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Quotes of the Day:
"Let go of your attachment to being right, and suddenly your mind is more open. You're able to benefit from the unique viewpoints of others, without being crippled by your judgment."
- Ralph Marston
“Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself.”
- Albert Camus
"The truth which makes me free is for the most part the truth which men prefer not to hear."
-Herbert Agar
1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 16, 6.00 pm EST - The three hundred and twenty-seventh day of the russian large-scale invasion.
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 17, 2023
3. Western Aid to Ukraine Is Still Not Enough
4. SOCOM Soliciting Info on Planned Revamp of Data Management, C2I Software Infrastructure
5. TSA finds undeclared 84 mm caliber weapon in checked luggage at Texas airport
6. Ukraine interior minister, others killed in helicopter crash
7. Kissinger Sheds Resistance to Ukraine Joining NATO
8. As 2 of the ‘MARSOC 3’ go on trial for homicide, the 3rd gets immunity
9. The Sanctions on Russia Are Working
10. Russia’s Crime and Punishment
11. Progressives Are Beating Populists Yet Again, But Don’t Celebrate
12. Air Force, Marine Generals Seen as Top Picks for Joint Chiefs Job
13. Are You a Strategist or an Operator?
14. Estonia buys 12 more howitzers amid ‘lessons from Ukraine’ (from Korea)
15. Army Special Operators Seek to Reduce Suicide with ‘Bottom-Led’ Approach
16. World leaders should press Switzerland on arms deliveries to Ukraine
17. Ian Bremmer on How Putin, Xi, and Elon Musk Are Alike
18. Army Special Forces are testing this rapid-fire mortar system
19. As champion of force-on-force training with US Marines, Japanese colonel paid ‘political’ price
20. Former commander in Russia’s Wagner Group seeking asylum, Norway says
21. Nobel laureate Maria Ressa cleared by Philippine court of tax evasion
22. Operation Allies Welcome: Lessons from a DSCA Mission
23. We Need Clear Communication Over What's Happening in Japan
24. Frank Sobchak Joins MWI as Chair of Irregular Warfare Studies
25. 'Night Stalkers' Stole a Soviet Mi-25 Hind D from Right Under Gaddafi's Nose
1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN January 16, 6.00 pm EST - The three hundred and twenty-seventh day of the russian large-scale invasion.
Also posted on the Small Wars Journal here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-january-16-600-pm-est-three-hundred-and-twenty-seventh-day-russian-large
Embassy of Ukraine in the USA
WAR BULLETIN
January 16, 6.00 pm EST
During the day, Russian forces launched 2 rocket and 6 air strikes and carried out more than 20 attacks from rocket salvo systems, in particular, on the civilian infrastructure of the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. There are dead and wounded among the civilian population.
There is a high danger of further Russian air and missile strikes throughout the territory of Ukraine.
President of Ukraine held a meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The participants considered the possibilities of enemy’s preparation of missile strikes at the territory of Ukraine and measures to counteract them.
Everyone will be held to account for terror: both those who kill and those who help to kill - address by the President of Ukraine.
Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal: Ukraine and the EU have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to provide €18bn in macro-financial assistance. We expect to receive a tranche of €3bn this week.
WAR ROOM
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The total combat losses of the Russian forces from 24.02.2022 to 16.01.2023:
personnel ‒ about 116080 (+790) killed,
tanks ‒ 3118 (+12),
APV ‒ 6204 (+21),
artillery systems – 2099 (+5),
MLRS – 438 (+1),
Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 220 (+1),
aircraft – 286,
helicopters – 276,
UAV operational-tactical level – 1872,
cruise missiles ‒ 749,
warships / boats ‒ 17,
vehicles and fuel tankers – 4870 (+24),
special equipment ‒ 190 (+3).
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zq9L4PufDXSRBJ123xMCkKdoWzsSrwKmVrzcwELytTDLgKHZ5D2LsuL8YUZKGbkal
The three hundred and twenty-seventh day of the russian large-scale invasion.
During the day, the russian occupiers launched 2 rocket and 6 air strikes and carried out more than 20 attacks from rocket salvo systems, in particular, on the civilian infrastructure of the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. There are dead and wounded among the civilian population.
There is a high danger of further russian air and missile strikes on objects throughout the territory of Ukraine.
In the Volyn, Polisiya, Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions, the situation has not changed significantly, and no offensive groups of the enemy have been detected. At the same time, on January 16, near the Ukrainian border, the joint flight and tactical training of the aviation units of the armed forces of the republic of belarus and russia, which are part of the regional grouping of troops with the involvement of combat aircraft of both countries, began. Thus, under the guise of joint training, the enemy strengthened the combat aviation group in belarus. In view of this, the threat of launching missile and air strikes from the airspace of belarus is increasing. At the same time, areas of more than thirty settlements were subjected to tank, mortar and artillery shelling. Among them are Veterinarne, Zelene, Ternova, Staritsa, Vilcha, Budarka and Topoli in Kharkiv region and Seredyna Buda, Popivka, Pavlivka and Kindrativka in Sumy region.
On the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, the enemy shelled the areas of more than
10 settlements. Among them are Kotlyarivka, Krokhmalne, Berestov, Vilshana of the Kharkiv region, as well as Novoselyvske, Stelmakhivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Kreminna of the Luhansk region.
In the Bakhmut direction, Rozdolivka, Krasnopolivka, Soledar, Krasna Gora, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Bila Gora, Kurdyumivka, Severnye and Vesele of the Donetsk region were damaged by fire. And in total there are more than 15 settlements.
Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Kamianka, Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Georgiivka, Maryinka and Novomykhailivka in Donetsk region came under enemy fire in the Avdiivka direction.
Vugledar, Prechistivka, Mykilski Dachi and Velika Novosilka of the Donetsk region were shelled in the Novopavlovka direction.
In the Zaporizhzhia direction, more than 15 settlements were affected by artillery fire, in particular, Zelene Pole, Olgivske, Poltavka, Biloghira, Novodanilivka, Orihiv, Novoandriivka, Stepove, Gulyaipole and Kamianske in Zaporizhzhia.
In the Kherson direction, the occupiers do not stop terrorizing the civilian population. In particular, Havrylivka, Dudchany, Kachkarivka, Zmiivka, Beryslav, Lvove, Novotyaginka, Sadove, Antonivka, Kizomys, and Kherson were hit by mortar and artillery fire.
On the territory of russia, foreign citizens who are in the queue to receive citizenship of the russian federation are offered to voluntarily enlist in the ranks of the enemy army and automatically receive russian citizenship. Also, in Moscow, pressure is exerted on commercial structures in order to financially support the enemy's armed forces through the transfer of funds in the amount of 10 million rubles. At the same time, the arrival of mobilized units is expected at the Kadamovsky training ground in the Rostov region, for the purpose of training and further equipping units and units of the russian occupying forces participating in hostilities in Ukraine. First of all, additional staffing will concern the private military company "Wagner" and the "Bars" detachments, which are constantly losing personnel in Ukraine.
According to available information, on January 15, during the use of the S-300 complex by the enemy, one rocket fell on a residential building in Novopskov, Starobil district, Luhansk region. Two civilians were killed.
In the settlements of the temporarily captured territory of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, the russian invaders are intensifying counter-intelligence and regime measures, carrying out intensified inspections of the local population. Special attention is paid to mobile phones.
Units of the missile troops and artillery of the Defense Forces of Ukraine hit the control post, 8 concentration areas of the occupiers, a warehouse of fuel and lubricants, and an enemy ammunition warehouse within a day.
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MNJSgaEwecgR1Q3mWFkp4UPJFYdyzBRWsiKZje4udFPja8ewFtcG1NxC3evH2pSLl
Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
russia’s Leadership Understands that Plan to Quickly Seize Ukraine Is Impossible to Realize
Russia’s preparartion for a long-term war means the enemy’s understanding that his plan to quickly seize Ukraine is impossible to implement. Therefore, putin is now considering the option of a long-term war of attrition. This was stated by Andrii Yusov, a representative of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, on the air of the telethon.
“The concept of the so-called “special military operation”, in fact, a brutal invasion of Ukraine’s territory consists in the following: putin has planned that it would be quick. And all enemy’s forces as well as means, and in general the plan of the so-called “special military operation” – are the plan of a quick war, the plan to seize Ukraine. These have not been done,” Andrii Yusov noted.
The representative of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has noted that there was no long-term war of attrition in putin’s plans. However, the last months have demonstrated the need to put russia's economy on "war rails" and force russian society to get used to the idea that the war will be a long one.
“russians are mobilizing all reserves and means. They have the huge military budgets. Also, we will see soon other measures of economic nature in russia’s territory. Undoubtedly, this is what putin is preparing for. The task in Ukraine is the opposite – 2023 should be the year of victory and a fundamental change in the situation, as neither Ukraine nor the entire civilised world needs this long war," Andrii Yusov summarized.
https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/kerivnytstvo-rosii-rozumiie-shcho-plan-shvydkoho-zakhoplennia-ukrainy-nezdiisnennyi.html
POLICY
President of Ukraine
Everyone will be held to account for terror: both those who kill and those who help to kill - address by the President of Ukraine
Today I have been receiving reports from Dnipro all day. The debris is being cleared there. All necessary services are involved. Thanks to everyone who is carrying out the rescue operation! I thank the State Emergency Service, the police and the National Guard. I want to thank the utility services, our doctors, all volunteers, ordinary citizens of Dnipro who are helping!
As of now, the fate of more than 30 people who could have been in the house at the time of the terrorists' missile hit remains unknown.
Dozens of people were rescued from the rubble, including six children. We are fighting for every person! The rescue operation will last as long as there is even the slightest chance to save lives.
Currently, the list of the dead includes 30 people, including one child - a girl, she was 15 years old.
There are reports that two children lost their parents. My condolences to all those who lost their loved ones...
Since the attack, Ukraine has heard words of condolences and support from many leaders, public figures, journalists and ordinary people from around the world. I thank everyone who did not remain indifferent! It is very important that normal people unite in response to terror.
But...
I want to say to all those in Russia - and from Russia - who even now could not utter even a few words of condemnation of this terror... Even though they see and know everything perfectly well…
Your cowardly silence, your attempt to "wait out" what is happening will only end with those same terrorists coming after you one day.
Evil is very sensitive to cowardice.
Evil always remembers those who fear it or try to bargain with it. And when it comes after you, there will be no one to protect you.
I think it is right that today there is a decision to expand our sanctions against Russian citizens and other persons who help terror.
Almost 200 - this list is carefully prepared, and behind each name there is a responsible motivation. Those who justify terror. Those who grease the Russian propaganda machine. Those who tried to sell Ukraine somewhere in Moscow. This public will face a full list of personal restrictions. We will do everything to make the sanctions work on the largest possible scale - in Europe, in the world.
Everyone will be held to account for terror: both those who kill and those who help to kill.
The work of the NSDC on the sanctions lists continues, and the next decisions will be made soon.
Today, as always, I want to thank our warriors. All those who heroically and steadfastly perform combat missions. Those who hold our positions. And especially in the most difficult areas of the front. The battle for Soledar, for Bakhmut, for the whole Donetsk region, for the Luhansk region continues without any respite, without any stop.
I am grateful to each of our fighters, each of our soldiers, sergeants, officers who understand how important it is to destroy the invaders in this direction. Russia has made the battle for the cities of our Donbas fundamental for itself. Our heroes make this battle fundamental for the destruction of the combat potential of the terrorist state.
Every day of Ukrainian resilience in Donbas and every success in our defense there are vital achievements for the protection of our entire state.
And one more thing.
Today a great friend of Ukraine, a legend - Vakhtang Kikabidze - passed away. We can talk a lot about him, and still there are not enough words to say all the good things that are worth saying about him.
It is an honor for us that he was our friend. May his memory be bright!
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidpovidalnist-za-teror-bude-dlya-vsih-i-dlya-tih-hto-vbivay-80385
We work every day and night to reduce the enemy's potential - address by the President of Ukraine
Fellow Ukrainians!
The debris of the house destroyed by the Russian missile is still being dismantled in Dnipro. I thank everyone who is carrying out this rescue operation! Every employee of the State Emergency Service and police, every doctor, every volunteer! Everyone who is involved!
As of now, 39 people, including 6 children, have been rescued from under the rubble.
In total, 47 reports were received about those who could have been in the house at the time of the strike and whose fate was unknown. The information about 22 people has been clarified. It is known about 40 dead, including 3 children. My condolences to all whose loved ones were killed by this strike!
The Security Service of Ukraine has already started to gather information about those Russian military who prepared and carried out this strike. There is no doubt: every person guilty of this war crime will be identified and brought to justice.
This strike at Dnipro, as well as other similar strikes, falls, in particular, under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. And we will use all available opportunities - both national and international - to ensure that all Russian murderers, everyone who gives and executes orders on missile terror against our people, face legal sentences. And to ensure that they serve their punishment.
This is a fundamental task for Ukraine and for our partners. I thank everyone who supports our country on the path to justice.
Today, by the way, I spoke with Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte - he is one of those who help Ukraine the most, particularly in the issue of justice.
It was our third conversation with Mr. Prime Minister in four weeks.
I am grateful to Mark and all Dutch people for their continued support and clear understanding that Ukrainians must defeat Russian aggression.
Today we discussed protection against Russian missiles and Iranian drones - we are doing everything to strengthen our air defense as much as possible.
It is very important that our conversation took place on the eve of the visit of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to the United States.
What happened in Dnipro, the fact that Russia is preparing a new attempt to seize the initiative in the war, the fact that the nature of hostilities at the front requires new decisions in the defense supply - all this only emphasizes how important it is to coordinate our efforts - efforts of all members of the coalition to defend Ukraine and freedom. And to speed up decision-making.
Today, there is a good example from the UK. A new package of defense assistance has been announced - exactly what we need. Tanks, other armored vehicles, artillery.
What we discussed with Prime Minister Sunak. I thank you, Rishi, I thank every Briton for the tangible and timely support!
I held a regular meeting of the Staff. The questions are as follows. Interaction with our partners. Counteraction to missile terror. Possible scenarios of enemy actions and our response to each of the probable scenarios.
There were reports of commanders, intelligence chiefs. There were also necessary decisions.
The situation in the Donetsk direction was considered separately and in detail. Soledar, Bakhmut and other cities against which Russia has concentrated its last most prepared forces.
We also reviewed the situation on the southern front. We see what Russia is preparing.
Every day and night we work to reduce the enemy's potential: every day and night we subtract their warehouses, headquarters, communications.
Today, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia visited Kyiv.
Of course, we discussed first of all how to make the OSCE effective.
This is one of those international organizations that have significant potential, but for various reasons in critical situations have a great lack of concrete actions, a great lack of determination.
The OSCE can significantly increase attention and act accordingly regarding the deportation of our people from the occupied territory to Russia. And regarding the situation with Ukrainian prisoners. No international organization has found the strength to gain access to the places of detention of our prisoners in Russia yet. This must be corrected.
I hope that the OSCE presidency of North Macedonia will contribute to this.
Starting tomorrow, this week will be even more active in terms of our diplomacy.
The Davos Forum will start its work - Ukraine will be heard at this globally important platform.
At the end of the week, a regular meeting in the Ramstein format will be held. We expect fundamental decisions from the coalition of our partners.
Important bilateral negotiations are also planned.
Every day of our diplomatic marathon brings Ukraine quite specific defensive results. And I thank everyone who helps our state! I thank everyone who works for the victory of Ukraine!
Glory to each of our warriors! Glory to all who have been fighting since February 24 and since 2014!
This week, on January 20, we will mark the Day of Honoring the Defenders of the Donetsk airport.
Today we have already started to recall that defense, that heroism of our people. The fight started in May 2014. The last defender left the DAP on January 23, 2015. And it was such a defense that the whole world should have seen back then already what Ukrainian invincibility means.
I am confident that the Ukrainian flag will return to the Donetsk airport, Donetsk and other cities and villages of our Donbas and other temporarily occupied territories. Temporarily is the key word.
Ukraine will return its people and what belongs to it.
Glory to Ukraine!
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shodnya-j-shonochi-diyemo-shob-zmenshiti-potencial-voroga-zv-80405
Andriy Yermak held a briefing for the U.S. delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of State
Head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak held a briefing for the delegation of the United States of America headed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on Ukraine's counteraction to the full-scale invasion of Russia.
The briefing was also attended by: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States to Ukraine Bridget Brink, Deputy Head of the Office of the President Andriy Sybiha, Chairman of the Board of the National Energy Company Ukrenergo Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, representatives of the military command.
Andriy Yermak informed the American partners, in particular, about the main events taking place in Ukraine and around its borders due to the aggression of the Russian Federation. He thanked the United States for supporting our country in the struggle for independence and territorial integrity.
"Ukrainians will never forget the assistance and support provided to us by the U.S., the American people, the government, the President and the Congress," the Head of State noted and emphasized the importance of the U.S. leadership in the unification of the international coalition.
"The United States not only supports - the United States is confident that Ukraine will win, of course, and is doing everything for our victory," he added.
Andriy Yermak stressed the importance of Wendy Sherman's visit to Ukraine, during which she will receive information about the situation in our country directly on the ground.
During the briefing, representatives of the Ukrainian intelligence and commanders of the troops of operational directions informed the American delegation about the current situation on the frontline and the needs of the defense forces.
The participants also heard reports on the work of air defense to repel missile attacks of the aggressor state and the consequences of missile hits during the New Year holidays and on January 14. Separately, the participants considered the restoration of damaged power facilities and measures taken to protect them from enemy air attacks.
In addition, the participants of the meeting discussed cooperation with international partners on the support for the restoration of the Ukrainian energy sector, which is overseen by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt. Thanks to his work, Ukraine has established a permanent dialogue with partners from the G7, the European Union and its institutions, representatives of financial and non-governmental organizations on the provision of equipment to the Ukrainian energy system.
Andriy Yermak stressed that such support in the restoration of energy and other critical infrastructure is extremely important for Ukraine, because the economy must function and people must be able to return to normal life and work, bringing our victory closer.
"We are committed to openness and transparency of all information, because now we feel that when we are together in this battle, when the United States is with us - it is very important and brings victory closer. But, of course, we want to gain this victory without losing our people, our cities and infrastructure," the Head of the Presidential Office summed up.
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/andrij-yermak-proviv-brifing-dlya-amerikanskoyi-delegaciyi-n-80397
Prime Minister of Ukraine
Prime Minister of Ukraine and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State discuss challenges of russia’s war on Ukraine
On January 16, Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal met with a delegation of U.S. officials led by Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman.
The parties discussed key challenges related to russia’s war on Ukraine. In particular, support for people affected by war, restoration of energy facilities after the shelling, financial support.
The Prime Minister noted that Ukraine counts on U.S. assistance in the course of recovery. The funds will be primarily directed at restoring people’s housing.
The Prime Minister thanked the U.S. Government for the significant and tangible support of Ukraine in the fight against the enemy.
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/premier-ministr-ukrainy-ta-zastupnyk-derzhsekretaria-ssha-obhovoryly-vyklyky-poviazani-z-viinoiu-rosii-proty-ukrainy
Ukraine and EU sign Memorandum and Loan Agreement on macro-financial assistance worth EUR 18 billion
On January 16, a Memorandum of Understanding and a Loan Agreement were signed between Ukraine and the European Union on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine in the amount of EUR 18 billion.
The respective agreements were signed by Minister of Finance of Ukraine Serhii Marchenko and Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine Andriy Pyshnyy, on behalf of Ukraine, and by Executive Vice-President of the European Commission Valdis Dombrovskis, on behalf of the EU.
It is expected that the first tranche of EUR 3 billion will be disbursed by the end of January this year.
“We highly appreciate our cooperation with the European Union and are sincerely grateful for the support of Ukraine in the conditions of full-scale war. During the systematic destruction of civilian and critical infrastructure by russia, Ukraine counts on support from partner countries and needs a rhythmic and predictable flow of funds to finance social and humanitarian needs of the state budget. The macro-financial assistance of the European Union in the amount of EUR 18 billion will largely ensure financing of priority budget expenditures and smooth functioning of the Ukrainian economy this year,” said Serhii Marchenko.
According to the agreements, concessional loans will be transferred to the state budget of Ukraine in 2023 in equal installments, subject to fulfillment by Ukraine of conditions agreed by the parties.
The attracted funds of macro-financial assistance will be used to ensure priority social and humanitarian expenditures of the state budget, in particular for the salaries of employees of state bodies and budgetary institutions of the educational sphere, medical institutions, payment of pensions and financing of certain programs of state social assistance, support for low-income families, children with disabilities and persons disabled since childhood, IDPs. The attracted funds will also contribute to the preservation of financial and economic stability in Ukraine.
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/ukraina-ta-ies-pidpysaly-memorandum-ta-kredytnu-uhodu-shchodo-otrymannia-makrofinansovoi-dopomohy-obsiahom-18-mlrd-ievro
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 17, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023
Key Takeaways
- Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on January 17 that he will implement Russian President Vladimir Putin's directive to conduct large-scale military reforms between 2023-2026 to expand Russia's conventional armed forces, likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and also to set conditions to build a significantly stronger Russian military quickly.
- Putin may announce a second mobilization wave in the coming days, possibly as soon as January 18.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to improve professionalism within the Russian armed forces and likely test and improve the effectiveness of its chains of command down to the small unit level.
- Several prominent voices in the pro-war information space seized on these guidelines to support further criticisms of the Russian MoD, suggesting that the MoD will likely face stiff resistance.
- Serbian President Alexander Vucic called on the Wagner Group to cease recruitment in Serbia.
- Russian forces continued to conduct limited counterattacks near Kreminna as Ukrainian officials continued to suggest that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive actions across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
- The Russian information space is struggling to portray tactical Russian gains around Soledar as operationally significant.
