Quotes of the Day:

"I shall ever repeat it, that mankind are governed not by extremes, buyt principles of moderation."

- Montesquieu

"The real man smiles in trouble, gathers strength from distress, and grows brave by reflection."

- Thomas Paine

"A teacher can never truly teach unless he is still learning himself. A lamp can never light another lamp unless it continues to burn its own flame.

The teacher who has come to the end of his subject, who has no living traffic with his knowledge but merely repeats his lesson to his students, can only load their minds, he cannot quicken them."

- Rabindranath Tagore

1. US invests millions to expose regime to North Koreans

2. Kim Jong-un’s daughter may determine North Korea’s fate

3. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ The country’s medical system continues its freefall into collapse, with hospitals sending patients back home due to lack of heating

4. Why South Korea’s President is Talking About Nuclear Weapons

5. North Korean museum targets drug use, K-pop in campaign against social ills

6. Seoul foreign ministry seeks to defuse controversy over Yoon's Iran remark

7. S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases fall to 13-week low; gov't discusses lifting indoor mask mandate

8. Korean companies’ business expansion in the US

9. After 'enemy' remark, Iran calls Yoon Suk Yeol 'meddlesome'

10. Pentagon chief likely to visit South Korea soon, consultations under way

11. Pyongyang's rubber stamp parliament convenes

12. In North Korea, an influencer might also be a propagandist

13. [INTERVIEW] India wants deeper ties with Korea on defense, security

14. [Column] What are our core national interests? (South Korea)

15. Korea-Japan ties on improvement trend after 'deep ordeal': Yoon

16. How South Korea plans to buoy its counter-drone capabilities

17. Will South Korea Build Nuclear Weapons?

1.  US invests millions to expose regime to North Koreans

This is great for USAGM and VOA and RFA. They are doing tremendous work. They need and deserve the additional resources.

I strongly believe in their work. They are professional journalists who inform the Korean people in the north with news and analysis of US and alliance policies. As the article notes this will (and already does) make Koreans ask questions. However, this is insufficient. USGMA does not build and execute a comprehensive information and influence campaigns. Furthermore, the grants provided to NGOs are useful but I find some of the grants questionable and suffer from a lack of understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime .

There needs to be a sophisticated alliance effort to orchestrate information and influence activities from the governments and the military while allowing NGOs to operate in ways that use their comparative advantages. And the organization (whatever it is) responsible for orchestrating the campaign should be overseeing the grants approvals to ensure that NDOs receiving US funding are operating in ways compatible with the influence campaign. If they receive US government funds they need to be in synch with the strategy.

I have provided this information previously but I think it is so important I will provide it again. We have also drafted a Korea chapter for an FDD monograph that will look at US information warfare around the world. Hopefully that will be published sometime soon.

But it is not simply loudspeakers and leaflets and not simply sending insults of KJU to the north. We need a sophisticated and comprehensive information and influence activities campaign that includes government, military, and civil society activities.

See section 6 (page 46) of this report at this link (https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/fdd-report-maximum-pressure-2-a-plan-for-north-korea.pdf) and excerpted below this article.  Mathew Ha and I (and many others) have been thinking about Information and Influence Activities for a long time.

Here are some specific references from a class I developed on the DPRK and the Gray Zone (for the Joint Special Operations University that will assist with Psychological Warfare/Operations/Information and Influence activities.

LTG Chun, In Bum, “How North Korea Wages Political Warfare at Home and Abroad...and How to Respond” ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 6, 2020, page 1-18

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OM-lnGiZHhuUUrI9xsnbR72MN20teWkz/view?usp=sharing

Commander Frederick Vincenzo, “An Information Based Strategy to Reduce North Korea’s Increasing Threat - Recommendations for ROK & U.S. Policy Makers,” Center for New American Security, October 3, 2016, pages 1-15.

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-information-based-strategy-to-reduce-north-koreas-increasing-threat

George Hutchinson, “Army of the Indoctrinated: The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,” April 26, 2022, Read Chapter 5 & 6 pages 57-88.

https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hutchinson_KPA_web_0426.pdf  

Jieun Baek, “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization,” Harvard Belfer Center, August 2021, pages 20-28.

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/policy-public-diplomacy-north-korea

David Maxwell, “The Nature of The Kim Family Regime: The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State,” Red Diamond, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 19,2020

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/02/19/the-nature-of-the-kim-family-regime-the-guerrilla-dynasty-and-gulag-state/  

David Maxwell, “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152,

https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a

Suki Kim, “The Underground Movement Trying to Topple the North Korean Regime,” The New Yorker Magazine, November 16, 2020

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/23/the-underground-movement-trying-to-topple-the-north-korean-regime

Video: “Conversation with COL (Ret) Dave Maxwell, Potential for North Korea Influence & Information Campaign,” Joint Special Operations University July 14, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0E9032OEOo

Video: David Maxwell, “Beyond Nuclear Crisis: New and Long-Term Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” Institute of World Politics, July 11, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6XPOWvQGpw&t=49s

Video: David Maxwell, “Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula, “ Institute of World Politics, September 28, 2021 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bgiZGWPIKuc&list=FL3fu5rXx0ma6f9Ze3C1i-MA&index=46&t=2s

US invests millions to expose regime to North Koreans – DW – 01/16/2023

DW

The United States will invest $50 million (€46 million) over the next five years to surreptitiously bring information about the outside world into North Korea — hoping to improve the image of the US and South Korea for North Koreans.

As part of a broader annual defense spending package, US President Joe Biden signed the Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act into law in late December.

The act is designed to counter the Pyongyang's all-pervasive censorship and surveillance of its citizens. It's named after the US student who was arrested in Pyongyang in 2016 on a charge of subversion and sentenced to 15 years in prison for stealing a poster. Released in June 2017 in a vegetative state, 22-year-old Warmbier died in a hospital in Ohio six days later.

Under the act, funds will be funneled to the US Agency for Global Media, which effectively serves as a promotional organization for the US government, broadcasting and disseminating information around the world.

"It is interesting to me as the US now seems to be more willing to operate in the 'gray zone' that other countries have been exploiting for some time now, with info-warfare now just one of the coercive measures being brought to bear while still staying under the thresholds that would trigger a conventional conflict," Dan Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University, told DW.

US hopes North Koreans 'ask more questions'

Washington is playing catch-up to Russia, which has been particularly effective at planting propaganda that furthers its own geopolitical aims, Pinkston said.

The US program will focus on additional radio programming into the North as well as the development of "internet freedom tools," which are designed to help users circumvent limitations placed on free access to the digital world by the North Korean government.

Prepared for North Korea's nukes

"Radio should be relatively easy but internet access will be more of a challenge," said Pinkston, adding that the "more sophisticated approaches" may not be noticed by Pyongyang at first, but "could quite quickly have an insidious effect on its own propaganda."

"Ideally, a successful 'attack' using information will be overlooked for some time and therefore be more subtle and have the longer-term aim of destabilizing and making the people of North Korea ask more questions," Pinkston said.

North Korea cracks down on foreign media

Eujin Kim, who fled with her mother and sister from North Hamgyong Province in the 1900s due to the food shortages that plagued her homeland, said getting more information into the North would encourage criticism of the regime, but warned it would be dangerous.

Pyongyang has in recent months stepped-up its crackdown on anyone caught listening to foreign radio broadcasts or watching films or television programs smuggled into the country, analysts and defectors cautioned. There have been reports that teenagers who were seen practicing dance moves to K-pop music were sent to penal colonies.

"Twenty years ago, very little information about the outside world got into North Korea, but now many people there have seen news or television shows or films from abroad," said Kim, a member of Freedom Speakers International, an organization which helps North Korean refugees learn English.

"But in the last year or so, it is clear that the government is trying very hard to control the information that is getting into the country," she said. "The regime is very worried about that because it threatens them and only a few days ago, I heard that a teenage boy had been executed for watching a South Korean movie."

'It is getting harder all the time'

The Seoul-based Daily NK news outlet reported in late December that North Korean citizens are being ordered to attend screenings of government movies showing the public humiliation and punishment of people who have been caught with foreign films. Foreign content has been described by the regime as "dangerous toxins that instill delusions about enemy countries and paralyze the revolutionary and class consciousness."

Footage shows groups of people berated by crowds in a sports stadium, their heads bowed as they apparently await their public sentencing.

In January, the North Korean government will pass the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, which bans citizens from using foreign terms when they speak or write. It will also outlaw foreign fashion and hairstyles and increase punishments for accessing overseas media.

"It is getting harder all the time," said Kim. "People have their public faces and their private thoughts, but it is more and more dangerous to share those thoughts."

Edited by Sou-Jie van Brunnersum

DW

The Korea Times · January 5, 2023

Information and Influence Activities

By David Maxwell and Mathew Ha

BACKGROUND 

Information and influence activities (IIA) are the means by which governments attempt to influence key populations to support strategic objectives. Despotic regimes use IIA to manipulate their populations to maintain authoritarian control. In contrast, the United States can use IIA to promote U.S. strategic objectives, including by informing oppressed populations and promoting principles related to democratic and human rights.220 Thus, IIA provide a key tool for generating the internal divisions and threats to Kim that could incentivize him to negotiate in good faith and relinquish his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

IIA are a critical and longstanding element of Pyongyang’s efforts to maintain power. The Worker’s Party of Korea’s Propaganda and Agitation Department has aggressively employed IIA to support the Kim family regime for the past seven decades. North Korea’s information strategy is focused on three broad lines of effort: enhancing the reputation of Kim Jong Un and the Kim dynasty among domestic and international target audiences; undermining the legitimacy of the ROK government; and countering U.S. influence in Korea and the region, with an emphasis on dividing the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Despite Pyongyang’s coordinated and persistent effort, North Koreans are increasingly gaining access to outside information. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) survey of 36 North Koreans living across several North Korean provinces found that almost 92 percent of them consume foreign media at least once a month. Eighty-three percent assessed that foreign media had a greater impact on their lives than decisions by the North Korean government.221

Despite the limited sample, the survey has several advantages. First, all those queried were living inside North Korea and were not escapees. Moreover, the surveys were conducted in person, meaning “respondents were free to voice critical opinions about their own government unfettered.”222 Relying solely on escapee surveys can distort findings since escapees are usually from border provinces near China and therefore do not necessarily provide a representative sample of the entire North Korean population. The CSIS survey, however, drew opinions from beyond these border areas.223

North Korean defector Thae Yong Ho, formerly the North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom, speaks to American scholar Robert Kelley at the Oslo Freedom Forum 2019 on May 28, 2019, in Oslo, Norway. (Photo by Julia Reinhart/Getty Images)

A key method of distributing foreign media in North Korea is through cross-border traders and smugglers. These individuals provide foreign media stored on various devices, such as DVDs and thumb drives, which are then distributed at private markets that have emerged in recent decades.224 Since the famines of the 1990s, these private markets have become an important component of everyday life for many non-elite North Koreans. Additionally, the proliferation of smart phones (some 6.5 million) is providing people in the North the ability to communicate. These developments offer opportunities for U.S. and ROK IIA.225

On the other hand, the emergence of fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications technology along the Chinese-North Korean border is a potentially dangerous development. The Chinese are using this technology to track and interdict North Korean smuggling operations.226 Although North Korea cannot yet produce its own 5G technology, leaked documents reveal that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has helped Pyongyang build wireless networks. The Washington Post reports that the Kim regime’s contact with Huawei began as early as 2006, when former leader Kim Jong Il visited Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzen, after which he oversaw the establishment of North Korea’s wireless provider Koryolink. 227

Experts believe this represents the beginning of North Korea and Huawei’s cooperation.228 While North Korean telecommunications capabilities may not yet be ready for 5G technology, this relationship should raise concerns. Huawei could equip the regime with the technology and infrastructure to surveil anyone in North Korea using a smart phone.

