Quotes of the Day:
“Some men are friends with the whole world in their hearts, and there are others that hate themselves and spread their hatred around like butter on hot bread.”
-John Steinbeck
"I think of it often and imagine the scene clearly. Even if they come to kill me, I will tell them what they are trying to do is wrong, that education is our basic right."
- Malala Yousafzai
"Our conclusion is that our foreign policy makers are experienced in conventional diplomacy, in global conflicts, and in other aspects of the international relations picture, but they have little skill in the arts of communicating with the political leadership of other countries on the people-to-people level. They are not only inexperienced in propaganda and political warfare, they are hostile to it. They prefer to ignore the fact that the propaganda and political warfare has been largely responsible for the communist expansion ever since the end of World War Two. C.D. Jackson of Time magazine says:
One of the reasons why the Eastern European satellite countries have become the forgotten theater of the Cold War is that the West's diplomats have won out over the psychological warriors. There is a great difference between political warfare and diplomacy although they both pursue the same ends, they are different sides of the street."
- Henry Mayers on Wednesday, 19 February, 1964, before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in support of the Freedom Academy
1. U.S. takes N. Korea's 'improving' missile programs seriously: Pentagon
2. Kim Jong Un’s January Missile-Test Barrage Is Fast but Not Furious
3. North Korea’s Missiles and Nuclear Weapons: Everything You Need to Know. (and more)
4. North Korea using Russian satellite navigation system instead of GPS for missile launches, observers say
5. It's Time for the United States to Reduce Sanctions Against North Korea
6. Why 2022 Could Be a Year Full of North Korean Missile Tests
7. Purges and piranhas: Why we love a crazy North Korea story
8. North Korea test fires 2 short-range ‘tactical-guided missiles’
9. Six N. Koreans related to hypersonic missile development added to sanctions list
10. U.S. calls for UN Security Council meeting following missile launches
11. Despite unpopularity among the people, North Korea may issue more cash vouchers this year
12. Did Seoul Misidentify N.Korea's Latest Missile Launch Site?
13. Young Koreans Lose Interest in Chinese Studies
14. Koreans see China rising, but much prefer Uncle Sam
15. Growing China risk (to South Korea)
16. Will South Korea Join the US Effort to Insulate Supply Chains From China?
1. U.S. takes N. Korea's 'improving' missile programs seriously: Pentagon
Here is the complete excerpt on Korea from the press briefing. I do not know who "Janne" is but her line of questioning seems to try to play "gotcha" with the INDOPACOM statement. But it did provide the opportunity for Admiral Kirby to address the issue and provide some strategic reassurance to our allies.
Janne?
Q: Thank you, John. Do -- you know the North Korea (inaudible) missile launches, that the United States have -- what kind of missile North Korea launches?
MR. KIRBY: Are you talking about the one on the 16th, two days ago?
Q: -- I think it's 17th --
MR. KIRBY: Okay.
Q: -- In Korea --
MR. KIRBY: A couple of days ago. Anyway, we've assessed them at -- we've assessed them as ballistic missiles and we're still -- we're still running the traps on that, so I don't have more detail than that.
Q: South Korean Defense Ministry said that (inaudible) Army tactical missile system KN-24 Are you confirming that?
MR. KIRBY: No, I cannot.
Q: Cause South Korean Defense Ministry, they announced yesterday that (inaudible). The South Korea minister of defense announced that North Korea's recent missile launches, assessed as a direct and serious military threat to ROK. My question is, are you devaluing these missile launches because they don't threaten United States?
MR. KIRBY: Are -- are we what about these launches? What was the verb you used?
Q: Yeah, devaluing.
MR. KIRBY: Devaluing.
Q: Yes.
MR. KIRBY: Deval -- we're not devaluing anything, Janne, not at all, and we're -- we -- we have a treaty alliance with the Republic of Korea, and we have actual, tangible security commitments to the defense of South Korea. We take that very seriously. So there's no devaluing, and -- at -- at all. We're -- we're obviously -- and we have as a -- as an administration, condemned these missile launches and called them out for what they are: clearly violations of various U.N. Security Council resolutions, and dangerous to the region, certainly dangerous to our allies and partners, and we're taking that very seriously. There's no devaluing of anything.
Q: Because Indo-Pacific commander always said that we are -- U.S. is not threatened, you know, so as far as...
MR. KIRBY: He's not -- we're not what?
Q: Indo-Pacific statement, in the commander's statement about those Korean missile launches, they are -- they said that there's no threat in the United States. So that means your -- our neighbor alliance countries so concerned, so worried...
MR. KIRBY: Yeah.
Q: ... about the North Korean missiles. But the -- it seems like if North Korea's not threatening the United States, you don't care, right?
MR. KIRBY: No, that's not true. That's not true, and I would encourage you to look at the -- the rest of the statement that the Indo-Pacific commander continues to put out on -- in these cases. I mean, he talks about the destabilization to the region and the threat that it poses to allies and partners. In this case, or in that case, you know, he -- he wanted to make clear, I think, to the American people, which they have a right to know if -- if -- if these things are posing a threat to the homeland.
But I -- I think you can, again, go back and look at his statements, and he's very clear about the threat that -- that this program continues to pose not only to our ally in South Korea, but -- but to others of our partners in the region. And we're not -- we're -- we're -- continue to take this threat and this improving program of Pyongyang's very, very seriously.
Q: Is this missile intercept-able, or not?
MR. KIRBY: Again, I'm not going to get into any more specifics of our assessment on these -- on these individual launches from the podium. I won't do that.
Q: Thank you.
MR. KIRBY: Pierre?
U.S. takes N. Korea's 'improving' missile programs seriously: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- The United States takes very seriously the threat posed by North Korea's "improving" missile programs, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby said Tuesday.
He, however, said the U.S. is still assessing the nature North Korea's recent missile launches, apparently to learn their exact capabilities.
"We will continue to take this threat and this improving program of Pyongyang's very, very seriously," he told a press briefing when asked about North's recent missile launches.
North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles on Monday (Seoul time), marking its fourth missile launch since the start of the new year.
Citing photos of the launch released by North Korea, Seoul officials have said the missiles fired Monday appeared to be the KN-24, which are said to be a North Korean version of the U.S.' Army Tactical Missile System or ATACMS that fly a complicated trajectory, making them hard to intercept.
"We've assessed them as ballistic missiles, and we're still running the traps on that. So I don't have more detail on that," Kirby said when asked about the nature of the missiles involved in the latest North Korean launch.
North Korea fired what it claims to be a newly developed hypersonic missile on Jan. 5 and Jan. 11 before launching two short-range ballistic missiles on Friday.
Kirby noted the U.S. has clearly and repeatedly called the North Korean missile launches a threat to U.S. allies and partners in the region.
"We're not devaluing anything. Not at all," he said when asked if the U.S. was downplaying the threat posed by the North Korean missile launches since they did not pose immediate threat to the U.S. homeland.
"We have, as an administration, condemned these missile launches and called them out for what they are, clearly violations of various U.N. Security Council resolutions and dangerous to the region, certainly dangerous to our allies and partners, and we're taking that very seriously. There's no devaluing of any," he added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Kim Jong Un’s January Missile-Test Barrage Is Fast but Not Furious
Let me say again:
Kim Jong-un is executing a political warfare strategy against the ROK, the US, and the international community. It is also preparing its warfighting campaign to be able to attack South Korea. These two lines of effort are not mutually exclusive, they are in fact mutually supporting and reinforcing. The more capable military systems the regime possesses, the more likely it can negotiate from a position of strength. And these actions and negotiations can contribute to driving a wedge in the ROK/US alliance to try to achieve one of the regime's key objectives: to drive US forces from the peninsula. Since the conditions are favorable to KimJong-un or if Kim Jong-un is treated and he feels he has no other options he may decide to execute his campaign plan by force to dominate the peninsula and ensure regime survival. These systems will make important contributions to warfighting. If the political warfare strategy is successful and US forces are driven from the peninsula Kim Jong-un may assess he has the combat power to successfully attack the South. Therefore, the political warfare and warfighting strategies are inextricably linked.
Kim Jong Un’s January Missile-Test Barrage Is Fast but Not Furious
North Korea’s spree of weapons launches carries strategic purpose, both in defense and diplomacy, security experts say
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
Mr. Kim is also keeping his promises to modernize and advance the country’s war deterrent. In recent years, the Kim regime has forsaken tests of long-range or nuclear weapons. Instead, Pyongyang has cultivated advances in hypersonic, submarine-launched and shorter-range missile technology designed for battles close to home.
