Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"As you grow older, you will discover that you have two hands, one for helping yourself, the other for helping others."

– Audrey Hepburn

"I know in my heart that man is good. That what is right will always eventually triumph."

– Ronald Reagan

"People expect your behavior to conform to known patterns and conventions. Your task as a strategist is to upset their expectations."

– Robert Greene

1. New Year’s Violence Rattles U.S.

2. The Descent of an Army Vet Turned Corporate Consultant Named in the New Year’s Attack

3. Driver in Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion identified as Colorado Springs resident: Sources

4. What Matthew Livelsberger's social media reveals about Cybertruck suspect

5. 150 homemade bombs seized from Virginia farm is "largest" in FBI history, prosecutors say

6. Dual-Use Is a Strategy, Not a Category (Nor a Trap)

7. Why mainland China’s Taiwan integration experiment in Fujian is starting to fizzle

8. The Eurasian Century (Q&A: Mick Ryan and Hal Brands)

9. Here is the military service record for the New Orleans attack suspect

10. Psychedelic therapy begins in Colorado, causing tension between conservatives and veterans

11. There are so many drones in Ukraine that operators are stumbling onto enemy drone feeds and picking up intel

12. Here's Where Trump's Pentagon and National Security Nominees Stand Ahead of New Year

13. A Ukrainian drone pilot has a novel plan to smash Russia's formidable defenses

14. Russia’s Imperial Mindset: Understanding the Roots of the Ukraine War

15. Project 33 Is Enabling Joint All-Domain Operations in the Indo-Pacific

16. The US will have a Happy New Year if Trump takes 4 pieces of advice

17. A China-Taiwan War Would Start an Economic Crisis. America Isn’t Ready.

18. How an FBI Sting Stopped a Russian Smuggler but Not His Hong Kong Supply Route

19. FBI found 150 homemade bombs at Virginia home during search in December, prosecutors say

20. Don't Repeat in Syria the Mistakes of Afghanistan

21. A Last Chance for Iran

22. Irregular Warfare in 2024: Lessons Learned, Paths Forward

23. Who was Matthew Livelsberger, the US Army veteran named as a suspect in the Cybertruck explosion?

1. New Year’s Violence Rattles U.S.

The 5 major threats to America: revisionist (China, Russia) , rogue (Iran, north Korea) powers AND Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). And those violent extremist organizations can radicalize Americans and strike the homeland.

New Orleans attack and Las Vegas explosion come as authorities have warned of rising threats

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/new-years-violence-rattles-u-s-9c4ca719?mod=WSJ_home_mediumtopper_pos_1

By Sadie Gurman

Jan. 2, 2025 5:00 am ET

The attack in New Orleans left at least 15 people dead and more than 30 injured. Photo: Chris Graythen/Getty Images

Deadly vehicle incidents in a pair of U.S. tourist hubs rattled the country at the start of the new year, as law enforcement warned of a heightened threat of extremism and violence ahead.

In New Orleans, investigators were still piecing together what led a 42-year-old U.S. veteran to ram a rented Ford pickup into a crowd of New Year’s Eve revelers on Bourbon Street, killing 15 in an attack authorities said was inspired by Islamic State.

“This is not just an act of terrorism. This is evil,” New Orleans Police Superintendent Anne Kirkpatrick said. “We have a plan. We know what to do. We are going to get these people.”

Hours later in Las Vegas, the deadly explosion of a Tesla Cybertruck outside the Trump International Hotel further stirred fears. Much was still unknown about the blast that killed the driver and left seven others injured, but officials were investigating whether it, too, was an act of terrorism.

Billionaire Elon Musk, the chief executive of electric-car company Tesla, the maker of the Cybertruck, supported Trump’s 2024 presidential bid and has been a close adviser.

“It’s a Tesla truck. And we know that Elon Musk is working with President-elect Trump. And it’s the Trump Tower. So there’s obviously things to be concerned about there,” Las Vegas police department Sheriff Kevin McMahill said.

The Descent of an Army Vet Turned Corporate Consultant Named in the New Year’s Attack

Texas born and bred, Shamsud-Din Jabbar had worked at Deloitte before plowing a truck with an Islamic State flag into a New Orleans crowd

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/the-descent-of-an-army-vet-turned-corporate-consultant-named-in-the-new-years-attack-66aa1e67?st=cf1dsh&utm

By Jack Gillum

Follow, Cameron McWhirter

Follow and Scott Calvert

Updated Jan. 1, 2025 11:27 pm ET

Law-enforcement officials outside a residence in the Houston area on Wednesday. Photo: adrees latif/Reuters

The alleged terrorist behind the New Year’s killing spree in New Orleans was a born-and-bred Texan, an Army veteran, and father of three who had climbed the corporate ladder.

But Shamsud-Din Jabbar’s burnished professional résumé belied a path that had gone off course. In recent years, the Houston-area resident’s life appeared to take a grim turn, with a contentious divorce and his finances in a deep hole, according to a desperate email he sent to his then-wife’s lawyer in 2022.

“Time is of the essence. I can not afford the house payment. It is past due in excess of $27,000 and in danger of foreclosure if we delay settling the divorce,” he wrote, worried about the tens of thousands in credit-card and other debt he had racked up as his real-estate business was losing money.

An undated passport photo of Shamsud-Din Jabbar. Photo: FBI/AP

Law-enforcement officials have identified Jabbar, 42, as the man who rammed a rented Ford F-150 truck into a partying crowd in the heart of the French Quarter early Wednesday, leaving at least 15 dead, dozens injured and a reawakened national fear of terrorism on American soil. Jabbar died in a shootout with police, according to authorities, who said a black-and-white flag of the radical group Islamic State was found on the pickup. Explosive devices were found in the truck and neighborhood.

On his internal profile page at Deloitte, where he worked from 2021 to at least the past fall as a “senior solutions specialist,” Jabbar posted about his interests including hunting and prayer. He quoted an English translation of the Quran, from a section known as Al-Insan, or “The Man,” which discusses how faithful Muslims will be rewarded by God.

“Indeed, the righteous will drink from a cup whose mixture is of Kafur, A spring of which the servants of Allah will drink,” according to a copy of his profile viewed by The Wall Street Journal. “They will make it gush forth in force. They fulfill vows and fear a Day whose evil will be widespread.”

He set his out-of-office message on Dec. 20 and planned to return after Jan. 1: “Please expect a delay in response during this time.” Now his account is deactivated.

“We are shocked to learn of reports today that the individual identified as a suspect had any association with our firm. The named individual served in a staff-level role since being hired in 2021,” according to a Deloitte statement. “Like everyone, we are outraged by this shameful and senseless act of violence and are doing all we can to assist authorities in their investigation.”

An aerial view of the pickup truck that was driven into a crowd in New Orleans. Photo: Gerald Herbert/AP

On paper, Jabbar hit significant milestones: military service—including war deployment—a college degree from a state university and ascendance at Accenture, Ernst & Young and finally Deloitte. In addition to this work, he tried to make it in the real-estate business.

In a promotional video for his real-estate endeavor, Jabbar appeared with a groomed beard and wearing a sports jacket. He asked viewers in a polite, slight Texas lilt to contract his services for selling or leasing properties. He stressed his work ethic as he sat at a desk in front of a motivational poster urging discipline as a way to success.

He emphasized his Texas roots and a decade in the U.S. Army, serving as a human-resources and information-technology specialist. That experience, he said, was “where I learned the meaning of great service and what it means to be responsive and take everything seriously, dotting i’s and crossing t’s to make sure that things go off without a hitch.”

Marilyn Bradford, a former neighbor of Jabbar’s at an apartment complex in the northern part of Houston, described him as “very to himself” and said, “He wasn’t a sociable person at all.” Still, the 70-year-old retiree said Jabbar was an attentive neighbor who regularly asked her if she needed anything and gave her his vacuum cleaner, washer and dryer when he moved out around 2022.

“Every morning when he sees me he says, ‘How are you doing Miss Marilyn?’” said Bradford. “I can’t understand what he was going through.”

“He was good to his children. I never heard him get out of line with anybody,” she added.

Jabbar was born in 1982 and raised in Beaumont, Texas, a city about an hour east of Houston and not far from the Louisiana border. Records show his family has longstanding ties in East Texas and other parts of the South.

An image from a video posted by Jabbar online that promoted his work in real estate.

As a young man, he had run-ins with the law, according to court records. He was sentenced to nine months of probation after pleading guilty to a 2002 charge of petty theft in Katy, Texas. Three years later he was arrested for driving with a suspended license in Beaumont. He got six months of probation after pleading no contest.

Jabbar also started a family and entered the military. He married Nakedra Charrlle Jabbar, and the couple had two daughters. He initially tried to join the Navy in 2004, according to records, but left after a month. Two years later, he joined the Army, serving at bases in Alaska and North Carolina.

Jabbar had an unremarkable but solid military career, according to Army records. He deployed to Afghanistan in February 2009, serving for 11 months. Based on the limited information the military released about his record, it doesn’t appear he was in combat. In 2013, he was promoted to the rank of staff sergeant.

He faced disciplinary action twice for behavior tied to driving under the influence, a Defense Department official said, before leaving the Army as an active duty soldier in 2015.

He joined the reserves, where he served about five years, according to Defense Department officials. He was honorably discharged.

He studied computer-information systems at Georgia State University while working as a senior cloud analyst at Accenture, according to a résumé he posted online. It appears he worked in real estate and briefly incorporated a business of his own before moving back to Texas in 2018. From 2019 to 2021, he worked as a cloud-consulting manager for Ernst & Young.

Driver in Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion identified as Colorado Springs resident: Sources

denver7.com · by By: Robert Garrison , The Associated Press · January 2, 2025

LAS VEGAS — The driver of the Tesla Cybertruck that exploded in front of a Las Vegas hotel on New Year's Day has been identified as an Army veteran who lived in Colorado Springs, multiple informed sources told Denver7 Investigates.

Those sources tell Denver7 the driver was Matthew Livelsberger, who has multiple Colorado Springs addresses associated to him. FBI agents were staking out one of those addresses on Marksheffel Road late Wednesday awaiting a search warrant.

Livelsberger died in the explosion outside the Trump Hotel Wednesday morning. Firework mortars and camp fuel canisters were found inside the truck.

BREAKING—Multiple informed sources have confirmed to Denver7 Investigates that the driver of the Tesla Cybertruck that exploded earlier today in Las Vegas is Matthew Livelsberger who lived in Colorado Springs. @DenverChannel

— Tony Kovaleski (@TonyKovaleski) January 2, 2025

Late Wednesday, Denver7 Investigates learned that Livelsberger served at the same Army base as Shamsud-Din Jabbar, the suspect in a New Orleans truck rampagehours earlier.

Denver7 Investigates

Suspects in Vegas, New Orleans attacks served at same Army base: Denver7 sources

Tony Kovaleski

The sheriff of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Kevin McMahill, confirmed the truck used in the attack was rented in Colorado and driven to Nevada. The truck was rented via the Turo app in Colorado Springs.

McMahill said investigators were able to track the truck’s journey from Colorado to Las Vegas as the driver stopped at charging stations along the route.

Denver7

A Turo spokesperson released the following statement:

"We are heartbroken by the violence perpetrated in New Orleans and Las Vegas, and our prayers are with the victims and families. We are actively partnering with law enforcement authorities as they investigate both incidents. We do not believe that either renter involved in the Las Vegas and New Orleans attacks had a criminal background that would have identified them as a security threat. We remain committed to maintaining the highest standards in risk management, thanks to our world-class trust and safety technologies and teams that include experienced former law enforcement professionals."

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police and Clark County Fire Department officials said in a news conference that a person died inside the futuristic-looking pickup truck and they were working to get the body out. Seven people nearby had minor injuries and several were taken to a hospital.

The fire in the valet area of the Trump International Hotel Las Vegas was reported at 8:40 a.m., a county spokesperson said in a statement.

Tesla CEO Elon Musk said Wednesday afternoon on X that "we have now confirmed that the explosion was caused by very large fireworks and/or a bomb carried in the bed of the rented Cybertruck and is unrelated to the vehicle itself. All vehicle telemetry was positive at the time of the explosion.”

"The whole Tesla senior team is investigating this matter right now,” Musk said in an earlier post on the platform after attending a New Year's Eve party at Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort. “We’ve never seen anything like this.”

Law enforcement officials have not ruled out terrorism as a possible motive, a person familiar with the matter said.

Cybertruck that exploded outside Trump Hotel in Las Vegas rented in Colorado

Coloradans making a difference | Denver7 featured videos

4. What Matthew Livelsberger's social media reveals about Cybertruck suspect

Oh no. I hope this can go into the category of "the first report is always wrong." Especially since this reporting is coming from analysis of various social media .

Excerpts:

According to the profile on LinkedIn, Livelsberger was an operations director and intelligence manager. He worked in the U.S. Army for over 19 years.

He began as a special forces communications specialist, a role he held for nine years. He then became a special forces intelligence and operations specialist, a role he had for seven years.

Livelsberger then became a special forces operations manager and team sergeant, a role he held for a little under two years, before becoming a remote and autonomous systems manager in November.

What Matthew Livelsberger's social media reveals about Cybertruck suspect

Newsweek · by Marni Rose McFall · January 2, 2025

Matthew Livelsberger has been named in reports as the suspect found dead inside an explosives-filled Tesla Cybertruck that blew up outside President-elect Donald Trump's Las Vegas hotel on Wednesday, New Year's Day 2025.

Colorado Springs station KOAA and the New York Post have reported that Livelsberger, a 37-year-old former Army veteran, is the suspect, citing unnamed law enforcement sources.

There have been a number of posts on social media that identify social media accounts, purportedly linked to Matt Livelsberger, that reveal details about his life.

Newsweek has reached out to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department via email for comment.

The Context

One person died and seven more were injured after the explosion cause fire to erupt in the valet area outside the Trump International Hotel at Las Vegas Boulevard at around 8:40 a.m. local time, according to authorities. The dead person was said to have been behind the wheel of the vehicle that exploded.

Police have yet to determine what caused the incident and are investigating whether it was an act of terrorism.

What We Know

There are three social media accounts in question: a LinkedIn account linked to Matt Livelsberger, a Facebook account linked to a Matt Berg, and a Facebook account linked to what appears to be a wife or girlfriend of Livelsberger, named Sara Livelsberger.

Newsweek has not been able to independently verify the veracity of these accounts.

Cybertruck explosion: Live updates as Matthew Livelsberger named as suspect

According to the social media profiles which appear to belong to Livelsberger and his partner, he was a former veteran from Colorado Springs.

According to the profile on LinkedIn, Livelsberger was an operations director and intelligence manager. He worked in the U.S. Army for over 19 years.

He began as a special forces communications specialist, a role he held for nine years. He then became a special forces intelligence and operations specialist, a role he had for seven years.

Livelsberger then became a special forces operations manager and team sergeant, a role he held for a little under two years, before becoming a remote and autonomous systems manager in November.

He studied at Norwich University in Vermont, where he obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis, and graduated summa cum laude.

According to LinkedIn, he received a State Meritorious Honor Award from the Department of State.

Livelsberger was active on LinkedIn, and often commented on posts from colleagues in the military. In a comment on one post about student debt, he responded to a question asking who was responsible for debts saying, "The govt."

The LinkedIn profile also lists that he was interested in human rights and animal welfare.

Although all three of the profiles have been shared on social media, there are discrepancies. The Matt Berg profile has a different surname, and the man in the pictures on the profile looks different from the man in the pictures on the Matt Livelsberger LinkedIn account, and the Sara Livelsberger Facebook page.

The details on the Sara Livelsberger page and the Matt Livelsberger LinkedIn match up. A post on Sara Livelsberger Facebook page from 2015 reads: "It is my old ass husbands's 28th birthday!" This aligns with Livelsberger's reported age of 37 now.

The Facebook account for Sara Livelsberger posted many pictures of Matt Livelsberger, and many posts spoke about their relationship. The last post on this account was from May, 2016.

An account on X, formerly Twitter, also belonged to a Sara Livelsberger. It has not been posted on since 2015. As such, it is unclear whether Sara Livelsberger, who appeared to be the wife or girlfriend of Matt Livelsberger, is still connected to him.

In posts shared on Sara Livelsberger's Facebook account, Matt Livelsberger is seen going out to rock music concerts, holidaying in Puerto Rico and spending time with dogs.

Images from LinkedIn and Facebook show Mathew Livelsberger, a 37-year-old former army veteran who has been named in reports as the suspect in the Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion. On January 1, 2025, a Tesla Cybertruck... Images from LinkedIn and Facebook show Mathew Livelsberger, a 37-year-old former army veteran who has been named in reports as the suspect in the Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion. On January 1, 2025, a Tesla Cybertruck exploded in Las Vegas, leaving one dead and seven injured. Matthew Livelsberger/Linkedin Sarah Livelsberger/Facebook

Livelsberger reportedly died in the blast.

The suspect is believed to have rented the Tesla Cybertruck via the carsharing company Turo in Colorado.

ABC affiliates have reported that multiple addresses have been associated with the alleged suspect, and the FBI are awaiting a search warrant for one of the residences.

Images from Sara Livelsberger's Facebook show Mathew Livelsberger, a 37-year-old former army veteran who has been named in reports as the suspect in the Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion. On January 1, 2025, a Tesla Cybertruck... Images from Sara Livelsberger's Facebook show Mathew Livelsberger, a 37-year-old former army veteran who has been named in reports as the suspect in the Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion. On January 1, 2025, a Tesla Cybertruck exploded in Las Vegas, leaving one dead and seven injured. Sara Livelsberger/Facebook

What People Are Saying

Las Vegas County Sheriff Kevin McMahill said in a news conference on Wednesday: "At this time, we are investigating a number of leads, and I'm not prepared to release any of that information to you just yet. I can tell you that there are seven victims right now that sustained injuries from the explosion."

Jeremy Schwartz, acting FBI Special Agent in Charge for the Las Vegas office, at a news conference: "I know you have a lot of questions."

"We don't have a lot of answers," he added.

What's Next

The Las Vegas police announced they are investigating the fire and explosion. At Wednesday's news conference, Schwartz confirmed that the FBI is also involved in the investigation.

Do you have a story Newsweek should be covering? Do you have any questions about this story? Contact LiveNews@newsweek.com.

Newsweek · by Marni Rose McFall · January 2, 2025

5. 150 homemade bombs seized from Virginia farm is "largest" in FBI history, prosecutors say

While we focus on New Orleans and Las Vegas we should not overlook this incident. (which seems to have been overlooked in reporting since his arrest on December 17th).

150 homemade bombs seized from Virginia farm is "largest" in FBI history, prosecutors say

Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · January 2, 2025

13 hours ago - Politics & Policy

"Largest" explosives cache "in FBI history" seized from farm, prosecutors say

Rebecca Falconer

The Department of Justice (DOJ) headquarters building in Washington, D.C. Photo: J. David Ake/Getty Images

The FBI found more than 150 homemade bombs during a raid on a Virginia farm when they arrested a man on a firearms charge, federal prosecutors allege.

The big picture: Preliminarily assessments of the haul seized from Brad Kenneth Spafford's Isle of Wight County farm indicate it's "the largest seizure by number of finished explosive devices in FBI history," per a court filing from federal prosecutors. His defense lawyers say there's no evidence that he planned to commit any acts of violence.

The 36-year-old Spafford allegedly used pictures of President Biden "for target practice," prosecutors said in the memorandum of support, filed Monday in U.S. federal court in Norfolk, seeking to keep Spafford in detention.
The FBI found pipe bombs in a detached garage and in a backpack in the home's bedroom that was labeled "#nolivesmatter" — an apparent reference to an extremist movement that promotes violence.

Context: The movement "promotes targeted attacks, mass killings, and criminal activity, and has historically encouraged members to engage in self-harm and animal abuse," per an August threat assessment from the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness.

Zoom in: Spafford was taken into custody and charged with possession of a firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act after being arrested on Dec. 17. More charges were expected to be filed.

Defense lawyers called for Spafford's immediate release in a Tuesday filing.
"There is not a shred of evidence in the record that Mr. Spafford ever threatened anyone and the contention that someone might be in danger because of their political views and comments is nonsensical," they wrote.

What we're watching: The federal judge overseeing the case said Spafford should be released under certain conditions including electronic monitoring, but agreed to keep him in detention while government lawyers appeal the decision, per VPM.

Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · January 2, 2025

6. Dual-Use Is a Strategy, Not a Category (Nor a Trap)

Excerpts:

As the range of technologies relevant to servicemembers has grown from highly specialized hardware platforms to widely available but nonetheless critical technologies, a widening landscape of solutions has the potential to benefit from well-executed strategies. Indeed, among the critical technologies listed by the United States as essential to its economic and national security, only a small number are “defense only” in their application, suggesting that defense-first or dual-use strategies are more essential than ever for our collective future. That said, for most founders, investors, and customers, it is challenging to understand and operate in two distinctive contexts, with different language, pathways, and cultures.

Our message to these founders and their investors is to recognize the opportunity as a strategic choice, not a categorical one. At times, military and commercial civilian contexts are mutually reinforcing with activities undertaken in support of one path being beneficial in the other. More typically, the pathways are conflicting or diverging, and pursuing both can be distracting and difficult, especially at the start. Cutting through the noise around dual-use as a category (or trap) and instead reframing it as a strategy, we are educating and expanding the community of entrepreneurs, investors, and innovators who aim to have an impact on “the mission.”

Dual-Use Is a Strategy, Not a Category (Nor a Trap) - War on the Rocks

Gene Keselman and Fiona Murray

warontherocks.com · by Gene Keselman · January 2, 2025

The term “dual-use” is something of a lightning rod in the startup world, sparking debates about its meaning and usefulness. In these virtual pages, Jake Chapman wrote that “reliance on dual-use technology is a trap,” arguing that timing issues, intellectual property controls, and commercial interests undermine the essential prioritization of defense needs. Others have worried that categorizing projects as dual-use excludes them from a range of funding sources or banking services. Some founders have even discovered that if they are categorized as having dual-use technology, they are assumed to be working in conflict with environmental, social, and governance guidelines. These barriers stymie our ability to invest in and build solutions for our collective security.

Our experience from MIT, working with startups across a range of critical technologies exploring defense and commercial civilian markets, is to define dual-use as a strategy, not a category. The technologies that can serve both military and civilian purposes are so wide that as a category, dual-use has a diminishing meaning. In reality, early stage founders build a capability and, as good entrepreneurs, consider the best market fit across commercial and military markets as necessary and with a clear focus. In other words, dual-use is a market strategy that might be deployed defense-first, commercial-first, or both (when economically effective due to scale constraints in some niche defense markets). This is not a cop-out. To assume up front which strategy an entrepreneur might take is to remove their agency and expertise and the fundamentally exploratory nature of venture building.

