Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Never build, but always plant; in the case of the first, nature will interfere and destroy the creation of your work, but in the case of the second, nature will help you, causing growth in everything you planted."

– Leo Tolstoy

"When the people are being beaten with a stick, they are not much happier if it is called the People's Stick."

– Mikhail Bakunin, Russian revolutionary, anarchist, and political writer (1814-1876)

"How far you go in life depends on your being tender with the young, compassionate with the aged, sympathetic with the striving and tolerant of the weak and strong. Because someday in your life you will have been all of these."

– George Washington Carver

1. A Fundamental Shift or More of the Same? A Rebuttal (north Korean situation)

2. #NorthKorea: Threats and the arsenal of resistance - John Batchelor Show

3. How the Ukraine War Is Aiding North Korea’s Illicit-Arms Business

4. Hyundai and Kia Emerge as Tesla’s Biggest U.S. Rivals

5. As if We Didn’t Have Enough to Frighten Us …. (north Korea)

6. UNSC to hold consultations on N. Korea this week

7. U.S. warns against N. Korea's weapons aid to Russia after N. Korean FM's visit to Moscow

8. Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea nearly triples in 2023

9. Defector-turned-lawmaker says ‘Kim Jong Un’s provocations a bluff, no need for concern’

10. Insiders say North Korea is not in any position to immediately wage war

11. N. Korean leader spotted using Mercedes-Benz SUV despite sanctions

12. Nuclear envoys of South, U.S. and Japan call on North to ditch hostile rhetoric

13. N. Korea risk, earning shocks cause Seoul's stock market to stumble

14. Kim Jong Un’s Declaration of a Hostile Relationship Between North and South Korea Is a Big Deal

15. North Korea boosts salaries, introduces cash cards for more currency control

16. N. Korea broadcasts map highlighting only northern Korean Peninsula in red

17. What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1: A blind spot with no outside witnesses

18. N. Korean refugee-turned-scholar joins prominent think tank

19. What Hezbollah’s Fortifications Teach Us About North Korean Defenses

1. A Fundamental Shift or More of the Same? A Rebuttal (north Korean situation)

A response from my friend and colleague at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy to Robert Carlin's and Siegfried Hecker's recent assessment of the north Korean security.

Ambassador Schäfer was twice the German Ambassador to Pyongyang.

A Fundamental Shift or More of the Same? A Rebuttal

HTTPS://WWW.38NORTH.ORG/2024/01/A-FUNDAMENTAL-SHIFT-OR-MORE-OF-THE-SAME-A-REBUTTAL/
BY: THOMAS SCHÄFER
JANUARY 17, 2024

I have always followed Robert Carlin’s and Siegfried Hecker’s meticulous work with a keen interest and admiration. I share their belief that engaging with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is necessary, and I also think that, as they state in their article “Is Kim Jong Un preparing for War?” “a failure to understand the history of North Korean policy…has dangerous implications for grasping the magnitude of what confronts us now.” However, my understanding of Pyongyang’s policy of the last one or two decades is quite different. 

There is one core statement in Carlin’s and Hecker’s article that I agree with: the danger of a military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has been growing for some time—and it keeps growing. Apart from that, however, I mainly diverge.

The authors argue that from 1990 to 2019, the DPRK “pursued a policy centered on the goal of normalizing relations with the United States as a buffer against China and Russia.” I assume that they talk about a security buffer, not an economic one, as most parts of the world, at least during Kim Jong Il’s time, would have welcomed stronger economic interchanges with North Korea, and some, including the US, even offered incentives. But the idea of Pyongyang wanting to rely on Washington security-wise, seems far-fetched indeed. Never have I encountered any indication of this. On the contrary: hostility towards the US is one of the core tenets of North Korea’s ideology of self-reliance; it serves as justification not only for its overspending on the military, but also for the regime’s other deficiencies.

The authors claim that North Korea “tried to pull the US back into serious talks by giving unprecedented access to the nuclear center at Yongbyon to one of us” (for clarity: during the time of Hecker’s visit in January 2004, the Six-Party-Talks (6PT) had been on-going for half a year). I do not know how much reticence there had been in Washington before agreeing to a resumption of talks with Pyongyang. But in any case, the authors do not mention that it was Pyongyang that proved to be not willing to comply with the agreements reached in the course of the negotiations (mainly the September 2005 agreement, and in big part because of verification issues) and that it was Pyongyang that finally, in 2009, pulled out of the 6PT altogether. This is a one-sided summary of the 6PT by the authors, at best.

The authors claim that because of the failure of the Hanoi summit in 2019, Pyongyang reoriented its policy away from seeking a “buffer” arrangement with Washington toward China and Russia and toward “a military solution to the Korean question.” They note that from 2023 on, war preparedness was repeatedly mentioned in the official media, that “at one point, Kim Jong Un even resurrected language calling for ‘preparations for a revolutionary war for accomplishing…reunification,’” and they correctly mention that the recent shift in Pyongyang’s South Korea policy has made South Korea a “legitimate” military target. They do not explain, however, why the consequence of a breakdown of talks with the US would necessarily have to be war with the South.

I agree that the international conditions (war in Ukraine, tensions because of Taiwan, etc.) are favorable to North Korea and that Pyongyang has been trying to increase tensions for some time. However, this process did not start after Hanoi, but much earlier, around the beginning of Kim Jong Un’s reign with e.g., the breakdown of the Leap Day Agreement, a new military doctrine and the “byungjin” policy (“parallel” development of the economy and nuclear arms which, however, in fact, meant a further increase of military funding, as even high officials privately admitted to me in those years). At about the same time, the official language became more aggressive as well. Threats about a “holy war of reunification,” implicitly or openly, including the use of nuclear bombs even against South Korea, were repeatedly made well before Hanoi.

Some examples: In 2013, a couple of days after the American and South Korean Defense Ministers had agreed on a “Tailored Deterrence Strategy Against North Korea Nuclear and Other WMD Threats,” the North Korean General Staff declared that Pyongyang would counter US-ROK plans to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons by preemptive measures such as a first strikeat the slightest sign of such preparations. In July 2014, Hwang Pyong So, Head of the General Political Bureau of the Armed Forces, threatened nuclear strikes against the White House and the US military bases scattered across the Pacific.

In 2015, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland stated:

…The DPRK’s access to smaller, precision and diversified nuclear strike means was designed to conclude the final battle with the US in its mainland. But we do not hide that if the south [sic] Korean warmongers offer cannon fodder for US war of aggression against the DPRK, south Korea will also be the target of our retaliatory strikes.

Or, in 2016, in the words of the Chief of the General Staff:

If the US imperialists and the south Korean puppet warmongers persistently stage nuclear provocation…the powerful revolutionary Paektusan army will launch a preemptive strike of severest punishment in the sky, land, seas and underwater without any restriction and without any warning and prior notice…until the historic cause of national reunification is accomplished and the root cause of aggression and evil is totally eliminated.

In July of the same year, according to the North Korean media, the country conducted ballistic missile tests to prepare for the preemptive strike of the ports and airports in South Korea from which it was assumed the US would use nuclear weapons against North Korea. And in 2017, Hwang Pyong So threatened to destroy “the strongholds of aggression through merciless preemptive strikes of Korean style and accomplish the historic cause of national reunification.” At times, however, Pyongyang has also said that it would “never” use nuclear weapons against South Korea.

So basically, there is nothing new in Pyongyang, but—and here, I agree with the authors—recently, there has been an increase in this kind of violent language.

This recent propaganda increase has nothing to do with a policy shift after Hanoi, but the timing is related to the coming US presidential elections. In the run-up to Hanoi, the North Koreans had hoped that President Trump—whom they considered the weakest link—would give in to their requests. Although they did their best to minimize the State Department’s influence on Trump (see Stephen Biegun’s interview with Arms Control in 2021, at that time, Trump did not agree to their demands. I do not think Pyongyang believes it can influence the outcome of the US presidential elections. But it surely believes that a Republican victory (preferably with Trump, but even with some of the other Republican contenders) would give North Korea a second chance to further its objectives. I thus believe that Pyongyang (following a well-established negotiating pattern employed, e.g. in the run-up to the Olympic Winter Games of 2018) will continue to increase tensions until after the US elections, but that at the height of tensions, it will finally be willing to re-engage with a Republican Administration in the hope to get sanctions relief, some sort of acceptance of their nuclear program, and—as main objective—a reduction or even complete withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula.

H.E. Thomas Schäfer hails from Oldenburg, Germany and he is a member of the Board of Advisors to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. During his career in the German Foreign Office, he was posted several times to East Asia and is the former German Ambassador to North Korea (2007-2010 and 2013-2018), and Guatemala (2010-2013). In Bonn and Berlin, he mainly focuses on arms control. He has PhD in German history from the University of Kiel in 1985. He is the author of the book, From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners Prevailed: On the Political History of North Korea (2007-2020).

2. #NorthKorea: Threats and the arsenal of resistance - John Batchelor Show

My interview last evening with John Batchelor and Gordon Chang on the recent developments in north Korea.

https://audioboom.com/posts/8434147-northkorea-threats-and-the-arsenal-of-resistance-david-maxwell-senior-fellow-at-the-foundatio

#NorthKorea: Threats and the arsenal of resistance. David Maxwell, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

https://www.38north.org/2024/01/is-kim-jong-un-preparing-for-war/

https://www.foxnews.com/world/north-korea-launches-solid-fuel-missile-tipped-hypersonic-warhead-state-media-claims

3. How the Ukraine War Is Aiding North Korea’s Illicit-Arms Business

An important article. north Korea's malign activities around the world are too often overlooked or ignored.

