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Quotes of the Day:
"War is what happens when language fails."
– Margaret Atwood
"The world suffers a lot. Not because of the violence of bad people but because of the silence of the good people."
– Bonaparte
"We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of kinship. The reunification of the motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!"
-Xi JingPing's 2026 New Year Message
https://english.news.cn/20251231/6df33f2b24d545f28138477a3c713f3d/c.html?utm
(I do not think I need to make any editorial comments about this statement but I would note the false narrative and support for Chinese cognitive warfare)
Since only a few responded to my challenge on New Year's Eve about how many articles presented im my daily Korean and National Security News and Commentary had connections to cognitive warfare I thought I would reprise the question and the description of cognitive warfare. Consider cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence as you read the news.
The NATO Chief Scientist Research Report frames Cognitive Warfare as a contest for “cognitive superiority” in which adversaries use synchronized military and non-military activities to influence how people perceive, make sense of events, and decide and act, at individual, group, and societal levels. It stresses that modern technologies expand reach and effectiveness, since the openness and connectedness of democracies can be exploited via propaganda, disinformation, deepfakes, and other information threats that degrade trust and polarize societies. The report treats Cognitive Warfare as broader than classic InfoOps, PSYOP, STRATCOM, or cyber operations. It is often not aimed at narrowly defined target audiences or outcomes, and it can be designed to create chaos and complexity below the threshold of armed conflict.
1. Lee calls national unity urgent task
2. Activists fear North Korean human rights policy is eroding under Lee Jae Myung
3. Kim Jong Un's daughter joins symbolic visit to family mausoleum
4. U.S. Army squadron in S. Korea deactivated last month amid concerns about potential troop cut
5. Unification minister urges N. Korea to return to dialogue, end hostilities
6. Top security adviser raises alarm about N. Korea's unveiling of what it calls nuclear sub
7. Pyongyang briefly reports on New Year's greeting by China's Xi to N. Korea's Kim
8. South Korea's Security Adviser Addresses U.S. Concerns Over Revised Communications Law
9. Top Seoul officials warn of North Korean threats but back engagement in new year
10. US-North Korea talks could be coming in 2026. But not the deal Trump wants.
11. Lee Jae Myung to seek China’s support on North Korea during upcoming visit: Wi
12. Lee says S. Korea will continue to respect 'one-China' policy: CCTV
13. Defense minister downplays troop cut concerns, cites broader US Army reforms
14.
1. Lee calls national unity urgent task
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung said national unity is the most urgent task for South Korea in 2026, warning that confrontation and division prevent society from moving forward. Speaking at a New Year’s meeting at Cheong Wa Dae with senior officials, party leaders, cabinet ministers, and figures from business, labor, and culture, he urged cooperation among government, companies, and the public to achieve a “new leap forward.” Lee called for a shift away from growth concentrated in the Seoul area and large conglomerates toward a more inclusive national strategy, expanding opportunities for venture firms, small and medium businesses, and young entrepreneurs.
(LEAD) Lee calls national unity urgent task | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 2, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260102001151315?section=national/politics
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with latest details, photos; CHANGES headline)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 2 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Friday that national unity is an urgent task to help the nation make a major leap forward, saying that confrontation and division resolve nothing.
"If people turn their backs on one another simply because they think differently, or differences lead to extreme confrontation, a society can never move forward," Lee told a New Year's meeting with key politicians, lawmakers and executives, as well as major figures from labor and cultural circles.
"National unity is the most important and urgent task," Lee said.
Gallery Gallery画报写真ギャラリーألبوم الصورGaleríaPhóng sự ảnh
President Lee Jae Myung (R) and first lady Kim Hea Kyung salute the national flag during a New Year's meeting at the guest house of Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 2, 2026. (Yonhap)
Looking back on last year's period of recovery and normalization, Lee said he hopes the country will make "a new leap forward" this year through concerted efforts by the government, businesses and the public.
"Rather than amplifying conflicts, we must seek a path toward coexistence and unity and think about shared prosperity, not just the speed of growth," he said, wearing a tie mixed with red and blue, the symbolic colors of the ruling and opposition parties.
Lee also called for a shift in the growth paradigm, moving away from a development model centered on the Seoul metropolitan area and large conglomerates toward a more inclusive, nationwide strategy.
"We must boldly change our existing growth strategy in today's environment, where the concentration of capital and the skewed distribution of opportunities hinder growth and lead to a vicious cycle of competition and conflict," he said.
He vowed efforts to ensure venture firms and small and medium-sized companies can benefit from growth, while encouraging young entrepreneurs and startup founders to innovate boldly.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) toasts his glass with National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik during a New Year's meeting at the guest house of Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 2, 2026. (Yonhap)
The meeting was attended by five key figures from the three branches of government: Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, Supreme Court Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae, Constitutional Court Chief Kim Sang-hwan and National Election Commission Chair Roh Tae-ak.
Leaders of the ruling Democratic Party and Cabinet ministers, as well as representatives from major business groups, labor organizations and cultural circles, also took part in the event.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 2, 2026
2. Activists fear North Korean human rights policy is eroding under Lee Jae Myung
Summary:
Seven months into President Lee Jae Myung’s term, defectors and human rights activists warn Seoul is sidelining north Korea human rights to revive inter-Korean engagement. They cite a tougher crackdown on balloon leafleting and the suspension of border loudspeaker broadcasts, both seen as key channels for uncensored information. Critics also point to the Unification Ministry overhaul that disbanded a dedicated human rights office, withheld a report on abuses, and slashed funding from 12.4 billion won to 378 million won. Advocacy groups say NGOs now face survival pressures and urge consistency. Engagement, they argue, must not sacrifice rights.
Comment. Yes, we should all be worried by both the ROK andUS. We cannot sacrifice the human rights of the Korean people in the north in pursuit of talks with Kim Jong Un in which he is only going to continue to execute his political warfare and black diplomacy strategies while he improves his military to prepare to dominate the entire peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime.
Activists fear North Korean human rights policy is eroding under Lee Jae Myung
Crackdown on leafleting, budget cuts and more have raised concern that Seoul is sidelining human rights for engagement
Jooheon Kim December 31, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/activists-fear-north-korean-human-rights-policy-is-eroding-under-lee-jae-myung/
A North Korean man in Pyongyang | Image: NK News
During his election campaign earlier this year, Lee Jae Myung vowed to seek improvements in North Korean human rights as president, tacking toward the political center on DPRK issues as he looked to appeal to moderate voters.
But seven months into his presidency, North Korean defectors and human rights activists are expressing concern that the Lee administration has turned its back on its promise to uphold human rights issues, deprioritizing efforts to spread awareness about Pyongyang’s atrocities to pursue inter-Korean engagement.
While Seoul supported a U.N. resolution on DPRK human rights, activists pointed to measures like curtailing cross-border leafleting, disbanding a human rights office, declining to release a report on North Korean abuses and cutting human rights budgets as evidence of weakened human rights policy.
They said this has increased the pressure on nongovernmental organizations to find funding to ensure their survival, and they stressed that, above all, the ROK government should not treat human rights as a political issue but should put it at the forefront of inter-Korean policy.
BORDER CRACKDOWN
During its first month in office, the Lee administration prioritized efforts to ease border tensions by cracking down on leafleting campaigns and suspending military loudspeaker broadcasts — efforts that critics say have cut off key sources of uncensored information for North Koreans living under the regime’s strict controls.
Human rights organizations and defectors have routinely launched balloons carrying anti-regime propaganda, household goods, USB drives containing South Korean media and religious material across the northern border in hopes they aid or inspire impoverished North Korean citizens.