The result has been four tests crammed into a 12-day span, including a Monday launch of two tactical-guided missiles. It’s the largest number of tests the Kim regime has ever conducted in such a short time window.
The acceleration in activity could prove even more important should Pyongyang decide to turn back to nuclear diplomacy. Showing advances in conventional weapons helps ease domestic fears that disarmament could weaken the country’s security, while establishing greater military strength if future talks don’t work out, said Kim Young-jun, a professor at the Korea National Defense University in Seoul.
Kim Jong Un is shown during a Jan. 11 missile test launch in a photo provided by the North Korean government.
Photo: Korean Central News Agency/Associated Press
“Kim Jong Un has to show his people that we have a strong military capability, so that even if negotiations fail, we have preparations for a war scenario,” said Mr. Kim, who advises the South Korean government on national security issues.
North Korea pivoted from tests to talks in 2018, leading to three face-to-face meetings between then-President Donald Trump and Mr. Kim. But the U.S. and North Korea haven’t held formal talks in more than two years. Pyongyang has given the Biden administration the cold shoulder, and Mr. Kim didn’t mention the U.S. in a year-end speech.
The U.S., in response to the Kim regime’s ballistic-missile launches, has recently imposed sanctions on a handful of North Koreans, while proposing new ones at the United Nations. Such North Korean testing is barred by U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The escalation in North Korean weapons tests and the latest U.S. sanctions moves show “dangerously contradictory myths” held by both sides, said Jessica J. Lee, a Korea specialist at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a Washington-based think tank
“Threatening the most closed economy in the world with more sanctions, as the U.S. is doing, will only justify the Kim regime’s nuclear buildup in the eyes of its constituents,” Ms. Lee said. “Demanding concessions up front, as North Korea has, is nothing more than political theater.”
China and Russia, which hold veto power on the U.N. Security Council, have advocated relaxing sanctions on North Korea and could block U.S. efforts to add more.
Punishing Pyongyang for continuing ballistic-missile tests can be achieved by better enforcing the sanctions already on the books, though Washington would have to make doing so a bigger political priority than now, said Katsuhisa Furukawa, a former member of the U.N. panel of experts monitoring sanctions enforcement against North Korea.
“The Biden administration invests so much time and energy on Iran, Afghanistan and China,” Mr. Furukawa said. “But not so much for North Korea, which is a source of the problem.”
North Korea has paid a big price during the pandemic, accepting economic pain to seal off its borders in an effort to avoid widespread outbreaks. The country claims to have zero Covid-19 cases. It has rejected millions of vaccines offered by foreign relief agencies.
Only in recent days has North Korea resumed some cargo-train shipments with China, its biggest benefactor and ally. Ties between the two Communist countries have been rocky throughout Mr. Kim’s decadelong reign. But their relationship has warmed in recent years, with Mr. Kim last month praising the outgoing Chinese ambassador in Pyongyang for helping establish a “fresh heyday” between the two countries.
North Korean weapon tests have interrupted China’s high-profile diplomatic moments in the past. In May 2017, Pyongyang fired a ballistic missile as Chinese President Xi Jinping convened a gathering of world leaders to kick off Beijing’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. Months later, Mr. Xi’s summit with the leaders of other major emerging economies came on the heels of a North Korean nuclear test.
Pyongyang is likely to continue to make choices driven chiefly by its own interests and strategic timetables, said Patricia M. Kim, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. “China has never been able to dictate North Korea’s actions,” she said.
Mr. Kim hasn’t been quiet on his arms ambitions. A year ago, he outlined a five-year policy meant to modernize the country’s conventional weaponry, wanting missiles to get smaller, lighter and fly farther. He gave unusually specific references to a nuclear-powered submarine, a hypersonic warhead and guided multiwarhead rockets.
North Korea stayed relatively inactive through the first months of Mr. Biden’s administration, flying cruise missiles and conducting a ballistic-missile test in March. It laid low during the summer. But since September, North Korea has conducted eight launches that showcased several weapons that Mr. Kim mentioned in his policy speech last year.
“The message is quite obvious: We’re developing our capabilities, and we’re doing exactly what we said we would do,” said Chun In-bum, a retired three-star South Korean army general. “The North Koreans keep their word.”
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
3. North Korea’s Missiles and Nuclear Weapons: Everything You Need to Know
Excerpts:
The Biden administration said in April 2021 it had completed a policy review on North Korea that examined every facet of Washington’s approach to the Kim regime over the years. At the same time, Biden officials have lashed out at North Korea’s human-rights violations, reupped sanctions and stressed the eventual goal of denuclearization. But they have also reached out to North Korea to resume talks.
In response to Pyongyang’s ballistic-missile tests, the U.S. in early 2022 sanctioned a handful of North Koreans involved in arms procurement and proposed new sanctions with the United Nations.
According to Seoul’s spy agency, North Korea’s demands to come back to talks include relaxing sanctions, so the Kim regime can export minerals and import more refined fuel. But the must-have list includes fine suits and premium liquor, too, according to the August 2021 assessment, shared in a briefing with South Korean lawmakers.
South Korean and U.S. officials have discussed offering humanitarian assistance to North Korea, including Covid-19 aid, specifying that any relief wouldn’t be conditioned on progress with denuclearization talks. As of January 2022, North Korea hadn’t accepted Covid-19 vaccines offered by international aid groups.
My revised comments concerning the Biden administration Korea policy.:
My criticism of the Biden administration's policy is that it has not sufficiently articulated the policy so that the press and public can adequately understand it, and it leads to assessments that criticize it for being "engagement only." The administration never "named" the policy just as the Obama administration did not and that leads the press and pundits to reprise the idea of "strategic patience." The second criticism I have among analysts is that the blame seems to always be on whatever US administration is in office and insufficient blame is placed on the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Perhaps everyone takes it for granted that everyone knows that the root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. But we should not take it for granted that people understand this. This is especially true among those pundits who call for maximum engagement (and appeasement) - they refuse to call out the regime's evil nature and instead dream of making a diplomatic breakthrough through lifting of sanctions.
We should also recall that during the Trump administration we set a very high red line for Kim - no nuclear tests and no ICBM testing. This has provided Kim freedom of action for anything below that. There were no significant responses to the sustained missile and rocket testing activity in 2019-2020 =with some 30 launches and tests. We cede the initiative to Kim as long as he did not test a nuclear weapon or ICBM. We have to now find a way to lower that red line.
But the Biden policy really consists of five parts or lines of effort that are rarely addressed comprehensively:
1. Principled and practical diplomacy. This is the press and pundit focus. But what the Biden administration is doing in this line of effort is offering Kim the chance to act as a responsible member of the international community. But the administration is not banking on that, thus the other three lines of effort that are too often overlooked.
2. Alliance based focus for deterrence, defense and diplomacy. (and trilateral cooperation among both of the US Northeast Asia alliances with the ROK and Japan).
3. "Stern deterrence" - this is about revitalizing the ROK/US military alliance and strengthening defense capabilities to include returning exercises to a level that will sustain readiness (and support OPCON transition) to reverse the dangerous trend being by the previous administration and welcomed by the current Moon administration.
4. Human rights upfront approach
5. Full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This provides the "end state" objectives for an end to the north's nuclear and missile programs, human right abuses and crimes against humanity, proliferation of weapons to conflict areas around the world, cyber attacks, and global illicit activities. It also underscores one element that the current administration has with the previous one and that is sanctions will not be lifted until there is substantive progress toward compliance with the UNSCRs. Both Trump and Biden deserve credit for not giving in to the pressure in Seoul and among some in Washington that believe we need to lift sanctions to bring Kim to the negotiating table. And one thing that engagers overlook is that the President does not have the authority to make a unilateral decision to lift UN sanctions or stop enforcing US laws as they pertain to north Korea. However, as noted, both presidents should have done more and hopefully will do more in the future and expend more effort on sanctions enforcement. The recent designation of the five Koreans from the north operating in Russia and China is a good start.
North Korea’s Missiles and Nuclear Weapons: Everything You Need to Know
Kim Jong Un vows to continue advancing an arsenal that has the potential to hit anywhere in the U.S.
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
Pyongyang developed its weapons program brazenly, flouting sanctions and breaking promises to halt nuclear production. In 2003 it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the main global commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.
At 2018’s Singapore summit with then-President Donald Trump, Kim Jong Un greatly boosted his global legitimacy by becoming the first North Korean leader to meet a sitting U.S. leader. In 2017 Pyongyang had ratcheted up tensions with the U.S. to their highest level in years by conducting its sixth nuclear test and firing off three intercontinental ballistic missiles—the last of them showing the range to strike anywhere in the U.S.