- Russian forces in Kherson Oblast continue to struggle to maintain their logistics efforts in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast due to Ukrainian strikes.
- A Russian occupation official claimed that Putin will make an "important statement" pertaining to the war in Ukraine on January 18.
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to establish the Wagner Group as a legal entity in Russia.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 17, 2023
understandingwar.org
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 17, 8:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on January 17 that he will implement Russian President Vladimir Putin’s directive to conduct large-scale military reforms between 2023-2026 to expand Russia’s conventional armed forces, likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and also to set conditions to build a significantly stronger Russian military quickly. Shoigu stated that Putin ordered Russian authorities to increase the number of Russian military personnel to 1.5 million (from the current 1.35 million). Shoigu outlined that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will institute unspecified “large-scale changes” in the composition, complement, and administrative divisions of the Russian Armed Forces between 2023-2026.[1] Shoigu noted that Russia also needs to strengthen the key structural components of the Russian Armed Forces. Shoigu announced that Russia will reestablish the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, form a new army corps in Karelia (on the Finnish border), form new self-sufficient force groupings in occupied Ukraine, and form 12 new maneuver divisions.[2] Shoigu added that Russia needs to increase its capabilities to adequately prepare its forces by developing more training grounds and increasing the number of trainers and specialists. Shoigu first foreshadowed aspects of this reform at the Russian MoD Collegium meeting on December 21 when he proposed that Russia form two new airborne assault divisions, three new motorized rifle divisions, and reform seven existing brigades of the Northern Fleet and Western, Central, and Eastern Military districts into seven new motorized rifle divisions while expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five naval infantry divisions.[3] It appears that Shoigu did not include the reformation of five naval infantry brigades into divisions in his January 17 statement. It is unclear if that part of the plan has been dropped.
These reforms demonstrate Russia’s intent to reform the Russian military to conduct large-scale conventional warfighting in general and not just for the current war against Ukraine, as ISW has previously assessed.[4] It is unclear if the Russian military will be able to grow as Shoigu described within three years.[5] Russia can nominally form new divisions but it remains unclear if Russia can generate enough forces to fully staff them to their doctrinal end strengths amid an ongoing war. Shoigu made previous announcements about Russian military reforms that never came to fruition, such as in May 2022 when he called for the formation of 12 new Western Military District (WMD) units of unspecified echelon by the end of 2022 and for the Russian MoD to recruit 100,000 reservists in August 2021.[6] Russia has previously faced challenges with fully staffing existing brigades and regiments, lacking sufficient trainers, and fully forming one new division it announced in 2020 before the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[7] The restructuring of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army) took over a year.[8] Russia will also continue to face economic problems, which may continue to strain the Russian military command’s ability to supply its forces.
Russia’s ability to generate large-scale rapid change in its military capacity depends on President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to redirect large portions of the federal budget to a military buildup and putting Russia on something like a war footing for several years. There are signs that Putin might be willing to do so. Reform and expansion on the scale Shoigu outlined will not happen in time to affect the war in Ukraine materially for many months, but it could change the correlation of forces going into 2024, and it could establish conditions for a much more formidable Russian military threat to its neighbors, including NATO, in the coming years. Ukraine likely continues to have a window of opportunity into and through the summer if the West provides it the support it needs.[9]
Putin may announce a second mobilization wave to expand his army in the coming days—possibly as early as January 18. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on January 17 that Putin will deliver a speech in St. Petersburg on January 18 in commemoration of the 80th anniversary of Soviet forces breaking the Nazi siege of Leningrad, Putin’s hometown.[10] Putin is fond of using symbolic dates to address the Russian people, and some Russian pro-war milbloggers noted that he will seize this opportunity to either declare mobilization or war with Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian and Western intelligence also repeatedly warned of Putin’s mobilization preparations scheduled for mid-January.[12]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to improve professionalism within the Russian armed forces and likely test and improve the effectiveness of its chains of command down to the small unit level. Several milbloggers commented on a reported list of guidelines for Russian troops in Ukraine that restricts the use of personal vehicles and certain personal electronic devices in the combat zone and sets stricter guidelines for the grooming standards of men on the frontlines.[13] The Russian MoD is likely attempting to institute these measures to instill greater professionalism in Russian troops and potentially gauge the ability of lower-level commanders to execute orders to standard, two issues that were brought to light in the wake of the December 31 Ukrainian strike on a Russian concentration area in Makiivka that killed up to 400 mobilized Russian servicemen. Following the Makiivka strike, the Russian MoD highlighted the lack of sound operational security (OPSEC) practices among Russian servicemen and blamed personal cellphone use—among other factors—for enabling the strike.[14] These guidelines likely are part of the ongoing Russian MoD line of effort to conduct widespread military reforms and bolster the overall professionalism of the Russian armed forces in order to avoid further failures such as the Makiivka strike.
The Russian MoD may have additionally issued these guidelines in an attempt to gauge the effectiveness of Russian commanders in executing orders. The issue of grooming on the frontlines, as ISW previously reported on January 16, has been a sticking point between lower-level commanders and undisciplined troops who refuse to obey orders to shave.[15] While the basic presentation of frontline troops may seem like a trivial matter, in reality, adherence to or disregard for such standards can indicate the professionalism or lack thereof of conventional forces. In poorly performing and demoralized units, failure to adhere to such standards can fuel demoralization and poor performance. Attempting to enforce those standards even in the circumstances facing the Russian military in Ukraine today, therefore, makes sense. The order to enforce such standards is also a way for higher echelons of the Russian command to test the ability of lower-level commanders to execute a relatively straightforward order on the individual soldier level.
Several prominent voices in the pro-war information space, including Russian and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials, seized on these guidelines to support further criticisms of the Russian MoD, suggesting that the Russian MoD will likely face stiff resistance in continued attempts at professionalization and modernization. Moscow City Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev complained that the Russian MoD is ignoring real issues on the front and instead banning the movement of personal vehicles in combat zones, which, Medvedev noted, restricts the ability of volunteers to provide servicemen on the frontline with crowdfunded vehicles and supplies that the MoD has failed to procure for them.[16] Medvedev and Deputy DNR Information Minister Daniil Bezsonov both noted that the prohibition of certain personal electronics will impede soldiers’ ability to control quadcopters and store terrain maps offline.[17] These responses suggest that Russian military leadership will struggle to institute meaningful and sustainable reforms as long as they continue to place the onus for change on an individual basis. While these suggested changes are sound and prudent decisions in principle, the Russian MoD will likely struggle to effectively implement them due to continued fragmentations in the information space that skew strongly against the conventional MoD apparatus. The MoD faces a challenge using improved enforcement of standards to raise the quality of the Russian Armed Forces with such a significant trust deficit.
Serbian President Alexander Vucic called on the Wagner Group to cease recruitment in Serbia on January 16. Vucic posed a rhetorical question, asking why Wagner is violating Serbia’s laws.[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that Wagner does not operate in Serbia and claimed that no Serbian nationals are enlisted in Wagner detachments because “Serbs themselves are doing an excellent job at handling their problems.”[19] Prigozhin’s statement may be a form of sarcasm, given recent tensions between Kosovo and Serbia.[20] Russian sources posted footage on January 17 purporting to show Serbian volunteers serving in a Russian volunteer battalion deployed to Zaporizhia Oblast, although ISW has not observed any Serbian nationals serving in Ukraine as a part of the Wagner Group.[21]
Key Takeaways
- Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on January 17 that he will implement Russian President Vladimir Putin's directive to conduct large-scale military reforms between 2023-2026 to expand Russia's conventional armed forces, likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and also to set conditions to build a significantly stronger Russian military quickly.
- Putin may announce a second mobilization wave in the coming days, possibly as soon as January 18.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to improve professionalism within the Russian armed forces and likely test and improve the effectiveness of its chains of command down to the small unit level.
- Several prominent voices in the pro-war information space seized on these guidelines to support further criticisms of the Russian MoD, suggesting that the MoD will likely face stiff resistance.
- Serbian President Alexander Vucic called on the Wagner Group to cease recruitment in Serbia.
- Russian forces continued to conduct limited counterattacks near Kreminna as Ukrainian officials continued to suggest that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive actions across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
- The Russian information space is struggling to portray tactical Russian gains around Soledar as operationally significant.
- Russian forces in Kherson Oblast continue to struggle to maintain their logistics efforts in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast due to Ukrainian strikes.
- A Russian occupation official claimed that Putin will make an "important statement" pertaining to the war in Ukraine on January 18.
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to establish the Wagner Group as a legal entity in Russia.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna on January 17. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually advancing along the Makiivka—Zhuravaka Balka river line (22km northwest of Kreminna) and conducted an assault near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[22] Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Russian forces holding positions west of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[24]
Ukrainian officials continued to suggest that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that a large-scale Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast is possible and that Russian forces continue to routinely transfer reinforcements to the Kreminna-Svatove line.[25] ISW has assessed that Russian forces are likely preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast.[26] Haidai also claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups disguised in Ukrainian uniforms tried to break through Ukrainian defenses in an unspecified area of Luhansk Oblast.[27]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar on January 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Soledar itself and within 24km north of Soledar near Verkhnokamianske, Spirne, Krasnopolivka, Sil, and Bilohorivka.[28] Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal advances north of Bilohorivka (11km northeast of Soledar).[29] Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Wagner Group elements south of Rozdolivka (7km north of Soledar) and north of Soledar.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are continuing offensives towards Rozdolivka and Vesele (8km northeast of Soledar).[31] One Russian milblogger reiterated claims that Wagner Group elements completely captured Sil, although ISW still cannot verify this claim.[32] The DNR Territorial Defense announced that Russian forces have officially captured Soledar, the third official Russian statement about Russian forces capturing the settlement in the past week.[33] Ukrainian forces may still maintain positions in western Sil (which is in Soledar) since Ukrainian officials continue to claim that Ukrainian forces are in Soledar.[34] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces are still conducting clearing operations in Soledar as of January 17 and that further Russian advances around the settlement have been slow because Russian forces need to consolidate their positions and repel Ukrainian counterattacks.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also conducting offensives in the direction of Blahodatne (5km west of Soledar), Paraskoviivka (5km southwest of Soledar), and Krasna Hora (5km southwest of Soledar).[36]
The Russian information space has yet to determine how to frame tactical advances in Soledar as operationally significant as of January 17. Russian sources previously suggested that the capture of Soledar presaged an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut or even a Ukrainian retreat as far back as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[37] Some Russian sources claimed on January 17 that the capture of Soledar allows Russian forces to cut Ukrainian supply routes between Siversk and Bakhmut (T0513 highway), creating a Russian bridgehead for offensives on Siversk.[38] Another Russian source claimed that the capture of Soledar will allow Russian forces to take Paraskoviivka and cut a section of the road from Slovyansk to Bakhmut (E40 highway).[39] The fact that the Russian information space has not identified the key ground line of communication (GLOC) that Russian forces are now better positioned to take, or any other operational advantage associated with Russian tactical advances in Soledar further underscores that the offensive to capture the settlement has not significantly changed Russian operations in the wider Bakhmut area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself and Pivnichne (22km southwest of Bakhmut).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting continued on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[41] Russian milbloggers refuted previous Russian claims that Russian forces captured Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and claimed that Wagner Group fighters broke through Ukrainian defenses in the settlement, where there are ongoing battles for its control.[42] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that Wagner Group elements have not captured Klishchiivka and that Ukrainian forces control a large part of the settlement as of January 17.[43] Geolocated footage posted on January 16 and 17 indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances near the settlement.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 17. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault near Novobakhmutivka (14km northeast of Avdiivka).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) and within 32km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, Marinka, and Pobieda.[46] Pushilin claimed on January 16 that Russian forces are close to being able to announce the capture of Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) and a Russian milblogger claimed on January 17 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions in the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[47] ISW cannot independently verify either of these claims. Pushilin also claimed on January 17 that Russian forces have cleared all high-rise buildings in Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and are close to capturing the settlement.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses on the western outskirts of the settlement and that Russian forces need to capture as little as 300 meters of the western outskirts to completely control the settlement.[49] ISW also cannot independently verify these claims. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults near Krasnohorivka (23km southwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[50] Another Russian milblogger published footage on January 17 purporting to show the aftermath of battles near Novomykhailivka.[51]
Russian forces reportedly conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on January 17. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Velyka Novosilka (55km southwest of Avdiivka) and Prechystivka (42km southwest of Avdiivka) in western Donetsk Oblast.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[53]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces in Kherson Oblast continue to struggle with their logistics efforts in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast due to Ukrainian strikes. Satellite imagery from January 3 and 9 suggests that Russian forces decreased their usage of a rail station with visible damage from strikes in Myrne, Kherson Oblast, and heavily use a rail station further to the rear in Sokolohirne, Kherson Oblast on the Kherson-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[54] Footage posted on January 17 reportedly shows Russian forces shelling Kherson City with incendiary munitions on January 17, the second observed instance of Russian forces using incendiary munitions against Kherson City in the past 10 days.[55] The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts the use of incendiary weapons against or near civilians.[56] Russian forces continued to strike areas on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, including Kherson City, Beryslav, and their environs.[57]
Russian forces continued routine fire against areas in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts on January 17.[58] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh stated that Russian forces intensified the shelling of residential and civilian infrastructure facilities in Zaporizhia Oblast.[59] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov expressed continued concern that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a potential counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast.[60]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued efforts to establish a safety and security zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The IAEA stated on January 17 that the backup external powerline from the ZNPP disconnected briefly for maintenance on January 16 after suffering repeated power cuts in recent weeks.[61] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the nuclear safety and security situation is precarious and called for a protection zone around the plant.[62]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian government continued efforts to expand the categories of Russians eligible for mobilization. Independent news outlet Meduza reported on January 16 that the Russian State Duma rejected a proposal to defer mobilization for doctoral students.[63] ISW previously assessed that Kremlin officials are discussing expanding eligibility protocols for the conscripted, mobilized, and mobilized reserve as an intensified force generation effort.[64] Putin expanded mobilization eligibility by signing an order to allow the mobilization of convicts in November 2022.[65] Other Russian reports indicated that Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov terminated mobilization exemptions for fathers of three or more children in January 2023—which Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov neither confirmed nor denied—on January 14.[66]
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to establish the Wagner Group as a legal entity in Russia. The BBC’s Russia service and independent Russian news outlet Meduza reported on January 17 that unknown actors legally registered a joint-stock company called "PMC Wagner Center" in Russia's Unified State Register of Legal Entities on December 27, 2022—the first time that any Wagner Group-affiliated legal entity has appeared in Russia.[67] BBC’s Russia service explained that this means that the PMC Wagner Center now has the ability to—among other things—receive government orders and grants without disclosing its beneficiaries (which are highly likely to include Wagner personnel).[68] Under Russian law, private military companies are still illegal given the Russian Constitution reserves all matters of defense and security for the Russian state.[69] The registration of a Wagner Group legal entity in Russia is likely another ploy by Prigozhin to seek increased legitimization of and state benefits for Wagner forces while bolstering his own reputation. Prigozhin previously advocated that Wagner fighters get their own specially recognized burial grounds in Russia, for example.[70]
Prigozhin claimed on January 17 that a fourth round of prisoners who completed their contracts with the Wagner Group to fight in Ukraine received pardons.[71] This is only the second time that Prigozhin has publicly “pardoned“ ex-convicts who completed their contracts with the Wagner Group: the first time was on January 5, as ISW previously reported.[72] ISW reported on January 9 that Russian Human Rights Council member Eva Merkacheva stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued secret and preemptive pardons to Russian convicts fighting with the Wagner Group in Ukraine, under a secret presidential decree.[73] ISW notes that the Russian Criminal Code and Article 89 of the Russian Constitution stipulate that only the Russian President may issue a pardon to an individual.[74] ISW continues to assess that these public announcements are an attempt by Prigozhin to inflate his political influence and power.
Prigozhin acknowledged Wagner Group deserter Andrey Medvedev’s January 12 escape to Norway and prior involvement in the Wagner Group on January 16. Prigozhin stated that Medvedev served in Wagner's Norwegian "Nidhogg" battalion but claimed that Medvedev mistreated Russian prisoners and should be prosecuted.[75] Prigozhin stated that he plans to release the details of Medvedev’s “mistreatment” to Russian officials and warned that Medvedev is “very dangerous.”[76]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation authorities are intensifying law enforcement measures in occupied territories, specifically targeting fellow occupation officials in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 17 that the DNR Ministry of Internal Affairs held a meeting to identify the parties responsible for the Ukrainian strike against Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31.[77] The report also stated that the self-proclaimed Ministry of State Security of the DNR arrested the deputy chief of the Makiivka Regional Police Department and seven other policemen for reportedly neglecting their duties of detecting and preventing the Ukrainian strike.[78] The GUR stated that Russian forces are deploying large numbers of personnel to the DNR in an effort to strengthen counterintelligence and are housing them in previously-seized private residences.[79] The GUR also noted that DNR officials are treating Chechen servicemen with greater suspicion as the Russian military has shown heightened distrust of Chechen forces.[80]
Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify filtration measures in occupied territories. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor, Serhiy Khlan, reported on January 17 that Russian forces continued shelling civilian infrastructure in occupied-Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, in an effort to intimidate residents to evacuate and repurpose private homes to house Russian servicemen.[81] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 17 that Russian forces are intensifying raids to identify possible deserters and pro-Ukrainian saboteurs in occupied Kherson Oblast.[82]
Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 17 that Russian occupation authorities in Zavodivka, Hornostaivka, and Kairy, Kherson Oblast, replaced all Ukrainian television channels with Russian broadcasting.[83] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 17 that Russian occupation authorities have replaced all Ukrainian mobile communication services with Russian operators in occupied territories.[84]
ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.
ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.
Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- Nothing significant to report.
Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that Russian and Belarusian pilots conducted unspecified joint combat training tasks as part of the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) on January 17.[85]
Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:
- The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 17 and that Russian forces in Belarus are doing training rotations.[86]
- Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Chernyak stated on January 16 that mobilized Russian forces in Belarus are undergoing training and redeploying to active frontlines elsewhere in Ukraine.[87] Chernyak stated that Russian forces are very unlikely to attack Ukraine from Belarus in the next two-to-three weeks.[88]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[10] https://iz dot ru/1455933/2023-01-17/obrashchenie-putina-18-ianvaria-meropriiatiia-ko-dniu-proryva-blokady
[18] https://www.rtvbn dot com/4037952/vucic-poslao-poruku-ruskim-prijateljima-sto-to-radite-sto-zovete-iz-vagnera#
[34] https://suspilne dot media/360492-situacia-viducora-ne-zminilasa-cerevatij-rozpoviv-pro-vijskovi-dii-u-soledari/
[35] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/16813875
[48] https://tass dot ru/politika/16813851
[63] https://www.forbes dot ru/society/483816-v-gosdume-socli-ideu-otsrocek-ucenym-protivorecasej-podhodu-k-mobilizacii-v-rossii; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/16/komitet-gosdumy-po-oborone-ne-podderzhal-otsrochki-ot-mobilizatsii-dlya-kandidatov-i-doktorov-nauk
[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://t.me/bloodysx/25161; https://www.starhit dot ru/life/dmitrii-peskov-kremlyu-nichego-ne-izvestno-ob-otmene-otsrochki-dlya-otcov-s-tremya-detmi-860807/; https://t.me/CITeam/3035; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/rus...
[67] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-64304032; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/17/v-rossii-poyavilos-yurlitso-chvk-vagner-tsentr-ono-zaregistrirovano-v-odnoimennom-zdanii-kotoroe-stroila-kompaniya-prigozhina
[68] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-64304032; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/17/v-rossii-poyavilos-yurlitso-chvk-vagner-tsentr-ono-zaregistrirovano-v-odnoimennom-zdanii-kotoroe-stroila-kompaniya-prigozhina
[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://base.garant dot ru/12125251 ; https://www.advgazeta dot ru/novosti/vladimir-putin-utverdil-novyy-poryadok-pomilovaniya/
[77] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-tak-zvanii-dnr-pryznachyly-vynnykh-v-zahybeli-chmobikiv-u-makiivtsi-a-takozh-posyliuiut-kontrrozviduvalni-zakhody-shchodo-kadyrivtsiv.html
[78] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-tak-zvanii-dnr-pryznachyly-vynnykh-v-zahybeli-chmobikiv-u-makiivtsi-a-takozh-posyliuiut-kontrrozviduvalni-zakhody-shchodo-kadyrivtsiv.html
[79] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-tak-zvanii-dnr-pryznachyly-vynnykh-v-zahybeli-chmobikiv-u-makiivtsi-a-takozh-posyliuiut-kontrrozviduvalni-zakhody-shchodo-kadyrivtsiv.html
[80] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-tak-zvanii-dnr-pryznachyly-vynnykh-v-zahybeli-chmobikiv-u-makiivtsi-a-takozh-posyliuiut-kontrrozviduvalni-zakhody-shchodo-kadyrivtsiv.html
understandingwar.org
3. Western Aid to Ukraine Is Still Not Enough
Excerpts:
Should Western leaders, through their passivity or reluctance, bring about a cease-fire that leaves Russia with Ukrainian territory under its control, they would disgrace themselves as much the French and British leaders did at Munich in 1938—and with less excuse. They will lay the grounds for future wars because, after some period of recuperation, Russia will surely try again. Already, Russia does not recognize the legitimacy of Ukrainian independence; already, blood is on Western hands because of a failure to arm Ukraine and deter Russia on previous occasions. Next time will be even worse.
If fear is the only thing some Western leaders understand, they should consider this. For other nations, the lesson of a Ukraine that is not allowed to win this war is very simple: get yourself nuclear weapons. Finns, Poles, Kazakhs, Ukrainians for that matter, and many others will conclude that conventional strength alone is not enough. That South Korea’s leadership has begun talking about the need to reintroduce nuclear weapons to the peninsula is not coincidental.