Defectors have testified about encountering these balloons while living in North Korea, in some cases stating that their contents played a crucial role in convincing them to escape.
But the Lee administration, like the progressive Moon administration before it, contends that the practice provokes the North and exacerbates inter-Korean tensions.
After exploring legal options to limit leafleting earlier in the year, Seoul welcomed the passage of a new law earlier this month that expands police authority to block activists from sending propaganda, describing the measure as “a stepping stone toward restoring inter-Korean relations.”
Lee has also dismissed military loudspeaker broadcasts at the border as “foolish acts” that bring no benefit to either side, citing North Korea’s retaliatory noise campaigns that affected South Koreans living near the border.
The previous Yoon administration restarted the audio broadcasts for the first time in six years in June 2024, framing them as retaliation to the DPRK’s trash balloon launches. Such broadcasts are a form of psychological warfare dating back to the 1950-53 Korean War and typically feature music, news, weather reports and other media unavailable to North Koreans.
South Korean soldiers removing loudspeakers near the inter-Korean border on Aug. 4, 2025. | Image: ROK defense ministry
Ryu Seong-hyeon, a former DPRK soldier who defected to South Korea, argued that providing outside information to ordinary North Koreans is more effective than engaging the regime.
“This administration’s approach is fundamentally flawed,” he told NK News. “It assumes Pyongyang will respond positively if it feels reassured, but that reflects a poor understanding of the regime.”
Ryu added that conciliatory gestures like halting loudspeaker broadcasts may temporarily ease tensions, but he described North Korea as ultimately a ticking time bomb.
“If you keep feeding a starving wolf to calm it, a stronger wolf will eventually turn on its keeper,” he said, arguing that meaningful progress starts with expanding North Koreans’ access to information.
OFFICE OVERHAUL
Critics of the Lee administration’s inter-Korean policies also homed in on the decision to restructure the Ministry of Unification, which disbanded a North Korean human rights office and merged its functions into a new bureau.
The unification ministry — the government department responsible for efforts to unify the Korean Peninsula and promote engagement — underwent a complete overhaul and announced plans to boost spending on inter-Korean cooperation by over 25% in 2026.
But the plans also gutted nearly all of the ministry’s funding for North Korean human rights issues, reducing it from 12.4 billion won ($8.6 million) to 378 million won ($261,417).
The plans followed the cancellation of the National Center for North Korean Human Rights Human Rights project planned under the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which was rebranded as the “Center for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.”
Kim Eun-ju, a defector who works for the Canada-based nonprofit HanVoice, said the restructuring campaign has shifted the government’s focus from human rights issues to dialogue and engagement with the North.
“This is a major crisis for human rights organizations,” she told NK News.
Kim said the government’s decision to reduce its human rights budget has led to growing frustration about the state of its efforts to promote North Korean human rights.
However, Bada Nam, the secretary-general of the North Korea-focused human rights nonprofit PSCORE, said that Lee was not completely ignoring DPRK human rights, citing Seoul’s co-sponsorship of a U.N. resolution condemning abuses.
Visitors at a ceremony commemorating Korean War abductees in Paju on June 28, 2025. | Image: Korean War Abductees’ Families Union
IGNORANCE OF ROK DETAINEES
The president’s apparent ignorance about detainees currently held in the DPRK shocked some advocacy groups earlier this month.
During a press conference, Lee expressed unawareness about the six South Korean citizens believed to be detained in North Korea, with one of them being held there since Oct. 2013.
Families of Korean War abductees have since called on the government to set up a dedicated office to address POWs and abductees still held in the DPRK.
“Lee’s apparent lack of knowledge … was particularly devastating for the families,” Ethan Shin of the Seoul-based NGO Transitional Justice Working Group told NK News.
Shin also noted that some South Korean diplomats no longer wear the “forget-me-not” (물망초) badge, which symbolizes their commitment to remember abductees, detainees and POWs, and to acknowledge the suffering of their families.
The foreign affairs ministry told NK News that wearing the badge is a personal choice for diplomats; however, Shin said they regularly wore the badge before Lee took office.
“Under the previous administration, officials wore it, but after this government took office, they stopped,” he said. “I see it as a reflection of the government’s will and attention toward resolving the issue of abductees, detainees, and POWs.”
BUDGET CUTS AND NGO CHALLENGES
Amid these structural changes, advocacy groups say NGOs are struggling to cope with financial instability due to government budget cuts for human rights work.
While the Yoon administration placed human rights at the center of its inter-Korean policy, funding for North Korean human rights projects has largely disappeared since Lee took office, according to the advocacy groups. This comes on the heels of massive U.S. budget cuts to foreign assistance projects that activists have described as an existential challenge.
“The previous ROK administration also used to provide funding for human rights support programs,” Bada Nam said.
Kim Eun-ju also stressed that securing sufficient funding to carry out human rights activities has become her organization’s “top priority.”
According to Kim, some NGOs are asking the EU to establish a human rights fund similar to the U.S. State Department’s Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau.
Human rights issues are not being erased but are “somewhat tucked away,” she said, noting that she doesn’t expect to see the same level of support as in previous years.
All of this is taking place as the number of defectors arriving in South Korea has dropped sharply in recent years, partly due to the pandemic border closures, with just 96 resettling in the South during the first half of 2025.
North Korean defectors in Seoul raise awareness of human rights in the DPRK. | Image: Jang Se-yul
CONTINUING THE WORK
Despite the challenges that NGOs currently face, both due to Lee administration policies and other factors, activists stressed the need to focus on producing high-quality work to move forward.
“We need to elevate our work,” Nam said. “Ultimately, the only path forward is improving the quality of their work and strengthening each NGO’s capacity.”
Shin emphasized that obtaining information from insiders in foreign countries is essential for their cause.
“Activists should also seek to reach North Koreans working abroad in places like Russia or Ukraine, as well as embassy personnel in China,” he said.
Korea Internet Studio chairman Jung Sung-jin, who oversees a broadcasting service directed at North Korea after the South Korean military suspended its “Voice of Freedom” (자유의 소리) radio broadcasts, also stressed the importance of continuing these efforts regardless of government policy.
“Telling the truth about life in North Korea, regardless of political shifts, is what ultimately lays the groundwork for unification,” he told NK News.
Kim Eun-ju suggested there should be ways to continuously raise awareness of North Korean human rights without provoking Pyongyang.
Rather than making drastic policy shifts, such as converting a human rights museum into an inter-Korean exchange museum, she pointed to the idea of creating an East Asia-focused museum that could address DPRK human rights issues.
“Some NGOs have argued that it would be impossible to discuss East Asia without covering North Korean human rights,” she said, adding that excluding DPRK-related issues would be unrealistic if budgets were allocated under the broader framework of human rights across East Asia.
Crucially, frequent policy reversals when administrations change undermines the effectiveness of human rights work, Kim said.
“A consistent approach to information inflow and rights advocacy is necessary from the perspective of North Korean residents.”
Edited by David Choi.
3. Kim Jong Un's daughter joins symbolic visit to family mausoleum
Summary:
State media photos showed Kim Jong Un visiting the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun for the New Year with his wife and daughter, Kim Ju Ae, placing the girl in the front row of senior officials. KCNA did not name her, but the imagery mattered because it was her first known public visit to the family mausoleum where Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il lie in state. The appearance adds to succession speculation because Ju Ae has been increasingly visible since her 2022 debut at an ICBM event, and South Korea’s intelligence service has assessed she is being groomed, citing honorific language used for her. Seoul said it is monitoring closely.
