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Quotes of the Day:
"Let go of your attachment to being right, and suddenly your mind is more open. You're able to benefit from the unique viewpoints of others, without being crippled by your judgment."
- Ralph Marston
“Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself.”
- Albert Camus
"The truth which makes me free is for the most part the truth which men prefer not to hear."
-Herbert Agar
1. US troops intercept drone flying near THAAD base in South Korea
2. Military resumes search for drone after its flight near THAAD base
3. Estonia buys 12 more howitzers amid ‘lessons from Ukraine’ (from Korea)
4. Austin to visit South Korea, Philippines amid elevated concerns about China, North Korea in Indo-Pacific region
5. Stryker soldiers train alongside South Korean army’s new innovation brigade
6. Spy agency, police raid labor group over alleged anti-communist law violations
7. South Korean Court Imprisons a Vietnam War Veteran and Retired ROK Army Colonel for Saying North Korea Was Involved in the Gwangju Uprising in May 1980
8. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Quest for Clarity and Global Leadership
9. Chongryon: The only way North Korea talks to Japan
10. Commentary: Lessons in preparing for war on the Korean peninsula
11. Russia desperate for Iran, North Korea help with missiles, drones: U.S.
12. “If the problem becomes more serious”: South Korea talks going nuclear
1. US troops intercept drone flying near THAAD base in South Korea
Perhaps local protestors/agitators. Attempt to cause further embarrassment of ROKG - part of a political subversion campaign by pro-north activists? (witting or unwitting).
US troops intercept drone flying near THAAD base in South Korea
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 18, 2023
Senior Airman Austin Geter of the 51st Security Forces Squadron operates a drone during training at Osan Air Base, South Korea, Sept. 13, 2022. (Trevor Gordnier/U.S. Air Force)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — U.S. forces were involved in stopping an unauthorized drone flying Tuesday near a military outpost that hosts a missile-defense system, an Eighth Army spokesman said.
U.S. and South Korean troops detected an unmanned aerial vehicle flying near Forward Operating Site Carroll, near Camp Carroll in Seongju County, roughly 130 miles south of Seoul, Eighth Army spokesman Lt. Col. Neil Penttila wrote in an email Wednesday to Stars and Stripes.
The troops “swiftly acted to deny its entry" and an investigation is ongoing, he said.
The site houses a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, also known as THAAD. The United States deployed the anti-missile battery to South Korea in 2017 as a defense against threats from North Korea, U.S. Forces Korea said at the time.
A U.S. soldier at the site spotted the drone at 12:54 p.m. Tuesday, according to a Yonhap News report the next day that cited South Korean military officials. The U.S. military used a jamming system to intercept the drone, causing it to possibly crash, the officials reportedly said.
A search for the drone was underway Wednesday but military officials do not believe it originated in North Korea, according to Yonhap’s report.
South Korea’s military is attuned to drone incursions after North Korea sent five of them into the country’s airspace on Dec. 26. The South scrambled fighter jets and deployed helicopters to northern Seoul and the western coast, where the drones were spotted.
None of the drones were captured and at least one is believed to have returned to North Korea, the Ministry of National Defense said last month.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time apologized for failing to capture any of the drones and said it was difficult tracking them due to their small size.
The South Korean military also responded to reports Dec. 27 of a possible drone near Seongmo Island in the northeast. Incheon city issued an automated text alert, Yonhap reported on the same day, but hours later the South Korean military determined the object was a flock of birds.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 18, 2023
2. Military resumes search for drone after its flight near THAAD base
Perhaps trying to create friction within the ROK/US alliance and embarrass the ROKG and ROK military?
Recognize north Korean strategy (political warfare), understand it, expose it, and attack it with a superior political warfare strategy
Excerpts:
The Army said chances appear low that the drone was mobilized for espionage.
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) personnel are known to have first detected the drone flying toward the base at 12:54 p.m. Tuesday and used a jamming gun to bring it down, according to defense sources.
The military and police staff scoured areas in Seongju County and the nearby city of Gimcheon to find the drone, but the search was halted after sunset Tuesday.
(LEAD) Military resumes search for drone after its flight near THAAD base | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 18, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with U.S. military's response in paras 6-7)
SEOUL, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- Military and police personnel resumed a search Wednesday for a presumed civilian drone thought to have crashed after flying near a U.S. THAAD missile defense unit in a southern county the previous day, officials said.
The authorities are conducting the search in areas close to the base in Seongju, 217 kilometers south of Seoul, while police are investigating who sent the drone and for what purpose.
The Army said chances appear low that the drone was mobilized for espionage.
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) personnel are known to have first detected the drone flying toward the base at 12:54 p.m. Tuesday and used a jamming gun to bring it down, according to defense sources.
The military and police staff scoured areas in Seongju County and the nearby city of Gimcheon to find the drone, but the search was halted after sunset Tuesday.
The Eighth Army under the USFK confirmed later that the allies' security forces detected the unmanned aerial vehicle near the THAAD base and "swiftly acted to deny its entry."
"We are currently working directly with our ROK partners to investigate the incident," the Eighth Army said in response to a question by Yonhap News Agency. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
The South Korean military has been striving to build counter-drone capabilities in the wake of North Korean drone infiltrations last month, which laid bare shortcomings in its air defense capabilities.
This undated file photo shows a drone, unrelated to the story, in operation. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 18, 2023
3. Estonia buys 12 more howitzers amid ‘lessons from Ukraine’ (from Korea)
Korea is a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy
Estonia buys 12 more howitzers amid ‘lessons from Ukraine’
Defense News · by Jaroslaw Adamowski · January 17, 2023
WARSAW, Poland — As Eastern European allies continue to invest in expanding their artillery fleets in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Estonia’s Ministry of Defence has announced it is placing an order for a further 12 K9 Thunder howitzers from South Korea’s Hanwha Defense.
Owing to the deal, the Estonian Defence Forces are to operate a total of 36 such weapons. The latest contract is worth about €36 million ($39 million), the country’s state-run Centre for Defence Investments said in a statement.
“Today’s war in Ukraine clearly shows how important indirect fire weapons are,” said Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur. “In light of the lessons learned in Ukraine, we have made quick decisions to equip both infantry brigades with additional K9 Thunder mobile howitzers and bring Estonia’s indirect fire capability to a completely new level.”