ASSESSMENT

The Kim regime is one of the most oppressive and abusive governments in the world. Freedom House gives North Korea the worst possible rating for freedom, political rights, and civil liberties, summarizing the situation in North Korea this way:

North Korea is a one-party state led by a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship. Surveillance is pervasive, arbitrary arrests and detention are common, and punishments for political offenses are severe. The state maintains a system of camps for political prisoners where torture, forced labor, starvation, and other atrocities take place … human rights violations are still widespread, grave, and systematic.229

In its annual human rights report on North Korea, the State Department echoed these concerns, noting that human rights abuses “continued to be a widespread problem.”230 These egregious human rights violations are part of a deliberate, systematic, and brutal system designed to keep the Kim regime in power.231

Any maximum pressure campaign targeting Kim Jong Un should feature robust IIA focused on human rights. A well-orchestrated campaign would enable the United States and South Korea to highlight and confront Kim’s human rights atrocities while shifting his cost-benefit analysis on denuclearization.

Undertaking such operations in a foreign country is a significant decision that should not be taken lightly. However, the nature of the totalitarian Kim regime and its human rights abuses, as well as the severity of the threat it poses, demonstrate the need for such an approach. In fact, such an approach would be consistent with the best traditions of U.S. foreign policy, simultaneously advancing U.S. interests and honoring American democratic and humanitarian principles.

Kim apparently believes that he can best ensure his survival by retaining his nuclear weapons, oppressing the North Korean people, and refusing to negotiate in good faith. The purpose of an IIA campaign would be to change Kim’s perceptions in each of these areas. The goal will be to persuade him that he can better secure his personal survival by respecting the human rights of the North Korean people and agreeing to relinquish his nuclear weapons in a permanent and verifiable manner. Kim must become convinced that the status quo poses a greater threat than charting a new course through good faith diplomatic negotiations.

An effective IIA campaign should target three North Korean audiences: the regime elite, the second-tier leadership, and the North Korean people. Messaging focused on the regime elite should highlight that denuclearization offers the best hope of survival.

The second-tier leadership is a key target audience. It comprises military and party officials outside of the core regime elite who lack sufficient power to act alone but whose collective action during war, crisis, or regime collapse would influence the outcome of any contingency. In the military, this category includes brigade commanders and assistant commanders, commanders and assistant commanders of specialized units (intelligence, missile, and WMD), and key senior staff controlling logistics and transportation. The military second tier would also include senior General Political Bureau and Military Security Command officers assigned to the aforementioned commands. All told, the military second tier numbers approximately 250 personnel.

In the Korean Workers’ Party, officers serving on party committees at the provincial, city, and county levels have enormous influence on all activity within their individual jurisdictions. Party committee chairmen at those levels carry similar authorities. Combined, these individuals add up to approximately 400 personnel across nine provinces, 145 counties, and key cities throughout the country.

Finally, Ministry of State Security (secret police) and Ministry of People’s Security (national police) leaders in those same geographical districts also have enormous influence within their jurisdictions. They also number approximately 400 personnel.

After accounting for roughly 50 key scientists and project leaders of WMD programs, the second-tier leadership totals approximately 1,100 personnel. Each of these individuals has the potential – in critical contingencies – to resist guidance orders, stop or alter logistical and transportation actions, and neutralize elite-level action officers.232

The IIA campaign targeting this second-tier should focus on providing information and media that sow doubt regarding the regime elite and suggest that life could improve if the regime changed its policies. As renowned North Korea analyst Andrei Lankov has noted, informing North Koreans about “attractive alternatives to their current way of life” represents a key way to pressure the regime to change its behavior.233 In addition, messages to the second-tier leadership should highlight how they could play a positive role in a non-nuclear North Korea or a unified Korea.

IIA focused on the third target audience, the North Korean people, should prioritize foreign media. The widespread dissemination of foreign media has already created fissures between the everyday North Koreans and the regime elite, thereby weakening the government’s propaganda and information blockade.234 As the CSIS survey found, North Koreans who consume foreign media will likely continue seeking this information despite the potential consequences if they are caught.235 Moreover, continually injecting foreign media into North Korea will help break down the regime’s ideological controls while encouraging more independent thinking among everyday North Koreans.

Although the United States possesses IIA capabilities, they have not been deployed in a robust and well-coordinated manner. Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia pump news into North Korea via radio, television, and the internet. According to one North Korean escapee, VOA broadcasts are transcribed and provided to the regime elite, who represent up to 10 to 15 percent of North Korea’s 24 million population.236 Similarly, the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor provides funding to nongovernmental organizations for “fostering the free flow of information into, out of, and within the DPRK.”237 Non-governmental organizations such as the Defense Forum Foundation support private efforts such as Free North Korea Radio.238 Given the relatively closed nature of North Korean society, however, it is difficult to assess how many of these programs are performing.

Moreover, an effective IIA campaign requires close coordination between the U.S. and ROK governments. However, Seoul has often undermined effective IIA tools, an approach rooted in the Moon administration’s belief that concessions lead to “better inter-Korean relations.”239 This belief ignores North Korea’s persistent failure to respond to such concessions with verifiable steps toward denuclearization. Washington therefore should remind Seoul that no prior intra-Korean agreements, such as the April Panmunjom Joint Declaration or the September Pyongyang Declaration, should encumber IIA against North Korea.

Bottles containing rice, money, and USB sticks are prepared prior to being thrown into the sea by North Korean defector activists on Ganghwa island, west of Seoul, on May 1, 2018. (Photo by Ed Jones/AFP via Getty Images)

Alarmingly, South Korea has cracked down on activities by escapee and refugee organizations. This is particularly problematic because the efforts of such organizations likely represent the most effective IIA. They have been successful in getting information into the North by flying balloons and floating plastic bottles filled with USB drives and other material.240

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States and South Korea should implement a comprehensive and aggressive IIA campaign in North Korea. The focus should be three-fold: create internal threats against the regime from among the elite, provide the second-tier leadership with alternative paths to survival, and prepare the Korean people for eventual unification under a United Republic of Korea. To do so, we recommend the following steps:

• Develop organizational infrastructure to facilitate IIA: The United States and South Korea lack a single organization to direct IIA against North Korea. Washington and Seoul should establish institutions that would work together to plan and shape combined IIA. Fortunately, as discussed earlier, the United States already has numerous tools at its disposal, such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Voice of America; and Radio Free Asia. The United States should centralize these activities under an oversight organization. This organization would coordinate all agencies and departments and work with non-government organizations.
• Under the Moon administration, there will likely be concerns that IIA could upset diplomatic conditions. Admittedly, an IIA campaign targeting Pyongyang could risk stirring additional short-term tensions with Pyongyang. But U.S. diplomats should remind their ROK counterparts that those tensions may ultimately forge a path to the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea. U.S. diplomats also need to remind their South Korean allies that Seoul’s persistent use of concessions has not elicited progress with Pyongyang.
• Encourage Moon’s government to increase intra-Korean people-to-people exchanges: Washington should encourage intra-Korean engagement by sponsoring people-to-people educational and cultural exchanges. Such exchanges could expose North Korea’s intelligentsia and emerging elites to democratic concepts as well as personal relationships with South Koreans.241
• Implement aggressive IIA targeting the North Korea regime: After building a baseline consensus, the United States and South Korea should implement increasingly aggressive IIA targeting the North Korean regime. These activities should inform North Koreans of their universal human rights and civil liberties that the regime is failing to respect. This will undermine the legitimacy of the Kim family regime and give hope to the people living in the North. Alternate sources of information can put regime propaganda in perspective.
• This campaign could also help lay the initial groundwork for emergent leaders who could replace Kim and who might seek to unify with the South as equal partners under the values of individual liberty and freedom, liberal democracy, and a free market economy. At a minimum, this campaign could help persuade Kim that the status quo poses a greater threat than good faith negotiations with the United States and South Korea. The ultimate goal is to create internal divisions and threats that will influence Kim to denuclearize.
• Increase exposure of North Koreans to the outside world: IIA must exploit North Koreans’ growing access to DVDs, USB drives, and smart phones from outside the country.242 These media devices can carry content popular among North Koreans, such as South Korean dramas, which can implicitly help Koreans in the North better understand the difference between the regime they have and the government they deserve.243
• Establish a Korea Defector Information Institute (KDII): There is no single organization in the United States or South Korea that harnesses the information of defectors to support IIA. If both nations worked together to establish a KDII, it could serve as a repository for defector information to inform policymakers, strategists, and those responsible for developing IIA themes and messages. This institute should utilize defector knowledge and advice in devising appropriate messages and communications techniques. It could also encourage North Koreans to defect, particularly members of Office 39 (also known as Department 39), who are knowledgeable of the Kim family regime’s finances.
• Provide military support to ROK-U.S. government programs for IIA: U.S. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces should be deployed on a permanent basis to support ROK PSYOP forces as part of a national-level alliance IIA campaign. ROK and U.S. PSYOP forces should advise and assist defector organizations to synchronize themes, messages, and dissemination methods to ensure unity of effort.

2. Kim Jong-un’s daughter may determine North Korea’s fate

I think it is too early to speculate on succession. But it gives the Korea watcher community something to focus on.   I think Sasha Mansourov is probably right about the reason for Kim's daughter being present at the missile launch. It is a simple message that he has no intention of giving up his nuclear weapons.

