Quotes of the Day:

"The use of large-scale military force in volatile regions of underdeveloped countries is difficult to do right, has major unintended consequences and rarely turns out to be quick, effective, controlled and short lived."

– Dennis C. Blair

"Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people."

– Eleanor Roosevelt

"Every man is guilty of all the good he did not do."

– Voltaire

1. Anticipating North Korea’s 2025 Foreign Policy Tasks and Policy Recommendations for the ROK’s Response

2. South Korea’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine War: Endeavors for a Global Pivotal State and Its Impact

3. US experts question reason for probe of loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea

4. Top Trump Diplomat to Share Foreign-Policy Role With Army of Envoys

5. ‘The evidence leaves no room for doubt’ Military analyst Ruslan Leviev reviews the proof corroborating North Korea’s military intervention in Russia’s Kursk region

6. Public support swings toward South Korea's ruling party despite martial law fallout

7. Exclusive: Korean-American lawmaker warns impeachment drive could bring disaster for S. Korea

8. Some N. Koreans marvel at South's freedom to criticize president

9. Crushing dissent: N. Korea's anti-reactionary thought law and its effect on daily life

10. N. Korea orders police to intensify public surveillance under guise of education

11. N. Koreans abandon won as currency redenomination fears spread

12. ＜Investigation＞ No Birthday Celebrations for Kim Jong-un - "Nobody Knows His Age Even Now," "Perhaps He's Still Too Young" - New Propaganda Film Screened

13. ＜Inside North Korea＞ Leaflets Reach Northernmost Ryanggang Province, Causing Lockdown and Confusion - 300km from South Korea... Who Did It?

14. ＜Inside North Korea＞ Worker Dispatches to Russia Expanding - Screening Criteria Unusually Relaxed... Appears to Have Increased Following Military Deployment

15. Ladders, noodle stations and K-pop: how the arrest of South Korea’s president unfolded

16. N. Korea's media reports on Yoon's detention over martial law bid

17. DP to unilaterally table revised special counsel bill to probe Yoon's insurrection charges

18. HRW “North Korea’s Deployment of Troops to Russia Shows Security and Human Rights Linkage… Forced Obedience through Reign of Terror”

19. Ukraine Military Situation: Mounting North Korean Casualties – Analysis

20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

21. Engagement vs. Alliance: Trump’s Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula

1. Anticipating North Korea’s 2025 Foreign Policy Tasks and Policy Recommendations for the ROK’s Response

The PDF of this article can be downloaded at this link:https://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtPcrmBoardDetail.do?sidx=366&idx=2640&depth=3&searchCondition=&searchKeyword=&pageIndex=1&lang=en

This is the first analytic report I have seen from a South Korean government source (KIDA) on the recent plenary meeting in north Korea.

Excerpts:

The fact that Choe Son-hui, who represents North Korea’s diplomacy, and Ri Yong-gil, who represents the military, were both appointed as members of North Korea’s Political Bureau denotes that its foreign policy tasks are significant. Such appointments may have been intended to strengthen a linkage between the Party’s leadership and diplomacy and the military. If so, what kinds of foreign policy tasks will be pursued?

First, North Korea will take a “strategy for the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction.” North Korea used a similar expression to “toughest” when it comes to its enemy during last year’s plenary meeting. What is worth of noticing this year is that i) it specified ‘the U.S.’ ii) in a more stronghanded manner and iii) it revealed that it had formulated a ‘strategy.’ This can be interpreted that North Korea could reinforce the ongoing approach or pursue more specific objectives.

Moreover, with a higher level of verbal threats to increase its leverage, North Korea has suggested its intent to coerce the U.S -- to either make the U.S. stop doing what it is doing or to receive something from the U.S. To put it simply, North Korea revealed its intention not to make concessions vis-à-vis the U.S., rather than lowering possibilities of talks.

Most concerningly, there is a chance that North Korea expects negotiations that can undermine security of South Korea. North Korea mentioned “for its long-term national interests and security” as the goal of the toughest strategy to deal with Washington. North Korea’s persistent demands such as a reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) and a suspension or reduction of the ROK-U.S. combined exercises satisfy this specific goal. In particular, North Korea may have considered implications of the recent leadership appointments of the Pentagon in Trump’s 2nd-term administration who seeks fiscal efficiency and heavily focuses on China.3 Furthermore, North Korea may have found it expedient to extend its hands to Trump, given a slim chance of summit talks between Seoul and Washington amidst current political uncertainties in Seoul.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s toughest strategy to deal with the U.S. seems to connote its intention to draw in China. North Korea has referred to the U.S. that “regards anti-communism as its invariable state policy,” which is an unprecedented expression. In contrast, it has only emphasized Washington’s hostile policy towards North Korea by using the term “anti-republic” in the past. It is presumed that North Korea takes the inauguration of a Republican government in the U.S., as well as the high-ranking post appointment of anti-communists and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio into account. Also, North Korea’s mention of the “U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance” indicates that it envisages a competitive dynamic among regional countries, thinking outside of the ‘bilateral relationships’ box. If so, North Korea is likely to restore its seemingly estranged relationship with China.

Anticipating North Korea’s 2025 Foreign Policy Tasks and Policy Recommendations for the ROK’s Response

- Based on Analysis of the 11^th Plenary Meeting of the 8^th Central Committee of the WPK -

By Dr. JEON Kyung-joo

Chief of Korean Peninsula Security Research Division, KIDA

Overall Assessment of the Plenary Meeting: Prudence, but Expressing Confidence

North Korea held the 11th plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee (hereafter the 11th plenary meeting) of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) from December 23 to 27, 2024. Since 2020, North Korea has not released a New Year’s Statement and has instead reported results of end-of-year plenary meetings.

The 11th plenary meeting turned out to be relatively not specific. Considering uncertainty of international situations in the foreseeable future, North Korea is thought to have felt a pressure to make conclusive and specific announcement. Particularly, when it comes to diplomacy, North Korea only briefly stated that an “the strategy for the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction,” while referring to a proposed task of “promoting the development of relations with the friendly countries.” With regards to the military, North Korea did not offer further details --- even though it mentioned “the strategic and tactical policies for more reliably guaranteeing the bolstering of war deterrence.” This is quite different from the previous year’s end-of-year plenary meeting when it mentioned specific numbers such as “three reconnaissance satellites.” Pyongyang is thought to have restrained from presenting specific announcement out of a fear of a failure to achieve. Of the three reconnaissance satellites mentioned above, North Korea managed to launch only one satellite in May 2024.

In addition, it is worth noticing conspicuously decreased belligerent rhetoric or mentions of strengthening military capabilities. Kim Jong Un chose not to mention last year’s achievements as well as nonachievements of major tasks. Indeed, Kim anomalously did not speak about achievements such as the Hwaseong-19 ICBM, rather than playing up with flowery languages. And besides, North Korea revealed its first 4,000-ton frigate, releasing only pictures without any comment at the plenary meeting.1 Belligerent expressions that warned actual military actions in 2023 such as “ability to respond to war” and “military readiness posture” were significantly reduced. References to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities were unwontedly entirely absent. Taken together, North Korea seems to remain prudent lest he provokes foreign countries or it may have saved comments for future opportunities.

Nevertheless, all plenary meetings held by North Korea have additional purpose of fomenting trust and pride in the regime among the people of North Korea. As such, North Korea exposed self-confidence amidst prudence in the following two ways.

First, North Korea deems itself as a country that contributes to a construction of a multipolar world. Just two years ago, North Korea defined the state of international affairs as a “New Cold War.”2 In contrast, during the 11th plenary meeting, it claimed that a multipolar world is being built, while also proclaiming that it is planting an international status as a core contributor to this progress. North Korea also asserted that while the international order remains divided between the “circles of supremacy-seeking forces” and the “circles of the independent forces,” the former is in decline and the latter, which includes North Korea, is on the rise.

Second, North Korea placed a greater emphasis on tasks such as disaster prevention, regional development, and strengthening the educational foundations. These are all national-level tasks that presuppose North Korea’s confidence in fulfillment. While mentioning shortfalls during a discussion on last year’s achievements, North Korea set a high bar for the proposed tasks for 2025. For example, it added large-scale tasks to the ongoing “Regional Development 20×10 Policy,” which seeks to construct local modernized industrial factories in 20 cities and counties per year over the next 10 years.

1 This is related to the goal of ‘enhancing underwater and naval capabilities’ which was proposed as a task for 2024 in the 2023 end-of-year plenary meeting. It has been pointed out as an underachieved goal among the 5 major goals for strengthening military capabilities.

2 Young-jong Lee, “[Full Transcript] North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, Report at the Plenary Meeting of the Workers Party

of Korea (in Korean),” NewsPim, January 1, 2023.

However, in order for self-confident North Korea to actually contribute to building the multipolar world and accomplish grand domestic tasks, an extremely advantageous international environments must be fostered in 2025. The ‘circles of the independent forces’ must continue to exert power and influence against the U.S.’s new Trump administration. Also, a considerable amount of foreign funding and resources must pour in to cover expenses of grand domestic projects. Given this, even though North Korea did not elaborate on its foreign policy tasks sufficiently, it is fair to say that this does not indicate an actual importance of foreign policy tasks in North Korea’s overall goals for 2025.

Anticipating North Korea’s Major Foreign Policy Tasks in 2025

The fact that Choe Son-hui, who represents North Korea’s diplomacy, and Ri Yong-gil, who represents the military, were both appointed as members of North Korea’s Political Bureau denotes that its foreign policy tasks are significant. Such appointments may have been intended to strengthen a linkage between the Party’s leadership and diplomacy and the military. If so, what kinds of foreign policy tasks will be pursued?

First, North Korea will take a “strategy for the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction.” North Korea used a similar expression to “toughest” when it comes to its enemy during last year’s plenary meeting. What is worth of noticing this year is that i) it specified ‘the U.S.’ ii) in a more stronghanded manner and iii) it revealed that it had formulated a ‘strategy.’ This can be interpreted that North Korea could reinforce the ongoing approach or pursue more specific objectives.

Moreover, with a higher level of verbal threats to increase its leverage, North Korea has suggested its intent to coerce the U.S -- to either make the U.S. stop doing what it is doing or to receive something from the U.S. To put it simply, North Korea revealed its intention not to make concessions vis-à-vis the U.S., rather than lowering possibilities of talks.

Most concerningly, there is a chance that North Korea expects negotiations that can undermine security of South Korea. North Korea mentioned “for its long-term national interests and security” as the goal of the toughest strategy to deal with Washington. North Korea’s persistent demands such as a reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) and a suspension or reduction of the ROK-U.S. combined exercises satisfy this specific goal. In particular, North Korea may have considered implications of the recent leadership appointments of the Pentagon in Trump’s 2nd-

term administration who seeks fiscal efficiency and heavily focuses on China.3 Furthermore, North Korea may have found it expedient to extend its hands to Trump, given a slim chance of summit talks between Seoul and Washington amidst current political uncertainties in Seoul.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s toughest strategy to deal with the U.S. seems to connote its intention to draw in China. North Korea has referred to the U.S. that “regards anti-communism as its invariable state policy,” which is an unprecedented expression. In contrast, it has only emphasized Washington’s hostile policy towards North Korea by using the term “anti-republic” in the past. It is presumed that North Korea takes the inauguration of a Republican government in the U.S., as well as the high-ranking post appointment of anti-communists and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio into account. Also, North Korea’s mention of the “U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance” indicates that it envisages a competitive dynamic among regional countries, thinking outside of the ‘bilateral relationships’ box. If so, North Korea is likely to restore its seemingly estranged relationship with China.

When North Korea’s U.S. strategy connotes mending fences with China in terms of foreign policy, it would entail military components as well, which seems to be intentionally kept undisclosed. 2025 is the year that North Korea must complete its five-year plan for defense science advancement and weapons development. Therefore, North Korea will need to launch reconnaissance satellites since it failed last year, conduct additional test launches of hypersonic missiles and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), and develop and reveal ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) this year. Progress in these weapon systems will increase Pyongyang’s leverage vis-a-vis Washington. In an attempt to agitate President Trump, North Korea may also carry out unprecedented strategic-level provocations such as test-launches of ICBMs on a normal angle and a 7th nuclear test.

Second, it is anticipated that North Korea will seek to drive its economy by improving friendly relations with not only China and Russia, but also with so-called ‘Global South’ countries. Mentions of specific countries other than the U.S., including China and Russia, were absent from reports of the 11th plenary meeting. However, the phrase “promote the development of relations with the friendly countries ” seems to imply renewed diplomacy with Global South countries. These tasks would suggest North Korea’s international economic cooperation to support its domestic tasks including regional development, strengthening the educational foundations, and tourism.

3 Kim and Park, “2nd in Command at the Department of Defense also a Millionaire ... Individual who has advocated for revising the Role of USFK appointed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at DoD (in Korean),” Yonhap News, December 23, 2024.

This is because resources necessary for these domestic tasks are unlikely to be sufficiently procured without international economic cooperation. North Korea’s domestic production appears to be continuously improving since 2023.4 However, most items of the “12 major goals of the national economic development” (grains, energy, coal, structural steel, non-ferrous metal, nitrogen fertilizer, cement, wooden logs, fabric, seafood, housing, and rail freight transport) are presumed to end up unsuccessfully, without assistance or imports from China and Russia.5

In particular, to consistently implement the aforementioned “Regional Development 20×10 Policy,” import of petroleum fuels from not only China but also Russia is absolutely essential. On this front, the fact Russia vis-à-vis North Korea has shown its willingness for continuous engagement weighs in North Korea’s favor.6

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has not yet fully restored its diplomatic relations with traditional partners, concentrating on limited relationships selectively. 7 In the aftermath of North Korea’s decision to close its borders and expel foreign Embassies, return of Western diplomats to missions in Pyongyang has been delayed. 8 In contrast, North Korea’s potential cooperation partners including China, Russia, Iran, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cuba, and India have resumed their diplomatic missions9. Other than these countries, North Korea is expected to strengthen diplomatic and economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Laos. North Korea’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs visited these countries in

4 North Korea Research Division, “Analysis and Implications of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea (in Korean),” Online Series, Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) No. 24-67 (December 29, 2024).

5 North Korea imports items related to the daily lives of the people from China, and resources related to economic infrastructure from Russia.

6 Russia has invited North Korean troops to Russia’s Victory Day celebration scheduled for May 2025, and it is

anticipated that Kim Jong-un might visit Russia on this occasion.

7 However, North Korea did claim in 2022 that it would “make diplomatic efforts to improve wide-ranging exchanges and cooperation with capitalist countries also.” Kim, “North Korea stresses need to ‘escape America’s Political and Economic Subjugation’ ... Emphasizes Cooperation among Developing Countries (in Korean),” Yonhap News, September 13, 2022.

8 Ahn, “Swedish Diplomats return to Pyongyang ... ‘Embassy Operations will return to pre-COVID-19 levels’ (in

Korean),” Voice of America (VoA), September 17, 2024; Ahn, “Poland resumes Embassy Operations in Pyongyang for the first time in 4 years ... Second Western Country to do so after Sweden (in Korean),” Voice of America (VoA), November 16, 2024; Kim, “European Countries that have not yet resumed Diplomatic Missions in

Pyongyang, are ”in Consultation with North Korea“ (in Korean),“ Yonhap News, June 3, 2024.

9 NK News Podcast, “The Status of North Korea's Foreign Community," December 31, 2024; Kim. ”Swedish Diplomats return to Pyongyang for the first time in 4 years ... first Western Country to resume Diplomatic Mission (in Korean),“ Chosun Ilbo, September 17, 2024

September 2024 to host Vice-Minister-level bilateral meetings.10 North Korea also appears to have plans to restore exchanges with African countries including Nigeria. African countries have been a traditional source of foreign currency for North Korea.11

Lastly, it seems that North Korea will devote its total resources to enhance actual capabilities and modern warfare capacity of the military. Compared to previous years, North Korea emphasized strengthening political ideology rather than military technology centered on nuclear weapons and missiles, with the focus of raising morale and developing doctrines.12

Given North Korea’s particular mentions of “putting its operations command on an IT and modern basis,” it is almost certain that its military doctrine will reflect hybrid warfare and drone warfare. By participating in the Russia-Ukraine war, North Korea may have learned the following painful lessons: that nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence but are difficult to actually use; and that gaining firsthand experience in future warfighting and consequent doctrine development is crucial to possibly determine the outcome of wars.13 Meanwhile, North Korea’s emphasis of actual capabilities and modern warfare capacities of the military may be laying the justifying groundwork to appease possible domestic backlash when its troop dispatch takes air nationwide.

Policy Recommendations for the ROK’s Response

South Korea’s desirable response to North Korea’s each anticipated foreign policy task is as follows. First, bilateral talks or negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea that is not actually associate with prospect of denuclearization of North Korea must be prevented. A possibility of U.S-North Korea bilateral talks is a contentious issue in Seoul and accordingly, there is a wide range of interpretations whether North Korea’s plenary meeting remarks connote negotiations vis-à-vis the U.S. However, if possibility of such talks cannot be completely ruled out and such talks significantly impacts South Korea’s national interests, it is better advised to prepare aftermath of possible negotiations.

