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Quotes of the Day:
“The greatest enemy of knowledge isn't ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge.”
Stephen Hawking
“Journalism is printing what somebody else doesn’t want printed – everything else Is public relations.”
– George Orwell
“Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent.”
– Isaac Asimov
1. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Strategy for Social Change
2. TikTok Goes Dark for U.S. Users, While Trump Signals He Will Save It
3. Trump Told Advisers He Wants to Visit China as President
4. The Pentagon, the Generals, and the Trump (47) Administration by Douglas Ollivant
5. The Mindboggling TruthAbout American Power
6. The World Is Getting Riskier. Americans Don’t Want to Pay for It.
7. Xi Tells Officials Scared of Being Purged: It’s OK to Make Mistakes
8. Analyzing Pete Hegseth's Congressional Testimony
9. Trump security adviser doesn't rule out continued Chinese ownership of TikTok
10. C.I.A.’s Chatbot Stands In for World Leaders
11. A First Draft For Secretary Hegseth
12. Trump claiming new world order in first 100 days
13. Who's who in Donald Trump's inner circle
14. US TikTok purchase won't eliminate security threat
15. Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say
16. Defiance Is Out, Deference Is in: Trump Returns to a Different Washington
17. Schools Using AI Emulation of Anne Frank That Urges Kids Not to Blame Anyone for Holocaust
18. Too hot to handle (Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard)
19. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2025
20. Iran Update, January 18, 2025
1. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Strategy for Social Change
Anyone (and especially a Green Beret) interested in studying unconventional warfare, revolutions, resistance, and insurgency should study Dr. Martin Luther King., Jr. And Lawrence Freedman's book Strategy is very much worth reading, having on your bookshelf, and periodically re-reading parts (such as about MLK) as I do.
I hope they are teaching MLK's concepts at SWCS and JSOU.
Martin Luther King Jr.'s Strategy for Social Change
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/martin-luther-king-jr-s-strategy-for-social-change
A Story of Effective Planning Detailed by Lawerence Freedman
STRATEGY CENTRAL
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth – January 19, 2025
Introduction
In his seminal work, Strategy, Lawrence Freedman explores the intricacies of strategic thinking across a variety of contexts, including political and social movements. One of the most profound examples he examines is the strategy employed by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. King’s strategy was not only a testament to moral courage but also a masterclass in utilizing attention and support to drive social change.
The Context of King’s Strategy
The Civil Rights Movement emerged as a response to systemic racial injustices that had persisted for centuries in the United States. Despite constitutional amendments and legal progress following the Civil War, African Americans continued to face segregation, disenfranchisement, and violence, particularly in the South. By the mid-20th century, the urgency to challenge these injustices had reached a boiling point. King, as one of the movement’s most prominent leaders, recognized that the battle for civil rights required more than moral arguments—it needed a strategic framework to capture the attention and conscience of the nation.
The Power of Nonviolence
At the heart of King’s strategy was the principle of nonviolence. This was not merely a moral stance but a deliberate tactical choice. Inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s successful campaign for Indian independence, King believed that nonviolence could expose the brutality of segregation and racism. By refusing to retaliate against violent opposition, protestors could reveal the stark moral contrast between the oppressors and the oppressed. This approach was designed to provoke public outrage and sympathy, particularly among moderate whites who were previously indifferent to the plight of African Americans.
Gaining Attention: The Role of Public Demonstrations
Freedman highlights King’s strategic use of public demonstrations to garner attention. Events like the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Birmingham Campaign, and the March on Washington were meticulously planned to maximize visibility. These demonstrations were often staged in locations where segregationist policies were most egregious and where resistance from local authorities was expected to be harsh. The resulting images of peaceful protestors being attacked by police dogs, beaten, or sprayed with fire hoses were broadcast across the nation, evoking widespread condemnation of the status quo.
King understood the power of media in shaping public opinion. The Civil Rights Movement coincided with the rise of television, which brought vivid images of racial violence into living rooms across America. These images shattered the myth of Southern gentility and made it impossible for Americans to ignore the reality of segregation. By targeting specific events for maximum media exposure, King ensured that the struggle for civil rights remained at the forefront of national consciousness.
Mobilizing Support: Building Coalitions
Another cornerstone of King’s strategy was coalition-building. He worked tirelessly to unite African Americans across class and regional lines while seeking allies outside the black community. Organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which King co-founded, served as a hub for coordinating efforts and amplifying the movement’s message.
King’s outreach extended to religious leaders, labor unions, and liberal politicians. He framed civil rights as a moral and ethical issue, appealing to the shared values of justice and equality rooted in American democracy and Christian theology. By aligning the movement’s goals with broader principles, King attracted a diverse array of supporters, from northern liberals to international observers, who saw the fight for civil rights as a universal struggle for human dignity.
Strategic Timing and Escalation
Freedman emphasizes King’s keen sense of timing and ability to escalate pressure at critical moments. For instance, the Birmingham Campaign of 1963 was carefully timed to coincide with the Easter shopping season, when economic boycotts would have maximum impact. King’s arrest during the campaign and his subsequent "Letter from Birmingham Jail" galvanized supporters and drew further attention to the cause.
The March on Washington, held later that year, was another strategic triumph. Organized to demonstrate the movement's breadth and unity, it culminated in King’s iconic "I Have a Dream" speech, which eloquently articulated the movement’s vision and aspirations. The event drew over 250,000 participants and remains one of the most significant demonstrations in American history.
Legislative and Social Impact
King’s strategy ultimately led to significant legislative victories, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These achievements were not inevitable; they resulted from sustained pressure, moral suasion, and strategic action. By forcing the federal government to confront the issue of segregation and by shifting public opinion, King’s approach created the conditions for systemic change.
Lessons from King’s Strategy
Freedman’s analysis of King’s strategy offers valuable insights into the dynamics of social movements. It underscores the importance of:
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Moral clarity: Framing issues in terms of universal principles can galvanize broad support.
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Visibility: Public demonstrations and media coverage are essential for raising awareness and applying pressure.
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Coalition-building: Effective movements require alliances that transcend individual constituencies.
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Timing and escalation: Strategic planning and capitalizing on critical moments are key to maintaining momentum.
Conclusion
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s strategy during the Civil Rights Movement exemplified the power of strategic thinking in achieving social change. By combining moral authority with tactical acumen, King was able to capture the nation's attention and mobilize support for a transformative agenda. Freedman’s examination of King’s approach in Strategy highlights the enduring relevance of these lessons for contemporary struggles for justice and equality.
Further Reading
Lawrence Freedman’s “Strategy: A History” is a comprehensive exploration of strategy across diverse domains, including military conflict, political movements, and business endeavors. Freedman masterfully traces the evolution of strategic thinking from its origins in classical philosophy and military doctrine to its modern applications in complex societal and organizational challenges. The book examines influential figures, from Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to Martin Luther King Jr., providing a nuanced understanding of how strategy is formulated and adapted in response to shifting circumstances. With engaging storytelling and deep analysis, Freedman illuminates the interplay between goals, resources, and the unpredictable nature of human behavior in the strategic process.
This work is essential to any strategist’s library because it transcends traditional military perspectives and presents strategy as a universal framework for problem-solving and achieving objectives. Freedman’s ability to synthesize historical insights with contemporary relevance makes the book both intellectually enriching and practically applicable. Whether navigating geopolitical crises, leading social movements, or managing corporate growth, readers will find invaluable lessons in the principles of strategic thinking that Freedman articulates. His emphasis on adaptability, foresight, and ethical considerations ensures that this book serves not only as a guide to effective strategy but also as a reflection on the broader implications of strategic decision-making in shaping history and society.
An additional recommendation is Martin Luther King Jr.'s "Where Do We Go From Here?" which reflects on the state of the civil rights movement and the challenges facing the quest for equality in America. In his speech delivered in 1967 at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from which the book is drawn, King emphasizes the importance of addressing systemic economic inequalities that disproportionately affect Black Americans. He advocates for a shift from civil rights to human rights, focusing on eradicating poverty, improving educational access, and securing fair employment opportunities for all Americans. King underscores the need for a nonviolent revolution to restructure American society, envisioning a world where "the triple evils" of racism, materialism, and militarism are dismantled.
King warns against complacency and calls for unity among marginalized groups, particularly Black and white workers, to build a coalition capable of confronting economic and social injustice. He critiques the persistence of systemic barriers hindering progress and urges the civil rights movement to adopt a broader vision transcending racial divisions. By prioritizing equality and justice for all, King emphasizes society's moral obligation to create a fair and inclusive democracy. His speech remains a profound roadmap for social transformation, advocating a relentless commitment to justice and human dignity.
Bibliography
Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. Oxford University Press, 2013.
King, Martin Luther Jr. “Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?” Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.
2. TikTok Goes Dark for U.S. Users, While Trump Signals He Will Save It
TikTok Goes Dark for U.S. Users, While Trump Signals He Will Save It
Americans lost access to popular video-sharing app as law goes into effect
https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-goes-dark-for-u-s-users-while-trump-signals-he-will-save-it-0370b227?mod=latest_headlines
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Updated Jan. 19, 2025 10:16 am ET
The closure of the app disrupted millions of American businesses and social-media entrepreneurs. Photo: Alex Kent/Getty Images
TikTok went dark in the U.S., erasing the popular app for its American users in an unprecedented move that sparked frustration, memes and finger-pointing.
The app started halting service Saturday night for 170 million users in its most important market shortly before a law took effect requiring it to shed its Chinese ownership or close in the U.S. It marked the first time the U.S. government has compelled the closure of such a widely used app, and disrupted millions of American businesses and social-media entrepreneurs who use TikTok to connect with customers and fans.
TikTok’s disappearance could be brief, however. President-elect Donald Trump on Saturday said he would likely give TikTok a 90-day extension from the potential ban after he takes office Monday. On Sunday morning, Trump posted on social media in all capital letters, “SAVE TIKTOK!”
TikTok users started seeing a message late Saturday saying, “Sorry, TikTok isn’t available right now.”
“A law banning TikTok has been enacted in the U.S. Unfortunately, that means you can’t use TikTok for now. We are fortunate that President Trump has indicated that he will work with us on a solution to reinstate TikTok once he takes office. Please stay tuned!”
There is an option under the message to get more information, and clicking brings users to a link to download their data. The app wasn’t available to download from Apple or Google’s app stores.
TikTok and parent ByteDance have portrayed themselves as independent of China. Photo: Richard B. Levine/ZUMA PRESS
After TikTok went dark, some users took to other social media platforms to either mourn or poke fun at its departure.
“I’m sorry, I can’t. Don’t hate me -” said a post on X pretending to be from TikTok, a parody of the infamous “Sex and The City” break-up note.
Another post put a creepy grim reaper-like character and a bright orange banner over the TikTok logo. “Spirit of Halloween,” it said, referring to the holiday retail popup that tends to move into empty storefronts.
Above a short clip of a packed escalator moving at high speed, an X user wrote: “Everyone rushing to twitter because TikTok is gone.”
TikTok Chief Executive Shou Chew is scheduled to attend Trump’s inauguration on Monday, along with U.S. tech luminaries including Mark Zuckerberg, whose Meta Platforms owns TikTok rival Instagram.
Trump’s comments were the latest in a flurry of last-minute statements that capped a yearslong saga complicated by U.S. presidential politics, conflicting geopolitical interests and the ambiguities surrounding enforcement of the law, which outlines hefty penalties for noncompliance.
Biden administration officials had signaled that they didn’t intend to enforce the ban on President Biden’s final day in office and that enforcement would fall to the Trump White House, but that wasn’t enough to give TikTok comfort. TikTok pressed the administration for more assurance that it won’t enforce the law. A White House official said: “We have already gone to extraordinary lengths to communicate our posture.”
Before positioning himself as TikTok’s potential savior, Trump tried to ban TikTok in his first term. Biden, who signed the bipartisan law last April, was ending his term with aides saying he wouldn’t enforce it on his final day in office.
TikTok and parent ByteDance have portrayed themselves as independent of China, but their ability to do any divestiture deal to satisfy the U.S. law has been constrained by Beijing. In recent days, Chinese officials have internally discussed options including allowing a trusted non-Chinese party such as Elon Musk to invest in or take control of TikTok’s U.S. operations.
Potential suitors include Project Liberty, led by billionaire Frank McCourt, which said it submitted a proposal to buy TikTok’s U.S. assets other than the app’s algorithm. Much of ByteDance is owned by major American financial firms, including BlackRock, General Atlantic and Susquehanna International Group, co-founded by Republican megadonor Jeff Yass.
The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as it is formally called, took effect after the Supreme Court on Friday unanimously upheld it, siding with Congress’s national-security concerns over the claim by the platform and its users that the ban violates the First Amendment.
The law makes it unlawful for an entity to distribute, maintain or update the app, known for its addictive short videos. TikTok planned to shut down the app protectively so that its partners, including Apple’s and Google’s app stores and Oracle, which hosts U.S. users’ data, would be shielded from legal liability.
Trump had asked the Supreme Court to stop the law from taking effect, saying that he wants to pursue a negotiated resolution and that it is possible to spare TikTok while addressing the national-security concerns that drove Congress to enact it. The law allows for an extension if there is progress toward a qualified divestiture.
Ginger Adams Otis contributed to this article.
Write to Elizabeth Wollman at elizabeth.wollman@wsj.com and Georgia Wells at georgia.wells@wsj.com
3. Trump Told Advisers He Wants to Visit China as President
South Korea should not be afraid of personal diplomacy between Trump and Kim. Trump and Xi personal diplomacy is more important and of course if Trump can make that work they can make everything else Trump wants to do work.
Excerpts:
Trump visited Beijing in 2017, nearly a year into his first term. Aides cautioned that no decision has been made for him to go again. One of the people familiar with the discussions said Trump has expressed interest in traveling to China in his first 100 days in office. Trump’s transition team didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Trump and Xi spoke by phone on Friday for the first time since the November election, discussing trade, fentanyl, TikTok and other subjects. “It is my expectation that we will solve many problems together, and starting immediately,” Trump wrote on social media after the call.
People close to Beijing’s decision-making said Trump and Xi, through their representatives, have discussed meeting in person, with one option involving the incoming American president inviting the Chinese leader to the U.S. It wasn’t clear if Trump raised a visit to China in his Friday conversation with Xi.
Trump Told Advisers He Wants to Visit China as President
The possibility of a visit to China comes as Trump has threatened to impose stiff tariffs on Chinese imports
https://www.wsj.com/us-news/trump-china-xi-jinping-visit-e9141794?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos2
By Alex Leary
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, Alexander Ward
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and Lingling Wei
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Jan. 18, 2025 5:27 pm ET
President Donald Trump in 2017 with China’s Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Photo: nicolas asfouri/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
WASHINGTON—President-elect Donald Trump has told advisers he wants to travel to China after he takes office, according to people familiar with the discussions, seeking to deepen a relationship with Xi Jinping strained by the president-elect’s threat to impose steeper tariffs on Chinese imports.
Trump visited Beijing in 2017, nearly a year into his first term. Aides cautioned that no decision has been made for him to go again. One of the people familiar with the discussions said Trump has expressed interest in traveling to China in his first 100 days in office. Trump’s transition team didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Trump and Xi spoke by phone on Friday for the first time since the November election, discussing trade, fentanyl, TikTok and other subjects. “It is my expectation that we will solve many problems together, and starting immediately,” Trump wrote on social media after the call.
People close to Beijing’s decision-making said Trump and Xi, through their representatives, have discussed meeting in person, with one option involving the incoming American president inviting the Chinese leader to the U.S. It wasn’t clear if Trump raised a visit to China in his Friday conversation with Xi.
Trump had invited Xi to his inauguration on Monday, but the Chinese leader is sending Vice President Han Zheng instead.
With economic pressure building in China, Beijing has a strong interest in engaging in negotiations to fend off, or at least slow down, tariff hikes promised by Trump. A summit between the two leaders, the people close to Beijing’s decision-making said, could help jump-start the process. Trump has pledged to impose tariffs of up to 60% on imports from China.
China’s official account of Friday’s phone call between Trump and Xi said the two leaders agreed to establish a strategic communication channel. It quoted Trump telling the Chinese leader that he was “looking forward to meeting with President Xi as soon as possible.”
China’s leader Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, attended a welcome banquet at Mar-a-Lago in 2017 hosted by President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump. Photo: Lan Hongguang/Xinhua/Getty Images
Trump’s visit to Beijing in late 2017 came months after meeting Xi face-to-face for the first time at Mar-a-Lago, his Florida estate. He toured the Forbidden City and took in a Peking Opera performance.
Trump has also talked to advisers about a possible trip to India, according to people close to him.
His initial focus is expected to be on domestic moves, including sharp new border-security measures and increased deportations. He is expected to travel around the U.S. in his first week in office to tout executive orders he plans to sign on energy and other issues, according to people familiar with his plans. Trump is planning to tour fire-ravaged Los Angeles later in the week.
A Beijing meeting would come at a fraught moment in the relationship between the world’s leading superpowers. Along with potential new tariffs on Chinese imports, Trump has also pushed Beijing to crack down on Chinese chemical producers that supply the ingredients for fentanyl to Mexican cartels.
Another potential flashpoint is Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory and hasn’t ruled out using force to take. Trump hasn’t said much about how he will handle the delicate U.S. relationship with Taipei, other than pressing its leaders to spend significantly more on defense. In their call Friday, Xi also reminded Trump to handle the issue of Taiwan “with prudence,” calling it a concern of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, state media said.
Han Kuo-yu, the speaker of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, will lead a Taiwanese delegation including lawmakers from both the Democratic and Nationalist, or Kuomintang, parties to attend Trump’s inauguration.
“It’s about representing the government in a bipartisan way, showing how much we value Taiwan-U.S. relations, and taking this chance to congratulate the new Trump administration,” Lin Chia-lung, Taiwan’s foreign minister, told reporters early this month.
China’s Vice President Han Zheng, right, with U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns last year at an American Chamber of Commerce event in Beijing. Photo: Associated Press
Han Zheng, Xi’s special envoy for Trump’s inauguration, is seen as a pragmatist by many in Washington. He largely plays a ceremonial role as the vice president. An English speaker, he ran Shanghai for years, and American businesses considered him an ally who supported foreign investment. Some executives have hoped that Xi would pick Han as his representative to the inauguration as that could signal to the Trump team Beijing’s willingness to negotiate a trade deal.
