Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Never build, but always plant; in the case of the first, nature will interfere and destroy the creation of your work, but in the case of the second, nature will help you, causing growth in everything you planted."

– Leo Tolstoy

"When the people are being beaten with a stick, they are not much happier if it is called the People's Stick."

– Mikhail Bakunin, Russian revolutionary, anarchist, and political writer (1814-1876)

"How far you go in life depends on your being tender with the young, compassionate with the aged, sympathetic with the striving and tolerant of the weak and strong. Because someday in your life you will have been all of these."

– George Washington Carver

1. Pakistan Conducts Strikes in Iran, Retaliating for Earlier Hit by Tehran

2. The First Rule of Cluster Munitions: Don’t Talk about Cluster Munitions By John Nagl and Dan Rice

3. Taiwan reports first major Chinese military activity after election

4. The Black Sea is now the center of gravity for the Ukraine War

5. Why US Airstrikes Aren’t Stopping Attacks by Iran-Backed Houthi Militia

6. DoD 'completely rewrites' classification policy for secret space programs

7. Expect a Chinese show of force against Taiwan soon, says INDOPACOM head

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2024

9. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 17, 2024

10. South Africa and other antisemitic genocidaires accuse Israel of genocide

11. To Defend Taiwan, the US Navy Must Retake the Ocean High Ground

12. Before Larger or More Lethal, the U.S. Navy First Needs a Maritime Strategy

13. The National Security Imperative of the Defense Appropriations Bill

14. What the Navy is learning from its fight in the Red Sea

15. Austin Leaves Hospital, Returns Home

16. Ukraine’s War of Narratives

17. The Quiet Transformation of Occupied Ukraine

18. DEI Destroys Excellence, Military Cohesion at Service Academies

19. Congress Ensures Continuity in US Policy Toward China and Taiwan

20. Of Green Berets & Secret CIA Missions

21. Zelenskyy's Battlefield Visits by Mick Ryan

22. China Has A Formidable Marine Corps But PLA's UN Peace-Keeping Fiasco Shows It's Not Battle-Hardened

23. People as a Weapons System: Moscow and Minsk’s Continued Attempts to Weaponize Migration

24. How civics education can help solve the military recruitment crisis

25. Goodbye PS Magazine

1. Pakistan Conducts Strikes in Iran, Retaliating for Earlier Hit by Tehran

Pakistan Conducts Strikes in Iran, Retaliating for Earlier Hit by Tehran

Pakistani official says 20 Pakistani militants killed

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/pakistan-conducts-airstrikes-in-iran-368922b0?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Saeed Shah

Updated Jan. 18, 2024 2:43 am ET

Pakistan’s foreign ministry in Islamabad. PHOTO: AAMIR QURESHI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—Pakistan carried out airstrikes early Thursday inside Iranian territory, in retaliation for an Iranian airstrike in Pakistan on Tuesday that had targeted Iranian insurgents, Pakistani officials said.

The two nations were careful to say that they had only targeted their own nationals in the tit-for-tat strikes, an indication that neither country wants the situation to spiral, experts said. But risks of a miscalculation remain amid heightened tensions in the Middle East in the wake of the Israel-Hamas war.

Pakistan, which has had an uneasy but not hostile relationship with Iran in recent decades, is getting hit by the wider shock waves in the region.

Tehran is trying to show strength as it is in an indirect confrontation with the U.S. and Israel in the wake of Israel’s war in Gaza, experts said. Pakistan got sucked into that demonstration of Iran’s resolve, which also saw Tehran hit targets in Syria and Iraq this week as it flexed its regional muscles, they added.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the bombardment as “precision military strikes against terrorist hideouts” in Iran’s bordering province of Sistan-Baluchistan. It said that the action was taken in light of credible intelligence of impending large-scale terrorist activity.

A Pakistani security official said 20 “terrorists” were killed, according to initial estimates. Both aircraft and missiles were used for the bombardment, no more than 31 miles inside Iran, which hit separatists based there from Pakistan’s west, the official said.

A man checks the daily newspapers at a stall in Islamabad. PHOTO: ANJUM NAVEED/ASSOCIATED PRESS

“This action is a manifestation of Pakistan’s unflinching resolve to protect and defend its national security against all threats,” said a statement from Pakistan’s foreign ministry.

The move was a response to Iran’s surprise airstrike inside Pakistani territory Tuesday, Pakistani officials said. In that strike, Tehran said that Iranian jihadists were hit, but Pakistan said that two children were killed and three women injured in a remote part of the country bordering Iran.

An Iranian official protested Thursday’s strike, according to the Fars news agency, which is close to the country’s security forces. “Iran demands an immediate explanation from the Pakistani authorities about this incident,” the agency quoted the official saying.

But Tehran also appeared to play down the impact of the strikes, saying that those killed weren’t Iranian.

Seven non-Iranian civilians—three women and four children—were killed in Pakistani strikes on an Iranian village close to the border with Pakistan, local Deputy Governor Alireza Marhamati said, according to Iranian state media.

A damaged building following an Iranian strike on Iraq launched earlier this week. PHOTO: SAFIN HAMID/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Both Islamabad and Tehran have long accused each other of harboring militants. The Pakistani airstrike was against Pakistani separatists it said were present inside Iran.

Iran is closely allied to the regimes in Iraq and Syria and its airstrikes there this week didn’t provoke a military response. But Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state with a large army, making it a far riskier target. Islamabad also needs to show it can’t be bullied, as its main adversary is its giant neighbor to the east, India, which is also nuclear-armed.

“Pakistan’s retaliation appears to have been proportionate to Iran’s earlier strike, and notably it targeted only militants and not Iranian security forces,” said Michael Kugelman, South Asia Institute Director at the Wilson Center, a think tank in Washington. “With both sides even, so to speak, this provides an opening for de-escalation, if cooler heads prevail. But that’s a big if.”

Pakistan indicated that it doesn’t seek further conflict, saying it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.

“Iran is a brotherly country,” said Pakistan’s foreign ministry. “We have always emphasized dialogue and cooperation in confronting common challenges including the menace of terrorism and will continue to endeavor to find joint solutions.”

Ethnic Baloch insurgents frequently attack Pakistani security forces in the remote west of the country, and they have also targeted the Chinese presence in Pakistan. Those insurgents were the target Thursday inside Iran, including a group called the Baloch Liberation Army, according to the Pakistani security official.

Benoit Faucon contributed to this article.

Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis: Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ Explained

About the Author(s)

John Nagl

Dr. John Nagl is a 1988 graduate of West Point and a Professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a master’s and a PhD from Oxford in International Relations, and a Masters from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He served in combat in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom and is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago 2005) and Knife Fights (Penguin 2014). This article expresses his personal views and not those of the United States Army War College, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense.

Dan Rice

Dan Rice is a 1988 graduate of West Point and is the President of the American University Kyiv and the Co-President of Thayer Leadership at West Point. He holds an MBA from Kellogg/Northwestern, a master’s in journalism and Marketing from Medill/Northwestern, a Masters of Education from the University of Pennsylvania and has completed all doctoral classes in Leadership from the University of Pennsylvania. He served in the Infantry in combat in Iraq in 2004-2005. Dan served as Special Advisor to the Commander in Chief of Ukraine Armed Forces (May 2022-March 2023) as an unpaid volunteer. He has been the primary advocate for Cluster Munitions for Ukraine and received the Saint Barbara’s Medal in 2023 for his advocacy that helped gain cluster artillery shells in July 2023, and then cluster rockets and missiles in October 2023.

3. Taiwan reports first major Chinese military activity after election

Taiwan reports first major Chinese military activity after election

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-first-major-post-election-chinese-military-activity-2024-01-17/?utm

By Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina

January 17, 20245:15 PM ESTUpdated 14 hours ago

Airplane is seen in front of Chinese and Taiwanese flags in this illustration, August 6, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

TAIPEI, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Taiwan's defence ministry said it detected 18 Chinese air force planes operating around Taiwan and carrying out "joint combat readiness patrols" with Chinese warships on Wednesday, the first large-scale military activity after the Taiwanese election.

China, which views Taiwan as its own territory, has over the past four years regularly sent warplanes and warships into the skies and waters around the island as it seeks to assert sovereignty claims that the Taipei government rejects.

Taiwan voted for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Lai Ching-te as its next president on Saturday, a man Beijing has repeatedly blasted as a dangerous separatist and bringer of war.

Taiwan's defence ministry said that starting around 7:50 p.m. (1150 GMT) on Wednesday it had detected 18 aircraft including Su-30 fighters operating off northern and central Taiwan and to the island's southwest.

Eleven of those aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line, or areas close by, working with Chinese warships to carry out "joint combat readiness patrols", the ministry added.

The strait's median line once served as an unofficial barrier between the two sides, but Chinese planes now regularly fly over it. China says it does not recognise the line's existence.

Taiwan sent its own forces to monitor, its defence ministry said.

"The security and prosperity of the Taiwan Strait region are closely related to global development and stability, and are obligations and responsibilities that all parties in the region must share," it said in a statement.

"The military will continue to strengthen its self-defence capabilities in accordance with enemy threats and self-defence needs, and respond to regional threats."

There was no immediate response from China's defence ministry.

Earlier on Wednesday, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said Beijing's position that it would not renounce using force to bring Taiwan under its control was aimed at foreign interference and a tiny number of separatists, but added that Taiwanese needed to be disabused of "biases" against China.

A U.S. State Department spokesperson said the United States was closely monitoring Beijing's actions and urged it not to use Taiwan's election as "pretext for escalation."

"We have consistently urged restraint and no unilateral change to the status quo, which has preserved peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and throughout the region for decades," the spokesperson said.

One source familiar with the Biden administration's thinking said "it would not be surprising to see Beijing use the next few months to gradually ratchet up pressure on Taiwan."

"We've already seen diplomatic pressure and threats of further economic pressure. And that pressure could continue even after the inauguration," the person said on condition of anonymity.

Lai, who takes office on May 20, has repeatedly offered talks with China but has been rebuffed. He says he will maintain peace and stability across the strait, but that only Taiwan's people can decide its future.

Vincent Chao, spokesperson for Lai's campaign and head of international affairs for the DPP, told the U.S. Institute of Peace think tank that the new administration would be one of "continuation" and "no surprises", while maintaining strong deterrence along with the U.S. and other countries in the region.

He said the administration would make every effort to be responsible and pragmatic and avoid provocations, while maintaining that deterrence.

"We must never give an opportunity for (Chinese leader) Xi Jinping to wake up one day and decide that today's a good day," he said.

"It's all based on risk and cost ... And so the risk and cost of him taking action must be astronomically high," Chao said, while adding: "We're also committed to keeping the risk and costs of not taking action very, very low."

Reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei and David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina in Washington; Editing by Gareth Jones, Mark Potter and Jamie Freed

4. The Black Sea is now the center of gravity for the Ukraine War

The Black Sea is now the center of gravity for the Ukraine War

BY GLEN E. HOWARD, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/17/24 6:30 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4414486-the-black-sea-is-now-the-center-of-gravity-for-the-ukraine-war/?utm

The Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz once wrote that “the talent of the strategist is to identify the decisive point and to concentrate everything on it.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky began the new year by stressing this point in an interview with the Economist, emphasizing that Crimea and the Black Sea would become the focus of Ukrainian forces. Isolating Crimea and degrading Russia’s military forces there “is extremely important for us, because it’s the way for us to reduce the number of attacks from that region,” Zelensky said.

While Ukraine may have failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough on land in 2023, the war at sea was a resounding success. Ukraine was able to inflict major punishment on the Russian Black Sea Fleet thanks to a relentless sea and air campaign, using a combination of sea drones and British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles, forcing the Russians to retreat into their naval bastion in Sevastopol. After the recent destruction of the Novocherkassk landing ship in late December, British Defense Minister Grant Shapps lauded the success of this campaign by announcing that Russia has lost 20 percent of its Black Sea Fleet in just the past four months.

Ukraine has effectively halted the Russian naval blockade of Odesa and renewed its exports of grain and other raw materials from its strategic Black Sea port. U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink announced that “400 ships carrying 13 million tons of cargo have passed through the Black Sea Humanitarian Corridor since August. This is a significant achievement as Ukraine continues to feed the world.”

The next step in the Black Sea is for the West to help Kyiv target Crimea — illegally annexed by Russia in 2014 — and sever Russia’s logistical lifeline to its forces operating in southern Ukraine. Two retired American generals have repeatedly stressed the urgency of helping Ukraine accomplish this goal. According to Ben Hodges, former Commanding General U.S. Army Europe, Crimea is “the decisive terrain of the war.” Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Philip Breedlove echoed this by emphasizing, “If we enable Ukraine to be able to strike Crimea — pervasively, persistently and precisely —Russia will be forced to rethink its posture there. Strike them all, strike them repeatedly, and destroy them in detail,” he told me.

One of the keys to disrupting Russia’s logistical lifeline to its forces in Crimea is the 12-mile-long Kerch Straits Bridge. Its destruction would severely curtail Moscow’s ability to resupply its military in southern Ukraine and considerably weaken Russian forces. Ukrainian armored forces could then punch their way through the Surovikin Line to reach the Sea of Azov, cutting Russian forces in half should they succeed. The Ukrainian frontlines at Robotnye are currently only 70 miles from the Azov coast.

Ukraine has attacked the Kerch Straits Bridge twice, most recently last July in a sea drone strike that forced Moscow to temporarily suspend road and rail traffic across the bridge. In his interview with the Economist, President Zelensky pleaded for the West to help Ukraine destroy the bridge by providing Kyiv with the German-made 300-mile-range Taurus cruise missile, something officials in the German government, apparently with support from the Biden administration, have refused to do over fears it might “escalate the war.”

Zelensky understands that the Taurus would be the perfect weapon to destroy the bridge, which is already weakened by previous attacks. Designed as a bunker-busting cruise missile, the Taurus could be air-launched by Ukrainian Su-24s — already successfully using the Storm Shadow to great effect — and if equipped with a secondary charge could cause devastating damage to any structure with reinforced concrete, making the bridge inoperable.

As Clausewitz reminded us nearly two centuries ago, it is up to military strategists to identify the “decisive point” and concentrate upon it. President Zelensky has urged us to keep in mind that the decisive terrain is Crimea, and that Germany’s Taurus cruise missile could be the one weapon provided by the West to help Ukraine destroy the Kerch Straits Bridge — and make 2024 a turning point in the war.

Glen E. Howard is the former president of the Jamestown Foundation.

5. Why US Airstrikes Aren’t Stopping Attacks by Iran-Backed Houthi Militia

Why US Airstrikes Aren’t Stopping Attacks by Iran-Backed Houthi Militia

The attacks on drone and ballistic missile launch sites damaged only 20% to 30% of the group's offensive capabilities, according to one estimate

Published 01/17/24 06:15 AM ET|Updated 20 hr ago

Nikhil Kumar and James LaPorta

themessenger.com · January 17, 2024

After the U.S. and U.K. launched a salvo of airstrikes on Houthi militants in Yemen last week, officials said the goal was to reduce Iran-backed group’s capabilities to launch missiles at ships in the Red Sea.

And yet, the attacks continue — with one missile being aimed at a American warship over the weekend.

That missile was shot down. But another struck a U.S.-owned cargo vessel Monday. The latest attack came Tuesday morning, when a Greek-owned ship was hit by the Houthis.

The attacks came amid fresh U.S. airstrikes on Houthi positions in Yemen Tuesday, the third such move in less than a week.

The developments have had a chilling effect on shipping in the waterway, a key route to the Suez Canal, the transit point for around 12 percent of global trade.

And with Houthi attacks persisting, the U.S. and U.K. strikes haven't quelled concerns: On Tuesday, news came that the British-Dutch oil giant Shell was suspending all shipments through the Red Sea.

Problems along this route could potentially drive up prices for all manner of goods internationally, threatening the stability of the world economy.

It’s all a fallout of the war in Israel and Gaza, with the Houthis, which have for years been supported by Iran, mounting their offensive in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza.

“The Iranians are providing both intelligence as well as ballistic missiles to the Houthis in Yemen. This is part of the broader strategy to create the network of terrorist organizations they call the axis of resistance,” Alex Plitsas, a Middle East analyst at the Atlantic Council, told The Messenger.

“In this particular case, the Iranians are using the Houthis to tie up U.S. assets and make us feel some pain for supporting Israel,” he said.

Given their links to Tehran, the U.S. and its allies spent months trying to find a way to secure Red Sea shipping routes without directly attacking the Houthis, lest such a move trigger a wider conflict that directly draws in Tehran.

A multinational maritime task force was set up, for example, spearheaded by the U.S. Ultimately, the Houthis mounted ever larger attacks.

But with fresh missiles being fired from Yemen, The Messenger looked at how the militants were counting to operate, why the strikes have failed to stop their attacks on a key artery of global trade, and the impact the fighting is having on global commerce.

Understanding the strikes, and what they hit

The U.S.-led airstrikes, which were joined by U.K. forces, and supported by a range of other international players, including Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Bahrain, were billed by U.S. President Joe Biden as a “defensive action” — the idea was to blunt the militants’ ability to attack again.

But they only damaged or destroyed an estimated 20% to 30% of the Houthis offensive capabilities, according to U.S. officials who spoke to The New York Times at the weekend.

Part of the challenge for the U.S. and its allies was working out exactly what the Houthis had in terms of firepower, and where it was located. The group had not been a priority for Western intelligence agencies until it began expanding its attacks beyond Yemen in recent months.

The British defense ministry’s statement in the aftermath of the airstrikes hinted at this problem; the strikes had dealt a “blow” to Houthi capabilities, it said, being careful not to overstate their impact.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) defeats a combination of Houthi missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea, Oct. 19.U.S. Navy

A years long buildup

Global attention has re-focused on the Houthis in recent months, but the group has been active in Yemen for years — and in that time is believed to have significantly beefed up its military capabilities.

Officially known as Ansar Allah but generally referred to by the name of their founder, Hussein al-Houthi, the Houthis are members of a minority Shiite sect in northern Yemen. For the past decade, they have fought a brutal civil war against Yemen’s internationally recognized government and an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia (and supported by the U.S.), all the while receiving substantial economic support and weaponry from Iran.

They are first believed to have come into possession of anti-ship missiles around later 2014, when they took control of northern Yemen, seizing some old Soviet missiles, as well as newer Chinese ones, from stocks kept by the Yemeni military, according to a recent report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

But they soon began to expand their capabilities — thanks to Iranian assistance. In fact, the Houthis showed off their military strength in parades in Yemen in recent years, including “a variety of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and guided rockets employing Iranian infrared or imaging infrared seeker technology,” according to IISS.

(That viral video of the lone, aged F-5 fighter jet soaring over the country is from one such parade.)

“Although the Houthis have linked their campaign against shipping to the ongoing fighting between Israel and Hamas, the weapons were being provided by Iran well before the Israeli–Hamas conflict erupted in October 2023,” IISS analyst Fabian Hinz wrote in a survey of Houthi capabilities published earlier this month.

“That suggests a strong, long-term Iranian focus on strengthening Houthi anti-ship capabilities.”

Yet for some experts, it remains unclear whether in the current conflict the continuing Houthi attacks are being driven purely by Iran pushing the group, or if the Yemeni militants are taking advantage of the situation to reinforce their domestic support base by making a regional military statement.

“(The Iranians are saying) they are not interested in escalation with the United States. The U.S. is echoing that message, they don’t want to escalate this to involve the U.S. and Iran confronting each other,” Alex Vatanka, the director of the Iran Program and Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, told The Messenger.

Although unclear at the moment, it is possible, Vatanka added, that the Houthis were acting more “for their own, very Yemeni-centric agenda… [for them] this is their moment to shine, if you will.”

If that is the case, it could further complicate efforts to deter the group, which is already hitting global commerce.

The fallout

That impact was clear Tuesday morning when, amid reports that the Houthis had attacked a Greek owned vessel, Shell was reported by the Wall Street Journal to have indefinitely suspended all shipments via the Red Sea. Rival oil major BP paused its ship movements in the area last month. And earlier this week, Qatar said it would stop sending shipments of liquified natural gas via the route.

Earlier this month, the Associated Press reported that at least 90% of the container ships that had been going through the Suez Canal are now rerouting around the tip of Africa—all because of the Houthi attacks.

That drives up the cost of moving goods around the world (going around Africa, versus via the Suez Canal, adds as much as 20 days to a ship’s journey). Moving a standard 40-foot container from China to Northern Europe used to cost around $1500 in November, a figure that has now ballooned to over $4000, according to one estimate from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in Germany, which tracks trade data.

The uptick is still not as bad as that seen during the Covid pandemic. Yet for Western military planners and economic analysts alike the trend line remains worrying—particularly as the Houthis remain on the offensive.