Excerpts:

North Korea has a long history of arms deals. In the 1980s, Pyongyang exported small arms to other authoritarian governments such as Libya and Iran, going on to sell tanks and armored vehicles to Zimbabwe. The Kim regime’s missile program is almost entirely modeled on Soviet weapons and technology. North Korea supplied Yemen’s Houthi rebels with Scud missiles in the 1990s as part of its efforts to secure foreign currency, according to South Korean intelligence.

More recently, North Korean grenade launchers have been used by Hamas fighters in the war with Israel, while its 122 mm artillery shells might also be in use by Hamas, according to South Korea’s military. North Korea has denied any weapons-supply ties with the group.

The North Korean leader also hasn’t shied away from showing off new weapons technology at military parades, including some gear that might seem unusual for use on the Korean Peninsula. At a 2021 parade, North Korean soldiers marched through downtown Pyongyang in desert camouflage—despite a lack of such terrain locally.

North Korea often publishes photos and video footage of its illicit weapons launches, too. In recent years, Pyongyang has conducted dozens of missile tests and flaunted its military drones.

How the Ukraine War Is Aiding North Korea’s Illicit-Arms Business

Moscow’s use of Pyongyang-supplied missiles on the battlefield showcases the advances of Kim Jong Un’s regime

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/how-the-ukraine-war-is-aiding-north-koreas-illicit-arms-business-62e66fd8?

By Dasl Yoon

Follow and Timothy W. Martin

Jan. 18, 2024 5:30 am ET

North Korea hasn’t been able to gauge how its new generation of missiles performs on the battlefield—until now. PHOTO: JUNG YEON-JE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

SEOUL—One of the world’s biggest illicit-arms suppliers just got a major advertisement.

In recent weeks, Russian forces have fired short-range ballistic missiles in Ukraine provided by North Korea, according to assessments from Washington, Seoul and Kyiv. Pyongyang has provided Moscow with dozens of the weapons, the U.S. says.

Officials concluded that North Korean weapons were being used by analyzing debris collected in Ukraine. Russia is believed to have used Pyongyang’s new KN-23 and KN-24 short-range missiles, defense experts say. Both countries have denied engaging in arms transfers.

Despite a barrage of test launches, North Korea hasn’t been able to gauge how its new generation of short-range ballistic missiles performs on the battlefield—particularly against Western defenses—until now.

The high-profile battlefield exposure is likely to afford the regime of leader Kim Jong Un new proliferation opportunities, security experts say. The country’s illicit-arms business stretches back decades, though it has trailed off in recent years. Traditional customers in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere shifted to lower-cost drones, which performed better than Pyongyang’s outdated offerings. Tighter sanctions elevated the risk that shipments en route would get intercepted.

The site of a Russian missile attack on a hotel in Kharkiv, Ukraine. PHOTO: YEVHEN TITOV/ZUMA PRESS

The use of the short-range missiles hands fresh endorsement to North Korea’s weapons sales, as militarization is rising globally and creating new demand from nations without access to legitimate arms sales.

“North Korea will be able to command a premium for these systems in ways it wasn’t before,” said Toby Dalton, senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. “This is the cash cow.”

Kim, the 40-year-old dictator, recently toured the country’s largest munitions factories, ordering officials to ramp up production. An increase in arms sales could provide a much-needed boost for a North Korean economy still recovering from the pandemic.

The country’s precise missile-production capacity is difficult to assess, given the Kim regime’s penchant for secrecy. But North Korea is believed to operate more than 300 munitions factories, including another 100 civilian facilities that can shift to weapons production, according to South Korean estimates.

North Korea does have some advantages over the West, where arms makers have struggled to keep up with the demand created by the Ukraine war. Pyongyang’s weapons manufacturing is state-controlled. Kim can put people to work in factories if he wants to ramp up production.

Pyongyang leans on homegrown producers and illicit networks to feed its missile industry. But it also leans heavily on Russia and a few other allies for certain supplies and technological know-how, said Tushar Sudesh Mangure, a defense analyst at analytics firm

GlobalData. To supercharge production further, Russia could provide the raw materials that North Korea struggles to access, he added.

The remains of an unidentified missile in Ukraine, which authorities there said was made in North Korea. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

That Russia, a United Nations Security Council permanent member, has used North Korean missiles with apparent success sends some very clear messages to potential customers who may have been on the fence about conducting arms business with the Kim regime, said Darya Dolzikova, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense and security think tank.

One such message is that Russia remains unlikely to interdict any such transactions shipped through its borders or greenlight punishment at the U.N. for buyers, she said. The other is that the North Korean missile systems may be more reliable than previously believed.

“If I were a potential customer of this, the technology is being used by the Russians, possibly improved by the Russians,” Dolzikova said. “I would assume these technologies are going to get better.”

The two countries’ closeness was on full display this week, as North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Moscow, meeting with her counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Lavrov expressed gratitude for North Korea’s support for Russia’s fight in Ukraine. Following a Putin-Kim summit last September, the two countries had pledged greater partnership in all areas.

North Korea: Most Powerful Weapon Ready if U.S. Makes ‘Wrong Decision’

Hyundai and Kia Emerge as Tesla’s Biggest U.S. Rivals

A pair of allied Korean carmakers push to launch electric vehicles ahead of competitors

https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/hyundai-and-kia-emerge-as-teslas-biggest-u-s-rivals-bc610384?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Sean McLain

Updated Jan. 18, 2024 12:34 am ET

The KIA EV9 at the New York International Auto Show in April. PHOTO: CRAIG RUTTLE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

As the electric-vehicle race heats up, a pair of Korean automakers are pulling ahead of larger rivals in the U.S. to emerge as

Tesla’s TSLA -1.98%decrease; red down pointing triangle biggest competition. Hyundai Motor 005380 -0.88%decrease; red down pointing triangle and affiliate Kia 000270 -0.68%decrease; red down pointing triangle jointly captured the No. 2 slot last year in U.S. electric-vehicle sales, trailing only Tesla, which still holds a commanding lead. Analysts say the allied carmakers, both a part of South Korea’s Hyundai Motor Group conglomerate, are poised to cement or advance their lead over non-Tesla rivals this year with fresh EV models and aggressive pricing. Behind their growth, which last year outpaced both Tesla and the broader EV market, is an aggressive bet on the technology that was placed last decade and is now materializing in showrooms as sales for EVs have taken off in recent years.

Robot Dogs and AI: Is This the Future of EV Factories?

As if We Didn’t Have Enough to Frighten Us …

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/opinion/north-korea-war.html

Jan. 17, 2024

A South Korean marine patrols the shore near the country’s boundary with North Korea.Credit...Jung Yeon-Je/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Share full article
268

By Nicholas Kristof

Opinion Columnist

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

Want the latest stories related to North Korea? Sign up for the newsletter Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send them to your inbox.

The globe is already pockmarked with crises, and here may be another: North Korea is acting in highly unusual ways, leading some veteran analysts to fear it is preparing a surprise attack on South Korea and perhaps on Japan and Guam as well.

I’ve seen many false alarms since I began covering and visiting North Korea in the 1980s. I wouldn’t write about this latest warning except that it comes from two particularly credible experts who bluntly conclude that “Kim Jong-un has made a strategic decision to go to war.”

That’s speculation without hard evidence to back it up, and they acknowledge that this kind of prediction is fraught. But one of those experts is Robert Carlin, who has been analyzing North Korea for 50 years for the C.I.A., State Department and other organizations. The other is Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear expert at Stanford who has visited North Korea seven times and was given extensive access to that country’s nuclear programs; he’s apparently the only American to have held North Korean plutonium (in a jar) in his hands.

Carlin and Hecker published their warning in an essay on the 38 North website, which focuses on North Korea. They raised the possibility that North Korea might use its nuclear warheads to strike the region (it’s not clear if its warheads could reach the United States and survive re-entry into the atmosphere).

Carlin and Hecker both told me that they don’t know when an attack by Kim, the country’s leader, would happen or what form it might take.

“Is it going to be an all-out attack?” Carlin asked. “I have no idea what the thinking of his army is right now. I suspect it is making plans and they’re arguing about it. And some of them are saying, ‘This is nuts. We can’t do it.’ Others are saying: ‘This is what the leader wants, and we’re going to do it. And actually, we have enough missiles and nuclear warheads that we can.’ ”

North Korea excels in bluster and insults (remember “dotard”?), and my general view is that Kim is a pragmatist who uses bombast for bargaining leverage. That may be the case this time: We’ve never much understood what’s going on with North Koreans, and perhaps they’re just seeking attention. My inclination would be to dismiss these warnings — if they were coming from anyone else. But Carlin and Hecker are pros who deserve to have their alarm taken very seriously.

It has been evident for some time that something is afoot in North Korea. Kim invested his hopes in a 2019 summit with President Donald Trump in Hanoi — and that fell apart, leaving Kim humiliated. For decades under three leaders, North Korea sought a deal with the United States involving trade, prestige and economic benefits, but now it seems to have given up on that. Instead, it has bolstered ties with Russia, improved its nuclear weapon capabilities and escalated its rhetoric.