Comment: I remain skeptical of all the succession speculation. We just will not know until KJU officially proclaims a successor. Does he have the confidence that his grandfather did when he named his son successor in 1973 but remained in power until his death in 1994?
World News Jan. 2, 2026 / 12:21 AM
Kim Jong Un's daughter joins symbolic visit to family mausoleum
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/02/Kim-Jong-Un-Ju-Ae-family-mausoleum-visit-succession/2331767330504/
A photo by state media released Friday shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (front, R), his daughter Kim Ju Ae (front, C) and wife Ri Sol-ju (front, L) visiting the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang. Photo by KCNA/EPA
SEOUL, Jan. 2 (UPI) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's daughter made her first known visit to the ruling family's mausoleum, images released by state media Friday showed, a symbolic appearance that has fueled speculation about her potential role in the country's dynastic succession.
Kim Ju Ae joined her parents and senior officials for a New Year's visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang, where Kim Jong Un's late father and grandfather lie in state.
The official Korean Central News Agency reported on Kim Jong Un's visit but did not mention Ju Ae by name. A photograph released by the agency, however, showed her standing in the front row of assembled dignitaries, flanked by her parents.
"All the visitors made a firm pledge to fulfill their responsibility and duty in the vanguard of accomplishing the sacred cause for the eternal prosperity and development of the great DPRK ... true to the ideas and leadership of Kim Jong Un with single-minded loyalty," KCNA said.
Related
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.
The appearance marked the first known visit to the family mausoleum by Ju Ae. She was first seen in state media in 2022, when she accompanied her father to the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
She has since appeared at a growing number of official events, strengthening speculation among analysts that she is being positioned as Kim Jong Un's eventual successor.
South Korea's National Intelligence Service told lawmakers last year it had concluded Ju Ae was being groomed to succeed her father, citing her expanding public profile and the language used to describe her in state media.
The spy agency noted that she is frequently referred to as "hyangdo," a Korean term meaning "guide" that is traditionally reserved for top leaders and their successors.
Ju Ae, believed to be around 12 or 13 years old, made her first known overseas public appearance in September, when she accompanied her father on a state visit to Beijing.
The Kim family has ruled North Korea since its establishment in 1948 under Kim Il Sung. After his death in 1994, his son Kim Jong Il assumed power, followed by third-generation leader Kim Jong Un in late 2011.
Kim Jong Un has typically visited the mausoleum on New Year's Day since taking power, though he skipped the occasion in 2018, 2024 and 2025. His last visit was in 2023.
On Friday, South Korea's Unification Ministry confirmed that this year's visit marked the first time Kim Jong Un's daughter had publicly accompanied him to the mausoleum.
"We are closely watching as this is [Ju Ae's] first visit," deputy spokeswoman Chang Yoon-jeong told a briefing. "We will continue to closely monitor her activities."
4. U.S. Army squadron in S. Korea deactivated last month amid concerns about potential troop cut
Summary:
Congressional Research Service reported that the 5th Air Cavalry Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment at Camp Humphreys was deactivated on Dec. 15, 2025 as part of an Army transformation effort. The squadron, supporting 2nd Infantry Division since May 2022, fielded AH-64E Apaches and RQ-7B Shadow drones for reconnaissance. The report said it is unclear whether personnel and equipment will leave Korea or be replaced. The move landed amid renewed speculation that Washington could adjust the 28,500-strong USFK posture to prioritize China and Taiwan contingencies across the Asia-Indo-Pacific. It follows earlier reports of troop cuts and Seoul-Washington language stressing capabilities over numbers.
Comment: Sigh... If we remove one soldier there are those who will try to interpret it as a reduction in comment. This is the problem. The Army and the entire military is transforming. Of course there are going to be changes in unit stationing. Why was the AH-64 squadron deactivated? Probably because it no longer makes sense to continue to field this unit. We must assess the lethality of the capability versus the defensive capability of the threat. How effective are helicopters in Ukraine right now?
While Yonhap focuses on the deactivation why did they not include in the same story the recent deployment of and live fire exercise of the new HIMARS (rocket artillery) unit which is a very lethal capability and probably more survivable than helos at the current time.
The media must improve its knowledge and understanding of military transformation and capability improvement versus simply counting numbers of troops and units.
The bottom line is that changes in military units are based on transformation that seek not only quantitative changes but more importantly, qualitative ones as well. But the media has never met a conclusion that it could not jump to.
World News Jan. 2, 2026 / 12:54 AM
U.S. Army squadron in S. Korea deactivated last month amid concerns about potential troop cut
By Song Sang-ho, Yonhap News Agency
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/02/korea/5521767332547/
This file photo shows the 5th Air Cavalry Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, taking part in the Spur Ride event at Camp Humphreys, a key U.S. base in Pyeongtaek, on Sept. 25, 2025. File Photo by Pfc. Kalisber Ortega/U.S. Army/UPI
A U.S. Army squadron tasked with a reconnaissance mission in South Korea was deactivated last month, a congressional report showed Thursday, amid speculation that Washington could consider a troop drawdown in the allied country in a force posture adjustment.
The 5th Air Cavalry Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment (5-17 ACS) at Camp Humphreys, a key U.S. base in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul, ceased its operation on Dec. 15, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report said, citing information from the U.S. Army. It had served in Korea to support the 2nd Infantry Division since May 2022.
Its deactivation as part of an Army transformation initiative came amid lingering concerns that U.S. President Donald Trump's administration could seek a ground troop reduction of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as part of an adjustment to better counter threats from an assertive China.
5-17 ACS is known to have had hundreds of personnel, as well as aviation and reconnaissance assets, including AH-64E Apache helicopters and RQ-7B Shadow drones. It is unclear whether the deactivation means the pullout of the unit's personnel and assets or whether there will be a replacement unit.
Comment from the U.S. Army on the deactivation was not immediately available.
A day after the 5-17 ACS deactivation, the Army restructured the 2nd Infantry Division's Combat Aviation Brigade Medical Evacuation (CAB MEDEVAC) unit, the CRS report said without elaboration.
5-17 ACS was activated in 2022, taking over the role of what had been rotational air cavalry squadrons to provide more stability to U.S. defense operations and enhance defense readiness in South Korea.
Speculation about a potential U.S. troop cut in Korea has persisted as Washington calls for Seoul to take greater responsibility for its own defense while seeking to bolster U.S. capabilities to better address potential China-related contingencies, including those related to Taiwan.
That speculation was reinforced as last year's key security document between Seoul and Washington omitted language committing the U.S. to maintaining the "current" USFK troop level, with U.S. officials emphasizing the importance of "capabilities" rather than the troop numbers.
Last May, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. was weighing the idea of pulling out roughly 4,500 troops from South Korea and moving them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam. The Pentagon dismissed it as "not true," reaffirming that America remains "fully" committed to the defense of South Korea.
Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.
5. Unification minister urges N. Korea to return to dialogue, end hostilities
Summary:
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Seoul is prepared to resume inter-Korean dialogue “anytime, anywhere and on any agenda,” urging the north to end hostilities in 2026. In a New Year’s message, he argued tensions must ease through talks and practical cooperation, and said the Lee Jae Myung administration will support, not hinder, private-sector exchanges and collaboration in public health, medical services, and humanitarian matters. Chung emphasized that Seoul does not seek “unification by absorption,” using the north’s official name in that context. He also floated reviving cross-border tourism, pointing to potential projects linked to the Wonsan-Kalma coastal resort zone and Samjiyon near Mount Paektu.