Trump could see Xi as a partner in helping bring the war in Ukraine to an end, as China has provided support to Russia, drawing the ire of U.S. lawmakers. Trump’s social-media post about Friday’s call with Xi didn’t mention the conflict. “President Xi and I will do everything possible to make the World more peaceful and safe!” he said.
Annie Linskey contributed to this article.
Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com
4. The Pentagon, the Generals, and the Trump (47) Administration by Douglas Ollivant
Excerpts:
Speaking of transparency, the Human Resources Command CG, Major General Hope Rampy, published on January 16, 2025, a memo that lays out how commanders were selected at the most recent boards, for both Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The memo contains interesting data. Bottom line—for the most recent selection for LTCs, BCAP performance was 60% of the total input, with prior performance (read: the old board system evaluating your efficiency reports) being 40%. For Colonels, the input was 50/50. Rampy provides interesting justification for the discrepancy between the two--that for (most) Lieutenant Colonels, recent performance is staff time, and other assignments, as it has usually been eight years since officers commanded their companies. While for Colonels, since recent performance includes battalion command, an analogous experience to brigade command, it makes sense to give that more weight. I had not previously considered this argument, and I have to admit it makes sense. I think I would still prefer the selection for Colonel command—which is essentially your audition for General—to give more weight to the skill set that generals will require. But by laying out the argument, MG Rampy has at least given us ground on which people of good will can disagree. Again, transparency.
So to loop back around, I think we can all concur that there is a crisis of leadership at the Pentagon. However, I do not think that either wholesale firings or deferring to some “warrior board” of greybeards is the answer. Instead, Secretary Hegseth (again, presuming confirmation) and his team should trim as shallow as possible but as deep as necessary to assert civilian control over the Pentagon. They should then think about a more active role for civilian leadership in the selection of generals at lower (one- and two-star) levels. But this team should recognize the Army’s Command Assessment Program as the best tool to evaluate and promote talent over time. As I’ve said elsewhere, the beauty of these programs is that they “radiate” both up and down the institution. At lower levels, they inform the company grade officers as to what the institution expects of commanders. And demographic replacement will eventually ensure that every general officer will have gone through the BCAP and/or CCAP crucible (though this may take another decade).
The Trump 47 administration has been left a mess. Active conflicts by proxies in the Middle East and Europe have drained resources that may be required for a direct conflict in East Asia. The defense industrial base is a shell of its former self and in deep need of reform—the shipyards in particular. The role of the Army in these conflicts is very unclear, the lessons to be drawn from the wars in Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza are ambiguous, and the strategic failure in Afghanistan looms large over the institution. It will be incumbent to have the right leadership for the coming challenges.
Finding exactly who that should—and should not—be will be the first major challenge of the Trump 47 Defense Department.
The Pentagon, the Generals, and the Trump (47) Administration
https://douglasollivant.substack.com/p/the-pentagon-the-generals-and-the?r=2mkzx&utm
Leadership reform done smartly
Douglas Ollivant
Jan 17, 2025
There is clearly an assessment by the incoming Trump 47 administration, and a significant portion of its political base, that the military generally—and perhaps the Army in particular—has a leadership problem. This distrust is perhaps personified in Pete Hegseth, the nominee for Secretary of Defense, who wrote a book on the subject.
It’s perhaps easiest to say that there is a “vibe shift” regarding the generals.[i] As an observer, I can discern at least three different versions of this shift. The most overly political is the response to “Diversity, Equity, Inclusion” or “DEI” initiatives inside the services. Hegseth’s take is that the excesses of DEI have weakened the military by promoting the incompetent or unfit, and thereby discouraging traditional sources of recruits—rural white men—from joining.
The second version has to do with military performance during the long wars. The ambiguous ending of the Iraq war and the undeniable failure to achieve any war aims in Afghanistan—not to mention the debacle of the withdrawal—contribute to the judgment that the generals didn’t know how to properly fight such wars, and that they were frequently deceptive to both political leadership and the American people. Senior general after senior general assured us that the Taliban was unable to hold ground against the valor of the Afghan Security Forces. Either they were utterly delusional in their assessments, or they were lying to us. Neither is acceptable and points to a need for reform.
Finally, many close observers believe that the Army (likely the other services as well) has lost its way when it comes to its core competencies. We are regularly “treated” to story after story, at post after post, about the inability of the service to adequately house and feed its soldiers—its core and more solemn duty. Whether black mold, lead paint, or asbestos, soldiers—and their families—are frequently required to live in environmentally hazardous conditions. And reports of soldiers not having food in their dining facilities to eat happen with alarming frequency—most recently at Fort Carson last month. But this isn’t a one-time thing. Similar stories were reported at Fort Cavazos (previously Fort Hood) in summer 2023. Strikingly, neither of these stories were accompanied by reports of mass “reliefs for cause” of the leadership—garrison commanders, post commanders, sergeants major—on whose watch these inexcusable failings occurred.
When these three streams interact, they bring about a significant challenge to the legitimacy of senior Army leadership. And both political commentators and candidates have risen to address this challenge. I have seen at least three approaches to this crisis proposed.
The first, by John Schindler, is perhaps the most draconian. He proposes a mass firing of all 3-star and 4-star ranks in the Pentagon, with a “safety mechanism” for each to write a one-page memo (whether to President or Secretary of Defense is unclear) explaining why they should be retained. Schindler maintains that by pruning (most of) these 200 individuals (around 40 4-star and 160 3-star) the new administration will show is “is serious about changing how the Pentagon does business” and that plenty of one and two-star officers (and then Colonels backfilling that demographic) are ready to step up into these jobs. He would then propose a similar round for the civilian Senior Executive Service (Pentagon civil servants with flag officer-like responsibilities).
The second was published in Responsible Statecraft by Steve Deal (a retired Naval Officer) entitled “Yes, US Generals Should Be Fired.” The essay is long on diagnosis, but short on solutions, and I found no discussion of just exactly who, why, how and how many generals should (per the title) be fired, though it is clear he wants someone to be. That said, there is powerful diagnosis in the essay, and it brings to light some very helpful aspects.
For example, Deal maintains that “most American do not realize that the competitive promotion board system for our military, as defined by law, ends after two-star selection.” This is true, but slightly misleading…in the wrong direction. Deal is correct that there is no “board system” for the highest two ranks, but conflating the board system that takes one to Colonel (or Navy Captain) with the board system for one- and two-star generals masks a distinction of kind.
Boards that select the promotion of officers to non-general ranks are ruthlessly objective systems, if—an important caveat—you consider the subjective “efficiency reports” in the officer’s file to be objective data. But with this limitation, the boards operate quite fairly. Members are isolated from one another and forbidden to speak to each other, so all they can do is “vote the file.” The highest and lowest scores are usually thrown out to further eliminate outlier bias. Again, if you consider the efficiency reports to be objective data, the board system (to Colonel) is ruthlessly meritocratic.
This system ends when selecting officers for one-star general. This board is instead entirely subjective. The members of the board—all generals themselves—discuss each potential selectee (or at least the realistic potential selectees—many files are set aside without a serious look) using quite subjective criteria. “I knew him when he commanded X and later when on staff at Y. I think he’ll be a good brigadier.” The board can refer to the efficiency reports…or not. As they prefer.
In short, while the lower level system is (within its limitations) ruthlessly meritocratic, selection to the general officer ranks more closely resembles being tapped to join a fraternity. Each of the senior members of the board will bring a favored candidate, who is almost certain to make the cut, regardless of actual merit.
But Deal is correct that selection to 3 and 4-star ranks don’t even have the fig leaf of a board process. Generally speaking, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs chooses the officers in “Joint” jobs (the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands), while the service chiefs choose the 3 and 4-star officers for their services. Political leadership may put a thumb on the scale in prominent cases but, for example, it will be rare for anyone other than the service chief, or Chairman, to decide who is the J8 or A4 or N1 or G3/5/7 (all 3-star jobs).
While Deal is short on recommendations, he does help pull back the curtain on the selection system for the generals. And he is correct that we should think of all generals as political appointees. Technically all military officers are, having been confirmed by the Senate (from Captain forward), but the generals even more so, having been selected by subjective and political (albeit intra-service politics) criteria.
Finally, the Wall Street Journal (among other outlets) reported shortly after the Presidential election that the transition team was considering a “Warrior Board” “of retired military personnel with the power to review three-and four-star officers and to recommend removals of any deemed unfit for leadership.” The purpose would be to purge “what [President Trump] views as failed generals.”
As I’ve laid out above, I have no issue with the idea that there are failing generals, for a host of reasons. But it will be important to use a scalpel, and not a cleaver, when trying to determine who should be purged, in both the criteria and the composition of the “deciders.”
I find the idea of a “Warrior Board” to be unhelpful for at least two reasons. First, this is putting the arsonists in charge of the firefighting. Any retired general has played a major part in selecting the current set of generals, either directly, or indirectly by selecting the generals that selected the generals (though perhaps several generations back). Putting the “graybeards” (as retired generals are often called) in charge of selection is likely to get you more of the same, particularly if these officers were service chiefs or vice-chiefs. In short, we should be suspicious of the ability of the authors of the current institutional morass to assist in reform.
Second, one should be careful in assigning guilt for prior “crimes” (metaphorically speaking) committed by the Pentagon. For example, there is clear desire on the part of President Trump to purge “those involved in the chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan.”
The general most identified with the withdrawal is then-Major General (now full, 4-star general) Chris “CD” Donahue, then commanding the 82d Airborne Division (after commanding Delta Force, among other things). Donahue was famously the last American soldier to leave Afghanistan, staying on the ground until his entire command was “in the air” from country. If you want someone “involved,” he is the guy.
But General Donahue—an officer beloved by an unusually wide range of servicemembers—is not, in my judgment, to blame.[ii] To use a somewhat salty metaphor, CD is not the guy who made the shit sandwich. He’s the guy who had to eat the shit sandwich. He is the commander who found himself placed in an unenviable and untenable situation on the ground, in which tragically difficult decisions had to be made. Decisions that I am sure haunt Donahue to this day. But don’t look at him. Look at the people who put him there. Primarily the politicals, but the Joint Staff and CENTCOM should probably be replying by endorsement.
Donahue is currently serving as a four-star general in Germany, dual-hatted as the commanding general of both US Army Europe and US Army Africa (his confirmation for this job was reportedly held up over Afghanistan concerns). Widely regarded as a unique talent, it would be a shame were his role in faithfully executing a deeply flawed policy to be held against him.
I have similar concerns about deeply emotional issues such as Covid vaccine mandates. Virtually all senior officers have had to touch first “encouraging” the taking of vaccines and then later mandating vaccines when policy changed. These commanders would similarly be responsible for separating those who refused to take “the jab.”
However—like Donahue above—these officers were faithfully, and in some cases, creatively, executing the lawful orders given to them by their civilian leadership. This should be EXACTLY what we want in serving officers. If an officer is given a lawful order by civilian leadership they should execute it, and not carry it out grudgingly and with foot dragging, but enthusiastically and with creativity in the execution. Once an order is determined to be neither illegal nor unethical (a very high bar in both cases), serving officers are put in a “theirs not to reason why, theirs not to make reply” moment. Very careful parsing should be made in these cases, because what many of the most talented officers exhibited in this case is exactly the behavior we want, even if we abhor the policy they were ordered to execute. An officer who will drag his feet on vaccination mandates may well also drag his feet when substituting his judgment on a favored policy by the next administration. The Republic needs officers who will well and faithfully discharge, to the best of their ability, the legitimate orders given to them. Any purging of the general officer ranks should be very careful not to eliminate exactly the traits it will want in the coming years.
Aside from the moral hazard of trusting retired generals to not just select more of the same, reforming the senior officer corps should have the effect of empowering the civilian leadership of the Pentagon. Should generals need to be eliminated, they should be purged by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (assuming confirmation) and/or his service secretaries. Removing senior leaders—and selecting their replacements—should be an executive decision by civilian leadership and not outsourced to some consultants, whether called a “Warrior Board” or a McKinsey team. Of course, civilian leadership can (and should) consult widely with whomever they choose, but they should “own” both any firings/retirements and the selection of the replacements. They should be building a team, by both subtraction and addition.
Finally, to return to one of my recurring soapboxes, military leadership should be looking at what the Army is doing with its Command Assessment Programs (or CAPs: CCAP for full Colonels, BCAP for Lt Colonels). I don’t think it is too strong to call this program revolutionary for the institution, as it insists on gathering data about those who will take command of its battalions and brigades. And with data comes transparency.
The CAPs came under a microscope recently, when a senior Army leader intervened into the process to ensure the selection of one of his subordinate Lieutenant Colonels for command, despite what were widely reported as dismal scores from the BCAP process. This leader’s intervention—what I referred to as “The Hamilton Affair,” was reported by the CAP cadre and after long investigation, he was relieved and retired by the current (outgoing) Army Secretary. (See my initial and final comments on this incident at links).
To reiterate, most generals do not—emphatically NOT—like the reforms that CAP brings to the command selection process (with the publication of each of those pieces I got multiple comments from retired generals assuring me that things were better in the old days). And so it surprised me not at all that several generals—retired and active—appear to be spreading the rumor to the Trump transition team that the CAPs are part of the DEI regime, and need to be purged.
Let us leave aside the fact that the CAP program was born during the Trump 45 administration. But more importantly, the events in the “Hamilton Affair” demonstrate that administering the CAP is in fact an anti-DEI program. Again, it gives data. As objective a set of data as measurement permits. What is then done with that data is, obviously, up to the institution and political leadership. It can “play it straight” with the data, it can water down the data, it can ignore the data. But the data still exists.
The Hamilton Affair can be seen as the last gasp of the old, pre-data system. In the “old days,” the institution would never have dared not give command to a black, female officer with patronage from a senior black general. But this is precisely what happened under the CAP system and what outraged General Hamilton. How dare the Army substitute objective data for his considered professional judgment? So he insisted that—in this one case—the old system of patronage be revived. And—to his shame—the Army Chief of Staff conceded. He (the CSA) initially slated this officer—whom the data stated should not be trusted with command of soldiers—for command of soldiers.
The beauty of CAP is—again—that it gathers and preserves data. And data gives transparency. The CAP system does not prevent a DEI system from being imposed. It does not prevent the Army Chief of Staff from installing a minority officer. For that matter, it does not prevent an officer with poor scores from being given command because his father was a respected general and he has the right last name. What it DOES prevent is the Army being able to say it didn’t know what it was doing. The Army can continue to put dim, and/or toxic leaders in command for whatever political reason—it just can’t claim ignorance when bad things happen because that leader was toxic and/or dim.
Speaking of transparency, the Human Resources Command CG, Major General Hope Rampy, published on January 16, 2025, a memo that lays out how commanders were selected at the most recent boards, for both Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The memo contains interesting data. Bottom line—for the most recent selection for LTCs, BCAP performance was 60% of the total input, with prior performance (read: the old board system evaluating your efficiency reports) being 40%. For Colonels, the input was 50/50. Rampy provides interesting justification for the discrepancy between the two--that for (most) Lieutenant Colonels, recent performance is staff time, and other assignments, as it has usually been eight years since officers commanded their companies. While for Colonels, since recent performance includes battalion command, an analogous experience to brigade command, it makes sense to give that more weight. I had not previously considered this argument, and I have to admit it makes sense. I think I would still prefer the selection for Colonel command—which is essentially your audition for General—to give more weight to the skill set that generals will require. But by laying out the argument, MG Rampy has at least given us ground on which people of good will can disagree. Again, transparency.
So to loop back around, I think we can all concur that there is a crisis of leadership at the Pentagon. However, I do not think that either wholesale firings or deferring to some “warrior board” of greybeards is the answer. Instead, Secretary Hegseth (again, presuming confirmation) and his team should trim as shallow as possible but as deep as necessary to assert civilian control over the Pentagon. They should then think about a more active role for civilian leadership in the selection of generals at lower (one- and two-star) levels. But this team should recognize the Army’s Command Assessment Program as the best tool to evaluate and promote talent over time. As I’ve said elsewhere, the beauty of these programs is that they “radiate” both up and down the institution. At lower levels, they inform the company grade officers as to what the institution expects of commanders. And demographic replacement will eventually ensure that every general officer will have gone through the BCAP and/or CCAP crucible (though this may take another decade).
The Trump 47 administration has been left a mess. Active conflicts by proxies in the Middle East and Europe have drained resources that may be required for a direct conflict in East Asia. The defense industrial base is a shell of its former self and in deep need of reform—the shipyards in particular. The role of the Army in these conflicts is very unclear, the lessons to be drawn from the wars in Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza are ambiguous, and the strategic failure in Afghanistan looms large over the institution. It will be incumbent to have the right leadership for the coming challenges.
Finding exactly who that should—and should not—be will be the first major challenge of the Trump 47 Defense Department.
[i] The vibe shift most definitely includes the admirals as well! But others are far better equipped than am I to discuss the Navy’s problems, which are equally deep and will require a much longer timeline to fix.
[ii] I have never (to my knowledge) met General Donahue in person. I write this from his sterling reputation attested to by many officers and soldiers whose judgment I trust.
5. The Mindboggling TruthAbout American Power
Passion, reason, and chance. (people, government, and military)
Fear, honor, and interest.
Ends, ways, and means.
Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
I love trinities.
The Mindboggling Truth About American Power
Clausewitz’s Trinity Applied to the U.S.
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-mindboggling-truth-about-american-power
STRATEGY CENTRAL
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth – January 18, 2025
Introduction
The "people" in Clausewitz's trinity represent war's emotional and social foundation, embodying the collective passions, cultural values, and public opinion that drive and sustain a nation's involvement in conflict. This element emphasizes that war is not solely a matter of military strategy or political calculation but also deeply rooted in the population's will and sentiment. The people provide the moral and material support necessary for waging war, influencing recruitment, resource allocation, and overall national resolve. When the population is united in purpose and motivation, they can bolster a state's ability to endure prolonged struggles and support policies that align with their values and interests.
However, the role of the people also introduces volatility and unpredictability. Public opinion can shift rapidly due to battlefield successes or failures, casualties, economic hardships, or propaganda. If popular support wanes, it can undermine the state's political leadership and the military's effectiveness, potentially forcing premature negotiations or withdrawal. Clausewitz highlights the necessity of maintaining alignment between the people's passions and the political and military components of the trinity, as their disunity can destabilize the overall war effort. In the current American application, the scenario is not war; rather, great power competition that parallels war. This underscores the complex interplay between the populace's emotional energy and the state's and military leadership's more calculated actions.