The historical origins of the term dual-use lie in the post–World War II era, when it focused on a narrow set of nuclear materials with the potential to be deployed in military (weapons) and civilian (power) applications. Today, it is used loosely to cover an extraordinarily wide range of companies whose products and services might solve military as well as civilian problems. In investment settings, until recently, large funders like the European Investment Fund have precluded ventures building dual-use solutions for defense. Others only considered these ventures appropriate for backing if commercial markets were explored first or constituted the majority of sales. But each of these boundary conditions is increasingly blurred. For the European Investment Fund, so-called dual-use investment is now welcomed, and the boundary is simply drawn to exclude ammunition and weapons. But dual-use as a category continues to confuse investors and markets as it lacks a clear, useful definition.

Instead of playing with category boundaries, for venture teams and their investors, dual-use must be understood as a strategy that shapes plans and priorities and emphasizes ethical adoption in all use cases. A dual-use strategy (regardless of whether it puts defense first or in parallel with civilian use cases), like any market entry strategy, is about making tradeoffs: which solution to build and for whom, how to test it, how to fund it, and how to appropriately deploy it. For example, a company could start off working with military procurement offices to navigate the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation and later, perhaps, move on to engaging business development teams with traditional commercial companies, or vice versa. Some entrepreneurs will be successful focusing on defense customers alone (if the market is large enough), and some will attempt and then outright reject those customers in favor of commercial ones, while still others will discover a defense market after years in civilian markets. Regardless of the precise path, a dual-use strategy needs a clear language and strategic framework to effectively move from one side to the other at that appropriate stage in a venture’s lifecycle.

Become a Member

Language and Translation

Pursuing a dual-use strategy that effectively attends to both military and commercial customers means building a dual identity and establishing the ability to work in different contexts. It’s rather like being bilingual, but it’s more than just being able to speak perfect French and English. Instead, the better analogy is knowing how to operate seamlessly in the cultural context of France and the United States. Indeed, aiming to succeed in both commercial and mission-driven markets (including those across defense and national security) is a choice that comes with a variety of challenges.

As a starting point for deploying a dual-use strategy in whatever order your team chooses, our goal is to teach entrepreneurs to “speak mission” and vice versa. To put it differently, we aim to translate the strategic pathways and milestones for commercial ecosystems into defense ecosystems and back again. Without a shared language (or at least a dictionary), startups, investors, and government stakeholders risk being misaligned, confused, and unable to seize the opportunities that lie before them. And the more opportunities that are seized, the bigger the industrial base becomes for our collective national security. From our experience, the starting point for speaking the language of dual-use highlights three dimensions: customers, funding, and technology.

The commercial and defense markets are vastly different. Typical commercial markets have fierce competition, a focus on rapid innovation, and a direct relationship between customers and products. They have demanding customers who focus on economic efficiency. In contrast, the mission market often operates within a more structured environment, with long timelines, stringent regulations, and a complex web of stakeholders that may lie between the capability and the end user but often focus more on end capabilities. Within both markets, there are customers, but the way customers are described and the way they make choices differ dramatically. And likewise, their buying process is distinctive.

Mission-driven organizations have multiple stakeholders, including program executives, end users, acquisition authorities, influencers, gatekeepers, and more. Each brings distinct needs and priorities, all of which have to be aligned to drive the decision to authorize, fund, purchase, and operationalize a capability for use “in the field.” When commercial customers make their purchasing decisions, their processes are typically driven by direct market demand, techno-economics, shorter urgent timelines, and more straightforward transactions. They can “single-source,” or select one supplier without concerns about violating rules that force competitive searches. They can issue purchase orders, sign letters of intent, or enter into master service agreements without navigating layers of bureaucratic approval. Decisions are more likely to be based on considerations such as return on investment and competitive advantage. Negotiations focus on price, delivery schedules, and performance metrics.

In contrast, government customers operate under a complex set of regulations and with a specialized vocabulary. Agencies must adhere to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Supplemental, which mandate procedures like full and open competition and require formal solicitation processes such as requests for proposals, requests for information, and broad agency announcements. Terms like justification and approval and source selection are important to fully grasp, and you must know the difference between cost-plus, fixed price, and indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts. Compliance with policies like the Buy American Act, small business set-asides, 8(a), and specific government socio-economic goals adds complexity, but in moments of urgent need, these can be overcome and the government customer operates at pace.

The second dimension where language matters is funding. Commercial ventures often rely on capital referred to as “dilutive,” funding from investors such as angels (individuals investing their own money) or venture capitalists (institutional investors investing others’ money) who take an equity stake in the venture. Terms like seed funding, series A/B/C rounds, and pre-money valuation are common in these discussions. As described by Brian McCarthy in these pages, the “valley of death” where seven in ten startups fail within the first few years is exacerbated by limited funding for research contracts and complex processes. Startups may negotiate term sheets outlining investment terms, including instruments like convertible notes. Government funding, on the other hand, is generally “non-dilutive” and comes in forms such as grants and contracts from discrete government offices. While this funding usually does not require giving up equity or ownership, the contractual complexities that come with this type of funding are equally important to appreciate. Government funding can provide opportunities to support some of the research and development but in its later and larger phases involves a labyrinth of regulations and compliance requirements where startups must understand statements of work and deliverables, and must adhere to strict reporting metrics. When it comes to funding, intellectual property rights can also be a significant consideration, with concepts like government purpose rights and data rights affecting how a startup can leverage its technology.

The third dimension where language matters is technology. While the underlying solution might be similar for commercial and defense contexts, the way technological progress is described and measured can differ significantly. In defense and wider government settings, technology is often discussed in terms of strict specifications, requirements, and compliance with standards such as military specifications and technology readiness levels. While the goal is to acquire capabilities that meet mission needs, these precise technology requirements are designed to ensure compatibility and effectiveness within the broader mission system. Mission users expect evidence of progress through formal processes such as field trials, operational tests and evaluations, and simulations like war games that replicate real-world scenarios. They focus on meeting rigorous criteria, with extensive documentation and adherence to protocols like configuration management and risk management.

In contrast, commercial customers emphasize features, benefits, user experience, and value propositions. Within a clear and often demanding focus on unit economics (driven by a demand for significant margins and low costs), they are interested in attributes like performance, scalability, and usability, with evidence of progress shown through prototypes, beta releases, and pilot programs. Development methodologies are more fluid, employing agile practices and focusing on rapid iteration based on customer feedback. Metrics such as user engagement, customer satisfaction scores, and net promoter scores are critical. Understanding these differences is crucial for startups pursuing a dual-use strategy; they must adeptly translate their technological capabilities into the language and metrics that resonate with each distinct market to avoid misalignment.

In recent years, government and defense customers have been integrating commercial methodologies and language into their organizations. Not content with the slow pace of market adoption, they have started to attempt to integrate terms such as valley of death, proof of concept, and scaling. And indeed, as more ventures move between commercial and defense markets, the lines continue to be blurred. That said, without an appreciation of the mapping from the language of one context to the other, startup ventures, their investors, and government stakeholders risk confusion and may be unable to seize the opportunities that lie before them.

A Strategy Framework

Beyond these essential semantics, the complexities of navigating both commercial and mission-driven markets require a structured model for success.

We do not advocate that leaders of a startup venture necessarily pursue a dual-use strategy from the start (i.e., defense and civilian). Rather, whatever your start point — whether it’s on the mission side and eventually moves into commercial markets, or vice versa — it is essential to appreciate that if you ultimately engage in both, you need to be able to map and translate successful milestones in one to the other to be efficient in how you use your resources.

At MIT, we have developed the Dual-Use Readiness Levels™ framework as a guide to help startup teams understand the language of both sides of the strategy, tack from one to another at the right time, and evaluate readiness across five critical dimensions: commercial funding, mission funding, commercial customers, mission customers, and technology. When put into practice, this framework establishes a common language between a startup and its potential customers, whether they are military mission–focused organizations or more traditional commercially focused ones.

By utilizing these dual-use readiness levels, we have found that startups can better navigate market complexities, secure diverse funding sources, and achieve growth. They can also appreciate the misunderstandings that arise when moving from one world into the other, and the need to build a team that is bilingual and has the characteristics of both contexts. By removing some of the debate around categories and focusing on strategies, we can accelerate the pace at which allies and partners are building the next generation of essential capabilities to the most significant challenges of our time. And we hope this alleviates some of the ambiguity that limits investors and their limited partners.

To demonstrate the ways in which dual-use is a strategy, not a category — and one that can be pursued in different orders and over different time frames — consider the team of Air Force veterans pursuing master of business administration degrees at Harvard and MIT in 2016. With their expertise in atmospheric physics and machine learning, they founded ClimaCell, a company with the ambitious goal of revolutionizing weather forecasting. While recognizing the potential of their technology in both commercial and defense sectors (and with a deep instinctive pull toward mission), they embarked upon a journey that started with commercial aviation, building strong sales in weather and climate security with over 120 clients in business verticals. In 2021 they expanded their strategy to incorporate government customers, first the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and then the United States Air Force, to support “data-as-a-service from its spaceborne radars.” Turning from commercial to military customers was the realization of a strategic dual-use vision articulated at the outset by the team. But it required the leadership to navigate the complexities of these two markets, working to drive efficiencies and perfect the product accuracy with commercial customers and then take more ambitious steps with military ones. At each point in their journey, they chose to emphasize one market and one identity over another, making key strategic choices at each milestone. Today, this “dual-use venture” known as Tomorrow.io has significant funding from venture capitalists and government agencies. It provides mission-critical weather intelligence to industries ranging from aviation and energy to defense and national security and has a team that balances the priorities and requirements of very different customers. The team is effectively bilingual.

Few entrepreneurs have the sorts of backgrounds that easily combine military and commercial markets as extensively as the Tomorrow.io team. Nor do all ventures explicitly focus on one market with an eye to learning and expansion into another. Take iRobot, founded decades before Tomorrow.io by a group of roboticists from MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Lab. They focused their early work solely on robots for military applications, leading to the creation of the PackBot, a ruggedized robot used for bomb disposal, reconnaissance missions in Afghanistan, and, unexpectedly, in search and rescue missions after 9/11. But what today would have been deemed a defense company ended up making a strategic decision to extend into the commercial space and develop the Roomba, a robotic vacuum cleaner. Its rapid popularity in the consumer market (and the very nascent defense market) set the company on a path of incredible commercial success at a time when the defense market pathway was not as clear or lucrative, and the company eventually sold off its military division.

Other ventures like Shield.AI are laser-focused on military markets but still emphasize the long-term potential for their AI-based drone piloting technology in complex commercial settings such as offshore oil and gas inspection. When Shield.AI approached the military, they already understood the programs of record they were hoping to access and had insight into the government procurement opportunities. Their chosen starting point was U.S. Special Operations Command, whose ability to work rapidly with startups is unique in the U.S. Department of Defense context. As they sought to expand, they chose to work closely with larger contractors as part of a wider systems integration effort as well.

As the range of technologies relevant to servicemembers has grown from highly specialized hardware platforms to widely available but nonetheless critical technologies, a widening landscape of solutions has the potential to benefit from well-executed strategies. Indeed, among the critical technologies listed by the United States as essential to its economic and national security, only a small number are “defense only” in their application, suggesting that defense-first or dual-use strategies are more essential than ever for our collective future. That said, for most founders, investors, and customers, it is challenging to understand and operate in two distinctive contexts, with different language, pathways, and cultures.

Our message to these founders and their investors is to recognize the opportunity as a strategic choice, not a categorical one. At times, military and commercial civilian contexts are mutually reinforcing with activities undertaken in support of one path being beneficial in the other. More typically, the pathways are conflicting or diverging, and pursuing both can be distracting and difficult, especially at the start. Cutting through the noise around dual-use as a category (or trap) and instead reframing it as a strategy, we are educating and expanding the community of entrepreneurs, investors, and innovators who aim to have an impact on “the mission.”

Become a Member

Gene R. Keselman is a lecturer at MIT School of Management, the executive director of MIT Mission Innovation Experimental,and managing director of MIT’s venture studio, Proto Ventures. He is also an officer in the U.S. Air Force Reserve.

Dame Fiona Murray is associate dean of innovation at the MIT School of Management. She is vice chair of the NATO Innovation Fund and sits on the Defence Innovation Advisory Panel at the U.K. Ministry of Defence.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Gene Keselman · January 2, 2025

7. Why mainland China’s Taiwan integration experiment in Fujian is starting to fizzle

"Money can't buy me love." (or so said Lennon and McCartney)

Taiwan

China Politics

Why mainland China’s Taiwan integration experiment in Fujian is starting to fizzle

Beijing invests billions into luring Taiwanese to Fujian’s Pingtan county, but it has yet to translate into political loyalty

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3293045/why-mainland-chinas-taiwan-integration-experiment-fujian-starting-fizzle?utm_source=rss_feed

Amber Wangin Beijing

Published: 6:00am, 2 Jan 2025Updated: 6:27am, 2 Jan 2025

Fujian province has become a test bed for mainland China’s push for economic, social and political integration with Taiwan. In this story – the first in a four-part on-the-ground series – Amber Wang details the 15-year integration drive in Fujian’s Pingtan county, which appears to be losing steam as the mainland economy falters, military tensions grow and Beijing struggles to turn cross-strait business ties into political loyalty.

For Allen Xue, a Taiwanese woman, the allure of moving just across the Taiwan Strait to the coastal county of Pingtan on the mainland was hard to resist.

Earlier this year, she settled into a compound specifically tailored for Taiwanese and bought it at a price far below market value.

Many decades ago, Pingtan, located just 110km (68 miles) from Taiwan in Fujian province, was a collection of underdeveloped fishing towns that served as a base for mainland Chinese attempting to illegally enter Taiwan.

Much has changed since then. Around 15 years ago, the county became a test site for economic, social and political integration with Taiwan. Business and infrastructure boomed as Beijing invested billions into building links across the strait.

However, the integration drive seems to be losing steam after its initial progress as the mainland’s economy stumbles and cross-strait tensions grow, according to Taiwanese residents of Fujian and Beijing policy advisers interviewed by the South China Morning Post.

While some Taiwanese businesses have taken advantage of the scheme, the plan has not succeeded in fostering deep cross-strait economic ties or political loyalty towards Beijing.

Pingtan, once a symbol of opportunity, is now dotted with abandoned factories and industrial estates and empty storefronts. The Taiwanese who remain there are left with mixed feelings – hope, scepticism, and even fear.

A mainland scholar, who advises on Taiwan affairs for multiple government bodies, said the effectiveness of the integration plan remained “limited”.

“The success of integrated development requires moving beyond exchanges based on economic interests to find ideological and political common ground,” said the scholar, who requested anonymity.

A once-a-millennium opportunity

In the late 1970s, as Beijing sought to integrate into the US-led global economic order following the death of leader Mao Zedong, it tuned down its rhetoric about “liberating Taiwan”, or taking over the island by force.

Beijing started advocating for “peaceful reunification” and exploring ways to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, though it has not ruled out the use of force to take the island back, if necessary.

Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese business leaders have come to mainland China to set up factories since the 1980s, attracted by its economic reforms and market potential. Taiwanese people have made 100 million visits to the mainland since the exchanges began in 1987.

In 2009, Pingtan was designated as a site to explore “common governance” centred around Beijing’s “one country, two systems” reunification formula.

In 2014, President Xi Jinping visited the area to unveil his vision of “integrated development”, an ambitious plan to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese by strengthening economic, social, and cultural ties – ultimately laying the groundwork for peaceful reunification and governance.

Pingtan was chosen as a place to try out the strategy, whose principles include shared development opportunities, equal treatment, and cross-strait connectivity in trade, infrastructure, and public services.

While in Pingtan, Xi reminded local officials that the county faced a “once-in-a-thousand-year opportunity”.

‘Every bit of strength’: Taiwanese leader William Lai vows to boost island’s defences

Beijing invested more than 150 billion yuan (US$20.6 billion) in infrastructure in the county from 2012 to 2022.

During this period, the number of Taiwanese residents in Pingtan grew from just a few dozen to over 3,000, and more than 1,000 Taiwanese enterprises were established in the county.

Industrial estates and residential communities aimed at serving Taiwanese businesses and residents proliferated, and certain government posts were reserved for Taiwanese people.

Beijing even planned a direct rail link connecting Pingtan to Taiwan in just half an hour to be completed by 2035 – a key reason Xue chose to settle in the county – though Taipei has shown no signs of interest in giving it the green light.

In September of last year, Beijing sought to replicate some of the Pingtan experience elsewhere in Fujian, declaring the province a “model zone for integrated development” and aiming for “substantial progress” by 2025.

In a 21-point plan issued at the time, Beijing sought to create shared industrial standards, foster social integration and encourage more Taiwanese to visit.

A year later, mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) recounted some successes of the plan. It said that in the first half of 2023, a total of 434,000 Taiwanese entered mainland China via Fujian’s ports, a 65 per cent increase from the previous year.

During the same period, over 1,500 Taiwanese people in 50 professions obtained certificates to practise in Fujian as part of the mainland’s policy to recognise Taiwanese standards, the TAO said.

The integration push has been backed by generous state financing. For example, the coastal city of Xiamen offers a subsidy of up to 1.5 million yuan per year for Taiwanese professionals who work in the city, while Taiwanese entrepreneurs who start businesses in Xiamen’s Huli district may receive start-up funds of up to 150,000 yuan.

The city also has policies to recruit Taiwanese talent in the integrated circuit industry, offering tens of thousands of yuan for those who join a mainland company in the sector.

Losing economic steam

However, Taiwanese companies operating in Fujian face challenges, including a lack of industrial clusters and skilled talent, a slowing mainland economy and tougher competition from mainland rivals, according to business owners and observers.

Following remarkable annual GDP growth averaging 9.3 per cent from 2012 to 2022, Pingtan’s economic growth slowed to just 3 per cent in 2023, compared with 4.5 per cent for Fujian province.

Pingtan’s 2023 growth rate was the second slowest of any city in the province, while just five years earlier it had the second-fastest-growing economy in Fujian.

A once-bustling duty-free market in Pingtan – previously home to over 300 Taiwanese vendors selling products from the island – is now nearly deserted and quiet.

“We just don’t make money here – there are hardly any customers except during the summer tourist season, and our Taiwanese products have gradually lost competitiveness on the mainland,” said a vendor surnamed Ye, who was considering leaving.

“Especially since the pandemic, the number of Taiwanese here has gradually declined,” she added.

Despite tax breaks and incentives, many frustrated Taiwanese businesses have departed Pingtan, leaving behind empty industrial estates and abandoned factories.

A new generation of Taiwanese young people is exploring government-backed initiatives and start-ups, but their numbers remain low.

Last month, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council released numbers from the January to September period showing rapidly declining investment on the mainland, falling from US$8.49 billion in 2018 to US$3.04 billion in 2023.

It added that investment in Fujian accounted for only 0.03 per cent of total Taiwanese investment outside the island.

Mainland authorities responded, saying the mainland was the “top choice” for the island’s investors, but did not provide numbers on total Taiwanese investment on the mainland.

Instead they pointed to growth in the number of investment contracts and cross-strait trade volume. They also noted 1,121 new Taiwan-funded enterprises were established in Fujian in the first half of 2024, up 27.4 per cent compared to the same period last year.

According to Beijing, the number of Taiwan Compatriot Residence Permits in Fujian in the first half of this year was 2.6 times that of the same period last year.

Mainland China’s economic downturn is a key reason it has become less attractive for Taiwanese businesses, said Tang Yonghang, a Taiwan affairs specialist at Xiamen University.

“In recent years, as our economic growth has slowed, that means fewer opportunities here,” Tang said.

The tense atmosphere across the strait, as well as the trade and tech rivalry between Beijing and Washington, have made many people proceed with “extra caution”, Tang said.

The rise of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan has not helped.

Official interactions between the island and mainland were frozen and people-to-people exchanges were limited after the independence-leaning party came to power in 2016. Since then, integration has been a “one-way effort”, according to several mainland observers.

In recent years, the Taiwanese government has introduced policies and incentives aimed at steering Taiwanese investments towards Southeast Asia or back home.

Yu Xintian, a researcher with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, blamed the DPP for pushing the island and its people away from the mainland and said the two sides were almost at a state of “economic decoupling”.

“The situation is largely due to the impact of the pandemic and the cooling of cross-strait relations. Since [former Taiwanese leader] Tsai Ing-wen took office [in 2016], the DPP administration has placed significant restrictions on cross-strait exchanges,” she said.

Taiwanese businesspeople in Fujian also pointed to the suspension of a passenger ferry as another DPP effort to stall economic integration.

The Haixia ferry, which over a decade carried more than 1 million people between Pingtan and three cities in Taiwan, has been suspended since the coronavirus pandemic erupted in 2020.

Taipei has rejected the ferry company’s application to resume operations 20 times.

Can money buy loyalty?

Beijing wants the integration efforts to lead to deeper political recognition of the mainland among Taiwanese, but they have so far not delivered on that goal.

A February survey by the Election Study Centre of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University showed that only 2.4 per cent of Taiwanese identify as Chinese, the lowest since 1992.

Roughly a month before the election in January, Song Tao, director of the mainland’s Taiwan affairs office, hosted 152 Taiwanese business moguls and told them they should “aim to steer cross-strait relations back onto the right track”.

But so far interactions have remained at a superficial level of cooperation, analysts said.

Yang Kaihuang, a professor with Taiwan’s Mingchuan University, said that while Beijing had introduced favourable measures for Taiwan and promoted broad exchanges in recent decades, they had inadvertently fostered anti-Beijing sentiment on the island.

“This would mean a significant risk for the governance of Taiwan after unification,” he said. “The costs are too high if we aim at political outcomes with economically preferential policies, and the pushes now are too rushed.”

While most Taiwanese businesses on the mainland are Beijing-friendly, Tang from Xiamen University said there was a certain degree of “separation of politics and economics” among Taiwanese businesspeople on the mainland.

He noted that some who were making money on the mainland still supported the DPP, with some cases of those being punished by the mainland in recent years.

Tang suggested Beijing take a “differentiated” approach – offering benefits to those who recognise both sides as one country, but withholding them from those who do not.

“If you consider me a friend, I’ll treat you as one; if you’re my enemy, I’ll treat you as such,” Tang said.

