Quotes of the Day:
“Some men are friends with the whole world in their hearts, and there are others that hate themselves and spread their hatred around like butter on hot bread.”
-John Steinbeck
"I think of it often and imagine the scene clearly. Even if they come to kill me, I will tell them what they are trying to do is wrong, that education is our basic right."
- Malala Yousafzai
"Our conclusion is that our foreign policy makers are experienced in conventional diplomacy, in global conflicts, and in other aspects of the international relations picture, but they have little skill in the arts of communicating with the political leadership of other countries on the people-to-people level. They are not only inexperienced in propaganda and political warfare, they are hostile to it. They prefer to ignore the fact that the propaganda and political warfare has been largely responsible for the communist expansion ever since the end of World War Two. C.D. Jackson of Time magazine says:
One of the reasons why the Eastern European satellite countries have become the forgotten theater of the Cold War is that the West's diplomats have won out over the psychological warriors. There is a great difference between political warfare and diplomacy although they both pursue the same ends, they are different sides of the street."
- Henry Mayers on Wednesday, 19 February, 1964, before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in support of the Freedom Academy
1. Blinken arrives in Ukraine, says Russia could attack at short notice
2. Defining the Biden Doctrine
3. China warns foreign Olympic athletes against speaking out on politics at Winter Games
4. Former army general on how the U.S. could back a Ukranian insurgency against Russia
5. Washington and the West must regain the initiative with China and Russia
6. As a former US intelligence officer, I see a red flag in the CIA’s latest anti-Russia playbook
7. US special operations presses on in Ukraine amid threat of Russian invasion
8. Opinion | The Marines are establishing a beachhead for needed change at the Pentagon
9. U.S. lawmakers call for U.N. Uyghur rights report before China's Olympics
10. Inside the secretive training that US Green Berets give to troops who may have to take on Russia or China
11. US Special Forces Have a Secret Weapon Everyone Forgets About
12. Why USSOCOM should develop an Arctic Strategy
13. All the president’s enemies
14. What's Plan B? -- The Small, The Agile, and The Many
15. Don’t Bury Alberto Nisman Again
16. 'Warmer' peace with Israel offers Jordan better economic dividends
17. No, Robin Sage is not the conspiracy theory that some people want it to be
18. US Signaling Putin that Ukraine Will Be Bloody
19. The Pentagon’s new cybersecurity model is better, but still an incremental solution to a big challenge
20. No Troops Needed: How America Can Punish Russia for a Ukraine Invasion
21. Inside the secretive training that US Green Berets give to troops who may have to take on Russia or China
22. China’s Lending Comes Under Fire as Sri Lankan Debt Crisis Deepens
23. China Detains Prominent Activists as Olympics Near, Citing State Security
24. EDITORIAL: Propaganda from China is no joke
1. Blinken arrives in Ukraine, says Russia could attack at short notice
Blinken arrives in Ukraine, says Russia could attack at short notice
1/6
Secretary of State of U.S. Antony Blinken speaks as he greets embassy staff at the U.S. embassy, in Kyiv, Ukraine, January 19, 2022. Alex Brandon/Pool via REUTERS
- Summary
- Russia has massed troops near Ukraine's borders
- Moscow also plans joint military drills in Belarus
- Blinken visits Ukraine, will go on to Berlin and Geneva
KYIV, Jan 19 (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Kyiv on Wednesday in a whistle-stop diplomatic push to defuse tensions with Moscow over Ukraine, warning that Russia could launch a new attack at "very short notice".
Blinken will meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and then travel to Berlin for talks with allies before going to Geneva to meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after negotiations last week produced no breakthrough.
Russia has massed tens of thousands of troops near Ukraine's borders in what Kyiv and its allies fear could be preparation for a new military offensive against Ukraine.
Adding to the jitters, Russia moved additional troops into Belarus this week ahead of what Minsk said were planned joint exercises next month. Moscow denies plans to launch an attack but has pressed Washington for security guarantees, including a block on Ukraine joining the NATO alliance.
Speaking to diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Kyiv, Blinken said he strongly hopes that Russia can stick to a diplomatic and peaceful path when he meets Lavrov, and warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin could give the order to attack at short notice.
"As you all know very, very well, we have been engaged in the past couple of months in an intense focus on Ukraine because of the significant buildup we've seen of Russian forces we’ve seen near the Ukrainian border," Blinken said.
The Russian buildup, he said, was taking place with "no provocation, no reason."
"We know that there are plans in place to increase that force even more on very short notice, and that gives President Putin the capacity, also on very short notice, to take further aggressive action against Ukraine," Blinken said.
Russia's actions had attracted the attention of Washington, and also of its allies in Europe and beyond, he said.
U.S. President Joe Biden's administration last month approved the provision of an additional $200 million in defensive security assistance to Ukraine and gave more such aid last year than at any point since Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE
State Department spokesman Ned Price said Blinken's visit was "to reiterate our support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity". Washington has warned Russia of severe consequences if it mounts a new offensive, while promising to beef up its security presence in Europe.
"Should Russia further invade Ukraine, we will provide additional defensive material to the Ukrainians above and beyond that which we are already in the process of providing," a State Department official said ahead of Blinken's arrival.
Blinken will meet Zelenskiy and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on Wednesday.
Then in Berlin he will meet German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and later the Transatlantic Quad, referring to a format that involves the United States, Britain, France and Germany.
Germany signalled on Tuesday that it could halt the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia if Moscow invades Ukraine.
Blinken spoke with Lavrov on Tuesday and the two decided in the call that it would be useful to meet in person.
Lavrov separately said Moscow would welcome U.S. diplomatic efforts and reiterated Russian accusations that Ukraine was "sabotaging" agreements aimed at ending the conflict between Ukrainian troops and Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine.
Despite diplomatic engagements this month, Washington has yet to see Russia de-escalate tensions and Moscow could launch an attack on Ukraine at any time in January or February, a senior U.S. official said earlier.
"We are now at a stage where Russia could at any point launch an attack on Ukraine," the official said
Kyiv has sought weapons from Western nations to shore up its defence. On Monday, Britain said it had begun supplying Ukraine with anti-tank weapons to help it defend itself. read more
Writing by Matthias Williams
2. Defining the Biden Doctrine
Interview with NSA Jake Sullivan.
Defining the Biden Doctrine
U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan sat down with FP to talk about Russia, China, relations with Europe, and year one of the Biden presidency.
By Amy Mackinnon, a national security and intelligence reporter at Foreign Policy.
In his first major foreign-policy speech as U.S. president, Joe Biden declared to the world that America was back. The international sigh of relief was almost audible amid hopes that former President Donald Trump’s disruptive style was a relic. Biden has pursued an ambitious agenda to repair alliances and forge new ones, curb corruption, arrest democratic backsliding, and tackle climate change, all while managing the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, Russian threats to Ukraine, and escalating tensions with China.
It hasn’t all been plain sailing. The decision to withdraw remaining U.S. troops from Afghanistan precipitated the collapse of the country’s government and chaos in Kabul as hundreds of thousands of people fled the Taliban. Plans to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia, at the expense of Canberra’s submarine deal with Paris, soured trans-Atlantic relations.
Ahead of the anniversary of Biden’s inauguration, Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon spoke with one of the central architects of his foreign policy, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, about America’s moral responsibility to the Afghan people, the role of trade in confronting China, and what really makes up the Biden Doctrine. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Foreign Policy: I want to start with the immediate crisis of the Russian buildup near the border with Ukraine. Last week, we saw this very intensive round of diplomacy in Europe. But Moscow, at least publicly, is showing little sign of backing down. What’s your view? Have the talks changed the calculus for Moscow? What offramps are you looking for to avoid war?
Jake Sullivan: Well, I’ll let Moscow speak for itself. I can only speak for the United States. And for the United States, we’re ready either way. We’re ready if Russia wants to move forward with diplomacy, and we put some ideas and proposals on the table for their consideration, and we’re prepared to continue discussions about those. But if Russia wants to go down the path of invasion and escalation, we’re ready for that too, with a robust response in coordination with our allies and partners. We have gotten ourselves prepared for further diplomacy, even as we are prepared to respond to Russian aggression. And in that way, we’ll give ourselves the best chance to protect our interests and the interests of our allies and partners. From my perspective, there is scope for meaningful progress through diplomacy on critical issues of European security that deserve detailed treatment, and that the U.S. and Russia and NATO and the EU and other partners in Europe can all sit down together and work through, and come to understandings on. But Moscow will have to make its own determinations in that regard.
FP: The buildup has exposed this long-standing tension about NATO’s expansion. The alliance has an open-door policy, but the reality is that nobody expects Ukraine or Georgia to be admitted anytime soon. There’s lots of media chatter that the alliance needs to be more frank about this, as a potential compromise to address Moscow’s concerns. To what extent has Russia already succeeded in reframing the conversation about European security and NATO expansion?
JS: I think the key point here is that the prospect of Russia invading Ukraine—further invading Ukraine—is not really about NATO or about something Jim Baker said or Mikhail Gorbachev said. It’s about much more fundamental questions. Does Ukraine have a right to exist as a sovereign, independent state? The U.N. Charter says yes. International law says yes. We all should, with one voice as an international community, say yes. Does Ukraine have a right to be a democracy? Again, the U.N. Charter says yes, international law says yes. And we should all say with one voice as an international community that the answer is yes. And so, from my perspective, it’s incumbent on all of us who are engaged in this to lift the conversation up to these core fundamental principles, which is what this is really about.
Now, on the question of NATO and European security, as far as I’m concerned, the allies, the 30 allies, spoke with one voice in Brussels last week on these issues. There is no dissent on the principle. What you saw in the meeting in Brussels was rock-solid unity across the alliance. And I think that will be sustained in the days and weeks ahead.
FP: In the first few months of the administration, the phrase we heard most often was this desire to establish a “stable and predictable relationship” with Moscow. And some analysts feel the administration maybe pulled its punches a little bit on sanctions over the poisoning of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, on Nord Stream 2. Looking at it in hindsight, was that the right approach? Would Russia be pushing as hard to redraw European security if there’d been a tougher line taken in the earlier days?
JS: There is a kind of funny quality to the analysis of causation with respect to Russia’s actions. You’ve got one group of people saying it’s because the U.S., the West, NATO pushed too hard, gave too many weapons, pressured Russia too much, got too much up in their grill, and that’s why Russia is acting the way it is. Then you’ve got another school that says it’s because the U.S., the West, NATO weren’t tough enough, didn’t impose enough sanctions, didn’t take enough steps. You can make both those cases. What we have tried to do is be very clear about the types of actions that we would respond to and how we would respond and then follow through on those things.
And so when we came into office, President Biden called President Putin and said, “I’m going to look at the SolarWinds question. I’m going to look at the issue of the use of chemical weapons against Navalny, and I’m going to look at election interference in the 2020 election. And if I determine that Russia was responsible for these things in ways that cross our lines, we will respond with economic sanctions.” And that’s precisely what we did, in a vigorous way. And not just sanctioning individuals or entities, but sanctioning sovereign debt, for example.
Then the president said that ransomware against critical infrastructure in the United States is not merely a criminal act. It threatens our national security and strategic stability. And if it continues, we will respond. And we believe that these past few months we have seen, from the point of view of high-profile ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure, a reduction in that activity. And just recently, in the last few days, we commend the Russian government, actually, for picking up a number of criminals associated with ransomware attacks against the United States.
FP: The former U.S. commander in the Indo-Pacific, retired Adm. Philip Davidson, said that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could come within the next six years. Do you agree with that assessment? And should or would the United States offer military support to Taiwan in the event of an attack by China?
JS: It’s the fundamental object of our policy toward cross-strait relations, to ensure that that never happens. That is what we are intent on doing through a combination of deterrence and diplomacy, through upholding the bipartisan tradition of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, the “One China” policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiques, the six assurances. But fundamentally, it’s our job to use all of the instruments at our disposal to ensure that military action against Taiwan, or a unilateral change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, does not, in fact, occur.
FP: A central plank to the competition with China is trade and economic engagement. On the other hand, you have delineated what you’ve described as a “foreign policy for the middle class” to protect jobs and businesses here in America. Are those ideas not in conflict with each other?
JS: I don’t believe they are in conflict, in three important respects. First, the idea of a foreign policy for the middle class is fundamentally about investing in the sources of strength at home, in our workforce and our infrastructure and our innovation and competitiveness. And when we do that, we not only create a stronger American middle class, but we put ourselves in a position to compete over the long term more effectively with China. And that is exactly what President Biden has been doing over the course of his first year. And if you look at prospects for the American economy, versus prospects for the Chinese economy, coming out of COVID, we believe we are well positioned.
Second, President Biden made clear throughout his career, including during the presidential campaign, including in office, that he believes that trading with the rest of the world is a good and important thing, and there’s nothing inconsistent with that and protecting American jobs. American workers, given the right investments and with a fair and level playing field, can outcompete anyone, anywhere. Now he’s also said the important thing was to make those investments first, before doing new-market-opening trade deals.
But he is pursuing an international economic policy focused on things that help reinforce American economic leadership, like the global minimum tax, like the G-7 infrastructure initiative, Build Back Better World. And I think you will see over the course of this year, with Secretary [of Commerce Gina] Raimondo, with Ambassador [Katherine] Tai, with other key figures on our economic team, a deeper and more intensive economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
FP: Biden has spoken at length about how he sees the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism as a defining challenge of our era. How do you, in concrete terms, support the advance of democracy around the world when countries such as China and Russia are willing to use economic coercion, or in Kazakhstan, boots on the ground, to influence states? How do you compete with that kind of clout?
JS: There’s not a single answer to that question. It has to be an entire toolbox that includes economic support for countries that are facing the type of coercion that the People’s Republic of China has imposed on other countries. There have to be efforts made to tackle the root of the rot in some emerging democratic societies that is corruption, and we have to put a whole bunch of tools in place to reduce corruption globally. There is the work that we can do to lift up independent media and independent voices, and one of the things that came out of the Summit for Democracy was an initiative to do precisely that.
There are steps that we can take in terms of making sure that it is democracies who are writing the rules of the road for trade and technology going forward, so that the technologies that will shape our future are more rights-respecting and less subject to authoritarian control and domination. It’s a comprehensive agenda, and you saw every element of it at play in the Summit for Democracy, which brought together more than 100 governments, as well as private sector leaders, civil society, activists. And across this whole range of effort, the United States is going to work to reinforce the strength of democracies and make sure that we show that democracy, rather than autocracy, is the form of government best suited for the challenges of our time.
FP: I want to turn now to another central focus of this past year, which is the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Looking ahead, with 97 percent of Afghans at risk of falling below the poverty line, how are you now thinking about U.S. sanctions on the Taliban? After two decades of war, what responsibility does the United States have to the Afghan people?
JS: We have a genuine responsibility to provide humanitarian relief to the Afghan people to try to alleviate suffering and enhance the prospects for a stable country that can deliver basic needs for its people and opportunity for its people. And we are the largest donor to the people of Afghanistan. We just, in the last few days, announced another tranche of funding to the tune of $300 million. We are working closely with the United Nations, the World Food Program, NGOs like the International Rescue Committee to try to flow as many resources as we possibly can to deal with the humanitarian situation there. We do not believe that simply writing blank checks to the Taliban, when they are not taking the kinds of measures for an inclusive government and a rights-respecting government, is consistent with the long-term best interests of the people of Afghanistan. We do believe that getting funds into the hands of independent entities and actors who can convert that into meaningful supplies in terms of food, medicine, and other basic necessities is a profound responsibility for the United States and the entire international community, and we will step up to do our part.
FP: I take your point on humanitarian aid, but surely that’s not a substitute for a functioning economy. What needs to be done? What do you want to see from the Taliban in order to take steps to start lifting sanctions?
JS: Well, we have been engaging with the Taliban diplomatically and laid out for them, not as public ultimatums but, as I said, a private request, coordinated with other allies and partners, the kinds of steps that we think that they should take. And I’m not going to go into detail here, because I don’t want to negotiate in public. But the broad parameters are well known. It’s about human rights. It’s about allowing Afghan allies of the United States and other countries to continue to have safe passage out of the country. It’s about treating women and girls with respect and equality. It’s about the core fundamental commitment to not let Afghanistan be used as a base for terrorism against any other country or people, so these are some of the areas that we’re discussing with them, and we believe it’s imperative that we see progress in these areas.
FP: I’d like to zoom out and take a 30,000-foot view on what many commentators would term the “Biden Doctrine.” What do you see as being the throughline between all of the major foreign-policy initiatives that the administration has undertaken so far? What are the ideas or ambitions that underpin this administration’s foreign policy?
JS: I would say that there are two very simple ideas that underpin both how this administration approaches geopolitical competition and how we approach the great transnational challenges of our time: climate and COVID, nuclear proliferation, economic equality, and more. First, deep investments in allies and partners so that we are addressing all of these challenges, leveraging the strength of friends, as well as our own strength.