Comment: I certainly want peace, security, and stability. But we need to beware of those who seek peace at any cost. The cost of that peace may be very high. If the cost of peace is a significant reduction in readiness then the cost of peace will eventually be blood and treasure.
No one should want unification by absorption. We should seek unification by transformation of leadership in the north. And the Minister should adopt these fourteen words:
Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights
Unification minister urges N. Korea to return to dialogue, end hostilities | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 2, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260102010500315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Jan. 2 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Chung Dong-young urged North Korea to return to dialogue Friday, saying South Korea is ready to talk with the North "on any agenda" to ease inter-Korean tensions.
Chung made the remarks in his New Year's message during a ceremony at the government complex in Seoul, stressing that the two Koreas must "end inter-Korean hostilities this year."
"The Lee Jae Myung administration, as a sovereign government, will fully support exchanges in the private sector and cooperation in areas such as public health, medical services and humanitarian issues and will not restrict or interfere in such efforts," he said.
"We are ready to sit down with North Korea for talks anytime, anywhere and on any agenda to ease inter-Korean tensions," he added.
Referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chung stressed that Seoul does not support the idea of unification by absorption.
He also proposed promoting cross-border tourism projects, including projects linked to the Wonsan-Kalma tourist zone on the east coast and the northern city of Samjiyon, near Mount Paektu.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, South Korea's point man on inter-Korean relations, addresses a ceremony to mark the start of business for the new year at the government complex in Seoul on Jan. 2, 2026. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 2, 2026
6. Top security adviser raises alarm about N. Korea's unveiling of what it calls nuclear sub
Summary:
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said the hull that north Korea unveiled as an 8,700-ton “nuclear submarine” should be treated as a new threat to South Korea, while warning that hard details on its true capability remain limited and require further assessment. He spoke as President Lee Jae Myung prepares to visit China next week for talks with Xi Jinping, where north Korea is expected to be a key agenda item. Wi also defended Seoul’s own interest in a nuclear-powered submarine, arguing it would comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA guidelines if it uses low-enriched uranium, and noting the IAEA’s conclusion that Australia’s AUKUS submarine arrangements are consistent with the NPT.
Top security adviser raises alarm about N. Korea's unveiling of what it calls nuclear sub | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 2, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260102010500315?section=nk/nk
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 2 (Yonhap) -- National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Friday that North Korea's recent unveiling of the hull of what it calls a nuclear submarine represents a new threat to South Korea, while taking a cautious tone on the capabilities of the North's submarine.
Last week, North Korea's state media released undated images of the completed hull of an 8,700-ton nuclear submarine, with leader Kim Jong-un inspecting it.
When asked about the North's unveiling of the hull of a nuclear submarine, Wi replied that, "As a new type of threat for us, it needs to be dealt with."
Still, Wi said there has been little information about the capabilities of the North's nuclear submarine, describing such information as an "area that needs to be further figured out."
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac explains President Lee Jae Myung's plan to make a state visit to China during a press briefing at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 2, 2026. (Yonhap)
President Lee Jae Myung is set to visit China next week for summit talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, with North Korea expected to be one of the main agenda items.
Wi stressed that South Korea's plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine would not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines, as it would use low-enriched uranium for its reactor.
He noted that the IAEA has concluded that Australia's nuclear-powered submarine cooperation with the United States under the AUKUS partnership complies with the NPT, saying Seoul will explain its position to other nations.
Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons and are required to place all nuclear material under IAEA safeguards to ensure it is not diverted for weapons purposes.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits the building site for an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 25, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 2, 2026
7. Pyongyang briefly reports on New Year's greeting by China's Xi to N. Korea's Kim
Comment: As we have long heard: "Closer than lips and teeth." Seems like Putin is closer than Xi at the present moment.
Pyongyang briefly reports on New Year's greeting by China's Xi to N. Korea's Kim | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 1, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260101000600315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Jan. 1 (Yonhap) -- Pyongyang's state media on Thursday briefly reported on a New Year's message by Chinese President Xi Jinping to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
The report by the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), however, did not provide details of Xi's message.
The KCNA listed Xi and his wife among a number of foreign leaders who have sent New Year's messages to Kim, including leaders from Vietnam, Myanmar and Belarus.
Last month, the KCNA reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a New Year's message to Kim, which it disclosed in detail.
Putin sent the New Year's message on Dec. 18 and the KCNA released it last Thursday, quoting him as hailing the North's "heroic" dispatch of troops in Russia's war against Ukraine.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping are seated side by side during a banquet in Beijing in this image captured on Sept. 6, 2025, from the Korean Central Television. The TV network aired a documentary on Kim's visit to China earlier that month. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 1, 2026
8. South Korea's Security Adviser Addresses U.S. Concerns Over Revised Communications Law
Summary:
South Korea’s national security adviser Wi Sung-lac said Seoul has been in active consultations with the United States over the revised Information and Communications Network Act, both during drafting and after passage, and will continue explaining Korea’s position. He noted some U.S. concerns were reflected in revisions, though Washington may judge the changes insufficient. The comments follow U.S. State Department criticism that the law could undermine freedom of expression and harm U.S.-based online platforms. The measure authorizes courts to impose punitive damages up to five times assessed harm for intentional or grossly negligent dissemination of false information and adds compliance obligations for large online service providers.
Comment: Yes we should be concerned about the revised communication law. Unfortunately the NSA has not allayed our concerns.
South Korea's Security Adviser Addresses U.S. Concerns Over Revised Communications Law
Adviser Highlights Ongoing Dialogue Amid U.S. Worries on Free Speech and Business Impacts
By Park Sang-ki
Published 2026.01.02. 21:21
Updated 2026.01.02. 21:33https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/01/02/X552CAYJ25ERHCSU4PVAETRNKU/
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac briefs on President Lee Jae-myung's state visit to China at the Cheong Wa Dae Chunchugwan press conference venue on the 2nd. /Yonhap
Wi Sung-lac, Cheong Wa Dae National Security Adviser, stated on the 2nd regarding the revised Information and Communications Network Act passed by the National Assembly, “There were several exchanges of opinions between South Korea and the U.S. during the drafting process, and discussions are still ongoing.” The adviser made this remark during a press briefing at Cheong Wa Dae, adding, “We will continue to convey our position to the U.S. side.”
The adviser noted, “There were exchanges of opinions between South Korea and the U.S. regarding this law, and as far as I know, some of the U.S. side’s opinions were reflected. Of course, the U.S. may view the reflected portions as insufficient.”
He added, “While issues could be raised afterward, I can confirm that such a dialogue process has occurred. We will continue this dialogue and strive to explain our position.”
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac briefs on President Lee Jae-myung's state visit to China at the Cheong Wa Dae Chunchugwan press conference venue on the 2nd. /Newsis
The ruling party, which dubbed the law the ‘False Manipulated Information Eradication Act’ and passed it on the 24th of last month, faced concerns from the U.S. Department of State on the 31st. These included worries about “undermining freedom of expression” and “negative impacts on U.S.-based online platform businesses.”
The law allows courts to order punitive damages of up to five times the amount of harm caused by the intentional or grossly negligent dissemination of false information. It also designates ‘large-scale information and communications service providers’ based on user numbers and sales, imposing various obligations. Critics argue that the law’s sanctions are excessive.
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
9. Top Seoul officials warn of North Korean threats but back engagement in new year
Summary:
Senior South Korean officials opened 2026 with a dual message: prepare hard for worsening north Korea military capabilities while keeping the door open to engagement. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back warned that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threat is becoming more sophisticated, citing the regime’s disclosure of an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered submarine hull. He also emphasized Seoul’s push to complete Full Operational Capability verification for wartime operational control transition, aiming to confirm readiness to lead peninsula defense within the ROK-U.S. alliance framework. Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, however, underscored continued efforts to reduce tensions, pointing to steps such as halting leaflet launches and border loudspeaker broadcasts. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young echoed that line, urging an end to hostility and support for humanitarian and private-sector exchanges.