Excerpts:

While Kim Jong-un’s wife and sister are managing to retain their positive public images, family members who could potentially challenge Kim’s authority have not fared so well. His uncle-in-law Jang Song-thaek was arrested and executed in 2013, and half brother Kim Jong-nam was famously assassinated in the Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. His other half siblings are rarely seen or discussed in state media, although his aunt occasionally appears seated with Kim and his wife at major state events.

As with nearly everything else about North Korea, there are few clues as to when (or even if) the Kim offspring will return to the public arena. But Kim Ju-ae’s recent public debut reflects a new confidence in her father and the decisions he’s made about North Korea’s WMD trajectory. As Mansourov notes, Kim might have brought his daughter to signal “our nuclear-missile arsenal is here to stay forever, not to be bargained away.” If he’s correct, getting North Korea back to the nuclear negotiations table will be no easy feat.

Kim Jong-un’s daughter may determine North Korea’s fate

New York Post · by Jenny Town · January 14, 2023

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Last November, North Korea conducted a successful test of its largest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) — the Hwasong-17 or what some experts have named the “monster missile.” While the test made clear how far Pyongyang’s ballistic missile program has advanced in recent years, the spectacle was quickly upstaged by a pair of unlikely attendees at the launch: Ri Sol-ju, the 33 year-old wife of North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, and their 9-year-old daughter Kim Ju-ae.

This was the first public appearance of any of Kim’s children, of which he is believed to have three – a son and two daughters. But all the “bring your daughter to work” jokes aside, Kim Ju-ae, the younger daughter, has now made two appearances at notable military functions: a November photo op with the Hwasong-17 team along with an undated tour of a missile factory.

Which raises questions about Kim’s daughter — who was introduced to the world by ex-basketballer Dennis Rodman during one of his infamous North Korea tours a decade ago: Why this child and why now?

Kim and his daughter at another missiles inspection. Little is known about the North Korea leader’s immediate family or why he’s chosen to present Kim Ju Ae to the public rather than his two other children.via REUTERS

Some experts, of course, have speculated that Kim Ju-ae’s elevated public profile might be tied to family succession planning. But her appearances are more likely part of a highly choreographed propaganda narrative aimed at elevating his father’s political image.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong-il, who led North Korea from 1994 until his death in 2011, Kim Jong-un has always presented himself as a man of the people. It’s a tactic he learned from his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who ruled the nation from its founding in 1948 till his death in 1994.

Young Kim Ju Ae first came to public light after she was “leaked” to the press by former pro-basketball player Dennis Rodman (seen here with the North Korean leader in 2014) who paid repeated visits to her father during the early part of the last decade.Kyodo News Stills via Getty Imag

The younger Kim bears a striking resemblance to his grandfather and is often similarly portrayed in state media posing with workers and soldiers — sometimes with locked arms or even in full embraces. Like his grandfather, Kim Jong-un has tried to appear approachable and concerned about his people. In 2017, there was even an unusual image of a strategic forces officer riding piggyback on Kim as they celebrated the launch of a new rocket engine.

“Kim Jong-un’s media team has succeeded in portraying their boss as the man of the people,” says Alexandre Mansourov, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. “His public activities and associated imagery ring the bell with ordinary folks in the North and bring him closer to their daily lives.”

Kim Jong-un’s inner circle includes his 33 year-old wife Ri Sol-ju, with whom he’s often spotted in “regular” settings — such as riding horses — in order to give him more of a “man of the people” persona.AP

A major component of that life is Kim’s family. From the beginning of his rule, Kim has often had his wife, Ri Sol-ju, by his side at state functions and overseas trips. His sister, 35-year-old Kim Yo-jong, is also in constant orbit, almost always at his side or in the background in public, gaining valuable experience in state and military affairs.

Many North Korea watchers have speculated that Kim’s sister — rather than his young daughter — is actually being groomed as a successor. But others, like Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, have suggested this seems “unlikely” in a system where “political power” has been “overwhelmingly male, and society remains deeply patriarchal.” Add to that Kim Yo-jong is also very close in age to her brother.

Also often by Kim Jong-un’s side is 35-year-old Kim Yo-jong. Some North Korea-watchers have speculated that she could one day succeed her brother. But their similar age and North Korea’s traditional, patriarchal culture suggest this is unlikely to happen.Bloomberg via Getty Images

Also like his grandfather, Kim Jong-un enjoys being photographed surrounded by children, a national paterfamilias regularly appearing in orphanages and festivals embraced by children smiling or in tears. This visual strategy has been accompanied by a growing use of the term “fatherly Marshal” in state media, describing Kim as a “benevolent father of a large family of the whole country.”

Michael Madden, a Nonresident Fellow with the 38 North Program at the Stimson Center, says these images feel at once exalting and commonplace. They play into “official ideology that depicts the Suryong [Great Leader] as the protective and loving father of socialist Korea,” explains Madden, referring to Kim by his traditional title. A recent photo op, for instance, shows Kim visiting a military site and inspecting the “bathhouse and food of the soldiers like their real father would do.”

Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong-un, fell out of favor with the regime and was assassinated in 2017 following years in exile. Kim Jong Nam is seen here in an undated pic in Shanghai.

Kim’s avuncular aura could not feel more different than his far less-social father. Today, in place of a dour dictator like Kim Jong-il, the son leads a new era where the military remains important, but so, too, is the welfare of the North Koreans themselves (some of the poorest people on the planet). And nothing says father more than Kim being photographed with his own young child.

Of course, images of young Kim Ju-ae do far more than just demonstrate fatherly affection. They also reflect a shifting narrative around the country’s WMD program. Politically isolated and crippled by economic sanctions, North Korea has paid a steep price for building up its nuclear arsenal. His daughter’s presence at the “monster missile” launch — and the resulting global press — give meaning to that price while suggesting it serves a higher purpose.

“Kim Jong-un wants to balance [North Korea’s] reputation of being an aggressive country with nukes,” says Ken Gause, director of Strategy, Policy, Plans and Programs Division at the Center for Naval Analysis. “By showing his wife and daughter at the missile launch, it portrays Kim as a good steward of his nuclear program which is defensive, meant to protect his family and his people.”

Current North Korea leader Kim Jong-un is similar in both look and image to his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who led the nation from its founding in 1948 until his death in 1994. Kim Il-sung is seen here during an official visit to Warsaw in 1984.Getty Images

Kim’s subtle evolution from baby-faced upstart to paternal leader coincides with a muscular new tone around the nation’s nukes. For instance, when North Korea announced its revised nuclear law in September 2022 — which for the first time spelled out conditions for preemptive nuclear use — Kim emphasized that the country would “never denuclearize,” “a line had been drawn,” and “there can no longer be any bargaining over nuclear weapons.”

Rachel Minyoung Lee, a senior analyst for the Open Nuclear Network, notes that “normally, if North Korea wanted to leave some wiggle room [for future negotiations], it will use conditional expressions like ‘as long as’ or ‘if’ when referring to its nuclear weapons program.” But that conditionality now appears gone. Kim and his daughter watching the ICBM launch and touring the missile factory reinforce the notion that the nukes, like young Kim Ju-ae, are here to stay.

Kim Il-sung, center, in a classic propaganda image, with his son and successor Kim Jong Il at his side surrounded by adoring young people. Kim Jong Il is the father of current North Korea leader Kim Jong-un.Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

Nonetheless, there remains the possibility that Ju-ae’s appearances have been less about legacy and more about boosting domestic support for North Korea’s seemingly relentless missile tests. Back in 2017, the regime raised eyebrows when it launched 24 rockets, sparking at the time the infamous “fire and fury” responses from the Trump administration. Last year North Korea launched more than 90 missiles. Indeed, amid economic hardships exacerbated by sanctions, border closures and limited trade due to COVID, sources such as Radio Free Asia have reported on grumbling among ordinary North Koreans about how the authorities keep launching missiles while many of the people “are desperately struggling to make ends meet right now.”

Icy and stone-faced, former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il (photographed on a trip to Russian in 2011) had a far lower-profile public image than his son. Some speculate it’s because he maintained numerous wives and households.Getty Images

Madden notes that Ju-ae’s appearances could have been more about trying to change negative public opinion about the testing. Anecdotal reports from unofficial sources, he said, suggest that she has been received positively by domestic audiences.

The history of how generations of Kims have been portrayed in the media is mixed. During the long rule of Kim Il-sung, his second wife, Kim Song-ae, (stepmother to Kim Jong-il and Kim Kyong-hui), served as first lady from 1963-1974 and was active in North Korean political life, heading the women’s union and participating in state affairs. Her children were also relatively influential in political circles. But Kim Song-ae’s public profile began to fade in the late 1970s after her stepson, Kim Jong-il, was designated Kim Il-sung’s successor.

Like his grandfather, Kim Jong-un has a penchant for appearing with adoring (often crying) young people, such as these female soldiers in 2014.REUTERS

During the mid-1990s, Kim Jong-il was far more secretive about his family. According to Madden, much of this was because Kim had multiple wives and households, which would have been viewed as “scandalous and offensive among wider elites and the North Korean public.” At least two of those wives had “problematic backgrounds.” “Kim Jong-nam’s mother was born in South Korea and was divorced,” he explains, “and Kim Jong-un’s mother was born in Japan.”

Despite the recent photo ops, Kim’s long-term plan for his children’s public personas remains unclear. And the reasoning around why he chose to reveal Kim Ju-ae — rather than the other two children or even all of his children — is unknown. Perhaps he favors her more. Or maybe because, thanks to Rodman, she is the only one of his children already known to the outside world. Back in 2013 in an interview about his visit to North Korea, Rodman described Kim as an “awesome guy” and a “good dad” to his “baby daughter named Ju-ae.”

Crippling sanctions from its nuclear arms program and the ongoing economic chaos caused by the coronavirus pandemic have made North Korea one of the world’s poorest nations. Ordinary people such as these two in the city of North Pyongan are beginning to question the cost of endless missile tests in the face of ongoing austerity.APUltimately, no one but Kim Jong-un really knows why he’s begun parading his daughter (here at the Hwasong-17 launch last year) in public. But it appears that the young girl, like North Korea’s missile program, aren’t going anywhere.via REUTERS

While Kim Jong-un’s wife and sister are managing to retain their positive public images, family members who could potentially challenge Kim’s authority have not fared so well. His uncle-in-law Jang Song-thaek was arrested and executed in 2013, and half brother Kim Jong-nam was famously assassinated in the Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. His other half siblings are rarely seen or discussed in state media, although his aunt occasionally appears seated with Kim and his wife at major state events.