10    Park and KIim, “North Korea’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs holds Vice-Minister-level Bilateral Meeting in

Indonesia ... Reaffirms Expanded Cooeration (in Korean),” Yonhap News, September 19, 2024.

11    Park, “Nigeria Resumes Embassy Mission in Pyongyang,” Radia Free Asia (RFA), December 16, 2024.

12 These two policy directions have been particularly emphasized since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. JEON Kyung-joo, “The New Phase of Revolutionary MIlitary Development Officialized by Kim Jong-un (in Korean),” Northeast Asia Strategic Analysis (NASA), Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) (May 9, 2022).

13 Of course, as analyzed earlier, nuclear and missile capabilities may have been intentionally omitted.

Indeed, the Trump transition team is reportedly reviewing possible direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea. South Korea should take heed of possibilities of any interactions between Trump and Kim Jong Un taking negotiations to end Russia-Ukraine war as a momentum. Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Keith Kellog has already been appointed as President Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine and Russia, and he has led efforts to formulate a strategy to end the war. Given President Trump’s remarks such as “North Korea gets involved, that's another

element that's a very complicating factor.” and “I get along very well with Kim Jong Un,”14 Trump may consider simultaneously or link a peace agreement in Ukraine and the North Korean issue. Should the peace negotiations begin as Trump hopes, a meeting between Trump and Kim Jong Un will likely to follow during the first half of 2025.

Since Trump will understandably seek successful or easy talks or negotiations after no- deal Hanoi summit, there is a slim chance of denuclearization talks with North Korea. However, in light of Trump administration’s possible attempts for peace talks for the war in Ukraine, we cannot rule out any possibilities of interactions between Washington and Pyongyang that is not associated with or aimed at denuclearization. Kim Jong Un can utilize a meeting with Trump to justify and advertise his decision to dispatch troops to Russia domestically. Trump can claim his contributing role to reduce instability on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, a prior coordination between Seoul and Washington against such scenarios must be made. Moreover, should the U.S. offer North Korea concessions that harm South Korea’s security by any chance in exchange for demands unassociated with denuclearization, Seoul must prevent a nightmare at all costs.

To this end, Seoul needs to first define its stance on every possible negotiation issue between the U.S. and North Korea and explain itself precisely to the ally. If North Korea’s proclaimed “toughest strategy” toward the U.S. can be interpreted as seeking its national interests and a guarantee of security without backing down to the U.S., North Korea may demand:

i) a modest reduction or suspension of ROK-U.S. combined military exercises; ii) a postponement (suspension) of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG); iii) a reduction of USFK troops; and iv) a suspension of the deployment of strategic assets to and around the Korean peninsula..

Conversely, the 2nd Trump administration may consider demands that can be fulfilled either immediately or in the next 4 years to secure the seemingly success such as: i) a suspension of the supply of weapons to third-party country currently at war; ii) a request to halt a resumption of nuclear tests; iii) a freeze on test launches of ICBMs and MIRVs; iv) refraining from normal-

14 Time Staff, “Read the Full Transcript of Donald Trump’s 2024 Person of the Year interview with TIME.” TIME,

December 12, 2024.

angle test launches of ICBMs; v) interim measures such as the dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon; and vi) a resumption of the inter-Korean military talks .

Second, South Korea must carry forward diplomacy with the purpose of offsetting North Korea’s cooperation with its partners. While maintaining its existing exchanges and cooperation with China and Russia as much as possible, Seoul needs to emphasize Beijing and Moscow’s roles in preserving stability in the region. Instability precipitated by North Korea and the responsible role of China and Russia should be stressed at every opportunity, not only through track 1 but also track1.5 and track 2 diplomacy. Seoul is called on to consistently clarify hat North Korea’s continuous development of nuclear and missile capabilities is responsible for instability in and around the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, South Korea needs to make China and Russia perceive North Korea as a regional spoiler, while they may not conceive North Korea a direct threat, that could ruin their national agenda and harm their vital interests.

Furthermore, South Korea should actively approach countries that North Korea, through its ties with China and Russia, would seek to increase influence. These countries include Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as the Global South countries in Asia and Africa. Seoul’s offset diplomacy based on its strength could start from exploring defense cooperation areas such defense industry, education and training on defense science technology, and HA/DR. At the same time, South Korea should take precautions against possible technology/information transfer to North Korea. The reason is that this year requires a special attention.

North Korea is impelled to complete the tasks set forth at the 8th Party Congress and has to formulate the 5-year plan to be announced at the upcoming 9th Party Congress in 2026. Therefore, North Korea will unceasingly attempt to gain opportunities to earn foreign currency and resources. Consequently, more frequent illicit activities including secretive meetings related to arms deals, cases of sanctions violations involving cryptocurrency theft in cyberspace are expected to increase. Therefore, South Korea must strengthen cooperation with its partner countries to counter North Korea’s criminal activities.

At the moment, North Korea is hesitant about cooperating with Western European countries, while these countries are startled by North Korean threat on the occasion of its troop dispatch. This makes it an opportune time for South Korea to actively seek joint efforts with partner states to deal with threats posed by the North. Given that many of the major NATO member states

are included in the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), which was launched in October 2024, extending cooperation with MSMT members would be a sensible way.15

Third, South Korea needs to prepare against possibility of military provocations by North Korea under the justification of actual exercises for future warfare. South Korea is better advised to gird itself for North Korea’s gray zone tactics to include test operations of suicide drones, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and cognitive warfare than skirmishes potential for a crisis escalation. North Korea reportedly requested the deployment of troops to Russia. One of the reasons behind this request is undoubtedly its willingness to strengthen the military’s actual warfighting capabilities through combat experience.16 Considering recent battlefield developments, in particular, North Korea would have learned considerable lessons about drone warfare and is likely to be identifying substantial part to be revised in its existing doctrine.

At the same time, Seoul needs to make arrangement on the diplomatic front since the test launches and testing weapon systems mentioned in North Korea’s five-year plan for defense science advancement and weapons development are expected. In particular, while North Korea has conducted high-angle test launches out of concern for neighboring countries, it may now attempt a normal-angle test launch to firm up its readiness. Even if a warhead succeeds in reentry during a high-angle test launch, it does not guarantee a success when launched at a normal-angle under the same conditions. This has accounted for North Korea’s relatively low ICBM threat credibility. Ultimately, it is necessary to keep an eye on the prospect of North Korea renting Russia’s base to safely test-launch an ICBM on a normal-angle.17

Lastly, South Korea needs to closely observe North Korea’s foreign policy activities following the 11th plenary meeting. It is judged that North Korea’ prudence was aimed at maintaining strategic ambiguity for its wait-and-see policy. However, there are several key variables in the first half of 2025, such as the U.S. policy on North Korea following the inauguration of President Trump’s 2nd term, prospect of the peace agreement in Russia’s war in Ukraine, and a possible Presidential election in South Korea. Given this, North Korea will likely to decide its specific course of action and gradually disclose its intentions after seeing how these events unfold.

15    There are 11 members in MSMT, including South Korea, the U.S., Japan, France, the U.K., Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

16 Cho, “NYT reports that North Korea first proposed the Deployment of Troops to Putin, which he accepted,”

Yonhap News, December 24, 2024.

17    Opinion of Dr. HYEONGPIL HAM, Senior Research Fellow, Director of Center for Security and Strategy, KIDA. Kang, “Will North Korea Conduct a Normal-angle ICBM Launch on the Russian Mainland? (in Korean)” Dailian, December 20, 2024.

Meanwhile, North Korea has already announced that it would convene the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) to “amend several articles in the Constitution” on January 22. If North Korea adds an article related to its territorial claims, it will cause an inevitable shock in the inter-Korean relations. 

* This article is a summarized translation of “Anticipating North Korea’s 2025 Foreign Policy Tasks and Policy Recommendations for the ROK’s Response,” Northeast Asia Strategic Analysis (NASA), Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) published on January 2, 2025. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and does not necessarily reflect the view or position of KIDA.

2. South Korea’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine War: Endeavors for a Global Pivotal State and Its Impact

​For all my Korea watcher friends, our Small Wars Journal at Arizona State University will publish Korea focused analysis.

Some useful insights here about Korea as a Global Pivotal State (motivations, progress, and impact) and its role in supporting Ukraine.

​Conclusion:

President Yoon and his administration have made significant efforts to elevate the ROK’s global standing, particularly through its participation in aiding Ukraine’s defense against Russian forces. While these efforts have yielded notable results some scholars express concerns about the long-term implications of such policies. With the likelihood that the war in Ukraine will extend into 2025, key global events, such as the United Nations General Assembly, where President Zelenskyy emphasized that Russia must be “forced into peace” to end the war; the change of Zelenskyy’s rhetoric regarding NATO membership; the fate of the Yoon Administration; the convening of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and the return of Donald Trump to the presidency will likely shape the conflict’s trajectory. The extent to which these developments will impact the ROK’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine remains uncertain.

This raises critical questions: Will the strengthening ties between Kim Jong Un and Putin exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and further strain inter-Korean relations? Is the DPRK-Russia relationship purely transactional, or will it deepen after the war? Will the ROK adjust its stance on directly procuring arms for Ukraine? How will its defense industry evolve post-war? Finally, will Yoon’s successor uphold the same commitment to aiding Ukraine and continue the GPS strategy? As strategic decisions often take time to manifest their full impact, only time will tell how the ROK will determine its role in the broader international response.

South Korea’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine War: Endeavors for a Global Pivotal State and Its Impact

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/17/south-koreas-role-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-endeavors-for-a-global-pivotal-state-and-its-impact/

by Jonathan Bak

|

01.17.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, South Korea has emerged as a significant player in the global response, despite being geographically distant from the conflict. This paper explores South Korea’s evolving role in the war, driven by its ambition to become a “global pivotal state.” South Korea’s engagement is driven by the imperative to address security concerns in Northeast Asia, advance international influence as part of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s “global pivotal state” strategy, and safeguard economic stability amidst volatile global markets. The paper also evaluates South Korea’s contributions, such as sanctions against Russia, various forms of aid to Ukraine, and its growing diplomatic engagement with NATO and other allies. These efforts not only demonstrate South Korea’s commitment to Ukraine’s defense but also bolster its global standing. However, South Korea’s involvement has also led to repercussions, including strained relations with neighboring countries and domestic challenges, such as economic impacts, declining support for the Yoon Administration, and the vote for Yoon’s impeachment. By analyzing South Korea’s actions and their broader impact, this paper provides insight into how South Korea is working to establish itself as a key player in global security during the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Discretion – This analysis was completed on December 20, 2024. As world news is constantly evolving, developments may have occurred since this date that could counter the arguments and perspectives proposed herein. 

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a sovereign nation and former Soviet republic. This marked a significant escalation of the conflict that began in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. What had been an intermittent, localized conflict in the Donbas region evolved into a broader war involving direct Russian military action across Ukraine. In the months that followed, countries around the world took sides, with democratic nations and members of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) aligning with Ukraine to help defend itself against aggression. Meanwhile, authoritarian states have shown support to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

However, unlike previous European conflicts, the war in Ukraine has also drawn participation from states in the Indo-Pacific region, notably South Korea (ROK). Despite being geographically distant from Europe, the ROK has assumed an increasingly vital role in the conflict that has repercussions on many fronts. To further understand the ROK’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war, this analysis will first explore the ROK’s motivations for joining the efforts in Ukraine’s defense, focusing on growing security concerns in Northeast Asia, President Yoon Suk Yeol’s push to expand the ROK’s influence on the international stage via its broader “global pivotal state” strategy, as well as ensuring economic security. This paper will then examine the progress made so far, including the multifaceted assistance given to support Ukraine, alongside diplomatic engagements and achievements made by the ROK to address the war of aggression. Finally, the paper will assess the impact of the ROK’s support of Ukraine and the consequences of its actions.

Motivation #1: Security Challenges in Northeast Asia and the DPRK-Russia Partnership

The ROK is motivated to have a role in the Russia-Ukraine war due to a number of factors, a major one being the regional security concerns in Northeast Asia. Inter-Korean relations took a turn for the worse in January 2024, when Kim Jong Un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea (DPRK), announced in his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly that the country would no longer pursue the longstanding goal of unification of the Korean Peninsula and would now view ROK as its “primary foe”. Since then, the DPRK has made numerous political and military insinuations that have signified a growing willingness to escalate tensions and challenge the ROK’s security posture, the most evident being the DPRK’s reignited bilateral relations with Russia. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, “Russia has been providing North Korea with diplomatic, economic, and military concessions in exchange for weaponry to continue the ongoing invasion of Ukraine”. High-level visits between both countries, coupled with growing concerns from the West, have signaled a deepening and dangerous relationship. In March 2024, the U.S. State Department reported that between September 2023 and February 2024, the DPRK had “transferred ballistic missiles as well as thousands of containers of ammunition to Russia via train for use in the ongoing war in Ukraine.” Some sources estimate that this transfer provided with up to five million rounds of ammunition. In late April 2024, UN sanctions experts released a report validating claims from Ukrainian officials that DPRK ballistic missiles were found in missile debris in Kharkiv, Ukraine, a known hot zone in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Defense Intelligence Agency also confirmed this in a May 2024 report.

The re-ignition of DPRK-Russia bilateral relations is concerning because Russia has technology that the DPRK can utilize to augment its military capabilities, such as nuclear and space technology. As the DPRK has successfully and unsuccessfully launched several satellites since late 2023 to mid-2024, Russian technology could improve the success rate (although ROK intelligence has speculated Russia has already assisted in the launches). Additionally, the bilateral relationship, or as Kim has referred to as the “unbreakable relationship”, has benefitted the DPRK on the international stage because Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), vetoed the resolution to extend the mandate for the United Nations’ Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on DPRK in March 2024. In June 2024, the bilateral ties further solidified when Putin visited the DPRK capital of Pyongyang, where he and Kim signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreement. According to Russian state media, the comprehensive strategic partnership covers “areas of cooperation such as military, political, and economics”. After the signing, Kim stated to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that “The relations of the two countries have also been placed on a better track of long-term development conducive to the progress and well-being of the two countries through the expansion of mutual cooperation in various fields, including politics, economy, culture and military affairs”. The new treaty succeeds the previous bilateral agreements signed in 1961 and 2000, as experts have affirmed that it is a revision of the former​​​​​, ​including language regarding “mutual assistance in the event of aggression”. During the event, Kim also went on the record to affirm his support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since then, bilateral cooperation has strengthened; railroad traffic between the two countries has intensified, the deployment of DPRK soldiers to Kursk Oblast (the site of Ukraine’s surprise incursion that began in August 2024) , and the ratification of the agreement have shown that Kim is utilizing all capabilities to not only test them in the field, but for a significant return on his investment. In short, if any nation has benefitted the most from the Russia-Ukraine war, it is the DPRK.

The DPRK’s contribution is having a significant impact on the frontlines. At the 2024 Yalta European Strategy forum, Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, stated that the DPKR’s arms shipments are the “worst problem” Ukrainian forces currently face. He emphasized that the arrival of these supplies escalates hostilities, and because the sheer volume of munitions from Pyongyang surpasses that of other countries, it presents a substantial challenge to Ukraine​. In addition, the deployment of DPRK troops add another layer to the conflict. In early November 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that at least “11,000 to 12,000” North Korean soldiers have been sent to Kursk Oblast and have confirmed to be in combat. The U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated in a press conference in mid-November 2024 that the deployment is “adding fuel to the fire for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”. However, experts and defectors have debated whether DPRK soldiers have the field experience not only to make a difference, but also survive the war. According to the Institute for the Study of War, by mid-December 2024, DPRK forces in Kursk Oblast were reportedly facing significant challenges, including high casualties, language barriers, and friendly fire incidents involving Russian troops. Other reports from Ukraine assert that DPRK soldiers are also vulnerable to Ukrainian drone attacks.

Russia’s growing reliance on the DPRK military supplies in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, coupled with the economic and political benefits the DPRK gains from the partnership, has emboldened Kim Jong-Un to adopt a more assertive posture toward both ROK and the United States. Its discreet missile tests and aggressive rhetoric pose threats to the region.​ Regardless of the level of their collaboration, the Russia-DPRK partnership poses significant security risks to both Europe and the Korean Peninsula. The Russia-Ukraine war incentivizes the ROK to strengthen strategic alliances with partners like NATO, highlighting the need for a coordinated, resilient response to mutual security threats.