In a world where a large predatory state is stalled but not beaten decisively, the only resort for its smaller neighbors is to acquire weapons of cataclysmic power. Their leaders would be irresponsible if they did not consider that option. And the leaders of the major Western states are not just irresponsible but willfully negligent if they fail to take the measures—all well within their power—to avoid the world that this failure would bequeath to succeeding generations.
Western Aid to Ukraine Is Still Not Enough
Any result other than a victory for Kyiv will make the world a more dangerous place for all of us.
By Eliot A. Cohen
The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · January 17, 2023
Ukraine’s friends have poured a considerable amount of weaponry into the nation’s fight for survival. The United States alone has provided more than $25 billion of matériel, including 160 modern artillery pieces, 38 medium-range HIMARS rocket systems, hundreds of armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of advanced munitions of all types. Allies such as Poland and the Czech Republic have done even more (in relative, not absolute terms), supplying hundreds of Soviet-model tanks, an array of modern artillery systems, and all kinds of nonlethal support. Even hesitant Germany has sent a score of advanced guns and missile launchers, some antiaircraft systems, and more. In total, the West has sent more than 320 tanks, 2,400 other armored vehicles, 450 artillery pieces, and more than 135 air-defense systems to Ukraine, and more is on the way.
This is still not enough.
With the material aid from the West, as well as intelligence support and similarly discreet training and advising efforts, Ukraine has been able, by its own extraordinary efforts, to drive Russian forces from Kyiv in the north, Kharkiv in the east, and Kherson city in the south. To finish liberating its territory, however, and to decisively defeat Russia’s forces, Ukraine needs not only greater quantities but also different types of arms, including modern battle tanks, extensive air and antiballistic-missile defenses, and, above all, deep-attack systems such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles. With such weapons, Ukraine can and will repeat and expand the disruption of Russian logistics that enabled its earlier counteroffensives.
Anne Applebaum: Germany is arguing with itself over Ukraine
Russia has been badly bloodied. Of its prewar army, perhaps a quarter of its troops were killed or wounded in its initial attacks on Ukraine. A hastily mobilized force of men swept up in a press-ganging effort is also suffering casualties at a horrific rate. But the losses have not yet broken the Russian army or the determination of the Putin regime in Moscow. Indeed, Ukrainian sources report that a new mobilization is being prepared with the aim of more than doubling the size of the Russian military to a total force of as many as 2 million personnel.
The Russian military is, by Western standards, poorly motivated, poorly trained, badly led, and inadequately supported. Its units have to be kept at the front by the fear of blocking units that will gun down soldiers fleeing the battlefield. Its maintenance practices are primitive, its rations outdated, its command unable to coordinate the combined-arms operations of modern war. But Russia retains three large advantages.
The first is, simply, size. With a population of 146 million, it still has plenty of bodies it can throw into the fight against Ukraine, a country of 43 million people, perhaps a third of whom have become refugees or have been internally displaced. Russia also retains vast stocks of military matériel accumulated during the Cold War—even if those have now been depleted. These are dwindling strengths, as skilled young men flee the country and sanctions retard and disrupt the war economy, but for now they matter.
Russia’s other advantages are less tangible. One of these is sheer ruthlessness. President Vladimir Putin and his generals simply do not care, from a human point of view, how many tens or even hundreds of thousands of their soldiers are killed or mutilated in war. They equally have no compunction about inflicting mayhem on Ukrainian civilians in apartment blocks, schools, or hospitals. They will feed soldiers and civilians alike into the furnace of war until such behavior threatens their own survival.
Russia has, in addition, the benefits of a homeland sanctuary. Ukraine has managed a few daring strikes into Russian territory, but it has not yet been able to inflict militarily significant damage there, much less to ruin the Russian economy.
Against these strengths, Ukraine has many and indeed more of its own. This war has reminded us of the transcendent importance of motivation. Ukrainians know what they are fighting for, and they will go on to the end. They have a growing edge in skill over their enemy, and all the creativity of a free society and an engaged civilian population that supports the front in many ways; this includes creating improvised drone squadrons and articles of war, and supplying food and tactical information to frontline units.
Wars are, in some measure, tests of a society’s will and resilience, and this one has shown just how different Russia and Ukraine are. Wars are also a test of vitality. Putin is 70; Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is 44. Russia’s chief of the general staff (and now overall commander in Ukraine), Valery Gerasimov, is 67; Ukraine’s chief of staff, Valeriy Zaluzhny, is 49. Support for Russia’s war is strongest among those who remember the Soviet Union, and the war is being conducted by the aging men in Putin’s inner circle.
In contrast, support for Ukraine’s war is across the board, and the war is being led by a generation in its prime, no more than middle-aged. This is, in many ways, a war between a calcified society lost in its brutal past and a free society looking toward a decent future.
Behind Ukraine lie the powers of the West, understood in the old-fashioned sense of a free coalition of states led by the United States. Despite understandable fretting about the slowness of its military-industrial mobilization, the Western allies have enormous and growing capacity, and they have—too slowly, and at times even stingily—provided Ukraine with battlefield technology that outmatches that deployed by Russia. Over time, that disparity will grow, if the Western commitment matches even a fraction of that of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers.
“War weariness” in Western democracies is a tired trope. We in the West are sacrificing nothing beyond modest financial resources—no comparison to the blood tax paid by the people of Ukraine. As a number of analysts have noted, spending some tens of billions of dollars to shatter the land and air forces of one of our chief opponents, Russia, is a bargain. Spending some tens of billions of dollars more, for as long as it takes, is no less worth it.
Eliot A. Cohen: Cut the baloney realism
Ukraine’s most urgent needs are, as Kyiv has made clear, air and ballistic-missile defenses, heavy tanks, and long-range strike systems. It has received some of the defense systems, but not yet the armor and offensive weapons. The excuses that Germany, in the first case, and the United States, in the latter case, have made for not freeing up the supply of Leopard tanks and systems such as ATACMS are at once flimsy and shameful.
Ukrainians have repeatedly shown themselves able to master complex military technology with astonishing speed. An honest audit of how long Western experts expected Ukrainians would need to learn how to operate them, and how long it actually took them, would be revealing and embarrassing. Similarly, Ukraine has shown remarkable restraint: The idea that long-range missile systems would be used to strike indiscriminately into Russia has no credible support. And fears of Russian escalation to the use of nuclear weapons have been discredited repeatedly, including in The Atlantic.
The real reasons for reluctance look to be timidity and a lack of imagination. So perhaps the best thing for Western leaders who cannot bring themselves to treat war as war is to clarify for them what they have to fear if they do not take the actions that both strategic calculations and moral imperatives demand.
Because Russia is big, ruthless, and counting on the sanctuary of its territory, the war can be concluded on reasonable terms only by the decisive defeat of its forces in Ukraine—their elimination by flight, capture, wounds, or death. Some 100,000 casualties have not been enough, but Russia’s will and resources are not infinite. If Moscow’s losses have to be several times that, the West has the ability to ensure such an outcome with little risk to itself. If Ukraine has heavy armor and long-range strike systems, the Russian position in occupied land can be rendered untenable. A defeat of that magnitude will likely bring about the internal changes that will deter Russia from pursuing its present path.
Should Western leaders, through their passivity or reluctance, bring about a cease-fire that leaves Russia with Ukrainian territory under its control, they would disgrace themselves as much the French and British leaders did at Munich in 1938—and with less excuse. They will lay the grounds for future wars because, after some period of recuperation, Russia will surely try again. Already, Russia does not recognize the legitimacy of Ukrainian independence; already, blood is on Western hands because of a failure to arm Ukraine and deter Russia on previous occasions. Next time will be even worse.
If fear is the only thing some Western leaders understand, they should consider this. For other nations, the lesson of a Ukraine that is not allowed to win this war is very simple: get yourself nuclear weapons. Finns, Poles, Kazakhs, Ukrainians for that matter, and many others will conclude that conventional strength alone is not enough. That South Korea’s leadership has begun talking about the need to reintroduce nuclear weapons to the peninsula is not coincidental.
In a world where a large predatory state is stalled but not beaten decisively, the only resort for its smaller neighbors is to acquire weapons of cataclysmic power. Their leaders would be irresponsible if they did not consider that option. And the leaders of the major Western states are not just irresponsible but willfully negligent if they fail to take the measures—all well within their power—to avoid the world that this failure would bequeath to succeeding generations.
The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · January 17, 2023
4. SOCOM Soliciting Info on Planned Revamp of Data Management, C2I Software Infrastructure
More things and stuff. All this is good but it takes a well educated force to exploit all these tools. Humans are more important than hardware. (A possible corollary is that the software in the human brain is more important than the software in the machine.)
SOCOM Soliciting Info on Planned Revamp of Data Management, C2I Software Infrastructure - ExecutiveBiz
blog.executivebiz.com · by Jamie Bennet · January 13, 2023
by January 13, 2023, 11:43 am
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_States_Special_Operations_Command_Insignia.svg
The U.S. Special Operations Command issued a request for information from companies that can provide guidance on software and technologies that can improve its information technology platform for data management, intelligence, mission planning, command and control systems.
In a notice posted on SAM.gov, USSOCOM said it is looking for a platform that can integrate its separate systems used in mission data storage as well in intelligence, planning and execution.
The service branch is seeking a system with an existing Authority to Operate from DOD or USSOCOM, which can provide a data integration layer for unclassified, secret, and top secret networks. The technology must be able to function in intermittent, limited or distributed bandwidth availability.
Other requirements include artificial intelligence capabilities, superior kinetic strike coordination capability, and on-premises as well as cloud-based accessibility.
RFI responses are due by Feb. 9, three months before the tentative period of performance starting May 1.
Defense DepartmentDODenterprise data managementGovconRFIUSSOCOM
blog.executivebiz.com · by Jamie Bennet · January 13, 2023
5. TSA finds undeclared 84 mm caliber weapon in checked luggage at Texas airport
Who forgot that their Carl Gustaf was in their checked baggage?
But it was only this:
The owner advised the item is a de-militarized 84MM Carl-Gustaf M4 recoilless rifle that was to be used as exhibit/demo item at the SHOT show currently happening in Las Vegas, Nevada.
TSA finds undeclared 84 mm caliber weapon in checked luggage at Texas airport
msn.com · by Pilar Arias 12 hrs ago
Transportation Security Administration officers at an airport in Texas found an undeclared, 84 mm caliber weapon in outbound checked luggage Monday, according to an agency tweet.
"We don't see that caliber of weapon very often, thank god," TSA spokesperson Patricia Mancha told San Antonio TV station KENS 5. She added the case has been handed over to the San Antonio Police Department.
The owner of the luggage was located, identified and escorted to an office, an SAPD spokesman told Fox News Digital.
The owner advised the item is a de-militarized 84MM Carl-Gustaf M4 recoilless rifle that was to be used as exhibit/demo item at the SHOT show currently happening in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The owner identified the steps taken to "demilitarize" the prop and produced company paperwork to that effect.
A TSA Explosives Specialist also confirmed item was no longer able to be used; however, a TSA supervisor declared item would not be allowed onboard aircraft.
The unidentified party cooperated with police, and a family member retrieved the prop. The man rebooked his departing flight.
At this time, no charges are pending in the case, but the incident at the San Antonio International Airport is being used to remind travelers how to transport firearms and ammunition.
Firearm owners may transport unloaded firearms in a locked, hard-sided container as checked baggage only, according to the TSA website. They must declare the firearm and/or ammunition to the airline when checking their bag at the ticket counter. The container must completely secure the firearm from being accessed. Locked cases that can be easily opened are not permitted.
© Provided by FOX News
msn.com · by Pilar Arias 12 hrs ago
6. Ukraine interior minister, others killed in helicopter crash
Ukraine interior minister, others killed in helicopter crash
AP · by MALAK HARB · January 18, 2023
BROVARY, Ukraine (AP) — Ukraine’s interior minister died Wednesday in a helicopter crash near the capital that killed at least another 14 people, including other officials and three children, authorities said.
Interior Minister Denys Monastyrskyi, who oversaw Ukraine’s police and emergency services, is the most senior official to die since Russia invaded nearly 11 months ago. His death, along with two others from his ministry, was the second calamity in four days to clobber Ukraine, after a Russian missile strike on an apartment building killed dozens of civilians.
There was no immediate word on whether the crash, which was near a kindergarten, was an accident or related to the war. No fighting has been reported recently in the Kyiv area.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the crash was “a terrible tragedy” on a “black morning.”
“The pain is unspeakable,” he wrote on Telegram.
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British Home Secretary Suella Braverman called Monastyrskyi “a leading light in supporting the Ukrainian people during Putin’s illegal invasion.” She said she was “struck by his determination, optimism and patriotism.”
Monastyrskyi’s deputy Yevhen Yenin and State Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yurii Lubkovych were also among those killed, according to the chief of Ukraine’s National Police. Senior officials routinely travel by helicopter during the conflict.
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Nine of those killed were aboard the chopper when it crashed in Brovary, an eastern suburb of the Ukrainian capital, Ihor Klymenko said. The others who died were apparently on the ground.
Kyiv Regional Governor Oleksii Kuleba said 18 people overall were killed, including three children, and that 25 were injured. Ukraine’s Emergency Service, however, put the death toll at 15. It was not immediately possible to confirm if that was old information or a revised figure.
At the scene of the crash, at least four bodies on the ground were covered by reflective sheets as officials cleared helicopter debris from a kindergarten playground. Wreckage also sat on top of a charred vehicle and a building.
“It is too early to talk about the reasons,” for the crash, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Air Forces, Yurii Ihnat, told a television channel. He said an investigation could take some time.
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The helicopter was a Super Puma supplied by France, he added.
The Security Service of Ukraine is conducting an investigation, prosecutor general Andriy Kostin said. “For now, we are considering all possible versions of the helicopter crash accident,” he said on Telegram.
The crash comes at a particularly dark period in the war for Ukraine, just days after the Russian strike on the apartment building in southeastern Ukraine killed 45 people, including six children — the deadliest attack on civilians since the spring.
“Another very sad day today — new losses,” said Ukraine’s first lady, Olena Zelenska, dabbing teary eyes and pinching her nose as she responded to the news while at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
The forum held 15 seconds of silence after opening the session to honor the Ukrainian officials killed.
“Haven’t had time to recover from one tragedy, there is already another one,” said the deputy head of the Ukrainian presidential office Kyrylo Tymoshenko.
___
Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by MALAK HARB · January 18, 2023
7. Kissinger Sheds Resistance to Ukraine Joining NATO
Excerpt:
“The idea of a neutral Ukraine under these conditions is no longer meaningful,” Kissinger, 99, told the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland on Tuesday. Kissinger, long an opponent of Ukraine’s membership of the organization, has softened his stance on the issue in recent months.
Also comments on Taiwan as well.
Kissinger Sheds Resistance to Ukraine Joining NATO
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-17/kissinger-reverses-sheds-resistance-to-ukraine-joining-nato?leadSource=uverify%20wall&sref=hhjZtX76
ByPeter Martin
January 17, 2023 at 1:11 PM EST
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said Ukraine joining NATO could be an “appropriate outcome” of Russia’s invasion, while reiterating his call for a negotiated solution to the conflict.
“The idea of a neutral Ukraine under these conditions is no longer meaningful,” Kissinger, 99, told the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland on Tuesday. Kissinger, long an opponent of Ukraine’s membership of the organization, has softened his stance on the issue in recent months.
Kissinger, a former secretary of state and national security adviser, said he believes in maintaining dialog with Russia while the war continues, with a view toward ending fighting if Ukraine is able to recapture territory that President Vladimir Putin’s forces seized after the Feb. 24 invasion. He warned against direct conflict between the west and Russia and stressed the importance of allowing Russia to rejoin the international system.
Kissinger said that limited and concrete steps from both the US and China are necessary to improve ties between the world’s two largest economies. Longer term, he said Washington and Beijing should weigh the risks of conflict between two nuclear-armed states that are also developing artificial-intelligence capabilities.
“Each side needs to consider for itself how the threat to human survival of the destructiveness of weapons, coupled with making them almost conscious in their application, can be dealt with,” Kissinger said.
The US and China have taken tentative steps to improve relations after years of deteriorating ties. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen will hold her first face-to-face meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He on Jan. 18 in Zurich, and plans are underway for Secretary of State Antony Blinken to visit China in early 2023.
On Taiwan, Kissinger said that both sides should avoid actions that suggest an “imminent showdown” and cool threatening language to create conditions for dialog.
8. As 2 of the ‘MARSOC 3’ go on trial for homicide, the 3rd gets immunity
As 2 of the ‘MARSOC 3’ go on trial for homicide, the 3rd gets immunity
marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · January 17, 2023
The trial of two Marine Raiders for a high-profile homicide case started Tuesday with a Navy corpsman, also charged in that case, receiving immunity that will let him testify freely and could make it harder for him to be prosecuted.
Gunnery Sgts. Daniel Draher and Joshua Negron are being tried at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, on charges that include involuntary manslaughter.
On the first day of the trial, the convening authority granted a third defendant, Hospital Corpsman Chief Petty Officer Eric Gilmet, immunity to testify, according to Gilmet’s civilian attorney, Colby Vokey. That means that any military prosecutors that bring Gilmet to trial in the future will have to ensure they derive all of their evidence independently of his testimony in this trial.
In practice, the immunity will make it harder for Gilmet to be prosecuted, according to Vokey.
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Two Marine Raiders and corpsman face manslaughter charges in retired Green Beret master sergeant’s death
The charges stem from an alleged fight outside of a nightclub in the early morning hours of New Year's Day 2019.
Draher, Negron and Gilmet — now known colloquially as “the MARSOC 3″ — were celebrating New Year’s 2019 at an off-base nightclub in Irbil, Iraq, while deployed with Marine Special Operations Command.
According to security footage and later statements to law enforcement, retired Army Master Sgt. Rich Rodriguez, who was deployed as a defense contractor, approached the trio and accused them of showing insufficient respect for his rank and former Green Beret status.
The argument ceased, but Rodriguez later confronted Draher outside the club. The short fight that ensued left Rodriguez unconscious.
The trio took the contractor back to the base, and Gilmet, a corpsman, monitored him through the night. When Rodriguez stopped breathing, Gilmet took him to a hospital, but the Army veteran died days later.
Nearly a year later, in December 2019, the men were charged on counts that included involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, obstructing justice and orders violations. Their trials before a general court-martial were delayed because of concerns that a senior lawyer for the Corps had engaged in unlawful command influence by allegedly threatening one of Gilmet’s lawyers.
A military appeals court in August 2022 reinstated the charges against Gilmet after a lower court had previously dismissed them. A Marine judge in September 2022 denied requests by Draher and Negron to dismiss the charges against them.
Gilmet isn’t being tried in January; he has asked the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to take up his request to dismiss the charges against him, Vokey told Marine Corps Times. The court has not yet released its decision.
About Irene Loewenson
Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.
9. The Sanctions on Russia Are Working
Excerpts:
All of this is not to say that Putin’s government is on the verge of collapse. Putin destroyed the organized political opposition after he imprisoned the leading dissident, Alexei Navalny, and sent most of Russia’s other most prominent opposition figures to jail or into exile. He has successfully intimidated the Russian population by introducing tough prison terms for those protesting his leadership: Russians face up to 15 years in jail for “political extremism” or “discrediting Russia's armed forces.”
But public opinion is trending against Putin. As the dissolution of the Soviet Union demonstrates, once long-suppressed public discontent breaks out into the open, change can happen fast. This is why policymakers must give sanctions time to work. Expecting immediate results is unrealistic and even counterproductive. Given time, sanctions may well deter Russia's aggressive behavior. Western policymakers must conduct a detailed analysis of the impact of sanctions instead of accepting a narrow set of manipulated indicators. And, above all, they must be patient.
The Sanctions on Russia Are Working
Slowly But Surely, They Are Weakening Putin
January 18, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Vladimir Milov · January 18, 2023
There is a widespread belief that Western sanctions on Russia have fallen flat. Proponents of this theory point to macroeconomic indicators suggesting that the Russian economy has proved resilient. Critics also highlight how sanctions haven’t had their desired effect: after all, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not moved to end his disastrous war against Ukraine.
These arguments, however, are misguided. It is important to note that Russia had the opportunity to cushion its economy against Western sanctions before Putin declared war. For starters, Russia accumulated substantial financial reserves. Since 2014, Russia has increased trade to Asia, which has allowed it to weather a reduction of commerce with the West. Most important, Putin aggressively strengthened his repressive machine to deter mass protests against deteriorating living standards. For all those reasons, expectations that Western sanctions would cause the Russian economy—and Putin’s regime—to quickly disintegrate were unrealistic.
Putin has invested significant resources in a disinformation campaign aimed at misleading Western policymakers about the real effects of sanctions. But make no mistake: they are, in fact, hobbling the Russian economy. And propagating the myth that they are not effective could nudge policymakers to drop them, giving Putin a lifeline.
BAD DATA
The assertion that the Russian economy has shown remarkable resilience to sanctions hinges on misleading macroeconomic indicators. Specifically, critics of sanctions point to the strengthened ruble, the modest contraction of Russian GDP, and low unemployment. But these figures do not in fact reflect the situation on the ground.
Take unemployment. Official unemployment currently stands at 3.7 percent, with only 2.7 million Russians unemployed. That's a record low. The reality, however, is that at the end of the third quarter of 2022, almost five million Russian workers were subject to various forms of hidden unemployment. Most notably, 70 percent of them were on unpaid leave. If the difference between being on unpaid leave and being unemployed seems semantic, that’s because it is. In fact, 10 percent of the Russian workforce is without work. This is comparable with the worst levels in the 1990s, during the second half of which 10 to 13 percent of Russians were unemployed.