The volatility and unpredictability of the American people, coupled with widespread distrust of government, may seem like a liability for national stability and global influence. Public skepticism, deep political polarization, and shifting priorities complicate governance and policy execution. Yet, paradoxically, these traits are also hallmarks of a dynamic, resilient society. The American system thrives on decentralized power, public debate, and a vigorous private sector, all more often than not transforming discord into innovation and adaptability. While instability at home can create challenges, the system’s flexibility enables the United States to weather crises, course-correct, and emerge stronger—an advantage many rigid or authoritarian competitors lack.
Despite its internal discord, America remains far ahead of its global competitors across critical measures of power and influence. The U.S. economy accounts for 26% of global GDP, making it larger than the combined economies of the global South. Its per capita wealth surpasses every other major nation, with middle-class households ranking among the wealthiest 1-2% globally. In technology, the United States generates over 50% of high-tech profits worldwide, and its energy revolution has turned it into the top producer of oil and natural gas. These achievements, combined with the dollar's dominant role in global finance and a network of military alliances spanning the globe, secure its unrivaled influence on the international stage.
From military alliances like NATO and AUKUS to its growing demographic strength fueled by immigration, the United States operates on a foundation unmatched by other nations. Even as China faces demographic decline and economic stagnation, and Europe wrestles with sluggish growth and aging populations, the United States uniquely combines scale, innovation, and strategic alliances. These facts underscore that, despite its internal challenges, America’s structural advantages ensure its continued leadership in shaping the global order.
The State of The State: A Powerful Mess
By all appearances, the United States is grappling with profound internal dysfunction. Public trust in government has plummeted to record lows, patriotism is declining sharply, and political polarization has peaked since Reconstruction. Amidst economic challenges, social divisions, and rising threats of violence against politicians, some scholars liken the U.S. to a failing state, with comparisons to Weimar Germany or the late Soviet Union. Yet, despite this domestic turmoil, the United States remains extraordinarily resilient as a global superpower. It commands 26% of the world’s GDP, matches its economic dominance of the 1990s, and has solidified its control over global arteries like energy, finance, and technology.
The paradox of American power lies in its enduring strengths. Its vast geographic expanse, resource wealth, and oceanic borders not only insulate it from external threats but also connect it to global trade. Unlike its rivals, the U.S. benefits from dynamic demographics, with a growing workforce driven by high immigration and birthrates. Its decentralized political system fosters innovation and adaptability, enabling a robust private sector to outpace global competitors in technology and productivity. While China, Europe, and Russia struggle with economic stagnation, demographic decline, and internal challenges, the U.S. leads in innovation, energy production, and alliance-building, bolstering its position as the world’s dominant power.
However, this dominance coexists with vulnerabilities. Economic disparities between thriving urban hubs and struggling rural areas fuel political polarization, while geographic security and wealth often foster disengagement from global challenges. These contradictions result in what some term “hollow internationalism,” as the U.S. simultaneously asserts global leadership while underfunding diplomatic and military capabilities. Despite these challenges, America’s unparalleled combination of scale, innovation, and strategic alliances ensures that it remains far ahead of both its rivals and allies, making it a unique power capable of shaping the global order even amid internal strife.
There is a significant civil and institutional crisis at home, marked by widespread public dissatisfaction and eroding trust in governmental institutions. No other statistic describes the problem more clearly than the fact that 47% of the nation believes the United States is nearing a civil war. A historical low of Americans, 44%, have confidence in the Supreme Court, 48% of respondents said they had confidence that the presidency is working, and 39% said the Congressional institution is working. A survey by The Hill on January 14, 2025, indicates that 59.9% of respondents feel the country is headed in the wrong direction. This sentiment transcends political affiliations, with significant portions of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents expressing pessimism about the nation's trajectory.
Compounding this discontent with government institutions, there is a growing perception of economic inequality. A 2024 survey highlighted that 69% of Americans believe that the political and economic elite do not care about hard-working people, reflecting a deep-seated skepticism towards those in power. Additionally, only 27% of Americans aged 18-25 "agree strongly" that democracy is the best system of government, compared with 48% for all ages, indicating a troubling decline in confidence among younger citizens. These statistics underscore a profound crisis of confidence in the nation's direction, economic equality, and its foundational institutions. Taken as a whole, these trends pose significant challenges to the cohesion and functionality of American society.
These contrasting conditions of significant power and civil discord should not be viewed rationally as correlated. What, then, is occurring? Let’s examine the numbers more closely.
The United States Power By The Numbers
Economic Resilience and Growth
Share of Global Wealth: The U.S. accounts for 26% of global GDP, maintaining its dominance since the early 1990s, and its economy is now twice the size of the eurozone.
Per Capita Wealth Growth: U.S. per capita wealth has surged past global competitors, with median household incomes rising 55% since 1990, even as wages in other major economies have stagnated.
Innovation Leadership: U.S. firms generate over 50% of global high-tech profits, with a robust venture capital ecosystem that represents about half the global total.
Energy Independence and Power
Energy Leadership: Transitioning from the world’s largest importer to the top oil and natural gas producer, the U.S. has insulated itself and its allies from foreign energy coercion.
Efficiency and Sustainability: Per capita carbon emissions have fallen to levels last seen in the 1910s, demonstrating a successful pivot toward renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Strategic Dominance
Military Alliances: Expanded alliances like NATO (including Finland and Sweden) and new initiatives such as AUKUS bolster U.S. influence across Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.
Dollar Dominance: The U.S. dollar remains the backbone of global finance, representing 60% of global central bank reserves and nearly 90% of foreign exchange transactions.
Demographic Advantage
Workforce Growth: While competitors face shrinking populations, U.S. prime working-age populations are growing, bolstered by high immigration rates and birthrates.
Talent Magnet: The U.S. consistently attracts global talent, and its world-class universities and innovation hubs foster a dynamic and productive workforce.
The numbers tell the story of resilient structural systems that endure despite political and cultural dysfunction. These systems may continue functioning for a while, but significant damage could ensue if disagreements lead to bad choices. It is even possible that these advantages will disappear altogether. Government intervention in what sustains these advantages risks undermining what makes America more effective than other nations. Additionally, if the American people fall behind in skills, motivation, and belief in the American way, they could jeopardize what makes America successful. The American government and the people should not undermine five specific areas of strength to maintain our benefits as the most powerful nation on Earth.
Why America Outpaces Rivals and Allies
The U.S. enjoys unique structural advantages that put it ahead of global rivals like China and allies in Europe:
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Scale and Efficiency: Unlike populous but less efficient nations like China and India, or wealthy but smaller nations like Japan and Germany, the U.S. combines size with productivity, ensuring unmatched material power.
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Geographic Insulation and Accessibility: Surrounded by oceans, the U.S. is both shielded from external threats and connected to global trade routes, creating a secure and prosperous environment for economic growth.
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Innovation Diffusion: The decentralized nature of the U.S. political and economic systems allows for rapid adoption and scaling of new technologies, a critical advantage over centrally planned economies like China.
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Resilience Through Crisis: Historical patterns show that the U.S. emerges stronger after crises, whether during the Civil War, the Great Depression, or the Cold War, reinforcing its global primacy.
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Global Integration: While rivals like China focus on subsidy-heavy models, the U.S. leverages open trade, foreign investment, and strategic alliances to enhance its global standing and influence.
The American Trinity
Clausewitz’s trinity describes war as the product of three interconnected forces: the army, the people, and the government. Each represents a critical aspect of a nation’s ability to engage in conflict or maintain cohesion in competition. The army symbolizes the calculated application of military power and professional expertise. The people reflect the emotional and social foundation, providing moral and material support. The government embodies rational decision-making, strategy, and policy leadership. In theory, aligning these elements ensures a nation’s success in war (and competition) and other existential challenges. However, in modern America, cracks in this alignment expose significant vulnerabilities.
The people, traditionally the emotional backbone of Clausewitz’s trinity, appear increasingly disconnected from their government and, by extension, the army. Public opinion, shaped by economic insecurity, political polarization, and distrust in institutions, has become volatile and fragmented. The forces driving this dissatisfaction are likely tied to the unseen or underexamined roles of political and economic power structures. These forces, operating through lobbying, campaign financing, and media manipulation, create a perception that the government serves elite interests rather than the public good. This misalignment erodes trust and undermines the collective will essential for national resilience.
Similarly, as the rational actor in Clausewitz’s trinity, the government faces challenges in maintaining legitimacy and coherence. Political gridlock, opaque decision-making, and a lack of accountability give the impression that leadership is unresponsive to the needs of the people. Meanwhile, economic powerhouses wield disproportionate influence, shaping policy to benefit narrow interests while neglecting broader societal needs. This dynamic distorts the intended function of government within the trinity, leaving it vulnerable to criticism and incapable of galvanizing public support for critical initiatives. Without a government that is both effective and trusted, the cohesion of the trinity weakens further.
Though often viewed as the most stable component, the army is not immune to these pressures. Its professional ethos and operational capacity depend on people's support and government guidance. When public trust in institutions falters, and government policies lack clarity, the army’s ability to function effectively is compromised. Moreover, the economic and political forces that shape military priorities may not align with national security interests, creating inefficiencies and further alienating the public. When examined through this lens, Clausewitz's trinity suggests that the dissatisfaction among Americans stems from visible dysfunction and deeper, systemic misalignments driven by unchecked political and economic power. Addressing these forces is essential to restoring trust and reestablishing balance.
America Is Better With a Sunny Disposition Than As The Cult of Doom
American democracy stands at a crossroads, burdened by political discord and eroding trust in its foundational institutions. Yet, history reminds us that the nation thrives on its ability to confront challenges with resilience and innovation. To preserve its global leadership and strengthen its domestic cohesion, the United States must rekindle the shared belief in democracy and capitalism as a unifying principle. This begins by confronting systemic flaws and the “cult of doom” that exacerbate division and undermine public trust.
Politically, urgent reforms are essential. By ending gerrymandering, introducing ranked-choice voting, eliminating primaries, and shortening the presidential campaign season, the United States can reduce polarization and elevate the quality of political discourse. Reshaping the internet and social media to combat the spread of falsehoods and disinformation would further enhance the quality of civic engagement, ensuring that technology serves the people rather than divides them. This is possible. Just because one form of predatory algorithm dominates does not mean it cannot be changed. We made it, we can change it. Additionally, improving government transparency and updating tax codes to address economic disparities would signal a renewed commitment to fairness and accountability.
Economic reforms are equally critical to bridging divides and fostering unity. Expanding education, training, housing, and healthcare access would provide a tangible foundation for shared prosperity. Strengthening economic mobility through targeted investments in underrepresented communities while simultaneously investing in our best and brightest can rebuild faith in the American Dream. These measures would address immediate inequalities and fortify the population’s belief in the system’s ability to deliver opportunities for all.
Finally, reviving the civic spirit requires comprehensive civics education and a renewed emphasis on citizen participation. Americans must be encouraged to engage with their government at all levels and see democracy not as a static achievement but as an ongoing commitment. The challenges are formidable, but they are not insurmountable. By recommitting to unity, reform, and opportunity, America can reaffirm its democratic ideals and continue to serve as a beacon of hope and strength in an increasingly uncertain world.
We all know the need for party power lurks behind any of these initiatives. The current political powers that be thrive off your rage. Deny the political parties’ rage and demand optimism. There is legitimate, solid proof that America is far better than most Americans realize. Suppose we sustain and expand our national power while we work to repair our disastrous civil strife. It would take believing in institutions that still generate a global power. It requires dropping rage long enough to see facts and truth, but we can do it. In that case, we can become a nation that deserves the blessings and advantages our power accords. If we fail to do this, our children will likely have to learn Chinese to get ahead in life.
Conclusion
The paradox of America’s global dominance lies in its extraordinary power juxtaposed with a population that largely disbelieves in the systems underpinning its success. Economically, militarily, and technologically, the United States remains unparalleled, yet its citizens' collective skepticism toward institutions, governance, and even democracy casts a long shadow over its achievements. This disconnect is ironic and alarming: America commands the heights of global influence while grappling with internal doubts about its trajectory and values.
At the heart of this irony is a profound misunderstanding or underappreciation of what makes the United States exceptional. Its decentralized political system, entrepreneurial spirit, and capacity for resilience have driven innovation, prosperity, and strategic dominance. Yet, many Americans see only dysfunction, missing the enduring strengths that continue to position their nation as the world’s leader. This perception gap undermines the collective will needed to address pressing challenges, from political polarization to economic inequality.
The United States must confront the cultural and informational forces eroding trust and unity to bridge this divide. Social media algorithms that amplify division, a broken political system that rewards extremism, and growing economic disparities all fuel this crisis of confidence. Reforms in governance, technology, and economic policy are critical to reversing these trends and rekindling a sense of shared purpose. Americans must be reminded that their nation’s global position is not guaranteed—it is the result of systems, values, and hard-won achievements that require constant care and renewal.
Ultimately, the irony of American power should serve as a call to action. Suppose the United States can harness its global strength to rebuild domestic trust and unity. In that case, it will sustain its leadership and transform it into something worthy of enduring pride. Only by addressing this paradox head-on can Americans ensure their nation’s remarkable story continues—one where its people not only live in the world’s most powerful country but also believe in the principles that make it so.
Bibliography
Michael Beckley. “The Strange Triumph of a Broken America: Why Power Abroad Comes With Dysfunction at Home.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2025.
George Washington Polling. https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/poll-shows-americans-trust-government-holds-steady-amid-turmoil
Marist Poll. https://maristpoll.marist.edu/polls/a-nation-divided/
Gallup Research Poll. https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx
6. The World Is Getting Riskier. Americans Don’t Want to Pay for It.
I wanted to start my comments and say this is the problem.
But this is reality. It is all about what the American people are willing to pay for: whether insurance for fire wildfires or national defense.
And it is the shrewd politician who harnesses these sentiments and exploits them for political gain.
This applies to wildfire defense as well as to managing strategic competition around the world.
I think we can use an analogy that insurance and alliances are both about pooling risk. The question is how much are we willing to invest in that pooling?
But we have to keep in mind that we get what we pay for (or don't pay for) and we reap what we sow (or don't sow).
The World Is Getting Riskier. Americans Don’t Want to Pay for It.
California is a microcosm of what happens when insurance breaks down: Either households face potential ruin, or the public is handed a financial time bomb.
https://www.wsj.com/economy/consumers/the-world-is-getting-riskier-americans-dont-want-to-pay-for-it-51901067?mod=hp_lead_pos5
By Greg Ip
Follow
Jan. 19, 2025 5:30 am ET
An aerial view of homes burned in the Palisade wildfire in Los Angeles earlier this month. Photo: Josh Edelson/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Insurance is one of finance’s great gifts to mankind. Through the statistical magic of risk pooling, an individual can obtain peace of mind and protection against devastating loss.
This remarkable invention shows signs of breaking down. As risks from illness and old age to natural and financial disaster grow, so does Americans’ resistance to paying to insure against them.
The latest example is California. Earlier this month, JPMorgan estimated the fires around Los Angeles had inflicted $50 billion in losses, of which only $20 billion were insured.
One reason for the gap: State regulators have prevented insurers from charging premiums commensurate with rising property values, construction costs and wildfire risk exacerbated by a warming climate. Many thus stopped renewing policies.
Hundreds of thousands of homeowners shifted to California’s state-run backstop, the Fair Plan, whose exposure has tripled since 2020 to $458 billion. It has only $2.5 billion in reinsurance and $200 million in cash.
If the Fair Plan runs out of money, it can impose an assessment on private insurers to be partly passed on to all policyholders. In other words, the costs of the disaster will be socialized.
A home destroyed by the Eaton fire next to a home that survived it, in Altadena, Calif., last week. Photo: Noah Berger/Associated Press
California is a microcosm of what happens when insurance breaks down: Either households face potential ruin or the public is handed a financial time bomb.
“What we are seeing is a real disconnect,” said Carolyn Kousky, an economist specializing in risk and founder of the nonprofit Insurance For Good. “There are opposing views on insurance: Is it a private market good, or is it social protection, to make sure everyone has the resources to recover from disaster?”
A central feature of insurance is risk pooling: The combined contributions of the community cover the losses incurred by members of the community in a given year.
Another feature of private insurance is actuarial rate-making, that is, calibrating premiums to the customer’s risk. That’s to prevent “adverse selection,” in which only the riskiest people buy insurance, and moral hazard—the tendency to encourage risk by undercharging for it.
But some activities or individuals are so risky they could never obtain, or afford, private insurance. That’s when risk gets socialized. The federal government’s expansion since the 1930s has largely been through the provision of insurance: Social Security, unemployment insurance, health insurance for the elderly and poor, deposit, mortgage, and flood insurance and, after Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism insurance. Not for nothing is the federal government often called an insurance company with an army.
The Luigi Factor
Nowhere are feelings about insurance more conflicted than in health. Americans want neither the rationing that comes with government-run insurance, nor the risk-management that comes with private insurance. This became painfully apparent when the fatal shooting of Brian Thompson, chief executive of UnitedHealthcare, triggered an outpouring of fury not at the suspected killer, Luigi Mangione, but at insurers for limiting benefits, such as by requiring prior authorization for care.
A demonstrator displayed a placard outside New York Supreme Court, where Luigi Mangione was being arraigned in the fatal shooting of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson last month. Photo: jeenah moon/Reuters
In fact, long before that shooting, the Affordable Care Act had constrained insurers’ ability to base premiums on risk, by prohibiting them from charging more to people with pre-existing conditions or denying coverage altogether.
The ACA also stipulated that insurers spend at least 80% to 85% (depending on the plan) of premiums on benefits. So while denials, deductibles and copays may, at the margin, affect profits, ultimately they serve to control premiums.
In finance, where risk supposedly goes hand in hand with reward, losses have been repeatedly socialized, most notably when major financial institutions were bailed out in 2008.
Deposit insurance, on paper, is capped at $250,000. Depositors with more are supposed to be careful where they keep their money. But in 2023, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. bailed out all the uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank. The costs are being socialized via a special assessment on other banks’ uninsured deposits.
What financial disaster was to the last era, natural disaster may be to the next. In a World Economic Forum survey, business, government and other leaders ranked extreme weather the most severe of 33 risks facing the world in the next 10 years. Major disasters pose a particular problem for insurers because claims occur all at once instead of randomly.
And as with financial disasters, the cost of natural disasters is being socialized. Numerous states have backstops for homeowners unable to get private insurance, and all struggle to charge premiums that reflect actual risk.