Motivation #2: The Stride for a Global Pivotal State

Furthermore, the ROK’s participation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict accentuates its increasing independence on the international stage. By addressing critical global issues and extending its influence beyond the region, the ROK is positioning itself as a key player in international security, committed to upholding peace and stability. It acknowledges that its own future is intertwined with the broader international environment. Yoon affirmed in his 2022 Foreign Affairs piece that “South Korea should no longer be confined to the Korean Peninsula but rise to the challenge of being what I have described as a ‘global pivotal state,’ one that advances freedom, peace, and prosperity through liberal democratic values and substantial cooperation.” The global pivotal state strategy (GPS) can be described as the ROK’s approach to expanding its influence and leadership on the international stage. It focuses on promoting peace, security, and prosperity by actively participating in international affairs, defending democratic values, and collaborating with other nations to address global challenges. Unlike his predecessor Moon Ja-In, Yoon aims for the ROK to expand its foreign policy by “embracing greater roles and responsibilities for resolving regional and global challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond”. In essence, Yoon aspires for the ROK to have an active voice alongside other key decision-makers in matters of global security. While ROK foreign policy has often aligned closely with that of the United States, Yoon’s GPS strategy allows the ROK to emerge from the background and establish its distinct presence on the world stage.

Motivation #3: The Safeguarding of Economic Security

A third motivation for the ROK to aid Ukraine in its war with Russia is economic security. As the 10th largest economy in the world, the ROK has significant economic interests in both countries, given Ukraine’s critical grain resources and Russia’s oil, both essential to global trade. In Russia, this includes major Korean businesses like Samsung Heavy Industries and Hyundai, which have had overseas operations there. In 2021, the ROK ranked Russia as its tenth-largest exporter, with exports amounting to $9.97 billion, as reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Russia has played a key role as an energy supplier for the ROK, providing nine percent of its total energy imports prior to the invasion. On the flip side, Russia’s exports to the ROK exceeded $17 billion in 2021, placing the ROK as its fifth-largest export market. Russia has long considered the ROK a crucial gateway to the Pacific Ocean, while the ROK has regarded Russia as a vital partner in regional connectivity projects, including logistics, energy networks, and broader transnational cooperation across the Eurasian continent.

When it comes to Ukraine, the Observatory of Economic Complexity states that ROK’s largest export to Ukraine in 2022 was automobiles, while the largest import in 2022 was grains. Since the invasion, the global economy has shifted; sanctions on Russian oil, along with a G7 price cap, have compelled Russia to sell oil at discounted rates, primarily to non-Western countries. Although Western countries have largely stopped purchasing Russian oil directly, it still enters the market indirectly through intermediaries and shadow fleets, causing price volatility and prompting countries like the ROK to diversify their energy imports. In addition, Ukrainian grain exports have been disrupted, causing global food insecurity and rising prices on top of that, global food security is still recovering from the quandaries caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Yoon’s 2023 National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of enhancing cooperation with strategic partners like the United States, Japan, the European Union (EU), and Australia to safeguard economic security. While Yoon’s strategy is adamant about the ROK standing by its allies, it would take time for it to execute it (which will be addressed later).

Progress #1: Sanctions Against Russia

The ROK’s motivation to participate has resulted in progress to attaining their objectives. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, The ROK became the first Indo-Pacific nation to join fellow democratic nations (i.e. NATO) in condemning the war of aggression and condemning sanctions. The ROK has implemented multiple sanction packages aimed at isolating Russia. In March 2022, the ROK government joined the EU and the United States in suspending financial transactions with Russian banks, including the central bank, and excluding Russia from the SWIFT network, a global platform for financial transactions. The sanctions were expanded in February 2023, with the ROK “banning the export of 741 strategic items, including machinery, automobiles, and chemicals that could be diverted for military purposes” also known as “dual-use technologies”. Between April and June 2024, the ROK imposed three rounds of sanctions on Russian vessels, entities, and North Korean nationals involved in arms shipments and oil transfers to the DPRK. These sanctions were a response to the deepening military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, which violated UNSC resolutions. These strategic decisions reflect the ROK’s commitment not only to countering the growing Russia-DPRK alliance but also to asserting its role as a global pivotal state in international security. By aligning its sanctions with those of the United States and EU, and targeting sectors critical to both Russian and DPRK interests, the ROK is sending a clear signal of its dedication to upholding international norms and deterring threats to regional stability. The sanctions also reinforce the broader goal of safeguarding economic security, ensuring the resilience of global supply chains, and enhancing the ROK’s influence on the global stage, in line with its aspirations to be a key player in the international community.

Progress #2: ROK’s Multifaceted Assistance to Ukraine

The ROK has also provided assistance to Ukraine in other apparatuses. Unlike other allies such as the United States, the ROK is forbidden to “export of weapons to countries at war and the re-export of weapons without permission” due to its Foreign Trade Act. Due to the law, the ROK government has focused its direct support for Ukraine on financial, humanitarian, and non-lethal military aid. Additionally, in August 2023, The ROK Parliament increased its 2024 support package for Ukraine to $394 million, covering reconstruction, humanitarian efforts, and contributions through international organizations. In September 2023, Yoon announced a $2.3 billion aid package to Ukraine for humanitarian support.

Despite the boundaries of the Foreign Trade Act, the Yoon Administration had found ways around it by transferring military assistance to allies; Since 2023, the ROK has transferred over 550,000 units of 155mm artillery rounds to the United States to replenish U.S. stockpiles sent to Ukraine. According to the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy and as reported by The Washington Post, the ROK’s contribution to supplying artillery ammunition indirectly to Ukraine is reportedly larger than the combined efforts of the European nations. Moreover, the ROK is collaborating with its European allies; Since 2023, Poland has made several agreements worth billions of dollars to procure arms from the ROK, notably tanks and armored vehicles. By partnering with nations bordering Ukraine, the ROK continues to contribute to international cooperation efforts condemning the invasion. These actions underscore the ROK’s commitment to asserting its leadership and influence on global security using strategic partnerships and defense cooperation as means to solidify its standing in the evolving international order.

While the ROK has found ways to support Ukraine, the Russia-DPRK partnership has caused the ROK government to reconsider its laws when it comes to exporting arms. In the aftermath of the June 2024 signing. The ROK government made an official statement that it would review and reconsider directly supplying arms to Ukraine.

Progress #3: ROK’s Bilateral Agreements

On the diplomatic front, the ROK has expanded its global presence to bolster its support for Ukraine. Since 2022, ROK officials have engaged in bilateral discussions with their counterparts from many nations, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands with the conflict in Ukraine being a central topic. In July 2023, Yoon visited Ukraine and held a summit with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, where he announced plans to extend support. In September 2023, the ROK government and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) announced a joint partnership to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector through the Agriculture Resilience Initiative-Ukraine (AGRI-Ukraine). Under the initiative, the partnership has pledged to deliver $5 million in fertilizer to support Ukrainian farmers and complement agricultural supplies already contributed by USAID.

Progress #4: ROK’s Multilateral Partnerships

ROK officials have also engaged in discussions with intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Criminal Court and the EU, to jointly condemn the war and underscore their support for Ukraine. The ROK also joined the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine (MDCP), an apparatus that organizes international financial support for Ukraine’s immediate needs and long-term reconstruction. The platform includes major donors such as the EU, G7 countries, and temporary members such as the Netherlands and ROK. According to a June 2024 report, Ukraine has received over $74 billion in budget support from the MDCP, out of a total of more than $142.8 billion committed by all donors. Additionally, ROK officials have also engaged in discussions with non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group to strengthen cooperation in conflict zones.

Progress #5: ROK-NATO Engagements

The most notable diplomatic effort conducted by the ROK in addressing the conflict in Ukraine is its ongoing engagements with NATO. Since 2012, NATO and the ROK have had a formal relationship due to the signing of the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program, an agreement which delineates subject matters for dialogue and cooperation between the two parties. However, the ROK-NATO bilateral relations only gained momentum in 2022, when President Yoon was invited to attend the NATO summit in Madrid.

Since then, the ROK has become more involved in NATO endeavors such as joining  NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and participating in the 2023 Locked Shields Cyber Exercise. Yoon has further solidified this engagement by attending three NATO summits, with his 2023 visit followed by a trip to Ukraine, emphasizing his support. He also attended the 2024 summit alongside leaders from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, the Indo-Pacific allies which are collectively known as the AP4. During the summit, Yoon announced that the ROK would provide more assistance, including doubling its contributions to NATO’s Ukraine Trust Fund, pledging $24 million for 2025. Additionally, NATO and the ROK signed an agreement for the mutual recognition of “military airworthiness certification”, guaranteeing that all air assets used by NATO allies and partners meet safety and airworthiness standards. This agreement is significant as it marks NATO’s first partnership with an Indo-Pacific nation while also benefiting South Korea’s defense industry.

When it comes to common security challenges, NATO has shown support for the ROK’s policy on the DPRK, which motivates the ROK to collaborate with the alliance. NATO advocates for denuclearization, denounces the DPRK’s provocative rhetoric, missile tests, as well as concurs that the actions represent a significant threat to international security. Moreover, concerns shared by the ROK and NATO regarding China as a security challenge have grown. During the 2024 NATO Summit, it was stated that China has become “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Both NATO and the ROK assert that augmenting their partnership is paramount because they also share mutual concerns of the repercussions of the Russia-DPRK partnership. As then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated it “demonstrates how security in the Indo-Pacific is closely intertwined with security in Europe”.

Moreover, since DPRK soldiers have been deployed to support Russian forces in the fall of 2024, ROK and NATO collaboration has increased. Within days of the news of the deployment, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte (who had only been appointed three weeks prior) spoke with Yoon and not only shared his concerns but also urged Yoon to send a delegation to Brussels to share intelligence on the situation as well as recommendations for further “cooperation in the defense industry and security dialogue.” Within a week, Rutte confirmed the delegation had met, and that DPRK troops were in Kursk Oblast. He stated that “The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a threat to both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security. It undermines peace on the Korean Peninsula and fuels the Russian war against Ukraine.” He later said in this statement that, “This underlines the importance of democracies standing together to uphold our values and to face our shared security challenge.” By November 2024, Yoon, along with several advisors and cabinet members, met with a Ukrainian delegation to further discuses cooperation efforts, the procurement of ROK defense systems, and the prospect of sending a South Korean monitoring team to Ukraine to analyze DPRK troops and possibly interrogate captured ones.

Impact #1: Strengthening Multilateral Security and Diplomacy

The ROK’s participation in the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened its relations with intergovernmental alliances, enhancing its role in multilateral security and diplomacy. This is likely to result in deeper strategic partnerships, increased military cooperation, and greater influence within international organizations. One could argue that the ROK has effectively advanced its GPS strategy by “strengthening solidarity with nations that share universal values and establishing a global network for comprehensive security cooperation.”

Impact #2: The Shifting of Regional Security Dynamics

That being said, the ROK’s participation has come at a cost, as regional security in Northeast Asia has become more precarious due to the DPRK-Russia partnership and the ROK’s alignment with its allies in response. As stated previously, inter-Korean relations has deteriorated. Despite Yoon introducing a “freedom-based unification” policy in August 2024, it may be a case of “too little, too late” to counter all of the provocations and alliance building. Additionally, ROK-Russia relations have deteriorated, jeopardizing one of the objectives in the National Security Strategy, which was to “maintain stable relations with Russia.” ROK-China relations have navigated a mix of cooperation and strain in recent months. In April 2023, tensions emerged following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s remarks framing the China-Taiwan issue as a “global issue.” This was followed by South Korea’s growing alignment with NATO, highlighted by Yoon’s participation in NATO summits in July 2023 and 2024. However, during their meeting in November 2024, on the sidelines of the APEC summit, Presidents Yoon and Xi emphasized bilateral cooperation, particularly on economic ties and addressing regional stability, while also discussing concerns over North Korea-Russia military cooperation Additionally, some scholars argue that NATO’s presence in the Indo-Pacific could heighten tensions with China and may not align with the strategic interests of countries that are cautious about choosing sides in the Great Power Competition The ROK (and assumingly the AP4) may need to tactically shape future security policies and ensure any threats are responded prudently.

Impact #3: Growth in the Defense Sector

Furthermore, the ROK’s commitment to support Ukraine and its allies has opened up opportunities for the defense sector to grow. Yoon has been keen on transforming the ROK into a “defense industry powerhouse” through diplomatic efforts as well as promoting policies in part of his national security strategy to make the ROK as the fourth-largest defense exporter in the world by 2027. In fact, the ROK was ranked the tenth largest arms exporter in 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The “boom” in defense production is mostly via exports, leading to new dealings in Europe and the Middle East. One notable example is the September 2024 the joint announcement between shipbuilding companies Hanwha Ocean (ROK) and WB Group (Polish) of a “memorandum of understanding” to collaborate on submarine projects. These endeavors help advance the objective of expanding defense exports that can lead to further diplomacy and mutual trust between nations.

Impact #4: Economic Costs of Sanctions and Energy Volatility

The ROK’s assistance to Ukraine and condemnation of Russia has also had some negative impacts on its economy. The imposition of sanctions on Russia has severely affected ROK businesses operating in the region, resulting in substantial financial losses. Companies in the shipbuilding sector have been forced to cancel contracts, while major automotive firms like Hyundai have been compelled to sell factories at a significant loss. Additionally, ROK electronics manufacturers, including LG and Samsung, have halted operations in Russia due to persistent supply chain disruptions

Moreover, the global energy price volatility has placed additional pressure on the ROK’s economy. Although the ROK was relatively insulated from direct dependence on Russian energy, sourcing only 9% of its energy from Russia prior to the conflict, the surge in global energy prices since early 2022 has contributed to inflationary pressures. By 2023 the ROK’s fossil fuel imports from Russia significantly decreased from $13.2 billion in 2021 to just $5.5 billion. Despite these reductions, some experts have criticized the fact that imports from Russia were still occurring and that the ROK “had not formally join the G7 price cap on Russian oil”. Additionally, there had been a year-long delay in implementing sanctions on dual-use technologies compared to other nations. In short, while the ROK’s support for Ukraine has strengthened its global standing, it has also imposed significant economic costs and complicated its regional security dynamics.

Impact #5: Yoon’s Domestic Challenges and possible Downfall

Moreover, while Yoon has been refining the ROK’s foreign affairs, the same cannot be said for domestic affairs; As of December 2024, Yoon’s approval ratings have dropped to 11%, marking the lowest levels since his inauguration. The Yoon Administration has encountered scandals and criticisms in response to issues such as the administration’s “handling of medical reforms, the cost of living, the president’s ability to communicate”, the abundance of scandals surrounding the First Lady, as well as Yoon’s focus on foreign policy.

However, Yoon’s declaration of martial law marks a decisive moment in his presidency, amplifying public discontent and firmly establishing it as one of the most controversial actions of his administration. In a late-night televised address on December 3, 2024, Yoon stated, “I hereby declare martial law to protect the free Republic of Korea from the threat of North Korean communist forces, to root out the shameless pro-North, anti-state elements that are plundering the freedom and happiness of our people, and to safeguard the free constitutional order.” Yoon further justified the declaration by citing the need to “wipe out anti-state forces as soon as possible and normalize the country’s operation.” This rhetoric is arguably reminiscent of South Korea’s pre-democracy era. Some analysts and reporters argue that Yoon has “put himself in a bubble,” perceiving members of opposing parties as existential threats and that his actions serve the greater good of the country, no matter how contentious they are.

The order triggered pandemonium, with military forces and police blocking lawmakers from accessing the National Assembly. In addition, troops were also sent to several offices of the National Election Commission. Reports out of Seoul as well as Japan suggest that Yoon may have been trying to find evidence towards election fraud allegations regarding the outcome of the April 2024 elections, which did not end in his favor. Lawmakers broke through the barriers of the National Assembly, and 190 members of parliament unanimously overturned the declaration, forcing Yoon to revoke it within six hours. However, the fallout was swift and severe. A first impeachment vote failed due to a ruling party boycott, but mounting public protests and internal divisions led to a second parliamentary vote on December 14, where Yoon was impeached by a decisive 204-85 margin. At least 12 lawmakers from Yoon’s own People Power Party (PPP) defected to support the motion.

As Yoon’s presidential powers have now been suspended, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo assumed the role of acting president. Investigations have been launched into Yoon for alleged insurrection, abuse of power, and violating the constitution. Several senior officials, including the defense minister, police chief, and head of Seoul’s police force, have already been arrested for their alleged roles in the martial law declaration. Additionally, mass resignations swept through the government as the fallout has taken affect, including the PPP party leader Han Dong-hoon. Public outrage has fueled large-scale protests, with opposition leaders framing the impeachment as a victory for democracy.

Following the second vote, Yoon remained defiant, pledging to “fight to the end” and accusing opposition parties of obstructing his governance. The Constitutional Court now has up to six months to determine Yoon’s fate. However, the court only has six out of the nine vacancies filled due to “a delay in appointing replacements.” While the court can technically review the impeachment motion due to recent rule change in October 2024, just having six judges presents challenges, as one vote could nullify the impeachment. In this period of ambiguity, the ROK faces political instability, mounting legal challenges, and internal divisions within the ruling party, leaving the nation in a state of uncertainty.