This week North Korea announced that it would take a much harsher approach to South Korea, changing its constitution and its longstanding policy on reunification, and would not respect traditional boundary lines. Kim said his army was making preparations for “a great revolutionary event,” which Carlin said is a phrasing that previously has been used to describe war with South Korea.Editors’ Picks

Kim said North Korea did not want war but suggested it may be coming: “The war will terribly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea” — the official name for South Korea — “and put an end to its existence. And it will inflict an unimaginably crushing defeat upon the U.S.”

I reached out to other experts to gauge their views. Joel Wit, a longtime North Korea expert at the State Department, now at the Stimson Center, said he takes Carlin and Hecker “extremely seriously.” Wit said that a recent incident in which North Korea fired artillery shells near waters disputed with South Korea “sent chills down my spine” because it seemed a possible rehearsal for a major provocation.

The Biden administration has not focused on North Korea for understandable reasons: It is wrestling with many other urgent crises. It may be too late to engage the North diplomatically if it has decisively given up on the United States, Wit said, but he added that China is now so deeply alarmed about North Korea that Beijing might be of help.

Deborah Fikes, a member of the National Committee on North Korea, a coalition of people with deep experience with the country, said that many nonprofits that normally have working relations with North Korea have been unable even to get responses to their inquiries. She, too, is worried about the risk of conflict.

On the other hand, one reason for skepticism is that it’s hard to see how North Korea benefits by attacking its neighbors. Carlin and Hecker don’t have a solid answer for that, but they note that there is a long history of surprise attacks around the world that were surprising precisely because they didn’t make sense to those attacked.

Hecker observed that North Korea is one of only three countries that constitute potential nuclear threats to the United States — the others are Russia and China — yet North Korea lately hasn’t gotten much high-level attention. It should.

What I’ve mostly learned from covering North Korea is not to make predictions about it. But it seems prudent to me for the Biden administration to step up diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang, to try to engage China at senior levels on this issue, to allocate intelligence assets to better understand North Korean risks and to ensure that our military forces are prepared. None of us know what will happen, and it would be wise to be ready for anything.

UNSC to hold consultations on N. Korea this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 18, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) will convene consultations on North Korea this week, its website showed Thursday.

The UNSC is scheduled to hold the "closed" consultations at 10 a.m. Thursday (New York time) on the issues of North Korea, non-proliferation and other matters, according to the website.

South Korea, along with the United States and Japan, are said to have requested the consultations.

It marks the first UNSC meeting dealing with North Korea since Seoul began a two-year term as a nonpermanent member this year.

South Korea is expected to expand its foothold in the U.N. body to better address the North Korean issue and other security challenges during its term.

During the meeting, UNSC members are likely to discuss North Korea's growing military cooperation with Russia and its latest provocations.

On Sunday, the North fired a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile carrying a hypersonic warhead, its first missile launch since firing the solid-fuel Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile on Dec. 18.

This composite image shows a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (L) and a missile being launched. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 18, 2024

7. U.S. warns against N. Korea's weapons aid to Russia after N. Korean FM's visit to Moscow

(LEAD) U.S. warns against N. Korea's weapons aid to Russia after N. Korean FM's visit to Moscow | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 18, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 (Yonhap) -- The United States warned Wednesday against North Korea's potential provision of additional military aid to Russia for use in Ukraine, as Pyongyang's top diplomat visited Moscow this week in an apparent sign of deepening bilateral ties.

At the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui visited Russia from Monday to Wednesday, during which she also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"Clearly, North Korea and Russia have a relationship," Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder told a press briefing. "What we don't want to see is the continued proliferation of aid to Russia to be used in Ukraine."

This photo, released by the Associated Press, shows Pentagon Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder speaking during a briefing at the Pentagon on Jan. 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

Asked to comment on the North's recent launch of what it claims was a hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile, Ryder called on Pyongyang to refrain from "destabilizing" activity.

"When it comes to destabilizing activity, we will continue to call on North Korea to refrain from such activity and will continue to consult closely with our allies in the region to ensure that we can maintain regional peace and security," he said.

In a separate briefing, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller urged the North to come back to dialogue.

"We call on the DPRK to refrain from further provocative destabilizing actions and statements and to return to diplomacy," he told a press briefing, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"In particular, we encourage the DPRK to engage in substantive discussions on identifying ways to manage military risks and create lasting peace on the Korean peninsula," he added, reiterating the U.S. harbors "no hostile intent" toward the North.

On the North Korean foreign minister's trip to Russia, Miller took note of arms transfers between the two sides that the U.S. has criticized as a violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.

"We've seen Russia providing weapons to North Korea. We've seen North Korea providing weapons to Russia," he said. "We've seen Russia taking actions in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, including ones that it itself supported."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 18, 2024

8. Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea nearly triples in 2023

An indicator of possible internal instability is an increase in the number of elite defections. Yes, many have better opportunities while being posted overseas but the fact is that members of the elite are defecting. They may know something we cannot yet observe.

(2nd LD) Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea nearly triples in 2023 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 18, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- The number of North Korean defectors who arrived in South Korea came to 196 last year amid a rise in defections by North Korean diplomats and trade officials, government data showed Thursday.

The defections by 32 men and 164 women raised the total number of the North's defectors in South Korea to 34,078, according to the data from Seoul's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs.

The figure represented a hike from 2021 and 2022, when the number of North Korean defectors entering South Korea fell sharply to 63 and 67, respectively, due to pandemic-related border closures. It marked a dramatic decline from a record high of 2,914 in 2009, according to the unification ministry.

Among those who came to the South last year, more than half, or 99 people, were in their 20s and 30s, the ministry said.

North Korean defectors receive computer education at Hanawon in Anseong, south of Seoul, in this file photo taken July 10, 2023, on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the opening of the resettlement center for North Korean defectors. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

The ministry said there has been a rise in the number of defections by North Korean diplomats, trade officials and students studying overseas, adding the number of such defectors in so-called elite groups came to around 10.

A ministry official said the number was the highest since 2017, without providing further details, such as comparable figures.

North Korean diplomats stationed at the country's overseas missions and officials engaged in trade affairs are believed to have chosen to flee their oppressive home country, as they are under pressure to send hard currency to the regime.

In November, North Korea's foreign ministry said it is restructuring its overseas missions to boost diplomatic efficiency, which Seoul's unification ministry assessed as being affected by the North's faltering economy, worsened by the U.N. sanctions on its nuclear and missile programs.

Among the 196 defectors, around 70 percent came from the North's provinces bordering China, and 25 people, or 12.8 percent, hailed from Pyongyang, the ministry said. It is far higher than 2.5 percent, the proportion of North Koreans coming from Pyongyang out of the total North Korean defectors arriving in the South.

In recent years, more North Korean defectors picked aspirations for freedom as the No. 1 reason for their escape over food shortages, according to a separate survey by the Korea Hana Foundation, an agency affiliated with the ministry.

In 2023, nearly 23 percent of those surveyed said they chose to defect as they were disillusioned with the North's regime, followed by 21.4 percent citing a food crisis.

South Korea has a longstanding policy of accepting any North Korean defectors who want to live in the South and repatriating any North Koreans who stray into the South if they want to return.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 18, 2024

9. Defector-turned-lawmaker says ‘Kim Jong Un’s provocations a bluff, no need for concern’

I think KJU is following the decades old KFR playbook. But each time KJU acts out it is like we are discovering north Korea for the first time.

But I do think we need to be concerned, especially if Kim is under stress from potential internal instability.

Defector-turned-lawmaker says ‘Kim Jong Un’s provocations a bluff, no need for concern’

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/01/18/RIEOE5YHZJH53OAHJ6IDZR56RE/

By Kim Seung-jae,

Kim Seo-young

Pubilshed 2024.01.18. 15:41

Updated 2024.01.18. 16:06

People Power Party lawmaker Tae Yong-ho said in an interview with Chosunilbo, "The regime known as North Korea is a system that falters and weakens when met with a strong response to elevated provocations." /Lee Deok-hoon

In an interview with Chosunilbo on Jan. 17, People Power Party (PPP) lawmaker Tae Yong-ho (Thae Yong-ho) said, “It doesn’t make sense for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to claim he is preparing for war while selling his weapons to other countries,” regarding North Korea’s recent political and military provocations. “There is no need to be anxious about Kim Jong Un’s bluff or intimidation.”

Tae Yong-ho, a former high-ranking North Korean diplomat, secured a seat in the Seoul Gangnam-gu district during the general elections on April 15, 2020, four years after his defection. He is now the ruling party’s spokesperson for the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee.

North Korea has been intensifying political and military provocations since the end of last year.

“Since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol government, the trilateral security alliance among South Korea, the United States, and Japan has strengthened, and the establishment of the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG) has enhanced capabilities for responding to North Korea’s nuclear threat. Kim Jong Un previously attempted to exploit the weakness in the nuclear war aspect that the South Korea-U.S. alliance had not adequately prepared for. However, with the South Korea-U.S. alliance now closely addressing North Korea’s nuclear threats, Kim Jong Un has become more uneasy.”

Some interpret the provocations as considering the April general elections in South Korea and the November U.S. presidential election.

“I agree. Kim Jong Un hopes for an opportunity to engage in dialogue and negotiations with the U.S. after President Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump. From Kim Jong Un’s perspective, he wants to instill the perception among the American people that North Korea has developed advanced nuclear weapons because the Biden administration has not engaged in dialogue with North Korea. To achieve this, he continues to showcase new and diversified weapons and escalate provocations.”

What impact is the North aiming to have on the South’s general elections?