In a 2023 study for California insurers, Nancy Watkins, an actuary with Milliman, an insurance consultancy, found that plans in California, Washington, Louisiana and Florida, which had doubled in size between 2017 and 2022, all incurred more in losses and expense than they took in through premiums.
In Florida, frequent storms, flood-plain development, inflation, fraud and litigation have pushed home-insurance premiums to the highest in the country. Yet insurers were “discouraged from large rate hikes by public hearings, documentation requirements, and their own customers and agents,” Kousky and a co-author wrote last year. In years past, some insurers pulled back, or became insolvent.
Hurricanes and other factors have pushed Florida’s insurance premiums to the highest in the country. Photo: Miguel J. Rodriguez carrillo/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
As in California, Florida homeowners flocked to the government backstop, Citizens Property Insurance. Like California, Florida has taken steps to make its insurance market financially viable. It has cracked down on litigation and allowed Citizens to raise premiums. Nonetheless, Citizens last year said premiums are 22% below the actuarially sound level.
Kousky said in the event of a series of major storms, Florida’s three insurance backstops—Citizens; a reinsurance fund; and guaranty program for insolvent insurers—could struggle to borrow enough to pay claims, triggering demands for a state or federal rescue.
Taxpayers nationwide are also on the hook. Since 2020, Congress has appropriated an average of $46 billion for disaster relief, triple the average of the prior decade (in constant 2023 dollars). Late last year, Congress rushed through $100 billion in aid for disasters including hurricanes Helene and Milton.
Socializing risk weakens one of the main benefits of insurance: Encouraging the insured to mitigate their risk so as to reduce premiums. Without that price signal, it usually takes direct intervention to modify behavior. After being bailed out in 2008-09, banks have had to submit to far more stringent safety and soundness rules.
The same may be true of natural disasters. If the risk is to be socialized, society has a right to demand the insured mitigate their risk, such as making homes more flood, wind and fire proof or staying out of disaster-prone areas entirely.
“It involves alignment of ordinances, building codes, enforcement, inspection, and finding resources for…communities and homeowners who really can’t afford” such measures, Watkins said. “All that is politically difficult. But it’s becoming increasingly obvious the old strategy, of denying the risk, has failed.”
Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com
7. Xi Tells Officials Scared of Being Purged: It’s OK to Make Mistakes
No Zero defects for Zi or no Xero defects for Xi. ( apologies for the attempt at humor).
When a dictator says this you should be afraid. Very afraid.
An interesting concept here to lay these out for the officials but in reading between the lines the most important connective tissue among them all is party discipline and loyalty to the party (and by definition Xi). You must never ever violate the directives of the party or the orders of Xi.
Excerpts:
The ‘Three Differentiates’ calls on party enforcers to distinguish among:
- Mistakes made because of lack of experience or trial and error in promoting overhauls vs. intentional violations of party discipline and the law
- Mistakes made when experimenting in areas without clear restrictions set by superiors vs. violations committed despite explicit restrictions
- Unintentional mistakes made in the course of promoting development vs. violations made for personal gain
Xi Tells Officials Scared of Being Purged: It’s OK to Make Mistakes
With China’s economy on the line and many bureaucrats too cowed to act, party enforcers vow to be lenient—when appropriate
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-xi-jinping-government-purge-approach-87e25bcf?mod=latest_headlines
By Chun Han Wong
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Updated Jan. 19, 2025 12:01 am ET
Xi has ordered party enforcers to absolve blame for honest mistakes and rekindle entrepreneurial verve. Photo: Andrea Verdelli/Bloomberg News
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is intensifying a war on corruption that has punished officials in record numbers—with the side effect of leaving many unwilling to act for fear of punishment.
To help his bureaucrats rediscover their mojo and revive a stagnating economy, Xi is also promoting the message that some mistakes are acceptable. His decree to the Communist Party: Enforcing strict discipline shouldn’t fuel a climate of fear that saps the can-do spirit that once helped power China’s economic rise.
The approach is to “combine strict control with loving care,” Xi has said, to “encourage cadres to forge ahead and be enterprising.”
To that end, Xi has ordered party enforcers to absolve blame for honest mistakes and rekindle entrepreneurial verve across the rank and file. The party elite approved a new economic plan that embedded Xi’s directive, dubbed the “Three Differentiates,” which calls for leniency for well-meaning officials who make honest mistakes, and differentiating them from those who willfully break the rules.
Xi’s campaign seeks to tackle a key challenge in his top-down leadership of the world’s second-largest economy: how to wield decisive control over a vast, unwieldy bureaucracy without stifling the local dynamism that he says China needs to overcome deep-seated economic issues.
As part of the push for calibrated clemency, authorities have also pledged to curb false accusations against bureaucrats—a phenomenon that grew amid Xi’s purges—and encourage remorseful offenders to make amends by working harder. State media meanwhile called for reviving a sense of mission among officials who might otherwise stay passive to avoid trouble.
Xi also made clear that he is pressing forward with a crackdown that has punished more than 6.2 million people since he took power in late 2012—and cemented his standing as China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong.
“No resting for even a single step, no retreating for even half a step,” Xi said this month at an annual meeting of the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. “Any hesitation, laxness, or giving up halfway will be subversive mistakes.”
Days later, the CCDI said that authorities had disciplined 889,000 people last year. It was a roughly 46% increase from 2023 and the highest annual total since the party started releasing such data about two decades ago.
Xi’s crackdown, first launched to combat rampant graft that was threatening Communist Party rule, has since become a campaign of ceaseless purges aimed at keeping officials loyal and on their toes, an echo of Mao’s ideas on fanning a “continuous revolution” across the party and Chinese society.
China experts say Xi will find it difficult to soothe frayed nerves among the party’s roughly 100 million members, while persisting with his autocratic style of leadership.
Xi wants to exert control through purges while also unshackling officials to do their jobs without fear, but “it is simply not possible to have it both ways,” said Sheng Hong, an independent economist in Beijing.
Corruption probes are often politically motivated and officials have little assurance that they won’t be punished arbitrarily, Sheng said.
Xi’s crackdown has become a campaign of ceaseless purges aimed at keeping officials loyal and on their toes. Photo: agustin marcarian/Reuters
In the past two years, discipline inspectors have barreled through the worlds of finance, energy, healthcare, sports and defense—rounding up scores of high-ranking bureaucrats, bankers, executives and military officers. Some of those targeted had vanished for weeks, even months, before Beijing acknowledged the investigations.
State television profiled some of these cases this month in a four-part documentary series featuring confessional interviews with an ex-justice minister and a former provincial party boss who were purged for corruption. At its conclave this month, the CCDI said it would continue to repair systemic problems in sectors including finance, state enterprises, energy, healthcare and sports.
The task of figuring out the right balance between harshness and leniency falls to party enforcers, who have been publicizing cases where errant officials were punished lightly or spared.
In one example, according to an official account, enforcers gave clemency to a former township party chief who faced allegations of negligence for rushing into a project to improve the safety of the local water supply.
The project, in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, didn’t result in financial losses and investigators found the official was contrite and hadn’t sought personal gain—meriting “criticism and education” in lieu of formal punishment.
Authorities also clamped down on false accusations. Between January and late December last year, Heilongjiang punished 137 people for framing officials and cleared the names of more than 1,100 party members who had been wrongly accused, the CCDI said.
One example cited in Shandong province involved a village party chief who cooked up corruption claims against officials from neighboring villages in an attempt to interfere with performance rankings, according to an official account.
As part of a nationwide effort to bring errant officials back into the fold, inspectors in the southern cities of Shenzhen and Shaoguan have been counseling thousands of “fallen cadres” who were disciplined by the party, with the aim of getting them to “stand up and start again,” according to Guangdong province’s disciplinary commission.
The party also ramped up efforts to curb bureaucratic inertia in May, when authorities disciplined roughly 10,600 people for offenses related to policy inaction, recklessness or deceit—an 80% jump from April and roughly 2.7 times the number from a year earlier, according to CCDI data. The numbers have continued to climb.
Bureaucratic passivity is one of the “challenges unique to major parties” that Xi says the Communist Party must overcome to stay in power. These challenges, he says, include questions about how the party can remain united, energetic and capable of getting things done.
The ‘Three Differentiates’ calls on party enforcers to distinguish among:
- Mistakes made because of lack of experience or trial and error in promoting overhauls vs. intentional violations of party discipline and the law
- Mistakes made when experimenting in areas without clear restrictions set by superiors vs. violations committed despite explicit restrictions
- Unintentional mistakes made in the course of promoting development vs. violations made for personal gain
Xi first raised the “Three Differentiates” as a principle in 2016, acknowledging that some officials felt uneasy about making decisions for which they could be held accountable. Two years later, Beijing issued guidelines on how to encourage bureaucrats to take the initiative and do their duty, including measures for tolerating innocent mistakes.
The effort grew more urgent as China’s economy struggled to bounce back from the Covid-19 pandemic. Xi told the CCDI in 2023 that the purpose of strict discipline “is not to incapacitate people, make them hesitant and fearful, or turn them into a stagnant pool of gloominess and inaction.”
The elite Central Committee added the “Three Differentiates” slogan to a new economic plan that it approved in July. The slogan calls for differentiating between cadres who err because of inexperience or well-meaning experimentation, and those who act willfully or selfishly.
“Some cadres are afraid that the more they do, the more mistakes they will make, and they are afraid of getting into conflicts and inviting trouble. This has created a mentality of not taking responsibility and not taking action,” said a party guidebook on the new economic plan.
“There are always risks in doing things,” the guidebook said. “We must give doers a chance to sum up their experiences and reinvigorate themselves.”
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Since then, party and state agencies have promised to do more to encourage initiative and risk-taking.
China’s top commissions for economic planning and managing state assets said they would create processes to waive punishment for officials who made subpar or failed investments—as long as they did due diligence, complied with regulations and weren’t seeking personal gain.
Party inspectors stressed the importance of rehabilitating errant officials where possible and reviving their commitment to public service.
“After being punished, I was under a lot of pressure,” one Shenzhen official censured in 2023 for unspecific misconduct was quoted as saying by the Guangdong disciplinary commission. The party “gave me a lot of warmth and encouragement, allowing me to quickly adjust my mentality and regain my passion for work.”
Bureaucratic passivity is one of the challenges that Xi says the Communist Party must overcome to stay in power. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Image
Write to Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com
8. Analyzing Pete Hegseth's Congressional Testimony
I agree. An insufficient number of the hard questions were asked. Questions about character flaws are not the "hard questions" though I expect that the nominee spent an inordinate amount of time focused on preparing his defense against those types of questions.
Rather than create a spectacle the Democrats could have delved into the critical questions and kept the moral high ground because Mr Hegseth was already being tried in the media. They could have done the nation a great service by asking the hard relevant questions ( e.g., doing their jobs) and would have spared us from their embarrassing questions and the spectacle we saw.
Analyzing Pete Hegseth's Congressional Testimony
The Senate failed to Ask Hegseth The Hard Questions
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/analyzing-pete-hegseth-s-congressional-testimony
STRATEGY CENTRAL
By And For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth – January 16, 2025
Pete Hegseth: https://www.aol.com/pete-hegseth-gets-friendly-gop-230844465.html
Introduction
Pete Hegseth's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 14, 2025, as a nominee for Secretary of Defense, sparked significant debate over his qualifications, vision, and preparedness for the role. While his testimony strongly emphasized readiness, modernization, and the restoration of a "warrior ethos," it also exposed critical gaps in his experience and understanding of complex global defense challenges. Hegseth presented himself as a disruptor, aiming to reform a bureaucratic Pentagon, but his polarizing statements and limited strategic depth left senators questioning his ability to lead the Department of Defense in an era defined by great power competition.
This analysis delves into Hegseth’s testimony, highlighting his policy priorities and leadership philosophy while comparing his approach to the established strategies of his predecessors, notably Secretary Jim Mattis. The contrasts underscore a broader concern: while Hegseth offers a compelling narrative of change, his lack of experience and nuanced understanding of defense complexities could hinder his ability to execute his vision effectively. The testimony ultimately revealed a candidate whose ambitions may outpace his readiness for the challenges ahead.
Opening Statement
Hegseth's opening statement emphasized his military background, gratitude for the nomination, and a clear commitment to restoring the "warrior ethos" within the Department of Defense. He framed his nomination as a necessary disruption to the status quo, stating, "Returning the Pentagon back to warfighting is my job." His statements focused on the military's core mission: readiness, lethality, and accountability.
This initial framing resonated with conservative members of the committee who value a back-to-basics approach to military operations. However, his language also sparked controversy, particularly regarding comments that hinted at a departure from current diversity and equity initiatives.
Hegseth’s leadership philosophy was oriented toward practicality and emphasized his personal experience as a warfighter as his principal guiding light as a leader.
- Emphasize experience-driven leadership with a focus on warfighters and their needs.
- Set clear goals, empower capable personnel, and hold leaders accountable for results.
- Advocate for "peace through strength," ensuring the U.S. military is unmatched and prepared for conflict.
Hegseth’s vision departs from traditional Pentagon leadership. He offers a "boots-on-the-ground" perspective rooted in combat experience. He pledges to uphold the Constitution, collaborate with Congress, and prioritize the welfare of troops while securing America’s global position.
Policy Priorities
Hegseth outlined three main objectives:
1. Restoration of Warrior Ethos: He emphasized addressing recruitment and retention challenges by focusing on readiness and unity, rather than diversity metrics. His assertion, "Unity is our strength, not diversity," drew mixed reactions from the committee.
- Revitalize the military's culture by emphasizing warfighting, lethality, and readiness.
- Address recruitment, retention, and readiness issues by fostering unity and shared purpose.
- Set high standards for performance and merit-based leadership while eliminating divisive politics from military matters.
2. Modernization of Military Capabilities: Hegseth highlighted the urgent need to modernize the nuclear triad, streamline acquisition processes, and integrate emerging technologies. He pledged to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies, referencing the "Valley of Death" between experimental prototypes and production.
- Modernize the military by reviving the defense industrial base and reforming acquisition processes.
- Focus on emerging technologies, nuclear triad modernization, and ensuring the Pentagon can pass audits.
- Match military capabilities to evolving threats and eliminate bureaucratic inefficiencies.
3. Re-establishing Deterrence: He proposed a robust focus on countering Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific and rebuilding alliances to ensure global stability. He framed deterrence as a cornerstone of his strategy, stating, "We need real deterrence, not reputational deterrence."
- Strengthen homeland defense, including securing borders and airspace.
- Partner with allies to counter aggression, particularly from China in the Indo-Pacific.
- Reallocate resources by responsibly ending wars and focusing on larger geopolitical challenges.
More Criticism & Praise Than An Inquiry Into Defense Challenges
Financial Mismanagement: Several senators raised concerns about Hegseth's leadership of Veterans for Freedom and Concerned Veterans for America, citing deficits and alleged financial mismanagement. Hegseth defended his record, emphasizing his commitment to mission execution and attributing financial challenges to external factors, such as donor volatility during the 2008 financial crisis. He framed his leadership as decisive, pointing to letters of support from colleagues attesting to his character.
Diversity and Inclusion. Hegseth faced sharp criticism for past comments opposing DEI initiatives and questioning the role of women in combat. His statements, including, "Standards must remain high," were viewed as dismissive of the contributions of women and minorities in the military. Despite acknowledging the value of all servicemembers, his tone left many senators unconvinced of his commitment to fostering an inclusive military culture.
Personal Conduct. Questions about allegations of alcohol abuse and inappropriate behavior were met with denials and assertions of a "coordinated smear campaign." Hegseth maintained that these accusations lacked credibility and were politically motivated. His responses aimed to refocus attention on his qualifications and vision.
Women in Combat Roles. Hegseth's testimony on this topic was a focal point of contention. While he acknowledged the contributions of women in the military, his past statements, such as, "Women in combat roles haven’t made us more effective," raised concerns about his stance. Senators pressed him to reconcile these views with the reality of a modern, diverse military. Hegseth pledged to ensure standards remain high but faced skepticism about his ability to lead inclusively.
Advocacy for Warfighters. Hegseth’s support for pardoning servicemembers convicted of war crimes was another divisive issue. Critics argued that his stance undermined the rule of law and military discipline. Hegseth defended his position by prioritizing warfighter welfare and navigating the balance between legality and lethality.
Interaction with Senators
The exchanges between Hegseth and senators highlighted a partisan divide. Republican members praised his focus on readiness and efficiency, while Democrats questioned his qualifications and temperament. Sadly, while some Senators focused on questions about the duties of Secretary of Defense, far too many were excessively focused on Hegseth’s personal failings or offered overly simplistic questions (more like statements). The questions asked did not explore how he would address difficult issues, leaving Americans with limited insight into Hegseth's perspectives on the matters expected to be significant during his time as Secretary. At times, this was an embarrassment for the Senate.
Key moments included:
- Senator Shaheen pressing Hegseth on his comments about women in combat.
- Senator Reed challenging his stance on DEI and the rule of law.
- Senator Gillibrand emphasized the need for inclusive leadership.
Hegseth’s responses maintained the "meritocracy and lethality" theme, but his deflections left many critical questions unanswered. For an excellent synopsis of missed topics, read David Brooks’ article in the NY Times.
Outlining His Strategic Vision
Hegseth articulated a vision for addressing the challenges of great power competition, mainly focusing on China as the foremost threat to U.S. national security. He underscored the necessity of redirecting resources and strategic priorities toward the Indo-Pacific region, aligning with the 2017 National Defense Strategy. Hegseth called for strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific region, such as bolstering ties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, while maintaining a strong deterrent posture to counter China's military buildup and aggressive actions in the South China Sea.
A central pillar of his strategic vision involved modernizing the defense industrial base to ensure the United States remains technologically and militarily dominant. Hegseth highlighted the importance of accelerating the adoption of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and autonomous systems. By cutting through bureaucratic inefficiencies, he argued, the Department of Defense could ensure these innovations reach warfighters faster and more effectively. He also stressed the need for economic and diplomatic tools to complement military efforts in curbing China's influence globally.
Hegseth also acknowledged the importance of adapting U.S. military strategy to prepare for multi-domain conflicts, emphasizing readiness across land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains. His vision included reinforcing the nuclear triad and expanding missile defense capabilities to deter both China and Russia. While his approach to addressing these threats was generally well-received by Republican senators, concerns about his ability to manage the complexities of great power competition without prior experience leading large organizations persisted. Nonetheless, Hegseth’s prioritization of strategic clarity and technological advancement demonstrated an understanding of the evolving global security landscape.
