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Quotes of the Day:
“Understand: your mind is weaker than your emotions. But you become aware of this weakness only in moments of adversity--precisely the time when you need strength. What best equips you to cope with tthe heat of battle is neither more knowledge nor more intellect. What makes your mind stronger, and more able to control your emotions, is internal discipline and toughness.No one can teach you this skill; you cannot learn it by reading about it. Like any discipline, it can come only through practice, experience, even a little suffering. The first step in building up presence of mind is to see the need for ii -- to want it badly enough to be willing to work for it.”
- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War
“It’s never too late to become who you want to be. I hope you live a life that you’re proud of, and if you find that you’re not, I hope you have the strength to start over.”
- F. Scott Fitzgerald
“Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow.”
- Albert Einstein
1. American Defense Priorities After Ukraine by Frank Hoffman
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1. American Defense Priorities After Ukraine by Frank Hoffman
Excerpts:
Even though the war will continue into next year, and perhaps beyond, it is time to begin assessing longer-term implications for modern warfare, especially in Europe. It is not too early in this age to draw inferences about how the character of warfare is changing. How can NATO and the United States adapt to best ensure Europe’s stability and advance U.S. interests?
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Grasping the larger strategic context and applying scarce resources in a disciplined manner is what separates good and bad strategy. Washington is often accused of responding to the crisis du jour rather than hewing to a disciplined strategy that matches ends with means. With respect to Asia, it is time to align words with action. As stated at the opening, misguided investments, in either theater, could lead to strategic defeat.
Balancing risk and making such tradeoffs is the essence of strategy, and these essential choices should be reflected in future U.S. grand strategy.
American Defense Priorities After Ukraine - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Frank Hoffman · January 2, 2023
Russia’s war against Ukraine has peeled back the veneer and revealed the rot within Moscow’s military machine. Kyiv’s impressive battlefield successes imposed major losses on Russia in terms of territory, manpower, and materiel. The tide has turned in a brutal war of attrition. Russia’s gains are being reversed ever so slowly and at significant cost to all sides. But Ukraine has not won yet, and it still has far to go in terms of regaining control of its territory as winter approaches. There are a variety of scenarios about when and how the war ends. Overall, based on the counter-offensives this past fall, one should be more optimistic than some senior U.S. military officials are about Ukraine’s prospects for greater success early next year.
Even though the war will continue into next year, and perhaps beyond, it is time to begin assessing longer-term implications for modern warfare, especially in Europe. It is not too early in this age to draw inferences about how the character of warfare is changing. How can NATO and the United States adapt to best ensure Europe’s stability and advance U.S. interests?
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There are two major issues in answering this question. The first is the ongoing debate about how shifts in military technology impact the balance between offense and defense. This debate has obvious implications for force structures across the West that should inform NATO’s security posture and investments. The second issue involves the overall balance of power in Europe and how NATO and the United States should be postured to best preserve stability. The implications of these shifts argue against increases in heavy tanks for the U.S. force structure and favor a posture along NATO’s frontier that is defensively oriented. This “hedgehog” approach is part of NATO’s past. An offensive posture that fails to take into account the changing character of warfare is counterproductive to regional stability and U.S. strategic priorities, which are increasingly at risk in Asia.
Defensive “Dominance”
A number of military scholars, such as my late friend David Johnson, have written about how emerging technologies have made the defense dominant and complicated offensive maneuver. The strategic importance of this issue should be underscored, and it should influence defense strategy and budgetary allocations beyond Europe. As T. X. Hammes put it:
Investing in the wrong side of the competition is a rich nation’s game that the United States may no longer be able to afford. Against peer competition at scale, misguided investment could lead to strategic defeat.
This question should guide force development and overseas posture as part of the national security discussion.
What does it mean when it is claimed that some new technology produces an offensive or defensive advantage to a degree of dominance? Some clarification will help readers not familiar with this longstanding theory and its critics. The more common term in literature is the offense-defense balance, which relates to military technology favoring one mode over the other. If the balance favors the defense because of some technological development like the rifled musket or machine gun, then it is considered easier to be successful on the defense, and thus wars are less likely. By contrast, if the offense is dominant, as the late Robert Jervis put it, “it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own.”
What is the utility of thinking in terms of offensive and defensive advantages in the state of military technology? Some scholars argue there is limited utility in categorizing weapons as offensive or defensive. Some weapons such as the tank can abet either an offensive campaign or a defensive mode of operations. One can easily imagine swarming drones as either offensive systems destroying an integrated air defense system or as a lethal defense against an armored force bearing down on friendly forces, as seen in Ukraine.
Second, “dominance” may be the wrong term to capture the ever-evolving shifts in the character of warfare, or the perpetual interaction of tactics, technology, and human creativity that occurs in war. It may be better to conceive of offensive and defensive superiority along a continuum and think in terms of how changes in military technology produce shifts in the balance. Conceivably, there are technological innovations (e.g., armed drones) that can achieve a truly dominating position in either offensive or defensive operations. Dominance would constitute the extremes of the continuum, and arguably there are few such occurrences. Nuclear weapons would be the most notable example of offensive dominance given the state of ballistic missile defense.
Third, it is not clear how emerging technologies impact each domain and whether policy makers and force planners we can generalize the current state of military technology across all domains as “defense dominant.” In space, offense seems dominant since satellites are fragile and easily tracked. Both China and Russia are focusing on counterspace capabilities that reflect that trend. Some cyber strategists challenge the idea of defensive dominance in the cyber realm entirely. Other technologies, including artificial intelligence, may generate decisive advantages in that domain, but it is not clear that they would only benefit defensive operations.
Finally, it should be noted that military technology is applied in a particular context. Black and white distinctions may be counterproductive. Surely the ubiquity and relative low cost of surveillance and targeting technologies is going to favor fires and attrition over maneuver for the foreseeable future. This would support the defensive dominance line of thinking. But the ongoing maneuver-attrition debate should not be a binary choice. Both offense and defense require combinations of firepower and movement.
In short, technology is changing the character of conflict and at present gives an edge in many situations to the defense. At this time, a shift in favor of the defender is evident in ground warfare just as it was in the days of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder when the firepower revolution of the late 19th century made massed formations and maneuver prohibitively difficult. The underlying technologies of the current revolution will have the same impact and are offered not just by the United States, but also by smaller powers like Turkey and Israel. However, prudent planners realize that countermeasures will inevitably arise. A continuous cycle of action and reaction will alter the offense-defense balance over time in each domain.
Europe’s Balance of Power
The second issue that requires reflection is the balance of power in Europe vis-à-vis Russia and NATO’s capacity for collective defense. While it would be a mistake to ignore Russia’s reckless leadership and its ingrained sense of grievance, overestimating its combat power and ability to reconstitute itself is not appropriate either.
In economic terms, the European Union’s gross domestic product is 10 times that of Russia. That gap is only going to grow larger. The Russian economy is on the brink of ruin as it struggles to sustain its war effort, and its recovery could last a decade or beyond. Demographically, Europe’s population is over three times the size of Russia’s. Moscow’s human capital is in decline, qualitatively but not quantitatively, and the prospects for restoration are diminished by the war. Assessments of Russia’s demographic decline focus too much on population size and avoid critical questions about the quality of human capital (e.g., health care, education, etc.).
Moscow’s limitations include available resources for defense. No matter how you measure it, NATO outspends Russia on defense. Moscow does well with converting its resources into effective weapons. Yet, the Russian military is not designed for sustained offensive operations or the grinding war of attrition that it has now been employed in. The U.S. government concludes that Moscow has absorbed grievous losses, with as many as 100,000 Russian troops killed or wounded in Ukraine. Independent sources document Russian losses of 1,420 tanks, 2,314 armored and infantry fighting vehicles, and 262 aircraft. This has forced Russia to issue dated legacy weapons and conduct a “stealth mobilization” to offset its casualties. Sources from Europe assess that Russia has expended 80 percent of its missile inventory and is improvising by applying aged nuclear missile components to offset its depleted stock of weapons.
Regenerating new forces and combat power is going to be an uphill climb for Moscow. Russia has been reduced to using 30-year-old chips from Texas Instruments to sustain its operations. Any country forced to steal computer chips from refrigerators and dishwashers is both adaptive and desperate. The economic sanctions applied against Moscow will further degrade its industry and military-related production. Sanctions are not magic weapons, but they clearly delay and depress a Russian reconstitution and impose higher costs. Still, Moscow will seek workarounds. It is already looking to Iran for missiles and drones and to North Korea for ammunition. It is unclear if China will come to Russia’s aid in terms of military supply.
The combination of an improved position of relative combat power vis-à-vis Russia, and Moscow’s limited ability to reconstitute its forces, suggests that NATO will remain in a strong position in the short to medium term. Adding to the ledger are the contributions that Sweden and Finland bring to enhance NATO’s capacity and bolster deterrence and European stability. As NATO consolidates the accession of Finland and Sweden into the alliance, and if Germany, the “sleeping giant,” can ever achieve its promised security transformation, the alliance will hold a favorable balance of power. Germany remains a big “if” in my mind.
Assessment
Overall, the threat from Russia is manifestly less challenging today than perceived. The conclusion that “the threat from Russia has returned to Cold War levels” does not stand up. In terms of its overall military power, Russia is a shadow of the 1970s Soviet threat and has been significantly degraded in the last nine months. As Jack Watling has observed, Russia’s poor performance and manifest shortfalls in Ukraine are notable and extend well beyond just materiel shortages. Russia does maintain a large force and has selected military capabilities (i.e., integrated air defense and long-range strike) that cannot be ignored, but its combat power is much diminished for the foreseeable future. Russian efforts to restore its military muscle are not “doomed to failure,” but it will be an uphill slog.
This argues against substantial increases in U.S. force presence on the continent. The current policy of temporary and modest increases in U.S. presence will do much to signal American commitment for the alliance from the Biden administration. Given the doubt that many Europeans have about American staying power after the Trump-era bashing of NATO, it is a prudent adjustment as a temporary measure. But research surveys suggest that it may also result in Europeans continuing to free ride or to feel more vulnerable due to the presence of robust U.S. force levels. Moreover, resources are limited and there are other critical gaps of higher priority to fund. The opportunity costs of further increasing force levels at the expense of other missions in Asia should be considered. All of this augurs against calls for significant increases in permanent U.S. armor formations on NATO’s frontier.
At the same time, Western observers should avoid hubristic assessments about Russia’s powers of reconstitution. While Moscow may no longer be a full-spectrum superpower, it retains geopolitical tools and a willingness to take risks. As a report from the Center for a New American Security shows, Russia retains a sizable but not agile industrial base for reconstituting its military power. That said, it will face challenges in acquiring modern technology from the West except through indirect means like from Iran to help build drones.
Russia will remain dangerous even in decline during the next decade and retain many tools to frustrate European stability. It is down but not out of business as a challenge to the West.
All told, the West holds many systemic advantages over Russia: demographics, education, military staff expertise in complex operations, advanced military technology, access to capital, and a relative lack of corruption. Russia’s economic potential is severely constrained, but it has not (sorry for the pun) tanked yet. Given the stark scale of its losses and evident internal decay, whatever resources Russia will have to invest will be needed to repair its present inventory, restock a depleted supply of munitions, and recruit tomorrow’s armed forces. Russia’s defense industry will be severely hampered by sanctions and lost fiscal and intellectual capital for some time. Its ambitious plans for fifth-generation fighters and peer-level combat aviation procurement are predicted to be deferred until it regains its missile production capacity and inventory, which is not likely to occur in this decade. Nor will Beijing offset Moscow’s manifest deficiencies in operational planning, manpower, and personnel development. As suggested by ten authors writing for the NATO Defense College, there are no scenarios in the offing in which the Russian economy is not heavily and negatively impacted by the war against Ukraine regardless of its outcome.
While arguing for a strengthened NATO defense posture, Michael O’Hanlon has come to the same conclusion:
The 2022 Ukraine conflict has underscored the limitations of Russian military power and in fact it has dramatically weakened the Russian armed forces. With sanctions and export controls likely to remain in place for some time to come, that reality is likely to persist.
As Stephen Kotkin has noted, Russia’s aspirations vis-à-vis the West routinely outrun its capabilities. This cycle of “weakness and grandeur” is playing out again. Reconstituting its forces back to their 2020 level is going to take up much of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s attention and budget over the rest of this decade, even though President Vladimir Putin has promised that there will be “no limitations” on military spending. Bringing its forces up to NATO’s level in qualitative terms may be near impossible when non-materiel elements are factored in. It is Russian weakness juxtaposed against Putin’s recklessness with the military power he has that makes Russia dangerous. While wounded, Russia will remain a persistent problem.
This conclusion needs to be factored into adaptations for U.S. overseas base posture in Europe. These outposts are a requisite for American power projection and reassurance, while supporting deterrence. But that does support the conclusion drawn by one recent paper that argued that current U.S. forward-deployed forces in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific should be held at their present levels and that the American posture in Europe should “increase and expand eastward.” That conclusion fails to address the imbalances in Asia and the strong position of NATO in Europe. This does not suggest that Europe should be left to fend for itself. It is difficult to imagine a case of outright Russian military aggression against a NATO ally that did not involve U.S. forces in combat on the battlefield.
However, Europe can and ought to become more competitive in terms of its military modernization programs and enhance its readiness levels. NATO, while improving, remains far from meeting the 2014 Wales Summit standards for both budgeting levels (2 percent of GDP) and modernization (20 percent of the defense budget). The alliance should quickly move to operationalize its Strategic Concept and make smart investments in command and control, air- and ground-delivered munitions, and adequate logistics for sustained conflict.
The massive employment of guided weapons, including rocket and missile artillery, in Ukraine is instructive. The combination of pervasive surveillance and deeper strike systems afford a defensive but operationally relevant advantage that NATO should base its defensive strategy around. Similar lessons should be carefully drawn with regard to mobile surface-to-air systems to meet air defense requirements and deny Russia the use of its fighter-bomber and helicopter assets.
Buying enhanced (mobile) air defenses, aerial drones, and tactical attack missiles (per Hammes) is a smart procurement priority. Even before this conflict, people saw the age of smart loitering munitions coming. The results from contemporary conflict reinforce arguments for greater standoff and precision, increased use of drones and loitering munitions, and fewer manned helicopters. As noted in these pages, the lower barriers to entry in the drone competition “make cheap but effective robotic airpower available to a much broader range of states.” Yet, while drones and loitering munitions are making combined arms more effective it is not yet clear that they have revolutionized warfare. Predictably the race for counter-drone capabilities is now ongoing and could offset the apparent advantages offered by more agile unmanned systems. My money is on the continued expansion of these in numbers and at increasingly lower cost compared to existing systems.
A prioritized program for both Europe and the United States would suggest that a substantial investment in both land force ammunition and precision-guided missile stocks, including aviation ordnance, is needed as a first order of business. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that protagonists should expect nearly insatiable consumption rates. As Sir Lawrence Freedman has assessed:
A huge lesson from the war in Ukraine is that the intensity of modern warfare means you go through material and supplies very quickly. The stockpiles are never sufficient. The NATO countries have greatly depleted their supplies supporting Ukraine.
The U.S. Army seems to appreciate this priority and is now seeking to double or triple production for some of these weapons. NATO countries, including the United States, have limited industrial base capacity and need to rebuild their inventories and rethink the risks involved in limited production capacity to offset large-scale attrition. A shift away from trip-wire forces offset by more robust munition stocks may do more to deter Moscow. At present, the “arsenal of democracy” will have empty shelves for some time.
Combat operations in Ukraine offer evidence for systems like the Javelin, the Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (more commonly known as the NLAW), and the Switchblade 600 that warrant consideration in the debate about more effective investment strategies. For one modern Western tank, one can buy 10 launchers and 100 missiles. The lifecycle costs of the tank — training, equipment transport, refuelers, and maintenance — compound this comparison much further. NATO should seek to impose such costs upon adversaries, not itself.
These weapon systems will be increasingly common and are already widely fielded around the world. The Israelis field a family of anti-tank missile systems, the Spike system, which is being marketed for export as a less expensive alternative to the Javelin and has been sold to numerous countries. The Chinese have the HJ-12 anti-tank guided missile, which closely resembles the Javelin and comes with air-launched options. Such systems will undoubtedly continue to proliferate.
These systems will surely alter how Western maneuver and armor systems are employed. Although tanks are not completely obsolete, they are increasingly vulnerable to modern anti-tank munitions, whether fired from the ground or the air. These new systems have more range, lethality, and maneuverability than the last generation. The advantages offered by these systems against maneuver platforms, including the once-potent tank, are unlikely to be offset by merely using better camouflage or better tactics than Russian forces to screen armor advances.
There are surely potential contingencies where offensive maneuver is needed to support counterattacks or to seize or deny ground that confers a position of advantage. Armored mobility will remain useful in these instances. There are scenarios where the terrain and the rival’s force design make tanks useful. Yet, in other scenarios, what constitutes “combined arms” will have to be refined to reflect changes in the character of warfare. Clearly, unmanned aerial systems are having an impact beyond just intelligence and targeting. The shibboleth that only a 72-ton tank can provide the protection, firepower, and mobility required for operational success will be severely tested in a future war.
Certainly, tanks afford protection against small arms and shrapnel, but only modern active protection systems can hope to thwart modern munitions, and the tank’s logistics train is easily identified and even more vulnerable. This degrades the operational value of the total system. It is comforting to have them advance as the force maneuvers into the adversary’s weapons-engagement range. Unfortunately, that danger zone is now much larger and more lethal, exposing maneuver forces to precise fires at far greater ranges, and while taking losses the entire time when competing against an opponent capable of modern combined arms.
Clearly, Steve Biddle disagrees. While he and I agree about the enduring need for offensive maneuver, he does not seem to accept that it is far harder to maneuver in an age of persistent surveillance coupled with proliferating armor-killing weapons. It is, in my view, unhelpful to compare Ukraine’s advances into Kharkiv in September to “the German conquest of France in 1940, or the Six Day War of 1967, or Operation Desert Storm in 1991,” as Biddle does. The different scales and methods of fighting hobble such comparisons. To be useful, historical analogies must survive discontinuities, which include in this case loitering munitions and other low-cost, hand-held, easy-to-operate, unmanned aerial systems and anti-tank missiles. Biddle does not account for the increasing costs involved in maneuver, which are now intimately and painfully familiar to Russia. Nor does he project the impact of improved munitions and the air-launched options that military analysts expect to evolve and proliferate. Both sides in Ukraine are using existing 20th century assets with improvised enhancements. Neither is fielding a force designed to exploit combined arms to enhance a defense with a weapons-engagement zone of longer ranges. The U.S. armed services need to anticipate competition with adversaries who learn from this conflict and not assume that they will only fight opponents that repeat the woeful command-and-control flaws of the Russian military. The U.S. military cannot be “future-proofed” with false comparisons.
To be sure, the tank is not dead. U.S. forces have and will continue to employ armor. Clearly Ukraine is making good use of its tanks and could use more advanced models. But for the United States, it’s just not a priority investment for fighting sophisticated peers in high-intensity combat going forward. As Chris Dougherty has noted, the value of marginal investments in this platform over other deficiencies — secure command and control, unmanned aviation, munitions stocks, etc. — is the key question for U.S. force planning. The issue goes beyond bad Russian tactics or tank design, given the proven cost effectiveness of increasingly lethal systems designed to defeat modern armor with top-down munitions or precision fires. Despite their limitations, cuts in armor in Europe or the U.S. Army are not warranted. That said, increased numbers of heavy armor or an expanded permanent U.S. force presence in Europe are not strategically warranted either.
Rather than threatening Russia with armor forces up to its border, a more defensive orientation is best suited for a strategy of denial in this age. Shifting to a strategy of denial does not require tank-heavy maneuver formations or large numbers of lumbering towed artillery systems. Instead, it relies upon significant precision fires including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and self-propelled precision artillery. In addition to markedly bolstering deterrence, an investment package that deters but does not exacerbate Putin’s security dilemma has more merit than replaying World War II tank battles.
At the strategic level, there is a transformational opportunity here to support a smarter, sustainable, and more cooperative defense of Europe. This opportunity should not be lost, especially as NATO’s “New Force Model” is being developed. Analysts in Europe have assessed the stark changes in the region’s security environment and recognize the necessity to assume “a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in its own region and neighborhood.” NATO’s European members should be able to take the lead in many areas, including more and better ground combat forces, and not require major U.S. contributions or augmentation for every combat function. Ukraine offers a compelling example of where the United States has an arsenal for allies or partners to draw upon. Security assistance is a valuable component of U.S. strategy, but it is not a universal template or a future American way of warfare.
NATO ought to revitalize its modernization plans and reintroduce what Sean Monaghan reminds us was once known as the “hedgehog defense.” Such an approach calls for extensive investment in long-range precision strike systems — including artillery, munitions, unmanned aerial systems, and missile defenses — which favors NATO’s strengths. This should guide NATO’s transformation and the implementation of the Strategic Concept issued in Madrid in 2022, as well as how the U.S. military contributes to the alliance with its unique strengths. This may not reduce Washington’s defense expenditures on the continent much, but it will shape how these resources are allocated. It should also shape the Department of Defense’s design and development priorities beyond this theater for conflict in Asia as well.
Implications
The shift between offense and defense has both operational and strategic implications. These implications need greater study, including differentiation over a wider range of domains. The balance is rarely static, and tomorrow’s opponents are undoubtedly already at work on their counter-revolution. Russia is going to learn and adapt, as no doubt others will. The first implication is the need to recognize the signposts from recent conflicts. The implications of exploiting emerging technologies and implementing a reinvigorated national innovation strategy will be evident to those willing to rigorously evaluate their potential. Many legacy systems, including heavy armor, will have value in other contexts. So do not melt down any tanks just yet, but do appreciate the implications of modern, low-cost, anti-armor, and unmanned aerial systems that require limited training. Ukraine’s small but successful naval actions could also be significant as portents, especially in unconventional applications in contested littoral regions.
Second, Europe’s systemic advantages versus Moscow provide a favorable balance of power. Admittedly, the argument is based on resource inputs instead of real capability outcomes, and those are divided over 30 allies (hopefully 32 in the near future). Arguments for Western force planners to invest less in the ideology of the offense should be heeded, especially in regard to land forces dedicated to deterring Russia. Instead, the ideology of collective defense in Europe should be retained and strengthened as NATO consolidates after the war in Ukraine. This will require continued attention to Europe’s military modernization. Europe should focus on operational credibility as a necessary stepping stone if it truly seeks strategic autonomy — and that focus needs to start with Germany, which needs to put more emphasis on actually delivering on its words.
Third, it is time for U.S. strategists to consider the larger global picture and the reality that choices involve tradeoffs. American policymakers understandably want to aid Ukraine’s embattled democracy. Ensuring that Moscow does not succeed is important. However, policymakers cannot lose sight of strategic priorities and risk continued investment shortfalls in Asia either. The next few years will pose severe challenges to U.S. technological competitiveness and military security. It’s long past time to get serious in the Pacific. China’s diplomatic behavior and military modernization have not become more benign, although its economy has slowed sharply. Some argue that it may be more aggressive as its economic power declines, which is worrisome. Others fear that the United States is moving too slowly and running out of time to deter aggression against Taiwan.
Less symbolism and more substance are needed to stabilize the Indo-Pacific region. As Luis Simon has noted in these pages, “The existence of strategic tradeoffs between Europe and the Indo-Pacific is very real. What the United States does in one region impinges on its ability to resource deterrence in the other region.”
Conclusion
Grasping the larger strategic context and applying scarce resources in a disciplined manner is what separates good and bad strategy. Washington is often accused of responding to the crisis du jour rather than hewing to a disciplined strategy that matches ends with means. With respect to Asia, it is time to align words with action. As stated at the opening, misguided investments, in either theater, could lead to strategic defeat.
Balancing risk and making such tradeoffs is the essence of strategy, and these essential choices should be reflected in future U.S. grand strategy.
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Frank Hoffman, Ph.D., is a retired marine and former senior Department of Defense official who currently serves at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He is the author of Mars Adapting: Military Change During War. The contents of this article reflect the research and views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Frank Hoffman · January 2, 2023
2. Volodymyr Zelenskyy pledges victory in 2023 as Ukraine shoots down Russian missiles
Volodymyr Zelenskyy pledges victory in 2023 as Ukraine shoots down Russian missiles
Financial Times · by John Paul Rathbone · January 1, 2023
Ukraine weathered another round of missile and drone attacks early on New Year’s Day as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy lauded the country’s determination to overcome Russian aggression, saying that “when we win, we will hug”.