“The People Power Party advocates ‘peace through strength,’ while the Democratic Party of Korea emphasizes ‘A bad peace is better than a good war.’ The North Korean regime is trying to manipulate the views of South Koreans by considering which choice they will make between the two parties. As the election approaches, the North Korean regime is likely to escalate its provocations.”

People Power Party lawmaker Tae Yong-ho gives an interview with Chosunilbo at the National Assembly Members' Office Building on Jan. 17, 2024. /Lee Deok-hoon

How much influence can North Korea’s provocations have on the general elections?

“In the past, the so-called ‘Northern Wind’ strategy worked, but now it is unlikely to receive much support. There are no signs of anxiety among the people or activities such as evacuation drills for U.S. military families. The impact on the elections is expected to be minimal. Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un will not give up on this approach. He has no other option.”

Is there an intention to consolidate internal unity?

“The [Millennials and Generation Z] in North Korea secretly watch South Korean dramas and movies, admiring South Korea and having expectations for reunification. By excluding concepts of nationality and peaceful reunification from the constitution, Kim Jong Un is trying to convince the MZ generation in North Korea that ‘unification is impossible.’”

President Yoon on Jan. 16 said, “If North Korea provokes, we will retaliate multiple times.”

“It was a very well-made statement. The North Korean regime is a system that backs down and weakens when faced with strong retaliation. If we ‘tone down’ the response, Kim Jong Un may misinterpret it as ‘South Korea is weakening because of my high-level provocations.’ Defense Minister Shin Won-sik and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Myung-soo delivered a strong message during the early part of this year when they inspected forward-deployed units, saying ‘swiftly, forcefully, until the end’ in response to provocations. When North Korea fired projectiles in the West Sea for three consecutive days at the beginning of the year, our military responded with more than double the firepower, and the situation is calm now.”

If North Korea raises the tension, could it lead to actual provocations?

“It’s hard to say that there is no possibility of provocations. The firing of guns and artillery shells could occur, but massive provocations like the sinking of the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan are unlikely to happen.”

What leads you to that judgment?

“North Korea is now selling a significant number of its shells and missiles to Russia, which is at war with Ukraine. They are reportedly selling everything they produce, including items deployed in military units because they need money right now. At the same time, they are concerned that ‘what if South Korea and the United States suddenly invade, knowing about this situation?’ If Kim Jong Un thinks of starting a war immediately this year, it doesn’t make sense for him to send a bunch of weapons to Russia right now. Kim Jong Un is trying to scare South Korea and the U.S. by showing off and acting as if he will do something significant.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) greets North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia on Jan. 16, 2024. /Reuters-News1

There are suspicions that North Korea is getting military technology from Russia in exchange for arms deals.

“I believe the frequent provocations are related to Russian military technology transfers. North Korea’s recent launches of military reconnaissance satellites, solid-fuel hypersonic missiles, and others are highly sophisticated technologies. From North Korea’s perspective, the current moment of transferring weapons to Russia is a time to conduct as many military experiments as possible and introduce technologies that were previously unresolved.”

What is the internal situation in North Korea?

“Contrary to Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric, North Korean residents view the possibility of war as absurd. They are preparing for farming, and Communist Party officials encourage factory production. In times of real tension, Pyongyang used to hold ‘nighttime air raid drills’ every evening, but they are not taking place now.”

10. Insiders say North Korea is not in any position to immediately wage war

I concur that the regime is likely not ready to go to war immediately and deliberately. But it could go to war "in extremis" if it has no other option. And while the north will not win a war, it can and will inflict tremendous damage if Kim chooses to attack for any reason. Sun Tzu: "Never assume your enemy will not attack. Make yourself invincible."

Insiders say North Korea is not in any position to immediately wage war

"A geometric expansion of our nuclear stockpile is a major issue under discussion. This will be reviewed within the year," a source in the Workers' Party of Korea said

By Seulkee Jang - 2024.01.18 3:51pm

dailynk.com

Insiders say North Korea is not in any position to immediately wage war | Daily NK English

“The 10th Plenary Meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was held on Jan. 15 at the Mansudae Shrine in the capital, Pyongyang,” the Rodong Sinmun reported on Tuesday. The meeting decided to abolish organizations related to dialogue with South Korea, including the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau, and the (Mount Kumgang) International Tourism Administration. (Rodong Sinnmun-News1)

After defining the inter-Korean relationship at a year-end party meeting as “between two hostile states,” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stoked war fever by speaking at a recent meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly about “completely occupying, subjugating, and reclaiming” the ROK. But some inside North Korea say the country is not in a position to wage an immediate war.

“While it could be said that we are prepared, at least to some extent, to [attack] Seoul and Tokyo, we can’t hit Washington with our current weapons systems. We can’t start a war without being able to hit the US,” said a source familiar with the situation in the North Korean military, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“Before we go to war, we first need multiple re-entry vehicles or EMP [electromagnetic pulse] devices,” said another source, who stated flatly that there is no chance of war breaking out any time soon.

Kim devoted a substantial portion of his policy speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly to ratcheting up tensions, mentioning the word “war” no fewer than 23 times.

“War will terribly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and put an end to its existence. And it will inflict an unimaginably crushing defeat on the U.S. Our military capabilities, already in readiness, are being rapidly updated,” Kim threatened in the speech, according to the English translation published by North Korean state media.

In addition, the North Korean leadership told senior cadres and military commanders after the year-end party meeting that “war could break out at any time” and ordered them to complete war preparations this year, even though the five-year plan for developing weapons systems is not due to be completed until late next year.

By stoking tensions with direct mentions of “war,” Kim’s apparent goal is twofold: internally, he hopes to strengthen discipline in the military and speed up weapons development; and externally, he seeks to gain leverage in negotiations with the U.S.

“There is a generational change in the Korean People’s Army, but no one wants to serve in the military these days. [Kim’s words] are a wake-up call for the army and a signal to the defense industry and defense science sector to speed up development,” one of the sources told Daily NK.

Meanwhile, discussions about negotiations with the U.S. appear to be ongoing inside North Korea.

“Our position is that we can sit down for talks if, as we desire, the U.S. and South Korea take a peaceful approach without objecting to our actions and without bothering us with human rights or sovereignty issues. This has been discussed again recently, and the foreign ministry department in charge of U.S. negotiations is working hard [in preparations],” said a source inside the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).

Ultimately, North Korea’s calculation behind ratcheting up military tensions and pushing for faster weapons development is to acquire strategic weapons before the U.S. presidential election and to gain more leverage in future negotiations with the U.S.

“A geometric expansion of our nuclear stockpile is a major issue under discussion. This will be reviewed within the year,” the WPK source said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Seulkee Jang

Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

11. N. Korean leader spotted using Mercedes-Benz SUV despite sanctions

No lack of luxury goods for Kim and his elite.

N. Korean leader spotted using Mercedes-Benz SUV despite sanctions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 18, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was seen getting out of what appeared to be a luxury Mercedes-Benz SUV, state media footage has shown, despite international sanctions banning the North's imports of luxury goods.

Footage aired by the North's Korean Central Television on Monday showed Kim emerging from a black SUV whose rear door on the right side has the sign of Kim's title, the president of the State Affairs Commission.

It appeared to be his new private car, presumed to be the top-class model of the Mercedes-Maybach GLS 600.

This image, captured from footage of North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Jan. 15, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un emerging from what appears to be a Mercedes-Benz SUV. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

In August 2020, Kim was spotted in the driver's seat of an SUV, presumed to be a Lexus LX 570, when he visited flood-hit areas.

Kim has made public appearances in different Mercedes-Maybach S-class vehicles, including a limousine, snubbing international sanctions on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

Key North Korean officials, including Premier Kim Tok-hun, arrived at the venue of a year-end party meeting in late December in Mercedes-Benz sedans, separate footage showed.

Such vehicles are subject to U.N. sanctions that ban the supply of luxury automobiles to North Korea.

In October, South Korea's unification ministry said Kim and his family are spending up to millions of dollars a year on luxury goods despite chronic food shortages and economic difficulties aggravated by U.N. sanctions and COVID-19.

This file image, captured from footage of North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Jan. 1, 2024, shows the North's leader getting out of a Mercedes-Benz vehicle to attend a performance celebrating the new year. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 18, 2024

12. Nuclear envoys of South, U.S. and Japan call on North to ditch hostile rhetoric

Unfortunately the regime's rhetoric is foundational to its political warfare strategy.

Thursday

January 18, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Published: 18 Jan. 2024, 17:46

Nuclear envoys of South, U.S. and Japan call on North to ditch hostile rhetoric

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-18/national/diplomacy/Nuclear-envoys-of-South-US-and-Japan-call-on-North-to-ditch-hostile-rhetoric/1961692

Kim Gunn, South Korea's nuclear envoy, center, shakes hands with his American counterpart Jung Pak, right, and Japanese counterpart Hiroyuki Namazu, left, at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul on Thursday. [NEWS1]

The nuclear envoys of South Korea, the United States and Japan urged the North to cease its increasingly hostile rhetoric against the South and return to denuclearization talks.

Meeting with the U.S. nuclear envoy Jung Pak and Japanese nuclear envoy Hiroyuki Namazu in Seoul on Thursday, South Korean nuclear envoy Kim Gunn criticized the North for clinging to the “old playbook” of shifting blame to the South and the U.S. and creating tensions “for the sake of internal solidarity.”

“We call on North Korea to immediately stop provocations, lift its self-imposed ban on talks, and come back to the path of denuclearization, peace and prosperity,” Kim said.