Comment: Again, peace at any cost is not a price we want to pay. Yes we must consider the growing military threat that we can with our eyes. But we must also consider how seeking talks with no pre-conditions plays right into Kim Jong Un's assessment ath his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are working.
Top Seoul officials warn of North Korean threats but back engagement in new year
Defense chief highlights DPRK’s nuclear sub development, as prime minister stresses efforts to reduce tensions
Jooheon Kim January 2, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/top-seoul-officials-warn-of-north-korean-threats-but-back-engagement-in-new-year/
South Korea's Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-back (left) and Prime Minister Kim Min-seok | Image: ROK defense ministry and Kim's Facebook page, edited by NK News
Top South Korean officials stressed the need to prepare for North Korean military threats in the new year, while also signaling support for engagement.
In a New Year’s message posted on social media on Friday, defense minister Ahn Gyu-back stressed that Seoul will get ready for Full Operational Capability (FOC) verification as part of efforts to eventually assume wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from the U.S.
The verification will demonstrate South Korea’s readiness to take the lead in security on the Korean Peninsula, based on the strong ROK-U.S. alliance, he said.
Last month, the defense ministry revealed its work plan that it will seek to complete the FOC verification and reach an agreement on the timing of OPCON transition at this year’s ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).
The minister also warned that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats are growing more sophisticated.
“The uncertainty of the security environment we face continues to increase,” he said, noting that the DPRK recently disclosed its construction of a nuclear-powered submarine.
During an inspection of the 8,700-ton submarine, Kim Jong Un touted the project’s progress and called the vessel a necessary asset to counter South Korea’s plans to build its own nuclear-powered submarine with U.S. support.
Meanwhile, also on Friday, Prime Minister Kim Min-seok stressed the importance of engagement with North Korea.
“We will not stop our efforts toward peace,” he said during a speech in Sejong.
Kim highlighted steps that the Lee Jae Myung administration has taken to reduce minor conflicts along the border, including stopping leaflet campaigns toward the DPRK and halting military loudspeaker broadcasts.
These actions aimed to reduce border tensions, though critics say they have cut off key sources of uncensored information for North Koreans living under the regime’s tight control.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young also called on North Korea to “end the hostile relationship this year.”
During a speech in Seoul on Friday, he emphasized that the Lee administration respects the DPRK’s views and denounced any hostile intent between the two Koreas.
The minister added the ROK government would support private exchanges and cooperation with the DPRK in areas such as health and medical care.
Edited by Bryan Betts
Updated at 6:14 p.m. on Jan. 2 with comments from the Unification Minister.
10. US-North Korea talks could be coming in 2026. But not the deal Trump wants.
Summary:
Andrei Lankov argues U.S.-north Korea talks may restart in 2026, but not on the sweeping deal POTUS wants. Washington signals interest in renewed contact and a summit, while Pyongyang hints it would talk only if the U.S. drops denuclearization demands. A likely agenda is a “Hanoi compromise”: partial dismantlement at Yongbyon or a freeze in exchange for sanctions relief. Since 2019, however, north Korea is stronger, buoyed by Russian cooperation and less isolated with China, so it can offer less and demand more. Arms control helps both, but domestic politics limits U.S. flexibility. Expect headlines, photo ops, and hard bargaining.
Comment: Unless we are going to execute a comprehensive political warfare campaign (which I advocate) against the Kim family regime there will only be one result of the talks: Kim will assess that his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are superior because US actions will prove they work.
US-North Korea talks could be coming in 2026. But not the deal Trump wants.
While arms control would benefit both, Trump will struggle to get more from a confident Kim Jong Un than he did in Hanoi
Andrei Lankov January 2, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/us-north-korea-talks-could-be-coming-in-2026-but-not-the-deal-trump-wants/
Images: White House, edited by NK News
Nearly one year ago, Donald Trump stormed back to the White House with a determination to remake America’s role in the world, and stirred hopes among some North Korea watchers that a new round of negotiations with Kim Jong Un were on the horizon.
But 11 months into Trump’s second term, the DPRK has been almost completely absent from his agenda, as tariff battles, the crisis in Gaza and the Ukraine war have commanded his attention. North Korean diplomats even rebuffed Trump’s attempt to deliver a letter to his former interlocutor.
The question now is whether there’s any chance of reviving U.S.-North Korea talks in the new year.
Throughout 2025, both sides hinted that they would not mind a meeting, and it’s easy to see why. A compromise would allow the U.S. to slow the DPRK’s nuclear development, while helping Pyongyang to get out from under sanctions and reduce its reliance on China.
But the failure of the 2019 summit in Hanoi looms large, and with a more confident North Korea basking in Russian support, Kim Jong Un can afford to play hardball in ways that will make it difficult for Trump to get a deal that he can sell.
President Donald Trump during his trip to Asia in Oct. 2025 | Image: Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok
OPEN TO TALKS
Over the past year, Washington has sent multiple signals that it is interested in talks with Pyongyang, often through public messaging.
For example, in June, Donald Trump said that he will “get the conflict solved with North Korea,” before adding: “I’ve had a good relationship with Kim Jong Un and get along with him, really great.”
He also talked about a possible summit several times, most recently during his visit to South Korea in October.
“We’ll, at some point in the not-too-distant future, meet with North Korea,” he said, after failing to meet Kim during the trip.
Pyongyang has been less enthusiastic, but occasional hints also suggested that North Korea was not ruling out a renewed dialogue.
In September, Kim Jong Un said that, “If the U.S. drops the absurd obsession with denuclearization and accepts reality, and wants genuine peaceful coexistence, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the U.S.”
He added: “Personally, I still have fond memories of U.S. President Trump.”
Both sides do not mind more talking and have signaled this publicly. While speculation that a summit would materialize around the APEC meeting in late October proved wrong, at least the U.S. side is still indicating its interest in talks.
North Korea short-range missile launchers at the Oct. 10 military parade | Image: KCNA (Oct. 11, 2025)
MUTUAL BENEFIT?
While neither side has said what, precisely, would be on the agenda, it seems fairly certain that any U.S.-DPRK talks would revolve around reviving the “Hanoi compromise.”
That compromise, discussed but not finalized at the Feb. 2019 summit in Hanoi, envisaged North Korea dismantling a significant portion of its nuclear facilities in exchange for U.S. support for relaxing U.N. sanctions.
In broad terms, such an agreement would suit both sides.
For the U.S., it would mean freezing, and possibly rolling back, parts of the North Korean nuclear program. After years of insisting on CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization) as the only acceptable outcome, Washington decisionmakers have belatedly come to recognize what their advisers understood for years: North Korean denuclearization is not achievable in the foreseeable future, if ever.
It is not incidental that these four capital letters do not appear in the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy — indeed any mention of North Korea or denuclearization — even though for decades they had to be included into such documents.
Furthermore, North Korea’s leaders, including Kim Jong Un and his sister Kim Yo Jong, have made it clear that any talks would require a prior U.S. willingness to drop its demand for North Korean denuclearization, which they have correctly described as unrealistic.
In such a situation, a freeze and, with some luck, partial downsizing of the program is indeed the best outcome available.