However, the integration push did succeed in reinforcing friendly sentiment towards Beijing among business owners who feel attached to the mainland.

Taiwanese businessman Chen Mengbang said that “the financial support is very generous and beneficial to Taiwanese people”.

He received a 15 per cent corporate income tax reduction and over 1 million yuan in funding for his tech company established in Pingtan.

Wang Shenhao is a young Taiwanese man who operates a government-funded cultural and tourism exhibition hall for a community in the Fujian city of Xiamen.

He said his time on the mainland had shown him it is not a place “without human rights”, despite the popular image portrayed by Taiwanese media.

Xue, the Taiwanese woman in Pingtan, said she believed moving to the mainland was consistent with a simple principle: she will go wherever there are policies that “care for the Chinese people”.

She is still counting on the resumption of the Haixia Ferry and the opening of the high-speed railway, despite the lack of progress on it.

She added that she hoped her son could come to the mainland to avoid the looming threat of war.

Military pressure and war worries

Xue’s worry about a potential war is on the minds of many Taiwanese who live in Fujian.

Wang Shenhao, the Taiwanese youth working in Xiamen, said he was worried about his own safety in the event of a war across the strait.

“If there were to be a war between the two sides, all of us Taiwanese people here on the mainland would definitely be rounded up and controlled, right?” he said, adding that he did not think Beijing would let Taiwanese “roam around and spread information” on the mainland about what was happening across the strait.

John Dotson, deputy director of the Global Taiwan Institute, said Beijing’s dual approach of heightened military pressure on the island alongside these softer integration policies were in conflict with each other.

“Beijing’s campaign of military coercive pressure raises concerns of instability or war – things businesspeople never like – and further alienates Taiwan’s population, at a time when a separate sense of Taiwanese identity is steadily rising,” he said.

Taiwanese lawmakers brawl in parliament over controversial bills

A test of joint governance

Beijing has long held the view that Taiwan should follow “one country, two systems” after its reunification with the mainland, meaning it may practise a political system somewhat different from the mainland.

Xi proposed in 2019 that “all sectors of Taiwanese society can work together” to explore how Taiwan’s version of “one country, two systems” could work out.

So far there are no official details, but observers believe Fujian’s experiments with hiring Taiwanese for grass-roots and community government positions are aimed at post-reunification governance.

In 2012, Pingtan said it planned to hire 20 Taiwanese people for government leadership roles in the next five years.

Eight Taiwanese people now serve as deputy heads of villages in Pingtan, and an unknown number have filled various government roles elsewhere in Fujian.

A Taiwanese person working a contract-based government job in Pingtan, who asked not to be named, said some participants truly believed they would become “influential figures” after reunification.

A mainland scholar said the bid to lure Taiwanese talent to the mainland was aimed at fostering professionals familiar with the systems of both sides.

The ruling DPP has pushed back aggressively against the plan for years, calling it a “trap”.

At least 30 Taiwanese people working in community governance roles in Fujian in recent years have been fined by Taiwanese authorities for having jobs that fall into the category of working for the Communist Party, the mainland government or the People’s Liberation Army, which is illegal in Taiwan and considered a threat to “national security”.

Last year, Taipei also investigated over 40 village chiefs who had travelled to the mainland. They were accused of accepting discounted prices for their trips to the mainland, also a violation of Taiwanese law.

Chang Ya-chung, a professor at National Taiwan University, argued that integration efforts were unlikely to succeed unless Beijing and Taipei addressed the most fundamental issues surrounding reunification.

“The concept of integration should ultimately serve the goal of unification. However, if the overarching political issues remain unresolved, grass-roots integration will never overcome this fundamental barrier,” Chang said.

He added that Beijing’s “one country, two systems” model remained unacceptable to most Taiwanese.

Amber Wang

Amber Wang is a reporter for the China desk, and focuses on Chinese politics and diplomacy. She joined the Post in 2021, and previously worked for The New York Times and Southern Metropolis Daily.

8. The Eurasian Century (Q&A: Mick Ryan and Hal Brands)

Another book for my "to read" pile. It will be published on January 14th. You can pre-order it on Amazon.

Conclusion:

This is not a long book, but it is a very good one. It is an important work that should not just be on bookshelves and bedside tables of modern politicians, policy makers and strategists; it needs to be read and pondered by these folks. Beyond politicians and strategic decision-makers in the national security and business communities, this is a book that should be read the broader citizenry of Western nations. It is a highly accessible book, and provides the background and insights that all of us require to understand the challenges our nations will face in the coming decades.

The shape of the century ahead will be influenced by the historical foundations of the first Eurasian century. Hal Brands’ book is an exemplary account of this period in world history. But more importantly, it is a superb assessment of the hard decisions that American and other western politicians will be faced with in the coming years, and how they might develop and execute the best strategies to successfully navigate the second Eurasian Century.

The Eurasian Century

My first post for 2025 is a Q&A with Professor Hal Brands on his new book, The Eurasian Century. His book explores the events and people of the first Eurasian century, and the contours of the second.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-eurasian-century?utm

Mick Ryan

Jan 01, 2025

We often think of the modern era as the age of American power. In reality, we’re living in a long, violent Eurasian century. Since the early 1900s, Eurasia has been the cockpit of global rivalry. Hal Brands, The Eurasian Century

Recently, I had the opportunity to read an advance reading copy of Professor Hal Brands’ fabulous new book, The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World. Professor Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion.

Professor Brands is also the author or editor of multiple books, all of which I can thoroughly recommend. He is one of the few people I know who is both prolific in their writings, but also produces extraordinarily high quality analysis and policy recommendations in all his work. Some of his more recent books include The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (2022), and Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (with Michael Beckley, 2022). He was the editor of the new version of Makers of Modern Strategy, The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (2023), and editor of a 2024 book on the war in Ukraine, War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World.

Given this background, Professor Brands is very well placed to conduct an examination of the precursors to contemporary geopolitics, and offer recommendations to modern policy makers on dealing with the threats posed by the axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Early in his book, he writes that “Eurasia is the fulcrum of world order: A country or group of countries that dominates its vital regions would have unmatched resources, wealth and global reach. If an aggressive autocracy or alliance of autocracies became preeminent within Eurasia, it could fundamentally reshape world order and coerce its rivals around the globe”.

Throughout the book, Professor Brands explores over a century of history in which nations have struggled to dominate Eurasia - or at least large parts of it. The First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War, are all part of what Professor Brands describes as the first Eurasian century, and each of these key world events are reviewed in the book.

Professor Brands also examines the work of geographers and geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Rudolph Kjellen, Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer, Nicholas Spykman, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. This review of the theoretical underpinnings of modern geopolitics and the importance of the Eurasian landmass is one of the highlights of the book.

It is such an interesting book, and one that has significant relevance to contemporary geopolitics. Professor Brands’ analysis provides insights that should help light the way for modern politicians in the West who appear to be struggling with the pace of change in technology, and the growing threat and alignment of techno-totalitarian powers.

To provide more insight into the book, I recently posed several questions to Professor Brands. You can read his answers below.

1. Your book explores historical theorists of geopolitics such as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. Why are these figures relevant to 21st century geopolitics and the strategic competition between America and China?

These guys are relevant because they provide us with the right mental map for understanding all of the great conflicts of the last century--and for the emerging conflicts of this century, as well. Mackinder and Spykman were among the great geopolitical thinkers of the early 20th century. I'm simplifying a bit here, but they basically explained why Eurasia--the supercontinent where most of the world's people, economic power, and military resources are located--would be the central shatterzone in global politics.

They outlined how aggressive powers would try to conquer Eurasia's vital regions and use them as platforms for global expansion--and how worldwide coalitions, made up of onshore and offshore nations, would try to hold them back. That's a pretty good template for understanding World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. It's a good model, also, for understanding our current situation--in which the US and its allies are facing off against an axis of Eurasian autocracies that are trying to dominate their regions and dramatically shift the global balance of power. Like it or not, we're still living in Mackinder's world.

2. You write that "the world's expansionist states are banding together, for self-protection and strategic profit." While the shared interest of China, Russia, Iran and NK in rolling back the American order might predate 2022, how much has the conflict in Ukraine provided the environment for an acceleration of authoritarian alignment and confrontation with the west?

Ukraine put the process of autocratic alignment into turbodrive. Yes, the convergence among the autocratic states runs deep: Are are ruled by illiberal regimes that feel existentially threatened in a world led by a democratic superpower. All see the United States as the primary barrier to the achievement of their neo-imperial dreams. If you're Iran, for instance, you can't rule the Persian Gulf without kicking the US out of the region.

Same goes for China in the Western Pacific. But Ukraine has been incredibly catalytic, because it has forced Vladimir Putin to seek more support from his illiberal friends--North Korean troops, Iranian arms, Chinese computer chips--as he grows more isolated from the West.

And now these relationships are paying real dividends: The bad guys are building an arsenal of autocracy that is shifting the military balance in multiple regions. So even after the Ukraine war ends, these relationships won't.

3. Late in the book, you write that "a generation ago, leading experts believed great power war was 'literally unthinkable'. Today, a return of history's horrors is all too plausible." Is the current generation of western politicians able to conceptualise the magnitude of the threat, and if so, do they have the communication and organisational skills to mobilise to deter a 21st century great power war.

Yes and no. Don't get me wrong--there were smart, serious people in the Biden administration who understood how dangerous the world is getting. I'm sure there are folks in the Trump administration who understand the same thing. But I think it still strikes many people, including many members of our political class, as absurd--even insane--to suggest that America and China could find themselves in a high-intensity shooting war. Or that a war that starts in the Western Pacific could spread into other regions around the globe.

We certainly aren't acting like we understand the danger: If we did, we wouldn't be trending toward a one-war military in a three-theater world. The success of the US-led international order since 1945 has simply made it hard for us to imagine that the horrors that haunted earlier generations could return today.

4. Your book is released just a few days before the inauguration of the 2nd Trump administration. How well do you think his administration understands the challenges you outline in your book?

I spend more time thinking and worrying about this than any other subject. I want to be fair to Trump and the people around him: I think it is very likely that this administration will pursue strong, necessary policies in a variety of areas. If Trump rolls back Iran's nuclear program and its power in the Middle East, if he hikes defense spending, if he pushes the allies--hard--to do the same, all of those things would leave the free world better positioned for the hard fights ahead.

But with Trump, there's also the possibility that he will spend his time brawling with allies over tariffs or host-nation payments, or that his administration will simply be a conflicted, disorganized mess. People who don't like Trump's policies might be tempted to root for that outcome, but that would be a mistake.

The US and its friends need Trump to be a successful foreign policy president if we are all to get through the dangerous years ahead.

*******

This is not a long book, but it is a very good one. It is an important work that should not just be on bookshelves and bedside tables of modern politicians, policy makers and strategists; it needs to be read and pondered by these folks. Beyond politicians and strategic decision-makers in the national security and business communities, this is a book that should be read the broader citizenry of Western nations. It is a highly accessible book, and provides the background and insights that all of us require to understand the challenges our nations will face in the coming decades.

The shape of the century ahead will be influenced by the historical foundations of the first Eurasian century. Hal Brands’ book is an exemplary account of this period in world history. But more importantly, it is a superb assessment of the hard decisions that American and other western politicians will be faced with in the coming years, and how they might develop and execute the best strategies to successfully navigate the second Eurasian Century.

The Eurasian Century is published by W.W. Norton and Company and will be released on 14 January 2025.

9. Here is the military service record for the New Orleans attack suspect

I am sure Jeff and his team will have information on the Cyber Truck driver in Las Vegas too.

Here is the military service record for the New Orleans attack suspect

Shamsud-Din Jabbar served in the U.S. Army between 2007 to 2020, after briefly being in the Navy's delayed entry program, but he never went to Navy boot camp.

Jeff Schogol

Posted 15 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

Shamsud-Din Jabbar, whom the FBI has identified as the suspect who allegedly killed at least 15 people in New Orleans on Wednesday, served in the Army from March 2007 to July 2020 after briefly enlisting in the Navy’s delayed entry program, defense officials told Task & Purpose.

“Shamsud-Din Bahar Jabbar was in the regular Army as a Human Resource Specialist (42A) and Information Technology (IT) Specialist (25B) from March 2007 until January 2015 and then in the Army Reserve as an IT Specialist (25B) from January 2015 until July 2020,” a defense official said. “He deployed to Afghanistan from February 2009 to January 2010. He held the rank of Staff Sergeant at the end of service.”

His awards include three Army Commendation Medals, four Army Achievement Medals, two Army Good Conduct Medal, the Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with campaign star, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, two Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbons, the Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon, NATO Medal, two Meritorious Unit Commendations, the Parachutist Badge, and the Driver and Mechanic Badge.

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Jabbar, an American citizen from Texas, allegedly drove a Ford pickup truck into a crowd of people on Bourbon Street in New Orleans about 3:15 a.m. local time on Wednesday, Jan. 1, according to a statement released by the FBI.

Jabbar, 42, allegedly got out of the truck and opened fire on others until he was shot and killed by law enforcement, the FBI statement says. Dozens of people were injured in the attack, including two police officers, who were taken to a local hospital. The FBI is investigating the attack as an act of terrorism.

Weapons and a possible improvised explosive device, or IED, were found in the truck, and other possible IEDs were found in New Orleans’ French Quarter, the FBI statement says. FBI special agent bomb technicians along with other law enforcement officers are investigating the potential bombs, and they will disarm any explosive devices, the statement said.

An Islamic State group flag was found in the pickup truck, which appears to be rented, according to the FBI. Investigators are looking into whether Jabbar had any connections to terrorist organizations and how he obtained the truck used in the attack.

In addition to serving in the Army, Jabbar enlisted in the Navy in August 2004 but was discharged from the service’s delayed entry program a month later, a Navy spokesperson told Task & Purpose. Jabbar did not go to boot camp.

“Because he did not serve in the Navy, there is no additional information to add to the attached biography,” the Navy spokesperson said.

Investigators do not believe that Jabbar acted alone, Althea Duncan, assistant special agent in charge of FBI New Orleans field office, said at a Wednesday news conference.

“We do not believe that Jabbar was solely responsible,” Althea Duncan, assistant special agent in charge of FBI New Orleans field office, Duncan told reporters. “We are aggressively running down every lead, including those of his known associates. That’s why we need the public’s help. We are asking if anybody had any interaction with Shamsud-Din Jabbar in the last 72 hours that you contact us.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

10. Psychedelic therapy begins in Colorado, causing tension between conservatives and veterans

Psychedelic therapy begins in Colorado, causing tension between conservatives and veterans

By JESSE BEDAYN

Updated 1:28 PM EST, January 1, 2025

AP · January 1, 2025

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. (AP) — As Colorado becomes the second state to legalize psychedelic therapy this week, a clash is playing out in Colorado Springs, where conservative leaders are restricting the treatment over objections from some of the city’s 90,000 veterans, who’ve become flagbearers for psychedelic therapy to treat post-traumatic stress disorder.

Colorado residents voted to legalize the therapeutic use of psilocybin, the chemical compound found in psychedelic mushrooms, in a 2022 ballot measure, launching two years of rulemaking before it could be used to treat conditions such as depression and PTSD.

This week, companies and people will be able to apply for licenses to administer the mind-altering drug, though treatment will likely not be available for some months as applications are processed.

Colorado joined Oregon in legalizing psilocybin therapy, though the drug remains illegal in most other states and federally. Over the last year, a growing number of Oregon cities have voted to ban psilocybin. While Colorado metros cannot ban the treatment under state law, several conservative cities have worked to preemptively restrict what are known as “healing centers.”

At a City Council meeting in Colorado Springs this month, members were set to vote on extending the state prohibition on healing centers from 1,000 feet (305 meters) to 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) from certain locations, such as schools. From the lectern, veterans implored them not to.

“We have an opportunity to support veterans, and it’s a really easy one to say ‘Yes’ to,” said Lane Belone, a special forces veteran who said he’s benefited from his own psychedelic experiences. Belone argued that the restrictions effectively limit the number of centers and would mean longer waiting lists for the treatment.

Veterans have pulled in some conservative support for psychedelic therapy — managing to set it apart from other politically charged drug policies such as legalizing marijuana.

That distinction was made clear by Councilmember David Leinweber, who said at the council meeting both that marijuana is “literally killing our kids” and that he supported greater access to psilocybin therapy.

Psilocybin is far more restricted in Colorado than marijuana, which the state legalized in 2014. Psilocybin is decriminalized but there won’t be recreational dispensaries for the substance, which will be largely confined to licensed businesses and therapy sessions with licensed facilitators.

Patients will have to go through a risk assessment, preliminary meetings, then follow-up sessions and remain with a facilitator while under the drug’s influence. The psilocybin will also be tested, and the companies that grow them regulated by a state agency.

Still, allowing broader access to the treatment hasn’t been easy for most of the city councilmembers, including three who are veterans. Colorado Springs is home to several military installations, including the U.S. Air Force Academy, and local leaders have touted it as an ideal community for retired service members.

“I will never sit up here and criticize a veteran for wanting to find a medical treatment to fix or to help with the issues that they carry,” said Council President Randy Helms, a veteran himself.

Still, he continued, “Do I think that it’s helpful to not just veterans but to individuals? Probably so. Do I think it still needs to be tested under strict requirements? Yes.”

The Colorado Springs City Council passed the proposed restrictions.

While research has shown promise for psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and MDMA, also known as molly, in helping people with conditions such as alcoholism, depression and PTSD, the scientific field remains in its relatively early stages.

“I’m very positive about the potential value, but I’m very concerned that we’ve gotten too far ahead of our skis,” said Jeffrey Lieberman, a professor of psychiatry at Columbia University, who’s been involved in studies of psychedelic drugs’ therapeutic efficacy.

The risks, said Lieberman, include customers being misled and paying out of pocket for expensive treatments. He also said there are cases where the drugs can exacerbate some extreme mental health conditions, such as schizophrenia.

In Oregon, where the treatments started in June 2023, costs can reach $2,000 for one session. Of the over 16,000 doses administered in the state, staff have only called 911 or taken a patient to the hospital five times.

Other Colorado Springs city councilmembers raised concerns that the Food and Drug Administration has not approved psilocybin to treat mental health conditions and, in August, rejected the psychedelic MDMA to treat PTSD. A number of clinical trials are still underway for both drugs.

Some researchers, advocacy groups and veterans worry that waiting on slow-moving bureaucracy — namely the FDA — carries its own risks as people continue to struggle with mental illnesses. Advocates argue that psychedelic therapy offers an option to those for whom talk therapy alone and antidepressants have not helped.

“This is a crisis that we are in, and this is a tool that we can add to our toolbox,” said Taylor West, executive director of the Healing Advocacy Fund, which advocates for psychedelic therapy.

Belone said he’s carried his military experience long after leaving the special forces. It started when he first heard artillery sirens wailing in a U.S. base in Iraq, his breath catching with fear for a few thudding moments.

That fear kept him on edge when he returned stateside and found himself always keeping his back to the wall, looking for exits to the room he was in, never quite able to give himself fully to the music at a concert.

A psychedelic experience with psilocybin, said Belone, helped him connect the fear that attached to him in the war zone to the ceaseless anxiety at home. It didn’t solve everything overnight, he said, but it allowed him to better identify when that humming fear was getting in the way of a joyful life.

___

Bedayn is a corps member for the Associated Press/Report for America Statehouse News Initiative. Report for America is a nonprofit national service program that places journalists in local newsrooms to report on undercovered issues.

JESSE BEDAYN

Bedayn is a statehouse reporter for The Associated Press based in Denver. He is a Report for America corps member.

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AP · January 1, 2025

The electromagnetic spectrum is a key element (domain?) of modern warfare.

There are so many drones in Ukraine that operators are stumbling onto enemy drone feeds and picking up intel

Business Insider · by Sinéad Baker

Military & Defense

Sinéad Baker

2025-01-01T08:17:01Z

Tanya Dzafarowa/Suspilne Ukraine/JSC "UA:PBC"/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now. Have an account? .

There are so many drones in Ukraine that operators sometimes accidentally pick up other feeds.
Those moments can provide incoming attack warnings and intelligence.
It is an emerging element within the constantly evolving drone war.

There are so many drones in the sky in Ukraine that drone operators are occasionally stumbling onto drone feeds and picking up unexpected intel. Neither side can be sure though when they are going to luck into this or when the enemy will suddenly get insight into their own activities.

Drones are being used more in Russia's war against Ukraine than in any other conflict in history, including cheap first-person-view drones. They are being used to attack troops and vehicles, complicating battlefield maneuvers, and they're so prolific that ground troops often struggle to sort out which ones are their drones and which belong to the enemy.

Ukrainian drone operators told Business Insider that extensive drone warfare has resulted in unintentional feed switching.

When this occurs, operators on one side of the battlefield can see the feed of the other side's drone — typically airborne devices that can target soldiers and gather intelligence to direct fires. A drone operator in Ukraine said being able to see Russian drone feeds is "useful because you see where the enemy drone that wants to destroy you is flying."

That gives the unit a chance to take defensive action.

Ukrainian soldiers watch a drone feed from an underground command center in Bakhmut. AP Photo/Libkos

Samuel Bendett, a drone expert at the Center for Naval Analyses, described it as the wartime version of a common civilian occurrence. When you drive in your car and have your radio at a certain frequency, your radio can flip between different stations that use the same frequency. That is what is happening right now in Ukraine, Bendett said.

Fight for the spectrum

Jackie, a US veteran fighting in Ukraine, said: "Right now, there are two fights when we're fighting with drones. There's one that you can see on video. And there's one that's completely invisible." That invisible fight is the fight in the electromagnetic spectrum or "fight for the spectrum."

Advantages and disadvantages

As neither side has dominated the electromagnetic spectrum through electronic warfare, both sides are experiencing all the advantages and disadvantages of these developments. Sometimes Ukraine is collecting intel, and sometimes it's Russia.

The feed can help operators helplessly realize an attack is incoming, and "it also can be very informative for drone crews, experienced ones to kind of determine the tactic of the adversary, how far the drone flies, how fast it flies, what's the drone route, what the drone is looking for, and so on and so forth," Bendett said.

But it's a hard thing to plan for given the chaotic nature of these occurrences.

Jackie shared that Ukraine has attempted to "play games with the signals," but Gregory Falso, an autonomous systems and cybersecurity expert at Cornell University, said that "it's probably not predictable when you'd be able to get these capabilities." It's more about seizing the advantage when the opportunity arises.

Switching signals

Falco said it would be difficult to tell if the enemy has access to a feed because "you don't have absolute certainty of where your band is at a given time and where you're projecting."