The meeting followed a series of meetings among the envoys in Seoul this week to discuss the North’s latest military provocations, including its launch of a ballistic missile last Sunday.

“We strongly condemn this launch, which violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions,” Pak said in the meeting.

She added that the North’s “unlawful, nuclear and ballistic missile programs,” arms transfers to Russia to aid its invasion of Ukraine, continued cyberattacks around the world and human rights violations against its people demanded coordinated action from Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul.

Pak also criticized the North’s increasingly hostile rhetoric against the South in recent weeks, which was “unnecessarily increasing tensions” on the Peninsula.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently called for South Korea to be designated the regime's top enemy in the constitution of the country, according to a report in the official newspaper of the North's ruling party earlier this week.

Namazu, in turn, called on the North to address immediately the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens in the meeting, thanking his U.S. and South Korean counterparts for their cooperation on the matter.

The three envoys also met bilaterally between Wednesday and Thursday in Seoul, addressing the North Korean foreign minister’s visit to Moscow this week in their talks.

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Tuesday. The Kremlin's statement a day later suggested the two sides discussed defense and security issues.

“We are aimed at developing relations in all areas, including sensitive ones,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reportedly told the press on Wednesday.

Following the White House announcement earlier this month that Russia had used short-range ballistic missiles provided by North Korea in attacks against Ukraine, nearly 50 foreign ministers, including those of South Korea, the United States and Japan, issued a statement condemning the North.

Both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied that arms shipments have taken place, but South Korean and U.S. officials have cited satellite reconnaissance of Rajin port in North Korea, which shows a significant number of containers being loaded onto Russia-bound ships, as circumstantial evidence of weapons being delivered to Russia.

With the North warning it will launch at least three additional spy satellites into space this year, the U.S. Department of Defense announced this week that it will be assessing the North's ability to conduct warfare in space.

“As far as the idea of North Korea as a threat from space, if there are things that enable their ability to do a war fight, that is a thing that we take seriously and track and build into our plans,” John Plumb, the first assistant secretary of defense for space policy, told reporters in a press briefing on Wednesday, according to local reports.

However, he also cast doubt on the sophistication of North Korea's space technology.

BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]

13. N. Korea risk, earning shocks cause Seoul's stock market to stumble

north Korea does not usually move the stock market. An indicator?

N. Korea risk, earning shocks cause Seoul's stock market to stumble

The Korea Times · January 18, 2024

An electronic signboard at Seoul's Hana Bank shows the benchmark KOSPI closing at 2,440.04 points, Thursday, up 4.14 points or 0.17 percent from the previous session. Yonhap

By Yi Whan-woo

Korean stocks have been performing sluggishly since the beginning of the year after advancing about 5 percent in December alone on the back of the U.S. central bank’s dovish shift in its monetary policy.

Analysts said Thursday that market sentiment in Seoul was increasingly weak due mainly to North Korea’s military threats that go beyond their usual bluster.

They also said the earning shocks suffered by Samsung Electronics and LG Energy Solution in the fourth quarter added to to the weak sentiment at the moment, considering the semiconductor and secondary battery sectors were considered highly promising.

Moreover, prospects for a U.S. rate cut dwindled as the U.S. Federal Reserve said it got “way ahead of itself” in late 2023, concerning its shift in monetary policy, by not taking into consideration jobs and other economic factors, which are still unstable.

The benchmark KOSPI retreated more than 8 percent, hovering at 2,400 points this week, after closing at 2,665.28 points on Dec. 27, the last trading day of 2023.

Korea correspondingly sits at the bottom among G20 economies in terms of growth rates concerning respective stock markets.

On Thursday, the KOSPI gained slightly — 4.14 points or 0.17 percent — to close at 2,440.04 points.

“Under the circumstances, the stocks possibly will lose ground for a couple of months as the risk factors are likely to persist,” Hi Investment & Securities analyst Lee Woong-chan said.

He noted that foreign investors dumped shares worth more than 900 billion won, in the midst of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s call to accelerate war preparations as well as the ratcheting up of missile provocations.

The leader has been steadily eradicating the traces of the legacy of inter-Korean cooperation. Such a move is rarely witnessed in the North and the repercussions on Seoul's stock market due to Pyongyang’s military threats should not be overlooked, according to Lee.

Speaking about semiconductor and secondary battery stocks, KB Securities analyst Lee Eun-taek said that the chip industry is steadily recovering but the pace of growth “will not increase dramatically.”

For the secondary batteries, he assessed that former U.S. President Donald Trump’s possible return if all goes according to his plans in the presidential election is “casting doubt on Korean battery manufacturers in the U.S. considering Trump is not an advocate of green policies."

Asked whether the Korean government’s market-friendly policies would help boost the KOSPI, Hanyang University economics professor Ha Joon-kyung remained skeptical.

The recent policies include a ban on short selling in the name of protecting retail investors and a raise in the capital gains tax threshold from 1 billion won to 5 billion won for shareholders to prevent a year-end selling spree.

“All these policies can help draw investors only when the country’s economy and its business are faring well, which in fact appears to not be the case,” Ha said.

The Korea Times · January 18, 2024

14. Kim Jong Un’s Declaration of a Hostile Relationship Between North and South Korea Is a Big Deal

Excerpts:

The transformation of the Korean Peninsula into a conflict zone poses another challenge for the international community. Countermeasures against nuclear missiles and tests, despite ongoing debate about their effectiveness, have already been established in line with international agreements. The key question is how to respond when military engagement occurs. The immediate priority is to move beyond a deterrent strategy and explore strategic alternatives designed to dissuade North Korea from further provocations.

For instance, an immediate consideration could be to proactively set red lines, such as declaring forceful retaliation if North Korean naval vessels appear below the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea or if there are signs of coastal artillery shelling. In a state of engagement, the risk of escalation to a full-scale war increases with repeated retaliations and counter-retaliations. To prevent this, it is critical to deter any intention to instigate a state of war in the first place.

Expanding the alliance framework to exert more pressure on North Korea is also necessary. While the core alliance revolves around South Korea, the United States, and Japan, it should be extended to include a more comprehensive multilateral force. To effectively restrain an adversary, it is most impactful to involve numerous allies in forming a united front. In this regard, considerations can be made for the “Quad Plus” or even an expansion of NATO into the Asian region.

Now is the time to prevent North Korea, by any means necessary, from instigating yet another war alongside the ongoing conflicts in Israel and Ukraine. Allowing such a scenario to unfold could potentially compromise the cohesion of the U.S. and its allies.

Kim Jong Un’s Declaration of a Hostile Relationship Between North and South Korea Is a Big Deal

thediplomat.com

With a decisive change in the North’s policy toward the South, the Korean Peninsula has now devolved from a state of armistice to one where conflict could loom at any moment.

By Lee Min-yong

January 18, 2024

In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks at the Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Jan. 15, 2024. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified.

Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP

During recent visits to munitions factories, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un referred to South Korea as the “principal enemy” and stated that he had “no intention of avoiding a war,” threatening to annihilate the South if provoked. Right at the outset of the new year, Pyongyang launched around 200 artillery shells into the waters off its western coast near South Korea, prompting Seoul to reciprocate with some 400 rounds of artillery fire. North Korea then conducted live-fire artillery exercises for an unprecedented three consecutive days. These maneuvers further heightened tensions in the aftermath of Kim’s rhetoric characterizing inter-Korean relations as “a relationship between two hostiles at war.”

During the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea late last year, Kim unequivocally stated that North-South relations had shifted from being compatriots to entering a hostile state of war between two countries. He emphasized that North Korea would no longer pursue the notion of peaceful reunification, opting instead to reaffirm its commitment to conquer South Korean territory if deemed necessary. His rhetoric marks a decisive change in the North’s policy toward the South.

Against this backdrop, the Korean Peninsula has now devolved from a state of armistice to one where conflict looms at any moment.

The artillery shelling made good on Pyongyang’s earlier vow to abandon the inter-Korean military agreement signed on September 19, 2018. By targeting the buffer zone in the West Sea, as outlined in the agreement, the North’s artillery assault effectively nullified the framework. This development also undermines longstanding agreements, including the armistice and other military accords, which have historically buttressed the security of the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, the region is regressing into a state reminiscent of the Korean War.

Kim’s declaration of South Korea as an adversary holds significance in shaping his governing strategy. While Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il sought to subvert South Korean administrations using a mix of infiltration operations and deceptive peace offensives, all such efforts ended in failure. In contrast, Kim Jong Un has adopted the pursuit of a bold head-on confrontation, employing nuclear missile provocations and now culminating in the declaration of a state of war.

It is essential to pay attention to the political and diplomatic benefits that Kim intends to achieve by officially declaring a hostile relationship between the North and South. In terms of foreign policy, his primary goal is to solidify cooperation with China and Russia to enhance security, countering the alliance formed by South Korea, the United States, and Japan. As tensions escalate on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea believes it can capture the interest of China and Russia. Pyongyang is keenly aware that heightened tensions will prompt Beijing to take action. Given that China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula aims to maintain the regional status quo without disruptive elements, North Korea views creating instability as more advantageous than aligning with China’s goals.

The upcoming U.S. presidential election in November is a critical variable in forging North Korea’s foreign strategy. Regardless of the election outcome, North Korea recognizes that being in a state of war is more favorable than remaining in a crisis situation.