The domestic challenges and persistent criticism undermine Yoon’s capacity to sustain public support, leading him unable to manage a dual focus on foreign and domestic policy. His decision-making has now jeopardized the future of not only ROK politics, but also his presidency, and future endeavors for a global pivotal state.

Conclusion

President Yoon and his administration have made significant efforts to elevate the ROK’s global standing, particularly through its participation in aiding Ukraine’s defense against Russian forces. While these efforts have yielded notable results some scholars express concerns about the long-term implications of such policies. With the likelihood that the war in Ukraine will extend into 2025, key global events, such as the United Nations General Assembly, where President Zelenskyy emphasized that Russia must be “forced into peace” to end the war; the change of Zelenskyy’s rhetoric regarding NATO membership; the fate of the Yoon Administration; the convening of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and the return of Donald Trump to the presidency will likely shape the conflict’s trajectory. The extent to which these developments will impact the ROK’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine remains uncertain.

This raises critical questions: Will the strengthening ties between Kim Jong Un and Putin exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and further strain inter-Korean relations? Is the DPRK-Russia relationship purely transactional, or will it deepen after the war? Will the ROK adjust its stance on directly procuring arms for Ukraine? How will its defense industry evolve post-war? Finally, will Yoon’s successor uphold the same commitment to aiding Ukraine and continue the GPS strategy? As strategic decisions often take time to manifest their full impact, only time will tell how the ROK will determine its role in the broader international response.

Tags: alliances, Global Pivotal State, Korea

About The Author

• 
  
• Jonathan Bak
• Jonathan Bak is an independent researcher on international affairs, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. He holds a Master of Arts in International Security Studies from the University of Arizona.

3. US experts question reason for probe of loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea

​This is a different VOA report from the previous one that I sent out with a similar headline. This is an English language version by a different journalist.

I do really want to highlight Syd Seiler's, Bruce Klingner's, and my comments in this as we are all making similar criticisms of the dangers posed by the opposition parties' views toward north Korea. Note of all the people interviewed it is Gittipong "Eddie" Paruchabutr who is the only one qualified to speak about the efficacy of loudspeaker activities as he is a career psychological operations officer. Unfortunately those criticizing the loudspeakers have his expertise and actual experience.

Excerpts:

Sydney Seiler, former national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council, pointed out that the allegations that Yoon provoked North Korea’s aggression is a political claim that ignores the threats North Korea is posing to South Korea.

“The accusation that these are treason is ludicrous, nothing short of ludicrous,” Seiler said Tuesday by phone.

“This is a democratically elected government taking seriously its responsibilities for the national security of the Republic of Korea. This is not treason. This is just political maneuvering on the opposition parties’ part,” Seiler said, using the official name to refer to South Korea.

Meanwhile, Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, said South Korea’s Democratic Party’s criticism of the information warfare reflects its thinking on policy toward North Korea.

“The main impact will be that if a Democratic Party government came in as a result of a special election, the Democratic Party would indeed have very different foreign security policies, would be much more conciliatory, if not concessionary, towards China and North Korea,” Klingner said Tuesday by phone.

David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, said the opposition parties’ assertion stokes concerns of “an extreme naivete about the strategy of the Kim family regime.”

“This is really troubling. They are sending the message that they do not think South Korea should be sending information into North Korea. That’s fundamentally what they’re talking about,” Maxwell, a former U.S. Special Forces colonel, told VOA Korean by phone on Tuesday.

US experts question reason for probe of loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea

January 16, 2025 5:34 AM

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-experts-question-reason-for-probe-of-loudspeaker-broadcasts-into-north-korea/7938830.html

• By Young Gyo Kim

A move by South Korean opposition leaders to launch an independent probe of embattled President Yoon Suk Yeol over Seoul’s use of loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea is raising questions among some U.S. experts about the future direction of Seoul’s approach toward Pyongyang.

Yoon, who was impeached and suspended from his duties last month for imposing emergency martial law on his unsuspecting country, was arrested Wednesday after a weeks-long standoff with investigators at the presidential compound.

Yoon, the first sitting president of South Korea to be under criminal investigation, faces a trial at the country’s Constitutional Court, which has the final say on whether he should be completely removed from his presidential responsibilities.

The country’s opposition Democratic Party, which holds a majority in parliament, and other smaller opposition parties introduced a revised bill last week to launch a special counsel investigation into Yoon’s alleged insurrection attempt during his short-lived declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, 2024.

The revised bill accuses Yoon of blasting loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea and sending propaganda leaflets to Pyongyang. They were cited as cases of provoking aggression from outside the country.

The South Korean Defense Ministry rejected the opposition’s allegations that the country’s military activities, including the use of loudspeakers, are intended to provoke North Korea.

“Our military has deterred North Korea’s provocations through a consistent policy toward North Korea while maintaining firm military readiness,” the ministry said Monday in a statement, adding that some people are “distorting the normal activities of our military.”

VOA Korean sought comment from the U.S. State Department on the latest controversy over South Korea’s information campaigns toward North Korea but did not receive a response.

However, a State Department spokesman said in an email on June 10, 2024, to VOA Korean that the United States supports the North Korean people’s right to access information from outside.

“We continue to promote the free flow of information into, out of, and within the DPRK [North Korea],” the spokesperson said, a day after the South Korean military resumed loudspeaker broadcasts on the inter-Korean border for the first time in six years in response to North Korea’s trash balloon offensive.

“It is critical for the people of North Korea to have access to independent information not controlled by the DPRK regime,” the spokesperson said.

Gittipong Paruchabutr, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told VOA Korean by phone Wednesday that loudspeaker broadcasts are “a low-risk, effective tool” for communicating with North Koreans.

“Absolutely, it’s a critical capability. It’s a low-risk capability that when we want to communicate to North Koreans, not just soldiers, but anybody within audio range. And I say low risk because it doesn’t really put Korean soldiers’ lives at risk,” Paruchabutr, who also served as chief of psychological operations for U.S. Forces Korea, said.

Paruchabutr added that in the past, South Korean loudspeaker broadcasts usually played K-pop songs and rebroadcasts of South Korean domestic news that included social topics promoting human rights, rather than information that “directly criticize North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his family.”

Controversy over accusation

Sydney Seiler, former national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council, pointed out that the allegations that Yoon provoked North Korea’s aggression is a political claim that ignores the threats North Korea is posing to South Korea.

“The accusation that these are treason is ludicrous, nothing short of ludicrous,” Seiler said Tuesday by phone.

“This is a democratically elected government taking seriously its responsibilities for the national security of the Republic of Korea. This is not treason. This is just political maneuvering on the opposition parties’ part,” Seiler said, using the official name to refer to South Korea.

David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, said the opposition parties’ assertion stokes concerns of “an extreme naivete about the strategy of the Kim family regime.”

“This is really troubling. They are sending the message that they do not think South Korea should be sending information into North Korea. That’s fundamentally what they’re talking about,” Maxwell, a former U.S. Special Forces colonel, told VOA Korean by phone on Tuesday.

Others shared more cautious views, saying more details are needed before determining whether Yoon’s policy decisions were legitimate or not.

Evans Revere, a former acting U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, highlighted the need for an investigation.

“The idea of propaganda balloons going into North Korea. The idea of loudspeakers blasting music and news and propaganda into North Korea — that’s been going on for many years, and it hasn't been regarded by most people as an attempt to instigate a conflict or a confrontation,” Revere told VOA Korean by phone on Tuesday.

“But now, the opposition is using that as one of the charges against [Yoon], and it needs to be looked into. It needs to be investigated,” Revere said.

“The question that’s probably weighing on the minds of a lot of policymakers in the United States right now is the question of whether there was some effort on the part of the Yoon administration to provoke a confrontation with North Korea. That’s a very serious charge,” he added.

Meanwhile, Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, said South Korea’s Democratic Party’s criticism of the information warfare reflects its thinking on policy toward North Korea.

“The main impact will be that if a Democratic Party government came in as a result of a special election, the Democratic Party would indeed have very different foreign security policies, would be much more conciliatory, if not concessionary, towards China and North Korea,” Klingner said Tuesday by phone.

VOA’s Sangjin Cho contributed to this report.

4. Top Trump Diplomat to Share Foreign-Policy Role With Army of Envoys

​I hope these "special missions" that will be undertaken by Mr. Grennell include political warfare strategies. Maybe he will take the lead in political and irregular warfare for POTUS and the US. I have some recommendations (and already developed plans) for him.

Excerpt:

Richard Grenell, who served as ambassador to Germany during Trump’s first term and was acting director of national intelligence, was picked to serve as a presidential envoy for “special missions” for what Trump called some of the “hottest spots” around the world, including Venezuela and North Korea. Some Trump-backing MAGA Republicans had hoped he would be named secretary of state. 

Top Trump Diplomat to Share Foreign-Policy Role With Army of Envoys

Marco Rubio used to clash with the president-elect, but now appears headed toward Senate confirmation as the next secretary of state

By Michael R. Gordon

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 and Vivian Salama

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Jan. 16, 2025 7:48 pm ET

Former Sen. Marco Rubio has vowed to strengthen the influence of the State Department if confirmed. Photo: nathan howard/Reuters

WASHINGTON—As Marco Rubio testified Wednesday at his confirmation hearing to be secretary of state, President-elect Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, was in Qatar, where he had helped to negotiate a long-sought Gaza cease-fire.

The split-screen moment underscored the novel way Trump is organizing his foreign-policy team—with the customary national-security cabinet members sharing the spotlight with half a dozen envoys and advisers assigned to deal directly with hot spots and foreign capitals.

The emerging structure reflects Trump’s determination to tighten control of the policy process with loyalists who will execute his priorities alongside more conventional members of his team.

But instead of more nimble diplomacy there is also a risk the multiheaded organization chart could lead to a more chaotic process, analysts said.

Trump seems intent on avoiding the situation he encountered during his first term when several of his top national-security officials pushed back on some of his most unorthodox foreign-policy decisions, including orders to remove troops from Syria and Afghanistan.

“Donald Trump likes an informal policy process where he is the hub and there is any number of spokes,” said Richard Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations who has served in the State Department, at the National Security Council and in the Pentagon. “I think this will be a challenging environment for any secretary of state.”

Donald Trump hosted Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff at the president-elect’s Mar-a-Lago club in Florida earlier this month. Photo: Evan Vucci/Associated Press

Rubio has vowed to strengthen the influence of the State Department if confirmed, as expected. With so many overlapping envoys, Sen. Chris Coons (D., Del.) asked him during his Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing how he hoped to sustain the State Department’s authority, avoid clashing policies and prevent conflicts of interest. 

“The way this will work is these envoys work for the president in coordination with us,” responded Rubio, who added that he knew virtually all of the envoys who had been named.

But the system appears designed to expand Trump’s policymaking role while diminishing that of the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security staff, some current and former officials say.

“They regard the bureaucracy as necessary to implement. But they don’t trust the institutions at all to develop ideas or deals or strategies in good faith consistent with the president’s principles,” said Philip Zelikow, a fellow at the Hoover Institution who served as the State Department’s counselor during the George W. Bush administration.

He added: “Since we haven’t had a system run quite like this in modern American history, no one can reliably predict whether or how it will work.”

The son of Cuban immigrants, Rubio was once one of Trump’s most sharp-tongued rivals. During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly derided Rubio as “Little Marco.” The Florida Republican senator, at the time, described Trump as a “con artist” and “the most vulgar person.”

In an administration in which influence is likely to be determined by proximity to Trump, Rubio has worked to strengthen ties to the president-elect.

Rubio also told lawmakers he would work to streamline the State Department’s own processes so it could play more of a role in White House policymaking.

“We have to be at that table when decisions are being made and the State Department has to be a source of creative ideas and effective implementation,” Rubio said.

But some newly named officials say it is ultimately Trump’s informal relationships with his advisers that might matter more.

“He names people he likes to jobs, and then we figure out how it will work over time,” said a person who will serve in the coming administration.

The group of special envoys vary in their closeness to Trump. Some have hit the ground running even before Trump takes office.

Witkoff, according to people with knowledge of his new role, has worked with Trump’s son-in-law and former de facto Middle East envoy, Jared Kushner. 

Kushner has facilitated introductions to leaders in the region and has worked closely with Witkoff to help develop a strategy for ending the war in Gaza and the hostage crisis, as well as some broader policy priorities in the region, including normalized relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, according to people familiar with their relationship.

Trump named Keith Kellogg, a retired Army lieutenant general and the former national-security adviser to then-Vice President Mike Pence, to serve as his special envoy on ending the war in Ukraine. The new Trump team hopes to bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a close within six months, people familiar with his appointment say.

Kellogg, who will also serve as an assistant to Trump, is planning a trip to Europe and Ukraine after Trump’s inauguration.

Richard Grenell, who served as ambassador to Germany during Trump’s first term and was acting director of national intelligence, was picked to serve as a presidential envoy for “special missions” for what Trump called some of the “hottest spots” around the world, including Venezuela and North Korea. Some Trump-backing MAGA Republicans had hoped he would be named secretary of state. 

Mauricio Claver-Carone, who worked on Latin American issues during Trump’s first term, will serve as a State Department special envoy for Latin America and has a good working relationship with Rubio.

Other envoys include Morgan Ortagus, the former State Department spokesperson during Trump’s first term, who is to serve as Witkoff’s deputy. Massad Boulos, the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, will serve as an adviser on Arab and Middle Eastern affairs.

Mark Burnett, Trump’s former producer for “The Apprentice” television program, was picked by Trump to serve as a special envoy to the U.K. on trade, investment and cultural issues. Burnett will supplement the role of the U.S. ambassador Trump has named, Warren Stephens, the chief executive of Stephens Inc., a private investment bank.

Rubio’s team at the State Department will include longtime aides as well as picks favored by MAGA Republicans, including Michael Anton, who served under George W. Bush and the first Trump administration. Anton has been named to serve as director of policy planning.

Rubio’s hard-line views on China, Russia, Latin America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are well within the Republican conservative mainstream. But he built close enough ties to Trump to be considered a potential choice to serve as his running mate before the president-elect settled on Ohio Sen. JD Vance.

In 2023, Rubio released a report titled “Diversity Over Diplomacy” that alleged that the State Department has weakened its capabilities by giving priority to diversity, equity and inclusion—echoing a Trump theme.

On Wednesday, he told lawmakers that concessions were needed on the part of Kyiv as well as Moscow to bring the war in Ukraine to an end and endorsed Trump’s concerns over Chinese influence over the Panama canal. 

“The postwar global order isn’t just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us,” Rubio said. “Placing the interest of America and Americans above all else has never been more relevant or more necessary than it is right now.”

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com

5. ‘The evidence leaves no room for doubt’ Military analyst Ruslan Leviev reviews the proof corroborating North Korea’s military intervention in Russia’s Kursk region

​Very useful analysis here to study and ponder.

‘The evidence leaves no room for doubt’ Military analyst Ruslan Leviev reviews the proof corroborating North Korea’s military intervention in Russia’s Kursk region — Meduza

meduza.io

An alleged North Korean soldier, photographed at an undisclosed location in Ukraine after his capture. January 11, 2025.

Vladimir Zelenskiy / AFP / Scanpix / LETA

Last month, a new “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” between Russia and North Korea entered force. Signed in June 2024 during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, the agreement includes a mutual defense pact for immediate military assistance if either faces armed aggression. For the past several weeks already, Moscow has reportedly been getting this assistance in the Kursk region, where a supposedly 10,000-men-strong North Korean contingent has been helping to push back the Ukrainian incursion force that has occupied several hundred square kilometers of Russian territory since the summer.

North Korean troops have fought as a “disciplined, dedicated, and fearless force” and made battles “far more ferocious than before,” Ukrainian soldiers told The New York Times in a story published earlier this week. Intelligence agencies in Kyiv, Seoul, and Washington have said they have proof of this military intervention. Nevertheless, many observers online remain skeptical of the scale of Pyongyang’s involvement. To understand the evidence beyond news reports and Pentagon press briefings, Meduza spoke to military analyst Ruslan Leviev, founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team.

— What’s the main evidence proving that North Korean soldiers are present and fighting in Russia’s Kursk region? Let’s start with the two captured prisoners who featured in video footage recently shared by Volodymyr Zelensky. Can we be sure these men are from North Korea?

— Of course, they didn’t have any Korean documents on them (or none were found anyway). Evidently, all Korean soldiers are issued false documents as soon as they arrive in Russia. In other words, they’re issued genuine Russian military documents, either under a fake name or the name of a real person. But all the documents are, of course, without photographs.

As a result, there’s no hard evidence proving they are North Korean nationals. On the other hand, we have confirmation through these two living prisoners, who do not speak any language other than Korean. Obviously, the Korean language is difficult; it’s very hard to pretend to be Korean.