As with nearly everything else about North Korea, there are few clues as to when (or even if) the Kim offspring will return to the public arena. But Kim Ju-ae’s recent public debut reflects a new confidence in her father and the decisions he’s made about North Korea’s WMD trajectory. As Mansourov notes, Kim might have brought his daughter to signal “our nuclear-missile arsenal is here to stay forever, not to be bargained away.” If he’s correct, getting North Korea back to the nuclear negotiations table will be no easy feat.

Jenny Town is a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center and the Co-founder and Director of 38 North.

New York Post · by Jenny Town · January 14, 2023

3. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ The country’s medical system continues its freefall into collapse, with hospitals sending patients back home due to lack of heating

There are no sanctuaries in north Korea.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ The country’s medical system continues its freefall into collapse, with hospitals sending patients back home due to lack of heating

asiapress.org

Kim Jong-un on a visit to the Samjiyon Tourist Zone construction site after major snowfall. Published in the Rodong Sinmun in November 2018.

◆ Hospitals lack funds to purchase coal and firewood for heating

North Korea is in the middle of its harsh winter season, but ordinary people are facing increasing difficulties obtaining enough coal and firewood for heating in the intense cold. With the coming of the new year, even major hospitals in provincial areas of the country are unable to heat their facilities, forcing hospital staff to send people with light diseases back home. (KANG Ji-won)

A recent report by a reporting partner in Yanggang Province highlighted the severity of the situation.

“As we entered the winter season, the government ordered medical institutions to ensure they have proper supplies of fuel (for heating), but even major municipal and provincial hospitals in the provinces lacked the funds to obtain heating fuel, leading them to send home everyone start on January 5, except for emergency cases and those suffering from severe disease. Doctors are doing their rounds (at people’s homes) around once every two days.”

The authorities ordered state-run companies to supply coal and firewood needed by hospitals for heating; however, the jump in vehicle fuel prices made it impossible for the companies to transport the heating fuel to hospitals. Unable to heat their facilities, municipal and provincial hospitals forcibly discharged their patients back to their homes.

◆ Ordinary people can’t buy firewood because they have no incomes

“I know someone whose appendix burst in the early days of this year and had to undergo major surgery. His wounds hadn’t yet been healed, but he was taken from his hospital bed on a stretcher back to his home to rest. A doctor from the hospital visits him for a checkup about once every two days,” a reporting partner told ASIAPRESS.

North Korean hospitals have long had serious problems heating their facilities in the winter months. They have lacked the money to buy heating fuel, forcing patients and their families to bring firewood and blankets themselves for heating purposes.

The Kim Jong-un regime’s overreaching anti-coronavirus prevention policies have worsened the country’s economic situation, which has dried up the incomes of many urban dwellers. Unable to buy firewood, most people can’t even heat their own homes. “Hospital patients who can’t bring firewood (to the hospital) are unable to get treatment there,” the reporting partner said.

North Korea also faces a lack of medications. Now, in addition to the difficulties hospitals face in heating their facilities, the country is confronting a continued collapse of its medical system.

A hospital room in a hospital in Yanggang Province. A patient can be seen lying on a bed. Taken by ASIAPRESS in April 2015.

◆ The government orders companies to watch for “fake illnesses” among workers

Amid a situation where many hospital patients are returning home, North Korea’s government has ordered state-run companies to monitor whether people are faking diseases so they can pretend to be getting medical treatment at home and not go to work.

“Companies are designating staff specifically to monitor whether workers are faking illnesses or not. The staff visit the homes of discharged hospital patients to investigate their status. There have even been fights breaking out among the staff and the families of patients because they’re upset the companies just care about faking illnesses and not the health of the patients themselves.

“The authorities believe that people avoiding work are committing anti-socialist acts and are causing problems because they are not participating in sessions set aside to study Workers’ Party instructions, criticism sessions, and other aspects of the country’s organizational life.”

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

asiapress.org

4. Why South Korea’s President is Talking About Nuclear Weapons

Cheong Seong-chang ha sto be the most quoted think tank analyst in the Korea watcher community today.

Excerpt:

“It’s a very important development,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, a nonpartisan foreign policy research organization outside Seoul. “Until now, the South Korean government had never considered independent nuclear armament, even as a ‘plan B.’”

Why South Korea’s President is Talking About Nuclear Weapons

January 16, 2023 4:57 AM

• William Gallo

voanews.com

Seoul, South Korea —

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is accelerating a once unthinkable debate over whether his country should acquire nuclear weapons — a move that would transform the U.S.-South Korea alliance and upend regional security dynamics.

Last week, Yoon made global headlines when he suggested during a policy briefing that South Korea could get its own nuclear arms if the security situation with North Korea worsens.

Yoon’s comment was delivered in an almost off-handed manner and framed as part of a worst-case scenario; his aides quickly claimed South Korea was not backing away from its commitments under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Nonetheless, Yoon’s comment was unprecedented, at least for the period since South Korea became a democracy.

“It’s a very important development,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, a nonpartisan foreign policy research organization outside Seoul. “Until now, the South Korean government had never considered independent nuclear armament, even as a ‘plan B.’”

SEE ALSO:

South Korean President Travels to UAE, Seeks Arms Sales

For Yoon, talking about nukes has become a pattern.

As a presidential hopeful in late 2021, Yoon said he would consider asking for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that were removed in the early 1990s. He also recently said the United States and South Korea were discussing nuclear cooperation, which he envisioned would eventually have the same effect as NATO-style “nuclear sharing.”

Yoon’s motives, in some ways, are straightforward.

North Korea recently has engaged in more frequent threatening behavior while rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. In comments published on New Year’s Day, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed to “exponentially” increase his stockpile of nuclear warheads.

SEE ALSO:

Kim Jong Un Vows to ‘Exponentially’ Increase Nuclear Warheads

Many in Seoul believe current U.S.-South Korea alliance structures need to be strengthened in order to compensate for North Korea’s growing threats. As part of those efforts, they want bigger displays of allied military strength, including with U.S. nuclear assets.

On a broader level, there are also concerns about the durability of Washington’s defense commitment to South Korea, especially given recent U.S. political turmoil and the relative popularity of so-called “America First” foreign policy ideas.

Those dynamics help explain the growing wave of scholars, former officials, and ex-officials who now publicly support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons.

SEE ALSO:

As Trump Looms, South Koreans Mull Their Own Nukes

What Yoon wants

Analysts are divided, though, over what Yoon intends to accomplish with his nuclear weapons talk. Few believe South Korea would actually pursue nuclear arms, at least anytime soon, given the massive economic and security risks that would accompany such a move.

Instead, Yoon could be using the issue to send a tough message to North Korea, or to satisfy his conservative allies who support a more aggressive approach toward Pyongyang.

SEE ALSO:

South Korea Embraces 'Tit for Tat' Approach to North's Provocations

Some former senior South Korean military officials have called for South Korea, already a major producer of nuclear energy, to enhance its ability to acquire nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so. Yoon’s comments may be designed to eventually make that idea more palatable, some analysts note.

But the most obvious explanation is that Yoon wants to publicly pressure the United States to provide more robust defense assurances, according to Go Myung-hyun, a research fellow at Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

“I think Yoon wants the Biden administration to offer further strengthening measures for extended deterrence,” Go said. “He wants to highlight how seriously he views the North Korean threat.”

In recent months, South Korea and the United States have agreed to increase joint military drills and more frequently deploy nuclear-capable U.S. bombers and aircraft carriers to the region. Last week, South Korea’s military announced it would hold a “table-top” exercise with the United States that would include the scenario of North Korea using a nuclear weapon, though U.S. officials said the idea of "joint nuclear exercises" is off the table.

SEE ALSO:

US Says It's Not Considering Joint Nuclear Exercises with South Korea

For some in Seoul, those steps are inadequate. South Korea, they argue, should have a bigger role in the planning and execution of U.S. nuclear forces. But South Korea may never be fully satisfied, since the U.S. president is the ultimate decider of whether U.S. nuclear weapons are used in any individual scenario

What is next?

While Yoon may think that publicly raising the nuclear option will force the United States to provide more security guarantees, “it is likely to have the opposite effect of straining the relationship,” according to Eric Brewer, a former White House National Security Council official.

Brewer, now at the Washington DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, said the United States “should balance firmly closing the door on any further talk of South Korea weaponization while avoiding a public spat with an ally.”

“The U.S. should be clear in public that it would not support South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and that Washington and Seoul are both focused on the real, and ongoing joint efforts to strengthen the alliance. It should also reinforce privately that such comments about developing nuclear weapons are counterproductive both to dealing with the North Korea threat, as well as efforts to enhance U.S.-ROK security cooperation and extended deterrence,” he added.

SEE ALSO:

US B-52s Fly Near South Korea, as North Korea Ramps Up Threats

If Seoul were to pursue nuclear weapons, it could risk breaking the U.S.-South Korea alliance, Brewer said.

“The idea that, if South Korea can just convince the United States to allow it to go nuclear, everything will be ok is fundamentally misguided. It would still risk Congressionally required sanctions, a de facto end to international cooperation for its civil nuclear energy program, and a severe response from China,” he added.

But if North Korea continues its provocative missile launches and other weapons tests, Yoon will keep feeling pressure to do more, said Go of the Asan Institute.

“There are two ways things can get worse for South Korea. One, the North Korea threat gets worse, say with an exponential increase in nuclear stockpile and ICBMs,” he said. “Two, is somehow the U.S. response strategy stays inadequate.”

Lee Juhyun contributed to this report.

voanews.com

5. North Korean museum targets drug use, K-pop in campaign against social ills

Not behind the paywall at NK News.

This is an indicator of the existential threat posed by information and influence to the Kim family regime.

North Korean museum targets drug use, K-pop in campaign against social ills

Propaganda display also acknowledges ‘smuggling’ issue but relies on images of early-2000s tech

Colin Zwirko January 16, 2023

"Class education" museum display warning against drug use and foreign media | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 16, 2023)

https://www.nknews.org/2023/01/north-korean-museum-targets-drug-use-k-pop-in-campaign-against-social-ills/?utm_source=pocket_reader

A North Korean museum is warning the public against drug use and foreign media consumption, images published in state media reveal, offering rare insights into the government’s approach to addressing such internal social issues after passing laws on the problems in recent years.

A photo published Monday in the Rodong Sinmun shows a recent visit by ordinary citizens to a government-run “class education” museum, where a guide stands in front of an exhibit that warns of “schemes to collapse our society by spreading reactionary ideological culture.”

The words “drug use,” “smuggling” and “black market dealing” appear in the exhibit beside images of foreign pop music CDs, cell phones and portable DVD players (“notels”). 