While much of this is in alignment with national security experts, his lack of experience managing large, complex organizations like the Department of Defense raised doubts about his ability to execute these plans effectively. He was well prepared for four hours of grueling interrogation; how much of what he said is deeply internalized by him is impossible to say.
Mattis vs. Hegseth: Strategic Contrasts
Since the Mattis National Defense Strategy has been invoked, it seems natural to compare Hegseth to a recent Secretary. As Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis brought a disciplined and deeply informed strategy rooted in decades of experience to the Pentagon. His strategy emphasized a clear, global framework to address China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. Mattis focused on reinvigorating alliances, enhancing readiness, and ensuring a well-balanced approach to modernizing the military. His leadership was marked by a commitment to fiscal responsibility and alignment with global partners to counter adversaries effectively.
Mattis’s strategy involved strengthening NATO and Pacific partnerships, signaling resolve against adversaries while maintaining a deterrent stance. He understood the nuances of military operations and global diplomacy, leveraging his background as a Marine Corps general and his expertise in strategic planning. During his tenure, progress was made in cyber defense, addressing readiness shortfalls and balancing immediate threats with long-term modernization goals.
In contrast, Pete Hegseth’s vision for the Department of Defense differs significantly in tone and approach. While both emphasize readiness and modernization, Hegseth focuses heavily on an "America First" philosophy and less on coalition-building. He is in for a shock when he finds out how important allies and partners are for maintaining a global U.S. military footprint and military force ready for conflict everywhere, all the time. His testimony reflected a prioritization of countering China but lacked the global framework underpinning Mattis’s strategy. Where Mattis brought a nuanced understanding of great power competition, Hegseth’s approach seemed more reactionary, framed by a desire to disrupt bureaucratic inertia without clearly articulated solutions.
Unlike Mattis, who entered the Pentagon with decades of military leadership and familiarity with defense processes, Hegseth’s background lacks comparable depth. Mattis’s "dust on his boots" stemmed from years of command experience and firsthand knowledge of complex military operations. His global strategy was well-honed, balancing military strength with diplomatic engagement. Hegseth, by contrast, enters with limited experience in managing large organizations and without a deeply established strategic philosophy. His emphasis on restoring the warrior ethos is a compelling narrative but may fall short when addressing the intricate dynamics of modern defense challenges.
Hegseth faces the monumental task of leading the Department of Defense in an era of great power competition. Yet, he does so without the depth of knowledge, experience, or strategic insight that characterized Mattis’s leadership. While Hegseth’s priorities align with a desire for change, his lack of expertise raises questions about his ability to navigate the complexities of countering adversaries like China and Russia, addressing domestic and global challenges while running the world’s largest bureaucracy and working for a Commander in Chief unfettered by criminality for the orders he issues to DoD.
Conclusion
Hegseth's testimony reflected a candidate deeply aligned with former President Trump’s "America First" philosophy. This appealed to conservative audiences and alienated democrats by design. In turn, the Democrats did themselves a few favors in their often sophomoric attempt to make an imperfect man look a little worse, leaving enormously important questions untouched. This left Hegseth looking more polished and capable while avoiding the scrutiny he should have faced.
Even fervent partisans would be right to worry about Hegseth’s ability to survive, much less excel as Secretary. Choosing a combat-experienced Major as a nominee to run the DoD is like the Ford Motor Company pulling an employee off the assembly line to be CEO. Which senator would bet big on Ford in this scenario? This is not to disparage any Major, anyone with combat experience, or anyone working the line at Ford. It is merely a common sense observation that not all types of experience translate in all situations.
Perhaps if Major (USA Ret) Hegseth had a bit more experience, he might have recognized the parallels between his "warrior ethos" and the French philosophy during World War I. The French belief in élan and the "cult of the offensive" was rooted in an idealistic confidence that soldiers' moral superiority and fighting spirit could decisively overcome material disadvantages and technological realities in warfare. This doctrine was grounded in Henri Bergson's concept of élan vital, which emphasizes intuition and vitality. The French military doctrine glorified the offensive, considering the bravery and aggressive spirit of the infantry as the ultimate determinants of victory.
However, this approach failed to consider the increasingly defensive nature of warfare, which was marked by entrenched positions and the use of machine guns and artillery. The disastrous results of early French offensives in 1914, particularly the massive casualties from futile frontal assaults, highlighted the shortcomings of this doctrine. An overreliance on sheer willpower and a disregard for modern tactical innovations led to catastrophic losses (the red pants did not help). This situation revealed the fundamental flaw of prioritizing ideology over practical military strategy.
The French experience exposes the counterintuitive relationship between combat experience and strategic thinking. Your world gets really small when in the Iraq or Afghanistan situation Hegseth experienced. You pay attention to details you never would in a class or board room. Leaving the operational world behind and joining a major COCOM or Joint Staff offers a chance to exponentially expand your understanding of the situation as you experience the shock of developing country, regional, and theater strategic plans and then jumping to global military strategy. All the tactical and operational experience is of little help in contemplating the relative issues between and among theaters and the political demands that shape the military requirements between them.
Solving global-level military problems is an entry-level experience necessary to understand how the Joint Force determines resourcing priorities and establishes viable courses of action that achieve global and theater political aims through military action. These are Clausewitz to Max Weber-level problems and well beyond. Even the vaunted military genius General Robert E. Lee did not have to think at this level. To know Clausewitz well is to know Major Hegseth is in no way prepared on "day one" to understand, much less lead, the DoD on a better strategic path.
Despite the Senator’s frequent and frustratingly off-the-mark questions, Pete Hegseth's congressional testimony illuminated just enough of his vision for the Department of Defense to allow for a cursory examination. While his focus on readiness, modernization, and accountability addressed several critical challenges, he also overestimates the impact DEI and other culture-war issues have on military strategy, lethality, and modernization. He might be the best cultural warrior for the job, but It is painfully obvious that he is not the best national security pick for this job.
Although it feels irresponsible to say this, Hegseth’s polarizing views on diversity and clear moral failings are not significant concerns for Americans to fixate on. Nuclear war, the impact of AI on short and long-term defense matters, the dearth of solutions for terrorism, competing with an axis of autocrats, a declining number of candidates for recruitment, the 2024 Congressional report declaring the DoD unprepared for conflict, and modernizing the DoD without getting fierce and talented pushback from corporations and Congress are not the issues you want a cabinet-level novice tackling. The Senate collectively failed to test him on these subjects. As a result, he will likely be our next Secretary of Defense.
Hegseth is a talented speaker with a convincing collection of buzzwords that will play well with uninformed audiences. “Peace through strength” is simply another way of saying “Reputational Deterrence” (which Hegseth denounced in his statement), and “warrior ethos” is necessary at the unit and army level but can lead to disaster if relied on at the strategic level. He may be quick with sound bites and a polished White House Pitbull posturing as a “born again hard” loyalist, but Hegseth cannot talk his way past what he does not know. America should not pay the price required for Hegseth’s steep learning curve.
The Bottom Line: We desperately need a leader of Secretary Mattis’s caliber and experience, not a trainee.
Bibliography
- "Stenographic Transcript Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate: Confirmation Hearing on the Expected Nomination of Mr. Peter B. Hegseth to Be Secretary of Defense," January 14, 2025.
- Hegseth, Pete. The War on Warriors: My Fight for the Soul of the U.S. Military. HarperCollins, 2019.
- U.S. Department of Defense, "2023 Demographics Report: Profile of the Military Community," 2023.
- Shaheen, Jeanne. "Statement on Women, Peace, and Security Act," U.S. Senate, 2024.
- Gillibrand, Kirsten. "Combatting Sexual Assault in the Military," U.S. Senate, 2023.
- https://www.jhiblog.org/2021/09/13/elan-vital-and-the-french-cult-of-the-offensive/
9. Trump security adviser doesn't rule out continued Chinese ownership of TikTok
President Trump will win over 170 million Americans tomorrow with an executive order keeping TikTok alive as it exists. He just won over all the teens, and twenty and thirty somethings. And the membes of the national security community will hang their heads and cry. The national security argument will not hold sway with 170 million Americans. Congress may not realize the gift it gave to the incoming president.
Trump security adviser doesn't rule out continued Chinese ownership of TikTok
19 Jan 2025 10:31PM
(Updated: 19 Jan 2025 11:09PM)
channelnewsasia.com
Trump security adviser doesn't rule out continued Chinese ownership of TikTok
FILE PHOTO: TikToker and "newsfluencer" Joe Andaloro, who goes by the TikTok handle @joy.of.everything, films a TikTok video outside the U.S. headquarters of the social media company TikTok in Culver City, California, U.S. January 18, 2025. REUTERS/Fred Greaves/File Photo
19 Jan 2025 10:31PM (Updated: 19 Jan 2025 11:09PM)
(Corrects paragraph three, position is not subject to Senate confirmation)
By Kanishka Singh
WASHINGTON :President-elect Donald Trump would not rule out continued Chinese ownership of TikTok if steps were taken to ensure that American users' data was protected and stored in the U.S., incoming National Security Adviser Mike Waltz told CNN on Sunday.
TikTok stopped working for its 170 million American users on Sunday after a law took effect banning the app's continued operation over U.S. politicians' concerns that Americans' data could be misused by Chinese officials.
Waltz told CNN the president-elect is working to "save TikTok" and doesn't rule out continued Chinese ownership coupled with "firewalls to make sure that the data is protected here on U.S. soil."
Trump has said he would "most likely" give TikTok a 90-day reprieve from a ban after he takes office on Monday, a promise TikTok cited in a notice posted to users on the app.
Waltz also spoke to CBS News on Sunday and said Trump needed time to sort out issues related to TikTok, while adding that an extension was needed for TikTok to evaluate proposed buyers.
However, Republican House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson sent contradictory signals, saying that he believed Trump would push for TikTok parent ByteDance to sell the app.
"The way we read that is that he's going to try to force along a true divestiture, changing of hands, the ownership," Johnson said. "It's not the platform that members of Congress were concerned about. It's the Chinese Communist Party."
Some of Trump's fellow Republicans in Congress have opposed the idea of the extension for TikTok.
Republican U.S. Senators Tom Cotton, who chairs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Pete Ricketts said in a joint statement on Sunday that "there's no legal basis for any kind of 'extension' of (the ban's) effective date."
Source: Reuters
10. C.I.A.’s Chatbot Stands In for World Leaders
Who controls the chatbot controls intelligence analysis? There must be some great quality control in this to reduce errors or manipulation. Could someone insert an algorithm that will give analysts what they want to hear so as to confirm baises?
As an aside in this week's episode of "The Agency" the protagonist was chastising an agent for being wedded to her phone and he said something like that HUMINT is the last pure element of intelligence not subject to technical manipulation or tracking (that device is tracking everything you do and listening to what you are saying and knowing everything that is in your mind) or words to that effect.
Sadly my daughter and I received new iPhones yesterday.
Excerpts:
Over the last two years, the Central Intelligence Agency has developed a tool that allows analysts to talk to virtual versions of foreign presidents and prime ministers, who answer back.
“It is a fantastic example of an app that we were able to rapidly deploy and get out to production in a cheaper, faster fashion,” said Nand Mulchandani, the C.I.A.’s chief technology officer.
The chatbot is part of the spy agency’s drive to improve the tools available to C.I.A. analysts and its officers in the field, and to better understand adversaries’ technical advances. Core to the effort is to make it easier for companies to work with the most secretive agency.
C.I.A.’s Chatbot Stands In for World Leaders
The spy agency is trying to give its teams better tools and make it easier for the private sector to develop technology for their secretive work.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/18/us/politics/cia-chatbot-technology.html
Nand Mulchandani, who helped found a series of successful start-ups before joining the Pentagon’s artificial intelligence center, is the C.I.A.’s first chief technology officer.Credit...Jason Andrew for The New York Times
By Julian E. Barnes
Julian Barnes covers the intelligence agencies.
Jan. 18, 2025
Understanding leaders around the world is one of the C.I.A.’s most important jobs. Teams of analysts comb through intelligence collected by spies and publicly available information to create profiles of leaders that can predict behaviors.
A chatbot powered by artificial intelligence now helps do that work.
Over the last two years, the Central Intelligence Agency has developed a tool that allows analysts to talk to virtual versions of foreign presidents and prime ministers, who answer back.
“It is a fantastic example of an app that we were able to rapidly deploy and get out to production in a cheaper, faster fashion,” said Nand Mulchandani, the C.I.A.’s chief technology officer.
The chatbot is part of the spy agency’s drive to improve the tools available to C.I.A. analysts and its officers in the field, and to better understand adversaries’ technical advances. Core to the effort is to make it easier for companies to work with the most secretive agency.
William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director for the past four years, prioritized improving the agency’s technology and understanding of how it is used. Incoming Trump administration officials say they plan to build on those initiatives, not tear them down.
In his confirmation hearing, John Ratcliffe, President-elect Donald J. Trump’s choice to lead the C.I.A., said the agency had “struggled to keep pace” as technological innovation had shifted from the public to private sectors. But Mr. Ratcliffe spoke in positive terms about Mr. Burns’s efforts and said he would expand them because “the nation who wins the race in the emerging technologies of today will dominate the world of tomorrow.”
Image
John Ratcliffe, President-elect Donald J. Trump’s pick to lead the C.I.A., spoke in positive terms about the agency’s efforts to keep pace with technological innovations.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times
The C.I.A. has long used digital tools, spy gadgets and even artificial intelligence. But with the development of new forms of A.I., including the large language models that power chat bots, the agency has stepped up its investments.
Making better use of A.I., Mr. Burns said, is crucial to the U.S. competition with China. And better A.I. models have helped the agency’s analysts “digest the avalanche of open-source information out there,” he said.
The new tools have also helped analysts process clandestinely acquired information, Mr. Burns said. New technologies developed by the agency are helping spies navigate cities in authoritarian countries where governments use A.I.-powered cameras to conduct constant surveillance on their population and foreign spies.
“We’re making decent strides,” Mr. Burns said. “But I’d be the first to argue we’ve got to go faster and further.”
Shortly after Mr. Burns took up his job, he picked Dawn Meyerriecks, who led the agency’s directorate of science and technology from 2014 to 2021, to review the C.I.A.’s efforts.
The review pushed for something of a culture change. Ms. Meyerriecks said the C.I.A. had long believed that it could do everything itself. The agency had to make an adjustment and embrace the idea that some of the technology it needed had been developed by the commercial sector and was designed to keep information secure.
“There was really no reason that the C.I.A. couldn’t adopt and adapt commercial technology,” Ms. Meyerriecks said.
Under Mr. Burns, the agency created a technology-focused mission center to better understand the technology being used by China and other adversaries. And it hired Mr. Mulchandani, who helped found a series of successful start-ups before joining the Pentagon’s artificial intelligence center, as the agency’s first chief technology officer.
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“We’re making decent strides,” William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, said of the agency’s technological push. “But I’d be the first to argue we’ve got to go faster and further.”Credit...Kent Nishimura for The New York Times
His mandate over the last two and a half years was to make it easier for private companies that had developed new technologies to be able to sell those applications and tools to the C.I.A.
The conundrums facing anyone wanting to do business with the agency are twofold. First, its needs are classified. How can you sell something to America’s spies if you do not know what they are doing or what they need? Second, there is the bureaucracy.
In his work space, Mr. Mulchandani unfurled a six-foot-long chart detailing the layers of approvals and other steps to get a contract with the agency.
Each of the rules was put in place for a reason — for example, to address a problem with a contract, or something else going wrong on a project. But the cumulative result is a set of regulations that has made it difficult for companies to work with government.
The C.I.A. is reviewing, and trying to prune, those rules. But it is also trying to be more open with technology companies about what it needs.
“The more we share about how we employ technology, how we procure technology, what we’re going to do with it, will make companies want to work with us and want to team with us more,” said Juliane Gallina, who leads the directorate of digital innovation for the C.I.A.
Ms. Gallina says the agency has taken the step to declassify some material to “expose a little bit” of the problem it is trying to overcome, so tech firms can compete for agency contracts.
The C.I.A. has long recognized the technology problem. A quarter century ago the agency helped found In-Q-Tel, a nonprofit venture capital fund, to help foster companies that could offer new technologies to the intelligence community. Its successes include helping expand firms like Palantir, a secretive data analytics company, and the company that became Google Earth.
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Secrecy and bureaucracy have been obstacles for companies trying to secure contracts with the C.I.A.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
But the C.I.A. also wants more established firms, or firms with other venture capital backing, to offer their ideas to the agency. That is where the bureaucratic clutter cutting comes in, along with efforts to change at least parts of the spy agency’s culture.
Many offices in the C.I.A. are warrens of cubicles or have clusters of desks for assistants. When Mr. Mulchandani started, he was given a space on the same floor as the C.I.A.’s top leadership, but he was not pleased.
Mr. Mulchandani recalled that the agency officer giving him the tour asked, “What is wrong?” He answered, “Everything.”
He was turned off by the small offices, the lack of natural light and the closetlike rooms for viewing the most classified of material. He ordered a renovation. The old offices were replaced by different spaces with movable desks for meetings and exchanging ideas. The goal was to make a space that echoed the workplaces of Silicon Valley — and signal to visiting entrepreneurs that the agency was ready to change.
“The space is going to drive the culture, a culture of talking,” Mr. Mulchandani said. “A slice of Silicon Valley on the seventh floor.”
Whether the cultural changes will stick is an open question. And adjusting the rules and cutting red tape is the work of years not months. But Mr. Mulchandani and the agency’s departing leadership are hopeful.
“Nobody will deny the fact that like tech is literally the single most disruptive force in the world today,” Mr. Mulchandani said. “And government and our own work is going to be completely dependent on tech and disrupted by tech. I can’t speak for the leadership coming in, but I don’t have any doubt in my mind that this is super top on their list.”
Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes
A version of this article appears in print on Jan. 19, 2025, Section A, Page 23 of the New York edition with the headline: C.I.A. Reboots Its Approach to Tech With A.I. Tools and Less Red Tape. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
11. A First Draft For Secretary Hegseth
A First Draft For Secretary Hegseth
By Gary Anderson
January 17, 2025
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/17/a_first_draft_for_secretary_hegseth_1085560.html
This is a hypothetical speech given by the incoming Secretary of Defense to the Department of Defense.