A Ukrainian serviceman launches a drone during a press tour in the Zhytomyr Region. Kirill Chubotin / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images

There are questions about whether this could be taken further, though, going from accidental insight to deliberately pirated drones. Right now, that's more theory than practice.

Whether any Ukrainian or Russian operators could actually get control of the other side's drone, rather than just being able to see through its eyes, probably depends on the drone, Falco said.

He explained that the spectral bands used to see drone feeds are likely very different from the ones that control it. And the bands used to receive signals — that let the operator see what the drone can see — are typically less protected than the ones that send the signals, which is how operators tell drones what to do.

He said the feed switching is "bound to happen" with so many drones in the sky and with different types of electronic warfare in play.

Solutions, Falco said, could involve something like added encryptions for drone feeds. But given the fast-moving, chaotic, and desperate nature of a lot of the fighting and the fact that drone operators can go through multiple drones a day and Ukraine, it may not be worth it. And if that's the case, this kind of thing will keep happening.

He said it was the type of thing civilians would frequently see if there was less regulation. "If we didn't have rules," and the likes of the United Nations body that allocates the radio spectrum didn't exist, "and companies didn't bother playing by the rules, then this would be a normal occurrence," Falco said.

Then, it would just be "a total shit show of hearing and seeing everything that you're not supposed to see."

A Ukrainian soldier watches a drone feed from an underground command center in Bakhmut. AP Photo/Libkos

Ukraine, often short on other weaponry as it faces off against Russia's larger military, has been relying on drones, including to replace ammunition amid its shortages. And even the cheap drones have let Ukraine destroy Russian equipment worth millions.

Ukraine's drones are critical assets in the war and are said to account for at least 80% of Russia's frontline losses. Drones are super vital. They're one of our more clever casualty-producing weapons," Jackie said.

Russia Ukraine Drone

Business Insider · by Sinéad Baker

12. Here's Where Trump's Pentagon and National Security Nominees Stand Ahead of New Year

Here's Where Trump's Pentagon and National Security Nominees Stand Ahead of New Year

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · December 31, 2024

President-elect Donald Trump's nominees to lead the Pentagon and other key national security and veterans agencies face a pivotal month in January as the Senate gets to work in earnest on confirming Trump's Cabinet.

Perhaps in the most precarious position, Pete Hegseth, Trump's pick for defense secretary, is scheduled to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 14 for his confirmation hearing. It could be a make-or-break moment for the nominee, who has been dogged by allegations of sexual misconduct, alcohol abuse and mismanagement at previous jobs.

At least one other national security nominee is also facing an uphill climb to confirmation: Tulsi Gabbard, Trump's choice to be director of national intelligence. Meanwhile, the nominee to lead the Department of Veterans Affairs, former GOP Rep. Doug Collins, appears to be on a glidepath to confirmation, while Trump's choices for military service secretaries have been quietly toiling away on the confirmation process while the spotlight is on Cabinet-level appointments.

In Hegseth's case, he spent much of December barnstorming the Capitol seeking to shore up support among senators. The efforts may have borne some fruit, as some Republicans seen as potential "no" votes have shifted their rhetoric after closed-door meetings with him. Still, with the thin margins in the Senate, how Hegseth answers publicly at his confirmation hearing could prove decisive.

"I obviously always wait until we have an FBI background check, and one is underway in the case of Mr. Hegseth, and I wait to see the committee hearing before reaching a final decision," Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, told reporters Dec. 11 after meeting with Hegseth.

The new session of Congress that will usher in GOP control of the Senate starts Friday, ahead of Trump's inauguration Jan. 20. In the intervening weeks, the Senate is expected to focus on getting ready to confirm Trump's Cabinet as quickly as possible after he is sworn in.

National security nominees are typically confirmed within days, if not hours, of the inauguration. For example, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was confirmed two days after President Joe Biden's inauguration, and Trump's first defense secretary in his first term, Jim Mattis, was confirmed on Inauguration Day.

Hegseth faces far more uncertainty than either Austin or Mattis, who both garnered widespread bipartisan support.

Hegseth's prospects have been in doubt since he confirmed he paid a woman who accused him of sexual assault in exchange for her signing a nondisclosure agreement. Later, police records revealed more details about the alleged assault.

The New Yorker also reported on allegations that Hegseth was repeatedly intoxicated on the job when he led conservative veterans group Concerned Veterans for America and mismanaged funds at another veterans group he led called Vets for Freedom. And NBC News reported that Hegseth's former colleagues at Fox News also expressed concern about his drinking.

Hegseth has vehemently denied the allegations against him, contending the lack of charges against him in the assault case means police "completely cleared" him and that the allegations of mismanagement at the veterans groups were leveled by "disgruntled people." He has also insisted he does not have a drinking problem, characterizing his drinking as typical of veterans even as he has pledged to stop drinking entirely if he is confirmed to lead the Pentagon.

"This is the biggest deployment of my life, and there won't be a drop of alcohol on my lips while I'm doing it," Hegseth, a National Guard veteran, said in an interview with conservative media figure Megyn Kelly.

Hegseth has also faced skepticism from senators about his opposition to women serving in combat roles. In recent weeks, Hegseth has softened his rhetoric on the issue and offered support to women in the military generally, though his comments have not directly contradicted his previous opposition to women in combat.

Amid the allegations and controversial past policy stances, some Republican senators have refused to publicly state their position on him. While it's not unusual for senators to be tight-lipped before a confirmation hearing, Hegseth can afford to lose only three Republican senators and still be confirmed, assuming all Democrats vote against him.

Some Republicans initially seen as possibly opposing Hegseth have shifted their comments about him in subtle yet noticeable ways after Hegseth's office visits, as well as an intense pressure campaign from Trump supporters that included threats of primary election challenges.

Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, a combat veteran and sexual assault survivor who said after one meeting with Hegseth that she wasn't ready to support him, said after a second meeting with him that she will "support Pete through this process" and that she looks "forward to a fair hearing based on truth, not anonymous sources."

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who at one point called the allegations against Hegseth "very disturbing," similarly contended in a statement after a meeting with Hegseth that "the accusations being made regarding financial management of veterans service organizations and personal misconduct should only be considered by the committee if they are supported by testimony before Congress -- not anonymous sources."

Graham added in an interview with "Meet the Press" that Hegseth would release the woman accusing him of sexual assault from the nondisclosure agreement. Hegseth's lawyer has also said she's been released from the nondisclosure agreement, but threatened to sue her if she goes public.

Meanwhile, as Hegseth fights to be confirmed, the team that would work under him at the Pentagon is shaping up.

Trump has not yet nominated an Air Force secretary, but has chosen his Navy and Army secretaries. John Phelan, a financier and GOP donor, was nominated to lead the Navy and Marine Corps, and Dan Driscoll, a businessman, Iraq War veteran and adviser to Vice President-elect JD Vance, was picked to lead the Army.

While Phelan lacks any military policy experience and Driscoll has never led a large organization, no vocal opposition has emerged yet to either nominee. They have not attracted the entourage of cameras and reporters Hegseth's visits have, but the two have also been visiting senators to lock up support prior to their confirmation hearings in the coming weeks.

Trump has also nominated a smattering of Pentagon deputies, including businessman Stephen Feinberg as deputy secretary of defense; conservative national security hand Elbridge Colby for undersecretary for policy; first Trump administration alum Michael Duffey for acquisition chief; former Uber executive Emil Michael for undersecretary for research and engineering; and VA medical center director Keith Bass for assistant secretary for health.

Potentially also facing a rocky path to confirmation is Gabbard, a former Democratic congresswoman who reregistered as a Republican earlier this year, who would oversee the intelligence community and produce the president's daily brief if confirmed as director of national intelligence.

Gabbard's troubles stem from appearing sympathetic to the now-toppled Assad regime in Syria and echoing Russian propaganda. While in Congress, Gabbard, a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, secretly met with Bashar Assad, said he "is not the enemy of the United States," and questioned U.S. intelligence that Assad carried out several chemical weapons attacks against his own people.

More recently, in 2021, Gabbard promoted the debunked conspiracy theory, pushed by Russia, that the U.S. was funding biolabs in Ukraine.

As with Hegseth, no Republican senators have explicitly come out in opposition to Gabbard. But former intelligence and national security officials have been lobbying senators to reject her.

On Tuesday morning, Trump used the social media platform he owns to urge Republicans to "BE SMART AND TOUGH" to get his nominees confirmed.

One nominee that so far appears to be breezing toward confirmation is Collins to be VA secretary. Despite some initial surprise around the pick since Collins did not focus on veterans issues during his time in Congress, lawmakers and veterans groups alike have given the Air Force Reserve chaplain positive reviews as he makes his own rounds in Washington.

"After hearing from Representative Collins and the transition team senior staff, it is clear to AMVETS that he has a firm understanding of how important the VA and its policies are to veterans and their families," AMVETS National Executive Director Joe Chenelly said in a Dec. 12 news release. "He has committed to safeguarding veterans' benefits and addressing the VA's key issues."

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · December 31, 2024

13. A Ukrainian drone pilot has a novel plan to smash Russia's formidable defenses

Like the bomber the drone will get through? Is this a reincarnation of Douhet and Billy Mitchell?

A Ukrainian drone pilot has a novel plan to smash Russia's formidable defenses

Story by insider@insider.com (Michael Peck) • 9h • 4 min read

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-drone-swarm-smash-russian-defenses-2024-12

A Ukrainian drone pilot argues a massive drone swarm could clear a path through enemy lines.
The pilot, Illya Sekirin, is calling for 40,000 drones to barrage a 6-mile-wide sector.
His vision calls for using drones similar to the way tanks were employed a century ago.

Behind the minefields and obstacles, the enemy waits in their entrenchments, poised to strike at tanks and infantry trying to advance through the treacherous ground. Instead, tens of thousands of drones descend on their positions, blowing up vehicles, artillery, and bunkers and clearing a path for friendly ground troops.==ne pilot who believes that armies need to create a separate branch for uncrewed aircraft systems and electromagnetic warfare — and go on the attack.

"Breakthroughs with large mechanized formations are becoming a thing of the past and static warfare, like the positional stalemate in Ukraine, appears to be the new norm," Illya Sekirin wrote in an article for the British Army Review. "As a result, the role of the UAS and electromagnetic warfare branch would be particularly useful in breaching enemy fortified positions through the use of massed offensive actions."

Drones — along with artillery — have become the dominant weapons in the Ukraine war. In particular, while tanks are still a major weapon on the battlefield, they no longer enjoy the supremacy they once had. Hordes of small first-person-view drones have made life hazardous for hulking, expensive weapons such as armored vehicles and artillery pieces, which now operate cautiously and under the protection of air defenses and electronic-warfare systems.

"FPV drones (also known as loitering munitions) have become so effective that they, at a cost of around $350 to $450 per asset, can now be described as the Ukrainian army's principal anti-tank weapon," wrote Sekirin, who has combat experience operating the DJI Mavic 3, a piloted drone popular with hobbyists as well as Ukrainian soldiers.

Mines, drones, and obstacles in Ukraine have hampered the power of tanks. Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu via Getty Images

Sekirin wants to take this to the next level. Breaching fortified lines, as both the Russians and the Ukrainians have learned the hard way, is a complex and fraught operation that often results in heavy losses for the assault troops. Sekirin's alternative: using immense numbers of drones to blast a hole in enemy defenses that creates breathing room for assault troops.

"For example, 40,000 drones that would attack in waves to destroy enemy forces in a frontline area 10 kilometres wide and 20 kilometres deep, with a resulting drone attack density of 200 UASs per square kilometre," Sekirin wrote, describing an area roughly 6 miles wide and 12 miles deep. "This drone attack would simultaneously provide accurate covering fire to friendly mine-clearing vehicles and advancing mechanised infantry units tasked with capturing the area. Through the resulting breach of the frontline, conventional manoeuvre forces could then enter to gain the operational initiative."

Sekirin argues that using drones for breaching operations saves money and reduces friendly casualties: "If the price of an average attack drone is presumed to be $500, drones would cost $20 million, which is roughly equivalent to the price of just two Ml Abrams tanks. 40,000 UASs would also constitute only 0.8 percent of worldwide consumer drone shipments (five million units were shipped in 2020), suggesting that production and supply issues would not be an issue."

This goes well beyond drone use in the nearly three years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has mostly been to try to disable vehicles and to stalk small groups of soldiers. Making drones into a massive strike force would require enhanced communication and tactics to limit friendly fire on advancing troops, who can resemble those of their enemy on grainy video or infrared feeds.

What is ironic is that a century ago, tanks were invented precisely as a means to breach the fortified trench lines of World War I that had largely been closely defended by machine guns. World War II saw armies rely on masses of tanks not just to penetrate defense lines, but also to use their mobility and firepower to smash enemy forces and capture vast amounts of territory.

Thus, Sekirin's concept would have drones assume the historical role of tanks. But that raises questions in itself. As soon as tanks made their debut in 1916, it quickly became clear that they were not a miracle solution for battlefield problems. Armored vehicles then and now are vulnerable to a variety of weapons, which means militaries must use combined-arms tactics in which armor coordinates with other arms such as infantry, artillery, engineers, and aircraft.

Because drones are cheap and easy to manufacture in quantity, it would be tempting for armies — and penny-pinching politicians — to rely on a massive fleet of drones at the expense of traditional breaching systems such as combat engineers and mine-clearing tanks. But just as tanks became vulnerable to mines, anti-tank rockets, and, now, drones, the drones themselves would most likely fall prey to countermeasures such as jamming (which already is disrupting UAV operations in the Ukraine war) as well as projectile weapons and intercept drones.

A horde of 40,000 drones would be an impressive and scary sight. But it is no panacea.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds a master's in political science from Rutgers University. Follow him on X and LinkedIn.

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14. Russia’s Imperial Mindset: Understanding the Roots of the Ukraine War

Excerpts:

Russia will take the West seriously and heed its warnings only if it sees that we possess the military capabilities and, most importantly, the intestinal fortitude to deter aggression and, if need be, defend our interests with force.

We need to reinvest in our military, and we need our European allies to rearm at speed and scale to provide the bulk of conventional deterrence and defense within NATO. But perhaps most of all, we urgently need political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to recognize the reality of what Russia is, not what they wish it to be. Only then can a deal with Russia that brings peace to Ukraine, or at the very least an enduring cessation of hostilities on the frontline, and thereby security to Europe, be achieved.

Russia’s Imperial Mindset: Understanding the Roots of the Ukraine War

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · January 1, 2025

As the second Trump administration prepares to take charge of US foreign and security policy, there is intense debate in Washington about what the end state in Ukraine should be, what kind of a peace deal can be negotiated with Putin, and what long-term prospects there might be for reaching a modus vivendi with Russia.

Much of the discussion is tied up in American domestic politics, as it trails the last presidential election. Indeed, this war should have never happened, and whatever “Russia explainers” might say going forward, there should be no doubt that the horrendous cost in Ukrainian and Russian lives is squarely on Vladimir Putin and his enablers in the Kremlin.

What Putin Wants in Ukraine

But taking a principled stance will not move the needle toward a durable armistice. In fact, by all indications, Moscow is not interested in anything short of an all-out surrender by Kyiv, including the foreclosure of any prospects for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, the de facto disbandment of the Ukrainian armed forces, and consigning Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Putin has no real incentive to negotiate in good faith because he believes that at this stage, he is winning, and unfortunately, he is right.

For three years, the US and Europe prioritized escalation management that left Ukraine with no clear path forward to an equitable negotiation for a lasting peace, or at the very least, an enduring armistice with Russia.

Today, Putin continues to signal that there is no deal he would accept that would not be tantamount to a victory for Russia because he believes he can defeat Ukraine at an acceptable cost, and thus deliver a devastating blow to US interests across the globe, undermining the system the United States and its democratic allies put in place post-Cold War. For three years of this war the West has offered no strategy for victory, while the horrendous attrition on the battlefield, combined with the mass flight of civilians from the front, has left Ukraine with roughly one-fourth of the population of the Russian Federation.

To appreciate the scope of the bloodletting and the attendant emigration from Ukraine, consider that on the day of its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 Ukraine had some 52 million citizens, on the eve of Russia’s second invasion in 2022 the number was just under 40 million, while today there are somewhere between 27-30 million people left in the country. So, while much of the debate in Washington has centered around whether to continue to supply Ukraine with money, weapons, and munitions, the stark reality is that the country is beginning to run out of people.

Simply put, absent a Western strategy for breaking the Russian military in Ukraine that would impose prohibitive costs on Moscow, Putin’s approach to the war is poised to deliver him a de facto victory, the consequences of which leaders in the United States and Europe have yet to fully appreciate, for he is not fighting a war against Ukraine, but a civilizational war against the West. Until real setbacks force him to realize that he cannot win at an acceptable cost to his power base, he will not stop.

Russian Msta Artillery in Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Let’s be clear about what is possible today when it comes to negotiating with Russia. We may in the end reach some form of a deal with Russia, but it will be at best a breather which Putin will use to rearm before attempting once more either to fully subjugate or destroy the independent Ukrainian state.

If such a temporary armistice is reached, much will depend on what happens next, i.e., whether the United States and Europe will create a credible enforcement mechanism and most importantly arm Ukraine to the point that another Russian invasion will not have a chance for success.

The United States and its European allies need to have a frank conversation about the kind of state the Russian Federation is and the realistic prospects for a long-term peaceful accommodation with Moscow. The “Russian question” that Western leaders continue to fail or refuse to understand, i.e., the problem posed by a quintessentially revisionist power straddling the Eurasian landmass of eleven time zones, cannot be reduced to the traditional “good tsar-bad tsar” formula that has defined both US and European approaches during the post-Cold War decades. The issue is both historical and systemic, and until Western leaders understand this, we have no realistic prospect of crafting a workable strategy to deal with Russia, either today or in the future.

How to Think of Russia: As An Empire

Any Russia policy must start with the realization that the Russian Federation is not a nation-state as we would understand it in the West; rather, it is and has always been an empire, whether in the tsarist, Soviet, or oligarchic varieties. The population consists of a multitude of nationalities governed by a centrally-run repressive state, with top-down pressure as the historic mode of governance and expansionism as the state’s raison d’être. Russia comprises over 80 sub-entities, including 21 non-Slavic autonomous republics. Ethnic Russians—though the population majority—are in decline.

In the West political leaders tend to mirror-image Russia based on their own experience of national consolidation giving rise to democratic government. Western leaders who perennially hope for a democratic Russia to emerge, or at least a pluralist one, need to accept that because a unified Russian nation doesn’t exist, there is no chance for democracy or any sort of polyarchic system to take root. Western analysts – many of whom neither speak Russian nor have a deep grounding in Russian culture and history beyond the Kremlin’s own version – fail to understand the systemic and cultural limitations that define that country’s policy choices.

T-90M. Image Credit: Russian State Media.

The Russian Federation is a top-down imperialist power. In its current form, the systemic nature of this empire offers no path forward for the West to reach a lasting modus vivendi with Moscow. Russia can be blocked and contained, as it was during the half-century of the Cold War, but until a fundamental systemic change occurs inside Russia that would begin to transform its political culture, the idea of turning Russia into a responsible stakeholder in the international system by satisfying its current demands will remain a pipedream. This should be the starting point for Washington in any negotiation with Moscow on stopping the war in Ukraine, and we should tailor our expectations as to its durability accordingly.

The Path Forward on Ukraine

Russia will take the West seriously and heed its warnings only if it sees that we possess the military capabilities and, most importantly, the intestinal fortitude to deter aggression and, if need be, defend our interests with force.

We need to reinvest in our military, and we need our European allies to rearm at speed and scale to provide the bulk of conventional deterrence and defense within NATO. But perhaps most of all, we urgently need political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to recognize the reality of what Russia is, not what they wish it to be. Only then can a deal with Russia that brings peace to Ukraine, or at the very least an enduring cessation of hostilities on the frontline, and thereby security to Europe, be achieved.

About the Author: Andrew A. Michta

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own.

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · January 1, 2025

15. Project 33 Is Enabling Joint All-Domain Operations in the Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

All these joint and combined exercises and activities strengthen U.S. alliances and communicate to adversaries the futility of aggression.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti discussed Navigation Plan 2024 and Project 33 with Seth Jones at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in September 2024. Both documents are focused on improving the Navy’s near-term readiness for crisis or conflict by 2027. U.S.Navy (Elliott Fabrizio)

No Time to Bluff

The CNO’s NavPlan and Project 33 set aggressive and necessary goals to improve readiness and prepare for crisis or conflict by 2027—just two years in the future. There can be no bluffing when it comes to deterring adversaries and assuring allies. The U.S. joint force must have unilateral combat capability and the combined power with its allies and partners to fight and win. Project 33 is enhancing those efforts and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, and I am confident it will give us the capability and capacity to prevail.

* Special thanks to Colonel Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army, for his help with this article.

Project 33 Is Enabling Joint All-Domain Operations in the Indo-Pacific

The Navy’s Navigation Plan 2024 and its Project 33 implementation plan are increasing readiness for high-end warfare.

By Admiral Sam Paparo, U.S. Navy

January 2025 Proceedings Vol. 151/1/1,463

usni.org · January 1, 2025

The United States strives to maintain regional stability and safeguard the sovereign rights of all nations in the Indo-Pacific—the most consequential theater of operations for the 21st century. China, Russia, and North Korea are threatening that stability and security.1 These states create instability to try to change the current rules-based international system to their advantage, but the U.S. joint force, working with increasingly capable allies and partners, is constantly preparing to deter them from upending the regional order.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is the theater joint force commander, employing Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force capabilities bolstered by service initiatives such as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Lisa Franchetti’s new Navigation Plan 2024 (NavPlan) and its implementation plan, Project 33. Those service capabilities—knitted together as a joint force—strengthen assurance and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific by expanding the battlespace to deter conflict, respond to crises, and, if necessary, fight and win.

Unmanned systems (UxSs), such as this Avidrone Aerospace unmanned aircraft, are a major focus of Project 33 because they can be built quickly, are difficult to detect and counter, and can carry a variety of payloads, both logistical and lethal. The Navy and Marine Corps are experimenting with swarming tactics using small, attritable UxSs for key geographic areas. U.S. Marine Corps (Dezmond Browning)

Core to the capabilities of the joint force and its interoperability with allies and partners are the readiness and modernization of each U.S. military service. Project 33 provides a clear path to improve the Navy as an individual service and enhance its contributions to the joint warfighting ecosystem.2

Through Project 33, the Navy will increase readiness by: reducing maintenance backlogs to improve combat surge capability; operationalizing robotic and autonomous systems (UxSs); redoubling efforts to recruit and retain the right talent; improving flexible training to build sailors’ tactical proficiency; and restoring critical infrastructure to generate and sustain the ready forces required.