Another misleading statistic is the ruble exchange rate. True, the ruble has strengthened, but only because the government has made it difficult for Russian businesses and individuals to withdraw money and convert it to foreign currency. The so-called strong ruble is propped up by draconian currency controls and a plunge in imports. This policy has badly hurt industries like the steelmaking sector: finished steel output contracted by over seven percent in 2022.
Policymakers criticizing sanctions point to the Russian Finance Ministry’s projection that the country’s GDP will contract by 2.7 percent, which would seem to undermine the contention that the economy is tanking. Note, however, that this GDP figure includes surging military-related production. A newly produced battle tank immediately sent to front and shot by a Ukrainian Javelin missile still counts as a nominal contribution to Russian GDP.
Make no mistake: sanctions are, in fact, hobbling the Russian economy.
In any case, other indicators show a far more serious economic contraction than the official GDP figures suggest. Arguably the most revealing indicator of Russian economic activity is revenue from sources other than oil and gas exports, and that figure was down by 20 percent in October 2022 from a year earlier. Manufacturing industries, the part of the Russian economy most dependent on Western technologies and component parts, were hit the hardest by sanctions. The output of the Russian automotive industry, which directly or indirectly provides jobs to 3.5 million people, plummeted by two-thirds in 2022.
Russian figures showing manageable levels of inflation are also misleading. Even the Russian central bank currently reports that observed inflation—that is, how the public views the increase in prices, as reported in surveys—to be 16 percent, or over four percentage points higher than the official statistic, which is a little less than 12 percent. The gap between the official figures and people’s lived experience is understandable because Russians’ living standards are sharply deteriorating. According to a poll released by the private Russian research company Romir in October 2022, 68 percent of Russians had noticed a reduction in the supply of goods offered in stores over the past three months. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 35 percent of Russians were forced to cut their spending on food in 2022. The Public Opinion Foundation, a Russian polling organization, reported in December 2022 that only 23 percent of Russians considered their personal financial situation to be “good.”
IT’S NOT GETTING BETTER
In sum, sanctions are having a profound effect on the Russian economy. Putin’s attempts to improve his country’s financial prospects include import substitution, or favoring the development of domestic industries and reducing reliance on manufactured imports; redirecting trade and investment flows to Asia; and sourcing semiconductors and other goods from countries such as Turkey to circumvent Western sanctions. None of these approaches will solve Russia's problems.
Import substitution is not working for obvious reasons. Handing over market share to companies that depend on a highly monopolistic environment invariably leads to inferior goods at higher prices. It does not stimulate innovation or encourage the manufacturing of better products.
Asian countries such as China and India are mostly interested in buying cheap Russian raw materials such as oil, gas, coal, and roundwood at a significant discount. Leaders in those countries are not interested in helping Russia develop its own competitive manufacturing sectors.
Russia was somewhat successful in circumventing sanctions by importing vital Western-produced goods such as parts for manufacturing through third countries, primarily Turkey: by the third quarter of 2022, Russian imports from that country had surged to over $1 billion a month, roughly double the figure from the same quarter the previous year. But Western governments may use diplomatic pressure to close these loopholes. And Putin cannot count on foreign investment to shore up the Russian economy. Capital flight from Russia in 2022 is projected to equal $251 billion, according to the Russian central bank.
All of this is not to say that Putin’s government is on the verge of collapse. Putin destroyed the organized political opposition after he imprisoned the leading dissident, Alexei Navalny, and sent most of Russia’s other most prominent opposition figures to jail or into exile. He has successfully intimidated the Russian population by introducing tough prison terms for those protesting his leadership: Russians face up to 15 years in jail for “political extremism” or “discrediting Russia's armed forces.”
But public opinion is trending against Putin. As the dissolution of the Soviet Union demonstrates, once long-suppressed public discontent breaks out into the open, change can happen fast. This is why policymakers must give sanctions time to work. Expecting immediate results is unrealistic and even counterproductive. Given time, sanctions may well deter Russia's aggressive behavior. Western policymakers must conduct a detailed analysis of the impact of sanctions instead of accepting a narrow set of manipulated indicators. And, above all, they must be patient.
- VLADIMIR MILOV is Vice President for International Advocacy at the Free Russia Foundation and former Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia.
- MORE BY VLADIMIR MILOV
Foreign Affairs · by Vladimir Milov · January 18, 2023
10. Russia’s Crime and Punishment
Excerpts:
The war in Ukraine began as the greatest threat to the international legal order, but it may turn out to be its salvation. When Russia, a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council possessing the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, invaded Ukraine in a blatant violation of the UN Charter, many began writing the obituary of the international legal order. Pundits mused that China’s invasion of Taiwan might be next.
Ukraine responded by waking dormant institutions of international law and, in the process, reviving global resolve to enforce the prohibition on war. Again and again, states have stood up to denounce the Russian invasion and the assault on the legal order that it represents. Now the task is to create a genuinely international judicial institution with the power to label Putin’s war not just wrong but also criminal. Only once that is built can the world provide justice to all those who have died and suffered in the war—and reaffirm the prohibition against war as an inviolable rule of the international order.
Russia’s Crime and Punishment
How to Prosecute the Illegal War in Ukraine
January 17, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Oona A. Hathaway · January 17, 2023
As the conflict in Ukraine is about to enter its second year, Ukraine and the West are accelerating efforts to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn’t get away with his illegal war. That has meant the West supplying weapons that were previously off the table, but it has also meant renewed attention to accountability. In November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made clear that justice is a key condition for peace. “This,” he explained, “is what stokes the greatest emotions.” But while there are courts where Russians can be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, a major piece is missing: there is nowhere to try Putin and other top Russian leaders for launching the war in the first place. For this, a special tribunal for the crime of aggression is needed.
For months, Ukrainian representatives have been quietly working to generate support for a special tribunal. The proposal picked up steam in mid-December, when the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, endorsed the creation of a tribunal and pledged to “start working with the international community to get the broadest international support possible for this specialized court.” In mid-December, while accepting the European Union’s top human rights award, Zelensky called on states to form a special tribunal to prosecute “the crime of Russian aggression.” At the same time, a Ukrainian delegation, hoping to capitalize on the momentum, arrived in Washington, D.C., seeking U.S. support for a special tribunal.
The effort to establish a special tribunal may seem quixotic. After all, plenty of criminal investigations into crimes committed by Russians during the war are already underway in both domestic and international courts. Why add another court to the mix? But without a special tribunal for the crime of aggression, the fundamental crime of launching and waging this illegal war—a crime without which the other crimes would not have taken place—would go entirely unpunished. Creating a court that has jurisdiction to try this crime is an essential step in the global effort to reject Russia’s blatantly illegal war and, with it, Putin’s willingness to destroy the modern international legal order in pursuit of a new Russian empire.
WHEN IS A WAR A CRIME?
When legal scholars speak of the crime of aggression, they mean the crime of waging an illegal war. Since the end of World War II, that has meant a war that violates the United Nations Charter, which prohibits states from using force against any other state unless they are acting in self-defense or have been authorized to use force by the UN Security Council. For much of history, however, there was no such thing as a crime of aggression, because aggressive wars were perfectly legal. Indeed, military conflict was an accepted method of settling international disputes. States could go to war for any number of reasons, including to collect debts, to enforce treaties, and to protect trade routes. That changed only in 1928, when nearly every country in the world joined the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which for the first time outlawed war, prohibiting states from using war “as an instrument of national policy.”
The first court with jurisdiction to try this new crime was the International Military Tribunal established at Nuremberg, Germany, after World War II. There, 24 Nazi leaders faced trial for crimes committed during the war, including the “crime against peace,” as it was then called. Prosecutors—including Robert Jackson, who took a leave of absence from his position as a U.S. Supreme Court justice to serve as a prosecutor in Nuremberg—filed an indictment, the first count of which charged defendants with participating in a conspiracy to commit acts of aggression, noting that the “invasions had been specifically planned in advance, in violation of the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.” The second count charged defendants who “participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression.” (Similar charges were made in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, which tried Japanese leaders for starting and waging war.)
The Nuremberg court found eight defendants guilty of the first count and 12 guilty of the second. In its judgment, it explained the foundational importance of the crime: “To initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”
The only other international court with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is the International Criminal Court (ICC), created in 2002. The treaty that established the court, the Rome Statute, granted the court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. But the crime could not be prosecuted until a conference of the states that had ratified the treaty could agree on the definition of the crime. That task was only completed in 2010, when the conference of states parties met in Kampala, Uganda, to amend the statute to fill in the missing pieces. The drafters limited criminal liability to “manifest” violations of the UN Charter by any person engaged in “planning, preparation, initiation or execution” who was “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.” This meant that only those most responsible for the war, and not ordinary soldiers, could be prosecuted (though only after the amendments became effective, in 2018). In a concession to the United States, which participated as an observer, the conference also agreed to limit the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction over the crime to wars of aggression committed by states that had ratified the Rome Statute as well as the new amendments. The United States signed but never ratified the treaty; thus, no citizen of the United States can be charged for the crime of aggression in the ICC.
TURF WAR
No citizen of Russia can be charged for the crime of aggression, either. Like the United States, Russia signed but never ratified the Rome Statute. Belarus, too, never ratified the treaty, and it therefore cannot be held to account by the court for its complicity in the illegal war, including by allowing Belarusian territory to be used in service of Russia’s war.
Although the ICC does not have the power to prosecute the crime of aggression committed by Russian or Belarusian citizens, the ICC does have the power to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Ukraine. That’s because countries gave the court broader jurisdiction over these crimes, allowing it to prosecute the nationals of nonmember states if the crime is alleged to have been committed on the territory of a state that has agreed to the jurisdiction of the court. This is why the United States could be investigated by the court for alleged crimes, including torture, committed by its forces in Afghanistan. While the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, Afghanistan is, meaning that crimes committed on its soil can be investigated by the court. In Ukraine, the court has had this same authority since 2014, when Ukraine first submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. (It extended that submission indefinitely in 2015.) Indeed, Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, has opened investigations into those atrocity crimes. Khan himself has traveled to Ukraine several times, including an April visit to the town of Bucha, where he saw mass graves and listened to survivors’ accounts of the Russian occupation.
But Khan is unable to lead the way on the crime of aggression in Ukraine because of the restrictions placed on the ICC in Kampala. This is a difficult truth for Khan. In December, at an annual gathering of the states that are party to the Rome Statute in The Hague, he tried to throw cold water on the proposal to create a special tribunal to try the crime of aggression. “The EU has misstated the law,” he declared, in an apparent effort to push back against von der Leyen’s statement the week before in support of a special tribunal. “We should avoid fragmentation, and instead work on consolidation,” he urged.
Khan’s statement, which was made the day before the Ukrainian delegation met with members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, took some of the air out of the campaign to create a court. It left some U.S. policymakers thinking that if the most public face of the international criminal investigations in Ukraine opposes a tribunal, then maybe it isn’t such a good idea after all.
But Khan’s position may be motivated more by a desire to keep the limelight on himself than by principled objection. He is likely also concerned that more funding for a special tribunal will mean less funding for the ICC, which is chronically underfunded as it is. Unfortunately, “consolidating” these charges—bringing them all under the ICC’s umbrella—is not an option, at least not for the war in Ukraine. Although the war has renewed interest in amending the Rome Statute so that the crime of aggression can also be prosecuted against states that commit the crimes on the territory of a state that has accepted the court’s jurisdiction (as is true for the other crimes), such an amendment would likely take years to enact. The best way forward is therefore a two-track approach: a special tribunal for the crimes of aggression in Ukraine and an amendment to the Rome Statute to expand the court’s jurisdiction so that a special court will not be necessary in the future.
THE POLITICS OF THE COURT
Despite Khan’s objections, support for the idea of a special tribunal to try the crime of aggression is growing. But how it should be done remains an open debate.
The first widely circulated proposal, put forward by former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and several other heads of state and legal experts, called for a special tribunal modeled on Nuremberg. But that approach has drawn criticism; some argue that a tribunal created by a few Western states would not have the legitimacy of one created under the auspices of an international organization. And what would stop, say, Russia, Belarus, and Syria from creating a competing “international court” of their own?
Alternative plans have emerged one after another. There was a proposal to establish a hybrid tribunal under the auspices of the Council of Europe that would be called the Extraordinary Ukrainian Chamber for Aggression. But the proposal would have required unanimity among members of the Council of Europe, and it never picked up steam. What about simply leaving it to the Ukrainian courts? Ukrainian domestic law, after all, criminalizes “Planning, preparation and waging of an aggressive war.” But domestic courts are obligated to recognize the immunity of foreign heads of state, heads of government, and the foreign minister, which would mean that Putin and his foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, would be out of the Ukrainian courts’ reach. (The same would likely be true of the proposed hybrid tribunal.) Russian generals could not take advantage of personal immunity, which applies only to those at the very highest level of government, but they would likely seek to claim functional immunity if prosecuted in Ukrainian courts, arguing that they cannot be held criminally responsible in a foreign domestic court for performing official acts. Those same immunities would not apply in an international court acting on behalf of the international community.
The proposal with the most widespread support at present (and the one I have advocated) is a court created through the UN. This would require agreement between Ukraine and the UN, after a vote of the General Assembly recommending its creation. This would be fitting: after all, the court would be created precisely to enforce and reaffirm the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. And creating the court through a vote in the General Assembly would give every country in the world a chance to reject Putin’s illegal war and endow the special tribunal with powerful international legitimacy.
For much of history, aggressive wars were perfectly legal.
But there are drawbacks. While over 140 members of the General Assembly voted for both resolutions condemning the war, it’s far from clear that a resolution to create a court would garner nearly as much support. Some worry that African states, in particular, would object. Although only four countries joined Russia in voting against the earlier resolutions, there were many more abstentions, a large proportion from African states, some of which are reliant on trade with Russia and others of which are simply uninterested in getting in the middle of what they see as a great-power conflict. Others share Khan’s concern that funding for a special court would mean that the ICC’s ongoing cases in African states would continue to be starved for resources.
Scholars and diplomats have pointed out the double standard they see in calls to create a special court to try to crime of aggression by Russia when no mention has been made of holding U.S. or British leaders to account for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which violated the UN Charter by launching a war without clear Security Council authorization. (The United States argued that the Security Council had authorized military intervention when it gave Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,” but few agreed. ) That war set off a cascade of cataclysmic events and contributed to the rise of the Islamic State (or ISIS) and the Syrian refugee crisis.
Yet failure in the past need not dictate failure in the future. All states have a great deal at stake in the Ukraine conflict. The war has disrupted grain exports from Ukraine, raising food and fuel prices around the world and contributing to placing 49 million people in 49 countries on the edge of famine. And it has upended energy markets around the globe. All states benefit from an effective global prohibition on wars of aggression and territorial conquest. A court created exclusively by European states, rather than through the UN, risks sending the message that the crime of aggression will be enforced only in Europe. The message should instead be that the entire world has been wronged by this war, and the entire world deserves to play a role in punishing the crimes committed in the initiation, planning, and prosecution of it.
The Biden administration has thus far been silent on the proposal to create a special tribunal. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack attended the ICC convention in The Hague in December and has repeatedly voiced support for that court, a welcome reversal of the position taken by the Trump administration, which placed economic sanctions, usually reserved for international law offenders, on the court’s personnel. Given concerns about double standards, the United States can probably help the case for a special tribunal most by quietly supporting the effort but letting others take the lead. In the meantime, it could assist in evidence collection and preservation of all four Rome Statute crimes—an overwhelming task important to both the ICC and a future special tribunal.
THE ACCUMULATED EVIL OF THE WHOLE
The fight to establish the special tribunal centers around not how the war is waged but that the war is waged at all. This is why simply prosecuting the crimes already before the ICC is not enough. A war crime is a serious violation of the rules that regulate the conduct of belligerents during a war, commonly referred to as the law of armed conflict. For example, the law of armed conflict requires that belligerent states target only objects with a military purpose, not civilians or civilian objects. It is not a war crime for Russian soldiers to kill Ukrainian soldiers in combat. It is not a war crime for Russian missiles to destroy a Ukrainian military base. It is not a war crime for Russia to try (and try and try) to kill Zelensky. And while civilians cannot be targeted, it is not a war crime to kill them as long as their deaths are proportionate to the military purpose—then they are mere (legal) collateral damage. Yet all this death and destruction is a direct result of Russia’s decision to launch an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
Even if the Russian leaders can be directly connected to individual war crimes, crimes of humanity, or acts of genocide and therefore be prosecuted by the ICC—far from certain, given the high evidentiary standards that must be met to connect them to particular events on the ground—prosecuting them only for these crimes would let the Russian and Belarusian leadership off the hook for many of the worst injustices that they have committed in this war. It would leave the Ukrainian soldiers who have died in combat, the vast majority of whom were civilians before the war, without justice. It would leave the Russian soldiers, many of them plucked from impoverished ethnic minority communities and sent to their deaths with little gear or training, without justice. It would leave those who have lost their homes and had to flee for their lives without justice. And it would leave civilians who were not directly targeted but who were “collateral damage” in Russia’s pursuit of targets with military purpose without justice.
Putin has no legal basis to wage this war, and the justifications that he points to are meritless. When he launched what he insisted on calling a “special military operation,” he made a variety of claims, including outrageous (and baseless) assertions of genocide by Ukraine. In a speech made on the eve of the war, Putin made equally baseless claims that he was acting in individual self-defense of Russia and collective self-defense of parts of eastern Ukraine that Russia had recognized as independent and with which it had concluded mutual military assistance “treaties.”
Support for the idea of a special tribunal to try the crime of aggression is growing.
Zelensky and his team understood that to win the public support at home and abroad that Ukraine needs to win the war, they had to make clear that these claims were false. They needed to show that the war was not just an assault on Ukraine but also an assault on every country’s right to sovereignty. On the day the war began, Zelensky declared, “If you, dear European leaders, dear world leaders, leaders of the free world, do not help us today, then tomorrow the war will knock on your door.” Ukraine has survived longer than anyone predicted by rallying the world behind the vision that Ukraine is not fighting only for its own survival but for the survival of the rules-based international order.
The war in Ukraine began as the greatest threat to the international legal order, but it may turn out to be its salvation. When Russia, a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council possessing the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, invaded Ukraine in a blatant violation of the UN Charter, many began writing the obituary of the international legal order. Pundits mused that China’s invasion of Taiwan might be next.
Ukraine responded by waking dormant institutions of international law and, in the process, reviving global resolve to enforce the prohibition on war. Again and again, states have stood up to denounce the Russian invasion and the assault on the legal order that it represents. Now the task is to create a genuinely international judicial institution with the power to label Putin’s war not just wrong but also criminal. Only once that is built can the world provide justice to all those who have died and suffered in the war—and reaffirm the prohibition against war as an inviolable rule of the international order.
- OONA A. HATHAWAY is Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School.
- MORE BY OONA A. HATHAWAY
Foreign Affairs · by Oona A. Hathaway · January 17, 2023
11. Progressives Are Beating Populists Yet Again, But Don’t Celebrate
Excerpts:
The last time I wrote about this, my friend and former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers objected smartly that, had Republicans won the elections of 1916, 1940, 1948 and 1964, the US would have been no less likely to enter World War I, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. He is right about those counterfactuals. Charles Evans Hughes, Wendell Willkie, Thomas Dewey and Barry Goldwater — the defeated Republican candidates — were at least as belligerent as the Democrats they ran against. So this is not a partisan point.
Nevertheless, war is back, and there is a real risk that it escalates and proliferates. The war in Ukraine isn’t about to end soon. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates are not the only ones worrying that time might after all be on Russia’s side. (The Ukrainians evidently think it’s on their side, which is why the war will keep going.)
A war in the Middle East is a growing risk as Iran gets closer to being a nuclear-armed power, and Israel and Saudi Arabia prepare to prevent that. Meanwhile, Taiwan is learning from Ukraine that it needs to become a military “porcupine” if it is to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping from invading or at least blockading the island. (If you don’t believe me, read the recent interview with Audrey Tang, Taiwan’s digital minister, about the need for Taiwan to have its own version of Elon Musk’s Starlink.)
Is something like an Asian NATO in the making? In the loose form of the so-called Quad and AUKUS, my Bloomberg Opinion colleague Hal Brands thinks so. Is a war between those allies and China over Taiwan conceivable? The latest war game by the Center for Strategic and International Studies offers the reassuring headline that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would “quickly founder.” But then you read on. The US and its allies would win only if Taiwan itself put up stiff (i.e. Ukrainian-style) resistance. Japanese air bases would be crucial, but also would be the targets of Chinese strikes. The US Navy would likely lose two aircraft carriers and from 10 to 20 large surface ships. All of this assumes that neither side resorts to nuclear weapons.
Populism hit a rock. Progressivism is on a roll. And not only in the US. But history has a warning for us. Those who believe in enlarging the power of the state in pursuit of their ideal of social justice often find themselves using that enlarged power for very different purposes from the ones they set out with.
Progressives Are Beating Populists Yet Again, But Don’t Celebrate
History shows that builders of big government have a bad habit of getting into big wars.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-15/progressives-beat-populists-again-but-don-t-celebrate-niall-ferguson?srnd=opinion&sref=hhjZtX76
ByNiall Ferguson
January 15, 2023 at 12:00 AM EST
Six years ago, populism was on a roll. It has since hit a rock. This should not have surprised anyone.
Back in 2017, I argued that populism had an inherently short half-life (though I wrongly thought it might be as brief as 12 months). The slogans devised by political strategists like Dominic Cummings in the UK and Steve Bannon in the US — “Take back control,” “Make America Great Again” and the rest — were politically potent, but their effect would be ephemeral.
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“At some point,” I wrote, “the political sugar rush of voting for the populist option was bound to wear off — or, in the language of nuclear physics, the polonium was bound to decay into lead. The only question was when.”