As your incoming Secretary of Defense, I am going to be brutally frank: the effectiveness and efficiency of our armed forces is at a low point not seen since the Carter administration.
My team will concentrate on four key areas:
- Military readiness;
- Morale and recruiting;
- Reviving our military industrial base; and
- Improving the quality of senior leadership.
Let me address readiness first.
During the last two decades, China has become a true military competitor. Her nuclear capabilities, cyber expertise, naval power, air force, and space and ground forces have modernized to become a twenty-first century competitor. However, most of our military capability remains in the late twentieth century. As a company-grade commander in combat, I saw a lot that needed to be changed. As Defense Secretary, I intend to make those changes.
Our young soldiers remain the finest in the world, but there are not enough of them. Too often they are led by senior general officers who are not up to the task. I will address solutions to those problems later.
Our domination of the air, which we assumed was absolute, is now in doubt. The Chinese are pursuing miliary use of AI and sixth-generation aircraft designed to challenge our nation's superiority in the air, space, and cyberspace. We need to explore new ways to team unmanned aircraft piloted by AI and manned aircraft in ways that will maximize the speed of AI execution with the judgment of human pilots.
We will make our Navy and Marine Corps great again. During the last four years, the Commandant of the Marine Corps had to tell the combatant commanders in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East that he could not respond to contingencies for the first time in the storied history of the Corps. His reason: lack of Navy amphibious shipping. We will build the Navy amphibious capability back up to the thirty-eight hulls needed to maintain 24/7 Navy-Marine Corps presence in the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indo-Pacific region.
Furthermore, we will rebuild the Corps into a balanced, combined-arms fighting force. It will take at least a decade to repair the damage done to the Corps since 2020. However, on our watch, we will reconstitute a Marine Expeditionary Brigade's worth of maritime prepositioned ships in the South China Sea to reinforce any nation requesting assistance if threatened by China. In the interim, the Marines may need Army augmentation in tanks, heavy engineers, and artillery that were eliminated since 2020. Eventually, we will backfill the Corps with modern equipment.
Our Navy does not have enough attack submarines to cover threats in the South China Sea, as well as other potential trouble spots around the world. I am asking the Navy to provide an estimate of the proper number so we can make funding recommendations to Congress.
To effectively deter Chinese adventurism and keep Americans safe worldwide, we need a Navy of at least 355 ships. That may require some innovative thinking. It will take time to reconstitute our shipbuilding capability. Until then, we may have to be innovative and imaginative even if we have to buy back hulls we have sold or given to allies, or pull ships out of mothballs until our defense industrial base is reconstituted. If we can strap new black boxes with advanced weapons and put sensors on older hulls, we can extend their service life until new ships can be built.
The second area of improvement will be in morale and recruiting.
Diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) ideologies infiltrated our force. Our military services and civilian work force must be systematically re-examined, with "woke" leaders replaced by personnel with a warfighting ethos. Most of the excess overhead caused by DEI will be eliminated with cost savings. From here on out, promotions will be by merit regardless of race, creed, or sex.
Our ability to recruit has been harmed by DEI because our best recruiters are no longer encouraging young people to enlist. These are veteran parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and neighbors. We want them to again encourage young people to enlist and not be concerned that they will be brainwashed by woke leadership spouting leftist propaganda, and that they will have a fair chance of promotion based on ability and effort.
The Army has a good program for preparing young people to get up to speed and pass the qualification tests to enlist and serve. That helps. But the high school athletes, hunters, and outdoor types who have traditionally made up the core of our warrior class need to again feel that they are wanted in the armed services.
A third area of concentration is the defense industrial base.
As the Cold War ended, Newt Gingrich warned us not to go too far in dismantling the industrial base in search of a peace dividend. He was largely ignored, and we are paying the price today.
President Trump is right when he claims that we can no longer build ships in adequate numbers. I would add that we cannot maintain them in sufficient strength to meet readiness needs. The industrial base has declined to the point we are no longer the arsenal of democracy. Regarding the neglect of the Navy and Marine Corps, it will take years to remedy. In the interim, we will explore foreign construction and maintenance-outsourcing, but we cannot count on that fix forever. AI and robotics should be able to help build up domestic capability, but the damage will take more than four years to be rectified. Through wise congressional funding, we can rebuild a more efficient and cost-effective series of production lines.
I am particularly worried about munitions availability. This includes conventional and precision weapons production. What was adequate for Iraq and Afghanistan falls far short of our capability to sustain combat with a foe such as China or Russia. Unmanned aerial systems "drone" production is lacking, and even the Ukrainians are far ahead of us in production capability. We are pricing ourselves out of drone warfare. Too many of our drones are prohibitively expensive due to ridiculous specifications in a warfighting environment where quantity has a quality all its own. Drone warfare is attritional, and better is the enemy of good enough.
Finally, we need to fix our senior military leadership.
In Afghanistan, many young officers and senior NCOs recognized for years that our strategy was not working, while three- and four-star flag and general officers whistled past the graveyard because speaking out would endanger their careers. Not a single senior officer was willing to stand up to the State Department's demand to use the Kabul Airport rather than Bagram Air Base as an evacuation site. As a result, 13 American service personnel and countless Afghan allies died. That will not happen on my watch. I will demand candid and honest military advice from all sides before making a decision, and I will explain my rationale if I make a decision counter to someone's recommendation. If it turns out to be wrong, I will take responsibility; accountability will flow downhill from there.
That is a promise.
Another area that needs leadership change is the Goldwater-Nichols military reform legislation crafted four decades ago.
It was designed to make the joint warfighting process more efficient and effective. It did some good things, but it also had negative, unintended consequences. The worst of these was the bloat of joint staffs. The legislation mandates that to be eligible for promotion to flag rank, an officer must serve a tour on a joint staff. In order to make room for the demand for joint jobs, staffs became bloated beyond belief. Admirals Spruance and Halsey beat Japan in World War II with forces far larger than anything we can field in 2025, but their staffs were smaller than the average Army brigade staff today. I find it hard to believe that service at the Graves Registration at Central Command Headquarters will make him or her a better general officer.
This must change.
Computers and AI can make warfighting staffs smaller and more efficient, freeing up young officers to lead in combat rather than sit in the rear with the gear in a marginally useful staff job.
I am convening a panel on military reform made up of respected senior military officers with successful combat experience as well as successful senior Pentagon officials to do the following:
- Review the performance of serving three- and four-star officers to determine their fitness to continue at their present rank or recommend to Congress that they be retired at their permanent two-star rank.
- Make recommendations regarding the Goldwater Nichols reform legislation.
- Make recommendations regarding staff reductions in the Pentagon itself.
Much will be done. Some of it will take more than four years. However, I am determined to immediately change what we can and set the stage for long-term, future reform. To paraphrase an Army recruiting slogan, we must once again make the nation's military all it can be.
Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer who served as a special adviser to the deputy secretary of defense and did several tours as a civilian adviser in Iraq and Afghanistan.
12. Trump claiming new world order in first 100 days
Excerpts:
Trump may be open to a deal with China – and China, in turn, has signaled interest in this as well. While Xi will not attend the inauguration, his vice-president, Han Zheng, will.
Trump and Xi also have a track record of deal-making, even though their 2020 agreement did little more than stop an escalating trade war. That deal took two years to negotiate and left many of the tariffs imposed by Trump early in his first term in place, albeit in some cases at a reduced rate.
Something similar could happen again now, with Trump fulfilling one of his campaign pledges for higher tariffs on Chinese goods while simultaneously starting negotiations on a new deal with Beijing.
In all likelihood, this is Trump’s last term as president. For the next two years, at least, he controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives. He has every incentive to make good on his promises – and faces few, if any, restraints. He sees himself as a disrupter, and his MAGA base expects him to be just that. Instability is all but guaranteed.
What is not clear, though, is whether Trump’s vision of an ultimately more stable international order with clearly defined spheres of influence for the great powers of the day – the US, China and possibly Russia – will emerge, let alone whether such an outcome would be desirable.
Trump claiming new world order in first 100 days - Asia Times
President-elect portrays as a disrupter and his MAGA base expects nothing less so global instability is all but guaranteed
asiatimes.com · by Stefan Wolff · January 18, 2025
Donald Trump’s return to the White House on January 20, 2025, is widely seen as ushering in a period of significant upheaval for US foreign policy and a change in the way diplomacy is done.
Trump’s favored style – bluster and threats against foreign leaders – already seems to have paid off in helping to craft a peace deal, however shaky, in Gaza. The deal was negotiated by Joe Biden and his team in coordination with Trump’s incoming administration.
But analysts suggest Trump’s fierce comments on January 7 that “all hell would break lose” if the hostages weren’t soon released were actually a threat to Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, to get something done quickly. And this forced the Israeli government to commit to a deal.
Trump used this abrasive style in his first term. And his recent threats to buy Greenland, annex Canada and resume control of the Panama Canal suggest it will happen again. That may not bode well, especially for traditional allies of the US.
Not only that but Elon Musk, one of Trump’s close confidants, is openly bragging about his attempts to change governments in the UK and Germany – in an apparent move to shore up a global alliance of populist leaders.
Add to that a promised deal with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, a renewal of the maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and a doubling down on confrontation with China, and you have all the ingredients of a fundamental remaking of US foreign policy.
Three particular aspects stand out and give an early indication of what the Trump doctrine of foreign policy might look like. First is the focus on the Western hemisphere. Trump’s focus here appears to be simultaneously asserting US dominance in the affairs of the Americas and eliminating any perceived strategic vulnerabilities.
While Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal have dominated the headlines, there are also implications for US relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, with Trump’s pick as secretary of state, Marco Rubio, being known for his hawkish approach.
Trump may inaccurately hype up China’s role in the Panama Canal, but Beijing has unquestionably increased its (mostly economic) footprint in Latin America. A Chinese-funded deep-water port in Peru has raised US security concerns.
Chinese investment in Mexico has created an important back door into the US market, and contributed to the fact that Mexico is now the largest trade partner for the US. In 2024, Mexican exports of goods to the US stood at just under US$467 billion, compared with China’s $401 billion.
Trump is likely to dial up the pressure in the Western hemisphere using a mixture of threatening rhetoric, tariffs and political pressure.
In an early demonstration of how seriously the incoming administration takes the issue, his allies in Congress have already introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to “authorize the President to seek to enter into negotiations with the Kingdom of Denmark to secure the acquisition of Greenland by the United States”
The second feature of the emerging Trump foreign policy doctrine is the scaling back of US involvement in regions the administration considers of secondary importance. The two main areas in this context are Europe and the Middle East.
Ukraine war deal
Trump’s promised deal with Russia to end the war in Ukraine is one key component of his strategy to free up US resources to focus on China and “un-unite” Russia and China.
His simultaneous insistence that US allies in NATO step up their defense spending, however, is an indication that the incoming administration continues to place value in transatlantic security.
It just does not want to be the one mostly paying for it. And Trump has a point: Washington currently shoulders 68% of all NATO expenditure, compared with European members’ 28%.
Trump’s approach to the Middle East is underpinned by the same calculation of US-brokered deal-making that protects US interests while enabling a scaling down of commitments.
With a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas now in place that will facilitate the release of Israeli hostages, a much clearer path to normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia exists. This is still contingent upon an Israeli nod towards Palestinian statehood, but when this materializes, Israel’s relations with the rest of the Arab world will also improve.
This will then shift the burden of containing Iran to a probably more effective and capable coalition of US allies in the region, and allow Washington to resume its maximum-pressure campaign against Tehran.
What next for China?
While Trump’s approach to the Western hemisphere and to Washington’s future relations with Europe and the Middle East is reasonably clear, there is an abundance of questions about his China strategy. His national security team is generally considered hawkish on Beijing – with the exception of Musk, who has significant business interests in China.
Trump himself oscillates between aggressive and conciliatory rhetoric. Alleged Chinese control of the Panama Canal is one of his justifications for seeking to reassert US control of the strategic waterway. But he also name-checked Chinese President Xi Jinping as being able to help with a Ukraine deal and even invited him to his inauguration.
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Trump may be open to a deal with China – and China, in turn, has signaled interest in this as well. While Xi will not attend the inauguration, his vice-president, Han Zheng, will.
Trump and Xi also have a track record of deal-making, even though their 2020 agreement did little more than stop an escalating trade war. That deal took two years to negotiate and left many of the tariffs imposed by Trump early in his first term in place, albeit in some cases at a reduced rate.
Something similar could happen again now, with Trump fulfilling one of his campaign pledges for higher tariffs on Chinese goods while simultaneously starting negotiations on a new deal with Beijing.
In all likelihood, this is Trump’s last term as president. For the next two years, at least, he controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives. He has every incentive to make good on his promises – and faces few, if any, restraints. He sees himself as a disrupter, and his MAGA base expects him to be just that. Instability is all but guaranteed.
What is not clear, though, is whether Trump’s vision of an ultimately more stable international order with clearly defined spheres of influence for the great powers of the day – the US, China and possibly Russia – will emerge, let alone whether such an outcome would be desirable.
Stefan Wolff is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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asiatimes.com · by Stefan Wolff · January 18, 2025
13. Who's who in Donald Trump's inner circle?
What is the median between isolationist and war hawk? I want that guy. Is that President Trump? Is he in the middle?
The irony (and connective tissue between the two extremes) is that allies can support the philosophy of both the isolationists and war hawks. We cannot effectively fight and win without allies. But strong allies will support deterrence which will (can) prevent war (and allow us to live with our isolationist desires). The myth that needs to be debunked is that allies do not have to drag us into war.
Who's who in Donald Trump's inner circle?
Trump’s cabinet and inner circle will be composed of both staunch isolationists and stalwart war hawks.
By HANNAH SARISOHN
JANUARY 18, 2025 00:56
Jerusalem Post
With just three days to go until Donald Trump is inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States, experts are steeped in uncertainty as to how Trump’s appointees to the top diplomatic roles will be vying for influence over long-term Middle East agenda items.
While the administration’s immediate priority will be on securing Israel’s ceasefire with Hamas and the release of the hostages, the focus will soon shift toward shoring up relations with Saudi Arabia and dealing with Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.
Trump’s cabinet and inner circle will be composed of both staunch isolationists and stalwart war hawks seeking to manage the president’s priorities in his relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“The Middle East is probably at one of the most uncertain moments it’s ever been, especially in recent decades, and they’re about to be reintroduced to the most unpredictable leader the United States has ever had,” Brian Katulis, a senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Middle East Institute, who specializes in Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan, told the Magazine.
Katulis indicated that those in the think tank community and media had failed when trying to impose “some sort of rational, analytic policy analysis” over Trump’s decisions during his first administration.
MICHAEL WALTZ, Donald Trump’s next national security adviser, gestures during the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, last summer. (credit: Mike Segar/Reuters)
When talking about predicting who will have influence over Trump and the Middle East, Katulis referenced John Bolton, Trump’s first national security adviser who, after leaving office, said Trump is a man who operates on instinct and quite often doesn’t listen to his closest advisers or his own team.
Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, reiterated Katulis’s uncertainty. Katulis added it almost doesn’t matter who in the administration will handle which Middle East file because if Trump sees an opportunity, he will interject himself in ways that steamroll the staffers and even cabinet officials.
Mike Waltz, Elon Musk, and Marco Rubio
Trump’s next national security adviser, Mike Waltz, will be challenged to maintain some sort of semblance of orderly inter-agency process and coordination between the Pentagon, the State Department, the Treasury, and the intelligence agencies, which Katulis said is made more difficult when Trump himself may be freelancing through different back channels as he or some of his family members outside of the administration did during his first term.
Katulis said it’s also a “different kettle of fish” right now with Elon Musk in the mix, citing reports of the tech giant’s alleged November meeting in New York with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations Amir Saeid Iravani, which Iran denied.
Katulis pointed out that there’s usually a divide between both the White House and the National Security Council and the State Department, adding that outgoing President Joe Biden and Antony Blinken’s close relationship had prevented that division.
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Katulis questions if secretary of state pick Marco Rubio will turn out to be more like Trump’s first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, who was fired early on, or more like Mike Pompeo, whom Trump closely trusted.
Bandow is interested in seeing the interplay between Rubio and Waltz. So is Ambassador Dennis Ross, the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Rubio and Waltz’s relationship will “go a long way” toward determining who will influence Trump regarding Iran. While Bandow described Rubio’s proclivities as tending to be very hawkish, he also thinks Rubio is a rational actor.
“He’s giving up a Senate seat for a position he could be fired from tomorrow, so he clearly will have to be very deferential to Trump’s views,” Bandow said, echoing Katulis.
“He doesn’t want to end up like a Tillerson, who, after a couple of years, is gone,” Katulis said. “You’ve given up your Senate seat, you’ve lost your career. He has strong views, but he also has to be very careful what he does.”
Bandow pointed out that while the national security adviser is always with the president, the secretary of state has more status internationally. Bandow queried whether Trump would be able to oversee someone like Rubio and how much he would actually let Rubio do.
“None of this we have any idea of, yet,” he continued. “Rubio has the institution, Waltz will have Trump’s ear.”
Steve Witcoff, JD Vance, Pete Hegseth, and Mike Huckabee
Will Wechsler, senior director of Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, said that Trump looks more confident coming into the Oval Office this time around. This is evident by his decision to fill Middle East positions with people who are close to him rather than with seasoned diplomats.
“This is evidence of a president who believes he’s his own diplomat,” Wechsler said.
No one represents this confidence better than Steve Witcoff, Trump’s appointed Middle East envoy who, as a real estate tycoon and major campaign donor, has never held a position in government or worked in diplomatic relations with the Middle East.
Much like Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who lacked diplomatic experience when tasked by his father-in-law with pursuing the Abraham Accords, Witcoff will face immense pressure as he seeks to push Saudi Arabia’s normalization agreement with Israel over the finish line.
Witcoff’s first order of business starts before the war ends, getting fully up to speed with the Saudis and learning exactly what Riyadh and Washington agreed upon under Biden, according to Ross.
Ross said one of Witcoff’s major responsibilities will be seeing if there’s a way to overcome the gap between Israel and the Saudis over a pathway to a Palestinian state.
Witcoff’s point of departure will be Trump’s 2020 peace plan, which gives Israel full control of the settlements and Jerusalem as its undivided capital. The plan also established a Palestinian state.
In his 2022 book, Breaking History, Kushner wrote how Trump nearly shelved his peace plan at the last minute because the Palestinians did not support it. “This level of detail is significant and quite challenging,” Ross commented.