Building capital ships takes years. Therefore, to increase warfighting capability in the near term, the CNO is focusing on rapidly developing, fielding, and integrating UxSs. These systems will augment the multimission conventional force to increase lethality, sensing, and survivability.

Project 33 also emphasizes the fleet maritime operations centers (MOCs) as the Navy’s central warfighting systems to increase information and decision advantage.

Robotic and Autonomous Systems

Building on the Replicator Initiative announced by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks in May 2023 and now employed in the Indo-Pacific, Project 33 will allow the Navy to operate in more areas with greater capability.3 Unmanned systems provide the ability to project fires and effects dynamically, at any time, from multiple axes, and with mass. Some capabilities are difficult for adversaries to detect or counterattack. Project 33’s vision to provide more munitions on more platforms in more places, and its focus on counter-C5ISR is key to making the Navy—and the joint force—more lethal and survivable. For example, as Vice Admiral Rob Goucher, Commander, Submarine Forces, recently wrote in these pages, “UUVs [unmanned undersea vehicles] will allow the submarine to conduct multiple operations at the same time, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), acoustic collection, and bottom surveys. A UUV can get into areas too shallow, too deep, or too risky for a submarine—shifting risk from the submarine and crew to a robot.”4

As another example, Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific’s Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics program is testing and fielding capabilities that focus on autonomous swarming tactics using small but massed attritable UxSs in key geographic areas.5 In addition, continued attention to autonomous systems under the Army’s Project Convergence, incorporated into exercises such as Balikatan with the Philippines, allows the joint force to rehearse and refine capabilities dynamically and continually.

Sea Denial/Control

U.S. Navy

Sea denial and sea control are both core Project 33 goals. In the Indo-Pacific theater, the joint force is exploring ways to use geography to canalize and restrict adversary movement. Traditional and new capabilities being developed will make key areas a wasteland for adversaries with malign intentions. Artificial intelligence (AI)—as yet a largely unfulfilled promise in emerging technology—will be key to enable UxSs. There are roles for AI to play in every aspect of sea denial and sea control, from ISR to fires, command-and-control, and sustainment. The military must continue to provide clear requirements, use cases, and concepts of operation to push industry. To do that, military leaders must be technology-literate, with expertise from computer sciences to engineering. For these reasons and more, the CNO’s NavPlan rightly calls for a campaign of learning and investing in warfighter competency.

At the same time, the joint force must not “overlearn” the lessons coming out of the current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. While the use of UxSs is significant in both conflicts, those platforms are not the long-duration, autonomous systems that can be recovered if unused, with capable, large, discrete payloads required for the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific.

In addition to the employment of UxSs, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is expanding its ability to manage and operate across the vast battlespace of the theater by rehearsing, exercising, refining, and improving command and control. This includes training and exercises that certify and improve joint task force–level commands that could be established quickly to address crises or conflict in the region, all the way down to service operations centers, such as the MOCs that Project 33 is enhancing. Annual joint exercises, including Pacific Sentry and Northern Edge, and service exercises—such as the Air Force’s Return of Forces to the Pacific and the Army’s Operation Pathways—provide large-scale testing of headquarters from the combatant-command level down to individual fighting units to continually test and improve command and control.

Sustainment

The all-domain, dynamic combat power provided by conventional forces, supplemented by UxS, must also be sustained throughout the theater. A key Project 33 element is restoring the critical infrastructure that generates, maneuvers, and sustains the force for the fight.6 An example of this is pushing increased naval maintenance infrastructure forward to Guam, Japan, and other areas in the western Pacific to facilitate increased naval operations in the region in the ongoing competition phase, as well as supporting combat repair in the event of conflict.

The entire joint force is creating tools to improve knowledge and awareness of sustainment stocks and forces—treating sustainment as a part of the fires and effects processes. This will improve decision-making superiority by allowing commanders to understand and task sustainment across the theater based on where supplies are being consumed and which sustainment forces can provide resupply. In addition to sustainment-decision tools, the joint force is improving force posture in theater to support distributed military operations, while also recognizing that all activities to sustain U.S. fighting forces will be contested. The Navy’s continued focus in Project 33 to improve and expand global networks of facilities and other infrastructure is critical to strengthening a combat-credible force.7

Putting more players on the field includes reducing the maintenance backlog for current ships and submarines. Here, the USS Colorado (SSN-788) undergoes maintenance at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in June 2024. U.S. Navy (Claudia Lamantia)

Joint . . .

Thanks to almost 40 years of dedicated actions following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, multiple military operations worldwide, and modernization efforts such as Project 33, the U.S. military is now more joint than ever—a far greater whole than the sum of its service- and domain-specific components alone. The services are integrated into a warfighting ecosystem at the tactical and operational levels, and they continue to pursue ways to increase integration.8 U.S. command-and-control, exercises, operations, security cooperation activities, and crisis-and-conflict planning are consistently employed, tested, and improved to ensure combat power in the Indo-Pacific can deter adversaries, assure allies, respond to crises, and prevail across the range of warfare.

. . . and Combined

NavPlan 2024 makes the salient point that there is no scenario in which the United States fights a major conflict alone. So, in addition to command and control of U.S. forces, U.S. IndoPaCom is continuing to refine and improve support to, and work with, other militaries and their headquarters. These efforts include the reconstitution of U.S. Forces Japan as a joint force headquarters reporting to U.S. IndoPaCom and as a key counterpart to the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command. This new command-and-control relationship and bilateral capability supports the agreements made by the U.S. and Japanese governments to upgrade their respective frameworks to integrate bilateral operations and capabilities and allow greater interoperability and planning between U.S. and allied forces in peacetime and during contingencies.

Recent examples are numerous. Take, for instance, the enhanced trilateral defense exercises, improved information sharing, and increased cooperation on ballistic-missile defense among the United States, Japan, and South Korea to address North Korean provocations.9 Throughout 2024, the three allies conducted two trilateral maritime exercises, a trilateral aerial exercise—escorting U.S. bombers operating in the region—and the inaugural Freedom Edge, a trilateral multidomain exercise. Each event improved interoperability, signaled to multiple adversary nations commitment and solidarity, and provided helpful lessons for better operational cooperation in the future.

Farther south, U.S.-Philippines-Australia-Japan joint patrols are supporting the Philippines in its attempts to push back against illegal Chinese claims in the South China Sea. These activities signal to Beijing that the United States has a strong coalition against coercive actions. They also assure allies and partners that the United States can not only support them unilaterally, but also convene other nations in the region and work through interoperability issues together in peacetime.

All these joint and combined exercises and activities strengthen U.S. alliances and communicate to adversaries the futility of aggression.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti discussed Navigation Plan 2024 and Project 33 with Seth Jones at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in September 2024. Both documents are focused on improving the Navy’s near-term readiness for crisis or conflict by 2027. U.S.Navy (Elliott Fabrizio)

No Time to Bluff

The CNO’s NavPlan and Project 33 set aggressive and necessary goals to improve readiness and prepare for crisis or conflict by 2027—just two years in the future. There can be no bluffing when it comes to deterring adversaries and assuring allies. The U.S. joint force must have unilateral combat capability and the combined power with its allies and partners to fight and win. Project 33 is enhancing those efforts and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, and I am confident it will give us the capability and capacity to prevail.

* Special thanks to Colonel Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army, for his help with this article.

usni.org · January 1, 2025

16. The US will have a Happy New Year if Trump takes 4 pieces of advice

A view from the Quincy Institute.

Excerpts:

Ukraine War

According to QI’s Eurasia and Grand Strategy fellows, Trump should maintain his commitment to putting U.S. interests first. This would mean pursuing a European balance of power strategy that avoids unnecessarily provoking Russia; rather, bringing all parties to the table and ending the war through negotiations.

Middle East

Trump is facing a number of different fronts here, and all concern U.S. interests. On Syria, according to QI Middle East experts, the U.S. should pursue talks with the emerging new government in Damascus, as well as Turkey, to begin the process of withdrawing its 2,000 troops from the country. This should be a priority.

China

Trump should recommit to the “One China” policy in order to avoid a war with Beijing over Taiwan, according to QI’s East Asia experts. This is the greatest potential flashpoint between the two countries today. The U.S. should continue to encourage a peaceful resolution to the China-Taiwan reunification issue, helping to reduce its own military tensions with Beijing in the Taiwan Strait while assuring Taipei that it will continue to receive the tools it needs to defend itself.

Global South

Trump may seem uninterested in the vast outreaches of U.S. spheres of influences, including Africa and Southeast Asia, but he should be aware that in many of these places, governments are seeking better trade and development deals than they are currently getting from the West, or from Washington’s peer competitor, China.

The US will have a Happy New Year if Trump takes 4 pieces of advice

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos · January 1, 2025

quincyinst.org

QI experts outline immediate challenges that will need urgency and a level of realism, and restraint.

Jan 01, 2025

President-elect Donald Trump spent the holidays mocking Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, suggesting that the U.S. could annex and make Canada the 51st state. He then went on to propose that the U.S. retake the Panama Canal, and buy Greenland.

Trump’s remarks brought the usual outcries and exhortations, but, in all seriousness, Trump will have more immediate foreign policy challenges on Day One, beginning with the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as Washington’s overall relationship with China.

Experts at the Quincy Institute have assembled several key priorities, keeping in mind Trump’s stated desires to pursue foreign policy in the national interest and reduce Washington’s foreign entanglements and new wars abroad. Can he keep to his own goals, considering the hot wars in Israel and Ukraine and Washington’s continued involvement in them — and growing tensions with Beijing?

2025 will be the test.

Ukraine War

According to QI’s Eurasia and Grand Strategy fellows, Trump should maintain his commitment to putting U.S. interests first. This would mean pursuing a European balance of power strategy that avoids unnecessarily provoking Russia; rather, bringing all parties to the table and ending the war through negotiations.

This path to peace would focus on a new European security relationship that takes into account Russia’s longstanding aversion to NATO expansion, emphasizing instead expediting Ukrainian admission to the European Union and providing strong guarantees for Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression.

Furthermore, says QI experts, the U.S. should play “the China card” by taking into account Beijing’s interest in seeing the war in Ukraine end, including some of the ancillary dynamics — like North Korea’s military support of Moscow. Including China in coming to a negotiated peace would help bind the parties and could help improve the rocky relations between Washington and Beijing, and lay the foundations for future diplomatic cooperation

Middle East

Trump is facing a number of different fronts here, and all concern U.S. interests. On Syria, according to QI Middle East experts, the U.S. should pursue talks with the emerging new government in Damascus, as well as Turkey, to begin the process of withdrawing its 2,000 troops from the country. This should be a priority.

In Israel, there is no certainty that Tel Aviv’s military dominance will continue, much less lead to peace in the region. Trump needs to convince the Netanyahu government to follow through with a ceasefire agreement in Gaza to stop the fighting, and the U.S must limit the number of lethal weapon transfers to Israel, particularly 2,000-pound bombs, which have led to violations of international law and U.S. law regarding the transfer of weapons that are likely to be used to commit serious abuses of human rights.

Washington should continue to push for a two-state solution and stand in firm opposition to Israel annexing the West Bank, says QI senior fellow Annelle Sheline. Netanyahu must be convinced that his maximalist policies in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon will backfire against Israel’s own relations and with the broader Arab World. In the worst-case scenario, she said, Israel’s actions will continue to fuel the potential for broader regional conflict and drag the U.S. in, despite the stated desire of multiple administrations to start reducing the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East.

“It would be in Trump's own self interest to rein in the Netanyahu government and its extremist agenda, which is destabilizing the region and increasing the likelihood of dragging the U.S. into an unnecessary war,” says Sheline.

“Trump should make clear to Netanyahu that he wants the regional conflict to wind down, which will require Israel to stop attacking its neighbors and stop killing Palestinians. In particular, Trump should tell Netanyahu not to annex the West Bank, which would likely drive Palestinians across the border and therefore violate Israel's treaty with Jordan, possibly sparking yet another conflict, when Trump campaigned on the promise that he could bring order to the region.”

On Iran, her colleagues say, Trump should resist efforts by some in his orbit to reimpose his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran and instead engage in talks to both curb Tehran’s nuclear program and help end the conflict with the Houthis in the Red Sea.

China

Trump should recommit to the “One China” policy in order to avoid a war with Beijing over Taiwan, according to QI’s East Asia experts. This is the greatest potential flashpoint between the two countries today. The U.S. should continue to encourage a peaceful resolution to the China-Taiwan reunification issue, helping to reduce its own military tensions with Beijing in the Taiwan Strait while assuring Taipei that it will continue to receive the tools it needs to defend itself.

In this vein, Washington should be willing to enhance crisis management mechanisms with Beijing. Quincy Institute senior Fellow Michael Swaine has formulated a series of recommendations on this front, calling out the current infrastructure as “critically deficient in carrying out this balancing act.”

“Such a process requires a delicate balancing act between achieving resolution without provocation and fostering accommodation without signaling weakness,” Swaine writes.

The other front is, of course, trade and economic engagement. Trump has threatened new tariffs against Chinese-made imports even as President Biden has expanded efforts to limit or ban certain exports to China, particularly in the realm of advanced technology, in order to prevent Beijing from achieving market dominance.

Washington should pursue less exclusionary and more reciprocal policies, say QI experts because in actuality the former ends up hurting U.S. competitiveness and business. In that vein, Trump should pursue policies that help revitalize U.S. industry at home while avoiding a decoupling strategy that could end up hurting the very American interests he has vowed to serve.

For more on the various approaches to economic competition with China, read QI Karthik Sankaran’s latest on RS.

Global South

Trump may seem uninterested in the vast outreaches of U.S. spheres of influences, including Africa and Southeast Asia, but he should be aware that in many of these places, governments are seeking better trade and development deals than they are currently getting from the West, or from Washington’s peer competitor, China.

Moreover, according to Sarang Shidore, director of QI’s Global South program, Washington needs to move away from a security-first approach that has typically seen the pursuit of blocs and has resulted in militarizing foreign policy. Not only does it not help the countries in question, but it also risks pulling the U.S. into other governments’ conflicts.

“We have seen this pattern in American history before, with Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq 2003 as being among the best examples. Chasing rivals and inflating local threats in these postcolonial societies through military interventions, regime change, and deep militarization generates blowback and insurgency more often than it wins friends and influences people,” he says.

“Unless there is a demonstrable threat to U.S. vital interests, the support should be for generating sustainable partnerships and creating win-win economic opportunities in the Global South rather than arming and basing.”

***

Trump will face a number of urgent issues (Ukraine, Israel) and long-term challenges (Global South, China competition) after his January 20 inauguration. No doubt, a combination of personnel, priorities, and Trump’s own impulsiveness will be engaged immediately, with results varying, leaving 2025 foreign policy just as much in question as it is today at the end of the Biden era.

From Your Site Articles

Would Trump 2.0 be a hawk or a dove? ›

A China-Taiwan War Would Start an Economic Crisis. America Isn’t Ready.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/31/opinion/china-taiwan-war-america.html?utm

Dec. 31, 2024

A Taiwanese soldier in 2022.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

By Eyck Freymann and Hugo Bromley

Eyck Freymann is a Hoover fellow at Stanford University. Hugo Bromley is a research fellow at the Center for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China and Taiwan? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

China’s military exercises in the waters around Taiwan this month — the largest in almost three decades — highlight the growing risk of a total breakdown in United States-China relations. A full-scale invasion of Taiwan is one eventuality; last year, the C.I.A. director, William Burns, noted that China’s president, Xi Jinping, has instructed his armed forces to be ready for an invasion by 2027.

That isn’t Mr. Xi’s only option. He could use his far larger coast guard and military to impose a “quarantine,” allowing merchant shippers and commercial airlines to travel in and out of Taiwan only on China’s terms. This strategy would mirror Beijing’s moves in the South China Sea, where its coast guard is trying to assert control over waters and atolls that are part of the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.

If China forces a confrontation over Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory, the United States will need to respond decisively: The implications are enormous, potentially including a global economic crisis far worse than the shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Right now, America isn’t ready.

As a report from a House panel concluded last year: “The United States lacks a contingency plan for the economic and financial impacts of conflict” with China.

Addressing this lack of preparation must be a bipartisan priority. The incoming administration must work with Congress and allied governments to develop a coherent plan that clearly outlines a vision for the global economy during and after a crisis that is anchored in American economic leadership.

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The most obvious economic implications relate to semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces about 90 percent of the world’s most advanced computer chips. Some are now made in Arizona, but T.S.M.C.’s most cutting-edge chips are still produced in Taiwan. Industries from autos to medical devices depend on these chips; if Taiwanese chip production is disabled, the global economy could be plunged into a deep slump. If T.S.M.C.’s factories fall into China’s hands — it relies on T.S.M.C.’s chips, too — Beijing could seize a competitive edge, including in the development of artificial intelligence technology, and have American and European manufacturers over a barrel.

But an invasion or quarantine of Taiwan matters economically for reasons far beyond semiconductor production. Two commitments form the basis of the economic order in the Indo-Pacific: The first is America’s warning, in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, that any violent move to threaten Taiwan’s political or economic autonomy would be a matter of “grave concern” to the United States. The second is China’s commitment, in 1982, to pursue unification with Taiwan through peaceful means, which Mr. Xi himself describes as part of the political foundation of U.S.-China relations.

If the United States failed to act in response to an invasion or quarantine, allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines would become more vulnerable to economic coercion in turn. America’s relationships with its closest allies would be called into question.

The United States, then, needs economic contingency plans for any Taiwan crisis.

Economic sanctions like those America has employed against Iran and Russia might seem superficially attractive, but because of China’s central role in global supply chains, similar efforts that disrupt its ability to trade would be self-defeating.

Indeed, imposing sweeping sanctions on China would undermine the international economic system that the United States is uniquely positioned to protect. Allies and neutral countries alike might refuse to cooperate with an American-led sanctions regime, given the huge costs of compliance for their own economies. Many Americans would find the probable rise in prices of consumer goods untenable.

Our leaders must face reality: China cannot be sidelined or expelled from the global economy. Instead, the United States needs an affirmative vision for how it would respond in a Taiwan crisis to defend the global economy. Such a plan would involve three key elements.

During and after any Taiwan crisis, markets would be in a state of panic. The Federal Reserve would need to coordinate with other countries’ central banks to provide liquidity to prevent global financial collapse. And to sustain business confidence in the international trading system, the United States and its allies should establish and fund an Economic Security Cooperation Board, open to all nations except rogue states. This board would combine financial support for member countries with a framework for enforcing trade policies rooted in American national security interests.

Washington would also have to work with allies on a crash reshoring of critical products from China on which America and other countries have become heavily dependent, including active pharmaceutical ingredients and drones. (In September, the House passed the Biosecure Act, legislation aimed at strategic decoupling from China in the area of biotechnology, but that has stalled in the Senate.)

To reduce reliance on noncritical consumer goods from China — think toasters and toys — the United States should adopt a gradual approach. A system of predictable, incrementally increasing tariffs on Chinese imports could guide manufacturers, importers and retailers to move production out of China without causing sudden inflationary pressures — unlike Donald Trump’s proposed approach of threatening immediate high tariffs to bargain for concessions. Washington shouldn’t try to direct the production of noncritical goods. Instead, it should work to create a level playing field, allowing countries to compete to attract production that moves out of China.

Putting this vision into effect would not be easy. China would very likely retaliate, including by punishing foreign companies in China. Still, building an inclusive economic security framework would be the best defense against the threat of disruption to trade and financial markets. To maintain international solidarity, a U.S.-led coalition would need to aid all countries that are the target of Chinese economic coercion.

Gaining political support for the kind of spending this would require wouldn’t be easy. A reasonable first step would be congressional hearings on the economic impact of a confrontation over Taiwan, with the eventual goal of drafting legislation that can be pulled off the shelf if a crisis arrives.

Whatever the answers, Washington needs to address these questions before something happens. Remember: If China invades or quarantines Taiwan, it wouldn’t just be targeting one island nation. It would be seeking to forcibly reshape the Indo-Pacific regional order and undermine the rules-based global economy. Without a plan, a Taiwan crisis risks undermining the foundations of American prosperity and security.

More on Taiwan, China, and the United States

Opinion | Vickie Wang

Taiwan Is Ready to Defend Democracy. Is Trump?

Nov. 24, 2024

Opinion | Ben Lewis

China Is Running Out of Lines to Cross in the Taiwan Strait

Feb. 26, 2024

Opinion | Nicholas Kristof

Visiting the Most Important Company in the World

Jan. 24, 2024

Eyck Freymann is a Hoover fellow at Stanford University. Hugo Bromley is a research fellow at the Center for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge. They are the authors of the paper “On Day One: An Economic Contingency Plan for a Taiwan Crisis.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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18. How an FBI Sting Stopped a Russian Smuggler but Not His Hong Kong Supply Route

C4ADS should become the 18th member of the US intelligence community. It does incredible work. We should all be paying attention to their analysis.

Excerpts:

The Americans missed their ultimate goal, however: More than seven months after Marchenko’s arrest, his network was still in business, continuing to feed Russian companies with ties to its military, according to research and a review of trade and procurement data by C4ADS, a Washington-based global security nonprofit.

How an FBI Sting Stopped a Russian Smuggler but Not His Hong Kong Supply Route

U.S. ruse with a path through Fiji shows extent of effort to stop flow of supplies supporting Moscow’s war in Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/how-an-fbi-sting-stopped-a-russian-smuggler-but-not-his-hong-kong-supply-route-64be1ad8?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By Austin RamzyFollow

Jan. 2, 2025 5:30 am ET

HONG KONG—It took the promise of access to contraband, an FBI front company and help from Fiji, but they got their man: U.S. investigators, in a tricky sting operation, picked off a supplier of parts Moscow needs for its war in Ukraine.

The smuggler, Maxim Marchenko, was sentenced in July by a New York court to three years in prison for his role in procuring military-grade electronics for Russia.

The Americans missed their ultimate goal, however: More than seven months after Marchenko’s arrest, his network was still in business, continuing to feed Russian companies with ties to its military, according to research and a review of trade and procurement data by C4ADS, a Washington-based global security nonprofit.

A photo of Maxim Marchenko posted on his Facebook page in July 2023.