And second, the proposition that American power in the world is fundamentally rooted in American strength at home, and the link between foreign policy and domestic policy is a tight link. And it matters profoundly to the lives of the American people, whether it’s things like the global minimum tax or managing the supply chain crisis or dealing with climate or dealing with Chinese economic coercion. The connection between domestic and foreign policy is one that needs to be attended to rigorously, persistently. Those two basic propositions underpin the president’s overall premise that we are in a decisive decade when it comes to democracy proving that it is the form of government best suited to delivering for its citizens and for delivering against the great challenges of our time in a way that improves the lives of people.
FP: You mentioned the importance of allies and partners. There was great anticipation in Europe following Biden’s election. But this year has had its ups and downs with Europe, with tensions over the Afghan withdrawal and over the AUKUS submarine deal. How would you characterize the state of the trans-Atlantic relationship now, almost a year into the Biden presidency?
JS: Well, I would say my characterization of it is probably less relevant than what you’re actually seeing with your own eyes when you look at the allies, the 30 allies of NATO, speaking with one voice in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. The tight coordination between the U.S. and the European Union coming into and out of the G-20 last year, on steel and aluminum tariffs, on the global methane pledge, on the global climate summit, on the Trade and Technology Council. It has been, I think, an exceptionally powerful few months of coordination and cooperation across the Atlantic.
And I acknowledge that it followed a period where many European leaders raised concerns about the level and nature of consultation and coordination in the early months of last year. But having come through that period, we have, I think, achieved a level of strength and confidence in the trans-Atlantic partnership that is actually really quite remarkable. And I think if you went to European interlocutors today, you would hear a very different story than you may have heard, you know, six, eight months ago. And that’s a testament to, I think, a really powerful thing, which is listening. We listened to our partners and allies. We heard what they had to say. We responded, and I think the results now speak for themselves.
3. China warns foreign Olympic athletes against speaking out on politics at Winter Games
Do we need any more confirmation that CHina is a "rule by law" country?
Excerpt:
“Any expression that is in line with the Olympic spirit I’m sure will be protected," Yang Shu, deputy director general of international relations for the Beijing Organizing Committee, said in a news conference Tuesday. “Any behavior or speech that is against the Olympic spirit, especially against the Chinese laws and regulations, are also subject to certain punishment.”
China warns foreign Olympic athletes against speaking out on politics at Winter Games
A member of China’s Olympics organizing committee warned that foreign athletes may face punishment for speech that violates Chinese law at the 2022 Winter Games, spotlighting concerns about the country’s restrictions on political expression.
“Any expression that is in line with the Olympic spirit I’m sure will be protected," Yang Shu, deputy director general of international relations for the Beijing Organizing Committee, said in a news conference Tuesday. “Any behavior or speech that is against the Olympic spirit, especially against the Chinese laws and regulations, are also subject to certain punishment.”
In broad strokes, China’s stance falls in line with the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) established rule against political protest at the Games. The IOC also announced before last year’s Summer Games in Tokyo that athletes who staged protests there would be punished, ignoring U.S. calls to allow respectful protest for human rights issues.
But China’s formulation of its rule appeared to be a shade stricter than the IOC’s, raising questions about how Beijing plans to interpret and enforce it. Rule 50 of the IOC charter forbids “demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda” at Olympic venues. Yang said Tuesday that “speech” could be subject to punishment and cited Chinese law, which is far more restrictive than many countries'.
Beijing’s warning came amid discussion in the West over expected political restrictions and surveillance at the Games, which will take place next month. Speakers at a seminar hosted by Human Rights Watch on Tuesday said they were advising athletes against criticizing China’s human rights record while in Beijing for their own safety, according to Reuters.
In China, critics of the government have routinely been sentenced to prison for staging political protests, or for comments they made on social media. While it’s unlikely Beijing would risk international ire to severely punish an athlete at the Olympics for speech, Yang declined to answer on Tuesday what the maximum punishment could be for political demonstration at the Games.
China’s human rights record has come under heavy scrutiny ahead of the Olympics, with the United States and several other countries announcing a diplomatic boycott of the event as a statement against China’s “ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.”
Athletes’ freedom of speech in China has also become a flash point, after Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai made explosive allegations against China’s former vice premier Zhang Gaoli in November, saying he coerced her into sex. Peng disappeared from public view, prompting international expressions of concern for her safety.
The Canadian cybersecurity research group Citizen Lab reported Tuesday that the health-tracking smartphone app that Olympics attendees are required to download has security flaws that made users’ personal data vulnerable. The app’s code included a list of political keywords and a feature that allows users to report “politically sensitive" content, Citizen Lab’s report said.
A representative of the Beijing Organizing Committee said at Tuesday’s news conference they were not aware of the political keyword list and would look into the matter. The official said they were working to patch any security vulnerabilities in the app.
China’s Foreign Ministry also fielded questions on Tuesday about reports that the United States and other countries have advised athletes to take “burner phones” to Beijing to avoid surveillance. Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian dismissed the concerns, saying those countries “who are guilty of the charge themselves are accusing the innocent party without any evidence.”
Beijing announced on Monday it was canceling public ticket sales to the Games, as the city recorded its first case of the highly contagious omicron variant of the coronavirus. Jing Quan, an official at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said at Tuesday’s news conference that only a few direct flights will remain between the United States and China next week, with others canceled because of coronavirus cases among passengers.
Yang said “dedicated departments” will evaluate punishment for athletes who violate the IOC political protest ban.
“I think for the athletes to participate in the Olympic Games, they should follow the spirit and requirements provided by the Olympic Charter,” he said. “The politicization of sports is one of the things opposed by the Olympic Charter.”
4. Former army general on how the U.S. could back a Ukranian insurgency against Russia
Former army general on how the U.S. could back a Ukranian insurgency against Russia
NPR · by Mary Louise Kelly · January 18, 2022
NPR's Mary Louise Kelly talks with Peter Zwack, former U.S. Army Brigadier General and global fellow at the Wilson Center, about the possibility of the U.S. arming Ukraine in an insurgency.
MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:
If - and it is still an if - Russia does soon attack Ukraine, how hard could Ukraine fight back? That is a question that involves the U.S., which has no boots on the ground but which has been helping to arm Ukraine, everything from ammunition to anti-tank javelin missiles. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators who visited Ukraine this week is promising more on that front. Here's Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut, briefing reporters after talks in Kyiv and delivering a warning to Vladimir Putin.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL: We will impose crippling economic sanctions. But more important, we will give the people of Ukraine the arms - lethal arms - they need to defend their lives and livelihoods.
KELLY: I want to bring in retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Peter Zwack. He served as U.S. defense attache to Russia. General, welcome back to ALL THINGS CONSIDERED.
PETER ZWACK: Thank you for having me, Mary Louise.
KELLY: When we hear the senator there talking about giving the people of Ukraine lethal arms, what's he talking about? What's on the table?
ZWACK: Well, I think that we're talking about trying to take the edge or deter a Russian mostly conventional ground offensive. And for that, the Ukrainians would need more javelin anti-tank missiles and - that are very, very effective and that will knock out, if you will, attacking tanks and armored vehicles. And they need Stingers. They need to be able to knock down, threaten Russian air support. One reason...
KELLY: Stingers, we should mention, this is another type of missile.
ZWACK: Yes, a Stinger missile. And the Russians were not able in 2014 - when I was in Russia at the time when their first invasion - to fly their red star jets over Ukraine because they weren't officially there. If they come, they're all going to come. And that first fight on the ground is going to be very, very important.
KELLY: But you've just touched on what I suppose is the central question here. You have a Russian military that is vastly bigger, better resourced than Ukraine's. No matter what arms the U.S. might send, would it be enough to change the outcome here?
ZWACK: Well, there are two outcomes here. It will be costly. Ukrainians are going to fight. Their modern military and their sense of who they are were really, really born in the battles of 2014 and 2015.
KELLY: It sounds like what you're saying is, yes, Russia's military is more powerful. Yes, they could go all in and they might win. But arming Ukraine makes - perhaps changes the calculus as to whether that's a good idea and would make it a much higher price that Russia would have to pay in terms of pictures running on - what? - domestic TV of Russian soldiers coming home in body bags.
ZWACK: Right. And it isn't just when we talk about U.S. when I think the real Russian underestimate or miscalculations is the fact that we are pretty lockstep with Europe, with NATO and the European Union and including neutrals. And the Russians, I think, are at the edge of a precipice. They know they can probably get initial advantage, but it gets harder and harder and harder.
The other challenge I think the Russians have is they've kind of boxed themselves into a diplomatic cul-de-sac. And they have to find a way to extract themselves from this situation or they double down with all the risks that go with that.
KELLY: As you know, the U.S. has a long history of funneling arms overseas to intervene in conflicts where the U.S. does not have boots on the ground and with results that aren't always what the U.S. intended. Are there past - lessons from the past that might be instructive here?
ZWACK: Well, I think that the first point is this is Eastern Europe. This is really part of, if you will, the overall aggregate of which we in Europe believe in the trans-Atlantic. Ideally, the successful negotiation between Russia and Ukraine to figure out a way is through Kyiv and Moscow. It's proven it's not possible. And that's why we are and European allies are involved in all of this.
What's the alternative? Do we just let them get invaded or do we make the cost so high on the ground-level military but also the diplomatic and the economic? And you mentioned that in the past. This is a huge, consequential decision for Russia. Russia is huge but, in the end, not that big when you get into their military and the issues that they have to deal with internally. So they have to be very careful or this blows back on them in a really, really bad way. So, yes, the Ukrainians deserve to have defensible lethal weapons.
KELLY: Just to make this a little bit personal, I mentioned you used to serve as America's defense attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, including in 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea. What feels the same? What feels different to you about this current situation?
ZWACK: We - during the early phases, certainly with Crimea and early Donbas, eastern Ukraine, there was a lot of fog of war. And before that, I'd call fog of peace. We just didn't know exactly what was going on. We were getting reports and strange guys in uniform and disinformation is flying.
The Russians have been utterly unambiguous about this. They have basically paraded over 100,000 troops, and that's just the tip of it. There would be things coming in behind them. But that is along the border, which is coercion in the classical sense. And then they're doing all the things we're reading about, the cyber and discussions of - so it's very clear they're there.
KELLY: And your argument would be Ukraine deserves a chance to fight.
ZWACK: And they deserve a chance to fight, Mary Louise. Yes, they do.
KELLY: General Peter Zwack is a global fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute. Thank you.
ZWACK: Thank you so much.
NPR · by Mary Louise Kelly · January 18, 2022
5. Washington and the West must regain the initiative with China and Russia
And the $64,000 question is how?
Excerpts:
The administration’s recent Summit for Democracy reflected the moral and ideological divide that characterizes today’s global state of affairs. It should be followed up with a broad-based information campaign that constantly reminds friends and allies — and the populations trapped under authoritarian regimes — of the existential stakes of the global struggle and enlists them in the common cause for freedom.
In the meantime, to deal with the Ukraine crisis that Putin created, Biden should present him with a clear choice: start immediately decreasing the Russian forces at Ukraine’s border or the U.S.and NATO will begin mobilizing their own forces to defend it against Russian aggression. Putin should be made to understand that war with Ukraine would mean war with NATO — the same kind of decision that must be presented to China regarding Taiwan. In both critical places, the world’s democracies must get off their back foot and deter aggression, rather than reacting to it after the fact. North Korea and Iran are watching.
Washington and the West must regain the initiative with China and Russia
The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · January 18, 2022
The Biden administration is struggling to respond to naked military threats from China and Russia against two Western-friendly democratic nations and emerging security partners.
It has responded to Beijing’s aggressive designs on Taiwan by retaining the policy of strategic ambiguity practiced by eight administrations — as modestly modified by the Trump and Biden national security teams through enhanced military assistance, expanded diplomatic interactions, and stronger messages of moral and rhetorical support.
Over recent months, Beijing dramatically increased both its military activities directed at Taiwan and its hostile rhetoric toward Taiwan and the United States, accusing both of “playing with fire.” But whenever President Biden suggests a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan, the State Department walks it back.
Whether coincidentally or by design, Russia massed 100,000 forces along the Ukraine border and demanded security concessions from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including a written guarantee that it would permanently deny Ukraine membership. By contrast to its ambiguous policy on Taiwan, the administration opted for strategic clarity. It rejected Moscow’s demands, as did NATO, and promised to punish Russia’s “further” invasion of Ukraine after its illegal seizure of Crimea and incursions into Eastern Ukraine in 2014. But the messaging was constrained and conflicted.
U.S. officials warned Moscow of “severe” and “unprecedented” economic sanctions that threatened “devastating” consequences for Russia’s economy. At the same time, Biden declared emphatically that the United States would not “unilaterally” use military force to defend Ukraine. But neither did he say that Washington would lead a collective NATO response, notwithstanding that in 2008 Ukraine was assured it would be welcomed to membership in the organization.
Taking the Western military option off the table emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin to escalate his aggressive negotiating tactics to a new level. He warned that if Washington carried out its sanctions threat it would mean “a complete rupture” in Russian-U.S. relations. Putin demanded the West’s capitulation “now.” That arrogant and domineering tone characterized Russia’s posture during a series of three bilateral and multilateral meetings with American and Western interlocutors last week. Putin’s agents made it clear they were there only to deliver instructions to the West, not to find mutually acceptable ways to defuse the crisis.
Putin almost certainly doubts the credibility of Washington’s threatened economic sanctions. The very harshness of the measures — e.g., cutting off Russia’s access to Western financial systems — would result in significant humanitarian suffering to the Russian people, which invariably raises moral qualms in the West. Punishing economic sanctions also have a boomerang effect on Western commercial interests.
One of the retaliatory actions being advocated by Washington is curtailment of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany. But, despite Biden administration entreaties, Berlin — first under Chancellor Angela Merkel and now under her successor, Olaf Scholz — has refused to commit to such punishing action. Germany’s adamance goes back to its rejection of national security adviser-designate Jake Sullivan’s plea a year ago to delay pipeline approval. Biden may have pronounced that “America is back” to leading the Western alliance, but Germany is not yet back as a vital and loyal member when its economic interests are at variance with Western security needs.
Instead, last May, Biden yielded to the German position and waived U.S. sanctions on the pipeline company. And last week, Biden and Senate Democrats defeated legislation that would have reimposed and expanded the sanctions, losing an opportunity to convey a message of bipartisan U.S. seriousness. Putin is clearly relying on such Western disunity to continue enhancing his position and expanding his aggressive options.
Biden’s dismissal of the collective military option is reminiscent of Washington’s disavowal of intention to defend South Korea and Taiwan in 1950. It led to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, eventually dragging America into the Korean War. A Russian invasion of Ukraine could quickly escalate to a wider European war, triggering U.S. collective security obligations under Article 5 of the NATO treaty.
Putin — and Chinese leader Xi Jinping — are also encouraged by repeated indications that the Biden administration is seeking to constrain and even reduce America’s nuclear arsenal while they are expanding theirs. Such policies magnify the significance of the calamitous withdrawal from Afghanistan and confirm the impression of an America in decline and retreat.
The Obama administration’s disastrous decisions to back down from U.S. “red lines” in Syria and allow Russia back into the Middle East also fed Putin’s ambitions.
The West devoted decades to reaching out to China and Russia to integrate them into the international community. But whether the issue is China’s expansionism in the Indo-Pacific or Russia’s revanchism in Eastern Europe, the United States and its friends and allies are confronted with existential challenges that rank with the dangers presented in World War II and the Cold War. The painful alternatives of war or surrender can be avoided only by a demonstration of deep and broad Western resolve — not only from NATO, but also from the European Union and other multilateral organizations — that almost certainly will mean the open recognition of a new cold war.
The administration’s recent Summit for Democracy reflected the moral and ideological divide that characterizes today’s global state of affairs. It should be followed up with a broad-based information campaign that constantly reminds friends and allies — and the populations trapped under authoritarian regimes — of the existential stakes of the global struggle and enlists them in the common cause for freedom.
In the meantime, to deal with the Ukraine crisis that Putin created, Biden should present him with a clear choice: start immediately decreasing the Russian forces at Ukraine’s border or the U.S.and NATO will begin mobilizing their own forces to defend it against Russian aggression. Putin should be made to understand that war with Ukraine would mean war with NATO — the same kind of decision that must be presented to China regarding Taiwan. In both critical places, the world’s democracies must get off their back foot and deter aggression, rather than reacting to it after the fact. North Korea and Iran are watching.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.
The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · January 18, 2022
6. As a former US intelligence officer, I see a red flag in the CIA’s latest anti-Russia playbook
Scott Ritter speaks again through the Russian propaganda outlet. Question: Is he a useful idiot or is a witting supporter of Russian propaganda?
As a former US intelligence officer, I see a red flag in the CIA’s latest anti-Russia playbook
The Agency has a long and largely unsuccessful track record when it comes to duelling with Moscow
is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer and author of 'SCORPION KING: America's Suicidal Embrace of Nuclear Weapons from FDR to Trump.' He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector. Follow him on Twitter @RealScottRitter
Reports that the CIA is running training programs to prepare Ukrainian forces for unconventional warfare bear an uncanny similarity to a long-exposed Cold War-era project. If history is any judge, it is likely to end the same way.