Ross also highlighted the uncertainty of how Witcoff’s relationship with Waltz and Rubio will function, as well as whether Witcoff’s responsibilities will extend to Iran.
“For all we know, Trump may decide to appoint an envoy for Iran,” Ross added.
“Certainly for Netanyahu, you could certainly envision a situation where some of what will be asked for him to do on the Palestinians, his ability to be responsive on that might be influenced by how much the administration is prepared to do to deal with the Iranian nuclear program and the character and the scope of the coordination between the two,” he said.
Bandow noted the unique role that Mike Huckabee, incoming US ambassador to Israel, could play in shielding Trump in Jerusalem from his decisions on Iran. Huckabee could be seen as a strategic pick who, at every turn, will tell Netanyahu and his loyalists what they want to hear.
“You could imagine that having somebody on station in Jerusalem who’s saying a lot of smooth things would give a bit of cover to Trump if he decided he wanted to make some kind of deal with Iran,” Bandow said of Huckabee’s job of reassuring Jerusalem how much the administration is supporting Israel.
Wechsler described “maximum pressure 2.0” as still unclear because of what, he said, had been fundamentally unclear during Trump’s first term: What’s the end objective of maximum pressure? Wechsler explained that while everyone in the Trump administration supported maximum pressure, they supported it toward varying ends.
Would Trump listen to his vice president, JD Vance who, while professing a love for Israel due to his Christian faith, positions himself as part of the Middle East isolationist wing, cautioning against war with Iran?
The defense and intelligence communities were happy and felt that maximum pressure efforts were sufficient, even if they only made it more difficult for Iran to “conduct their malign behaviors.”
Pete Hegseth, Trump’s scandal-riddled pick for defense secretary, however, doesn’t strike Bandow as someone who would resist a hawkish stance on Iran.
Elbridge Colby and Trump’s Iran policy
However, both Bandow and Katulis could see Elbridge Colby, Trump’s appointed under-secretary for defense policy, coming into the Pentagon saying China is the “big issue” and not to get bogged down in the Middle East.
But as Wechsler pointed out, it is clear that Trump foresees that his most important task at the Pentagon will be removing military personnel he views as “political generals” and those allied with former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley Miley – people he believes were responsible for delaying or denying military action.
A Pentagon purge and politicized confirmation process in the Senate Armed Services Committee could create a ripple effect in US military operations around the world and have effects in the Middle East.
Wechsler then nodded to the other group within the first Trump administration that saw maximum pressure policies as setting the stage for regime change in Tehran, saying: “Those people tended to have more of an impact on how it was actually handled in the Trump administration.”
According to Wechsler, “That group believed the purpose of maximum pressure was to get a better deal and do a deal from a position of strength.”
He also said that the underappreciated influence on Trump’s Iran policy will be the depth of information he’s briefed on, showing that Tehran has been trying to assassinate not only him but also people who worked for him.
“I do not think that the average analyst has, in any way, appropriately integrated that reality into the potential for policymaking,” Wechsler concluded. “That is a real, big thing. That should be the headline.”
Katulis mused that there was likely a 50-50 chance that Trump either “bombs Tehran or flies to Tehran and tries to negotiate with the supreme leader.” He said he doubted that anyone, in or out of the administration, might say or do anything to constrain Trump in any sort of way: “That’s how unpredictable he is.”
Jerusalem Post
14. US TikTok purchase won't eliminate security threat
Excerpts:
The forced sale could keep China, a country with which the US is locked in a new Cold War, from controlling the most popular platform for political and cultural discourse. This is obviously good news for the Pentagon, and for just about every other American. Yet whether Musk or O’Leary or any American owner tweaks the algorithm to favour self-serving narratives or Government propaganda — with or without formal coercion — we may not know until it’s too late. It’s also possible they may have no qualms whatsoever about profiting off the addiction of children.
This is sad to say because we deserve better, but much of the zeal to protect American users from leaders in government and business right now is likely explained by bad intentions, not good ones. We may soon be able to see this with even more clarity.
US TikTok purchase won't eliminate security threat
unherd.com · by Emily Jashinsky
January 17, 2025 - 4:00pm
The Supreme Court has today upheld legislation forcing TikTok’s Chinese parent company to sell the app or face prohibition in the US. Incoming President Trump, who invited the app’s CEO to sit on the inaugural dais, is now likely to devise a delay of the ban.
With only two days left, Chinese officials are reportedly weighing the sale of TikTok to Elon Musk. Bytedance, the company which owns TikTok, is denying these reports; but, from Kevin O’Leary to Mr Beast, American investors are champing at the bit to save the app and make bank. Trump could orchestrate a friendly sale.
There are laudable reasons to ban TikTok and laudable reasons to buy it. In theory, at least, those reasons could overlap. An altruistic billionaire like Musk could, for instance, genuinely transfer all operations to the US, thereby eliminating legitimate concerns about foreign surveillance and manipulation.
That hypothetical, however, is extraordinarily far-fetched. The enormous power of TikTok is irresistible to oligarchs at home and abroad, and so the app’s fundamental threat remains — whatever Musk’s decision. It is also irresistible to America’s own intelligence agencies, which are rightly beating the drum about security concerns but have nonetheless abused their own powers repeatedly in recent years.
The Chinese government forces ByteDance to function domestically as a tool furthering education and patriotism. US officials know it’s an incredibly powerful weapon. That is why, according to journalist Ken Klippenstein, they’re already carving out exemptions for America’s own diplomacy. O’Leary and Musk are especially interesting potential investors, given that both are close to incoming president Donald Trump. Musk also happens to have cordial relations with the Chinese government, and it is striking that media reports suggest Beijing is even entertaining talk of a sale to the billionaire given its enthusiastic rejection of other potential deals. With Musk, at least, the CCP would have an open line of communication.
In the hands of an American owner friendly with the incumbent administration, the app could provide more surveillance access and opportunities for narrative control, much as we saw the Biden administration pressure and cooperate with Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Google during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Notably, Musk is also a major recipient of military contracts in the US, while his telecoms provider Starlink is an important part of wartime operations in Ukraine and Israel. This is worth considering given that, rather than banning TikTok outright, a bipartisan coalition of hawks passed a sweeping bill last spring that forced its sale to a US company. That legislation mentioned TikTok just once.
It is reasonable to disagree on whether the app should simply be banned outright. (I don’t support measures like Kosa but tend to think TikTok has much worse health outcomes than cigarettes for minors, though we needn’t open up that can of worms here.) It is less reasonable to see our public and private sectors’ management of the app as a service to the public, unless you support Big Government and Big Business exerting more control over our daily lives.
The forced sale could keep China, a country with which the US is locked in a new Cold War, from controlling the most popular platform for political and cultural discourse. This is obviously good news for the Pentagon, and for just about every other American. Yet whether Musk or O’Leary or any American owner tweaks the algorithm to favour self-serving narratives or Government propaganda — with or without formal coercion — we may not know until it’s too late. It’s also possible they may have no qualms whatsoever about profiting off the addiction of children.
This is sad to say because we deserve better, but much of the zeal to protect American users from leaders in government and business right now is likely explained by bad intentions, not good ones. We may soon be able to see this with even more clarity.
Emily Jashinsky is UnHerd‘s Washington D.C. Correspondent.
15. Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say
Maps/graphics at the link.
Excerpt:
Pekka Toveri, who represents Finland in the European Parliament and previously served as the country’s top military intelligence official, said that the seabed cases are part of “a typical hybrid operation” from Moscow.
“The most important thing in any hybrid operation is deniability,” Toveri said. Russia’s security services may have succeeded in not leaving “any proof that would hold up in court,” he said, but to conclude that they were accidents “is total B.S.”
Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say
An emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services holds that accidents were the cause of damage to Baltic seabed energy and communications lines.
Today at 6:00 a.m. EST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/
An Estonian naval vessel patrols the Baltic Sea on Jan. 9 as part of stepped-up NATO monitoring in the wake of damage to undersea cables. (Hendrik Osula/AP)
By Greg Miller, Robyn Dixon and Isaac Stanley-Becker
LONDON — Ruptures of undersea cables that have rattled European security officials in recent months were likely the result of maritime accidents rather than Russian sabotage, according to several U.S. and European intelligence officials.
The determination reflects an emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services, according to senior officials from three countries involved in ongoing investigations of a string of incidents in which critical seabed energy and communications lines have been severed.
The cases raised suspicion that Russia was targeting undersea infrastructure as part of a broader campaign of hybrid attacks across Europe, and prompted stepped-up security measures including an announcement last week that NATO would launch new patrol and surveillance operations in the Baltic Sea.
But so far, officials said, investigations involving the United States and a half-dozen European security services have turned up no indication that commercial ships suspected of dragging anchors across seabed systems did so intentionally or at the direction of Moscow.
Instead, U.S. and European officials said that the evidence gathered to date — including intercepted communications and other classified intelligence — points to accidents caused by inexperienced crews serving aboard poorly maintained vessels.
U.S. officials cited “clear explanations” that have come to light in each case indicating a likelihood that the damage was accidental, and a lack of evidence suggesting Russian culpability. Officials with two European intelligence services said that they concurred with U.S. assessments.
Despite initial suspicions that Russia was involved, one European official said there is “counter evidence” suggesting otherwise. The U.S. and European officials declined to elaborate and spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of ongoing investigations.
The probes center on three incidents over the past 18 months in which ships traveling to or from Russian ports were suspected of severing key links in a vast underwater network of conduits that carry gas, electricity and internet traffic to millions of people across northern Europe.
The oil tanker Eagle S on Dec. 28 in the Gulf of Finland. The tanker was seized by Finnish authorities on suspicion the crew deliberately dragged an anchor to damage undersea cables. (Jussi Nukari/AFP/Getty Images)
In the most recent case, Finland seized an oil tanker suspected of dragging its anchor across an undersea power line connecting Finland and Estonia. Finnish authorities said the vessel, the Eagle S, is part of a “shadow fleet” of tanker ships helping Moscow sell oil on global markets in violation of international sanctions.
Following World news
Following
Previous cases involved a Hong Kong-registered container ship, the NewnewPolar Bear, that ruptured a natural gas pipeline in the Gulf of Finland in October 2023, and a Chinese ship, the Yi Peng 3, that cut two data cables in Swedish waters in November last year.
Undersea cables damaged in ship incidents in the Baltic Sea since late 2023
Damaged undersea cables
Damaged gas pipeline
FINLAND
Oct. 2023
Balticconnector gas
pipeline damaged
Dec. 2024
Power cable
damaged
SWEDEN
ESTONIA
Gotland
LATVIA
Nov. 2024
Data and telecom
cables damaged
LITHUANIA
POLAND
Sources: TeleGeography, Global Energy Monitor, OpenStreetMap
Russia’s denials of responsibility have been greeted with deep skepticism by European officials confronting a broader wave of hybrid attacks attributed to Moscow.
U.S. and European security officials last year disrupted an alleged Russian plot to smuggle incendiary devices on cargo planes in an apparent trial run for later attacks targeting the United States and Canada. U.S. intelligence officials also warned German authorities that Russia was planning to assassinate the chief executive of one of
Europe’s largest weapons producers, a company that had announced plans to build an ammunition manufacturing facility in Ukraine.
At the same time, European security officials have accused Russia of using proxies to carry out hundreds of arson attacks, rail disruptions and smaller sabotage operations aimed at sowing divisions in Europe and sapping support for Ukraine.
Against that backdrop, the damage to seabed systems added to a European sense of being under siege. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called the anchor-dragging incident in November “sabotage” and said “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed.” Weeks later, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said a Christmas Day incident was “definitely” linked to Russia.
Experts have also said that the seabed cases fit a pattern of Russian aggression.
The severing of cables “may very well be random accidents,” said Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who previously served as the United States’ deputy national intelligence officer for Russia. “But it’s hard to rule out a concerted Russian campaign when [Moscow’s] intelligence services are trying to assassinate German business executives, starting fires at factories across Europe, and putting bombs on cargo planes.”
The emerging view among Western spy agencies that accidents — and not Russia — are likely to blame for the undersea damage was dismissed by some critics of Russia.
Pekka Toveri, who represents Finland in the European Parliament and previously served as the country’s top military intelligence official, said that the seabed cases are part of “a typical hybrid operation” from Moscow.
“The most important thing in any hybrid operation is deniability,” Toveri said. Russia’s security services may have succeeded in not leaving “any proof that would hold up in court,” he said, but to conclude that they were accidents “is total B.S.”
Toveri and others cited anomalies in the behavior of the vessels involved as well as evidence that Russia has for decades devoted extensive resources — including a dedicated military unit known as the General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research — to mapping Western seabed infrastructure and identifying its vulnerabilities.
At least two of the ships suspected of causing damage appear to have dragged their anchors 100 miles or more across seafloor. A ship that dropped an anchor by accident, Toveri said, would immediately be dragged so noticeably off course that crews would scramble to bring the vessel to a stop and assess the damage.
Mike Plunkett, naval expert at Janes, said that “aside from a very loud splash, there will also be a lot of noise from the anchor chain paying out through the hawse hole.” He described the chances of three anchor-dropping incidents in the Baltic region since 2023 as “vanishingly small” although not zero. But he said it was extremely difficult to prove intentional sabotage.
The timing of the incidents has heightened suspicion. The most recent cases, in November and December, damaged undersea energy lines at a time when Baltic nations are accelerating efforts to disconnect their power grids from Russia — a move that gained urgency after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
There are also reasons to question why Russia would risk targeting undersea systems in waterways now lined by NATO-member countries. Doing so could endanger oil smuggling operations Russia has relied on to finance the war in Ukraine, and possibly provoke more aggressive efforts by Western governments to choke off Russia’s route to the North Atlantic.
At a Baltic summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced plans for new patrols by frigates, aircraft, submarine satellites and a “small fleet of naval drones” designed to detect undersea sabotage.
From left, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with back to camera, at the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki on Jan. 14. (Kimmo Brandt/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)
Despite advances in undersea surveillance capabilities, attributing attacks has proved difficult. The bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in September 2022 was initially widely blamed on Russia but is now believed to have been carried out by a senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services.
Finland took a more aggressive approach to the Dec. 25 case of cable damage, forcing the Eagle S into Finnish waters before police and coast guard authorities boarded the vessel by helicopter. Members of the crew suspected of being on duty during the anchor-dragging damage are barred from leaving Finland while the investigation moves forward.
A Nordic official briefed on the investigation said conditions on the tanker were abysmal. “We’ve always gone out with the assumption that shadow fleet vessels are in bad shape,” the official said. “But this was even worse than we thought.”
Herman Ljunberg, a lawyer who represents the owner of the Eagle S tanker, acknowledged in a telephone interview that the vessel was carrying Russian oil but denied that it was in violation of international law or that the crew had intentionally caused any damage.
European security officials said that Finland’s main intelligence service is in agreement with Western counterparts that the Dec. 25 incident appears to have been an accident, though they cautioned that it may be impossible to rule out a Russian role.
A spokeswoman for Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation, which is leading the investigation of the Eagle S, said that the bureau’s probe is “still open, and it is too early to make final conclusions of the causes or combinations behind the damages.”
Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia, and Stanley-Becker from Washington. Ellen Francis in Brussels contributed to this report.
16. Defiance Is Out, Deference Is in: Trump Returns to a Different Washington
Defiance Is Out, Deference Is in: Trump Returns to a Different Washington
As Donald J. Trump prepares to take the oath of office for a second time, much of the world seems to be bowing down to him and demoralized opponents are rethinking the future.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/19/us/politics/trump-washington.html
President-elect Donald Trump will encounter a changed Washington when he is sworn in for a second term on Monday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
By Peter Baker
Peter Baker has covered the past five presidents and is the co-author of a book about Donald J. Trump’s first term in the White House.
Jan. 19, 2025
Updated 10:11 a.m. ET
Sign up for the Tilt newsletter, for Times subscribers only. Nate Cohn, The Times’s chief political analyst, makes sense of the latest political data. Get it in your inbox.
More than 30 miles of anti-scale fencing are being erected all over the nation’s capital. Concrete barriers are being placed at key junctures. Certain roads have already been closed to traffic. Surveillance drones will flood the skies.
But if Washington looks like a war zone again, it does not necessarily feel that way. Unlike the last time President-elect Donald J. Trump took the oath of office eight years ago, the bristling tension and angry defiance have given way to accommodation and submission. The Resistance of 2017 has faded into the Resignation of 2025.
The mood leading up to the second Trump inauguration reflects how much has changed since the first Trump inauguration. Much of the world, it seems, is bowing down to the incoming president. Technology moguls have rushed to Mar-a-Lago to pay homage. Billionaires are signing seven-figure checks and jockeying for space at the inaugural ceremony. Some corporations are pre-emptively dropping climate and diversity programs to curry favor.
Some Democrats are talking about working with the newly restored Republican president on discrete issues. Some news organizations are perceived to be reorienting to show more deference. The grass roots opposition that put hundreds of thousands of people in the streets of Washington to protest Mr. Trump just a day after he was sworn in back in 2017 generated a fraction of that in their sequel on Saturday.
Image
A smaller crowd than in 2017 protested near the Lincoln Memorial on Saturday.Credit...Ruth Fremson/The New York Times
“Hashtag-resistance has turned into hashtag-capitulation,” said David Urban, a longtime Republican strategist and Trump ally. “The pink-pussy hats are gone, and they’re replaced by MAGA hats worn by Black and brown people.”
The determined protesters who did turn out for Saturday’s People’s March said they refused to give up, but some sympathized with those who expressed exhaustion by Mr. Trump’s latest victory.
“Why do we have to keep doing this?” asked Lisa Clark, 65, from Akron, Ohio, who also attended the Women’s March in 2017. “But hey, we will. We’ve been here before, and we’ll be here again if we have to be.”
For both the progressive left and the Never Trump right, this second inauguration has upended all the assumptions after eight years of fighting Mr. Trump. Their strategies and messaging failed to keep him out of power. And many of them have grown drained and demoralized.
“Democratic leaders have learned that focusing all of the energy on one man failed to make the difference,” said Donna Brazile, a former Democratic National Committee chairwoman. “It’s a bitter pill to swallow, but it’s not the end. We shall rebuild. The resistance to Trumpism will never go away, but will show up differently during Trump 2.0.”
For the Trump team, on the other hand, it is a moment of triumph and celebration. After Mr. Trump left office four years ago defeated, impeached twice and facing the prospect of multiple criminal investigations, it hardly seemed likely that he would be moving back into the White House four years later. So for his camp, this weekend brings a sense of justice.