In recent years, the Kim regime has shifted to testing more conventional weapons designed for battles close to home, from submarine-launched missiles to hypersonic technology. North Korea started 2022 with an unprecedented number of weapons tests in a 12-day span. Mr. Kim, after skipping nearly two years of weapons tests, attended a Jan. 11 launch and asked officials to boost the country’s military muscle.
What are North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?
The U.S. Army in July 2020 said North Korea may now have 20 to 60 nuclear bombs and the ability to manufacture six new bombs each year. In May 2021, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Mark Milley said North Korea possesses the technical capacity to “present a real danger to the US homeland as well as our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific,” according to written testimony provided to U.S. lawmakers.
Pyongyang has yet to show it can reliably strike the U.S. with a nuclear weapon. That requires developing a warhead that can survive the enormous pressure and heat of re-entering the atmosphere. And in its tests the North has launched ICBMs at a steep angle—in part to keep them from splashing down in U.S. territorial waters—which leaves doubts about whether the technology could traverse an actual flight, with its flatter trajectory.
Nuclear talks have stalled between Washington and Pyongyang, despite three meetings between Messrs. Trump and Kim. The two sides remain far apart on when and how the North should relinquish its nuclear arsenal. The last formal talks, in October 2019 in Stockholm, broke down after a single day. In an August 2021 statement addressing U.S. affairs, Kim Yo Jong, the leader’s younger sister, suggested only a substantial deterrent—and not words—would bring peace and security to the Korean Peninsula.
What type of missiles does North Korea have?
Mr. Kim, in a policy speech published Jan. 1, 2020, declared he no longer felt bound by a moratorium on long-range weapons tests dating to late 2017. At an October 2020 military parade, the North showcased a new ICBM that weapons experts believe is the largest of its kind and could hold multiple warheads. Mr. Kim has recently said such technology is at a final stage of development.
Since the 2019 Vietnam summit ended without a deal, North Korea has conducted more than two dozen tests of shorter-range weapons that can’t reach the U.S. mainland but endanger allies and overseas troops in South Korea and Japan. It has honed new launch systems, flown weapons designed to evade U.S. missile defenses and upgraded its submarine-fired technology.
In August 2021, the U.N.’s atomic agency pointed to recent activity that suggests North Korea’s plutonium-producing reactor and another facility had again become operational. The reactor, at the North’s Yongbyon facility, had appeared to be inactive from December 2018 until the beginning of July 2021.
Mr. Kim outlined his weapons ambitions at a rare Workers’ Party Congress meeting in early 2021, when he vowed to put the country’s war-fighting capabilities and deterrence on the highest level.
When was the last time North Korea fired missiles?
Pyongyang conducted its last nuclear and ICBM tests in the fall of 2017. The nuclear test, in September of that year, produced an estimated yield as high as 100 kilotons, according to a South Korean lawmaker—or roughly five times that of the atomic bomb the U.S. dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945.
The ICBM test came that November. The missile, dubbed the Hwasong-15, soared to an altitude of around 2,800 miles, or about 11 times as high as the International Space Station.
Mr. Kim accelerated the country’s weapons development. In the three years before the Singapore summit in 2018, North Korea unleashed more major missiles than in the three previous decades. Of the country’s more than 110 missile launches and nuclear tests, more than 80 have been conducted since Mr. Kim took power in late 2011, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank with a database going back to 1984.
Can North Korea’s missiles reach the continental U.S.?
The Hwasong-15 missile could potentially strike anywhere in the U.S., according to an assessment by the U.S. Forces Korea, which oversees the roughly 28,500 American personnel in South Korea.
North Korea’s most recent test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, in November 2017, demonstrated the potential to reach anywhere in the U.S.
Photo: KCNA/Associated Press
Missile experts estimate its range at 8,100 miles, and say a North Korean ICBM could hit the U.S. mainland less than 30 minutes after launch.
The shorter- and medium-range weapons have repeatedly shown the North has ample ability to hit South Korea and Japan.
What has the U.S. response been to North Korea’s missile tests?
Washington and Pyongyang have held denuclearization talks since President George H.W. Bush was in the White House and North Korea was still led by founder Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un’s grandfather. Prior deals sought to freeze production, allow on-site inspections or dismantle facilities in return for aid or other resources. But the arrangements broke down after the North refused to comply or engaged in a military provocation.
Mr. Trump took a different approach, shifting negotiations customarily left to working-level officials to leader-level diplomacy. The Trump administration played down North Korea’s resumption of weapons tests in spring 2019, because they didn’t include ICBMs or nuclear bombs. The absence of long-range tests, Mr. Trump and senior officials said, was a sign the U.S. approach was successful. Others, like former U.S. national security adviser John Bolton, said the tests violated United Nations restrictions.
North Korea has ignored repeated offers by the Biden administration to meet without preconditions at any time and anywhere.
In June 2021, Pyongyang’s foreign minister said the country wasn’t entertaining “even the possibility of any contact with the U.S.,” saying talks with Washington “would get us nowhere.” Kim Jong Un didn’t mention the U.S. or Mr. Biden in a year-end speech.
Without a nuclear deal that eases sanctions—which limit the North’s access to foreign banks and global trade—Mr. Kim can’t deliver on his promise to revitalize a North Korean economy that has crumbled during the pandemic. Living conditions have slid so much that Mr. Kim has apologized a number of times for the policy failure, a gesture previously unheard of in North Korea.
What is President Biden’s stance on North Korea?
Mr. Biden has advocated mixing pressure with what he calls principled diplomacy. He has declared an end to holding summits without preconditions, which he said amounts to embracing a thug. Mr. Biden said he would sit down with Mr. Kim only if Pyongyang were sincere and pledged to reduce its nuclear arsenal.
In January 2021, Mr. Kim called the U.S. his country’s biggest enemy. North Korean state media last mentioned Mr. Biden by name in 2019, when it called him a “fool of low I.Q.” and compared him to a rabid dog that “must be beaten to death.”
The Biden administration said in April 2021 it had completed a policy review on North Korea that examined every facet of Washington’s approach to the Kim regime over the years. At the same time, Biden officials have lashed out at North Korea’s human-rights violations, reupped sanctions and stressed the eventual goal of denuclearization. But they have also reached out to North Korea to resume talks.
In response to Pyongyang’s ballistic-missile tests, the U.S. in early 2022 sanctioned a handful of North Koreans involved in arms procurement and proposed new sanctions with the United Nations.
According to Seoul’s spy agency, North Korea’s demands to come back to talks include relaxing sanctions, so the Kim regime can export minerals and import more refined fuel. But the must-have list includes fine suits and premium liquor, too, according to the August 2021 assessment, shared in a briefing with South Korean lawmakers.
South Korean and U.S. officials have discussed offering humanitarian assistance to North Korea, including Covid-19 aid, specifying that any relief wouldn’t be conditioned on progress with denuclearization talks. As of January 2022, North Korea hadn’t accepted Covid-19 vaccines offered by international aid groups.
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
4. North Korea using Russian satellite navigation system instead of GPS for missile launches, observers say
I was discussing these missile tests with a good friend, mentor, and Korea hand, Dr. Bruce Bechtol. He assesses these new missiles may very well have either been provided by the Russians or developed with Russian assistance. This article might add some evidence to that important assessment.
It also goes against my belief that north Korea will be a spoiler in strategic competition. It would be convenient for north Korea to cause a distraction for the US while Russia focuses on Ukraine. Russia (and China, Iran, and north Korea) are likely presenting the US with multiple strategic dilemmas.
North Korea using Russian satellite navigation system instead of GPS for missile launches, observers say
By Minnie Chan South China Morning Post3 min
+ FOLLOW
Published: 7:00am, 18 Jan, 2022
A woman watches news of the latest North Korean missile test on a screen at a station in Seoul on Monday. Photo: EPA-EFE
North Korea has been launching missiles without the support of America’s global positioning system, instead turning to Russia’s satellite navigation network, according to observers.
In its fourth test this month, Pyongyang on Monday fired what appeared to be two short-range ballistic missiles into the sea off the east coast of the Korean peninsula, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said.
Pyongyang also conducted tests of hypersonic missiles on January 5 and 11 and fired ballistic missiles on Friday, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency.
The latest tests come after the US on Wednesday imposed new sanctions on North Korea over the launches and again called for Pyongyang to return to denuclearisation talks that have been stalled since 2019.
Pyongyang’s frequent tests in recent years – including two intercontinental ballistic missiles with an estimated range of more than 6,000km (3,700 miles) in 2017 – have drawn condemnation. They have also highlighted the gains in North Korea’s missile programme – even without using America’s GPS.