The exhibit appears intended to educate law-abiding citizens of what to avoid and report to police, such as MSI-brand USB flash drives, Maxtor-brand large optical hard drives and other products that may be used to smuggle drugs and media. A pile of toys visible under glass on the floor may be examples of such smuggling methods.

Words written in large red letters in the display denounce “drug use (마약사용),” “smuggling (밀수)” and “black-market dealing (밀매)” (indicated by red dotted-line box in the center) while the slogan above the exhibit says “schemes to collapse our society by spreading reactionary ideological culture (반동적인 사상문화를 페뜨려 우리 내부를 변질와해시키려는 책동)” (indicated in yellow dotted-line box at the top) | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 16, 2023)

North Korean defectors have long attested that the use of meth and opium is widespread in the country, despite the lack of coverage of the issue in state media and Pyongyang’s frequent denunciation of other countries for their drug problems. 

However, state publications have occasionally talked about domestic drug problems, and authorities established a new law on “prevention of drug-related crimes” in 2021, suggesting it remained a large enough issue to demand urgent attention.

They also established a new “law on rejecting the reactionary ideology and culture” in 2020 and have pushed new campaigns to try and win political support from young people uninterested in the ruling party’s extremely strict ideological system and social rules. 

But despite the new law against “anti-socialist” culture, it appears modern methods of media smuggling are outpacing the North Korean government’s propaganda against the practice. 

Most of the items depicted in the museum exhibit as dangerous carriers of foreign media are from the early 2000s and are reportedly losing popularity in North Korea. The Seoul-based Daily NK reported in 2018 that SD cards had by then already replaced discs and USB sticks as the main method to smuggle media due to their small size and higher storage capacity.

Display boards featuring many of the same images of outdated tech as those seen in Monday’s museum exhibit photo are featured in mass-produced propaganda material still being used despite authorities signaling new approaches to drug and media smuggling with the passage of new laws in recent years | Images, clockwise from top left: Taehung County House of Class Education, Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 17, 2019); KCTV (July 20, 2021); Pyongyang City Art Studio, KCTV (July 15, 2021); August 28 Youth Shock Brigade Management Bureau, KCTV (Nov 29, 2021)

NK News has spotted other propaganda materials recently displayed in offices and schools that use the same images of old phones, media discs and hard drives.

However, authorities have appeared to update their education materials for propaganda that is only distributed internally and not published by state media, according to the Daily NK. 

The outlet published screenshots of an internal propaganda video last month showing a clip of South Korean K-pop group 2NE1 as well as people seated and hanging their heads in shame in front of crowds and police. The article stated that authorities were subjecting the people to public humiliation after being caught consuming illegal foreign media. 

NK News could not independently verify the video content but identified the location of one screenshot as the Pyongyang City Youth Park Open-Air Theatre. The wearing of masks by those present suggests the video was taken since COVID-19-related policies went into effect in 2020.  

For its part, the U.S. State Department is open about its goal of subverting North Korea’s domestic information controls, announcing last month that it hoped to hand out $1.5 million to organizations that will boost the “free flow of objective, independent information” to and from the DPRK. 

President Joe Biden also signed a law in December earmarking $40 million toward countering “the brutal rule of Kim Jung Un” with outside information. 

Edited by Bryan Betts

6. Seoul foreign ministry seeks to defuse controversy over Yoon's Iran remark

Sounds like President Yoon is telling it like it is. And we should not forget the close relationship between north Korea and Iran. They are two rogue powers who collaborate to create chaos and conflict in the international system.

(LEAD) Seoul foreign ministry seeks to defuse controversy over Yoon's Iran remark | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · January 17, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with ministry spokesperson's comments in last 2 paras; ADDS photo, byline)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Jan. 17 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean foreign ministry on Tuesday said President Yoon Suk Yeol's recent remark about Iran during his visit to the United Arab Emirates was "irrelevant" to Seoul's relations with Tehran, in an apparent effort to prevent it from spilling into a diplomatic controversy.

While speaking to South Korean troops in the UAE earlier this week during his state visit there, Yoon compared the UAE-Iran relations to that of South and North Koreas, and said the UAE's "enemy and biggest threat is Iran."

In response, the Iranian foreign ministry said it was "looking into and pursuing the meddling comments" by Yoon, and awaiting an explanation from the Seoul foreign ministry.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (C) speaks as he meets with South Korean troops of the Akh unit in the United Arab Emirates on Jan. 15, 2023. (Yonhap)

In a text message to reporters, the Seoul foreign ministry urged against "unnecessary overinterpretation" of the remark, saying it was made while encouraging South Korean soldiers.

It added the remark was "irrelevant" to South Korea's diplomatic ties with Iran or other countries.

"Since forging diplomatic ties with Iran in 1962, our country has long maintained friendly and cooperative ties with Iran, and our commitment to continue developing the friendly bilateral relations with Iran remains firm," the ministry said.

Lim Soo-suk, spokesperson for the ministry, added in a regular press briefing that Seoul has conveyed such stance to Tehran through their diplomatic channels. Lim stopped short of providing further details of the communications.

He added the ministry believes Tehran "well understands the intention" of the president's remark.

Lim Soo-suk, the South Korean foreign ministry's spokesperson, speaks during a regular press briefing at the government complex in Seoul on Jan. 17, 2023. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · January 17, 2023

7. S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases fall to 13-week low; gov't discusses lifting indoor mask mandate

(LEAD) S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases fall to 13-week low; gov't discusses lifting indoor mask mandate | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · January 17, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with details on mask mandate policy in last three paras)

SEOUL, Jan. 17 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new COVID-19 cases fell to the lowest Tuesday tally in 13 weeks in a sign of a downward trend in new infections, as the country prepares to lift the indoor mask mandate.

The country reported 40,199 new COVID-19 infections, including 95 from overseas, bringing the total to 29,861,234, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.

Tuesday's tally is down by around 20,000 from the previous week and half the daily caseload from two weeks ago, the KDCA data showed. It also marked the lowest for any Tuesday since Oct. 18, when the country reported 33,218 cases.

South Korea added 30 COVID-19 deaths, raising the death toll to 33,014.

The number of critically ill patients stood at 503, down by seven from the previous day.

A notice urges customers to wear masks inside a cafe in Seoul on Jan. 16, 2023. (Yonhap)

On Tuesday, an expert advisory board held a video conference to collect opinions about easing the indoor mask mandate, the last remaining pandemic restriction.

The KDCA said it will review their recommendations and announce the timing of the lifting of the mask mandate on Friday, just before the Lunar New Year holiday.

The government said earlier it could scrap the mask mandate in phases if at least two of four criteria are met. Those criteria include a downward trend in new infections and critically ill cases and deaths, as well as strong medical response capabilities and a high vaccination rate among high-risk groups.

fairydust@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · January 17, 2023

8. Korean companies’ business expansion in the US

Excerpts:

Korean companies’ investment in the U.S. is the successful outcome of winning an intense competition for survival in the global market. This is the same reason why Taiwanese company TSMC, which leads the foundry business, is building plants in the U.S. and Japan. Chinese company CATL, the no. 1 battery producer, is building a joint factory in the U.S. as well. If Korean companies hadn’t set early footholds in next-generation industries and widened gap with other competitors, advanced economies such as the U.S. and the E.U. wouldn’t have asked Korean companies to build factories in their countries.

However, we must keep in mind that industries around the world are facing mounting challenges of countries putting their own interests first and deteriorating free trade. Even Korean businesses, whose position stands higher than ever, should not remain complacent and be mindful that even the slightest slip can result in a major fall. We need to exert all efforts to provide talent, reduce regulations and promote business through diplomacy so that Korean companies can continue to lead high-tech businesses.

Korean companies’ business expansion in the US

donga.com

Posted January. 17, 2023 07:47,

Updated January. 17, 2023 07:47

Korean companies’ business expansion in the US. January. 17, 2023 07:47. .

Leading Korean companies are increasingly building manufacturing facilities in the Southeastern region of the U.S. Samsung Electronics’ chip-making facilities, Hyundai Motor’s electric car plant, LG Energy Solution, and SK ON’s battery plants are being built and preparing for operation. These efforts reflect Korean companies’ efforts to adapt to the US government’s so-called “Made In America” policy to bolster the manufacturing of high-tech products in the U.S.

The foundry plant that Samsung Electronics is building in Texas is scheduled to be completed this year. It took less than two years to build the facility after announcing that it would build the plant by investing 17 billion dollars two years ago. Hyundai Motor is building an electric car plant in Georgia, targeting to open in 2025. The plant, which is jointly built with Ford by SK On, will start manufacturing batteries to be equipped on electric pick-up trucks two years away from now. LG Electronic’s plant in Tennessee, which produces 12 million washing machines a year, was named a lighthouse factory by the World Economic Forum.

The U.S. government’s policy impacted Korean companies’ expansion to the U.S. Shortly after taking office, President Joe Biden invited leading Korean semiconductor and battery manufactures to the White House and encouraged investment in the U.S. Many states and cities vied to attract these companies suggesting significant tax benefits. Cities in the southeastern part of the U.S., with low tax rates, labor costs, and fewer regulations, have kept to their word by building “Samsung highways" and “LG highways” leading to the plants.

Korean companies’ investment in the U.S. is the successful outcome of winning an intense competition for survival in the global market. This is the same reason why Taiwanese company TSMC, which leads the foundry business, is building plants in the U.S. and Japan. Chinese company CATL, the no. 1 battery producer, is building a joint factory in the U.S. as well. If Korean companies hadn’t set early footholds in next-generation industries and widened gap with other competitors, advanced economies such as the U.S. and the E.U. wouldn’t have asked Korean companies to build factories in their countries.

However, we must keep in mind that industries around the world are facing mounting challenges of countries putting their own interests first and deteriorating free trade. Even Korean businesses, whose position stands higher than ever, should not remain complacent and be mindful that even the slightest slip can result in a major fall. We need to exert all efforts to provide talent, reduce regulations and promote business through diplomacy so that Korean companies can continue to lead high-tech businesses.

한국어

donga.com

9. After 'enemy' remark, Iran calls Yoon Suk Yeol 'meddlesome'

And "clueless!"  

Tuesday

January 17, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

After 'enemy' remark, Iran calls Yoon Suk Yeol 'meddlesome'

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/17/national/diplomacy/Korea-Iran-Yoon-Sukyeok/20230117160702717.html

President Yoon Suk Yeol, center, speaks to the South Korean Army’s Akh unit in the United Arab Emirates on Sunday. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]

The Korean Foreign Ministry and presidential office played down Tehran's ire over remarks by President Yook Suk Yeol on a visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in which he called Iran an "enemy."