A tranche of allegations recently published in the press, ostensibly sourced to “five former intelligence and national security officials familiar with the initiative,” claims that America's top spy agency has been, since 2015, conducting training for select Ukrainian military and security personnel. According to the speculation, the program aims to develop skillsets associated with unconventional warfare (UW), a form of conflict often referred to as insurgency. These reports say that the training takes place in the US, and is overseen by the CIA’s paramilitary arm, the Special Activities Division.
An unconventional approach
The Department of Defense defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area.” The term ‘guerrilla force’ is further defined as “a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.”
If the press reports are to be believed, the CIA is actively training Ukrainian citizens to resist a Russian occupation. One reading of this would be that Washington is creating a capability designed to inflict a follow-on cost to any future Russian military invasion and occupation of Ukraine, something Russia insists it is not preparing for. Another reading, given the fact that both Ukraine and the US consider Crimea and the Donbass to be territories that are illegally occupied, is that the CIA could be training Ukrainian forces to conduct offensive guerrilla warfare on lands either controlled directly by the Russian government, which has been the case in Crimea since 2014, or controlled by anti-Kiev separatists, as in Donbass. Either version would be cause for alarm in Moscow.
From Nazis to communists
If true, the reported CIA activity would not represent the agency’s first foray into organizing Ukrainians to fight against the authority of Moscow. At the conclusion of WWII, the CIA established close contacts with two Ukrainian resistance groups, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought alongside Hitler’s Nazi Germany against the Soviets.
Initially, the support was geared toward facilitating the unconventional warfare activities of OUN-UPA fighters. Agents were identified and recruited with the assistance of the West German Gehlen Organization, named after General Reinhard Gehlen, head of the Nazi German military intelligence (the 12th Department of the German Army General Staff-Foreign Armies East, or FHO) on the Eastern Front during World War II.
Gehlen controlled numerous networks of agents who continued to work on behalf of Nazi Germany up until the end of the war. After the fighting ended, the United States took control of the 12th Department and, with Gehlen still at the helm, transferred it and its network of agents to US control. Gehlen’s organization would provide the US with Ukrainian individuals under its control, who were trained by the US Army in West Germany, and then dispatched to eastern Poland/western Ukraine, where they helped coordinate an active resistance which continued up until 1955.
Once the Soviets had defeated the paramilitary arm of the OUN-UPA, the CIA transitioned its focus away from unconventional warfare toward political covert action, funding a variety of publications which were used to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda both inside Ukraine and around the world. This effort was known by the CIA cryptogram ‘AERODYNAMIC’, and continued up until the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990.
Repeating history?
According to press reports, the CIA is carefully vetting the personnel receiving the UW training to ensure that ideologically incompatible persons, for example, those affiliated with neo-Nazi organizations, and potential Russian double agents, are not brought into the program. There are two problems with this scenario as presented: First, the segment of indigenous society most suitable for sustaining a long-term post-Russian occupation resistance is the modern-day incarnation of the OUN-UPA.
On the one hand, CIA support for this group would provide it with a base of indigenous support inclined to make violence against Russia. On the other, the present day OUN-UPA successor movement has been taken over by Ukrainian nationalists given to embracing neo-Nazi symbology and ideology. However, the recent willingness of US military attaches assigned to Kiev to freely associate with members of the Ukrainian military who openly brandished neo-Nazi badges and patches on their uniforms indicates that the association with Nazi ideology may, in fact, not be the show-stopper logic would indicate it should be.
The larger problem for any modern-day reincarnation of AEODYNAMIC is that, to have any chance of success, it must be completely covert. The fact of the matter is, if the average American citizen is reading about it in the media, then the program is no longer covert.
Is the secret out?
There is no reason not to believe that the CIA has, in fact, been running a UW training mission for Ukrainians. However, at the same time, there is also no reason to doubt that the media hype in recent days is less about preparing for the worst, but rather to create the perception in Moscow that such operations are, in fact, being prepared, in an effort to influence Moscow’s next moves. The possibility of a concerted UW threat because of a Russian military invasion of Ukraine has a certain deterrent value. Likewise, any Russian response, both politically and militarily, to a possible UW threat reduces the resources Russia can deploy in support of any potential invasion.
However, the fact that this story was leaked to the press by “five former intelligence and national security officials familiar with the initiative” is more indicative of a controlled release of information than a massive failure of operational security. Covert paramilitary operations are among the most highly classified and compartmented activities undertaken by the CIA. Knowledge of such programs is kept extremely tight and entrusted only to those personnel who have a need to know. These same personnel are usually sourced from the same community that is carrying out the operation, and as such are extremely sensitive to the need for secrecy – especially in such a case as this, where the lives of those being trained could be put at risk in the event of any inadvertent disclosure.
That five former officials entrusted with such information simultaneously decided to go public, even in an anonymous capacity, should send red flags flying for anyone assessing the viability of the information being shared. While it is not beyond the capacity of the CIA to undertake such training, it is also not beyond the capacity of the CIA to go through the motions of such training for the sole purpose of having the program leaked to the Russians for deterrent value. This kind of psychological operation is more aligned with the covert political action the CIA is known for.
Moreover, given the CIA’s poor track record in recent decades when it comes to mounting covert operations targeting Russia, there is every probability that the Russian security services have not only been monitoring the operation since its inception, but have been helping guide it, directly or indirectly, using their own considerable intelligence resources. Regardless of its goals and objectives, the CIA’s effort to resurrect AERODYNAMIC appears doomed from the outset, and likely to join its Cold War predecessor in the trash bin of history.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.
7. US special operations presses on in Ukraine amid threat of Russian invasion
US special operations presses on in Ukraine amid threat of Russian invasion
A Ukrainian soldier aims a machine gun during an anti-sabotage exercise near Yavoriv, Ukraine, Sept. 27, 2021. U.S. special operators remain in the country in an advisory training role, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe said Tuesday. (Preston Hammon/U.S. Army)
STUTTGART, Germany — U.S. special operators are continuing with a mission to build up an elite fighting force in Ukraine, military officials said, even as Russia threatens invasion with its thousands of troops, tanks and artillery massed along their borders.
“The bottom line is that our training mission in Ukraine is ongoing,” Lt. Col. Juan Martinez, spokesman for U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, said Tuesday.
Martinez said there are a “ton of outside factors at work,” but that the command hasn’t stepped back from Ukraine.
“We continue to view our mission in Ukraine as part of an ongoing effort in enhancing Special Operations Forces capabilities as a keystone for regional stability,” he said.
The Stuttgart-based SOCEUR has quietly operated out of a training center outside of Kyiv for the past several years. The mission’s focus is assisting Ukrainian forces to defend more effectively against Russian aggression.
The presence of U.S. special operators is part of a small American military contingent that remains in Ukraine. There are also more than 100 Florida National Guard troops in Ukraine in an advisory role, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Tuesday.
A U.S. Air Force special tactics operator assigned to the 24th Special Operations Wing conducts casualty care training with Ukrainian air force members near Vinnytsia, Ukraine, Aug. 6, 2021. The U.S. airman's face was obscured by military officials for security reasons. (Izabella Workman/U.S. Air Force)
Martinez declined to say how many special operators are now in Ukraine, citing security concerns.
Whether they would remain there in the event of invasion isn’t clear, but the Biden administration has already ruled out the direct involvement of U.S. troops in any conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine. Still, there could be special implications for SOCEUR’s mission should a Russian invasion turn into an effort to occupy large parts of the country.
On Friday, The New York Times reported that the White House was considering a plan to fund, train and arm a resistance movement inside Ukraine in the event of an occupation. The plan could involve helping Ukrainian resistance fighters by providing training inside NATO countries such as Poland, Romania and Slovakia, the Times reported, citing administration officials.
For the Green Berets and Navy SEALs assigned to SOCEUR, that could mean a heavy focus on guerilla warfare instruction, a specialty of such units.
During the Cold War, NATO created a network of clandestine, stay-behind units in many European countries. These consisted of troops tasked with conducting intelligence and reconnaissance operations, as well as guerrilla attacks, in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion.
But Moscow’s military intentions remain unclear. A U.S. contingency plan to back an insurgency would be rendered moot if Russia’s aim is to dismantle Ukraine’s military rather than occupy territory.
U.S. Navy SEALs operate as opposing forces during a joint raid exercise with Ukrainian special operations forces on Pervomays’kyy Island, Ukraine, July 2, 2021. U.S. special operators remain in Ukraine in an advisory training role, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe said Tuesday. (Patrik Orcutt/U.S. Army)
And while some allies, including the U.S. and United Kingdom, have delivered anti-tank weaponry to Ukraine in hopes of giving Kyiv a boost in conventional combat capabilities, Russia still has the overwhelming military advantage.
In addition to curtailing Western military cooperation with Ukraine, some analysts say Russia’s interest appears focused on getting Kyiv to cease its efforts to develop longer range missiles that could eventually target Russia.
“Moscow’s military objectives would focus on imposing unacceptable costs on Ukraine by destroying military units, inflicting casualties, taking prisoners of war, or degrading Ukraine’s ability to defend itself,” wrote Russia expert Rob Lee in an analysis Tuesday for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Russia could choose to seize territory to raise the costs on Kyiv, but this would likely not be the ultimate objective.”
Lee said the message Moscow is signaling is that “it believes the costs of inaction are higher than the costs of employing force now.”
8. Opinion | The Marines are establishing a beachhead for needed change at the Pentagon
The Corps as a change agent.
Conclusion:
Berger has forced the Marine Corps to learn a new vocabulary, and his best commanders speak the language of change with passion. But truly reinventing a combat force won’t be easy, and some of the new “stand-in” concepts sound to me nearly as vulnerable to a high-tech adversary as the old ones. Still, for a Pentagon where inertia has too often been a way of life, the Marines are showing overdue signs of movement.
Opinion | The Marines are establishing a beachhead for needed change at the Pentagon
When Gen. David H. Berger, commandant of the Marine Corps, announced a radical new plan in 2019 to remake his service, many Marines figuratively rolled their eyes. For a combat force proud of its traditions, change can sometimes seem like the enemy.
Two and a half years later, Berger actually appears to have pulled much of it off. The Marine Corps is smaller and more agile, it has disposed of all of its tanks and many of its artillery pieces, and it looks like a force of the future, not the past. The era of counterinsurgency wars, along with the doctrine and equipment to support them, is over for the Marines.
Resistance to change was “less than I thought it would be,” Berger told me in an interview last month at the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, Calif. The key, he said, has been to take the money and people freed up by discarding old systems and invest in new capabilities that can combat a modern, high-tech rival such as China.
“We cannot afford to retain outdated policies, doctrine, organizations, or force development strategies,” Berger wrote in his 2019 “Commandant’s Planning Guidance.” The heroic tradition of Marines storming faraway beaches from a few big amphibious assault ships was “illogical,” Berger wrote, “given the growth of adversary precision strike capabilities.”
For a Pentagon that has been agonizingly slow to shed legacy weapons systems — such as aircraft carrier task forces and fighter jet wings — Berger’s rethink of the Marine Corps has been encouraging. It’s one thing to demand change but quite another to make it happen over inevitable objections from Congress, defense contractors and the military’s own implacable bureaucracy.
To assess what Berger’s makeover looks like in practice, I talked with some of his senior commanders. They tell a similar story — of getting rid of venerable old systems to make way for newer ones that are small, elusive and sometimes unmanned.
Maj. Gen. Francis L. Donovan, the commander of the 2nd Marine Division, illustrates the transition. His division fought in the bloody amphibious assaults across the Pacific in World War II, at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Tinian and Okinawa. They were in the first wave of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and fought in the bitter battle of Fallujah. The division motto is “Follow Me,” right out of a John Wayne war movie.
So, what does change look like for this fabled division, based at the legendary Camp Lejeune in North Carolina? First, the division shrank, from 18,000 Marines to 15,000. It lost two artillery batteries. It shed the heavy bridging and engineering units that had constructed forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. It gave up a tank battalion, losing 44 M1A1 tanks and the Marines who had made tank warfare their specialty.
“Why would I want a tank, when I can kill a tank with a loitering [drone] munition?” Donovan bluntly asks. The challenge, he says, was providing a “transition with honor” for Marines who had devoted their careers to tank warfare. The division helped them find new jobs, transfer to Army tank units or retire.
How has the Marine Corps rebuilt its combat capabilities using different weapons and doctrine? I talked with Brig. Gen. Benjamin T. Watson, the commander of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory at Quantico, Va., and a deputy, Brig. Gen. Eric Austin, who is director of capabilities development. (Both were nominated in December by President Biden for a second star.)
Watson described a future Marine Corps with a very different footprint. Rather than sailing toward beachheads in big amphibious assault ships, the Marines of the future will be deployed forward, in smaller, more agile, harder-to-find units. Because China can easily target “stand-off” units stationed far from potential conflict, these will be “stand-in” forces that, says Watson, will be “operating persistently forward.”
If a conflict seemed imminent with China, say, these future Marines could move quickly from their forward bases to seize maritime choke points. They would operate closely with allies, such as Japan, with which the Marines just staged a big exercise called Resolute Dragon 21, and Australia, where Marines are based in Darwin on the northern coast.
The warfighting lab envisions littoral brigades that can operate quickly and stealthily, with many Marines replaced by unmanned systems — and using electronic-warfare tools that can hide the Marines’ presence and find the adversary. “This is the biggest change in 70 years for the Marine Corps, but we’re still the Marines,” says Austin.
Berger has forced the Marine Corps to learn a new vocabulary, and his best commanders speak the language of change with passion. But truly reinventing a combat force won’t be easy, and some of the new “stand-in” concepts sound to me nearly as vulnerable to a high-tech adversary as the old ones. Still, for a Pentagon where inertia has too often been a way of life, the Marines are showing overdue signs of movement.
9. U.S. lawmakers call for U.N. Uyghur rights report before China's Olympics
Perhaps a test of the UN and China's power to influence its decision making.
U.S. lawmakers call for U.N. Uyghur rights report before China's Olympics
The sun shines behind the United Nations Secretariat Building at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, June 18, 2021. REUTERS/Andrew Kelly
WASHINGTON, Jan 18 (Reuters) - U.S. lawmakers on Tuesday urged the United Nations' human rights office to release its assessment of China's policies in Xinjiang before next month's Beijing Winter Olympics, which the U.S. government is boycotting on a diplomatic level over what it says is ongoing genocide in the region.
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet has lamented that her office has been unable to gain access to the western Chinese region to probe allegations of rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups.
Her office said in December that it was finalizing a report on the situation in Xinjiang that it hoped to publish in the coming weeks after long-running talks with Chinese officials on a proposed visit had yielded no progress. read more
Senator Jeff Merkley and Representative James McGovern, two Democrats who respectively chair and co-chair the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, wrote a public letter to Bachelet asking her to issue the report before the "international spectacle" of the Beijing Games begins on Feb. 4.
"Its publication would send an important reminder that no country can evade international scrutiny for engaging in serious human rights abuses," Merkley and McGovern said.
Bachelet's office did not respond immediately to a Reuters question asking when the report would be released.
Bachelet had been negotiating the terms of a Xinjiang visit since September 2018, as allegations were emerging that some one million Uyghurs had been held in mass detention camps.
China denies wrongdoing in Xinjiang, and says the camps are for vocational training and to stem religious extremism.
The United States and many of its allies, including Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan and Denmark, have said they will not send official diplomatic delegations to the Games in protest of China's rights record.
Reporting by Michael Martina; Additional reporting by Michelle Nichols in New York; Editing by Rosalba O'Brien
10. Inside the secretive training that US Green Berets give to troops who may have to take on Russia or China
Inside the secretive training that US Green Berets give to troops who may have to take on Russia or China
US Army Special Forces soldiers and Nepalese soldiers practice evacuating casualties in Nepal, February 18, 2020.
US Army
- US special-operations troops have for decades deployed overseas to train partners.
- Such training makes those partners better fighters and helps establish long-term relationships.
- Foreign internal defense, as it is known, is one of the most important special-ops mission, a US Green Beret said.
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But this is nothing new. Indeed, US special-operations units have been working in scores of countries for decades, teaching local units how to become better fighters and win conflicts.
This military diplomacy strengthens US presence worldwide and creates valuable alliances and partnerships that can be leveraged in a time of need.
A US soldier trains a Chadian soldier during an exercise, in Chad, February 22, 2015.
Emmanuel Braun/REUTERS
The roughly 70,000 members and supporting troops attached to US Special Operations Command and its more secretive subunit Joint Special Operations Command have global responsibilities and can conduct a wide range of mission sets.
An Army Ranger platoon may conduct a direct-action operation to take down an Al Qaeda target in Iraq. A Marine Raider team may do a strategic-reconnaissance mission to observe an Al Shabaab outpost in Kenya and gather intelligence. Army Green Berets may conduct an unconventional-warfare operation by linking up with local guerrillas to take on Taliban fighters.