Russia launched 45 Iranian-made drones mostly targeting the capital Kyiv overnight, all of which were shot down by Ukraine’s air defences, with no reported casualties. “It didn’t work out that the holiday was spoilt for Ukrainians!” the country’s air forces said.
The latest attack came hours after Saturday’s volley of cruise missiles that Russia launched as President Vladimir Putin was delivering a militaristic end-of-year message during which he pledged to put an end to the “criminal Nazi regime in Kyiv”.
Flanked by uniformed soldiers, Putin’s speech contrasted sharply with Zelenskyy’s more emotive message in which he said he wished for “one thing — victory” and that 2023 would be a year of return for Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s full-scale invasion launched more than 10 months ago.
“The return of our people: Soldiers — to their families. Prisoners — to their homes. Migrants — to their Ukraine . . . Return of our lands . . . Return to normal life,” Zelenskyy said in his overnight New Year’s address to the nation. “To happy moments without curfew . . . without air raid sirens.”
A Russian family watches the country’s president Vladimir Putin deliver his New Year’s address © Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty Images
Russia has stepped up its use of missile and drone strikes as its military campaign on the ground has become bogged down in the face of Ukrainian counteroffensives, with the aim of destroying critical infrastructure and eroding Ukrainian morale.
Kyiv’s air raid sirens began sounding shortly after midnight, and continued until nearly 5am on New Year’s Day. But by midday, the capital’s streets were marked by relaxed-looking Ukrainians, with the aisles of the upmarket Tsum department store in the centre busy with shoppers.
Western officials condemned the latest round of Russian attacks and pledged to continue standing with Ukraine in 2023.
Bridget Brink, US ambassador to Ukraine, wrote on Twitter: “Russia coldly and cowardly attacked Ukraine in the early hours of the new year. But Putin still does not seem to understand that Ukrainians are made of iron.”
Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign policy chief, said in a tweet: “At the year’s end, Putin tries once again to force Ukrainians into darkness with despicable attacks. We are resolved to continue standing by Ukraine.”
“Glory to Ukraine,” Ben Wallace, Britain’s defence minister, said on Twitter. “The UK will be with you in 2023.”
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Sunday’s attempted drone strikes on Kyiv only resulted in falling debris that caused little damage, according to city authorities. But the 20 cruise missiles that Russia launched from the Caspian Sea on Saturday left at least one dead in Kyiv, and dozens wounded across the country. Ukraine’s military said it shot down 12 of the missiles — lower than the roughly 80 per cent success rate achieved against recent attacks.
Zelenskyy, who pledged last week that the nation’s air defences “will become even stronger and more efficient” in the new year, has long pleaded with his US and European allies to bolster Ukraine’s defensive systems, which rely on Soviet-era equipment that is in danger of running out of ammunition.
The latest Russian attacks, which partly seek to deplete those stocks further, came days after US president Joe Biden said he had approved provision of one Patriot air defence missile battery for Kyiv to be delivered in the coming months.
Additional reporting by Henry Foy in Brussels
Financial Times · by John Paul Rathbone · January 1, 2023
3. Russia’s War on Ukraine Worsens Global Starvation
I wonder if it will become a truism that every war in the modern era will have global effects.
Russia’s War on Ukraine Worsens Global Starvation
Moscow blocks most shipments from Ukraine, one of the world’s largest wheat producers, and its attacks on the country’s energy grid also disrupt the flow of food.
By Edward Wong and Ana Swanson
Jan. 2, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET
7 MIN READ
nytimes.com · by Ana Swanson · January 2, 2023
From March to November, Ukraine exported an average of 3.5 million metric tons per month of grains and oilseeds, a drop from five million to seven million metric tons per month before the war.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
ISTANBUL — Hulking ships carrying Ukrainian wheat and other grains are backed up along the Bosporus here in Istanbul as they await inspections before moving on to ports around the world.
The number of ships sailing through this narrow strait, which connects Black Sea ports to wider waters, plummeted when Russia invaded Ukraine 10 months ago and imposed a naval blockade. Under diplomatic pressure, Moscow has begun allowing some vessels to pass, but it continues to restrict most shipments from Ukraine, which together with Russia once exported a quarter of the world’s wheat.
And at the few Ukrainian ports that are operational, Russia’s missile and drone attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid periodically cripple the grain terminals where wheat and corn are loaded onto ships.
An enduring global food crisis has become one of the farthest-reaching consequences of Russia’s war, contributing to widespread starvation, poverty and premature deaths.
The United States and allies are struggling to reduce the damage. American officials are organizing efforts to help Ukrainian farmers get food out of their country through rail and road networks that connect to Eastern Europe and on barges traveling up the Danube River.
But as deep winter sets in and Russia presses assaults on Ukraine’s infrastructure, the crisis is worsening. Food shortages are already being exacerbated by a drought in the Horn of Africa and unusually harsh weather in other parts of the world.
The United Nations World Food Program estimates that more than 345 million people are suffering from or at risk of acute food insecurity, more than double the number from 2019.
“We’re dealing now with a massive food insecurity crisis,” Antony J. Blinken, the U.S. secretary of state, said last month at a summit with African leaders in Washington. “It’s the product of a lot of things, as we all know,” he said, “including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.”
The food shortages and high prices are causing intense pain across Africa, Asia and the Americas. U.S. officials are especially worried about Afghanistan and Yemen, which have been ravaged by war. Egypt, Lebanon and other big food-importing nations are finding it difficult to pay their debts and other expenses because costs have surged. Even in wealthy countries like the United States and Britain, soaring inflation driven in part by the war’s disruptions has left poorer people without enough to eat.
“By attacking Ukraine, the breadbasket of the world, Putin is attacking the world’s poor, spiking global hunger when people are already on the brink of famine,” said Samantha Power, the administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID.
The State of the War
Ukrainians are likening the events to the Holodomor, when Joseph Stalin engineered a famine in Soviet-ruled Ukraine 90 years ago that killed millions.
Mr. Blinken announced on Dec. 20 that the U.S. government would begin granting blanket exceptions to its economic sanctions programs worldwide to ensure that food aid and other assistance kept flowing. The action is intended to ensure that companies and organizations do not withhold assistance for fear of running afoul of U.S. sanctions.
State Department officials said it was the most significant change to U.S. sanctions policy in years. The United Nations Security Council adopted a similar resolution on sanctions last month.
But Russia’s intentional disruption of global food supplies poses an entirely different problem.
Moscow has restricted its own exports, increasing costs elsewhere. Most important, it has stopped sales of fertilizer, needed by the world’s farmers. Before the war, Russia was the biggest exporter of fertilizer.
Its hostilities in Ukraine have also had a major impact. From March to November, Ukraine exported an average of 3.5 million metric tons of grains and oilseeds per month, a steep drop from the five million to seven million metric tons per month it exported before the war began in February, according to data from the country’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food.
That number would be even lower if not for an agreement forged in July by the United Nations, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine, called the Black Sea Grain Initiative, in which Russia agreed to allow exports from three Ukrainian seaports.
Russia continues to block seven of the 13 ports used by Ukraine. (Ukraine has 18 ports, but five are in Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014.) Besides the three on the Black Sea, three on the Danube are operational.
The initial deal was only for four months but was extended in November for another four months. When Russia threatened to leave it in October, global food prices surged five to six percent, said Isobel Coleman, a deputy administrator at USAID.
“The effects of this war are hugely, hugely disruptive,” she said. “Putin is pushing millions of people into poverty.”
While increases in the price of food this past year have been particularly sharp in the Middle East, North Africa and South America, no region has been immune.
“You’re looking at price increases of everything from 60 percent in the U.S. to 1900 percent in Sudan,” said Sara Menker, the chief executive of Gro Intelligence, a platform for climate and agriculture data that tracks food prices.
Before the war, food prices had already climbed to their highest levels in over a decade because of pandemic disruptions in the supply chain and pervasive drought.
The United States, Brazil and Argentina, key grain producers for the world, have experienced three consecutive years of drought. The level of the Mississippi River fell so much that the barges that carry American grain to ports were temporarily grounded.
The weakening of many foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar has also forced some countries to buy less food on the international market than in years past.
“There were a lot of structural issues, and then the war just made it that much worse,” Ms. Menker said.
U.S. officials say the Russian military has deliberately targeted grain storage facilities in Ukraine, a potential war crime, and has destroyed wheat processing plants.
Many farmers in Ukraine have gone to war or fled their land, and the infrastructure that processed and carried wheat and sunflower oil to foreign markets has broken down.
At a farm 190 miles south of Kyiv, 40 of the 350 employees have enlisted in the army. And the farm is struggling with other shortages. Kees Huizinga, the Dutch co-owner, said Russia’s attacks on the energy grid have led to the shutdown of a plant that provides his farm and others with nitrogen fertilizer.
Other fertilizer plants in Europe were forced to shut down or slow production last year as natural gas prices soared, a result of the war. Natural gas is critical for fertilizer production.
“So this year’s harvest has already been reduced,” Mr. Huizinga said in November. “And if Russians continue like this, next year’s harvest might even be worse.”
He added that transportation costs have risen sharply for farmers in Ukraine.
Before the war, farmers shipped out 95 percent of the country’s wheat and grain exports through the Black Sea. Mr. Huizinga’s farm paid $23 to $24 per ton to transport its products to ports and onto ships. Now, the cost has more than doubled, he said. And an alternative route — by truck to Romania — costs $85 per ton.
Mr. Huizinga said Russia’s compromise on Black Sea shipments has helped, but he suspects Moscow is hobbling operations by slowing inspections.
Under the arrangement, each vessel leaving one of three Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea has to be inspected by joint teams of Ukrainian, Russian, Turkish and United Nations employees once the ship reaches Istanbul.
The teams look for any unauthorized cargo or crew members, and vessels heading to Ukraine need to be empty of cargo, said Ismini Palla, a spokeswoman for the U.N. office overseeing the program.
U.N. data shows that the rate of inspections has dropped in recent weeks. The parties agreed to deploy three teams each day, Ms. Palla said, adding that the United Nations has requested more.
“We hope that this will change soon, so that the Ukrainian ports can operate again at higher capacity,” she said. “Ukrainian exports remain a vital element in combating global food insecurity.”
Ms. Palla said the parties’ decision in November to extend the agreement contributed to a 2.8 percent drop in global wheat prices.
Over the last six months, food prices have retreated from highs reached this spring, according to an index compiled by the United Nations. But they remain much higher than in previous years.
An uncertainty for farmers this winter is the soaring price of fertilizer, one of their biggest costs.
Farmers have passed on the higher cost by increasing the price of food products. And many farmers are using less fertilizer in their fields. That will result in lower crop yields in the coming seasons, pushing food prices higher.
Subsistence farms, which produce nearly a third of the world’s food, are being hit even harder, Ms. Coleman said.
In a communiqué issued at the close of their meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in November, leaders of the Group of 20 nations said they were deeply concerned by the challenges to global food security and pledged to support the international efforts to keep food supply chains functioning.
“We need to strengthen trade cooperation, not weaken it,” Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the director general of the World Trade Organization, said at the summit.
The U.S. government spends about $2 billion per year on global food security, and it started a program called Feed the Future after the last big food crisis, in 2010, that now encompasses 20 countries.
Since the start of the Ukraine war, the United States has provided more than $11 billion to address the food crisis. That includes a $100 million program called AGRI-Ukraine, which has helped about 13,000 farmers in Ukraine — 27 percent of the total — gain access to financing, technology, transportation, seeds, fertilizer, bags and mobile storage units, Ms. Coleman said.
The efforts could help rebuild the country while alleviating the global food crisis — one-fifth of Ukraine’s economy is in the agriculture sector, and a fifth of the country’s labor force is connected to it.
“It’s hugely important for Ukraine’s economy,” she said, “and for Ukraine’s economic survival.”
Edward Wong reported from Istanbul and Washington, and Ana Swanson from Washington.
nytimes.com · by Ana Swanson · January 2, 2023
4. Why China’s Economy Faces a Perilous Road to Recovery
Excerpts:
The pressure on exporters has only intensified in recent months. China’s exports fell in November compared to a year earlier, led by a 25 percent plunge in exports to the United States. Households in the West had spent heavily on exercise equipment and other manufactured goods from China during the first two years of the pandemic, but are now more budget-conscious as prices rise.
The Communist Party has pledged to spur domestic demand to revive growth. But convincing people to spend after three years of stop-start activity and punishing lockdowns will be tough. Many Chinese workers are now looking for ways to rebuild their savings, even as the Lunar New Year holiday approaches, a time when families used to splurge.
“The overall wages are quite low, you can’t make much money,” said Gong Shuguang, a garment worker in Guangzhou who plans to stay in the city for the holiday instead of returning to his hometown in Sichuan Province for a family reunion. He lost two months’ wages during a Covid lockdown in the autumn.
Why China’s Economy Faces a Perilous Road to Recovery
Years of lockdowns took a brutal toll on businesses. Now, the rapid spread of Covid after a chaotic reopening has deprived them of workers and customers.
By Keith Bradsher
Keith Bradsher reported from Yangjiang and Guangzhou, China.
Jan. 2, 2023
nytimes.com · by Keith Bradsher · January 2, 2023
Garment factory owners showing samples in Guangzhou, China. Years of “zero Covid” had a devastating effect on businesses in the southern city.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times
Three weeks after Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, tried to reinvigorate China’s stalled economy by abruptly abandoning his stringent pandemic restrictions, he struck an upbeat note in his annual New Year’s Eve address. “China’s economy has strong resilience, great potential and vitality,” he said.
But that optimism is hard to find in downtown Guangzhou, the commercial hub of southern China. Nearly three years of “zero Covid” measures have crushed businesses. Streets are lined with shuttered stores and workshops. Walls are plastered not with “help wanted” signs, but with notices from entrepreneurs putting their businesses up for sale. Roads and alleys once packed with migrant workers are now mostly empty.
China’s reversal of its Covid restrictions in early December was meant to help places like Guangzhou. But the chaotic approach has contributed to a tsunami of infections that has swept across the nation, overwhelming hospitals and funeral parlors. In many industries, truck drivers and other workers have quickly fallen ill, temporarily stretching staff and slowing operations.
Now, faced with an unpredictable — and uncontrolled — epidemic and financial uncertainty, people and companies are spending cautiously, suggesting that the road to recovery will be uneven and painful.
China is also confronting broader challenges beyond its borders. The global economy is slowing, dragged down by high inflation, an energy crisis and geopolitical turmoil. As American and European shoppers tighten their budgets, China increasingly faces a double blow of slumping demand both at home and abroad.
Weak spending is further depressing the already razor-thin or nonexistent profit margins of many of the small private businesses that power China’s economy.
In Guangzhou, Tony Tang, the owner of a fifth-floor workshop that makes women’s clothing, said his sales had plunged by two-thirds in the past year. Competition among small factories in China and overseas is fierce, pushing down the wholesale price he can charge for a woman’s jacket with no brand name from $14 to $11.30 apiece.
Tony Tang at his clothing factory in Guangzhou last week. He said sales had fallen by two-thirds in the past year.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times
Mr. Tang’s work force has shrunk from 30 to 10, but there is no shortage of labor. When he needed a worker to help sew an order of halter tops, he went out on a street corner with a handmade cardboard sign and hired one within several minutes, for one-sixth less than he paid about a year ago.
The problem, Mr. Tang said, is a lack of orders. His workshop has “a lot of workers, but we don’t have work to do,” he said.
Understand the Situation in China
The Communist Party cast aside restrictive “zero Covid” policy, which set off mass protests that were a rare challenge to the Communist leadership.
China’s factory activity contracted further in December as rapidly spreading infections grounded workers, snarled deliveries and dampened demand, according to a survey of manufacturers that the government released on Saturday. For service industries like restaurants, the same survey found, business was almost as bad as in early 2020, during the nearly nationwide lockdown that followed the first Covid outbreak in the city of Wuhan. Eateries and other businesses closed last month as customers stayed home to avoid infection or because they were sick.
“The epidemic has had a great impact on the production and demand of enterprises, the attendance of personnel, and logistics and distribution,” the National Bureau of Statistics said in a statement that accompanied its release of the survey data.
Manufacturing had already been in decline in November, when many cities and regions in China imposed lockdowns on residents in a futile bid to contain outbreaks. Car dealerships are crammed with unsold cars. Stores have little need to order more for their shelves when they are already full of unsold merchandise.
Nio, an electric car manufacturer in east-central China’s Anhui Province, said that Covid outbreaks had affected its supply chain and reduced its car deliveries in December. Tesla suspended the production of cars at its factory in Shanghai for the last week of December, a move that Yale Zhang, managing director of Automotive Foresight, a consultancy in Shanghai, saw as a sign of flagging sales in China and elsewhere, partly because other automakers are introducing more electric cars.
But even as many cities and provinces are in the throes of deadly outbreaks that have silenced once-busy streets, in other places, there are early signs that economic activity is resuming. In a few cities in northern China like Beijing, which saw widespread outbreaks that have since peaked, people have been going out again in recent days.
The lifting of quarantine rules has helped drive sales of airline tickets ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday later this month. The removal of onerous Covid restrictions like daily P.C.R. testing on people and imported goods has saved time and money for companies and workers.
Xu Zeqiang, a truck driver in Yangjiang, a city in southeastern China that is a hub of knife and scissors production, said that he and his driving partner could now complete a round trip from Yangjiang to the ports at Shenzhen, 200 miles away, in a day, instead of two or three days.
“In the past, we could be stopped for P.C.R. test results and health code checks — now, it’s not required anymore, you can come and leave any time,” he said.
Many European manufacturers in China have been forced to operate with about half their usual staff for two to three weeks, affecting output somewhat, said Klaus Zenkel, the chairman of the chamber’s South China chapter. As a precaution against lockdowns, many companies had accumulated spare parts in warehouses before the Covid wave and have relied on those to keep running.
But to save on costs, a few small suppliers of specific components have stopped operations early for the Lunar New Year holiday, which starts on Jan. 21. “Everyone managed a way to continue somehow, to keep the damage at a minimum,” Mr. Zenkel said.
The damage that “zero Covid” inflicted on China’s once-unbeatable attractiveness as a manufacturing hub could be hard to repair.
Lockdowns and closed borders slowed or disrupted deliveries of goods and prevented many companies from sending buyers to factories. Some global retailers, seeing risk in overreliance on China, have turned instead to other countries for supplies. Walmart, for example, plans to ramp up imports from India to $10 billion a year by 2027.
Even Chinese exporters are trying to diversify.
In Yangjiang, Velong Enterprises, a Chinese manufacturer of knives, grilling thermometers and other kitchenware for Walmart, Ikea, Target, Carrefour and other retailers, is expanding its operations in Cambodia, Vietnam and India. It has shrunk its work force in Yangjiang from 1,700 to 1,200 through attrition and is considering potential factory sites from Mexico to Turkey, said Jacob Rothman, a co-founder and co-chief executive.
Companies like Velong find some savings when they venture out. The company pays workers in Cambodia half as much as its workers in Yangjiang.
But China’s strengths in industrial prowess and labor, even in the midst of a raging epidemic, are hard to beat.
A fifth of Velong’s remaining factory workers in China are now out sick. But the company has been able to avoid missing deliveries by hiring temporary workers from among the large pool of workers in Yangjiang with knife-making experience, said Iven Chen, the company’s other co-founder and co-chief executive.
“Our employees can be trained in five to eight days, and the skilled ones need less than one day,” said Ye Yuanqiang, a factory production manager at Velong. “I have worked in Cambodia, and sometimes I can’t train them well in two months.”
The pressure on exporters has only intensified in recent months. China’s exports fell in November compared to a year earlier, led by a 25 percent plunge in exports to the United States. Households in the West had spent heavily on exercise equipment and other manufactured goods from China during the first two years of the pandemic, but are now more budget-conscious as prices rise.
The Communist Party has pledged to spur domestic demand to revive growth. But convincing people to spend after three years of stop-start activity and punishing lockdowns will be tough. Many Chinese workers are now looking for ways to rebuild their savings, even as the Lunar New Year holiday approaches, a time when families used to splurge.
“The overall wages are quite low, you can’t make much money,” said Gong Shuguang, a garment worker in Guangzhou who plans to stay in the city for the holiday instead of returning to his hometown in Sichuan Province for a family reunion. He lost two months’ wages during a Covid lockdown in the autumn.
nytimes.com · by Keith Bradsher · January 2, 2023
5. Nearly 1,500 Russians Killed in Last Two Days of War: Ukraine
Nearly 1,500 Russians Killed in Last Two Days of War: Ukraine
msn.com · by Scott McDonald 11 hrs ago
© Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images The casket of Ukrainian soldier Gennadiy Afanasyev is carried out of a church after his funeral at a Kyiv church on December 30, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Russia has lost 1,470 soldiers in the last two days of the war, and more than 106,000 soldiers since the war began.
Russian casualties piled up more than usual in the last two days as the 2022 calendar year came to a close. The Ukraine Defense Ministry stated on Sunday that the previous day's toll of Russian soldiers killed was 760, which is much higher than typical daily averages of less than 600.
The defense ministry on Saturday listed 710 Russians killed, which brings the two-day total to 1,470 Russian casualties. Russia has now lost an estimated 106,720 soldiers since the war began in late February 2022.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky during his Sunday night address to the nation said Russia is "afraid" and that he senses "fear."
"They are afraid. You can feel it. And they are right to be afraid. Because they are losing. Drones, missiles, anything else will not help them. Because we are together. And they are together only with fear," Zelensky said.
Zelensky added that Ukraine shot down 45 Shahed drones on the first day of the new year, and he called Russians "pathetic."
"Russian terrorists were pathetic, and they entered this year staying the same. Our defenders were awesome, and on January 1 they showed themselves very well," Zelensky said.
Ukraine defense officials Sunday additionally stated heavy losses of equipment by Russia during the 312th day of the war, including nine armored combat vehicles and 13 automotive equipment and tanks.
Just one week ago, Zelensky said Russia has lost a lot in this war, but that Russian President Vladimir Putin will keep pressing forward.
"Russia has lost everything possible this year," Zelensky said the day after Christmas. "But [Putin] is trying to compensate for his losses with the cunning of his propagandists following missile strikes on our country, on our energy sector.
"There are a few days left in this year. We must be aware that our enemy will try to make this time dark and difficult for us," Zelensky said. "I know that the darkness will not prevent us from leading the occupiers to their new defeats, but we must be prepared for any scenario."
His Christmas message was a little more sobering, including saying there's a loss of hope.
"Our houses and streets can't be so bright. And Christmas bells can ring not so loudly and inspiringly. Through air raid sirens, or even worse – gunshots and explosions," Zelensky said. "And all this together can pose a bigger threat. It is a disappointment. Of the higher forces and their power, of goodness and justice in the world. Loss of hope. Loss of love. Loss of myself ..."
Newsweek reached out to Russia's Ministry of Defense for comment.
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msn.com · by Scott McDonald 11 hrs ago
6. 2023 and the world: Grid’s global forecast — from Ukraine to China, conflict zones to climate change
Major events:
A second year of war
In China, “dangerous storms”
Global economy: Food, fuel and “debt bombs”
The fate of the planet
Leaders to watch
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
Rishi Sunak
Kim Jong Un
Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Mohammed bin Salman
Benjamin Netanyahu
Ali Khamenei
Taliban leaders
On the global calendar
2023 and the world: Grid’s global forecast — from Ukraine to China, conflict zones to climate change
Grid’s Global Team looks at trends, looming nightmares and potential silver linings for the year ahead.
Global Editor
January 2, 2023
grid.news · by Tom Nagorski
One year ago, even some sophisticated readers — and savvy editors — couldn’t have identified Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a photo or found Luhansk and Donetsk on a map. It’s doubtful they’d have known what “HIMARS” or “ATACMS” were, or that the largest nuclear reactor in Europe was in Zaporizhzhia, in southeastern Ukraine. We might have needed refreshers on the Budapest Agreement or NATO’s Article 5.
And one year ago, Grid’s look at global hot spots for 2022 was focused more on Taiwan and North Korea than Russia and Ukraine.