“They (the Houthis) don’t seem to think they have much to lose,” Vatanka, from the Middle East Institute, warned. “That’s why the deterrence card the Biden administration has played with the United Kingdom hasn’t worked so far.”

themessenger.com · January 17, 2024

6. DoD 'completely rewrites' classification policy for secret space programs

This should spur some broader questions: Do we have too many SAPs? Are SAPs effective? Are they used appropriately and for intended purposes?

DoD 'completely rewrites' classification policy for secret space programs - Breaking Defense

Under the new approach, there must be a technical rationale for stamping a space program as special access, not simply because of a service policy decision, said DoD space policy czar John Plumb.

By THERESA HITCHENS

on January 17, 2024 at 2:46 PM

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · January 17, 2024

Assistant Secretary of Defense John Plumb testifies before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, D.C. March 30, 2023. (DoD photo by EJ Hersom)

WASHINGTON — Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks has signed off on a new classification policy for space programs that discourages the use of Special Access Program status (SAPs) that dramatically limits clearances to handful of US officials — in hopes of opening still-secret programs to more stakeholders, including US allies and industry partners, according to a senior official.

“What the classification memo does, generally, is it overwrites — it really completely rewrites — a legacy document that had its roots 20 years ago, and it’s just no longer applicable to the current environment that involves national security space,” DoD Assistant Secretary for Space Policy John Plumb told reporters today.

While the specifics of the policy, signed off by Hicks “at the end of 2023,” are themselves classified, Plumb explained that a key issue has been the overuse of SAPs that not only have limited the ability to share with allies and industry, but even among different organizations within the Defense Department.

“So, anything we can bring from a SAP level to a Top Secret level for example, brings massive value to the warfighter, massive value to the department, and frankly, my hope is over time [it] will also allow us to share more information with allies and partners that they might not currently be able to share.”

Plumb explained that from now on DoD will be “assigning minimum classifications to a various number of things, which will then allow the services to examine their own programs and determine ‘should this really be SAP-ed any more?’ And the general point that I have made clear is policy is not a reason, it’s not the only reason, to hide something in a SAP program. There have to be technical aspects to it.”

National security space leaders within the Pentagon and outside experts for years have been pushing to lower the sky-high classification levels traditionally applied to all things military space. This has included a call for declassifying information about DoD’s plans for conducting warfighting in space — but this new policy document does not do that, Plumb said.

“Inside the beltway, people always ask me about how can I make things unclassified? And that is not actually a thing I’m all that concerned about. I’m concerned about reducing the classification of things where they are over-classified to the point that it hampers our ability to get work done or hamper the ability of the warfighter to do their mission,” he said.

Plumb acknowledged that it will take time for the new approach to work its way down through the bureaucracy and be accepted, but said at the same time there are “many folks looking forward to getting started on it.”

He further noted that he will be “briefing some close allies and partners on these changes” in future.

The new classification policy is in essence a first step in an overarching effort by Plumb’s office to craft a new “DoD International Space Cooperation Strategy,” designed to support the ability of the US, allies and partners to more seamlessly undertake collective military space operations.

Plumb noted that already the Pentagon expanded the “Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO)” from seven members — Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States — to 10. At the CSpO’s last meeting in early December, DoD announced that Italy, Japan and Norway had now been admitted.

7. Expect a Chinese show of force against Taiwan soon, says INDOPACOM head

Probably a pretty safe bet that he is correct.

Excerpts:

On Saturday, Taiwan elected as president a candidate from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, in a blow to China’s attempts to more closely control the island. President Biden said after the election that he does not support independence for Taiwan.

Three days later, the State Department’s Mira Resnick told Defense One the administration’s position has not changed.

The U.S. wants to ensure “peace in the Taiwan Strait, that there is security for Taiwan, and security in the United States,” said Resnick, the deputy assistant secretary for regional security in the bureau of political-military affairs. To that end, the U.S. has worked to “both speed [foreign military sales] items to Taiwan that they need, and to make sure that we’re carving out from our own resources… grant assistance that can be useful to Taiwan, which is something we’ve never done before.”

Expect a Chinese show of force against Taiwan soon, says INDOPACOM head

“When something occurs that they don’t like, they tend to take actions,” said Adm. John Aquilino.

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

HONOLULU, Hawaii—China is likely to demonstrate “force against Taiwan in the near term” because of the recent election, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said—and they will probably blame the United States.

“The pressure campaign against Taiwan continues, and we’re watching it in the wake of the elections,” Adm. John Aquilino said Tuesday at a conference hosted by the Pacific Forum.

“Their actions over the past number of years have been pretty consistent. When something occurs that they don’t like, they tend to take actions,” Aquilino said, noting that China increased its military harassment after then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited the island in 2022.

China is “clearly not happy,” and the U.S. should “not be surprised” if they “attempt to spin it in the information space as the United States as the aggressor,” he said. “I don’t know how you connect those dots, but they’re pretty effective in the information space. Doesn’t have to be true. They’ve just got to say it enough times.”

On Saturday, Taiwan elected as president a candidate from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, in a blow to China’s attempts to more closely control the island. President Biden said after the election that he does not support independence for Taiwan.

Three days later, the State Department’s Mira Resnick told Defense One the administration’s position has not changed.

The U.S. wants to ensure “peace in the Taiwan Strait, that there is security for Taiwan, and security in the United States,” said Resnick, the deputy assistant secretary for regional security in the bureau of political-military affairs. To that end, the U.S. has worked to “both speed [foreign military sales] items to Taiwan that they need, and to make sure that we’re carving out from our own resources… grant assistance that can be useful to Taiwan, which is something we’ve never done before.”

In a conflict, “Taiwan will need to have things that are already positioned on island, so we are looking to make sure that Taiwan has what it needs and that they will continue to have what they need in any sort of contingency,” she said.

Regarding the elections, Aquilino said the U.S. and its allies and partners must “understand what should come, we should expect it,” but we should also “push back against mis- and disinformation.”

And, he said, U.S. and “like-minded nations” must be cognizant of the fact that China’s “expansive claims in the South China Sea are not just thought anymore. What we are seeing as it applies to Second Thomas Shoal and our Philippine partners is that the rhetoric and the actions, whether they be lawfare, information warfare, or physical actions, they are now enforcing or attempting to enforce that illegal claim.”

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024

Key Takeaways:

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims.
Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time.
Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16.
The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.
The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists.
Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community.
Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals.
The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military.
The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps.
The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish-Russian financial ties.
Positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact on January 17.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 17, 2024

Jan 17, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2024

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 17, 2024, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on January 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 17 that Russia does not have enough reserves to conduct large-scale offensive operations in several directions at the same time.[1] Skibitskyi stated that it is impossible for Russian forces to conduct strategically or operationally significant offensive operations without “powerful” reserves and implied that Russia does not have such reserves.[2] Skibitskyi noted that mobilization measures are ongoing in Russia, likely referring to the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign that relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants.[3] It is unclear if Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign has provided or would be able to provide the increased number of personnel that an intensified Russian offensive effort would require. Skibitskyi reported on January 15 that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month, which the Russian military uses to replenish losses and form reserve regiments, and that Russia would need to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to another “partial mobilization” like Russia conducted in September 2022 or a large-scale general mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[4] Skibitskyi’s statements suggest that although the Russian military is able to generate enough manpower to conduct routine operational-level rotations in Ukraine, Russian forces may not necessarily be able to generate manpower at a rate that would allow Russian forces to quickly re-establish the operational reserves necessary for simultaneous offensive efforts in several directions.[5]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims. Medvedev claimed that “the presence of an independent state on historical Russian territories” is a “constant reason for the resumption of hostilities” and that Ukraine’s very existence as an independent state is therefore “mortally dangerous” for Ukrainians.[6] Medvedev claimed that an independent Ukraine will never be a legitimate state regardless of who leads the government and that a future conflict for Ukrainian territory is inevitable whether or not it is a new conflict or the continuation of the current Russian war in Ukraine.[7] Medvedev’s January 17 statement is one of many recent signals from senior Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, that Putin and the Kremlin have no interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and that Putin’s maximalist war aims in Ukraine remain unchanged.[8] Medvedev attempted to portray Russia’s commitment to these maximalist objectives as unwavering by claiming that Ukrainian accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO will not prevent future conflict.[9] Medvedev notably did not define what he considers to be historical Russian territories, but Putin has defined historical Russian lands as the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[10] Medvedev’s opacity may be intentional, as the Kremlin’s loosely defined concept of “historical Russian territories” allows the Kremlin to pursue expansionist objectives wherever and whenever it so determines in a broad area including Central Asia, the Caucuses and parts of Eastern Europe.[11] Medvedev’s emphasis on the destruction of any Ukrainian state on these “historical Russian territories” could indicate that some actors in the Kremlin prioritize expansionist objectives over the identified objective of regime change under calls for the “de-nazification” of Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Odesa and Kharkiv cities on the night of January 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv City and 20 Shahed-136/-131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 19 of the drones over Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[12] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian drones largely targeted Odesa City.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings in Odesa and Kharkiv cities.[14]

Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on January 17 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Shahed drone with a hybrid air defense system — referring to the so-called FrankenSAM systems that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers — for the first time.[15] Kamyshin noted that the full development of Ukraine’s own air defenses will take years, so Ukraine is creating home-made air defense systems using Soviet components and Western missiles. ISW continues to assess that Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remain crucial as Ukraine develops its defense industrial base (DIB).[16] Kamyshin also stated that Ukraine has doubled its ammunition production for NATO-caliber artillery systems.[17] Ukraine began domestically producing 155mm shells, which are a NATO-standard used by Western-supplied guns that Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) had never produced before, no later than September 2023.[18]

Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on January 16 that Germany will provide Ukraine with military goods worth more than seven billion euros (roughly $7.62 billion) in 2024.[19] The German government announced that the aid package includes ammunition for Leopard tanks, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance drones, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles.[20] Germany provided 5.4 billion euros ($5.89 billion) worth of military assistance to Ukraine in 2023.[21] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on January 16 that he would finalize a bilateral security agreement with Kyiv during a visit to Ukraine in February 2024.[22] Macron also stated that France will send 40 SCALP long-range missiles and “several hundred” unspecified bombs to Ukraine in the coming weeks.

Western officials highlighted Ukraine’s battlefield successes at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16 and 17. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that Ukraine has opened a corridor to export grain in the Black Sea, weakened the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and liberated more than half of its territory that Russian forces captured since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[23] Sullivan also highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to develop its own defense industrial base (DIB).[24] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely in the near future — in line with ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia is not interested in engaging in meaningful, good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Ghanan President Nana Akufo-Addo and called on them to support Ukraine’s peace formula.[26] Zelensky also met with Polish President Andrzej Duda and discussed bilateral relations, the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU).[27]

The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia. Russian information space actors within the ultranationalist milblogger community have increasingly fixated on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in 2023 and have weaponized this rhetoric to call on Russian officials to more widely mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine, curtail migrants’ access to social and economic opportunities, and substantively change Russia’s existing migration policies.[28] Russian ultranationalists have also increasingly advocated for ethnic Russians to receive more domestic power in Russia and continue to promote hyper-nationalist ideologies that are generating domestic tensions between ethnic minority communities and ethnic Russians.[29] s may malign the nominal rights to autonomy that many non-ethnic Russian communities have through their respective federal Russian republics and are likely to react harshly to discussions centering on the political, economic, and social concerns of non-ethnic Russians.[30]

The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists. Russian officials appear to have tolerated or even endorsed ultranationalists’ increasing anti-migration rhetoric since it likely generated social pressures that have augmented Russian efforts to coerce migrants into military service in Ukraine.[31] The Kremlin now appears to be struggling to reconcile efforts to increase Russian industrial capacity while also coercing migrants into military service and disincentivizing them from working in Russia.[32] Any efforts to appease Russian ultranationalists will likely only exacerbate inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies concerning migrants. Hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia directly contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effort to promote the concept of a wider and ethnically inclusive “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) that encompasses non-ethnic Russians in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.[33] The Kremlin continues to rely on the ultranationalist community in its effort to solidify pro-war sentiments, hyper-nationalism, Russian orthodoxy, and “traditional” social values as core tenets of the Russian state.[34] The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance these parallel efforts as Russian ultranationalists display increasing animus to non-ethnic Russians in Russia and in neighboring countries.

Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community. Bashkortostan’s Baymaksky Court found prominent Bashkort activist Fail Alsynov guilty on January 11 of inciting ethnic hatred and sentenced him to four years in prison, which the court announced publicly on January 17 following a closed-door trial.[35] Alsynov allegedly gave a speech on April 28, 2023, that insulted ethnic groups from the Caucasus.[36] Hundreds of Alsynov’s supporters had gathered at the courthouse ahead of his January 17 verdict announcement, and protests involving hundreds to thousands of supporters lasted for hours following the verdict. Some Russian opposition sources reported that 2,000-5,000 people protested in support of Alsynov and that responding Russian authorities detained anywhere from five to several dozen protestors.[37] The reported scale of the Baymak protest appears comparable to if not larger than that of the antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[38] Footage shows Russian riot police using tear gas and stun grenades to dispel the protestors, two of whom Russian police beat with batons and 20-40 of whom sought medical attention following the protests.[39] Russian law enforcement reportedly detained around 20-40 protestors, and Alsynov’s supporters negotiated with Russian law enforcement to cease protests for the day in exchange for the release of the detained protestors.[40] The protests have dispersed as of this publication, though it is unclear whether activists are planning for further protests on subsequent days. Hundreds to thousands of activists gathered outside the Baymaksky Court in the days leading up to the public announcement of Alsynov’s sentence, suggesting that the size of the protests on January 17 was not necessarily spontaneous.[41]

Russian authorities appear to be better equipped to handle the Bashkortostan protests than the October 2023 Dagestan protests. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it is opening a criminal investigation into the protest for the organization of and participation in “mass riots” and for the use of violence against authorities.[42] Multiple Telegram channels that the Bashkort activists reportedly used to coordinate and spread news of the protest became temporarily unavailable on January 17, a possible Russian government censorship attempt to limit the protest from growing or spreading.[43] The Russian ultranationalist community latched onto the Bashkortostan protest in anger despite the swift government response. Some criticized Alsynov’s supporters as “extremists” and “wolves in sheep’s clothing” who only aim to separate Bashkortostan from Russia.[44] Others amplified footage of military personnel in Bashkortostan’s “Minigali Shaimuratov” Battalion disavowing the protesters and Alsynov as “traitors,” “extremists,” and “separatists.”[45] The Russian government and Bashkort military personnel’s swift response suggest that the Russian government may intensify efforts to ensure that non-ethnic Russian communities support the war in Ukraine. Russian sources’ characterization of the protesters as “separatists” organized by outside forces suggests that Russian ultranationalists will continue to label any notable unrest from non-ethnic Russians as a hybrid warfare attack against Russia.[46]

Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it opened a criminal investigation into Interregional Uzbek Community "Vatandosh" President Usman Baratov for a social media post allegedly “insulting the participants of the special military operation” after unspecified Russian military correspondents appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin.[47] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers widely criticized Baratov’s social media posts and called for Baratov to leave Russia.[48] The Investigative Committee’s swift response to milbloggers’ requests may prompt them to make future demands of the Russian government. The Investigative Committee’s prompt announcement also suggests that the Russian government is monitoring and potentially responding to demands of the Russian ultranationalist community — a subsection of the Russian information space that it routinely attempts to cultivate and co-opt to advance government narratives. Russian milbloggers also widely criticized an allegedly naturalized Russian citizen of Azeri ethnicity against whom the Investigative Committee opened a case for “attempted murder and incitement of hatred based on ethnicity” on January 17.[49] Russian milbloggers increasingly fixate on crimes that non-ethnic Russians reportedly commit, and some milbloggers have claimed that unspecified non-ethnic Russian diasporas control entire sectors of the Russian economy.[50] The Russian ultranationalist community’s framing of non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities as an internal threat to Russian security and economic interests are irreconcilable with the Kremlin’s portrayal of Russia as a harmonious multiethnic society. The Russian ultranationalist community may increasingly pressure the Russian government to take actions against migrant and non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities, which may exacerbate the fracture between the ultranationalist community and the government.

The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military. Moscow’s Second Western District Military Court sentenced the former head of Rosgvardia’s maritime department, Colonel Sergei Volkov, to six years in prison on January 16 for allegedly supplying low-quality radar systems to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and a gas pipeline from Krasnodar Krai to occupied Crimea from Ukrainian drone strikes.[51] The court found Volkov guilty of “abuse of office with grave consequences” for his participation in a 400 million ruble ($4.5 million) corruption scheme involving the acquisition of two radar systems that Volkov reportedly knew could not properly defend against Ukrainian drones.[52] The Second Western District Military Court convicted two Russian air defense officers on December 6, 2023, for negligence in failing to prevent a Ukrainian strike on Russian territory.[53] Russian authorities also previously detained the commander of the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army on corruption and bribery charges, likely for failing to prevent drone strikes against Moscow City in July and August 2023.[54] The Russian military command likely intends to set a precedent across the Russian military concerning possible punishment for failures to defend against Ukrainian strikes — particularly strikes against high-value targets — regardless of whether the cases explicitly allege that these officers violated Russian rules of combat duty or tangentially associate the officers’ dereliction of duties with corruption schemes.[55] The Russian command likely hopes that these precedents will improve discipline writ large among Russian forces in Ukraine, although ISW has not observed such an effect.

The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Russian military is forming squads of “military instructors” to deploy to African countries, likely referring to the Africa Corps, and that Russia is recruiting these squads in Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly in Crimea.[56] ISW previously reported that the Africa Corps aims to subsume the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa after the Russian MoD failed to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.[57] Russian officials have routinely referred to Wagner personnel operating in Africa as “military instructors” and “advisors” since 2018 despite Wagner’s combat roles in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.[58] The GUR reported that Russia is particularly focused on recruiting Russian reservists who specialized in maintaining air defense systems, former sailors, and other specialists and that Russian reservists are attracted to this opportunity due to high salaries and the hope of avoiding fighting in Ukraine.[59] ISW has previously observed the Africa Corps advertising “high salaries” beginning at 110,000 rubles ($1,240) but stipulating that interested applicants who are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine cannot transfer to serve in the Africa Corps.[60] The Russian MoD announced on January 17 that Russian Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General Alexander Fomin and Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Nigerien National Defense Minister Major General Salifou Modi to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation.[61] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.[62]

The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish–Russian financial ties. Russian outlet Kommersant stated on January 17 that Turkish banks have “universally” begun to refuse to work with Russian banks.[63] Kommersant reported that sources indicated that Turkish banks’ fear of secondary sanctions sharply increased after the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions on December 22, 2023, that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that at least two state-owned Chinese banks ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities tied to the Russian defense industry following the US’ December 2022 secondary sanctions authorization.[64]

The Russian government likely continues efforts to gain access to data on Russian citizens. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on January 17 that a Moscow court fined Amazon Cloud Services more than 200 million rubles (about $2,256,400) for not having a representative office in Russia.[65] Russian law stipulates that Russian authorities can fine entities that operate in Russia without opening a branch or representative office in Russia a penalty amounting to one-fifteenth to one-tenth of their total revenue for the year. Russia previously fined Google for a similar law that requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021.[66] Russia also previously fined Yandex for failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding the disclosure of users’ personal data to the Russian government.[67]

Key Takeaways:

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims.
Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time.
Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16.
The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.
The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists.
Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community.
Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals.
The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military.
The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps.
The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish-Russian financial ties.
Positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact on January 17.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly advanced south of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 17. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured unspecified positions east of Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast (south of Kreminna) and advanced west of Kreminna near Makiivka, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[68] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; northwest of Kreminna near Ploshchanka and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova, north of Hryhorivka, and near the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[69] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[70]

Ukrainian officials continue to suggest that Russian forces are preparing to renew offensive actions in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, likely in late January or early February 2024. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo reported on January 17 that Russian forces are currently shifting their offensive efforts from the Kupyansk direction to the Lyman direction.[71] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian attacks in the Kupyansk direction have deceased in the past three weeks to two to five attacks per day.[72] Synehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are expecting renewed Russian assaults in the Kupyansk direction as soon as consistent sub-zero temperatures freeze the fields and soil in the area.[73] Current weather forecasts suggest that the temperature in Luhansk Oblast will hover at or below consistent temperatures cold enough to freeze the ground in late January 2024, suggesting that Russian forces could renew assaults with ground conducive to maneuver in late January or early February 2024.[74]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on January 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Vesele, Bilohorivka (21km northeast of Bakhmut), and Spirne; north of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka; northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka, and Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Khromove and Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that the rate of Russian advance in the Bakhmut direction has slowed after Russian forces made “significant” advances in the previous 1.5 months.[76] ISW has not observed Russian forces make operationally or tactically significant advances in the Bakhmut direction since the start of localized Russian offensive operations in the area in early November 2023.[77] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate northwest of Bakhmut, and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Bakhmut direction.[78] Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Bohdanivka, and elements of the Russian “Nevsky” Detachment are reportedly operating in the Soledar direction as part of the Russian Volunteer Corps.[79]