The primary drivers behind Kim’s declaration involve internal motives within his governance tactics. As highlighted by the unification minister of South Korea, North Korea has escalated the standoff with its opponents as a political strategy to divert domestic discontent over the North’s economic challenges. The critical question hinges on the severity of North Korea’s predicament, as the country has reached a state of disarray to the point where assessing its economic and social conditions is pointless.

For over two decades, the World Food Program (WFP) has consistently listed North Korea among the 20 countries facing the most significant challenges in food and nutrition security. During times of famine, Pyongyang tends to manufacture a war crisis, pushing its citizens into the Arduous March. When Kim asserts his willingness to go to war with South Korea, it reveals the gravity of internal discontent and anxiety within North Korea.

The Korean Peninsula has now emerged as a potential hotspot for an outbreak of war. The United States has long prepared for the worst-case scenario of escalating wars in two far-flung theaters – the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is also currently playing a supporting role in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, although it is avoiding direct involvement. Nonetheless, there are discernible signs of accumulating political and diplomatic fatigue.

In this context, the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula have thrust the United States and its allies into a triple spiral of crises. The latest developments orchestrated by North Korea are unveiling a new phase, characterized by a low-intensity conflict situation. This strategic approach seeks to control military conflict at a limited level, yet the inherent risk lies in its potential escalation into a full-scale war at any moment.

Reflecting on history is imperative: Just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the North deliberately initiated limited military clashes along the border, providing the pretext for its surprise invasion of the South. The recent artillery provocations from North Korea mirror this tactical maneuver and are designed to lure South Korea into a military conflict. The deployment of such a strategy only underscores the seriousness of Kim Jong Un’s governing conditions.

The transformation of the Korean Peninsula into a conflict zone poses another challenge for the international community. Countermeasures against nuclear missiles and tests, despite ongoing debate about their effectiveness, have already been established in line with international agreements. The key question is how to respond when military engagement occurs. The immediate priority is to move beyond a deterrent strategy and explore strategic alternatives designed to dissuade North Korea from further provocations.

For instance, an immediate consideration could be to proactively set red lines, such as declaring forceful retaliation if North Korean naval vessels appear below the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea or if there are signs of coastal artillery shelling. In a state of engagement, the risk of escalation to a full-scale war increases with repeated retaliations and counter-retaliations. To prevent this, it is critical to deter any intention to instigate a state of war in the first place.

Expanding the alliance framework to exert more pressure on North Korea is also necessary. While the core alliance revolves around South Korea, the United States, and Japan, it should be extended to include a more comprehensive multilateral force. To effectively restrain an adversary, it is most impactful to involve numerous allies in forming a united front. In this regard, considerations can be made for the “Quad Plus” or even an expansion of NATO into the Asian region.

Now is the time to prevent North Korea, by any means necessary, from instigating yet another war alongside the ongoing conflicts in Israel and Ukraine. Allowing such a scenario to unfold could potentially compromise the cohesion of the U.S. and its allies.

Authors

Guest Author

Lee Min-yong

Lee Min-yong is a visiting professor at Sookmyung Women's University, Seoul, South Korea, researching North Korea issues.

thediplomat.com

15. North Korea boosts salaries, introduces cash cards for more currency control

Another indicator that the reime is trying to impose even more control over the people. And as noted this may also harm local businesses (probably an intended effect that the regime desires).

North Korea boosts salaries, introduces cash cards for more currency control

Paying with plastic means citizen-run informal markets could suffer.

By Sung Hui Moon and Jieun Kim for RFA Korean

2024.01.17

rfa.org

North Korea is raising workers’ salaries and paying them with cash cards to discourage them from frequenting local markets, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.

The salary increases kicked in at the end of December, with workers in key industries such as foreign currency earners and fertilizer companies getting paid more than 40 times their previous rate, in keeping with similar hikes in the price of rationed rice, which is available only to certain segments of the population.

Other industries saw an increase of about 10- to 15-fold, a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

The raised salaries are being paid out on cash cards, which people can only use at government-owned stores and establishments.

The goal seems to be to exert more control over economic transactions and benefit government-run businesses, instead of family-run businesses in markets, the sources said.

“Instead of paying salaries in cash, the payment is made using an electronic payment card issued by the central bank,” the resident said.

The cards will funnel business into government-owned stores, another Ryanggang resident told RFA on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“The idea is that they don’t go to the market, and they will only use department stores and grain stores,” the second resident said.

But there is still a need for the open-air market, because the government stores don’t sell everything, he said.

“There are no products in department stores and there is only rice and corn at the grain stores. I have to go to the marketplace to find clothes that fit me and sticky rice [not sold elsewhere.]”

From the ashes

North Korea’s marketplaces were born out of economic disaster.

Though North Korea’s planned economy was designed with the government in control of all commerce, it collapsed after the fall of the Soviet Union and a cessation of aid from Moscow, resulting in a famine that killed hundreds of thousands of people, or possibly more than 2 million, or about 10% of the country by some estimates.

The resulting inflation meant that government-assigned jobs no longer paid a living wage, and people had to go into business for themselves to find a way to make ends meet. For many families, opening a stall in the open-air market became a means of survival.

The marketplaces sell living essentials and other goods smuggled in from China or stolen from the military, or services provided by residents, and the government has almost no ability to tax transactions between buyer and seller, paid mostly in U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan.

The marketplaces will not die out overnight though. The new increased salaries are still not enough to live on, so people will still need other income sources.

But paying significant sums of money to workers on cash cards will take some business away from the marketplace, especially when digital cash is more widely accepted in the future, an expert from Ryanggang told RFA.

“There are not many things that can be purchased with an electronic payment card yet, but this problem will be solved if more electronic payment systems are installed in the future,” he said. “When electronic payment cards become widespread, money in residents’ hands will naturally flow into the banks.”

He compared the switch to cash cards with a 2009 change in currency, which wreaked havoc on savings, as the government limited how much of the old currency each person could exchange for the new. The old currency became worthless, and those who were not able to exchange it lost out.

“Now, cash is being replaced, and the salaries are paid with electronic payment cards that can suppress cash,” the expert said. “Therefore, there will be no confusion like the currency exchange in 2009.”

The intellectual said that the authorities believe that the marketplaces will be neutralized once this switch to digital cash occurs.

“[But] in order to neutralize the marketplace, the conditions are that grain stores must be operated without restrictions and department stores and store networks must carry enough products as requested by residents,” he added.

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

16. N. Korea broadcasts map highlighting only northern Korean Peninsula in red

Maybe the Propaganda and Agitation Department thinks this counter's the satellite imagery of the peninsula that shows the lights are out in the north.

See Images at the link: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/01/103_367136.html

N. Korea broadcasts map highlighting only northern Korean Peninsula in red

The Korea Times · January 17, 2024

The image on the right, taken from North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television's program on Jan. 17, 2023, displays a map of the Korean Peninsula with a red highlight specifically focused on the northern part. This contrasts with the image on the left, captured on Monday, where the entire peninsula was highlighted in red. Yonhap

North Korea's state-run broadcasting station on Wednesday aired a map that highlights only the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in red after its leader vowed to no longer seek reconciliation and unification with South Korea.

In the initial segment of a program broadcast on Pyongyang's state-run Korean Central Television, the network presented a map highlighting only the northern region of the Korean Peninsula in red.

The station used the same map on another program Monday, which highlighted the entire Korean Peninsula, encompassing South Korea's southern island of Jeju and the eastern island of Ulleung, in color.

The latest change came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for revising the regime's constitution earlier this week to define South Korea as its "invariable principal enemy" and to codify a commitment to "completely occupying" South Korean territory in the event of war.

South and North Korea remain technically at war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended with a truce, not a peace treaty. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · January 17, 2024

17. What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1: A blind spot with no outside witnesses

An interesting look at COVID in the north. Key points in this excerpt:

As explained in more detail below, I have been working with people living in North Korea for more than 20 years to report on internal developments. The information I received from them is fragmentary, but by comparing and analyzing this accumulated information, I was able to see that the Kim Jong-un regime was using the pandemic as an excuse to impose unprecedented social control measures and a major policy shift to an "anti-market" regime. I could also see that these measures were a recipe for disaster. In this article, I will look back at the four years since the outbreak of the pandemic, focusing on the domestic situation in North Korea.

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1: A blind spot with no outside witnesses　ISHIMARU Jiro

asiapress.org

North Koreans repairing the Yalu River embankment by hand. They appear to have been mobilized from workplaces and the country’s women’s organization. Photo taken from the Chinese side of North Pyongan Province in mid-2021. (ASIAPRESS)

◆Introduction…A disaster unfolding

In the three years and nine months since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in January 2020, many people have died in North Korea. When the border was closed for quarantine reasons, ASIAPRESS reporting partners in North Korea said that they were "more afraid of starvation than the pandemic" and that they had a premonition of disaster. Unfortunately, it became a reality.

The deaths were first caused by the collapse of North Korea's medical system. Trade was cut off, leading to a shortage of Chinese-made medicines, and the sick and injured, especially the elderly and infants, died without treatment. Then, as economic stagnation worsened the plight of urban residents, people began to die of malnutrition. There were also cases of people taking their own lives in despair over the future.

In May 2022, when the coronavirus pandemic hit the country, many people lost their lives, and for several months in the spring of 2023, the chaos in the provincial cities reached its peak; in some areas, there were even signs of famine. Chaos naturally breeds disorder. To combat this, the Kim regime resumed public executions in August 2023.