Well, it turned out to be longer than a year. However, contemplating recent events in Brasilia, as well as the decline of former President Donald Trump as a political force, the recent shambles over electing a speaker of the House of Representatives, and the waning of public support for Brexit, I find it hard not to conclude that populism is now the political equivalent of lead.
Populist governments were doomed to decay, I argued then, because they were never likely to deliver on their promises, especially to those predominantly white, non-college-educated, middle-aged voters to whom their slogans had been most appealing. In the case of Brexit, the economic arguments for taking the UK out of a single market and customs union with its principal trading partners were at no point persuasive. The costs of doing so have thus far clearly exceeded the benefits.
In the case of Trump, it was less clear-cut. There was much about his administration’s economic strategy — deregulation, cutting taxes on businesses, reducing illegal immigration — that seemed likely to deliver higher wages to the American working class. (His tariffs not so much, but the easy money and deficit finance for sure.) And indeed, median household income rose by 9% in real terms between 2016 and 2019 — ending 17 years of stagnation — and the magic combination of full employment with no rise in inflation was achieved. But from the outset, it seemed unlikely that Trump himself had sufficient competence to be a two-term president. The Covid-19 pandemic confirmed such doubts.
The other part of my argument was that, as in the late 19th century, populism would swiftly be superseded by a brighter and shinier political alternative: progressivism. In Gilded Age America, the populists had campaigned — like Trump — on promises of tariffs, easy money and immigration restriction. But the perennial populist candidate, William Jennings Bryan, never won the presidency, unlike Trump. Far more attractive to a rapidly urbanizing America were the policies of progressives, who aimed to reduce poverty, inequality and depravity by expanding the role of government.
Muckraking progressive journalists — Upton Sinclair, Ida Tarbell — exposed industrial monopolies and corrupt political machines. Progressive remedies ranged from antitrust laws to new federal agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (founded in 1906) and the Federal Reserve (1913). Progressives were in favor of wider and more direct democracy (primaries, suffrage for women), greater power for trade unions, and more funding for schools and colleges.
Their fundamental conviction that government could provide the solutions to society’s ills was dominant from the 1900s until the 1970s, by which time the stagflationary downsides of rising spending, taxation and regulation could no longer be ignored.
Progressives had their eccentricities, or so they now seem. Many favored the prohibition of alcohol. Some were believers in eugenics. Few were committed to reducing the country’s deepest inequality, that between the white majority and the former slaves and their descendants. Yet the core ideas of the progressives remain almost as popular today as they were a century ago.
Unlike populist policies, progressive policies have a built-in tendency to increase their own constituency by creating an ever-expanding class of state employees with a vested interest in bigger government, as well as a vociferous horde of journalists and professors ideologically committed to the same cause.
Prohibition of alcohol is out these days (to be replaced perhaps by prohibition of meat), but the progressives have made a comeback. President Joe Biden’s administration is unmistakably a progressive government, enacting big-ticket legislation and gleefully unleashing the dogs of regulation, not to mention the hipsters of antitrust.
In one important respect, populism and progressivism overlap. “America First” is a century-old slogan, first used by the progressive President Woodrow Wilson before being appropriated by right-wing isolationists between the wars. Historically ignorant to an astounding extent, Trump picked up the phrase, seeing it as complementary to his own MAGA. But Biden has understood that he can just as easily say much the same words. “America First” is bi-political.
We see a similar pattern elsewhere. In Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was president from 2003 to 2010, is back in power. Lula, like Biden, is a grizzled old progressive. When last in power, he passed the Bolsa Familia initiative, which paid around $35 a month to poorer Brazilians who met certain conditions, such as sending their kids to school. His government drove up the minimum wage by 50% in real terms.
Sure, there was also rampant corruption, exposed by the “Car Wash” scandal, which landed Lula in jail with a 12-year sentence. But the Brazilian Supreme Court let Lula out in 2019, pending an appeal, and restored his political rights in 2021, in time for him to run against the Trump of the tropics, Jair Bolsonaro.
While the progressives are ascendant, the populists are reduced to bungled coups. People love to quote Karl Marx’s great line from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon that “all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice … the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” What would Marx have made of two consecutive farces, the first in Washington on Jan. 6, 2021, the second in Brasilia a week ago?
“Selma’s party is going to be off the charts,” one Bolsonaro supporter wrote. “Entry is free for all Brazilian patriots. It is going to be the greatest show of all time.” (The code word Festa da Selma was a play on selva, the battle cry of the Brazilian army.) Well, entry was not quite free: Would-be insurrectionists were asked to make a $10 donation on Pix, Brazil’s new instant-payments system.
As in Washington two years ago, it began as a peaceful march through the heart of the capital but descended into pandemonium as protesters forced their way into not only the congressional building, but also the presidential palace and the Supreme Court. Jan. 6 had its tragic elements, as the US Capitol was in session and lives were lost in the ensuing battle. Last weekend in Brasilia was all farce. Lula had already been sworn in; the buildings were empty due to the Southern Hemisphere summer recess. The charade nevertheless went ahead. Members of the mob sat in the speaker’s chair, smashed windows, defecated on desks. All that was missing was the QAnon shaman, whose place was taken by a vendor selling cotton candy.
This is not to say that the progressives revere established institutions. I understand why my Hoover Institution colleague Victor Davis Hanson laments “The Coup We Never Knew,” a litany of criticisms of the left’s most egregious attacks on personal freedoms and political norms. But such indignation doesn’t look like the launchpad for a Trump Restoration. A December survey from YouGov/the Economist put Florida Governor Ron DeSantis well ahead of Trump. An average of all the head-to-head national polls since the midterms puts DeSantis five points in front, with 48% to Trump’s 43%.
Trump’s best hope of winning the nomination, as Nathaniel Rakich recently pointed out on FiveThirtyEight, is another crowded field of candidates. In polls conducted since the midterm elections, Trump almost always leads DeSantis when there are three or more potential nominees, with an average lead of 10 points (41% to 31%).
The most interesting revelation of recent polling is the appeal of DeSantis to more moderate Republicans. In a December Wall Street Journal poll of likely GOP primary voters, “those who are very conservative favor Mr. Trump over Mr. DeSantis, 54% to 38%, while those who say they are just somewhat conservative back Mr. DeSantis over Mr. Trump, 59% to 29%.” Among those with a high-school education or less, Trump dominated DeSantis. Among college-educated voters, it’s the other way around. DeSantis also does better among suburban and urban residents, Trump with the rural folks.
DeSantis is more likely to win a general election than Trump. Among all registered voters, he beats Trump 43% to 36%. Rerun 2020 today and Biden beats Trump again. Now ask yourself: How likely are all the other potential Republican candidates to step aside politely and let DeSantis roll up the primaries and deny Trump a third, likely doomed shot at the White House?
Progressivism beats populism, again and again. One of my younger, left-leaning colleagues has bet me a bottle of Scotch that Biden — whom conservatives just keep underestimating — will be the Democratic candidate in 2024 and will win. I begin to see myself handing over that whisky. Unlike nearly every president in modern times, Biden did not see his party battered in the midterm elections: They held the Senate and only narrowly lost the House.
Even more impressively, Biden’s administration has succeeded in passing three major pieces of legislation that do rather more to put “America First” than anything done under Trump: the $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act, which promotes domestic semiconductor research and production; the misleadingly named Inflation Reduction Act, which directs $369 billion to clean energy programs; and the $1 trillion infrastructure bill, much of which is also supposed to be spent on boosting US economic competitiveness.
When populists impose tariffs, it’s protectionism. When progressives discriminate in favor of domestic companies, it’s “industrial policy.” If you believe, as I do, in free trade and comparative advantage, you don’t like either. But you have to admire how much more glamorous the progressive version seems. At least US Trade Representative Katherine Tai acknowledges that the administration, like its predecessor, is moving away from market liberalization and tariff elimination, as these had imposed “significant costs” on America’s economy and society. “The need for correction is clear,” she said in October, “and industrial policy is part of that rebalancing act.” Presumably Trump’s tariffs on China are, too. Team Biden has conspicuously declined to get rid of them.
Progressivism is contagious. The European Union, Japan and South Korea are all demanding that the US repeal or revise its tax incentive program for electric vehicles. That won’t happen, so they’ll soon introduce similar schemes of their own. In a joint paper issued on Dec. 19, Bruno Le Maire, the French finance minister, and his German counterpart, Robert Habeck, argued for a European version of the new American industrial policy. Europeans are understandably skeptical of Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s claim that the US will prioritize “friendshoring” — attracting investment to allied countries and away from strategic rivals — over “America First.”
In this context, it’s not hard to see why Brexit is foundering. Its most ardent proponents envisioned the post-Brexit UK as a Singapore on the Thames, a soaraway free-trading island economy, unshackled from the bureaucracy of Brussels. But this strategy stood no chance in a world where the biggest trading blocs were turning away from globalization.
For the past three months, more than two-thirds of British voters have told pollsters they think the government is handling Brexit badly. A YouGov poll in November showed support for Brexit at a record low, with only 32% of those surveyed saying it had been right to vote to leave the European Union. In another YouGov poll, just 12% of voters thought Brexit had gone well since the end of 2020, the date of the UK’s departure from the EU.
Even among Conservatives there is disillusionment. A third of people planning to vote Conservative at the next election now believe that Brexit has created more problems than it solved, according to the pro-Tory Daily Telegraph, compared with 22% who think it has solved more problems. With the country gripped by public-sector strikes and the National Health Service suffering the longest waiting lists and delays in treatment in 30 years, a Labour victory at the next election seems all but certain. Keir Starmer, the Labour leader, lacks former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s charisma. But he also knows that Blairism itself is obsolete, tolerant as it was of City of London bonuses and West End bling. Like Biden and Lula, Starmer will offer voters the progressive package of state intervention, taxing the rich and wokeism-lite.
What’s the catch? The answer is that, historically, progressives have a bad habit of getting into big wars. I am not trying to resuscitate Bob Dole’s nasty debating point about “Democrat wars” (uttered in the vice presidential debate of 1976). The point is simply that governments that come in with an ambitious domestic agenda can quite easily find themselves drawn into major conflicts. It was the fate of Woodrow Wilson in 1917, Franklin Roosevelt in 1941, Harry Truman in 1950 and Lyndon Johnson after 1965.
The last time I wrote about this, my friend and former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers objected smartly that, had Republicans won the elections of 1916, 1940, 1948 and 1964, the US would have been no less likely to enter World War I, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. He is right about those counterfactuals. Charles Evans Hughes, Wendell Willkie, Thomas Dewey and Barry Goldwater — the defeated Republican candidates — were at least as belligerent as the Democrats they ran against. So this is not a partisan point.
Nevertheless, war is back, and there is a real risk that it escalates and proliferates. The war in Ukraine isn’t about to end soon. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates are not the only ones worrying that time might after all be on Russia’s side. (The Ukrainians evidently think it’s on their side, which is why the war will keep going.)
A war in the Middle East is a growing risk as Iran gets closer to being a nuclear-armed power, and Israel and Saudi Arabia prepare to prevent that. Meanwhile, Taiwan is learning from Ukraine that it needs to become a military “porcupine” if it is to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping from invading or at least blockading the island. (If you don’t believe me, read the recent interview with Audrey Tang, Taiwan’s digital minister, about the need for Taiwan to have its own version of Elon Musk’s Starlink.)
Is something like an Asian NATO in the making? In the loose form of the so-called Quad and AUKUS, my Bloomberg Opinion colleague Hal Brands thinks so. Is a war between those allies and China over Taiwan conceivable? The latest war game by the Center for Strategic and International Studies offers the reassuring headline that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would “quickly founder.” But then you read on. The US and its allies would win only if Taiwan itself put up stiff (i.e. Ukrainian-style) resistance. Japanese air bases would be crucial, but also would be the targets of Chinese strikes. The US Navy would likely lose two aircraft carriers and from 10 to 20 large surface ships. All of this assumes that neither side resorts to nuclear weapons.
Populism hit a rock. Progressivism is on a roll. And not only in the US. But history has a warning for us. Those who believe in enlarging the power of the state in pursuit of their ideal of social justice often find themselves using that enlarged power for very different purposes from the ones they set out with.
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12. Air Force, Marine Generals Seen as Top Picks for Joint Chiefs Job
"Equal opportunity" for the services? Or competence regardless of parent service? Is competence based on service? Is an Army or Navy officer now not acceptable because they have dominated the CJCS in recent years and some of those are seen as less than successful in the job so that all others are tainted because they wear the same uniform?
I am not advocating for any one service or any specific person except that the President should select the woman or man who is best suited for the job based on demonstrated competence regardless of service.
But as we know, once that selection is made there will be griping among the three (or four or five) services that did not have their nominee selected. Interservice rivalry rules.
Air Force, Marine Generals Seen as Top Picks for Joint Chiefs Job
Biden expected to announce nominee in spring; Gen. Mark Milley’s tenure ends Sept. 30
https://www.wsj.com/articles/air-force-marine-generals-seen-as-top-picks-for-joint-chiefs-job-11673981496
By Nancy A. YoussefFollow
and Gordon LuboldFollow
Jan. 17, 2023 1:51 pm ET
WASHINGTON—President Biden is considering two service chiefs and the head of the U.S. cyber defense command to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in what will be the president’s biggest opportunity to date to shape U.S. military leadership.
Air Force Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown, the Air Force chief of staff, and Gen. David Berger, the Marine Corps commandant, are leading candidates to succeed Army Gen. Mark Milley as the Pentagon’s top officer when his four-year appointment ends Sept. 30. Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, who serves as both head of U.S. Cyber Command and the director of the National Security Agency, also is a contender, U.S. and defense officials said.
The president is expected to announce his nominee in the spring. The candidate then would face a Senate confirmation hearing. The Pentagon and the White House declined to comment.
Air Force Gen. Charles ‘CQ’ Brown, the Air Force chief of staff, is among the favorites to be nominated as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PHOTO: TOM WILLIAMS/ZUMA PRESS
The nomination of the chairman of the joint chiefs is one of the most consequential decisions a president makes on the U.S. military. While the chairman is the highest-ranking military officer, he has no troops under his command. Rather, he serves as the top military adviser to the president, and over time, the Joint Chiefs has gained deep influence over every part of U.S. security. During Gen. Milley’s time in the job, the position also has shaped public opinion of the military.
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To choose a chairman, each of the services nominates an eligible general or admiral for the position, and by tradition, the job rotates among the services. Because Gen. Milley is from the Army, it is unlikely that he would be succeeded by Gen. Nakasone, another Army officer. The last Marine to serve as Chairman was Gen. Joe Dunford, who stepped down in 2019. The last airman to hold the post was Gen. Richard Myers, whose term ended in 2005.
Gen. Brown spent much of his career in the Asia-Pacific region, where the U.S. considers strategic competition with China its pre-eminent national-security concern. He also is the first Black commander to lead a service. Gen. Berger, who commanded Marines in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has sought changes within the Marine Corps aimed at modernizing the force with an eye toward a confrontation in the Pacific. And Gen. Nakasone has been widely acclaimed for his leadership of U.S. cybersecurity defenses.
Gen. David Berger, the Marine Corps commandant, is another top name being discussed to be the next Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman.
PHOTO: TOM WILLIAMS/ZUMA PRESS
It is unknown if the Navy has nominated a candidate. Navy Adm. Chris Grady is currently the Joint Chiefs’ vice chairman, rendering it unlikely that the Navy’s pick would get a nod, as that would have two naval officers overseeing the Joint Staff.
Gen. Brown has been a longtime favorite of many within the military, U.S. officials have said. He flew 130 hours of combat missions, and is credited with inspiring minority officers across the services. Shortly after Minneapolis police killed George Floyd in May 2020, the usually reserved Gen. Brown made a nearly five-minute video on how Mr. Floyd’s death affected him and the nation, weaving his personal experiences into the presentation, including discrimination throughout his military career.
“I want to hear what you are thinking about and how together we can make a difference,” Gen. Brown said at the end of the video.
Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, another contender to lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serves as both head of U.S. Cyber Command and the director of the National Security Agency.
PHOTO: ANDREW HARNIK/ASSOCIATED PRESS
During a 2022 panel, Gen. Brown declined to speculate about future assignments.
Gen. Berger, who has led the Marine Corps since July 2019, prompted an internal debate within the Corps with a push to restructure forces to make them more agile to fight or conduct operations around the world, including in the Indo-Pacific should war break out with China. His spokesman referred requests for comment to the office of the chairman.
Gen. Nakasone, meanwhile, has been credited with resolving rifts among the various U.S. government agencies involved in cyber defense, and has overseen U.S. cyber command and the National Security Agency during a period of rising cyber threats from China, Iran and Russia and an array of hackers and criminal gangs.
A spokesman for the National Security Agency noted that Gen. Nakasone serves at the pleasure of the president and remains focused on his current job.
Gen. Milley, more than most of his 19 predecessors, found himself a target of critics on the right who branded him a defender of what they called “wokeness” in the military. Critics on the left accused Gen. Milley of participating in what they considered a political stunt with former President Donald Trump when he appeared in uniform at Mr. Trump’s photo opportunity in Washington’s Lafayette Square after protesters were cleared.
Navy Adm. Chris Grady is now the Joint Chiefs’ vice chairman, so it is unlikely that a Navy leader would get a nod for the chairman’s job.
PHOTO: GEMUNU AMARASINGHE/ASSOCIATED PRESS
He has served during a number of crises in his more than three years as chairman: the withdrawal from Afghanistan; the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol;, the protests following the killing of Mr. Floyd; the Covid-19 pandemic; and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the run-up to the Russian invasion, he warned legislators of the Kremlin’s military plan, persuading skeptics and raising awareness across Washington about the implications of the war.
Some lawmakers have said they would open investigations into his conduct in office. Even with the slim Republican majority in the House, administration officials anticipate lawmakers will demand Gen. Milley appear before them on a range of issues. Gen Milley has defended some actions, such as communicating with a top Chinese general during the presidential transition to Mr. Biden, and apologized for others, including the photo opportunity in Lafayette Square. He has reportedly privately described himself as a “lightning rod for the politicization of the military.”
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com
Appeared in the January 18, 2023, print edition as 'President Weighs Joint Chiefs of Staff Pick'.
13. Are You a Strategist or an Operator?
I do not usually go to the Art of Manliness website for national security related issues.
A simplistic view (Eisenhower versus Patton) but some food for thought and perhaps useful for self reflection for young officers considering their future. Of course the authors are not really writing this for military personnel but for the civilian/business world (it is always internsting when authors use the military for examples).
Perhaps this should be part of the assessment criteria for the next CJCS
Are You a Strategist or an Operator?
The Art of Manliness · by Brett & Kate McKay · January 17, 2023
In the years after World War I, longtime Army colleagues and friends George S. Patton and Dwight D. Eisenhower contemplated what would happen if another global conflict broke out. As Patton envisioned it: “In the next war, I’ll be the Stonewall Jackson, and you can be the Robert E. Lee. Ike, you do the big planning, and you let me go in and shoot up the enemy.”
And that’s pretty much how things worked out in World War II.
Eisenhower led from Allied headquarters as Europe’s Supreme Commander, while Patton served on the ground as commander of the Third and Seventh armies.
Ike, who lacked battlefield experience, was nonetheless brilliant as a theater commander. Having spent his career as a highly effective staff officer, he had a genius for planning, marshaling material, organizing logistics, and practicing diplomacy. Charming, modest, flexible, and steady, he excelled at getting the disparate and sometimes rivalrous Allied leaders to work together, interfacing with politicians and the press, and keeping all the pieces of a monumental war effort sorted and spinning.
Patton, on the other hand, had little patience for politicking and wasn’t lauded for his ability to formulate high-level plans. But, he possessed all the traits necessary for superior battlefield command. Bold and aggressive, he executed missions with mastery and confidence and advanced with relentless drive.
While each man’s position and responsibilities were different, each excelled in his particular role.
Ike was the consummate strategist.
Patton was born to be an operator.
Strategists Versus Operators
Andrew Wilson, a professor at the Naval War College, describes the difference between Eisenhower and Patton as the difference between having a bent toward strategy versus having a bent toward operations.
Wilson defines strategy as “the means by which you translate political purpose” — what the political leadership hopes to achieve with a war — “into military action, and how it is that you anticipate military action to deliver your political purpose. . . . So strategy is the bridge between policy and military actions.”
Operations, he says, are those military actions — “essentially the big muscle movements, the battles.”
Those who excel in that second kind of work — operators — do best on the ground and in the field. They excel at, and derive satisfaction from, practicing and carrying out a certain skill, craft, or art.
Those who excel at the first kind of work — strategists — do best in high-level positions. They excel at, and derive satisfaction from, overseeing, organizing, and supervising those who practice and carry out skills, crafts, and arts.
Another way to describe the strategists versus operators dichotomy is as managers versus tacticians.
It’s a distinction in men’s proclivities that extends beyond the military context, and it’s crucial to know which category you fall into.
While there are a few men who are adept at both strategy and operations, most primarily lean toward one over the other.
Problems arise when men don’t have the self-awareness and foresight to understand their personal strengths and propensities, and end up in a role for which they are ill-suited.
Strategists Becoming Operators
Sometimes a man is doing well as a manager type, but may desire a job in the field, perhaps because such work seems “sexier.” For example, he may have done well for years as a supervisor within a company, but thinks about striking out on his own and becoming an entrepreneur, even though the skill set necessary for success in the former pursuit isn’t likely to translate to success in the latter.
Eisenhower thought about making this kind of shift.
In the lead-up to WWII, Ike thought he’d like to work alongside Patton and become the commander of an armored regiment. He had never seen combat; because he was so good at training others, he had been kept stateside during WWI and tasked with preparing troops to deploy. Having missed out on the consummate experience of a military career during the First World War, he was determined to get into the field during the Second.