“None of the anti-American countries [such as North Korea] will use GPS because of their worries about possible disruption or interference by the US military,” said Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the Canada-based Kanwa Defence Review.
Chang said they instead used the Chinese BeiDou navigation system or Russia’s global navigation satellite system (Glonass).
But according to a source close to the Chinese military in Beijing, the BeiDou system – which has been fully operational since 2020 – does not provide support to other countries for missile launches.
The source, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said North Korea had been using the Russian system – whose coverage is not as broad as that of GPS – for its missile tests.
“Experts from Pyongyang assessed China’s BeiDou system as well as the Russian one and they decided Glonass was more suitable for the country’s geographic location, its high latitude, when launching missiles,” the person said.
“Moreover, it’s an open secret that the North has been benefited from the legacy of the former Soviet Union, which transferred intermediate-range missile technology to Pyongyang after signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the US.”
The INF Treaty – signed in 1987 and abandoned by Washington in 2019 – required both the US and the Soviet Union to eliminate all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500km to 5,500km. However, Moscow had transferred technologies to its ally Pyongyang, according to the source.
Intelligence agencies in the US and Europe have long believed that North Korea incorporated Soviet designs and technology – going back to the 1960s – into many of its missiles, military publisher Janes and The Washington Post have reported.
Meanwhile, China’s BeiDou navigation system is being used by both Iran and Pakistan for military applications, according to the source in Beijing.
“Iranian experts have managed to combine 12 civilian BeiDou signals and this – supported by their own calculations – gets it closer to the military version [used by the PLA] in terms of accuracy,” he said.
Former People’s Liberation Army instructor Song Zhongping said Pakistan’s military was also likely to be using a limited version of BeiDou.
“While China may share some codes for the BeiDou military signals with Pakistan under their strategic partnership, it would be regional not global,” he said.
Minnie Chan is an award-winning journalist, specialising in reporting on defence and diplomacy in China. Her coverage of the US EP-3 spy plane crash with a PLA J-8 in 2001 near the South China Sea opened her door to the military world. Since then, she has had several scoops relating to China's military development. She has been at the Post since 2005 and has a master's in international public affairs from The University of Hong Kong.
5. It's Time for the United States to Reduce Sanctions Against North Korea
Kim Jong-un reads this and says: "Exactly. My political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy works. I will continue to execute." I wonder if an "Order of Kim Il-sung" will be awarded in secret and kept in the vault until Kim achieves his ultimate objectives.
It's Time for the United States to Reduce Sanctions Against North Korea
The United States' maximum pressure strategy against North Korea has only emboldened Kim Jong-un. It's time for the Biden administration to consider other options.
Sanctions don’t work. At least, they don’t cause governments to yield political power or abandon territory, weapons, and other interests viewed as vital. So it is with North Korea, which is heading for another “arduous march,” according to Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, referring to the terrible famine of the late 1990s.
The Kim regime continues to produce missiles, nuclear weapons, and a host of other war materiel. In January 2021 Kim said creating nuclear weapons was “the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation,” quite a claim for a people whose kingdoms go back centuries. Kim also presented a long list of weapons under development. In October, Kim said his country needed to possess an “invincible military capability.” Pyongyang later justified its activities by pointing to the hypocrisy of Americans producing weapons for themselves while criticizing the North’s activities.
Washington’s protests have not impressed Kim. He stated that “The US.. has frequently signaled it’s not hostile to our state, but there is no action-based evidence to make us believe that they are not hostile.” Rather, he added, “The US is continuing to create tensions in the region with its wrong judgments and actions.”
That certainly was Kim’s view of the sanctions proposed by the Biden administration in January 2022 after two recent Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) missile tests. Washington penalized several North Korean officials and proposed new UN measures on the DPRK, but those sanctions are unlikely to win Chinese and Russian support.
Pyongyang responded sharply, launching two more short-range missiles from rail cars. North Korea dismissed administration threats: “The U.S. is intentionally escalating the situation even with the activation of independent sanctions, not content with referring the DPRK’s just activity to the U.N. Security Council,” stated the Foreign Ministry. North Korea also warned: “If the U.S. adopts such a confrontational stance, the DPRK will be forced to take stronger and certain reaction to it.”
That could be a longer-range missile or even nuclear test.
Sanctions obviously have not deterred North Korea from devoting a disproportionate share of its resources to the military or developing UN-prohibited missiles and nuclear weapons. Economic penalties have failed to convince the DPRK to roll back any of its military programs. If anything, Kim has used sanctions to justify new advances, proving that Pyongyang will defend itself and not be intimidated.
Yet some observers still hope to find the perfect sanctions recipe that will disarm North Korea. It is the classic mistake of hope trumping experience. Military action, with a significant risk of war, surely is too dangerous, given North Korea’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Diplomacy has failed thus far, and Kim shows no interest in talking to the United States now. Thus, contended Nah Liang Tuang of Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “the only door open is a sustained maximum pressure strategy against the regime.”
Advocates for sanctions inevitably call for tougher measures when even the strictest sanctions fail. It was no different with President Donald Trump. He imposed “maximum pressure” on North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, as well as lesser penalties on Cuba, Russia, China, and even Germany, an American ally. He failed to achieve his objective in every case. Not one government gave in. His record was a perfect zero.
Despite this, he continually reinforced failure. When Trump’s targets failed to fly to Washington and sign surrender documents, he added more sanctions. And then even more. Unsurprisingly, these sanctions also failed. Nevertheless, advocates blamed their lack of success on failing to be tough enough. For instance, the Center for Security Policy’s Grant Newsham claimed: “Sanctions do work. I would submit that they’ve never been tried with any degree of seriousness towards North Korea,” a curious claim to make when Beijing was enforcing the measures with sufficient alacrity to spark angry protests from the DPRK.
Nah also recommended even tighter controls: “The U.S. and other stakeholders should pursue watertight enforcement of all UNSC sanctions against North Korea. Since such sanctions amount to an embargo on most of the DPRK’s official economy, this will make the opportunity cost, or the cost in terms of alternative spending forgone, exorbitantly high for any expansion or even maintenance of Kim’s nuclear weapons.”
Where, one wonders, can such a watertight system be found? The problems with this argument are many. The tougher the sanctions, the greater the profit from smuggling. Neighboring countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, also often have political and security reasons for moderating enforcement. The more countries the United States attempts to punish to enforce its original sanctions, the greater the resistance and price paid by America.
This is a particular problem regarding North Korea, since compliance by both Beijing and Moscow is necessary to effectively enforce economic restrictions. Both countries already are subject to U.S. penalties for other reasons, and neither is inclined to be helpful for American policy in Northeast Asia. Forcing them to comply is a steep task. Complicating it further, few of America’s friends and allies would support stringent controls over commerce with China.
Although North Korea’s weapons programs are not cheap, Pyongyang has managed to maintain funding even during its most economically desperate times. The regime has been able to find the resources necessary to become a nuclear power with an increasing long reach despite “maximum pressure.”
Nah ignored the reality that the DPRK, not America, decides whether the price exacted by sanctions is “exorbitant.” North Korean leadership has been willing to accept a very high cost paid by those outside of the political elite and military. During the mid- to late-1990s as many as three million North Koreans died during the famine, but the regime did not change course. Although Kim’s rhetoric was measured at the party plenum which closed out 2021, it was evident that food production is lagging badly. Nevertheless, the regime launched four missiles in the following weeks.
Ironically, the COVID-19 epidemic provided an opportunity to test the thesis that watertight sanctions would force the Kim regime to crawl back to Washington and disgorge its nukes. Pyongyang closed the country’s borders in January 2020. It isolated itself from the world, ordering its border forces to shoot and kill anyone seeking to enter. Aid workers and diplomats went home. Even most trade with China appeared to end.
It is unlikely that the US could ever attain a similar level of control. Yet the North continued to develop and deploy an array of sophisticated new weapons.
Now trade appears likely to resume, with the first freight trains seen crossing the PRC-DPRK border in seventeen months. Such commerce will be quarantined and disinfected, but will ease pressure on North Korea. And the United States has no practical way to interdict such shipments.
If increased sanctions on North Korea won’t work, it is time to reconsider American policy. While retaining personal and sectoral penalties—focused on military and dual-use technologies—Washington should consider lifting broader economic penalties which “work” only by impoverishing the entire population. These sanctions keep the DPRK notably poorer economically but only somewhat weaker militarily than it otherwise would be. They don’t prevent it from being deadly, able to kill hundreds of thousands, or even millions in a full-scale war. This means innocent North Koreans are suffering for no good reason.
