS

Tactics likely spreading from East to West

"Commonalities between the Taiwan Strait and Baltic Sea seems to be the frequency of incidents and both being geopolitically tense regions. The incidents have had direct impact on national security and communication infrastructure," the researcher said.

"Judging by the frequency in the Taiwan Strait from 2017-2022 and the frequency in the Baltic Sea from 2023 onwards, it looks like a spread of tactics from the Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea."

Are Moscow and Beijing cooperating? China (PRC) is assumed to have given tacit support for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, even if it has never said so publicly. But there is evidence the countries are in other areas. Last October, a Chinese coast guard fleet entered the Arctic sea for the first time in a joint patrol with Russian counterparts, Reuters news agency reported.

The Russian Navy has been "sporadically active" in the Taiwan Strait, Hanso said, often in coordination with the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy. Russian shipping vessels may also pass through those waters

"But there's no concrete, public evidence suggesting that Russian naval or commercial vessels have directly been involved in cutting undersea cables in the Taiwan Strait. It is also questionable how active China would actually want Russia to be in those waters, Beijing may prefer to limit Russian presence there," he said.

But the case is "stronger" in the Baltic Sea.

"First, in the sense that this tactic has likely been taken over from the Taiwan Strait, where it began to be used frequently before the same practice began appearing in the Baltic Sea. Second, considering the involvement of Chinese ships, Newnew Polar Bear and Yi Peng 3 in the Baltic Sea," the researcher said.

China ramping up hybrid tactics in Taiwan Strait

Hanso said China is using grey-zone tactics and cable cutting is a clearer example than many others. These "grey-zone" activities do not breach escalatory thresholds but still apply coercive pressure, he explained: "PRC practices fit this general pattern."

"While Taiwan often suspects China's involvement, especially given the geopolitical context, the government typically stops short of definitively blaming the PRC without concrete evidence," Hanso said. "If Taiwanese officials were to directly attribute it to the PRC, this could escalate tensions or chances of conflict."

Incidents have spread from the South China Sea, the East China Sea and into the Taiwan Strait since the 2000s.

These include the gradual encirclement and establishment of effective control over disputed island territories, Enforcement of PRC jurisdiction over water and air space surrounding disputed territories, interference with legitimate commercial activity by coastal states, challenges to lawful freedoms of navigation and overflight by the United States and its allies and the undermining the credibility of U.S. alliances, Hanso outlined.

"China is increasingly using grey-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait," he concluded.

Outlining what Taipei can do, the researcher said: "On preventive measures, there is currently little Taiwan can do to stop Chinese cargo ships carrying out such activities. On increasing resilience, Taiwan can increase the number of cables it has so that cutting one cable does not create a complete outage and cables can be buried deeper to make damaging them harder. Satellite communications are an alternative that Taiwan is investing in to reduce reliance on undersea cables, but these are inferior to undersea cables in terms of transmission capacity."

Wider region watching closely

Hanso said, unlike in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea has not seen frequent cable cutting incidents.

"But other countries in the region will certainly be watching closely," he said, citing Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam as examples.

"Especially the Philippines which has increasing military cooperation with the U.S. and increasing friction with China in the South China Sea, will probably be very concerned about potential incidents."

Hanso said several incidents between 2017 and 2023, including harassment by Chinese ships of other countries' vessels, has raised concerns about maritime security and protection of undersea infrastructure in the region.

In 2020, the Indonesian authorities called for better protection of critical infrastructure.

Changing maritime regulations depends on China

After the damage to EstLink 2 last month, several countries including Estonia, Finland and Lithuania have suggested changing international maritime regulations to prevent further incidents.

However, this will be difficult and need the agreement of countries such as Russia and China, experts agree.

Hanso said countries in the South China Sea may prefer to prioritize economic ties with Beijing over security.

"All countries in the region probably wish for more secure undersea cables, as these constitute critical infrastructure. However, all countries in the region must also consider their relationship with China," he said.

"If openly supporting a change in maritime law had a negative impact on their trade or security relationship with China, then these countries would have to weigh up whether a perceived increase in maritime security might offset a deterioration in relations with China. Considering that China is the top trading partner of all South China Sea countries except Brunei, they might be hesitant to support a such a law, if it is perceived as "anti-China"."

The situation in the South China Sea has also become increasingly tense in recent years, the researcher said: "Regional countries would probably prefer not to aggravate China and worsen the situation. So, South China Sea countries' support for such a law, might depend largely on how China perceives the law."

NATO's Baltic Sea members will discuss maritime legislation at a summit in Helsinki this week.

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!

news.err.ee · by Helen Wright | ERR · January 14, 2025

1. John Ratcliffe Is Expected to Lay Out a Vision for a More Aggressive C.I.A.

Is he going to build on the OSS mission?

He also pledged that the agency’s analysis would be objective, “never allowing political or personal biases to cloud our judgment or infect our products.”

Mr. Ratcliffe evoked the C.I.A.’s predecessor — the Office of Strategic Services — and said the ideal recruit for the agency would be a “Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.”

Perhaps we should give intelligence back to the CIA and make him the DIrector of Central Intelligence (again) and re-purpose the ODNI and put it in charge of ​irregular warfare and man it with the right people for such a mission.​ After all the ODNI has shown that it can coordinate across agencies. We need an organization that can orchestrate and synchornie gray zone/irregular warfare activities across the government.

John Ratcliffe Is Expected to Lay Out a Vision for a More Aggressive C.I.A.

Donald Trump’s pick for the agency’s director seems likely to win some Democratic support for this nomination, but how much is unclear.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/15/us/politics/john-ratcliffe-cia-trump.html?smid=li-share

Senators on both sides of the aisle regard John Ratcliffe as one of the more qualified senior officials chosen by President-elect Donald J. Trump.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes

Reporting from Washington

Jan. 15, 2025

Updated 10:52 a.m. ET

John Ratcliffe, President-elect Donald J. Trump’s pick for C.I.A. director, offered his vision for a more aggressive spy agency as he faced questions from senators on Wednesday about his intelligence priorities and ability to deliver unvarnished assessments.

Mr. Ratcliffe’s confirmation is all but assured, and he is likely to be voted on by the full Senate soon after Mr. Trump’s inauguration on Monday. During the first Trump administration, the Senate confirmed Mr. Ratcliffe, 49 to 44, to serve as the director of national intelligence. He was the first national intelligence chief installed without support from the opposition party.

But now, senators from both parties view Mr. Ratcliffe as one of the more qualified senior officials picked by Mr. Trump, whose focus on the threat from China is widely shared by Republican and Democratic lawmakers.

Mr. Ratcliffe used his opening comments to outline his vision of an agency that offers intelligence free of political bias. While he said he would not discuss specific intelligence priorities, he promised he would make the C.I.A. less averse to risk and more willing to conduct covert action when ordered by the president, “going places no one else can go and doing things no one else can do.”

In his opening statement, Mr. Ratcliffe promised that the C.I.A. would collect intelligence in every part of the globe, “no matter how dark or difficult.”

He also pledged that the agency’s analysis would be objective, “never allowing political or personal biases to cloud our judgment or infect our products.”

Mr. Ratcliffe evoked the C.I.A.’s predecessor — the Office of Strategic Services — and said the ideal recruit for the agency would be a “Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.”

“This sentiment is the essence of what today’s C.I.A. must recapture,” Mr. Ratcliffe said.

Senator Tom Cotton, Republican of Arkansas and the new chairman of the Intelligence Committee, struck similar themes, arguing that the agency needed to be bolder and more innovative with its covert action. Without providing details, Mr. Cotton said the Biden administration’s timidity in its overt actions extended to covert action. “The nation needs a strong and more aggressive C.I.A.,” he said.

Mr. Ratcliffe seems likely to win some Democratic support for this nomination, but how much is unclear. The Democratic minority is expected to ask Mr. Ratcliffe about Mr. Trump’s attacks on the intelligence community and Mr. Ratcliffe’s ability to deliver intelligence that might be at odds with Mr. Trump’s worldview.

Throughout his first term in office, Mr. Trump attacked the intelligence agencies and their leaders. He has often referred darkly to “the deep state,” a group of national security officials opposed to his agenda. And he and his aides have discussed pushing out government officials whom they view as disloyal to the White House.

Senator Mark Warner, Democrat of Virginia and the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, asked Mr. Ratcliffe about Mr. Trump’s attacks.

“These comments do affect the morale of these men and women, ” Mr. Warner said.

The hearing, the senator said, was Mr. Ratcliffe’s opportunity to reassure C.I.A. employees that they would not face reprisal for “being willing to speak truth to power.”

In his opening statement, Mr. Ratcliffe said he wanted the C.I.A. to be the “ultimate meritocracy.” He also said he would empower the “courageous risk takers and innovators” but not tolerate anything distracting from the core mission.

While the director of national intelligence is responsible for preparing the President’s Daily Brief, which contains intelligence analysis from all of the nation’s spy agencies, the C.I.A. director also frequently briefs the president.

Some Democratic lawmakers have voiced concern about whether Mr. Trump’s choices for top intelligence posts will deliver unvarnished intelligence. Mr. Ratcliffe had a close relationship with Mr. Trump, especially at the end of the administration, and took over some of the intelligence briefing duties often handled by less senior intelligence officers.

During Mr. Trump’s first term, Mr. Ratcliffe issued public warnings about election interference in 2020 that drew attention to efforts by Russia, Iran and China to influence the vote. Subsequent intelligence assessments by the Biden administration supported Mr. Ratcliffe’s warnings. But he also declassified some intelligence related to Russia’s activities in 2016 over the objections of C.I.A. officials who thought the release of the material would harm sources and collection methods.

Mr. Warner asked Mr. Ratcliffe to pledge to provide “unbiased, unvarnished and timely intelligence assessments” to the president and Congress.

Mr. Cotton criticized the U.S. intelligence community for failing to anticipate threats, like the Hamas-led attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and called on Mr. Ratcliffe to push for changes at the C.I.A. to help the agency “get back to its roots.”

Mr. Cotton praised intelligence officers but said the C.I.A. had neglected its core mission of secretly collecting foreign intelligence. Too often policymakers were “in the dark,” he said.

“Put more simply, stealing secrets,” Mr. Cotton continued. “Intelligence collection is the main effort; every other job is a supporting effort.”

The senator said he had seen too many intelligence reports based on news accounts or diplomatic cables.

“Those sources are not unimportant, but without clandestine intelligence, we might as well get briefed by the State Department or a think tank, or just read the newspaper,” Mr. Cotton said.

He attacked the C.I.A. for being too quick to tailor its intelligence reports to the Biden administration’s views, including Israel’s ability to destroy Hezbollah’s military might. He also criticized the agency’s work to diversify its ranks, saying it had paid too much for consultants focused on diversity, equity and inclusion.

As director of national intelligence, Mr. Ratcliffe called for more resources to be devoted to understanding China, which he said was the top national security threat.

Intelligence officials in the Biden administration accepted much of Mr. Ratcliffe’s critique. Under William J. Burns, the director, the C.I.A. created a new China Mission Center and stepped up spending on collecting intelligence in China and analyzing the country.

Mr. Ratcliffe said the C.I.A. would continue and intensify its focus on threats from China. He praised the establishment of the China mission center under the Biden administration, even as he said more would be done.

“This is our once-in-a-generation challenge,” he said. “The intelligence is clear. Our response must be clear as well.”

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

2. Assembling the A-Team: Creating an Interagency Office to Counter Irregular Warfare

​Not counter. Conduct. We have to get out of the defensive, reactive, fear of escalation mindset.

And when we consider irregular warfare a lesser included case that is conducted by all forces we naturally neglect IW in favor of preparing for what is perceived (and actually) as the more dangerous. And I absolutely support developing the strongest possible nuclear and conventional forces to sustain the highest readiness to fight and win our nation's wars as the best method to deter war. But in so doing we create space for our adversaries to operate using what they now have as comparative advantages in the gray zone. 

I wish I could adapt Kipling's poem:

“A Time For Prayer

"In times of war and not before,

God and the soldier we adore.

But in times of peace and all things righted,

God is forgotten and the soldier slighted."

Perhaps:

In time of major war we adore the soldier who can kill many targets through conventional or irregular war.

But in the space of the gray zone the proponents of irregular warfare are all alone, forgotten, and ignored.

I will have to work on that.

But I have rethought my views on "Countering." We worked hard to influence the concept of countering our adversaries conduct unconditional warfare (See below NDAA Section 1097 and the enlightened former Rep Mac Thornberry). Congress directed DOD to develop a strategy for countering unconventional warfare. DOD failed to comply.

Although our intent was to drive the knowledge of and understanding that we need to conduct our own UW as a way to counter our adversaries' UW activities, the use of counter sustained a defensive and reactive mindset. 

You could change UW to IW below (or better political warfare). 

To the author I am having a sense of deja vu all over again (see below). However, this capability (political warfare) must reside outside of DOD - DOD must absolutely provide the right forces to conduct irregular warfare in support of political warfare but what is needed is a national level capability to conduct political warfare in the gray zone in support of US national security objectives. The more I think about it, the more I think we should consider repurposing the ODNI to do this. But we would need to staff it with the right people and from a DOGE perspective rather than creating a new bureaucracy we can repurpose one and cut its size in half. Like the old "name that tune game," I can do PW with just 6 notes (versus the 12 of the ODNI).

And oh by the way, this is NOT a SOF grab for power or prominence though we should understand the two SOF trinities provide for comparative advantage for major operations in this space of the gray zone of strategic competition.

The SOF MIssion Trinity (SF, PSYOP, and CA primary forces)

1. Unconventional Warfare

2. Irregular Warfare 

3. Support to Political Warfare

The SOF Comparative Advantage Trinity

1. Influence

2. Governance

3. Support to indigenous forces and populations.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94     

 SEC. 1097. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

(a) Strategy Required.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare threats to the United States and allies.

(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.

(3) An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities and command structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.

(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.

(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.

(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.

(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(c) Submittal To Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 

(d) Unconventional Warfare Defined.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

Assembling the A-Team: Creating an Interagency Office to Counter Irregular Warfare

irregularwarfare.org · by Erik Ackroyd · January 16, 2025

When a new American president takes office on January 20th, they will confront a dangerous national security environment shaped by Irregular Warfare (IW) challenges. From cyber warfare and gray zone conflicts to terrorism and insurgency, these challenges demand immediate, actionable solutions. In September, the Irregular Warfare Initiative invited our readers to contribute fresh, pragmatic, and non-partisan policy recommendations to help shape the next administration’s approach to these threats. In our second article, Erik Ackroyd argues for a new interagency office working on irregular warfare.