Moreover, there are conversations, including a video published by Volodymyr Zelensky, where the prisoners are being questioned. One of them doesn’t speak — he either has a broken jaw or some kind of jaw injury, and his head is bandaged. He only responds with gestures or in writing, but the questions are being asked in Korean. The other prisoner speaks freely; he is asked in Korean, and he answers in Korean. You can hear it — it’s all recorded in Korean, both video and audio.

Additionally, there are also handwritten notes, not from these prisoners but from killed North Korean soldiers, which were released by Ukraine’s Security Service. Korean experts have studied these notes and said they look very authentic. Moreover, certain words there are unique to the North Korean dialect, words not usually used in South Korea. There’s also confirmation from South Korean intelligence, which initially reported that North Korean soldiers were being sent to Russia. [Seoul] even shared photographs tracking military ships.

I’ve also been told that these two prisoners are servicemen of the North Korean army, reportedly from an intelligence unit.

Beyond documents and more formal evidence, there is a lot of other proof. There are many photos and videos of dead Korean soldiers recorded by Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines.

Another look at the situation

North Korea first sent troops to Russia in October, according to Western intelligence. So why is there no clear footage of them on the battlefield?

a month ago

3 cards

— Some skeptics say the proof of North Koreans in the Kursk region is actually just people deliberately or accidentally misidentifying soldiers from Russia’s Far East. How certain can we be that the evidence shows men from North Korea, not Yakutia or Buryatia?

— It’s reasonable to question these claims. However, as my colleagues and I point out, the two men are most likely not Buryats or Yakuts. As you can see, there are also Buryats and Yakuts fighting. Just recently, a Yakut corporal was awarded the title of Hero of Russia for killing a Ukrainian soldier in battle. He also has Asian features. (Of course, I’m not someone who differentiates between Yakuts and Koreans — I’m no phrenologist.)

What stands out when we look at all the photos and videos involving North Korean soldiers? All the Korean soldiers are very young. Those two prisoners — one is 25 years old, and the other is 20. In photos shared on pro-Russian Telegram channels that show Korean and Russian soldiers standing together, hugging or posing together, it’s striking how all the Russians appear to be 50-plus, while these Koreans are young guys. The visual contrast is striking.

Therefore, in some sense, it’s an educated guess. It appears that the photographs of dead soldiers with Asian features wearing Russian uniforms are indeed Koreans, as Ukrainian soldiers claim.

Additionally, there’s video evidence from the early days of battles involving North Korean soldiers in December of last year, published on pro-Russian channels. In what appears to be a scene with a Korean soldier speaking Korean, he’s in a dugout explaining something to Russian soldiers from Chechnya, using gestures to indicate that drones or something bad is over there. You can hear him speaking Korean in the video, and the Russian soldiers also respond with gestures, agreeing, “Yes, bad. Yes, drones.”

There are also older videos, not from the front lines but from training grounds in Russia, recorded by Russian soldiers, where you can hear them saying, “These guys have arrived from Korea.”

If you ask me, the combined evidence leaves no room for doubt. Everyone is now fully convinced that North Korean soldiers are participating in frontline combat. There’s not much to uncover here.

For example, a media outlet recently claimed that the two Korean prisoners are the first visual proof of Korean soldiers’ participation in battles in the Kursk region. This statement surprised me because, as I’ve said, there was already plenty of evidence before. In my opinion, the appearance of live Korean prisoners doesn’t add much new. It’s evidence that can be presented to the media, you can hold briefings about it, and so on, but essentially, it was already proven, in my view.

— Do you expect the Ukrainian military to capture many more North Korean soldiers?

— This is typical of how hostilities develop. It doesn’t seem like [the North Koreans] are being withdrawn from anywhere right now; on the contrary, judging by the situation, they’ll likely replenish their losses gradually. Meaning that new arrivals will come from North Korea. And from time to time, they’ll engage in battles, and occasionally, as is often the case, there will be prisoners. It might not happen often, but there will occasionally be new prisoners.

— Rumors have circulated on social media that one reason Ukraine hasn’t captured more North Korean soldiers is that they’re under orders to kill themselves rather than become prisoners of war. Is there any evidence for that speculation?

— I think Ukrainian soldiers exaggerate this a bit. For instance, alongside Ukrainian journalists, they’ve shared stories claiming that Korean soldiers are ordered to kill themselves if they’re at risk of capture, supposedly to prevent Ukraine from proving Korean involvement in the war. Earlier, there were strange videos showing drone footage of dead soldiers with their heads burning. Ukrainian Telegram channels claimed this was done to hide the fact that they were Korean. I think it’s nonsense — just stories soldiers tell each other.

The practice of promoting suicide in the face of capture predates the North Koreans arriving in Russia — it existed among Russian soldiers. It was even glorified on state television, like on Russia 24 and other networks, with weird gurus going on Vladimir Solovyovand saying things like, “If you’re surrounded, it’s better to kill yourself because that’s honor, that’s courage, that’s pride. Being taken prisoner is disgraceful. So it’s better to kill yourself.”

This has been consistently and frequently emphasized on various channels and in different media outlets. And no one, it seems, has tried to argue against it or say that it’s unacceptable. Nobody says, no, these people need to be rescued. Instead, propaganda supports this kind of behavior in these situations. So, when the Korean military showed up, it’s possible they were also instructed, in a manner similar to political commissars, to adopt the same approach.

However, I don’t think the cases of suicides I’ve seen, especially among Russian soldiers, are usually connected to being surrounded and not wanting to be captured. Rather, it’s because a soldier is wounded, realizes no one will come to save or evacuate him, and that no one, including the commander, cares. They might even hear over the radio, “It’s your problem. Deal with it however you can.”

On top of that, they understand that Ukrainian drones could drop grenades on them at any moment and finish them off. Many realize that it’s better to end their suffering quickly by blowing themselves up or shooting themselves than to die slowly and painfully. That’s why there are so many suicides among Russian soldiers.

Further reading

‘How many more are there?’ Intercepted recording appears to capture Russian nurse complaining about hundreds of North Korean soldiers arriving at Moscow hospital

a month ago

Further reading

‘How many more are there?’ Intercepted recording appears to capture Russian nurse complaining about hundreds of North Korean soldiers arriving at Moscow hospital

a month ago

— How have pro-invasion Telegram channels responded to reports of North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region? Do they try to conceal or debunk the evidence that’s circulated? Is Russia’s mainstream state media any different?

— A lot of Telegram channels and large pro-Russian Telegram bloggers don’t hide it. They acknowledge that Korean soldiers, Korean equipment, and Korean shells are there. More mainstream propaganda, like television networks, Solovyov, and [Alexander] Kots, tends to sidestep it. I haven’t seen any big, bold takes, like in 2014 when Russian propaganda heavily pushed the narrative that local militias were all local volunteers, not Russian soldiers. I don’t see that kind of activity from major state and national media outlets now. At a grassroots level, like on Telegram, nobody denies it. It’s no secret.

— Why isn’t there more satellite or drone footage showing large North Korean formations? Some who take an “I’ll believe it when I see it” approach seem to want a smoking gun — a grand image of the North Korean Army on Russian soil.

— Last October and November, Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian sources announced the first clashes with North Koreans, supposedly around November 2-3. I remember people asking me whether anything had been confirmed. I told them we had lots of drone footage from Ukrainian forces showing people in Russian military uniforms in combat, but from that altitude, you can’t see faces and can’t determine if they are Korean or Russian.

It was only in December, during their first confirmed engagement, that we identified them, thanks to a mistake the Russians stopped making long ago. Drone footage captured a large group of about 40–50 men moving across a field. Russians have learned that such large groups are immediately spotted by drones and targeted by artillery or cluster munitions, which is what happened. That’s how we realized these guys were North Koreans. But, of course, their faces were not visible in the videos.

Читайте также

Friends with (strategic) benefits Troops and missiles for oil and bears: What Russia gets from North Korea, and what Pyongyang receives in return

2 months ago

Читайте также

Friends with (strategic) benefits Troops and missiles for oil and bears: What Russia gets from North Korea, and what Pyongyang receives in return

2 months ago

— In November 2024, the Pentagon reported that there were 10,000 North Korean troops in Russia's Kursk region. Just a few days ago, South Korea’s spy agency told journalists that around 300 North Korean soldiers had been killed and 2,700 wounded while fighting in Russia. Are these numbers verifiable? Is there any proof of these exact figures, or should people just trust the claims of intelligence agencies in “friendly” countries like Ukraine, South Korea, and the United States?

— Well, everyone should decide for themselves whether to take these figures on faith. We’ve always been, and continue to be, very skeptical of data coming from warring sides — whether it’s the Ukrainian General Staff’s reports or the Russian General Staff’s.

As with all wars, both sides consistently overstate enemy losses and downplay their own. So, when Zelensky said that North Korea has already lost 4,000 soldiers killed and wounded, well, it might be true. I don’t know — maybe it is, maybe it isn’t. But given that Ukraine is making the claim, I expect they’re likely inflating the numbers. That’s why I approach it with skepticism.

On the other hand, when South Korea spoke up, it seemed, at first glance, to be a relatively neutral third party — not a warring party. It maintains a firm position of not supplying weapons to Ukraine. So, maybe Seoul’s numbers are more trustworthy. But their figures don’t match up either.

Last December, South Korea reported that North Korea had 100 soldiers killed and 1,000 wounded. Now, they’re saying North Korea has lost 300 killed and 2,700 wounded. In December, the ratio of killed to wounded was 1:10; now it’s 1:9. That’s an extraordinary, completely implausible statistic.

After hearing this, we specifically investigated similar cases and looked at statistics from Israel’s operations in Gaza. It’s a small area, which makes evacuating wounded soldiers relatively simple and quick. Israel has excellent medical care, including military medicine. According to the numbers provided by the IDF, their ratio of killed to wounded is roughly 1:6.

And that’s in a small area with an advanced, modern army. For the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ratio was roughly 1:6 or 1:7 — also with efficient evacuations, adherence to the golden hour rule, and access to excellent medical care. Yet, the South Koreans claim a 1:10 ratio for the North Koreans in the Kursk region. This suggests that nearly all of their wounded soldiers received immediate medical attention and evacuation within the first hour and then fully recovered. Evidently, none of those alleged cases of self-inflicted wounds occurred. It’s hard to believe.

If true, it would mean that North Korea has the world’s best military medical system, capable of saving soldiers at an unprecedented level — even though they’re operating in Russian territory. For comparison, the Russian ratio is 1:3, which is three times worse than North Korea’s supposed results. Naturally, we don’t believe these figures.

As for the claim of 300 killed, that seems entirely plausible, and the number could be even higher in reality. The Ukrainian military has recorded a lot of drone footage showing rows of [supposed] North Korean soldiers’ bodies laid out, prepared for evacuation, collected from the front lines, and gathered in one spot. There are a lot of these videos, each showing 20–30 bodies. And that’s only what made it on camera. So, just based on observations, I’d say the number of deaths is probably in the hundreds by now. As for the exact number of wounded, I can’t say.

Interview by Kevin Rothrock

Cover Image: Vladimir Zelenskiy / AFP / Scanpix / LETA

meduza.io

6. Public support swings toward South Korea's ruling party despite martial law fallout

​The fundamental question for the Korean people in the South is which party is going to best protect Korean democracy and protect koKorea from the threat from the north?

Yes the martial law decision was misguided but the actions of the Minjoo Party are revealing its true colors.

Public support swings toward South Korea's ruling party despite martial law fallout

Democratic Party's missteps boost People Power Party support

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/01/17/SK4GZ3HR7JBSJGHMDHPPX2IKDM/

By Yang Jihea,

Joo Hee-yeon,

Lee Jae-eun

Published 2025.01.17. 11:11

Updated 2025.01.17. 13:57

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung / Newsis

A recent poll revealed that support for the ruling People Power Party (PPP) has narrowly overtaken the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DP), albeit within the margin of error. The reversal is the first in three months since support for the DP (28%) surpassed the PPP (27%) in the second week of October last year, according to a joint survey conducted by research firms Embrain Public, KSTAT Research, Korea Research International, and Hankook Research on Jan. 16.

This reflects a shift in public opinion. Voter support for the PPP, which had plummeted following the December 3 martial law crisis, rebounded in late December, while support for the DP has steadily declined.

A National Barometer Survey (NBS) conducted via phone interviews with 1,005 men and women from Jan. 13 to 15 showed the following party support ratings: 35% for the People Power Party, 33% for the Democratic Party, 8% for the Rebuilding Korea Party, 3% for the Reform Party, and 1% for the Progressive Party. Around 17% of respondents said they had no preferred party or were “unsure.”

Additionally, 48% of respondents said a candidate from the opposition party should win the next presidential elections, compared to 41% who supported a ruling party candidate. If an early presidential election were to take place, 36% of respondents said they would vote for a DP candidate, while 33% leaned toward a PPP candidate, both within the margin of error (±3.1 percentage points).

Political analysts attribute this change to growing public dissatisfaction with the DP’s recent course of action following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s unexpected martial law debacle. Instead of working to stabilize the chaos, the DP passed impeachment motions for President Yoon and former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials' (CIO’s) attempts at arresting President Yoon also raised concerns that the DP was using its dominance in the parliament for political maneuvers.

Poll results show that the PPP had maintained a slight lead over the DP within the margin of error until late September. This trend was reversed in October, and by the third week of December, after the martial law declaration, the DP had widened the gap to a significant 13 percentage points, leading with 39% support, while the PPP trailed at 26%.

However, the gap began to close in late December, narrowing to 4 percentage points in the second week of January (DP 36%, PPP 32%), and ultimately reversed in the latest survey (PPP 35%, DPK 33%).

Experts cite the DP-led impeachment of Prime Minister Han on Dec. 27 as one of the focal points when centrist voters turned their backs on the opposition party. “The impeachment of Prime Minister Han received criticism from centrist voters, as it was perceived as the opposition abusing its political dominance,” said a political analyst.

The gap between those favoring “regime change” (48%) and “regime reconstruction” (41%) for the next presidential election has narrowed by nine percentage points compared to the previous week’s survey (53% vs. 37%). Similarly, the gap in voting intentions for DP (36%) and PPP (33%) candidates has narrowed from 12 percentage points to just three percentage points over the past week.

The DP-led impeachment investigation committee’s decision to remove insurrection charges from the grounds for impeaching President Yoon also faced public backlash. The DP’s plans to combat the “spread of fake news” on the messenger app KakaoTalk has sparked controversy over alleged “KakaoTalk censorship,” further alienating centrist voters.

Recent attempts to arrest President Yoon also divided public opinion, reigniting support for the ruling party. “President Yoon’s arrest has triggered a shift in public perception,” said Yoon Tae-gon, a political analyst. “DP leader Lee Jae-myung’s many legal risks have come to light, prompting a more critical evaluation of his leadership, particularly in the context of recent impeachment proceedings and his handling of the party’s dominance.”

7. Exclusive: Korean-American lawmaker warns impeachment drive could bring disaster for S. Korea

Exclusive: Korean-American lawmaker warns impeachment drive could bring disaster for S. Korea

Interview with Rep. Young Kim, U.S. Republican congresswoman

https://www.chosun.com/english/people-en/2025/01/17/7ID7JWEQBVCRLC4LPVJTL6DZ5Y/

By Kim Eun-joong (Washington),

Kim Seo-young,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2025.01.17. 17:14

Updated 2025.01.17. 19:48

U.S. Republican Congresswoman Young Kim. /News1

“If the factions behind the impeachment in South Korea continue to steer the current situation, North Korea and China will seize this opportunity to weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance. I say this based on my over 20 years of experience witnessing the threats posed by North Korea and China in the U.S. House of Representatives.”

In a written interview with The Chosun Ilbo on Jan. 14, Young Kim, a U.S. congresswoman (Republican, California), said, “The forces behind President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment prefer appeasement toward North Korea and accommodation of China, which could lead to a major disaster for the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region.”

The 63-year-old Korean-American was elected to the House in 2020 and secured her third term last November, as U.S. House terms are two years. She was appointed chair of the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee under the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Jan. 9. Kim drew attention on Jan. 6, becoming the first U.S. political figure to criticize the faction that led the impeachment in a column for The Hill, a congressional media outlet. This faction refers to the opposition parties in South Korea, including the Democratic Party of Korea, which led the impeachment effort in the National Assembly.

◇ “Regardless of who holds power in Korea, responding to the ‘malicious alliance of North Korea and China’ must be a priority for the U.S. and Korea”

What led you to write the column in The Hill?

“My perspective is based on a belief in the strength and importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and a hope for the freedom and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula. I was born in Incheon and grew up witnessing the aftermath of the Korean War. I have relatives who defected from North Korea. I’ve seen how South Korea, once a developing country, grew into a donor nation, and I worked for over 20 years as a foreign affairs advisor in the House of Representatives, helping strengthen the bilateral relationship through initiatives like the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). As a congressman and the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee Chair, I directly witnessed the unpredictability of the North Korean regime and the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party. I couldn’t remain silent.”