In practice, there is only one option dealing with North Korea and that is negotiation. Diplomacy might be doomed to fail. However, reducing sanctions, the most antagonistic aspect of America’s “hostile policy,” might create new areas for agreement. Even if not, the situation is unlikely to be much worse than today, with a heavily armed North Korea isolated from the world and paranoid about possible threats from America.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Image: Reuters.
6. Why 2022 Could Be a Year Full of North Korean Missile Tests
And we should not overreact but instead execute our own superior form of political warfare.
Conclusion:
All of this sets up 2022 as a potentially significant year for renewed North Korean missile testing. The 8th Party Congress agenda is clearly getting off the ground and Kim’s personal appearance at a missile test for the first time since March 2020 this month indicates high-level attention to these issues. The prospect of a return to diplomacy appears remote and North Korea may zero in on developing its capabilities further before revisiting talks with the United States.
And again just to re-emphasize, here is a summary of the 8th Party Congress from last January. We need to address this.
•Political Warfare
•Subversion, coercion, extortion
•“Blackmail diplomacy” – the use of tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions
•Example: Kim Yo-jong threats in June – ROK anti-leaflet law in December
•Negotiate to set conditions - not to denuclearize
•Set Conditions for unification (domination to complete the revolution)
•Split ROK/US alliance
•Reduce/weaken defense of the South
•Exploit regional powers (e.g, China and Russia)
•Economics by Juche ideology – the paradox of “reform”
•Illicit activities to generate funds for regime
•Deny human rights to ensure regime survival
•Continue to exploit COVID threat to suppress dissent and crack down on 400+ markets and foreign currency use
•Priority to military and nuclear programs
•For deterrence or domination?
Why 2022 Could Be a Year Full of North Korean Missile Tests
North Korea has kicked off 2022 with a flurry of missile launches. While analysts were tempted to zero in on Kim Jong Un‘s agriculture and economy-focused remarks on new year’s day at a recent Workers’ Party of Korea plenum, national defense priorities haven’t fallen by the wayside. In fact, during his speech, Kim did call for the enhancement of military capabilities “without a moment’s delay.” Days later, the first missile launch of four so far in January took place.
The broader context for these launches is the military modernization agenda that Kim presented at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. As part of a broader five-year plan of economic development, Kim ordered the development of a range of capabilities. These included maneuverable hypersonic weapons like the missile system tested across the first two tests this month. Kim personally attended and guided the second of these tests, on January 11, and underscored that hypersonic weapons were among the “core tasks” outlined at the Party Congress.
North Korean Missile Launches: A Signal or a True Test of Capabilities?
While analysts outside North Korea are tempted to read missile tests as cries for attention or signaling, most evidence points to a simpler explanation: North Korea is testing capabilities it perceives to be important for its national defense because the leadership thinks the development of military capability is important. Messaging to South Korea, the United States, and the broader world are sometimes factors, but secondary to this overarching goal.
There are other considerations as well. Internally, Kim has refocused on his national defense scientists and technical experts. This class received particular attention during the missile and nuclear testing campaign that ran between 2013 and 2017. The new five-year plan has brought them renewed prominence.
For instance, at a national defense expo held last October, two large photographs were prominently featured: one of Kim Jong Un alongside Pak Jong Chon, a senior military official involved personally with guiding missile tests in 2021, and another featuring Kim Jong Un flanked by Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho, and Kim Jong Sik–three of the best-known North Korean officials involved in guiding the research, development, and testing of new missiles.
At a time when Kim has been open about internal economic difficulties in North Korea brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, making sure that the development of new missiles succeeds can showcase positive developments for domestic reasons. A prominent theme in Kim’s tenure as North Korea’s leader so far has been an emphasis on pursuing economic development alongside a robust national defense; while the former isn’t going so well at the moment, Kim seeks to demonstrate that the latter remains largely unaffected by economic difficulties.
With regard to the outside world, it is notable that two of North Korea’s most recent launches have followed the Biden administration’s announcement of new sanctions against individuals and entities involved in facilitating the illicit procurement of materials and components used in the manufacture of missile systems. In the aftermath of this action, the North Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs promised countermeasures.
A day later, North Korea carried out a rapid-reaction operational drill involving the launch of two short-range ballistic missiles from a railcar. The state media description of this test emphasized that the order to carry out the exercise was given on the very same day–emphasizing that this wasn’t something pre-planned like the earlier developmental tests of the maneuverable hypersonic weapon in the month.
The state media account of the fourth and most recent launch of two short-range ballistic missiles from Pyongyang’s Sunan Airport similarly made reference to the Second Economic Committee (SEC). The SEC is involved with, among other tasks, procurement for missile development and manufacture. While neither test made reference to U.S. sanctions or actions, these might have been designed to convey a degree of defiance. The broader point, however, remains that these tests primarily served to evaluate the readiness of the involved missile units.
All of this sets up 2022 as a potentially significant year for renewed North Korean missile testing. The 8th Party Congress agenda is clearly getting off the ground and Kim’s personal appearance at a missile test for the first time since March 2020 this month indicates high-level attention to these issues. The prospect of a return to diplomacy appears remote and North Korea may zero in on developing its capabilities further before revisiting talks with the United States.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on the Asia-Pacific region, his research interests range from nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, nonproliferation, emerging technologies, and U.S. extended deterrence. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020).
A widely published writer, Panda’s work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Diplomat, the Atlantic, the New Republic, the South China Morning Post, War on the Rocks, Politico, and the National Interest. Panda has also published in scholarly journals, including Survival, the Washington Quarterly, and India Review, and has contributed to the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment and Strategic Survey. He is editor-at-large at the Diplomat, where he hosts the Asia Geopolitics podcast, and a contributing editor at War on the Rocks.
7. Purges and piranhas: Why we love a crazy North Korea story
Purges and piranhas: Why we love a crazy North Korea story
North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un are frequent subjects of news stories in Western media, which highlight the dictatorship’s strict control over everyday life, its brutal treatment of opponents, and attempts to glorify the Kim family.
But many of these stories are unfounded or blown out of proportion. So why are they still so popular? And what do we really need to know about North Korea?
BBC Monitoring's Tse Yin Lee spoke to two experts on the topic to find out.
Video produced by Suniti Singh
8. North Korea test fires 2 short-range ‘tactical-guided missiles’
Support to warfighting.
Excerpt:
Bruce Bechtol Jr., professor of political science at Angelo State University, agreed that it was unlikely that weapons would be used to deliver nuclear warheads.
“My best guess would be it's likely going to be used as a tactical support system for ground maneuver forces in any conflict, Bechtol said.
“That would probably be more of a conventional warhead … because, in a combat situation, ground forces want to take and hold ground. So, if they put a nuclear warhead on that thing, they're not going to be able to hold that ground because it's going to be contaminated,” he said.
North Korea test fires 2 short-range ‘tactical-guided missiles’
The missiles are likely for precision strikes, not destroying whole cities with nuclear warheads, experts say.
By Jaeduk Seo
2022.01.18
North Korea conducted its fourth missile test this month on Monday when its military fired two short-range ballistic missiles at an island about 236 miles northeast from the capital Pyongyang.
Experts said the missiles would probably be armed with conventional, not nuclear, warheads in an attack, but their launch is likely to ratchet up tensions in the region as both the U.S. and South Korea governments promptly criticized North Korea’s latest action.
The state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that the two “tactical-guided missiles” hit their objectives. Experts said these missiles were more accurate than other missiles that North Korea tested recently. Based on photos in the newspaper, the fired missiles were similar to the KN-24, which Pyongyang tested on multiple occasions in 2019 and 2020.
South Korea’s defense ministry has said that the KN-24 missile resembles the U.S. MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and has been designed to avoid missile defense systems and perform precision strikes.
Monday’s test followed a test of two ballistic missiles on Friday, which came after North Korea warned of a “stronger and certain reaction” if Washington were to authorize more sanctions in response to the test Pyongyang conducted days before.
The Pentagon was not able to confirm that the missile was a KN-24 or any other missile resembling ATACMS, press secretary John Kirby said in a news briefing Tuesday.
“We've assessed them as ballistic missiles, and we're still we're still running the traps on that,” Kirby said.
When asked if the U.S. was downplaying the missile launches because they do not pose a threat to the U.S. mainland, Kirby reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the defense of South Korea.
“We have as an administration condemned these missile launches and called them out for what they are, clearly violations of various U.N. Security Council resolutions and dangerous to the region certainly dangerous to our allies and partners and we're taking that very seriously,” Kirby said.
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, through spokesman Stéphane Dujarric, on Monday repeated calls for a diplomatic solution, referring to North Korea by its acronym.