Irregular warfare is a nebulous term that very much resembles the polycephalic hydra of Greek mythology. The manipulation of international law and norms to secure regional hegemony, use of unmarked soldiers and equipment to occupy the territory of another nation, highly violent transnational militia and terror networks, recurring cyberattacks, threats to critical infrastructure, and everything in between fall within the domain of irregular warfare. Ultimately, what binds this near-infinite array of actors is a wish to fight with just enough plausible deniability built into their respective deeds to forestall the escalation of a conflict to the level of traditional conventional or nuclear war, typically involving the use of soldiers, tanks, ships, planes, and nuclear arms to occupy territory or otherwise impose political and material defeat upon an enemy. In essence, irregular warfare consists of just about everything under the sun since it works both separately and in tandem with conventional warfare to achieve desired outcomes.However, separating irregular warfare from conventional warfare perhaps occludes more than it clarifies. The goal of securing influence over other actors—“assur[ing] or coerc[ing] states or other groups,” in the words of the Congressional Research Service—can be seen as the goal of both conventional and irregular warfare as traditional alliance networks and wars are meant to defend friends and repel enemies through any means necessary. For instance, surreptitious cyberattacks aimed at key banks or commercial actors are not much different than the use of formal naval blocks used to curtail a nation’s economic activity. Therefore, it is of great importance to recognize that warfare—whether conventional or irregular—is a continuum requiring management from whole-of-society inputs.

Consequently, the United States government should consider the implementation of a new interagency office to coordinate these various inputs while bringing irregular threats into strategic focus. Such a body would not seek to duplicate the efforts of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) or other such entities focused solely on collecting and disseminating governmental intelligence. Rather, this new entity should resemble a more informal version of the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), which was established in 1940 by Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to marry the leadership of governmental agencies (e.g. the Departments of War, Labor, and Agriculture) with that of commercial heavyweights (e.g. the Ford Motor Company or Higgins Industries) to concentrate defense production, stabilize consumer prices, and promote broad innovation.

Indeed, as the Second World War effectively demonstrated, everything the American people could muster was necessary for expelling the forces of fascism from both the Atlantic and Pacific. This meant not only recruiting millions of men to fight in uniform, but also recruiting men and women at home to create effective propaganda, to coordinate the production of materiel to support those fighting abroad, to bolster deception, and to generate revenue through things like war bonds to ensure the United States and its allies had the treasure to prosecute a war against tyrants. In other words, there was little distinction between means and ends, warfighter and civilian, as the whole heft of the United States had to be mobilized to ensure victory in two theaters.

Likewise, the numerous domains of irregular warfare today require many of the same public-private inputs as those used to fight in the Second World War. Cyber threats require both government bodies and private businesses to protect the data and infrastructure of the American people. The United States Navy must use its advanced warships and munitions to not only compete against other navies, but to protect vital shipping lanes like the Red Sea from disruptions. The American foreign policy apparatus must take staunch positions in forums like the United Nations to ensure strategic competitors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) cannot amend or abuse elements like international maritime law to become the suzerain of a whole region. In this way, there is little distinction between irregular and conventional threats, with many of the same tools used across the board.

With that in mind, it’s time to muster a new A-team to assess and respond to irregular threats in a holistic, far-seeing manner. The Department of Defense (DoD) veered close to this idea in miniature when it consolidated several military intelligence elements to form the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS). The formation of the DCS signaled a desire to overcome a degree of myopia imposed by the Global War on Terrorism. Rather than focusing solely on highly localized battlefield intelligence as it had during the start of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq in Afghanistan, the DCS would gather information relevant to the broader military capabilities of near-peer competitors and revisionist powers like the PRC and Iran. In doing so, other intelligence organizations like the overburdened Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) could redirect resources away from military intelligence to securing information on the social, economic, and political aspects of a given target. This symbiotic approach allows one agency to tap into the resources and expertise of the other to create a larger, complementary vision of the world and the various threats to American interests. An upscaled version of this arrangement could help the executive office dampen the impact of irregular warfare as well. That is, creating a unified operational command center shared by various agencies could not only align means with ends, but also save costs on redundancies while enhancing the strengths of each constituent organization.

A new interagency effort might consist of a small office filled with one or two senior officials from many of the major federal departments and agencies who are responsible for American defense or foreign policy (e.g. the Departments of State and Defense). While not quite at the secretary or undersecretary levels, these officials should be of significant enough rank to understand the complexities of their respective organizations, the internal and external constraints they face, and be endowed with enough authority to share these complexities with others. In many ways, this new interagency office would be like the Cabinet of the United States; however, the key difference is that this new body would be focused on the warfare continuum rather than concerning themselves with maintaining the good graces of the American voter. In essence, domestic policy as it is traditionally envisioned would be eschewed by this new office in the interest of staying focused on adversaries from both within and without. Thus, the themes of terrorism (both domestic and foreign), cyberwarfare, supply chain security, and more would all fall within the purview of this office without having to redirect attention to domestic distractions like offsetting America’s carbon footprint or lowering interest rates and gas prices for consumers during pivotal election seasons.

The goal of gathering so many senior minds from disparate departments would be for each organization to regularly brief the others on the worldviews, ambitions, fears, and key projects unique to each of them. For instance, the representative(s) of the National Security Agency (NSA) could note that there has been a rise in the use of cyberattacks by Iran, the PRC, and/or North Korea against the physical infrastructure, personal records, and intellectual property of the American people. The Department of Defense could chime in to confirm this account while the Department of Commerce shares how such cyber intrusions could lead to a loss of confidence in e-commerce if left unabated. In turn, this candid sharing of information and perspectives creates a combined sense of urgency within the new counter-IW agency to curtail any shrinking of America’s economic and technological edge.

With this new cross-departmental understanding of a common threat, an operational game plan could be quickly sketched out and passed along to the relevant authorities within and between each organization. For instance, the Department of Commerce could use its connections with the civilian tech sector to create new security protocols and reporting mechanisms to better home in on cyber threats. Likewise, the NSA could work in conjunction with the DoD to launch tailored, retaliatory cyberattacks to let adversaries know that cyberweapons cut both ways. Moreover, select technology companies could help to enhance the counter-IW efforts of the federal government by enabling agencies to use things like generative artificial intelligence to create allied botnets, targeted disinformation campaigns, and other smokescreens to slow enemy operations in the cyber domain and beyond. Even the Departments of Education and Labor could be brought into the mix by offering tuition assistance, grants, and stronger wage standards to incentivize young Americans to seek degrees and jobs in cybersecurity, creating a long-term commitment to the cause.

Again, the goal would be to create a more effective division of labor while bringing in voices that are typically not heard by the conventional intelligence community under the NSC, ODNI, and other such organizations. By allowing the Cabinet to deliberate and determine the strategic interests of the United States, the interagency counter-IW consortium could freely haggle amongst itself and brainstorm how to actualize those interests and create desired effects at the operational level. With a truly interagency picture in mind, not just broad departmental directives from the President and Cabinet, each agency within the federal government could then use its respective strengths and resources to create a whole-of-government, if not whole-of-society, response to pertinent threats.

Of course, this assumes that each organization within the counter-IW office does not view the others as competitors. Indeed, agencies may fear that too much collaboration could blur the mandates or prohibitions that distinguish one agency from another, leading to legal trouble, exacerbating battles for funding, or creating internal dysfunction within each agency. For example, the CIA’s restrictions on collecting information on U.S. persons could be compromised by too eagerly participating in an interagency crackdown on domestic violent extremists hypothetically being radicalized and funded, at least in part, by foreign adversaries such as Russia. Thus, with only one or two folks to represent the CIA at such a juncture, decision overload may lead to self-restrictive behavior, effectively promoting or maintaining the very bureaucratic siloing the counter-IW office is meant to resolve. Nevertheless, it is important to create some sort of vehicle that actually mobilizes interagency cooperation rather than merely gesturing at the concept.

To reiterate, there is considerable overlap between the means and ends of conventional and irregular warfare. Both modes of conflict seek to influence an adversary, whether through overt fighting, use of proxies to harass or undermine allied institutions, or the clandestine battle for hearts and minds in cyberspace and beyond. Indeed, we now find ourselves in a space where conflict is a continuum rather than a stark dichotomy by peace on one end and war on the other. Even when the United States is not involved in kinetic combat with adversaries like the PRC on land, at sea, or in the skies, both parties (and many others) seek to shape the political, social, and economic environments to favor their forces if conventional or nuclear war does erupt. Thus, competition in the 21st century has once again become a whole-of-society effort as highly sophisticated polities seek to defeat each other in a multitude of ways before shots are ever fired. Recognizing this, a dedicated office to mobilize the whole might of the United States as was done during the Second World War is essential to maintain an edge or, at the very least, mitigate the harm done from nonstop competition below the threshold of conventional warfare. The A-team would channel the creative and destructive energies of the American republic—though perhaps under a different name to escape copyright infringement.

Erik Ackroyd is an independent researcher interested in grand strategy and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. He holds an MA in Diplomacy from Norwich University.

Image generated by OpenAI’s DALL·E, customized for this article

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

3. How Months of Geopolitical Upheaval Paved Way for Gaza Cease-Fire

E​xcertpts:

Meanwhile, both sides have been galvanized by President-elect Donald Trump’s imminent return to office. The incoming president said a week ago that “all hell will break out in the Middle East” if the hostages held in Gaza aren’t released by the time he is inaugurated on Jan. 20. He hasn’t explained what he meant, but last week said it wouldn’t be good for Hamas or “frankly, for anyone.”

How Months of Geopolitical Upheaval Paved Way for Gaza Cease-Fire

Benjamin Netanyahu’s wins, and Hamas’s losses, pushed the two foes toward a deal

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-months-of-geopolitical-upheaval-paved-way-for-gaza-cease-fire-52a285d6?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Rory Jones

Follow

, Summer Said

Follow

 and Carrie Keller-Lynn

Jan. 15, 2025 9:00 pm ET

The broad terms of the cease-fire deal that Israel and Hamas agreed to Wednesday after a year of fruitless negotiations aren’t substantially different from those that were available to both sides eight months ago. What changed is everything else.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spent the first half of last year fighting with political rivals and trying to keep his governing coalition together. He was stuck in a war of attrition with Hamas in Gaza and facing ominous threats from Iran and its allied militia in Lebanon, Hezbollah.

Then the tables turned. Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza and battered Hezbollah with a series of operations that pushed the group to accede to a cease-fire in Lebanon. A strike on Iran destroyed most of the country’s air defenses. The Assad regime collapsed in Syria, punching a bigger hole in Iran’s network of militias. As prominent Palestinians began calling for an alternative government for the Gaza Strip, Netanyahu shored up his political base at home.

Meanwhile, both sides have been galvanized by President-elect Donald Trump’s imminent return to office. The incoming president said a week ago that “all hell will break out in the Middle East” if the hostages held in Gaza aren’t released by the time he is inaugurated on Jan. 20. He hasn’t explained what he meant, but last week said it wouldn’t be good for Hamas or “frankly, for anyone.”

The result is a deal agreed to by Israel and Hamas that will pause their fighting in the Gaza Strip and open a pathway to end a 15-month war that has devastated the enclave and sparked wider conflict in the region.

The cease-fire, agreed to during talks in the Qatari capital Doha this week—though Netanyahu said there are still clauses to be finalized—would be implemented in phases beginning with an exchange of hostages for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and moving on to talks over a broader end to the fighting. Those latter talks will likely be contentious, as Israel and Hamas remain at odds over whether there should be a permanent halt to the fighting. 

Both sides of the cease-fire talks were galvanized by the impending return to office of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, seen on a banner displayed in Jerusalem on Wednesday. Photo: ammar awad/Reuters

“U.S. pressure, coming from President Trump directly, I think has been a huge motivator, particularly on Prime Minister Netanyahu,” said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, a think tank in London. “But this deal is very fragile.” 

Far-right members of Netanyahu’s government have publicly denounced the agreement, which they say will end Israel’s war in Gaza without uprooting Hamas. But in recent days Netanyahu has made headway toward shoring up support for the deal within his government, even without far-right votes, according to people familiar with the matter.

Netanyahu has repeatedly said that he has worked toward a cease-fire. Nevertheless, for months he has faced allegations from within his own security establishment of slow-walking a deal to avoid making choices that would potentially anger his right-wing partners and derail his political career. 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gained political strength after Israel’s military successes this past fall. Photo: maya alleruzzo/Reuters

Since September, however, Israel’s series of military successes strengthened Netanyahu politically. The prime minister’s office said ahead of the cease-fire deal it was those achievements during the war, and pressure brought by the U.S. president-elect, that ultimately forced Hamas into a truce. 

The Israeli public broadly supports a deal, with 60% saying they believed Israel achieved its military objectives in Gaza and should focus on diplomatic efforts to release the hostages, according to a survey this week by Agam Labs at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

“Netanyahu has basically come to the conclusion that he can make this deal, stay in power and get credit to some extent for getting the hostages back,” said Gadi Wolfsfeld, a political scientist at Israel’s Reichman University. 

The fighting in Gaza was triggered by the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel, which left around 1,200 dead and some 250 people taken hostage. More than 46,000 people have been killed in Gaza, according to Palestinian health authorities, who don’t say how many were combatants.

Israeli soldiers secured an area near bodies of civilians killed by attacking Palestinian militants on Oct. 7, 2023, in Sderot, Israel. Photo: baz ratner/AFP/Getty Images

Palestinians inspected the rubble of the Yassin Mosque after an airstrike in Gaza City following the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. Photo: Adel Hana/Associated Press

Israel says 94 hostages taken during the Oct. 7 attacks remain in Gaza, most of them Israeli. They include dual nationals and more than 30 hostages who Israel has concluded are no longer alive, based on intelligence findings. Israeli and U.S. officials privately believe the number of dead is much higher. 

For Hamas, the turning point toward a cease-fire came in October when Israel killed Sinwar, Hamas’s leader and the architect of the attacks that sparked the war. Sinwar had consistently pushed Hamas to agree to a deal that ensured a permanent end to fighting and the U.S.-designated terrorist’s survival. 

Even until recently, Hamas under the leadership of Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed Sinwar, was taking a hard line on talks and recruiting new members to continue the fight. 