For North Korea, the logic is clear. Escaping sanctions pressure even partially would give Pyongyang greater diplomatic room to maneuver. It could create opportunities for economic engagement with a number of countries, including the U.S. and South Korea. It might even make possible the long-promised Japanese compensation related to the colonial period.
Over time, this would help North Korea reduce its dependence on China, which has deepened over the past 5-7 years to the great dismay of Pyongyang.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stands alongside China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin on the Tiananmen Square rostrum during Beijing’s Sept. 3 Victory over Japan Day military parade. | Image: KCNA (Sept. 4, 2025)
THINGS HAVE CHANGED
Still, the fact that both sides may be prepared to negotiate does not mean summit-level talks will actually happen and produce results. A Hanoi-style compromise was plausibly within reach in 2019. But the world has changed a great deal since then.
The 2019 summit ended in failure because Donald Trump judged North Korea’s concessions insufficient. In Hanoi, Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its main nuclear research and production complex at Yongbyon, but it was not ready to discuss other facilities, including the HEU production site at Kangson, which they tried to hide but the U.S. intelligence community knew existed.
Confronted with Kim Jong Un’s reluctance to go further, Trump declared that North Korea was not ready for serious negotiations and walked away.
Since then, however, North Korea’s external and internal position has improved dramatically. In 2019, Pyongyang was isolated internationally: Even its would-be partners, Russia and China, supported the sanctions regime. The economy was shrinking, and the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike did not seem entirely implausible.
The contrast with today is striking. Kim Jong Un’s highly public appearance alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on the viewing stand at Tiananmen Square in September sent an unmistakable message that North Korea is no longer isolated. Chinese assistance and, above all, wartime cooperation with Russia — which have seen the DPRK send ammunition, weapons and troops — have boosted North Korean revenues to levels it has not seen for decades.
In the short to medium term, the regime faces no acute threats, and it knows it.
In such circumstances, it would be logical to expect Pyongyang to take a tougher line than it did in 2019. North Korea is likely to offer more modest concessions, while demanding more from Washington. Given the shift in the balance of leverage, it could hardly be otherwise.
This raises the question of how the U.S. side, and Donald Trump in particular, will respond. If negotiations resume, he may have to accept terms less favorable to the U.S. than those he so demonstratively rejected as “insufficient” in 2019.
Trump, a professional showman, can sell almost anything to the public, including setbacks. Even so, there is a real risk that the media and his critics will highlight the apparent reversal by a self-proclaimed “master of the deal.” That would open him to the charge he fears most: weakness.
There is also a second complication. Even if a Hanoi-style compromise would, on balance, benefit the U.S., the gains are not immediately obvious. They would accrue gradually and would be easy to dismiss in domestic political combat.
For these reasons, it is possible, even likely, that negotiations will begin in 2026 and yet fail to deliver a durable agreement. We should therefore brace for another wave of journalistic hype, for flashy Trump-Kim meetings and for triumphant proclamations from the president’s Truth Social account.
Whether any of this produces results is far less certain. Still, given that the potential payoff is real, another attempt may be worth making.
Edited by Bryan Betts
11. Lee Jae Myung to seek China’s support on North Korea during upcoming visit: Wi
Summary:
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac says President Lee Jae Myung’s upcoming Beijing visit will press China to play a constructive role in restarting dialogue with north Korea and easing peninsula tensions. Wi frames the trip as part of a “full restoration” of ROK China relations and stronger strategic communication, arguing both share an interest in peace and stability in Northeast Asia. He signals Seoul will likely explain its proposed nuclear-powered attack submarine as a deterrent response to Pyongyang’s nuclear submarine pursuit and widening military asymmetry. Wi also notes China appears less eager to support denuclearization efforts, and he cautions any joint statement language is uncertain.
Comment: What incentive does Xi have for helping South Korea with its security problem from the north?
Lee Jae Myung to seek China’s support on North Korea during upcoming visit: Wi
Seoul’s top security adviser voices hope that ROK president’s talks with Xi Jinping will help reduce peninsula tensions
Joon Ha Park January 2, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/lee-jae-myung-to-seek-chinas-support-on-north-korea-during-upcoming-visit-wi/
Chinese President Xi Jinping and ROK President Lee Jae Myung during their Gyeongju summit on Nov. 1, 2025, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac during a briefing on Nov. 14, 2025 | Images: Blue House, edited by Korea Pro
Seoul will seek China’s cooperation in advancing dialogue with North Korea during President Lee Jae Myung’s upcoming state visit to Beijing, South Korea’s national security adviser said Friday, underscoring hopes that improved bilateral ties will help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Speaking to reporters at the Blue House, Wi Sung-lac said the Lee administration views next week’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping as an opportunity to lock in the “full restoration” of ROK-China relations and, in parallel, revive Beijing’s “constructive role” on North Korea.
Lee is scheduled to visit China at Xi’s invitation from Sunday to Wednesday. The two leaders are expected to hold an official welcoming ceremony, summit talks, a memorandum signing ceremony and a state banquet on Monday.
Wi stressed that Seoul intends to ask Beijing to play a “constructive role” in easing tensions and advancing peace, saying that it will “strengthen strategic communication between South Korea and China so that the full restoration of bilateral relations can also contribute to creating a breakthrough for resolving the Korean Peninsula issue.”
He added that both countries share “the common goal of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.”
Wi’s main briefing did not address how Seoul plans to discuss its proposed nuclear-powered attack submarine program with Beijing, an issue that has drawn caution from China.
In October, China’s foreign ministry said it hoped South Korea and the U.S. will “earnestly fulfill their nuclear non-proliferation obligations” and pursue actions “conducive to regional peace and stability.”
In a separate interview with Hankyoreh published Friday, Wi acknowledged Beijing’s likely unease and framed Seoul’s rationale in deterrence terms.
North Korea, he said, is “pursuing nuclear-armed submarines and could potentially launch from them,” adding that South Korea “must explain why we also need to respond.”
The growing nuclear and missile “asymmetry” between the two Koreas, Wi said, has become “not just a serious issue, but a matter of survival.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects the country’s new “nuclear-powered” submarine | Image: KCNA (Dec. 25, 2025)
The presidential National Security Office confirmed the full scope of Wi’s further remarks in the interview to NK News, including his assessment of China’s shifting posture on denuclearization.
While Beijing was a vocal supporter of denuclearization during heightened North Korean nuclear and missile testing in 2016-2017, it has largely avoided public endorsements of nuclear disarmament in recent years.
China notably omitted mention of North Korea in its official readout of the Xi-Lee talks in November, and it avoided the topic of denuclearization during a bilateral summit between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in September. Beijing also did not reference denuclearization in a defense report released on Nov. 27.
To this, Wi told Hankyoreh that “China does not seem eager to talk about denuclearization.” While calling that trend “undesirable,” he said Beijing’s overall approach to the peninsula still shows “stability and continuity.”
Seoul’s national security adviser expressed caution about whether the upcoming Xi-Lee summit will mention denuclearization in a joint statement.
“Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a matter of common interest for all neighboring countries,” Wi added, warning that regional actors will take “next steps” for security if denuclearization is seen as impossible.
Wi added that Seoul is reviewing options for inter-Korean confidence-building “within a range that does not undermine security.”
He emphasized that previous efforts failed to elicit a response from Pyongyang but also prevented further deterioration.
“That itself should be considered an achievement,” Wi said.
Addressing concerns that Beijing may press Seoul to clarify its position on Taiwan following large-scale military drills, Wi said South Korea’s stance remains unchanged.
“Peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are important,” he said.