The prosecution of Marchenko cast light on the extent of U.S. efforts to enforce sanctions that were imposed after Russia invaded Ukraine nearly three years ago. It also showed how difficult it is to stanch the flow of equipment to Russia through China, which the U.S. accuses of helping Moscow sustain the military production it needs to continue the war.

The Biden administration has imposed Russia-related sanctions on more than 300 people and entities in China, including at least 75 in Hong Kong, freezing assets and restricting their ability to do business. But the trade continues to flow, aided by entities such as Marchenko’s companies in Hong Kong, a shipping hub where the leadership readily denounces Western sanctions.

Between August 2023 and December 2023, Hong Kong companies shipped to Russia more than $750 million worth of microchips and other goods that Moscow needs in its military campaign, according to a July report by the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, a Washington-based rights group.

Russia, with its domestic war supplies dwindling, relies on foreign help for its offensive in Ukraine—most recently in an alliance with North Korea, which has given Moscow thousands of troops and boosted arms shipments.

Ukraine’s front line with Russia. Sanctions have sought to cut off Moscow’s access to Western supplies. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

Hong Kong’s role as a transshipment point for Russia-bound goods is backed by Chinese policy: Beijing rejects what it calls unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S., in part because those restrictions often target Chinese entities and officials, a group that includes Hong Kong’s leader, Chief Executive John Lee. Hong Kong closely follows Beijing’s lead.

“Wheeling and dealing is in Hong Kong’s DNA,” said Joseph Webster, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who researches China-Russia ties. “Beijing is certainly aware of the trade conducted via Hong Kong, but they are doing virtually nothing to stop it.”

A route to Russia

Marchenko, who hails from Moscow and is now 53 years old, worked in Hong Kong for more than a decade, running mostly electronics-trading businesses out of a small office in the crowded Sham Shui Po district.

“Good fortune to my home,” reads a red Chinese card still hanging from what was his office door in a commercial building near a famed Hong Kong electronics market.

Marchenko’s social-media accounts show an interest in thrash metal—he visited the Philippines to see the band Slayer—and drinking beer in Hong Kong pubs. He posted little that could be construed as political except for an occasional dad joke: “If USA is so great then why did someone create a USB?”

Among his companies was one he started with his wife, Diana Izutkina, importing caviar, cheese and candy from Eastern Europe to Hong Kong.

Izutkina called Hong Kong an ideal environment for doing business. “Everything is done to ensure the ease of starting a company,” she said in a 2019 interview with Russian state television.

The item that put Marchenko on the FBI’s radar was a small digital display manufactured by eMagin, a company based in New York. The microdisplays use organic light-emitting diodes for very thin and compact devices. They can be used in military equipment including aircraft helmets, targeting screens, thermal scopes and night-vision goggles.

A screenshot of the website of eMagin, an American electronic-components manufacturer.

The company, eMagin, isn’t named in court documents but is the only such manufacturer listed in Dutchess County, the location of the company identified in the documents. The company didn’t respond to requests for comment. A spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York’s Southern District, which handled the prosecution, declined to comment on the case.

Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Marchenko used one of his companies in Hong Kong—Neway Technologies—to deliver to a Russian electronics company more than $250,000 worth of displays from the New York company, according to an indictment in the U.S. case. He stated the devices were for use in rescue kits by a Russian state civil-defense organization.

After the invasion, the U.S. imposed unprecedented sanctions on a large number of companies and individuals, while the Justice Department launched an interagency program, Task Force KleptoCapture, to enforce sanctions and break up procurement networks such as Marchenko’s.

After February 2022, eMagin told its staff to no longer send devices to Russia or companies that would transfer them to Russia, prosecutors said.

Marchenko then used another of his companies, Alice Components, to continue the trade. In July 2022, the company attempted to order 2,000 displays from eMagin for more than $1 million, saying they would be used for medical equipment in Asia.

Hong Kong’s role as a transshipment point for Russia-bound goods is backed by Chinese policy. Photo: jerome favre/Shutterstock

An eMagin representative told Marchenko’s company that, for “compliance-related reasons,” it couldn’t fulfill its order, refunding its money, according to the indictment—and directing Alice Components to a distributor.

The distributor was in fact a front run by the FBI. From them, Alice Components ordered 2,450 displays at a price of $1.6 million.

Between December 2022 and February 2023, Marchenko used two companies in Hong Kong to pay the distributor nearly $1.3 million. But the FBI front told Marchenko that the shipment had been held up over concerns that the goods would go to Russia. Scrambling to find a way to acquire the displays, Marchenko suggested sending them in batches with a listed value under $2,500, so that there would be no need to report their final destination.

The undercover agents offered an alternative: Meet in Fiji.

The Fiji option

Marchenko checked the customs regulations of the South Pacific island nation and determined “nobody will check there,” prosecutors said.

In mid-September 2023, Marchenko and his wife boarded the 5,000-mile flight from Hong Kong. His last Facebook photos show a Fiji Airways plane at Hong Kong International Airport, then a walkway at Fiji’s main airport, with staff wearing the country’s distinctive kilt-like sulus.

While meeting with undercover agents in Fiji, Marchenko said that one of the people he was working with was based in Russia and that the microdisplays were intended for hunting rifles, prosecutors said.

When an agent asked him about the risk that the microdisplays would end up on the battlefield in Ukraine, Marchenko said they wouldn’t be used in the war, but “lasers were available and so they could take care of the serial numbers,” according to court documents.

Screenshots from Maxim Marchenko’s Facebook profile show a Fiji Airways plane at Hong Kong International Airport.

After a meeting in a Fiji hotel, Fijian police stormed the room and arrested Marchenko and his wife. Izutkina told state-controlled media outlet Russia Today. He was extradited to the U.S., while she was held for five days before being sent back to Hong Kong.

“Maxim is an ordinary entrepreneur who carries out his activities in full compliance with the requirements of the law,” she added. The case against him was “not only terrible and inhumane, but also absurd.” Izutkina didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Moscow protested Marchenko’s arrest in Fiji. The Russian Foreign Ministry called it an example of “unlawful application of the principle of extraterritoriality of the American justice.”

In the end, Marchenko pleaded guilty to charges of smuggling and money laundering. His lawyers didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The future of the U.S. sanctions regime targeting Russia is uncertain. President-elect Donald Trump used sanctions extensively against Iran during his first term, but said during his recent campaign that such tools should be applied judiciously. He has said he would bring an end to the war in Ukraine even before taking office. Easing sanctions could be part of any deal to stop the fighting.

Even with Marchenko in custody, his network continued to move products to Russia. Court documents in his prosecution list two unnamed co-conspirators, including one who was operating from Russia.

In April 2024, the last month for which figures are available before a Russian clampdown on detailed trade data, Alice Components delivered nearly $220,000 worth of telecommunications equipment seen by the U.S. as critical to the Russian war effort.

The equipment was shipped via Dongguan, a manufacturing hub in mainland China near Hong Kong, to Radiofid Systems, the same company to which Marchenko delivered eMagin microdisplays shortly before Russia’s invasion.

In August, the U.S. State Department said sanctions had been imposed on Radiofid and Alice Components, noting that as recently as the preceding January there had been transactions on what it called “Maxim Marchenko’s illicit procurement network.”

Write to Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com

19. FBI found 150 homemade bombs at Virginia home during search in December, prosecutors say

Better late than never. Why has there been so little reporting on this since the arrest on December 17th?

FBI found 150 homemade bombs at Virginia home during search in December, prosecutors say

Updated 9:59 AM EST, January 2, 2025

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · January 1, 2025

NORFOLK, Va. (AP) — Federal agents found one of the largest stockpiles of homemade explosives they have ever seized when they arrested a Virginia man on a firearms charge last month, according to a court filing by federal prosecutors.

Investigators seized more than 150 pipe bombs and other homemade devices when they searched the home of Brad Spafford northwest of Norfolk in December, the prosecutors said in a motion filed Monday. The prosecutors wrote that this is believed to be “the largest seizure by number of finished explosive devices in FBI history.”

Most of the bombs were found in a detached garage at the home in Isle of Wight County, along with tools and bomb-making materials including fuses and pieces of plastic pipe, according to court documents. The prosecutors also wrote: “Several additional apparent pipe bombs were found in a backpack in the home’s bedroom, completely unsecured,” in the home he shares with his wife and two young children.

Spafford, 36, was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of the National Firearms Act. Law enforcement officers allege he owned an unregistered short barrel rifle. Prosecutors said that he faces “numerous additional potential charges” related to the explosives.

Defense attorneys argued in a motion Tuesday that authorities haven’t produced evidence that he was planning violence, also noting that he has no criminal record. Further, they question whether the explosive devices were usable because “professionally trained explosive technicians had to rig the devices to explode them.”

“There is not a shred of evidence in the record that Mr. Spafford ever threatened anyone and the contention that someone might be in danger because of their political views and comments is nonsensical,” the defense lawyers wrote.

Messages were left Wednesday seeking further comment from the defense lawyers who signed the motion, Lawrence Woodward and Jerry Swartz.

The investigation began in 2023 when an informant told authorities that Spafford was stockpiling weapons and ammunition, according to court documents. The informant, a friend, told authorities Spafford had disfigured his hand in 2021 while working on homemade explosives. Prosecutors said he only has two fingers on his right hand. The informant told authorities that Spafford was using pictures of the president, an apparent reference to President Joe Biden, for target practice and that “he believed political assassinations should be brought back,” prosecutors wrote.

Numerous law enforcement officers and bomb technicians searched the property on Dec. 17. The agents located the rifle and the explosive devices, some of which had been hand-labeled as “lethal” and some of which were loaded into a wearable vest, court documents state. Technicians detonated most of the devices on site because they were deemed unsafe to transport, though several were kept for analysis.

At a hearing Tuesday, federal Magistrate Judge Lawrence Leonard determined that Spafford could be released into house arrest at his mother’s home but agreed to keep him detained while the government files further arguments.

In response, prosecutors reiterated why they believe Spafford is dangerous, writing that “while he is not known to have engaged in any apparent violence, he has certainly expressed interest in the same, through his manufacture of pope bombs marked ‘lethal,’ his possession of riot gear and a vest loaded with pipe bombs, his support for political assassinations and use of the pictures of the President for target practice.”

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · January 1, 2025

20. Don't Repeat in Syria the Mistakes of Afghanistan

Excerpts:

In the coming weeks, foreign governments should also coordinate to offer clear, realistic, and time-bound demands for Syria’s new leaders in exchange for further relief from both the terrorism sanctions that affect them directly as well as other economic restrictions imposed on the Assad regime. These negotiations can take place via bilateral talks, as well as engagements in multilateral forums. If foreign governments define realistic benchmarks that Syria’s new leaders can meet to obtain sanctions relief, they could receive concrete concessions from HTS, such as commitments on good governance and guarantees that both the Syrian state and other groups inside the country will not pose a threat abroad. Reaching agreements often requires difficult compromises, but doing so would hold both the ex-rebels and international officials accountable for their parts of the bargain. Governments that worry about trading away their leverage should remember that delisting HTS and providing Syria with sanctions relief now would not stop them from undertaking other punitive actions later if the circumstances require it.

Unfortunately, international actors already appear to be missing their opportunity to set the new Syria up for success. On December 23, U.S. President Joe Biden signed a law that extends the 2019 Caesar Act, which imposed some of the harshest sanctions on Syria, for five years—even though most of the criteria for suspending those sanctions have been satisfied since Assad’s ouster. Lawmakers said it was too early to lift the sanctions. In mid-December, Idaho Senator Jim Risch, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that Congress would “watch and see” how HTS governs.

Waiting and watching carries risks, however, particularly as the needs of the Syrian people mount. Nor does it do anything to keep the country from collapsing. Syria now stands at a crossroads: one path offers a chance to rebuild and reengage with the world, and the other leads toward deeper isolation and suffering for the Syrian people. International actors should learn from their failures in Afghanistan and move decisively. They should seize the chance to push HTS to make concessions that would set Syria on a path toward economic recovery and sustainable governance while taking credible steps to address international security concerns. A strong global response can reduce the chances of another Afghanistan-style tragedy.

Don't Repeat in Syria the Mistakes of Afghanistan

Foreign Affairs · by More by Delaney Simon · January 2, 2025

Isolating Damascus’s New Rulers Won’t Moderate Them

Delaney Simon, Graeme Smith, and Jerome Drevon

January 2, 2025

The flag adopted by Syria's new rulers, Umayyad Square, Damascus, December 2024 Ammar Awad / Reuters

Delaney Simon is a Senior Analyst for the U.S. Program at the International Crisis Group.

Graeme Smith is a Senior Analyst for Afghanistan at the International Crisis Group.

Jerome Drevon is a Senior Analyst for Jihad and Modern Conflict at the International Crisis Group.

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Syria’s new leaders have few models to follow in their quest to win international recognition. No guidebooks exist on how to run a government for groups operating under terrorist designations—and there is no clear set of rules for foreign governments on how to bring a former al Qaeda affiliate in from the cold. But Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that dislodged Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in early December, and outside governments alike can learn from a cautionary precedent: the Taliban’s 2021 return to power in Afghanistan.

After the Taliban seized Kabul, Afghanistan staggered under the weight of sanctions and other kinds of economic and diplomatic isolation. Other governments failed to act with sufficient speed and boldness to ease the country’s poverty crisis, and they left in place economic punishments that had no moderating effect on the Taliban but pushed Afghans closer to famine. Most countries declined to negotiate with the Taliban in a way that might have promoted women’s rights and other international norms, choosing instead to wait and see whether Afghanistan’s new leaders would do so on their own. That reluctance to engage with the Taliban dealt a blow to the movement’s pragmatic wing, empowering hard-liners during the regime’s precarious first months.

International officials have engaged more deeply with HTS in the past month than they did with the Taliban after the fall of Kabul. HTS encouraged that outreach by foreign officials by demonstrating a political and ideological flexibility that distinguishes the group from the Taliban. Yet unfortunately, outside actors seem poised to repeat many of the same mistakes they made in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s takeover.

During a political transition, every step can change the course of history. Western officials, in particular, seem excited about the prospect of a new Syria, and rightly so. But without actions that allow Syria to rebuild and reinvigorate its economy after years of war, the country could suffer further chaos and instability, which neither the West nor Syrians want. Western governments have a strong interest in learning from their missteps in Afghanistan, because a prolonged crisis in Syria would likely spill over into the rest of the Middle East, undermine Western influence in the region, and force more people to flee the country. Most important, Syrians deserve better.

The United States and its partners should act swiftly to soften the harsh effects of sanctions on Syria as it attempts to recover. They should also establish a clear path toward the removal of these sanctions and diplomatic recognition for HTS in exchange for actions and commitments from Syria’s new leaders. If the West drags its heels, it could push the country toward collapse and squander its short window of opportunity to convince the ex-rebels to pursue the right path.

HISTORY LESSONS

It is impossible to calculate the degree to which external actions affected Afghanistan after the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover. Nobody can disaggregate the effects of international policies from the impact of the Taliban’s awful misrule. But two lessons pertinent to the Syrian case emerge from Afghanistan’s recent history.

The first is that, in the Afghan case, international actors moved too slowly to ease humanitarian suffering, especially the impoverishing effects of their own sanctions, banking restrictions, and other economic policies. The United States, the United Nations, and other entities initially levied sanctions on the Taliban in the 1990s and ramped them up after September 11, 2001. That legacy of restrictions on the Taliban, however, effectively condemned the entire country after the former insurgents captured the government. Ordinary Afghans could see that the Taliban had pushed out the foreign troops that had been deployed to the country since 2001, when U.S.-led forces toppled an earlier Taliban government, and many viewed the economic measures against the Taliban as an act of revenge by defeated invaders. Materially, the sanctions and restrictions contributed to sharp declines in the value of the local currency, the central bank’s loss of access to its reserves, and disruptions to supply chains in the months after the Taliban’s return. By December 2021, UN agencies were describing Afghanistan as the world’s biggest humanitarian disaster.

Only six months after the fall of Kabul, with famine looming, did foreign governments modify their sanctions to a degree that began to approach the scale of the calamity. Washington granted the most sweeping exemptions ever written for U.S. sanctions, and the UN improved Afghanistan’s monetary stability by sending cash shipments for aid operations. These measures helped, but they came too late and were too timid. Private firms and development agencies felt reluctant to do business in a pariah state with a crippled banking sector. Many would-be investors did not know about the U.S. exemptions, and those that did still worried about violating the sanctions and breaking the antiterrorism laws of other countries that had not loosened their rules.

International actors moved too slowly to ease Afghans' suffering.

A second lesson should be learned, too, from the West’s failure to give the Taliban adequate clarity about how to gain diplomatic recognition and shake off sanctions. Although foreign actors talked about the need for stability and took some measures to ease the economic crisis, international engagements remained limited by the West’s reluctance to take any steps that might confer legitimacy on Kabul’s new leaders. Western governments made hazy demands about respecting women’s rights and forming an “inclusive” government—a well-intended but vague term now floated by international actors discussing Syria’s future—but did not define the quid pro quo.

The lion’s share of responsibility for Afghanistan’s pariah status falls on the shoulders of the clerics who insisted on regulating the behavior of women and girls in ways that violated international norms and made the Taliban politically toxic. But there were pragmatists within the Taliban, too. These moderates were never able to convince the hard-liners that more tolerant policies would result in significant benefits, in part because the outside world failed to offer clear rewards for instituting better policies. Over and over, pragmatists among the Taliban visited their religious leaders in Kandahar to push against new draconian edicts. But each time, they arrived empty-handed.

The closest thing to an outright offer emerged in June 2023, during a visit UN Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioglu made to Afghanistan. During that visit, Taliban officials got the impression that their government could represent Afghanistan at the UN if they allowed girls of all ages to receive an education. But the Taliban wanted a firm proposal, which they never received. After consultations with UN member states, Sinirlioglu’s report to the Security Council laid out an extensive set of demands for the Taliban—but only nebulous promises about the path toward normalization that the regime could win in return.

It is, of course, not guaranteed that a more transactional approach would have persuaded the Taliban’s leadership to change their policies in exchange for recognition and sanctions relief. Some diplomats bridle at the very idea of haggling with the Taliban, saying that the rights of women and girls are non-negotiable. But such an approach was never properly tested. Without any real prospect of serious concessions from Western states, the Taliban became cynical about ever gaining legitimacy on the world stage.

TEMPERATE WINDS

Like the Taliban, Syria’s new leaders come from a militant Islamist movement. HTS emerged in 2017 after a coalition of several armed groups formed around a jihadist faction called Jabhat al-Nusra. The al-Nusra faction had been created by Ahmed al-Shara, HTS’s current leader, who at the time was a Syrian member of the Islamic State (or ISIS). In 2013, however, Al-Shara cut ties with ISIS and pledged allegiance to al Qaeda before breaking with that group in 2016.

But in crucial ways, HTS does not resemble the Taliban. The Taliban’s leader was born in a mud-walled villages, advocates strict religious education, and preaches against the evil influences of the outside world. By contrast, HTS’s leaders, although religiously committed, emerged from modern cities in Syria, often graduated from universities, and want more global connections. The group has long sought to shed its links with the West’s enemies, starting with the terrorist groups that the West reviles. HTS clamped down hard on Hurras al-Din, an al Qaeda affiliate in northwest Syria that was not involved in the 2024 rebellion against Assad. The group suppressed Syrian ISIS members more severely, arresting and sometimes executing them in public, and it vows to continue fighting ISIS in Syria’s east.

Additionally, Syria’s rebels have spent years fending off attacks from two longtime nemeses of the West: Assad and Russia. Their victory saw the downfall of two American foes, whereas the Taliban’s win epitomized American defeat. Although HTS is now undertaking a delicate dance to avoid antagonizing Russia—offering Moscow the opportunity to retain its military bases in Syria—the new authorities in Damascus recently hosted Ukraine’s foreign minister and pledged to strengthen ties with Kyiv. HTS’s relationship with Iran has been much colder, bordering on hostile, as the group asserts that Iran must be held accountable for its many destabilizing actions in Syria. The ex-rebels have also affirmed that they will not threaten Syria’s neighbors—a gesture that seems, in part, intended to give comfort to Israel, the United States’ closest regional ally.

In crucial ways, Syria's new rulers do not resemble the Taliban.

Syria’s new leaders also have a more moderate governance record. When HTS governed Idlib—the province it has controlled since 2017—it did maintain restrictions on some non-Islamic faiths that had been imposed by previous ruling factions, such as silencing church bells. The group also included no women in its leadership or in the local legislature. Yet overall, the rebels have been substantially more tolerant than the Taliban. Morality police patrol Afghanistan, but earlier this year, HTS froze proposed regulations that called for the enforcement of Islamic rules in the malls, restaurants, and cafés of Idlib. Conservative religious elements dominate the Taliban’s leadership, but HTS has disempowered its own most radical sheikhs. The group touts its record of promoting education for girls of all ages, albeit with classes segregated by gender.

Since taking Damascus, Syria’s rebels have adopted a markedly conciliatory tone. HTS has pledged to respect the rights of Christians, Alawites, and other minority groups. It affirmed the right of all sectors of society to engage in peaceful protests. The group has committed to disbanding and merging itself into official government structures. Syria’s new leaders have also recently appointed women to leadership roles, including to head the Department of Women’s Affairs and Syria’s central bank.

HTS’s moderate rhetoric and actions may find a skeptical audience around the world because of the group’s past affiliations and lingering questions about how it will manage to govern a large country. But Syria’s new leaders seem much more eager than the Taliban ever was to curry favor with the West, in part because HTS’s leaders appear to understand that development and reconstruction will require Western support and sanctions relief. Outside powers should gain confidence in Damascus if the new authorities rule with the same openness they have shown in their first weeks in power.

INHERITANCE TAX

But the fact that the Syrian rebels are sending more palatable messages to outside powers does not mean they will find it easier to escape sanctions than the Taliban did. The United Nations, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and other influential states still designate HTS as a terrorist group. Since 2014, the United States has considered HTS a foreign terrorist organization—a designation with harsher implications than the Taliban’s specially designated global terrorist label. The FTO designation makes its targets politically and legally radioactive, in part because the United States outlaws extending any material support to listed groups, including training and advice. Severe penalties can be imposed on both Americans and non-Americans who break the rules, including fines of up to $500,000 and decades in prison. With an FTO-listed group acting as Syria’s new government, virtually all dealings in the country are now fraught with legal risk, hampering aid workers, business owners, and even diplomats from working in the country. Even if HTS disbands, its FTO status will not automatically be revoked; rolling the designation back could take years.