But the group has been battered. Before the war, Israel believed that Hamas had up to 30,000 fighters arranged into 24 battalions in a structure that loosely resembled a state military. The Israeli military now says it has destroyed that organized structure and has killed about 17,000 fighters and detained thousands of others. The militant group hasn’t said how many of its fighters have been killed.

The killing last year of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, seen in a 2023 photo, was a turning point in cease-fire talks. Photo: mohammed saber/Shutterstock

Gazans in Deir al-Balah on Wednesday carried the body of a person who had been killed in an airstrike. Photo: Omar Ashtawy/Zuma Press

Hamas also has faced growing internal pressure to end the war from Gaza residents who have endured widespread destruction, death, displacement and the breakdown in law and order. People have been angry for months about false starts in the cease-fire talks. On social media, Palestinians in Gaza had urged Hamas to accept a deal even if it meant giving up on some of its demands.

Community leaders, business people and the heads of prominent families made a number of appeals in recent weeks for the Palestinian Authority—which governs much of the West Bank and had run the Gaza Strip until being forced out by Hamas in 2007—to take over the enclave again. 

“Hamas’s bets during the war were misplaced,” said London-based political analyst Akram Atallah, who signed one of the appeals. “It seemingly did not anticipate Israel’s severe response or realize that the hostages it holds would not serve as a strong bargaining chip. Israel views this as an existential war.”

The worsening situation forced Hamas into the most serious negotiations in months. When the deal was announced, Palestinians in Gaza celebrated in the streets, and cheerful comments filled social media.

Gaza residents, some celebrating the cease-fire in Deir al-Balah on Wednesday, had been urging Hamas to accept a deal. Photo: Abdel Kareem Hana/Associated Press

Protesters in Tel Aviv, who were calling for the return of hostages held by Hamas, reacted to news of the cease-fire and hostage-release deal. Photo: Amir Levy/Getty Images

The first stage of the deal would pause fighting in Gaza and allow for the release of some Palestinian prisoners held in Israel, in exchange for the release of 33 hostages being held in Gaza. The hostages to be released would include women, children, people with severe injuries and those over age 50, according to a draft seen by The Wall Street Journal. Hamas would also hand over dead bodies.

The test will come after the first 16 days, when the parties will begin debating whether to extend the pause into a permanent halt to the fighting over the second and third stages of the deal. These stages would also include the release of all the hostages and eventually a plan to rebuild Gaza.

“The real negotiations are in Stage Two,” said Wolfsfeld, the political scientist. But, he said, “I certainly think Trump will want the cease-fire to continue. He doesn’t want an ongoing war if he can avoid it.” 

Previous talks have been undermined by a fundamental disagreement: Israel has wanted to get its hostages back and then continue the war, while Hamas has been loath to release captives without ending the conflict. 

In the current deal, Hamas accepted verbal guarantees from the U.S., Qatar, Egypt and Turkey that Israel would continue negotiations for a permanent cease-fire after the expiration of the first phase of the deal, Arab mediators said. 

President-elect Donald Trump with his designated Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, in Palm Beach, Fla., last week. Photo: Evan Vucci/Associated Press

According to those involved, Steve Witkoff, a real-estate mogul designated by Trump as Middle East envoy, breathed fresh life into the talks. The Biden administration worked to advance a deal with Witkoff, whom Arab mediators said made clear from the get-go that he was serious about pushing through an agreement and uninterested in endless diplomatic gestures. Witkoff met on Saturday in Israel with Netanyahu.

“It seems that Steve Witkoff, the special envoy, achieved in one meeting with Netanyahu what dozens of Biden officials could not achieve,” said Michael Oren, a former Israeli envoy to the United States.

Trump has tapped a number of longtime friends of Israel for his Middle East team. Analysts say Netanyahu will need the administration’s help as he confronts Iran, tries to cement Israel’s control over the West Bank and pursues a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia.

“As long as pressure came from the Biden administration, you could play on time. Around the corner there was a possibility of Trump,” said Abraham Diskin, an Israeli political scientist. “With Trump, you cannot do that, because you have nothing better for Israel on the horizon.”

Write to Rory Jones at Rory.Jones@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

4. How the Biden and Trump teams worked together to get the Gaza ceasefire and hostages deal done

​It is too bad this was only a marriage of convenience. It would be great to see such cooperation among political factions in other areas of national security.

How the Biden and Trump teams worked together to get the Gaza ceasefire and hostages deal done | CNN Politics

CNN · by Kevin Liptak, Michael Williams, Nikki Carvajal, Alayna Treene, Arlette Saenz · January 15, 2025

President Joe Biden, right, with Vice President Kamala Harris, left, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, center, speaks in the Cross Hall of the White House on the announcement of a ceasefire deal in Gaza.

Evan Vucci/AP

Washington CNN —

When Qatar’s prime minister emerged Wednesday to declare — at long last — that a ceasefire-for-hostage deal had been struck in Gaza, representatives for two American administrations were on hand in Doha to bask in the victory.

The cooperation between the two was “almost unprecedented,” a senior Biden administration official said after the deal was clinched, made possible by a rare intersection of interests between bitter rivals who both saw an opening following Trump’s victory.

Brett McGurk, the longtime Middle East negotiator for President Joe Biden, had been planted in the Qatari capital for weeks in the hopes of a final agreement. He was joined in recent days by President-elect Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, for the final push.

At points, McGurk and Witkoff divvied up meetings across the Middle East to push the deal across the line, including critical talks between Witkoff and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week that McGurk joined by phone. If McGurk was focused primarily on the parameters of the deal, Witkoff was on hand to emphasize Trump’s desire to see a deal finished by Inauguration Day.

After the agreement was announced, both the incoming and outgoing president took full credit, a sign the poisonous relationship between them endures.

Ultimately, however, the deal enables both Biden and Trump to claim victory. It notches a final bit of positive news for a president who is poised to leave office with the lowest approval rating of his term. And it bolsters the bonafides of a president-elect who vowed “all hell would break out” in Gaza if the hostages were not released before his second inauguration.

The reality of who is responsible for the deal is complex. Biden administration officials say momentum toward a deal began before the election, after a separate ceasefire was struck between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The contours of the final agreement with Hamas map closely with a proposal Biden first unveiled in May, but was unable to complete.

Speaking at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate earlier this month, Witkoff said Biden’s team was the “tip of the spear” in the talks.

“No one has pride of authorship. We are totally outcome oriented. Let’s get them home,” Witkoff, a former real estate investor, said then.

Still, after the deal was struck, even Biden officials acknowledged the deadline of Trump’s entry into office was a motivating factor in finally finding success after months of failure. And Trump, who was monitoring developments from Florida, was quick to declare the agreement was only made possible by his win.

“This EPIC ceasefire agreement could have only happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November,” he wrote on social media.

Biden was more circumspect.

“It’s a very good afternoon,” Biden said Wednesday from the White House Cross Hall, steps from where members of the incoming Trump team were meeting with their Biden administration counterparts in the West Wing to discuss national security matters.

The president, who has decades of high-level foreign policy experience, described the talks that led to the ceasefire deal as “one of the toughest negotiations I’ve ever experienced.” He said his team had been “speaking as one” with Trump officials.

But asked as he was stepping away from the podium who deserves credit for Wednesday’s deal – himself or Trump – the president flashed his annoyance:

“Is that a joke?” he said before walking away.

Months of talks starting, stopping

By the final stretch of the 2024 presidential campaign, few inside the White House believed a hostage deal could be achieved before the results of the election were known.

American and European officials saw Netanyahu as biding his time, waiting to see which US president he’d be dealing with going forward – and keeping his options open for any outcome.

Hours of angry phone calls between the White House and Netanyahu’s office had yielded little progress, and even the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar did not immediately shake loose a deal.

Trump’s victory – widely seen inside the White House as Netanyahu’s preferred result – was hardly the outcome any Biden’s aides were hoping for. In their loss, though, some saw a fresh opportunity.

So during a post-election meeting with Trump in front of a roaring Oval Office fire, Biden had a request for the man who’d be replacing him in a few months: Work with the administration’s team to get the hostages out of Gaza.

In conversations between the incoming and outgoing national security teams, Biden’s aides made clear that whatever acrimony existed between the two men – and despite their friendly chat in the Oval Office, they remained bitterly opposed – the issue of the hostages was a place they must work together.

”We’re prepared to work with the incoming team in common cause on a bipartisan basis to do everything in our collective American power to secure the release of the hostages, both living and deceased,” Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan said the week after the November election.

A mutually beneficial agreement

In their fireside conversation, Biden and Trump came to an agreement that the hostage matter could and should be resolved before the hand-off of power on January 20, according to people who heard about the meeting afterward.

The timing suited both men.

Trump’s advisers have long felt that any agreement struck after his victory, but prior to him taking office, would enable him to take credit for it. It would also take the issue off his plate as he begins a second presidency squarely focused on fulfilling his campaign pledges on immigration, tariffs and dismantling Biden-era regulations.

For Biden, having finally secured the hostage deal he’s spent more than a quarter of his presidency trying to cement would validate time and energy – and political capital – lost to the cause.

And so, with both men’s blessing, the two opposing sides set to work on a final, last-week push to achieve what had for so long seemed impossible.

Late nights and final demands

A critical sticking point that had emerged over the past several months was Hamas’ refusal to acknowledge how many hostages it was still holding, or to identify which hostages it would release as part of the first phase of the deal, according to the senior administration official.

American officials made clear to Hamas through its intermediaries that no agreement could be realized without a full list of hostages that would be released as part of the deal.

The pressure appeared to work. By late December, Hamas had agreed to provide the list, accelerating talks to reach the final-stage negotiations toward a deal.

McGurk remained in the Middle East working toward completing the complex agreement, including finalizing details on the sequencing of how and when prisoners would be released.

Holed up inside a building in Doha, negotiators from the US, Israel, Qatar and Egypt, along with Hamas officials, talked until 3 a.m. as the sides attempted to finalize what had been a frustratingly elusive deal to end the conflict.

Hamas raised a number of last minute demands during the final negotiations. But the American and Israeli sides held firm as they pushed Hamas to agree.

Implementation of the deal could begin as early as Sunday, an official said.

As the reality of the deal sank in, Netanyahu got on the phone with his American counterparts. His first call was to Trump, to thank him and arrange a meeting in Washington. Next, he called Biden and “thanked him as well,” according to a statement from the prime minister’s office.

CNN · by Kevin Liptak, Michael Williams, Nikki Carvajal, Alayna Treene, Arlette Saenz · January 15, 2025

5. China Has a $1 Trillion Head Start in Any Tariff Fight

​Graphs/charts at the link.

The geopolitical situation has changed since Lenins said "The Capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them."

Today it is China will sell America the rope to hang itself.

China Has a $1 Trillion Head Start in Any Tariff Fight

China’s trade surplus shows Western efforts to reduce dependence on China are coming up short

The U.S. has sought to compete with China by placing tariffs on imports and subsidizing strategic industries. Photo: Wang Quanchao/Zuma Press

By Jason DouglasFollow

Updated Jan. 16, 2025 12:10 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/china-has-a-1-trillion-head-start-in-any-tariff-fight-e1c82092?st=jqWvmM&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Donald Trump kicked off a new era of Western economic rivalry with Beijing when he took office in 2017. As he prepares for his second term, China’s dominance of global manufacturing is greater than ever. 

China just posted a trade surplus with the rest of the world of almost $1 trillion for 2024, according to official data released this week. That giant gap between exports and imports—roughly equal to the annual output of Poland—is now three times what it was in 2018 when decades of Western orthodoxy favoring open trade were upended by Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports.

China today accounts for around 27% of global industrial production, according to United Nations data, up from 24% in 2018. By 2030, the U.N. predicts, China’s share of industry will have risen to 45%—a level of dominance unmatched since the U.S.’s postwar manufacturing heyday or the U.K.’s in the 19th century. 

For Washington and its allies, this ascendancy shows that efforts to reduce their dependence on China are coming up short. That suggests it will remain hard for Trump to rebalance U.S.-China trade relations, even if he pushes tariffs higher. 

Over the past several years, the U.S. has placed tariffs on billions of dollars of Chinese imports and offered subsidies to chip makers and other companies in strategic industries. To varying degrees, governments from Berlin to Tokyo have embraced a similar policy mix to rejuvenate their factory sectors and shield strategic champions from Chinese competition. 

But China has responded by finding other customers, subsidizing its factories and working around the levies by moving production to other countries. Those strategies are keeping China’s factory floor intact for now, though its economic problems are multiplying, with excess capacity, the specter of deflation and collapsing corporate profits all weighing on growth.

The result is an increasingly unbalanced global economy, which many analysts and Western politicians fear can’t continue. 

The expansion of China’s global share of production anticipated by the U.N. means other countries’ slice of manufacturing will need to shrink unless something changes. Losers will be manufacturing-led economies such as Germany, Japan, and potentially the U.S., as well as poor countries hoping to move up the development ladder by building factories to compete with China.

Those trends are setting up debates over what, if anything, the U.S. and its allies should do. 

Trump has pledged stiffer, across-the-board tariffs on Chinese imports, potentially of 60% or more. His incoming trade chief has floated the idea of imposing tariffs on imports from third countries made with Chinese parts, or made by Chinese companies.

China has responded to tariffs by finding new customers, with subsidies, and by moving production overseas. Photo: Cfoto/Zuma Press

President Biden’s administration married tariffs with new export controls on advanced semiconductor technology on national security grounds, while also tightening rules around U.S. investment in China. 

The European Union has been more cautious, but there are signs its attitude to Chinese trade practices is hardening, bringing the bloc closer to the U.S. It levied tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles last year and this week accused China of unfairly discriminating against European medical device makers in its domestic market, setting the stage for further retaliation. 

The U.K.’s Trade Remedies Authority in November recommended levying tariffs of 83.5% on Chinese excavators after a monthslong antidumping investigation. 

Surpluses all around

The tariffs and industrial subsidies of the Trump and Biden administrations are credited with spurring a wave of manufacturing investment in the U.S., especially in sectors such as semiconductors, and nudging American firms to move some production back home or to other friendly countries. 

Still, some economists have voiced doubts over whether tariffs will do much to claw back for the U.S.-led West a bigger share of global manufacturing from China. 