"There haven't been that many periods, I think, in recent time where we have seen so many launches from the DPRK," Dujarric said. "And for us, it is just another reminder of the need for the DPRK, and all the parties engaged to involve themselves, engage themselves in diplomatic talks so we can get what the United Nations would like to see, which is a very verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and, in the more immediate term, a lowering of tensions."
Nevertheless, the missile tests are a “direct and serious military threat,” Boo Seung Chan, a spokesman for South Korea’s Defense Ministry said.
South Korea’s main opposition People Power Party released a statement condemning North Korea’s many missile provocations and called on the ruling party to do the same.
Several U.S.-based analysts told RFA’s Korean Service that the KN-24 missiles were likely conventional-only systems for North Korea. Joshua Pollack, a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California, noted that the KN-24 and the KN-23 before it were introduced as “tactical weapons.”
“[That implies] that they would be intended to carry conventional warheads only. But that picture was muddied in January 2021, when Kim Jong Un introduced the subject of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons,” Pollack told RFA.
“For now, at least, I think they are meant to be conventional precision-strike weapons. They appear to be North Korea's response to similar missiles developed in South Korea in previous years,” he said.
Bruce Bechtol Jr., professor of political science at Angelo State University, agreed that it was unlikely that weapons would be used to deliver nuclear warheads.
“My best guess would be it's likely going to be used as a tactical support system for ground maneuver forces in any conflict, Bechtol said.
“That would probably be more of a conventional warhead … because, in a combat situation, ground forces want to take and hold ground. So, if they put a nuclear warhead on that thing, they're not going to be able to hold that ground because it's going to be contaminated,” he said.
Michael Duitsman, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told RFA that the KN-24’s higher accuracy might even decrease incentives for Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons for short-range missions.
“Precision strike weapons like the KN-24, U.S. ATACMS, and South Korea’s Hyunmoo-2 can accurately hit high-value targets with single, conventionally-armed missiles. Hitting these targets with older, less accurate missiles could require several missiles, or one missile with a nuclear warhead,” Duitsman said.
North Korea has, however, been able to produce the KN-24 in significant numbers, Ian Williams of the Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies told RFA.
“We've seen them in the parades they have done. We've seen a good number of them … and just the number of times they have fired particularly the KN-23, we've seen them test launch this now multiple times, typically firing them in pairs. So that suggests they've got a fairly good production capacity for them,” Williams said.
Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
9. Six N. Koreans related to hypersonic missile development added to sanctions list
Based on my recent conversations with Dr. Bechtol on possible Russian support to north Korea's missile programs, we should read between the lines on these designations. It may be a signal to the Russians *and the Chinese) that we know they are complicit in north Koreans activities.
It is one thing to no longer enforce sanctions but it is quite another to actively contribute to the sanctioned activity itself.
Six N. Koreans related to hypersonic missile development added to sanctions list
Posted January. 19, 2022 07:49,
Updated January. 19, 2022 07:49
Six N. Koreans related to hypersonic missile development added to sanctions list. January. 19, 2022 07:49. by Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com.
Six North Korean nationals, who have recently been included in the Biden administration’s independent sanctions list, are reportedly related to the development of North Korea’s hypersonic missiles. They are known to have procured goods for hypersonic missile development. North Korea said it successfully tested hypersonic missiles after launching them consecutively from Jagang Province on Jan. 5 and Jan. 11, respectively.
Earlier on Jan. 12 (local time), the Biden administration included six North Korean nationals such as Choi Myong Hyon and Oh Yong Ho, who are based in Russia, as well as Shim Kwang Sok, Kim Song Hoon, Kang Chong Hak, and Byeon Kwang Chol, who are active in China, to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN). They are known to have procured steel alloys, Kevlar (high-strength fiber) wire and aramid fiber for the missile programs from China and Russia.
According to a military source on Tuesday, the goods procured by the six North Koreans, who are officials at an organization affiliated with North Korea’s State Academy of Defense Sciences, have been used to develop warheads for hypersonic missiles. After a ballistic missile is launched, the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) separated from the propellant flies at more than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5) when descending from the atmosphere. During the process, the temperature of the warhead rises close to 3,000 degrees Celsius, resulting in a need for core heat-resistant parts. The six North Korean nationals are in charge of procuring those components from abroad.
Hypersonic missiles are capable of irregular maneuvers at more than five times the speed of sound. North Korea is expected to make further efforts to improve its missile technology by actively importing related equipment from China and Russia.
10. U.S. calls for UN Security Council meeting following missile launches
It is likely near impossible for us to generate any action but the UNSC. But we still need to drive meetings to be able to call out north Korean strategy and show how China and Russia are complicit in north Korean malign activities.
Wednesday
January 19, 2022
U.S. calls for UN Security Council meeting following missile launches
A photograph of Friday's tactical guided missile launch from a train in Uiju, North Pyongan Province, released by the North Korean state-run Korean Central News Agency on Saturday. The test was the third out of four conducted by the North in the new year. [YONHAP]
The United States on Tuesday (local time) called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to address the recent series of missile launches by North Korea, in apparent defiance of the international body's resolutions banning such tests by the secretive regime.
The U.S. call for a meeting, which was first reported by Agence France-Presse citing an anonymous diplomat, is expected to take place on Thursday behind closed doors and marks a change in tone from the Joe Biden administration’s policy of seeking engagement with Pyongyang.
“We will continue to ramp up the pressure on the North Koreans,” the U.S. envoy to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said in an interview with The Washington Post.
The meeting was requested by the United States, France and Britain — three of the five permanent members on the Security Council — as well as non-permanent members Mexico, Ireland and Albania, the sources said Thursday.
Five countries, including China and Russia, hold permanent seats on the Security Council, which is tasked with ensuring world peace, while 10 other countries take up non-permanent seats in the council on a rotational basis.
The Security Council held its last meeting on North Korea’s missile program on Jan. 10, following Pyongyang’s test of a missile armed with a hypersonic gliding warhead on Jan. 5.
The most recent call from the United States for a Security Council meeting comes on the heels of a North Korean test of two missiles on Monday morning, which the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said Tuesday were tactical guided missiles currently in production for deployment.
The KCNA’s report said the test was carried out to “selectively evaluate tactical guided missiles being produced and deployed and to verify the accuracy of the weapon system.”
The KCNA said the two tactical guided missiles were “launched in the western area of the DPRK and precisely hit an island target in the East Sea.” The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on Monday that the missiles were fired from Sunan airfield in Pyongyang.
DPRK is the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The JCS said the two missiles flew 380 kilometers (236 miles), reaching a maximum altitude of 42 kilometers.
Successive Security Council resolutions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile weapons programs, the most recent of which was passed in December 2017, prohibit the North from conducting missile or nuclear tests and have imposed increasingly punitive sanctions on Pyongyang, barring it from trading weapons, importing luxury goods or sending workers abroad to earn foreign currency for the regime.
However, there is little indication that the United Nations sanctions regime has deterred North Korea from further developing its arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons.
Monday’s test was the fourth in an unusual spate of launches within the last two weeks.
North Korea conducted three other missile tests since the new year, beginning with two separate tests of what it claimed were hypersonic glide missiles on Jan. 5 and 10, followed by a test last Friday of tactical guided missiles fired from train cars.
The flurry of missile launches by Pyongyang in the new year have sparked concern from the United States, South Korea and neighboring Japan that the North is quickly honing the capabilities of its missiles, possibly with an eye to mount them with nuclear warheads.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
11. Despite unpopularity among the people, North Korea may issue more cash vouchers this year
The regime seems to be trying to get control of its currency and reduce reliance on foreign currency.
Despite unpopularity among the people, North Korea may issue more cash vouchers this year
The biggest public complaint is that consumers unilaterally take a loss when they use the donpyo because they cannot receive change
2022.01.19 2:39pm
A picture of the foreign currency vouchers currently in circulation in North Korea. / Image: Daily NK
North Korean authorities have given the cash vouchers (donpyo) issued last year a positive evaluation, and despite their unpopularity among many North Koreans it appears likely the authorities will issue more this year.
According to a Daily NK source in North Korea on Tuesday, the North Korean authorities held discussions about the donpyo during the recent Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee, concluding that the vouchers succeeded in securing some cash for state coffers.
That is, the source claims that even though the limited number of donpyo issued on a trial basis last year met with little public enthusiasm, the authorities managed to secure foreign and local currency commensurate with the amount of vouchers issued.
The authorities have reportedly ordered that banks boost public confidence in the donpyo by changing them into cash for people or institutions that want to exchange the vouchers for foreign currency.