And yet as 2022 ended, Zelenskyy was everyone’s “Person of the Year” and Russia’s war against Ukraine was without question the year’s most consequential global event. It looks certain to be the same in 2023 — for reasons that matter well beyond the battlefield.
2023 will also be a year (like most in recent memory) when what happens in China influences events far from its own borders. As Grid’s Lili Pike notes, China enters the new year in a state of rare tumult for President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party, given economic uncertainties and a messy unwinding of its “zero-covid” policy.
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What happens in China and Ukraine will weigh heavily on the global economy, which starts 2023 with twin worries about inflation and recession, along with nightmarish “debt bomb” crises roiling many nations of the Global South.
As 2023 begins, we are watching other hot spots, most notably the protest movements and regime response in Iran, missile tests (and — likely coming soon — a nuclear test) in North Korea, and the deepening crisis — for women and girls especially — in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
And we’ll monitor global efforts to fight climate change, because — to put it bluntly — in the long term, no crisis matters more than the one that puts the planet at risk.
But we begin our look ahead with the item that rated barely a paragraph in last year’s forecast. We begin with the war.
A second year of war
They are the most profound questions the world will face in 2023:
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- Will the war in Ukraine end?
- If so, when and in what way?
- And if not, what next for Ukraine and Russia?
The stunning reality is that as the new year begins, a Ukrainian victory is possible. A year ago, some of the world’s sharpest military minds were warning that a Russian invasion would topple Ukraine’s government in a matter of days or weeks. Against the world’s largest army, and with a fickle friend in NATO, what chance did Zelenskyy and his country have?
And yet here we are. The failings of the Russian military, resilience of the Ukrainian people and anything-but-fickle response of NATO were perhaps the greatest surprises on the global stage in 2022. Together, they have left Ukraine with a chance to win.
The year closed with Zelenskyy’s triumphant visit to Washington (“Ukraine is alive and kicking!”) and fresh pledges of tens of billions of dollars in U.S. military aid. New Year’s resolutions for Zelenskyy and his commanders likely include counteroffensives in the east and south, and perhaps even a move to retake Crimea, which has been in Russian hands for more than eight years.
But obstacles remain — not least the fact that Zelenskyy’s opponent appears dug in as ever. In one of his last addresses of 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed an all-in fight: “Do they think we will just stand idly watching threats to Russia emerge? This is the problem: We simply have no room to retreat.”
And that means that beyond the can-Ukraine-win question, there are many others:
- Will Russia make another move against Kyiv?
It seems unlikely, given the battlefield realities — but Ukrainian officials warned recently that Putin is planning an assault on the capital in the coming months. Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top commander, told the Economist that the Russians were mobilizing for a major spring offensive, including “another go at Kyiv” and strikes to interrupt NATO’s flow of weaponry to the Ukrainians.
Some analysts are skeptical, given the Russian military performance in 2022. And a new full-scale assault on Kyiv might harden even the softest among Ukraine’s European supporters. But — like the initial invasion — the fact that a plan might be strategically flawed doesn’t mean Putin won’t try.
On the other end of the spectrum, a different question for 2023:
- Will peace have a chance?
In the last days of 2022, both sides were talking about a deal.
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba laid out a proposal for a February “peace summit,” and on Christmas Day Putin told a Russia TV interviewer that “we are ready to negotiate with all the participants in this process about some acceptable outcomes.”
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The problem is that “acceptable outcomes” for Putin — recognition of the four regions he annexed in September and an official cementing of Russia’s hold on Crimea — are non-starters for Ukraine. And Kuleba’s February plan stipulates that Russia must first face a war-crimes tribunal. That’s not happening any time soon.
What this means is that one side will need to pummel the other badly enough to make negotiations attractive. It’s not hard to imagine European support for deal-making — in Paris and Berlin especially — and Turkey, China or India may use their influence with Putin to move a peace process forward. But the year begins with a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the two sides — and a strong appetite for more fighting.
At which point, other questions come into play:
- Will sanctions finally bite in Russia, in a meaningful way?
- Will Russian opposition to the war grow and influence the Kremlin?
- Will U.S. and European support hold as the war moves into its second year?
- And — back to that overriding question: How will it end?
Among more than 100 stories Grid has published on the war, one remains particularly relevant to that last question: “In the war in Ukraine, are ‘a coup or a nuke’ the only endgames left?” Meaning, with a slog on the front lines and no sign of negotiations, are the only remaining outcomes an overthrow of Putin or a Russian use of nuclear weapons?
Recently, the forecasting firm Good Judgment surveyed experts to test the likelihood of those scenarios in 2023. It found only a 9 percent chance that Putin would cease to be president of Russia and an even lower probability (5 percent) that Russia would use a nuclear weapon. Five percent is of course a frighteningly high number for such an event, but if these outcomes remain so unlikely, then what? When the Good Judgment survey asked about a negotiated settlement, more than half (55 percent) said it wouldn’t happen until after Oct. 1, 2024.
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In Grid’s own year-end survey of experts, many said the war’s chief lesson has been to expect the unexpected — or even the unthinkable. Liana Fix, fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, said too many analysts of the war had suffered from the “fallacy of linear thinking”; in her view, the “unexpected” in 2023 might include major gains by the Ukrainians and the “unthinkable” an end to Putin’s rule.
In China, “dangerous storms”
“All roads run through Beijing.” That was one headline in Grid’s forecast a year ago. We could reuse it now.
One could argue that 2022′s most important bilateral summits involved Xi. The first came in February, when Xi and Putin met on the sidelines of the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing and declared their “no-limits” friendship. That friendship has been tested — it’s safe to assume Xi has been unhappily surprised by the long and messy nature of Putin’s war — but China has also been a much-needed “friend” for the Kremlin in terms of trade and rhetorical support. How that relationship evolves will be a major question in 2023.
Meanwhile, Xi’s meeting with President Joe Biden at the November G-20 in Bali, Indonesia, offered glimmers of hope for the world’s most important geopolitical relationship. After a yearslong downward spiral, the two leaders managed to avoid vitriol and pledge collaboration — most notably an agreement to resume cooperation in the fight against climate change.
On the domestic front, as Pike reported last week, China’s 2023 begins with an unusually long list of worries.
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Xi has acknowledged as much. “We face many deep-seated problems regarding reform, development and stability that cannot be avoided or bypassed,” Xi told the Communist Party Congress in October. He added that China had to be “prepared to withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms on our journey ahead.”
Some of those storms are familiar — a property bubble, sputtering economy and relations with the West — but others are new.
The covid-19 pandemic may be receding in other parts of the world, but after China’s sudden pivot away from zero-covid, caseloads are soaring. And as Pike and Jonathan Lambert reported last month, China’s healthcare system appears dangerously ill-prepared for the deluge; a nation that reported only 6,000 covid fatalities in three years may be on track for hundreds of thousands of deaths in 2023. Later this month, hundreds of millions of Chinese will take advantage of relaxed rules to travel for the Lunar New Year holiday. “I think we’ll see astronomical case numbers,” Jennifer Bouey, an epidemiologist and leader of China studies at the Rand Corporation, told Grid.
Pike also noted that “how China handles the messy unwinding of zero-covid … could have ripple effects well beyond China’s public health — the nation’s economic growth and perhaps even Xi’s leadership could be called into question.”
For three years, the party messages were hammered home relentlessly: Lockdowns, strict quarantines and other measures were essential to ensure the virus did not spread; and Xi regularly cheered China’s tough response as a model for the world. Then came November’s widespread protests against the restrictions; less than two weeks later, the policy and message were turned on their heads.
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Xi addressed the changes for the first time in a New Year’s Eve address to the nation. While the epidemic “is still a struggle,” he said, “everyone is working hard with perseverance. Let’s work harder, persistence means victory.”
The shift may ultimately prove popular, but if the unwinding of zero-covid brings a nationwide public health nightmare, huge questions loom:
- How will the party explain a high death toll?
- Given that public protests accelerated the change, will angry citizens be emboldened to take to the streets again?
- And beyond the public health concerns, what will the covid troubles mean for China’s economy?
In 2021, Xi told his people that “Common Prosperity” would be the defining principle of the party’s rule — a doctrine built chiefly on the promise of a fairer distribution of wealth and better life for his people. Today, it’s hard to see that the regime has delivered.
As Grid has reported, income inequality and youth unemployment have risen, and in 2022, China hit an unfortunate demographic milestone: Its population has begun to shrink.
The hope is that the reopening will reinvigorate the Chinese economy. But all these problems, together with the crisis in China’s property markets and whatever economic consequences come with the covid wave, paint a landscape of anxieties for the year ahead.
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Before we leave China, one more note about geopolitics.
Conversations about the war in Ukraine turn often to implications for a potential conflict over Taiwan. In Grid’s year-end look at the war’s most important lessons, former Australian prime minister and Asia Society President Kevin Rudd said that “Ukraine is a global wake-up call, prompting us to reassess the dangers of other potential conflicts. … The most significant among these is the possibility of war between the U.S. and China. It is a prospect that we must now acknowledge is no longer unthinkable.”
Few experts believe a war over Taiwan is likely in 2023, but the level of concern is higher than ever — and that means that Grid Global Security Reporter Joshua Keating’s piece “Imagining the unimaginable,” which looked at how such a conflict might play out, is also more relevant than ever.
As Rudd put it, in 2023 the U.S. and China will have to make every effort to “avoid sleepwalking into crisis, conflict and war.”
Global economy: Food, fuel and “debt bombs”
The war in Ukraine and troubles in China will weigh heavily on the global economy in 2023 — a year that begins with a nasty mix of inflation and recession worries in many corners of the world.
All the knock-on effects of the war — the refugee crisis, the energy crisis, the crisis in the global food supply — remain in play as the year begins. A sudden end to the conflict would help on all those fronts; a war that drags into 2024 would leave the region and the world vulnerable to yet more economic trauma.
Inflation — driven primarily by the war — crossed the 10 percent threshold in the European Union in 2022, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported recently that the price of staples in a basket of countries had risen by 24 percent since 2020. Meanwhile, recession fears persist in parts of the European Union and the U.S. as well.
China’s economic performance will loom large for the rest of the world. The farewell to zero-covid isn’t just a matter of mollifying protesters; it’s also meant to boost growth. The Center for China and Globalization said that expanding domestic demand will be China’s main priority this year. Success would help boost global growth — but it would also increase the costs of energy and therefore the rate of inflation.
Meanwhile, in several corners of the developing world, there’s a different economic worry, summed up in a term we first heard in the summer of 2022: Debt bombs.
As Grid’s Nikhil Kumar has reported, several countries have taken on high levels of debt that have become more burdensome as global inflation and interest rates rise. The phenomenon has squeezed budgets from Lebanon to Egypt, Kenya to Pakistan — and a debt-bomb crisis brought down the government of Sri Lanka in 2022. The problem has forced governments to cut public spending and — in many cases — petition the IMF for help.
Kumar wrote that as 2023 begins, “the world is left facing the very real prospect of a series of economic explosions that could affect the lives of tens of millions of its poorest people.”
The fate of the planet
It’s hard to say that 2022 was a good year for the global fight against climate change. All the urgency of the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings (the latest was held at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in November) wasn’t enough to avoid a conference that struggled to repeat past pledges, and despite the traumas climate change inflicted in 2022 — heat waves and fires in Europe and the American West, drought in China, deadly floods in Pakistan, to name just a few — the world has done little to stanch the bleeding.
As Grid’s Dave Levitan reported from the COP27 meetings, “While some aspects of the final text offered cause for celebration … others left the world much where it was before — in a spiraling climate emergency without a clear path to meeting goals set forth in the Paris Agreement seven years ago.”
As 2023 begins, one hope is that the energy crisis sparked by the Ukraine War also sparks a rush to green energy. For the moment, two conflicting trends are in play: heavy investments in wind and solar power and the electric vehicle industry — alongside a short-term return to coal and other fossil fuels. A year-end International Energy Agency report found that coal use probably hit an all-time high in 2022.
The short-term/long-term paradox was summed up in December by Eurasia Group CEO Ian Bremmer: “Take a few steps back and you see a planet that’s moving away from carbon-based energy at breakneck speed, but in 2022 that transition looked anything but smooth.”
These questions, then, for 2023 and beyond:
- Will the rush to renewables maintain that “breakneck speed”?
- Will the return to coal be a brief phenomenon?
- And will that reboot of U.S.-China cooperation pay dividends for the planet?
Leaders to watch
Along with Putin, Zelenskyy and Xi, a few other global leaders will be worth special attention in 2023.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva barely won Brazil’s October election — and the happy surprise in South America was what didn’t happen afterward. Having vowed repeatedly to contest any outcome that didn’t keep him in office, President Jair Bolsonaro scrapped the Donald Trump playbook for the most part, and on Sunday power passed peacefully to Lula, who spoke of “hope and reconstruction” after his swearing-in. Now the challenge for Lula — and for Brazil — will be to reboot an economy that is weaker than it was at the end of his last term as president in 2010, and to do so with a powerful right-wing opposition. How he performs may be South America’s most pressing question for 2023.
Britain’s Rishi Sunak is another newly minted leader with mountains to climb in 2023. Sunak was the third prime minister in the U.K.’s annus horribilis — a year that featured the scandals that brought down Boris Johnson, the historically brief and disastrous tenure of Liz Truss, a full-blown economic crisis, and the death of Queen Elizabeth II. Sunak’s main calling card is economic competence, and his main job now is to at least begin to fix the country’s worst economic mess in decades. As Kumar reported, Britain is suffering from both the general European malaise and the self-inflicted economic wounds caused by Brexit.
We’ll watch Kim Jong Un — because his country always bears watching and because 2022 saw a record spate of North Korean missile tests. On Sunday, Kim rang in the new year with a call for “exponential” growth in the country’s nuclear system, according to state media. Threats and bluster are nothing new for Kim and his predecessors, but experts believe 2023 will bring the first nuclear test Kim has conducted since 2017.
Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to have a Putinesque longevity. He played a tough geopolitical hand well in 2022, balancing ties with Moscow with drone shipments to Kyiv — and styling himself a dealmaker when it came to the crucial effort to free Ukrainian grain stocks from Black Sea ports. But Turkey starts the year with high unemployment (roughly 10 percent) and wildly high inflation (Reuters forecast a 43 percent rate for 2023), and an election looms this summer. Suffice to say Erdogan’s longevity may be tested.
Then to the Middle East — and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu, who won another term as Israeli prime minister in 2022. What are those two leaders doing in the same sentence? There are rumblings that the Saudis will be the next to make peace with Israel; in its look ahead to 2023, the Economist reported that Riyadh has invested more than $2 billion in Israeli startups, and while the two nations have little else in common, they share a deep antipathy toward Iran.
Which brings us to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. As Grid Special Contributor Roxane Farmanfarmaian wrote recently, Khamenei is not well, and his departure from the scene “would unsettle an already tense and dangerous situation” in Iran. Protests sparked by one woman’s death in custody have spread widely and now include demands for a change in the theocracy. Potential endgames range from brutal crackdown to civil war; key questions for the regime in 2023 are whether it will offer reforms that quiet the protesters without endangering its grip on power — and how a post-Khamenei era unfolds, if it comes to that.
And we’ll watch the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, whose last acts of 2022 included rulings to ban high school education for girls and keep women from working at nongovernmental organizations. In response, four NGOs shut down operations in Afghanistan last week. All this comes against a backdrop of economic crisis, and as 2023 begins, the Taliban 2.0 is evolving into a regime as repressive as its earlier iteration.
On the global calendar
There are a few things we can forecast with certainty.
We know that 2023 will bring elections in several important nations — among them Nigeria in February, Turkey in June and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in December.
King Charles III will be crowned in May.
The next major climate conference — COP28 — will gather in the United Arab Emirates in November.
Meanwhile, the U.N. says that in mid-April, someone in India will give birth to the country’s 1.43 billionth person — and at that moment India will surpass China as the world’s most populous nation. (How the U.N. knows the timing with such precision, we’re not sure.)
Silver linings?
It’s always good — and never easy — to finish such forecasts on an uplifting note. To that end, here are some of the best scenarios we can imagine.
A deal is done to end the war in Ukraine, or at least to silence the guns, and it is negotiated from a position of Ukrainian strength. Fuel and food prices drop. Inflation ebbs. Other crises start earning a greater share of global attention.
The world benefits from a less turbulent U.S.-China relationship. China gets a short-term benefit from American assistance with the latest covid waves. (This would mark an interesting reversal of roles, given China’s shipments of PPE and other medical equipment to the U.S. in the pandemic’s early days.) Beijing beats back the worst of the covid outbreak, and life in China — along with the country’s economy — returns to something more like normal.
In the rest of the world, covid-19 is no longer the all-consuming front-burner issue it has been.
The race to renewable energy outpaces the backpedaling to coal.
Some measure of reforms come to Iran. Some measure of peace holds in the long-running wars in Yemen and Eritrea.
Finally, perhaps the safest bet for good news comes from the world of sport. Twice in 2022 — at the Winter Olympics in Beijing and soccer’s World Cup in Qatar — global gatherings of sport brought both controversy and thrills. In July 2023, another World Cup — the women’s edition — will kick off in Australia and New Zealand. It’s not too much to hope that this year, we’ll get the thrills, minus the controversy.
Happy New Year.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
grid.news · by Tom Nagorski
7. Cause for optimism in the South China Sea
Excerpts:
Indeed, China’s coercive behavior in the SCS, while remaining consistent, has also displayed some signs of restraint. In May, for instance, the China Coast Guard did not intervene when its Filipino counterpart placed navigational buoys in a part of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone claimed by Beijing.
That might well be cold comfort since Beijing’s actions in the SCS remain fraught with uncertainty well into 2023. Nonetheless, the diplomatic efforts undertaken by concerned parties — both regional and extra-regional — in the SCS should provide some space for greater cooperation as countries in the region cope with more pressing socioeconomic challenges at home.
Cause for optimism in the South China Sea
China’s coercive behavior in contested waterway was consistent throughout 2022 but also showed certain new signs of restraint
asiatimes.com · by Collin Koh · January 2, 2023
Attention shifted away from the South China Sea (SCS) in 2022 as the world confronted the Ukraine war and the Taiwan Strait crisis in February and August. Fears that a Ukraine-inspired conflict would erupt in the Taiwan Strait have not eventuated.
Domestic economic and political concerns, such as inflationary pressures on the economy and the 20th Party Congress have seized much of Beijing’s attention.
Still, China’s maritime coercion against its Southeast Asian and extra-regional rivals have continued in the SCS throughout 2022, with widely-reported incidents involving Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Australia.
Various claimants, including China and the Philippines, have continued to engage in construction activities on their existing Spratly Islands outposts. Vietnam has been observed to have undertaken significant dredging and landfill work since early this year.
Yet there could be cause for optimism. Late 2022 caps off a flurry of regional summitry. The first in-person summit between the Chinese and US presidents on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali should have created some respite for regional countries holding their breath over a China-US conflict.
How China and the United States manage their geostrategic competition in 2023 will strongly affect the geopolitical dynamics in the SCS. The Biden administration has sought to balance pushing back against China’s irredentism in the SCS while preventing the rivalry from spiraling out of control.
Recent follow-ups from the Biden-Xi Bali meeting, such as the latest senior US delegation visit to China and a planned trip by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, bode well for a less tense 2023.
On the ground, US Navy freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the SCS declined from the record high of 10 instances in 2020, to five in 2021 and five in 2022 up to the mission by USS Chancellorsville in late November.
Multiple aircraft fly in formation over the USS Ronald Reagan, a US Navy aircraft carrier, in the South China Sea. Photo: Kaila V Peters / US Navy
While the US military maintains a regular presence in Southeast Asia and the SCS through its routine naval and air missions, the tapering down of FONOP frequency seems to reflect the desire to implement “guardrails” with Beijing.
The strategic priorities of ASEAN countries remain skewed towards addressing economic woes such as inflationary pressures and even a potential global recession. Renewed attention will need to be placed on diplomacy to build on the momentum of this year’s summits to stabilize competition in the region.
Relaxation of curbs on international travel will also help reinvigorate in-person diplomatic initiatives such as the ASEAN-China negotiations on the proposed Code of Conduct (COC) in the SCS.
The negotiations look set to regain momentum with the second draft negotiating text currently being discussed. But it also has become clear that the parties concerned have walked back from a definite timeline and much of the differences among the 11 parties to the COC that stymied progress in negotiations pre-Covid-19 will continue to be contentious.
China and its ASEAN counterparts will push talks and tout achievements, such as readings of the draft negotiating text, for different yet convergent reasons. Beijing needs to showcase its negotiations as reflecting its desire for peace and stability to fend off what it perceives to be foreign meddling in its disputes.
Meanwhile, ASEAN has been stung by lackluster progress in tackling the Myanmar crisis. With ASEAN credibility and relevance further questioned, the bloc needs a new rallying point and self-validation.
There is unlikely to be a new breakthrough in the COC process in 2023 as the region remains largely invested in domestic socioeconomic priorities. In parallel, the SCS is likely to face twin dynamics of both competition and cooperation.
Washington will still conduct FONOPs in the SCS and looks set to continue working with close regional allies to project and sustain a military presence in the SCS.
The spate of “minilateral” exercises involving the United States and allied militaries sets this pattern of engagement, facilitated by the enhancement of defense postures by some of these allies, such as Japan.
Expanded military engagements by extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia are expected in the coming new year. Indonesia is keen to further expand the scope of Exercise Super Garuda Shield in 2023 to include more foreign militaries.
Philippine marines take position next to US marines Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) during an amphibious landing exercise at the beach of the Philippine navy training center facing the south China sea in San Antonio town, Zambales province, north of Manila on October 6, 2018. Japanese troops stormed a South China Sea beach in the Philippines on October 6 in joint military exercises with US and Filipino troops that officials said marked the first time Tokyo’s armored vehicles rolled on foreign soil after World War II. Photo: AFP / Ted Aljibe
The Philippines and the United States are tipped to build on the momentum from the later months of the Duterte administration by expanding their institutional military links as Manila also explores a Visiting Forces Agreement with Japan.
Southeast Asian parties will continue to seek strategic assurance through a collective approach with extra-regional partners while maintaining buoyant and economics-driven relations with China. This may induce caution from Beijing in managing its dynamics with its SCS rivals.
Indeed, China’s coercive behavior in the SCS, while remaining consistent, has also displayed some signs of restraint. In May, for instance, the China Coast Guard did not intervene when its Filipino counterpart placed navigational buoys in a part of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone claimed by Beijing.
That might well be cold comfort since Beijing’s actions in the SCS remain fraught with uncertainty well into 2023. Nonetheless, the diplomatic efforts undertaken by concerned parties — both regional and extra-regional — in the SCS should provide some space for greater cooperation as countries in the region cope with more pressing socioeconomic challenges at home.
Collin Koh is a Research Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2022 in review and the year ahead.
This article, republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.
asiatimes.com · by Collin Koh · January 2, 2023
8. Patriot Missiles, NATO, and Ukraine: Tactical Weapons with Strategic Impacts
Patriot Missiles, NATO, and Ukraine: Tactical Weapons with Strategic Impacts - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Peter Mitchell · December 29, 2022
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In his address to Congress, Ukrainian Volodymyr Zelensky unsurprisingly asked for additional weapons, support, and funding for Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to repel the Russian invasion. He specifically named one weapon: the MIM-104 Patriot. “If your Patriots stop the Russian terror against our cities, it will let Ukrainian patriots work to the full to defend our freedom.” Shortly thereafter, the Department of Defense announced Patriots were headed to Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to support Ukraine. Following the training of Ukrainian servicemembers at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, Patriot batteries will likely be deployed around critical defended areas within Ukraine itself. This move by the Pentagon—although of limited tactical importance—marks a seismic strategic shift in intra-NATO cooperation and sets the stage for long-term NATO-Ukrainian partnership.
Training a Patriot Battery
Long-range air defense systems are complicated machines, and the Patriot is no exception. While most photographs of the Patriot focus on the M901 launching station, the system also comprises of four other components. The eyes of the system, a C-band radar, feeds information to the brains, the engagement control station. Firing data is sent to the muscles, the launcher, and coordination is conducted with the battalion information control center and to other elements using Link 16. Powering the battery is a truck-mounted generator. Each component is unique and requires intensive individual training and constant maintenance to remain mission ready.