While not as bad as the social chaos of the late 1990s, known as the "Arduous March," the past few years have arguably been just as disastrous. Japan, South Korea, and the international community have been silent about this humanitarian crisis. I think it's because information is so scarce, and due to the "coronavirus pandemic," no one from the outside has been able to witness the disaster. Koreans in Japan who have relatives in North Korea and North Korean defectors living in Japan are becoming increasingly worried. They haven't heard from their relatives for almost four years.

As explained in more detail below, I have been working with people living in North Korea for more than 20 years to report on internal developments. The information I received from them is fragmentary, but by comparing and analyzing this accumulated information, I was able to see that the Kim Jong-un regime was using the pandemic as an excuse to impose unprecedented social control measures and a major policy shift to an "anti-market" regime. I could also see that these measures were a recipe for disaster. In this article, I will look back at the four years since the outbreak of the pandemic, focusing on the domestic situation in North Korea.

North Koreans work in protective clothing on the banks of the Yalu River. Taken from the Chinese side across from Hyesan in October 2020 (ASIAPRESS)

◆A growing “blind spot”

In January 2020, at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in China, the Kim Jong-un regime sealed its borders, preventing people and goods from entering and leaving the country, and very few people traveled to China, crossed the border illegally, or defected (more on this below).

International media access to North Korea has also been cut off. Major news organizations and media, including Kyodo, AP, and AFP, which had bureaus in Pyongyang, were unable to send a single reporter into the country for four years. Even the Pyongyang correspondent for Chosun Sinbo, the official newspaper of Chongryon in Japan, withdrew in March 2020, and no replacement has been named as of January 2024.

The same goes for the Russian state news agency TASS (China's Xinhua declined to confirm this to us). It has been impossible to travel to China, which has imposed a strict zero-COVID policy, making it difficult to report from the DPRK-China border. Even international mail was stopped, and not a single postcard reached Japan. I don't think there has ever been such an information blackout regarding North Korea.

The cover of the top-secret document entitled: "Remarks by Comrade Kim Jong Un at the Emergency Expanded Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party Central Committee on July 25. In the document, Kim Jong-un made remarks that acknowledged the spread of COVID inside the country. (ASIAPRESS)

A portion of the above document, which reads, "We have failed to prevent the novel coronavirus from entering the country… (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Reporting partners inside North Korea

I began reporting on North Korea in 1993. I went to Pyongyang in 1995 and to North Hamgyong Province in 1997 and 1998, but I realized that there is a "high wall" that can never be jumped over by outsiders, no matter how much effort or money is spent.

In 2002, I decided to work with North Koreans to report on the internal situation. I traveled to China, met with North Koreans who had left the country both legally and illegally, and sought out reporting partners. The goal was to cultivate "citizen journalists. I used a Chinese cell phone to communicate with them. The signals can reach several kilometers inside North Korea. I had 10 reporting partners with varying levels of skill and motivation. But when the pandemic began, I lost contact with four of them. They live in Pyongyang and North Pyongan Province, and I lost the means to communicate with them because they are unable to travel to the border areas, let alone China. The other six live in Yanggang and North Hamgyung Provinces, and Pyongyang and I communicate by telephone or messenger.

In Japan, Yasunobu Shirouchi of the Tokyo Shimbun (who will retire at the end of 2023) and Koichi Yonemura of the Mainichi Shimbun are the only media outlets currently reporting on the situation in North Korea from independent sources, while overseas, several journalists from RFA (Radio Free Asia) have reported with their own sources. Unfortunately, South Korean media has all but abandoned independent reporting from inside North Korea.

ASIAPRESS reporters are all ordinary people, so we can't get high-level information. We don't know much about them except where they live. The research method is simple. All North Koreans are organized into local "people's units" and social groups such as workplaces and women's associations. There, in meetings and study sessions held every one to two weeks, policies and instructions from the Workers' Party or the government are passed on.

We also conduct weekly price surveys at markets and state-owned stores, and visit nearby cooperative farms to assess rural conditions. We ask our reporting partners to use their Chinese smartphones to take pictures of the documents they find so we can review them. But we are a small organization, and our research capacity is limited. With that in mind, we hope you will read the following report.

※ People’s units (or neighborhood watch units) are the lowest level administrative unit in North Korea and each consists of about 20 to 30 households, or about 60 to 100 members. The units are responsible for delivering instructions from the government and tracking the thinking and behavior of the population.

asiapress.org

18. N. Korean refugee-turned-scholar joins prominent think tank

It is very important that KINU has a strong north Korean perspective.

N. Korean refugee-turned-scholar joins prominent think tank

The Korea Times · January 17, 2024

This 2021 file photo shows Cho Hyun-jung, who recently joined the Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-funded think tank that specializes in North Korean studies. Courtesy of Cho Hyun-jung

At 34, Cho decided to go to college where she rediscovered her childhood passion

By Jung Min-ho

At age 4, she lost the tip of her finger due to an accident. Two years later, she lost her mother to tuberculosis. To take care of her sick grandmother, she decided not to go to college. After being deported by Chinese authorities, she even spent months in a North Korean prison.

Yet Cho Hyun-jung never gave up. After escaping North Korea and adjusting to South Korean social and economic life for 10 years, she decided to attend college, where she rediscovered her childhood passion for learning and teaching.

Cho, now 48, recently joined the Korea Institute for National Unification, a prominent think tank for North Korean studies as its first female researcher from the North.

“It is such a great honor to work at this respected and admired institute. I was overwhelmed with emotion to hear that they would hire me,” Cho said in a recent interview. “I’ll do my best to use my expertise and experience to help improve the human rights situation in North Korea as a new member assigned to the human rights department.”

Despite the tragedies during her early years, Cho stayed positive, being too young to understand what it really means to live with a physical disability and without a mother in North Korea. As a talented singer, her first dream was to become a famous vocalist. But she was later forced to quit her school music group due to the finger injury.

Cho was devastated. She eventually convinced herself to become a teacher instead. But going to college was a luxury she could not afford as she had to take care of her grandmother who was showing symptoms of a cerebral vascular disease. Around that period, North Korea’s state rationing system was collapsing. For many people like her, leaving for China to make money seemed like the only option for survival.

In China, Cho said she was, for the first time, able to see her own country objectively from an outside perspective.

“Everything that I had been told in North Korea about capitalism, the United States and South Korea was not true. For the first time in life, I was given a chance to see North Korea’s reality,” she said.

Following the passing of her grandmother, she no longer had any reason to return to North Korea.

After being forcibly repatriated twice in 1999 and 2000, Cho arrived in South Korea in 2003. At first, she never thought of going to college. After deciding to pursue a degree in education, her original plan was simply to get a stable, well-paying job after graduating. But as she delved deeper into her area of studies, she discovered just how interesting and rewarding the field of education could be, which also reminded her of her forgotten passion for sharing her knowledge with others.

Looking back on what she went through, Cho said it was quite a journey. She also said she was excited for the next chapter as she is gearing up for her new role as a researcher and lecturer, hoping her future work would help establish more facts about North Korea, a country founded on countless lies and broken promises.

The Korea Times · January 17, 2024

19. What Hezbollah’s Fortifications Teach Us About North Korean Defenses

Perhaps planners from the ROK/US CFC should pay a visit to Israel and get some briefings from the IDF on the tunnels they have observed.

What Hezbollah’s Fortifications Teach Us About North Korean Defenses

thediplomat.com

Massive underground fortifications, built with Pyongyang’s knowhow, have been key to Hezbollah’s ability to fight Israel – and preview the difficulties of any assault on North Korea.

By A. B. Abrams

January 17, 2024

Israeli soldiers stand at the entrance of a Hezbollah tunnel, May 19, 2019. According to the IDF, the tunnel reaches a depth of 80 meters and extends into Israeli territory.

In the aftermath of the outbreak of open hostilities between Israel and Palestinian militia groups based in the Gaza Strip on October 7, the Israel Defense Forces were simultaneously engaged in an escalating series of skirmishes with militia of the Lebanese political party Hezbollah on their northern border. Ongoing clashes have seen Israeli aviation target militia positions and population centers in southern Lebanon, including using white phosphorus munitions and on January 8 killing a Hezbollah field commander. Hezbollah units have meanwhile frequently launched anti-tank missiles on Israeli armor, targeted Israeli Iron Dome air defense systems with artillery, and on January 6 struck a key Israeli mountain airbase with artillery rockets.

Escalating hostilities have fueled growing calls within Israel for a full-scale assault on southern Lebanon. However, with Hezbollah’s military capabilities and firepower being orders of magnitude greater than those of Gaza-based Palestinian militia groups, the feasibility of such action has repeatedly been brought to question both in Israel and in the United States. According to the Washington Post, a secret assessment by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) warned that Israeli forces would find it “difficult to succeed” in such an operation.

The Washington Post further observed, on the basis of information from multiple U.S. officials, that a “full-scale conflict between Israel and Lebanon would surpass the bloodshed of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war on account of Hezbollah’s substantially larger arsenal of long-range and precision weaponry.” Speaking anonymously, officials warned Hezbollah’s sizable and increasingly sophisticated missile arsenal would also enable it to seriously threaten Israeli petrochemical plants and nuclear reactors. As a result, the Post reported: “In private conversations, the [Biden] administration has warned Israel against a significant escalation in Lebanon.”