An Iranian official labeled Yoon "meddlesome" and clueless. 

Speaking to the Korean military's Akh unit in the UAE on Sunday, Yoon told the troops, "The UAE's enemy and biggest threat is Iran, while ours is North Korea."

He called the UAE a "brother nation," with shared security interests in his speech to the 147-strong unit. 

The remarks immediately drew the wrath of Iran's Foreign Ministry. 

It's spokesman, Nasser Kanaani, said Monday that Iran is "evaluating the latest meddlesome remarks" by the Korean president "about relations between the neighboring and friendly countries of Iran and the United Arab Emirates." 

Kanaani was quoted by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) as saying that Yoon's "undiplomatic" remarks show that he is "totally unaware of Iran's historical and friendly ties with the Persian Gulf littoral states, including the UAE, as well as the positive developments rapidly happening in this regard."

A senior Korean presidential official told reporters at a press briefing in the UAE late Monday that Yoon's remarks were part of his efforts to "encourage our soldiers" in the Akh unit.

"The remark was made with the intention of encouraging them to do their duties amid the severe security reality facing the UAE," said the official. "It has nothing to do with the current bilateral relationship between Korea and Iran." 

The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a statement Tuesday also said Yoon's remarks were "irrelevant" to Korea's diplomatic ties with Iran and other countries. 

The ministry warned against any "unnecessary overinterpreting" of the remark, saying it was made while encouraging Korean soldiers.

"Korea has long maintained friendly and cooperative ties with Iran since establishing diplomatic ties in 1962, and our government's commitment to continue developing such relations remains unwavering and firm," added the ministry. 

Yoon has been on a four-day state visit to the UAE since Saturday, the first leg of a two-country tour that also takes him to Switzerland. 

Korea deployed the Akh unit in January 2011 to help train UAE special forces during peace time and protect Korean residents there. It is a symbol of military cooperation between the two countries. The Akh unit's name comes from the Arabic word for "brother." 

"We have sufficiently explained our position through diplomatic channels between Seoul and Tehran," a Korean Foreign Ministry official said Tuesday. "We believe that the Iranian side also understands our intentions and circumstances to some extent.

"The president wasn't remarking on relations with Iran," said the official. "We understand it as a statement with the intention of calling on our soldiers who are performing duties in the field to do their best." 

But the official pointed out that the ministry is not in the place to explain the "true intentions" of the president. 

This is not the first Yoon has made a gaffe on an overseas trip. He was involved in an embarrassing hot mic moment at a fundraiser hosted by U.S. President Joe Biden in New York in September 2022. 

The presidential office blamed MBC, the first broadcaster to report on the incident, for erroneous subtitles, which it claimed undermined Korea's alliance with the United States. 

Bilateral relations between Seoul and Tehran have frayed in recent years due to Iranian money frozen in two Korean banks because of U.S. sanctions reimposed after former President Donald Trump in 2018 withdrew from a landmark 2015 nuclear accord with Iran.

President Yoon Suk Yeol, center left, and first lady Kim Keon-hee, center right, pose for a commemorative photo with the South Korean Army’s Akh unit during a state visit to the United Arab Emirates on Sunday. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]

10. Pentagon chief likely to visit South Korea soon, consultations under way

Sustained engagement by high level officials. Alliances are important to mutual national security.

Tuesday

January 17, 2023

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Pentagon chief likely to visit South Korea soon, consultations under way

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/17/national/defense/Korea-United-States-defense/20230117130459767.html

Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, right, speaks with his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin, during their visit at Joint Base Andrews in Prince George's County, Maryland, on Nov. 3, 2022. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE]

South Korea and the United States are in consultations to arrange a visit to Seoul by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Seoul's Defense Ministry said Tuesday, as the allies seek to bolster deterrence against growing North Korean military threats.

Austin's visit, if realized, is expected to focus on strengthening America's trilateral security cooperation with its Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, amid questions here over Tokyo's drive for stronger armament backed by Washington, observers said.

"The issue of Secretary Austin's visit here is a matter that the two countries' defense authorities have been discussing, and we cannot offer any details at this point," the ministry said in a statement.

The exact date of Austin's possible visit to Seoul remains unknown, but speculation has emerged that he could arrive here later this month after the Lunar New Year holiday, which runs from Saturday to next Tuesday.

When in Seoul, Austin is likely to pay a courtesy call on President Yoon Suk Yeol and hold talks with his South Korean counterpart, Lee Jong-sup.

During the meetings here, Austin could explain the outcome of the White House summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on Friday.

At the summit, Biden threw his weight behind Japan's push to beef up its military capabilities under its newly revised key security documents. His backing came as many South Koreans have doubts over the security push by Japan, which they believe has yet to fully atone for its colonial-era wrongdoings.

His agenda could also include the reaffirmation of Washington's security commitment to South Korea as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has hardened his rhetoric against the allies.

During last month's key ruling party gathering, Kim raised the need for an "exponential" increase in his country's nuclear arsenal and named South Korea an "undoubted" enemy, while unveiling a plan to develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile and launch a military surveillance satellite at the "earliest possible date."

Earlier this month, Seoul's Defense Ministry briefed Yoon on a plan to hold defense ministerial talks between the allies three times or more this year.

The allies' defense chiefs usually meet at the regional security gathering, called the Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore in June, and at their annual Security Consultative Meeting in November.

Yonhap

11. Pyongyang's rubber stamp parliament convenes

We are waiting to see what will be rubber stamped.

Excerpt:

State media reports on the SPA’s meeting said it would focus on approving this year’s budget, but the legislature could also elaborate plans to carry out nuclear weapon and missile development policies announced by leader Kim Jong-un at an expanded plenary session of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea's Central Committee in late December.

Tuesday

January 17, 2023

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Pyongyang's rubber stamp parliament convenes

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/17/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-Supreme-Peoples-Assembly/20230117172803819.html

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at the 6th expanded plenary session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party in Pyongyang in footage broadcast by the state-controlled Korean Central Television on Dec. 29. It remains to be seen if Kim also spoke at Tuesday's gathering of the Supreme People's Assembly, the regime's rubber-stamp parliament. [YONHAP]

North Korea's rubber-stamp parliament met on Tuesday amid weeks of silence on the direction of its external relations and military policy. 

The meeting was announced by state media last month.

The Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) meets once or twice a year in Pyongyang to approve budgets, amendments to current laws and personnel appointments.

While the SPA holds no real power — its functions are usually exercised by a Standing Committee made up of 15 SPA members, and real power is concentrated in the Presidium of the ruling Workers’ Party Politburo — it is constitutionally held to be the highest organ of state power, and its laws legitimize policy decisions made by the party’s leadership. 

State media reports on the SPA’s meeting said it would focus on approving this year’s budget, but the legislature could also elaborate plans to carry out nuclear weapon and missile development policies announced by leader Kim Jong-un at an expanded plenary session of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea's Central Committee in late December.

It remained unclear if leader Kim Jong-un delivered remarks at the SPA’s meeting that would shed any light on the direction of the regime’s external relations and weapons programs.

At a Workers’ Party plenary session in December, Kim said the regime intends to develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile in 2023, which marks the 75th anniversary of the country’s founding. 

He also said that the North needs to mass-produce tactical nuclear weapons and “exponentially” increase its production of nuclear warheads.

Kim has used previous SPA meetings as a platform to deliver messages aimed at the outside world, especially the United States and South Korea.

At a meeting of the legislature in 2019, just after the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi, Kim said he was willing to hold a third North Korea-U.S. summit. 

At another SPA gathering in September 2021, he expressed his intention to restore inter-Korean communication lines, which Pyongyang unilaterally severed in June 2020 to protest anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets sent over the border by North Korean defector groups in the South. 

At its last meeting in September, the SPA adopted legislation setting conditions for using nuclear weapons. 

Kim gave a speech at that meeting heralding the law as a clear sign of the North’s “irreversible” status as a nuclear weapons state.

In an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, Prof. Chung Dae-jin of Halla University in Wonju said that recent political gatherings in the North indicate a concerted effort by the regime to consolidate internal cohesion amid high tensions with the South and the United States.

“North Korea seems to be expanding workshop politics as a means of breaking through the current complicated state of crisis,” he said.

“It seems to be trying to achieve internal solidarity at the SPA meeting, in addition to executing other necessary tasks handed over by the Workers’ Party plenary session.”

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

12. In North Korea, an influencer might also be a propagandist

The north Korean Propaganda and Agitation department is trying to operate in the modern information age. To me this "influencer's" videos seem contrived or fake but that may be because I am aware of what life is like in the north. But for those who do not follow the Korean situation it can lead to questions I have actually heard - "Is that the 'good Korea' or the 'bad Korea?'"

Tuesday

January 17, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

In North Korea, an influencer might also be a propagandist

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/17/national/northKorea/north-korea-youtube-vlog/20230117195255383.html

Youtuber 'Yu Mi' introduces herself on her first video covering the daily lives of Pyongyang residents, uploaded on Aug. 2, 2022. [SCREEN CAPTURE]

A North Korean YouTuber is posting videos that she claims offer a glimpse into life on the other side of the DMZ.

Her sincere looking and somewhat amateurish efforts come as the North Korean government works to disseminate propaganda via social media, though it's not clear whether the YouTuber's efforts are by the individual or sponsored by the state. 

Calling herself "Yu Mi," the woman has been posting since August 2022 on the "Olivia Natasha- YuMi Space DPRK daily" channel.

In "Yu Mi from Pyongyang," her first video, the YouTuber says she wants to show how Pyongyang is changing and how people are living their daily lives, along with how she lives. She believes some people may be curious about how Pyongyang is doing since the pandemic has made it difficult to visit the North Korean capital in recent years.

Videos on the channel shows clips of Yu Mi buying drinks and sweets at a grocery store, visiting an amusement park and eating bulgogi, or marinated stir-fried beef, at a restaurant. Yu Mi's channel was created on June 21, 2022, and currently has 10 videos.

Yu Mi focuses on emphasizing Pyongyang as a lovely place to live through her videos. In the most recent post on Jan. 13, she visits a fitness center for personal training and yoga classes.

Analysts say Yu Mi may come from a privileged family, noting that most facilities she introduces are only enjoyed by those highest in the social and political order, even among Pyongyang residents.