Jeongmin Kim contributed reporting to this article. Edited by David Choi
12. Lee says S. Korea will continue to respect 'one-China' policy: CCTV
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung told China’s CCTV that South Korea will continue respecting the “one-China” policy on Taiwan-related issues ahead of his four-day state visit to China for talks with Xi Jinping. He said the 1992 diplomatic principles remain the core guidelines for bilateral ties, and stressed peace and stability in Northeast Asia, including the Taiwan Strait.
Comment: China is conducting information preparation of the environment here. The CCP wants to make support for One China a fait accompli. Will there be nuance on the ROK's actual statement? Does President Lee's support of the one China policy mean that the ROK supports a "One China" explicitly or that it acknowledges that China has a policy of "One China" and will not state that there is specific support for the outcome of that policy?
Lee says S. Korea will continue to respect 'one-China' policy: CCTV | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 2, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260102010900315
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 2 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Friday that South Korea will continue to maintain its stance of respecting the "one-China" policy on Taiwan-related issues, ahead of his state visit to China for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
In an interview with China's CCTV, Lee said the foreign policy principles agreed upon by South Korea and China at the time of establishing diplomatic ties in 1992 remain valid and continue to serve as the "core guidelines" for bilateral relations.
"I clearly affirm that respecting the 'one-China' principle and maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia, including in the Taiwan Strait, are very important," Lee said in the interview.
Lee's four-day trip to China, which begins Sunday, comes amid heightened tensions around the Taiwan Strait after Beijing conducted large-scale military drills near the self-ruled island earlier this week.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of their summit at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Nov. 1, 2025, in this file photo provided by Lee's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 2, 2026
13. Defense minister downplays troop cut concerns, cites broader US Army reforms
Summary:
South Korea’s defense minister pushed back on speculation that the December deactivation of a U.S. Army Apache helicopter unit at Camp Humphreys signals a USFK drawdown, saying it fits broader U.S. Army-wide reforms tied to Apache employment. Ahn Gyu-back said he does not believe the move implies a cut from the roughly 28,500 USFK personnel, and warned against conclusions driven by rumor. He said he will visit Camp Humphreys on Jan. 6 to seek direct clarification from U.S. commanders. A defense ministry official added that debates about Apache effectiveness in modern warfare likely shaped the decision. Ahn stressed combined readiness remains intact.
Comment: It is good to see the MINDEF providing much needed context.
Defense minister downplays troop cut concerns, cites broader US Army reforms
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By Bahk Eun-ji
- Published Jan 2, 2026 6:21 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20260102/defense-minister-downplays-troop-cut-concerns-cites-broader-us-army-reforms
An Apache helicopter takes off at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, Aug. 12, 2024. Newsis
Korea’s defense minister on Friday rejected speculation that the recent deactivation of a U.S. Army Apache helicopter unit here signals a reduction in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), saying the move appears to be part of a broader transformation of the U.S. Army.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back told reporters that the suspension of operationㄴ at the unit should not be interpreted as a troop cut. When asked whether this indicated a reduction in number from the current 28,500-strong USFK, Ahn said, “I do not think that is the case.”
“There seem to be a number of changes underway within the U.S. Army related to Apache helicopters,” Ahn said. “This does not appear to be an issue limited to U.S. Forces in Korea, but rather part of reforms taking place across the U.S. Army as a whole.”
His comments followed a U.S. congressional report which revealed that the 5th Air Cavalry Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment at the main U.S. base of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, ceased operations in the middle of December. The unit had operated Apache attack helicopters and reconnaissance assets, prompting questions over whether the move was connected to a wider adjustment to the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula.
Ahn said that he plans to visit Camp Humphreys on Tuesday and seek further clarification from U.S. military officials.
“I will be visiting Camp Humphreys on Jan. 6, and I intend to hear firsthand about the circumstances surrounding this decision,” he said. “It would not be appropriate to draw conclusions based on speculation alone.”
An official from the defense ministry echoed this view, noting that the role of attack helicopters has increasingly been called into question in modern warfare. “There have been growing debates over the effectiveness of Apache helicopters in contemporary combat environments,” the official said. “We understand this change in that context.”
Ahn stressed that the deactivation does not affect the defense posture of Seoul and Washington. “Our combined defense readiness remains intact,” he said, adding discussions with U.S. forces are ongoing and closely coordinated.
14. Why has control over DMZ access become such a point of contention between South Korea and the U.S.?
Summary:
Control of DMZ access turned contentious because it collides sovereignty with the Armistice’s legal regime. The 1953 Armistice assigns the UNC commander responsibility for civil administration and relief activities south of the MDL, and it bars entry without UNC approval. South Korean lawmakers now want a “DMZ law” that lets Seoul approve civilian, “peaceful” access on its own, in some drafts “notwithstanding the Armistice Agreement.” The fight sharpened after the UNC initially denied a senior Blue House official’s visit to a remains recovery site, then reversed under public pressure, which looked arbitrary and political in Seoul. The UNC and conservatives warn unilateral change risks breaching the armistice framework and eroding alliance credibility.
Comment: The short answer is because uninformed people are making uninformed comments. People are weighing in on the issue and are stirring things up when they have little to no understanding of the Armistice, the MAC, or security on the DMZ.
Of course as a sovereign nation, South Korea could ask the UNC to leave. This is of course exactly what Kim Jong Un wants and the Kim family regime has been focused on removing the UNC for decades. Those who are stirring up the Armistice/DMZ/UNC Issues are not only ill-informed but they are also wittingly or unwittingly supporting Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
Why has control over DMZ access become such a point of contention between South Korea and the U.S.?
Published: 02 Jan. 2026, 07:00
Tourists use binoculars to view North Korea from the Dora Observation Post in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Paju, Gyeonggi, on May 25, 2025. [AP/YONHAP]
[EXPLAINER]
The demilitarized zone (DMZ) has become a political flashpoint in Seoul's foreign and security policy — and an unexpected source of tension between South Korea and the United Nations Command (UNC).
A new legislative push by ruling party Democratic Party (DP) lawmakers to grant the South Korean government authority over civilian access to the DMZ for peaceful purposes triggered a rare public rebuke from the UNC, which maintains control over the area under the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which ended the three-year Korean War in a cease-fire.
In a statement Sunday regarding its assessment of the South Korean military’s envisioned border rule revisions, the UNC reaffirmed its "commitment to maintaining the Armistice Agreement," including the military demarcation line (MDL), and to “supporting measures that prevent escalation and promote stability” within the DMZ.
Related Article
However, the debate over the jurisdiction of the DMZ for nonmilitary access now touches on sovereignty, alliance coordination and the legal boundaries of the armistice regime — and analysts warn it could influence the future of inter-Korean engagement and even the credibility of the South Korea-U.S. security framework.
South Korean soldiers stand guard at the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, inside the DMZ, during a tour on July 19, 2022. The JSA, with its iconic blue huts (South Korean side) and the grey Panmun-gak building (North Korean side in the background), is one of the few spots in the DMZ where troops from both Koreas face each other directly under the armistice agreement. [JOONGANG ILBO]
Who controls the DMZ, and why does it matter?
The DMZ is a 4-kilometer-wide buffer zone across the Korean Peninsula established by the 1953 Korean War armistice to separate North and South Korean forces.
Although it lies within South Korean territory, all access is controlled by the UNC — the entity through which 18 nations, including the United States and many of the original Korean War combatants — led by Washington.
The armistice’s Article I states that “civil administration and relief activities in the DMZ which is south of the MDL shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,” and no military or civilian personnel may enter the DMZ without specific approval.
Entry requires approval from the UNC’s Military Armistice Commission with 48 hours' notice, a rule not explicitly written into the armistice but enforced for decades. The control extends even to South Korea’s highest-ranking officials, including the president.