Adding to the restrictions on HTS are the complex sanctions on the state of Syria itself, which the new leaders will inherit. The United States designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 and tightened sanctions in the early years of this century; in the 2010s, as the Syrian government brutally repressed a popular uprising and sank into civil war, the United States, the European Union, and other international entities issued fresh economic restrictions that persist today. These include sanctions on the energy, banking, and telecommunications sectors; restrictions on importing most U.S. goods, as well as goods from other countries with components made in the United States; and rules that forbid non-U.S. businesses from trading with Syrian companies. Many of the restrictions were imposed legislatively, making them especially difficult to lift. The result of these overlapping restrictions is a near-total trade embargo.

Before the December fall of Damascus, sanctions—along with other factors such as the Assad regime’s mismanagement—had contributed to the collapse of the Syrian economy and a humanitarian crisis that left 70 percent of Syria’s population in dire need of food, water, and other essentials. The economic restrictions also hindered aid delivery: humanitarian groups struggled to find banks for payments into Syria, and the extra paperwork required for legal compliance ate up time and resources. Delays in delivering aid sometimes proved deadly. For instance, first responders to the 2023 earthquake that hit Syria as well as Turkey spent weeks waiting for permission to bring in the diggers that they needed to reach survivors under the rubble, because U.S. export controls banned the importation of such tools.

These kinds of headaches will continue as long as broad economic restrictions remain in place—and many of the sanctions have, in any case, lost relevance because they targeted the now-defunct Assad regime. Without sanctions relief, poverty and hindrances to aid delivery will worsen in Syria because the new government is controlled by a group with a terrorist designation. Already, in the parts of northwest Syria that have been under HTS control for years, fear of prosecution has hindered the supply of basic goods and the provision of aid. Now, these problems may well spread across the entire country.

POVERTY TRAP

Unless it is quickly addressed, the isolation that the world has imposed on HTS and the Syrian state could create a crisis that outstrips Afghanistan’s. The spate of battles that led to Assad’s overthrow displaced about 900,000 Syrians in the final months of 2024. The UN has forecasted that 33 million Syrians will need assistance in the coming year. Even if foreign powers move swiftly on the humanitarian front, foreign aid cannot sustain an entire country: Syria needs not only emergency supplies but also support for the recovery of its economy, which ground to a halt during the war. Economic repair will require both financial and technical support from donors and international institutions. Yet institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund remain blocked by the U.S. state sponsor of terrorism designation that requires Washington, a deciding vote on these institutions’ boards, to oppose such help. Other actors such as the EU also maintain regulations against loans and grants to Syria. Moreover, as long as HTS remains on the U.S. FTO list, any expert who provides advice to the new regime risks breaking U.S. laws.

Economic recovery will also require the swift resumption of private-sector activity and international trade, which contracted by around 80 percent from 2010 to 2022. But many countries prohibit their citizens from doing business with Syria. And as long as Syria’s central bank remains under sanctions, its financial institutions will remain closed to the world. Further complications may arise from the fact that any central bank would have trouble meeting global standards on combating the financing of terrorism if the arbiter of new appointments at the bank is a listed terrorist.

Continued isolation of Syria’s economy risks driving it deeper into the shadows. If Syrians cannot get permission to trade with the world, they may instead rely further on the illicit industries that have been among the country’s few sources of profit in recent years. Assad’s regime relied on producing and exporting captagon, a banned stimulant. International officials will push HTS to curb the drug trade, but Syria’s leaders will struggle to comply unless those appeals are paired with fresh economic opportunities to build sustainable livelihoods.

A deepening economic and humanitarian crisis in Syria could also undermine Western geopolitical interests. The Assad regime, cut off from the rest of the world, depended heavily on Russia and Iran. Syria’s new leaders are trying to distance their country from both these actors; days after Assad’s ouster, an oil tanker full of Iranian crude made a U-turn away from Syria, suggesting that Tehran might stop backing the country’s energy sector. But if Western restrictions on Syria’s economy remain in place, the new leaders of Damascus may have little choice but to ask for help from Western adversaries in order to keep the lights on.

OUT OF A BIND

Western governments want to see Syria remade for the better, reverse the flow of migration, and work to suppress terrorism. Backroom discussions have accelerated in recent weeks between Western and Arab countries about how to engage with Syria’s new leaders. Senior officials from France, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Gulf Arab states, and the UN, among others, have already talked to HTS, and several have embarked on visits to Damascus. In late December, the United States even removed the $10 million bounty on al-Shara. Direct talks at a senior level would have been unthinkable just a month ago, when many states had a policy of nonengagement with HTS.

There are other signs, however, that the world may make many of the same mistakes in Syria that it did in Afghanistan after 2021. Western capitals have not been willing to commit to a road map for sanctions relief and eventual recognition of the new authorities—one in which specific actions by HTS would be met with specific steps by Western countries. Nor have they taken the measures that are now urgently required to soften the impact of sanctions on Syria’s humanitarian and economic crisis.

European and U.S. officials have, over the past several weeks, floated numerous requirements of HTS, such as demanding that the group take action against transnational militancy, create a more inclusive government, uphold women’s and minority rights, close Russian bases, and hold free and fair elections. But nobody has clarified precisely what the world will offer the ex-rebels in return or how HTS should prioritize the litany of demands. On the contrary, policymakers are kicking the can down the road.

HTS is, of course, responsible for playing its part in a successful transition. Its inclusion of other armed groups in its rebellion—among them groups sanctioned by the UN Security Council for links to al Qaeda and ISIS—could raise red flags, and some observers worry that HTS contains a hard core of extremists who are concealing their true ambitions until the group consolidates power. Some governments have expressed concern about HTS’s recent decision to grant a small number of official roles in the new Syrian military to foreign fighters. Other capitals fear that early outreach could reward the rebels before they have a track record of decent governance. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently warned HTS to avoid the missteps of Taliban leaders, who he said projected a moderate face before the group’s “true colors came out.”

NO TIME TO WAIT

In the absence of decisive action from international actors, Syria is poised to descend further into crisis, as Afghanistan did. To avert this fate, foreign governments must quickly stop sanctions from driving Syria into a deeper economic and humanitarian emergency.

Right away, the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, and other actors should issue broad exemptions to allow economic and commercial activity, similar to the General License 20 that the U.S. Treasury issued in 2022 for Afghanistan. Such permissions would save lives in the short term, aligning with Western interests in shoring up the region’s stability and reversing the outflow of migrants. The steps could be taken in a matter of days via actions by the U.S. Treasury, the Council of the EU, and the British treasury and would build on existing exemptions for humanitarian aid.

Other actions to relieve pressure on key sectors such as Syria’s energy and banking should also be taken immediately, without imposing conditions. Although the country’s economic growth will lag so long as Syria remains under sanctions, no recovery can begin while the essential activities of key sectors are blocked. Such reforms would not compromise the leverage that sanctions give foreign powers, given the sheer quantity of restrictions on Syria that are currently in place. Enacting such sanctions relief will be time-consuming, as it requires a combination of legislative, regulatory, and other actions untaken by various arms of the U.S. government, the EU, the United Kingdom, and other actors, so Western governments should start the process of unraveling those restrictions now.

Steps to ease sanctions on Syria could be taken within days.

In the coming weeks, foreign governments should also coordinate to offer clear, realistic, and time-bound demands for Syria’s new leaders in exchange for further relief from both the terrorism sanctions that affect them directly as well as other economic restrictions imposed on the Assad regime. These negotiations can take place via bilateral talks, as well as engagements in multilateral forums. If foreign governments define realistic benchmarks that Syria’s new leaders can meet to obtain sanctions relief, they could receive concrete concessions from HTS, such as commitments on good governance and guarantees that both the Syrian state and other groups inside the country will not pose a threat abroad. Reaching agreements often requires difficult compromises, but doing so would hold both the ex-rebels and international officials accountable for their parts of the bargain. Governments that worry about trading away their leverage should remember that delisting HTS and providing Syria with sanctions relief now would not stop them from undertaking other punitive actions later if the circumstances require it.

Unfortunately, international actors already appear to be missing their opportunity to set the new Syria up for success. On December 23, U.S. President Joe Biden signed a law that extends the 2019 Caesar Act, which imposed some of the harshest sanctions on Syria, for five years—even though most of the criteria for suspending those sanctions have been satisfied since Assad’s ouster. Lawmakers said it was too early to lift the sanctions. In mid-December, Idaho Senator Jim Risch, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that Congress would “watch and see” how HTS governs.

Waiting and watching carries risks, however, particularly as the needs of the Syrian people mount. Nor does it do anything to keep the country from collapsing. Syria now stands at a crossroads: one path offers a chance to rebuild and reengage with the world, and the other leads toward deeper isolation and suffering for the Syrian people. International actors should learn from their failures in Afghanistan and move decisively. They should seize the chance to push HTS to make concessions that would set Syria on a path toward economic recovery and sustainable governance while taking credible steps to address international security concerns. A strong global response can reduce the chances of another Afghanistan-style tragedy.

Delaney Simon is a Senior Analyst for the U.S. Program at the International Crisis Group.

Graeme Smith is a Senior Analyst for Afghanistan at the International Crisis Group.

Jerome Drevon is a Senior Analyst for Jihad and Modern Conflict at the International Crisis Group.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Delaney Simon · January 2, 2025

21. A Last Chance for Iran

Excerpts:

Washington’s power over Tehran’s nuclear calculus is ultimately limited. No one in the United States knows how Iranian officials are really looking at their current predicament. The return of maximum-pressure sanctions could be the trigger for weaponization. But the blows Iran has already received from Israel, combined with its struggling economy, could already be enough to trigger it to go nuclear at a time of its own choosing. U.S. policymakers should begin to build into their own calculations that Iranian nuclear weapons are an eventuality to be managed, but there is a limited opportunity to avoid this outcome.

It is thus time for Washington to consider extreme steps. When the United States negotiated the JCPOA, it judged that keeping Iran to a one-year breakout time—the time required to produce enough usable nuclear material for a nuclear weapon—was needed to give the United States and its partners opportunities to find diplomatic off-ramps and, if necessary, to rally the world behind a military response. But that buffer is long gone; Iran has been breaking out since it started producing 60 percent enriched uranium, in 2021. The relative quiet of the present nuclear crisis between Iran and the United States speaks more to the raging nature of wars elsewhere than to restraint on Tehran’s part or effective diplomacy on Washington’s. There is no guarantee that the crisis will remain quiescent for much longer. The fact that military force may be necessary to prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout should be seen as a bipartisan policy failure. The downsides of a strike are grave, and so the safer course is to make another attempt at negotiation. But if that fails, Washington must be ready.

A Last Chance for Iran

Foreign Affairs · by More by Richard Nephew · January 2, 2025

America Should Give Diplomacy a Final Shot—While Preparing to Use Military Force

Richard Nephew

January 2, 2025

At the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Museum, Tehran, November 2024 Majid Asgaripour / WANA / Reuters

Richard Nephew is Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University and an Adjunct Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the former U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for Iran.

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For two decades, hawkish voices in Washington have called for the United States to attack Iran’s nuclear program. And for two decades their calls have been rejected. That is because for most of that time, the argument against military action was compelling and straightforward. Iran’s nuclear capabilities were immature. The international community was united on the need for Tehran to prove that its nuclear intentions were entirely peaceful, and thus was reasonably united in sanctioning the country when it became clear that they weren’t. These sanctions imposed high costs that pushed the Islamic Republic into negotiations.

There are still many good reasons to not bomb Iran. Striking the country would inject more chaos and instability into the Middle East. It would consume substantial American resources at a time when Washington wants to focus on other regions. It could undermine U.S. credibility if the attacks don’t succeed. And the odds of failure are high: even the most accurate strikes might only delay Iranian nuclearization. The best, most durable solution to the issue remains a diplomatic agreement.

But today, the case against military action is not so neat. Iran’s nuclear program is no longer nascent; in fact, the country has just about everything it needs to make a weapon. Tehran, meanwhile, is more vulnerable and more in need of a new deterrent than it was a few years ago: its network of partners is in tatters and Israel struck targets within Iran’s borders several times in 2024. The international community is also now fractured on whether to pressure the Iranian regime. There are still harsh sanctions on Iran, but they are constantly being breached by China, India, and Russia, among others. Resuming full enforcement may be possible, but it will require China’s cooperation in particular at a time when Beijing faces bipartisan hostility from Washington. Russia’s relationship with Iran is likewise stronger than it has been for decades, buoyed by mutual defense ties. Tehran’s incentives to go nuclear have hardly ever been greater, and its expected costs have likely diminished.

Given the risks of military action, the United States must make a final, good-faith attempt to negotiate a halt to Tehran’s nuclear program early in the Trump administration. But unless it is prepared to live in the world that Iranian nuclear weapons would create, it may have little choice but to attack Iran—and soon. Prudence demands that Washington both plot out military action now and ensure that Iran understands that this threat is real, even as it tries the diplomatic path once more.

CONS OF CONFLICT

There are many reasons to give diplomacy a final chance. First and foremost, American officials do not know whether a military attack would succeed. The United States and its partners may possess the means to destroy all of Iran’s main nuclear facilities. But that is no guarantee of eliminating all the country’s nuclear material, or indeed all of its nuclear equipment, some of which could be hidden away in deeply buried storage. Tehran could, either in anticipation of or in quick response to U.S. strikes, divert some of its of highly enriched uranium to secret sites, preserving enough material for the country to produce multiple bombs quickly.

If Iran were attacked by a declared nuclear power—a designation that applies to the United States—Tehran would be newly incentivized to develop its own deterrent and could perceive that it had more international legitimacy to do so. And with enriched uranium still in hand, it would already possess the main ingredient. The essential elements of bomb-making are known to Iran, and so it would be positioned for fast assembly. That is why the 2015 nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), focused on preventing nuclear material acquisition rather than on weaponization equipment or missiles.

In fact, Iran’s decades-long development of nuclear expertise means that the country could build a weapon even if military strikes render all of its existing equipment and material unusable. Restoring its nuclear program would take time, but an attack that destroys Natanz and other sites is not the end of the problem any more than was the death of Iranian physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in 2020, or the attack on Iran’s centrifuge production site, in 2021. The bombing of the Osirak reactor in Iraq, in 1981, did not end its nuclear program; Iraq’s nuclear weapons program even intensified in the following years. The bombing of the al Kibar reactor in Syria, in 2007, may have been more successful, but the country’s plunge into civil war makes it hard to assess the long-term effects of the strike on its nuclear decision-making.

The high costs of attacking Iran mean the United States should again try diplomacy.

To permanently quash Iran’s nuclear aspirations, the United States may have to attack Iran in perpetuity or carry out a much larger assault—one that takes out elements of the country’s security forces or regime. Both tasks would be far longer and more arduous than a limited campaign, and it is foolhardy to assume that Washington has the commitment needed to complete either. This means that strikes on Iran would raise credibility problems for U.S. leaders, especially if Washington eventually gave up its attacks and Tehran produced a weapon.

Moreover, once strikes began, it is hard to imagine there would be a swift turn to diplomacy, short of a change in the Iranian government. Regime change itself is no guarantee of a better outcome, with regard to either the nuclear program or the regime’s other malign activities. Even if the Islamic Republic collapsed, it might only be replaced by a more virulent regime. Iran could descend into anarchy. Few would lament the end of the country’s current government, especially those who have been repressed by it for 40 years. Yet there is a reason why Iranians are also worried about the risks of regime instability and have been since witnessing the Arab Spring.

No matter the outcome, attacks on Iran would strain U.S. resources. Dire reports already abound concerning U.S. ammunition and missile defense interceptor shortages. Additional expenses would come at a poor time for Washington. The international situation today is complex. Russia continues to wage war against Ukraine. There is a risk that China will invade Taiwan. And almost the entire Middle East is unsettled. A new military campaign against Iran would especially burden the United States if Europe, the global South, and Washington’s Arab partners were against or at best skeptical of American military action—which they all may well be.

DEALMAKING

The high costs of attacking Iran mean that the United States should again try diplomacy. And there are reasons to be optimistic that, despite the volatile situation, the two countries can reach an agreement. Diplomacy, after all, has a successful track record when it comes to slowing Iran’s nuclear aspirations. The European initiatives of the early 2000s led to short-term suspensions of Iranian nuclear activities and, when these failed to take root in the long term, compelled Russia and China to support UN sanctions. In 2013, the Joint Plan of Action halted Iranian nuclear advances to allow two years of negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA. The JCPOA outright froze significant parts of Iran’s nuclear program while subjecting it to more stringent international monitoring.

Each of these initiatives eventually failed. But although Iran was responsible for the end of the European-negotiated suspension agreements, Tehran complied with the JCPOA, a fact that even the first Trump administration acknowledged in its mandatory reports to Congress on the deal. The JCPOA collapsed because President-elect Donald Trump withdrew from it in his first term. But Trump is well positioned to engineer a replacement precisely because he killed the last deal. Talks to return the United States and Iran to full, mutual compliance with the JCPOA in 2021 and 2022 died because the Iranians did not trust the United States to live up to an agreement after a transfer of power and because the United States refused to consider other diplomatic approaches. Yet if Trump himself agrees to a new deal, Iran may believe that it will stand. Most Democrats have been supportive of diplomacy, and if Trump gets on board, Republicans might as well.

Although a deal is possible and preferable, coming up with one will be hard. Trump has shown interest in what he describes as a “simple” deal to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but the terms of any deal would have to be complex to have much effect. Tehran and Washington would need to come to terms on how far the constraints on Iran’s nuclear program must go, whether to create rules around Iran’s regional behavior, and what sanctions relief and security assurances Iran might receive. Figuring out all these issues would require extensive negotiations—especially to ensure that a deal is sustainable, verifiable, and enforceable—and would require more parties to be involved if regional issues are to be a focus. Multilateral talks are difficult at the best of times. Russia’s war in Ukraine and tensions between Beijing and Washington are just two irritants that would make such a process very difficult to orchestrate today.

FIRST STRIKE

Still, there is reason to hope that, with enough time and creativity, Tehran and Washington can come to some kind of agreement. But despite Iran’s strategic setbacks and vulnerabilities, primarily a result of Israel’s attacks on Tehran’s proxies and on Iran itself in October, Iran’s nuclear progress has made time a resource in short supply. If the United States pursues a “maximum pressure” approach to soften Iran for later talks, Iran could retaliate by hiding its nuclear material, building a bomb, withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or all three. Should attempts to strike a deal fail, the United States must be willing to use its military.

Iranian nuclear weapons would not present a near-term existential threat to the United States. Washington’s own nuclear armaments would vastly outnumber any Iranian stockpile, and Iran is still developing its intercontinental ballistic missile capability. If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, however, it would encourage others in the Middle East to do so as well, producing future arms races that risk nuclear war. Even if Iran did not transfer nuclear weapons to proxy groups—although Iran’s decision to equip the Houthis and Hezbollah with ballistic missiles makes a nuclear transfer seem more plausible—its nuclear arsenal could become a target for terrorist or criminal groups. And many U.S. partners would fall within Iran’s range of fire, as would an appreciable supply of the world’s energy resources. A world in which Iran possesses nuclear weapons would thus be a far more dangerous one for the United States and its partners.

Attacking Iran’s nuclear program would come with strategic benefits beyond just preventing a dangerous adversary from going nuclear. Strikes, for example, would further stretch Tehran’s already limited resources. The country, set back again, would struggle more than ever to threaten U.S. interests. It would have to simultaneously balance restoring its nuclear program, rebuilding Hezbollah, restocking its missile force, and managing its overall economic problems, all while still under sanctions. Simply put, Iran would have to make real choices as to its strategic direction. It would have lost all of its major deterrence systems and methods, and it could no longer turn to nuclear weapons as a cheap, quick option to restore them.

Should attempts to strike a deal fail, the United States must be willing to use its military.

A weakened Iran would yield dividends for the Middle East. The Iranian government might receive a limited boost in its popular support after U.S. attacks, but depending on their severity, targeting scope, and any unintended collateral damage, average Iranians might also see in them an opportunity to pressure the regime to change. Israel’s attack on Iran in October 2024 does not appear to have generated a notable “rally around the flag” effect, suggesting that a U.S. attack might not either. Furthermore, Tehran would have less time and fewer resources to harass or undermine its neighbors following a U.S. attack, and more incentive to work instead toward constructive regional security arrangements. Its setbacks would also reduce the pressure on other countries to acquire their own nuclear arsenals.

Finally, attacking Iran’s nuclear program could help shore up U.S. credibility—even though failure risks weakening it. Over the last two decades, the world has developed doubts about Washington’s commitment to addressing threats. The fault is bipartisan. The Obama administration drew a redline at former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad using chemical weapons and then refused to enforce it. Trump did not respond to Iran’s many attacks on U.S. forces and the energy infrastructure of U.S. allies, despite his pledges to act. If the U.S. government now sees Iran go nuclear despite repeated promises not to let it do so, challenger states will ask even more questions about the durability of U.S. commitments, exposing Washington’s friends and allies to grave risk. Striking Iran is certainly not the only (or perhaps even best) way to enhance perceptions of American power. But it could play a part.

This assumes, of course, that Washington’s strikes would go far enough to ultimately succeed in preventing Iranian nuclear weaponization. The United States could, without a doubt, destroy Iran’s known nuclear facilities, but that alone would not prevent Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition. Such a feat would likely require more than one round of strikes, a long-term U.S. military presence, and U.S. readiness to expand its attack profile beyond nuclear facilities to target Iran’s decision-makers. As such, the United States would likely need to launch strikes that focus on regime assets or security forces, even if they prompt internal instability, and it should think now about how to design those strikes to reduce the negative consequences of that instability. Loose talk about so-called simple strikes—or how Washington can solve a decades-long challenge through a few bombing sorties—may sound appealing. But there is no substitute for a serious, honest, and sustained evaluation of what kinds of attacks would work, how long they would have to be sustained, how much they would cost, and how to avoid the worst outcomes.

A QUIET CRISIS

Washington’s power over Tehran’s nuclear calculus is ultimately limited. No one in the United States knows how Iranian officials are really looking at their current predicament. The return of maximum-pressure sanctions could be the trigger for weaponization. But the blows Iran has already received from Israel, combined with its struggling economy, could already be enough to trigger it to go nuclear at a time of its own choosing. U.S. policymakers should begin to build into their own calculations that Iranian nuclear weapons are an eventuality to be managed, but there is a limited opportunity to avoid this outcome.