A different North Korean YouTuber named Im Song-a, an 11-year-old YouTuber who also lives in Pyongyang, was identified as a daughter of a North Korean diplomat to London and great-granddaughter of Ri Ul-sol, an ex-marshal of North Korea's Army, in July 2022 by Thae Young-ho, a North Korean defector and a member of the People Power Party.

Analysts say North Korea is training YouTubers as a strategy to increase government propaganda. Yu Mi mentions that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is making an effort to improve the lives of Pyongyang residents.

Kang Dong-wan, a professor at Dong-A University, said North Korea is utilizing private accounts for propaganda after the state-ran channels were repeatedly shut down for violating platform policies.

"The strategy is to use videos containing the daily lives of residents to say 'we're not so different.'"

A google spokesperson said videos of private channels covering North Korean people's daily lives are not in violation of its policies.

BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO,SOHN DONG-JOO [sohn.dongjoo@joongang.co.kr]

​

13. [INTERVIEW] India wants deeper ties with Korea on defense, security

This should be good news and a positive international security development.

Tuesday

January 17, 2023

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[INTERVIEW] India wants deeper ties with Korea on defense, security

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/17/national/diplomacy/korea-india-defense/20230117171923489.html

Saurabh Kumar, secretary (east) of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, speaks with the Korea JoongAng Daily at the Grand Hyatt Seoul on Tuesday. [PARK SANG-MOON]

India wants to expand cooperation with Korea on defense and security in the Indo-Pacific region, said Saurabh Kumar, secretary (east) of the Ministry of External Affairs of India.

“We discussed [Korea’s] new Indo-Pacific policy and the opportunities it offers to deepen, strengthen and broaden our bilateral relationship,” said Kumar, speaking at the Grand Hyatt Seoul on Tuesday, the second day of a three-day trip to the country.

Kumar met with First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong on Monday to discuss regional security dynamics and resume the India-Korea Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue, launched in 2010 and last held in Seoul in 2014. 

The two countries may hold a first two-plus-two dialogue between their vice foreign and vice defense ministers this year, Kumar said. 

Korea holds similar dialogues on the ministerial level with the United States, Indonesia and Australia, two of which are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, with India.

“There is a convergence amongst the countries which form the Quad, both in terms of the values they uphold as well as the objectives in the Indo-Pacific, which is that we would like to see a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific,” Kumar said. “We would like resolution of issues in a peaceful manner through diplomacy, with territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries being apparent.”

His visit was the first by a senior-ranking official from India this year, when the two countries mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties.

India, hosting the G20 summit in New Delhi in September, may host a presidential summit with President Yoon Suk Yeol on the sidelines.

“We are looking forward to high-level exchanges during the course of this year, to the visit of President Yoon to India and the foreign minister,” said Kumar. 

The last summit between Korea and India was in 2019 in Seoul when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited. A year earlier, the leaders of the two countries met in New Delhi and vowed to increase trade levels to $50 billion by 2030.  

The trade volume between the two was 23.7 billion in 2021, according to the Foreign Ministry in Seoul. 

“India is on a growth trajectory – we recorded growth of 8.5 percent in 2021, and figures last year are estimated to be close to 8 percent,” said Kumar. “India is a promising investment destination and we look for Korean companies to come and invest in India.”

Traditionally, Korean investments in India have focused on the automotive industry and electronics, as Daewoo, Hyundai, LG and Samsung Electronics led Korea’s initial wave of investments in the late 1990s, pumping some $5.44 million into the Indian market between 1996 and 1998, according to the Foreign Ministry in Seoul. 

“We would like to see Korean companies further consolidate their position in these sectors, the automobiles, electric vehicles and electronic goods, but also open partnerships across new sectors such as green technology,” Kumar said. 

The Kia Carens won the Indian Car of the Year award for 2023 on Sunday, according Hyundai Motor Group. The award, considered the Oscars of the Indian car industry, also crowned Kia’s electric EV6 with the Green Car Award, making Kia the only automotive brand to ever win two Indian Car of the Year awards in the same year. 

Kumar was scheduled to meet with the First Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul and National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee chair Kim Tae-ho on Tuesday before concluding his trip Wednesday. 

BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]

14. [Column] What are our core national interests? (South Korea)

Excerpts:

Without a common orientation to national interests, our society’s factional, ideological and generational splits will grow. The worsening schisms will go further than harming our internal unity. Rival countries will enjoy the weakening of our national power after it worked so hard to become the world’s sixth most powerful country.

Two weeks have passed since the New Year. When we make a meaningful first step, it will be a fruitful year.

Tuesday

January 17, 2023

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[Column] What are our core national interests?

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/17/opinion/columns/national-interest-international-community/20230117201735547.html

Lee Jae-min

The author is a professor of law at the Seoul National University’s School of Law.

Over the past few years, I have attended seminars at home and abroad on conflicts between the United States and China. They all had different introductions and flows, but the conclusions were all the same. The seminars ended with the conclusion that as both countries are equally important, Korea is caught between the two and must behave cautiously.

Cautious behavior cannot be a foreign policy strategy. It is just like saying, “The sky is blue.” We cannot find any guidance from it. Is it saying that we must take advantages of both sides but we must never suffer a loss?

Whenever a seminar ends, I feel frustrated. Why are we having the same discussions over and over? My conclusion is that Korean society has no consensus on what is our national interests. Instead of a consensus, antagonism between factions, generations and groups deepens each year.

As a result, we tend to measure our national interests by an easy indicator — numbers — such as import goals, per capita GDP, foreign currency reserves and semiconductor market share. We have hardly had a discussion on our comprehensive national interests that reflects how this country is perceived in the cruel reality of the international community and how it will survive and prosper. Instead, we hear a cacophony of voices. They are all important. But it is unclear if any of the arguments — and the sum of the specific interests — really serves the comprehensive and long-term national interests of our country.

There is a saying that “if everything matters, nothing matters.” We must make clear what our core values are and what our non-negotiable principles are. We need introspection and in-depth discussions. We should look at relations with other countries using this framework. Only then can we have a determination to suffer some short-term losses for a longer-term gain.

Without this process, we will have a difficult time making a decision when we face a problem. A case in point is the ongoing U.S.-China contest. We take one side, and then we take the other. After the administration changes, we go back to square one. Flexible responses within a framework of set goals and stopgap measures without goals are different.

The starting point of this process is to think about the prestige and status in the international community that we hope for in 30 years. The past 30 years after the end of the Cold War was an era of turbulence. There were hardships, but we successfully overcame them. One piece of great news at the end of last year was that Korea was ranked sixth in a global evaluation of national powers, which factored in economic, diplomatic and military power. This symbolizes our accomplishments of the past 30 years.

As the international order is being shaken, however, we must think about the next 30 years. Where do we want to stand in the world in 2050? The youth today will lead the country by 2050. Given their different characteristics, a very different leadership is bound to emerge.

We have a plan for carbon reduction until 2050, but we do not think about what our position will be in the international community by then. We have a plan to reach Mars by 2045 but we do not think about what would be the affairs of the neighboring countries of Korea at that time.

Lately, more discussions take place about 2050. The discussions must include what Korea’s brand in the international community will be by that time and what Korea’s abilities and national prestige will be. So, we must reflect this and make clear what should be the key to our national interests. Through this kind of introspection, we must come up with a consistent and wise response to challenges before us.

Without a common orientation to national interests, our society’s factional, ideological and generational splits will grow. The worsening schisms will go further than harming our internal unity. Rival countries will enjoy the weakening of our national power after it worked so hard to become the world’s sixth most powerful country.

Two weeks have passed since the New Year. When we make a meaningful first step, it will be a fruitful year.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

15. Korea-Japan ties on improvement trend after 'deep ordeal': Yoon

Korea-Japan ties on improvement trend after 'deep ordeal': Yoon

The Korea Times · January 17, 2023

In this Nov. 13, 2022 file photo, Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, right, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pose for a photo during their summit at a hotel in Phnom Penh. Yonhap

Relations between Korea and Japan have shown a clear trend of improvement recently following a period of "deep ordeal" in the past few years, President Yoon Suk Yeol said in a message Tuesday.

"Relations between Korea and Japan went through the most difficult and deepest ordeal for the past few years, but they are showing a clear trend of improvement recently," Yoon said in the message, read by First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong, at a joint Seoul conference of the two countries' private panels on helping develop bilateral relations.

Yoon stressed Korea and Japan are "the closest and most important neighbors" that need to cooperate in all fields, including security and the economy. The president added the Seoul government will continue to make efforts toward "practical improvements" of the relations.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also pledged to work toward improving bilateral ties in his message delivered by Koichi Aiboshi, Japan's ambassador to Korea.

Kishida said he will maintain close communications with Yoon for a prompt resolution for pending issues.

Yoon has repeatedly expressed a commitment to improve the bilateral relationship in a departure from his liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in. The two neighbors have stepped up efforts to improve security cooperation against North Korea's provocations and threats. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · January 17, 2023

16. How South Korea plans to buoy its counter-drone capabilities

How South Korea plans to buoy its counter-drone capabilities

Defense News · by Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo · January 13, 2023

MILAN, Italy — In the early hours of Dec. 26, five North Korean drones entered South Korean airspace, with one traveling as far as the capital Seoul.

Although authorities claimed the UAVs did not fly near critical security facilities, the systems did operate above the country’s territory for several hours.

Defense forces failed to counter the threat, even after deploying fighter jets, attack helicopters and firing warning shots. The helicopters fired a combined 100 rounds, according to the Defense Ministry.

One fighter jet scrambled that day, a KA-1 light attack plane, crashed during takeoff; its two pilots safely ejected, defense officials said.

One drone returned to the North after three hours in South Korea, while the rest disappeared from South Korean military radars one after another, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said.

Following the incident, South Korea sent surveillance assets near and across the border to photograph key military facilities in the North, the Joint Chiefs said, without elaborating further.

Incidents like the one in late December present a national security threat to the South, as the drones flew long enough to potentially collect intelligence and take images. More alarming, however, is the fact that “South Korea has suffered similar drone incursions repeatedly — in 2014 and 2017, for example — and each time the military says it will improve its counter-drone systems,” according to David Hambling, a writer of drone warfare and technology topics.

A suspected North Korean drone is seen at the South Korean Defense Ministry on June 21, 2017. (Lee Jung-hoon/Yonhap via AP)

North Korea is reportedly expanding its drone capabilities, with a United Nations report from 2016 estimating the country possessed about 300 drones of various types.

It’s unlikely the South’s military was unaware of those drone development efforts, but the “sophistication of the systems as well as their ability to swarm and evade detection” did come as a surprise, said Ken Gause, a North Korea expert with the U.S.-based Center for Naval Analyses think tank.