In U.S. political circles, there has been growing concern over the phrase “diplomacy antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia,” which was cited as a reason for impeachment in the first motion proposed by South Korea’s Democratic Party last month. After the first motion was defeated and controversy intensified, the opposition removed this clause from the second motion.

U.S. Congresswoman Young Kim (left) takes the oath of office at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., alongside her spouse Charles Kim (center) and House Speaker Mike Johnson on Jan. 3. /AP-Yonhap News

Why did the phrase “antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia” attract so much attention in U.S. politics?

“It is clearly wrong to use President Yoon’s antagonism toward South Korea’s adversaries as grounds for impeachment. The malicious alliance of North Korea, China, and Russia threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific, and ultimately, global democracy. The forces pushing for impeachment favor appeasement toward North Korea and compliance with China, which could bring great disaster to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the entire region. The North Korean regime has never kept its promises. Furthermore, China’s President Xi Jinping, while supporting Russia’s unjust and brutal invasion of Ukraine, is also looking for the right moment to seize Taiwan. President Yoon has been critical of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s illegal expansion of maritime sovereignty. He has also stressed that denuclearization of North Korea is crucial for regional peace. I share that stance, and I believe we must confront the North Korea-China-Russia alliance even more resolutely. Under President Yoon’s leadership, South Korea has become a stronger strategic partner to the U.S.”

Wasn’t it unjustified for President Yoon to declare martial law?

“Whether martial law aligns with constitutional principles is a matter for legal scholars to debate. I trust the South Korean people’s commitment to democracy and their ability to navigate and overcome this situation.”

How might the prolonged political instability in South Korea affect the actions of North Korea, Russia, and China?

“If the faction driving the impeachment prolongs the unrest, political instability and anti-American sentiment could deepen in South Korea. North Korea and China are likely to exploit the situation by spreading disinformation, sowing discord, and undermining the U.S.-South Korea alliance.”

Some supporters of President Yoon claim that China has been manipulating public sentiment during the impeachment protests and spreading disinformation via social media. “While such allegations remain unconfirmed, it wouldn’t be surprising. It’s entirely plausible,” Rep. Kim said. She noted that President Yoon’s administration has taken a more critical stance toward China than his predecessors, whereas the opposition has adopted a more conciliatory approach. “President Yoon’s impeachment and any resulting discord within the alliance would undoubtedly benefit China,” she added.

U.S. Representative Young Kim listens attentively to participants' remarks at the annual international conference hosted by the nonprofit organization Concordia in New York in September 2023. In an interview with The Chosunilbo, she referred to the opposition party's initial impeachment motion, stating, "It is clearly a mistake to consider President Yoon Suk-yeol's stance against hostile forces in South Korea as grounds for impeachment." /Getty Images Korea

How will the current crisis in South Korea influence the U.S.-South Korea alliance?

“The U.S.-South Korea alliance has a proud 72-year history. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently visited Seoul and met with South Korean officials, including Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, to underscore the enduring importance of our partnership. I hope both nations continue to recognize the value of joint military exercises and defense cooperation.”

What are your thoughts on the evolution of U.S.-South Korea-Japan relations?

“Relations among the three nations have made significant progress in recent years, and I believe they should continue to deepen. Our adversaries, such as North Korea and China, aim to exploit any fractures in our alliance to undermine a free and democratic Indo-Pacific. China has sought to intimidate its neighbors, including actions like allegedly severing Taiwan’s undersea cables. The U.S. must work closely with its allies to counter such threats, making trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan indispensable. Bipartisan support for this partnership remains strong in the U.S. Congress. I commend the efforts of South Korean and Japanese leaders to resolve historical disputes. Florida Senator Marco Rubio, nominated as secretary of state by President-elect Trump, understands the crucial role of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan in advancing shared interests in the Indo-Pacific. I expect him to further develop and expand the Camp David Agreements—a security pact between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., announced on Aug. 18, 2023, at Camp David. As chair of the Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific within the Foreign Affairs Committee, I am committed to advancing trilateral cooperation with my counterparts in South Korea and Japan.”

Rep. Kim recently met with President-elect Donald Trump, who will be inaugurated as U.S. president on Jan. 20. While she declined to disclose specific details of their conversation, she shared, “Last weekend, I had an opportunity to discuss the situation in South Korea with advisors to the incoming Trump administration.” She added, “I recommended inviting a South Korean delegation to attend President Trump’s inauguration.”

What should the next U.S. administration prioritize regarding the situation in South Korea?

“We are closely monitoring its developments in South Korea. Once President Trump takes office, his administration must reaffirm its commitment to bilateral cooperation with South Korea and trilateral efforts with Japan to counter the influence of North Korea and China. Regardless of who holds power in South Korea, it must be clear that appeasement toward North Korea is ineffective and that addressing the North Korea-China alliance is a priority for both nations.”

8. Some N. Koreans marvel at South's freedom to criticize president

​One of the positive effects of the martial law/impeachment crisis that should be exploited for the information campaign.

South Koreans are showing strength, not weakness. And some in north Korea "marvel" at this.

Some N. Koreans marvel at South's freedom to criticize president - Daily NK English

"Here, you can vanish without a trace for speaking out. People are surprised to learn it's not like that in the South," a source told Daily NK

By Seon Hwa - January 16, 2025

dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · January 15, 2025

A protest demanding the resignation of the government in relation to the martial law declaration, taking place at the plaza of Lotte Department Store's Ulsan branch in Samsan-dong, Nam-gu, Ulsan, on the afternoon of Dec. 4, 2024. /Photo=Yonhap News

Recent detailed coverage of South Korean politics in North Korean state media has sparked intense curiosity among North Koreans, particularly regarding South Koreans’ freedom to openly criticize their president.

Multiple sources told Daily NK on Friday that a Jan. 3 Rodong Sinmun newspaper article about South Korea’s political situation has become a widespread topic of private discussion. While public discussion of South Korean politics remains strictly forbidden and punishable in North Korea, people are quietly sharing their thoughts with close family and friends.

The initial reaction has largely been one of disbelief. The Rodong Sinmun newspaper’s coverage of Seoul protests, including “large-scale candlelight vigils and marches demanding ‘Expel Yoon Suk Yeol! Disband the People Power Party!'” has left many North Koreans stunned at the notion of citizens openly calling for their president’s removal.

“We can’t even imagine criticizing the party or Supreme Leader,” a source in Ryanggang province said. “People can’t comprehend how South Koreans can demand their president’s expulsion. It makes them say the South must truly be a different world.”

The detailed reporting has prompted North Koreans to draw comparisons between the political systems on either side of the DMZ. Many question whether the reports of South Koreans using “crude language” to criticize their administration are accurate or deliberately edited.

Another striking revelation for North Koreans has been learning that South Korean society continues to function normally despite political upheaval. “People with relatives who have defected are surprised to hear their family members in the South saying everything’s fine, even amid what’s being described as social paralysis,” the Ryanggang source noted.

“The consensus is that South Korea must be genuinely free,” the source added. “Here, you can vanish without a trace for speaking out. People are surprised to learn it’s not like that in the South.”

While the North Korean authorities likely intended these reports to highlight the superiority of their socialist system, they appear to have instead underscored the stark differences in political freedom between the two countries.

The situation raises questions about how North Korean authorities will balance their coverage of South Korean politics going forward, as more detailed reporting seems to be fostering increased sympathy and curiosity about life in the South.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · January 15, 2025

9. Crushing dissent: N. Korea's anti-reactionary thought law and its effect on daily life

​The 69 page report can be downloaded at this link: https://www.dailynk.com/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/01/Supressing-Foreign-Influence-The-Impact-of-the-Reactionary-Ideology-and-Culture-Rejection-Law-on-North-Korean-Society_Daily-NK_October-2024.pdf

I am going to have to spend some time reviewing this.

Crushing dissent: N. Korea's anti-reactionary thought law and its effect on daily life - Daily NK English

Of particular concern is how the law itself contradicts international human rights standards, especially regarding freedom of thought and expression

By English Language Editor - January 17, 2025

dailynk.com · by English Language Editor · January 17, 2025

Screenshot from a video produced in North Korea in 2022 showing a public struggle session of those caught violating the country's "anti-reactionary thought law." (©Daily NK)

Daily NK has released a comprehensive report examining how North Korea’s “Anti-Reactionary Thought Law” is severely restricting citizens’ basic rights and daily lives. The report, titled “Suppresssing Foreign Influence: The Impact of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law on North Korean society,” provides an in-depth analysis of the law’s implementation and its effects on the North Korean population.

The findings reveal that since the law’s enactment, North Korean authorities have expanded both enforcement agencies and their jurisdiction, extending control into citizens’ everyday activities. The report highlights that most citizens have received no formal education about the law’s provisions or their rights, instead being subjected to state-driven ideological instruction that has instilled a deep-seated fear of punishment. Implementation of the law has been marked by widespread procedural violations, with authorities frequently conducting arrests and carrying out punishments without warrants, failing to notify families, or providing access to legal representation. The system is further corrupted by enforcement officials who routinely accept bribes and make arbitrary decisions, seriously undermining any semblance of fair application.

Of particular concern is how the anti-reactionary thought law itself contradicts international human rights standards, especially regarding freedom of thought and expression. The report argues that North Korean authorities are using this legislation primarily as a tool to justify their crackdown on access to foreign media and information. In light of these findings, the report calls for the international community to take a stronger stance in holding North Korean authorities accountable for their human rights obligations and to actively challenge the ongoing violations of citizens’ basic rights under this law.

Daily NK will continue its mission to expose North Korea’s human rights situation to the international community through sustained investigation and analysis of internal conditions within the country. The complete findings can be accessed in the full report.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by English Language Editor · January 17, 2025

10. N. Korea orders police to intensify public surveillance under guise of education

​The regime is very worried. The potential for internal instability (and resistance) is growing and the regime is telling us they see it coming. Kim Jong Un is more afraid of the Korean people in the north than he is of the combined ROK and US militaries.

Despite the political turmoil in the South and the nuclear threat from the regime we cannot be blind to the potential for instability and the threat to the regime.

N. Korea orders police to intensify public surveillance under guise of education - Daily NK English

"The directive aims to prevent even minimal ideological deviation and create a population that unquestioningly follows party orders through tighter controls," a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Eun - January 17, 2025

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · January 17, 2025

A view of the North Korean city of Sinuiju, in North Pyongan province, as seen from Dandong, Liaoning province, China. (Photo provided by Lee Seung-ju, a profiler with Transitional Justice Working Group)

North Korea’s Ministry of Social Security has ordered local police boxes nationwide to intensify “mass educational activities,” a move that signals tighter surveillance of public ideological attitudes, according to sources.

A Daily NK source in North Pyongan province reported that Sinuiju police boxes received directives early this month to implement enhanced public education programs. Police boxes, which form the lowest tier of North Korea’s public security system, monitor households in their jurisdictions and track resident movements.

The order notably included instructions about “going into the masses to bring even just one person into the party’s fold” – language that suggests growing official concern about ideological discipline. According to the source, this reflects regime anxiety about public disaffection and attempts to counter it through intensified indoctrination.

“The directive aims to prevent even minimal ideological deviation and create a population that unquestioningly follows party orders through tighter controls,” the source explained. “The party considers only those who demonstrate absolute obedience as loyal citizens unified with the regime.”

In Sinuiju, police box officers have increased their monitoring of residents, using informants to document daily activities in minute detail. “They record people’s lives as if photographing them with a camera,” the source said. “With mass educational activities designated as the police’s primary task this year, residents fear life will become even more restrictive.”

“The state increasingly imprisons people in a web of surveillance and control, further suffocating those already struggling with hardships,” the source added. “The authorities should recognize that this surveillance is toxic to people’s lives. If this continues, the public’s suppressed discontent will only deepen.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · January 17, 2025

11. N. Koreans abandon won as currency redenomination fears spread

​Could we be seeing a tipping point in the offing? Will another attempt at (2009) currency controls lead to pushback, resistance, and instability?

Don't mess with people's money.

N. Koreans abandon won as currency redenomination fears spread - Daily NK English

"Currency redenomination rumors are destroying what little faith remained in the won," a source told Daily NK

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · January 17, 2025

FILE PHOTO: North Korean currency. (Daily NK)

Amid persistent rumors of currency redenomination, North Koreans are increasingly shunning the domestic won in favor of foreign currencies. This growing distrust is accelerating the economy’s dependence on foreign money.

“Rumors about currency redenomination that began last year continue to spread, and more North Koreans are refusing to hold the domestic currency,” a source in South Hamgyong province told Daily NK on Thursday.

At marketplaces and shops, customers are noticeably avoiding the won. U.S. dollars and Chinese yuan now dominate transactions, with won-based exchanges becoming increasingly rare. While merchants have long preferred foreign currency due to mistrust in the won, this preference has now reached unprecedented levels.

A veteran vendor in her 50s, who has operated in Hamhung for over two decades, described the situation as unprecedented. “Dollars were always common here, but now the yuan is everywhere too. Vendors resist accepting won, and customers won’t even take Korean coins as change from foreign currency transactions. Some vendors struggle to conduct business because they can’t make change in foreign coins,” the source explained.

This aversion to the won stems largely from the traumatic 2009 currency reform, when the government limited how much old currency families could exchange for new bills, causing widespread financial devastation. Though more than a decade has passed, this memory continues to haunt North Koreans, fueling current fears of another redenomination.

Common sentiments in Hamhung reflect this anxiety: “We’re not foolish enough to hold onto domestic currency” and “There’s no telling when people will be ruined by another currency redenomination.”

This rush to secure foreign currency is driving exchange rates ever higher in North Korean markets. “Government crackdowns on private money changers haven’t calmed public nerves,” the source noted.

A source in North Pyongan province added, “Unlike previous periods of high exchange rates when people would sell foreign currency, now no one is selling regardless of how high rates climb.” Foreign currency is widely viewed as the only safe haven in uncertain times.

“Currency redenomination rumors are destroying what little faith remained in the won,” the source concluded. “People no longer see it as legitimate currency. Won bills were once considered as valuable as scrap paper – now they’re worth even less than that.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · January 17, 2025

12. ＜Investigation＞ No Birthday Celebrations for Kim Jong-un - "Nobody Knows His Age Even Now," "Perhaps He's Still Too Young" - New Propaganda Film Screened

​Is north Korean internal propaganda backfiring?

＜Investigation＞ No Birthday Celebrations for Kim Jong-un - "Nobody Knows His Age Even Now," "Perhaps He's Still Too Young" - New Propaganda Film Screened

asiapress.org

A rare photo of young Kim Jong-un in military uniform with his mother Ko Yong-hui. The photo appears to be from the late 1980s. Taken from the documentary film "Mother of Great Songun Korea" made to idolize Ko Yong-hui. This work was never released publicly.

January 8 is known as Kim Jong-un's birthday. In recent years, the idolization of Kim Jong-un has been rapidly progressing, with efforts such as the formalization of his revolutionary ideology and the introduction of portrait badges of him to establish his authority. His predecessors, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, had their birthdays designated as the greatest national holidays and used them as tools for idolization. How was the birthday of Kim Jong-un, said to be 41 years old (born in 1984), treated in North Korea? Here are reports from three reporting partners living in the northern region. (By KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆ Musan County, North Hamgyong Province

"While everyone knows January 8 is Kim Jong-un's birthday, there were no official anniversary celebrations or commemorative events. On January 8, a large assembly was held. The content was about pledging loyalty and implementing (Kim Jong-un's) speech from the Supreme People's Assembly.

Meetings were held at each institution and enterprise. At Musan Mine, everyone except morning shift workers attended. There was no mention of Kim Jong-un's birthday. The reason is unknown. Nobody knows even now how old Kim Jong-un is. However, the meeting heavily promoted Kim Jong-un's achievements, emphasizing devotion to the state and encouraging everyone to become masters of the country to build a better nation."

*Note: The timing of the Supreme People's Assembly speech referenced is unclear.

◆ Hyesan City, Ryanggang Province

"On January 8, there was a regular Wednesday study session for the Women's Union, with a 30-minute commemorative lecture promoting (Kim Jong-un) Marshal's achievements starting at 2 PM, followed by screening of a newly produced documentary film. Although electricity is scarce these days, they supplied power that day for the film screening.

There was absolutely no mention of Kim Jong-un's birthday or age. Even officials didn't mention it. Perhaps he's still too young for it to be publicly announced. However, everyone knows this is his birthday.

On the morning of January 8, students were mobilized to clean revolutionary historical sites, (Kim family’s) mosaic murals, and revolutionary study rooms. Nothing else special happened. No one questions why there aren't celebrations. It's actually better without special events because it's too cold."

◆ Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province

"This year again, there were no official birthday events for Kim Jong-un on January 8. On January 10, factories and enterprises held commemorative lectures and watched documentaries celebrating Kim Jong-un's appointment as General Secretary of the Workers' Party. January 8 wasn't a holiday, and there were no special rations."