Teaching others how to fight
An instructor explains patrol procedures to Iraqi special-operations soldiers during foreign internal defense training in central Iraq, August 19, 2019.
CJTF-OIR
The Department of Defense defines foreign internal defense as civilian and military agencies of one government participating in any "action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."
"Foreign internal defense is one of the important tools in our toolbox, and that is why we place so much focus on it," a Green Beret assigned to a National Guard unit told Insider.
When conducting foreign internal defense, special operators link up with foreign military forces and train them, the idea being that it's easier and a better use of resources to teach a foreign force to fight for itself.
"There is a specific reason why the Q course leans heavily on the foreign internal defense skill set," the Green Beret added, referring to the Special Forces Qualification Course.
Soldiers at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School speak with indigenous role players during training, June 16, 2021.
US Army/K. Kassens
"On top of the tactical component, we learn how to transmit knowledge very well. This is where the cultural and linguist training" that Green Berets receive "really shines," the Green Beret said. "I may think I am the best SUT [small-unit tactics] instructor out there, but if I can't transmit that knowledge succinctly and effectively, then I am no real instructor."
With the instruction provided through foreign internal defense, US special operators can reduce or eliminate the assistance partner forces would need in the event of a conflict.
That instruction can range from basic small-unit tactics to advanced close-quarters battle, among many other skills, "but the goal is always to enable [host nation] forces to conduct their own unilateral operations. If we don't have that end-goal in mind, then we will be there forever," said the National Guard Green Beret.
Building long-term relationships
Lithuanian troops and US Army Special Forces soldiers conduct mission planning during an exercise, September 8, 2018.
US Army/Sgt. Karen Sampson
Foreign internal defense is also about building long-term relationships with foreign militaries or even specific units.
"FID can establish and refine capabilities. It is a very diverse mission set that can address different needs and truly be a force-multiplier. In many ways, FID is the first line of defense," a former Army Special Forces officer told Insider.
"FID also has an interesting evolutionary aspect," the former officer said. "We can go in a country and establish a special-operations or conventional unit and go back there a few years later and train them up on a specific insertion capability," such as combat diving or free-fall parachuting.
"In a lot of ways, FID never ends, and we often end up building successful longterm partnerships with some units," said the former officer, who like the National Guard Green Beret was not authorized to speak to the press. "But we get something out of it too. Years or decades after, when we revisit X country, they are now experienced, and they get to teach us stuff too. FID can be a mutually beneficial arrangement that increases our experience and combat effectiveness in the long-term."
Although foreign internal defense is a specialty of Army Green Berets, the intense operational demand created by the global war on terror forced other units — which were competing for deployment opportunities and funding — to put more emphasis on that mission set.
Even the most elite special-mission units, such as Delta Force and the unit formerly known as SEAL Team 6, have had to do foreign internal defense on occasion as a way to get missions.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
11. US Special Forces Have a Secret Weapon Everyone Forgets About
Good to see SWCCs getting some respect.
US Special Forces Have a Secret Weapon Everyone Forgets About
SOCOM has several different vessels designed for different problems and situations, one of which, the Combatant Craft Assault, is one of the US military’s most used special-operations boats.
A small but elite special-operations community operates the CCA and other high-speed vessels.
SWCC: Naval Special Warfare’s hidden gem
Of about 70,000 troops in uniform with SOCOM, less than 1,000 are SWCC operators.
Depending on the operational environment, SWCCs can provide four small-boat options: the Combatant Craft Assault (CCA), Combatant Craft Medium (CCM), Combatant Craft Heavy (CCH), and the Special Operations Craft-Riverine (SOC-R).
The first three are designed for ocean and near-shore operations. The Special Operations Craft-Riverine is designed for operations in and around rivers.
Despite a common misconception, the Special Boat Teams do a lot more than ferry SEALs around. SWCC operators specialize in maritime direct-action operations, special reconnaissance, and the infiltration and exfiltration of other special-operations units.
The Combatant Craft Assault
The Combatant Craft Assault is for medium-range special operations and can be used to conduct maritime interdiction, littoral patrol, and insertion and extraction of other special-operations units.
The vessel was designed to bridge the capability gap between smaller special-operations boats, such as the Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat, and the Combatant Craft Medium, which is larger and less agile.
The CCA entered service in 2015, replacing the Mark V Special Operations Craft. The Special Boat Teams can field about 30 CCAs. But the production line is still active, and several boats have already been replaced or upgraded.
The 41-foot CCA has two powerful diesel engines and can reach speeds of more than 60 mph, though the exact number is classified, as is the CCA’s range, but the specs of similar vessels made by the same company suggest the special-operations craft has a range of about 400 miles.
The CCA is made out of composite material, which protects against rust and allows it to be lightweight but durable. It is open to the elements, with just a windshield around the crew compartment. In addition to the four SWCC operators who typically work the boat, it can carry about eight special operators.
The Combatant Craft Assault can pack quite an arsenal. It has traditionally been armed with the M2HB .50-caliber machine gun, the M240 7.62 mm machine gun, the M134 mini-gun, and the Mark 19 40 mm grenade launcher.
The special-operations boat can now also carry small drones and may even be equipped with guided missiles in the future. SOCOM is experimenting with several precision-guided munitions, such as the SPIKE NLOS anti-tank guided missile used by AH-64 Apache helicopters.
“The CCA is a handy vessel we use for several different mission sets. We can stake out and interdict a target we know will be passing from a certain waterway, but we can also move around other SOF [special-operations forces] elements without the bad guys knowing we were there,” a former SWCC operator told Insider.
Reflecting its flexibility and versatility, the CCA can be deployed anywhere in the world from land, a larger vessel, or even from the air. The boat is airborne-qualified and can be dropped from the C-17 and MC-130 transport aircraft.
Standard procedure for such airdrops involves the aircraft dropping the CCA with several static-line parachutes, which open on their own after the person or object exits the plane. SWCC operators then jump after the boat and swim to it once safely in the water.
SOCOM also wants to improve the CCA’s sensors by adding the Combatant Craft Forward Looking Infrared (CCFLIR), a multi-sensor electro-optic system that can detect, identify, and track other vessels and objects in maritime environments. CCFLIR is already in use on the Combatant Craft Medium and Combatant Craft Heavy.
While SWCC operations don’t have the same risks as SEAL operations, they are not simple or risk-free.
“These boats can go really fast,” said the former SWCC operator, who requested anonymity because he still works with the Navy. “As a result, the forces we have to sustain while operating them are very intense. This is our version of the ‘g forces’ pilots experience when flying.”
“Our bodies take a toll, and a lot of guys end up getting surgeries on their backs and necks. People are doing studies about possible brain damage from all the banging too,” the former operator added. “This is something people tend to gloss over when talking about the [SWCC] community and their cool boats.”
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
12. Why USSOCOM should develop an Arctic Strategy
Excerpts:
USSOCOM is in a unique position to synthesize the GCCs’ operational concepts and requirements (facilitated by the three TSOCs with Arctic responsibilities) with the readiness, training and equipping of their subordinate special operations forces, under the daily command of its service components (USASOC, NAVSPECWARCOM, AFSOC and MARSOC). This would ensure that special operations forces’ development and modernization efforts remain grounded in evolving operational concepts and requirements (and not based on the assumption of legacy requirements and nostalgic perceptions of what SOF represents).
Additionally, the USSOCOM maintains a unique global network of SOF partnerships. Within the USSOCOM headquarters are twenty-eight allied special operations exchange officers and liaison officers (assigned to the J3-International Division). Among these are international personnel from five Arctic nations in addition to the U.S: Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. In addition, there are numerous other partners with equities related to the Arctic within the same headquarters. This represents a relevant and unique capability if we utilize it in the right manner. This unique capability could enable USSOCOM to integrate allied SOF partners’ expertise and operational efforts into U.S.-centric theater plans, and thereby help generate both a national and an integrated multinational strategy for special operations forces in the Arctic. Harnessing this allied expertise and participation would also ensure that U.S. plans are based on a comprehensive perspective and have a multi-domain, holistic approach to the region.
Such an integrated strategy could significantly enhance the U.S. Joint Staff and GCCs’ plans for competition in the Arctic by synchronizing various disparate efforts resulting in a more comprehensive and holistic approach compared to what we experience today.
Why USSOCOM should develop an Arctic Strategy
U.S. Army LTC(R). Senior International SOF advisor in the USSOCOM J3-I Division. Holds a B.A. in National Defense Studies from Kings College and is a graduate of the British Joint Staff College.
Hæroffiser som også har tjenesteerfaring fra Sjøforsvaret. Har militær utdanning fra befalsskolen for Kystartilleriet, Krigsskolen Linderud og stabsskole hos U.S. Marine Corps.
Executive Summary: The Arctic is an arena for strategic competition. Developing a viable and comprehensive strategy is critical to maintain a competitive advantage and counter Russian and Chinese influence and malign activities. There are eight Arctic nations; Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, United States, Russia, and Iceland. USSOCOM is in a unique position, with six of these eight Arctic countries represented in their headquarters with exchange or liaison officers assigned to the J3-International Division. This provides an exclusive capability and opportunity for USSOCOM and the U.S. Department of Defense to facilitate enhanced understanding of the situation and enable the development of an informed and integrated international special operations Arctic strategy.
Figure 1: “Arctic Region,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 02 JAN 2022, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/
The Arctic – An Area for Strategic Competition
Military experts seem to agree that the Arctic is a rapidly growing arena for strategic competition. The polar ice is melting, creating new corridors for sea transportation, and opening opportunities for extended extraction of resources, such as seafood, oil, gas, and minerals. Historically, with significant national economic opportunities like those listed, security interests evolve and establishing a favorable stability soon follows as a priority. Both Russia and China acknowledge that the Arctic is an area of great strategic interest, and an area where they are willing to compete with comprehensive and coordinated means. Nations that do not deliberately dedicate their attention to this environment will be ceding a competitive advantage to those that will.
The Arctic presents unique challenges from an operational perspective. The remoteness and size of the region cannot be overstated. And despite the common perception of stable snow and ice, the environmental conditions can change significantly from month to month in the whole region. The sustainment of operations requires enhanced and tailored logistical capabilities. More simply put, it requires more support to accomplish less when compared to other operations, even in remote areas like Afghanistan. The harshness of the environment affects all variants of technology, and even basics like fuel, power (batteries), or the electro-magnetic spectrum will pose specific challenges. Standard equipment can not merely be deployed to this environment without modifications.
Picture 1: Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) and 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conducted an exercise above the Arctic Circle to validate techniques in extreme cold-weather conditions, (U.S. NORTHCOM).
Simply developing and maintaining the required capabilities and expertise to effectively operate in the Arctic is an extremely complex and challenging task. Successfully competing in the Arctic is an entirely different endeavor. Effective competition requires situational understanding and persistent presence in the form of influencing or shaping activities. Potential activities could include joint and combined training exercises, civil-military operations, support to scientific research and expeditions, search and rescue operations, security and presence patrols, reconnaissance or intelligence operations, and operations intended to communicate strategic messages. The Arctic truly is a multidomain environment that requires a comprehensive approach to effectively compete and influence. Developing a deliberate strategy, comprised of appropriate activities as well as assessing their effectiveness, requires an understanding of the social, geopolitical, and environmental factors. Unless it is a singular priority, the scope and scale of effort required to effectively compete generally exceeds the capacity of any single nation.
Figure 2: The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement (formally the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic),U.S. Department of State, Accessed 02 JAN 2022, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/
The United States and the Arctic Partner Nations.
The Arctic is comprised of eight nations: The United States, Russia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland. Each of these nations maintains their own sovereign territory and strategic interests in the region. The potential effectiveness of a strategy for competition is reliant on the degree of integration with the Arctic allies. From the U.S. DoD perspective, the Arctic spans three different Geographic Combatant Commands (USNORTHCOM, USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM), each with their own unique requirements and equities. Additionally, although populations that live above the Arctic circle are sparse, each nation has their own unique indigenous populations that inhabit their territories and plays a key role in the region.
Russia
Russia understands the necessity for preparing its forces, equipment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training for Arctic conditions. In 2020, Russia developed an Arctic strategy looking forward in a 15-year perspective, focused on controlling Arctic natural resources and the Northern Sea Route. Russia has heavily developed its military capabilities in the region. They benefit from their experiences in cold-weather training and have implemented the lessons learned from the numerous winter campaigns in their recent history. The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) reported in its annual intelligence assessment that to support Russia's interests in the Arctic, the Northern (Russian) Fleet’s ability to conduct military operations has been strengthened in general, particularly for Arctic conditions.
Figure 3: Map of the Arctic Region showing the Northeast Passage, the Northern Sea Route and the Nortwest Passage, Artic Maritime Shipping Assessment Report 2009, Accessed 03 JAN 2022, https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf
China
China continues to expand its influence inch by inch through a long-term strategic mindset, smart economic investments, advanced networks, diplomatic coercion, and other means. China has multiple interests in the Arctic. Utilizing the Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast, Chinese merchant ships can reduce the sailing-distance to European ports by thousands of nautical miles. China also sees the Arctic as a source of protein (fish) to its growing population and recognizes the vast amounts of natural resources, more specifically, gas, oil, and minerals, all of which are vital ingredients to China’s technology industry.
The Role of Special Operations in the Arctic
USSOCOM, in its role as a functional combatant command for U.S. special operations forces, operates in a manner similar to a service component. Much like the Army’s Arctic strategy, as articulated in the January 2021 Regaining the Arctic Dominance – The U.S. Army in the Arctic, ideally a SOF Arctic strategy would not only outline the environmental requirements, but also the potential operational requirement needed to support the Joint force concept for competition. More specifically, it is important that special operations capabilities remained linked to the Joint Forces capabilities and requirements and not purely based on what now seems to be traditional or legacy special operations activities. It would help inform readiness, training, force development and modernization efforts specific to special operations requirements.
In general terms, the likely contributions of special operations forces to a competition strategy would include a combination of exercises (that demonstrate capability and create presence), discrete steady state operational capabilities (such as civil-military operations, reconnaissance and intelligence operations, security patrols, etc.) and low visibility and contingency (special) operations (in response to aggression or conflict). Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) need to share a common perspective on exactly what types of special operations SOF-units are prepared to conduct and contribute with in terms of the Arctic (and how it actually relates to the GCCs’ requirements). Achieving this requires more than understanding joint and service doctrine. It requires a synchronization of campaign design and objectives, validated by experimentation and war-gaming with the different unit’s capabilities. This ensures capabilities and concepts to continue to evolve and remain relevant. This type of integrated approach would also better inform senior military decision-makers of the options available “for competition,” as well prepare the special operations forces units to conduct the required special operations.
Picture 2: The 2021-planning team for joint BTF/NORSOF/NORAF-training in the Arctic region, (from left) «Castle» from US, Morten Christiansen, Ståle «Steel» Nymoen and NORSOC\FSK-operator (with mask) from Norway and «Booster» from US (right), Norwegian Armed Forces 2021. (Forsvaret)
The need for a USSOCOM Arctic Strategy
USSOCOM is in a unique position to synthesize the GCCs’ operational concepts and requirements (facilitated by the three TSOCs with Arctic responsibilities) with the readiness, training and equipping of their subordinate special operations forces, under the daily command of its service components (USASOC, NAVSPECWARCOM, AFSOC and MARSOC). This would ensure that special operations forces’ development and modernization efforts remain grounded in evolving operational concepts and requirements (and not based on the assumption of legacy requirements and nostalgic perceptions of what SOF represents).
Picture 3: Combat Craft Medium (CCM), US NAVY Special Warfare Command (U.S. Navy Special Warfare Command)
Additionally, the USSOCOM maintains a unique global network of SOF partnerships. Within the USSOCOM headquarters are twenty-eight allied special operations exchange officers and liaison officers (assigned to the J3-International Division). Among these are international personnel from five Arctic nations in addition to the U.S: Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. In addition, there are numerous other partners with equities related to the Arctic within the same headquarters. This represents a relevant and unique capability if we utilize it in the right manner. This unique capability could enable USSOCOM to integrate allied SOF partners’ expertise and operational efforts into U.S.-centric theater plans, and thereby help generate both a national and an integrated multinational strategy for special operations forces in the Arctic. Harnessing this allied expertise and participation would also ensure that U.S. plans are based on a comprehensive perspective and have a multi-domain, holistic approach to the region.
Such an integrated strategy could significantly enhance the U.S. Joint Staff and GCCs’ plans for competition in the Arctic by synchronizing various disparate efforts resulting in a more comprehensive and holistic approach compared to what we experience today.
Foto: Forsvaret
About the authors:
Mark Grdovic is currently the Senior International SOF advisor within the U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters J3-International Division. In 2012 he retired as a Special Forces LTC from the U.S. Army. Since his retirement from active service, he has served in a variety of positions, including as a strategic planner at U.S. CENTCOM, an operations advisor in SOCCENT and Adjunct Faculty member at the U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Special Operations University. He holds a B.A. in National Defense Studies from Kings College London and is a graduate of the British Joint Staff College.