Positional engagements continued near Avdiivka on January 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Novobakhmutivka, and Stepove; near the Avdiivka Coke Plant in northwestern Avdiivka; northeast of Avdiivka near Kamianka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian rate of advance near the water treatment facilities close to the Avdiivka Coke Plant is about 100 to 200 meters per day.[81] Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration head Vadym Filashkin stated that Russian forces have dropped 250 glide bombs on Avdiivka since the beginning of 2024, compared to 149 glide bombs in all of 2023.[82] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Avdiivka.[83]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area on January 17. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Marinka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and west of Marinka.[85] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novomykhailivka, with some milbloggers claiming on January 16 that alleged Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces advanced more than seven kilometers south of Novomykhailivka in the previous day.[86] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have shifted the direction of their attacks south of Novomykhailivka and are attempting to reach the O0532 (Marinka-Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery activity is complicating Russian logistics and that Ukrainian mines are limiting Russian vehicle movement.[88]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued south of Vuhledar, north of Novodonetske (both east of Velyka Novosilka), west of Staromlynivka, and near Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[89] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District) reportedly continue operating in the Velyka Novosilka area and near Staromayorske, respectively.[90]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters and recaptured previously lost positions west of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[91] Positional engagements continued near Pyatykhatky (27km northwest of Robotyne), Kopani (northwest of Robotyne), Robotyne, Verbove, and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne).[92] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction and along the Robotyne-Kopani line, respectively.[93]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have recently concentrated artillery and aviation activity in frontline areas but have also conducted successful strikes in rear areas in Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[94] ISW has observed a recent increase in Russian Shahed drone strikes on Ukrainian frontline positions.[95]

Ukrainian forces maintain positions on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements on January 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that personnel from the 8th company of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) hoisted a Russian flag over the center of Krynky, although ISW has not observed any visual evidence confirming this claim.[96] Positional engagements continued near Krynky.[97] Russian sources claimed that the Dnipro River has frozen in many areas making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to cross the river and for Russian forces to operate on Dnipro River islands.[98] Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) and 2nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (104th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near the Dnipro River islands and near Kozachi Laheri (west of Krynky), respectively.[99]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 17 that Russian air defense downed two Storm Shadow missiles near Popivka near the Chonhar Bridge, which connects occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.[100] ISW cannot confirm Rogov’s claim.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

See topline text.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 16 that Russian weapons manufacturers, including aviation producer Technodinamika JSC, have developed cluster munitions that will allow Russian forces to remotely lay anti-tank mines using multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[101] TASS reported that Russian manufacturers have already conducted field tests and that the new munitions will allow Russian forces to lay minefields more efficiently and quickly from longer distances.[102]

A Russian milblogger amplified footage on January 16 showing Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia commander Viktor Anosov testing the “Bratishka” unmanned tracked vehicle.[103] Anosov claimed that Russian forces can use the unmanned tracked vehicle to demine and mine areas, deliver weapons and ammunition, conduct reconnaissance, deploy electronic warfare (EW) systems, evacuate wounded personnel, and support assaults on positions while under fire.[104] Russian sources claimed that unspecified Russian producers in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, finished developing the “Bratishka” vehicle in September 2023.[105]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

Two of Ukraine’s international partners announced that they have refurbished some of the Leopard tanks purchased for the Ukrainian military. The Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 17 that German defense enterprise Rheinmetall refurbished the first two of 14 Leopard 2 A4 tanks that the Netherlands and Denmark had ordered in 2023 and that Rheinmetall will complete restoration of the other 12 Leopards in the coming months.[106] The Dutch MoD reported that it is transferring these Leopards to Poland where Ukrainian forces will train to operate the tanks.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.[107] Yusov confirmed that there are 35,000 Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine and that Russian authorities are considering deploying more Rosgvardia personnel to occupied areas.[108] ISW observed reports in late December 2023 that Rosgvardia deployed three newly formed regiments of its 116th Special Purpose Brigade — the 900th, 901st, and 902nd Special Purpose Regiments — to occupied Donetsk Oblast, increasing the total number of Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine to about 34,300 troops.[109]

Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of medical treatment. Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova stated on January 17 that 17 children from occupied Donetsk Oblast will undergo treatment at the Ogonyok Rehabilitation Center near Moscow.[110] Lvova-Belova claimed that the Ogonyok Rehabilitation Center, Wonderland Charitable Foundation, and the Russian Presidential Grants Fund implemented the “A Country for Children” program that brought 150 children from occupied Ukraine to Russia for rehabilitation treatments in 2023.[111]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Kremlin and its mouthpieces are intensifying efforts to portray the West as a threat to both Russians who reside in Western states and to Russia itself. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on January 17 that Western states are using Russia’s war in Ukraine to justify various “violations” against and “unsightly attitudes” towards Russian citizens residing in Western states by denying them access to bureaucratic procedures, sports and cultural events, and Russian media.[112] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov promoted the recent Kremlin effort to portray itself as the protector of all Russian-speakers and not just Russian citizens, claiming that Russian-speaking communities abroad face “unprecedented Russophobia” and that the Russian government will continue efforts to support these communities abroad.[113] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Baltic states intend to resolve the “Russian question” by deporting Russian-speaking residents en masse.[114] Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov claimed that the West, chiefly the United States, is constraining the Russian government’s ability to allow Russians abroad to vote in the March 2024 presidential elections by limiting the number of Russian consulates and MFA personnel.[115] Russian state outlet RIA Novosti amplified on January 17 a Kremlin readout from January 14 in which Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed senior members of the Russian government to submit proposals by July 1 to repatriate Russians abroad in case of “unfriendly” countries deporting Russians.[116] Putin initially issued the instructions on December 4, 2023, and RIA Novosti likely amplified this order on January 17, 2024, in support of Putin’s January 16 accusations that Baltic states are “throwing [ethnic] Russian people” out of their countries, thereby “directly affect[ing]” Russian security.[117]

Prominent Russian ultranationalists continued attacking Kazakhstan for recent Kazakh government efforts to promote the Kazakh language.[118] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified a criticism on January 17 that Kazakh people are losing their sense of identity by “discarding history, including historical names” — referring to the Kazakh effort to rename rail stations from Russian language names to Kazakh language names. Another prominent Russian milblogger accused Kazakhstan of “Russophobia” and of increasingly drifting towards the West.[119]

Russian government officials continue to falsely accuse Ukrainian officials of "committing criminal acts” against minors in Ukraine in response to multiple reports that Russian forces are forcibly deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine. The Russian Supreme Court supported a bill aimed at strengthening criminal liability for abducting minors during a period of partial mobilization.[120] Federation Council Deputy Chairperson of the Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Construction Irina Rukavishnikova claimed that the bill is aimed at protecting minors from crimes that the Ukrainian government allegedly commits.[121] Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab published an independent investigation in February 2023 that found that Russian authorities have likely deported over 14,700 Ukrainian children to Russia, and the European Parliament adopted a resolution in September 2023 recognizing that Belarus is involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[122]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

9. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 17, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-17-2024

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously.
The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.
Israel and Hamas began implementing a deal on January 17 that aims to supply medicine for Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian flow into the Gaza Strip.
IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the likelihood of war in northern Israel is “higher than before” on January 17 while attending IDF drills simulating an offensive in Lebanon.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq by restructuring Iraq’s security agreement, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to expel US forces entirely. This policy is at odds with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq.
The US State Department redesignated the Houthis as specially designated global terrorists on January 17.
The Pakistani government has strongly condemned and warned of possible retaliation for the IRGC strikes.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 17, 2024

Jan 17, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 17, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously.
The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.
Israel and Hamas began implementing a deal on January 17 that aims to supply medicine for Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian flow into the Gaza Strip.
IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the likelihood of war in northern Israel is “higher than before” on January 17 while attending IDF drills simulating an offensive in Lebanon.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq by restructuring Iraq’s security agreement, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to expel US forces entirely. This policy is at odds with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq.
The US State Department redesignated the Houthis as specially designated global terrorists on January 17.
The Pakistani government has strongly condemned and warned of possible retaliation for the IRGC strikes.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously. CTP-ISW reported on January 16 that Palestinian militias have renewed attacks in the northern Gaza Strip, particularly around Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan.[1] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, conducted five attacks in Jabalia, Sheikh Radwan, and Karama neighborhoods on January 17.[2] The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms at Israeli forces in Karama as well.[3] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that Israeli forces entered Rimal neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City. CTP-ISW assessed on January 16 that Palestinian militias are likely reinfiltrating this area.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 17 that its forces directed an airstrike that targeted two Palestinian fighters in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City. The IDF also found large amounts of weapons in the area.[5]

Palestinian militia activity renewed slightly during the past week in other locations where Israeli forces have conducted clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip, as well. The al Qassem Brigades and the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, claimed that they attacked Israeli forces east of Tuffah.[6] The IDF conducted raids in Tuffah up until January 7.[7] The National Resistance Brigades also fired small arms at Israeli infantrymen north of Shujaiya.[8]

The IDF 646th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) located rocket launchers that Hamas used to attack Israel on January 16.[9] The 99th Division has been conducting clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip for nearly a week.[10] Israeli media reported that the al Qassem Brigades fired the rocket salvo into southern Israel from areas in the central Gaza Strip where Israeli forces recently withdrew.[11]

Palestinian militias launched several attacks on Israeli forces operating in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 16. The al Qassem Brigades reported on January 16 that its fighters returned from the areas of fighting in Maghazi and reported several different attacks in the area on Israeli infantry and armor.[12] The militia targeted an Israeli military bulldozer with an anti-tank improvised explosive device in a combined attack with the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades.[13] The al Quds Brigades fighters returned from areas of fighting in Bureij and reported that they conducted several attacks using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars targeting IDF forces near Bureij using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars.[14] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that Israeli forces are operating in Deir al Balah, Nuseirat, Bureij, and Maghazi.[15]

The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 17. Israeli forces resupplied the 98th Division by airdrop in southern Khan Younis City sometime in the last few days.[16] The IDF has conducted five aerial supply operations since the beginning of the fighting.[17] The 7th Armored Brigade directed a helicopter attack targeting two Palestinian fighters who launched mortars at them in Khan Younis.[18]

Hamas and other Palestinian militias are continuing their efforts to defend against Israeli armor and dismounted infantry since December 3. The al Quds Brigades fired an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) that targeted an IDF combat outpost in southern Khan Younis City on January 17.[19] The al Qassem Brigades also targeted Israeli armor and other IDF units using anti-tank RPGs and mortars in and south of Khan Younis City.[20] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis was the most intense in over two months of fighting.[21]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.[22] A Palestinian telecommunications company said that the blackout was a result of damaged infrastructure in the southern city of Khan Younis.[23] Repair crews are unable to reach the damaged sites due to airstrikes and fighting between the IDF and Palestinian fighters in the city according to the company.[24] NetBlocks reported on January 17 that telecommunications have been offline in the Gaza Strip for six days.[25]

Israel and Hamas began implementing a deal on January 17 that aims to supply medicine for Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian flow into the Gaza Strip.[26] An anonymous Israeli official told the Washington Post on January 17 that at least one plane carrying medicine landed in Egypt. The Washington Post reported that Hamas Politburo member Musa Abu Marzouk said on X (formerly Twitter) that the delivery of humanitarian aid includes 140 types of medicine that the Red Cross will deliver to four hospitals in the Gaza Strip. The medicine will then be distributed to additional, unspecified locations, including to hostages.[27] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a unit in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, reported on January 17 that trucks carrying medicine will undergo a security check at the Kerem Shalom crossing.[28]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan delivered a speech that criticized Israel’s “third phase” of operations in the Gaza Strip.[29] Hamdan said that the United States and Israel are falsely describing the third phase of operations in the Gaza Strip to mislead the public. Israeli media began reporting in December 2023 that the IDF would transition to a third phase of operations that includes securing a buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids.[30] Israeli officials have confirmed that the IDF is shifting to fewer ground forces and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[31]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 17.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in four locations across the West Bank. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Tulkarm and Nour Shams refugee camp on January 17.[32] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who detonated explosive devices targeting Israeli forces during the fighting in Tulkarm.[33] The IDF also conducted another airstrike targeting an al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades commander in Balata camp, Nablus, who the IDF said was planning an attack against an unspecified target.[34] Palestinian media reported the two airstrikes in Tulkarm and Nablus killed a total of 11 people, including nine fighters.[35] Palestinian fighters detonated an IED targeting Israeli vehicles in Nablus on January 16.[36]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon, Osama Hamdan, called for Palestinian militias to escalate operations against Israel in the West Bank on January 17.[37] Hamdan also called on Palestinian Authority security forces to join Hamas. The Jenin Battalion of the al Qassem Brigades claimed that repeated IDF operations in the last three years failed to weaken Palestinian militias in Jenin and that now Palestinian militia groups are expanding into Tulkarm.[38]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 17.[39] The al Qassem Brigades said that it fired 20 rockets targeting Israeli forces in Liman.[40] The group said that the attack was in response to Israeli "massacres” against civilians in the Gaza Strip and Israeli attacks targeting Iranian-backed fighters in southern Lebanon.[41] The al Qassem Brigades also said that it fired a rocket salvo towards Liman on December 25.[42] The IDF said that the Israeli Air Force attacked LH infrastructure in multiple locations in southern Lebanon on January 17.[43]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the likelihood of war in northern Israel is “higher than before” on January 17 while attending IDF drills simulating an offensive in Lebanon.[44] Israeli officials, including Halevi, have expressed concerns about the threat that LH poses to Israel and the potential for LH to conduct an attack into Israel like Hamas’ attack on October 7.[45] Israeli officials have said repeatedly that they seek a diplomatic solution to push LH fighters north of the Litani River, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, but that Israel will use military force if diplomatic efforts fail.[46]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq by restructuring Iraq’s security agreement, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to expel US forces entirely. Sudani said that his administration would review Iraq’s relationship with the International Coalition and establish bilateral agreements with member countries. Iraq discussed this measure with the United States during the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue in August 2023.[47] The US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue in August 2023 included the discussion of expanding US-Iraq security cooperation beyond the current counter-ISIS framework under Operation Inherent Resolve to include joint military exercises, training, and officer exchange programs.[48] The diplomatic advisor to the prime minister stated that "the goal is not to get the [United States] out,” but that Iraq needs to “set a timetable” to transition from the US-led anti-ISIS coalition to a "bilateral agreement.”[49]

This policy is at odds with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have fueled an escalation cycle that aims to prompt US self-defense strikes, which they then misrepresent as violations of Iraqi sovereignty.[50] They use these supposed “violations” to demand the complete removal of US forces from Iraq. The Conquest Alliance, the Iranian-backed Badr Organization’s arm in parliament, submitted a draft law to the Council of Representatives on January 13 that would require Sudani to detail plans to end the US presence in Iraq.[51] The inclusion of this requirement is a key difference between the draft law and the 2020 nonbinding resolution that called for the expulsion of US forces.[52] The draft law was 77 signatories short of a majority needed to be presented for a vote.[53] Sudani’s current policy leaves open the possibility for continued US military cooperation in Iraq, though it is still unclear what that bilateral relationship would look like.

The US State Department redesignated the Houthis as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs) on January 17.[54] The designation requires US financial institutions to freeze any Houthi assets, but it will not take effect until mid-February. The State Department said that this 30-day delay would ensure the sanctions do not hinder humanitarian aid going to the Yemeni people.[55] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated that the United States would reevaluate this designation if the Houthis halted their attacks in the Red Sea.[56] The United States briefly listed the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization from January to February 2021. The Biden Administration lifted the designation in February 2021, citing humanitarian concerns.[57]

Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister and powerbroker Hussein al Ezzi threatened on January 16 that the Houthis would consider any measure that harmed Yemeni interests as a declaration of war.[58] Ezzi warned that the Houthis could expand their targeting of commercial shipping beyond the Bab al Mandeb through coordination with unspecified actors.[59] Ezzi controls the Houthi foreign affairs file, not the official foreign minister.[60] The Houthi spokesperson further reiterated that the US SDGT designation would not change Houthi support for Palestine on January 17.[61]

The Houthis said that they fired an unspecified missile that hit a US-owned Marshall Islands-flagged commercial vessel while the vessel transited the Gulf of Aden on January 17.[62] The UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that the vessel briefly caught fire but was able to continue to its next port of call.[63] The UK Maritime Trade Operations said that a drone targeted the vessel, not a missile.

Syrian, Western, and Iranian media provided further details on January 17 about the January 15 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps missile strike on Syria. UK-based Syrian opposition media Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and a Syrian humanitarian organization reported that the Iranian missile strike targeted an empty, non-operational medical clinic in Idlib.[64] Bloomberg reported that the range at which the IRGC fired the Kheibar Shekan missile on January 15 is nearly the range required for Iran to target Tel Aviv, Israel.[65] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled media highlighted that the missile’s name references a Jewish fortress captured by Muslim armies during the Battle of Kheibar in 628. AFGS-controlled media also noted that the purpose of the missile is to target Israel.[66] Israeli media and Iranian officials and media said on January 16 that the IRGC ballistic missile attacks in Idlib, Syria were the furthest that Iran has ever fired a missile.[67]

Western media reported on January 17 that India is attempting to persuade Iran to help shield Indian exporters from Iran-backed Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.[68] Reuters said that the Indian defense ministry improved its surveillance capabilities in the region and that Indian naval vessels are escorting Indian container ships transiting the Red Sea. The Indian foreign minister met with the Iranian president, Supreme National Security Council secretary, and foreign minister in Tehran on January 15.[69] The Iranian and Indian foreign ministers discussed maritime security in the Red Sea during their meeting.[70] The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting the Gabon-flagged Sai Baba commercial vessel with 25 Indian crew members on December 24.[71]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the IRGC’s January 15-16 strikes in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria with US media during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The IRGC struck actors in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria that Iranian leaders accused of trying to destabilize and undermine the regime.[72] Abdollahian described the strikes to CNBC on January 16 as acts of “legitimate self-defense" aimed at combatting terrorism.[73] Abdollahian separately told CNN on January 17 that Iran respects Iraq and Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it will not allow terrorists in Pakistan or “Israeli currents” in Iraqi Kurdistan to threaten Iran’s national security.[74] Abdollahian emphasized that the IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil targeted “Mossad agents,” not Iraq. Abdollahian also claimed that the IRGC acted within the framework of the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad. The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[75] Abdollahian may have made this statement in response to Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi’s warning on January 17 that the Iraqi federal government may suspend the agreement with Iran in response to the IRGC’s strikes in Erbil.[76] Abbasi is a member of a Sunni coalition named the National Resolution Alliance (Al Hasm Alliance).[77]

Abdollahian also claimed that Pakistan is Iran’s “friend and brother” and that the IRGC strikes in Pakistan did not kill any civilians. Abdollahian likely made this last statement in response to the Pakistani government’s claim that the airstrikes killed two children.[78] Abdollahian similarly emphasized that the IRGC strikes only targeted members of the Baloch Salafi-Jihadi group Jaish al Adl in a phone call with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Minister Jalil Abbas Jilani on January 17.[79] The Iranian readout of this phone call emphasized Iran’s respect for Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, while the Pakistani readout focused on Jilani’s condemnation of the strikes as “an egregious violation of international law and the spirit of bilateral relations between Pakistan and Iran.”[80]

The Pakistani government has strongly condemned and warned of possible retaliation for the IRGC strikes. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry warned on January 17 that Pakistan retains the right to “respond” to the strikes and that “the responsibility for the consequences [of the strikes] will lie squarely with Iran.”[81] Pakistan also recalled its ambassador to Iran and expelled the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan on January 17.[82] Pakistan media reported that Pakistan also closed its border with Iran.[83] The Pakistani Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee held a meeting on January 17 to discuss possible responses to the strikes.[84]

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with various foreign leaders while attending the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 16 and 17. Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war and bilateral counterterrorism efforts with the interim Prime Minister of Pakistan hours before the IRGC strike on Pakistan on January 16.[85] Abdollahian said fighting terrorism was one of the most important issues facing Iran and Pakistan. Abdollahian discussed Palestinian self-determination with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on January 17.[86] Abdollahian also discussed the need for a ceasefire with the Norwegian Foreign Minister on January 17.[87] Abdollahian further reiterated the need for a Palestinian-led effort to decide the governance of the post-war Gaza Strip and warned that the Israel-Hamas war could spread throughout the Middle East during the meeting.

Iranian security forces repulsed three Jaish al Adl fighters who attempted to cross the Iran-Pakistan border on January 17.[88] Iranian media reported that the Jaish al Adl fighters planned to conduct attacks in Iran.[89] Iranian security forces killed one fighter. Iranian forces injured two other fighters, who escaped. Iranian security forces captured weapons, ammunition, explosives, and hand grenades that the trio attempted to bring across the border.