This suggests North Korean authorities recognize that the public still deeply distrusts the vouchers, and that they need to take measures to correct this.
Additionally, North Korean authorities have ordered that merchants and money changers who were arrested through the end of last year “to set an example” for refusing to accept the donpyo or for changing them less than face value be included in next year’s special amnesty.
Foreign currency vouchers issued by North Korea in the past. / Image: Yonhap
Daily NK previously reported that the authorities ordered a special amnesty for many of the inmates of political prison camps and forced labor camps run by the Ministry of Social Security to mark the birthday of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il on Feb. 16.
The move suggests that the authorities wish to emphasize their magnanimity and “leadership of love for the people” along with earning public loyalty and trust by pardoning people punished for acts related to the donpyo.
Meanwhile, North Koreans are still shunning the donpyo despite the illustrative crackdowns and punishments.
The source said people try to hold onto currencies such as dollars and yuan because they cannot trust the local currency. In short, nobody trusts donpyo, which many believe could simply disappear at any time.
Another source told Daily NK that donpyo are troublesome to use since, once obtaining them, you need to exchange them again. He asked, “Who would want to use them when they are such a pain for both buyer and seller?”
The biggest public complaint is that consumers unilaterally take a loss when they use the donpyo because they cannot receive change.
Because the vouchers were issued in KPW 5,000 denominations only, people cannot receive change when purchasing items that cost less than KPW 5,000, or items not priced at multiples of KPW 5,000.
All in all, the public has apparently greeted the donpyo with little enthusiasm, complaining that they are inconvenient and that money is lost using them.
On the other hand, the fact that people’s unreceived change goes into the state’s pockets inevitably works in the favor of the North Korean state.
Given that the authorities gave the donpyo a thumbs up during the recent plenary meeting, attention now turns to whether lawmakers will discuss a budget for the vouchers during the Supreme People’s Assembly session scheduled for next month.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
12. Did Seoul Misidentify N.Korea's Latest Missile Launch Site?
The old adage: "the first report is always (or often) wrong."
Did Seoul Misidentify N.Korea's Latest Missile Launch Site?
January 19, 2022 09:48
The South Korean military failed to pinpoint the exact location of the launch site of ballistic missiles North Korea fired last week.
On Jan. 14, the Joint Chiefs of Staff here said that the North launched two short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea from "around Uiju," North Pyongan Province. But the Korea Defense and Security Forum on Tuesday said they were actually fired from Pihyon, about 20 km south of Uiju.
Determining the precise location of the launch site is the first step in the "kill-chain" defense to launch a preemptive strike on missile facilities in case there are signs of provocation. Unless the exact location is determined, the defense system is doomed.
"The North fired the missiles from behind a tunnel after carrying them on a train to dodge detection by South Korea and the U.S.," said Shin Jong-woo at the forum. "It must have been very difficult for the South Korean military to detect them in advance."
A missile is being fired in Pyongyang on Monday, in this grab from [North] Korean Central Television the following day.
In March last year, the JCS also failed to detect the North's launch of a missile with a range of 150 km. But this time, it failed to determine even the location of the site where they were launched.
But the JCS denied blundering. "We simply said 'around Uiju,' because it is better known to South Korean people than Pihyon," a spokesman claimed.
Meanwhile, the projectiles the North launched from Pyongyang on Monday were a version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile known as KN24.
North Korean state media said the launch aimed to "selectively evaluate tactical guided missile to check their accuracy," which suggests that it was a quality test of a missile selected randomly from many and that the regime has already deployed.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
13. Young Koreans Lose Interest in Chinese Studies
Young Koreans Lose Interest in Chinese Studies
January 19, 2022 08:43
A growing number of younger Koreans view China negatively as it becomes an assertive regional bully and exchanges between the two sides decline, although the world's most populous country is Korea's largest trade partner.
The sentiments are reflected in a straw poll the Chosun Ilbo conducted among 30 Seoul National University politics students and graduates. About 20 or two-thirds said they dislike China, while the rest said the country was "so-so" and none of them ticked they "favor" it. Also, 29 out of the 30 said they feel anti-China sentiment increasing among Koreans.
Chinese studies courses here are dwindling. There were just 14 graduate school students at SNU studying Chinese language and literature last year, halving since from 32 in 2017. In comparison, the number studying French language and literature remained at around nine to 12 over the same period, and for German language and literature it declined only from 18 to 14.
The sentiment seems to be shared among undergraduates. The number of students taking the beginner's Mandarin class dropped sharply at undergraduate school, according to an SNU official.
That trend is also seen in other surveys. A Hankook Research survey showed the interest in China among Koreans in their 20s halved from 34.2 points in October 2018 to 17.8 points last year. Over the same period, the level of interest in China among those in their 40s also fell from 42.5 to 27.2 points and dropped from 39.1 to 30.7 points 50-somethings.
Lee Dong-han at Hankook Research said, "Interest in China has declined steadily due to a number of issues and the younger generation are particularly sensitive. In particular they seem to be more critical of the current administration's pro-China stance."
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
14. Koreans see China rising, but much prefer Uncle Sam
For the Global Engagement Center (GEC): Can you derive some themes and messages from this? For both Chinese and Korean target audiences?
Wednesday
January 19, 2022
Koreans see China rising, but much prefer Uncle Sam
Koreans invoke the saying, "In a fight between whales, a shrimp's back gets broken," to describe the country's historical position between competing powers in East Asia.
A recent survey illustrates popular awareness of this vulnerability, with most Koreans expressing a preference for cooperation with the United States in almost all fields — but admitting the possibility that neighboring China could overtake Korea's longtime ally as the dominant power in East Asia.
According to an opinion survey conducted by the Asia Research Institute at Seoul National University at the request of the JoongAng Ilbo, 67.8 percent of respondents chose the United States when asked which country they support in the growing U.S.-China rivalry. A mere 4.4 percent said they supported China.
However, only 53.7 percent of respondents said they believed the United States would come out on top when asked who would prevail in the competition between the two countries, while 11.5 percent said that China could triumph.
The differing responses to the two questions signaled awareness among Koreans that China is a force to reckon with — and one that could possibly eclipse the United States, which Korea has long relied on for security guarantees.
The survey polled 1,031 individuals over the age of 18 and had a confidence interval of 95 percent, with a 3.1 percent margin of error.
Even more striking was the respondents' opinions regarding the future of the power balance in East Asia, a region that was part of the Chinese-led geopolitical order and cultural sphere before the 20th century, the latter half of which witnessed the United States becoming the security guarantor of not only Korea, but also Japan and self-governing Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province.
Almost 59.9 percent of individuals polled said they believed there was a possibility that China could become the dominant power in East Asia — almost twice the 31.8 percent who said they did not believe such a power shift away from the United States would happen.
However, when asked what they thought of China's possible rise to regional dominance, an overwhelming 78.5 percent of respondents said they did not see such a change in a positive light.
The United States also led China in every field as Koreans' preferred choice of partner for cooperation.
Almost all respondents — 98.6 percent — said they preferred to work with the United States in dealing with Covid-19, reflecting widespread faith in the U.S.-developed Pfizer and Moderna vaccines.
The United States was also seen as a more trustworthy partner by 95.8 percent of respondents in the realm of human rights, an area where the country has locked heads with China over multiple issues, such as Hong Kong and the treatment of the ethnic Uighur minority.
Even though China leads the United States as the top market for Korean exports, two-thirds of respondents said they preferred to cooperate with the latter in trade, reflecting long-lasting bitterness over Beijing's response to the deployment of a U.S. missile shield on the peninsula, which included a ban on Chinese tourist groups to Korea and restrictions on Korean companies operating in China.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
15. Growing China risk (to South Korea)
South Korea remains vulnerable to Chinese economic warfare.
Growing China risk
Korea needs to diversify export markets
South Korea is likely to bear the brunt of China's expected economic slowdown this year, raising the need to reduce its undue dependence on the world's second-largest economy. The question now is how to minimize the fallout from the growing China risk.
The Chinese economy expanded 8.1 percent year-on-year in 2021, which was ostensibly a solid rate of growth. But it has begun to lose steam. Its growth rate plunged to 4 percent in the fourth quarter of last year, after reaching 4.9 percent in the third quarter, 7.9 percent in the second quarter and 18.3 percent in the first quarter.
Such a downward trend is predicted to continue this year. China faces negative factors, such as possible defaults by real estate developers, rising prices of crude oil and other raw materials, trade friction with the U.S., and prolonged global supply chain bottlenecks amid the resurgent COVID-19 pandemic.