LTC Marius Kristiansen is an active duty Norwegian Army Officer. LTC Kristiansen currently serves as the Norwegian Exchange Officer in the U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters J3-International Division. He holds a B.A. in Military Leadership and Land Warfare from the Norwegian Military Academy, an Advanced Certificate in Terrorism studies from the University of St. Andrews in the U.K., an M.S. in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and is a graduate of U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer: The views presented are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Department of Defense, the U.S. Special Operations Command or the Norwegian Armed Forces.
References:
13. All the president’s enemies
Conclusion:
Many people also expected he’d at least attempt to reunite an increasingly polarized nation. As he begins his second year in office, he’d be wise to consider what he must do — and what he absolutely must not do — if he is to have any chance of accomplishing that worthy mission.
All the president’s enemies
Mitch McConnell is no Vladimir Putin, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or Xi Jinping
OPINION:
As he begins his second year in office this week, President Biden looks toward the horizon and sees multiple challenges and threats. Three of the most worrisome:
Russia’s strongman, President Vladimir Putin, having taken the Crimean Peninsula and Donbas region from neighboring Ukraine, now has troops poised for a possible further invasion of that former Soviet state.
Iran’s strongman, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who commands military proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, is continuing to develop nuclear weapons, key to furthering his neo-imperialist ambitions.
China’s strongman, President Xi Jinping, having stamped his boot on the people of Hong Kong, is now considering the deployment of his increasingly powerful military to do the same to the people of Taiwan.
In a fiery speech last week, Mr. Biden boasted that he’s “worked in foreign policy my whole life.” He warned of forces “that value power over principle” that pose a “grave threat” to “our democracy,” promote “subversion” and maybe preparing for an “onslaught.”
We must choose “democracy over autocracy, light over shadows, justice over injustice!” he declared.
Oh, I should mention: He was referring not to foreign tyrants but to members of Congress who disagree with his legislative proposals.
What are we to make of such rhetoric? An election year has begun, and Mr. Biden would doubtless prefer not to talk about the fiasco of the Afghanistan surrender and withdrawal, the absence of security on the Mexican border, the highest inflation rate in 40 years, unionized teachers refusing to return to the classroom and confused pandemic policies.
But does he sincerely believe that those who oppose a bill to nationalize election procedures are, as he put it, “on the side” of Jefferson Davis, the rebel leader and slavery defender, while those who agree with him are “on the side of Abraham Lincoln”?
He went on to pledge that he would fight “all enemies — foreign and, yes, domestic” — equating elected American lawmakers with ultranationalist Mr. Putin, Mr. Khamenei and Chinese Communist Party Chair Xi.
Beyond slandering his former colleagues, such comments trivialize the life-and-death crises in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia. After all his years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is it possible that Mr. Biden doesn’t get that?
Whatever the answer, Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi and Mr. Khamenei must be mightily encouraged to see the American house continuing to divide. They must be pleasantly surprised to hear Mr. Biden say that America lacks “voting rights,” will fail without his “reforms” and that the millions of Americans who disagree are racists and traitors. That sounds not unlike the messages they’ve long been propagating about the American experiment.
Over the days since the Atlanta speech, criticism of the president has come from across the political spectrum. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell called Mr. Biden’s remarks “incorrect, incoherent, and beneath his office.” Sen. Mitt Romney, a moderate Republican, lamented that Mr. Biden was going “down the same tragic road taken by President Trump casting doubt on the reliability of American elections.” Sen. Kyrsten Sinema, a moderate Democrat, rebuked Mr. Biden for “pressuring us to see our fellow Americans as enemies.” Sen. Dick Durbin, a Democrat of the left, acknowledged that the president “went a little too far.”
If Mr. Biden’s political advisers are worth their salt, they’ll urge him to stop denigrating Americans who differ with him as … well, “deplorable” is the word that comes to mind. If he does not change direction, invitations to campaign with Democratic candidates in competitive districts are likely to be few and far between.
More consequentially, the president’s national security and foreign policies require significant adjustment if he is to do better in 2022 than he did in 2021. That should start with the recognition that America’s enemies are making common cause, cheering each other’s victories, and building on them. Deterrence cannot be achieved simply by sending diplomats to talkfests at posh hotels while declaring, “America is back!”
Among the most urgent actions right now: Supplying Ukraine and Taiwan with the military equipment and weapons needed to make them “porcupines” — difficult for an invader to digest.
If the Ukrainian and Taiwanese leaders have the means to mount a prolonged and determined defense of their homelands, Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi may conclude that “strategic patience” is preferable to what Lenin called “adventurism.”
As for Iran’s rulers, Mr. Biden should understand by now that attempts to appease, bribe or seduce them will be unavailing. My FDD colleague, Mark Dubowitz, and former Pentagon senior adviser Matthew Kroenig made the case in a Wall Street Journal op-ed last week for a realistic alternative: “coercive diplomacy.” That means “putting the military option back on the table, along with a renewed sanctions offensive.” Without those tools, American diplomats have no leverage.
More broadly, the president’s highest priority should be ensuring that the United States remains significantly more powerful, both militarily and economically than its adversaries. The strongmen in Moscow, Tehran and Beijing find weakness provocative — maybe irresistible.
One more point: Mr. Biden won the White House largely because millions of people thought he would be “sane and normal and principled” — as New York Times columnist Gail Collins described him the day before the Atlanta speech (which was anything but). They certainly expected he’d know better than to confuse political opponents in Washington with predators in the global jungle.
Many people also expected he’d at least attempt to reunite an increasingly polarized nation. As he begins his second year in office, he’d be wise to consider what he must do — and what he absolutely must not do — if he is to have any chance of accomplishing that worthy mission.
• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a columnist for the Washington Times.
14. What's Plan B? -- The Small, The Agile, and The Many
What's Plan B? -- The Small, The Agile, and The Many
One of the most audacious and bold manifestos for the future of Naval innovation has just been posted by the Rear Admiral who heads up the Office of Naval Research. It may be the hedge we need to deter China in the South China Sea.
While You Were Out
In the two decades since 9/11, while the U.S. was fighting Al-Qaeda and ISIS, China built new weapons and developed new operational concepts to negate U.S. military strengths. They’ve built ICBMs with conventional warheads to hit our aircraft carriers. They converted reefs in international waters into airbases, creating unsinkable aircraft carriers that extend the range of their aircraft and are armed with surface to air missiles make it dangerous to approach China’s mainland and Taiwan.
To evade our own fleet air defense systems, they’ve armed their missiles with maneuvering warheads, and to reduce our reaction time they have missiles that travel at hypersonic speed.
The sum of these Chinese offset strategies means that in the South China Sea the U.S. can no longer deter a war because we can longer guarantee we can win one.
This does not bode well for our treaty allies, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Control of the South China Sea would allow China to control fishing operations and oil and gas exploration; to politically coerce other countries bordering in the region; to enforce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea; or to enforce a blockade around Taiwan or invade it.
What To Do About It?
Today the Navy has aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, and sensors under the sea and in space. Our plan to counter to China can be summed up as, more of the same but better and more tightly integrated.
This might be the right strategy. However, what if we’re wrong? What if our assumptions about the survivability of these naval platforms and the ability of our marines to operate, were based on incorrect assumption about our investments in material, operational concepts and mental models?
If so, it might be prudent for the Navy to have a hedge strategy. Think of a hedge as a “just in case” strategy. It turns out the Navy had one in WWII. And it won the war in the Pacific.
War Plan Orange
In the 1930s U.S. war planners thought about a future war with Japan. The result was “War Plan Orange” centered on the idea that ultimately, American battleships would engage the Japanese fleet in a gunnery battle, which the U.S. would win.
Unfortunately for us Japan didn’t adhere to our war plan. They were bolder and more imaginative than we were. Instead of battleships, they used aircraft carriers to attack us. The U.S. woke up on Dec. 7, 1941, with most of our battleships sitting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The core precept of War Plan Orange went to the bottom with it.
But the portfolio of options available to Admiral Nimitz and President Roosevelt were not limited to battleships. They had a hedge strategy in place in case the battleships were not the solution. The hedges? Aircraft carriers and submarines.
While the U.S. Navy’s primary investment pre-WW2 was in battleships, the Navy had also made a substantial alternative investment – in aircraft carriers and submarines. The Navy launched the first aircraft carrier in 1920. For the next two decades they ran fleet exercises with them. At the beginning of the war the U.S. Navy had seven aircraft carriers (CVs) and one aircraft escort vessel (AVG). By the end of the war the U.S. had built 111 carriers. (24 fleet carriers, 9 light carriers and 78 escort carriers.) 12 were sunk.
As it turned out, it was carriers, subs, and the Marines who won the Pacific conflict.
Our Current Plan
Fast forward to today. For the last 80 years the carriers in a Carrier Strike Group and submarines remain the preeminent formation for U.S. naval warfare.
China has been watching us operate and fight in this formation for decades. But what if carrier strike groups can no longer win a fight? What if the U.S. is underestimating China’s capabilities, intents, imagination, and operating concepts? What if they can disable or destroy our strike groups (via cyber, conventionally armed ICBMs, cruise missiles, hypersonics, drones, submarines, etc.)? If that’s a possibility, then what is the Navy’s 21st-century hedge? What is its Plan B?
Says Who?
Here’s where this conversation gets interesting. While I have an opinion, think tanks have an opinion, and civilians in the Pentagon have an opinion, RAdm Lorin Selby, the Chief of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), has more than just “an opinion.” ONR is the Navy’s science and technology systems command. Its job is to see over the horizon and think about what’s possible. Selby was previously deputy commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and commander of the Naval Surface Warfare Centers (NSWC). As the chief engineer of the Navy, he was the master of engineering the large and the complex.
Diversification
A hedge strategy is built on the premise that you invest in different things, not more or better versions of the same.
But there is an equally accurate statement that this is not a diversified portfolio because all these assets share many of the same characteristics:
- They are all large compared to their predecessors
- They are all expensive – to the point where the Navy can’t afford the number of platforms our force structure assessments suggest they need
- They are all multi-mission and therefore complex
- The system-to-system interactions to create these complex integrations drive up cost and manufacturing lead times
- Long manufacturing lead times mean they have no surge capacity
- They are acquired on a requirements model that lags operational identification of need by years…sometimes decades when you fold in the construction span times for some of these complex capabilities like carriers or submarines
- They are difficult to modernize – The ability to update the systems aboard these platforms, even the software systems, still takes years to accomplish
If the primary asset of the U.S. fleet now and in the future is the large and the complex, then surely there must be a hedge, a Plan B somewhere? (Like the pre-WW2 aircraft carriers.) In fact, there isn’t. The Navy has demos of alternatives, but there is no force structure built on a different set of principles that would complicate China’s plans and create doubt in our adversaries of whether they could prevail in a conflict.
The Hedge Strategy – Create “the small, the agile, and the many”
In a world where the large and the complex are either too expensive to generate en masse or potentially too vulnerable to put at risk, “the small, the agile, and the many” has the potential to define the future of Navy formations.
We need formations composed of dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of unmanned vehicles above, below, and on the ocean surface. We need to build collaborating, autonomous formations…NOT a collection of platforms.
This novel formation is going to be highly dependent on artificial intelligence and new software that enables cross-platform collaboration and human machine teaming.
To do this we need a different world view. One that is no longer tied to large 20th-century industrial systems, but to a 21st-century software-centric agile world.
The Selby Manifesto:
-- Digitally adept naval forces will outcompete forces organized around principle of industrial optimization. “Data is the new oil and software is the new steel”
-- The systems engineering process we have built over the last 150 years is not optimal for software-based systems.
- Instead, iterative design approaches dominate software design
-- The Navy has world-class engineering and acquisition processes to deal with hardware
- but applying the same process and principles to digital systems is a mistake
-- The design principles that drive software companies are fundamentally different than those that drive industrial organizations.
-- Applying industrial-era principles to digital era technologies is a recipe for failure
-- The Navy has access to amazing capabilities that already exist. And part of our challenge will be to integrate those capabilities together in novel ways that allow new modes of operation and more effectiveness against operational priorities
-- There’s an absolute need to foster a collaborative partnership with academia and businesses – big businesses, small businesses, and startups
-- This has serious implication of how the Navy and Marine Corps needs to change. What do we need to change when it comes to engineering and operating concepts?
How To Get “The Small, The Agile, and The Many” Tested and In The Water?
Today, “the small, the agile and the many” have been run in war games, exercises, simulations, and small demonstrations, but not built at scale in a formation of dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of unmanned vehicles above, below and on the ocean’s surface. We need to prove whether these systems can fight alongside our existing assets (or independently if required).
ONR plans to rapidly prove that this idea works, and that the Navy can build it. Or they will disprove the theory. Either way the Navy needs to know quickly whether they have a hedge. Time is not on our side in the South China Sea.
ONR’s plan is to move boldly. They’re building this new “small, the agile, and the many”formation on digital principles and they’re training a new class of program managers – digital leaders – to guide the journey through the complex software and data.
They are going to partner with industry using rapid, simple, and accountable acquisition processes, using it to get through the gauntlet of discussions to contract in short time periods so we can get to work. And these processes are going to excite new partners and allies.
They’re going to use all the ideas already on the shelves, whether government shelves or commercial shelves, and focus on what can be integrated and then what must be invented.
All the while they’ve been talking to commanders in fleets around the world. And taking a page from digital engineering practices, instead of generating a list of requirements, they’re building to the operational need by asking “what is the real problem?” They are actively listening, using Lean and design thinking to hear and understand the problems, to build a minimal viable product – a prototype solution – and get it into the water. Then asking, did that solve the problem…no? Why not? Okay, we are going to go fix it and come back in a few months, not years.
The goal is to demonstrate this novel naval formation virtually, digitally, and then physically with feedback from in water experiments. Ultimately the goal is getting agile prototyping out to sea and doing it faster than ever before.
In the end the goal is to effectively evaluate the idea of “the small, the agile, and the many.” How to iterate at scale and at speed. How to take things that meet operational needs and make them part of the force structure, deploying them in novel naval formations, learning their operational capabilities, not just their technical merits. If we’re successful, then we can help guarantee the rest of century.
What Can Go Wrong?
During the Cold War the U.S. prided itself on developing offset strategies, technical or operational concepts that leapfrogged the Soviet Union. Today China has done that to us. They’ve surprised us with multiple offset strategies, and more are likely to come. The fact is that China is innovating faster than the Department of Defense, they’ve gotten inside our DoD OODA loop.
But China is not innovating faster than our nation as a whole. Innovation in our commercial ecosystem — in AI, machine learning, autonomy, commercial access to space, cyber, biotech, semiconductors (all technologies the DoD and Navy need) — continues to solve the toughest problems at speed and scale, attracting the best and the brightest with private capital that dwarfs the entire DoD R&E (research and engineering) budget.
RADM Selby’s plan of testing the hedge of “the small, the agile, and the many” using tools and technologies of the 21st century is exactly the right direction for the Navy.
However, in peacetime bold, radical ideas are not welcomed. They disrupt the status quo. They challenge existing reporting structures, and in a world of finite budgets, money has to be taken from existing programs and primes or programs even have to be killed to make the new happen. Even when positioned as a hedge, existing vendors, existing Navy and DoD organizations, existing political power centers, will all see “the small, the agile, and the many” as a threat. It challenges careers, dollars, and mindsets. Many will do their best to impede, kill or co-opt this idea.
We are outmatched in the South China Sea. And the odds are getting longer each year. In a war with China we won’t have years to rebuild our Navy.
A crisis is an opportunity to clear out the old to make way for the new. If senior leadership of the Navy, DoD, executive branch, and Congress truly believe we need to win this fight, that this is a crisis, then ONR and “the small, the agile, and the many” needs a direct report to the Secretary of the Navy and the budget and authority to make this happen.
The Navy and the country need a hedge. Let’s get started now.
15. Don’t Bury Alberto Nisman Again
Excerpts:
Today, AMIA-related INTERPOL red notices for current and former Iranian officials, including Mohsen Rezaei, and a Lebanese national remain in effect. Last week, the world witnessed Nicaragua hosting Mohsen Rezaee for whom Argentina also has an arrest warrant in connection with the AMIA bombing. He is also on Argentina’s terrorism list and is sanctioned by the United States.
Argentina issued a bland statement criticizing Nicaragua but did not fulfill its own obligation in a timely manner to seek his arrest and extradition so he could stand before an Argentine court of law to face justice. Argentina’s justice system is failing both the victims of the AMIA bombing and the Argentine public. Those with the legal duty to seek the truth have done just the opposite. They are seeking to bury Alberto Nisman and his investigation once again.
Those who care about justice, about holding Iran accountable and denying Hezbollah the means to carry out its malign activities, will seek to designate Hezbollah the terrorist outfit that it is. They will ensure that Iran’s entities and proxies perpetrating its terrorist activities abroad will be sanctioned and denied the legitimacy that they seek. Those who care will not let Argentina—or the world—rebury Alberto Nisman and his incriminating, meticulously assembled incriminating investigation.
Don’t Bury Alberto Nisman Again
Those with the legal duty to seek the truth have done just the opposite. They are seeking to bury Alberto Nisman and his investigation once again.