China’s goods surplus with the U.S. in 2024 was $360 billion, 23% larger in dollar terms than it was when Trump imposed tariffs in January 2018. The U.S. has reduced the share of its imports that come directly from China, though it still relies on Chinese factories for electronic goods, plastics and pharmaceuticals. It also now vacuums up products made in places such as Vietnam and Mexico with Chinese parts, often in Chinese-owned factories.

China’s surplus with the EU has more than doubled since 2018 to almost $250 billion. China’s surplus with other parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, has also increased.

China in 2023 vaulted past Japan to become the world’s pre-eminent exporter of cars. Its factories now produce more than a third of global apparel exports, around 30% of global electronics exports, and 22% of machinery exports. In solar power modules, China ships 80% of the world’s exports.

To shore up its position in global trade, China has poured support into its factories in the form of cheap loans and subsidies, bolstering manufacturers’ ability to keep selling at low prices and undercutting rivals abroad. 

A weak exchange rate has helped, as has China’s formidable expertise in emerging sectors such as EVs and renewable energy equipment. 

At the same time, growth in Chinese demand for the rest of the world’s goods has been anemic. In part that is because of a weak economy, battered by a real estate bust, which needs less iron ore and other commodities. It is also because China has been replacing foreign suppliers of everything from chemicals to cars with domestic ones.

Some economists see China’s trade surplus as evidence of an unsustainable growth model. Photo: Florence lo/Reuters

China used to buy lots of German cars and Japanese machinery, said Stefan Angrick, senior economist at Moody’s Analytics in Tokyo. Not anymore. Now China is the world’s biggest exporter of passenger cars and its streets are filled with EVs made by Chinese companies such as BYD and XPeng. Starbucks is losing out in China to Luckin Coffee. Apple is in danger of being eclipsed in smartphone sales in China by Huawei.

“Everything is made in China now,” Angrick said. Though high energy costs and other factors are at play, too, dwindling Chinese demand for the goods of traditional manufacturing powers helps explain why other countries’ manufacturing sectors are in the doldrums, he said. “China just doesn’t need the rest of the world as it did in the past.” 

Questions of sustainability

To many economists, China’s $1 trillion surplus isn’t a sign of economic strength, but evidence of an unsustainable growth model that is already creating problems for the country. As supply outpaces demand, producer prices in China have been falling for more than two years, pummeling corporate profit margins and restraining hiring and incomes. 

That has left China at risk of sinking into the kind of stagnation that dogged Japan for decades after its stock and real-estate bubbles burst in the early 1990s. 

Chinese officials say they intend to boost consumption to counter these and other headwinds and avoid Japan’s fate. But their efforts so far—nudging up pension payments and expanding cash-for-clunkers-style trade-in programs to encourage spending on new cars and appliances—fall short of the kind of deep reforms many analysts say China needs to rebalance its economy and unlock more sustained consumption.  

China’s ever-expanding exports have also come in for greater scrutiny in many emerging markets, including India, Indonesia and Pakistan, where officials worry their efforts to industrialize their economies and get richer are being threatened by China’s overwhelming manufacturing strength. Turkey and Brazil are among those countries that have joined the U.S. and Canada in raising tariffs on Chinese steel.

Still, some economists believe the U.S. and other countries that want to rein in China’s factory dominance may have to make other adjustments, including curbing their own spending habits. 

In the U.S., years of enthusiastic government borrowing and a shortfall in domestic savings have contributed to the widening trade deficit. Reducing China’s surplus could therefore require not just a monumental shift in China’s economy, but in the U.S.’s, too. 

“This surplus is here to stay,” said Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. Treasury official. “Just tariffing the bejesus out of China won’t solve this problem.”

Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com

6. Pax Polska: Poland is Primed to Become the Backbone of Europe’s Security

​With the help of a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy, South Korea.

Excerpt:

Poland has favored American and Korean hardware to replace dated Soviet equipment. For its artillery, Poland bought Korean K9 howitzers, K239 Chunmoo systems, and American High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). For armor, Poland chose the Korean K2 Black Panther, the American M1A1FEP Abrams, and the M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams. This adds to its existing fleet of German Leopard II tanks.

Pax Polska: Poland is Primed to Become the Backbone of Europe’s Security

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/16/pax-polska-poland-is-primed/

by Tareq Alotaiba

|

01.16.2025 at 06:00am

An attack on one is an attack on all. The principle of collective defense is at the heart of NATO—an institution that is a product and pillar of the liberal world order. NATO is a congruence of different states, and that feature enables the alliance to share resources and create a formidable defensive line against aggression. The combined force of NATO allies acts as deterrence, but that deterrence does not work if a pass-the-buck mentality takes hold amongst allies. Russia’s renewed aggression has spurned a surge of investment in European military readiness, and Poland is emerging as one of NATO’s top spending and rising military powers. Economic growth in Poland has given it the resources it needs to invest in its military, and its position on the eastern edge of the alliance, bordering Russia, has helped it generate the political will necessary to build one of NATO’s largest standing armies. Undeniably, Poland’s prioritization of defense is turning it into a bulwark in the east.

One of the core principles at the heart of the US-led rules-based international order is the sanctity of sovereignty and the aversion to wars of territorial conquest. Russia has repeatedly challenged those conventions and, more recently, shattered them with its latest invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This Russian aggression in Europe has rekindled interest in NATO and revitalized its relevance. It is understandable, then, that proponents of the liberal order react strongly to President Trump’s hostile rhetoric against NATO. As an institution, NATO contributed to the staying power of the peace of Pax Americana—the period after the end of World War II (WWII), which remains the most peaceful in modern history. Yet, looking past the rhetoric, the crux of Trump’s disdain is his belief that the US’s NATO allies are freeloading at the expense of the American taxpayer.

President Trump’s rhetoric has triggered a sense of urgency in Europe. European NATO partners have started increasing their military spending and preparedness in response to what they see as the unreliability of the US as a security partner under a second Trump presidency. Poland is chief among the European countries that are building up their self-reliance. As Trump put it in 2020, “Poland is one of only eight that is current with the money that they are supposed to be paying … the United States is defending a lot of countries that are delinquent … I never feel too good about that.”

Is Europe Passing-the-Buck?

In 1951, President Eisenhower said, “If, in 10 years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project [NATO] will have failed.” The United States is a different country now. It has a military presence in over 170 countries on all continents except Antarctica. Europe is an important front for American security. The NATO alliance as an institution enforces that security and fosters political goodwill amongst its members. However, there has been wavering and varying European commitment to spending on military readiness, which has triggered frustration in Washington.

There hasn’t always been an issue of European commitment to defense spending. In an emergency, NATO has a history of stepping up. During the Cold War, European NATO members spent over 3% of their GDP on defense, with the UK spending around 7% in the 1950s. In 2023, only ten of the 32 NATO countries’ spending was at the 2% of GDP goal. The Russian invasion of Ukraine changed that, and by 2024, 23 of the 32 countries had reached that goal, with a collective $1.47 trillion spent on defense.

The sense of urgency felt in Europe is not uniform. The countries closest to Russia—the Baltic and Nordic states have prioritized defense, while Germany and other wealthy European countries are underperforming. If all NATO countries spent 2% of GDP on defense, that would materialize in approximately $43.5 billion in extra funding. Additionally, if Germany, France, and the UK alone spent at US levels, that would generate an additional US$ 132 billion in spending. (Note: The figures cited in this paragraph are calculated based on the difference of military spending as a percentage of GDP from the 2% goal and applied to the latest available GDP data in current US dollars.)

Poland stands out among the European countries that increased spending after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Poland is one of only two NATO countries that outspends the United States. It currently spends over 4% of GDP. The increase in spending has allowed it to expand its armed forces to 216,000 personnel in 2024. Poland now has the third-largest NATO standing army after the US and Turkey, beating larger economies like Germany, France, and the UK. Despite its current military size, Poland aims to increase its armed forces further to have the largest European fighting force. It stated that it is preparing for a scenario of “full-scale conflict” with Russia and its allies.

How is Poland Preparing?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided Poland and the rest of NATO with a laboratory for observing Russian capabilities. It enables them to tailor their defense development to address the Russian threat. Poland is strategically selecting equipment to counter Russian aggression. Warsaw is investing in armor, air defense, and artillery as it learns from Russian tactics on the ground.

Poland has favored American and Korean hardware to replace dated Soviet equipment. For its artillery, Poland bought Korean K9 howitzers, K239 Chunmoo systems, and American High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). For armor, Poland chose the Korean K2 Black Panther, the American M1A1FEP Abrams, and the M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams. This adds to its existing fleet of German Leopard II tanks.

Regarding air defense and air power, Poland ordered the American Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) and the Patriot system. This supplements its British Common Anti-air Modular Missile Extended Range (CAMM-ER) surface-to-air missiles and their launchers. The Polish Air Force, however, still needs upgrading. It has ordered new training jets and bought used Saab 340 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft equipped with Erieye radars from the UAE—giving its Air Force early warning capability. For its offensive capabilities, Poland ordered 32 F-35A Lightning II jets.

Poland is also getting involved with large NATO countries to develop more costly programs that fill strategic security gaps in Europe. In 2024, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland signed a letter of intent to jointly develop a long-range precision-strike system, the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) program. Once active, the system would supplement Poland’s modernization efforts with advanced counterattack capabilities, as the system intends to be a ground-launched cruise missile with a 600 to 1,200-mile range.

Poland borders Russia and Belarus. This provides the logistical advantage of being close to a potential front in a war with Russia. The proximity has enabled it to avoid using resources for complicated logistics. Additionally, Poland chose not to spend on support functions like intelligence, relying instead on its NATO partners with established capabilities to fill that need.

Despite all the hard work, Poland’s military modernization is still incomplete. Although they have less manpower, militaries like those of the UK, France, and Italy still out-punch Poland in terms of equipment and experience. Moreover, France and the UK have nuclear weapons. The gap between Poland and its European partners will nonetheless continue to shrink as Poland’s economic development and modernization efforts continue.

What Drivers Enable Poland to Modernize its Military?

Poland has a long history of subjugation by larger European powers, the last of which was the Soviet Union. Poland’s history of invasion is etched in the country’s national memory, adding to its long-held distrust of Russia. Poland is also close to the war in Ukraine. Images of the impact of war on Ukrainian civilians have given the government the political capital to prioritize defense spending.

Likewise, military development cannot be divorced from economic development. European Union (EU) membership has expanded the Polish economy, enabling it to take on capital-intensive projects like military modernization. Since joining the EU, Poland has received over €250 billion in structural funds. In 2004, the Polish GDP per Capita was 48% of the EU average—it is now at 82%. Its GDP grew from $255 billion in 2004 to $845 billion, an increase of over 230% in twenty years. Furthermore, Poland’s GDP growth rate in 2024 was 3% and is projected to stay around that level into the near term. Poland has become the sixth-largest contributor to the EU economy.

Poland is also looking to the future. Spending on R&D increased from 0.6% of GDP in 2004 to 1.5% in 2024, an increase of over 160%. In the same period, EU-wide spending on R&D increased by less than 30%. In 2022, Poland had over 300,000 people working in research. The country’s efforts to grow its internal defense industry drive part of the surge in support to R&D.

Poland is both an emerging military power in Europe and an emerging economic power. As its economy continues to develop, so will its capacity to strengthen its armed forces. The institution of the Polish armed forces and the increased spending on them are received positively by the Polish people. Unlike in Germany, there is national pride in strengthening Polish military capabilities. This will continue to sustain high investments in defense.

Challenges Facing Poland

Despite the increased spending on research and development, Poland still has a challenge with innovating. With over 7,400 entities conducting research, Polish R&D has yet to materialize in significant innovations. Poland remains a net importer of technology and equipment despite having the population to support a local industry. Years of neglect and underfunding have curtailed the Polish defense industry’s production capacity. State-owned PGZ, a holding company of 50 defense companies, is the dominant local firm—only around 10% of Polish military spending went to it. (Note: Calculated using total contracts given to PGZ and total Polish defense spending of that year.)

As Poland aims to have the largest European standing army, its shrinking demographics will be a long-term challenge for the state. Poland has had net population declines for years, driven by its citizens’ immigration and decreasing birth rates. Its current population of under 37 million people has decreased by nearly 2 million since its peak in the 1990s. 2023 marked the lowest number of births in modern Polish history, with an average birthrate of 1.2 children per woman.

Poland is addressing the challenges it faces. Regarding innovation, the government is providing substantial funding, with support for higher education and science increasing by a record 22% in 2023. For the demographics, as Poland continues to develop economically, the opportunities in a growing economy are attracting its expatriate and emigrated citizenry to return home. Additionally, the war in Ukraine helped drive an increase in consumption-driven growth, as 2.5 million of Poland’s estimated 3 million migrant workers are Ukrainians, of which a little under 1 million are refugees.

Conclusion

Detractors may disagree with President Trump’s rhetoric against NATO. However, from an American perspective, the argument is sound. Despite the recent increases in defense spending, NATO’s current levels are not enough. Secretary-General Mark Rutte said, “He is right about this,” when discussing Trump’s demands for increased European spending. Understandably, President Trump’s rhetoric is causing uncertainty in Europe. Uncertainty also breeds opportunity. The wealthier states in Europe are still some of the world’s largest and most innovative economies. If they focus their resources on defense, NATO can reemerge stronger and more relevant than ever. For now, however, countries on the front line, like Poland, are building their self-reliance on security.

On Poland’s Independence Day in 2022, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said, “The Polish army must be so powerful that it does not have to fight due to its strength alone.” Poland is beginning a long process of modernizing its military and turning it into a major military power and deterrent against aggression. The change in the economic fortunes of Poland and the invasion of Ukraine spurred a boon in the resources and political will necessary for military modernization. Poland’s investments in the latest military hardware and build-up of its manpower and readiness have turned it into a formidable strength. Additionally, its location bordering Russia on the eastern flank of NATO allies makes it indispensable for European security. Poland’s defensive capabilities have grown by leaps over the past few years. It remains to be seen if Poland’s efforts will bring about Pax Polska in the East.

Tags: alliances, global security, NATO, Poland

About The Author

• 
  
• Tareq Alotaiba
• Tareq Alotaiba has 12 years of experience in economic policy, foreign affairs, and national security with the Abu Dhabi and UAE Federal governments. Tareq is a columnist for Semafor and has previously served on the board of the UAE defense firm International Golden Group board. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of British Columbia. He is a master’s candidate in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University.