Poland also ordered the K9 Thunder, with the first batch of 24 weapons received last month. In total, Hanwha Defense is to deliver 212 K9 Thunders to the Polish military, and a further 460 howitzers could be manufactured by Poland’s defense industry under a license.
In December 2022, Estonia signed a contract with the United States to buy six M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, joining a rapidly expanding group of Eastern European allies who eye the weapons in the aftermath of Russia’s attack against Ukraine. The same month, Lithuania and the U.S. government inked a deal for as many as eight M142 HIMARS. The third Baltic nation, Latvia, also aims to purchase the systems for its armed forces.
Speaking on Jan. 6, Pevkur said that the three countries’ HIMARS acquisitions will bolster allies’ “interoperability [on] NATO’s Eastern flank” and represent “a milestone in developing long-range indirect fire capability” of their forces.
About Jaroslaw Adamowski
Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.
4. Austin to visit South Korea, Philippines amid elevated concerns about China, North Korea in Indo-Pacific region
Austin to visit South Korea, Philippines amid elevated concerns about China, North Korea in Indo-Pacific region
Stars and Stripes · by Doug G. Ware · January 17, 2023
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin meets with Army Gen. Robert Abrams, commander of U.S Forces Korea, upon arrival at Osan Air Base, South Korea, on March 17, 2021. (Lisa Ferdinando/Department of Defense)
WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has scheduled a trip to the Indo-Pacific region in a move to strengthen relations with key allies in the face of growing influence from regional powers China and North Korea, the Pentagon said Tuesday.
Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon’s top spokesman, told reporters that Austin will travel to South Korea and the Philippines in the coming weeks.
Ryder didn’t specify the travel dates, but he said the trip is a calculated move to bolster defense partnerships with both countries.
“This upcoming trip is a reaffirmation of our deep commitment to working in concert with allies and partners to chart our shared vision to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific,” Ryder said.
The Defense Department, White House and other branches of President Joe Biden’s administration have underscored the importance of supporting U.S. allies in the region — particularly with China continuing to assert control over parts of the South China Sea and North Korea carrying out missile tests. Additionally, Beijing continues to claim ownership of Taiwan and has sought new relationships in the Indo-Pacific.
For example, China caused some alarm last year when it struck a new security agreement with the Solomon Islands, an island nation that lies not far off the coasts of northeast Australia and Papua New Guinea in the South Pacific.
Austin’s trip to the Korean Peninsula and the Philippines follows other actions that the U.S. has taken recently to broaden allied support in the Indo-Pacific. Washington and Seoul, for example, are reportedly planning an extended deterrence exercise next month to counter a possible North Korean nuclear attack.
South Korean defense minister Lee Jong-sup told reporters last week the exercises would take place in February — and both countries will conduct more drills in May. Further, Seoul announced Tuesday that American troops have drilled for the first time with a new South Korean army brigade that tests new warfare concepts and equipment, such as unmanned vehicles.
Hundreds of troops from the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division drilled with Seoul’s Tiger Demonstration Brigade and completed their two-week exercise Sunday.
Austin, who welcomed Lee to the Pentagon for bilateral talks in November, previously visited Seoul in March 2021 and the Philippines in July of that year.
Last week, Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken welcomed their Japanese counterparts to Washington to announce a deeper partnership that’s also intended to bring stability to the Indo-Pacific region. Austin, Blinken, Japanese defense minister Yasukazu Hamada and Japanese foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi said the purpose of the pact is to counter potential Chinese and North Korean threats.
Doug G. Ware
Doug G. Ware
Doug G. Ware covers the Department of Defense at the Pentagon. He has many years of experience in journalism, digital media and broadcasting and holds a degree from the University of Utah. He is based in Washington, D.C.
Stars and Stripes · by Doug G. Ware · January 17, 2023
5. Stryker soldiers train alongside South Korean army’s new innovation brigade
Stryker soldiers train alongside South Korean army’s new innovation brigade
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 17, 2023
Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division and South Korea’s Tiger Demonstration Brigade train using Strykers and K808 White Tiger infantry fighting vehicles at Mugeonri Training Field in Paju, South Korea, Friday, Jan. 13, 2023. (South Korean army)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — U.S. troops drilled for the first time with a new South Korean army brigade created to test new weapons and tactics.
More than 800 soldiers from the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and the South Korean Tiger Demonstration Brigade wrapped up a two-week exercise on Sunday at the Mugeonri Training Field in Paju, roughly 15 miles north of Seoul, according to a news release Tuesday from the Ministry of National Defense.
The Tiger brigade was established in June to test new warfare concepts and equipment, such as unmanned vehicles, military officials told reporters in Seoul last year.
The brigade was equipped with K808 White Tiger infantry fighting vehicles, surveillance drones and the AT-1K Raybolt antitank guided missile, according to the ministry’s news release.
The Army’s 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., arrived in South Korea in October for a roughly nine-month deployment with 2nd ID. The brigade replaced the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team after the Army opted to use the more mobile Strykers in South Korea, rather than tracked vehicles like the M1A2 Abrams tank.
Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division and South Korea’s Tiger Demonstration Brigade train using Strykers and K808 White Tiger infantry fighting vehicles at Mugeonri Training Field in Paju, South Korea, Friday, Jan. 13, 2023. (South Korean army)
Photos of the exercise released by the ministry showed the Army’s eight-wheeled Stryker vehicles operating in the mountainous terrain.
The Stryker brigade on Jan. 10 conducted its first live-fire exercise in South Korea using mounted, remote-controlled MK-19 grenade launchers and M-2 Browning machine guns.
The joint exercise boosted the “combined fighting power” of the U.S. and South Korea through the sharing of military techniques, South Korean army Lt. Col. Lee Jae Yong, the training commander, said in the release.
According to the ministry, the exercise enhances the South Korea-U.S. military alliance and shares combat skills among the troops amid threats from North Korea.
North Korea tested its first missile of the year on Jan. 1 after firing around 75 missiles on 36 separate days last year.
“In a situation where we are in need of firmer [South Korea]-U.S. joint readiness defense posture due to North Korea’s recent consecutive provocations, this exercise has been planned in order to improve capabilities …,” the National Defense Ministry said.