Alberto Nisman was found dead in his Buenos Aires apartment on Sunday, January 18, 2015. The cover-up of his murder started immediately, with evidence seeping out like water from a leaky faucet that won’t stop dripping even after multiple attempts to plug it.
Nisman had spent a decade as the head prosecutor investigating the deadliest bombing in Argentina’s history. Eighty-five people were killed and hundreds more wounded on the morning of July 18, 1994, when, according to Nisman’s findings from his exhaustive investigation, Iranian officials at the highest levels of government had planned the bombing which its proxy Hezbollah carried out. A van carrying 606 pounds of ammonium nitrate plowed into the five-story AMIA Jewish community center building. The souls of the victims’ families are still scarred.
Nisman had filed a complaint with Federal Judge Ariel Lijo’s court on Wednesday, January 14, 2015. He alleged that then-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner had made an agreement with Iran to absolve the Islamic Republic of responsibility in the AMIA terrorist attack and to lift the INTERPOL red notices on the Iranian officials Nisman had implicated. In exchange, Iran would sell oil to Argentina and Tehran would receive grain, and possibly weapons, according to the complaint filed with Lijo. A Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU, was signed between the two countries, a document that is now public.
Kirchner’s allies scrambled to learn what else Nisman had on her.
Days after his death, Kirchner disbanded the SIDE, the top intelligence agency, knowing some agents had cooperated with Nisman. She created a new spy agency, Agencia Federal de Inteligencia, led by her cronies.
After long delays, Prosecutor Eduardo Taiano pursued the complaint Nisman had filed with Lijo. On March 5, 2018, Kirchner and a dozen of her associates were indicted in federal court for obstructing the investigation into Iran’s role in the bombing.
Within hours after he was found dead, Kirchner immediately—and falsely—announced Nisman had committed suicide. Soon after, she posited other false conspiracy theories. None have stuck. The evidence was not there.
Diego Lagomarsino, Nisman’s technology consultant indicted as an accessory to the murder, claimed the prosecutor had asked him to bring him a gun. It was Lagomarsino’s .22-caliber Bersa gun that killed Nisman. Police investigations found no residue from Lagomarsiono’s gun on Nisman’s hands.
The investigation into his death was so bungled that one can only surmise the sloppiness was intentional. Then-Vice Minister of Security Sergio Berni tracked through the apartment with his muddy shoes. Viviana Fein, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation, stepped in pools of Nisman’s blood. Evidence that ought to have been preserved was not taken into custody until months or even years—after Nisman’s death.
Nisman had bodyguards protecting him in his Puerto Madero residence. On that Sunday, for twelve hours, he was suspiciously left unprotected. Many of the cameras in his usually secure building were inoperable that day.
Nisman’s complaint was one of a dozen judicial cases against Kirchner.
Kirchner sought to defend herself against Nisman’s allegations. She insisted on taking actions that had no basis in Argentina’s justice system, demanding to address the court and to have her court statement publicly broadcast. Neither of these demands was permissible under Argentine law because the trial had not yet begun. And yet the panel of judges acquiesced.
In an hour-long speech, Kirchner argued that she had committed no crime and that therefore the trial should not proceed, and the case should be dismissed. In his earlier reports, Nisman had agreed that Kirchner’s conduct of foreign relations was part of her executive duties, but maintained that under the constitution, her executive authorities could not intrude into the judiciary’s authority. That is, in carrying out her foreign relations work she was not allowed to absolve Iranian citizens that Argentina’s judiciary had implicated in the killing of eighty-five Argentine citizens. That, he said, was the crime she had committed.
To the shock of victims’ families, last October the three-judge panel dismissed the case before the trial of by now Vice President Kirchner had even started, before the evidence was presented, and before 300 witnesses were to speak—witnesses who were not afforded the opportunity to address the court and the nation. The miscarriage of justice continued. As she did with corruption cases against her before other courts, she successfully unwound this case. Victims’ families appealed the case before a higher court where a decision is pending.
Also in October 2021, major evidence of an alleged attempt to obstruct an investigation into Nisman’s death emerged. The respected Clarin journalist Hector Gambini uncovered what had happened in the Casa Rosada—the presidential offices—the day before Nisman was found dead. At 4:15 pm, a fire broke out in the room holding the electronic data tracking all those entering the presidential offices. The data was destroyed. The fire took place during the same afternoon that technology consultant Lagomarsino would later claim he was bringing Nisman the gun he claimed Nisman had requested.
Anibal Fernandez, then Kirchner’s chief-of-cabinet (now minister of security), denied there had been a fire in the Casa Rosada. He later acknowledged a fire but claimed it had occurred on February 21. When time-stamped photographs were published showing the fire had taken place on January 17—the evening before Nisman was found dead, not thirty-five days after—he asserted it was inconsequential. Was it?
As many as 130,000 records of those who entered the presidential offices from 2011 to 2015 were destroyed in the fire. It’s the same period during which Nisman found, according to wiretaps he had obtained, that negotiations about the MOU with Iran were taking place.
Was it inconsequential that the fire destroying critical data took place just three days after Nisman had filed his complaint against Kirchner?
Was it inconsequential that Casa Rosada staff were directed to record the fire as accidental so that it would not trigger a judicial investigation?
Was it inconsequential that Kirchner’s top aide Fernandez assured the public there was a backup of the data when in fact he had ordered the technicians not to back up the data, according to evidence published by Clarin?
Was it inconsequential that the electrical overload only destroyed the visitor access records but not any other digital files in the Casa Rosada?
Was it inconsequential that while several firefighters suffered injuries from smoke inhalation, it was recorded as just a “fire alarm”?
Why did the summary of the incident indicate that “no journalists were nearby?” Was it to keep secret a possible conspiracy to destroy evidence?
Who was seeking to bury evidence and for what purpose?
Those who successfully plotted to kill Nisman didn’t want to just bury his body. They wanted to bury the body of evidence he had collected while investigating the bombing of the AMIA, and, perhaps, the data that might have corroborated the incriminating evidence he had accumulated from some 30,000 legally obtained wire taps he said implicated Kirschner and her associates for seeking to whitewash Iran’s role in the bombing.
Today, AMIA-related INTERPOL red notices for current and former Iranian officials, including Mohsen Rezaei, and a Lebanese national remain in effect. Last week, the world witnessed Nicaragua hosting Mohsen Rezaee for whom Argentina also has an arrest warrant in connection with the AMIA bombing. He is also on Argentina’s terrorism list and is sanctioned by the United States.
Argentina issued a bland statement criticizing Nicaragua but did not fulfill its own obligation in a timely manner to seek his arrest and extradition so he could stand before an Argentine court of law to face justice. Argentina’s justice system is failing both the victims of the AMIA bombing and the Argentine public. Those with the legal duty to seek the truth have done just the opposite. They are seeking to bury Alberto Nisman and his investigation once again.
Those who care about justice, about holding Iran accountable and denying Hezbollah the means to carry out its malign activities, will seek to designate Hezbollah the terrorist outfit that it is. They will ensure that Iran’s entities and proxies perpetrating its terrorist activities abroad will be sanctioned and denied the legitimacy that they seek. Those who care will not let Argentina—or the world—rebury Alberto Nisman and his incriminating, meticulously assembled incriminating investigation.
Toby Dershowitz is senior vice president for government relations and strategy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow her on Twitter @TobyDersh.
Image: Reuters.
16. 'Warmer' peace with Israel offers Jordan better economic dividends
Excerpt:
America and its allies can do more to help Jordan economically. At $38 billion, or 90 percent of its GDP, Jordan’s national debt is surging, while debt service is consuming money that could be invested in productive sectors. A donor conference could offer Amman assistance and low interest loans that could help tame its debt. As the past three decades have shown, investing in Jordan does more to stabilize the region, both politically and economically, than trying to fix some of the country’s troubled neighbors.
'Warmer' peace with Israel offers Jordan better economic dividends
The Hill · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain and Enia Krivine, opinion contributors · January 18, 2022
For the first time in seven years, the Jordanian royal court recently released a photo of King Abdullah II meeting with an Israeli official, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Jan. 5 in Amman. This gesture is a clear indication that relations between the two neighboring countries are warming up again. After a decade of sluggish growth and falling standards of living, Jordan likely wants to capture a bigger share of the growing pie of Arab economic cooperation with Israel.
U.S. legislators from both parties recently launched a bipartisan House-Senate caucus that would be a “cheerleading squad” for the Abraham Accords, signed last year between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain.
In the first year of peace between Israel and the UAE, bilateral trade reached $700 million. In 2020, bilateral trade between Israel and Jordan stood at $250 million, 27 years after they had signed a peace treaty. These numbers suggest that Jordan has much to gain by moving beyond the “cold peace” it has with Israel and embracing the accords.
In December, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement to facilitate Jordanian exports to the West Bank. The deal’s ambitious goal is to increase the total from $150 million to $700 million a year. In July, Israel agreed to increase its annual supply of fresh water to its eastern neighbor by 50 million cubic meters, doubling the previous figure. The UAE brokered a deal in which Jordan produces solar energy for the Israeli market, and Israel reciprocates by desalinating Mediterranean water for supply to Jordan.
Israel’s peace with Jordan remains colder than expected because some Jordanians see the agreement as a political necessity rather than a true opportunity. They argue that relations with Israel should remain a purely government-to-government affair, rather than a bond between two peoples. Some even argue that while peace is net positive for the Israeli economy, it is a net negative for Arab economies.
The data say otherwise. One “fruit of peace” with Israel, according to the Tony Blair Institute, “was the start of a process that led to a series of international trade agreements and placed Jordan on a path of accelerated, export-driven economic growth.”
The institute observed that during “the 2000s the Jordanian economy grew at an average real rate of 6 percent a year. Jordanian exports of goods increased fourfold, from $2 billion in 2000 to $8 billion in 2008. Jordan’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita more than doubled, and unemployment declined from 15 to 12 percent, despite an annual 5 percent growth in the Jordanian workforce.”
Because of its political stability and economic growth, Jordan attracted Iraqi immigrants, followed by waves of Syrian and Iraqi refugees starting in 2011. The population of Jordan has thus doubled over the past decade, putting pressure on the economy. The wars in Iraq and Syria have also interrupted regional trade and tourism, a further drag on the Jordanian economy. Over the past decade, the economy has grown by only a bit more than 2 percent per year, while per capita GDP has fallen significantly.
The road ahead for Jordan will be difficult, but the Abraham Accords offer Amman the opportunity to collect more dividends of peace. The bigger the volume of trade in goods and services between Israel and Arab countries, the bigger the regional economic pie and the bigger share Jordan can capture for its own economy.
One positive sign is that Israeli tourism in Jordan is on the rise as more Israelis choose to vacation in Aqaba — a Jordanian resort town on the Red Sea — over Israel’s Eilat. And since Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula — once a popular escape for Israeli vacationers — has become riskier due to a surge of Islamist terrorism, Jordan has become the best alternative.
Leaders in Egypt, until recently the only other Arab country with a peace treaty with Israel, have recognized the opportunity to forge deeper economic ties and have been trying to turn their country’s “cold peace” with Israel into a warmer one.
In September, Abdul-Fattah al-Sissi became the first Egyptian president to openly meet with an Israeli prime minister in a decade. In October, Egyptian airlines announced that it will fly its trips to and from Israel under its own name, 39 years after flying under the guise of the non-existent airliner Sinai Air. In November, Israeli generals visited Sinai for a rare public meeting with their Egyptian counterparts.
When Arab countries launched their boycott of Israel in 1948, they reasoned that such policy would result in Israel dying off. But Israel survived. Enforcement of the boycott became inconsistent during the 1990s, when Israel seemed to be approaching peace with the Palestinians. Yet until the Abraham Accords, the notion of a true partnership with Israel still seemed out of bounds. The accords offer the Jordanian economy an opportunity for further integration into the regional economy of Arab countries that are living at peace with Israel, and therefore more growth.
America and its allies can do more to help Jordan economically. At $38 billion, or 90 percent of its GDP, Jordan’s national debt is surging, while debt service is consuming money that could be invested in productive sectors. A donor conference could offer Amman assistance and low interest loans that could help tame its debt. As the past three decades have shown, investing in Jordan does more to stabilize the region, both politically and economically, than trying to fix some of the country’s troubled neighbors.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow and Enia Krivine is the senior director of the Israel Program and National Security Network at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (@FDD), a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow Hussain on Twitter @hahussain and Enia @EKrivine
The Hill · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain and Enia Krivine, opinion contributors · January 18, 2022
17. No, Robin Sage is not the conspiracy theory that some people want it to be
I think Jack Murphy's tweet that accompanied this article put. Robin Sage in perspective.
Jack Murphy
@JackMurphyRGR
·
18h
Things that Robin Sage is not:
1. A girl that dances at the Platinum Club off of Bragg Blvd.
2. A government conspiracy to wage war against the American people.
No, Robin Sage is not the conspiracy theory that some people want it to be
It is unfortunate that this needs to be addressed once again, but no, the Robin Sage exercise run by U.S. Army Special Warfare Center in North Carolina to train Special Forces students is not a part of some grand conspiracy.
Robin Sage is an unconventional warfare training exercise run multiple times per year in which soldiers training to be Green Berets have their skills tested in large-scale scenarios. This year's exercise will run from Jan. 22 to Feb. 4 when students infiltrate the fictional country of Atlantica and meet up with guerrilla fighters played by role players, a combination of DOD contractors and local volunteers. Then they begin planning and training to wage unconventional warfare.
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As the Army reasonably announced that the exercise will soon take place in order to alert the local populace, the conspiracies and innuendoes started right away. Perhaps the all-time dumbest take on it came from the Daily Mail with the salacious headline: "A civil war rehearsal? US Army will conduct a two-week 'guerilla war' training exercise in North Carolina to teach Special Forces how to overthrow an 'illegitimate government' just weeks after DoJ announced new 'domestic terrorism' unit."
The Daily Mail article is a perfect example of how correlation is not causation. Yes, the Army is running an unconventional warfare training exercise and that has nothing to do with any Department of Justice attempts to combat domestic terrorism.
Contrary to what random social media users may say, Robin Sage has nothing to do with training the Army to fight Americans, wage war here at home, or otherwise prepare for martial law.
The purpose of the exercise is for prospective Special Forces soldiers to train to conduct unconventional warfare abroad should it become necessary, as 5th Special Forces Group did in Afghanistan in 2001 and 10th Special Forces Group did in Iraq in 2003.
Every so often these conspiracies spread like wildfire online, from Robin Sage to Jade Helm. After decades of conspiracies about FEMA camps and the UN invading America, it might be time for some folks to try the decaf.
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18. US Signaling Putin that Ukraine Will Be Bloody
Excerpts:
“I suspect Putin is finding out that they don’t make spheres of influence like they used to, and that in this populist era he may be sitting over powder kegs more than client states,” Robert Manning, a former State Department official at the Atlantic Council, wrote earlier this month.
That’s a message Washington wants Moscow to hear in the Kabuki shadow war over Ukraine. And it’s understood that some in Washington are indeed serious about setting fires in Kazakhstan and elsewhere—not just Ukraine—should Russian troops and tanks cross the Dnieper in the coming days.
But the theater of veiled and unveiled threats is coming to a close. The real thing starts soon.
US Signaling Putin that Ukraine Will Be Bloody
CIA, Green Berets prepare Ukraine for guerrilla war, while Washington eyes other Russian weak points
The diplomatic game of chicken between Russia and the U.S. appears to be rolling toward a violent climax, with a U.S. official warning Tuesday that the situation is "extremely dangerous," and that Russia could invade Ukraine "at any moment." The U.S.-Russia talks appear to be “at a dead end,” as one Kremlin diplomat put it last week, even as they intend to give it one more try on Friday in Vienna.
Washington has taken pains to appear girding Ukraine for battle, with CIA Director Bill Burns and Secretary of State Antony Blinken flying off to Kyiv for urgent meetings, all the while expediting intelligence support and defensive arms shipments. On Tuesday a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators visiting Kyiv vowed solidarity and weapons for the Ukrainian government and people, including possibly deadly Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The CIA and U.S. Green Berets have been preparing Ukraine troops for unconventional warfare—a defense-only move, they say. But the training, which has included “tactical stuff,” is “going to start looking pretty offensive if Russians invade Ukraine,” a former senior intelligence official told Yahoo News’ Zach Dorfman.
(Staff Sgt. Eddie Siguenza/Army National Guard)
"I think Vladimir Putin has made the biggest mistake of his career in underestimating how courageously the people of Ukraine will fight him if he invades," Senator Richard Blumenthal told reporters.
No one imagines that Ukraine can imperil, much less rout, a Russian invasion, but Washington’s part in the darkening drama has been to warn Putin that an attempt at a permanent occupation will be plagued by a bloody, U.S.-backed insurgency that will make its experience in Afghanistan seem mild in comparison.
And Washington could well be tempted to stir up trouble elsewhere.