So when in 1941, a general in the War Plans Division asked Eisenhower to consider joining its staff in Washington, Ike demurred. He really liked the prospect of that position, and knew he’d do well there, but felt that a field command was something he was supposed to prefer. He felt conflicted, and worried he’d “pass[ed] up something I wanted to do, in favor of something I thought I ought to do.”
Eisenhower needn’t have worried. While he continued to position himself for field command, his administrative abilities were too valuable to be dispensed with, and he was eventually appointed chief of staff to the commander of the Third Army, then Chief of the War Plans Division, and eventually Supreme Allied Commander. Ike’s sense of personal satisfaction, and the fate of world history, benefitted from his sticking to these strategic positions.
Operators Becoming Strategists
What happens more often than managerial men trying to shift into tactical roles is tacticians being promoted into administrative positions. Those who excel in operational roles are frequently moved up the ranks. The problem is, the skills required to succeed as tactical operators don’t typically translate into success as strategic supervisors. This is the essence of the “Peter principle.” And not only may a tactician placed in a managerial or executive job struggle to be competent in that position, he is also unlikely to enjoy it.
Entrepreneurs who successfully launch start-ups often don’t transition well to becoming the CEOs who run them. Fitness coaches who excel at training clients frequently flounder at owning their own gyms. Pastors who have the skill set to plant churches don’t always have the skill set to oversee the large, established congregations they grow into. Doctors who like practicing hands-on medicine won’t be satisfied spending their days supervising teams of nurses. Academics who enjoy teaching end up less happy as deans than they were as professors.
Writers and artists, who initially function as fully autonomous operators, sometimes try hiring assistants and social media gurus to expand the empire around their “brand,” but find they’d rather keep their “business” smaller than to give over any of the time they could be creating to managing other people.
Sometimes an operator has to transition to being a strategist because the fieldwork they do is physical in nature and takes a toll on the body. As a man who works in the trades gets older, for example, he may find it desirable and/or necessary to move from working on projects himself to supervising the work of others.
But oftentimes, an operator ends up in a managerial position because he feels he’s supposed to take it and defaults to following the standard professional trajectory. The next rung up the ladder may take someone out of the field, but the position comes with more money, power, and/or status. A man thinks he ought to keep moving up in the world, even if that “advancement” puts him into a position he’s less suited for and finds less fulfilling.
Do You Want to Be in the War Room or in the Trenches?
It’s important to know who you are: a strategist or an operator.
If you’re a manager type, lean into that, even if that job may not seem as sexy as others. Administrators are absolutely crucial in keeping the world spinning round, and even help win world wars.
If you’re the tactician type, do some real reflection before you accept that “promotion.” Is the benefit in money and status worth the tradeoff in fulfillment that comes from doing a job you’re brilliant at and love? It’s okay to recognize that you like carrying out orders more than formulating them. And it’s okay to value the chance to practice the things you’re really skilled at more than a bigger office.
When Eisenhower was serving as Allied Supreme Commander in North Africa during WWII, his forces experienced some initial setbacks on the battlefield, and the Army’s Chief of Staff, George Marshall, suggested that Ike bring Patton in to serve as his deputy and oversee the fighting. But Patton balked at the idea of taking a more administrative job. He understood that he could do more good on the ground than at HQ, and that an operator belongs in the field — not behind a desk.
Previous
The Art of Manliness · by Brett & Kate McKay · January 17, 2023
14. Estonia buys 12 more howitzers amid ‘lessons from Ukraine’ (from Korea)
Korea is a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy
Estonia buys 12 more howitzers amid ‘lessons from Ukraine’
Defense News · by Jaroslaw Adamowski · January 17, 2023
WARSAW, Poland — As Eastern European allies continue to invest in expanding their artillery fleets in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Estonia’s Ministry of Defence has announced it is placing an order for a further 12 K9 Thunder howitzers from South Korea’s Hanwha Defense.
Owing to the deal, the Estonian Defence Forces are to operate a total of 36 such weapons. The latest contract is worth about €36 million ($39 million), the country’s state-run Centre for Defence Investments said in a statement.
“Today’s war in Ukraine clearly shows how important indirect fire weapons are,” said Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur. “In light of the lessons learned in Ukraine, we have made quick decisions to equip both infantry brigades with additional K9 Thunder mobile howitzers and bring Estonia’s indirect fire capability to a completely new level.”
Poland also ordered the K9 Thunder, with the first batch of 24 weapons received last month. In total, Hanwha Defense is to deliver 212 K9 Thunders to the Polish military, and a further 460 howitzers could be manufactured by Poland’s defense industry under a license.
In December 2022, Estonia signed a contract with the United States to buy six M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, joining a rapidly expanding group of Eastern European allies who eye the weapons in the aftermath of Russia’s attack against Ukraine. The same month, Lithuania and the U.S. government inked a deal for as many as eight M142 HIMARS. The third Baltic nation, Latvia, also aims to purchase the systems for its armed forces.
Speaking on Jan. 6, Pevkur said that the three countries’ HIMARS acquisitions will bolster allies’ “interoperability [on] NATO’s Eastern flank” and represent “a milestone in developing long-range indirect fire capability” of their forces.
About Jaroslaw Adamowski
Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.
15. Army Special Operators Seek to Reduce Suicide with ‘Bottom-Led’ Approach
As an aside from this important article, I give props to the Defense One editor for correcting the initial reference to "Army SOCOM." When I first read this article last evening USASOC was referred to as "Army SOCOM." But by this morning it was corrected. (I have pasted the original article below this one). I am sure the journalist will not make the same mistake again.
Army Special Operators Seek to Reduce Suicide with ‘Bottom-Led’ Approach
Units have been ordered to develop anti-suicide efforts based on the USASOC's new strategy.
BY LAUREN C. WILLIAMS
SENIOR EDITOR
JANUARY 17, 2023 04:57 PM ET
Suicide deaths have increased over the past five years among the elite troops of Army’s Special Operations Command, or USASOC, so the command is making changes to better support soldiers and their families. The results could shape how other parts of the military deal with the problem.
“We got to get in front of people and say, ‘This lifestyle is challenging; you're going to need some help along the way, whether it's a medical doctor, the mental piece…just to perform better’,” Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, the deputy commander for USASOC at Fort Bragg, told reporters Wednesday. “You can be the toughest guy in the world. You're gonna hurt yourself at some point.”
The command has about 36,000 soldiers, the vast majority of whom are on active duty, and they represent more than half of the military’s special operations forces. In 2022, USASOC reported 18 suicide deaths, up from six in 2017 and 12 in 2018.
As of Sept. 30, the Army reported 195 confirmed or suspected suicide deaths across all components. The Pentagon has not yet released its final pan-military quarterly report for 2022.
The USASOC strategy, which was finalized in September, is based on Thomas Joiner’s Interpersonal Theory of Suicide, which says individuals’ risk is highest if they don’t feel like they belong, are a burden, and have the means, such as access to firearms. So the updated approach aims to build a sense of community, create a sense of purpose, promote wellness and stress management, and collect data. The data will help target and track markers for overall wellbeing and catch vulnerable operators earlier.
USASOC brigades and similar units have been directed create a suicide prevention liaison that would lead developments and efforts, Jeff Wright, deputy director of the command’s Human Performance and Wellness Program, told reporters Wednesday.
The strategy adds to existing prevention efforts and is considered a “bottom-led” effort that allows special operations groups to determine what works best for their teams and their families. Units are expected to create strategy action plans by April when they’ll be evaluated on effectiveness and ultimately inform the command on best practices.
Roberson said leaders are being trained to be more aware of individuals' behaviors and limits. He said gathering and analyzing data has become increasingly important to detect mental distress. Data from wearables, for example, helps commanders understand how well their troops are sleeping.
“Sleep is a great indicator. Are you having, under mental distress? You can't sleep. We know this. Our job is to make sure that our students understand this, that our soldiers understand” how to interpret personal data and performance to evaluate individuals as they come in and throughout their careers.
“I think this is a great new horizon for us to improve people’s performance and outcomes.”
Wright said soldiers’ assessment data, which includes markers for physical and spiritual performance, cognitive and psychological tests, enters a database continually.
“And we'll follow that soldier” from the qualification course to when they get to their unit, he said. “That data will migrate with them. So over the long haul of a career, we have touch points where we're able to kind of see how well that soldiers performing” over time to figure out what assistance can be provided.
The result is being able to “see where we need to inject ourselves from a performance standpoint. And then be able to give that feedback to the soldier. Here's how you were doing. Here's what you looked like a couple of years ago, here's where you're at now. Are we still on track because we're areas you want to improve your performance on?”
The 2023 defense policy law also includes initiatives designed to improve how DOD reviews and reports on suicide rates in the military since 9/11, including breakdowns by occupation, service, and grade. Congress also requested briefings on the efficacy of suicide prevention reforms.
But there’s a cultural aspect that the deputy commander said won’t change quickly, but stressing holistic health and wellness, particularly in the schoolhouses, should help.
Survivors also noted the cultural barriers in the Special Operations Command community while expressing hope that the new approach could help spot struggling servicemembers sooner.
Through her experience, Erica Wirka, surviving spouse of Warrant Officer Johnny Wirka of the 7th Special Forces Group, decided to pursue a master’s degree in counseling and plans to support and assist others particularly in military communities and addicted populations.
“I don't believe we're designed to do this life alone. We need the support of others and that community and I hope to be a source of that support in a professional professional capacity,” said Wirka, alluding to her own bouts with suicidal thoughts after her husband’s death in 2021. “Though Johnny possessed great strength and fortitude as a person. He was still one that fell victim to his own distorted thoughts. Just going to show that even the strongest among us are not immune to suicidal ideations. Vulnerability and reaching out when help is needed, is one of the hardest things for us to do. I think it's especially hard in the SOF community.”
“Maybe I'm going a little outside of my lane,” she said, “but you know, we've got these soldiers that are, you know, trained to not be in vulnerable positions when they're on missions…even in a training situation—no vulnerability. And that is what they are taught. But that vulnerability can be life-saving.”
Master Sgt. Trevor Beaman of the 7th Special Forces Groups, who has survived multiple suicide attempts, stressed the importance of community and reaching out when in distress.
“We're seeing a lot of hard things on deployments. So that's a really hard thing to say that it's hurting me, but at the same time I used it to a benefit,” Beaman said.
Beaman said the strategy and its use of Joiner’s theory rang true to his own experiences.
“Being vulnerable didn't take away anything about me being an operator or a warrior,” he said. “It did the opposite. It really enhanced me to be a better thinker and a better provider to the unit that I was in.”
Army SOCOM Takes Aim At Suicide with ‘Bottom-Led’ Approach
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
Suicide deaths have increased over the past five years among the elite troops of Army’s Special Operations Command, so the command is making changes to better support soldiers and their families. The results could shape how other parts of the military deal with the problem.
“We got to get in front of people and say, ‘This lifestyle is challenging; you're going to need some help along the way, whether it's a medical doctor, the mental piece…just to perform better’,” Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, the deputy commander for Army SOCOM at Fort Bragg, told reporters Wednesday. “You can be the toughest guy in the world. You're gonna hurt yourself at some point.”
The command has about 36,000 soldiers, the vast majority of whom are on active duty, and they represent more than half of the military’s special operations forces. In 2022, Army SOCOM reported 18 suicide deaths, up from six in 2017 and 12 in 2018.
As of Sept. 30, the Army reported 195 confirmed or suspected suicide deaths across all components. The Pentagon has not yet released its final pan-military quarterly report for 2022.
The Army SOCOM strategy, which was finalized in September, is based on Thomas Joiner’s Interpersonal Theory of Suicide, which says individuals’ risk is highest if they don’t feel like they belong, are a burden, and have the means, such as access to firearms. So the updated approach aims to build a sense of community, create a sense of purpose, promote wellness and stress management, and collect data. The data will help target and track markers for overall wellbeing and catch vulnerable operators earlier.
Army SOCOM brigades and similar units have been directed create a suicide prevention liaison that would lead developments and efforts, Jeff Wright, deputy director of the command’s Human Performance and Wellness Program, told reporters Wednesday.
The strategy adds to existing prevention efforts and is considered a “bottom-led” effort that allows special operations groups to determine what works best for their teams and their families. Units are expected to create strategy action plans by April when they’ll be evaluated on effectiveness and ultimately inform the command on best practices.
Roberson said leaders are being trained to be more aware of individuals' behaviors and limits. He said gathering and analyzing data has become increasingly important to detect mental distress. Data from wearables, for example, helps commanders understand how well their troops are sleeping.
“Sleep is a great indicator. Are you having, under mental distress? You can't sleep. We know this. Our job is to make sure that our students understand this, that our soldiers understand” how to interpret personal data and performance to evaluate individuals as they come in and throughout their careers.
“I think this is a great new horizon for us to improve people’s performance and outcomes.”
Wright said soldiers’ assessment data, which includes markers for physical and spiritual performance, cognitive and psychological tests, enters a database continually.
“And we'll follow that soldier” from the qualification course to when they get to their unit, he said. “That data will migrate with them. So over the long haul of a career, we have touch points where we're able to kind of see how well that soldiers performing” over time to figure out what assistance can be provided.
The result is being able to “see where we need to inject ourselves from a performance standpoint. And then be able to give that feedback to the soldier. Here's how you were doing. Here's what you looked like a couple of years ago, here's where you're at now. Are we still on track because we're areas you want to improve your performance on?”
The 2023 defense policy law also includes initiatives designed to improve how DOD reviews and reports on suicide rates in the military since 9/11, including breakdowns by occupation, service, and grade. Congress also requested briefings on the efficacy of suicide prevention reforms.
But there’s a cultural aspect that the deputy commander said won’t change quickly, but stressing holistic health and wellness, particularly in the schoolhouses, should help.
Survivors also noted the cultural barriers in the Special Operations Command community while expressing hope that the new approach could help spot struggling servicemembers sooner.
Through her experience, Erica Wirka, surviving spouse of Warrant Officer Johnny Wirka of the 7th Special Forces Group, decided to pursue a master’s degree in counseling and plans to support and assist others particularly in military communities and addicted populations.
“I don't believe we're designed to do this life alone. We need the support of others and that community and I hope to be a source of that support in a professional professional capacity,” said Wirka, alluding to her own bouts with suicidal thoughts after her husband’s death in 2021. “Though Johnny possessed great strength and fortitude as a person. He was still one that fell victim to his own distorted thoughts. Just going to show that even the strongest among us are not immune to suicidal ideations. Vulnerability and reaching out when help is needed, is one of the hardest things for us to do. I think it's especially hard in the SOF community.”
“Maybe I'm going a little outside of my lane,” she said, “but you know, we've got these soldiers that are, you know, trained to not be in vulnerable positions when they're on missions…even in a training situation—no vulnerability. And that is what they are taught. But that vulnerability can be life-saving.”
Master Sgt. Trevor Beaman of the 7th Special Forces Groups, who has survived multiple suicide attempts, stressed the importance of community and reaching out when in distress.
“We're seeing a lot of hard things on deployments. So that's a really hard thing to say that it's hurting me, but at the same time I used it to a benefit,” Beaman said.
Beaman said the strategy and its use of Joiner’s theory rang true to his own experiences.
“Being vulnerable didn't take away anything about me being an operator or a warrior,” he said. “It did the opposite. It really enhanced me to be a better thinker and a better provider to the unit that I was in.”
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
16. World leaders should press Switzerland on arms deliveries to Ukraine
World leaders should press Switzerland on arms deliveries to Ukraine
By Ryan Brobst, John Hardie and Bradley Bowman
Jan 17, 02:48 PM
Defense News · by Ryan Brobst · January 17, 2023
As government officials and business leaders from around the world flock to Switzerland for the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting this week, Ukrainian soldiers continue to fight and die to protect their homes — and the rest of Europe — from Russian aggression. Yet, Switzerland is blocking vital assistance.
Despite repeated pleas, Switzerland won’t allow Germany to give Ukraine much-needed Swiss-made air defense ammunition that can help protect Ukrainians from the Russian onslaught. As they descend on Davos, U.S. and allied officials should take this opportunity to press Switzerland to change course.
Berlin has provided Kyiv with Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns that have proved effective against the drones and cruise missiles Russia uses to bombard Ukraine’s electrical grid and other critical infrastructure. Gepards also proved useful in protecting Ukrainian ground troops during their counteroffensive in the Kharkiv oblast last September. Berlin intends to provide Kyiv with seven more Gepards, which could allow Ukraine to defend more critical infrastructure sites or deploy more of them to the front lines.
But these additional systems will be useless if Ukraine lacks sufficient ammunition to operate them. Kyiv is already running low, and could run out soon. The Germany company Rheinmetall is building a new facility that can produce the 35mm rounds fired by the Gepard, but it won’t begin production until June.
With its Gepards out of action, Ukrainians would be more vulnerable to Russian attacks and would be forced to expend much more expensive surface-to-air missiles, some of which are already in short supply.
The good news is that Switzerland can help. The bad news is that Bern refuses to do so, citing its commitment to military neutrality. Switzerland, where much of the existing ammunition for the Gepard was made, has repeatedly rejected German requests for permission to send Kyiv Swiss-made ammunition exported to Germany decades ago. Switzerland has also blocked other weapon transfers to Ukraine from Spain and Denmark.
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Despite Switzerland’s longstanding commitment to military neutrality, the country is actually a significant exporter of military hardware. Bern attempts to thread this needle by prohibiting arms exports to countries at war, but it has at times loosened these guidelines, mainly out of a desire to support the Swiss defense industry.
Notably, the Swiss government in 2016 decided to permit certain arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries fighting the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. Among other things, Bern allowed Riyadh to receive ammunition for previously delivered air defense systems, noting that the ammunition would be used for “legitimate military self-defense” and to “protect civil infrastructure.”
Does that sound familiar? That is exactly how Swiss air defense ammunition would be used in Ukraine, even against the same Iranian-made drones.
If it wanted to, Switzerland could make a similar exception for Ukraine. Some Swiss politicians argue that legislative changes to the country’s laws governing arms sales wouldn’t even be necessary, meaning Bern would perhaps simply need to issue an administrative decision.
This week in Davos, American and European leaders should make clear to their Swiss hosts that Bern’s inconsistent and lamentable position on the transfer of Gepard ammunition will cost lives in Ukraine and incur increasing consequences for Switzerland.
Those consequences should include decisions to stop purchasing Swiss arms, as some politicians in Germany — one of Switzerland’s top arms customers — have already suggested. In fact, reducing the reliance on Swiss weapons might make sense anyhow if there is a danger of Bern blocking deliveries of spare parts and ammunition to NATO countries in a future conflict.
American officials may also want to remind their Swiss counterparts that the U.S. is planning to deliver advanced weapon systems to Switzerland, including the Patriot air defense system. This is the same Patriot system Washington promised to deliver to Ukraine in the near future. These systems are also desperately needed to protect allies and American forces forward deployed in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region.
If Bern persists in its refusal to allow others to provide Kyiv with air defense ammunition, then Washington should think twice about prioritizing future arms sales to Switzerland, especially for systems needed elsewhere by countries willing to carry their fair share of the security burden.
Ukraine is defending itself from a war of aggression in which the Kremlin deliberately targets civilians. A Russian victory would overturn the post-World War II order that has fostered peace and security in Europe, including for the Swiss. Viewed in that light, Switzerland’s decision to block aid from reaching Ukraine is not an act of neutrality — it is something much worse.
Ryan Brobst is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. John Hardie is deputy director of the think tank’s Russia Program. Bradley Bowman is senior director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power.
17. Ian Bremmer on How Putin, Xi, and Elon Musk Are Alike
:-)
Ian Bremmer on How Putin, Xi, and Elon Musk Are Alike
New York Magazine · by Intelligencer Staff · January 17, 2023
Photo-Illustration: Intelligencer. Photo: Richard Jopson
Things are a little crazy around the world right now with crises such as the never-ending war in Ukraine, climate change, China’s big COVID mess, the attempted insurrection in Brazil, the unrest in Iran, ongoing economic instability, and so forth. In the latest episode of On With Kara Swisher, Kara talks to Eurasia Group president and global political-risk analyst Ian Bremmer, whose job it is to determine how various threats like these overlap and to predict what impact they could have on businesses.
The Eurasia Group recently published its annual “Top Risks” list, which forecasts the ten most significant political risks the world faces in 2023, including “Rogue Russia” (ranked as the top risk), “Weapons of Mass Disruption,” “Arrested Global Development,” the “Divided States of America,” and “Maximum Xi.” The report highlights an overarching concern: “A small group of individuals has amassed an extraordinary amount of power, making decisions of profound geopolitical consequence with limited information in opaque environments.”
In Swisher and Bremmer’s wide-ranging conversation, they go down the risk list, debate the value of attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, discuss the political impact of AI innovations like ChatGPT, and ponder whether TikTok is more like Twinkies or fentanyl. And it should come as absolutely no surprise that Elon Musk comes up several times. For the record, Bremmer believes Ukraine might not have survived Russia’s invasion if Musk hadn’t bestowed his Starlink satellite internet service upon the country. But in the below excerpts, he also explains to Kara why the tech billionaire’s ability to intervene should trouble everyone.
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Ian Bremmer: One thing that was really problematic is, after all of this good work that was being done with Starlink, suddenly you had Ukrainians in the front lines, in the occupied territories, trying to take their land back, and suddenly Starlink didn’t work. The Ukrainians didn’t know why. They thought it was a tech problem. The Americans didn’t know why. Ukrainians were getting killed. They had to pull back from some of those territories. And it’s because, after the Russians annexed them, Elon decided that Starlink needed to be —
Kara Swisher: Geofenced.
Ian Bremmer: Yeah, it needed to be geofenced, and that never should have been a decision that was being made. I mean, you can’t be in a situation where the only countries that are recognizing Russian annexation are the North Koreans, the Syrians, and Elon. Like, that’s not okay. Right.