It is thus time for Washington to consider extreme steps. When the United States negotiated the JCPOA, it judged that keeping Iran to a one-year breakout time—the time required to produce enough usable nuclear material for a nuclear weapon—was needed to give the United States and its partners opportunities to find diplomatic off-ramps and, if necessary, to rally the world behind a military response. But that buffer is long gone; Iran has been breaking out since it started producing 60 percent enriched uranium, in 2021. The relative quiet of the present nuclear crisis between Iran and the United States speaks more to the raging nature of wars elsewhere than to restraint on Tehran’s part or effective diplomacy on Washington’s. There is no guarantee that the crisis will remain quiescent for much longer. The fact that military force may be necessary to prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout should be seen as a bipartisan policy failure. The downsides of a strike are grave, and so the safer course is to make another attempt at negotiation. But if that fails, Washington must be ready.

Richard Nephew is Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University and an Adjunct Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the former U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for Iran.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Richard Nephew · January 2, 2025

22. Irregular Warfare in 2024: Lessons Learned, Paths Forward

Irregular Warfare in 2024: Lessons Learned, Paths Forward - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Guido L Torres · January 2, 2025

2024 in Review: A Glimpse Ahead

The global security environment in 2024 proved as unpredictable as ever—yet, beneath the headlines, several clear themes and patterns emerged. A review of our articles published throughout the year reveals deeper insights into how irregular warfare is evolving across multiple fronts, from the Indo-Pacific to the Sahel, and from space to the bottom of the sea. This was not a year of singular, decisive battles but of incremental advances and strategic maneuvering in unconventional ways.

In 2024 technology continued to be a transformative force, redefining the operational limits of both small insurgent groups and global superpowers. Actors wielded narratives and perceptions as critical tools in modern warfare. Partnerships and resilience played pivotal roles in shaping alliances, bolstering societal defenses, and destabilizing adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic competition in the gray zone blurred the lines between war and peace, making indirect warfare the centerpiece of great power rivalries. Below is a synthesis of major trends, lessons learned, and interesting data points that can help contextualize and forecast what might come next.

Disruptive Technologies

In 2024, technology cemented itself not merely as a tool but as a revolutionary force in irregular warfare, reshaping the contours of conflict and enabling actors to achieve strategic objectives. This shift showcased a range of capabilities—drones, cyber tools, space-based systems, and artificial intelligence (AI)—that altered the operations of both state and non-state actors while exposing vulnerabilities that require urgent attention.

The modern battlefield exemplified this transformation, where Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) evolved from basic surveillance tools into strategic force multipliers. These drones now execute precision strikes, deliver logistical support, and perform in new ways every day. Adversaries like insurgents and narco-criminals have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity, adapting commercially available drones for offensive purposes, as explored in Harnessing Insurgent and Narco-Criminal Drone Tactics for Special Operations. Conversely, the inability of conventional forces to fully address this threat underscores the urgent need for improved counter-drone capabilities, as highlighted in How the US Army Can Close its Dangerous and Growing Small Drone Gap.

Beyond traditional domains, the accessibility of space-based technology has redefined strategic competition. Once dominated by superpowers, satellite intelligence is now leveraged by smaller actors to gain operational advantages. The Wagner Group, for instance, utilized Chinese satellite intelligence to enhance situational awareness and precision targeting, a trend analyzed in The Wagner Group’s Use of Chinese Space Intelligence. This democratization of orbital assets increases the complexity of competition, as the control and security of space-based systems become critical priorities for all actors.

Cyber capabilities have similarly grown as a key aspect of irregular warfare, becoming indispensable tools for economic sabotage, espionage, and influence. These operations often cloak attribution, allowing state actors to conduct sophisticated intelligence operations, control public perception, and exploit critical infrastructure. The vulnerabilities this creates are explored in Secret Cyber Wars, which examines how cyber tools are deployed covertly to destabilize adversaries. Exacerbating the problem, the integration of AI amplifies their reach, enabling actors to craft precision-targeted propaganda, manipulate public opinion through disinformation, and even employ deepfakes to erode trust in institutions.

AI’s impact extends beyond information warfare into operational efficiencies and decision-making processes. Pilotless systems capable of reconnaissance, swarm-based offenses, and surface and subsurface autonomous strikes have introduced new dimensions of unpredictability on the battlefield. Their transformative role is discussed in Autonomous Ghosts … Reshaping Irregular Warfare, which illustrated the lethality of these technologies. However, reliance on such systems also creates vulnerabilities. Cyberattacks, drone hacking, and satellite jamming threaten to neutralize technological advantages, as emphasized in Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, which highlights the growing reality of adversarial collusion.

AI and autonomous systems are revolutionizing warfare. Yet, they raise ethical concerns about accountability and decision-making, demanding new norms for the laws of war. As these technologies proliferate, the need for common standards becomes ever more pressing. 2025 will undoubtably see a growth in capabilities and a constant challenge to balance with ethical regulations.

Narrative and Perception as Weapons

In warfare, technology’s influence goes far beyond tactical advancements—it reshapes the narratives that drive perceptions and outcomes. The precision and reach of AI-driven propaganda, akin to the disruptive potential of drones, illustrates how innovation impacts both the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict. Nowhere is this more evident than in social media, which is now the frontline for amplifying messages in real-time. The Israeli Air Force’s experience, detailed in Winning the Operational Air Campaign but Losing the Information War, underscores how failures in digital narrative management can undermine tactical victories. Similarly, in Israel’s Pyrrhic Victory in the Gaza Strip, the authors note that “any nonstate actor or state with the right social media campaign has the ability to portray a just war,” showing us that real-time dissemination of open-source data can galvanize global sentiment against military actions, even when operational objectives are achieved.

In contrast, Ukraine’s transparent and consistent messaging, explored in From the Shadows to the Social Sphere andI Want to Live: Psychological Warfare for the Modern Era, demonstrates the power of cohesive narratives to rally domestic support and secure international aid. One author comments, “Despite the Russian narrative aiming to disparage HUR [Ukraine’s military intelligence agency], the Ukrainian agency’s actions reveal a nuanced truth. Diverging markedly from traditional intelligence practices, HUR has not only stepped out of the shadows but has also embraced transparency through active engagement on social media platforms.” This “strategy of engagement” serves as a blueprint for countering adversary propaganda and sustaining resilience during protracted conflicts.

However, narratives intersect with legal warfare, or lawfare, as detailed in Combatting Russian Lawfare with a Cognitive Shield, which the authors claim that “the typology of Russian lawfare has been well-explored: some researchers distinguish up to 36 types of Russian lawfare, depending on the warfare domain and legal environment.” Russia’s integration of legal systems and disinformation campaigns demonstrates the hybrid nature of these tactics, which challenge conventional responses and require coordinated legal, informational, and kinetic strategies.

Non-state actors have also leveraged narratives to gain legitimacy and influence. Groups like ISIS and the Taliban use popular platforms as powerful propaganda tools, where “social media amplifies messages and ideologies, with every user potentially becoming a broadcaster. Perhaps most crucially, these platforms boost morale by instantly sharing successes, attracting support, and creating a global community among disparate groups.” These strategies are explored in The Digital Battlefield: How Social Media is Reshaping Modern Insurgencies.

Superior narratives have the power to reinforce public support, weaken adversary morale, and secure international legitimacy. Ukraine’s adept use of social media has been pivotal in countering Russian disinformation and maintaining Western support, while Israel’s challenges reveal how tactical successes can be overshadowed by failures in the information domain. At the same time, persistent disinformation campaigns erode societal trust and destabilize institutions, creating fertile ground for insurgencies and hybrid threats.

These lessons highlight that as competition increasingly centers on the contest of narratives, the ability to craft and sustain compelling stories is as critical as physical actions. Today, integrating narrative control into broader strategies is an essential component to ensuring that operational successes translate into lasting strategic advantages.

Partnerships, Resilience, and Humanitarian Leverage

The power to shape narratives is also inseparable from the strength of societal resilience and bolstering partnerships. Effective storytelling fosters collective identity and reinforces governance, while adversarial disinformation exploits societal fractures to sow instability. Throughout 2024, partnerships, resilience, and humanitarian dynamics emerged as essential pillars of enduring influence and stability. Whether through promoting cooperation among allies or exploiting adversaries’ vulnerabilities, these elements stressed the importance of trust and governance in navigating conflict and competition alike.

The value of genuine partnerships was perhaps most evident in Ukraine’s collaboration with NATO and other Western allies. As explored in The Key to Ukrainian Victory Is Partnering, Not ‘Ukrainifying’, partnerships rooted in mutual trust and aligned objectives proved far more sustainable than imposing external models. Ukraine’s ability to bolster its defense capabilities and societal resilience serves as a blueprint for fostering lasting alliances and mobilizing citizens —one that Taiwan should take special note of. Conversely, Afghanistan’s collapse reminds us of the perils of neglecting legitimacy and local agency, a lesson detailed in The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces.

Regional partnerships further highlight the importance of context-sensitive approaches. In West Africa, multinational coalitions attempted to stabilize fragile states amid insurgencies and external influence. Shifting Sands: The Future of West Africa’s Power Dynamics and the Sahel Alliance expressed the necessity of inclusive and adaptable strategies to navigate diverse environments and counter complex threats.

At the heart of these partnerships lies societal resilience, a strategic asset crucial for withstanding conflict and fostering long-term stability. Governance, social cohesion, and economic capacity emerged as key metrics for gauging resilience, as detailed in A Guide for Measuring Resiliency. The inability to address grievances or establish credible governance often leads to rapid societal collapse, leaving populations vulnerable to insurgencies and adversarial exploitation. This dynamic was evident in Afghanistan’s failure to maintain legitimacy, a cautionary tale for states navigating similar waters.

Humanitarian vulnerabilities also play a notable role in the competitive battle between threat actors. Adversaries weaponized migration and resource scarcity to exert geopolitical pressure and strain alliances, as examined in People as a Weapons System: Moscow and Minsk’s Continued Attempts to Weaponize Migration. Similarly, historical reminders like Dry Pipes, Liberated Water, and Struggles for Legitimacy, reaffirm the historical importance of resource management as a lever of influence against a more capable military power.

Amid these challenges, renewable energy was presented as a unique opportunity to align humanitarian efforts with strategic objectives. As detailed in Solar Diplomacy: The Role of Renewable Energy in Great Power Competition, leadership in green technologies can project soft power while reducing vulnerabilities tied to resource dependence. This dual-use approach offers a pathway to influence without coercion, demonstrating the potential of resilience-building initiatives to shape competition dynamics.

These anecdotes reaffirm the importance of trust and credibility in forging effective partnerships and fostering resilient societies. Addressing grievances, promoting equity, and strengthening governance directly enhance institutional legitimacy, which is essential for stability. Conversely, neglecting these dynamics risks fracturing alliances and undermining long-term security. As the landscape increasingly intersects with humanitarian challenges, proactive investments in resilience, whether through renewable energy, resource management, or inclusive governance—will be vital for mitigating risks and projecting influence. Balancing these dual objectives requires an integrated approach, blending development and security strategies to navigate convoluted geopolitics.

Gray Zone: Strategic Competition and Proxy Wars

The intricacies of gray zone activities—marked by deniable operations, economic coercion, and proxy conflicts—signals the importance of adaptability and coalition-building in modern warfare. Just as effective partnerships and resilience strengthen societal defenses, they are critical for navigating the ambiguity of this space, where actions become distorted lines between war and peace.

To this end, China’s approach to the gray zone exemplifies a subtle and long-term strategy designed to reshape the international system and erode adversarial resilience without overtly acting and risking armed conflict. As explored in China’s Gray Zone Air Power and Beijing’s Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific, Beijing’s gray zone tactics are employed to buy time and prepare for a potential kinetic conflict with the US. Like other gray zone actors, China prefers exploiting asymmetries and vulnerabilities to gain advantages. Some other irregular opportunities China employs are manipulating global trade networks, international law, supply chains, and financial systems, along with covert cyber operations, while constantly striving to maintain a proactive force posture. These maneuvers, often deniable, reflect a comprehensive approach that integrates economic and political tools with military might.

Russia and Iran, too, continue to demonstrate strategic proficiency in the gray zone through the use of proxy forces and hybrid warfare. The Wagner Group and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, as analyzed in Boxing with Shadows: Drawbacks in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group, extended their influence in Africa, while largely overlooked by most. Likewise, in Ukraine, Russia’s hybrid strategies blended conventional and cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns with proxy operations. Two Years On: Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and the Continuing Lessons for the Future of Irregular Warfare and The Age of Decentralized Information Warfare is Here highlight how disinformation campaigns, advanced electronic warfare, and irregular forces have tested Ukraine’s sovereignty and NATO’s resolve, which have nevertheless remained largely intact.

The Middle East and North Africa provide additional examples of proxy warfare, illustrating an interwoven tapestry of sectarian, ideological, and power-based struggles. Articles on Hamas’s military buildup, Hezbollah’s potential transition (“The Day After Nasrallah”), and innovative warfare methods show the regional complexities that lie between military and political operations. In West Africa and the Sahel, gray zone competition takes a different shape. Shifting Sands: The Future of West Africa’s Power Dynamics and the Sahel Alliance examines how insurgencies, coups, and external interventions destabilize governance, creating an environment ripe for exploitation by state and non-state actors alike.

Economic and maritime domains also play a role in gray zone competition. The resurgence of privateering, discussed in Irregular Warfare at Sea: Using Privateers to Seize Chinese Commerce, demonstrates how economic disruption can merge with irregular operations to challenge adversaries on unconventional fronts. These examples highlight the versatility of gray zone tactics, which extend well beyond traditional military engagements.

Gray zone operations thrive on ambiguity, complicating deterrence and escalation management. Adversaries exploit this uncertainty to advance their objectives incrementally, often shielded from accountability using proxies, lawfare, or cyber operations. This lack of attribution undermines international norms and muddles collective security responses.

To counter gray zone tactics effectively, states must integrate all the tools at their disposal in an integrated manner, while fostering alliances and building resilience. Transparency and adaptability remain essential for outmaneuvering adversaries. The lessons of 2024 emphasize the need for strategies that anticipate and disrupt gray zone maneuvers, reinforcing stability in an increasingly contested world.

A Year of Insights, a Future of Possibilities

Reflecting on the year, IWI’s 2024 essays paint a vivid picture of a world in flux. These developments offer several critical insights for practitioners, policymakers, and scholars of irregular warfare: the transformative power of technology, the critical importance of shared legitimacy in partnerships, and the growing role of gray zone tactics in great power rivalries. Beneath the surface of buzzwords like “resilience” and “legitimacy” lies their undeniable truth: these concepts often tip the balance between success and failure. Irregular warfare is no longer a sideshow; it is at the epicenter where power is contested, and alliances are forged. This is a realm where success depends on mastering complexity and integrating whole-of-society strategies to outpace adversaries operating in the shadows.

Looking ahead to 2025, the challenge will not simply be to respond to these evolving dynamics, but to anticipate and shape them. The character of war has always adapted to its context, and today’s context is one of nuance, interconnectivity, and relentless change. It’s a daunting challenge, but one that reminds us of a fundamental truth: resilient societies, anchored by credible institutions and compelling narratives, are best positioned to endure. As the rules of engagement evolve, so too must IW strategies. This is not about fighting harder or even smarter; it is about staying one step ahead in a contest defined by shifting boundaries and deniable actions. The future of warfare is [irregular] one where resilience, creativity, and the ability to shape narratives will determine the balance of power.

To those navigating this shifting terrain, whether as a practitioner or scholar: your role is vital. The lessons of 2024 illustrate the importance of rigor, creativity, flexibility, and foresight. The coming year will demand the same relentless commitment to innovation and collaboration. As irregular warfare becomes the defining feature of modern conflict, let us not merely adapt to the rules but redefine them. After all, the greatest advantage lies not in mastering the game but in changing it entirely.

Thank you!

This year’s achievements were made possible by a diverse and dedicated community of contributors, readers, and partners. Your insights and expertise have pushed boundaries, sparked debates, and advanced our collective understanding. Whether through in-depth essays, podcast contributions, collaborative research, or thought-provoking discussions, you’ve been at the heart of IWI’s growth.

To our volunteers, who tirelessly lend their time and talents, and to our partner organizations, who amplify our impact—thank you. Your contributions have been invaluable in shaping a shared vision for the future of irregular warfare.

As we turn the page to 2025, IWI remains committed to fostering dialogue, sparking innovation, and championing collaboration. Together, we’ve laid a strong foundation, and there’s much more to achieve. I invite each of you to stay engaged—share your perspectives, challenge assumptions, and collaborate on the ideas that will define the next chapter.

In a world marked by constant upheaval, the work we do together isn’t just important—it’s essential. Thank you for being part of this journey. Let’s continue to shine a light on new pathways toward shared awareness, stability, and security.

Keep Warfare Irregular!

Sincerely,

Guido Torres

Executive Director

Irregular Warfare Initiative

Who was Matthew Livelsberger, the US Army veteran named as a suspect in the Cybertruck explosion?

Local media identified the 37-year-old Special Forces veteran as the driver of the Tesla Cybertruck that exploded outside Trump International Hotel in Las Vegas on New Year’s Day

James Liddell

Thursday 02 January 2025 15:31 GMT

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/matthew-livelsberger-tesla-cybertuck-explosion-las-vegas-trump-b2672787.html

Just hours after Shamsud-Din Jabbar rammed a truck into New Year’s Day revellers in New Orleans killing at least 15 people, reports came in of a second suspected terror attack in Las Vegas.

In the early hours of Thursday morning, media outlets in Colorado named Matthew Livelsberger as the man who detonated a Tesla Cybertruck outside Donald Trump’s Las Vegas hotel at 8.40 a.m. on Wednesday. Police are investigating whether it was a terrorist attack.

Livelsberger, 37, of Colorado Springs, died in the blast, with seven others sustaining minor injuries, police said. Officials have not yet confirmed the name of the suspect or identify any of those who were injured.

The two New Year’s Day attackers were both Army veterans and, according to a report from Denver 7, allegedly served at the same military base, Fort Bragg, and even served in Afghanistan around the same period.

In addition, Livelsberger and Jabbar rented their vehicles via the carsharing company, Turo, officials have said.

Authorities are investigating a possible link between the two men. At the time they were fighting in the Middle East, the US had around 100,000 military personnel in Afghanistan as part of President Barack Obama’s ‘troop surge.’

According to CBS, law enforcement sources said that Livelsberger was on active duty with the Army serving in Germany and was on leave in Colorado at the time of the incident. His wife hadn’t heard from him in several days prior to the incident, the source said.

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Linkedin profile picture believed to be of Matthew Livelsberger, the man believed to have detonated a Tesla outside Donald Trump’s Las Vegas hotel (LinkedIn)

Livelsberger spent 18 of his 19-year Army career with the Special Forces, according to his Linkedin profile. He is believed to have joined the Green Berets as a commmunicaton’s specialist in January 2006, before becoming a operations manager and team sergeant in February 2023.

The profile picture on the account shows a man sporting winter gear armed with an assault rifle, standing atop of a snowmobile in mountainous terrain.

His most recent role, from November 2024, was listed as a Remote and Autonomous Systems Manager for the Army.

Livelsberger earned a summa cum laude – an award given to the students earning the highest grades in their class – after graduating from Norwich University in Vermont with a degree in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis, according to his LinkedIn profile.

It also states he earned the Department of State Meritorious Honor Award for “interagency contributions that resulted in increased interoperability and efficiency while serving as the Operations Sergeant at Special Operations Command Forward”.

Livelsberger often commented on posts from military personnel. In a comment on one viral post from an Air Force veteran, he responded to a question noting that “the govt” was responsible for making people believe they were responsible for others’ student debt.

Erasing student debts was a signature Biden-era policy.

At the age of 22, Livelsberger began collecting clothes, toys and educational items for children and disseminating off humanitarian aid while serving a tour in Afghanistan, he told the News Journal in his native Ohio.

Appealing to US citizens for donations in Janaury, 2010, he told the outlet: “Handing out humanitarian assistance continues to be one of the few approaches of gaining the credibility and loyalty of the people of Afghanistan and I believe you are directly contributing to our success at ground level.”

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Flames rise from a Tesla Cybertruck after it exploded outside the Trump International Hotel Las Vegas, in Las Vegas, Nevada, on January 1, 2025 (Alcides Antunes/Reuters)

His wife, believed to be Sara Livelsberger, wrote on Facebook in May 2016 that she was a registered Democrat. She posted a picture of a graphic commissioned by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee appearing to show Donald Trump which read “stop bigotry”.

She captioned the post: “Perks of being a registered Democrat… I can’t wait to slap this baby on my truck.”

Sara Livelsberger shared photographs of the two together, the last was posted in 2016. Sara had another Facebook profile page but it was removed shortly after news of the Cybertruck explosion emerged.

In one image from April 2016, the pair posed for a selfie, with Livelsberger sporting a camo backpack.

In another from July 2015, Livelsberger can be seen with a tattoo of a bald eagle and the American flag on his shoulder, as he posed with a dog.

A Facebook account that appears to belong to Livelsberger shows a heavily-tattooed man holding a baby, with its profile picture updated in September 2024.

Details on the Sara Livelsberger Facebook page and information released about Livelsberger’s age match reports from officials. One post from 2015 reads: “It is my old a** husbands’s 28th birthday!”

Sources told Denver 7 that multiple addresses had been associated with Livelsberger in the area around Colorado Springs. The FBI were investigating these properties.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives have been brought in to assist, according to reports.

Authorities continue to investigate the explosion as a possible act of terror, an official with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department told ABC News, but a potential motive is not yet known.

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Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department swarm the area around the Trump International Hotel (Getty Images)

“At this time, we are investigating a number of leads, and I’m not prepared to release any of that information to you just yet,” Las Vegas County Sheriff Kevin McMahill said in a news conference on Wednesday evening. “I can tell you that there are seven victims right now that sustained injuries from the explosion.”

The fire has since been extinguished by the Clark County fire department.

Video posted on social media showed different angles of the explosion, which appeared to include fireworks.

Firework mortars and camp fuel canisters were found inside the truck, sources told Denver 7.

McMahill highlighted the link between Trump and Elon Musk, the Tesla founder and the president-elect’s incoming head of the unofficial Department of Government Efficiency, tasked with cutting trillions from government spending.

“Obviously a Cybertruck, the Trump hotel, there are lots of questions we have to answer,” McMahill said, underscoring the close relationship between the president-elect and Tesla founder Elon Musk

Musk took the opportunity to praise Tesla’s Cybertruck for being so sturdy that he said it helped contain the blast.

“The evil knuckleheads picked the wrong vehicle for a terrorist attack. Cybertruck actually contained the explosion and directed the blast upwards,” he wrote in a post on X.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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