Under these circumstances, China finds it difficult to enjoy growth of more than 5 percent this year. The Chinese government is going all out to revive its growth engine. On Monday, the People's Bank of China cut its interest rate for medium-term loans to commercial banks to the lowest level since early 2020 following the outbreak of the pandemic. However, it is unclear whether the country can boost the slumping economy.
The bleak outlook for China could have a devastating impact on the global economy. South Korea could be more vulnerable to China's economic weakness than other countries in the world. Korea's exports to China, its largest trading partner, accounted for 24.6 percent of its total overseas shipments in 2020. Thus, the potential economic woes stemming from China loom large.
The Hyundai Research Institute said that South Korea's growth rate will shrink by 0.5 percentage points if that of China falls by 1 percent. This demonstrates how heavily our economy has depended on China. We have 1,850 materials and products with more than 80 percent of their imports coming from China. Major South Korean industrial sectors such as semiconductors, petrochemicals, steel and machinery are likely to be hit hard by China's economic slowdown. The Korean currency could also lose its value further against the U.S. dollar if the Chinese economy remains stagnant.
The government and businesses should work out detailed measures to reduce the excessive reliance on China. Such measures are all the more necessary as South Korea is facing dangers of falling victim to the escalating Sino-U.S. competition. Korea must also diversity its import sources of raw materials and parts, while exploring new export markets around the world.
It is equally important to minimize the impact of the U.S. Federal Reserve's move to end its asset purchase program and raise its key interest rate as early as March. At stake is how to ensure financial stability and economic recovery in the face of downside risks deriving from the G2 countries.
16. Will South Korea Join the US Effort to Insulate Supply Chains From China?
Mutually beneficial strategic interests.
Will South Korea Join the US Effort to Insulate Supply Chains From China?
Pressure from Washington to align with the U.S. decoupling effort is growing, but it’s a tall order for South Korea.
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According to the U.S. State Department, Jose Fernandez, U.S. undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment, called on South Korea to play a greater role in building “resilient” semiconductor supply chains in late December 2021, when he traveled to Seoul to participate in the sixth Senior Economic Dialogue (SED) between South Korea and the United States.
Fernandez’s call came at a time when Washington has been trying to address global supply chain disruptions and chip shortages amid increasingly tough strategic competition with China, especially in the high-technology industries. Shortly before the sixth SED, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai also visited Seoul, Tokyo, and New Delhi to discuss supply chain and trade issues.
With its global leadership in semiconductor R&D, manufacturing technology, and global market share, South Korea certainly may play a very important role in the Biden administration’s ambitious global supply chain restructuring plan. In fact, South Korea is probably the only single country that can cooperate with the U.S. in three of the four vulnerable areas identified by Biden’s supply chain report released in June 2021: semiconductors, large-capacity batteries, and pharmaceuticals with active pharmaceutical ingredients, whereas China plays a leading role in the other one, critical minerals and materials.
The changing trend in the themes discussed at the SED also shows the importance of South Korea as a key ally in U.S. global policies and Washington’s competition with China, particularly in the context of the recent global supply chain disruptions.
Starting in November 2015, the first SED focused on “new frontiers” like health security, the North Pole, and the oceans. The “China issue” particularly emerged during the second SED in 2017, when South Korean delegates asked for cooperation in preventing the negative impacts of increasing China-U.S. trade conflict from reaching South Korea. Then U.S. delegates asked Seoul to take a more active role in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy in the third SED (in October 2018) and reaffirmed such issues during the fourth SED, which was held in November 2019. South Korea’s participation in global issues like fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and economic recovery was part of the key issues raised during the fifth SED talk (October 2020). Most recently, as already mentioned, the U.S. delegates asked South Korea to play an important role in building “resilient semiconductor supply chains” during the sixth SED, which was held in Seoul in December 2021.
The above storyline seems to suggest that, at least in terms of critical bilateral economic issues, Washington’s policy intentions and aims are becoming increasingly clear and detailed, especially with a clear focus on the supply chain realignment in the latest round of SED talk.
Over the years, South Koreans have always described their country’s geopolitical environment as a “tiny crevice” among great powers, especially between the U.S. and China. However, as the China-U.S. rivalry – or, more specifically, “strategic competition” as proclaimed by U.S. President Joe Biden – enters a new phase, heading toward a technological and financial decoupling, could there be new signs or maybe even a turnaround in South Korea’s strategic choice? Washington keeps pushing many countries to follow the United States’ policy lead out of the need to compete with and decouple from China, while Beijing has responded with its “dual circulation” plan, which emphasizes building up domestic demand.
These developments have been viewed with alarm in South Korea, where officials continuously stress the critical roles of both China – in economics – and the U.S. – in security – for their country.
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“Most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have relied on the U.S. for security and had no choice but to stay close to China, which has shown through 20 years of dramatic economic growth. Globally, around 50 countries have the U.S. as their largest trading partner while about 100 countries have China as theirs,” Yeo Han-koo, South Korea’s trade minister, told The Korea Times on January 6.
“So not only Korea, but also other nations are feeling the same way. I think we are now in the process of figuring out a model of coexistence and sustainability between the superpowers.”
A public petition was listed on the official website of the Blue House in early 2021 asking the South Korean government to stop allowing investments from Chinese capital in South Korea’s semiconductor industry to prevent possible leakage of advanced technologies. Over 30,000 South Koreans signed the petition.
For multiple reasons, South Koreans’ attitude toward China has been worsening in recent years. But as a policy brief released by the Center for American Progress in December 2021 claims, “the country’s economic dependence on China creates risk when it comes to translating negative sentiment into policy action.”
This is especially true when it comes to South Korea’s semiconductor industry. According to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), China accounted for over 40 percent of South Korea’s semiconductor exports as of October 2021. Nonetheless, the heavy reliance on the Chinese market has forced the South Korean government to consider a new market development strategy, something like Japan’s “China+1” market initiative, which has Japan staying in the Chinese market while actively developing other markets as well.
Apparently, the ASEAN market, which plays an increasingly important role in global supply chains, especially with respect to intermediate products, is a key direction for both Japan and South Korea. Economic and people-to-people ties with ASEAN countries have been repeatedly highlighted in the Moon Jae-in administration’s “New Southern Policy.” ASEAN countries will remain an important pivot point for South Korea’s southern and global diplomacy, regardless of which party wins the presidential election in March 2022.
However, while Seoul and Tokyo share some concerns and even have adopted some common strategies, the possibility of in-depth cooperation between Japan and South Korea in line with the U.S. supply chain realignment targeting China remains low, at least in the short term. Political, historical, and territorial disputes continue to prevent Japan and South Korea from engaging in more comprehensive or deeper cooperation. In fact, we have seen the exact opposite occur: In 2019, the Japanese government imposed restrictions on specific technology exports to South Korea, after tensions over historical issues between Seoul and Tokyo significantly escalated.
Meanwhile, as Dr. Rajiv Kumar of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies has noted, India has been “striving to emerge as a supply chain hub for key industries by ending China’s control.” In a paper published in the Journal of Indian and Asian Studies in July 2021, Kumar found that both India and South Korea have assessed the safety of the current China-centric supply chains, especially against the background of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Pointing to the increase of South Korean investment in India, Kumar suggests that cooperation between India and South Korea in the realignment of current supply chains may effectively cope with China’s influence, which subsequently may help to build a new “India-centric supply chain.” Whether it is feasible or not in the short term, his point is well worth thinking about.
At a time when a China-U.S. decoupling seems to be inevitable, and Washington is pushing Seoul to play a more active, reliable, and resilient role in global supply chain realignment, should South Korea cooperate with the U.S. on all fronts, such as working with Washington to build a “de-Sinicized” regional and global supply chain centered on Japan, India, and ASEAN countries?
This will be a long-term game, and the Americans seem to have decided to play it hard, even when it comes to pressuring U.S. allies. The United States has not only requested South Korea’s semiconductor manufacturers provide internal information on exports to the Chinese market but also pressured a South Korean company to halt shipments of advanced machinery to its semiconductor plant in China.
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As U.S. pressure increases, is there no longer a “middle way” between the world’s two leading economies for South Korea to follow? Some South Korean analysts are coming to that conclusion. Choi Jin-baek of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security warned in an April 2021 analysis:
…the pace of the U.S.-China decoupling could accelerate in the coming years. This will disrupt Korea’s close economic relationship with China that Seoul was able to maintain when the level of economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing remained high. Hence, Beijing’s push for ‘dual circulation’ indicates that Korea’s strategy of ‘strengthening alliance with the U.S. while deepening economic cooperation with China’ is no longer a viable option.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