The wreckage of a crashed drone is seen on a mountain on April 6, 2014, in Samcheok, South Korea. (South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

This suggests “North Korea has benefitted from outside technology, potentially from Russia or Iran,” Gause told Defense News.

Hambling also noted that Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones against Ukraine “is likely to encourage North Korea to increase efforts in this direction, posing an asymmetric threat which Seoul seems poorly prepared for.”

Failed countermeasures

Some experts agreed that South Korea’s failure to shoot down the drones in December simply comes down to the fact that unmanned aircraft are complex and difficult to counter — something that is especially true for smaller and faster UAVs.

“To begin with, air defenses are naturally designed to deal with threats from aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters, which are all relatively large and fast,” Hambling said. “Many were previously designed to specifically filter out small, slow, low-flying objects, as there were almost invariable birds which would otherwise create many false alerts.”

Case in point: The morning after the Dec. 26 incident, South Korea preemptively deployed fighter planes to its border in response to what turned out to be a flock of birds.

As drones are typically smaller and generally contain fewer metallic elements than larger aircraft, they are “naturally stealthier with a smaller radar signature than larger aircraft, making them harder to detect,” Hambling explained.

Lt. Gen. Kang Shin Chul, South Korea’s chief director of operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged in a televised statement following the Dec. 26 intrusion that the country lacks the ability to detect and strike small surveillance drones with wingspans less than 3 meters (9.84 feet). However, the South has radars and other assets to spot and shoot down larger combat UAVs.

“We have seen this in Saudi Arabia, Russia and Ukraine, all of which have had high-tech defenses penetrated by small, low-tech drones,” Hambling said. “South Korea is certainly not alone in suffering this kind of breach.”

A Chunma short-range air defense system is seen during a counter-drone drill on Dec. 29, 2022, in Yangju, South Korea. (South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

Bruce Bennett, a defense researcher at the think tank Rand, said South Korea’s failed counter-drone measures are due to a lack of focus on that capability. Instead, he explained, the country has prioritized combat aircraft and naval programs.

In addition, he told Defense News, the Army has faced “limitations to its military budgets, tremendous demographic problems, and a lack of personnel from 2005 and on, which led to [a downsizing] of the military, and the trade-off was to acquire new, expensive technologies for the manpower they were losing.”

Next steps

Three days after the airspace incursion, the South Korean military staged large-scale drills to simulate shooting down drones. The exercise involved land-based anti-air guns, UAVs playing the role of enemy drones, and a total of 20 fighter jets, attack helicopters and unmanned assets.

While there was no live fire, it was the country’s first set of major counter-drone drills since 2017, according to military authorities.

South Korean soldiers operate a Vulcan automatic cannon during a military exercise in Yangju, South Korea, on Dec. 29, 2022. (South Korea Defense Ministry via AP)

And following the aerial trespassing, South Korean authorities have promised to increase defense spending, specifically allocating about $440 million for counter-drone efforts, which would include the development of an airborne laser weapon and a jamming system focused on small drones.

In 2021, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration announced a project to develop a laser anti-aircraft system to protect against mini-UAVs, with local firm Hanwha designated as the test product developer.

Hanwha Defense spokesman Jeff Sung told Defense News that the company is scheduled to complete development of this system in 2023, with initial production scheduled for 2024. Hanwha will make the second iterance of what Sung called “a truck-mounted laser anti-aircraft system” over the next couple of years.

The company is currently trying to improve the system’s mobility by developing smaller and lighter platforms as well as diversifying the output power of lasers to address different types of targets, Sung added.

South Korea is also adding a third squadron dedicated to addressing UAV threats, and the country is now accepting bids for a portable anti-drone jammer for deployment next year.

But experts say more must be done to ensure drone incursions are stopped. Bennett said South Korea must be prepared to not only jam drones but also target their GPS systems with enough electrical power to make the system fail.

This image, provided April 2, 2014, by the South Korean Defense Ministry, shows the wreckage of a crashed drone on the South's Baengnyeong Island. Two drones, believed to be North Korean, were found in as many weeks. (South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

North Korea has years of experience developing jamming capabilities to counter GPS-guided weapons that the South and its American allies might deploy in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The North reportedly maintains a regiment-sized unit focused on GPS jamming near its capital, and the country previously used Russian-made equipment and satellite navigation technology to jam signals near border regions.

“The experience North Korea has built over the last 20 years in doing this likely makes its drones harder to jam,” Bennett said.

Meanwhile, Hambling recommends South Korea carry out a complete assessment of its air defense systems to identify shortcomings. This could also answer questions about the Dec. 26 incident, he added. “Were the UAVs misidentified? Or were they correctly identified, but did the rules of engagement not allow them to be tackled? Were no suitable assets available for the interception? Or were they simply not detected?”

Gause agreed, noting the importance of identifying where the drones launched from and maintaining an ongoing list of possible future launch sites.

However, he warned, “North Korea does have the ability to pop up from underground facilities to launch things like missiles and drones, which gives the U.S. and Korea very little warning.”

Hyung-Jin Kim with The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. She covers a wide range of topics related to military procurement and international security, and specializes in reporting on the aviation sector. She is based in Milan, Italy.

17. Will South Korea Build Nuclear Weapons?

​Excerpts:

The big hurdle then is the Americans. The US is South Korea’s only treaty ally and its core foreign relationship. Without American defense guarantees, South Korea’s defense spending would double or triple. So South Korean governments have traditionally given American preferences wide berth.

And indeed, the American response was to play down Yoon’s comments.

But I doubt this position is sustainable over the long, or even medium, term. The North Korean nuclear threat is not going away. There is no denuclearization deal to be had with them – Trump and Moon’s failure proved that – and China will not help. In fact, the North Korean nuclear and missile threat will only worsen as the regime tests more and more, and they certainly are not going to stop. The more North Korea can threaten US cities with massive destruction, the less credible US alliance guarantees will be.

Luckily, this problem is not new. America’s European allies faced it during the Cold War because the USSR could strike the US homeland, and a variety of responses, including nuclear sharing and indigenous nuclearization, were tried with reasonable success. The US has also adapted to Israeli, Indian, and Pakistani nuclearization without a massive crisis.

So South Korean nuclearization need not lead to an alliance rupture unless the US insists on it.

​

Will South Korea Build Nuclear Weapons?

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · January 16, 2023

South Korea’s President Mentions the Possible Nuclearization of His Country – South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol suggested in a press conference last week that South Korea might develop its own nuclear weapon. There has been a rolling debate in South Korea for about a year on its potential nuclearization.

(Subscribe to Our YouTube Channel Here. 19FortyFive publishes original videos every day.)

But that has been mostly limited to extra-governmental voices in think-tanks and academia.

So it is genuinely surprising that this has already reached the presidential office.

Indeed, it speaks to just how threatening North Korea’s nuclear weapons are perceived in South Korea – and how unhelpful China has been in restraining Pyongyang – that no less than its president is now discussing this.

The Argument for South Korean Nuclear Weapons

I have written about this elsewhere, but the brief version of the South Korean argument for nuclear weapons is that US extended deterrence over South Korea is less credible since North Korea developed the ability in 2017 to hit the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. Indeed, striking the US homeland is almost certainly why the North Koreans built an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un and his cronies are not crazy or insane. They are highly unlikely to launch a first strike on the US or its allies. That would entrain massive US retaliation, eliminating the Kim regime and devasting the country. Instead, the purpose of North Korea’s nuclear ICBMs is to push the Americans and South Koreans apart. Ukraine is an example of how North Korea might leverage strategic nuclear threats to block or reduce American assistance to South Korea in time of need.

Ukraine is not a US ally, of course. South Korea is. But the analogy roughly works. Russian President Vladimir Putin has, since the start of his war, made oblique nuclear threats against the West to limit its assistance to Ukraine. It is irrelevant if Putin was bluffing or not (he probably was). What mattered was the uncertainty he stirred up in Western capitals.

We know that Russian nuclear threats deterred the West from setting up a no-fly zone over Ukraine in March, when Kiev was begging for that. (And NATO still has not done that.) We also know that NATO member states have been unwilling to transfer too many weapons and their most modern weapons to Ukraine for fear of crossing a nuclear red line with Putin. Finally, Russia’s nuclear status has provoked great debate over just how far the Ukrainians should push for final victory. Specifically, if Kiev tries to take Crimea – which Putin snatched back in 2014 – would that be a bridge too far?

In short, while NATO has not abandoned Ukraine for fear of Russian nuclear weapons, its commitment, transfers, and zeal have been blunted by them. The South Korean fear is similar: in a spiraling crisis with North Korea, would its nuclear ICBMs compel the US to ‘slow-roll’ assistance for fear of crossing some retaliation threshold with North Korea?

The answer is almost certainly yes. It is inconceivable now, in a nuclearized environment, that the US alliance commitment to South Korea is as automatic as it was in a conventional environment. Any US president will flinch at a course of action which might realistically incur a nuclear strike on US cities.

This new reality, since North Korea’s successful 2017 ICBM test, is only just sinking in. For a few years, it looked like former US President Donald Trump and former South President Moon Jae In might strike a deal with North Korea. That was always pretty far-fetched, but once it definitely fell apart by 2020, a South Korean nuclear debate was likely inevitable.

America’s Response

The debate on nuclearization in South Korea itself is culminating. South Korea public opinion is supportive. Nongovernmental opinion is tilting toward it. The country’s main conservative party has said South Korea should withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty if North Korea tests another, seventh, nuclear weapon. And now the South Korean president has broached the issue too.

The big hurdle then is the Americans. The US is South Korea’s only treaty ally and its core foreign relationship. Without American defense guarantees, South Korea’s defense spending would double or triple. So South Korean governments have traditionally given American preferences wide berth.

And indeed, the American response was to play down Yoon’s comments.

But I doubt this position is sustainable over the long, or even medium, term. The North Korean nuclear threat is not going away. There is no denuclearization deal to be had with them – Trump and Moon’s failure proved that – and China will not help. In fact, the North Korean nuclear and missile threat will only worsen as the regime tests more and more, and they certainly are not going to stop. The more North Korea can threaten US cities with massive destruction, the less credible US alliance guarantees will be.

Luckily, this problem is not new. America’s European allies faced it during the Cold War because the USSR could strike the US homeland, and a variety of responses, including nuclear sharing and indigenous nuclearization, were tried with reasonable success. The US has also adapted to Israeli, Indian, and Pakistani nuclearization without a massive crisis.

So South Korean nuclearization need not lead to an alliance rupture unless the US insists on it.

Expert Biography: Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · January 16, 2023

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com