“U.S. Special Forces Are Training for Full-Blown War with Russia,” a headline in The National Interest, a bipartisan conservative magazine, trumpeted last May. Green Berets and other American spec ops teams have been conducting joint training exercises in a Russia-ringing arc from northern Scandinavia through the Baltics to the Balkans and beyond, involving nearly two dozen foreign counterparts (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Spain and, of course, Ukraine). Albania was just added to the mix. U.S. Special Forces have also been welcomed in some of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
“If Putin invades Ukraine with a major military force, U.S. and NATO military assistance—intelligence, cyber, anti-armor and anti-air weapons, offensive naval missiles—would ratchet up significantly,” James Stavridis, a retired four-star Navy admiral who was the supreme allied commander at NATO, told the New York Times last week. “And if it turned into a Ukrainian insurgency, Putin should realize that after fighting insurgencies ourselves for two decades, we know how to arm, train and energize them.”
Stavridis may have misspoken. “Fighting insurgencies,” we haven’t been so good at, from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. efforts were undermine by their tethers to corrupt, inefficient regimes and officials. Supporting insurgencies, we’ve been better at.
But CNN reports that some Biden officials, “wary of getting bogged down in an anti-occupation support effort,” are not so gung-ho to green light an unconventional warfare campaign that could go on for years. Afghanistan is a not distant memory, it’s not even over.
"We can exact some pain, but there is a big difference between exacting pain and actually having leverage," a senior US official said.
Optimists look back to the U.S.-backed Muslim uprising against the Soviet Red Army during the 1980s, especially after the CIA deployed game-changing Stingers, which neutralized Russian warplanes and gunships. But other CIA-backed insurgencies—Nicaragua in the 1980s, Iraq in the 1990s and Syria over the past decade—have fallen far short of that mark. With one major exception—covertly backing Poland’s Solidarity movement in the 1980s—the CIA’s Cold War record of clandestine operations aimed at the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites was mostly a bust.
History Lessons
In the summer of 1948, President Harry S Truman’s White House National Security Council drew up “perhaps one of the most important documents in the CIA's history,” as a an agency planning document described it. NCS Directive 10/2 was a plan for all-out "covert operations" and “activities” against the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites.
Frank Wisner, the leader of Its psychological warfare component, thought the U.S. could exploit Russia’s “internal strains” and "psychological fission" to crack the Soviet Union. The project had some psywar successes, publicizing Soviet repression and economic failures, mainly through such CIA-backed propaganda vehicles as Radio Free Europe. But its efforts to subvert the USSR and its satellites by supporting or inventing anti-communist organizations in Russia were a spectacular bust. The KGB was always one step ahead.
“There were hundreds of these operations. And, yes, they ranged all the way from Bulgaria in the southeast of Europe all the way up to Poland, even in the Baltic states that were under Soviet control—or were part of the Soviet Union,” Scott Anderson, author of The Quiet Americans, told NPR in 2020. “They were uniformly disastrous. Virtually everybody who was parachuted in either disappeared or were captured and executed.”
In the 1960s, the CIA was busy at war elsewhere with the Soviets or their putative proxies, in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. Covert action aimed directly at Mother Russia was pretty much abandoned over the next two decades.
Ronald Reagan would reverse that.
On May 20, 1982, Reagan signed into law National Security Decision Directive 32, authorizing diplomatic, propaganda, political, and military action to “contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence through the world,” as Seth Jones, vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it in a 2018 paper. Reagan followed up months later with an even more aggressive Top Secret directive, one which declared “it was U.S. policy to unhinge Moscow’s grip on Eastern Europe and to reunite it—eventually—with Western Europe.” Its most lauded success, code-named QRHelpful, funneled $20 million worth of covert support to the Solidarity labor movement. Before the end of the decade, Eastern Europe cracked open, the Berlin Wall came down, and the Soviet Union, long sagging under its own economic weight and military adventurism, was well on the way to dissolution.
Tremors in Kazakhstan
It’s easy to understand why Vladimir Putin might’ve been rattled by the popular protests that swept across Kazakhstan early this month. His hands were already full with the crisis he’d manufactured in Ukraine. He blamed foreign interests, and people “apparently trained in terrorist camps abroad” for the unrest, which reportedly included well organized attacks on police stations.
Analysts awarded Putin a victory for his quick military intervention (officially, an action by Moscow’s version of NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). But now he’s saddled with propping up yet another deeply unpopular and corrupt regime—which makes Kazakhstan a tempting target for the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, especially should Putin go ahead and invade Ukraine. He appears deeply concerned that Kazakhstan, even Belarus, could be ripe for another wave of Western backed “color revolutions,” which shattered Moscow’s control of Eastern Europe beginning 20 years ago.
“Of course, there is definitely polarity in Kazakhstan between the rich and very poor, which has never been seriously challenged before now, and that is an important upshot from these protests,” says Michael Frachetti, a professor of anthropology at Washington University, St. Louis, who specializes in Central Europe.
“The future of Kazakhstan will be ultimately be decided by approaches the government takes going forward—whether they want to bolster a representative relationship with the populace or double down on the path toward greater autocracy,” Frachetti said.
“I suspect Putin is finding out that they don’t make spheres of influence like they used to, and that in this populist era he may be sitting over powder kegs more than client states,” Robert Manning, a former State Department official at the Atlantic Council, wrote earlier this month.
That’s a message Washington wants Moscow to hear in the Kabuki shadow war over Ukraine. And it’s understood that some in Washington are indeed serious about setting fires in Kazakhstan and elsewhere—not just Ukraine—should Russian troops and tanks cross the Dnieper in the coming days.
But the theater of veiled and unveiled threats is coming to a close. The real thing starts soon.
19. The Pentagon’s new cybersecurity model is better, but still an incremental solution to a big challenge
Excerpts:
If the Biden administration wants to make bold changes, its priority must be securing the supply chain, not just policing companies’ basic cyber hygiene practices. In a recent conversation, John Weiler of the IT Acquisition Advisory Council, a founding member of the AB, said that to make CMMC 2.0 effective, the Pentagon needs a “very robust supply chain risk management public and private partnership to rapidly assess the technologies and architectures that government and industry rely upon.”
One way to achieve this would be to require software vendors to provide a software bill of materials (SBOM), a list of nested software components designed to enable supply chain transparency. The government should also create a single, central capability that continuously monitors SBOMs. Analyzing SBOMs can reveal otherwise hidden dependencies of components built by foreign nationals of adversarial countries and other leading indicators of risk. With this knowledge, the government and industry partners can take appropriate risk mitigations.
CMMC 2.0 may fix some of the flaws of its predecessor, but the hard work to strengthen cybersecurity still lies ahead.
The Pentagon’s new cybersecurity model is better, but still an incremental solution to a big challenge
5 min read
The Pentagon announced in November a new “strategic direction” for its Cyber Maturity Model Certification, calling it CMMC 2.0 and essentially admitting the first iteration was overly complex and costly. The new version better aligns to existing federal standards and requirements but falls well short of being the “bold change” President Biden called for in his much-touted May cybersecurity executive order.
Prior to the creation of CMMC, federal acquisition regulations required all defense contractors that interacted with controlled unclassified information (CUI) to implement the basic cyber hygiene safeguards listed in the National Institute of Standards and Technology guidelines, NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-171. Companies would then conduct self-assessments of their compliance. Predictably, not all companies assessed themselves equally or honestly, or addressed the issues they self-identified.
In November 2020, after nearly two years of development, the Defense Department introduced the original CMMC. Its most significant change was a new requirement that a third-party conduct the assessment for all organizations seeking contracts, including universities applying for grants. The Association of American Universities and others associations warned the “potentially burdensome and harmful requirements” of CMMC would “have a chilling effect” on fundamental research. CMMC had no flexibility and required all organizations, regardless of size, to meet all requirements. Thus, CMMC’s mandates on companies to pay third-party assessors and to implement potentially unnecessary security controls created significant expenses for small and medium-sized businesses. Meanwhile, in the race to roll out CMMC, DoD apparently disregarded industry concerns about the lack of clarity regarding its implementation.
DoD launched a CMMC review in March in part to “reinforce trust and confidence in the maturing CMMC assessment ecosystem,” Jesse Salazar, deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy explained. After two years of scandals focusing more on profit and power than advancing the cybersecurity posture of the defense industrial base, this is a welcome goal.
To fix the ecosystem, CMMC 2.0 reduces the security certification tiers from five to three and removes the third-party assessment requirement for level one and part of level two, allowing contractors to return to self-attestation. For the other part of level two (advanced), CMMC 2.0 requires a third-party assessment, meaning the new industry of CMMC assessors still have jobs, just a smaller market. Level three certification requires government assessors, which are already in short supply and high demand.
In addition to giving industry the flexibility it will need to meet requirements and establish an effective foundation of cybersecurity, CMMC 2.0 removes extra requirements that went beyond those included in NIST SP 800-171. David McKeown, DoD’s deputy chief information officer, explained in a town hall on November 9 that the Pentagon will “not invent a whole bunch of extra controls on our own. If additional controls are needed, we are going to work with NIST to get those added in.” Hopefully, the new leadership and direction will also leverage industry expertise and recommendations to improve CMMC 2.0’s efficacy.
To establish baseline cyber hygiene practices that protect all CUI and not just that relevant to the Defense Department, the Biden administration should consider government-wide implementation of CMMC rather than the development by each department and agency of its own separate model. At the same time, the administration should be honest about the limitations of CMMC to solve the cybersecurity crisis that the government and private sector face.
DoD has touted CMMC as a solution to supply chain risk management. It is not. The cybersecurity safeguards in NIST SP 800-171 are basic cyber hygiene practices. Separate NIST guidelines, NIST SP 800-161, identify supply chain controls, and CMMC makes no reference to them.
Days after the Pentagon’s CMMC 2.0 announcement, CNN reported that hackers breached companies across the defense industrial base by exploiting vulnerabilities that bypassed the authentication process. Which controls in NIST SP 800-171 would have stopped this? None. How would CMMC 1.0 or CMMC 2.0 have protected organizations from a SolarWinds-type attack? They would not have. SolarWinds provided a commercial, off-the-shelf product not subject to CMMC.
President Biden’s May executive order states, “Incremental improvements will not give us the security we need; instead, the federal government needs to make bold changes and significant investments to defend the vital institutions that underpin the American way of life.”
Unfortunately, CMMC 2.0 is just such an incremental improvement.
If the Biden administration wants to make bold changes, its priority must be securing the supply chain, not just policing companies’ basic cyber hygiene practices. In a recent conversation, John Weiler of the IT Acquisition Advisory Council, a founding member of the AB, said that to make CMMC 2.0 effective, the Pentagon needs a “very robust supply chain risk management public and private partnership to rapidly assess the technologies and architectures that government and industry rely upon.”
One way to achieve this would be to require software vendors to provide a software bill of materials (SBOM), a list of nested software components designed to enable supply chain transparency. The government should also create a single, central capability that continuously monitors SBOMs. Analyzing SBOMs can reveal otherwise hidden dependencies of components built by foreign nationals of adversarial countries and other leading indicators of risk. With this knowledge, the government and industry partners can take appropriate risk mitigations.
CMMC 2.0 may fix some of the flaws of its predecessor, but the hard work to strengthen cybersecurity still lies ahead.
Dr. Georgianna Shea is the chief technologist of the Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab and Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and previously served as a subject matter expert and consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on cyber resiliency. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan
20. No Troops Needed: How America Can Punish Russia for a Ukraine Invasion
Conclusion:
US cyber and space assets probably can’t win the war for Ukraine, but they can definitely hurt Russia. Information about Russian troop movements could lead to the deaths of hundreds or thousands of Russian troops. We don’t know how Russia will view such efforts, but the sophistication and extent of US capabilities in both the space and the cyber domains are well-known to the Russians. Much will depend on what the Biden administration wants the post-war environment to look like. If Washington decides that relations with the Putin government are unsalvageable, it has little incentive to go easy.
No Troops Needed: How America Can Punish Russia for a Ukraine Invasion
For many Ukrainians, the question “what will the West do if Russia starts a war?” rings hollow. Since 2014 (and even before) Russia has been trying to force Kyiv to acquiesce to its regional dominance. Low-level warfare on Ukraine’s eastern border has cost hundreds of lives and disrupted the politics and economy of the rest of the country. Some analysts call this “gray zone” or “hybrid” warfare, although both of those terms suggest more novelty than Russian actions really reveal. But now of course Russia is threatening to enforce its will through more traditional military means.
The US has virtually ruled out a response using military force in the air, at sea, or on the land. US fighters will not contest Ukrainian airspace, and US warships are unlikely to attack their Russian counterparts or deliver ordnance from sea to land. The prospect of US soldiers fighting in Ukraine seems particularly remote. But of course, the United States has lots of tools in the toolbox. In a previous column, I discussed how the United States is considering using its weapons in what we might call the “financial domain.” Here, we can think about the steps that the United States might take in space and in the cyber domain.
Russia vs. Ukraine: The Intel Game
In space, the omnipresence of satellites has already changed the calculus of war. Russia’s mobilization efforts are glaringly obvious to Ukraine and to the rest of the world. An attack like Operation Barbarossa, in which the German acquired complete strategic and operational surprise, is no longer possible. Russia can disguise its moves in order to give its armed forces a tactical advantage, but the world is watching. The United States can take further steps, however. In the event of a conflict, the United States could supply the Ukrainian armed forces with substantial intelligence with respect to the movement, strength, and logistical support networks of Russian forces in the field. This matters a great deal on the ground; Ukrainian artillery bombardments directed by US-supplied satellite intelligence could kill hundreds or even thousands of Russian troops.
The US could also lend its massive satellite communications capabilities to Ukrainian forces in the field, and although there would certainly be interoperability concerns these networks could provide communications more secure and more immediate than Ukraine’s armed forces currently possess. Even if the Biden administration hesitated to turn over the keys to the kingdom, Ukraine could use the assets of private space companies. There is little that Russia can do to prevent this, short of attacks against satellites operated by the United States and other countries. This would represent a massive escalation and might well incur retaliation against Russia’s own relatively less-developed satellite networks.
Russia vs. Ukraine: The Cyber Game
With respect to the cyber domain, Russia and Ukraine have been engaged in a low-key cyber conflict since before 2014. Russia used cyber-attacks to disrupt Ukraine during the 2014 war, just as it had against Georgia in 2008. Russia’s capabilities are surely formidable, with attacks likely to come from both state-owned and state-sponsored actors. Indeed, some reports already indicate that Russia has begun to harass both civilian and governmental Ukrainian targets. The United States tends to keep its cyber capabilities close to the vest, and so it’s unclear what Washington can do to disrupt or divert the flow of information in deployed Russian military forces. But freezing or even damaging Russian communications could have significant tactical and operational effects. The US could also launch a wide-ranging set of cyber-attacks against Russian government institutions and Russia’s own cyber-agencies; such efforts have seen some success in the recent past. It remains unclear, however, how willing either Moscow or Washington will be to let the cyber dogs off their leashes.
US cyber and space assets probably can’t win the war for Ukraine, but they can definitely hurt Russia. Information about Russian troop movements could lead to the deaths of hundreds or thousands of Russian troops. We don’t know how Russia will view such efforts, but the sophistication and extent of US capabilities in both the space and the cyber domains are well-known to the Russians. Much will depend on what the Biden administration wants the post-war environment to look like. If Washington decides that relations with the Putin government are unsalvageable, it has little incentive to go easy.
21. Inside the secretive training that US Green Berets give to troops who may have to take on Russia or China
Yes, FID is an important mission. But Special Forces are proficient in it because of their foundational mission which is unconventional warfare. The training and education in UW informs every other mission conducted by Special Forces.
“Unconventional Warfare (UW) … remains uniquely Special Forces'. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces Soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed). Robert M. Gates, Remarks at dedication
of OSS Memorial, 12 June 1992
Essence of UW:
- UW thinking informs everything SOF should do
- UW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems
- And creating dilemmas for our adversaries
- UW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of the population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, it is integral to the action arms of IO/PSYOP/CA.
Traditional strategic unconventional warfare objectives may include the following:
- Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
- Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization
- Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
- Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization
- Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.
Inside the secretive training that US Green Berets give to troops who may have to take on Russia or China
US Army Special Forces soldiers and Nepalese soldiers practice evacuating casualties in Nepal, February 18, 2020.
US Army
- US special-operations troops have for decades deployed overseas to train partners.
- Such training makes those partners better fighters and helps establish long-term relationships.
- Foreign internal defense, as it is known, is one of the most important special-ops mission, a US Green Beret said.
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But this is nothing new. Indeed, US special-operations units have been working in scores of countries for decades, teaching local units how to become better fighters and win conflicts.
This military diplomacy strengthens US presence worldwide and creates valuable alliances and partnerships that can be leveraged in a time of need.
A US soldier trains a Chadian soldier during an exercise, in Chad, February 22, 2015.
Emmanuel Braun/REUTERS
The roughly 70,000 members and supporting troops attached to US Special Operations Command and its more secretive subunit Joint Special Operations Command have global responsibilities and can conduct a wide range of mission sets.