The UNC defends its authority as essential to preventing provocations and preserving the armistice’s stability.
They point out that the armistice is a legally binding international agreement aimed at halting all armed conflict “until a final peaceful settlement is achieved,” which includes tightly regulating movement in the DMZ. The UNC has administered the DMZ for over 70 years and credits this regime with helping maintain stability even during periods of high inter-Korean tension.
The agreement is still regarded as a binding international treaty under South Korea’s Constitution. From this perspective, the DMZ is not just Korean territory but also a globally monitored cease-fire zone.
South Korean soldiers salute as the flag-draped remains of a soldier killed in the Korean War (1950-53) are carried from the Baekma-Goji excavation site inside the DMZ on Dec. 1, 2025. Over a 40-day excavation, the military recovered 25 sets of remains and nearly 2,000 artifacts from this former battlefield in Cheorwon, Gangwon, part of efforts to transform the DMZ into a zone of peace. A senior national security official’s visit here was recently blocked by the UNC, sparking controversy. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE]
How did it all start?
Kim Hyun-jong, the first deputy director of South Korea’s presidential National Security Office, attempted to visit the Korean War remains excavation site at Baekma-Goji, or White Horse Hill, inside the DMZ.
The excavation, managed by the Defense Ministry, took place on the central front of the DMZ from Oct. 15 to Nov. 28 of last year.
Kim’s scheduled visit to the site, however, was denied by the UNC, only to be later publicly revealed by South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young. Chung expressed outrage that even a top national security official could be barred from “our own land” in the DMZ.
The incident was framed domestically as a sovereignty issue, since Kim’s role is to oversee national security, and yet he was prevented from visiting a site on South Korean territory.
The UNC did not cite a specific incident or hazard as the reason for blocking Kim’s visit.
Instead, it issued only a general statement of policy, reiterating that as the enforcer of the armistice, it reviews all DMZ access requests according to established procedures to ensure safety and compliance.
Following public criticism and debate, the UNC reversed its stance and allowed Kim to enter the DMZ about two weeks later, on Dec. 17, where it announced via its website and social media that it had granted Kim access to the DMZ.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a joint ministry policy briefing on Dec. 19, 2025. Chung has criticized the UNC denying senior government official's access to the DMZ. [YONHAP]
What would the proposed DMZ law change?
Reps. Lee Jae-gang and Han Jeoung-ae from the DP proposed an act on the peaceful use of the DMZ, or simply "DMZ law," in August of last year.
Although the drafts vary slightly, their core premise is to allow the South Korean government — specifically the Unification Ministry or other agencies — to independently approve civilian access to the DMZ for nonmilitary and peaceful purposes, bypassing UNC control.
One version explicitly states that the Unification Minister can authorize DMZ access “notwithstanding the Armistice Agreement,” after review by a special committee.
Another version similarly empowers a government committee to grant DMZ entry permits by presidential decree. The legislation also proposes that this new DMZ law would take precedence over any conflicting domestic laws, such as existing border area or military facilities protection laws.
Advocates argue that the UNC’s blanket control is overly restrictive and has impeded harmless civilian endeavors in the past.
South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, right, and Roman Catholic Cardinal Lazzaro You Heung-sik place postcards in a mailbox at the Imjingak Peace Park in Paju, Gyeonggi, on July 23, 2025, to express hopes for inter-Korean reconciliation. A planned prayer ceremony by the visiting cardinal near the DMZ was canceled in 2025 due to procedural hurdles with the UNC’s 48-hour approval rule. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Before the deputy national security adviser's denial, a prayer-for-peace ceremony by visiting Cardinal Lazzaro You Heung-sik was also canceled for procedural reasons. The UNC cited that the cardinal’s team requested access on short notice, not adhering to the standard advance notification timeline.
During the inter-Korean summit in 2007, then-President Roh Moo-hyun had to receive final clearance from the UNC’s operations center before crossing the MDL in front of live cameras.
Yang Moo-jin, a distinguished professor at the University of North Korean Studies, argues that while the armistice grants the UNC access control, that authority should apply strictly to military matters.
“The UNC’s role should be limited to military functions under the armistice,” Yang told the Korean press.
Yang pointed specifically to the Kim case, only to be later granted access after public criticism, shows an "overextension" and "arbitrary interpretation" of its mandate.
“This shows that the UNC is reacting politically, not legally — which it was never meant to do,” he said.
Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of United States Forces Korea, delivers a commemorative speech during a ceremony to celebrate the UN Forces Participation Day at Kintex in Goyang, Gyeonggi, on July 27, 2025. [JOING PRESS CORPS]
Why are the UNC and others opposed to it?
The UNC issued an unusual public statement on Dec. 17 strongly opposing the bill.
In it, the command reiterated that DMZ access control “is the inherent authority of the UNC under the armistice,” quoting the agreement’s clause that no personnel may enter without MAC approval.
UNC officials warn that if South Korea passes a law to unilaterally override those armistice provisions, it would amount to a breach of an international agreement.
The UNC commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, who also heads U.S. Forces Korea, stressed that the command’s actions are governed by the Korean War armistice, and "we've got to adhere to the standards put forward" in the agreement.
He cautioned that the UNC cannot "seek to change the way we do business in abrogation of a legal document, which is the armistice.”
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense echoed the UNC's position.
In an official review submitted to the National Assembly, the ministry acknowledged the “intent” of enabling peaceful DMZ use but insisted that any steps must be done in close coordination with the UNC.
South Korea's conservative camp, including the opposition People Power Party (PPP), went further, saying undermining UNC authority would “remove the basis for UN member states’ automatic intervention” in a crisis, essentially weakening a key “safety pin” for South Korea’s security.
“Attempting to nullify an international pact [the armistice] through domestic law is a blatant violation of the Vienna Convention,” said PPP spokesman Park Sung-hoon, calling it an act that could turn South Korea into an international “rogue state” that breaks its commitments.
Will the DMZ law strain the alliance?
The DMZ law debate ultimately reflects a deeper tension — South Korea’s ambition for greater autonomy versus the practical constraints of a 70-year-old armistice system.
Washington has allowed the UNC to lead the response so far, but this isn't the first time the two sides have faced strain.
During the inter-Korean detente in 2018, the United States, through the UNC, slowed some inter-Korean projects that were moving faster than U.S.-North Korea talks.
The UNC exercised control over DMZ access and delayed or restricted some inter-Korean projects, such as the joint railway survey in the DMZ and some military de-escalation measures or site visits under a comprehensive military agreement signed by the two Koreas that year.
South Korea, rather than act unilaterally or override UNC authority, adjusted its timelines and coordinated with Washington.
Today, the PPP called the DMZ bill a dangerous move that could erode tight South Korea-U.S. cooperation on North Korea policy.
“Shaking the UNC’s authority is a very dangerous idea that weakens the framework of our alliance,” said Park, adding that it amounts to “security self-harm.”
This is exactly what North Korea desires, PPP officials note, adding that Pyongyang has long demanded the dissolution of the UNC, viewing it as a U.S.-led mechanism to bring multinational forces against the North.
North Korean state media denounced the recent revitalization of UNC activities as a “second, Asian version of NATO" on the peninsula in a Foreign Ministry statement carried by state media Korean Central News Agency in August 2024.
Still, the unification minister reiterated his support for the DMZ law in a joint policy briefing on Dec. 19, citing the recent incidents of denied entry.
"That is our reality," he said, stressing the need for legal authority to guarantee peaceful access.
BY SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]
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