The exercise was one of many planned by the U.S. and South Korean military this year. The two allied forces may train together in about 20 large-scale drills by June, according to a budget proposal submitted Jan. 11 to South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.
“It’s right for South Korea and the United States to cooperate because both of us are exposed to the North Korean nuclear threat,” Yoon said in a report that day by The Associated Press.
Stars and Stripes reporter Yoo Kyong Chang contributed to this report.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 17, 2023
6. Spy agency, police raid labor group over alleged anti-communist law violations
(2nd LD) Spy agency, police raid labor group over alleged anti-communist law violations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김보람 · January 18, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more comments in last 3 paras, new photo)
SEOUL, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- The nation's spy agency and police raided a militant labor umbrella organization Wednesday on suspicion of anti-communist law violations by some of its members.
Investigators from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Police Agency (NPA) began their raid on the headquarters of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in central Seoul, beginning around noon, after hours of confrontations with KCTU officials.
Officials of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions protest a raid by police and the National Intelligence Service in front of its headquarters in central Seoul on Jan. 18, 2023. (Yonhap)
The two agencies have reportedly obtained a search and seizure warrant for the KCTU from the court in connection with alleged violations of the National Security Law by some KCTU members.
The investigators entered the KCTU head office after confrontations with KCTU officials who resisted the raid attempt, demanding the search and seizure be conducted in the presence of its lawyers. A scuffle reportedly occurred during the process.
Around the same time, the NIS and NPA also raided the headquarters of the KCTU-affiliated Korean Health and Medical Workers' Union (KHMU) in the southwestern Seoul ward of Yeongdeungpo.
In the southwestern province of South Jeolla, NIS investigators also raided the home of a former KCTU official in Damyang, 250 kilometers south of Seoul.
An NIS official told Yonhap News Agency by phone: "The case has been internally under investigation for several years and related evidence has been secured. A search and seizure warrant has been obtained from the court due to the need for a forced investigation."
KCTU spokesperson Han Sang-jin told reporters that the NIS and police were conducting raids on one KCTU official and three others -- one official from the KHMU, one official from the KCTU-affiliated Korean Metal Workers' Union and a Jeju Island activist.
Members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions stage a protest against a raid by police and the National Intelligence Service in front of its headquarters in central Seoul on Jan. 18, 2023. (Yonhap)
He said the investigators used excessive force while conducting the raid, which is very unusual compared to previous seizures.
"They came to execute a search warrant but they attacked us as if they they were carrying out an arrest warrant," the spokesperson said during a press briefing when investigators raided the office. "There must be some reason for it."
The KCTU said it will have a press conference on Thursday at its headquarters and subsequently hold a joint media event with other civic groups in front of the presidential office in central Seoul.
ycm@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김보람 · January 18, 2023
7. South Korean Court Imprisons a Vietnam War Veteran and Retired ROK Army Colonel for Saying North Korea Was Involved in the Gwangju Uprising in May 1980
South Korean Court Imprisons a Vietnam War Veteran and Retired ROK Army Colonel for Saying North Korea Was Involved in the Gwangju Uprising in May 1980
PUBLISHED DATEJANUARY 17, 2023 LAST MODIFIED DATEJANUARY 17, 2023 AUTHOR_
2023-1-17, Tara O
On January 12, 2023, the Korean Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Court’s decision to imprison Colonel Ji Man-won on defamation charges for saying North Korea was involved in the Gwangju / Kwangju Uprising in May 1980. Colonel Ji, who is in his 80s, started his prison sentence on January 16, 2023. The South Korean courts have become an active player in suppressing freedom of speech, which is guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The way the “justice system” handled his research and findings through “defamation” charges chills academic freedom, and the severe harassment he had endured in defending his work is contrary to basic human decency and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Colonel Ji Man-won being assaulted after one of many court sessions
After graduating from the Korean Military Academy, Lieutenant Ji Man-won, an Artillery officer, entered the ROK Army in 1965. He served in Vietnam in the 1970s as a battery commander and retired from the Army in 1987 as a colonel. In late 1970s, he was selected to be a military exchange student at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, where he received his Master’s degree in Management and Doctoral degree in Systems Engineering (1980). After his retirement from the ROK Army, he was a columnist and analyst on national security. For decades, he has extensively researched the events that occurred in and around Gwangju in May 1980 and has become a specialist in this field.
Stolen ammunition, Gwangju, May 1980
There were numerous activities that require surveillance and reconnaissance, special training, detailed planning, rigorous rehearsals, highly disciplined personnel, and leadership, such as ambushing the government convoys at a toll gate in Gwangju, stealing hundreds of military vehicles, including Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), from a defense contractor, and stealing massive quantities of weapons from dozens of armories simultaneously, with all of these events occurring on the same day—May 21, 1980. Other activities included conducting multiple assaults on a prison (and subsequent firefight engagement with the government forces defending the prison) and rigging the provincial government building with 8 tons of TNT (enough to level a city block) were yet more activities. These are not activities that ordinary citizens can do. Colonel Ji’s extensive research and knowledge conducting military operations led him to conclude that North Korean special forces were involved in these activities.
Stolen grenades, TNT, detonation cords, Gwangju, May 1980
An unidentified man directing, Gwangju, May 1980
Stolen machine gun and ammunition on right, Gwangju, May 1980
In 2021, the Democratic Party of Korea (Deobureo Minjoo Party) passed the so-called 5.18 History Distortion Punishment Act, which turns ordinary citizens into “criminals” and punishes them for “distorting the 5/18 democracy movement.” The punishment is up to 5 years in prison and/or a ₩50,000,000 ($42,000) fine. The enforcement of this law began on January 5, 2022.
Soon after the enforcement of the new law began, the police referred 11 people in their 20s to 40s for prosecution for “distorting 5.18 history” for their comments on social media and/or posting videos online. Apparently, they posted that 5.18 was a riot or that North Korean forces were involved, and to say such things is not only a taboo, but after the “5.18 History Distortion Punishment Act,” it is now a “crime” in South Korea.