Jaish al Adl claimed responsibility for killing an IRGC Ground Forces Colonel in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 17.[90] Colonel Hossein Ali Javadanfar was a member of the IRGC Ground Forces 110th Farsi Independent Special Forces Brigade. Jaish al Adl conducted at least four other attacks targeting Iranian security personnel inside Iran between December 15, 2023, and January 16, 2024.[91]

10. South Africa and other antisemitic genocidaires accuse Israel of genocide

South Africa and other antisemitic genocidaires accuse Israel of genocide

Blood libel in The Hague

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jan/16/south-africa-and-other-antisemitic-genocidaires-ac/

By Clifford D. May - - Tuesday, January 16, 2024

OPINION:

They say you can’t kill an idea, and maybe they’re right. Among Hitler’s ideas: murdering Jews — every man, woman and child.

Early in World War II, Winston Churchill observed that the deliberate and systematic destruction of a people was a “crime without a name.”

But in 1944, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-born Jewish lawyer who fled to America, where he advised the War Department, coined one: genocide. The word is a combination of “genos,” the Greek word for race or tribe, and “cide,” the Latin word for killing.

In 1948, the newly founded United Nations established the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the organization’s first human rights treaty.

It defines genocide as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”

On Oct. 7, Hamas terrorists invaded Israel and murdered as many men, women and children as they could.

To Defend Taiwan, the US Navy Must Retake the Ocean High Ground

Published 01/17/24 07:00 AM ET|Updated 17 hr ago

Rear Admiral (ret.) Tim Gallaudet, Ph.D.

themessenger.com · January 17, 2024

A well-known axiom in warfare is that occupying elevated terrain, or high ground, provides a tactical advantage over an opposing force.

There is a form of high ground in the undersea domain as well. Bathymetric and sedimentary features of the seafloor, as well as dynamical changes in the three-dimensional distribution of seawater properties over time, affect the performance of the undersea acoustic and optical sensors used to detect and target an adversary’s assets. Depending upon the impact of these variations on the propagation of sound and light, it may be more beneficial to operate in different regions of the ocean than others, much like the way cloud-free skies enable the collection of imagery with reconnaissance satellites.

The U.S. Navy maps and monitors this ever-evolving ocean high ground with a fleet of oceanographic ships, an array of underwater drones, an interagency constellation of environmental satellites, as well as a global network of fixed and drifting sensors on the seabed, the sea surface and within the water column. The primary challenge for these systems is that the global ocean is vast, and large volumes of the maritime domain are unobserved. In fact, we know more about the surfaces of Mars and the moon than we do about the world’s seafloor, of which 75% has not been mapped to modern standards. This tragically came to light in 2005 and 2021 when two U.S. submarines collided with uncharted seamounts.

Compounding the problem is the fact that China has dramatically increased its oceanographic surveying activities in the Indo-Pacific region. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) revealed that Chinese survey vessels have carried out hundreds of thousands of hours of operations over the past four years. Incredibly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 64 active research and survey vessels compared to the 11 operated by the Naval Oceanographic Office and the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System for the U.S. Navy. Unfortunately, this disparity only mirrors the rapid expansion of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy into the largest navy in the world.

The U.S. Navy’s relinquishing of oceanographic leadership to China is not just an academic concern, as an accurate understanding of the ocean environment is an essential enabler in submarine operations, mine warfare, amphibious warfare and Naval Special Warfare — all of which may be necessary for a successful defense of Taiwan.

To right this ship of ocean science superiority, the U.S. Navy needs to take the following action now:

Increase the scope and funding for the Navy’s Task Force Ocean (TFO). In 2017, as oceanographer of the Navy, I established TFO with the Office of Naval Research to advance Navy-relevant ocean science through strengthened partnerships with academia and the private sector. A priority effort for TFO today is a four-year Department Research Initiative to conduct a detailed study of ocean processes in a 10,000 square kilometer area off the U.S. East Coast. While we will learn a great deal from this research, the time is now to conduct similar studies in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Philippine Sea, which is the area of operation for any foreseeable fight with the PRC.

Assign NOAA Ships to more Indo-Pacific missions in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has a fleet of 16 oceanographic ships that conduct fisheries and hydrographic surveys for the U.S. Department of Commerce. From 2022-2023, the NOAA Ship Rainier completed a first-of-its-kind nautical charting and coral reef survey campaign in the Marianas Islands, American Samoa and the Pacific Remote Island Areas.

To keep the U.S. from falling further behind China, the Navy must build on its current partnership with NOAA by requesting the agency continue campaigns like Rainier’s in the Indo-Pacific.

Leverage the DoD’s Replicator initiative to dramatically expand the Navy’s oceanographic drone fleet. In 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced the Replicator initiative to counter the PRC’s military mass by fielding thousands of attritable, all-domain, autonomous systems. Replicator presents the perfect opportunity for the Navy to overcome its survey ship shortfall by converting them into motherships of unmanned hydrographic vessels in the same way NOAA is doing with the agency’s fleet modernization. Additionally, the Navy needs to increase the quantity and quality of its oceanographic underwater drone fleet with more modular and modern ocean gliders that are on the leading edge of marine technology.

Acquire more commercial data to improve the Navy’s predictive ocean models. One of the most important applications of survey data is to provide boundary and initial conditions for predictive oceanographic models, which are increasingly advancing through the application of data-driven artificial intelligence (AI). To realize the full potential of AI, the Navy needs to access the new wave of commercial ocean data providers who are using small satellite constellations, ocean buoy networks and contractor-owned/contractor-operated ocean drone services. Such cost-effective solutions will also directly address the Navy’s gaps in ocean observations.

Last year, in a series of war games involving the U.S. and China over Taiwan, CSIS found that even in victory, the U.S. fleet could lose over one-quarter of its submarines and a thousand of its sailors. The loss of just a single submarine or sailor is one too many, so it is imperative for us to secure any advantage available. Retaking the ocean high ground can deliver that edge, without which the Navy could be dead in the water.

Rear Admiral (ret.) Tim Gallaudet is the CEO of Ocean STL Consulting, LLC, former acting and deputy administrator at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as well as former acting undersecretary and assistant secretary of Commerce. Prior to NOAA, he served as an oceanographer in the U.S. Navy, completing his career as the commander of the Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command and founding director of the Navy’s Task Force Ocean.

themessenger.com · January 17, 2024

12. Before Larger or More Lethal, the U.S. Navy First Needs a Maritime Strategy

Excerpts:

A maritime strategy does not invest the CNO with command powers over the regional deployed commanders, but instead it allows her to build the Navy Program Objective Memorandum, the annual budget submission for the service that supports fleet and joint commander needs. It drives research and procurement budgets, and it provides civilian and military leaders with consistency and direction.

Sadly, there is a recurring myth within the halls of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense that such service estimates are wildly out of place and parochial in that they serve only the interests of one service. That fallacy needs to be dispelled and Congress should act objectively on the force requirements that naval professionals provide.

Unlike at the end of the Cold War, the Navy did not have a decade to create the building blocks for maritime strategy. The service must act now and boldly to present Congress and the president with a maritime strategy and fleet size and design to confront current and near-term threats. The Navy needs an aggressive maritime strategy before deciding what to build and in what numbers and lethality.

Before Larger or More Lethal, the U.S. Navy First Needs a Maritime Strategy

defenseopinion.com · by By Steven Wills

Published January 17, 2024
@ 3:12 pm

By Steven Wills

A recent Washington Post editorial makes the laudable case for a larger, or at least a more lethal U.S. Navy for checking the rise of China’s navy and for current contingency operations such as shooting down hostile drones and missiles launched by Yemen-based Houthi rebels at maritime targets. The editorial also makes a good case that the Navy needs to do a better job maintaining the ships it has before asking for a larger, more capable fleet.

But what is missing in the discussion about the right size Navy needed to counter these threats is a defined maritime strategy, a type of document not used by the service since the end of the Cold War. A maritime strategy lays out a detailed risk assessment for political leaders and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the consequences of not meeting naval force projection goals. It drives budgets for new ships, submarines, weapons and research.

The last such strategy in the 1980’s defined what the Navy intended to do in both peace and war and specified the number and types of ships needed for that effort. It also spelled out acceptable risks that lawmakers could consider when thinking about the size and capability of the fleet.

While the Navy has been remiss in providing such a risk assessment in recent years, there is now ample evidence one is needed with significant threats on the rise in the form of two peer competitors (China and Russia) two regional opponents (Iran and North Korea) and the ever-present threat of violent non-state actors such as the Houthi insurgents in Yemen.

Maritime strategies through the decades

When confronting peer maritime opponents such strategies are immensely useful. In the years before the World War II when facing a threat from Imperial Japan, the Navy generated War Plan Orange as a strategy against Japanese aggression. That strategy developed over the course of three decades. When the Soviet Union’s navy became a more global and threatening force after its 1970 OKEAN exercise, Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Elmo Zumwalt began development of what would later become the 1980’s maritime strategy.

Zumwalt did this by refocusing the Navy on war at sea as opposed to power projection ashore in Southeast Asia. Over the next decade Zumwalt and his successors, Adms. Jim Holloway and Tom Hayward, further refined the concept of a maritime strategy and the size and types of ships needed to accomplish the maritime component of national strategy.

Accurate intelligence determined that the Soviets were not really interested in contesting command of the global seas and instead desired to protect their ballistic missile submarines in waters close to the Soviet homeland. Limited budgets always had a say in what the Navy could and could not accomplish and the push for a 600-ship fleet was very much a compromise as 1,000-, 800- and 400-ship fleets were also proposed.

Leaders selected a strategy with a goal of 15 aircraft carriers and 90 nuclear submarines to enable the Navy to contest the Soviets in the Atlantic, the Pacific and in the Mediterranean, while giving up attempts in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, his Navy Secretary John Lehman aggressively sought support for the Navy’s strategy and force design efforts.

The maritime strategy of the 1980’s has been credited with helping to win the Cold War through its peacetime exercise programs led by officers like 2nd Fleet Commanders Adm. Ace Lyons and Hank Mustin. The Navy did not reach 600 ships, and it remains a hypothetical discussion of how long the budget for a larger fleet could have been maintained. But the combination of the maritime strategy and 600-ship quest as a cornerstone gave the Navy a strong arguing point in Congress that won bipartisan support for both the strategy and ship count for seven years.

Building a new maritime strategy

While it is arguable that the U.S. Navy today should be larger and more capable, having a maritime strategy can make the case for such enlargement with more effectiveness than just referencing current threats. Thirty-year shipbuilding plans would be part of this process but alone are not a substitute for having a strategy and a force design in support.

The 1980’s maritime strategy and 600-ship requirements were not created in Washington D.C., but rather by the fleet commanders who led the Navy in peace and war. Their inputs to the Chief of Naval Operations became the core of the strategy and the fleet size. The Navy should again harness its fleet commanders to build a global strategy with sufficient size and capability. Once armed with these requirements, the Navy can present its case to the Congress and the president for what its commanders think they need to win.

A maritime strategy does not invest the CNO with command powers over the regional deployed commanders, but instead it allows her to build the Navy Program Objective Memorandum, the annual budget submission for the service that supports fleet and joint commander needs. It drives research and procurement budgets, and it provides civilian and military leaders with consistency and direction.

Sadly, there is a recurring myth within the halls of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense that such service estimates are wildly out of place and parochial in that they serve only the interests of one service. That fallacy needs to be dispelled and Congress should act objectively on the force requirements that naval professionals provide.

Unlike at the end of the Cold War, the Navy did not have a decade to create the building blocks for maritime strategy. The service must act now and boldly to present Congress and the president with a maritime strategy and fleet size and design to confront current and near-term threats. The Navy needs an aggressive maritime strategy before deciding what to build and in what numbers and lethality.

Steven Wills

Dr. Steven Wills is the navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms and military history.

defenseopinion.com · by By Steven Wills

13. The National Security Imperative of the Defense Appropriations Bill

Excerpts:

This prolonged debate over the 2024 budget, when we are already months into the fiscal year, is harmful to our overall security goals. Top U.S. security officials in the Administration and Congress have been warning for years of the dire consequences stemming from unstable and insufficient defense budgets, and here we are again. “China doesn’t become less aggressive or Russia less revanchist or Iran less extreme because our military is shrunk. In fact, the opposite is true. They grow more ambitious and dangerous,” said U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton this summer.

Instead, we need to provide stable defense funding, as the country’s senior-most military officer, General Charles Q. Brown, called for in November, saying “the consistent steady funding and predictable funding is what actually helps us to ensure we are going to have the capacity not just for today, but into the future as well.”

When I speak to American aerospace companies, their number one request of the federal government is stability. If Congress wants them to build it, they need faith that Congress will come up with the funding. Right now, that confidence is shaken.

If Congress wants to counter China’s modernization threat, it needs to restore that trust and invest in America’s defense companies, workforce and supply chain. Congress has always found a path forward on its most basic constitutional duty: funding the federal government. At this pivotal point, we hope they will do so again. To fail to meet this moment and to allow China to gain further traction against us would be a mistake with lasting repercussions.

The National Security Imperative of the Defense Appropriations Bill

By Eric Fanning

January 18, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/18/the_national_security_imperative_of_the_defense_appropriations_bill_1005722.html?mc_cid=4f18128ce4&mc_eid=70bf478f36

It’s a new year, but the same old conversations are consuming Washington. With the global security situation worsening, Congress is fighting yet another battle over government funding. They reached a topline budget deal, but whether the bulk of Congress goes along with this proposal remains to be seen. While Washington weighs bad options, like short-term funding measures, critical national security programs are delayed, and the U.S. economy risks destabilization.

The only path that allows the United States to maintain its global strength and continue outpacing China is to fully fund the federal government, especially one of our most important strategic assets: the defense industrial base.

No other country has a defense industrial base with the innovation, infrastructure, and workforce like the United States does: it is a critical deterrent to our enemies. But that leadership did not happen overnight, and it has taken decades of policy and investment to shape the defense industrial base into what it is today: positioned for peacetime.

The past two years have given Americans a front row seat to how our defense industry would be put to the test in a time of war. Between the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a hot conflict in the Middle East, if we were to ask our defense companies to also tackle an escalation in the Indo-Pacific, current federal funding would be insufficient to enable ramping up production quickly.

Meanwhile China is playing a better long game than we are. They have doubled their defense budget over the last decade alone, making them the second-largest military spender in the world. And while China’s lack of transparency means we do not know exactly how they are spending this money; we do know they are leapfrogging us in technologies like hypersonic missiles and shipbuilding capabilities.

And on top of this military spending, China is on track to surpass us in in novel technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, as well as the infrastructure that supports this research and development. China can harness its entire communist economy to build its workforce and maintain its supply chain, while here in the U.S., we are just starting to secure our supply chain and address talent shortages, especially in key areas like science and engineering.

Yet Congress appears to be distracted. They are also ignoring other economic realities like inflation, which is steadily reducing the Pentagon’s buying power by billions. Every day we fail to fund the government, we risk being forced to make sacrifices down the road, when we will not be able to afford the technology needed to defeat our enemies, or do not have the infrastructure and workforce needed to build equipment. A lack of responsible, stable funding is going to put us dangerously behind.

This prolonged debate over the 2024 budget, when we are already months into the fiscal year, is harmful to our overall security goals. Top U.S. security officials in the Administration and Congress have been warning for years of the dire consequences stemming from unstable and insufficient defense budgets, and here we are again. “China doesn’t become less aggressive or Russia less revanchist or Iran less extreme because our military is shrunk. In fact, the opposite is true. They grow more ambitious and dangerous,” said U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton this summer.

Instead, we need to provide stable defense funding, as the country’s senior-most military officer, General Charles Q. Brown, called for in November, saying “the consistent steady funding and predictable funding is what actually helps us to ensure we are going to have the capacity not just for today, but into the future as well.”

When I speak to American aerospace companies, their number one request of the federal government is stability. If Congress wants them to build it, they need faith that Congress will come up with the funding. Right now, that confidence is shaken.

If Congress wants to counter China’s modernization threat, it needs to restore that trust and invest in America’s defense companies, workforce and supply chain. Congress has always found a path forward on its most basic constitutional duty: funding the federal government. At this pivotal point, we hope they will do so again. To fail to meet this moment and to allow China to gain further traction against us would be a mistake with lasting repercussions.

Eric Fanning is President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). Mr. Fanning is also the former Secretary of the Army along with several other senior appointments in the Department of Dfense.

14. What the Navy is learning from its fight in the Red Sea

What the Navy is learning from its fight in the Red Sea

militarytimes.com · by Geoff Ziezulewicz · January 18, 2024

Thirteen years ago, the current head of the Navy’s surface fleet was captaining the destroyer Carney.

Even in 2010, airborne drones were a threat for which his ship had tactics and munitions at the ready, Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, now the head of Naval Surface Forces, told reporters earlier this month.

“We had a specific tactic to go after it, with a specific munition that we could shoot out our gun,” McLane said.

Fast forward to the present day and McLane has watched his former warship Carney, along with fellow destroyers Gravely, Laboon, Mason and Thomas Hudner, shoot down dozens of attack drones and missiles in the Red Sea in recent months.

Iran-backed Houthi rebels have launched attacks at commercial vessels transiting the vital economic waterway, and sometimes at Navy warships themselves. The attacks have come on a regular basis since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel by Hamas, and Israel’s subsequent operations to clear the militant group from the Gaza Strip.

The Navy destroyer Laboon at work in the Red Sea in December. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Alice Husted/Navy)

The Carney and other warships have been at the spear’s tip for intercepting these attacks, shooting down scores of Houthi air attack drones in the process.

And while it remains to be seen whether last week’s U.S.-led bombing of Houthi sites in Yemen will cause the rebels to meaningfully relent, current Navy leaders and analysts agree: The volume of intercepts in the Red Sea is without modern precedent for the Navy, and the surface fleet is quickly learning from the encounters.

Those lessons are also raising questions about which warship weapons are right for such a job. While McLane declined to get into the specifics of how the Red Sea fight is impacting tactics and training during a recent interview, citing classification levels, he said the surface fleet is tracking developments “very closely.”

“We have our warfare tactics instructors involved in analyzing the data that we’re getting from the tapes on the Carney and the other ships,” he said. “And we’re looking very closely at profiles and what we have to do when it comes to radar tuning. And what we have to do when it comes to setting up our weapons system on the ship to make sure that we have … maximum defensive capability at all times.”

Those instructors are also helping to analyze data and provide updated tactics, techniques and procedures, Rear Adm. Joseph Cahill, the head of Naval Surface Force Atlantic, told reporters this month.

While destroyers have taken part in a variety of missions over the years to keep commerce flowing in the Middle East, the months-long effort to shoot down Houthi missiles and drones is new, and something the Navy hasn’t done regularly since gunfire support missions during the Vietnam War, according to Jan van Tol, a retired forward-deployed warship captain and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

USS Carney sailors awarded for battling Houthi attacks in Red Sea

The warship deployed in May.

The surface fleet finds itself steaming through uncharted waters in the Red Sea, when it comes to the types of munitions they are intercepting and the sustained nature of the threat.

“This is a mix we haven’t seen before, and it does represent a new wrinkle,” retired Vice. Adm. Robert Murrett, a former vice director of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff who now leads the Institute for Security Policy and Law at Syracuse University.

According to McLane, the captain of the Carney, Cmdr. Jeremy Robertson, has reported that while his crew has been working hard, the urgency of the mission seems to have supercharged the deck plates.

“[Robertson] told me that, two days after their first engagement, he had 15 reenlistment contracts on his desk,” McLane said. “I think this has something to do with the investment that we’ve made in [weapons tactics instructors], and the investment that we’ve made in developing a warfighting culture.

“Our sailors are incredibly energized by being able to operate their weapons systems in the way that they are intended and seeing success in doing that.”

A sailor stands ready during flight quarters aboard the Navy destroyer Gravely in the Red Sea on Jan. 5, 2024. Gravely and other destroyers have been shooting down a steady stream of attack drones and missiles fired by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen since October. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jonathan Word/Navy)

Pick your poison

The Navy’s Red Sea engagements have often pitted relatively cheap, Iran-made attack drones against a Navy destroyer’s SM-2 missiles, which cost roughly $2.4 million each but allow a ship to take out a threat from a greater distance compared to other onboard weapons systems.

To date, the SM-2 munition is the only one used in the Red Sea that the sea service has officially confirmed.

Relying on a pricey asset to eliminate cheap threats raises questions about the sustainability and efficiency of the tactic, multiple analysts told Navy Times.

Navy leaders have indicated that they feel good about the surface fleet’s munitions stockpile.

“Right now, we’re stable in our inventory,” Rear Adm. Fred Pyle, head of the Surface Warfare Division for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, told reporters this month. “But it’s something we are very focused on and we continue to work on it.”

The men and women of the Navy destroyer Mason are one of several that have shot down scores of Iran-backed Houthi rebel attack drones and missiles over the Red Sea in recent months. The crew is shown here during an at-sea replenishment on Dec. 21. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Krucke/Navy)

Still, some analysts argue that shooting Houthi drones out of the sky with SM-2s might not be an ideal solution.