The US Army advanced individual training schedule reflects this complexity, with 14E Patriot fire control operators requiring twenty weeks of advanced individual training. Tactical control officers spend ten weeks at the Basic Officer Leader Course with several more weeks of on-the job training upon arriving at their unit prior to being certified. Patriot batteries are staffed with three tactical site crews. These crews are evaluated through regularly scheduled gunnery tables. The Standardized Patriot Evaluation and Assessment Reporting (SPEAR) culminating exercise serves to test all potential combat situations, with a particular emphasis on preventing friendly fire. If Ukrainian soldiers take no weekends off and do double training shifts, training a single battery of seventy-one soldiers and four officers could be feasibly reduced to two months.
Sourcing a Battery
While training on the Patriot takes considerable time, manufacturing, delivering, and fielding them is an even lengthier process. Average deliveries take between four and six years from order to shipment. In 2012, Qatar ordered eleven Patriot batteries and 1032 missiles. Approximately six years later, in November 2018, the Qatari military announced that the Patriots had arrived and were fully mission capable. In March 2018, NATO member Poland ordered two Patriot batteries with a planned delivery of winter 2022. Those batteries have not arrived yet, leading to an offer from Germany to deploy its own Patriot batteries to Poland to supplement the two American batteries already positioned at Rzeszow. Additional orders from Poland came in May 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Waiting four-to-six years for a new system to be manufactured is unacceptable for Kyiv considering the ongoing Russian strategic bombing campaign. As a result, the United States must look internally to find an available Patriot battery it can donate. It is highly likely that the Patriot battery in question will come from the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The probable battery is “a training set of older Patriot equipment” currently being used to train 14E soldiers and air defense officers. As with other American equipment sent to Ukraine, the Patriot battery will eventually need to be replaced with newly manufactured equipment.
Tactical Operations
Bringing a single Ukrainian Patriot missile battery online may seem like an insignificant thing in a massive conventional war involving whole army groups, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and tens of thousands of vehicles. From a tactical perspective, this is more or less correct. In the limited terms of putting steel on target, Patriot does not provide any substantial upgrade from the Buks or S-300s that the Ukrainians are already using with significant effect against Russian aircraft and cruise missiles.
The real tactical advantage of the newest Patriot missile is its ability to intercept tactical ballistic missiles like the 9K720 Iskander which the Russians have strongly tapered off using since the first few months of the war due to limited supply. The possibility of Russia acquiring Iranian ballistic missiles expands their ability to attack targets in Ukraine. Here, again, the Patriot offers significant benefits as Saudi Arabia has proven, receiving from one analyst the moniker “the world leader in ballistic missile intercepts.”
Interoperability and NATO Resolve
A Patriot battery in Ukraine also opens a world of interoperability between Ukraine and NATO in a way that Kyiv could never have done before with its legacy Soviet air defense equipment. NATO and Kyiv are currently sharing military intelligence reports in an unprecedented way, but due to a difference in military systems, the data has to be passed through intermediaries. The introduction of a Patriot system and its Link 16 system streamlines the process by passing Link 16 data directly through the Ukrainian Patriot battery to German or US Patriot batteries or other Link 16 networked military hardware.
This interconnectivity is a major step strategically and geopolitically. Link 16 works both ways up the reporting chain, which means US airborne radars and NATO combat air patrols can pass radar tracks of Russian sorties in real time to Ukrainian Patriot systems, which can fire upon the linked tracks. The Ukrainians can also pass back data on Russian drones, cruise missile attacks, and other activities back through Link 16. The interoperability offered by the Patriots is more than just a tactical or operational asset. It presages a long-term partnership between NATO and Ukraine.
Strategically, this deal is another indicatory of how the Russo-Ukrainian war is going to end in a catastrophic Russian defeat. Getting Law and Justice-ruled Warsaw to agree to German forward deployment on Polish territory is a significant step towards better NATO cooperation. Hopefully, it also signals stiffening resolve within the Bundestag towards pursuing victory in Ukraine.
With US-supplied Patriots protecting Ukrainian patriots on the ground, the strategic landscape in Ukraine and for NATO has shifted. The Patriot is only the latest step in increasing US support to Kyiv. More advanced US systems are likely to arrive with the springtime—matching our air defense commitment with offensive capability—to buttress the Ukrainian war effort against impending Russian offensives. For all intents and purposes, giving Ukraine Patriot marks its official military integration into the NATO war machine and another nail in the coffin of the Russian special military operation. Moscow is rapidly running out of potential countermoves, while Washington and Brussels are just getting started.
Capt. Peter Mitchell is an air defense officer and strategic studies instructor at West Point.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Master Sgt. Sean M. Worrell
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mwi.usma.edu · by Peter Mitchell · December 29, 2022
9. Taiwan willing to offer help to China to deal with Covid-19 surge
Should we wager on whether China would accept any assistance?
Taiwan willing to offer help to China to deal with Covid-19 surge | CNN
CNN · by Wayne Chang,Kathleen Magramo · January 1, 2023
Taipei CNN —
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen said the self-ruled democratic island is willing to provide assistance to help China deal with its Covid surge after Beijing eased its hardline approach last month.
China abandoned its restrictive zero-Covid stance after nearly three years, ending snap lockdowns, contact tracing, mandatory testing and scrapping quarantine that severely limited people from traveling in and out of the country.
But the abrupt exit from zero-Covid could lead to nearly 1 million deaths, according to a new study, with the country facing an unprecedented wave of infections spreading out from its biggest cities into its rural areas.
“Based on humanitarian needs, we are willing to provide necessary assistance (to China) as needed, so that more people can put the pandemic behind and have a healthy and peaceful new year,” Tsai said in her new year’s remarks on Sunday.
However, she did not spell out what forms of assistance Taipei would provide.
China’s U-turn on its Covid policy caught citizens and the medical system off guard, with some pharmacy shelves swept empty of cold and fever medicines and hospitals scrambling to cope with an unprecedented jump in infections.
China also announced last week that it will drop quarantine requirements for international arrivals and resume outbound travel for Chinese citizens starting January 8 – but it also sparked concern among some overseas governments as China’s Covid cases skyrocket.
Empty cough medicine shelves in China's central Hubei province on December 20, 2022.
Liu Junfeng/FeatureChina/AP
Countries including the United States, Japan and South Korea moved to impose restrictions, while others such as France and the United Kingdom have made it clear they are ready to welcome Chinese travelers – who had been a major driver of international tourism before the pandemic.
Renewed calls for regional stability
In her new year’s message, Tsai also called on Beijing to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, saying that it is the common responsibility and expectation of the entire region.
“War is not an option to solve problems. Only through dialogue, cooperation, and the common goal of fostering peaceful development and regional stability can we bring security and happiness to more people,” Tsai said.
China’s ruling Communist Party views Taiwan – a democratically governed island of 24 million – as part of its territory, despite having never controlled it. It has long vowed to “reunify” the island with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.
Cross-strait tensions have racheted up in the past year.
When US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made a visit to Taiwan last August, China lashed out with its Foreign Ministry saying the trip would have a “severe impact on the political foundation of China-US relations.”
Not long after she landed in Taiwan, Beijing also launched a series of unprecedented military exercises around the island.
CNN’s Nectar Gan and Jessie Yeung contributed to this report.
CNN · by Wayne Chang,Kathleen Magramo · January 1, 2023
10. How Russia deploys an army of shadow diplomats
How Russia deploys an army of shadow diplomats
Thailand, Bangladesh are among the states that have given diplomatic protection and camouflage to Putin spooks
asiatimes.com · by ProPublica and ICIJ · January 2, 2023
This article was originally co-published by ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom, and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists as part of a .
BUDVA, Montenegro – Near a teeming town square along the Adriatic coast, where ancient city walls surround the ruins of bygone empires and shops and churches rise over the sea, Russia’s newly appointed representative to this tiny Balkan nation opened his consulate office.
Boro Djukic, the first honorary consul named by Russia in Montenegro, was supposed to use his prestigious post to champion cultural ties and the interests of local Russian business owners and tourists – a benevolent bridge between the two countries.
Instead, the middle-aged former bureaucrat took on an aggressive role in Montenegro’s politics, backing a movement that aimed to empower allies of the Kremlin and working to undermine the fragile government of a country considered a valuable US ally in a turbulent region.
Budva, a picturesque town on the Adriatic coast where Russia’s former honorary consul in Montenegro maintained a consulatet. Photo: :Matthew Orr for ProPubica
While honorary consul from 2014 to 2018, Djukic helped found a hard-line, Kremlin-backed political party that sought to force the country’s withdrawal from NATO. When the party needed a headquarters, he went one step further, offering his family home in a posh neighborhood in Podgorica, Montenegro’s capital.
A sign near the front door read: “Residence of the Honorary Consul of the Russian Federation.”
Djukic was part of a faithful network of honorary consuls embedded by the Russian government around the world that has supported President Vladimir Putin amid his most contentious military and political campaigns, including the February invasion of Ukraine that has killed or injured thousands of civilians, an investigation by ProPublica and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found.
Under Putin, Russia has become an enthusiastic supporter of a largely unregulated system of international diplomacy, which for centuries has empowered private citizens in their home countries to serve as liaisons for foreign nations.
Experts say Russia is using honorary consuls as part of a strategy to move public opinion in the Kremlin’s favor and, over time, weaken pro-Western governments, particularly in European countries vulnerable to influence. In one high-profile case, intelligence officials tied two consuls in North Macedonia to an alleged Russian propaganda campaign to destabilize a stretch of southeastern Europe.
In Montenegro, Ljubomir Filipovic, a political scientist and former deputy mayor of Budva, said Djukic helped spread chaos and dysfunction in a country that has struggled to establish an identity since it became a sovereign nation in 2006.
“He went beyond what an ordinary honorary consul would do. He went even beyond what an official diplomat would do,” said Filipovic, who tracked Djukic’s activities as consul. “The intention was to damage the social fabric of Montenegro – and he did that.”
Honorary consuls were once deployed primarily by smaller countries unable to afford career diplomats in critical foreign outposts. The arrangement is now used by most of the world’s governments as a way to further their interests in regions where embassies are far away or too costly to maintain.
Under international treaty, honorary consuls receive some of the same privileges and protections provided to career diplomats, including the ability to move consular bags across borders without inspection and maintain archives and correspondence that cannot be searched.
Consuls, however, are widely expected to be unobtrusive advocates, volunteers who focus on cultural and economic ties without proselytizing the political views of the governments they represent. “Apolitical in their words and deeds,” according to guidelines approved by an international association of consuls.
Many consuls fulfill that role honorably: promoting industry, the arts and academia on behalf of their appointing countries; assisting stranded or sick travelers; and helping with visa applications.
But a global investigation led by ProPublica and ICIJ identified at least 500 current and former honorary consuls who have been accused of crimes or become embroiled in controversy, including some who exploited their status for profit, to advance criminal activities or to dodge law enforcement. The scale of the abuse emerged in a review of thousands of pages of court documents, government reports and media accounts from dozens of countries.
Russia, which for decades did not appoint honorary consuls, has increasingly leveraged the system in service of its political agenda. Inside Russia, several of Putin’s closest associates secured their own honorary consul appointments – with the privileges that come with the title – and formed an advocacy group called The League of Honorary Consuls. Outside Russia, the government has appointed honorary consuls on six continents, quadrupling their number to more than 80 in the first decade after Putin took office.
Consuls appointed by the Russian government have denounced Western sanctions and criticized NATO. An American who served as Russia’s honorary consul in Denver traveled to Crimea several years after Russia invaded Ukraine and seized the peninsula. She visited a museum and posed for photos, while the US State Department reported that torture, arbitrary arrests, ethnic violence and corruption were rampant there under Russian rule.
This year, as Russian rockets fell on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, at least two honorary consuls representing Russia spoke out again. “I’m sorry he did not do it sooner,” one consul, Constantine van Vloten in the Netherlands, declared in support of Putin.
A consul in Spain appeared on Russian state television to decry violence he attributed to the “Ukrainian terrorist state.” Before he was named consul, Pedro Mouriño Uzal traveled to Crimea as an independent observer and vouched for the “absolute normality and tranquility” of a 2014 referendum, widely condemned as illegitimate, to incorporate the region into Russia.
Uzal told ProPublica and ICIJ that criticism of the vote was unfounded and that Ukraine has “joined the ranks of terrorist organizations that attack civilian infrastructure and take lives of civilians.” Van Vloten said in a statement that he has no personal relationship with Putin and that he wished the military operation had started sooner “so that it could end sooner the civil war.”
Several of Russia’s honorary consuls quit to protest the invasion. But others have remained in place even as countries in Europe and Asia expelled Russia’s career diplomats.
Illustration: Matt Rota for ProPublica and ICIJ
Though Russia does not release lists of its honorary consuls, ProPublica and ICIJ were able to identify consuls appointed by Russia who have served in at least 45 countries.
One is a hotel and nightclub owner in Mexico whose personal security guard is accused by Mexican officials of meeting at the consul’s properties with leaders of an organized crime gang known as The Russians, according to a 2021 military intelligence report.
Another was a businessman in Equatorial Guinea whom Russia named an honorary consul in 2011 after he was imprisoned for selling cruise missiles – capable of carrying nuclear warheads – to Iran and China. He is no longer a consul and could not be reached for comment. The consul in Mexico did not respond to requests for comment.
In Montenegro, Djukic remained a consul for about four years. In 2018, the government stripped him of his title – reportedly as part of governments’ coordinated response to the poisoning of a former Russian military intelligence officer who had become a British spy (a case unrelated to Djukic). Russian agents were accused of carrying out the attack; Moscow denied any involvement.
Djukic, who did not respond to requests for comment, has denied acting improperly as consul. “I am not a Russian citizen but, as a person who loves Russia, I represented it in the best possible way,” he told local media after Montenegro terminated his diplomatic status.
This year, one day after the invasion of Ukraine, Djukic denounced NATO and praised Putin on social media.
Putin, he wrote between heart emojis, stopped “American domination over the whole world.”
Putin’s Circle
Honorary consuls are nominated by foreign governments but serve at the discretion of their home countries. There are thousands of consuls, though no one has a more precise estimate because dozens of governments don’t publicly release the names of their appointees.
Under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consuls are entitled to a coveted series of benefits that can include special identity cards, passports and license plates. They cannot be prosecuted for crimes committed in the official course of duty and their offices, and correspondence and consular bags are protected from searches.
For decades, what was then the Soviet Union declined to appoint honorary consuls overseas or approve requests by foreign governments that such consuls be welcomed on Soviet soil. Soviet leaders saw honorary consuls as nothing more than “bourgeois spies,” scholar Geoff Berridge wrote in his widely cited book about diplomatic law and practice.
Soon after Putin became president in 2000, however, Russia fully embraced the honorary consul system. The title afforded protections and diplomatic credentials to a new class of well-connected elites.
ProPublica and ICIJ found a who’s who list of Russian power brokers and oligarchs – in mining, steel, gas, oil and banking – who have had honorary consul status.
In 2002, four of Putin’s associates founded the League of Honorary Consuls. Little is publicly known about the group, but Russian government documents show that the league spends donations on the “defense and support” of consuls.
The organization is based in Putin’s hometown of St Petersburg, where he was a leading liaison to foreign diplomats during his rise to national power.
The founders secured their own honorary consul appointments: one from Brazil, another from Bangladesh, a third from Seychelles. Putin himself reportedly recommended that the government of Thailand appoint as consul the fourth organizer, Yury Kovalchuk, an oligarch the U.S. government has called “a personal banker” to Putin and other senior government officials.
In 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear that his government supported the honorary consul system. Meeting with the leaders of some of the smallest countries in the Pacific region at the United Nations in New York, Lavrov announced: “We are actively using the institution of honorary consuls. … I think we should expand the practice.”
ProPublica and ICIJ found that at least nine current and former consuls in Russia have been sanctioned for their reported ties to Putin or for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine. That includes Kovalchuk, whom U.S. authorities blacklisted in 2014 after the Russian invasion of Crimea and again in March after the latest attack on Ukraine.
Kovalchuk did not respond to requests for comment.
Under Putin, Russia also nominated a cadre of its own consuls around the world. Some were Russian expatriates, others influential local magnates of culture and industry.
Russian regulations for honorary consuls in the late 1990s said the volunteer diplomats would promote “friendly relations … the expansion of economic, trade, scientific, cultural and other ties.”
In Montenegro, Djukic went much farther.
‘He’s everywhere’
Born in Podgorica in 1970, Djukic grew up eating his mother’s dumplings and borscht. His father worked for a time as a director of a tobacco factory and later moved to the Soviet Union.
In 1989, with the Soviet bloc unraveling, Djukic went to Moscow. Then 19 and knowing little Russian, he struggled to find his way.
“My first impressions were not very joyful,” he later told a Russian-language newspaper in Montenegro. “It was like being thrown into the past by a time machine.… I ended up in a half-starved Moscow with dirty, broken streets, empty counters, shops without shop windows. People were driving old cars.”
After working for an Austrian trading company, he returned in 1997 to Montenegro and found work as an adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013, Ukraine named him an honorary consul in Montenegro.
Djukic said in an interview at the time that he wanted to give back, helping Ukrainian tourists with visa problems and families with emergencies while on vacation, routine duties of honorary consuls.
“It’s time to give from yourself, to do useful things,” he said.
That consulship ended; Djukic said only that the decision was tied to leadership changes after Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014.
He was soon appointed a consul by Russia, initially maintaining a low profile even as tensions in Montenegro continued to rise.
Yachts in Budva near the former consulate office of Boro Djukic. Photo: Matthew Orr for ProPublica
A country of 620,000, Montegegro had once been part of Yugoslavia and, later, part of a smaller federation with neighboring Serbia. By the time Djukic became consul in 2014, setting up his office near a town square in Budva, Montenegro was an independent nation seeking to become a member of NATO.
That position made Montenegro, with longstanding ties to Moscow and an influx of Russian tourists and investment, a high-stakes battleground between Russia and the West.
In 2016, Montenegrin authorities disrupted an Election Day coup attempt by Russian military intelligence operatives and others who had plotted to overthrow Montenegro’s government and kill its pro-Western prime minister.
Montenegro joined NATO the following year, a move celebrated by political leaders and diplomats as a guarantee against foreign meddling.
“It will never happen again that someone else decides instead of us and our state behind our back, as was the case in the past,” Montenegro’s then-Prime Minister Dusko Markovic said at a ceremony in Washington, DC.
In the US Senate a few weeks later, Senator John McCain, an Arizona Republican, praised Montenegro’s leaders and warned of Putin’s “long-term campaign … to erode any and all resistance to his dark and dangerous view of the world.”
“Every American should be disturbed,” McCain said.
Four months later in October 2017, Djukic took a bold public step.
As honorary consul, he helped organize a trip to Moscow for Marko Milacic, one of Montenegro’s most well-known anti-NATO populist leaders. Milacic had already been convicted for organizing what local media described as an unauthorized protest. Reporting to prison to serve a 20-day sentence, Milacic had paused outside to burn a blue-and-white NATO flag.
In Moscow, according to a subsequent social media post by Milacic, the politician met with Sergei Zheleznyak, a top Putin ally who was under US sanctions for his involvement in the annexation of Crimea.
Two months after the trip, according to records obtained by ProPublica and ICIJ and reporting by local media, Djukic signed the founding documents for True Montenegro, a Kremlin-backed, right-wing political party led by Milacic. Djukic would later acknowledge that the party set up its headquarters at his family home in a Podgorica neighborhood of expansive houses and foreign embassies.
In 2018, shortly after the Montenegrin government removed Djukic as consul, he stood alongside Milacic at a press conference, endorsed True Montenegro and defended his own involvement in politics.
Djukic offered his family home to True Montenegro, the Kremlin-backed political party he helped establish. Photo: Matthew Orr for ProPublica
“If I had several million euros or dollars, I would legally offer them to Mr Milacic,” Djukic told reporters. “Why? Because I like his idea.”
Djukic also commented on Facebook that he had been “persecuted” by NATO. And in an interview with a Russian media outlet, he defended the men behind the attempted coup in 2016, calling one of the plotters a “comrade, friend” and saying there was no conspiracy.
“If there was something like that, I would know for sure,” Djukic told the interviewer. “This is in the same category as everything else that has been done against Russia in recent years. There was no coup d’état. The maximum that could be … someone in a drunken conversation said, ‘Come on, let’s kill someone.’”
Milan Jovanovic, an analyst for a democracy group in Montenegro that tracks disinformation, said Djukic was an influential force. “He went from national Montenegrin to … the closest possible cooperation with Russia,” Jovanovic said.
In a two-bedroom apartment crowded with books about philosophy and religion, Filipovic, the political scientist and former Budva deputy mayor, watched the former consul’s appearance at the True Montenegro press conference. Filipovic took to social media, posting commentary, media reports and photos that Djukic had put on Facebook.
“He went beyond what an ordinary honorary consul would do,” Ljubomir Filipovic, former deputy mayor of Budva, said of Djukic. Photo: Matthew Orr for ProPublica
One photo showed the former consul in a black T-shirt emblazoned with the word “Russian,” his arm around Alexander Zaldostanov, leader of the pro-Kremlin motorcycle gang known as the Night Wolves. The US Treasury Department had previously sanctioned Zaldostanov, whose nickname is “The Surgeon,” accusing him of leading an organization that recruited fighters and committed crimes during the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea. He could not be reached for comment.
In another photo, Djukic brandished a machine gun in front of a wall of rifles, rockets and other military paraphernalia.
Djukic in a photo he posted on Facebook in 2018.
“He’s everywhere,” Filipovic said in a recent interview in a Budva coffee shop overlooking the Adriatic Sea. “It’s sharp power that masquerades as soft power. It’s not the power of attraction. It’s the power of coercion.”
Russia’s reach in Denver
Nearly 6,000 miles away in Colorado, the last remaining honorary consul for Russia in the United States lost her post in March as Russian forces invaded Ukraine.
“Colorado is … severing diplomatic ties with Russia,” Governor Jared Polis, a Democrat, wrote in a letter to the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC, seeking the decertification of honorary consul Deborah Palmieri. “Should at some point the regime change in Russia to one that honors global order … Colorado will reconsider.”
The State Department subsequently withdrew recognition of Palmieri’s consular status, the governor’s office said. The State Department did not respond to questions about Palmieri or the governor’s request.
Russia has nominated a series of American citizens as honorary consuls on US soil. They included the founder of a Russian art museum in Minnesota, the president of a Russian trading firm in Puerto Rico and the former president of St Petersburg College in Florida, who in 2007 penned a newspaper column titled “Putin and Me.”
“Their definition of ‘democracy’ is different than ours,” Carl Kuttler Jr. wrote, calling Putin “perceptive,” “detail oriented” and a “muscular man” with “an amazing intellect.”
In an interview, Kuttler, who is no longer an honorary consul, said his work included trade, education and helping Americans with adoptions and that he “never was asked to participate in anything but the most ethical of ventures.”
In 2016, the State Department revoked the status of all but one of the Russian-appointed consuls in the United States after reports that Russian intelligence officers were harassing US diplomats in Moscow. Only Palmieri stayed on.
Before she was appointed consul in 2007, Palmieri publicly supported Putin, writing in a publication for the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce that he was achieving democracy “at his own pace.”
As consul, she worked out of a downtown Denver rowhouse, with photos of the Kremlin and Red Square in the dining room, and promoted the Deb Palmieri Russia Institute, a provider of training to businesses seeking to enter the Russian market. Her website, which is no longer active, noted that she had worked with hundreds of US and Russian companies, including Aeroflot, Russia’s state airline.
After Russia sent troops into Crimea in 2014, Colorado lawyer Olena Ruth, who was born in Kyiv, organized a rally in support of Ukraine and marched with scores of others to the consulate.
“She was just ignoring the Ukrainian question,” Ruth said in a recent interview. “Nobody wanted to have her presence here.”
Three years later, Palmieri was among a group of Americans who toured annexed Crimea, visiting a local university and a museum and posing for photos. On her website, Palmieri described the trip as a “fact-finding visit.”
Rusty Butler, a retired college administrator and former honorary consul for Russia in Utah, when told by reporters about Palmieri’s 2017 visit expressed surprise: “She was a participant in the trip? I can’t wrap my head around seeing myself in that role.”
Palmieri in an undated photo Credit:Obtained by ProPublica and ICIJ
Palmieri, whose website included an undated picture of herself greeting Putin, has kept a low profile since she lost the consul post and did not respond to emails and calls seeking comment.