As a result of certain political interests, the Gwangju Incident of May 1980 has become a subject that demands unquestioning acceptance and even worship. For a sense of how strange the 5.18 History Distortion Punishment Act is and the placing “5.18” on a pedestal overall, compare this to other historical events. There are those who deny that North Korea attacked South Korea, starting the Korean War, but there is no punishment for writing or making these sorts of statements in books, in schools, or at political events. There are those who deny that the Republic of Korea was born on August 15, 1948, and they deny its legitimacy as a country, but they are not charged with a crime. It is only when it comes to the May 1980 Gwangju Uprising, that people are jailed, fined, fired, and harassed for decades, for daring to question the narrative. These political interests demand that Gwangju must be referred to only as a “democracy movement” or else. Lawfare, specifically defamation or libel charges, has become a useful tool in silencing those who challenge the narrative. In South Korea, defamation or libel charges are both criminal and civil cases (defamation and libel are only a civil case in the U.S.),
In demanding unquestioned acceptance of the Gwangju Uprising as a “democracy movement,” the “May organizations,” along with the City of Gwangju, the prosecution and the court, charged Colonel Ji Man-won with various “defamation” charges:
- Violation of the Act on Promotion and Use of Information and Communications Network and Information Protection, etc. (Defamation) [정보통신망이용촉진 및 정보보호등에 관한법률위반 (명예회손)] (took effect on 2022-12-11)
- Defamation of a dead person (사자명예회손)
- Defamation (명예회손)
- Defamation by Publication (출판물에의한 명예회손)
It appears that every law pertaining to “defamation” was used in charging him. In the U.S., one cannot defame a dead person, because one cannot materially damage (for instance a loss of income due to defamation) a dead person, but in Korea, a dead person can be “defamed.” In addition to the regular “defamation” charge, the other defamation charges are methods of information dissemination, such as defamation by publication and defamation by posting his research findings on his website, System Club (http://www.systemclub.co.kr/).
Dr. Ji Man-won had his own YouTube Channel, but Google Korea deleted his entire channel, when the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC 방송통신심의위원회 or 방심회 for short ), South Korea’s internet censorship body, pressured Google Korea to delete his YouTube Channel and videos from other YouTube channels in July 2020. KCSC wanted the videos censored for “distorting history” related to the Gwangju Uprising of May 1980 (referred to as “5.18”), because they mentioned North Korea’s involvement or presented details that are different than the narrative created after the creation of the 5.18 Special Laws in 1995 under Kim Yong-sam administration.
Another scholar was censored, but through a different method. Park Hoon-tak (박훈탁), professor at Uiduk University (위덕대학교), also talked about North Korean special forces involvement in Gwangju in May 1980 in his class. The 5.18 Commemoration Foundation (5.18기념재단), National Council on 5.18 Meritorious Persons (5.18 유공자 전국협의회), 5.18 Democracy Meritorious Persons’ Bereaved Family Association (5·18민주유공자유족회), Solidarity for Pohang Citizens’ Organizations (포항시민단체연대회), Disparaging the 5.18 Democratic Movement Daily Newspaper Daegu North Gyeongsang Countermeasures Committee (5.18민주화운동폄훼 매일신문 대구경북대책위), Uiduk University Student Association (위덕대학교 총학생회), and other 5.18-related organizations strongly pressured Uiduk University to fire the professor, and Professor Park was indeed fired.
As Dr. Ji goes to prison on 16 January 2023, the South Korean court system has been used yet again to punish an innocent South Korean citizen. Special interest groups praised the decision. It is sad and shameful that suppression of freedom of speech and oppression of human rights is occurring in South Korea, especially in the name of the Gwangju “democracy movement.”
Categories:5.18Abuse of AuthorityCensorshipFreedom of ExpressionFreedom of SpeechFreedom of the PressHistoryHuman RightsLawfareNorth KoreaSouth KoreaSuppression
Tags:defamationlibelspecial operations
8. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Quest for Clarity and Global Leadership
Excerpts:
In simple terms, Yoon’s much-touted global vision aims to amplify economic diplomacy, enhance connections with lower- and middle-ranked economies, and embrace economic multilateral frameworks while seeking greater responsibilities in the regional and global geopolitics. The agenda is to move beyond the limited confines of Korean Peninsular or Northeast Asian diplomacy, and regain opportunities that will help South Korea create a global profile – much like what India and Japan are showcasing today.
Whether Yoon has oversold South Korea’s diplomatic/strategic capabilities or its economic, technology-driven growth and the so-called “middle power” strengths for strategic autonomy, including soft power, will finally propel the long-anticipated transformation in South Korea’s fortunes is the question.
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Quest for Clarity and Global Leadership
President Yoon Suk-yeol has consolidated his global vision for South Korea by embracing “strategic clarity” in the China-U.S. competition.
thediplomat.com · by Jagannath Panda · January 16, 2023
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Less than a year after the Biden administration released the latest U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea unveiled its own “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” in December 2022. The move highlights a decisive shift in Seoul’s political intent and vision as it leaves behind former President Moon Jae-in’s cautious approach to the Indo-Pacific: South Korea’s version of “strategic ambiguity” emphasized treading a delicate balance between the two great powers, the United States and China, without taking obvious sides. In particular, Moon’s reticence to clearly align with Washington was meant to avoid upsetting Beijing in view of the “sophisticated” economic coercion faced by South Korea following the 2016-2017 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense program deployment.
At the same time, in his later years especially, a gradual shift toward U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific was observed in Moon’s flagship regional initiative, the New Southern Policy NSP, which came into greater alignment with the U.S. vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” So the present government’s outlook is not as abrupt a phenomenon as it might appear; it is nonetheless bold.
The new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has consolidated his global vision for South Korea by embracing “strategic clarity,” even as the dilemma between favoring the U.S. – the security guarantor – and not antagonizing China – the largest trade partner – remains pertinent due to the ongoing China-U.S. strategic competition.
Can South Korea’s balancing act be truly relegated to the past? Would the shift from strategy ambiguity to clarity bring insight or compound confusion? How can South Korea strengthen the rules-based order? What are the prospects for Yoon’s “global pivotal state” vision to materialize?
That Yoon would soon be embracing the U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific was clear even before his inauguration. In April, Yoon’s policy consultation delegation on a visit to the United States not only highlighted the upgrading of the South Korea-U.S. strategic alliance but also South Korea’s new interest in being included as part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – the quintessential mark of an Indo-Pacific embrace due to China’s vehement disapproval of the Quad as a U.S. tool.