7. Hamas Ceasefire Deal Means One Thing: Israel Loses

Hamas Ceasefire Deal Means One Thing: Israel Loses

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · January 15, 2025

Israel and Hamas reportedly reached a ceasefire deal that will theoretically see an exchange in its first stage of women, children, and wounded Israelis held by Hamas in exchange for hundreds of Hamas members held in Israeli prisons. In the second stage, Israel would release an even greater number of Hamas members, including those arrested for murder, in exchange for military and military-age male prisoners it holds.

President-elect Donald Trump may celebrate. He can say both his promise to “unleash hell” if Hamas did not release American hostages and the threats conveyed privately by his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff forced Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire he was long reluctant to embrace. President Joe Biden and his team will also likely claim credit for the persistence of their own diplomacy leading up to the last-minute deal.

The Ceasefire Deal Is No Deal for Israel

The deal is a disaster. Families of the hostages may feel otherwise if their goal was only to get their loved ones home, but releasing murderers and unrepentant terrorists to do so only guarantees more violence. The October 7, 2023 attacks—the largest single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust not only occurred during an ongoing Israel-Hamas ceasefire but was also planned and led by Yahya Sinwar, a prisoner released in a previous hostage swap. In effect, to release one Hamas hostage, Gilad Shalit, Netanyahu—who was prime minister during that swap as well—not only freed more than 1,000 Hamas prisoners but, in hindsight, set Israel down a course that led to the slaughter of more than 1,200 Israelis. Hamas tortured and broadcast hostage videos as information warfare; Netanyahu rewarded their strategy.

Netanyahu now goes down in Israeli history not only as the man who enabled October 7, 2023, through misguided negotiations with terrorists and poor supervision of the military and intelligence in the run-up to the October 7 attacks but also as the man who caved to pressure to throw Hamas a lifeline effectively.

Make no mistake, with Israel striking a deal, not only will Hamas claim victory, but it will also likely scuttle the final release to continue its leverage and buy time to rebuild.

Nor will Biden and Trump have long to bask in their alleged success. Consider Ronald Reagan: The arms-for-hostages scheme that he implemented to free American hostages not only created a scandal that paralyzed his second term, but it also failed: As soon as Iran and its proxies got their ransom, they seized new hostages. Repeatedly. The Reagan dynamic continues to the present day, with Iran’s hostage diplomacy now leading to billions of dollars in payment to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and a dynamic that arguably has kept the regime afloat.

Reagan’s surrender, however, was far more deadly for Americans. While he ordered U.S. Marines into Lebanon as peacekeepers to support a tenuous ceasefire, his subsequent decision to leave after the October 1983 Marine Barracks bombing directly inspired Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Laden to believe that the United States lacked staying power and that terrorism worked.

Today, Netanyahu follows Reagan’s trajectory, not for good but for evil. When the broader history of the period is written, it will be hard not to conclude that Netanyahu’s decisions throughout his career encouraged, rewarded, and catalyzed terrorism against the Jewish state.

He may win the release of some hostages, but at what cost?

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The author’s views are his own.

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · January 15, 2025

8. Marco Rubio warns China is America's 'biggest threat,' affirms value of NATO alliance

Marco Rubio warns China is America's 'biggest threat,' affirms value of NATO alliance

By FARNOUSH AMIRI, MATTHEW LEE and DIDI TANG

Updated 3:18 PM EST, January 15, 2025

Share

AP · by FARNOUSH AMIRI · January 15, 2025

 Several of Donald Trump’s picks for his Cabinet are appearing before the Senate for confirmation hearings Wednesday. Follow live updates.

WASHINGTON (AP) — Florida Sen. Marco Rubio on Wednesday painted a dark vision of the consequences of America’s “unbalanced relationship” with China, echoing President-elect Donald Trump’s anti-globalist rhetoric as he vies to be confirmed as his secretary of state.

While touching on issues plaguing the Middle East, Latin America and eastern Europe, Rubio focused much of his five-hour Senate confirmation hearing warning that without swift and substantive policy shifts, China will remain the “biggest threat” to American prosperity in the 21st Century.

“If we don’t change course, we are going to live in the world where much of what matters to us on a daily basis from our security to our health will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not,” Rubio testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Asked about NATO, the 75-year-old security organization that Trump has repeatedly criticized, Rubio affirmed its value, calling it a “very important alliance.” But Rubio endorsed Trump’s view that some European allies should be contributing more to their collective defense, adding that the U.S. must decide whether it wants “a primary defense role” or to be a “backstop” against aggression.

The 53-year-old Republican made the case against China and other U.S. adversaries to his colleagues on the Foreign Relations panel where he served for 14 years. He received a warm welcome from both sides of the aisle, making jokes about how “surreal” it was to be on the other side of the dais.

“I hope I can earn your support, whether it’s because you believe I would do a good job, or because you want to get rid of me,” Rubio joked as part of his opening statement.

But in between the niceties, Rubio blamed America’s vulnerability to China on the shift to globalism, which he says “is now a weapon being used against us.” He said the U.S. must begin placing “our core national interests above all else.”

It’s a remarkable opening salvo from Rubio, who was born in Miami to Cuban immigrants and who, if confirmed, would become the first Latino to serve as the nation’s top diplomat.

The confirmation hearing begins a new chapter in the political career of the third-term senator, whose relationship with Trump has evolved over the last decade. Once rivals trading schoolyard insults as they campaigned for president in 2016, the two men became close allies as Trump campaigned for another White House term last year.

Rubio first came to Washington as part of the “tea party” wave in 2010 and once advocated for allowing a path to citizenship for immigrants in the country illegally. But like other Republicans, Rubio’s views on immigration have shifted toward the hardline stance of Trump, who has pledged to aggressively pursue deportations once he takes office on Monday.

Unlike many of Trump’s Cabinet selections, Rubio is expected to easily win confirmation, notching support not only from Republicans but also Democrats who endorse him as a “responsible” pick to represent the U.S. abroad. Many expect he will be among the first of Trump’s Cabinet picks approved.

Democratic Sen. Brian Schatz, who served alongside Rubio on the Foreign Relations Committee, said he has high hopes that the Florida Republican will reject the isolationist approach of other Trump allies.

“I think Marco is a hawk, but he’s also an internationalist, and I think the challenge for him will be to maintain the long bipartisan tradition of America being indispensable in world affairs,” the Hawaii lawmaker told The Associated Press. “And there are people in the Trump world who want us to run away from being the leaders of the free world. And I’m hoping that Marco’s instincts towards American strength will win the day.”

Rubio’s approach to foreign affairs is grounded in his years of service on the Foreign Relations committee and the Senate Intelligence panel. In his speeches and writings, he’s delivered increasingly stern warnings about growing military and economic threats to the United States.

If confirmed, Rubio will become the leader of U.S. foreign policy — though his role will surely remain secondary to Trump, who relishes the global stage and frequently uses the bully pulpit against America’s allies.

Even before taking office, Trump has stirred angst in foreign capitals by threatening to seize the Panama Canal and Greenland and suggesting he will pressure Canada to become the nation’s 51st state.

When asked about the canal Wednesday, Rubio testified that while he hasn’t “looked at the legal research,” he is “compelled to suspect that an argument could be made that the terms under which that canal were turned over has been violated.”

But, he added, that “Panama is a great partner in a lot of other issues and I hope we can resolve this issue.”

A Biden administration decision to rescind Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism with just days left in office is likely to have irked Rubio, who has long supported tough sanctions on the communist-run island.

When asked by Sen. Ted Cruz, Republican from Texas, if he believed Cuba should have remained on that list, Rubio replied: “without a question.” He also indicated that the new administration would reverse plans by the Biden administration to remove Cuba from the state of sponsor of terrorism list.

“Nothing that the Biden administration has agreed to in the last 12 or 18 hours binds the next administration, which starts on Monday,” Rubio said.

Secretaries of state have played a key role in formulating the foreign policy of the country since its founding, starting with the first one, Thomas Jefferson, who served in the top Cabinet position under President George Washington.

Since then, Jefferson, as well as his 19th century successors James Madison, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren and James Buchanan, have all gone on to be elected president.

More recent secretaries of state have been less successful in their political ambitions, including John Kerry, who lost the 2004 presidential election to President George W. Bush before becoming the top diplomat, and Hillary Clinton, who lost the 2016 election to Trump.

The most successful secretaries of state have been known for their closeness to the presidents whom they serve, notably James Baker under George H.W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice under George W. Bush and, to some extent, Clinton under Barack Obama.

Like Clinton, Rubio was once a political rival to the president-elect who nominated them. However, the Clinton-Obama relationship during the 2008 Democratic primaries was not nearly as hostile as that between Trump and Rubio in the 2016 GOP primaries, which was marked by name-calling and personal insults.

Trump had an acrimonious relationship with his first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson. Trump fired him from the position via a social media post less than two years into his term.

___

Associated Press writer Matt Brown contributed to this report.

AP · by FARNOUSH AMIRI · January 15, 2025

9. Top Marine general says moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam ‘puts us going the wrong way’

​Perhaps we should leave the Marines in Okinawa and shift more from the US west coast to Guam.

Top Marine general says moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam ‘puts us going the wrong way’

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith said that plans to move 4,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam will put those forces far from where they are needed.

Jeff Schogol

Posted 14 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith cautioned on Wednesday that ongoing efforts to relocate Marines from Okinawa to Guam will move those forces away from where they are most needed.

“Frankly, Guam puts us going the wrong way,” Smith told reporters at a Defense Writers Group Breakfast in Washington, D.C. “Guam puts us on the other side of the International Date Line, but it puts us a long way from the crisis theater, from the priority theater.”

About 19,000 Marines are currently stationed in Okinawa. The United States and Japan agreed in 2012 to move about 9,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the Pacific, including Hawaii. About 4,000 Marines are expected to be stationed on Guam, where Camp Biaz will serve as their primary installation.

Although the Marine Corps is committed to drawing down to about 10,000 Marines on Okinawa, the move to Guam is a “challenge,” Smith told reporters on Wednesday.

For example, the Army also expects to deploy forces to Guam, and that would limit the space available for the Marines, Smith said. Apra Harbor, where aircraft carriers and other Navy ships can dock, is also undergoing infrastructure updates. In April 2023, a $106.9 million contract was awarded for an embarkation and debarkation facility for Marines.

“So, I’m not sure that is in the best strategic interests of America, to be honest with you,” Smith told reporters on Wednesday. “But it is a treaty obligation we have with Japan, which we’re going to comply with unless, and until, it changes.”

Roughly 100 logistics support Marines with III Marine Expeditionary Force began moving from Okinawa to Guam in December.

The Marine Corps supports the 2012 agreement between Japan and the United States and the planned relocation of forces to Guam or Hawaii, a spokesperson for the service told Task & Purpose on Wednesday.

“The Marine Corps will continue to explore options for the best location for the future force in the region,” they said. “The realignment of Japan-based Marines is the result of nearly 20 years of bilateral policy negotiation reflected in multiple international agreements and arrangements. This laydown honors an international agreement with the [Japanese government].”

Okinawa is part of the “first island chain,” which refers to a chain of islands in the Pacific that includes Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which would be the front line in a war with China. U.S. military leaders have speculated that China could attempt to invade Taiwan by 2027. Although the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is vague about how the United States would respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, President Joe Biden has repeatedly vowed to defend the island nation.

Pete Hegseth, President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for defense secretary, testified during his confirmation on Tuesday that the incoming administration will make deterring China a top priority.

“We’re going to start by ensuring the institution understands that as far as threats abroad, the [Chinese Communist Party] is front and center — also, obviously defending our homeland as well,” Hegseth said.

China’s aggressive claims that it controls waters administered by other countries in the Western Pacific and the Defense Department’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region provide an argument to possibly consider relooking at the agreement to move Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Smith said.

“That’s obviously a domestic issue for the Japanese government to decide,” Smith said. “But what I do know is every time you give China a foot, they take a mile. They only understand one thing, which is a credible deterrent force. And that credible deterrent force has to be present to win, which to me means being in the first island chain.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Storied Marine infantry battalion to be transformed into Littoral Combat Team
• Soldiers are turning to social media when the chain of command falls short. The Army sees it as a nuisance.
• Marine recruit uniforms were photoshopped on at boot camp
• Army doctor pleads guilty on first day of trial in largest military abuse case
• Air Force ‘standards update’ includes more inspections and review of ‘waivers and exceptions’

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

10. Reported Trump ‘loyalty tests’ for national-security officials draw criticism

​Sigh... 

All oaths of office are derived from Article II of the Constitution. But by definition supporting the Constitution means supporting the laws, decisions, policies, and lawful orders of the legislature, courts, and the President. What more loyalty is needed? And it is (or should be) a requirement for every member of government and citizen to understand their responsibilities to the Constitution. Perhaps instead of a loyalty test they have to pass a test on what it means to support and defend the Constitution before they have the privilege and honor of serving. That might also drive improvements in civic education in the US.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:--"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

“I do solemnly swear” — The oath of office and what it means

“An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: “I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.””

https://federalnewsnetwork.com/commentary/2021/01/i-do-solemnly-swear-the-oath-of-office-and-what-it-means/

Reported Trump ‘loyalty tests’ for national-security officials draw criticism

defenseone.com · by Sean Michael Newhouse

Mike Waltz attends the 2024 Concordia Annual Summit on Sept. 23, 2024 in New York City. John Nacion / Getty Images

If career employees are removed from the National Security Council, they would return to their home agencies, but the top Democrat on the House Oversight Committee has expressed concern.

|

January 15, 2025 04:00 PM ET

By Sean Michael Newhouse

Staff Reporter

January 15, 2025 04:00 PM ET

• White House
• Pentagon
• Personnel
• Civilians

Good government groups and Democrats are reacting to news first reported on Monday by The Associated Press that incoming senior Trump administration officials have begun questioning federal employees who work on the National Security Council about their political affiliations as part of an effort to ensure the White House entity is composed of loyalists.

“The folks that are at the NSC, the career people that are there, are apolitical. They're the best experts in the fields that they're involved in that are about maintaining our national security,” said Max Stier, president and CEO of the Partnership for Public Service, at a press briefing. “It appears as if they're being subjected to a loyalty test that's, I think, fundamentally irrelevant to the quality of the work that they're going to do and certainly irrelevant to their expertise and reason for being there.”