*Note: Kim Jong-un was appointed General Secretary at the Eighth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea held in January 2021.

*Note: ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

• ＜Inside North Korea＞ Worker Dispatches to Russia Expanding - Screening Criteria Unusually Relaxed... Appears to Have Increased Following Military Deployment
• ＜Inside North Korea＞ Leaflets Reach Northernmost Ryanggang Province, Causing Lockdown and Confusion - 300km from South Korea... Who Did It?
• ＜North Korea Analysis＞Reality of 'Speed Battle' Apartments - Expert: "Durability at Best 10-15 Years"
• ＜Inside N.Korea＞"No One Knows soldiers are dying in battle... It's Like a Dog's Death" Strict Silence Order on Russian Deployment Information Anxiety Spreads Among Soldiers' Parents
• ＜Inside N.Korea＞Chaos Spreads as Prices Soar - Gas More Than Doubles, Rice Up 1.65x, Currency Value Falls to One-Third... 'We'll Die Like This…'

asiapress.org

13. ＜Inside North Korea＞ Leaflets Reach Northernmost Ryanggang Province, Causing Lockdown and Confusion - 300km from South Korea... Who Did It?

​Enquiring minds want to know.

＜Inside North Korea＞ Leaflets Reach Northernmost Ryanggang Province, Causing Lockdown and Confusion - 300km from South Korea... Who Did It?

asiapress.org

Leaflets that the North Korean government claims South Korea scattered over Pyongyang's airspace on October 11. Source: Korean Central News Agency.

It has been reported that leaflets reached Baekam County in Ryanggang Province in September 2024, located in North Korea's northernmost region, causing confusion that led to the area being locked down.

According to a reporting partner living in Ryanggang Province in early October 2024, the leaflets arrived in September. After being discovered and reported to authorities, the Ministry of Social Security (police) blocked off access to the surrounding mountains and deployed selected Workers' Party members to collect the leaflets.

While various South Korean civic groups frequently send balloons carrying leaflets to North Korea to share outside information, the source and content of these particular leaflets remain unclear. Baekam County is a cold highland region with over 90% forest coverage and is located nearly 300km from the military demarcation line with South Korea. The possibility that they were launched from China, which is only dozens of kilometers away, cannot be ruled out. Leaflets reaching Ryanggang Province is reportedly a rare occurrence.

The reporting partner said, "The authorities made the person who first discovered and reported the leaflets sign a pledge stating that any disclosure would be considered an anti-socialist act."

The Kim Jong-un regime has been strengthening its vigilance against information inflow from South Korea, including incoming leaflets. (By KANG Ji-won)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

• ＜North Korea Analysis＞Reality of 'Speed Battle' Apartments - Expert: "Durability at Best 10-15 Years"
• ＜Inside N.Korea＞"No One Knows soldiers are dying in battle... It's Like a Dog's Death" Strict Silence Order on Russian Deployment Information Anxiety Spreads Among Soldiers' Parents
• ＜Inside N.Korea＞Chaos Spreads as Prices Soar - Gas More Than Doubles, Rice Up 1.65x, Currency Value Falls to One-Third... 'We'll Die Like This…'
• Analysis of Dangerously Rushed Apartment Construction (1): Expert Warns '90 Years Behind Japan, Durability at Most 10-15 Years' - Severely Lacking Materials, Zero Power Sources...
• ＜Super-telephoto video＞North Korea's border with Russia: What's in the pile of unidentified cargo? Guards at the checkpoint... North Korean military tightens control of railroad terminals

asiapress.org

​14. ＜Inside North Korea＞ Worker Dispatches to Russia Expanding - Screening Criteria Unusually Relaxed... Appears to Have Increased Following Military Deployment

＜Inside North Korea＞ Worker Dispatches to Russia Expanding - Screening Criteria Unusually Relaxed... Appears to Have Increased Following Military Deployment

asiapress.org

Combat personnel believed to be deployed North Korean soldiers, photographed in Kursk Oblast in November 2024. Sourced from Andrei Chaprien's Telegram.

A boom in worker dispatches to Russia is occurring in North Korea. Recruitment continues throughout North Korea, with previously strict screening criteria reportedly being relaxed. The numbers appear to have surged since around October-November last year when military deployments to Russia came to light. This investigation was conducted in three northern cities. (By KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆ Russia Ignores Security Council Sanctions

Following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea resumed dispatching workers to China and Russia in early 2024. For the Kim Jong-un regime, struggling with economic damage and foreign currency shortages due to COVID isolation, sending citizens abroad is an easy way to earn foreign currency, despite risks such as defection and exposure to foreign information.

However, accepting North Korean workers violates UN Security Council sanctions. While China had accepted between 50,000 to 100,000 workers until 2017, since the waning of the pandemic, they have been urging returns while strongly restricting the acceptance of new workers.

◆ Dispatched for Construction and Siberian Logging

Russia has been accepting workers for construction sites, interior work, and Siberian logging operations. The number was reportedly around 30,000 until 2017. Russian domestic evaluation of North Korean workers has been very high, noting their diligence and quality work at low wages.

Russia, which has grown rapidly closer to North Korea following its invasion of Ukraine, has largely ignored its sanctions implementation duties despite being a permanent Security Council member. With chronic labor shortages worsened by war, Russia resumed accepting new workers early last year as demand for North Korean workers increased. South Korea's National Intelligence Service announced on October 29 last year that approximately 4,000 North Korean workers were in Russia, earning around $800 monthly.

Kim Jong-un visiting Russia in September 2023. Source: Rodong Sinmun.

◆ No Dispatch Allowed Even for Korean Drama Viewers

In North Korea, many people rushed at this rare opportunity to earn money abroad. This is because urban residents have become impoverished due to the regime's strict restrictions on private economic activities. It's not uncommon for people to borrow money from relatives or sell homes to prepare bribes. Screening has been strict - in addition to background checks, those previously caught watching South Korean dramas or with defector relatives were excluded. Recommendations from workplaces and neighborhood units were also required.

◆ Worker Selection Intensifies Following Military Deployment

A reporting partner from Musan County, North Hamgyong Province, shared the following in December last year: "Since last spring, Musan Mine had recruited and selected workers for dispatch to China, but China either vaguely delayed accepting them or cited sanctions violations, leading to some September deployments being returned. So they began sending workers to Russia instead, and are rushing to reconfirm that there are no issues with backgrounds and workplace organizational life. Most will reportedly be engaged in construction work."

A reporting partner in Hoeryong City also reported that authorities are conducting large-scale recruitment for Russia: "In Hoeryong, recruitment intensified after November 15, following the deployment of soldiers to Russia. The work involves construction and factory labor. In Hoeryong alone, about 200 people were selected. I heard the work periods are divided into one and two years."

In Ryanggang Province, which borders China, many people are heading to Russia instead of the stagnant Chinese option: "Many have gone to Russia from Hyesan City too. In December alone, 37 people reportedly left. Even those without special skills are being selected. There's talk of them being mobilized for war recovery construction, while others work in regular factories. They travel to Russia via Pyongyang and Rason. If there are no political issues, dispatch permits are generally granted with just workplace recommendations and guarantors."

◆ Some Cancel Due to Reports of Exploitation

Meanwhile, there appears to be a recent increase in people canceling their confirmed Russian assignments due to dissatisfaction with conditions. Before COVID, workers could earn money in Russia for 5-10 years, but now periods are shorter at one or two years. "They're even recruiting for 3-6 month short-term dispatches. Some people have given up going despite receiving workplace recommendations," says the Musan County reporting partner.

Information about poor working conditions and severe exploitation by authorities is spreading through returning workers from China and Russia.

"There's a woman nearby who returned from China with back pain who complained, 'They worked us like machines or livestock. They said we could earn 50,000 yuan (about 9.92 million won) per year, but we didn't receive proper payment.' This led to her being called to the Ministry of State Security (police) and made to write self-criticism at the Youth League. Everyone now knows that going abroad for work is difficult," (Ryanggang Province reporting partner)

*Note: The Youth League (Socialist Patriotic Youth League) is a Workers' Party mass organization for students from senior middle school through university and working youth generally up to age 30.

In January 2024, Japanese and South Korean media reported an incident where North Korean workers at a factory in Jilin Province, angered by unpaid wages, occupied their workplace and assaulted a management supervisor, resulting in death.

Additionally, North Korean domestic collaborators were unable to confirm which regions the workers dispatched to Russia are in or what kind of work they are doing.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

• ＜Inside North Korea＞ Leaflets Reach Northernmost Ryanggang Province, Causing Lockdown and Confusion - 300km from South Korea... Who Did It?
• ＜North Korea Analysis＞Reality of 'Speed Battle' Apartments - Expert: "Durability at Best 10-15 Years"
• ＜Inside N.Korea＞"No One Knows soldiers are dying in battle... It's Like a Dog's Death" Strict Silence Order on Russian Deployment Information Anxiety Spreads Among Soldiers' Parents
• ＜Inside N.Korea＞Chaos Spreads as Prices Soar - Gas More Than Doubles, Rice Up 1.65x, Currency Value Falls to One-Third... 'We'll Die Like This…'
• Analysis of Dangerously Rushed Apartment Construction (2): Expert Says 'Only Completion Matters, Life is Being Disregarded' - Past 23-Story Building Collapse in Pyongyang...
• Analysis of Dangerously Rushed Apartment Construction (1): Expert Warns '90 Years Behind Japan, Durability at Most 10-15 Years' - Severely Lacking Materials, Zero Power Sources...

asiapress.org

15. Ladders, noodle stations and K-pop: how the arrest of South Korea’s president unfolded

Ladders, noodle stations and K-pop: how the arrest of South Korea’s president unfolded

Police came better prepared than for their first attempt two weeks ago while supporters on both sides of the political divide came out to protest

The Guardian · by Raphael Rashid · January 15, 2025

By 4.30am, the streets around Yoon Suk Yeol’s hilltop residence felt like rush hour, packed with police and protesters despite the early hour.

Roads were completely sealed off and thousands of officers were in position on the freezing winter morning, while hundreds of pro-Yoon supporters chanted aggressively while clutching red light sticks and American flags.

Behind multiple police cordons, segregated for security, a smaller crowd of anti-Yoon demonstrators had secured positions closest to the gates.

Tea and instant noodle stations were set up, serving both sides of the political divide.

Arrest of Yoon Suk Yeol in South Korea: why has it taken so long and what happens next?

Read more

“Stop the steal”, read banners in English and Korean from Yoon’s supporters, referring to unfounded claims of election interference used to justify the martial law, while across came chants of “Arrest him now!”

Members of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials and police officers make their way towards the presidential residence to execute the arrest warrant on Wednesday morning. Photograph: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

As dawn broke and temperatures rose slightly, the anti-Yoon camp’s mood turned almost festive: singing, dancing and broadcasting live scenes from multiple angles as the operation to arrest South Korea’s impeached president began in earnest. It was buzzing.

Unlike their failed attempt earlier this month, investigators came prepared. Television footage showed investigators and police scaling the compound’s walls with ladders. Others reportedly approached through mountain paths behind the residence.

Inside, clashes reportedly broke out with security personnel, and at least one person was injured and evacuated by paramedics.

“The security staff aren’t responding as aggressively as feared”, noted opposition lawmaker Han Chang-min at the scene. “Police are proceeding while trying to get maximum cooperation”.

Headlines began flashing that the compound’s defences were slowly collapsing.

“Come out! Come out!” the anti-Yoon crowd cheered. “Go get him!” Despite the gravity of attempting to arrest a sitting president, there was an air of inevitability.

South Korean impeached president Yoon Suk Yeol speaking to the public in a video message. Photograph: South Korean Presidential Office/Yonhap/AFP/Getty Images

For 43 days since declaring martial law, a move that has thrown the country into political chaos, Yoon has remained defiant in his fortress-like residence, protected by loyal security forces. But now, his castle was crumbling.

‘You said you would protect him’

At about 10.30am, police suddenly lined the roads further. A convoy of vehicles emerged and departed. Within moments, euphoria erupted from the pro-impeachment crowd: “They got him!”

Within a minute, the police lines suddenly melted away as the compound’s main gates stood open. Hundreds of investigators and police streamed out like a river. From within their cordoned area, jubilant protesters shouted “Thank you so much!” and “You did a great job!” at the departing officers. Then they went back to celebrate to the tunes of K-pop.

Communist spies and assassination attempts: how the cold war still shapes South Korean politics

Read more

On the other side, Yoon’s supporters were standing in stunned silence. Some collapsed in tears. “How can this be?” one woman wailed. Another man, visibly distraught, swore viciously at the crowd: “You said you would protect him, but what did you do?”

Supporters of the impeached president, Yoon Suk Yeol, rally near the offices of the Corruption Investigation Office in Gwacheon. Photograph: Kim Soo-hyeon/Reuters

Minutes before his arrest, Yoon had released another defiant message. “As president who must protect the constitution and legal system of the Republic of Korea, my compliance with these illegal and invalid procedures does not mean I accept them. It is only to prevent unsavoury bloodshed”.

He now holds the distinction of being the first sitting South Korean president to be arrested, a dramatic fall for a leader who just weeks ago had attempted to impose military rule on his country.

The morning’s events played out like a live television drama, with every development broadcast across multiple news channels.

As his convoy arrived at the anti-corruption agency’s offices in Gwacheon, investigators prepared to question him over insurrection charges that could carry the death penalty.

Yoon faces 48 hours of questioning, after which investigators must decide whether to seek a warrant to detain him for up to 20 days or release him. Meanwhile, the constitutional court continues deliberating his impeachment. Technically, it could still reinstate him as president.

For now, though, many South Koreans were simply processing the extraordinary scenes they had witnessed. The siege was over. The president was in custody.

The Guardian · by Raphael Rashid · January 15, 2025

16. N. Korea's media reports on Yoon's detention over martial law bid

​On the surface the Propaganda and Agitation department might think this is a windfall. But they are going to have a hard time with this especially if more information comes in from South Korea. In the long run the martial law/impeachment crisis could have more positive information effects for the pursuit of freedom versus the regime's oppression. 

N. Korea's media reports on Yoon's detention over martial law bid | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · January 17, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state media on Friday published reports about impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's detention as part of an investigation into his botched imposition of martial law, two days after he was taken into custody.

The Korean Central Broadcasting Station, a radio broadcaster, and the Rodong Sinmun newspaper, which caters to the general public in North Korea, published the report, citing breaking news from the international community.

"The international community is shining a spotlight on the chaotic situation in puppet South Korea by publishing breaking news on puppet Yoon Suk Yeol's detention as a sitting president for the first time and his transfer to investigative authorities," the report said.

The radio station described the detention process surrounding Yoon as an "unusual scene," mentioning his "miserable fate" and predicting further chaos in South Korea.

It also quoted foreign media as reporting that Yoon is expected to become the fifth South Korean president to face a prison term and that he could face the death sentence in the worst-case scenario.

North Korea's media had published near daily reports about civic rallies in South Korea calling for Yoon's ouster since late November, in what appears to be an attempt to stir domestic animosity toward South Korea.

Since Yoon's martial law declaration on Dec. 3, the North remained silent on the issue for about a week before publishing news coverage on the botched martial attempt and the subsequent moves to impeach Yoon the following week.

A vehicle carrying impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol (2nd from L) heads to Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, south of the capital, on Jan. 15, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · January 17, 2025

​17. DP to unilaterally table revised special counsel bill to probe Yoon's insurrection charges

​The Minjoo party is recognizing the hle it is digging for itself.

(3rd LD) DP to unilaterally table revised special counsel bill to probe Yoon's insurrection charges | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 17, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES details throughout; TRIMS)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Jan. 17 (Yonhap) -- The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) has decided to unilaterally table a revised bill on launching a special counsel probe into impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol over his failed martial law bid after failing to narrow a gap with the ruling People Power Party (PPP), officials said Friday.

DP floor leader Park Chan-dae made the announcement to reporters, saying that talks with the ruling bloc have fallen through.

Park, however, said the DP has made "major compromises" on the scope of the special counsel probe bill, such as excluding allegations Yoon committed "treason" against his own country.

Opposition parties have been seeking to pass a revised special counsel bill that includes allegations Yoon committed "treason" by attempting to deliberately provoke war with North Korea.

The PPP has argued that the scope of the bill is excessive and decided to introduce its own bill that excludes such allegations.

Park noted the DP has accepted the PPP's requests on details, such as the period of the probe, stressing that the revision is akin to "almost fully accommodating the PPP's claims."

The announcement came after Park and his PPP counterpart, Kweon Seong-dong, failed to reach a compromise in talks presided over by National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik.

PPP floor leader Kweon earlier said talks have fallen through due to a difference in their positions.

"From our side, we made a bill that only includes essential details, to the extent that we could compromise, rather than a bill that bargains back and forth," he said, criticizing the opposition over its approach to the talks.

The opposition-proposed bill will likely pass the National Assembly as the opposition bloc currently dominates the 300-member parliament with 192 seats.