South Korea being chosen as the first stopover for Biden’s Asia visit in May and the ensuing developments, including the upgrade to the South Korea-U.S. “global comprehensive alliance” beyond the Korean Peninsula and Yoon signing onto the United States’ Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), put to rest any doubts about where Yoon’s loyalty lay vis-à-vis the China-U.S. competition.
Unsurprisingly, Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy is heavily influenced by the U.S. version, which is reflected in its overall vision. By emphasizing the co-prosperity of like-minded countries, human rights, objections to unilateral changes to the status quo by force, rules-based maritime order in the South China Sea, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and freedom of navigation, among others, the strategy castigates China without directly mentioning names, and backs the U.S. intent to contain its strategic rival. Such implicit references and allusions to China throughout the document suggest that, in truth, Seoul holds a much less benign perception of China, and that is guiding its strategy.
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By focusing on the rules-based international order and condemning unilateral efforts that challenge the status quo, Yoon is certainly echoing the threat Beijing poses to Washington and its allies like Tokyo. Naturally, the United States has openly endorsed South Korea’s first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy as “a reflection of our shared commitment to the region’s security and growing prosperity.”
Notwithstanding such implicit antipathy to China, the strategy only makes one explicit reference to China, and that in a “positive” vein: naming China “a key partner for achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region.” Interesting, too, is South Korea’s emphasis on inclusivity as a foundation of the strategy, stating that it “neither targets nor excludes any specific nation.” In contrast, the latest corresponding strategies of democratic like-minded states like the United States, Japan, and Canada – with which Seoul looks to enhance cooperation – have called out China as a strategic challenge.
Notably, the strategy itself is cleverly designed so that the Indo-Pacific’s importance to South Korea’s interests, and in particular trade dependency, is emphasized at the beginning, which provides the legitimacy for such a dichotomous approach to counter China. Given the risks Seoul faces from geopolitical tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific – largely stemming from Beijing – there is context for Yoon to show that developing a new strategic plan to deal with the challenges is necessary, and he is clearly confident that following Washington’s lead will be the most effective in furthering his country’s interests.
Concurrently, even though North Korea does not appear to take up the same space in Yoon’s foreign policy as previous administrations, it is certainly recognized as a relentless, abiding threat to South Korea due to the North’s growing arsenal of nuclear and missile capabilities. In 2022, North Korea launched more missiles than any previous year and ended the year by flying drones into South Korean airspace for the first time since 2017. Therefore, Seoul’s strategy fittingly labels North Korea as a “serious threat to peace and stability” both to the Korean Peninsula and globally.
In this respect, more than the potentially “forward-looking” bilateral relationship with Japan – which, due to the unresolved historical concerns, will likely remain a polarizing mire despite common security concerns – the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral has been given a viable thrust by its inclusion into the strategy’s core line of efforts. Also, the three-way cooperation has comprehensive aims besides the North Korean threat, including supply chain resilience, health crisis, cybersecurity, and climate action.
Interestingly, the document calls for only the denuclearization of North Korea and not the Korean Peninsula as a whole, suggesting Seoul’s acknowledgment of the significant domestic public support (up to 70 percent in 2022) for South Korea attaining its own nuclear capabilities for national defense. In January, Yoon said his government was in talks with the United States to take on a greater role in managing nuclear weapons in the Korea Peninsula, which would be a remarkable development if realized. Thus far in his presidency, Yoon has kept the option for resuming diplomacy with Pyongyang open and offered an “audacious” plan of generous benefits if the North agrees to denuclearize.
Thus, the Indo-Pacific strategy signifies Seoul’s movement toward a dual strategy that addresses both North Korea and China, as well as the peninsular and regional security challenges they present.
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Notably, in terms of not overly provoking China, the document seems to have had the desired effect. Although in the recent past China has criticized the Yoon government’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, accusing it of blindly following Washington, China’s official response to the latest strategy has been rather nondescript: encouraging South Korea to work together while warning against “exclusive coteries.”
However, critics have warned against a strategy that not only pivots toward the United States but also is endorsed by Washington, noting that it could in the long run expose South Korea’s interests – particularly if the China-U.S. hostility worsens. Besides, although the decisive shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity has been already accomplished to a great extent (much credit to the dynamic Foreign Minister Park Jin), it is bound to confront challenges, arising from contradictions due to the dual framing of the China question. Not to forget, the nature of the Northeast Asian politics compels such an equivocal narrative.
Going Global: Expanding the Diplomatic Scope
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Beyond the China dilemma and the North Korean threat, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy harbingers the hope of fulfilling its underutilized potential as a technological, economic powerhouse and a middle power, which over time would develop into what Yoon desires: South Korea’s role as a “Global Pivotal State.” For this purpose, the strategy spans cooperation with diverse and far-reaching regions – the North Pacific, South and Southeast Asia, Oceania, Europe, and Latin America.
In this context, the strategy has asserted its intent to “expand the geographical scope and breadth of cooperation” by pursuing a leading role in building the rules-based international order in fields ranging from human rights to multiple security aspects (economic, military, intelligence, environmental, and technological). Also, economic and social development through “contributive and sharing diplomacy” – utilizing its learnings as an evolving democratic economy – would serve as one of the main goals of Seoul’s global principled diplomacy vision.
Its emphasis on the weakened global governance system and South Korea’s intent to contribute to strengthening the rule-based regional order is a welcome step away from the earlier obsession with the North Korean threat or lack of attention to the strategic aspects in favor of trade and investment goals (as evidenced by the NSP’s limited outreach).
At the same time, boosting the economic security architecture via proactive interactions at multiple multilateral initiatives – such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, IPEF, speedy membership application for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, all-out expanded economic partnership with ASEAN and India, and Digital Economy Partnership Agreement – will help reduce the risk from Chinese economic coercion for the export-dependent South Korea, not just ensure supply chain stability.
With comprehensive security as the focus of the strategy, one of the avenues that will get due prominence is maritime security cooperation with like-minded states like India and the European Union, which are both looking to boost their partnerships in the regional maritime security architecture due to China’s increasing footprint, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. South Korea has already been engaging in maritime exercises like the India-led Milan and the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC); more such joint ventures, including initiatives for maritime domain awareness, capacity building, or intelligence sharing, will enhance interoperability and combat readiness in these uncertain times.