Mike Waltz, Trump’s pick to be national security adviser, has said that the president-elect’s administration will “clear the decks” so that NSC staffers are “fully aligned with his America First agenda.”

“We’re getting the team in place with the political [appointees] and we literally just got the list of the folks that are currently there [the detailees from the agencies] and like I said they’re all going to be asked to go,” Waltz said in a Jan. 9 interview with Breitbart. “We’re taking resignations at 12:01 [on Inauguration Day] and we’re going to put the president’s team in place.”

Staffers are generally detailed to the NSC from intelligence and national security agencies. If they are removed from NSC, they would return to their home agencies.

Stier warned that “loyalty tests” are one method the Trump administration will likely use early on to upend the federal workforce.

“I'd be looking at more behaviors like that in the near term — things that might actually not involve a formal change of status, but rather create the same impact of chasing away great talent that is actually really fundamental to delivery of good service to the public,” he said.

Rep. Gerald Connolly, D-Va., the ranking member on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, said in a statement that: “Partisan loyalty tests have no place in national security.”

“President-elect Trump and his transition team are making the National Security Council ground zero for its purge of non-partisan civil servants,” he said. “Replacing the experts on the council with political cronies threatens our national security and our ability to respond quickly and effectively to the ongoing and very real global threats in a dangerous world.”

Neither the American Federation of Government Employees nor the National Treasury Employees Union immediately responded to a request for comment.

In 2019, Alexander and Eugene Vindman, twin brothers and then both NSC officials, raised concerns about a phone call between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which led to Trump’s first impeachment. Trump later fired the pair following his first impeachment acquittal.

Eugene is now a newly elected Democratic congressman from Virginia.

11. US Army Black Hawks to go autonomous, take-off with just a tap

​The Black Hawk Pilot's Union is going to protest (apologies for the attempt at humor).

US Army Black Hawks to go autonomous, take-off with just a tap

interestingengineering.com · by Kapil Kajal

• Military

US Army Black Hawks to fly without pilots, launch at the touch of a button

The initiative will center around Skyryse’s new aviation operating system, SkyOS, designed to provide advanced automation and user-friendly controls.

Updated: Jan 15, 2025 05:42 PM EST

Kapil Kajal

14 hours ago

Black Hawk helicopters.

Skyryse

Skyryse, a pioneering company in aviation technology, has announced a significant partnership with the U.S. Army to improve the training process for pilots and enhance the operational capabilities of helicopters in their fleet, notably the Black Hawk.

This collaboration reflects a shared commitment to advancing military aviation through improved safety and efficiency.

The initiative will center around Skyryse’s new aviation operating system, SkyOS, designed to provide advanced automation and user-friendly controls.

Given the military’s reliance on the Black Hawk helicopter, one of the largest fleets of its kind globally, the goals of this partnership align with the Army’s emphasis on modernization in aviation.

Introducing SkyOS

SkyOS represents a significant leap in helicopter operating systems, distinguishing itself from traditional autopilot systems by eliminating typical single points of failure.

The system employs a full authority fly-by-wire architecture with triple redundancy, enhancing stability during all phases of flight, including takeoff, landing, and challenging weather conditions.

Unlike older systems that may rely on mechanical controls, SkyOS seeks to make flying more intuitive through clearly labeled information accessible to pilots of varying skill levels.

For example, the Skyrise One helicopter, an R66 model equipped with SkyOS, features a straightforward auto-flight system that avoids the complications often associated with conventional autopilots.

SkyOS communicates with pilots using plain language instead of cryptic codes, allowing for an easier understanding of flight parameters such as speed and altitude.

This approach could reduce the learning curve for less experienced pilots, allowing for greater confidence in their flying skills.

Optionally-piloted capability

One innovative aspect of SkyOS is its optionally-piloted capability, which allows aircraft to operate with or without a pilot on board.

This functionality is particularly relevant for military missions involving high-risk scenarios or non-passenger transport.

Integrating this capability into the Black Hawk fleet could revolutionize operational strategies, enabling service personnel to undertake various missions with reduced risk.

Through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA), Skyryse will work closely with Army aviation experts to ensure that SkyOS is tailored to meet the unique demands of military missions.

This collaboration signifies a move towards enhancing mission effectiveness while prioritizing safety.

The optionally piloted feature, in particular, opens doors for innovative applications, from combat support to reconnaissance missions, where human presence may not be necessary.

Recently, Skyryse also made a fully conforming production helicopter that can hover with the swipe of a finger.

Black Hawks

As Skyryse and the U.S. Army embark on this partnership, their focus on streamlining pilot operations and enhancing safety is expected to set a new standard in aviation technology.

The Black Hawk helicopter has established itself as a reliable asset for various missions over the past five decades, and the integration of SkyOS aims to build on that legacy.

Rich Enderle, CEO of ACE Aeronautics, expressed optimism regarding the future impact of this partnership.

With the Black Hawk being a tried-and-true platform, he looks forward to leveraging SkyOS in transformative ways that could enhance operational capabilities.

The collaboration also signals a broader trend toward advanced, user-friendly aviation solutions that address the growing demands of both military and civilian sectors.

As more focus is placed on safety and efficiency in aviation, innovations like SkyOS could pave the way for a new era in helicopter operations, making them more accessible and safer for all pilots.

In conclusion, as Skyryse and the U.S. Army work together, the aim is clear—enhancing aviation capabilities through technology that prioritizes safety and operational ease, ensuring that seasoned professionals and less experienced pilots can confidently operate aircraft.

The implications of this partnership could extend well beyond military applications, benefiting civilian aviation markets and advanced rescue operations.

RECOMMENDED ARTICLES

NEWSLETTER

The Blueprint Daily

Stay up-to-date on engineering, tech, space, and science news with The Blueprint.

By clicking sign up, you confirm that you accept this site's Terms of Use and Privacy Policy

ABOUT THE EDITOR

Kapil Kajal Kapil Kajal is an award-winning journalist with a diverse portfolio spanning defense, politics, technology, crime, environment, human rights, and foreign policy. His work has been featured in publications such as Janes, National Geographic, Al Jazeera, Rest of World, Mongabay, and Nikkei. Kapil holds a dual bachelor's degree in Electrical, Electronics, and Communication Engineering and a master’s diploma in journalism from the Institute of Journalism and New Media in Bangalore.

Newsmilitary

interestingengineering.com · by Kapil Kajal

12. Takeaways From Marco Rubio’s Senate Hearing

​My main concern is alliances:

Rubio supports U.S. alliances, despite Trump’s persistent attacks on them.

Mr. Rubio called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Mr. Trump has repeatedly criticized, “a very important alliance” and insisted that Mr. Trump was a NATO supporter. But he also backed Mr. Trump’s argument that a strong NATO requires Europe to spend more money on its collective defense.

The United States, he said, must choose whether it will serve “a primary defense role or a backstop” to a self-reliant Europe

Mr. Rubio, who wrote legislation preventing a president from unilaterally withdrawing from NATO, told senators he still supported the law. Mr. Trump has suggested that the United States might not defend NATO allies who do not pay their share and has even privately spoken of quitting the alliance, according to his former aides.

Mr. Rubio expressed views aligned with those of most senators who work on foreign policy, while taking care not to break from Donald J. Trump’s unorthodox ideas.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/15/us/politics/marco-rubio-senate-hearing-takeaways.html

By Edward WongMichael Crowley and Karoun Demirjian

Reporting from Washington

• Jan. 15, 2025

Marco Rubio, the Republican senator from Florida named by Donald J. Trump to be the next secretary of state, was warmly welcomed by senators from both parties at his confirmation hearing on Wednesday. He has served for years on the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees in the Senate, and is known as a lawmaker devoted to the details of foreign policy.

“I believe you have the skills and are well qualified to serve as secretary of state,” Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Democrat of Hampshire, said in her opening remarks.

The notable lack of tension at the hearing indicated that Mr. Rubio would almost certainly be confirmed quickly.

Republican and Democratic senators agree on the biggest U.S. challenges.

From the lines of questioning, it was clear what senators want Mr. Rubio and the Trump administration to focus on: China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. Mr. Rubio himself pointed to those four powers — what some call an “axis” — in his opening remarks.

They “sow chaos and instability and align with and fund radical terror groups, then hide behind their veto power at the United Nations and the threat of nuclear war,” he said. As permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, China and Russia have veto power over U.N. resolutions.

Mr. Rubio repeatedly singled out the Chinese Communist Party for criticism, and, unlike Mr. Trump, he had no praise for any of the autocrats running those nations.

He did say the administration’s official policy on Ukraine would be to try to end the war that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia started, and that leaders in both Kyiv and Moscow would need to make concessions. U.S. officials say Russia has drawn its allies and partners into the war, relying on North Korea for troops and arms, Iran for weapons and training, and China for a rebuilding of the Russian defense industrial base.

Rubio’s stance on Israel and Gaza is firmly within a foreign policy consensus in Washington.

Mr. Rubio defended Israel’s conduct in the war in Gaza, blaming Hamas for using civilians as human shields and calling the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, most of them non-combatants, “one of the terrible things about war.”

He expressed concern about threats to Israel’s security. “You cannot coexist with armed elements at your border who seek your destruction and evisceration, as a state. You just can’t,” he said.

When asked whether he believed Israel’s annexing Palestinian territory would be contrary to peace and security in the Middle East, Mr. Rubio did not give a direct answer, calling it “a very complex issue.”

Mr. Rubio’s hearing was about two hours in when the committee’s chairman announced that Israel and Hamas had sealed an agreement to begin a temporary cease-fire and partial hostage release in Gaza. An initial hostage and cease-fire agreement, reached in November 2023, fell apart after a week.

Rubio supports U.S. alliances, despite Trump’s persistent attacks on them.

Mr. Rubio called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Mr. Trump has repeatedly criticized, “a very important alliance” and insisted that Mr. Trump was a NATO supporter. But he also backed Mr. Trump’s argument that a strong NATO requires Europe to spend more money on its collective defense.

The United States, he said, must choose whether it will serve “a primary defense role or a backstop” to a self-reliant Europe.

Image

Mr. Rubio called NATO “a very important alliance” on Wednesday.Credit...Omar Havana/Getty Images

Mr. Rubio, who wrote legislation preventing a president from unilaterally withdrawing from NATO, told senators he still supported the law. Mr. Trump has suggested that the United States might not defend NATO allies who do not pay their share and has even privately spoken of quitting the alliance, according to his former aides.

Though many Senate colleagues praised him, Rubio has detractors.

Some prominent Trump supporters remain distrustful of Mr. Rubio. They recall his vote to certify the 2020 election results despite Mr. Trump’s false claims of election fraud. And they consider Mr. Rubio’s foreign policy record dangerously interventionist.

Mr. Rubio has long been a hawkish voice on national security issues, often in ways that clash with Mr. Trump’s views, even if the ideas are conventional ones among centrist Republican and Democratic politicians.

In the past, Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, has criticized Mr. Rubio for advocating aggressive American intervention overseas. Mr. Paul has been outspoken in pushing for less use of U.S. troops abroad and is skeptical about whether economic sanctions can lead to positive outcomes.

On Wednesday, Mr. Paul pointedly asked Mr. Rubio whether he saw any way to work with China rather then persisting in attacks on Beijing, and he also questioned the wisdom of many American and European policymakers who insisted that Ukraine must be admitted to NATO.

Edward Wong reports on global affairs, U.S. foreign policy and the State Department. More about Edward Wong

Michael Crowley covers the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The Times. He has reported from nearly three dozen countries and often travels with the secretary of state. More about Michael Crowley

Karoun Demirjian covers Congress with a focus on defense, foreign policy, intelligence, immigration, and trade and technology. More about Karoun Demirjian

See more on: U.S. Politics, The Israel Hamas War, Vladimir Putin, Marco Rubio, Donald Trump, U.S. Senate

13. Biotech Battlefield: Weaponizing Innovation in the Age of Genomics

​Download the entire 40 page monograph at this link:  https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/fdd-monograph-biotech-battlefield-weaponizing-innovation-in-the-age-of-genomics.pdf

January 15, 2025 | Monograph

Biotech Battlefield

Weaponizing Innovation in the Age of Genomics

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/01/15/biotech-battlefield/?mc_cid=c5458264e3

Craig Singleton

China Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow

Download Monograph

“Only by grasping the core technologies in our own hands will we be able to truly grasp the initiative in competition and development, and fundamentally guarantee our country’s economic security, defense security, and security in other [domains].”

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping, speaking before China’s Academy of Sciences in 20141

“The vast ocean of data, just like oil resources during industrialization, contains immense productive power and opportunities. Whoever controls big data technologies will control the resources for development and have the upper hand.”

Xi Jinping, in a 2013 address to the Chinese Academy of Sciences

“Today, modern biotechnology that focuses on the microcosmos of the life structure can directly explore the main entity of war — human beings themselves — thus taking precise control of the battle effectiveness of enemies … We [China] can use many modern biotechnologies directly as a means of defense and attack, and with further development, they probably will become new weapons systems.”

Col. Guo Ji-wei, The People’s Liberation Army, 20052

“Under the leadership and strong support of the party and the government, BGI has a great foresight and leadership in the field of life sciences. We will continue to strengthen the leadership of Party building and achieve rapid development.”

BGI Chairman and Co-Founder Wang Jian, 20173

Introduction

In a sign of his unwavering commitment to technological self-reliance (自力更生), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping has declared technological innovation to be the “main battlefield of the international strategic game.”4 Central to Xi’s vision is biotechnology, which he has identified as a critical sector in China’s bid to become a global science superpower.5

Xi’s broader ambitions are anchored in China’s military-civil fusion (军民 融合) strategy, which aims to break down barriers between military and civilian institutions to mobilize the latter in service of the former. Specifically, military-civil fusion facilitates the direct transfer of data and cutting-edge technologies to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), ensuring that China’s military capabilities keep pace with rapid civilian technological progress. Biotechnology, with its vast potential to revolutionize fields such as genomics, synthetic biology, and bioengineering, is integral to military-civil fusion.

The PLA has long recognized the strategic importance of biotechnology, engaging in extensive collaborations with Chinese biotechnology behemoths like BGI Group (華大集團, or BGI) and its former subsidiary MGI Tech (深圳华大智造科技股份有限公司). These and other partnerships have yielded research with potential military applications, including efforts to enhance Chinese soldiers’ physical and cognitive abilities. The PLA’s involvement in biotechnology research extends to its collaborations with select Chinese civilian universities, which, along with entities like BGI Group and MGI Tech, play a pivotal role in advancing China’s military-civil fusion strategy.