“Today’s operations will stress the sustainability of the U.S. surface fleet, which relies on relatively expensive weapons for self-defense,” Bryan Clark, a retired submariner and current senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said in an email to Navy Times.

Not relying so heavily on the SM-2 could allow commanders to “become more comfortable” with the idea of letting drones get in closer proximity to where they can be taken out with less expensive assets, said James Holmes, a former surface warfare officer and director of maritime strategy at the Naval War College.

But not relying on SM-2s to take out Houthi threats and engaging attack drones with different systems at a shorter range involves greater risk to a Navy warship and its crew, Holmes warned.

“Anything we can do to bring about a soft kill, whether through the new electronic-warfare upgrades to our destroyers, or through directed energy, is certainly worth exploring as we try to keep costs down and manage weapons inventories,” he said.

The surface fleet could create new concepts to defend against such attacks that don’t require firing their SM-2s, a combination of defensive air drones, electronic warfare and other assets, he added.

While the Navy has been “pretty cagey with operational details for obvious reasons,” Holmes noted that these expensive engagements are “expending a finite inventory of surface-to-air missiles.”

Sailors assigned to the Navy destroyer Carney stand watch in the ship’s Combat Information Center during an operation to defeat a combination of Houthi missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles on Oct. 19, 2023, in the Red Sea. (Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aaron Lau/Navy)

“[I have] no idea what specific doctrine our ships are using in the Red Sea, but you generally train to use multiple missiles per engagement,” Holmes said. “If it’s an SM-2 engagement … the latest variant of the SM-2 seems to run about $2.4 million per round, so you’re talking just under $5 million to bring down what is probably an inexpensive threat. And again, weapons expended in the Red Sea are weapons not available in the primary theater, East Asia, and are not quickly replaced.”

Big Navy is likely grappling with such questions internally, according to Holmes.

“Sad to say, but human nature is that it usually takes a crisis to focus the mind,” he said. “As Dr. Johnson once wisecracked, the prospect of a hanging concentrates the mind wonderfully.”

Destroyers could also use shorter-range weapons, like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile or the Rolling Air Frame missile, munitions that can be carried in greater numbers, according to Clark.

Four Sea Sparrows can be loaded into one vertical launch system cell on ship, he noted, and the Rolling Air Frame missile can be reloaded at sea.SM-2s, however, cannot be reloaded while a ship is underway.

While the Navy has confirmed the use of SM-2 missiles, Clark said he suspects ships are already using other systems against less-capable drones.

“[Five-inch] guns do have an anti-air capability, though, and the Navy has been fielding man-portable counter-drone [electronic warfare] systems like those used by the Army and Marine Corps,” he said.

The SLQ-32 electronic warfare system could also take out a drone’s navigation or command signals, Clark added.

A destroyer’s five-inch gun and smaller missile options would make sense in the Red Sea against incoming Houthi fires, but it remains to be seen whether the surface fleet would culturally choose those options, given how ingrained the concepts of layered defense are within the fleet and the desire to take down a threat from as far away as possible, according to van Tol.

“Ultimately the likely future increase in numbers of simultaneous incoming threats will require higher capacities of defensive fires, and those can’t only be expensive [long-range, surface-to-air missiles], both for cost imposition and limited ship [vertical launch system] capacity reasons,” he said.

After a busy eight-month deployment that involved shooting down Iran-backed Houthi rebel attack drones and missiles in the Red Sea, the Navy destroyer Thomas Hudner returned to Naval Station Mayport, Florida, on Jan. 4. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brandon J. Vinson/Navy)

Rough seas

Analysts say the very nature of the Red Sea makes it a challenging fight for the Navy.

In a way, the Houthis are firing into a prime theater. The Red Sea is shallow and relatively narrow, and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait at the sea’s south end is only about 16-nautical-miles wide, van Tol noted.

“The Houthi targeting challenge is not high if they just want to whack a ship since there are multiple ways to detect it and get the targeting info to the shooters,” he said. “There’s obviously also limited reaction time once an incoming [anti-ship cruise missile] or drone is detected.”

The volume of Houthi strikes thus far has not suggested that any Navy destroyers would need to head to the Mediterranean Sea or Bahrain to refill their missile cells, Holmes said.

“If someone attacked shipping in the Suez Canal, closing it, or interfered with passage through the Bab el-Mandeb or Hormuz strait, things could get uncomfortable trying to resupply our Red Sea flotilla,” he said.

About Geoff Ziezulewicz

Geoff is the editor of Navy Times, but he still loves writing stories. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.

militarytimes.com · by Geoff Ziezulewicz · January 18, 2024

15. Austin Leaves Hospital, Returns Home

Austin Leaves Hospital, Returns Home

Jan. 18, 2024 | By C. Todd Lopez , DOD News

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

After a two-week stay at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III returned home on Monday. The secretary said he expects in the short term to continue his recovery at home while also performing his duties as the defense secretary.

"I'm grateful for the excellent care I received at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and want to thank the outstanding doctors and nursing staff for their professionalism and superb support," Austin said in a statement released earlier this week. "I also am thankful and appreciative for all the well wishes I received for a speedy recovery. Now, as I continue to recuperate and perform my duties from home, I'm eager to fully recover and return as quickly as possible to the Pentagon."

Aerial View

An aerial view of the Pentagon, May 15, 2023.

Download: Full Size (3.8 MB)

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Alexander Kubitza, DOD

VIRIN: 230515-D-PM193-1868X

According to doctors at Walter Reed, Austin underwent surgery Dec. 22 to treat prostate cancer, which had been detected earlier in the month following a routine screening. On Jan. 1, the secretary was re-admitted to Walter Reed with complications related to that earlier surgery.

During a briefing yesterday, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, said Austin's doctors have said the secretary is expected to make a full recovery. They also noted that in relation to the cancer, early diagnosis and treatment led to an excellent prognosis. Austin will continue to undergo physical therapy while at home.

41:32

Houthis Degraded

Last week, the U.S. and U.K., with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands, conducted strikes against military targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen as part of an effort to disrupt and degrade Houthi ability to attack international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Ryder said.

"The U.S. also conducted subsequent follow-up strikes against a radar site on Saturday ... that was part of the original target list, and four anti-ship ballistic missiles yesterday ... that were prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, [and] which presented an imminent threat to both merchant and U.S. Navy ships in the region."

According to U.S. Central Command, the strike against the Houthi radar site was conducted by the USS Carney using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles.

Following the U.S. attacks on the Houthi site, Ryder said, the U.S. assessment is that Houthi capabilities have been degraded.

"In our assessment, we hit what we intended to hit with good effects," the general said. "The objective here was to disrupt and degrade Houthi capabilities to conduct attacks. And we believe that overall, in terms of the scope and the number of strikes that we took, we have degraded their ability to attack."

Ryder also said that while the department believes the strikes met their objectives, the Houthis still maintain capability and the U.S. military and its partners remain vigilant.

"We're going to keep working alongside our international partners," he said. "And ... we're going to continue to do what we need to do to protect our forces, but also deter future attacks from the Houthis."

According to U.S. Centcom, Iranian-backed Houthi militants have attempted to attack and harass vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 28 times since Nov. 19.

Pentagon Briefing

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder conducts a press briefing at the Pentagon, Jan. 17, 2024.

Download: Full Size (4.32 MB)

VIRIN: 240117-F-GD090-1139

Search Continues for Lost Navy SEALs

Last Thursday, Centcom naval forces, including U.S. Navy SEALs, seized Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missile components from a vessel operating in the Arabian Sea near the coast of Somalia. According to Centcom, this was the first seizure of lethal, Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis since the beginning of Houthi attacks November 2023.

During that action, two U.S. Navy SEALs were lost at sea. Centcom continues to search for those lost SEALs, Ryder said.

"On the search and rescue, Centcom continues to lead that effort," he said. "It is ongoing, certainly. We hope that we are able to recover our teammates. Our thoughts and prayers are clearly with their families at this time."

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

16. Ukraine’s War of Narratives

Conclusion:

In reviewing these many reversals, I certainly don’t intend to claim that I had more foresight than other observers. Many of the above assumptions did feel overwhelmingly convincing. I, for one, thought the seemingly perfect storm of Russian battlefield reverses and internal chaos in fall 2022 would be nearly impossible for Putin to overcome. Yet if there is one lesson this war should have taught us, it is that no present reality or narrative is nearly as solid as it seems. The nature of the conflict means that at any time, a coherent and well-argued piece can be written explaining why defeat is imminent for either of the sides. And yet this has yet to happen. Both at the present, with Ukraine on the back foot, and when Ukraine is ascendant again in the near future, we would all do well to moderate our predictions of what’s next.

Ukraine’s War of Narratives - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Neil Hauer · January 18, 2024

It’s now almost two years into Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, and if you’re a Ukraine supporter, the past few months have not been encouraging. This summer and fall were meant to be a time of great returns for Ukraine. Amidst much fanfare, Ukraine launched its vaunted summer offensive in June. The campaign, bolstered by a major stockpile of Western-supplied armoured vehicles and ammunition, was meant to deliver a war-changing blow to Russian forces and liberate significant territory. The broad aim was to reach the Azov Sea coast somewhere west of Mariupol, cleaving Russia’s occupation forces in southern Ukraine in two by severing their only land connection. Failing that, Ukrainian generals expected to at least retake the cities of Melitopol and Tokmak.

None of this has happened. For a variety of reasons, discussed at length elsewhere, Ukraine’s counteroffensive fell well short of its goals, capturing only a handful of villages and grinding to a halt without any major territorial gains. The disappointing results were compounded by a spate of negative headlines. These included the return of political infighting to Ukraine, with Kyiv’s mayor Vitaly Klitschko lashing out at President Volodymyr Zelensky and a reported rift emerging between Zelensky and Ukrainian military chief Valery Zaluzhny. Now, Western aid is dwindling. The past three months saw the lowest foreign aid pledges to Ukraine since the war’s start, marked by the failure of the U.S. Congress to pass a much-needed new aid package before the year’s end. There are whispers that Western nations are pressuring Kyiv to launch renewed negotiations with Moscow as the stalemate on the front deepens. Russia, meanwhile, has not only weathered the storm but is back on the attack, its forces launching a series of costly offensives on the fortress town of Avdiivka in the southeastern Donbas.

Become a Member

Put together, the above seems to paint a dire picture for Ukraine and its prospects going forward. But one of the key lessons from watching this war, and the way that it’s covered in the media, is that perceptions can be fickle. Throughout 22 months of conflict, the ironclad conventional wisdom regarding the war’s present state and near future has repeatedly been shattered. By my count, there have been no less than seven major narrative periods of this war, each of which has ended with the script flipping almost entirely. Both Ukraine and Russia have regularly been seen as the conflict’s inevitable victor — only to fall back down to earth when the expectations created failed to live up to reality.

The length of each cycle seems to have expanded as the war itself has gone on and dramatic swings of battlefield fortune have become less common. But the characteristics of each new paradigm have fundamentally remained much the same, and there is every reason to expect more to come.

Sequential Swings

The first major narrative cycle preceded the war itself. In the run-up to the Russian invasion, Russian forces were widely expected to crush Ukraine’s conventional troops in the field. While the potential scope of this initial victory was much debated, there was a broad sense that Russia’s reformed and far better-equipped military would triumph in open battle with Ukrainian forces before proceeding to a costly occupation period. Russia was expected to use its huge advantage in long-range missile capabilities in a “shock and awe” campaign that would decimate much of Ukraine’s military. Alexander Vindman, a former U.S. army officer and analyst on Ukraine, told RFERL in December 2021 that “the advantage is still heavily in Russia’s favor.” If Russia invaded, he thought, its forces would succeed as they had in 2014–15: “the outcome doesn’t really change.” Top U.S. military officials reportedly assessed that Russia could take Kyiv within 72 hours of an assault, while plans for Zelensky to evacuate the capital to the western Ukrainian city of Lviv were also discussed. Even many Ukrainian commanders felt this way. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, was quoted by the New York Times in mid-December 2021 as stating that Ukraine did not have “sufficient military resources for repelling a full-scale attack by Russian forces” if it did not receive major Western support beforehand. “Believe me, without delivery of [Western] reserves, there’s not an army in the world that can hold out [against Russia],” Budanov stated.

In the event, Ukraine did, of course, hold out. Russia’s poorly planned and executed initial invasion floundered, stalling well short of most of its objectives within days and failing to even surround, let alone take, Kyiv. By early April, Russian forces had withdrawn entirely from northern Ukraine. Images of Russian military incompetence were everywhere, most famously in videos of Russian tanks and other heavy ordnance abandoned and towed off by Ukrainian farmers. Some observers used this to draw sweeping conclusions. The idea that Russia was a state whose military had credibly threatened Europe and NATO countries when it couldn’t even seize Kharkiv, a city 15 kilometers from its borders, now felt ludicrous. If the Russian army couldn’t even properly fuel its tanks, how could it hope to advance even elsewhere in Ukraine?

As the euphoria of the unexpected victories in the war’s opening stages faded, another phase of the war and its perception set in. Having withdrawn its brigades from northern Ukraine in fairly good order, Moscow now refocused its efforts entirely on Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Here, Russia would be able to deploy its massive advantage in artillery fires to grind down the Ukrainian army, as demonstrated by its ability to annihilate the town of Popasna before seizing it on May 7. Having spent nearly all of May 2022 in Donbas myself, reporting on the ground and talking to Ukrainian soldiers, the shift in mood was palpable: Soldiers talked about being outgunned and outmanned by as much as “ten to one” and discussed feeling abandoned by the leadership in Kyiv. As Russia’s enormous Soviet-era military stockpile fueled its grinding, relentless, artillery-heavy assaults for months, another perception of the war gained popularity. Russia was simply too large and too resilient to lose this war, its material advantages making any talk of Ukrainian victory “implausible.” Russia’s progress could be only slowed, not stopped, and Western arms for Ukraine would only prolong the inevitable and increase suffering. As Moscow’s troops captured the twin cities of Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, seizing the entirety of Ukraine’s Luhansk oblast as advanced Western military systems continued to be delayed, the mood by late summer 2022 was a dark one.

The next shift was perhaps just as drastic. On Sept. 6, 2022, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise offensive on Russian positions east of the city of Kharkiv. Finding them undermanned and ill-coordinated, Ukrainian troops quickly punched through Russian lines into rear areas, leading to a total rout that saw Ukrainian forces liberate nearly the entirety of Russian-held Kharkiv oblast within days. The revelations of Russia’s manpower issues, with some units operating at less than 30 percent of their intended strength, were followed by a chaotic partial mobilization ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin just weeks later. Scenes of drunken Russian conscripts brawling at their deployment zones, protests against the mobilization, and another mass exodus of Russians fleeing their country created a sense that Russia was on the verge of collapse, either on the battlefield or internally. The liberation of the city of Kherson — the only Ukrainian provincial capital captured by Russia following their February invasion, and a long-stated Ukrainian goal — only added to the sense of inevitability that the war was now Ukraine’s to lose. Some analysts began to talk of the war being over by Christmas, and others talked of at least reaching the Crimean peninsula within a few months. The convergence of these factors was intoxicating on social media and felt like it would not be reversed.

This, too, did not last. Now, it was Ukraine’s turn to fall short of supplies, with ammunition in particular running down. Hopes of a Ukrainian winter offensive to seize the key Donbas junction town of Kreminna did not materialize, as Ukrainian forces ran low on artillery shells. Mobilized Russian conscripts began to reach the battlefield in large numbers, stymying the Ukrainian advance and plugging the holes in Russian lines. It was at this time that the single longest and deadliest battle of the entire war played out: the siege of Bakhmut. Russian forces, led by Wagner Group mercenaries, began the systematic destruction of the city, punching through with endless waves of convicts as Ukrainian forces struggled to hold out. The slow but steady advance through the city, from winter 2022 until its full capture in May 2023, renewed the atmosphere of pessimism that characterized Russia’s 2022 summer Donbas offensive. Alongside this came yet another spate of pieces arguing that Ukraine must make peace with Russia while it still could, and that a negotiated settlement to end the fighting was necessary. Western weapons had not won the war yet for Ukraine, people claimed, and it was thus high time to realize that a Russian defeat was impossible.

During the desperate defense of Bakhmut, Ukraine and its Western partners were not idle. They had instead spent the interim training and equipping a number of new brigades that were to use Western-supplied main battle tanks and armored vehicles in a sweeping counteroffensive that would liberate large swathes of territory. Ukrainian officials did not shy away from buoying expectations to lofty heights: Mykhailo Podolyak, one of Zelensky’s top advisors, stated in April that Ukraine would “return [liberate] Crimea within five to seven months.” Some social media commentators posited that Ukraine could simply use bulldozers to plow over Russian trenches, as U.S. forces had done in Kuwait and Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. Others announced that the coming counteroffensive would “rewrite military history.” Even as the offensive ground on for months, with its gains measured in tree lines, many analysts continued to insist that the campaign was succeeding. Ukraine would not come close to achieving its minimum goals in the offensive — the city of Tokmak, as stated by Ukrainian general Oleksandr Tarnavsky — but this was often hard to discern from the infallible optimism seen across much of social media.

Now, as the counteroffensive’s failings are broadly discussed, the pendulum has swung back toward pessimism once again. The paucity of territorial gains, amplified in many ways by the lofty expectations heading into the campaign, led to yet another cycle of articles and headlines suggesting the dour inevitability of a Russian victory in the conflict. With Russian lines having failed to collapse, the popular talk is now about fading Western support, Ukrainian political disunity and behind-the-scenes pushes for Zelensky to accept the reality on the ground. Another round of articles about the necessity of negotiations have emerged, while pundits on the pro-Russian side have again claimed that Ukraine and the West are headed for certain defeat.

Conclusion

By this stage, one can almost imagine how the next paragraph of this article would read six months from now: Russia’s newest reverse, whiplash in the Western media, optimism about Putin’s imminent fall. Perceptions of this conflict have largely been defined by overcorrections, as mercurial audiences and headline writers seek the latest eye-catching takes. But the reality of the Russian-Ukrainian war — as with most major interstate conflicts — has been a much more nuanced affair. While significant events like the capture of a city or the defection of a mercenary group can be startling and encourage expectations of more of the same, observers of this war are better served by resisting the temptation to extrapolate too broadly about what comes next. Topics like artillery shell production and military recruitment numbers might be less captivating, but the underlying factors in any conflict of this scale are usually more impactful than the headline news. The pace of developments may slowing after its bombastic first year, as the battlefield approaches something resembling stalemate. Nonetheless, the course of the conflict to date suggests that another next major shift in narrative is all too likely — even if it takes a bit longer to materialize.

One of the key takeaways from reviewing these narrative cycles is that not all observers are equally reliable. While coverage in the media, and especially social media, has often made the outcome of this conflict appear inevitable, the analyst community has largely worked to avoid this. Both military and political analysts commentating on the war have consistently couched their insights with many layers of caveats, emphasizing that anything with as many inputs and moving parts as the 21st century’s largest interstate conflict are exceedingly difficult to predict. This has led to a much more robust record on their part, albeit one that’s inherently less attractive in our contemporary global media environment than more bombastic predictions. Social media in particular is not well-suited to such nuance: Long threads of analysis with many provisions and stipulations guiding their takeaways rarely, if ever, outperform similar posts promising grand victories or crushing defeats for one side. Given the nature of social media, this is unlikely to change anytime soon, but readers will hopefully grow more savvy.

In reviewing these many reversals, I certainly don’t intend to claim that I had more foresight than other observers. Many of the above assumptions did feel overwhelmingly convincing. I, for one, thought the seemingly perfect storm of Russian battlefield reverses and internal chaos in fall 2022 would be nearly impossible for Putin to overcome. Yet if there is one lesson this war should have taught us, it is that no present reality or narrative is nearly as solid as it seems. The nature of the conflict means that at any time, a coherent and well-argued piece can be written explaining why defeat is imminent for either of the sides. And yet this has yet to happen. Both at the present, with Ukraine on the back foot, and when Ukraine is ascendant again in the near future, we would all do well to moderate our predictions of what’s next.

Become a Member

Neil Hauer is a Canadian journalist covering Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus from his base in Yerevan, Armenia. He has reported from the ground on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since the war’s first day.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Neil Hauer · January 18, 2024

17. The Quiet Transformation of Occupied Ukraine

Every time someone advocates ceding occupied territory to Russia during a peace negotiation, they should remember what is happening to ukrainian citizens in those occupied territories.

Conclusion:

The prospects for the occupied territories are bleak. Ukraine lacks a political and diplomatic strategy to challenge Russia’s occupation over the longer term. Ukrainian policymakers had hoped that a quick and successful military counteroffensive last year would free these territories and roll back Russian forces. That did not come to pass. With the frontline at a territorial stalemate, Ukraine’s chances of regaining full control of the occupied territories by force of arms in 2024 appear slim. Any armistice or freezing of the conflict would draw a line through southern and eastern Ukraine, leaving millions of Ukrainians under Russian rule. As the war grinds on, Russia has time to further consolidate its political, economic, and administrative occupation, making the eventual reintegration of these territories back into Ukraine increasingly difficult.