The security-tilted strategy is aiming to deepen engagements with both regional minilaterals like the Quad and global organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). South Korea’s participation in NATO’s Cyber Defense Group and summit in 2022, as well as approval for its mission to NATO, indicates a greater role in the coming years. In the Quad framework, Yoon’s pledge for inclusion is gearing toward fruition, although first perhaps through the “Plus” format or working groups; the Quad members will not be in a hurry to disturb their existing congenial configuration.
In simple terms, Yoon’s much-touted global vision aims to amplify economic diplomacy, enhance connections with lower- and middle-ranked economies, and embrace economic multilateral frameworks while seeking greater responsibilities in the regional and global geopolitics. The agenda is to move beyond the limited confines of Korean Peninsular or Northeast Asian diplomacy, and regain opportunities that will help South Korea create a global profile – much like what India and Japan are showcasing today.
Whether Yoon has oversold South Korea’s diplomatic/strategic capabilities or its economic, technology-driven growth and the so-called “middle power” strengths for strategic autonomy, including soft power, will finally propel the long-anticipated transformation in South Korea’s fortunes is the question.
Jagannath Panda
Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden; and a senior fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands.
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Choong Yong Ahn
Dr. Choong Yong Ahn is a distinguished professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Chung-Ang University, Seoul. He was earlier the president of Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).
thediplomat.com · by Jagannath Panda · January 16, 2023
9. Chongryon: The only way North Korea talks to Japan
I doubt most understand the nature of this organization in Japan.
But a Japan-north Korea summit is a long shot.
Note I have learned from my north Korean expert friends (such as Bob Collins) that the 225th Bureau of the United Front Department (UFD) has been renamed the Cultural Engagement Bureau (CEB). But its mission remains political subversion. No one should trust organizations that are affiliated with it.
Excerpts:
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un is rumored to have shown interest in Chongryon since coming to power. He proclaimed that “it is the eternal policy of our Republic to attach importance to Chongryon and overseas compatriots” in his letter commemorating Chongryon’s 25th Congress.
The Japanese government also seems to recognize Chongryon’s value, as it expressed a desire to host a summit with North Korea via Chongryon in 2017.
Chongryon has weathered economic collapse, bilateral crises, social discrimination and political pressure in its history. But as long as it retains North Korea’s confidence and remains the only regular and stable conduit for bilateral discourse, it will remain relevant to the political relationship between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Chongryon: The only way North Korea talks to Japan
As Pyongyang’s only delegate in Japan, association is crucial to bilateral ties and holds the key to possible Kim-Kishida summit
asiatimes.com · by Soyoung Kim · January 18, 2023
The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan — abbreviated as Chongryon in Korean — has long served the interests of the North Korean government in Japan under the supervision of the 225th Bureau of the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
It is the only conduit between the governments of North Korea and Japan as there is no North Korean embassy in Japan.
Despite its reduced membership size and financial capacity compared to its prime, Chongryon remains relevant to bilateral political and diplomatic relations. This is especially the case given the heightened possibility of communication between Japan and North Korea after Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s recent overtures towards meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unconditionally.
Chongryon’s continued importance in the bilateral relationship depends on whether it can maintain the confidence of the North Korean government to represent it in Japan and if other organizations could substitute for the Chongryon’s roles and functions.
Chongryon was established in 1955 with the support of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party. It has run dozens of schools and a university in Japan that educates ethnic Koreans on North Korean culture and language, and practically functions as a propaganda platform for the North Korean government, which has funded these Chosen schools since 1957.
Students were not allowed to benefit from various student-related privileges and activities until the 1990s. These schools are ineligible for tuition subsidies from the Japanese government, having been disqualified for their ties to North Korea.
Chongryon also ran various business and criminal enterprises which reportedly produced over US$1 billion in annual revenue, most of which was remitted to North Korea.
But Chongryon’s ability to support the Workers’ Party has been severely impaired, with its businesses suffering from the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in the 1990s and the Japanese government’s surveillance and sanctions against North Korea.
North Korea-leaning Koreans are becoming more open to Japanese society and South Korea-leaning ethnic Koreans in Japan. Many Chongryon members may remain in the organization to maintain personal relationships rather than shared principles or ideology.
Chongryon and the Japanese elite have had a mutually beneficial relationship. From 1959 to the 1980s, Chongryon collaborated with the Japanese government in repatriating up to 90,000 Koreans to North Korea, removing what the Japanese elites perceived as “leftist troublemakers.” It also supported the political career of prominent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers in the 1970s and 1980s.
Chongryon has held discussions and lectures on the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and Japan with various mainstream Japanese political parties. In May 2005, prime minister Junichiro Koizumi commemorated the 50th anniversary of Chongryon in his capacity as president of the LDP. This demonstrates Chongryon’s role in promoting engagement with the Japanese public and elite and in possibly gathering intelligence.
Japanese attitudes towards North Korea deteriorated after the 2002 Japan-North Korea summit when North Korea confirmed the kidnapping of Japanese citizens, which had been long denied by the government and its sympathizers — including Chongryon. North Korea’s return of the surviving victims is a persisting political issue in Japan. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is the latest leader who has vowed to ensure the return of all abductees.
The major symbol of Chongryon’s decline was the forced auction of its headquarters in central Tokyo. The Japanese government started the bidding for the building in March 2013 to recover some of the 62.7 billion yen owed by the Chongryon for a bailout in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But the building remains in Chongryon’s control even after its sale.
Chongryon membership has also declined. The Japanese Ministry of Justice announced that as of December 2018, there were 29,559 Chosen-seki, which is a legal status assigned to ethnic Koreans in Japan who are neither Japanese nor South Korean in nationality.
Most Chosen-seki are known to be Chongryon members. According to the Ministry of Justice, this was an 11.5% decrease over three years. This suggests that many Chosen-seki have chosen to acquire either Japanese or South Korean citizenship.
North Korea, after firing a ballistic missile over Japan in October 2022, warned the Japanese government against further persecution of pro-regime Koreans in Japan, regarding it as “a challenge to its dignity and sovereignty.”