China’s civilian biotechnology advancements have also contributed to widespread human rights abuses, particularly in Xinjiang Province, where Chinese authorities exploit genetic data to surveil and repress ethnic minorities. These actions highlight how biotechnology, beyond its military applications, is reinforcing the authoritarian regime’s grip on society.

This report begins by exploring the growing importance of biotechnology within China’s national development strategy, with a particular focus on Xi Jinping’s prioritization of the field as pivotal to China’s military modernization. First, it examines the PLA’s increasing interest in biotechnology and its implications for China’s military capabilities. The report then delves into the ties between BGI, MGI Tech, and China’s military and state institutions, highlighting the significant risks these relationships pose to U.S. national security and global technological leadership. Finally, the report presents a series of policy recommendations designed to counter these threats, including measures to limit BGI’s and MGI’s influence and prevent their access to sensitive U.S. data and technologies.

14. Rewind and Reconnoiter: Why Women Scare Autocrats

​Excerpts:

And finally, with the benefit of hindsight, is there anything you would change about your argument or piece?

Reflecting on the article, one area for further development is the intersection of U.S. domestic politics with global strategies to counter authoritarian regimes, particularly through the lens of emerging technologies like AI. As AI becomes integral to intelligence and national security, ensuring these systems align with democratic values is critical. Incorporating benchmarking studies to identify and mitigate bias in AI models is essential, especially since biased algorithms risk perpetuating harmful stereotypes or replicating authoritarian narratives about gender and identity.

In hindsight, the piece could more explicitly address how U.S. domestic debates on gender influence international perceptions of democracy. A robust foreign policy depends on the credibility of domestic policies — if the United States struggles with divisive debates on gender equity or traditional values, it provides authoritarian regimes with rhetorical ammunition to discredit democratic ideals.

Additionally, the argument could have highlighted how technology amplifies these dynamics. For example, authoritarian states weaponize computational propaganda, targeting vulnerabilities in Western democracies. To counter this, the United States should prioritize transparent and equitable AI systems that reflect inclusive values. Benchmarking studies are a foundational step in this process, ensuring that the tools used to combat authoritarianism do not unintentionally reinforce the very biases they seek to dismantle.

Rewind and Reconnoiter: Why Women Scare Autocrats - War on the Rocks

Kathleen J. McInnis and Benjamin Jensen

https://warontherocks.com/2025/01/rewind-and-reconnoiter-why-women-threaten-autocrats/

January 15, 2025

Members

In 2022, Kathleen J. McInnis, Benjamin Jensen, and Jaron Wharton wrote, “Why Dictators are Afraid of Girls: Rethinking Gender and National Security,” where they analyzed how gender can break or bolster authoritarian regimes. We asked Kathleen and Benjamin to revisit their article to see how the relationship between government and gender has evolved since then.

Read more below:

Image: Photo from Paval Hadzinski Catholic Belarus, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

In your 2022 article “Why Dictators are Afraid of Girls: Rethinking Gender and National Security” you argue that Russia “weaponized gender” to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Can you explain more about this and what effect it has on both domestic and foreign perceptions of the war, especially over the last two years? 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an illustrative case of weaponizing gender to shape both domestic and international narratives. Vladimir Putin’s regime framed Russia as a bastion of traditional values under threat from a “decadent West.” This narrative portrays the West’s emphasis on gender equality and freedoms as signs of moral decay, positioning Russia as a defender of a purer, more traditional social order. Internally, this reinforced Putin’s image as a strong, paternal leader, while marginalizing dissenting voices.

Over the past two years, this approach has had mixed effects. Domestically, the emphasis on tradition helped consolidate support among conservative populations, though the growing human and economic toll of the war has strained this narrative. Internationally, the attempt to rally global populist and traditionalist allies by exploiting fears of cultural liberalization has seen more limited success, and their efforts have been largely undermined by global condemnation of Russian aggression. That said, the promulgation of messages emphasizing traditional gender roles and values have proven more resilient in shaping domestic politics in multiple countries. Importantly, as women and marginalized groups increasingly lead resistance movements, the Kremlin’s weaponization of gender has inadvertently highlighted the regime’s vulnerabilities, demonstrating how gender dynamics are pivotal in modern geopolitical strategy.

How does religion complicate the question of what is considered oppressive behavior, specifically in the case of Iran or Afghanistan? How should we view the relationship between religion and gender in these countries, in a national security/foreign policy context? 

You just asked about the intersection of arguably the two most “hot button” aspects of individual and societal identity. The bottom line: These interactions are more complex than most national security scholars seem to appreciate and therefore deserve significantly more scrutiny.

Religion deeply influences societal norms and governance, particularly in Iran and Afghanistan, where interpretations of Islam intertwine with political structures to define gender roles. The enforcement of traditional family values, framed as religious imperatives, restricts women’s rights and autonomy, with practices like mandatory veiling or limiting women’s education justified as cultural preservation. It is worth noting that women on the ground in Iran and Afghanistan argue that they are subject to “gender apartheid” — repression that is thinly cloaked in religious rhetoric.

Governments often frame restrictive policies as protective or morally righteous, shielding them from external criticism under the guise of cultural or religious sovereignty. For national security and foreign policy, this poses challenges. Western criticisms of gender-based restrictions can be dismissed as neo-imperialism, strengthening authoritarian narratives and alienating local populations.

The argument that women’s rights are a strategic “nice to have” relative to other defense and national security priorities is short-sighted. Gender and women’s basic rights may instead be a central way to identify and exploit cracks in authoritarian regimes. Strategically, understanding the nexus of religion and gender is critical. Effective policy should avoid framing interventions as attacks on religion but instead highlight shared values, such as justice or human dignity. Engaging civil society, particularly women-led movements, offers pathways to support change without undermining cultural legitimacy, advancing stability and gender equity in alignment with global security goals.

This article made me think of how gender stereotypes are carried on through both cultures and governments. For example, machismo is still prevalent in many Latin American countries today, but the Mexican electorate just elected their first female president. What does this tell us about how some countries view gender as it relates to prominent government roles?

While traditional machismo remains a significant cultural force in many Latin American countries, its influence is increasingly being challenged by shifts in societal attitudes, particularly regarding women’s leadership. The victory of a female leader in a historically patriarchal society suggests that many voters are prioritizing competence, vision, and inclusivity over outdated gender norms. It also indicates that grassroots movements advocating for gender equality, bolstered by global trends in feminism and social media activism, have begun to reshape political landscapes.

However, this milestone does not mean that machismo is obsolete. Mexico’s electorate has signaled a willingness to break with tradition, but sustained progress will depend on both institutional reforms and cultural shifts that normalize women’s participation at the highest levels of governance. In other words, the election of a woman to the highest level of power is an important indicator of gender equity, but it is by no means the end of the story. In order to reap sustained strategic advantages, Mexico — and other countries — will need to continue exploring the cultural shifts needed to bring a plurality of viewpoints to decision-making spaces.

And finally, with the benefit of hindsight, is there anything you would change about your argument or piece?

Reflecting on the article, one area for further development is the intersection of U.S. domestic politics with global strategies to counter authoritarian regimes, particularly through the lens of emerging technologies like AI. As AI becomes integral to intelligence and national security, ensuring these systems align with democratic values is critical. Incorporating benchmarking studies to identify and mitigate bias in AI models is essential, especially since biased algorithms risk perpetuating harmful stereotypes or replicating authoritarian narratives about gender and identity.

In hindsight, the piece could more explicitly address how U.S. domestic debates on gender influence international perceptions of democracy. A robust foreign policy depends on the credibility of domestic policies — if the United States struggles with divisive debates on gender equity or traditional values, it provides authoritarian regimes with rhetorical ammunition to discredit democratic ideals.

Additionally, the argument could have highlighted how technology amplifies these dynamics. For example, authoritarian states weaponize computational propaganda, targeting vulnerabilities in Western democracies. To counter this, the United States should prioritize transparent and equitable AI systems that reflect inclusive values. Benchmarking studies are a foundational step in this process, ensuring that the tools used to combat authoritarianism do not unintentionally reinforce the very biases they seek to dismantle.

***

Kathleen J. McInnis, PhD is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D., is the Frank E. Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology at the Marine Corps University and a professor in the School of Advanced Warfighting. He is also a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

The views expressed are their own and do not reflect the views or positions of the School of Advanced Warfighting, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

15. Could the Fall of Assad and the Return of Trump Lead to a Better Deal with Iran?

​I certainly hope so (even if hope is not a course of action).

Excerpts:

As observed, even entrenched autocratic regimes eventually collapse. The primary factors behind such downfalls are internal frailties and external circumstances that facilitate change. The rift between the Iranian regime and its citizens is likely to further widen and the global landscape continues to evolve rapidly. Consequently, the Iranian regime may ultimately either collapse or be compelled to undergo significant transformations.

When the Iranian regime eventually faces change, there is a possibility that its longstanding ambition to possess nuclear weapons may be relinquished. Until such a transformation occurs, the focus remains unwavering: The regime should be prevented from advancing any closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon. This is crucial to avert a radical destabilization of the Middle Eastern order and to stop acceleration of regional nuclear proliferation.

Could the Fall of Assad and the Return of Trump Lead to a Better Deal with Iran? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Assaf Zoran · January 16, 2025

Iran’s inability to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime and prevent its collapse, coupled with recent significant blows to Hizballah and Israeli strikes within Iranian borders, underscores Tehran’s unprecedented regional weakness.

With Russian support proving unreliable, the rapid Syrian downfall reminds Iranian leadership of the danger of their growing domestic estrangement. Now, Tehran faces a critical choice between dangerously advancing its military nuclear ambitions as the ultimate deterrent or seeking de-escalation at the risk of seeming vulnerable.

As Donald Trump prepares to take office again, a unique opportunity to influence Iran’s direction arises by renewing the combination of effective pressure and robust negotiations, mainly aimed at a permanent detailed weaponization ban, while providing Tehran with possible domestic benefits. At the same time, the military “Plan B” against Iran’s nuclear program that was recently debated by the Biden administration should remain at hand — operationally and politically — in case diplomacy fails.

Become a Member

Iran’s Chain of Failures

In recent months, the Iranian regime has faced a series of setbacks that have severely undermined its regional prestige, bringing it to a record low. These include the decimation of most of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, the substantial weakening of Hizballah’s leadership and its offensive capabilities in Lebanon, the first extensive Israeli military strike deep within Iran (a move unprecedented since the war between Iran and Iraq), and the collapse of Assad’s regime despite Tehran’s prolonged efforts to stabilize its Syrian ally. Collectively, these events highlight the vulnerabilities of the Iranian regime and portray it in a negative light.

Iran’s strategy, aimed at cultivating peer forces to encircle its adversaries with security challenges, has largely failed. The control over a crucial corridor stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon was disrupted, the cohesion of the “axis of resistance” has weakened, and instead of shielding its territory through proxies, Iran found itself engaged in direct confrontations with Israel. These exchanges severely compromised Iran’s air defense systems, increasing its vulnerabilities. Furthermore, despite two notable demonstrations of Iranian missile power in the past year, these efforts have yet proven insufficient to prevent further Israeli strikes.

The failure of the axis of resistance and the missile project to protect Iran’s national security has positioned its nuclear program as the principal potential deterrent against adversaries. However, despite significant advancements in recent years, the nuclear component, in its present state, appears to remain insufficient in warding off external threats.

Are Nuclear Weapons a Solution for Tehran?

Iran now stands at a critical juncture. Should the Iranian leader, heeding advice from prominent figures within its political sphere and drawing lessons from the experiences of North Korea, Libya, and Ukraine, opt to pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent? Assad’s failed reliance on Russian aid could embolden regime insiders who advocate for such strategic autonomy. But this strategy, while aimed at securing the regime’s survival, risks legitimizing significant foreign attacks on Iranian soil. Alternatively, should the Iranian leader favor de-escalation to reduce confrontation risks and maximize economic gains, albeit at the potential cost of eroding Iran’s resilient image? This dilemma might underlie the Iranian foreign minister’s statement that “2025 will be an important year regarding Iran’s nuclear issue.”

Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei, showcasing more risk-prone behavior in recent years, is nearing a decision regarding this strategic issue, as numerous internal challenges are at stake: a widening rift between the regime and the public, severe economic difficulties, and increased focus on succession. The disintegration of Assad’s regime provides the Iranian leadership a stark reminder and a possible foreshadowing of Tehran’s fate if these issues remain unresolved.

Improved Conditions for a New Deal

In this context, recent developments in the Middle East, coupled with Trump’s forthcoming presidency, present a unique opportunity to alter the strategic landscape and possibly prevent Iran from taking perilous steps in its nuclear pursuits. Trump’s reputation as an unpredictable and forceful leader, coupled with his noted eagerness to swiftly secure agreements that have eluded others, might create favorable conditions for negotiating a new deal with Iran.

Trump’s review of the military strike options against nuclear facilities in Iran could signal to decision-makers in Tehran a possible policy shift in Washington. The president-elect’s leniency toward Israeli use of force could further empower him to influence Iran’s strategic decisions. Trump’s eagerness to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin may facilitate collaboration between Washington and Moscow, potentially encouraging Russia to exert pressure on its ally in Tehran, aiding in reaching a deal with Iran. The new administration’s readiness to intensify pressure on Beijing could result in more decisive measures, including stricter enforcement of oil sanctions against Chinese entities. This would increase the economic pressure on Iran, which heavily relies on oil exports to China.

Achieving a “longer and stronger” nuclear agreement with Iran is possible, but the pathway is challenging, and time is constrained. By October 2025, the international mechanism to reimpose U.N. Security Council nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will expire. Furthermore, growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear advancements and their impact on long-term security interests may drive Israel towards a preemptive strike, similar to those it conducted against nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. The increasing calls for an attack, especially following the downfall of the Assad regime, the weakening of Hamas and Hizballah, and the Israeli long-range strikes in Yemen, suggest that such a move is more likely today. This possibility remains pertinent irrespective of whether a strike would permanently eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat.

Unlike the previous time-limited agreement, which focused on fissile materials, a new timeless arrangement should prioritize detailed scrutiny of nuclear weaponization and strengthen safeguards. Along with the importance of inspections for increasing transparency and trust, flexible access to Iranian facilities acts as both a hurdle and a potential deterrent against covert activities to promote nuclear weapons.