The Quiet Transformation of Occupied Ukraine

Away From the Frontlines, Russia Cements Its Conquest

By David Lewis

January 18, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by David Lewis · January 18, 2024

While the West continues to squabble over providing further aid to Ukraine, Russia has been quietly consolidating its control over the territories it occupies in southeastern Ukraine. As the frontline stabilized in 2023, Russia remained in control of almost 18 percent of Ukrainian territory, including about 25,000 square miles of land seized since February 2022. All branches of the Russian government are involved in a costly and ambitious program to integrate these newly occupied territories into the Russian Federation—as Russia did with Crimea after it seized the peninsula in 2014. The Kremlin hopes to create facts on the ground that will be difficult for Ukraine to challenge, either by military force or in future peace talks.

Russia ceremonially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts—Donetsk and Luhansk in the east of the country and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in the south—in September 2022, although its military is not in full control of any of these provinces. Since then, Russian officials have transformed the governance of the areas under its control, holding sham elections last September and appointing pro-Moscow officials at every level. An army of technocrats is overseeing the complete absorption of these territories, aligning their laws, regulations, and tax and banking systems with Russia, and getting rid of any traces of institutional ties to Ukraine. A nominal transition period runs until January 2026, by which time the Kremlin expects Russian legal, judicial, and political systems to be fully in force in what it calls the “New Regions.”

This administrative occupation is less well known than the violence and human rights abuses that accompany it. But Russia’s war in Ukraine extends well beyond its ruthless missile and drone strikes, its legions of soldiers, and its bellicose rhetoric. In occupied Ukraine, bureaucrats have been effective at enforcing the compliance of locals. Even as some people resist, authorities impose Russian education, cultural indoctrination, and economic and legal systems to rope these lands ever more tightly to Russia. The longer Russia occupies these territories, the harder it will be for Ukraine to get them back.

UNDER THE RUSSIAN YOKE

Probably more than half the prewar population of newly occupied regions fled after Russia invaded in 2022. But for those people who remained, the Russian system has forced almost everybody into some level of cooperation. According to Russian figures, almost 90 percent of the remaining residents in the four annexed oblasts—around three million people—have now been issued Russian passports. They have little choice: you need a Russian passport to open a bank account, run a business, or receive welfare payments.

Assessing the attitudes and loyalties of those living under Russian occupation is extremely difficult. There are no independent media or civil society groups, and the security services carefully monitor social media. But society in the newly occupied areas is clearly divided. A minority of people have served in the occupation regime or publicly adopted pro-Russian positions, often in line with their prewar sentiments. But Russian visitors to newly occupied regions report quiet hostility from locals. The Ukrainian military has maintained an armed resistance behind the frontlines in all four oblasts, with reports every few weeks of car bombs targeting Russian officers or local collaborators. Nevertheless, the Russians’ brutal but effective filtration mechanisms—procedures that screen every individual’s background, record of military service, and political views—have suppressed popular resistance. Most people simply try to get by without ending up “in the basement,” as locals term the grim brutality of Russian detention. Russia is happy to see potential opponents leave: there is still an exit route available to those with the money to buy a ticket on regular charter buses from the occupied territories to Europe via Russia.

Those who remain must endure endless pro-Russian messaging and indoctrination. Whenever Russian forces reached a new town in Ukraine, they swiftly seized the television tower. They took Ukrainian broadcasts off air and switched to the Kremlin’s propaganda. The Russian journalist Alexander Malkevich—sanctioned by the United States for his attempts to interfere in U.S. politics in 2018—turned up in June 2022 in Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to set up new local television stations and a school for young journalists. His local radio station in the occupied areas broadcasts patriotic music shows to Russian troops.

Few locals can stomach this blatant Russian propaganda, so they look for alternatives. Most people scroll through endless Telegram channels in search of news. This messaging app is used by everybody in the occupied territories, including pro-Russian officials and members of the Ukrainian resistance. It is a key battleground in the propaganda wars but also a survival mechanism for people stuck under Russian rule. On local channels on Telegram, users can get warnings of impending missile attacks, find out when the banks are open, discuss how to get a better Internet connection, or discover the best place to get a manicure. Russia now runs all the telecommunications and Internet networks in the annexed oblasts, so many Ukrainian news sites are blocked. People do use virtual private networks to get around Russian barriers and access Ukrainian sources, but as time passes, some locals say they no longer bother. Some complain that Ukrainian news is out of touch with the realities of life under occupation.

Under occupation, everyday decisions can be life changing.

At schools in the Russian occupied areas, children cannot avoid the propaganda. They are forced to sing the Russian national anthem every week. Schools have completely switched over to using Russian curriculum, with Ukrainian reduced to an optional second language. Senior pupils are taught from a new Russian history textbook that tells them that Ukraine is run by neo-Nazis and that Russia’s so-called special military operation in Ukraine was a justified response to Western aggression. Some parents manage to keep their children studying in online Ukrainian schools, but that is risky—according to a report by Amnesty International, parents are afraid that their children will be taken away if they are discovered to be enrolled in remote Ukrainian schools.

Some teachers refused to use the new Russian curriculum in the face of detention and threats. But many continue to work under the new regime—thousands of Ukrainian teachers are reported to have undergone compulsory retraining courses in Crimea and in Russia. Their motivations vary. A few may be irredentists who want to be part of a greater Russian polity. Others perhaps had always disliked the shift to Ukrainian-language education that occurred in recent years and welcomed the switch back to Russian-language schooling. Some teachers probably believed they could mitigate the worst aspects of Russian education, working within the system to protect their students. Others saw the Russian occupation as an opportunity for better salaries and promotion. Many people have remained in these areas because they had elderly relatives who would not move or because they could not face living in exile.

Under occupation, everyday decisions can be life changing. Choosing to work in a Russian-controlled school—or any other local organization—leaves residents open to eventual prosecution for collaboration. Ukrainian authorities have already launched at least 6,000 cases against supposed collaborators since a new law was introduced in March 2022. Possible penalties range from bans on future government employment to significant prison terms and the confiscation of property. The law is controversial: it defines collaboration so broadly that many business owners or local government employees run the risk of prosecution once Ukraine retakes their towns and communities. More senior figures have often escaped as Ukrainian forces advanced, so it has been mostly low-level administrators or teachers who have ended up in court. Many of these are women, who often occupy such posts in local government and education. Although most Ukrainians agree that anybody who takes up a leading position in Russia’s occupation administration deserves the full force of the law, lawyers and human rights activists are concerned that the law is too broad and plays into Russia’s hands. When Russian forces withdrew from Kherson in November 2022, thousands of Ukrainians—including many teachers—also left with them, encouraged by Russian propaganda warning that they would be prosecuted as collaborators.

Russia is betting that in the long term, Ukrainian children in these areas will become socialized as patriotic Russians. Ukrainian schoolchildren have been taken on lavish study tours of Russia, visiting tourist sites and university summer schools. Russian television programs regularly show children from the Donbas or southern Ukraine being welcomed at festivals inside Russia. This is unpleasant propaganda, but these visits at least appear to be mostly voluntary. There are also much grimmer cases in which thousands of children from Ukraine were illegally deported to Crimea or Russia during the fighting. Some were illegally adopted by Russian families. Many Ukrainian families are struggling to locate their children and get them back.

THE MANY TENTACLES OF OCCUPATION

In conquered Ukrainian towns such as Melitopol or Mariupol, Russia is slowly obliterating every visual reminder of Ukraine. In the first weeks of the war, Russian troops pulled down Ukrainian tridents and destroyed monuments that commemorated the Soviet-induced famine—known as the Holodomor—that killed millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s. They have painted over Ukrainian colors—blue and yellow—everywhere with Russia's red and blue. Russia aims to reverse completely the Ukrainianization and “decommunization” campaigns that swept through the region after 2014. A May 2015 law ordered the removal of all Soviet and communist symbols and statues and replaced tens of thousands of Soviet-era names of towns and streets. During the campaign, the Ukrainian authorities knocked down over 1,000 statues of Lenin across the country. Now, the Russians are putting them back up.

Streets have been obsessively renamed. In Mariupol, Freedom Square has once again become Lenin Square. Meotida Boulevard, a devastated street in the heart of the city’s Greek community, has returned to its previous awkward Soviet-era name, 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution Street. University Street in Melitopol was changed to Darya Dugina Street, named for the far-right Russian activist and pundit who was killed by a car bomb in Moscow in August 2022. Street names also reflect the legacy of twentieth-century ideological battles. In Melitopol, Dmytro Dontsov Street, named for a Ukrainian political thinker of the 1930s with fascist views, now bears the name of Pavel Sudoplatov, an infamous Stalinist secret agent who helped murder Leo Trotsky.

The war spills over into culture, where Russia has pursued an all-out program of Russification that plays on preexisting tensions over language and politics. The main theater in Mariupol was destroyed in one of the most infamous atrocities of the war when a suspected Russian airstrike in March 2022 killed hundreds of civilians. The theater is being rebuilt, but its troupe is now divided. One group has relocated to western Ukraine, where it stages contemporary political plays in Ukrainian. Those who remain in Mariupol perform undemanding Chekhovian comedies in Russian in the local youth center. Russia is expanding the network of movie theaters in the region—not to screen overt propaganda but to draw people back into everyday Russian popular culture. Moviegoers in Mariupol over the New Year weekend flocked to see Russia’s latest hit comedy, Serf 2. Propaganda films about the war, such as Russia’s 2023 box office disaster, Witness, are nowhere to be seen. People want distraction, not indoctrination, but even that distraction can serve to tie locals closer to Russia.

Beyond culture, economic policy is Russia’s most powerful means to co-opt society and effect long-term demographic change in occupied parts of Ukraine. Russia’s welfare system and state salaries are often more generous than Ukraine’s and are aimed at winning over poorer parts of the population and pensioners. In December, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would spend more than one trillion rubles (about $11 billion) a year in the four annexed regions. This includes billions of dollars for a huge reconstruction program in the hope of creating a “New Russia” on the northern shores of the Sea of Azov, recalling Catherine the Great’s eighteenth-century idea of Novorossiya (New Russia). Glossy brochures portray the future of Mariupol as an ersatz Russia-by-the-sea, where any memory of Ukraine has been razed to the ground and replaced by Russian apartment blocks, parks, and boulevards. The city was devastated during fighting in 2022, and authorities have rehoused some locals. Many complain, however, that the best new homes are reserved for Russian newcomers. It seems Moscow wants to encourage Russian immigrants to replace those Ukrainian residents who have been dispossessed and forced into exile. Not for the first time in this conflict, Russian actions would violate international law, which explicitly prohibits such population transfers in and out of occupied territories.

Many Ukrainians who fled have already lost their properties and their businesses. Since the summer of 2022, the occupation authorities have presided over the mass expropriation of Ukrainian assets—a further blatant violation of international law on occupation. Owners had to turn up within three days with a stack of documents to claim their title if their business was included on a list published by the local authorities of supposedly abandoned assets and companies. Otherwise, it was turned over to local cronies or to Russian entrepreneurs. Since the invasion began in February 2022, the Russian authorities have forcibly registered thousands of Ukrainian businesses, including vast metals plants and local bakeries, in the official Russian corporate database in one of the biggest seizures of property in recent times. Russian companies took control of great swaths of Zaporizhzhia’s prime agricultural land and have been illegally shipping thousands of tons of Ukrainian crops abroad. The port of Mariupol is open again, with ships bringing in construction materials for Russian projects and leaving full of appropriated Ukrainian grain.

TIED TO RUSSIA

The prospects for the occupied territories are bleak. Ukraine lacks a political and diplomatic strategy to challenge Russia’s occupation over the longer term. Ukrainian policymakers had hoped that a quick and successful military counteroffensive last year would free these territories and roll back Russian forces. That did not come to pass. With the frontline at a territorial stalemate, Ukraine’s chances of regaining full control of the occupied territories by force of arms in 2024 appear slim. Any armistice or freezing of the conflict would draw a line through southern and eastern Ukraine, leaving millions of Ukrainians under Russian rule. As the war grinds on, Russia has time to further consolidate its political, economic, and administrative occupation, making the eventual reintegration of these territories back into Ukraine increasingly difficult.

DAVID LEWIS is Professor of Global Politics at the University of Exeter and the author of the forthcoming book Occupation: Russian Rule in South-Eastern Ukraine.

Foreign Affairs · by David Lewis · January 18, 2024

18. DEI Destroys Excellence, Military Cohesion at Service Academies

I think Professor Fleming is known for almost never giving "A's" in his class ( in addition to being a very outspoken critic of the Naval Academy).

Excerpts:

Over the course of my decades teaching literature, I’ve had to answer these questions:

What’s the point of reading (say) Shakespeare? Or Toni Morrison? Is the point different for future officers than for anybody else? If so, how? I don’t think the point is to check the box through reading works by someone of a certain skin color or sexual orientation. There has to be a higher purpose. But teaching everything according to categories of race, gender, and sexual orientation is what has supplanted sexual assault training as topic A at Annapolis: hiring and teaching courses in gay, Latino/a, and African American literature focused on the experiences of recent immigrants to the exclusion of almost everything else, usually to emphasize how tough they had it. For example, two out of three upper-level senior seminars English majors could choose from in Spring 2023 were “The Queering of the Renaissance” and “Queer Communities in Film and Literature.” We have courses in post-colonial studies, African American studies, and Native American Studies, and a “diversity” requirement. I guess we’re really with the Zeitgeist!

Recent hiring emphasizes minority racial and sexual-orientation groups. And now the faculty get relentless “training” in DEI with newly hired administrators to enforce the rules—Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. In our English Department, there is now a faculty committee to vet faculty syllabi to ensure that an acceptable number of works about and by nonwhite authors are taught. It’s all intensely political, and usually with an edge of resentment: our kind didn’t get or don’t have as much as your kind! In fact, these kinds of resentment studies have nothing to do with being a good officer. Having a sense of what separates people, sure. How about what unites them? And if you as an officer see yourself as radically different from people with a different skin color––and groups of your subordinates with different skin colors as lacking a common goal––military cohesion is torn asunder. This is military suicide, shooting ourselves not merely in the foot but in the head. How about we emphasize commonality and deal with difference as it comes up rather than assuming it? It’s insulting to say “I see that you have a different skin color, so I can tell you we have little in common”—aside from destructive of military cohesion.

DEI Destroys Excellence, Military Cohesion at Service Academies

By Bruce Fleming

January 18, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/18/dei_destroys_excellence_military_cohesion_at_service_academies_1005678.html

This is an excerpt from Bruce Fleming's new book, Saving Our Service Academies (Post Hill Press).

Applicants who self-identified as a member of a race the Academy wished to privilege—at the time I was on the Admissions Board it was African American, Hispanic, and Native American—were briefed separately to the committee not by a white member but by a minority Navy lieutenant. Briefings (a minute and forty seconds per applicant, no more) ran through a number of factors quite quickly and offered a recommendation that we had been told was appropriate: “qualified” for USNA if grades A/B for white applicants (but not minorities, who needed only C grades), 600 score in each part of the SAT for white applicants (but about 550 for minorities who come to USNA without remediation), and Whole Person Multiple (points given for grades/tests, school leadership positions, and sports) of at least 55,000 for whites, no bottom for minorities.

This is aside from the fact that 20 percent of the class could be sent to the remedial, taxpayer-supported prep school for a year, also with no minimum for scores. Other possible recommendations included a year at a civilian prep school that the Naval Academy Foundation pays for, where they also do a thirteenth year (the profile for this was white lacrosse players, not black football players), and USNA “pool,” a sort of wait list for nonrecruited whites, who typically weren’t tracked to NAPS or Foundation schools. The athletic department offered its list of recruits that were invariably deemed “qualified” no matter how low in scores, because many if not most to go to NAPS and only a few to USNA directly.

Race in America is a complex question that we have no silver bullet for. We’d like to see everybody playing happily in the academic sandbox together, as well as elsewhere in society at large. However, in academic institutions with limited places, we have a problem—especially at an institution touted for academic rigor and that taxpayers fund for one specific job. Blacks, on average, consistently score lower than whites (who score lower than Asians) on standardized tests. The choices are simple. If you want students who look a certain way but tend to score lower than others, you accept the lower scores and stop talking about your standards. Or you go with the class that can meet these standards and stop talking about the way they look. The Naval Academy tries to square the circle by both bragging about its standards and letting in half the class to lower standards. No wonder they were furious that I pointed this out. All educational institutions have this problem to some degree; the academies are just worse than others. And in 2023, the Supreme Court said we’re legal in doing so, whereas all others are not.

I’ve had some brilliant black students over three decades, and quite a few really nice ones. I’ve taught classes at both ends of our ability spectrum—our honors classes and our remedial precollege English classes, which are almost all filled with black and Hispanic students, most of whom have just come from the remedial, taxpayer-funded thirteenth grade at the prep school. I usually love them as people, and the warmth I show them usually melts the ice when they heard they got Professor Fleming, the one who “hates the football team.” I don’t hate the football team. I just don’t think we should be recruiting them to play Division I, which takes up slots better all-around qualified candidates (like your kids?) could have filled. But they got the offer, and here they are, so I’m going to give it my all, and hope to inspire them to do the same.

Some of the African American kids are the most disappointed of all. One brilliant young woman from New York City announced in my office some years ago, “I should have gone to Howard.”

“Why?” I said.

“Because I am so tired of being stereotyped as black,” she said. “In New York nobody is anything. But here they want me to join the gospel choir. I can’t sing. And I hate this channeling of the black kids so the administration looks good.”

“Yeah,” I said. “It’s a problem. But don’t give up. Just be you.”

“Hmmm,” she said. “Hard at this place.”

“Tell me about it,” I said.

In 2021, the Academy issued a Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan whose lead picture has a black male midshipman standing as Brigade Commander in front of a phalanx of white males. A former military instructor in the History Department and USNA graduate J.A. Cauthen, in an article entitled “The US Naval Academy is Adrift” objects—and it’s hard to disagree with him that this plan “will erode the competency of future officers and imperil our national security.”

He quotes the plan as saying that the Naval Academy “will develop a diversity and inclusion checklist and schedule to inventory and assess all academic classes and training events,” something I saw beginning as I was being forced out of the classroom. It will “partner with Academic Departments in conducting comprehensive curriculum review prioritizing the inclusion of marginalized scholarship and hidden histories within midshipmen education.” And he asks a question relevant to my situation: “What will be the fate of those who will not comply, given their belief in, and right to, academic freedom?”

I can answer that question already. Academic freedom doesn’t exist at Annapolis. And those who do not repeat the party line unquestioningly, such as (um, yes) your humble correspondent, will be relentlessly pursued and fired. Cauthen goes on with his quote: The Naval Academy “will develop a confidential process for reporting bias incidents”—for what it calls “nonpunitive informational purposes” to “identify areas for potential additional training.” My experience suggests that “nonpunitive” is bunkum. Indeed, Cauthen points out that all of this comes with the whip hand of the UCMJ and quotes Article 917 as saying that

“Any person subject to this chapter who uses provoking or reproachful words or gestures toward any others person subject to this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”

All this comes with something called the DPE Program, Diversity Peer Educator Program, including a confidential system to report “bias incidents.” I’ve seen it all before with sexual assault training. And he asks: “will a DEI agenda propagating woke ideology prepare future leaders to wage and win wars against our enemies? Those who believe so are either blind or worse.” But of course, the service academies have long since moved on from preparing leaders to wage and win wars. Now they’re about enforcing by military rather than constitutionally permitted means (even against civilians) the obsessions of a certain sector of society.

Over the course of my decades teaching literature, I’ve had to answer these questions:

What’s the point of reading (say) Shakespeare? Or Toni Morrison? Is the point different for future officers than for anybody else? If so, how? I don’t think the point is to check the box through reading works by someone of a certain skin color or sexual orientation. There has to be a higher purpose. But teaching everything according to categories of race, gender, and sexual orientation is what has supplanted sexual assault training as topic A at Annapolis: hiring and teaching courses in gay, Latino/a, and African American literature focused on the experiences of recent immigrants to the exclusion of almost everything else, usually to emphasize how tough they had it. For example, two out of three upper-level senior seminars English majors could choose from in Spring 2023 were “The Queering of the Renaissance” and “Queer Communities in Film and Literature.” We have courses in post-colonial studies, African American studies, and Native American Studies, and a “diversity” requirement. I guess we’re really with the Zeitgeist!