I mean, Elon’s business model — on the one hand, you’ve got SpaceX, which is a U.S. national champion that gets contracts from the Pentagon and NASA. You’ve got Tesla, which finds China to be its most important future market, does AI development there, needs access to that data, all the rest. And then you’ve got Twitter, which is “free speech for everyone,” at least in the countries that we have some influence over. Like, it’s pretty clear that, geopolitically, those things do not work together.
Kara Swisher: No, they do not. I think the government got itself into trouble by not having options either with Starlink or with SpaceX. That’s the problem: He’s the option for many of these things.
Ian Bremmer: He’s the only option. I mean, there are Australian companies that are developing — they’re early stage, but there’s nowhere else to go that was anywhere close to as effective. And what I think should have happened is the Defense Department should have paid them for Starlink and the Defense Department should have been deciding who does and does not have geofencing. And Elon needs to have plausible deniability when the Russians and the Chinese are pressuring him, which they were. I mean, he needs to be able to say, “Hey, this is not me. I’m not the person,” and instead he’s inserting himself into the process. A very dangerous place to be.
Musk came up again later when Swisher and Bremmer’s discussion turned to the risk of Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power in China:
Kara Swisher: Xi Jinping himself is another — you call him a “modern-day emperor.” Talk a little bit about where he is now because obviously the “zero COVID” policy has not been good for him. And the economic performance, which he puts a lot of weight in — a lot of people in China do — are at odds with this policy. He can only stay emperor as long as he maintains economic growth. That’s my — control can only go so far with this country. But maybe you think differently.
Ian Bremmer: Look, I certainly think there are reserves of very significant stability in China. But I think that the risk list we do has the conceit of only looking at 12 months in the future. So if this wasn’t just 2023 but was the next five or ten years, then China would be No. 1. I mean, the only strange thing about “Maximum Xi” is that it’s only No. 2 on the list. I agree with that completely, but they’re very similar risks, and they shouldn’t be, because the fact is that Xi Jinping increasingly rules China the way that Putin rules Russia, the way that the supreme leader rules Iran, the way that Mark Zuckerberg and Elon rule their companies. And that’s where the risks are. The risks are —
Kara Swisher: They cannot be fired. They cannot be fired.
Ian Bremmer: They can’t be fired. They don’t get great inputs. There are a lot of yes men surrounding them. And, as a consequence, you can get really big, sudden mistakes that come out of them. Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was a colossal misjudgment. Xi Jinping’s decision to go from zero COVID to maximum COVID — there was no plan or preparation around that because he wasn’t getting good information. And so suddenly he just saw the demonstrations and he said, “Okay, that’s it! Let it rip!”
Kara Swisher: And now everybody has COVID.
Ian Bremmer: Everyone has COVID, and we are not gonna get information from China on new variants until they come to us — and that’s a horrible position for the world to be in.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
On With Kara Swisher is produced by Nayeema Raza, Blakeney Schick, Cristian Castro Rossel, and Rafaela Siewert, with mixing by Fernando Arruda, engineering by Christopher Shurtleff, and theme music by Trackademics. New episodes will drop every Monday and Thursday. Follow the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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New York Magazine · by Intelligencer Staff · January 17, 2023
18. Army Special Forces are testing this rapid-fire mortar system
Army Special Forces are testing this rapid-fire mortar system
armytimes.com · by Rachael Riley · January 17, 2023
FORT BRAGG, N.C. — The 3rd Special Forces Group is testing a new mortar systems platform that could be used by special operation forces across the globe, according to a December news release.
“The current research and development project has lasted two years and will soon modernize firepower capabilities on the battlefield,” the release states.
The 3rd Special Forces Group is developing and testing the system through a partnership with Elbit Systems of America, which produces 120mm mortar weapon systems in Fort Worth, Texas.
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Incoming: Mortars are getting some serious upgrades with renewed Army interest
The programs look to extend ranges, automate targeting and speed up fires on both 120mm and 81mm mortar systems.
Elbit announced a five-year $49 million contract with the Army in September.
Company officials announced at the time that the contract was awarded following the successful completion of a previous contract of this type that was awarded to the company in 2016.
The system tested by the Fort Bragg-based Special Forces soldiers is being called “Sling” and is in the final stages of development, according to the release.
The soldiers have tested the system “in applicable scenarios and environments,” the release said.
According to Elbit, Sling is an adaptable 120 mm mortar system that can be used on small 4x4 wheeled vehicles within 30 to 60 seconds.
The system can fire 16 rounds per minute with a range of about 4.3 miles, according to Elbit.
“The system will allow for more mobile and versatile capabilities on the battlefield for combatant commanders and other leaders to consider when planning both defensive and offensive operations,” the 3rd Special Forces Group release stated.
*EDITORS NOTE: This article was published as part of a content-sharing agreement between Army Times and The Fayettville Observer.
*CORRECTION: A previously published version of this article misstated the testing date in a photo caption.
19. As champion of force-on-force training with US Marines, Japanese colonel paid ‘political’ price
What a shame. I hope attitudes will change.
Excerpts:
Shinka, which translates to “infinitely improving,” paired two Marine infantry companies against a Japanese mechanized battalion, according to the Marine Corps and Indo-Pacific Command. The exercise allowed both sides to flex their muscles in a multidomain setting, Bodisch said.
Shinka proved valuable for both militaries in many areas, Bodisch wrote, and helped hone them as stand-in forces ready to fight on key island terrain. The stand-in force concept is a part of Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 doctrine.
But a year later, just after the second Shinka exercise, Kondo retired. During the award ceremony at III MEF headquarters, Kondo said his enthusiasm for bilateral training had hit a political ceiling.
“My activities were not welcomed by Japanese headquarters, but I believe this force-on-force exercise is tremendously required for the Japanese military and U.S. Marine Corps and these current circumstances, especially, look at China and Russia,” he said. “We need realistic training.”
As champion of force-on-force training with US Marines, Japanese colonel paid ‘political’ price
Stars and Stripes · by Frank Andrews · January 16, 2023
The commander of III Marine Expeditionary Force, Lt. Gen. James Bierman, presents the Meritous Service Medal to retired Col. Rikiya Kondo of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Jan. 6, 2023. (Frank Andrews/Stars and Stripes)
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CAMP COURTNEY, Okinawa – A decision to train Japanese troops with U.S. Marines in force-on-force exercises near Mount Fuji may have cost a Japanese colonel his career.
Col. Rikiya Kondo, who retired from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in May after two years as commander of the Fuji Training Center, received the Meritorious Service Medal on Jan. 6. The award honors outstanding achievement or meritorious service to the United States in a noncombat setting.
“Col. Kondo showed vision; he showed courage,” Lt. Gen. James Bierman, commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, told an audience of about 60 people at the ceremony. “He was a leader who was unimpressed and unsatisfied with the status quo and in the process of seizing opportunities and being willing to stick his neck out, he set conditions that made all of us better.”
Retired Col. Rikiya Kondo, former commander of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Fuji Training Center, poses with Marine Col. Robert Bodisch, former commander of Combined Arms Training Center Camp Fuji, at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Jan. 6, 2023. Kondo received the Meritous Service Medal from the III Marine Expeditionary Force commander that day. (Frank Andrews/Stars and Stripes)
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Under Kondo, the Ground Self-Defense Force trained for the first time against their neighbors at the Marines’ Combined Armed Training Center Camp Fuji. The force-on-force exercise, called Shinka, marked a first in the Japanese training site’s 21-year history and the U.S. camp’s 70 years, Marine Col. Robert Bodisch told Stars and Stripes in a Jan. 6 email relayed by a III MEF spokesman, 1st Lt. Zachary Voss.
Bodisch’s two-year tenure as Camp Fuji’s commander coincided with Kondo’s on the Japanese side. The two quickly established “an unprecedented professional and personal relationship” that led to plans for the combined exercise, Bodisch said.
The U.S. is a treaty ally of Japan, bound to come to its defense. The two engage regularly in military exercises; however, Shinka was the first time they went head-to-head, according to a Jan. 6 report by III MEF spokeswoman Sgt. Savannah Mesimer.
These two officers, both new to the area and serving in similar roles, sought each other out to see how they could increase combat training for both Japanese and Marine combat units, Bodisch wrote.
“Col. Kondo is a very colorful character," he said. “He is a student of Japanese military history and enjoys relating to the most famous Samurai Warrior of the Mount Fuji area – Takeda Shingen.”
‘Too bureaucratic’
The Marines at Camp Fuji had never trained with their counterparts at five surrounding Ground Self-Defense Force garrisons before the Shinka exercise in 2021, Bodisch wrote. A second, monthlong exercise was held in March.
Shinka, which translates to “infinitely improving,” paired two Marine infantry companies against a Japanese mechanized battalion, according to the Marine Corps and Indo-Pacific Command. The exercise allowed both sides to flex their muscles in a multidomain setting, Bodisch said.
Shinka proved valuable for both militaries in many areas, Bodisch wrote, and helped hone them as stand-in forces ready to fight on key island terrain. The stand-in force concept is a part of Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 doctrine.
But a year later, just after the second Shinka exercise, Kondo retired. During the award ceremony at III MEF headquarters, Kondo said his enthusiasm for bilateral training had hit a political ceiling.
“My activities were not welcomed by Japanese headquarters, but I believe this force-on-force exercise is tremendously required for the Japanese military and U.S. Marine Corps and these current circumstances, especially, look at China and Russia,” he said. “We need realistic training.”
He described the Ground Self-Defense Force headquarters as “too bureaucratic.” Despite having to retire, Kondo is ready to return and fight “against aggression from crazy countries,” he said during the ceremony.
A spokesman from Japan's Ministry of Defense declined to comment on Thursday. Neither the Fuji Training Center nor the Ground Self-Defense Force have responded to requests for comment.
‘Political risk’
During the ceremony, Col. Matthew Tracy, former commander of the 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, explained the risk Kondo faced by espousing force-on-force training.
“What makes this exceptional is that there's political risk baked into the constitution for Japan for bilateral training,” Tracy said during the ceremony. “Not only is there a face or professional risk associated with what Col. Kondo proposed and carried forward, but there was also a real political risk for his entire organization, and he shouldered that on his back probably to his own professional detriment to make his organization and our organization better and that's one of the things we're holding up today.”
Kondo stood nearby with his wife, Naoko, as Bodisch listened in via video conference call from Boulder, Colo., his new duty station, as the award citation was read aloud and Bierman pinned the medal to Kondo’s blazer.
He declared Kondo an honorary member of III MEF and presented him with a decorated paddle that represents “a tool for forward progress,” the general said.
“The is a great, great honor for me,” Kondo told the crowd after receiving the award. “Very surprising.”
Stars and Stripes reporter Keishi Koja contributed to this report.
Stars and Stripes · by Frank Andrews · January 16, 2023
20. Former commander in Russia’s Wagner Group seeking asylum, Norway says
Excerpts:
According to U.S. assessments, Wagner has deployed 50,000 fighters in Ukraine — 40,000 of them convicts recruited directly from Russian prisons. In the early months of the war, Wagner launched a public advertising campaign to recruit contract soldiers. It is unclear how Medvedev joined.
This is not the first report of a Wagner member fleeing. Last year, Yevgeny Nuzhin, a 55-year-old murder convict released from prison to fight in Ukraine, gave interviews after defecting to Ukrainian forces.
In November, however, an unverified video was shared on a Wagner-linked Telegram account appearing to show Nuzhin’s brutal killing with a sledgehammer. A Ukrainian presidential adviser said Nuzhin had agreed to return to Russia voluntarily. According to Medvedev’s statements to Gulagu Net, Nuzhin was a member of his unit.
Former commander in Russia’s Wagner Group seeking asylum, Norway says
By Victoria Bisset and Mary Ilyushina
Updated January 17, 2023 at 4:40 p.m. EST|Published January 17, 2023 at 8:21 a.m. EST
The Washington Post · by Victoria Bisset · January 17, 2023
A former commander in the Russian mercenary Wagner Group has requested asylum in Norway after fleeing Russia, a move that rights groups say could aid international investigations into alleged crimes by Russian soldiers in Ukraine.
The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration told the Associated Press on Monday that the man, whom it identified as Andrey Medvedev, had arrived in Norway. The directorate declined to comment further, citing security and privacy reasons.
Medvedev’s Norwegian lawyer also told the AP that his client is seeking asylum in the country. The lawyer did not respond to a Washington Post request for comment Monday night.
Last week, police said an individual, whom they identified only as a foreign national, was arrested after illegally crossing into Norway from Russia early Friday. The two countries share a 123-mile-long border.
The Russian human rights organization Gulagu Net reported that Medvedev joined Wagner in July 2022 and fled the group four months later after witnessing its fighters capturing and executing deserters. He then hid in Russia for weeks before requesting Gulagu Net’s help to flee the country.
“Medvedev became a witness to many executions and extrajudicial killings by the security services of Yevgeniy Prigozhin committed against ‘refuseniks’ — those who refused to fight against the Ukrainians and who wanted to leave the ranks of this supposedly voluntary organization, which de facto forces the Russians to fight against Ukraine under the threat of being shot,” the head of Gulagu Net, Vladimir Osechkin, wrote in a Facebook post.
In a video posted by Osechkin earlier this week, Medvedev said he was willing to collaborate with international investigators looking into potential war crimes committed by Wagner, which has emerged as a prominent force fighting to accomplish Russia’s military goals in Ukraine.
The shadowy Wagner Group was founded by Prigozhin, a Kremlin-connected business executive, who until Russia launched the Ukraine war had denied any connection to the group. Wagner has been accused of carrying out atrocities in countries including Libya, Syria, the Central African Republic and Mali.
In a comment issued by Prigozhin’s press service, he offered an elusive response to reports about Medvedev’s escape, seemingly confirming that he was member of Wagner but adding a snarky remark that he was “a Norwegian citizen” accused of “mistreatment of prisoners.”
According to U.S. assessments, Wagner has deployed 50,000 fighters in Ukraine — 40,000 of them convicts recruited directly from Russian prisons. In the early months of the war, Wagner launched a public advertising campaign to recruit contract soldiers. It is unclear how Medvedev joined.
This is not the first report of a Wagner member fleeing. Last year, Yevgeny Nuzhin, a 55-year-old murder convict released from prison to fight in Ukraine, gave interviews after defecting to Ukrainian forces.
In November, however, an unverified video was shared on a Wagner-linked Telegram account appearing to show Nuzhin’s brutal killing with a sledgehammer. A Ukrainian presidential adviser said Nuzhin had agreed to return to Russia voluntarily. According to Medvedev’s statements to Gulagu Net, Nuzhin was a member of his unit.
The Washington Post · by Victoria Bisset · January 17, 2023
21. Nobel laureate Maria Ressa cleared by Philippine court of tax evasion
Great news. Justice and the rule of law prevail.
Nobel laureate Maria Ressa cleared by Philippine court of tax evasion | CNN
CNN · by Heather Chen,Kathleen Magramo,Angus Watson · January 18, 2023
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CNN —
A Philippine court on Wednesday acquitted Nobel laureate Maria Ressa of tax evasion, ending a raft of legal hearings against the veteran Filipino-American journalist that she said were “politically motivated.”
Ressa, CEO and founder of news site Rappler and a former CNN bureau chief, was cleared of four counts of tax violations filed in 2018 by former President Rodrigo Duterte’s government, an official from the Court of Tax Appeals confirmed to CNN. She pleaded not guilty to all charges.
Speaking with CNN following the verdict, Ressa said, “it feels like the world is slowly turning right side up.”
“I was hoping for an acquittal and I was thrilled to get it … having said that, I think our victory is not just Rappler’s. It is for every single person who’s been unjustly accused with politically motivated charges,” she said.
The tax evasion case stemmed from accusations by the state revenue agency that Rappler had omitted from its tax returns the proceeds of a 2015 sale of depositary receipts to foreign investors, which later became the securities regulator’s basis to revoke its license.
The Philippine Justice Department said it respected the decision of the court.
Ressa, 59, is currently on bail as she appeals a six-year prison sentence handed down in 2020 for a cyber libel conviction.
She won the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize, along with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov, for her efforts to safeguard freedom of expression in the Philippines.
Maria Ressa, CEO of online news platform Rappler, speaking with the media after being served an arrest warrant in n Pasig City, Philippines on February, 13 2019.
Eloisa Lopez/Reuters/FILE
Philippine Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Ressa to fight conviction at Supreme Court
Ressa founded Rappler in 2012 and it gained prominence for its unflinching coverage of Duterte and his brutal “war on drugs.” She has been engulfed in legal battles in recent years and previously claimed she had been targeted because of her news site’s critical reports on Duterte.
And her legal battles are not over.
She still faces one outstanding tax case against her and has also lodged an appeal with the Philippine Supreme Court in a bid to overturn her 2020 libel conviction.
Meanwhile, Rappler is still fighting a 2018 government order to shut down after the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission in June last year upheld its earlier ruling to revoke the news site’s operating license.
Hold The Line, an advocacy group formed to support Ressa, welcomed the verdict Wednesday and called for all pending cases against her to to be closed.
“Rappler and Ressa have maintained their innocence and will continue to hold the line in defense of press freedom in the Philippines as they fight a barrage of pending cases designed to silence their reporting,” the group said in a statement.
“We hope we are seeing the beginning of an end to the previous administration’s strategy to instrumentalize the courts as a means to undermine independent news organizations and damage journalists’ credibility.”
The Philippines ranked 147 out of 180 countries in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index, and the Committee to Protect Journalists ranks the Philippines seventh in the world in its 2022 impunity index, which tracks deaths of media members whose killers go free.
Additional reporting by Reuters.
CNN · by Heather Chen,Kathleen Magramo,Angus Watson · January 18, 2023
22. Operation Allies Welcome: Lessons from a DSCA Mission
Acronym alert. In this article DSCA is defense support to civil authorities. When I first saw DSCA my mind thought of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Operation Allies Welcome: Lessons from a DSCA Mission - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Jeb Graydon · January 18, 2023
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There I was. It was day two of my relief-in-place—I was taking over as the battalion operations officer—when our battalion received a warning order that we might be called upon to support the ongoing Afghan refugee crisis. Less than sixty days later, we were on a plane to Camp Atterbury, Indiana to conduct a mission that is one of the four core competencies of the Army, but one that is rarely executed: defense support of civil authorities, or DSCA. It was a unique and challenging experience, but also a rewarding and developmental one, individually and as a unit.
President Joe Biden’s decision to conduct a large-scale evacuation of US citizens, Special Immigrant Visa holders, and others out of the airport in Kabul, Afghanistan in August 2021 necessitated a similar large-scale operation to integrate that population into American society. A variety of military units from across the country and from all three components of the armed forces—active duty, reserve, and National Guard—participated in what was dubbed Operation Allies Welcome at eight different locations across the continental United States. Our battalion, 2-12 Cavalry, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, was given the mission to support the operations at Camp Atterbury from October 2021 to January 2022.
Mission Execution
In the brief time we had to prepare, the battalion staff focused on analyzing the layout of the camp and determining the best way to array our forces to meet the various missions we would be asked to carry out—all of which were far outside of the missions we routinely trained for. Several weeks before the battalion deployed, I led a team on a site survey to gain a better understanding of how the camp operated. This trip filled critical information gaps and allowed the staff to finalize our plan. Additionally, our battalion intelligence section researched and taught a culture brief to the entire formation, which provided helpful information on the culture and background of the refugees we would be working with.
Immediately upon the battalion’s arrival at Camp Atterbury, we began taking full ownership of the mission from 2-7 Cavalry, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, a battalion that had arrived approximately sixty days prior to us. We divided the various barracks buildings into several blocks and assigned company commanders to run five separate mayor’s cells across the camp. These mayor’s cells were responsible for distributing supplies, organizing town hall meetings, disseminating information, and managing appointments and movements of personnel for a wide variety of activities and events on a daily basis. The battalion’s specialty units were assigned specific jobs to assist in the overall management of the camp, all of which fell far outside their mission-essential task lists. The battalion’s mortar platoon, for example, was given the task of running a supply warehouse full of donated goods. They executed daily supply missions to keep the five mayor’s cells stocked with the supplies they requested. The scout platoon was tasked with managing the movement of personnel to and from medical appointments. This included hundreds of appointments each day at the on-camp medical clinic run by a separate task force primarily led by US Navy personnel and a team of contracted medical personnel, but it also included dozens of off-post appointments at specialty clinics in the surrounding area. Approximately sixty-nine thousand vaccinations and over sixty thousand COVID tests were administered to refugees at Camp Atterbury.
In addition to our organic units, the battalion was augmented by an engineer company, which ran one of the mayor’s cells and a dining facility, and a military police company tasked with maintaining order across the camp. Both of these companies came from the Oregon National Guard. To round out our task force, the 576th Movement Control Team from the US Army Reserve was assigned to us and was given the mission to assist with what were categorized as “independent departures,” wherein refugees decided to leave the camp on their own rather than accept the resettlement benefits of a job, housing, and sponsorship. In total, our battalion consisted of a task force of approximately 950 personnel.
Challenges
We experienced a wide variety of challenges that forced us to continually develop innovative solutions throughout the mission. First, we had to learn how to work under the leadership of the lead federal agency—the Department of Homeland Security—and how to work with the dozens of other governmental agencies, NGOs, and sister services. We implemented a battle rhythm within the task force of daily commander’s update briefs, battle update briefs, and logistics synchs. We attended daily interagency meetings led by Department of Homeland Security personnel that synchronized all federal, NGO, and volunteer efforts across the camp. Additionally, we assigned a liaison officer who worked alongside our interagency partners and handled all requests for military support from other organizations.