An Army Ranger platoon may conduct a direct-action operation to take down an Al Qaeda target in Iraq. A Marine Raider team may do a strategic-reconnaissance mission to observe an Al Shabaab outpost in Kenya and gather intelligence. Army Green Berets may conduct an unconventional-warfare operation by linking up with local guerrillas to take on Taliban fighters.
Teaching others how to fight
An instructor explains patrol procedures to Iraqi special-operations soldiers during foreign internal defense training in central Iraq, August 19, 2019.
CJTF-OIR
The Department of Defense defines foreign internal defense as civilian and military agencies of one government participating in any "action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."
"Foreign internal defense is one of the important tools in our toolbox, and that is why we place so much focus on it," a Green Beret assigned to a National Guard unit told Insider.
When conducting foreign internal defense, special operators link up with foreign military forces and train them, the idea being that it's easier and a better use of resources to teach a foreign force to fight for itself.
"There is a specific reason why the Q course leans heavily on the foreign internal defense skill set," the Green Beret added, referring to the Special Forces Qualification Course.
Soldiers at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School speak with indigenous role players during training, June 16, 2021.
US Army/K. Kassens
"On top of the tactical component, we learn how to transmit knowledge very well. This is where the cultural and linguist training" that Green Berets receive "really shines," the Green Beret said. "I may think I am the best SUT [small-unit tactics] instructor out there, but if I can't transmit that knowledge succinctly and effectively, then I am no real instructor."
With the instruction provided through foreign internal defense, US special operators can reduce or eliminate the assistance partner forces would need in the event of a conflict.
That instruction can range from basic small-unit tactics to advanced close-quarters battle, among many other skills, "but the goal is always to enable [host nation] forces to conduct their own unilateral operations. If we don't have that end-goal in mind, then we will be there forever," said the National Guard Green Beret.
Building long-term relationships
Lithuanian troops and US Army Special Forces soldiers conduct mission planning during an exercise, September 8, 2018.
US Army/Sgt. Karen Sampson
Foreign internal defense is also about building long-term relationships with foreign militaries or even specific units.
"FID can establish and refine capabilities. It is a very diverse mission set that can address different needs and truly be a force-multiplier. In many ways, FID is the first line of defense," a former Army Special Forces officer told Insider.
"FID also has an interesting evolutionary aspect," the former officer said. "We can go in a country and establish a special-operations or conventional unit and go back there a few years later and train them up on a specific insertion capability," such as combat diving or free-fall parachuting.
"In a lot of ways, FID never ends, and we often end up building successful longterm partnerships with some units," said the former officer, who like the National Guard Green Beret was not authorized to speak to the press. "But we get something out of it too. Years or decades after, when we revisit X country, they are now experienced, and they get to teach us stuff too. FID can be a mutually beneficial arrangement that increases our experience and combat effectiveness in the long-term."
Although foreign internal defense is a specialty of Army Green Berets, the intense operational demand created by the global war on terror forced other units — which were competing for deployment opportunities and funding — to put more emphasis on that mission set.
Even the most elite special-mission units, such as Delta Force and the unit formerly known as SEAL Team 6, have had to do foreign internal defense on occasion as a way to get missions.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
22. China’s Lending Comes Under Fire as Sri Lankan Debt Crisis Deepens
Excerpts:
In his address to Parliament, Mr. Rajapaksa said that the crisis was the climax of a problem that previous governments had failed to solve and that the country would bank on its existing strategy of boosting tourism, exports and foreign investment.
Mr. Rajapaksa also suggested he wouldn’t deviate from courting Chinese investment, saying that Sri Lanka, as a small country with limited natural resources, relied on foreign investment for development and job creation.
“If one acts for purely political reasons to misinterpret and create a wrong opinion among the people about foreign investments, then such [a] person is not doing any good to the country,” Mr. Rajapaksa said, without specifying any countries or individuals.
Deep Pal, a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said while he didn’t believe Sri Lanka was in a debt trap, the problem was compounded by the fact that other key regional players such as India would be hesitant to bail out Sri Lanka if it felt that the funds would go straight to servicing Chinese debt.
“Things are not going to improve for Sri Lanka any time soon,” he said. “In the absence of other players it really allows China to be more significantly involved.”
China’s Lending Comes Under Fire as Sri Lankan Debt Crisis Deepens
The crunch opens a window for India to push back against Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region
Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Sri Lanka’s central bank governor, said on his official Twitter account that the country had repaid the bond, which matured on Tuesday. It was the first major tranche of $4.5 billion total sovereign-debt repayments due in 2022.
But with around two-thirds of government revenue already going toward interest payments, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa warned in a speech to Parliament that the country had insufficient foreign-currency reserves to pay for the imports it needed.
That warning followed his appeal last week to visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for Beijing to restructure its debt, provide concessional trade terms, and lift Covid-related restrictions on Chinese tourists visiting Sri Lanka.
It also came after unusual criticism from within Sri Lanka’s ruling party over China’s lending for a series of major infrastructure projects, which include a $13 billion seafront business hub in the capital, Colombo, and a port and airport in the Rajapaksa family’s home constituency of Hambantota.
Earlier this month, Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, a member of Parliament in the ruling party, wrote a six-page letter addressed to Chinese President Xi Jinping accusing Beijing of pushing Sri Lanka into a debt trap to expand China’s sphere of political influence.
“It is manifestly visible that your friendship with us is no more genuine and candid, instead you use our relations to achieve your ambition of becoming the world power at the stake of lives of our innocent people,” Mr. Rajapakshe wrote in his letter.
Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in white, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met this month in Colombo amid allegations of Chinese predatory lending.
Photo: ishara s. kodikara/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
At a regular news briefing last week, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said that China had always done its utmost to provide help for Sri Lanka’s economic and social development and would continue to do so in the future.
India’s external-affairs minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, said Saturday that India would continue to support Sri Lanka in all possible ways with its economic and other challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic. He said the two countries were discussing Indian loans totaling $1.5 billion for essential commodities, fuel, food and medicine.
Recent Indian investments in Sri Lanka include a deal for India’s Adani Group to develop and operate a container terminal in Colombo and an agreement for a subsidiary of the state-run Indian Oil Corp oration to operate 14 oil storage tanks in the eastern port city of Trincomalee.
A spokesman for India’s Foreign Ministry said he had no further comment.
Sri Lanka had about $3.5 billion in debt from China as of end-2020, excluding loans to state enterprises, according to Sri Lankan central-bank data, about the same as owed to Japan. The largest portion—about 36%—of Sri Lanka’s debt is owed through international sovereign bonds.
While China accounts for only around 10% of Sri Lanka’s total debt, U.S. officials and some scholars have often cited it as evidence of how Beijing is causing debt distress through its Belt and Road initiative to build ports, railways, pipelines and other infrastructure across Asia and beyond.
In one prominent example, Sri Lanka’s government was unable to repay a Chinese loan for the port in Hambantota that China helped build. To settle the loan, it granted a Chinese state company a 99-year lease on the facility.
Beijing denies any ulterior motive and says the projects promote development and benefit all parties.
Sri Lanka’s debt problems have escalated over the last two years, as both its key foreign-exchange earners—tourism and remittances from abroad—were hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic.
Confronted with decade-high inflation, a weak currency and rising import costs, Mr. Rajapaksa declared an economic emergency in September, appointing the military to oversee the supply of basic staples such as rice and sugar, sold at government-guaranteed prices. Since November, Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s ratings firms have all downgraded Sri Lanka sovereign credit score further into junk territory.
According to Fitch, Sri Lanka’s foreign-currency reserves were depleted to as low as $1.6 billion in November, enough to cover less than one month of imports.
“Sri Lanka “has no sufficient reserves to import even the essential imports like fuel, medicines, foods, and industrial raw materials.””
— W.A. Wijewardena, a former Sri Lankan central bank deputy governor
In its search for funds to repay loans and boost its foreign-currency reserves, Sri Lanka said in December that it would seek to repay Iran for oil purchases with $5 million worth of tea a month as a means to conserve foreign currency. An agreement with India last week deferring $500 million in payments owed through the Asian Clearing Union and a $400 million currency swap has also earned some breathing room.
“The forex situation has become so critical that [Sri Lanka] has no sufficient reserves to import even the essential imports like fuel, medicines, foods, and industrial raw materials,” said W.A. Wijewardena, a former Sri Lankan central bank deputy governor.
Some top Sri Lankan economists have called for the government to suspend repayments until it restructures its debt, saying the country’s dwindling reserves are better used to secure the supply of essential goods for its citizens, who are facing rolling power outages and shortages of imported essentials such as milk powder, cooking gas and fuel.
“If it is not done, there will be shortages leading to price increases and long queues,” Mr. Wijewardena said. “They will ultimately result in social and political disorder.”
In his address to Parliament, Mr. Rajapaksa said that the crisis was the climax of a problem that previous governments had failed to solve and that the country would bank on its existing strategy of boosting tourism, exports and foreign investment.
Mr. Rajapaksa also suggested he wouldn’t deviate from courting Chinese investment, saying that Sri Lanka, as a small country with limited natural resources, relied on foreign investment for development and job creation.
“If one acts for purely political reasons to misinterpret and create a wrong opinion among the people about foreign investments, then such [a] person is not doing any good to the country,” Mr. Rajapaksa said, without specifying any countries or individuals.
Deep Pal, a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said while he didn’t believe Sri Lanka was in a debt trap, the problem was compounded by the fact that other key regional players such as India would be hesitant to bail out Sri Lanka if it felt that the funds would go straight to servicing Chinese debt.
“Things are not going to improve for Sri Lanka any time soon,” he said. “In the absence of other players it really allows China to be more significantly involved.”
23. China Detains Prominent Activists as Olympics Near, Citing State Security
China Detains Prominent Activists as Olympics Near, Citing State Security
Detention of free-speech advocate Yang Maodong, missing since December, is confirmed days after wife’s death from cancer in the U.S.
Mr. Yang, who writes under the pen name Guo Feixiong, has been blocked from leaving China for the past year. Authorities rejected his pleas, and entreaties from friends and family, that he be allowed to be with his wife in her final months. Friends said they had lost contact with the 55-year-old in early December, though it was only on Monday that police officially confirmed his detention to his family.
“It’s really too cruel, too heartless,” Yang Maoping, his sister said, adding that police had been vague about the reason for his detention.
Xie Yang, a 49-year old lawyer who has taken up politically sensitive cases related to religion and land rights, was detained on Jan. 11, also on subversion charges, and is being held in the southern city of Changsha, according to his family.
Human-rights advocates linked the detentions to the coming 2022 Winter Games, scheduled to begin on Feb. 4, which have been dogged by criticism over China’s human-rights record.
“You can imagine authorities all over the country are tightening control pre-emptively to strike out any potential dissent and criticism,” said Renee Xia, a senior researcher with Chinese Human Rights Defenders, a Washington, D.C., based group.
Police in Guangzhou and Changsha didn’t reply to requests for comment.
Asked about the detentions, the International Olympic Committee said that it takes human rights seriously but has “neither the mandate nor the capability to change the laws or the political system of a sovereign country.” It added that “given the diverse participation in the Olympic Games, the IOC must remain neutral on all global political issues.”
A Berlin protest against the Beijing Olympics earlier this month; for its part, China’s Foreign Ministry has protested what it calls attempts to politicize the Games.
Photo: filip singer/Shutterstock
Chinese authorities also pressured dissidents and activists ahead of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, though space remained for some critics. Under President Xi Jinping, China has grown less tolerant of dissent, tightening controls over the media and the internet while pursuing a campaign of forcible assimilation against ethnic minorities in remote regions of the country.
The U.S., Australia and U.K. have said government officials won’t attend the 2022 Olympics, to protest Mr. Xi’s treatment of ethnic minorities and other alleged human-rights abuses. Activists groups have pressed Olympics sponsors and other global brands to distance themselves from the Games.
China has rejected criticism of its human-rights record and called it interference in the country’s internal affairs. Its Foreign Ministry has protested what it says are attempts to politicize the Olympic Games.
Mr. Yang, the free-speech activist, has been in police custody on and off since 2013, when he joined in protesting Communist Party efforts to censor Southern Weekly, a Guangzhou newspaper once celebrated by Chinese liberals for its unusually hard-hitting coverage. He spent six years in prison for disrupting public order and “picking quarrels.”
Some of his supporters, including his former lawyer, say they believe he is being targeted because of his public conflict with authorities over being allowed to visit his wife, Zhang Qing. After Ms. Zhang was diagnosed with terminal cancer roughly a year ago, Mr. Yang wrote an open letter to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang seeking the return of his confiscated passport and permission to leave the country.
After briefly being detained, Mr. Yang stayed quiet in the hope the government would yield, but he went public again in December after learning that his wife was on the verge of death.
“It put the government in an awkward position,” Mr. Yang’s former lawyer, Sui Muqing, said.
The U.S. State Department issued a statement offering condolences after Ms. Zhang died and called on the Chinese government to let Mr. Yang travel to the U.S. to grieve and be reunited with his family. Mr. Yang has two young-adult children in the U.S.
Mr. Xie, the other activist in custody, was previously detained as part of a sweeping crackdown on human-rights lawyers in 2015. Charged with inciting subversion, he was released after two years following a guilty plea.
Mr. Xie’s wife, Chen Guiqiu, confirmed his most recent detention Tuesday. Ms. Chen, who fled China in 2017 and now lives in Texas with the couple’s two daughters, said she suspects the detention is related to her husband’s trip this past Christmas to Yongshun country in southern China’s Hunan province. He unfurled a banner near a police station there calling for the release of a schoolteacher who had accused the government of sending her to a psychiatric facility against her will.
The government “can make up anything” as an excuse to detain someone, Ms. Chen said of her husband’s situation.
Legal scholar and activist Xu Zhiyong, here in 2013, is expected to face trial soon on subversion charges.
Photo: xiao guozhen/Reuters
Inciting subversion is typically punishable by up to five years in prison, and sometimes more in cases deemed severe.
Two other influential activists, legal scholar Xu Zhiyong and lawyer Ding Jiaxi, are expected to face trial soon on subversion charges. Both were leaders of the New Citizens Movement, a now-defunct civic group founded by Mr. Xu. According to the prosecutor’s latest indictment, the two men organized a 2019 meeting of more than a dozen people in Xiamen city to plan activities against the state.
Supporters of the two men called for their release, saying their arrests were arbitrary.
The squeezing of dissent is likely motivated by this year’s coming Communist Party congress as well as by the Olympics, human-rights activists say. Mr. Xi is expected to break with recent precedent at the twice-a-decade meeting by taking a third term as the country’s top leader.
“The intentional use of such strong-arm tactics is intended to warn possible opponents within and outside the system, and to tell the West that China will not compromise on human-rights issues,” Wang Dan, a student leader during the 1989 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, said in response to the detentions of Messrs. Yang and Xie. “The international community should have a tougher way of responding.”
24. EDITORIAL: Propaganda from China is no joke
A view (and a correct one in my opinion) from Canada.
Psychological warfare
Legal warfare
Media (or public opinion) warfare
EDITORIAL: Propaganda from China is no joke
Author of the article:
Publishing date:
Jan 18, 2022 • 15 hours ago • 2 minute read • 8 Comments
While it’s tempting to laugh off the Chinese government’s ludicrous attempt to blame the arrival of Omicron in Beijing on a piece of mail sent from Canada, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his fellow communist dictators don’t care what we think.
They care about controlling what China’s domestic population of 1.4 billion people think, holding them captive to a never-ending deluge of propaganda, churned out by China’s state-controlled media.
Since the start of the pandemic in Wuhan almost two years ago, Chinese authorities have blamed the origins of COVID-19 on everything from the U.S. military, to frozen beef from Australia, to possible origins everywhere from Bangladesh, to India, Greece, Italy, Russia, Czech Republic and Serbia.
In the early weeks of the pandemic, when it might have been possible to contain COVID-19 within China, state authorities insisted the newly discovered coronavirus wasn’t capable of human transmission — while arresting doctors in Wuhan, one of whom later died from COVID-19.
Those doctors were trying to tell the world the truth, that it was contagious.
Similarly, China’s rulers don’t care if we believe their claims Uyghur Muslims are terrorists and separatists as they inflict crimes against humanity and genocide on them, or their charges that protesters fighting for democracy in China-controlled Hong Kong are criminals.
They don’t care if we believe the espionage charges they laid against Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were based in reality, or nothing more than a blatant example of hostage diplomacy, in a bid to force Canada to release Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, who was wanted in the U.S. on fraud charges.
They don’t care if we believe their claim Kovrig and Spavor confessed to their “crimes” before they were released and Meng was returned to China.
They don’t care because none of these statements are intended for a Canadian audience.
They are for domestic consumption, to convince the Chinese people their justice system is a paragon of virtue, as opposed to the state-controlled agency of the Chinese government that it is.
China’s dictators, of course, will always deny wrongdoing, always lie to their own people, always rev up their state-funded propaganda machine to crush dissent.
And that is no laughing matter.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