Recent hiring emphasizes minority racial and sexual-orientation groups. And now the faculty get relentless “training” in DEI with newly hired administrators to enforce the rules—Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. In our English Department, there is now a faculty committee to vet faculty syllabi to ensure that an acceptable number of works about and by nonwhite authors are taught. It’s all intensely political, and usually with an edge of resentment: our kind didn’t get or don’t have as much as your kind! In fact, these kinds of resentment studies have nothing to do with being a good officer. Having a sense of what separates people, sure. How about what unites them? And if you as an officer see yourself as radically different from people with a different skin color––and groups of your subordinates with different skin colors as lacking a common goal––military cohesion is torn asunder. This is military suicide, shooting ourselves not merely in the foot but in the head. How about we emphasize commonality and deal with difference as it comes up rather than assuming it? It’s insulting to say “I see that you have a different skin color, so I can tell you we have little in common”—aside from destructive of military cohesion.

Bruce Fleming has taught at the U.S. Naval Academy since 1987.

19. Congress Ensures Continuity in US Policy Toward China and Taiwan

Download the 13 page report at this link: https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/OP%202_Sutter_01032023.pdf

Congress Ensures Continuity in US Policy Toward China and Taiwan

https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/congress-ensures-continuity-us-policy-toward-china-and-taiwan

Robert Sutter

Jan 10, 2024

Part of the Washington-Taipei-Beijing Relations Occasional Paper Special Series

This article explains the evolution over the past six years of the US government’s clearer awareness of the dangers that Chinese challenges pose to America. It focuses on the central role of the US Congress in advancing US awareness and driving American responses. With Congress and both the Trump and Biden administrations working cooperatively together, the US government has been increasingly effective in building positions of strength at home and in working constructively with allies and partners abroad in carrying out acute competition with China and countering its ambitions. Regarding Taiwan, the most important matter in dispute between the United States and China, US resolve in countering China is very much in the interests of the government and people of Taiwan. This article forecasts strong congressional resolve to defend America from Beijing challenges, concluding with brief observations about the implications of the presidential elections in Taiwan in January 2024 and the United States in November 2024.

20. Of Green Berets & Secret CIA Missions

James is a great American. His book on DET - A is a very important contribution to our understanding of the history of Special Forces. His novels are fun.

Listen to the podcast here: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/spytalk/id1560016782

Of Green Berets & Secret CIA Missions

James Stejskal did it all, and shares his memories on the latest SpyTalk podcast

JEFF STEIN

JAN 16, 2024

spytalk.co · by Jeff Stein

James Stejskal spent 23 years in the U.S. Army, much of it in top secret Green Beret cover assignments, before shifting to the CIA, where spent the next 13 years operating in the spy-world wilds as a case officer under non-official cover. In retirement today he’s a prolific author of political-military thrillers, his latest being Dead Hand, set in the aftermath of a Russian victory in Ukraine, when very bad things start to happen in Moscow and Western Europe.

James Stejskal did it all (BestThriller books photo)

On the latest SpyTalk podcast, Stejskal talks with me about his time with a shadowy Special Forces unit in Berlin, whose main job was to sabotage East German rail lines and organize resistance in the event of a Soviet Red Army invasion—“a suicide mission,” he called it, “about a million and a half Russians against a hundred Americans,” the idea being “to slow the Russians down, to get the Allies out and give West Germany and Western Europe time to prepare for their defense, to fight back.” But that wasn't all they did.

Later, as a CIA ops officer under civilian nonofficial cover, he had clandestine missions with targets in Russia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. And then there’s the story about the time he “cold pitched” a North Korean diplomat to defect….

Listen to the whole interesting show on Apple, or wherever you get your podcasts. And do leave a comment—we love hearing from you.

SpyTalk is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

spytalk.co · by Jeff Stein

21. Zelenskyy's Battlefield Visits by Mick Ryan

Zelenskyy's Battlefield Visits

A Crucial Element of His Strategic Leadership

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/zelenskyys-battlefield-visits?r=7i07&utm

MICK RYAN

JAN 17, 2024

∙ PAID

Zelenskyy on a recent battlefield visit (Source: President of Ukraine official site)

The study of wartime leadership has been reinvigorated over the last couple of years. It is a crucial human skill with a wide variety of definitions and philosophies. In his 1961 book, The Path to Leadership, Field Marshal Montgomery described leadership as a “battle for the hearts and minds of men.” And the most recent leadership doctrine for the Australian Defence Force described it as follows:

Leadership is an affair of the heart. And of the mind. Guided by character. It is the spirit that develops people, builds teams and gets results. It is an interplay of emotions, feelings, attitudes and values. It involves being able to understand what followers need, being able to predict how they will react, and inspiring them towards achieving a common goal. We define it as the art of positively influencing others to get the job done.

There have are many other definitions offered by individuals from government, commerce, the arts and the military.

No human endeavour has the high stakes leadership that leading a nation at war possesses. In recent years, the leadership of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been examined from many angles.

Leadership and Battlefield Visits

Recently, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy conducted a battlefield visit to the Donetsk region. Almost since the start of the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Zelenskyy has regularly travelled around his country to visit his soldiers in the field. These battlefield visits are important for a variety of reasons.

First and probably most importantly, they allow him to gain a sense for the morale and capability of his military. While as President he would receive and read hundreds of reports each day, none of them are a substitute for walking the ground with leaders and soldiers who are fighting on the frontline. This direct contact is vital for a leader during wartime. It allows a national leader to ask questions, which is a vital function of a national political leader in their interaction with military commanders. Not only does it provide ground truth, but even the best staff for a senior leader cannot anticipate all the questions their leaders might want answered.

In their superb book on how organisations might anticipate and deal with failure, Managing the Unexpected, Kathleen Sutcliffe and Karl Weick describe how British wartime leader Winton Churchill used questions of subordinates to round out his knowledge and to inform his thinking. They write how:

During World War two, Churchill made the terrible discovery that Singapore was much more vulnerable to a Japanese land invasion than he first thought. Reflecting on this unexpected discovery, Churchill commented in his history of the war, “I ought to have known. My advisers ought to have known, and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked”.

Thereafter, Churchill’s would use questions to ascertain the following: Why didn’t I know? Why didn’t my advisers know? Why wasn’t I told? Why didn’t I ask?” Eliot Cohen writes in Supreme Command how asking these questions were a crucial element of Winston Churchill’s leadership style:

His art of leadership included a skill at questioning and challenging professional subordinates that few others have mastered.

Thus, the battlefield visits by President Zelenskyy allow him to ask important questions. These might be asked of senior military leaders about resources or their understanding of strategic priorities. Or Zelenskyy might ask simpler questions of soldiers about the sufficiency of their food, how long they have been deployed at the front for, or whether they have good leaders.

As such, the visits conducted by Zelenskyy also serve another purpose: to see the military situation as it truly is. National leaders receive many different kinds of assessments and reports about the war, but these need to be complemented by seeing the situation with one’s own eyes. Eliot Cohen described this in Supreme Command as follows:

In war to see things as they are, and not as one would like them to be, to persevere despite disappointments, to know of numerous opportunities lost and of perils still ahead, to lead knowing that one’s subordinates and colleagues are in some case inadequate, in others hostile, is a courage of a rarer kind that a willingness to expose oneself to the unlucky bullet or shell.

But in seeing the situation as it is, his visits also allow him to speak directly to the most senior military leaders where he visits. Not only does this permit him to better inform senior military leaders about the political context for their campaigns, it also allows the President to discuss the timing and resourcing for such campaigns and battles.

Zelenskky briefed by battlefield commanders. (source: President of Ukraine official site)

This was a technique used by U.S. President Abraham Lincoln. Particularly in the last year of the U.S. Civil War, Lincoln was a frequent visitor to battlefields. While he normally visited not long after battles concluded, he did visit Antietam in October 1862 to implore the Union commander, George McClellan to attack the confederates. In July 1864, Lincoln was even shot at by a Confederate sniper during his visit to the Battle of Fort Stevens. As one account describes:

Suddenly a shot rang out and three feet to the right of Lincoln a Union surgeon crumbled to the ground with a severe wound to his leg. Only after repeated entreaties and threats to forcibly remove him did Lincoln’s subordinates succeed in convincing him to take cover.

So, whether it is in older wars or in modern conflicts, these visits are opportunities for politicians to display their personal courage. It is a form of courage and leadership that Zelenskyy has demonstrated throughout the war.

Zelenskyy’s visits allow him to see the situation not only on the battlefield, but in the towns and cities that have become battlefields. It permits him to appreciate the magnitude of the reconstruction task ahead and informs his impassioned pleas for Western assistance for the international reconstruction fund and other assistance to rebuild Ukraine. With the damage caused by Russia’s invasion already reaching hundreds of billions of dollars, seeing this himself is vital for Ukraine’s leader.

This was made clear with his 2022 visits to places such as Bucha and Izium. In his book The War Came to Us, Christopher Miller describes Zelenskyy’s visit to Bucha in early April 2022 and quotes Zelenskyy:

There is not a single crime they did not commit there…It is very difficult to talk. It is very difficult to negotiate when you see what they did here.

In his book The Russo-Ukraine War, Serhii Plokhy describes Zelenskyy’s visit to Izium in September. After returning from visiting the town, and viewing the war crimes committed there by the Russians, Zelenskyy was quoted as saying that:

Russia is leaving death behind it everywhere and must be held responsible.

While these visits will have left many indelible images burned into Zelenskyy’s mind, they will also have influenced his positions on negotiating with the Russians. Such visits are also sure to have informed his speeches, as well as his ten-point plan presented to the G20 summit held in November 2022. When speaking about the seventh point of the plan – Justice – Zelenskyy employed his experiences during battlefield visits to Bucha and Izium when he described how:

Everywhere, when we liberate our land, we see one thing - Russia leaves behind torture chambers and mass burials of murdered people. This was the case in Bucha and other cities in the north of the country after the occupation. This was the case in the Kharkiv region… That is why the world should endorse establishment of the Special Tribunal regarding the crime of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Another purpose of the field visits by the Ukrainian president is to engage with junior soldiers in the field, to inspire them, and to recognise their sacrifice. Zelenskyy often conducts award ceremonies during his battlefield visits and speaks with troops. It is important for soldiers to feel recognised, and that their leaders clearly reiterate the purpose of their sacrifices. This is the essence of leadership.

Purpose is the most important thing a leader can provide. As Dwight Eisenhower writes in his personal chronicle of his Second World War experiences, Crusade in Europe, “belief in an underlying cause is fully as important to success in war as any local espirit or discipline induced or produced by command or leadership action.”

The Civil-Military Dimension

Another reason for these visits is for President Zelenskyy to demonstrate that he has trust in his nation’s Army. He shows he is comfortable in placing his life in the hands of the soldiers of the Ukrainian military institution. This is an important and strategic trust-building exercise between politicians and military leaders.

Throughout the war, he has set the strategic direction for his nation while (generally) allowing the high command to get on with the implementation of national defence. But these visits, and regular briefings, provide all-important feedback in the civil-military relationship.

That said, in more recent times there have been stresses in civil-military relations in Ukraine. The use of the word ‘stalemate’ by General Zaluzhnyi in his interview with The Economist resulted in an almost instant public rebuke from the Ukrainian President. Also in December, there was a report that the President was bypassing his commander in chief and speaking directly to battlefront commanders.

But tensions in a civil-military relationship are normal in democracies whether they are at peace or at war. The tensions are inherent in what Eliot Cohen describes as ‘an unequal dialog’.

And while there has been speculation about Zaluzhnyi’s political future, this has many historical precedents. Whether Grant at the end of the U.S. Civil War, General Douglas MacArthur in the 1940s or David Petraeus at the beginning of this century, journalists love to ascribe political aspirations to popular, successful military leaders.

In this recent analysis by Konstantin Shorkin of the Carnegie Endowment, the Zelensky-Zaluzhnyi relationship was examined. Shorkin writes that:

Zaluzhnyi himself has not yet shown any political ambitions. He readily comments publicly on military topics, but skilfully avoids touching on politics, and compared with the hysteria of the civilian authorities and their political opponents, he exudes stoic calm. He appears to be quite satisfied with the existing balance, in which the president, while exercising general leadership, does not interfere in purely military affairs. The person violating this status quo right now appears to be Zelensky.

Speculation about successful battlefield leaders is something that national leaders have to deal with, and generally, Zelenskyy has dealt with it well. But there is little doubt that his frequent battlefield visits help developing his military knowledge to better manage civil-military relations.

There is much more study to be undertaken about civil-military relations in Ukraine during this war.

Other Reasons for Battlefield Visits

The visits also give him a break from the endless round of meetings, and online presentations to various institutions around the world. The Presidency in normal times is a busy job. During this war, it has seen him having to sustain an insane workload of meetings, domestic politics, phone calls, video appearances and more recently, overseas visits. These visits to the battlefield, notwithstanding their attendant danger, are likely to provide a respite from the other demands of his Presidency.

Zelenskyy’s visits are an important way that he differentiates himself from the Russian leader. It is unlikely that Putin will ever visit the poorly fed, and terribly led Russian troops and draftees in Ukraine. Putin has yet to conduct a frontline visit to his troops in the field, although he did undertake a short, evening visit to the ruined, Russian-occupied city of Mariupol in March 2023. His apparent reluctance to visit front line soldiers might be because of the threat from the Ukrainians. But it is entirely likely that Putin is under just as great a threat from his own soldiers, who have been poorly trained, equipped and led during the war (but well paid).

Zelenskyy presents medals on a visit to Bakhmut in December 2022 (Source: President of Ukraine official site)

Finally, the battlefield visits of Zelenskyy possess important strategic communications objectives. Modern leadership isn’t just about getting things done, but also being seen to be getting things done. As such, the battlefield visits are part of Zelenskyy’s efforts to demonstrate his energy and competence as a national leader, and his frequent visits are a key element of his official web site.

These activities draw attention from audiences external to Ukraine. He is showing that he is not a ‘bunker leader’, and that he is the leader of a nation worth supporting ‘for as long as it takes’.

Leadership, Zelenskyy-style

These visits are just one component of Zelenskyy’s leadership, which has developed over the course of this war. His personal surveys of different battlefields over the past two years is part of the Zelenskyy approach to building Ukraine’s ‘soft power’. As the originator of this term, Joseph Nye, recently described:

Zelensky realised that wearing a green T-shirt and appealing to victimhood would develop sympathies. [He] was brilliant at using soft power, and that translated into hard power, in the form of shipments of military equipment. Hard power is the core, but soft power plays an auxiliary role.

Other important elements of the Zelenskyy model of strategic leadership include his very good use of different languages to communicate with audiences in Ukraine and around the world, as well his empathy and use of modern social media. He has combined all of these to unify Ukraine and explain the war to global audiences. They are skills which he will also have to evolve as he seeks more U.S. and European assistance in what is likely to be a very difficult year ahead.

But undoubtedly, his battlefield visits are an important component of the Zelenskyy model of leadership. They provide important inputs of information – and emotional insights – that assist him in leading a nation at war, resisting its powerful but brutal adversary, and seeking assistance from countries around the world to do so.

His approach, with its inherent strengths and weaknesses, is sure to be studied for decades to come.

Futura Doctrina is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Subscribed

22. China Has A Formidable Marine Corps But PLA's UN Peace-Keeping Fiasco Shows It's Not Battle-Hardened

China Has A Formidable Marine Corps But PLA's UN Peace-Keeping Fiasco Shows It's Not Battle-Hardened

eurasiantimes.com · by Guest Author · January 15, 2024

OPED by Lt Gen. PR Shankar (Retired)

The PLA Marine Corps (PLANMC) is a vital cog in Xi Jinping’s dream of establishing a Sino-centric world order as he builds the strongest military in the world. He is striving to develop a world-class Marine Corps that will be an elite force capable of full spectrum multidomain operations in all dimensions, including during emergencies at all times.

The success or failure of China’s global ambitions depends heavily on the growth of this force. As the PLANMC expands, the PLA assumes the nature of a capability-based force instead of a task/threat-based force. It becomes a critical capability for China’s expeditionary tasks and power projection. In the future, the pulse of China’s military prowess can be felt through its Marine Corps operations.

Broad Organization

The 1st Marine Brigade was founded on May 5, 1980. Later, in 1998, the PLAA’s 164th Division was reorganized into the 2nd Marine Brigade, forming the PLANMC with two brigades and approximately 10,000 personnel under the South Sea Fleet as part of the PLA Navy.

In the initial stages, the primary mission of the PLANMC was confined to islands and reefs in the South China Sea. In those days, the PLANMC was primarily involved in establishing and expanding Chinese control over the South China Sea by seizing unoccupied islands or assaulting and annexing held islands. After that, the marines were used to defend these islands from countries with which China had disputes in the South China Sea.

It was well into Xi’s reign that, in April 2017, the PLA expanded the Marine Corps. Its strength increased from the original brigades to six with four additional brigades. These new brigades were transferred from the PLAA’s coastal defense force, motorized infantry, and some other forces.

In addition, a Special Operations Brigade was constituted. This was based on the Jiaolong Commando Unit, an existing special forces unit of PLAN. An Aviation Brigade operating transport helicopters was also transferred into the force. This brought the total force to eight brigades with around 40,000 personnel (see Table).

It is estimated that the PLANMC will be expanded to 100,000 personnel in the future. It is important to note that among the five branches comprising the PLAN — the Surface Force, the Submarine Force, the Naval Air Force, the Coastal Defense Force, and the Marine Corps — it is the PLANMC, which has its headquarters.

Though the PLANMC is subordinate to the PLAN, the fact that it has been allowed to have its own Headquarters is indicative that in the long run, PLANMC might be a Service of its own fashion, much like the US Marine Corps.

Concept

The PLANMC is being designed as the first choice force for strategic maneuver operations. It is expected to carry out multidimensional precision assaults in overseas and out-of-area contingencies. Such maneuver will encompass multidimensional projection, multi-arm coordinated assault, and over-the-horizon concealed launch.

It will be supported by combined precision information and firepower offensive capabilities of the PLASF and PLARF. The PLANMC forces are expected to conduct rapid precision maneuvers to strike at the enemy’s weak areas in depth to exploit gaps, outflank enemy localities, and disrupt an opponent’s defensive system. The aim seems to be to paralyze the enemy so that the PLA can gain its objectives at the least cost.

Role and Tasks

The prime motive in establishing the PLANMC is to recover areas China considers “lost territories,” such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the Spratly Islands. This also breaks the First Island Chain, which constricts PLAN and contains China by posing a direct threat to the mainland.

If needed and an opportunity presents itself, China might not hesitate to change the status quo forcefully. This was already exhibited when China occupied reefs and built them into artificial islands to establish control over the South China Sea.

The next task of the PLANMC would be to defend the islands it has usurped in the South China Sea and capture those it claims in the South China Sea. With the issuance of its new standard map in which the entire South China Sea inside the new ‘Ten Dash’ Line has been depicted to be Chinese, this task has assumed increased significance and importance.

It will do well to remember that the PRC has already seized control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 and has thoroughly repudiated the ruling of the International Court of Justice. Since 2014, China has conducted reclamation/dredging in seven reefs and islets in the South China Sea to construct and militarize artificial islands. It has also kept US forces at bay.

The ongoing tussle with the Philippines indicates that China intends to gain control of islands and reefs controlled by other countries in due course. This includes the Taiwan-controlled islands of Itu Aba and the Pratas Islands. This role will become more significant as the PLANMC expands its amphibious capabilities.

An important role and task of the PLANMC would be “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by capturing Taiwan in conjunction with other forces in a full-scale invasion of the island.

Whenever China decides to unify Taiwan by force, it will use PLANMC as the spearhead to carry out the amphibious assault in conjunction with all its other naval, missile, and air forces. To annex Taiwan, the initial boots on the ground will be that of PLANMC personnel to overcome the opposition from the islanders.

The PLA is strengthening its expeditionary capability to protect China’s “overseas interests” worldwide. To that end, the PLANMC is being trained and organized to carry out expeditionary operations and missions in areas far away from mainland China.

These areas of interest include Chinese diplomatic missions, business enterprises, construction projects, and workers in other countries as part of the BRI and other mercantile ventures.

The PLANMC will be expected to protect Chinese overseas interests in various countries and open oceans from regional and international turmoil. This includes terrorism and piracy. Already, PLAN vessels are conducting anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden.

In addition, PLANMC units have been stationed to guard China’s base in Djibouti since 2017. It is also being assessed that marines will be deployed in Gwadar if they have not been secretly deployed.

In recent years, the Marines’ special operations unit has repeatedly conducted training exercises in deserts, cold highlands, and jungle terrains. Such training indicates that the PLANMC can perform operations in any part of the world. The PLANMC will likely play an essential role along with PLASSF and PLARF in power projection through expeditionary roles.