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un is rumored to have shown interest in Chongryon since coming to power. He proclaimed that “it is the eternal policy of our Republic to attach importance to Chongryon and overseas compatriots” in his letter commemorating Chongryon’s 25th Congress.
The Japanese government also seems to recognize Chongryon’s value, as it expressed a desire to host a summit with North Korea via Chongryon in 2017.
Chongryon has weathered economic collapse, bilateral crises, social discrimination and political pressure in its history. But as long as it retains North Korea’s confidence and remains the only regular and stable conduit for bilateral discourse, it will remain relevant to the political relationship between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Given its enduring position as North Korea’s delegate in Japan, greater attention should be paid to the activities of Chongryon as diplomatic signals and the specific roles that it would oversee if a Japan-North Korea summit is to be held.
Soyoung Kim is a PhD candidate at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
asiatimes.com · by Soyoung Kim · January 18, 2023
10. Commentary: Lessons in preparing for war on the Korean peninsula
How do you develop resilience in Seoul under the threat of north Korea fire.
"NEO" planning for foreigners is recommended.
I recommend this short RAND report to put this article in context
Gian Gentile et. al., “Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s expanding nuclear capabilities drive a complex set of problems,” RAND Corporation
https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html
Commentary: Lessons in preparing for war on the Korean peninsula
As Kim Jong Un ratchets up his nuclear arsenal, Seoul residents face questions over how to plan for a crisis, says Financial Times' Christian Davies.
Christian Davies
18 Jan 2023 06:12AM
(Updated: 18 Jan 2023 06:12AM)
channelnewsasia.com · by Christian Davies
SEOUL: Feigning as much detachment as I could, I once asked a Western diplomat over lunch what arrangements various countries had for evacuating their citizens in the event of a conflict on the Korean peninsula.
I shouldn’t worry about it, they said. The firepower of the respective adversaries is so great, and the distances between them so small, that it - and I - would all be over before I even knew it had begun.
So when I attended a seminar hosted by the Korea Risk Group consultancy late last year on how businesses and governments might prepare for various crisis contingencies up to and including war, I was oddly comforted to learn that my chances of survival are in fact slightly better than zero.
The seminar was held in recognition of the fact that the security situation on the peninsula has deteriorated over the past year. Having acquired intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is now focused on developing a new generation of tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons, which experts worry have a lower threshold for use than higher yield weapons.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year also concentrated the minds of governments and businesses on the need to plan for possible conflagrations elsewhere, most notably in Taiwan or Korea.
WHEN DOES TENSION LEAD TO CRISIS?
But for the people tasked with drawing up those plans, the dilemmas are acute. At what point does a period of heightened tension, which is fairly common on the Korean peninsula, reach the threshold of a crisis? At what stage of a crisis does one start seriously to prepare for war? And if war is on the horizon, at what point should you decide to escape?
“It’s extremely difficult to calibrate,” says Andrew Gilholm, a Korea-based analyst for consultancy Control Risks. “Either you lean towards caution and risk ending up looking foolish by evacuating people every few years, or you wait for clear triggers and risk leaving it too late.”
While many foreign companies fail to plan for a war, others have developed elaborate evacuation plans to get employees off the peninsula if necessary. These often involve staff somehow finding their way out of the South Korean capital and gathering at a port to catch a boat to China or Japan.
But as anyone who has tried to leave Seoul even during a major public holiday in peacetime will attest, there would be almost no possibility of getting out of the capital in such a situation.
The best thing for Seoul residents to do, therefore, would probably be to shelter in a subway station, an underground car park or one of the numerous designated bomb shelters dotted throughout the city.
Many experts believe that in the initial stages of a conflict at least, North Korea would use precision weapons to target key military and command installations as well as critical infrastructure, rather than simply levelling Seoul as some people assume it would.
"GRAB BAGS"
To prepare for this, foreign employees who work in Seoul are often encouraged by their companies to keep ready in their homes a “grab bag” - a rucksack full of items ranging from water, non-perishable foods and iodine tablets to cash, a torch, a satellite phone and even a Geiger counter that could help you survive up to 30 days underground or in a post-conflict environment.
A grab bag like this could well keep you alive in such a scenario. And yet the vast majority of people, whether foreign or Korean, have never bothered to pack one.
“There are so many different forms that a war could take, so how can you be prepared for all of them?” asks Hye-jin, a 31-year-old South Korean who works in finance.
She adds that even if she had the opportunity to be evacuated, she would find it hard to go if it meant leaving her closest friends and family behind.
A British businessman who runs a small company in Seoul says that his Korean wife and employees - long inured to the threat of war - would never agree to come with him anyway. “Imagine if I got myself out, there was no war, and I came back with my tail between my legs,” he says. “I couldn’t look them in the eye ever again.”
channelnewsasia.com · by Christian Davies
11. Russia desperate for Iran, North Korea help with missiles, drones: U.S.
We ignore north Korea's connectivity to all revisionist and rogue powers and its support to hostile actors in conflict zones around the world.
Russia desperate for Iran, North Korea help with missiles, drones: U.S.
Newsweek · by David Brennan · January 17, 2023
Top U.S. officials have said they expect Russia's ties with Iran to deepen as Moscow searches for a friendly supply of ammunition, missiles, drones, and other weapons needed to continue its war in Ukraine, now almost 11 months old.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl are part of a U.S. delegation visiting Ukraine this week. They told journalists on Monday at the Media Center Ukraine in Kyiv that Russia appears to be running low on long-range strike options.
"Frankly speaking, it is a sign of Russia's desperation that they are turning to Iran and North Korea," Kahl said, referring to reports that Moscow has sought a wide range of ammunition from Pyongyang, plus drones and ballistic missiles from Tehran.
North Korea has denied recent reports that it has sent ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine. Iran also initially denied it had supplied Russia with combat and reconnaissance drones—most notably the Shahed-136 "kamikaze" UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle)—but later admitted it had sent a small number to Moscow before the full-scale invasion began on February 24.
A Iranian-made drone flies over Kyiv during an attack on October 17, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iran initially denied it had supplied Russia with combat and reconnaissance drones but later admitted it had sent a small number to Moscow before the invasion began in February. SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images
Ukraine and its Western partners have disputed Tehran's claim and said there have been regular deliveries of hundreds of drones since the invasion began. The Kremlin, they have said, is also setting up its own facilities to produce Iranian drones within Russian borders.