A retired Colorado federal bankruptcy judge, Sid Brooks, who once helped train Russian judges about independent judiciaries, said he knew Palmieri from events at the consulate. Brooks said he stepped back from his own work in Russia in recent years because of Putin’s policies.
“I don’t know what triggered the [removal] of Deb Palmieri as honorary consul, but as far as I’m concerned, that’s just fine,” Brooks said. “I always thought it was a little bit curious that [as consul] she seemed to continue her efforts to promote exchanges.”
‘Intelligence bases’
In North Macedonia, another fragile Balkan democracy, honorary consul Sergej Samsonenko became one of the most visible promoters of the Kremlin.
A Russian-born entrepreneur who made millions as the founder of an international sports betting company, Samsonenko built a four-star hotel in the capital that he called Hotel Russia and helped fund a landmark Russian Orthodox church that, according to local media, an archbishop described as a “part of the Russian soul on Macedonian soil.”
Illustration: Matt Rota for ProPublica and ICIJ
In 2016, Samsonenko was named honorary consul for Russia. He set up his consulate in Bitola, an ancient trading hub near the Greek border that had served as a cultural and political junction under the Ottoman Empire, earning the nickname “City of Consuls.”
In 2017, a North Macedonian intelligence report found that the consulate offices in Bitola and in the lakeside city of Ohrid represented “intelligence bases” used by Russia as part of an alleged propaganda campaign aimed at creating conflict in the Balkans and isolating countries like North Macedonia from the West.
“Performing intelligence activities from diplomatic consular missions is a widely used method of the Russian Federation … from which they are collecting, processing, analyzing and distributing information,” noted the report, first obtained by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.
The report also described Samsonenko’s financing of the Russian church, saying “religious influence [of the Russian Federation] is an important segment of the Russian strategy.”
Illustration: Matt Rota for ProPublica and ICIJ
North Macedonia joined NATO in 2020. This past summer, the government withdrew its approval of Samsonenko’s honorary consul position.
Samsonenko declined to comment to ProPublica and ICIJ beyond dismissing reports about him as “lies and slander.” He has previously denied using his diplomatic status to support Russian intelligence operations.
“I am not a political person, I am an honorary consul of Russia and I should support the politics of my home country,” Samsonenko told the Macedonidan magazine Fokus in 2019.
He added, “Of everything written about me … one of the many lies [is] that there is a spy center in Bitola, in my consulate.”
A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson previously called Samsonenko’s dismissal “yet another politically charged gesture.”
Lingering divisions
In early fall, four years after Djukic lost his honorary consul post in Montenegro, red and white election posters promoting the True Montenegro political party that he co-founded lined a busy mountain pass connecting the capital to Budva.
Filipovic, the former deputy mayor, said he fears that pro-Russian interests will drive his country of birth back to the Kremlin. In September, authorities expelled six Russian diplomats in Montenegro who were suspected of espionage.
Filipovic said he blames Djukic and others for helping to fuel the unrest that has roiled the country.
“The honorary consul position gave him stature. It gave him a position in society,” Filipovic said. “He was an agent of Russian influence.”
Djukic has regularly posted on social media, sharing photos and comments about his love for Putin, Russian religious orthodoxy and his former position as honorary consul.
In July, he reposted a pro-Russia video that circulated on social media. “Beautiful women.… No cancel culture.… Economy that can withstand thousands of sanctions,” the narrator proclaimed. “Time to move to Russia.”
A few days later, Djukic also posted a red and white image of the Kremlin and “First Honorary Consul of the Russian Federation in Montenegro” written above it in Russian.
In his post, he included three words: “JOY. JOY. JOY.”
Debbie Cenziper reports for ProPublica; Will Fitzgibbon, for the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists; and Eva Herscowitz, Hannah Feuer and Michael Korsh, for the Medill Investigative Lab. Sign up for The Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox.
asiatimes.com · by ProPublica and ICIJ · January 2, 2023
11. Taiwan counts on military conscription reform to deter China invasion
It is not only that the training falls short. If the Taiwan people do not support this it is not going to have the effect of unconventional deterrence. The population must show a willingness to resist and demonstrate their resilience. But if the people are unwilling to commit a year to this the CHina will assess that the will to resist is low.
Taiwan counts on military conscription reform to deter China invasion
Plan to extend compulsory training falls short of what is needed, experts warn
Financial Times · by Kathrin Hille · January 2, 2023
A low-key US military delegation arrived in Taiwan last month to assess its army, navy and air force and explore what the country’s armed services could gain from closer co-operation with Washington.
The visit’s aims were the same as Taipei’s high-profile announcement last week that it was lengthening conscription: to strengthen Taiwan’s defences enough to deter China from attempting an invasion.
The People’s Republic of China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory, has threatened to use force to bring the island under its control since the ruling Chinese Communist party’s Nationalist civil war adversaries fled there in 1949. But only over the past few years has that threat become a real concern for Taiwan and the US, the guarantor of its security.
“Not only has the People’s Liberation Army a lot more advanced weapons, [but] we also see them single-mindedly focused on acquiring all the skills they need to take Taiwan,” said a US official in Asia. “In that situation, if you are Taiwan, you have to face up to it and get ready fast.”
China’s more than two-decade push to build armed forces capable of realising its national ambitions has left Taiwan’s military dangerously outgunned. Last year, Beijing spent $270bn on its military, more than 21 times more than Taipei, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a non-profit conflict research organisation.
The PLA has used that spending spree to assemble a naval fleet that now outnumbers that of the US, field new fighter jets at increasing speed and develop missiles that aim to put US air force bases in the Pacific and even large warships at risk.
As alarm grows over the increasing frequency, scope and sophistication of the PLA’s operations near Taiwan and Beijing’s more belligerent tone, Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen has devoted much more attention and resources to defence than any of her predecessors.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been an additional catalyst for long-delayed military reforms. On Tuesday, Tsai announced plans to resurrect year-long mandatory military service for men from 2024, a decade after a previous government slashed conscription to an almost meaningless four months, as well as boosting conscript pay and upgrading their training.
Taiwan’s government has announced plans to upgrade its military training, but it still lags far behind China’s PLA in strength and sophistication © Eyepress/Reuters
Yet military experts warned that the measures could fall far short of what is needed.
“They are basically going back to what was in place in 2008, before the force reductions started,” said Kitsch Liao, military and cyber affairs consultant for Doublethink Lab, a Taipei-based civil society group. “While you have to give the president credit for reviving that system, they are not addressing the problem of military power, which is the core of deterrence.”
Military analysts said the conscription reform was little more than an emergency measure to end a chronic shortfall in military headcount, which an earlier attempted transition to an all-volunteer force could not achieve.
The defence ministry has pledged to implement an overhauled training regimen, including dropping bayonet training — ridiculed by many conscripts as useless and a symbol of the weak state of the force. Instead, young recruits will be put through modern US-designed modules, including for weapons such as Stinger or Javelin missiles.
But the new programme was initially devised for Taiwan’s nominally large if almost entirely dysfunctional reserve force. Foreign observers and local defence experts also expressed concerns that the sudden inflow of conscripts would result in severe training bottlenecks.
“How are you going to ensure all that if you suddenly get that many more people coming through?” Liao said. “That raises concerns that people will again have to wait many months until it’s their turn.”
Apart from whether Tsai’s government can deliver its ambitious reform plans, military experts have also warned that much bigger strategic issues remain unsolved.
“I have long urged them to build a territorial defence force, a force which could operate as an urban guerrilla under a more decentralised command, but it is very clear from this plan that they do not want to adopt that concept,” said Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, former chief of the general staff of Taiwan’s armed forces. “This also means that they are not embracing the example of Ukraine or the Baltic states.”
Under Lee’s “Overall Defense Concept”, Taiwan’s military would have adopted an asymmetric strategy, abandoning keeping up with China in air or naval power and focusing instead on building capabilities that could exploit the weaknesses of an invading force, such as guerrilla warfare. But after Lee retired in July 2019, the concept was watered down.
“Our armed forces now continue to operate with traditional warfighting concepts and without clearly communicating a new strategy to the public,” said another retired general.
The US delegation observed a similar problem, according to people familiar with the matter. “They saw that our military is proficient on the tactical level, but lacks strategic thinking capabilities,” said one person briefed on the matter.
Insiders argued Taipei was on the right track, however late. “Tsai has made the difficult and big move to tell the public things need to change and an all-of-society effort is needed to defend their homeland,” said the US official. “There will be more progress from here.”
Financial Times · by Kathrin Hille · January 2, 2023
12. In Taiwan, an activist's release from prison has sparked debate on how to deter China
In Taiwan, an activist's release from prison has sparked debate on how to deter China
January 1, 20236:55 AM ET
https://www.npr.org/2023/01/01/1146485942/in-taiwan-an-activists-release-from-prison-has-sparked-discussion-on-how-to-dete
Heard on Weekend Edition Sunday
EMILY FENGipt
For decades, Taiwan residents have accepted Washington's deliberately ambiguous stance towards the island. But Chinese aggression is causing people there to demand stronger security commitments.
EMILY FENG, HOST:
I recently made a reporting trip to Taiwan, where I was struck by how attitudes there are hardening towards the island's much larger neighbor, China. That's led to a public debate over some basic assumptions underpinning Taiwan's relationship with China and the U.S. I tried to understand this shift and its potentially life-or-death implications. One of the people I spoke to about this was Taiwanese activist and social worker Li Ming-che. He survived five years in a Chinese prison, he says through resistance by rallying support from the outside and from his wife.
LI MING-CHE: (Through interpreter) She decided to carve a message of support on her own arms so that all she had to do was raise her hands for me to see it at my trial.
FENG: She had tattooed, I am proud of you on her forearms.
LI: (Through interpreter) This was the one thing the Chinese Communist Party could not take away.
FENG: In April, Lee was released, a free man. And his story has resonated across Taiwan, sparking a fierce discussion on what Taiwan can do to deter China.
WANG TING-YU: Allies like this need to provide clear signal to the decision maker, the only one, Xi Jinping.
FENG: This is Taiwanese lawmaker Wang Ting-yu. He's on the island's Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee and is a member of the ruling party. He's also been sanctioned by China.
WANG: If you launch a military action toward Taiwan or India or South China Sea or Japan, we will fight. That red line maybe can postpone or deter the war itself.
FENG: In other words, Wang wants to deter China. But historically, analysts feared an explicit U.S. defense commitment would provoke China into invading Taiwan. That's why the U.S. has an official policy of strategic ambiguity. The U.S. will help Taiwan with defense, but it won't commit to sending soldiers itself. It's an idea that has kept the peace in the region for more than 40 years. But support for this deliberate lack of clarity is wavering. President Biden has repeatedly made comments this year hinting that the U.S. might actually defend the island.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER: Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?
PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER: You are?
BIDEN: That's the commitment we made.
FENG: The White House quickly clarified its policy of strategic ambiguity has not changed. But Biden's comment set off a debate in Taiwan about whether ditching ambiguity is helpful or reckless.
LEV NACHMAN: And there is unending disagreement about which is correct.
FENG: This is Lev Nachman. He's a political scientist at National Chengchi University in Taipei. He notes it's not just Li Ming-che's experience but China's broader autocratic behavior that's driving the Taiwanese further away.
NACHMAN: And collectively, these things have kind of, I would say, led civil society to feel much more strongly about the idea of defending Taiwanese sovereignty.
FENG: But taking a more aggressive stance is a huge gamble. And the survival of Taiwan may hang in the balance.
NACHMAN: I think for some people, they see it as high risk, high reward, where if they do declare strategic clarity and there is no conflict, then that is an equivalent of calling part of China's bluff. The other side says, yes, it's high risk, meaning that if you do declare strategic clarity and it leads to conflict, then that is in part our doing.
FENG: The problem is the U.S. and China don't really know what the other country is planning, and that means two superpowers are facing each other down in a game of deterrence with Taiwan's fate at stake and with only assumptions about the other's intentions.
(SOUNDBITE OF TORTOISE'S "TEN-DAY INTERVAL")
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13. Delta Force operator breaks silence on how Saddam Hussein was captured
Delta Force operator breaks silence on how Saddam Hussein was captured
‘A big Texan nails him in the mouth, knocks him down’: Delta Force operator breaks silence after 20 years to reveal how Saddam Hussein was captured - and reveals he said ‘President Bush sends his regards’
- Appearing on a podcast last month, Kevin Holland spoke about Hussein's December 13, 2003 arrest - the first time an American has done so in 19 years
- The only known soldier to serve in both the Navy's elite SEAL Team 6 and the Army equivalent Delta Force, Holland the offered the never-before heard details
- The accounts comes nearly two decades after the most recent official statement on the dictator's capture, before his eventual execution by hanging in 2006
- Holland - who left the SEALS in 1999 only to join the Army after 9/11 - said after restraining the prisoner, they told him, ‘President Bush sends his regards’
By ALEX HAMMER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM
PUBLISHED: 14:58 EST, 1 January 2023 | UPDATED: 18:04 EST, 1 January 2023
Daily Mail · by Alex Hammer For Dailymail.Com · January 1, 2023
A former member of the Army's secretive Delta Force - which pulled Saddam Hussein out of his underground hideout in 2003 - has finally provided a firsthand account of the dictator's capture.
Appearing on a podcast last month, retired Army Master Sergeant Kevin Holland spoke about Hussein's December 13, 2003 arrest - the first time an American has done so in nearly 20 years.
The only known soldier to serve in both the Navy's elite SEAL Team 6 and the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, Holland then offered never-before heard details to former Navy SEAL Jack Carr on his program Danger Close.
Speaking surprisingly candidly to his fellow serviceman when questioned about the high profile incident, Holland revealed how he and his brothers-in-arms came to find the eight-foot hole, and how they found a haggard Hussein armed with a gun inside.
Holland - a 20 year vet who left the SEALS in 1999 only to join the Army after the attacks on the World Trade Center - said that at a point, after restraining the prisoner, they told him, 'President Bush sends his regards.'
Scroll down for video:
SEAL 6 vet Kevin Holland appeared alongside fellow north Carolina Daniel Winkler - a knifemaker Holland is collaborating with on a new tactical blade - the soldier broke his silence
Holland, seen on the far left in the December 2003 photo, revealed how he and his brother's and arms came to find the eight-foot-deep hole, and how they found a haggard Hussein armed with a gun inside
The accounts comes nearly two decades after the most recent official statement on the dictator's capture, before his eventual execution by hanging in 2006.
Appearing alongside fellow North Carolina Daniel Winkler - a knifemaker Holland is collaborating with on a new tactical blade - the storied soldier broke his silence on the arrest, which came into question last year when an Iraqi interpreter who worked with the US military refuted claims that Hussein was hiding at the time of his arrest.
The trio began their discussion by speaking about Holland and Winkler's origins and how they came to know each other - before turning to Holland's 20-year military career.
Holland described how he came to join the SEALS out of high school when he saw a Parade magazine that showed the special operations force on a supposed mission 'all covered in mud.'
'I always grew up on John Wayne, and watching Green Berets, and all that, and wanted to be a Green Beret, and read First Blood, of course,' Holland said, noting that main character Rambo carried 'a 30/30 [Winchester Rifle],' the gun he used to hunt game as a teen in the foothills of North Carolina.
'That’s what I grew up with and so his background was a green beret, and that’s what I wanted to be.'
Eventually, after seeing how limited the requirements were for joining other services such as the Army, Holland said he decided to join the SEALS, and eventually joined the hallowed 6 Team. Before the War in Iraq broke out in 2003, he transferred to the Army's equivalent, the Delta Force.
The only known soldier to serve in both the Navy's elite SEAL Team 6 and the Army equivalent Delta Force, Holland - seen at left - described how soldiers posed for pictures with the deposed dictator, who said exuded an 'evil presence'
The conversation then turned to Hussein, with Carr approaching the subject somewhat carefully, seemingly anticipating that Holland would - and likely could - not elaborate.
'I don’t know if we can talk about it or not – we’ll edit it out,’ Carr said, before asking the serviceman about the 2003 mission in the small agricultural town of Ad-Dawr, where Hussein was holed up.
Holland responded by describing in painstaking detail how they received 'human intel' regarding the then deposed dictator's location, and eventually found a haggard Hussein in a small hideout near a farm.
The farm was set in a deserted expanse lined with only one road, Holland said, where Iraqis loyal to Hussein would station themselves to notify them of any approaching forces.
After being well received, Carr started the sensitive exchange by asking how Holland and his team came to spot the small hole, which was masked with brush and dirt and a large layer of Styrofoam underneath.
Holland described in painstaking detail how they received 'human intel' regarding the then deposed dictator's location, and found a haggard Hussein in a small hideout near a farm
'Mhm. Oh yeah,' Holland said, as if remembering an old, familiar memory.
'Yeah, well, we had some human intel that showed us exactly where it was at,' Holland said.
When his team found the obscured spot mentioned by the informant, 'we just brushed it away,' said Holland.
'They had a big Styrofoam plug, you know, that they would put in there and then cover it with leaves and dirt, sand, and it had a pipe for air – we had noticed it when we cleared it. Just dug it away, pulled it up, and sand fell in.
'And in goes a banger,' the soldier then laughed, revealing how soldiers first cleared the hole with a well-placed grenade.
Holland then revealed that once the dust cleared, his team came face to face with a pit encased in brick, too dark to see inside with the naked eye - and eventually Hussein.
Holland, pictured in 2003 with fellow Delta Force members in Iraq, revealed that Hussein was armed, and that the gun, a Glock-15, is now in the possession of ex-President George W. Bush
'We had lights on our guns, when you looked in it, you could tell – you could see bricks, you know, where they bricked it up,' Holland recalled.
'We know it’s something. And the guys says he’s in there.'
Soldiers then attempted to flush out the subterranean lair with a dog, but, according to Holland, the animal was too scared to enter.
'So, finally, once he pulls the dogs back, we start hearing somebody talk in Arabic, and the interpreter starts talking back,' Holland continues.
'And it’s like, someone’s coming - the voice is getting closer, you can tell. The sound, it’s getting closer.'
He then detailed how, suddenly, 'hands come out of the hole, and then a big bushy head of hair.'
Holland - - a 20 year vet who left the SEALS in 1999 only to join the army after the attacks on the World Trade Center - said the gun is now in the possession of President George W. Bush
'We grab him and jerk him out, and it’s like, 'that's him,' Holland told both Carr and Winkler, who appeared in awe of the soldier's impromptu story.
Holland added how one of the larger soldiers helped him pull Hussein out of the eight-foot-deep hole.
The serviceman described the awe he felt when his fellow soldier helped him hoist Hussein out, remarking, 'it was 'like, "Holy cow, it’s him."'
Holland went on to describe how Hussein, then 66, had been armed with a handgun - causing one of his fellow soldiers, whom he referred to only as 'a Big Texan,' to hit the Iraqi despot in the mouth.
'Then, a big Texan nails him in the mouth, knocks him down – cause he’s got a gun, he’s armed. So we had to make sure that he couldn’t get to that gun.'
Holland then remarked how the gun was a 'fully automatic Glock- 15 - and how it is now in the possession of former US President George W. Bush.
Holland added that at a point, after restraining the bloodied prisoner, they tauntingly told him, ‘President Bush sends his regards’
'Bush has that now,' Holland said, before providing more detail on how Hussein acted during his capture.
'He was pretty beatdown,' he recalled. 'He just said he was the president of Iraq and that he’s ready to negotiate, and he said that in English. And we’re like, "That time’s passed, brother."'
Holland added that after restraining the prisoner, the soldiers told him that the then president 'sends his regards.'
He then described how he, himself, descended in the underground den after one of his fellow soldiers failed to fit in the small, now exposed opening.
'So he jumps out, I jump in,' Holland said. 'I got my .45, and look down, and I got my flashlight.' At that point, the soldier that the underground hideout had multiple pathways and blind corners.
'So, I’m like, give me another pistol,' Holland said. 'And so the guy hands me down a Glock, with a light on it.'
'He was pretty beatdown,' he recalled. 'He just said he was the president of Iraq and that he’s ready to negotiate, and he said that in English. And we’re like, "That time’s passed, brother"'
After clearing one corner, Holland said he immediately found himself in a small area that Hussein likely had used when hiding in the cavern.
'It was just enough room, a six foot area, for a guys to lay down, and he had a little bench he could sit on,' the serviceman said.
In regard to how low the ceilings in the underground room were, Holland said: 'You could stand and your head would stick out of the hole.'
The soldier added, however, that despite the lack of standing room, Hussein's hideout was surprisingly habitable.
'Yeah, I mean, it was nice,' he said. 'You go down, and it’s brick, and the ceilings got beams, and it’s parched, and there’s cement on top of him. It was dry and it had a fan in there, a little white fan that you saw in the video. It was on Fox News.'
He went on: So I clear it, got the camera, took a video of the thing, and I’m talking and telling what it all looks like, and then I lay down to see if I can lay down in here, and my boots are sticking out - you can see it in the video.'
Hussein (bottom) complained of cuts and bruises from his capture in 2003, during which members of Holland's team posed for photos after disarming the dictator - who is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqis
When asked how Hussein survived holed up in a hole for so long, Holland revealed the dictator 'was never in there for any extended period.'
'Oh yeah... he'd get out,' he told Carr. 'They had crows all up and down the road who would notify him .
He added that the Sunni Muslim politicians also had two guards who doubled as cooks, who were captured in the nearby hut.
'He would be in the hut all day, and then if we came down that road, they would jump in there, cover him up,' Holland said. 'That’s how it happened.'
Holland then described how they transported the embattled leader by helicopter to a military base in Tikrit, and then eventually to the country's capital of Baghdad to be imprisoned by the new government.
'They took him on a little bird and flew back to Tikrit into the palace, and we got back up there - myself, and then another guy, and the commander flew into Baghdad.'
Hussein's regime fell in 2003, the year he was captured. The dictator was executed three years later, by hanging, for crimes against humanity
Holland then offered a rare glimpse into the demeanor of the dictator at the time, after going into hiding for more than five months after the US declared war on the country.
'And that’s when you could feel he was just an evil guy,' Holland said. 'He had this presence about him that was very unnerving.'
He added that after realizing he was not going to be killed, the despot - who between 1983 and 1988 alone murdered more than 30,000 Iraqis with mustard and nerve gas - gave off the impression that 'he was back in charge.'
While being restrained, according to Holland, the dictator would like, reach up - we had him by the beard – and pat your hand every now and then.
'Another guy had him by the back of the head, and shake his head back and forth to make him quit touching us.'
The deposed dictator was said to be arrogant at first but slowly revealed he knew little about what his regime was up to, as he spent his time away from governance
When Carr asked why he thinks that was, Holland said: I don’t know. We had a good grip on him. He wasn’t jumping out of the helicopter, he wasn’t hurting nobody in the helicopter – we had him.
'But he would just reach up and touch my hand.'
Carr asked: 'So you could just feel this evil presence?' - to which Holland replied: 'Yeah, he was just not a good dude.'
When asked if members of his team felt the same sensation when in the presence of the late political figure, Holland replied: Yeah, everybody.
'And nobody really wanted to hang out with him,' he added, in reference to the widely seen photos of himself and other members of his outfit snapping pictures with Hussein.
'He had an air of – once he knew he wasn’t being killed, he was back in charge, and he had that air about him,' Holland eventually remarked.
'He was just – he had a presence. I don’t know what it was. A presence of evil.'
Afterwards, Holland completed his tour in Baghdad, after which he completed the 8-month Special Forces Qualification Course (Q Course) to become a Green Beret.
Overall, Holland was deployed 20 times to the Middle East, conducting over 2000 missions. He retired from the SEALS in 1999, but after 9/11, was encouraged to reenter the service. He now lives with his wife, stepdaughters, and his younger son in North Carolina
The year prior, Holland found himself badly wounded, after being stuck by a piece shrapnel after an IED explosion behind his vehicle. The incident saw one of his fellow Delta Force members killed.
Overall, Holland was deployed 20 times to the Middle East, conducting over 2000 missions. He retired from the SEALS in 1999, but after 9/11, was encouraged to reenter the service.
After completing his special services certification in 2005, Holland - then ascending to the post of master sergeant - served as an assaulter with the Delta Force for roughly ten years.