China’s PLA Marine Corps Commandos. (Wikimedia Commons)

Composition

The six Marine brigades will be amphibious combined arms brigades. They are equipped with amphibious assault guns instead of tanks and amphibious infantry fighting vehicles (IFV)/armored personnel carriers (APC). An entire amphibious combined arms brigade will likely have about 5,000 personnel and over 400 vehicles. Each amphibious combined arms brigade is expected to be composed of the following:

Four combined arms battalions, each with two amphibious assault gun companies, two amphibious mechanized infantry companies, a firepower company (mortars and man-portable air defense systems—MANPADs), and a service support company (with reconnaissance and engineer platoons). An amphibious combined arms battalion numbers about 80 vehicles of all types and an estimated 500-600 soldiers.
One reconnaissance battalion has amphibious reconnaissance vehicles, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and technical reconnaissance systems.
One artillery battalion has amphibious 122mm howitzers, tracked 122mm rocket launchers, and anti-tank guided missile systems.
One air defense battalion with tracked anti-aircraft gun systems, short-range surface-to-air missile systems, and MANPADS.
One operational support battalion with command and control vehicles, electronic warfare systems, engineering equipment, chemical defense systems, and security elements
One service support battalion with supply, medical, and repair and maintenance units.

The six amphibious combined arms brigades command 24 amphibious combined arms battalions and six reconnaissance battalions. These are expected to be the first wave to hit the beaches in an amphibious assault.

The Special Operations Brigade has around 3,000 personnel. Its detailed organization is still unclear. Several specialists and experts from across the entire spectrum of special operations units in the PLA have been transferred to this brigade. These special forces units will likely be at high readiness levels to respond to emergencies and critical tasks.

The Aviation Brigade is a significant addition to the PLANMC. It enhances the integral aerial mobility of PLANMC. It does not have to rely on PLAN or PLAAF for its Helilift capability. The aviation brigade is expected to be a “leading force for advancing from the sea to shore in depth” and “a force for strategic maneuver.” The Aviation Brigade will, in all probability, be used to carry out vertical envelopment operations into the adversary’s depth.

The PLANMC is being outfitted with advanced equipment. This includes lightweight amphibious troop carriers, tanks, and artillery. Light equipment currently designed and deployed in their high-altitude areas is also being repurposed for airborne roles. The PLANMC is also equipped with landing ships capable of carrying amphibious fighting vehicles and other vehicles into the intended areas of operation to support amphibious and follow-up land operations.

Analysis

The PLANMC is a work in progress. The Chinese are aping the US Marine Corps in the way they are shaping their marines. Hence, they are far from being a force of decision.

PLA-CHINA

The four brigades newly formed out of units transferred from the PLAA will take a long time to be fully effective in the execution of amphibious operations. Amphibious and related special operations require many skill sets and complex command and operational capabilities combining sea, land, and air forces. While the organization has come into being and manpower has been provided, it is not yet fully trained or kitted for the envisaged tasks. There is a long way to go.

A significant drawback of this force is the lack of helicopter pilots and sufficient helicopters to go with it. As per reports that have been emerging, the PLA Navy has been handicapped by a lack of capable officers to command their ships.

This shortage would apply equally to its amphibious craft, where the requisite skill capability would be higher. These two drawbacks significantly would inhibit any Marine Corps.

There will be many more HR problems related to leadership and manpower capabilities that have not appeared in the open domain. These problems cannot be wished away. Such capability cannot be enhanced in quick time. The overall lack of combat experience of the PLA will be telling. Hence, the PLANMC will be a force with limited capabilities for a long time.

For a force that has just come into being, it has been given too many competing missions. It is tasked to focus on large-scale amphibious operations, urgent contingency response tasks, and precision attack tasks in the near and far seas.

On paper, the PLANMC looks like a formidable force. These tasks will involve use of unmanned systems (air, ground, surface, and underwater), operations involving long-range precision fires through various delivery platforms in an informatised environment.

These complex tasks need a flexible approach and a directive style of leadership. The politically oriented PLA, on the other hand, is known for its rigidity in thought. This issue must be considered because the performance of the PLA in UN missions has been subpar.

There are plenty of reports that have indicated that Chinese troops have even run away after abandoning weapons. In the larger scheme of things, the effectiveness of this force in the long term, even when fully kitted, will be questionable.

eurasiantimes.com · by Guest Author · January 15, 2024

23. People as a Weapons System: Moscow and Minsk’s Continued Attempts to Weaponize Migration

Conclusion:

While the plight of migrants and their treatment by border guards on both sides has been criticized by international organizations, pragmatically and proactively stalling the modern employment of weaponized migration is more than a pressing human rights issue. It is a critical security threat, one that drives states to increase spending and reallocate resources while maintaining the initial identity of a human rights challenge. Countries facing migration-related threats are slowly beginning to appreciate that fact. Finland, for example, has viewed ”everything to do with Russia through the prism of security” since February 2022. Nevertheless, the view from NATO’s newest ally regarding the danger posed by this tactic and its reemergence in twenty-first century strategic competition may contrast with that from members who enjoy strategic depth vis-à-vis Russia and Belarus. The United States, thanks to the defensive benefits of two bordering oceans, does not have its primary competitors on its doorstep like the Baltic and Nordic states do. No country, however, is totally immune to the dangers posed by weaponized migration. By capitalizing on human suffering, Putin and Lukashenko’s weaponized migration approaches are first and foremost security challenges and must be treated as such. Western allies would thus do well to recognize the dangers posed by these tactics.

People as a Weapons System: Moscow and Minsk’s Continued Attempts to Weaponize Migration - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Rick Chersicla · January 18, 2024

Weaponized migration, the orchestration or threatened orchestration of a sudden influx of refugees by a hostile government into another country for coercive purposes, continues to make appearances as the latest preferred instrument in the modern autocrat’s toolkit. Using what was once a favorite strategy of leaders such as Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Russian and Belarusian leaders have been accused in recent years of employing this irregular approach as a way to distract Western governments from other malign behavior by instigating political turmoil, forcing spending, and driving the reallocation of military forces to augment border security in Nordic and eastern European states.

While not a new concept, attempts to weaponize migration capitalize on vulnerable populations and remain especially odious given the misery they cause (or exacerbate) for at-risk and potentially desperate migrants. Kelly Greenhill expertly outlined the logic behind the coercive employment of purposefully-created migration crises over a decade ago, detailing how coercion-engineered migrations are deliberately organized to induce concessions from a target state. To counter this particularly cruel approach, the West must remain both pragmatic and proactive in considering ways to respond to Moscow and Minsk’s attempts to weaponize migration.

“Hybrid Operations” on the Finnish Border

Finland is only the latest country to call out Russia’s hidden hand in fomenting migration crises, closing border crossings with Russia for the second time in early December 2023 after more than two hundred asylum seekers entered the country from Russia. The Finnish Prime Minister, Petteri Orpo, described the situation as “exceptional” and accused Russia of trying to undermine Finnish national security with a “hybrid operation.” Officials in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) newest ally have stated that Russian officials were likely “heavily involved in the transport operation” that brought migrants from places such as Kenya, Syria, and Yemen to the Russo-Finnish border this winter, providing necessary transportation, equipment, and assistance at the border. Specifically, Russia has been accused of paving the way for migrants along its border with Finland by abandoning visa checks in the border zone and providing bicycles, which allow migrants to skirt laws that criminalize approaching Russian border posts on foot.

Lukashenko Targets Poland and the Baltics

Russia is not the only country weaponizing migrants, as evidenced by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s behavior since late 2021. By December of that year, at least 8,000 migrants had crossed the Belarusian border into migration centers in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. The pressure exerted by Lukashenko, likely acting in retaliation against European Union (EU) sanctions imposed to punish the regime for its treatment of opponents, has been perhaps most acutely felt in Poland. There, 4,000 Polish troops have been dispatched to the border with Belarus, a move this past fall that came in addition to the 115-mile long steel wall completed during the summer of 2022, also in response to border crossings. Reports in 2023 of cross-border incidents involving helicopters, as well as claims that mercenaries from the private military corporation Wagner were training with Belarusian forces within miles of the Polish border, have only added to the tensions.

Costs and Benefits

While morally repugnant, weaponized migration is nevertheless seen as an effective approach by the governments who employ it because it necessitates a response from the targeted state: the political leadership must respond in some fashion given the tactical manipulation of human suffering and impacts on public perception. Furthermore, such required responses can have significant implications on the target state’s limited monetary and nonmonetary resources. For example, the short-term and near-term financial costs of addressing organized migrant influxes have been significant for the Baltic states: Lithuania alone sought 120 million euros ($130 million) in damages from Belarus in early 2023 to replenish money spent on border infrastructure, including a new barbed-wire fence. Further south, the Poland-Belarus border wall reportedly cost Warsaw 353 million euros ($407 million in 2023 dollars) in addition to the costs incurred from moving military forces to the border. The Polish border patrol has also seen vehicles damaged and officers attacked by groups of people throwing stones from the Belarusian side of the border. Beyond the millions spent on increased security measures, there are also political costs for incumbent parties whose decisions are closely scrutinized by their constituents given the highly politicized nature of migration-related policies, as demonstrated by the Social Democratic Party’s ousting from power in Finland last year in favor of nationalist parties calling for stricter asylum policies and border control. There is also potential for such tactics to inflame a country’s already polarized political and social dynamics, as evidenced by the rhetoric surrounding migration in campaigns leading up to the Polish parliamentary elections in October 2023.

Using migrants as weapons is thus a low-cost way for national leaders whose regard for human life is famously absent to indirectly impose costs on other governments. For Russian President Vladimir Putin in particular, these are not acts of desperation but simply additional ways to pose dilemmas on the United States and its allies. Given Moscow’s history with the Tatar people in Crimea, having forcibly deported thousands of ethnic Tatars from the region during the Cold War, the West can only be so surprised by current headlines from Helsinki regarding overwhelming migrant surges. Any non-attributable—or simply deniable—actions that stress the border security of NATO allies cause unexpected troop deployments or require budgetary changes that create the type of political turmoil that only stands to benefit the strongmen of Moscow and Minsk. For Putin and Lukashenko, weaponized migration is strategic distraction on the cheap.

Addressing the Threat

Beyond individual, national decisions regarding border walls, fences, and immigration laws, there are a handful of imperatives for the United States’ Nordic and eastern European allies to consider as a collective response to these modern examples of weaponized migration. The first should not be contentious: all states impacted by this tactic—from Finland to Poland—should “name and shame” Russia and Belarus so as to discourage this practice from becoming an accepted norm and potentially deter its further use. Leaders like Prime Minister Orpo should continue making public statements identifying Moscow’s weaponization of migrants as unacceptable hybrid operations, and other Western decision-makers should follow suit, casting light on such gray zone tactics when discussing the security threats posed by Russia more broadly and thus diminishing their subversive power. Secondly, Baltic and Nordic states, as well as Poland, could also shape mil-to-mil engagements with other, unaffected NATO allies to increase multinational training with border guards, potentially sharing best practices regarding border security. At a minimum, NATO writ large should incorporate scenarios similar to those currently experienced by border countries into future wargames as a way to feature Russian hybrid operations in more conventionally-minded events.

While the plight of migrants and their treatment by border guards on both sides has been criticized by international organizations, pragmatically and proactively stalling the modern employment of weaponized migration is more than a pressing human rights issue. It is a critical security threat, one that drives states to increase spending and reallocate resources while maintaining the initial identity of a human rights challenge. Countries facing migration-related threats are slowly beginning to appreciate that fact. Finland, for example, has viewed ”everything to do with Russia through the prism of security” since February 2022. Nevertheless, the view from NATO’s newest ally regarding the danger posed by this tactic and its reemergence in twenty-first century strategic competition may contrast with that from members who enjoy strategic depth vis-à-vis Russia and Belarus. The United States, thanks to the defensive benefits of two bordering oceans, does not have its primary competitors on its doorstep like the Baltic and Nordic states do. No country, however, is totally immune to the dangers posed by weaponized migration. By capitalizing on human suffering, Putin and Lukashenko’s weaponized migration approaches are first and foremost security challenges and must be treated as such. Western allies would thus do well to recognize the dangers posed by these tactics.

Rick Chersicla is a Strategist in the United States Army. The views expressed in this article are his, and do not reflect the those of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Main image: A sign marking the end of the border for Lithuania and the start for Poland after U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to the Company D, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade crossed through, Oct. 24, 2015, as part of Operation Bayonet Thrust. Bayonet Thrust is a demonstration of NATO’s ability to move forces freely across allied borders and maintain freedom of movement across the region. (Staff Sgt. Opal Vaughn via U.S. Army)

0 Shares

irregularwarfare.org · by Rick Chersicla · January 18, 2024

24. How civics education can help solve the military recruitment crisis

When our daughter was in high school I paid close attention to her AP American History course. I thought the subject matter was adequate but pretty basic and should have been taught to everyone and not just students opting to take AP classes. Interestingly she uses some of her AP history lessons in the high school 10th grade English classes she teaches, tying them to her American literature classes.

My high school American history classes (taught by Charles Fischer - also our varsity baseball coach) has had a life long impact on me.

Excerpts:

Innovation and economic power constitute a second battleground. We can see the early warning signs of a highly innovative, scientifically minded society losing its sense of shared purpose as young people are encouraged to study STEM fields, yet fewer and fewer are asked to contemplate the implications of AI, quantum computing, and other burgeoning fields on our humanity and governance. We need innovation. But innovation unmoored from civic purpose and mission is the theme of many an apocalyptic film. The two-pronged role of education is to develop skills for the workplace and develop a cohesive and civil citizenry united by American principles. As U.S. Marine 2nd Lt. Francisco Navarro recently pointed out, “Diversity of background but unity of purpose is our greatest weapon. No amount of enemy technology can replicate it.”

The need, whether in K-12 public education, higher education, or military education, is not for unquestioning national loyalty. Rather, we need the kind of thoughtful, reflective citizenship that George Washington emphasized in his first message to Congress, and an embrace of civics based on civil debate, a willingness to be wrong, and a serious reading of the foundational documents that belong to all of us.

How civics education can help solve the military recruitment crisis

Washington Examiner · January 16, 2024

For the second year in a row, every branch of the U.S. military, except the Marine and Space Corps, missed its recruiting target. To put this crisis into context, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force ended 2023 with a recruitment shortfall of 41,000. There has not been a more difficult recruitment environment since the end of the draft in 1973.

At the same time our volunteer force faces a reluctance of people to enlist, the U.S. faces its most perilous moment since the end of the Cold War because of the tripartite threat of China, Russia, and Iran. Given the obvious challenges confronting our country, policymakers must urgently ask themselves, “Why are so many young Americans refusing to serve at the time when our country needs them most?”

To be fair, much of the recruitment crisis is driven by U.S. military eligibility problems. The military’s stringent physical fitness requirements are often incompatible with historically low levels of physical and mental health. Currently, only 23% of young Americans are even eligible to serve.

But there’s more to the story of our military recruiting failure, and that is that we face a national civics education crisis. Too few people know what our country stands for, what their place in our nation is, and why they should rise to its defense. Polls find that only 55% say they would stay and fight if our nation faced an existential attack.

To keep America free, we must first teach people their freedoms — and how they got them. This is important not just for military readiness, dire though that is, but for democracy itself. Without an understanding of the goals of the American political project, people are vulnerable to seduction by anti-democratic ideologies and hyperpartisanship, deepening our distrust of one another and of our governing institutions.

Our schools are the first battleground. If people are not taught why their country is worth defending, they are less inclined to serve in the military or to contribute their skills to its success. As George Washington said in his very first State of the Union address, “The security of a free constitution” depends on a disposition among all Americans to think deeply about the important questions of liberty, public order, and human rights.

Civic preparation is firmly within the national interest. Each of us bears a share of responsibility for governing the country and contributing to its welfare. For this experiment in self-government to succeed, we must be equipped with a basic understanding of America, including its central ideas of freedom, equality, and human dignity, if we are to risk our lives for them in times of need.

This notion of a national identity based on founding principles stands in contrast to the identity-based ideologies that dominate much of our education system. Instead of teaching about the American dream and the progress previously disenfranchised communities have experienced because of it, ideologues would rather simplistically bifurcate the world between victim and oppressor. As a result, people are learning not to view themselves as collective members of a nation but rather as individuals split among various identity groups. Nearly 90% of both Democrats and Republicans, for example, now believe that the other party is intentionally trying to destroy America. This was not the view taken by America’s founders, who in fact warned against hyperpartisanship and who constructed a system rooted in compromise and working across the aisle.

Innovation and economic power constitute a second battleground. We can see the early warning signs of a highly innovative, scientifically minded society losing its sense of shared purpose as young people are encouraged to study STEM fields, yet fewer and fewer are asked to contemplate the implications of AI, quantum computing, and other burgeoning fields on our humanity and governance. We need innovation. But innovation unmoored from civic purpose and mission is the theme of many an apocalyptic film. The two-pronged role of education is to develop skills for the workplace and develop a cohesive and civil citizenry united by American principles. As U.S. Marine 2nd Lt. Francisco Navarro recently pointed out, “Diversity of background but unity of purpose is our greatest weapon. No amount of enemy technology can replicate it.”

The need, whether in K-12 public education, higher education, or military education, is not for unquestioning national loyalty. Rather, we need the kind of thoughtful, reflective citizenship that George Washington emphasized in his first message to Congress, and an embrace of civics based on civil debate, a willingness to be wrong, and a serious reading of the foundational documents that belong to all of us.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM RESTORING AMERICA

Carrie Filipetti is the executive director of the Vandenberg Coalition, and formerly served as deputy assistant secretary for Cuba and Venezuela and the deputy special representative for Venezuela at the U.S. Department of State. Hans Zeiger is president of the Jack Miller Center, and formerly served as a Washington State legislator and a public affairs officer in the Air National Guard.

Washington Examiner · January 16, 2024

25. Goodbye PS Magazine

As the XO of a mechanized infantry Company (M113 and M2 Bradley) and Battalion Motor Officer of a leg infantry battalion) I fondly recall PS Magazine.

Goodbye PS Magazine

hardingproject.com · by Rebecca S

The Army’s Army’s Preventive Maintenance Magazine, known as PS Magazine, is shutting down this fall. Due to budget cuts, the magazine that had scaled down over the last several years will shutter. PS’ great strength was in making maintenance accessible to every Soldier in the Army.

The magazine was a cornerstone resource for those of us at the tactical level. Whether you are a maintainer yourself, an executive officer focused on maintenance, or just somebody in search of a serial number for a niche replacement part, PS was there. Founded in 1951 to build on the success of Army Motors during World War II, personnel of all ranks and components not only read the magazine, but were also sent in inquiries and engaging with PS. Not only did that individual access the information, but they then shared the information with others, and brought more people to the website. Further, every Soldier benefitted from the magazine’s influence by having improved equipment. The magazine even recognized individuals who either maintained their own equipment well or helped fix others’ equipment. PS improved the Army.

Even more than that, PS Magazine provided content that was not only oriented, but also formatted for their reader-population, and had been well read. When talking to a current battery commander on the budget-cut-driven-decision, he commented that “using comics as an accessible medium to communicate best practices seems like a worthwhile investment.” He mentioned that not only had his unit benefited from the accessibility of the information, but even argued that the magazine’s formatting—whether short articles or comics—is a model the Army should use for other topics ranging from Army Regulations to tactics. “I’d even go further,” he said, “The concept needs to be expanded. We need entire portions of technical manuals, how-to operator guides, and maintenance steps in accessible forms.”

So, not only do we still need this resource as a pacesetter in both the maintenance and writing communities, but we need it to modernize. Today’s PS could be even more interactive, accessible, and searchable, perhaps even evolving from comics to Reels or other short video. With such a high operational tempo and a recruiting crisis, maintaining ready formations will only become increasingly more difficult. We need all the help we can get, and PS Magazine’s multitude of resources are a proven asset.

In order to not lose the wealth of information that has been published over 80 years, the Army should take care to organize PS’ archives. The closure announcement mentioned that “efforts are being made to ensure the website remains available for reference for up to three years past end-of-mission. Once this website is fully retired, readers can continue to access the PS Magazine archive on the publicly available Radio Nerds website.” But this is hardy ideal. Radio Nerds is not very searchable and, as a private website, could shutdown itself.

There is still value in retaining the PS archives. While some of the information from the magazine is no longer relevant due to phased out equipment or maintenance techniques, other articles are as relevant today as they were 60 years ago. For example, an article on firing artillery in cold weather from 1957 has many similar tips to one published in 2023. Casting aside more than 70 years of maintenance focused content seems shortsighted.

Fortunately, on the maintenance modernization side, some of this is already in the works. The Army Software Factory is fielding an app to support maintenance. However, this new app could merge an easily searchable archive of the magazine and the resources on the PS Magazine website to put the information at a Soldier’s fingertips.

PS Magazine’s model of Soldier-centric communication was a prime example of how to make a useful resource that improves the profession through writing, and we cannot let that example perish with this publication.

Zachery Bilskie is a logistics officer who is currently in company command in the 11th Airborne Division. He was previously in the 82nd Airborne Division and is originally from Evansville, IN.

Rebecca Segal is a field artillery officer, a graduate of Amherst College, a Massachusetts native, and a member of the Harding Project team.

hardingproject.com · by Rebecca S

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website