There have been numerous reports that Moscow has lobbied Tehran to provide ballistic missiles, though there is no evidence that Iran has complied. There has also been speculation that Moscow will reward Tehran for its backing by protecting Iran from international action over its revitalized nuclear program and sending Iran new weapons.
Iran's semi-official Tasnim news agency reported on Sunday—citing an Iranian lawmaker—that Tehran would soon receive a number of Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, as well as new defense systems, missiles and helicopters.
"In terms of aircraft, I think we should expect Iran and Russia to deepen their relationship, again, because Russia will increasingly rely on assistance from other nations to get the weapons they lack," Kahl said Monday.
Sherman expressed U.S. concern about the state of Russia-Iran relations and said Washington, D.C. was monitoring Moscow's missile production capabilities and would look to impose related sanctions.
Newsweek has contacted the Russian and Iranian foreign ministries to request comment.
The deputy secretary of state said the U.S. was firmly committed to backing Kyiv against Russia's ongoing aggression, regardless of threats of escalation from President Vladimir Putin or rumors that the dictator would order further military mobilization.
"Putin decided to press further, so we must also press and we will do it," Sherman said.
Ukraine has warned that another wave of mobilization might see 500,000 Russians conscripted. The Kremlin gathered 300,000 new recruits in the first wave of partial mobilization announced in September.
Sherman said further large-scale mobilization would pose problems for Moscow.
"The mobilization of 500,000 people is a staggering thing," she said. "I suspect that, of course, under the staggering conditions there will be no quick training nor equipping of such a force, and it will be something that we, together with other countries, will work very hard on, so that Ukraine will win."
A destroyed Russian multiple launch rocket system is pictured in the Donetsk region on October 9, 2022 in Sviatohirs'k, Ukraine. Carl Court/Getty Images
Newsweek · by David Brennan · January 17, 2023
12. “If the problem becomes more serious”: South Korea talks going nuclear
I am reminded of the movie Animal House and the final parade scene with the ROTC Cadet yelling to the crowd - "Remain calm. Remain calm."
“If the problem becomes more serious”: South Korea talks going nuclear | Lowy Institute
The high stakes on Korean Peninsula have
quickly become even more acute in 2023.
lowyinstitute.org · by Gabriela Bernal
The political and security environment on the Korean Peninsula has changed dramatically over the past year, with tensions reaching new levels because of continuous confrontations between the two Koreas.
There are no signs yet of a de-escalation. In fact, things got even worse barely a few days into 2023.
On New Year’s Day, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered the “exponential” expansion of his country’s nuclear arsenal and the development of a more powerful intercontinental ballistic missile. In response, South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol hinted at the possibility for joint planning and military drills involving US nuclear assets. Washington, however, was quick to refute these claims, denying it was considering any joint nuclear drills with Seoul.
Just days later, Yoon went a step further, floating the possibility of scrapping the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, which has helped prevent accidental military clashes along maritime and land borders between the two Koreas since its signing. Unlike its predecessor, which sought engagement with the North, the Yoon administration, newly-inaugurated in 2022, has been more than eager to very publicly align itself with the United States and follow Washington’s lead on many major issues, including on how to deal with North Korea.
North Korea will not take the first step in deescalating tensions. This move must come from the South.
Yoon seems committed to respond to the North with a power-for-power approach, despite the risks of escalation. He proved this again on 11 January, when he publicly expressed the possibility of South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. Yoon warned his country could take the nuclear route if the security situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to worsen. This was a major move as it marked the first time that a South Korean leader has expressed the possibility for nuclear armament.
The South Korean president said he would not rule out the possibility of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Korean territory. He even raised the prospect of his country developing its own nuclear weapons. “If the problem becomes more serious, South Korea could have tactical nuclear weapons deployed or secure its own nuclear weapons,” Yoon said, adding that “if things turn out this way, we will be able to acquire [nuclear weapons] quickly thanks to our science and technological capabilities.”
Yoon also instructed the Ministry of National Defence to amp up its retaliatory capabilities to be able to launch counter-strikes against the North that are 100 or 1,000 times more powerful.
US Air Force and Republic of Korea aircraft training together in November (Indo-Pacific Command/Flickr)
Despite Yoon’s comments on nuclear armament, however, the leaders of the US and Japan reaffirmed on Friday their commitment to completely denuclearise the Korean Peninsula. And Yoon himself admitted that the priority should be to find “realistic” options to deal with North Korea. But his continued hard-line remarks in public could end up leading to further unwanted military clashes with the North, serious misunderstandings, or the unilateral implementation of policies that could end up negatively affecting the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula.
Indeed, Yoon’s support for trilateral cooperation with Japan and the United States, and for Japan’s recent defence policy changes, has also raised eyebrows in South Korea, where public attitudes remain largely against military cooperation with Tokyo.
For its part, North Korean media published a statement on Saturday criticising the UN Secretary General for ignoring arms build-ups by the United States and Japan, and declared that “the international position of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, true to its name, will remain an eternally inerasable, stark reality.” Through the passing of its new nuclear weapons law in September, public statements, and continuous military provocations of various kinds, North Korea has made its strong opposition to the new South Korean administration very clear. Pyongyang has shown no interest in engaging in any kind of denuclearisation talks. The controversy surrounding the remarks made by Yoon have likely only solidified this position.
North Korea will not take the first step in deescalating tensions. This move must come from the South. While it may seem unfair or akin to “losing face” for Seoul, it is the only way to prevent what could become a catastrophic conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
Although former South Korean president Moon Jae-in was ultimately unable to secure a deal on denuclearisation, he did show the world that with perseverance and consistent policy, making a space for dialogue with North Korea is more than possible. Tensions on the Peninsula in 2017, when Moon took office, were high and there was even talk of war. Nevertheless, Moon was able to consistently relay his message to North Korea and back it up with action. Instead of responding to military provocations in a tit-for-tat manner, Seoul continuously matched words with deeds and facilitated the resumption of diplomacy with North Korea.
With tensions once again at dangerous highs, it is important for the administration in Seoul to return to a measured approach and to focus on diplomacy instead of military escalation.
lowyinstitute.org · by Gabriela Bernal
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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