In 2011, he again found himself injured, with his arm paralyzed after being shot by an insurgent in Afghanistan. He spent the rest of his military career rehabbing the injury, before retiring from the service in 2013.
He now lives with his wife, stepdaughters, and his younger son in North Carolina, not far from the small town where he grew up. His oldest son, Connor, now carries on his accomplished father's legacy, as as a member of the Green Berets.
Holland's expertise as a military operator, as well as a skilled outdoorsman, has since seen him venture into the world in professional knifemaking, recently designing a $350 blade with Winkler.
The blade, like its creator, is not only effective in tactical environments, but can provide utility when necessary. DailyMail.com reached out to Holland for comment Sunday regarding his account of Hussein's capture.
The bombshell account contradicts a previous account about Hussein's arrest provided last yearby Iraqi interpreter who worked with the US military.
At the time, interpreter, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons, stressed he wanted the world to know that Hussein was not in an underground den but in a room, and had most likely been praying as he was wearing a traditional Arab robe.
He claimed the notion provided by the Pentagon that he was cowering in a pit at the time of his arrest was fabricated. The Biden Administration has yet to comment on those claims.
Daily Mail · by Alex Hammer For Dailymail.Com · January 1, 2023
14. Return of Big War: Military expert on why the invasion of Ukraine will change conflicts to come
Excerpts:
The former British Army brigadier said Ukraine was more like major wars such as the Korean War, the Bosnian conflict or the Iran-Iraq War than a smaller-scale “special military operation” as it was initially described by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Strategists in the UK and the US have been too preoccupied with counterinsurgency involving campaigns of unconventional, irregular and special operations warfare in countries such as Afghanistan but Ukraine has shifted the focus, Barry said.
He said: “Big War is back. Perhaps the most important facet of the war is that what was planned as a short ‘special military operation’ against an inferior enemy has turned into a large-scale conflict between states in which prolonged fighting has been at a high intensity and over a wide geographical area.
“Both sides in Ukraine are finding it much more difficult to prevail than the US did against the Taliban in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 where it took little more than a month to accomplish regime change.
Return of Big War: Military expert on why the invasion of Ukraine will change conflicts to come
sundaypost.com · by Stephen Stewart
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests “big war is back” with large-scale conflict between nations likely to shape world politics for years to come, according to a military expert.
Ben Barry, senior fellow for land warfare at the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies thinktank, said the conflict had transformed contemporary warfare.
The former British Army brigadier said Ukraine was more like major wars such as the Korean War, the Bosnian conflict or the Iran-Iraq War than a smaller-scale “special military operation” as it was initially described by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Strategists in the UK and the US have been too preoccupied with counterinsurgency involving campaigns of unconventional, irregular and special operations warfare in countries such as Afghanistan but Ukraine has shifted the focus, Barry said.
He said: “Big War is back. Perhaps the most important facet of the war is that what was planned as a short ‘special military operation’ against an inferior enemy has turned into a large-scale conflict between states in which prolonged fighting has been at a high intensity and over a wide geographical area.
“Both sides in Ukraine are finding it much more difficult to prevail than the US did against the Taliban in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 where it took little more than a month to accomplish regime change.
“This war might be more like the wars in Korea from 1950-53, Bosnia in 1992-95 and between Iran and Iraq from 1980-88. Its outcome, military dynamics and lessons will have a significant influence on global military thinking and planning as defence ministries contemplate possible future wars.”
Russia must face long-term consequences for Ukraine, says Wallace
Barry is a visiting professor at the department of war studies at King’s College London. His most recent book is Blood, Metal And Dust: How Victory Turned Into Defeat In Afghanistan And Iraq.
He said British troops must relearn the art of camouflage and concealment as Ukraine’s drone war has revealed the “transparency” of the modern battlefield while both Russia and Ukraine prepared for heavy fighting in the new year.
He said: “The lesson is that UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and drones are now key capabilities for land forces. This adds a degree of land-air integration to the lowest tactical levels, right down to company and platoon level, that was not achievable in earlier wars including the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
“This also means that counter-drone capabilities are similarly required by land forces, including at the lowest tactical level.
“The threat from both UAVs and civilian and military satellite reconnaissance will require US and Nato forces to rediscover the art of camouflage, concealment and deception, which has been lost in recent decades.”
Barry, who also commanded an armoured infantry battalion and a multinational brigade on UN and Nato operations in Bosnia, said Russia and Ukraine were generating fresh forces for a renewal of heavy fighting in 2023. He added: “Ukraine is seeking to field new armoured and mechanised brigades and to integrate the Western equipment it is receiving.
“Its defence chief has openly spoken of moving to a strategic counter-offensive in the medium term. Russia is preparing defensive belts of anti-tank obstacles, minefields and hedgehog positions and at road junctions.
“It is integrating its recently mobilised soldiers and may be continuing to build fresh units and formations. Given the attrition it has suffered this year, it may well refrain from major offensive operations until the spring.”
Barry – who was director of the British Army Staff in the Ministry of Defence and author of the Army’s analysis of post-conflict stabilisation of Iraq – said the tempo of combat in winter could drop but the possibility of lasting peace was still remote.
He said: “Both sides will probably continue to attack each other’s depth with rocket artillery and drone strikes.
“Russia will continue to strike Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and energy installations to pressure Ukrainian civilians – although every cruise missile fired at a transformer is one not fired at a military target.
“The winter weather will reduce both sides’ ability to gain images from satellites and drones. Ukraine will continue to use special forces, partisans and precision missiles, particularly the guided rockets fired from HIMARS launchers to attack key Russian positions, logistic networks and installations, although the weather will reduce the tempo of Ukrainian fighters operating behind Russian lines.
“Both sides will probably continue to skirmish for key terrain, at lower tempo.
“Major Ukrainian tactical counter-offensives are still possible over the winter months. There are a wide variety of operational designs they could use and both will seek to continue to disrupt each other’s plans.
“Both sides in this war have votes and may well choose to cast them over the winter months to seek advantage over each other. This may result in reaction and counter-reaction dynamics. Bouts of heavy fighting before the spring are quite possible.”
Year ends with Russian drones and missiles raining down on Ukraine
Russia launched a fresh missile attack on Ukraine yesterday with explosions throughout the country.
Kyiv’s mayor Vitali Klitschko said at least one person had been killed and 20 wounded, including a journalist from Japan, after a series of explosions in the capital. A hotel, two schools and a nursery were damaged by the attack.
People were also injured in drone and missile attacks in the cities of Mykolaiv and Khmelnytskyi. Russia launched 20 cruise missiles over Ukraine, of which 12 were successfully shot down, according to Ukrainian military chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
First Lady Olena Zelenska expressed outrage at the attacks just before New Year’s Eve celebrations. “Ruining lives of others is a disgusting habit of our neighbours,” she said.
It was also reported yesterday that Russian troops in Ukraine will be exempt from paying income tax in a bid to encourage support for the occupation.
sundaypost.com · by Stephen Stewart
15. China is preparing for war, retired general warns
China is preparing for war, retired general warns
Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · January 1, 2023
China is preparing its military for war over Taiwan, warned retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former national security adviser, H.R. McMaster.
Relations between China and Taiwan have long been strained over the island's push for independence, but have grown even more tense amid increasingly aggressive Chinese leadership. Although Taiwan considers itself independent of China—and is recognized as a semi-autonomous state—China has claimed it as its own and views control of the island as essential to its policy of reunification.
Amid growing tensions, McMaster said he believes China could be gearing up for military action to take control of the island nation during an appearance on CBS News' Face the Nation on Sunday—adding that Chinese President Xi Jinping, who secured a historic third term last year, has made it clear he plans to retake Taiwan.
"Xi Jinping has made it quite clear, in his statements, that he is going to make, from his perspective, China whole again by subsuming Taiwan," McMaster said. "And preparations are underway."
Former Trump administration National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster says China's president is serious about his threats involving Taiwan: "Xi Jinping is preparing the Chinese people for war." pic.twitter.com/6wfOuhtG9x
— Face The Nation (@FaceTheNation) January 1, 2023
McMaster said the best way to prevent a widescale military war over Taiwan is "deterrence," adding that the United States, which already spends more than $1.6 trillion on defense, should invest even more in national security because it would be "much more costly" to respond to a war with China, which boasts one of the strongest militaries across the globe and continues to seek to grow its influence in the Pacific region.
"China has become increasingly aggressive, not only from an economic and financial perspective and a wolf warrior diplomacy perspective, but physically, with its military," McMaster said. "And what's really disturbing is, I think, Xi Jinping is preparing the Chinese people for war."
He pointed to some of Xi's speeches, which have taken on a hardline tone in recent months, as evidence that the U.S. should take the threat of war more seriously and "extend our power." Doing so would also compel allies to invest more in their national defense, which would further serve as a deterrent, he added.
He said the U.S. and its allies need to "be careful not to mirror image" or "fall into the same traps" they did with Russia, which launched an invasion of Ukraine last February.
Chinese President Xi Jinping is seen, inset, former national security adviser and retired U.S. Army lieutenant general H.R. McMaster. McMaster, during an appearance on CBS News Sunday, warned that China is preparing for war over control of Taiwan. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images; Kevin Dietsch-Pool/Getty Images
McMaster's warning follows other indications that China may be considering a war over Taiwan. In November, The Guardian reported that Xi told his military to "focus all its energy on fighting" to prepare for a potential war.
"Focus all [your] energy on fighting, work hard on fighting and improve [your] capability to win," he reportedly said.
China-Taiwan relations flared last August after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made a historic visit to Taiwan. At the time, Beijing made several threats against her visit and launched military drills around the island, leading to concerns that the conflict could escalate.
Newsweek reached out to the Department of State for comment.
Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · January 1, 2023
16. All Is Not Quiet on the Eastern Front
All Is Not Quiet on the Eastern Front
2022 was the year in which war made a comeback. But Cold War II could become World War III in 2023 — with China as the arsenal of democracy.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-01/victory-over-russia-in-ukraine-may-bring-world-war-3-niall-ferguson?sref=hhjZtX76
War is hell on earth — and if you doubt it, visit Ukraine or watch Edward Berger’s All Quiet on the Western Front, Netflix’s gut-wrenching new adaptation of Erich Maria Remarque’s classic antiwar novel of 1929.
Even a small war is hellish for those caught up in it, of course. But a world war is the worst thing we humans have ever done to one another. In a memorable essay published last month, Henry Kissinger reflected on “How to Avoid Another World War.” In 1914, “The nations of Europe, insufficiently familiar with how technology had enhanced their respective military forces, proceeded to inflict unprecedented devastation on one another.” Then, after two years of industrialized slaughter, “the principal combatants in the West (Britain, France and Germany) began to explore prospects for ending the carnage.” Even with US intermediation, the effort failed.
Kissinger posed an important question: “Does the world today find itself at a comparable turning point [like the opportunity for peace in 1916] in Ukraine as winter imposes a pause on large-scale military operations there?” This time last year, I predicted that Russia would invade Ukraine. The question one year later is whether there is a way to end this war, or whether it is destined to grow into something much larger.
As Kissinger rightly points out, two nuclear-armed powers are currently contesting the fate of Ukraine. One side, Russia, is directly engaged in conventional warfare. However, the US and its allies are fighting indirectly by providing Ukraine with what Alex Karp, chief executive of Palantir Technologies Inc., calls “the power of advanced algorithmic warfare systems.” These are now so potent, he recently told the Washington Post’s David Ignatius, that they “equate to having tactical nuclear weapons against an adversary with only conventional ones.” Take a moment to ponder the implications of that.
War is back. Could world war also make a comeback? If so, it will affect all of our lives. In the second interwar era (1991-2019), we lost sight of the role of war in the global economy. Because the wars of that time were small (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq), we forgot that war is history’s favorite driver of inflation, debt defaults — even famines. That is because large-scale war is simultaneously destructive of productive capacity, disruptive of trade, and destabilizing of fiscal and monetary policies.
But war is as much about the mobilization of real resources as it is about finance and money: Every great power needs to be able to feed its population and power its industry. In times of high interdependence (globalization), a great power needs to retain the option to revert to self-sufficiency in time of war. And self-sufficiency makes things more expensive than relying on free trade and comparative advantage.
Throughout history, the principal source of power is technological superiority in armaments, including intelligence and communications. A critical question is therefore: What are the key inputs without which a state-of-the-art military is unattainable?
In 1914, they were coal, iron and the manufacturing capacity to mass-produce artillery and shells, as well as steamships. In 1939, they were oil, steel, aluminum and the manufacturing capacity to mass-produce artillery, ships, submarines, planes and tanks. After 1945 it was all of the above, plus the scientific and technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
Today, the vital inputs are the capacity to mass-produce high-performance semiconductors, satellites, and the algorithmic warfare systems that depend on them.
What were the principal lessons of the 20th-century world wars? First, the American combination of technological and financial leadership, plus abundant natural resources, was impossible to beat. Secondly, however, the dominant Anglophone empires were poor at deterrence. The UK failed twice to dissuade Germany and its allies from gambling on world war. This was mainly because Liberal and Conservative governments alike were unwilling to ask voters for peacetime sacrifices, and they failed at statecraft. The result was two very expensive conflicts that cost much more in life and treasure than effective deterrence would have — and left the UK exhausted and unable to sustain its empire.
The US has been the dominant Anglophone empire since the Suez Crisis of 1956. With the threat of nuclear Armageddon, the US successfully deterred the Soviet Union from advancing its Marxist-Leninist empire in Europe much beyond the rivers Elbe and Danube. But America was relatively unsuccessful at preventing the spread of communism by Soviet-backed organizations and regimes in what was then known as the Third World.
The US is still bad at deterrence. Last year, it failed to deter President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine, mainly because it had low confidence in the Ukrainian defense forces it had trained and the Kyiv government that controlled them. The latest objective of American deterrence is Taiwan, a functionally autonomous democracy that China claims as its own.
In October, President Joe Biden’s administration belatedly published its National Security Strategy. Such documents are always the work of a committee, but internal dissonance shouldn’t be this obvious. “The post-Cold War era is definitively over,” the authors declare, “and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.” However, “we do not seek conflict or a new Cold War.” For the major powers have “shared challenges” such as climate change and Covid and other pandemic diseases.
On the other hand, “Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown.” China, meanwhile, is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.”
So what will the US do to check these rivals? The answer sounds remarkably similar to what it did in Cold War I:
“We will assemble the strongest possible coalitions to advance and defend a world that is free, open, prosperous and secure.”
“We will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over the PRC while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia.”
“We must ensure strategic competitors cannot exploit foundational American and allied technologies, know-how, or data to undermine American and allied security.”
In other words: form and maintain alliances and try to prevent the other side from catching up technologically. This is a cold war strategy in all but name.
US support for Ukraine since the Feb. 24 invasion has undoubtedly succeeded in weakening Putin’s regime. The Russian military has suffered disastrous losses of trained manpower and equipment. The Russian economy may not have contracted by as much as Washington hoped (a mere 3.4% last year, according to the International Monetary Fund), but Russian imports have crashed due to Western export controls. As Russia’s stock of imported component parts and machinery runs down, Russian industry will face deep disruptions, including in the defense and energy sectors.
Last year, Russia cut off gas exports to Europe that it cannot reroute, as there are no alternative pipelines. Putin thought the gas weapon would allow him to divide the West. So far, it has not worked. Russia also tried choking Black Sea grain exports. But that lever had little strategic value as the biggest losers of the blockade were poor African and Middle Eastern countries.
The net result of Putin’s war thus far has been to reduce Russia to something like an economic appendage of China, its biggest trading partner. And Western sanctions mean that what Russia exports to China is sold at a discount.
There are two obvious problems with US strategy, however. The first is that if algorithmic weapons systems are the equivalent of tactical nuclear weapons, Putin may eventually be driven to using the latter, as he clearly lacks the former. The second is that the Biden administration appears to have delegated to Kyiv the timing of any peace negotiations — and the preconditions the Ukrainians demand are manifestly unacceptable in Moscow.
The war therefore seems destined, like the Korean War in Cold War I, to drag on until a stalemate is reached, Putin dies and an armistice is agreed that draws a new border between Ukraine and Russia. The problem with protracted wars is that the US and European publics tend to get sick of them well before the enemy does.
China is a much tougher nut to crack than Russia. Whereas a proxy war is driving Russia’s economy and military back into the 1990s, the preferred approach to China is to stunt its technological growth, particularly with respect to — in the words of National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan — “computing-related technologies, including microelectronics, quantum information systems and artificial intelligence” and “biotechnologies and biomanufacturing.”
“On export controls,” Sullivan went on, “we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining ‘relative’ advantages over competitors in certain key technologies. We previously maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”
Sanctions on Russia, argued Sullivan, had “demonstrated that technology export controls can be more than just a preventative tool.” They can be “a new strategic asset in the US and allied toolkit.” Meanwhile, the US is going to ramp up its investment in home-produced semiconductors and related hardware.
The experience of Cold War I confirms that such methods can work. Export controls were part of the reason the Soviet economy could not keep pace with the US in information technology. The question is whether this approach can work against China, which is as much the workshop of the world today as America was in the 20th century, with a far broader and deeper industrial economy than the Soviet Union ever achieved.
Readers of the science-fiction novel The Three-Body Problem by Liu Cixin will recall that the aliens from the planet Trisolaris use intergalactic surveillance to halt technological advance on Earth while their invasion force makes its way through deep space. Can arresting China’s development really be how the US prevails in Cold War II?
True, recent Commerce Department restrictions — on the transfer of advanced graphics processing units to China, the use of American chips and expertise in Chinese supercomputers, and the export to China of chipmaking technology — pose major problems for Beijing. They essentially cut the People’s Republic off from all high-end semiconductor chips, including those made in Taiwan and Korea, as well as all chip experts who are “US persons,” which includes green-card holders as well as citizens.
It’s also true that there are no quick fixes for Chinese President Xi Jinping. Most of China’s fabrication capacity is at low-tech nodes (less than 16 nanometers). He cannot conjure up overnight a mainland clone of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., which leads the world in the sophistication of its chips. Nor can Xi expect that TSMC would conduct business as usual if China launched a successful invasion of Taiwan. The company’s chip fabs would almost certainly be destroyed in a war. Even if they survived, they could not function without TSMC personnel, who might flee, and equipment from the US, Japan and Europe, which would cease to be available.
Yet China has other cards it can play. It is dominant in the processing of minerals that are vital to the modern economy, including copper, nickel, cobalt and lithium. In particular, China controls over 70% of rare earth production both in terms of extraction and processing. These are 17 minerals used to make components in devices such as smartphones, electric vehicles, solar panels and semiconductors. An embargo on their export to the US might not be a lethal blow, but it would force the US and its allies to develop other sources in a hurry.
America’s Achilles heel is often seen as its unsustainable fiscal path. At some point in the coming decade, according to the Congressional Budget Office, interest payments on the federal debt are likely to exceed defense spending. Meanwhile, it is not immediately obvious who buys all the additional Treasuries issued each year if the Federal Reserve is engaged in quantitative tightening.
Might this give China an opportunity to exert financial pressure on the US? In July, it held $970 billion worth of Treasuries, making it the second-largest foreign holder of US debt. As has often been pointed out, if China chose to dump its Treasuries, it would drive up US bond yields and bring down the dollar, though not without causing considerable pain to itself.
Yet the bigger American vulnerability may be in the realm of resources rather than finance. The US long ago ceased to be a manufacturing economy. It has become a great importer from the rest of the world. As Matthew Suarez, a lieutenant in the US Marine Corps, points out in an insightful essay at American Purpose, that makes the nation heavily reliant on the world’s merchant marine. “Setting aside the movement of oil and bulk commodities,” Suarez writes, “most internationally traded goods travel in one of six million containers transported in approximately 61,000 ships. This flow of goods depends on an equally robust parallel flow of digital information.”
The growing dominance of China in both these areas should not be underestimated. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has created infrastructure that reduces Chinese reliance on seaborne trade. Meanwhile, Shanghai Westwell Lab Information Technology Co. is rapidly becoming the leading vendor of the most advanced port-operating systems.
The war in Ukraine has provided a reminder that the disruption of trade is a vital weapon of war. It has also reminded us that a great power must be in a position to mass-produce modern weaponry, with or without access to imports. Both sides in the war have consumed staggering quantities of shells and missiles as well as armored vehicles and drones. The big question raised by any Chinese-American conflict is how long the US could sustain it.
As my Hoover Institution colleague Jackie Schneider has pointed out, just “four months of support to Ukraine … depleted much of the stockpile of such weapons, including a third of the US Javelin arsenal and a quarter of US Stingers.” According to the Royal United Services Institute, the artillery ammunition that the US currently produces in a year would have sufficed for only 10 days to two weeks of combat in Ukraine in the early phase of the war.
A February 2022 Department of Defense report on industrial capacity warned that the US companies producing tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft and satellites had reduced their output by more than half.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, the US today is in some ways in the situation of the British Empire in the 1930s. If it repeats the mistakes successive UK governments made in that decade, a fiscally overstretched America will fail to deter a nascent Axis-like combination of Russia, Iran and China from risking simultaneous conflict in three theaters: Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. The difference is that there will be no sympathetic industrial power to serve as the “arsenal of democracy” — a phrase used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a radio broadcast on Dec. 29, 1940. This time it is the autocracies that have the arsenal.
The Biden administration must be exceedingly careful not to pursue economic warfare against China so aggressively that Beijing finds itself in the position of Japan in 1941, with no better option than to strike early and hope for military success. This would be very dangerous indeed, as China’s position today is much stronger than Japan’s was then.
Kissinger is right to worry about the perils of a world war. The first and second world wars were each preceded by smaller conflicts: the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the Sino-Japanese War (1937). The Russian invasion of Ukraine may seem to be going well for the West right now. But in a worst-case scenario, it could be a similar harbinger of a much wider war.
More From This Writer at Bloomberg Opinion:
The Four Mysteries of Pelosi’s Troublesome Taiwan Trip: Niall Ferguson
The World’s Cascade of Disasters Is Not a Coincidence: Niall Ferguson
The Fed Hasn’t Fixed Its Worst Blunder Since the 1970s: Niall Ferguson
Want more Bloomberg Opinion? Terminal readers head to OPIN <GO>. Web readers click here .
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Niall Ferguson at nferguson23@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net
17. From G-20 to the Pacific Islands, India offers new hope
From G-20 to the Pacific Islands, India offers new hope - The Sunday Guardian Live
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Cleo PaskalPublished : December 31, 2022, 5:13 pm | Updated : January 1, 2023, 1:18 AM
sundayguardianlive.com · December 31, 2022
One of the most important external examples of the potential for India’s realignment of global leadership will be PM Modi’s ground-breaking trip to Papua New Guinea (PNG), reported to take place in the first half of 2023.
Alexandria, Va.: For those watching China, 2023 is a year of danger.
From the point of view of Beijing, it might be a good year to make a major move. The PLA, and especially the Navy, is growing, arming and flexing. Meanwhile the United States is perceived as weakened and distracted, Australian Prime Minister Albanese seems to want to mend relations with China (as does Germany), Europe is caught up in Ukraine, Taiwan has yet to get its one year of military service up and running (and its military remains under-armed and under-trained), and the Japanese seem serious about defending against China but have a way to go before becoming fully effective. It’s a dangerous situation.
But, at the same time, for those watching India, 2023 is a year of hope. Countries around the world feel squeezed between perceived PRC aggression and Western confusion. As they try to resurrect after Covid lockdowns devastated their economies and the war in Ukraine contributed to energy and food price inflation, many leaders are looking at their beleaguered fellow citizens and wondering “what now?”
THE ONLY CHOICES?
Some leaders, as with Prime Minister Sogavare in Solomon Islands, have already thrown in their lot with Beijing, leading them down the path to an authoritarianism that is resulting in their being willing to go to war with their own people (with PRC backing). And so, the Chinese Communist Party model metastasizes.
Others are trying to work with Western countries, but some—especially smaller ones—see themselves as being used as pawns in the games of larger partners. Ask the opposition leaders in Solomons—who have been trying to work with Australia for years—what they think when they see Australian Prime Minister Albanese cozying up to Beijing and its proxy Sogavare, and refusing to even meet with them.
Which is why a reengaged India offers a new hope—not as leader of a non-aligned world, but of a realigned world.