And this time, Mr. Trump arrives at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue not as a fluke Electoral College winner who fell short in the popular vote. He takes the oath on Monday with a burst of momentum propelled by a victory in the popular vote, albeit with one of the smallest margins of victory since the 19th century rather than the landslide he claims.
“If you’re somebody who was there in 2015, 2016, 2017, and you’re here today, you feel vindicated,” said Mr. Urban.
Updated
Jan. 19, 2025, 10:51 a.m. ET12 minutes ago
Some of the deference being shown to Mr. Trump now by the political, media and corporate worlds stems from a broader sense that perhaps popular opinion is more on Mr. Trump’s side than they had assumed. Perhaps, in this view, Mr. Trump, however imperfect, has grasped something important by suggesting that the country needs to fundamentally rethink some of its embedded ways of doing things.
A new survey released Saturday by The New York Times and Ipsos found that even many Americans who dislike Mr. Trump agree with some of his diagnosis of the country’s problems and some of his signature policy prescriptions, including the mass deportation of undocumented immigrants.
And so dispirited opponents face a period of introspection before they return to the arena. “The humbling reality of a popular vote victory for him requires a lot of self-reflection and inward looking,” said Patrick Gaspard, president of the Center for American Progress, a progressive research group.
The mood on the eve of this second inauguration is different, he said, because progressives were stunned when Mr. Trump beat former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in 2016 but not so surprised when he beat Vice President Kamala Harris in November.
“The activist response comes usually from a shock to the body — something happens, people are stunned by it or bewildered by it or outraged by it, and this visceral reaction takes place that metastasizes,” Mr. Gaspard said. “That usually comes from shock. There’s nothing that’s happened here has been shocking.”
Indeed, he added, President Biden’s political troubles and his insistence on running for a second term had long ago drained energy from supporters. “For the center-left, we’ve been having a slow-moving train wreck that we could see for a long time coming,” Mr. Gaspard said. “From the minute that Joe Biden announced he would run for a second term, you could sense in our big tent and coalition an immediate deflation take hold.”
While the resistance rethinks its approach, the powerful are cozying up to the returning leader. The eagerness of tech tycoons like Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg to court Mr. Trump may not reveal any newfound personal affection for the incoming president but certainly underscores their analysis of the shifting tides of society and their calculation of the best way to protect themselves from a volatile, revenge-minded leader. Companies that have abandoned diversity, equity and inclusion policies without even being asked are anticipating where the future lies.
As he takes office again, Mr. Trump has discovered that he does not even have to take action to force his adversaries to adapt, back down or bend in his direction in a strategy of self preservation. He is already getting his way just by being himself.
News networks are shaking up their lineups, editorial pages are recasting their attitudes at the behest of wealthy owners and corporate media parent companies are settling lawsuits with Mr. Trump or considering doing so. Mr. Zuckerberg’s Meta abandoned fact-checking in a nod to a fact-challenged president.
Unlike his predecessor, James B. Comey, in Mr. Trump’s first term, Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director, did not wait to be fired but resigned on his own accord. The special counsel Jack Smith did not wait to be ordered to abandon his investigation of Mr. Trump but preemptively did so on his own.
Democrats like Senator John Fetterman of Pennsylvania and Gov. Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan are preaching the virtues of cooperation. Seven congressional Democrats who boycotted Mr. Trump’s 2017 inauguration told Politico they would attend this one. Republicans who sometimes stood up to Mr. Trump at the start of his first term are now bending over backward to confirm nominees they privately disdain.
Image
Workers prepared the stage for the Commander-in-Chief Ball, one of three official inaugural balls that will take place Monday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
At the same time, beneath that wave of acquiescence is a current of fear in Washington. Many of those threatened with retribution by Mr. Trump are spending this weekend dreading what is to come. An F.B.I. under the control of Kash Patel, the pro-Trump warrior awaiting confirmation by the Senate, could become the bureau of revenge. Mr. Patel in a book he wrote published a list of 60 people he considers “deep state” actors to be targeted and has vowed to “come after” the news media for what he considers their lies.
The anticipation has changed the environment. Some critics who were once vocal in speaking out against Mr. Trump are staying off television, not posting on social media and declining to speak to reporters on the record to avoid attracting his attention. If they keep low, they reason, it is possible he will not come after them.
But pockets of resistance in Washington remain. Sarah Longwell, a Republican political strategist who is now publisher of The Bulwark, a conservative online publication and refuge of the remaining Never Trumpers, said that she has found there is “an enormous appetite” for heterodox views, “as more and more people capitulate.”
One reason Washington feels different at the dawn of the next Trump term, she said, is that this time he is a lame duck who under the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution cannot run again — although from time to time he makes jokes, if they are jokes, about finding a way to stay in office even after four years.
“There are a million reasons why it’s different,” Ms. Longwell said, “but no one is trying to gear up to beat Trump out of a second term. They’re trying to figure out how to constitute themselves, how to win again in two years and four years.”
In some ways, she said, it is now a question not of just warring with him but waiting him out: “People are just thinking, how do you endure for the next four years?”
Aishvarya Kavi contributed reporting.
Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent for The Times. He has covered the last five presidents and sometimes writes analytical pieces that place presidents and their administrations in a larger context and historical framework. More about Peter Baker
See more on: U.S. Politics, 2024 Elections: News, Polls and Analysis, Republican Party, President Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Democratic Party
17. Schools Using AI Emulation of Anne Frank That Urges Kids Not to Blame Anyone for Holocaust
Wow. Compare this with the CIA Chatbot NY Times article.
It is a brave new world. And dangerous too.
Schools Using AI Emulation of Anne Frank That Urges Kids Not to Blame Anyone for Holocaust
Futurism
"It's a kind of grave-digging and incredibly disrespectful to the real Anne Frank and her family."
The Anne Frank Experience
You're probably familiar with Anne Frank, a European Jewish girl whose posthumously-published diary documents her time hiding from Nazi persecution, before being apprehended and killed in a concentration camp at age 15.
Unfortunately for humanity, a Utah-based tech startup called SchoolAI has summoned up an AI-generated version of Frank that feels like both an affront to her memory and a grim sign of things to come in the world of education.
While there's a veneer of the historical character, it also shows all the flaws of OpenAI-style chatbots: overly courteous, unhelpfully vague, and so uplifting that it borders on wax museum-creepy.
What's worse, as Berlin historian Henrik Schönemann discovered while experimenting with the bot, is that it seems trained to avoid pinning blame for Frank's death on the actual Nazis responsible for her death, instead redirecting the conversation in a positive light.
"Instead of focusing on blame, let's remember the importance of learning from the past," the bot told Schönemann. "How do you think understanding history can help us build a more tolerant and peaceful world today?"
Crash Course
It's true that the real Frank expressed a certain commitment to forgiveness — "in spite of everything I still believe that people are really good at heart," goes one famous passage from her diary — it's puzzling to see such an iconic account of genocide twisted into such a balmy sentiment.
"It's a kind of grave-digging and incredibly disrespectful to the real Anne Frank and her family," Schönemann wrote. "She, her memory and the things she wrote get abused for our enjoyment, with no regard or care for the real person. How anyone thinks this is even remotely appropriate is beyond me." In addition, he added, the bot "violates every premise of Holocaust-education."
As Miles Klee wrote for Rolling Stone when similar bots started to hit the web in 2023, the ersatz historical figures are often wrong about basic biographical details, and show the same bowdlerized unwillingness to grapple with the type of incisive questions that real students might pose about difficult topics.
Needless to say, school administrators who've thrown caution to the wind to deploy this type of software are failing to ask important questions, from the practical to the philosophical: what does it mean to interact with a chatbot based on Anne Frank, how will it affect the education of actual kids, and what level of control do educators, administrators and state regulators have over the kind of content these things pump out? And above all, how did anyone think this was in good taste?
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Futurism
18. Too hot to handle (Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard)
A view from Pakistan.
Excerpts:
Tulsi Gabbard, the incoming director of national intelligence (DNI), is a seasoned military leader who completed the Officer Candidate School at the Alabama Military Academy, where she underwent rigorous officer training. As an Army Military Police platoon leader, she was deployed to Kuwait, leading her unit with tactical precision in high-stakes operations. Gabbard currently serves as a lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserve. Under her leadership, all 18 US intelligence agencies - including the CIA, DIA and NSA – will be aligned under a unified strategic framework to ensure cohesive and coordinated operations. Gabbard is unapologetically direct, and employs a mission-first mindset and a no-nonsense approach to intelligence operations. With her combat-tested leadership, she will be too hot to handle.
Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard are backed by a formidable military-industrial complex capable of deploying strategic deterrence, precision strikes, and expeditionary forces to project American power worldwide.
Pakistan must tread cautiously. Eleven thousand kilometres from Islamabad, a team of unconventional, battle-hardened leaders has been assembled. With Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard, Pakistan could find itself in the crosshairs of a hyper-aggressive, no-holds-barred geopolitical strategy. With Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard, the international landscape promises to be volatile, marked by high-stakes confrontations and unpredictable manoeuvres. Pakistan must adopt a calculated, vigilant approach.
Too hot to handle
thenews.com.pk
Opinion
Tulsi Gabbard, incoming DNI is seasoned military leader who completed Officer Candidate School at Alabama Military Academy
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
January 19, 2025
United State's President-elect Donald Trump seen in this picture taken on November 6, 2024. — Reuters
Tomorrow, the disruptor-in-chief will be sworn in as the 45th president of the US. On his first day in office, he plans to issue a hundred executive orders. The disruptor-in-chief has prioritised an extremely confrontational approach to foreign policy, focusing on increasing pressure on China. He has also signalled an expansionist foreign policy, including initiatives to annex Canada as the 51st state and potential acquisition of the Panama Canal and Greenland, possibly through military or economic means. He has pledged to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America.
China, the world's second-largest economy, is grappling with severe financial distress, marked by a sharp decline in consumer confidence that is deepening the economic slowdown. The ruling party in Japan, the LDP, has lost its parliamentary majority. In Germany, the government has collapsed. Russia is in a state of war with Ukraine. And the UK is grappling with significant political challenges.
Eleven thousand kilometres from Beijing, the US economy is radiating confidence, with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) reaching record highs and reflecting robust investor sentiment. The US tech sector is buzzing with confidence and teeming with optimism. Consumer confidence is high and unemployment is low. The incoming cabinet, featuring 13 billionaires, brings a blend of wealth and private-sector expertise, promising forward-thinking policies.
Marco Rubio, the incoming secretary of state, is poised to bring a fiery and unrelenting edge to US foreign policy. Renowned for his assertive and combative political style, Rubio is a staunch hawk, particularly when it comes to confronting China and Russia. A fierce advocate for sanctions and military readiness, he has never shied away from bold, high-stakes decisions. Known for delivering sharp, pointed critiques of his opponents, Rubio’s aggressive commitment to advancing his agenda signals a new era of unapologetic diplomacy. Rubio will be too hot to handle.
Mike Waltz, the incoming national security adviser (NSA), is a former Green Beret – a highly trained special operations force renowned for its expertise in unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla tactics. Waltz routinely brings the battlefield to the briefing room. He is a fierce advocate for a fortified and agile US military across all domains, from land and sea to air and cyber. Waltz has a mission-driven focus and employs strategies akin to force projection and deterrence to counter emerging threats. Waltz will be too hot to handle.
Tulsi Gabbard, the incoming director of national intelligence (DNI), is a seasoned military leader who completed the Officer Candidate School at the Alabama Military Academy, where she underwent rigorous officer training. As an Army Military Police platoon leader, she was deployed to Kuwait, leading her unit with tactical precision in high-stakes operations. Gabbard currently serves as a lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserve. Under her leadership, all 18 US intelligence agencies - including the CIA, DIA and NSA – will be aligned under a unified strategic framework to ensure cohesive and coordinated operations. Gabbard is unapologetically direct, and employs a mission-first mindset and a no-nonsense approach to intelligence operations. With her combat-tested leadership, she will be too hot to handle.
Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard are backed by a formidable military-industrial complex capable of deploying strategic deterrence, precision strikes, and expeditionary forces to project American power worldwide.
Pakistan must tread cautiously. Eleven thousand kilometres from Islamabad, a team of unconventional, battle-hardened leaders has been assembled. With Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard, Pakistan could find itself in the crosshairs of a hyper-aggressive, no-holds-barred geopolitical strategy. With Rubio, Waltz, and Gabbard, the international landscape promises to be volatile, marked by high-stakes confrontations and unpredictable manoeuvres. Pakistan must adopt a calculated, vigilant approach.
The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. He tweets/posts @saleemfarrukh and can be reached at: farrukh15@hotmail.com
19. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2025
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-20
Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed seven drones over the region. Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil depot. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing a fuel tank to catch on fire. Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.
The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 18 that the Russian military command has consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne) and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved in combat operations in Ukraine.
The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian forces are not advancing immediately south of the town. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town. ISW previously observed indications that the Russian military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA) are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces. The Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming weeks and months.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.
- Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.
- The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.
- The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.
- NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka directions.
- Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv direction.
20. Iran Update, January 18, 2025
Iran Update, January 18, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025
The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. The ceasefire will go into effect at 1:30AM ET on January 19 and the release of Israeli hostages will start at 9:30AM ET on January 19. Unspecified security sources cited by Israeli Army Radio stated that Israel estimates that 25 out of the 33 hostages Hamas will release in the first phase of the deal are alive. Hamas is expected to release three hostages on January 19 and release the other 30 hostages every subsequent Saturday until March 1. An unspecified Israeli official said that Hamas has not provided the names of the three hostages to Israel for the January 19 exchange as stipulated under the agreement. The official warned that Israel would not move forward with the prisoner-hostage exchange if Hamas fails to provide the list prior to the deadline. Israeli media said that Israel will release 1,904 Palestinian prisoners in the first phase of the ceasefire deal. The IDF has begun to withdraw some forces from the Gaza Strip and redeploy others to the buffer zone ahead of the ceasefire implementation. The BBC cited an unspecified senior Palestinian official who claimed that Hamas will be permitted to operate its police force in the Gaza Strip under the ceasefire agreement. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.
Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir resigned on January 18 after the Israeli government approved the ceasefire deal. Ben Gvir voted against the ceasefire-hostage agreement during the Israeli cabinet vote on January 17. Ben Gvir stated that he would return to his position if the war eventually resumes. Gvir also called on Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to resign.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but assuming governing authority will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s office stated on January 17 that the PA holds legal and political jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip as the recognized governing authority of the Palestinian territories and is prepared to deploy administrative and security teams to the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire agreement does not task the PA with governing the Strip, nor does the ceasefire discuss post-war governance in any capacity. PA Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa separately stated on January 18 that the PA has a “hundred-day plan” for after the ceasefire goes into effect.
IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves. These cells are presumably organized on personal, and social ties and not institutionalized in a quasi-military structure like existed immediately after October 7, 2023. The PA and Hamas have repeatedly discussed post-war governance since the October 7 war began, including the formation of an independent civilian committee to manage civilian affairs. Hamas would almost certainly attempt to resist or subvert any PA takeover in the Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented by force from doing so. Hamas' cells cannot defeat PA security forces in battles at this time, but the PA would need to seek out and destroy these Hamas cells to prevent Hamas from gradually rebuilding and overthrowing the PA’s new authority. It is unclear if the PA is willing to fight Hamas in a long guerrilla campaign to cement PA rule in the Strip. A senior Palestinian official told BBC on January 18 that uniformed, mostly unarmed Hamas police will operate within designated areas in the Strip to manage the movement of displaced civilians after the ceasefire begins while avoiding areas of IDF presence. This BBC report indicates that some elements of Hamas' authority remain in the Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW is unable to certify the validity of this report, but Hamas police activity throughout the Strip could create more opportunities for friction between Hamas and PA forces.
The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is reportedly continuing to pursue a decentralized government against Turkish and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) pressure. A Deir ez Zor-based journalist reported that SDF leadership met with representatives from Raqqa in an attempt to secure their support for a decentralized government in exchange for increased governing authorities. Turkey has threatened to launch a full-scale military operation against the SDF since December 2024 as part of an effort to coerce the SDF to disarm. HTS has supported this Turkish effort. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has maintained that he seeks a “decentralized” administration and wants the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” rather than on an “individual” level.” A decentralized government would enable to SDF to continue operating in its current capacity, which directly contradicts Turkish demands.
The SDF’s outreach to Raqqa may be an attempt to secure local Arab support ahead of a potential Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack into SDF territory. The Raqqa representatives present rejected the SDF’s offer and emphasized the unity and sovereignty of Syrian territory. The representatives called for a conference with other groups in SDF-controlled territory to address popular demands. Arab communities under SDF control in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez Zor have ”defected” from the SDF and called for an end to SDF rule since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. CTP-ISW has not observed other Syrian reports about this meeting, which suggests that this source may have unique access.
Key Takeaways:
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Iraqi Sunni Coalition: The newly-formed Iraqi United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) called on the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands on January 18. It is unlikely that the United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) will be able to achieve most or all of these demands. The coalition therefore likely published these demands to rally support from Iraqi Sunnis ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
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Iraqi Parliamentary Politics: The Iraqi parliamentary leadership placed an amendment that appears to benefit Kurdish political parties on the parliamentary agenda for January 19, likely to try to ensure that Kurdish political parties attend parliament on January 19. The participation of Kurdish parties in parliament on January 19 would make it more difficult for Sunni parties to prevent a quorum.
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Ceasefire-Hostage Deal: The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. It will enter into effect at 0130 ET on January 19. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir resigned on January 18 after the Israeli government approved the ceasefire deal.
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Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but assuming governing authority will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves. Hamas‘ cells cannot defeat PA security forces in battles at this time, but the PA would need to seek out and destroy these Hamas cells to prevent Hamas from gradually rebuilding and overthrowing the PA’s new authority.
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Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is reportedly continuing to pursue a decentralized government against Turkish and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) pressure. The SDF’s outreach to Raqqa may be an attempt to secure local Arab support ahead of a potential Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack into SDF territory.
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Assassination in Iran: An unidentified individual, likely an Iranian Judicial office service employee, killed two senior Iranian Supreme Court judges, Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini, at the Iranian Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18. The official Iranian response to this attack has not yet materialized, but incidents like this often trigger paranoia about infiltration and foreign plots. The way Iran responds to the incident will indicate whether it perceives a broader security threat.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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