The growing possibility of a major war has drawn attention to the sources of Hezbollah’s power, which have allowed it to confront and largely deter a leading regional military. In particular, its vast network of underground tunnels and bunkers is among the best-fortified in the world and stretches across much of southern Lebanon. This network was key to Hezbollah’s ability to effectively counter Israeli forces during their month-long conflict in July-August 2006, which is considered the only military defeat Israel has suffered in its 75-year history.

It is thus notable that this underground network is one of many manifestations of the considerable influence that North Korea has had on the Lebanese militia. More than any other fighting force in the world, Hezbollah has shown strong commonalities with the Korean People’s Army in how it has developed its capabilities over the past two decades. Israeli experts referred to Hezbollah’s war effort in 2006 as “a defensive guerrilla force organized along North Korean lines,” highlighting that “all the underground facilities, including arms dumps, food stocks, dispensaries for the wounded, were put in place primarily in 2003–2004 under the supervision of North Korean instructors.” Other intelligence sources indicated that Hezbollah was “believed to be benefiting from assistance provided by North Korean advisers” on the ground.

Research Department director Tal Beeri of the Israeli Alma Research and Education Center, the country’s leading center for the study of Hezbollah-related security challenges, more recently highlighted that the hundreds of kilometers of underground fortifications were at the core of the Lebanese militia’s ability to wage war with Israel. “In our assessment, these polygons mark Hezbollah’s staging centers as part of the ‘defense’ plan against an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Each local staging center (‘defense’) possesses a network of local underground tunnels. Between all these centers, an infrastructure of regional tunnels was built, interconnected [with] them,” he observed in an interview with the Times of Israel.

With these facilities able to accommodate trucks, they allow Hezbollah to provide security to its mobile ballistic missile launchers much as North Korean forces do. As Beeri stated: “subterranean infrastructure enables a truck to transit to the place where the missile is to be fired. In theory, at the launch site, a platform can be constructed, or a slope leading up from the tunnel. The truck exits the tunnel, fires and goes back down.”

Regarding the North Korean influence on Hezbollah and its role in bolstering the militia’s fighting prowess, and its network of underground fortifications in particular, Beeri elaborated:

Digging tunnels in Lebanon was done from the start with the assistance of North Korea – as far back as the 1980s and especially toward the end of the ‘90s. There is evidence of this. North Korea has historic expertise in the digging of tunnels in mountainous and rocky areas… Eventually, Hezbollah got everything it needed from the Koreans. By 2014, they’d had 25 years of interaction, in the course of which Hezbollah received knowledge and technology to the point where it was able to dig and build the tunnels by itself.

The tunnel and bunker network in the region south of Lebanon’s Litani river alone was by 2006 estimated to have over 600 ammunition and weapons bunkers fortified eight or more meters underground – alongside better fortified command bunkers constructed to a depth of 40 meters using poured concrete. By that time there were at least ten Korean-built tunnel and bunker networks in southern Lebanon – each with dozens of command bunkers, which in turn were each divided into several rooms.

When war broke out that year, Hezbollah’s rocket artillery systems were often deployed from firing pits five meters deep, with foot-thick poured concrete frames reinforced with blast walls and covered with sandbags and thermal blankets, minimizing positions’ heat signatures and making them highly resilient to Israeli air or artillery strikes. North Korean-style tunnels thus served as a force multiplier, which was at the core of Hezbollah’s ability to achieve military success.

This closely mirrored how the Korean People’s Army was itself hoping to counter a U.S.-led assault on a much larger scale in the event of war on the peninsula.

North Korean expertise in tunneling and underground fortifications has its origins in the Korean War, when U.S. forces dropped 635,000 tons of bombs across the peninsula. An estimated 20-30 percent of the northern population died in the war. In the war’s aftermath, in parallel to a major focus on developing a modern air defense capability, key military and industrial sites including entire airfields were built deep underground to prepare for the possibility of a similar air assault.

A recent example of North Korea’s ability to build airbases under mountains was provided in February 2023 when Iranian media released images of the country’s Eagle 44 airbase, likely intended to host newly ordered Russian Su-35 fighters, which is considered highly likely to have been built with extensive North Korean support. Iran’s Fordow uranium enrichment plant is similarly thought to have been built with extensive North Korean assistance and was heavily fortified under a mountain. North Korean knowhow in underground fortifications was previously also exported to China and offered to Vietnam during the Cold War.

Although footage of examples from within North Korea is more scarce, the Pyongyang Metro was notably built from 1965 as the deepest in the world after the United States began deploying and rapidly expanding an arsenal of several hundred nuclear weapons in South Korea, which were largely aimed at the North and peaked at 950 warheads. Three thick metal blast doors at every entrance allow the metro to serve as a shelter in the case of U.S. nuclear strikes. Indeed, this is arguably the Pyongyang Metro’s primary purpose, since the need for underground transportation in the uncrowded city remains limited.

North Korea’s network of tunnels has consistently been a major factor complicating possible planning for military operations against the country. North Korea has the ability to store and manufacture vast arsenals underground, and move them over long distances on underground roads, making it near impossible to ascertain the locations of key weapons and highly challenging to damage them even when they do briefly surface. This has been a major contributor to the country’s security.

When the Obama administration in 2016 seriously considered launching strikes on North Korea, the Pentagon informed the president that options for a limited preventative attack were effectively non-existent as the country’s highly mobile nuclear delivery systems were stored deep underground in facilities which the U.S. military could not locate or neutralize from the air. The Pentagon had thus concluded that not only was it infeasible to seriously set back nuclear and missile development with an attack, as then-President Obama had intended, but also that nothing short of a full-scale ground invasion could disarm North Korea.

The importance of North Korea’s underground fortifications was reflected earlier in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s confirmation hearing in January 2001, when he argued against launching a military attack against the country: “They have gone underground across that country in a way that few nations have done… They have underground emplacements of enormous numbers of weapons.” Rumsfeld thus referred to North Korea’s armed forces as “world class tunnellers.”

Underground fortifications are far from invulnerable. Special “bunker buster” assets such as GBU-57 and nuclear B61-11 bombs are able to reach deep underground, while others such as the Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missile can penetrate less well protected positions. However, such assets are highly costly and compromise only small fractions of any country’s arsenals. This makes even the much smaller tunnel network in southern Lebanon effectively impossible to destroy from the air, let alone the underground networks in North Korea.

Underground fortifications are far from the only means by which North Korea has contributed to Hezbollah’s military potency, with the militia’s intelligence and security network built by Korean-trained specialists such as Ibrahim Akil and Mustapha Badreddine. In parallel to this support, North Korean forces have also fought alongside Hezbollah in Syria, such as at the battle of Al Qusair where North Korean artillery advisers were present, combating an insurgency that was strongly and directly supported by Israel, Turkey and other U.S.- aligned regional and extra-regional actors.

North Korea’s ability to construct tremendous networks of underground fortifications particularly in mountainous or rocky terrain has been a major game changer for the balance of power not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah might have been nearly eradicated in 2006, in accordance with Israeli objectives at the time, had it been forced to deploy its assets on the surface. Hezbollah’s utilization of these networks to achieve major unexpected military successes in 2006 ultimately did much to vindicate decades of tremendous investments in underground fortifications by Pyongyang and the pairing of these with an emphasis on artillery and missile assets as a means of providing an asymmetric defense.

With these fortifications continuing to represent a leading constraint on the Israel Defense Forces’ freedom of action, they have also highlighted the magnitude of the challenges the much larger underground network in North Korea would pose to the United States and its allies in the event of a war on the peninsula.

Authors

Guest Author

A. B. Abrams

A. B. Abrams has published widely on international security and geopolitics with a focus on East Asia, and holds related Master's degrees from the University of London. Among his publications are the books “Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power,” and “China and America’s Tech War from AI to 5G: The Struggle to Shape the Future of World Order.”

thediplomat.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

A Fundamental Shift or More of the Same? A Rebuttal

How the Ukraine War Is Aiding North Korea’s Illicit-Arms Business

Moscow’s use of Pyongyang-supplied missiles on the battlefield showcases the advances of Kim Jong Un’s regime

Hyundai and Kia Emerge as Tesla’s Biggest U.S. Rivals

A pair of allied Korean carmakers push to launch electric vehicles ahead of competitors

As if We Didn’t Have Enough to Frighten Us …

UNSC to hold consultations on N. Korea this week | Yonhap News Agency

(LEAD) U.S. warns against N. Korea's weapons aid to Russia after N. Korean FM's visit to Moscow | Yonhap News Agency

(2nd LD) Number of N. Korean defectors entering S. Korea nearly triples in 2023 | Yonhap News Agency

Defector-turned-lawmaker says ‘Kim Jong Un’s provocations a bluff, no need for concern’

Insiders say North Korea is not in any position to immediately wage war

N. Korean leader spotted using Mercedes-Benz SUV despite sanctions | Yonhap News Agency

Nuclear envoys of South, U.S. and Japan call on North to ditch hostile rhetoric

N. Korea risk, earning shocks cause Seoul's stock market to stumble

Kim Jong Un’s Declaration of a Hostile Relationship Between North and South Korea Is a Big Deal

North Korea boosts salaries, introduces cash cards for more currency control

N. Korea broadcasts map highlighting only northern Korean Peninsula in red

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1: A blind spot with no outside witnesses ISHIMARU Jiro

◆Introduction…A disaster unfolding

◆A growing “blind spot”

◆ Reporting partners inside North Korea

N. Korean refugee-turned-scholar joins prominent think tank

What Hezbollah’s Fortifications Teach Us About North Korean Defenses

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1: A blind spot with no outside witnesses　ISHIMARU Jiro