In addition to its political importance in binding decision makers in Tehran, an agreement focused on weaponization holds declarative value vis-a-vis Iranian technological circles as well. Senior scientists in organizations previously involved in weaponization, such as Iran’s Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (often known by the initials SPND), may perceive the current public debates on military nuclear breakout as implicit permission for related actions, including covert activities. Consequently, a formal agreement in this area could help suppress grassroots initiatives, some of which might proceed without leadership approval and potentially hasten the breakout timeline.

While extending the time for fissile material breakout remains essential, some of Iran’s technological advancements are no longer reversible and do not constitute bottlenecks. Under current circumstances, maintaining a one-year distance from Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium to military-grade levels may not be feasible. Nonetheless, the current state is untenable, with Iran merely a few days away from this capacity.

In addition to applying effective pressure, the Iranian regime needs to see a choice, anticipating sustainable economic benefits and internal stability at the negotiation’s conclusion. Allowing the preservation of other limited Iranian deterrence capabilities can help Iranian leaders avoid the perception of capitulation, thereby reducing the likelihood of a future resurgence in nuclear weaponization ambitions as a last resort for projecting power to ensure regime preservation. Focusing on incorporating regional or missile issues into a new agreement could undermine the primary objective. Furthermore, Iran has recently sustained significant setbacks in some of these components, which can be deepened without the regime’s consent.

Given the well-known Iranian tactics of prolonging talks, a limited timeframe should be assigned to negotiating a nuclear agreement. Simultaneously, a new deal should not be viewed as an end in itself, and the urgency to resolve the current perilous situation should not lead to compromises that maintain Iran in a hazardous nuclear position. Consequently, the military Plan B against Iran’s nuclear program should be prepared in case diplomacy fails, while operational readiness and political maturity are essential to enable a swift action.

Fall or Change

As observed, even entrenched autocratic regimes eventually collapse. The primary factors behind such downfalls are internal frailties and external circumstances that facilitate change. The rift between the Iranian regime and its citizens is likely to further widen and the global landscape continues to evolve rapidly. Consequently, the Iranian regime may ultimately either collapse or be compelled to undergo significant transformations.

When the Iranian regime eventually faces change, there is a possibility that its longstanding ambition to possess nuclear weapons may be relinquished. Until such a transformation occurs, the focus remains unwavering: The regime should be prevented from advancing any closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon. This is crucial to avert a radical destabilization of the Middle Eastern order and to stop acceleration of regional nuclear proliferation.

Become a Member

Assaf Zoran is a research fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is a lawyer with 25 years of experience addressing policy and operational issues in the Middle East, engaging in strategic dialogue with decision-makers in Israel and other regions.

Image: Fars Media Corporation via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Assaf Zoran · January 16, 2025

16. Poland's leader accuses Russia of planning acts of sabotage against 'airlines around the world'

​There is a war in the gray zone, both kinetic and information.

Poland's leader accuses Russia of planning acts of sabotage against 'airlines around the world'

By  VANESSA GERA

Updated 9:34 AM EST, January 15, 2025

AP · January 15, 2025

WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk accused Russia on Wednesday of planning acts of sabotage worldwide that included “acts of air terror” against airlines.

Tusk spoke at a news conference in Warsaw alongside Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenskyy.

“I will not go into details, I can only confirm the validity of fears that Russia was planning acts of air terror, not only against Poland, but against airlines around the world,” Tusk said.

The Kremlin has dismissed previous Western claims that Russia sponsored acts of sabotage and attacks in Europe.

Western security officials suspect Russian intelligence was behind a plot to put incendiary devices in packages on cargo planes headed to North America, including one that caught fire at a courier hub in Germany and another that ignited in a warehouse in England last year.

Late last year, Azerbaijan accused Russia of unintentionally shooting down an Azerbaijani airliner that crashed in Kazakhstan on Dec. 25, killing 38 people. Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to his Azerbaijani counterpart for what he called a “tragic incident” following the crash, but stopped short of acknowledging that Moscow was responsible.

The pro-European Union government in Warsaw says that Russia is pursuing acts of hybrid war against Poland and other Western countries in retaliation for their support for Poland’s neighbor Ukraine in its struggle against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The government has accused Russia, and its ally Belarus, of fomenting a migration crisis on the EU’s eastern border with Belarus in order to create chaos and division in the EU.

Last year, Poland’s foreign minister ordered the closure of one of three Russian consulates in the country in response to acts of sabotage, including arson attacks that he said were sponsored by Moscow.

AP · January 15, 2025

17. Special Operations Command eyes creating new tech-based MOS

Special Operations Command eyes creating new tech-based MOS

audacy.com · by Jack Murphy · January 15, 2025

Special Operations Command is looking towards creating a new technology-based Military Occupational Speciality (MOS), and is using the Ignite Program at MIT to help lead the way and get some new recruits.

Ignite is a developmental program that brings together STEM majors at MIT (and other schools) with Special Operations mentors who work together to innovate new tech that has military applications. This year there were some specific focuses that Special Operations Command wanted the cadets to focus on. These were big data analytics, smart sensors, unmanned system autonomy and swarming, human-machine teaming, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and generating real-time actionable intelligence from battlefield sensors.

During the kick-off speech prior to the event, USASOC Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann announced the creation of a new MOS in their formation.

"Special operations is leading the Army by creating a new MOS this year for technology, innovation and integration, a new MOS that does not exist in the Army," Naumann said. "We’re creating it because we realized that we need it. We will have people whose job is to think about these kinds of problems, build prototypes and then help us once we get the technology integrated into the battlefield and make it work in real-world scenarios."

"I think this MOS is going to be great for recruiting for the Army, special operations and the military in general," explained 2nd Lt. Katrina Thoms who attended a previous Ignite event. "This gives a new pathway and a new job opportunity for people who are really good at technology, and not just the gun-ho, ‘let’s be in the field,’ type of people."

90 cadets participated in Ignite this September, making it the largest event of its kind thus far. SOCOM is currently searching for more SOF mentors for upcoming Ignite events.

audacy.com · by Jack Murphy · January 15, 2025

18. Researcher: Hybrid tactics likely spreading from Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea

Researcher: Hybrid tactics likely spreading from Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea

news.err.ee · by Helen Wright | ERR · January 14, 2025

Over the past 18 months, several pipelines and electricity and internet cables have been damaged in the Baltic Sea mostly connecting Finland with other countries in the region such as Estonia, Sweden and Germany. The most recent was on Christmas Day.

In at least two cases, ships dragging their anchors are thought to be the cause. Sabotage is suspected, but difficult to prove – as is typical of hybrid warfare.

Vessels have been flagged from Hong Kong, China and the Cook Islands in the South Pacific. There are also connections to Russia.

But these incidents are not unique. More than 30 fiber-optic data cables connecting Taiwan to surrounding islands have been broken – potentially deliberately – by Chinese ships as political relations have soured in recent years. The most recent was on January 3.

Toomas Hanso, junior research fellow at the International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS), said there are similarities and differences in both cases.

Toomas Hanso. Source: ICDS

Tactics likely spreading from East to West

"Commonalities between the Taiwan Strait and Baltic Sea seems to be the frequency of incidents and both being geopolitically tense regions. The incidents have had direct impact on national security and communication infrastructure," the researcher said.

"Judging by the frequency in the Taiwan Strait from 2017-2022 and the frequency in the Baltic Sea from 2023 onwards, it looks like a spread of tactics from the Taiwan Strait to the Baltic Sea."

Are Moscow and Beijing cooperating? China (PRC) is assumed to have given tacit support for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, even if it has never said so publicly. But there is evidence the countries are in other areas. Last October, a Chinese coast guard fleet entered the Arctic sea for the first time in a joint patrol with Russian counterparts, Reuters news agency reported.

The Russian Navy has been "sporadically active" in the Taiwan Strait, Hanso said, often in coordination with the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy. Russian shipping vessels may also pass through those waters

"But there's no concrete, public evidence suggesting that Russian naval or commercial vessels have directly been involved in cutting undersea cables in the Taiwan Strait. It is also questionable how active China would actually want Russia to be in those waters, Beijing may prefer to limit Russian presence there," he said.

But the case is "stronger" in the Baltic Sea.

"First, in the sense that this tactic has likely been taken over from the Taiwan Strait, where it began to be used frequently before the same practice began appearing in the Baltic Sea. Second, considering the involvement of Chinese ships, Newnew Polar Bear and Yi Peng 3 in the Baltic Sea," the researcher said.

China ramping up hybrid tactics in Taiwan Strait

Hanso said China is using grey-zone tactics and cable cutting is a clearer example than many others. These "grey-zone" activities do not breach escalatory thresholds but still apply coercive pressure, he explained: "PRC practices fit this general pattern."

"While Taiwan often suspects China's involvement, especially given the geopolitical context, the government typically stops short of definitively blaming the PRC without concrete evidence," Hanso said. "If Taiwanese officials were to directly attribute it to the PRC, this could escalate tensions or chances of conflict."

Incidents have spread from the South China Sea, the East China Sea and into the Taiwan Strait since the 2000s.

These include the gradual encirclement and establishment of effective control over disputed island territories, Enforcement of PRC jurisdiction over water and air space surrounding disputed territories, interference with legitimate commercial activity by coastal states, challenges to lawful freedoms of navigation and overflight by the United States and its allies and the undermining the credibility of U.S. alliances, Hanso outlined.

"China is increasingly using grey-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait," he concluded.

Outlining what Taipei can do, the researcher said: "On preventive measures, there is currently little Taiwan can do to stop Chinese cargo ships carrying out such activities. On increasing resilience, Taiwan can increase the number of cables it has so that cutting one cable does not create a complete outage and cables can be buried deeper to make damaging them harder. Satellite communications are an alternative that Taiwan is investing in to reduce reliance on undersea cables, but these are inferior to undersea cables in terms of transmission capacity."

Wider region watching closely

Hanso said, unlike in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea has not seen frequent cable cutting incidents.

"But other countries in the region will certainly be watching closely," he said, citing Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam as examples.

"Especially the Philippines which has increasing military cooperation with the U.S. and increasing friction with China in the South China Sea, will probably be very concerned about potential incidents."

Hanso said several incidents between 2017 and 2023, including harassment by Chinese ships of other countries' vessels, has raised concerns about maritime security and protection of undersea infrastructure in the region.

In 2020, the Indonesian authorities called for better protection of critical infrastructure.

Changing maritime regulations depends on China

After the damage to EstLink 2 last month, several countries including Estonia, Finland and Lithuania have suggested changing international maritime regulations to prevent further incidents.

However, this will be difficult and need the agreement of countries such as Russia and China, experts agree.

Hanso said countries in the South China Sea may prefer to prioritize economic ties with Beijing over security.

"All countries in the region probably wish for more secure undersea cables, as these constitute critical infrastructure. However, all countries in the region must also consider their relationship with China," he said.

"If openly supporting a change in maritime law had a negative impact on their trade or security relationship with China, then these countries would have to weigh up whether a perceived increase in maritime security might offset a deterioration in relations with China. Considering that China is the top trading partner of all South China Sea countries except Brunei, they might be hesitant to support a such a law, if it is perceived as "anti-China"."

The situation in the South China Sea has also become increasingly tense in recent years, the researcher said: "Regional countries would probably prefer not to aggravate China and worsen the situation. So, South China Sea countries' support for such a law, might depend largely on how China perceives the law."

NATO's Baltic Sea members will discuss maritime legislation at a summit in Helsinki this week.

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!

news.err.ee · by Helen Wright | ERR · January 14, 2025

​19. Japan and Philippines plan to convey to Trump the need for US engagement in Asia

Japan and Philippines plan to convey to Trump the need for US engagement in Asia

By  JIM GOMEZ and JOEAL CALUPITAN

Updated 4:13 AM EST, January 15, 2025

AP · by JIM GOMEZ · January 15, 2025

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Japan and the Philippines will convey to President-elect Donald Trump the urgent need for the U.S. to remain committed to help uphold the rule of law in an Asian region where security concerns have become “increasingly severe,” Japan’s top diplomat said Wednesday.

The U.S., Japan and the Philippines have been building an alliance under outgoing President Joe Biden since last year to deal with China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea and East China Sea. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy thrust has triggered concerns about the scale and depth of U.S. commitment to the region under his new term.

“We will approach the next U.S. administration to convey that constructive commitment of the United States in this region is important also for the United States itself,” Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya said in a news conference with his Philippine counterpart, Enrique Manalo, in Manila.

Iwaya said he was scheduled to attend Trump’s Jan. 20 inauguration as one of Washington’s closest treaty allies in Asia along with the Philippines.

“Amid the increasingly severe strategic environment in the region, Japan places importance on our bilateral cooperation as well as on maintaining and strengthening trilateral cooperation between Japan, the Philippines and the United States,” Iwaya said.

An alarming spike in confrontations between Chinese and Philippine coast guard and other forces in the busy sea passage has set off fears of a major escalation that could draw in the United States, which has repeatedly warned that it’s obligated to help defend Philippine forces if they come under an armed attack in the South China Sea.

“The issue over the South China Sea is a legitimate concern for the international community because it directly links to the regional peace and stability,” Iwaya said. “Japan strongly opposes any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force or build up tension in the region. We strongly ask for easing of tensions.”

Jonathan Malaya, assistant director-general of the National Security Council in the Philippines, a top government body, said Tuesday that China was “pushing us to the wall” and warned that “all options are on the table” for Manila’s response, including new international lawsuits.

A large Chinese coast guard ship patrolled hotly disputed Scarborough Shoal i n recent days and then sailed toward the northwestern coast of the Philippines on Tuesday, coming as close as 77 nautical miles (143 kilometers), the Philippine coast guard said.

A Chinese official said in Beijing that his country’s sovereignty in the South China Sea is well established and its coast guard patrols are lawful and justified.

The Chinese government has repeatedly accused the Philippines and other rival claimant states including Vietnam and Malaysia of encroaching on what it says are “undisputed” Chinese territorial waters.

Manalo told reporters that the Philippines would raise China’s latest actions in a meeting on Thursday between Chinese and Philippine diplomats in the Chinese city of Xiamen.

The rival claimants have been holding talks, called the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism. for years to prevent the disputes from worsening into a major armed conflict.

AP · by JIM GOMEZ · January 15, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com