FROM NON-ALIGNMENT TO REALIGNMENT
As seen by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s goals for the G-20 Presidency, India seeks to show the world by example how a democratic, pluralistic, economically dynamic country, with a large rural population, in a geopolitical complicated neighbourhood, can not only survive, but thrive, with its humanity intact.
Yes, India has challenges, but it is largely transparent about them, trusting that its systems will be robust enough over time to improve the lives of its citizens as it strives for, yes, a more perfect union.
These used to be features that the West claimed as its own. But the legitimacy of Western leadership has taken hit after hit, including: the 2007-2008 financial crisis (financial legitimacy); Afghanistan withdrawal (strategic legitimacy); management of Covid response, including censorship of Indian scientists (scientific legitimacy); narrative control (media legitimacy); and culture wars (moral legitimacy).
The West is far from finished, but it is diminished. It has a lot of work to do, especially as it tries to heal self-inflicted wounds while being targeted by unrelenting CCP political warfare designed to weaken it further.
And so, for many smaller and medium sized non-Western countries, there is urgent need for another option, for realignment. Those leaders and citizens who believe in (and are willing to fight for) democracy, a free press, the right to practice their faith, to start a business, to study as they want, are looking for allies. And one country they want to learn more about is India.
THE POTENTIAL INDIA
India is one of the few major countries that, in places like the Pacific Islands, can give China a run for its money—literally. Unlike the other three Quad members, India is much more economically compatible with the developing economies of the region. It has pioneered village-scale economies, low cost yet reliable and robust technologies, affordable pharmaceuticals, medical care, renewable energy systems, and tertiary education—and all of it largely available in English. India also has highly trained personnel accustomed to working in difficult conditions that require adaptability and improvisation.
Indian engagement has the potential to transform local economies and displace predatory and parasitic PRC entrenchment.
INDIAN CHALLENGE IN SOLOMONS
And the Chinese know it. That is why they used their proxies in Solomons to try to delay the arrival of the Indian High Commissioner to Solomons, H.E. Shri Inbasekar Sunaramuthi, for as long as possible. Not that the Australians helped break the logjam. Those in Canberra who don’t understand the severity of the PRC threat aren’t keen on the region having more options (those who do welcome more engagement by their democratic partner).
When the High Commissioner was finally let in, he quietly went to work building business linkages, meeting with a wide range of civil society leaders, and getting of sense of what was needed.
The visit was very well received by non-PRC-proxies (the majority of the population) in Solomons. Respected Parliamentarian Hon. Peter Kenilorea Jr. summed it up when he said Solomons needs: “Increased people-to-people connections with likeminded countries. For example, education and availability of scholarships, both academic and sports. And study visits for both national, provincial level leaders and business leaders. Yes US, but India would be great as well. We lack capacity in tertiary education, and students might want to take courses that aren’t available here. The pivot towards India is something I personally would like us to move towards. I think India has a lot to offer.”
FROM G-20 TO THE PICS
While G-20 meetings within India will showcase the country’s domestic strengths, one of the most interesting and important external examples of the potential for India’s realignment of global leadership will be Prime Minister Modi’s ground-breaking trip to Papua New Guinea (PNG), reported to take place in the first half of 2023.
It is difficult to understate how important this trip might be to the region. PNG is the largest of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) by population and landmass. It has more people and more land than New Zealand, is strategically located, contains v ast natural resources, and is in desperate need of economic opportunities and educational and health care development.
It is a perfect candidate for testing the potential for “Indian realignment”.
Prime Minister Modi will be the first Indian Prime Minister to visit the country. He started building India’s profile in the PICs with his visit to Fiji in 2014, during which he announced a range of initiatives, including the much-appreciated e-visa option for PIC visitors to India (by contrast PIC visitors to Australia and New Zealand have to go through a costly and sometimes humiliating process—familiar to many Indians—to apply for entry).
Then there was a Forum for India-Pacific Islands cooperation meeting in Jaipur in 2015. After that, there was little movement. One of the problems was there was little awareness in the bureaucracies in India about the region, and the governments of the PICs are small and overstretched, so finding time and funding for exploratory missions to India was not viable unless there seemed real interest.
One country that bucked that trend was PNG. There is a resident Indian mission in PNG (that also covers other PICs) and, importantly, PNG opened a mission in Delhi in 2006. That helped.
What also helped revive the process was India being willing to go to the region, meeting them where they live. In December 2022, there were Foreign Office Consultation between India and PNG in the PNG capital Port Moresby. One of the things discussed was the potential for co-hosting the next FIPIC in PNG. If that happens, it will be a strong signal to the region that India is ready to work with the PICs in a “grounded” manner.
So, 2023 has the potential to begin a realignment in the PICs, that could then act as proof of concept more broadly.
What would be needed to really make it work? Here are ten ideas:
1. Establish direct flights between India and the Pacific Islands, bypassing the need for citizens to go through Australia and New Zealand and their restrictive visas regimes.
2. Set up an Oceania House in Delhi so Pacific Island Countries that can’t afford to set up their own High Commissions can post representatives in India.
3. Broaden Indian diplomatic representation in the PICs. If a full High Commission isn’t viable, establish a network of Honorary Consuls so every PIC is covered.
4. As with India, PIC cultures value family, faith and freedom (and good food). Broaden cultural exchanges, perhaps through the establishment of India Houses in each PIC that could, for example, facilitate access to Indian media for local broadcast (something PM Modi originally mentioned in Fiji). Also work with Indian TV and movie producers to film in the PICs, training local talent, and building awareness and tourism ties.
5. Bring representatives from Indian educational institutions to the PICs to raise awareness of the quality, affordability and safety of Indian education. Also consider setting up campuses in the PICs.
6. Set up working groups to develop lasting treatment solutions for specific health concerns in the PICs, for example, diabetes.
7. Understand India’s relationship with Fiji is unique, and diaspora-based (the 12th World Hindi Conference will be in Fiji in February 2023). But that working with the region through Fiji makes it seems as through India wants to work with people that just look similar, rather than people who have similar values.
8. Where appropriate, work with the PICs on intelligence sharing. Currently many are victims of major Chinese organized crime networks, and Western intelligence organizations do little to help them protect themselves. This could also incorporate training on the identification and countering of PRC political warfare operations—something India has taken the lead on as seen, for example, by the banning of TikTok and WeChat.
9. Where welcome, work together on institution building, including Chambers of Commerce and think tanks that can facilitate exchanges, including in areas of strategic concern.
10. Consider working with Indian states that have similar physical environments, such as Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to set up joint research institutes into key sectors, such as fisheries, tropical disease, environmental security, water and agriculture.
Capitals around the world will be closely watching Prime Minister Modi’s visit to PNG. Many, including Beijing, will hope the visit fails to make a difference. But even more, including all over the PICs, will be looking for signs that 2023 is a year not of danger but of hope.
sundayguardianlive.com · December 31, 2022
18. "Cognitive warfare”: NATO is planning a war for people's minds
Conclusion:
Considering that cognitive warfare is already underway and the latest manipulation techniques are currently being used in the war in Ukraine to direct the thoughts and feelings of the populations of all nations involved in the war, clarification on the soft power techniques of cognitive warfare would be appreciated and should be more urgent than ever.
"Cognitive warfare”: NATO is planning a war for people's minds
28.12.2022
Jonas Tögel
geopolitika.ru · December 28, 2022
Since 2020, NATO has pursued plans for psychological warfare that must stand on an equal footing with the military alliance's five previous areas of operation (land, water, air, space, cyberspace). It is the battleground of public opinion. NATO documents speak of “cognitive warfare”, i.e.: mental warfare. How concrete is the project, what steps have been taken so far, and who is it aimed at?
To be victorious in war, one must also win the battle for public opinion. This has been carried out for more than 100 years with increasingly modern tools, the so-called soft power techniques. These describe all those psychological tools of influence by which people can be guided in such a way that they themselves are not aware of this control. The American political scientist Joseph Nye thus defines soft power as “the ability to persuade others to do what one wants without using violence or coercion”.
Distrust of governments and the military is increasing, while NATO is stepping up its efforts to use increasingly sophisticated psychological warfare in the battle for people's minds and hearts. The main program for this is “Cognitive Warfare”. With the psychological weapons of this program, man himself is to be declared the new theater of war, the so-called “Human Domain” (human sphere).
One of NATO's first documents on these plans is the September 2020 essay “NATO's Sixth Domain of Operations”, written on behalf of the NATO Innovation Hub (abbreviated: IHub ). The authors are American August Cole, a former Wall Street Journal journalist specializing in the defense industry who has worked for the transatlantic think tank Atlantic Council for several years, and Frenchman Hervé le Guyader.
Founded in 2012, IHub claims to be a think tank where “experts and inventors from all over work together to solve NATO challenges” and is based in Norfolk, Virginia, in the US. Officially not part of NATO, it is funded by NATO Allied Transformation Command, one of NATO's two strategic headquarters.
The essay tells several fictional stories and concludes with a made-up speech by the U.S. president, who explains to his listeners how cognitive warfare works and why anyone can get involved:
“Today's advances in nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science, driven by the seemingly unstoppable advance of the troika of artificial intelligence, big data, and the 'digital addiction' of our civilization, have created a far more disturbing prospect: an integrated fifth pillar, where everyone, unbeknownst to him or her, acts according to the plans of one of our adversaries”.
Each individual's thoughts and feelings are increasingly at the center of this new war:
“You are the disputed territory, wherever you are, whoever you are”.
In addition, there is to be lamented a “steady erosion of the morale of the population”. Cole and Guyader thus argue that the human domain is the greatest vulnerability. This area of operation (“domain”) would consequently be the basis for all other battlefields (land, water, air, space, cyberspace) to be controlled. Therefore, the two authors urge NATO to act quickly and consider the human spirit as NATO's “sixth domain of operations”.
Participatory Propaganda
Almost at the same time, former French official and chief innovation officer at IHub, François du Cluzel, was working on the comprehensive strategy paper “Cognitive Warfare” that was published by IHub in January 2021. Instead of using imaginary scenarios, du Cluzel wrote a detailed analysis of the war of minds. Like the authors of “The Sixth Domain of NATO Operations”, he emphasizes that “trust (...) is the goal. This can be won or destroyed in information warfare or through PsyOps, i.e., psychological warfare. However, conventional soft-power techniques are no longer sufficient; what is needed is cognitive warfare, i.e., relative to the mind, a “participatory propaganda” in which “everyone takes part”.
It is not clear who exactly is the target of this propaganda, but du Cluzel emphasizes that everyone is involved in this new form of manipulation and that the goal is to protect NATO's “human capital”. The area of application refers to “the entire human environment, whether friend or foe”. Although the enemy's capabilities and threat in the field of cognitive warfare are “still low”, du Cluzel calls for NATO to act quickly and promote cognitive warfare:
“Cognitive warfare may be the missing element that enables the transition from military victory on the battlefield to lasting political success. The 'human domain' may well be the decisive factor (...). The first five theaters of operations [land, sea, air, space, cyberspace] can lead to tactical and operational victories, but only the human theater of operations can lead to ultimate and complete victory” (pag. 36).
Neuroscience as a weapon
A few months later, NATO took up the strategists' demands. In June 2021, it held its first scientific meeting on cognitive warfare in Bordeaux, France. In an anthology that accompanied the symposium, Innovation Hub strategists had the opportunity to speak alongside high-ranking NATO officials. In the preface, French General André Lanata thanked “our Innovation Hub” and stressed the importance of “exploiting the weaknesses of human nature” and leading this “battle” in “all areas of society”. It is also about engaging neuroscience in the arms race (“Weaponization of Neurosciences”). It has been pointed out that NATO's cognitive warfare is a defense against similar wars by China and Russia. Their “disinformation activities” have led to “growing concern” among NATO allies.
At the symposium, there was intense discussion on how to use neuroscience to carry out digital attacks on human thought, feelings and action:
“From the attacker's perspective, the most efficient, though most difficult action to take, is to encourage the use of digital devices that can disrupt or influence all levels of an adversary's cognitive processes” (pag. 29).
NATO would like to confuse potential opponents as thoroughly as possible to “dictate” their behavior. (pag. 29) As part of the symposium, Du Cluzel wrote an essay together with French cognitive researcher Bernard Claverie explaining that-contrary to the claim that one reacts only to threats from Russia or China-it is also “good to execute well-considered attack processes as well as countermeasures and preventive measures” (pag. 26):
“Attacking is the stated goal and exploiting, devaluing or even destroying the way one builds one's reality, one's spiritual self-confidence, one's faith in functioning groups, societies or even nations” (pag. 27).
Strategists rarely openly admit that these techniques can be used not only on enemy populations but also within NATO countries. Statements about this are often vague. However, there are indications that NATO is also targeting its own population. French General Eric Autellet writes in an article in the anthology cited above (pag. 24):
“Since Vietnam, our wars have been lost despite military successes, in large part because of the weakness of our narrative (i.e., 'winning the hearts and minds of the people'), both in relation to local populations in theaters of operations and with respect to our own populations. There are two stakes in our relations with enemy and friend, and we can choose passive and active modes of action-or both-when considering the limits and constraints of our model of freedom and democracy. As for our enemy, we must be able to “read” the minds of our opponents to anticipate their reactions. If necessary, we must be able to “penetrate” the minds of our opponents to influence them and enable them to act on our behalf. As for our friend (and even ourselves), we must be able to protect our brains and improve our cognitive understanding and decision-making skills”.
The fall 2021 NATO innovation competition
The next step was taken by the IHub, which officially announced the NATO Countering Cognitive Warfare Innovation Competition in October 2021. The Innovation Challenge has been in existence since 2017, and since then the competition has been held twice a year. In order to gather as many ideas as possible, NATO always emphasizes the open nature of the competition: “The challenge is open to everyone (individuals, entrepreneurs, start-ups, industry, science, etc.) who is in a NATO member country”. Those who win can expect a cash prize of $8,500.
Topics are selected in collaboration with Johns Hopkins University. They are always topics “particularly influential for the development of future military capabilities”, following the motto “the best way to anticipate the future is to invent it”. The areas are artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space, hypersonics, quantum technology, and biotechnology.
Thus, the key questions in previous competitions are contrasting and set very different priorities. In fall 2018, for example, it was about systems that can be used to intercept unmanned drones. Here the Dutch drone manufacturer Delft won. In fall 2019, the focus was on helping soldiers with psychological stress or fatigue in order to improve their performance in combat. Spring 2021 was about space surveillance. Here the French start-up Share My Space won.
Despite the different focal points, one topic continues to emerge: information and data management on the Internet. In spring 2018, the innovation competition was dedicated to this topic under the motto “Complexity and Information Management”, in spring 2020 the theme was “Fake News in Pandemics”, and in fall 2021 finally “The Invisible Threat - Neutralizing Cognitive Warfare”.
“The most advanced form of manipulation”
In October 2021, just before this competition was publicized on the IHub website, NATO broadcast a live stream discussing cognitive warfare and calling for participation in the innovation competition. The task is “one of the hottest topics for NATO right now”, du Cluzel pointed out in his opening remarks. French defense expert Marie-Pierre Raymond took the opportunity to explain what cognitive warfare actually is, namely “the most advanced form of manipulation that exists today”.
There were ten participants in the final of the competition, broadcast almost two months later. Eight of them had developed computer programs that use artificial intelligence to scan and analyze large amounts of data on the Internet in order to better monitor and, one assumes, predict people's opinions, thoughts and information exchange. The most popular target of computer programs are social media: Facebook, Twitter, Tik-Tok, Telegram.
Changing beliefs and behaviors
The winner was the U.S.-based company Veriphix (motto: “We measure beliefs to predict and change behavior”), which has developed a platform with which it is possible to identify so-called nudges, or unconscious psychological “nudges” on the Internet. The Veriphix platform has been in use for years, working with several governments and large companies, according to the head, John Fuisz, who has close family ties to the U.S. security apparatus. For him, cognitive warfare is about changing beliefs (“changing beliefs”). His software can analyze these changes “within your military, within your population and within a foreign population”, as he explained to the competition judges.
Considering that cognitive warfare is already underway and the latest manipulation techniques are currently being used in the war in Ukraine to direct the thoughts and feelings of the populations of all nations involved in the war, clarification on the soft power techniques of cognitive warfare would be appreciated and should be more urgent than ever.
********************************************
Original column of Jonas Tögel:
https://www.sinistrainrete.info/politica/24503-jonas-toegel-guerra-cognitiva-la-nato-sta-pianificando-una-guerra-per-le-menti-delle-persone.html
Translation by Costantino Ceoldo
geopolitika.ru · December 28, 2022
19. What I Learned From the Ukrainian People
What I Learned From the Ukrainian People
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-i-learned-ukrainian-people
By Andrew Loftesnes
The unprovoked Russian war of aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine is the most stark case of good and evil since the Second World War. The Russian state is waging a genocidal campaign in order to manifest the imperial ambitions of a single evil man. Vladimir Putin undoubtedly has been emboldened after years of indiscriminate and consequence-free slaughter of the Syrian people, and by the unopposed annexation of Crimea in 2014. Any policy which aims to achieve anything short of an unquestionably defeated Russia is against the national security interests of the United States, and a moral calamity. But there are other times and places to talk about policy.
I want to talk to you about the Ukrainian people.
I want to tell you about what I learned by being in their presence from mid-April until mid-July of 2022, while serving on the ground in Ukraine as a humanitarian volunteer. I did nothing brave there, and the only aspect of my experiences in that country which I wish to share with you is what I learned from being in the presence of a courageous people who want nothing more than for their lives to go back to the way they were before February 24, 2022; the last day in which their existence was like yours and mine is now. I want to tell you why they have a special place in my heart.
I flew out of the United States the day after leaving my job and found myself on the Polish side of the Ukrainian border a few days later. I will tell that you two things about crossing that border back in April. The first is that as soon as you did so, it was clear that you were in a nation at war. The emphasis here is on the entirety of the nation, and not a distinct class in the society which burdens the whole of the conflict. The second is that you have entered the territory of a people with a distinct, cherished and fiercely protected identity. Both of these factors stood out in stark contrast to me when I thought of the American home front during the 20 years of the War on Terror. These circumstances stand out even more in our present age of petty and manufactured divisiveness.
I was only 9 years old on September 11, 2001, but given that my dad was working in the Pentagon at the time, I remember the day well. I also remember the immediate period following the attacks and the visceral feeling of common identity shared by a people who shared a community. For most Americans today, this is now a distant and almost impossible seeming memory.
In Ukraine that spirit not only exists but has endured and been strengthened since the first day of the invasion. I stood in the presence of Ukrainian civilians in a bomb shelter as they broke out together in song; “Do not worry, glorious Ukraine, You have a free people… And we, our glorious Ukraine, shall, hey, hey, rise up and rejoice!” I spoke with wounded soldiers in a hospital in central Ukraine who wanted nothing more than to return to the army and continue to defend their country. I am confident that Russian missiles and Iranian provided drones targeting civilian infrastructure will never make the winter cold enough to break the spirit of such a people. This Russian strategy will only strengthen the very identity which it seeks to destroy. For Ukrainians, the simple act of enduring is an act of defiance and resistance against the Russian war machine.
The Ukrainian people want to help themselves. Not only do they insist on it, but they excel at it. The entire nation has mobilized in a way which I have to imagine was similar to civilian populations in Europe from 1939-1945. For Ukraine and its people, there is only the war effort. Civil society groups which existed before the war to promote Ukrainian culture and traditional folk music, are now gathering in basements to teach community classes on weaving sniper suits, making homemade MREs (Meals Ready to Eat), and moving medicine to locations where it is most needed. Across Ukraine we encountered groups consisting of ordinary people who banded together at the community level to deliver humanitarian aid to where it was needed the most. We met young people who stayed behind to be of service to the elderly of their community, for whom evacuation may have presented serious challenges. Do you think that any of these volunteers thought they would spend a day of their lives doing this before the day the war started?
From the Ukrainian people I learned about service. Everywhere we went in Ukraine we were surrounded by local volunteers. What was astonishing was that many of them were (are) themselves displaced persons. As soon as they reached a place of relative safety compared to their previous location, they began to turn around and help. Many did this even as they themselves were homeless, sleeping in public spaces, and dependent entirely on the generosity of those around them. Every day across Ukraine, I saw the best of humanity embodied by people who had lost everything but still had the strength and compassion to ask, “how can I help?” This comes to mind often when I hear talk of “war weariness” among the American public, brought up in debates about how long the West can or should help Ukraine to hold the line.
Now back in the United States, I think of my Ukrainian friends and the countless people I met, and the long winter being weaponized by the Russian war against their way of life. A war which grows increasingly barbaric in its desperation and fear. I deeply hope that anyone reading this will not forget about them, and will reach out to help in whatever way suits you best. The winter will be long. Most tragically the war itself may very well be long. But one thing I learned from the Ukrainians is that normal people can make a difference. They are doing it every day and if you are so moved, you can make a difference as well.
When I think of the Ukrainians themselves, I think not only of lives shattered or of a dark winter which must now be endured. Far from it. Instead, I think of what I learned about from being by their side. When I think of the Ukrainians I think of a spirit which cannot be broken, of a hope which cannot be killed, of a people who will endure, and of a nation that will win.
About the Author(s)
Andrew Loftesnes
Andrew Loftesnes was a corporal in the Marine Corps infantry. He served as a humanitarian volunteer in Ukraine, and currently lives and works in Washington DC.
20. Russia presses its Ukraine strategy, fires 40 drones at Kyiv
Russia presses its Ukraine strategy, fires 40 drones at Kyiv
AP · by FELIPE DANA · January 2, 2023
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russia deployed multiple exploding drones in another nighttime attack on Ukraine, officials said Monday, as the Kremlin signaled no letup in its strategy of using bombardments to target civilian infrastructure and wear down Ukrainian resistance to its invasion.
The barrage was the latest in a series of relentless year-end attacks, including one that killed three civilians on New Year’s Eve.
Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said Monday that 40 drones “headed for Kyiv” overnight. All of them were destroyed, according to air defense forces.
Klitschko said 22 drones were destroyed over Kyiv, three in the outlying Kyiv region and 15 over neighboring provinces.
Energy infrastructure facilities were damaged as the result of the attack and an explosion occurred in one city district, the mayor said. It wasn’t immediately clear whether that was caused by drones or other munitions. A wounded 19-year-old man was hospitalized, Klitschko added, and emergency power outages were underway in the capital.
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In the outlying Kyiv region a “critical infrastructure object” and residential buildings were hit, Gov. Oleksiy Kuleba said.
Russia has carried out airstrikes on Ukrainian power and water supplies almost weekly since October.
Ukraine faces grim start to 2023 after fresh Russian attacks
Sarajevo’s agony echoes as Ukraine braces for a dark winter
Ukraine conflict casts shadow on Russia as it enters 2023
The AP Interview: Ukraine FM aims for February peace summit
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Russia of “energy terrorism” as the aerial bombardments have left many people without heat amid freezing temperatures. Ukrainian officials say Moscow is “weaponizing winter” in its effort to demoralize the Ukrainian resistance.
Ukraine is using sophisticated Western-supplied weapons to help shoot down Russia’s missiles and drones, as well as send artillery fire into Russian-held areas of the country.
Moscow’s full-scale invasion on Feb. 24 has gone awry, putting pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin as his ground forces struggle to hold ground and advance. He said in his New Year’s address to the nation that 2022 was “a year of difficult, necessary decisions.”
Putin insists he had no choice, but to send troops into Ukraine because it threatened Russia’s security — an assertion condemned by the West, which says Moscow bears full responsibility for the invasion.
Russia is currently observing public holidays through Jan. 8.
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Drones, missiles and artillery shells launched by Russian forces also struck areas across Ukraine.
Five people were wounded in the Monday morning shelling of a Ukraine-controlled area of the southern Kherson region, its Ukrainian Gov. Yaroslav Yanushevich said on Telegram.
The Russian forces attacked the city of Beryslav, the official said, firing at a local market, likely from a tank. Three of the wounded are in serious condition and are being evacuated to Kherson, Yanushevich said.
Seven drones were shot down over the southern Mykolaiv region, according to Gov. Vitali Kim, and three more were shot down in the southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region, Gov. Valentyn Reznichenko said.
In the Dnipropetrovsk region, a missile was also destroyed, according to Reznichenko. He said that energy infrastructure in the region was being targeted.
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Ukraine’s Air Force Command reported Monday that 39 Iranian-made exploding Shahed drones were shot down overnight, as well as two Russian-made Orlan drones and a X-59 missile.