Rep. Kweon Seong-dong (R), floor leader of the ruling People Power Party, speaks with Park Chan-dae, floor leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, during a ceremony marking the 68th anniversary of the Kwanhun Club, an association of senior journalists, in Seoul on Jan. 10, 2025. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 17, 2025

​18. HRW “North Korea’s Deployment of Troops to Russia Shows Security and Human Rights Linkage… Forced Obedience through Reign of Terror”

​Yes.. Human rights are. amoral imperative. But they are also a national security issue. This is why a human rights upfront approach needs to be a part of a policy and strategy toward north Korea.

This is a Google translation of a VOA report.

HRW “North Korea’s Deployment of Troops to Russia Shows Security and Human Rights Linkage… Forced Obedience through Reign of Terror”

2025.1.17

• An So-young

https://www.voakorea.com/a/7939636.html

The deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia shows that North Korea's nuclear and human rights issues are directly linked, an international human rights group pointed out. North Korean citizens, deprived of basic freedoms, are criticized for being forced to submit under threats from the regime. Reporter Ahn So-young reports.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international human rights organization that monitors human rights situations around the world, pointed out on the 16th that “North Korea is one of the most repressive countries in the world.”

[HRW Report] “The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is one of the most repressive countries in the world. Under totalitarian leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea maintains fearful obedience through arbitrary punishments, torture, executions, unjust imprisonment, and forced labor. Sexual and domestic violence against women and girls is widespread and normalized. Basic freedoms, including expression, assembly, and access to information, are severely restricted. In 2024, North Korea maintained extreme and unnecessary measures under the pretext of Covid-19 protection.”

Human Rights Watch made this assessment in its “2025 World Human Rights Report,” which included the human rights conditions in over 100 countries around the world, and pointed out that “under the totalitarian leader Kim Jong-un’s regime, North Korea maintains a system of subjugation through arbitrary punishment, torture, execution, unjust imprisonment, and forced labor.”

It also said that in North Korea, “sexual violence and domestic violence against women and girls is widespread and routine,” and added that “basic freedoms such as expression, association, and access to information are severely restricted.”

He then criticized, “North Korea continued to take extreme and unnecessary measures in 2024 under the pretext of preventing the spread of the novel coronavirus.”

In particular, this year's report focused on North Korea's military support for Russia, which is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine.

[HRW report] “North Korea's expanded military cooperation with Russia, including the transfer of materiel and troops to support Russia's war with Ukraine, provided an example of the interconnection between North Korea's security and human rights issues. The deployment of soldiers to a conflict in which Russia has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities, was reportedly carried out in exchange for oil and technology related to North Korea's nuclear and weapons and missile programs.”

The report noted that “North Korea’s expanded military cooperation with Russia, including the transfer of supplies and troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, is an example of the link between North Korea’s security and human rights issues.”

He explained, “It is known that (North Korea) sends troops to conflicts where Russia has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities in exchange for oil and technology related to North Korea’s nuclear, weapons, and missile programs.”

“Concerns about deepening cooperation between North Korea and Russia”

John Sifton, Asia Director, Human Rights Watch

John Sifton, Asia director for HRW, said in a phone call with VOA on the same day, “One of the issues highlighted in this report is the close relationship between North Korea and Russia,” adding, “This (the close relationship between North Korea and Russia) is very concerning.”

[Recording: Director Sifton] “It is very worrying. Reports indicated that Russia is supply North Korea with military technology and assistance which violates UN sanctions as part of the payment for weapons and troops that are now being sent to Russia for its war against Ukraine. They're connected North Korea's nuclear program, illegal arms exports, participation in Russia's war against Ukraine. These pose threats to international peace and security. But importantly, what they show is that these threats have been enabled by the regime's intense repression and the atrocities they use to terrorize North Koreans into fearful obedience which allows them to send troops to Ukraine and use forced labor to fuel the nuclear program and the military in general”

“The report points out that Russia is providing North Korea with military technology and assistance in violation of UN sanctions in exchange for arms and troop deployment,” Sifton said, adding that “this is a threat to international peace and security.”

He then criticized North Korea for sending troops to Ukraine and strengthening its nuclear program and military power through forced labor, saying, “Such threats were possible through the North Korean regime’s extreme repression and brutal actions to terrorize its people into submission.”

“North Korea’s human rights situation is worsening”

Director Sifton added that “the human rights situation in North Korea is worsening as the North Korean regime strengthens its control over its people’s ideological education and freedom of movement.”

In fact, the report notes in its section on “Freedom of Expression and Information” that “all media is strictly controlled in North Korea,” and that “last July, a man was reportedly sentenced to seven years of hard labor for borrowing an SD card containing South Korean films.”

Regarding the “freedom of movement,” he pointed out that “traveling without prior approval is illegal in North Korea,” and said, “Human Rights Watch confirmed that in September of last year, there was an order on the North Korea-China border to shoot anyone who crosses the border without exception.”

Regarding the “right to health,” he said, “there is little reliable data on North Korea,” adding, “according to a South Korean research institute last year, North Korea’s gross national income per capita was estimated at $1,200.”

He also pointed out that while North Korea's social and economic inequality is widening and the regime is prioritizing military development over public welfare, the situation is worsening, as "this level is one of the poorest countries in the world."

“Many residents have little or no access to health care and face chronic food insecurity,” he added.

The report also focused on the reality of 'forced labor' in North Korea.

[Report] “The North Korean government systematically requires forced, uncompensated labor from much of its population to sustain its economy. The government's forced labor demands target women, children, state workers, detainees, and prisoners. The government justifies these practices as demonstrations of loyalty to the government, with severe punishment for non-compliance.”

“North Korea is one of seven UN member states that has not joined the International Labour Organization (ILO),” the report said. “The North Korean government systematically demands uncompensated forced labour from many of its citizens to sustain its economy.”

He added that the targets of forced labor are diverse, including women, children, state workers, detainees, and prisoners.

He then criticized the government, saying, “This practice justifies the expression of loyalty to the government and imposes harsh punishments for non-compliance.”

The report noted that despite continued international condemnation, accountability for North Korea's serious human rights abuses remains elusive.

He added that in 2024, the 10th anniversary of the publication of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on human rights in North Korea, the international community's efforts to determine accountability for human rights abuses in North Korea are once again receiving attention.

This is Soyoung Ahn from VOA News.

• 
  
• An So-young
• sahn@voanews.com
•  subscribe

​19. Ukraine Military Situation: Mounting North Korean Casualties – Analysis

Ukraine Military Situation: Mounting North Korean Casualties – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · January 17, 2025

By Can Kasapoğlu

1. North Korean Casualties Mount in Kursk

North Korea has continued to deepen its engagement in the Russian region of Kursk, where Pyongyang’s troops have been pushed into high-risk offensive tasks. South Korean intelligence estimates that hundreds of North Korean fighters have been killed in action, and thousands more wounded. But despite these casualties, North Korea has continued to rotate and reinforce its troops, showcasing its commitment to Russia’s war.

Notably, Ukraine has captured some of these troops, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has posted videos of their interrogations on his X account. South Korean news outlets reported that the captured troops were serving with the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau, a key intelligence agency. While Ukraine has yet to capture a high-ranking North Korean officer, this possibility cannot be ruled out.

Nonetheless, Pyongyang will likely send additional troops from its most elite formations to Kursk—and possibly to occupied Ukraine. American officials report that Russia has agreed to supply North Korea with Su-27 and MiG-29 combat aircraft in return for its contributions. The two allies may also share ballistic missile technology and submarine systems. These developments demonstrate that Kyiv and Seoul need to deepen their security and intelligence cooperation.

2. Battlefield Assessment

Today 18 percent of Ukraine is under Russian occupation. Despite high casualties, the Russian military maintains an offensive footing on multiple fronts.

The Kremlin’s abundance of manpower highlights Ukraine’s force generation troubles. Kyiv has denied social media claims that it transferred technicians from the Ukrainian Air Force to help stabilize the front lines. But press sources indicate that President Zelenskyy intervened to countermand this decision.

True or not, these rumors point to a grim reality. Over the past week, the Russian military has successfully pushed onto the highway network surrounding Pokrovsk. It has likely secured Neskuchne, to the southwest of Velyka Novosilka, where Russian combat formations have already been operating along the Mokri Yaly River. Russia has also gained territory in Toretsk and Kurakhove.

In Kursk, Russia and Ukraine have been conducting separate tactical offensives at high operational tempos. As in previous weeks, Russia’s operational concepts have involved launching both mechanized, echeloned attacks and waves of soldiers at Ukrainian defenses. Ukraine’s attempts to hit the Russian rear with fire-support weapons have found some success: on January 7, Kyiv conducted a precision strike against Russia’s 810th Separate Marine Brigade in Kursk.

3. Drone Warfare Update

As previous editions of this report have highlighted, Russia has continued to use first-person-view (FPV) drones equipped with fiber-optic cables to counter Ukraine’s electronic warfare efforts in Kursk. In recent interviews, Ukrainian personnel have stated that they have resorted to using shotguns against these drones because other defenses have failed.

Russia continued to launch loitering munition salvos against Ukraine, employing predominantly Iranian Shahed drones. The Kremlin’s target set included Ukraine’s population centers and energy grid. Statistical assessments suggest that Moscow, with Tehran’s help, has the capacity to launch over 1,500 Shaheds per month.

In drone warfare, volume matters. Roughly half of Russia’s strike packages fail to breach Ukraine’s air defenses and others fall prey to Kyiv’s electronic warfare efforts. But even a low rate of success can cause significant damage. In November 2024, its most prolific month to date, the Russian military launched 2,300 kamikaze drones at Ukraine. Iranian drones will likely continue to grow in importance throughout 2025.

Two bright spots did emerge for Ukraine. First, Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) operatives managed to infiltrate the Russian rear area and inflict damage on enemy units. Second, Ukraine used its robust long-range strike capabilities to conduct overwhelming strikes deep inside Russia, most prominently in a January 14 attack on ammunition depots at the Engels-2 air base and various chemical plants.

• About the author: Can Kasapoğlu is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute
• Source: This article was published at the Hudson Institute

eurasiareview.com · January 17, 2025

20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Note this assessment:

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion. Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products. Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations. North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast. North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.

• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.

• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

21. Engagement vs. Alliance: Trump’s Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula

​Concessions and arms control negotiations means victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.

It is imperative that decision makers have a sufficient understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime so they do not makes simple mistakes.

Engagement vs. Alliance: Trump’s Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula

The Trump administration is set to take the White House in a matter of just four days. The former President’s foreign policy regarding North Korean engagement greatly differed from the standard, unwillingness to relent to North Korean negotiations without denuclearization. Will the Trump presidency yet again change the way America interacts with the Hermit Kingdom?

The National Interest · by Dylan Motin · January 16, 2025

With the Trump administration soon to enter office, the North Korean (DPRK) issue will quickly come back onto the radar. Although a large part of the foreign policy commentariat would prefer Donald Trump to maintain the current status quo of isolating the DPRK, he made clear his willingness to revert to diplomacy and solve the nuclear conundrum for good. However the new administration will have to juggle competing priorities successfully to avoid repeating past failures in building a productive relationship with Pyongyang,

Since the first Trump administration, U.S. foreign policy has refocused on strategic competition with China, the sole rival potentially strong enough to overpower the United States. With the appointment of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and the return of realist Elbridge Colby to the Pentagon, China will inevitably be front and center for the foreseeable future. Hence, Trump’s engagement with North Korea will necessarily unfold in the shadow of competition with Beijing.

The U.S.’s foreign policy when it comes to China imposes two seemingly contradictory courses of action on the Korean Peninsula. First, Washington wants a strong South Korea (ROK) on its side, Seoul is an economic and military powerhouse that contributes to maintaining the balance of power in East Asia. It helps defend the approaches to Japan and offers strategic military bases near Taiwan and northeastern China, further, its massive warlike production ability makes it all the more important.

Second, Washington has a deep-seated interest in shutting down its forever antagonism with North Korea. In itself, the DPRK is a small, impoverished state of no consequence for U.S. world strategy. The last few decades of picking fights with foreign countries because they had unsavory regimes or to ‘show resolve’ for the sake of it has exhausted the American polity. Moreover, reducing the odds of a war with Pyongyang can help the United States refocus all its bandwidth on the Chinese threat. Washington also wants to prevent the nightmare scenario of a close alliance between North Korea and China, which would divide U.S. attention and increase the danger of joint hostile actions.

Going further, peace with the DPRK would turn South Korea into a more potent and helpful ally. The North Korean issue poisons South Korea’s body politics, with the nation’s conservatives seeing any politician they dislike as a communist agent. Last December, President Yoon used the supposed threat of an imminent North Korean conspiracy to justify his botched coup attempt. Appeased relations with Pyongyang would lower the temperature in Seoul and allow it to devote more attention to counterbalancing China.

Here Is the Catch

Making peace with North Korea is challenging because Pyongyang perceives the U.S.-ROK alliance as a fundamental threat. It has a point, as the two countries dwarf North Korea’s power potential and military capabilities.

Furthermore, the North Koreans have made clear time and time again that complete denuclearization was off the table. The other way around, South Korea considers North Korea an existential danger. It is scared that a bilateral U.S.-DPRK rapprochement would leave it exposed to Pyongyang’s growingly formidable nuclear arsenal and its massive army.

Therefore, Trump’s diplomacy must square the circle of engaging with North Korea without abandoning South Korea. Also, the new American administration must maintain close ties with Seoul while being open to engaging with a nuclear North Korea.

Arms control talks are possible for the DPRK, but complete denuclearization is a dealbreaker. Still, any deal toward arms control will require symbolic concessions, and Pyongyang may even ask for a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War or want to establish diplomatic relations to lock in the rapprochement.

Many neoconservative pundits will likely balk at that, but symbols are only that. More significantly, North Korea will wish for sanction relief and normal participation in the world economy. Given the unmitigated failure of sanctions to prevent its nuclearization and its ongoing trade with China and Russia, granting sanction relief presents little risk. It will at least alleviate the plea of ordinary North Korean citizens.

However, Donald Trump should leave Kim Jong Un with no doubt that the U.S.-ROK alliance is non-negotiable. Although U.S. forces have no nefarious intentions toward the DPRK, they need to stay to counterbalance China’s rising power. Thankfully, that is something Kim can understand.

He has poisonous relations with Xi Jinping and seeks alternative partners like Russia to reduce Beijing’s leverage. Kim might even be happy if American troops remained in Korea. Indeed, in 2018, he told then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo “that he needed the Americans in South Korea to protect him from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and that the CCP needed the Americans out so they could treat the peninsula like Tibet and Xinjiang.”

The Two Ways to Get South Korea on Board

First, let Seoul decide what defense policy is best for itself. A significant part of the South Korean public and numerous experts are now of the opinion that the country needs its nuclear deterrent. Indeed, a nuclear South Korea would become capable of deterring potential North Korean aggressions alone and more able to project power outward to support the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

Donald Trump himself said in 2016 that he was not against the idea. Whether the country goes nuclear is a decision for the Koreans to make, but if it can allay Seoul’s fears and bolster the U.S. position in the region, there is no reason to oppose it.

A second option is to shift the focus of security negotiations with North Korea from nuclear to conventional arms control. Pyongyang maintains over one million soldiers, a significant part of which dwells near the inter-Korean border and the Seoul capital area. With several thousand now fighting in Ukraine, the Korean People’s Army is bound to acquire combat experience. Although the weapons they are equipped with weapons are mostly obsolete, North Koreans fighting in Europe have large quantities of them. Further, Russian support for the DPRK’s military will greatly increase North Korea’s strength in the coming years.

The threat to South Korea is not so much Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons in isolation but the danger that the DPRK would use them to facilitate a conventional invasion and deter U.S. intervention on Seoul’s side. Since denuclearization is impossible, U.S. diplomats could focus instead on reducing the threat of a conventional invasion.

As it did with the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, Washington could insist on North Korean force reductions in exchange for additional economic benefits or security cooperation. If Pyongyang proves reluctant to cut troop and weapon numbers, the United States could propose North Korea redeploy some of its forces away from the inter-Korean border and toward China’s border. This move would both offer relief to Seoul and become a thorn in Beijing’s side.

The incoming administration will have to play a complex game. It needs to reach peace with North Korea, already a headache in itself. But it must do so without sacrificing South Korea, one of America’s most vital allies.

However, if successful, Donald Trump will secure the momentous foreign policy success of resolving the North Korean conundrum while reinforcing the regional U.S. position against China.

Dylan Motin holds a Ph.D. in political science. He is currently a Non-resident Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a non-resident research fellow at the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy. He is the author of Territorial Expansion and Great Power Behavior during the Cold War: A Theory of Armed Emergence (Routledge, 2025) and Bandwagoning in International Relations: China, Russia, and Their Neighbors (Vernon Press, 2024).

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Dylan Motin · January 16, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com