Another challenge centered around supply distribution. We benefitted tremendously from the efforts of Team Rubicon, a volunteer organization that managed the intake and warehousing of thousands of donated goods. Our battalion’s mortar platoon worked closely with the volunteer team to sort soccer balls, school supplies, clothing, diapers, baby formula, hygiene items, and a variety of other items. Company executive officers submitted requests for supplies, sometimes identifying specific diaper sizes or clothing items that were needed in their respective blocks, which the mortar platoon later delivered from the warehouse. Throughout the mission our team distributed over 2.6 million donated items and tens of thousands of government-purchased items.
Feeding the 7,200 refugees proved to be a daily challenge. Our task force assisted in crowd control for two dining facilities and six grab-and-go facilities across the camp. Early in the mission the Afghan refugees were highly concerned about having enough food, which resulted in disorganized and chaotic queues and the hoarding of food. Over time, the guests gained confidence that the dining facilities would not run out of food, which reduced the amount of hoarding. Additionally, KBR, the contractor that ran the dining facilities and many of the other services across the camp, implemented a meal card system that greatly improved operations.
Maintaining an accurate count of the population remained an ever-present challenge. Since we were unable to use standard military methods to maintain accountability, such as formations and roll calls, keeping track of thousands of people who were free to wander the camp as they pleased proved to be particularly difficult. The State Department and the Department of Homeland Security ran several different databases that listed the guests housed at the camp, but each system computed slightly different numbers. To remedy this problem, our task force planned and executed a camp-wide census to reverify the camp’s population. Since dozens to hundreds of refugees left the camp for resettlement each day and shuttle buses carried hundreds more to various locations across the camp on a continual basis, gaining an accurate count proved to be a serious and perplexing problem. The solution we developed involved publicizing the date and time of our census several days in advance and issuing instructions for all refugees to remain in their assigned barracks buildings until they could be counted. Additionally, we had to gain the cooperation and consent of all other agencies and NGOs working on the camp to ensure a soccer game, an English class, or a knitting group wouldn’t pull people away from their barracks on the assigned day. On the day of the census over a dozen teams consisting of military and State Department personnel quickly verified each refugee’s identification materials and validated that the camp’s overall population matched the database.
Lessons Learned
In the approximately ninety days our battalion spent at Camp Atterbury, we assisted in the resettlement of over six thousand Afghan refugees. During the mission we interacted with over ten federal agencies, a half dozen nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations International Organization for Migration. To be successful, our battalion had to learn and implement a few lessons. First, we had to remain flexible. As a combined arms battalion that normally focuses on shooting gunnery and training for the next National Training Center rotation or combat deployment, we had to implement nonstandard solutions to meet the needs of this unique mission. Military occupational specialties were largely irrelevant since the entire operation fell outside of our normal combat mission. Rather, in several cases we had to adapt by assigning tasks based on individual personality and aptitude.
The second lesson we learned was the importance of remaining patient, exercising tact, and building relationships with partners to achieve a common goal. Liaising closely with interagency partners was essential to our success, and developing relationships was a critical part of that process. On several occasions we encountered civilians who were completely unfamiliar with how military organizations functioned, which forced us to exercise restraint and understanding rather than the take-charge attitude that is often celebrated among members of the military. Assertiveness often proves useful in the missions assigned to the military but can be counterproductive during a DSCA mission requiring collaboration with interagency partners.
Finally, we learned to continuously emphasize cultural sensitivity with our soldiers. While we never experienced a serious incident, we knew that a careless word or gesture from someone in our task force could do great harm to our relationship with the refugees under our care. By providing a detailed culture brief to the entire formation prior to deployment, and by continuing to reinforce those lessons throughout the mission, we never experienced a serious cross-cultural misunderstanding during our time at Camp Atterbury.
Overall, it was an honor to serve in support of Operation Allies Welcome. It was a challenging mission, one that required our battalion’s soldiers to work far outside the bounds of their normal duties and overcome challenges every day. These challenges taught us lessons, making it an experience that contributed to the development of both the battalion and its individual members. More broadly, every soldier I spoke to was glad to be a part of such a historic moment in our history. After two decades of war, the Thunderhorse Battalion proudly served in the final chapter of our nation’s conflict in Afghanistan.
Major Jeb Graydon serves as the executive officer in the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Previously, he served as the maneuver program manager at the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq in the US embassy in Baghdad. He holds a master’s degree in history from the University of North Georgia and a master of military arts and sciences from the US Army Command and General Staff College.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. Tackora Farrington, Indiana National Guard
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mwi.usma.edu · by Jeb Graydon · January 18, 2023
23. We Need Clear Communication Over What's Happening in Japan
Excerpts:
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters, “We’re replacing an artillery regiment with an outfit that’s more lethal, more agile, more capable.”
Another element agreed to last week, was for Japan “to establish a permanent joint headquarters” so that there could be “more effective Alliance command and control relationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness.”
As impressive, was the outcome of the talks in terms of promised military capabilities to meet any Chinese threat. Austin insisted, “It’s absolutely critical that leaders of great powers maintain open lines of communication and be able to talk with each other. In that way, we can avoid miscalculation wherever possible. And you see us continuing to try to ensure that we keep those lines open, and I would invite my colleagues in China to meet us halfway there.”
And although Austin said, “What we’re seeing recently, is some very provocative behavior on the part of China’s forces,” he added, “whether or not that means that an invasion is imminent, I seriously doubt that.”
Let us hope open communications prevent miscalculations in both the short and long terms.
We Need Clear Communication Over What's Happening in Japan
thecipherbrief.com
Fine Print
January 17th, 2023 by Walter Pincus, |
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010.
View all articles by Walter Pincus
OPINION — A rearmed Japan provides the U.S. with another strong Indo-Pacific ally which should calm down what I believe are exaggerated fears of China using military force to seize Taiwan.
Japan’s decision last month to spend $320 billion on defense over the next five years, almost doubling its former planned defense spending, and spending two percent of GDP annually thereafter, will put it near $80 billion annually by 2027. That would place it third in world spending, behind only the U.S. and China.
More important is Japan’s decision to develop counterstrike or offensive capabilities, illustrated by the reported plan to purchase $1.58 billion of U.S. long-range [up to 1,000 miles] Tomahawk cruise missiles for deployment on Japanese Aegis destroyers in 2026 and 2027. Also, in Japan’s proposed budget is a plan to purchase American-made Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with a range of about 560 miles for its upgraded F-15s.
Japan also has a capable defense industry as illustrated by a December agreement with the United Kingdom and Italy to develop jointly – a next-generation, F-X fighter aircraft by 2035. The proposed stealthy, twin-engine airplane project will be led by Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Britain’s BAE Systems. Japan is also developing its own hypersonic weapons as well as unmanned and multi-role military vehicles.
In the production area, among last week’s U.S.–Japan agreements, was a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding in which both the Pentagon and Japan’s Ministry of Defense commit to promoting U.S.-Japanese collaboration on research projects in emerging defense technologies such as high-power microwaves, autonomous systems, and counter-hypersonics.
There was also movement related to nuclear weapons.
In January 11, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoshimasa Hayashi, and Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada held what was described as “an in-depth discussion on U.S. extended deterrence for Japan, as well as on the recently released U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,” according to a Defense Department press release.
During that discussion, “The United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear,” according to the release.
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In the past, nuclear weapons have been a super-sensitive subject in Japan. However, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, the late former-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was instrumental in promoting a rearmed Japan, said that Japan should break with the past and debate possible “nuclear-sharing” with the U.S., similar to that of NATO countries.
Without disclosing the outcome of last week’s talks, the January 11 press release said the four officials “reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended nuclear deterrence remains credible and resilient, bolstered by Japan’s capabilities.”
That latter phrase would indicate some new role for the Japanese when it comes to possible U.S. nuclear weapons use – a reaction bolstered by the statement that both countries plan a deeper “Extended Deterrence Dialogue” at future senior level meetings.
U.S.-Japanese officials did, however, agree to update Article V to include a possible attack “to, from or within space” on a Japanese or U.S. target. They added, however, “a decision as to when such an attack would lead to an invocation of Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.”
Back in 2019, the U.S. and Japan included cyber as a military domain where attacks also would be covered under Article V.
Another less publicized outcome from the talks came in the Joint Statement of President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida released last Friday. It was a re-affirmation that America’s Article V treaty commitment to defend Japan “using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear…applies to the Senkaku Islands.”
The Senkaku Islands are five uninhabited, rocky islets 87 miles northeast of Taiwan and 205 miles southeast of mainland China. After World War II, the Senkakus were administered, along with the Ryukyu Islands, by the U.S. until 1972, at which time they were returned to Japan.
However, China considers the Senkakus to be part of Taiwan, over which it claims sovereignty. That’s based on China’s control over the islands from the 14th Century and the claim they are part of Taiwan, despite the terms of an 1895 treaty ending the Sino-Japanese war which gave the Senkakus to Japan.
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Since 2012, “China has increased its deployments of maritime law enforcement and naval ships near the [Senkaku] islands and increased military patrol flights in the East China Sea, prompting reciprocal responses from the Japanese Coast Guard and Japanese Air Self Defense Force,” according to a March 2021 Congressional Research Service report.
In January 2021, the Beijing government passed a law that permitted the Chinese Coast Guard to forcibly attack foreign vessels they believe are carrying out economic activities in waters claimed by China. The Japanese responded by giving their own Coast Guard authority to fire when foreign vessels attempted to land persons on any of the Senkaku Islands.
In April 2021, at a meeting in Washington, President Biden and then-Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide issued a statement that referred to Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and said, “Together, we oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands.”
Beyond reinforcing Japanese defense of the Senkakus, last week’s meetings made clear that the U.S. and Japan plan to increase bilateral military exercises and training in and around those islands. “They also committed to expand joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and to increase bilateral exercises and training in areas including Japan’s Southwest Islands,” as stated in a Defense Department release.
There are approximately 55,000 American service members based in Japan today, located primarily on seven bases along with dozens of smaller installations.
The U.S. Navy has about 20,000 service members at three major bases on mainland Japan: Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo. Yokosuka is the largest U.S. Navy base in the world and has the aircraft carrier “USS Ronald Reagan,” the Seventh Fleet Command ship “USS Blue Ridge,” plus other cruisers and destroyers that are part of Carrier Strike Group Five.
The Fifth Air Force, with headquarters at Yokota Air Base, has 15,000 Airmen and civilians located on three main air bases – Kadena Air Base, on Okinawa; the 35th Fighter Wing at Japan’s Misawa Air Base on the northern island of Honshu; and the 374th Airlift Wing at Yokota Air Base in a Tokyo suburb.
The Misawa Air Base is interesting in that it has both U.S. Air Force and Navy as well as Japanese Self Defense Force aircraft on the nation’s most northern major island, closest to North Korea. The U.S. Navy flies patrol, reconnaissance and electronic collection aircraft from Misawa while the Japanese fly three unmanned Global Hawk surveillance drones that arrived last March.
The Global Hawks are there to “conduct information gathering in areas relatively remote from Japan, as well as persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions,” Japan’s Ministry of Defense said when the drones first arrived.
Not too much later, in October 2022, U.S. Pacific Air Forces deployed MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Kanoya Air Base, which is located on Japan’s most southern major island.
The unmanned Reapers will be used for surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering activities near Japan’s southwestern island chains, including the Senkakus. An estimated 150 to 200 U.S. military personnel will be stationed in Kanoya to provide operational support.
These new surveillance assets will be run in coordination with the newly established U.S.-Japan Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell (BIAC) at Yokota Air Base, set up to jointly analyze information acquired by Japanese and U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The Japanese Defense Ministry said a team of 30 Japanese and U.S. intelligence analysts would work on the project.
Some 18,000 Marines are stationed in Japan, most of them on Okinawa. However, changes in their deployments were outlined by the Marines months ago, but discussed and agreed to by the Japanese during last week’s meetings. The plan is to change the Okinawa-based 12th Marine Regiment, which is now an artillery unit with 3,400 personnel, into a 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) which would have 2,000, but with a different makeup and different equipment. Plans called for the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment to be in Japan by 2025, with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, such as the MQ-9A Reaper, anti-ship, long-range fires, and long-range, unmanned transportation capabilities.
The MLR would also include smaller units that would have 75 to 100 Marines as an Expeditionary Advanced Base detachment that could be prepared to deploy to small island chains. The MLRs would be built for small tasks with a signature that it is not easily detectable, but power enough, that an enemy has to deal with it.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters, “We’re replacing an artillery regiment with an outfit that’s more lethal, more agile, more capable.”
Another element agreed to last week, was for Japan “to establish a permanent joint headquarters” so that there could be “more effective Alliance command and control relationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness.”
As impressive, was the outcome of the talks in terms of promised military capabilities to meet any Chinese threat. Austin insisted, “It’s absolutely critical that leaders of great powers maintain open lines of communication and be able to talk with each other. In that way, we can avoid miscalculation wherever possible. And you see us continuing to try to ensure that we keep those lines open, and I would invite my colleagues in China to meet us halfway there.”
And although Austin said, “What we’re seeing recently, is some very provocative behavior on the part of China’s forces,” he added, “whether or not that means that an invasion is imminent, I seriously doubt that.”
Let us hope open communications prevent miscalculations in both the short and long terms.
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24. Frank Sobchak Joins MWI as Chair of Irregular Warfare Studies
Someone who speaks truth to power.
Irregular Warfare has for too long been an intellectual orphan in DOD and Frank is someone who can help correct that as well as help to correct the single biggest failure of the last two decades: the lack of IW proficient campaign headquarters to orchestrate comprehensive IW campaigns.
Frank Sobchak Joins MWI as Chair of Irregular Warfare Studies - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by MWI Staff · January 17, 2023
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Retired Colonel Frank Sobchak, PhD, has joined the Modern War Institute as the chair of irregular warfare studies for 2023. He has taught at the US Military Academy at West Point, the Joint Special Operations University, Tufts University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in military history from West Point, an MA in Arab studies from Georgetown University, and a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. During his twenty-six-year career in the US Army, he served in various Special Forces assignments including leading teams and companies in 5th Special Forces Group advising foreign militaries and representing US Special Operations Command as a congressional liaison. He served in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and in combat in Iraq. His final assignments included garrison command.
He led the Army effort to publish an official history of the Iraq War. That effort spanned five years and included the declassification of over thirty thousand pages of documents and several hundred interviews in addition to having access to a similar sized set of documents and interviews that had not yet been released. The project’s culmination resulted in the publication of the two-volume, 1,500-page set, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War.
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mwi.usma.edu · by MWI Staff · January 17, 2023
25. 'Night Stalkers' Stole a Soviet Mi-25 Hind D from Right Under Gaddafi's Nose
A fascinating story that I am sure few are aware of.
'Night Stalkers' Stole a Soviet Mi-25 Hind D from Right Under Gaddafi's Nose
warhistoryonline.com · by Elisabeth Edwards, Guest Author · January 5, 2023
In just 70 hours, over 60 men with the US Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment pulled off one of the most brazen military heists in recent history. Dubbed Operation Mount Hope III, the top-secret clandestine mission went off without a hitch, despite sand storms and the looming threat of Libyan forces. Without a single shot fired, they managed to steal one of the Soviet Union’s most prized possessions: a Mil Mi-25 Hind D attack helicopter.
Chadian-Libyan War
Map of the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya + Libyan troops recapture the Aouzou Strip following the Battle of Aouzou, 1987. (Photo Credit: 1. Mohammedbas / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0 2. Bernard Bisson / Sygma / Getty Images)
Operation Mount Hope III took place directly following the end of the Chadian-Libyan War, which raged across Chad between 1978 and 1987.
Tensions between both had began a decade prior with the rise of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. As part of his siege of power, Gaddafi claimed a piece of land along the Chad-Libya border known as the Aouzou Strip, a 44,000-square-mile piece of land consisting almost entirely of the Sahara Desert. With support from Eastern Bloc countries, he trained and armed a Chadian group of insurgents known as the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT).
On August 27, 1971, Chad accused Egypt and Libya of supporting a coup d’etat against President François Tombalbaye. When it failed, Tombalbaye cut all diplomatic ties with Libya and Egypt, and invited Libyan opposition groups to relocate themselves to the country. In response, Gaddafi chose to officially recognize the FROLINAT as the true Chadian government.
The countries resumed diplomatic relations in 1972, when Chad agreed to cede the Aouzou Strip to Libya in exchange for £40 million. Chad and Libya signed a Treaty of Friendship in December 1972 to make the deal official.
By 1978, the newly-peaceful relationship between Chad and Libya had all but dissolved. The former became a war zone, with Chadian groups backed by France and the FROLINAT supported by Libya. The French intervened in the conflict with no luck, and it continued well into the 1980s.
At the start of 1987, Libyan forces still bolstered impressive numbers: 8,000 troops and 300 tanks. However, they’d lost the support of their Chadian allies, who’d previously provided assault infantry and reconnaissance forces. Without this help, Libya was left high and dry in the desert.
Meanwhile, the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) had increased their military force to 10,000 troops who were equipped for the desert war with fast and sand-proof Toyota pickup trucks armed with Missile d’Infanterie Léger Antichar (MILAN) anti-tank guided missiles. The vehicles gave this part of the conflict the nickname, “Toyota War.”
Mil Mi-25 Hind D
Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) soldiers with a modified Toyota pickup truck near Ouadi Doum following the defeat of Libyan forces during the Chadian-Libyan War. (Photo Credit: Dominique Faget /AFP / Getty Images)
The Toyota War ended in September 1987, after the Chadians outnumbered the Libyans and regained control of the Aouzou Strip, only for it to fall to Libya once more during a second battle. The Libyans lost thousands of troops and $1.5 billion worth of tanks, weapons and equipment that were destroyed or abandoned during their retreat. Twenty aircraft were also left behind at the air base at Ouadi Doum – one, in particular, caught the attention of the US military.
The Mil Mi-25 Hind D was among the most advanced Soviet helicopters of the time, and the US had nothing like it. Dubbed the “devil’s chariot” by forces in Afghanistan, it’s both adaptable and unbeatable, serving as an attack and transport chopper. It has six suspension weapon units on its wingtips, is equipped with a four-barreled YakB-12.7 machine gun and can accommodate up to 12 anti-tank missiles.
The Mi-25 Hind D is also heavily-armed, with a sophisticated high-explosive fragmentation warhead capable of penetrating thick armor. The 18,000-pound beast is fast and adept at combat, as well as troop transport, making it the ultimate chopper – and also incredibly difficult to steal from right under Libya’s nose.
Operation Mount Hope III
Mil Mi-25 Hind D being loaded into a Lockheed C-5 Galaxy after its successful capture during Operation Mount Hope III. (Photo Credit: US Army / Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain)
After negotiations between American, French and Chadian forces, the US military was granted permission to recover two Mi-25s, one of which was at Ouadi Doum. The mission was assigned to the US Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, also known as the “Night Stalkers.”
Their task posed several unique challenges. Not only did they have to fly to the area in the middle of the night, they then had to slung-load the massive helicopter and fly off without losing it or tipping off nearby Libyan guards. In April 1988, the troops began training with Boeing MH-47 Chinook helicopters around the deserts of New Mexico. One carried an external load of six 1,900-liter water containers to mimic the weight of the Mi-25 Hind D.
On June 10, over 60 personnel boarded a Lockheed C-5 Galaxy with two MH-47s loaded in the cargo hold. Departing from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the team flew to N’Djamena International Airport, in Chad, and disembarked the C-5, loading up the two helicopters before departing for their 550-mile trip to Ouadi Doum at midnight.
Keeping the mission a secret was the only way it would succeed; Libyan forces remained in the target area and could easily be tipped off. There were also fears the Mi-25 Hind D would be bombed as part of the Soviet Union’s plan to prevent clandestine recovery efforts like that of Operation Mount Hope III.
At Ouadi Doum, a team was already on the ground preparing the helicopter for transport. Flying it was deemed too risky, as it had a bullet hole in one of its engines, so the rotors were removed in preparation for transport. The MH-47s then arrived on the scene. Their additional fuel tanks were removed to ensure they could lift the Soviet chopper, which was slung-loaded underneath one of the American helicopters, before taking off toward safety with the second in tow.
The additional fuel tanks and rotor blades were flown out on a Lockheed C-130 Hercules.
Just as they were approaching N’Djamena International Airport, the team was engulfed by a sand storm, which virtually clouded out any visibility. Both MH-47s flew slowly and within sight of one another to prevent a collision as they braved the onslaught of desert dust. Remarkably, they safely landed with the Mi-25 Hind D – not a single bullet fired or man left behind.
What happened to the Mil Mi-25 Hind D?
Captured Mil Mi-25 Hind D on display at the Southern Museum of Flight in Birmingham, Alabama. (Photo Credit: US Army / Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain)
After the storm had settled, the Mi-25 Hind D was loaded onto a C-5, while the two MH-47s were put into a second.
The Soviet helicopter arrived at Fort Rucker, Alabama on June 16, 1988, where it was brought up to flying status and thoroughly evaluated to inform and train personnel on enemy capabilities. It was even flown during training exercises, acting as an opposing force for US helicopters and soldiers on the ground.
In 2012, the Mi-25 Hind D was saved from the scrapyard and put on display at the Southern Museum of Flight in Birmingham, Alabama, where it remains today.
Elisabeth Edwards is a public historian and history content writer. After completing her Master’s in Public History at Western University in Ontario, Canada Elisabeth has shared her passion for history as a researcher, interpreter, and volunteer at local heritage organizations.
She also helps make history fun and accessible with her podcast The Digital Dust Podcast, which covers topics on everything from art history to grad school.
In her spare time, you can find her camping, hiking, and exploring new places. Elisabeth is especially thrilled to share a love of history with readers who enjoy learning something new every day!
The Digital Dust Podcast
linkedin.com/in/elisabethcedwards
warhistoryonline.com · by Elisabeth Edwards, Guest Author · January 5, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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