“We are staying strong,” the Ukrainian defense ministry tweeted.
A blistering New Year’s Eve assault killed at least four civilians across the country, Ukrainian authorities reported, and wounded dozens. The fourth victim, a 46-year-old resident of Kyiv, died in a hospital on Monday morning, Klitschko said.
Multiple blasts rocked the capital and other areas of Ukraine on Saturday and through the night. The strikes came 36 hours after widespread missile attacks Russia launched Thursday to damage energy infrastructure facilities, and the unusually quick follow-up alarmed Ukrainian officials.
In Russia, a Ukrainian drone hit an energy facility in the Bryansk region that borders with Ukraine, Bryansk regional governor Alexander Bogomaz reported on Monday morning. A village was left without power as a result, he said.
___
Follow the AP’s coverage of the war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by FELIPE DANA · January 2, 2023
21. A Portrait of Carl von Clausewitz as a Senior Officer: The Question of Military Regulations and the Role of Routine and Creativity in Military Conduct
We still have so much to learn from Clausewitz (and Sun Tzu, and Thucydides, etc)
Excerpts:
A newly discovered drawing, now in the collection of the German History Museum in Berlin, promises to shed new light on Clausewitz's life. Furthermore, its connection to real-life events provides a better understanding of the decade’s influence over Clausewitz's thought and the realities surrounding the creation of On War. The find highlights an overlooked memorandum Clausewitz wrote in 1825 that, for its part, reveals Clausewitz as a thoughtful and consummate military professional. In fact, the ideas expressed in this memorandum matured on the pages of his general theory, On War, reinforcing the notion of his theory as a product of complex reflection on the realities military professionals encounter.
...
The discovery of the 1825 portrait and an understanding of its larger context reveals how little we still know about the military theorist's life and writing process. Although his war experience is extensively studied, Clausewitz's tangible achievements as a military reformer on the eve of the Wars of German Liberation and afterwards are not yet fully appreciated.[20] The process of creation of On War remains, too, largely unexplored, a circumstance particularly vexing given the treatise's unfinished nature. In fact, due to its complex language, the chapter on Methodismus discussed in this article is seldom read or debated in professional military seminars, despite its valuable insight into the business of war. By studying the roots of Clausewitz's ideas and their gradual development, we can better understand their meaning while broadening our modern interpretation of his thought.
Most of all, for today's national security practitioners exploring Clausewitz's thought process brings reassurance and encouragement. The Prussian general continuously reflected on practical challenges he encountered in war and peace—and strove to capture these reflections in a general theory transcending the constraints of early nineteenth-century warfare. Thus, his treatise is an homage and empowerment of those enlightened professionals who constantly study the business of war and strive to conduct it in an informed and effective manner.
A Portrait of Carl von Clausewitz as a Senior Officer: The Question of Military Regulations and the Role of Routine and Creativity in Military Conduct
thestrategybridge.org · January 2, 2023
In the realm of Clausewitzian scholarship, the 1820s represent a conundrum. On the one hand, this was when Carl von Clausewitz wrote most of his treatise On War. On the other hand, despite the period's undoubted significance for the military theorist’s legacy, we know relatively little about his life, career, and writing process. For modern national security professionals, this knowledge gap is particularly unfortunate, as it tends to, first, reinforce the mistaken impression that Clausewitz's efforts to write a theory of war were an exoteric process separated from his experience in war or his performance as a senior officer. As a result, it is also easier to brush aside the need for reflection and the continuous study of war, politics, and society Clausewitz thought central for the business of war.
The reasons for this decade-long knowledge gap are manifold. First and foremost is the lack of correspondence between Clausewitz and his wife Marie as they lived together; although other letters are preserved, their number is not as great nor their content as candid and detailed as their correspondence as a couple. Furthermore, the military theorist spent most of this period drafting On War, and the prolonged and secluded nature of that writing process offers a less compelling narrative to scholars and audiences. Following the riveting accounts of the Napoleonic Wars, the realities of peace and the Restoration Era's stifling climate additionally constrain interest in the period. Thus, biographies tend to describe the 1820s in broad strokes, often squeezing the decade Clausewitz dedicated to writing On War into a single chapter.
A newly discovered drawing, now in the collection of the German History Museum in Berlin, promises to shed new light on Clausewitz's life. Furthermore, its connection to real-life events provides a better understanding of the decade’s influence over Clausewitz's thought and the realities surrounding the creation of On War. The find highlights an overlooked memorandum Clausewitz wrote in 1825 that, for its part, reveals Clausewitz as a thoughtful and consummate military professional. In fact, the ideas expressed in this memorandum matured on the pages of his general theory, On War, reinforcing the notion of his theory as a product of complex reflection on the realities military professionals encounter.
A New Image of Clausewitz
Johann Jakob Kirchhoff, Carl von Clausewitz, 1825. (Copyright: German Historical Museum/Deutsches Historisches Museum/I. Desnica. All rights reserved.)
The newly discovered drawing comes from the collection of the German Historical Museum in Berlin. Several years ago, the institution acquired the partial estate of the artist Johann Jakob Kirchhoff (1796-1848). Among the sketches and studies found was an aquarelle representing Carl von Clausewitz. The drawing was part of a series of portraits of Prussian officers and statesmen who played a significant role in the 1813-1815 campaigns against Napoleon (or the Wars of German Liberation, as the period is also known in German historiography). The portraits were bundled together with Kirchhoff's work Royal Parade on the Tempelhof Field (Königsparade auf dem Tempelhofer Feld). Also an aquarelle, the Royal Parade represented a gathering of the elite of the Prussian army, with the famous cast iron monument dedicated to the Prussian victories in 1813-1815 as a background. Although the intention and immediate purpose of this work and the additional portraits remain unclear, the iconography evoking the Wars of German Liberation suggests Kirchhoff probably envisioned the sequence as a jubilee celebration of the Allied victories against Napoleon. As the faces on the Royal Parade are hard to distinguish while the individual sketches are rich in detail, it is also possible the artist might have had another, more monumental work in mind; thus, the sequence may have constituted a preliminary study for it. Alternatively, Kirchhoff's illustrator work could also suggest he intended the Royal Parade and the drawings for a book or a luxury album.[1]
Kirchhoff's portrait of Clausewitz unmistakably reminds us of the military theorist's popular image by Wilhelm Wach. There is a possible explanation for that—after Clausewitz's death, Marie wished to commission a portrait of her beloved husband that could be turned into lithograph and then printed and gifted to close friends. She, however, was dissatisfied with a recent official portrait done by the famous German artist Franz Krüger, a work that is now lost. As she shared in a letter, Marie intended to commission another painting, an amalgam of Krüger's work and a drawing she possessed that, according to Marie, truly captured her beloved Carl's facial expression.[2] The similarity between Kirchhoff's image and Wach's famous portrait of Clausewitz suggest the former might have been that drawing. This also implies Wach's work was created posthumously by combining Clausewitz's figure from Krüger's portrait with the facial expression from Kirchhoff's.
“Carl von Clausewitz” by Wilhelm Wach (Wikimedia)
Kirchhoff's image emphasizes Clausewitz's penetrating blue eyes, a feature the work shares with another recently discovered drawing of the military theorist, the so-called “young Clausewitz.”[3] Yet compared to that work's confident and energetic look, Clausewitz's gaze in 1825 is solemn. Not only the fifteen-year difference and the burdens of several wars separate the two images. In 1825, Clausewitz's health was at a low point. His letters from that time describe prolonged and severe pain in the throat that made it impossible for him to swallow and enjoy food and drink.[4] Hence the unhealthy complexion and weariness evident in his face.
Kirchhoff's drawing provides one additional insight. The larger aquarelle was called Royal Parade on the Tempelhof Field, but no known source mentions a prodigious parade in 1825. In that year, however, the Prussian army conducted military exercises in Potsdam and Berlin with the additional purpose of creating a modern field manual. The indications in Kirchhoff's papers that the series was made both in Berlin and Potsdam also suggest the maneuvers may have served as the real-life basis for the artist's work.[5]
In his position as a director of the Prussian Military Academy, Clausewitz also performed duties as associate to the General Staff (aggregirtier Officer des General Stabes), occasionally called to support the evaluation of maneuvers and training.[6] However, his particular involvement in the 1825 maneuvers remains unclear. A memorandum he wrote ahead of the event suggests Clausewitz was not included in the committee working on the field manual. Kirchhoff's aquarelle, however, indicates that even if the military theorist did not belong to the Prussian General Staff's leading figures, he still enjoyed recognition for his role in the Napoleonic Wars and, most likely, did observe the maneuvers up close. Otherwise, the artist would have not included him in the series.
Clausewitz as a General Staff officer, circa 1809-1810, author unknown.(Forschungsgemeinschaft Clausewitz-Burg, Burg bei Magdeburg)
Clausewitz's Thoughts on Creating Guidelines for Military Conduct
Even if the committee working on a new field manual omitted Clausewitz, the short memorandum captured his thoughts on the ways to create guidelines for conduct in the field. Although published in the 1990 volume containing Clausewitz’s manuscripts and correspondence, the document has never been extensively studied, nor translated into English. This article offers its first English translation.
Clausewitz's memorandum was sent to his close friend and former commander, Field Marshall August Neidhardt von Gneisenau.[7] Serving as the chief of staff for Blücher, Gneisenau was largely responsible for the planning of the Allied campaigns against Napoleon in 1813-1815. In the post-1819 period, the so-called Restoration Era, when Prussian politics took a reactionary turn, Gneisenau was awarded many honors but, as a suspected liberal, was kept away from active service. He and Clausewitz continuously exchanged ideas, and Gneisenau encouraged Clausewitz's work on a general theory of war. It remains unclear whether Clausewitz expected that his friend would pass along the 1825 memorandum to other leading features in the Prussian military or used the occasion to simply clarify his thoughts on the subject.
A booklet capturing the conduct of armies in the field, a Feldmanual or field manual, was called to close a gap in Prussia's military documentation. As part of the efforts to restructure and modernize the Prussian army after its disastrous defeat at the hands of Napoleon in the Jena-Auerstedt Campaign (1806), the reform circle led by Gerhard von Scharnhorst created an exercise manual in 1812.[8] The document aimed at introducing contemporary tactics, unifying the Prussian army's conduct, and rebuilding it as a force able to face Napoleon's troops. Following his mentor Scharnhorst's instructions, as a General Staff major, Clausewitz served on the committee that compiled the infantry exercise manual. The booklet was considered a comprehensive guide for training troops that, with some changes, remained in use until 1843.[9]
Yet the realities of prolonged campaigning and mass warfare in the 1813-1815 period also revealed its limits. The exercise manual required extensive periods of training and long and systematic development of officers and non-commissioned officers able to lead troops. However, in the Wars of German Liberation, Prussia increasingly relied on newly drafted soldiers and the Landwehr (territorial reserve). For its officer corps, the Landwehr selected schoolteachers, civil servants, and prominent members of the society; although enthusiastic, they were far from military professionals. In general, the drafted Prussian troops and their leadership arrived at the war theater with four months of service on average. Without extensive training, newly commissioned and non-commissioned officers often lacked knowledge and experience leading to poor performance in the field.[10] They needed practical guidance for their conduct in combat.
As a reaction to this experience in the Wars of German Liberation, Clausewitz considered writing a field manual in 1816. His request for institutional support for the project was met with little enthusiasm from the war ministry; instead, Clausewitz devoted his energy to writing war theory.[11] Nonetheless, the need for a new manual guiding and unifying the army's conduct on the field became hard to overlook, leading the Prussian military to plan the maneuvers of 1825 as the basis for the creation of such document.
Clausewitz's memorandum displays his disdain for habitual committee work. As he stated, the emphasis on consensus from early on and attempts to please every expectation tended to steer the process in the wrong direction: "From the very first moment, everything is taken into account and agreement is sought too early." Instead, Clausewitz suggested a group of experienced and knowledgeable officers with diverse expertise should reflect and write their proposals separately; only after these rough drafts were prepared should the committee meet and discuss which requirements and ideas should be captured in the manual. This process, Clausewitz implied, would "safeguard against one-sidedness" and could produce a valuable product.
This careful reflection on military instructions promised to also bridge the gap between theory and practice. Clausewitz criticized the notion that a field manual should be based on the experience from such a limited event as a fourteen-day exercise: “It seems to me implausible that we will learn in a fourteen-day-long exercise what has not been learned while experiencing a four-year-long war.” Instead, the creation of a manual had to be a deliberate and thoughtful process: "It is more a question of capturing, through careful and persistent reflection, what needs to be prescribed and can be prescribed."
A military manual, Clausewitz argued, should be written in clear language and aim to capture the majority of cases. Arguing that no guide could offer instructions for every occasion—nor should it attempt to do it—Clausewitz emphasized the need for reliance on "common sense." He also took a jab at the military profession and its love for elaborate paperwork, "which some find the service's particular dignity."
The practical field manual, he concluded, had to unify the force's performance. Clausewitz argued further that practical guidance for combat, military education, and war theory ought to be in constant dialog. To describe this theoretical and normative unification of conduct, Clausewitz used the term Methodismus or mode of procedure. The latter, not coincidently, was also a chapter in his treatise On War.
The Consequences for On War
In the 1990s, the eminent German scholar Werner Hahlweg briefly commented on the similarities between the 1825 Memorandum and the chapter in Book II, Chapter 4 (translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard as "Method and Routine").[12] Contrary to the popular perception that the entirety of Clausewitz's manuscripts had been lost in World War II, some of the early drafts are preserved in the German archives and provide clues on the development of his thought. The early version of Methodismus is one of those preserved.[13] Famously, as captured in the Note of 1827 published as the preface of On War, Clausewitz envisioned comprehensive revisions in the drafts, a plan never to be fulfilled due to his unexpected death in 1831.[14] The preservation of the earlier manuscripts allow us to study the development of Clausewitz's thought and particularly the influence of the 1825 events and the memorandum on his revisions of On War.
In its early version, the chapter offered a rather short discussion, merely two pages in print, on the place of guidance in the study of war and the role routine and patterns could play in military conduct. As Clausewitz wrote in the draft, with its complex enactment and ever-changing conditions, war may appear as a human activity the least amendable to rules, guidance, and routine. However, when considering that commanders usually worked with imperfect information and without the ability to oversee and control the execution of every order, basing disposition “on the general and probable” was often the case. (The paragraph was partially preserved in the mature version of On War).[15] Thus, the question Clausewitz raised in the early draft—but failed to answer—was how this methodical procedure should be devised to facilitate military performance on the field without becoming a stiff routine that shackled conduct and blinded commanders to the singular challenges they faced in combat.
The 1825 Memorandum helped Clausewitz to refine his thinking on the matter. The chapter in On War we read today is an extended meditation on the role guidance, regulations, and routine should and could play in the conduct of war. Echoing the memorandum, Clausewitz argued that a "method" or "mode of procedure" is a constantly recurring procedure "that has been selected from several possibilities." Despite its seeming uniformity, it could not describe all eventualities but "should be designed to meet the most probable cases. Routine is not based on definite individual premises, but rather on the average probability of analogous cases. Its aim is to postulate an average truth, which, when applied evenly and constantly, will soon acquire some of the nature of a mechanical skill."[16] Clausewitz also found an answer to the question he posed in the early draft, namely, how to create practical but undogmatic guidance for conduct on the field: "As such [routines] may well have a place in the theory of the conduct of war, provided they are not falsely represented as absolute, binding frameworks for action (systems); rather they are the best of the general forms, short cuts, and options that may be substituted for individual decisions."[17] In other words, they had to be understood for what they are—general guidelines and heuristics; thus, if keeping in mind their limitations, modes of procedure had their place. However, if they were seen as rules to be continuously followed, the guidelines would become counterproductive and even dangerous.
Additionally, as in the memorandum, Clausewitz saw procedures and routines in perpetual discourse with war theory; the latter, as he stated in the same chapter, was the "intelligent analysis of conduct of war."[18] While unified methods and routines are typical and acceptable on a tactical level, Clausewitz commented that, at the higher levels of war, some imitation of previously successful approaches, application of ready-made solutions, or preferences dictated by the fashion of the day was also unavoidable. The danger came, however, when people failed to recognize these routines on an operational and strategic level for what they were, a "style, developed out of a single case." As an antidote, war theory and its study, according to Clausewitz, are called to provide context and reveal when a method had outlived its time while simultaneously empowering leaders to seek and develop new approaches.[19]
Understanding Clausewitz's Experience
The discovery of the 1825 portrait and an understanding of its larger context reveals how little we still know about the military theorist's life and writing process. Although his war experience is extensively studied, Clausewitz's tangible achievements as a military reformer on the eve of the Wars of German Liberation and afterwards are not yet fully appreciated.[20] The process of creation of On War remains, too, largely unexplored, a circumstance particularly vexing given the treatise's unfinished nature. In fact, due to its complex language, the chapter on Methodismus discussed in this article is seldom read or debated in professional military seminars, despite its valuable insight into the business of war. By studying the roots of Clausewitz's ideas and their gradual development, we can better understand their meaning while broadening our modern interpretation of his thought.
Most of all, for today's national security practitioners exploring Clausewitz's thought process brings reassurance and encouragement. The Prussian general continuously reflected on practical challenges he encountered in war and peace—and strove to capture these reflections in a general theory transcending the constraints of early nineteenth-century warfare. Thus, his treatise is an homage and empowerment of those enlightened professionals who constantly study the business of war and strive to conduct it in an informed and effective manner.
Royal Parade on the Tempelhof Field" (Königsparade auf dem Tempelhofer Feld)” by Johann Jakob Kirchhoff, (Wikipedia)
Carl von Clausewitz to August Neidhardt von Gneisenau on Creating a Field Manual, 9 October 1825[21]
These days here and in Potsdam small-scale field exercises are starting, carried out mostly by light troops, namely Jäger {light elite infantry}, Schützen {marksmen}, Fusiliers {skirmishers}, hussars {light cavalry}, dragoons {mounted infantry}, and horse artillery, to continue for several weeks. Their purpose is to produce practical suggestions for field-duty regulations. In Potsdam, Colonel {August Wilhelm von} Neumann is going to be the commander, and Colonels {Eugen Maximilian von} Roeder and {Karl Friedrich Adolph von} Malachowski will be the observers and arbitrators. Here {in Berlin}, Lieutenant Colonel {Ulrich Friedrich Johann Gottlieb von} Barner will command and General {Adolf Eduard von} Thiele will be the second observer and arbitrator. I know too little about the matter to be able to judge the practicability of this measure. Still, it seems to me implausible that we will learn in a fourteen-day-long exercise what has not been learned while experiencing a four-year-long war. And it is more a question of capturing, through careful and persistent reflection, what needs to be prescribed and can be prescribed. When such a task is done tenfold in the office, it surely would be more practical than these meditations and observations made with reins in the hand. What I have in mind are five to six individuals with different backgrounds: a couple of capable drill instructors from the infantry and the cavalry, a couple of capable soldiers from the frontline of both branches, a couple of academically educated ones, meaning such who are already acquainted and understand the existing {body of knowledge} and know what a professional handbook should say.[22] They are tasked to create the first draft of a field manual and independently explore in detail their specific areas. These differing and in their biases surely very varying works would then provide the materials, from which a commission could draw ideas. This process would safeguard against one-sidedness and raise all concerns and complexities. However, if we begin, as it always happens, with a commission, then from the onset we will attain an artificial half-baked product {Halbding} divorced from any originality because in such a commission no member has an opportunity to express themself completely. From the very first moment, everyone holds back, and agreement is sought too early. In my opinion, a field manual, just as in war so in peace, should:
1. Capture only the most essential and useful matters, subsequently leaving out all immaterial or impractical forms; for the useful and needed is so much that it is even more unwarranted to clutter military service with paperwork, in which some find the service’s particular dignity.
2. To capture only what covers a majority of cases, for an instruction that includes points that cannot be applied in hundreds of cases, on the one hand, loses influence and gravitas; and on the other ceases to be among the required readings to which a practitioner adheres and, combined with one’s common sense, to belong among what amounts to everything a practitioner needs. If these rules are to be followed, then the regulations would also not be overshadowed by one component (for the whole text must be divided in such), and this is crucial.
3. As the main requirement for field regulations, I believe that the provisions concerning the engagement of the enemy amount to an elementary war study {Kriegslehre}, which covers topics from the whole so-called small war up to the positioning and application of a brigade. This way, a specific mode of procedure {Methodismus} in command of troops is created, which safeguards against too much ignorance and going astray while following some false ingenuity. This methodological procedure, when keeping up with military theory’s {Kriegskunst} development and not too outdated, is the best that an army could receive. The provisions captured in the military regulations should represent it {this methodological procedure}, and these provisions should serve at professional and advanced schools as the base for the curriculum, from which the art of fighting wars will be further developed; thereby, in this aspect too, we are safeguarded from going astray and, at the same time, the teacher can rely on a textbook, which is not divorced of authority.
However, all of this is just wishful thinking, for it is very difficult to implement. I beg Your Excellency all the more for forgiveness for having diverted your attention with it for so long.
Vanya Eftimova Bellinger is the author of Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War. She currently teaches at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: “Royal Parade on the Tempelhof Field" (Königsparade auf dem Tempelhofer Feld)” by Johann Jakob Kirchhoff, (Wikipedia)
Notes:
[1] See Kirchhoff’s biography in Neuer Nekrolog der Deutschen 1848 (Weimar: Voigt Verlag, 1850), 799-803. https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=LEzuCFYkFjsC&pg=GBS.PA536&hl=en
[2] Unpublished letter, Marie von Clausewitz to Karl von der Gröben, 8 December 1831, Prussian Privy State Archives, Berlin, HA VI, NL Karl von der Groeben, Uncatalogued Box Nr.56.
[3] Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, “A Portrait of Clausewitz as a Young Officer,” War on the Rocks, 23 October 2015. https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/a-portrait-of-clausewitz-as-a-young-officer/
[4] Clausewitz to Gneisenau, 9 and 25 October 1825, in Carl von Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe, Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz-, Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau-Nachlaß sowie aus öffentlichen und privaten Sammlungen, ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990), Vol. 2-1, 475 and 481.
[5] See the provenance on https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/YUNMXRUJPUJWRN5DACFC4FJ5HPZLEPSH.
[6] Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 307.
[7] Clausewitz to Gneisenau, 9 October 1825, in Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Briefe, Vol. 2-1, 477-479.
[8] On Scharnhorst and the reform circle, see Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, “Introducing #Scharnhorst: The Vision of an Enlightened Soldier ‘On Experience and Theory’,” The Strategy Bridge, 1 April 2019. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/4/1/introducing-scharnhorst-the-vision-of-an-enlightened-soldier-on-experience-and-theory
[9] Peter Paret, Yorck and The Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 179-181; Jürgen Angelow, Von Wien nach Königgrätz: Die Sicherheitspolitik des Deutschen Bundes im europäischen Gleichgewicht 1815–1866 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 76.
[10] Dennis E. Showalter, "The Prussian Landwehr and Its Critics, 1813-1819," Central European History 4, no. 1 (1971): 16-17.
[11] August Neidhardt von Gneisenau to War Minister Boyen, 5 August 1816, in G.H. Pertz and Hans Delbrück, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau, Vol.5 (Berlin: Reimer Verlag, 1880), 132-133.
[12] Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Briefe, Vol. 2-1, 478, n.21.
[13] Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Briefe, Vol.2-2, 659-661.
[14] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 69.
[15] Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Briefe, Vol. 2-2, 659-660, and Clausewitz, On War, 153.
[16] Clausewitz, On War, 151-152.
[17] Clausewitz, On War, 153.
[18] Clausewitz, On War, 154.
[19] Clausewitz, On War, 154-155.
[20] On Clausewitz's experiences as a soldier, see Donald Stoker, Clausewitz: His Life and Work (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[21] Carl von Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe, Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz-, Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau-Nachlaß sowie aus öffentlichen und privaten Sammlungen, ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990), Vol. 2-1, pp.477-479. Translated by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger. Dr. Christopher Bassford provided initial comments and corrections.
[22] Emphasis in the original. In his manuscripts and letters, Clausewitz frequently underlined sentences and key words he thought important. Unfortunately, later editions and English translations do not always reflect Clausewitz’s preferences. This translation reproduces the emphases as published in Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe, 477-479.
thestrategybridge.org · January 2, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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