Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"War is what happens when language fails."

– Margaret Atwood

"The world suffers a lot. Not because of the violence of bad people but because of the silence of the good people."

– Bonaparte

"We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of kinship. The reunification of the motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!"

-Xi JingPing's 2026 New Year Message

https://english.news.cn/20251231/6df33f2b24d545f28138477a3c713f3d/c.html?utm

(I do not think I need to make any editorial comments about this statement but I would note the false narrative and support for Chinese cognitive warfare)

Since only a few responded to my challenge on New Year's Eve about how many articles presented im my daily Korean and National Security News and Commentary had connections to cognitive warfare I thought I would reprise the question and the description of cognitive warfare. Consider cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence as you read the news.

The NATO Chief Scientist Research Report frames Cognitive Warfare as a contest for “cognitive superiority” in which adversaries use synchronized military and non-military activities to influence how people perceive, make sense of events, and decide and act, at individual, group, and societal levels. It stresses that modern technologies expand reach and effectiveness, since the openness and connectedness of democracies can be exploited via propaganda, disinformation, deepfakes, and other information threats that degrade trust and polarize societies. The report treats Cognitive Warfare as broader than classic InfoOps, PSYOP, STRATCOM, or cyber operations. It is often not aimed at narrowly defined target audiences or outcomes, and it can be designed to create chaos and complexity below the threshold of armed conflict.

1. Happy New Year from Xinanigans!

2. Full text: Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2026 New Year message

3. Iran’s heroic protesters need to hear that America is on their side

4. Iranian Protesters Killed as Unrest Turns Violent on Fifth Day

5. Opinion | About the New Iranian Protests

6. Trump Warns Iran Against Shooting Protesters

7. Opinion | China Seeks Power, Not Only Trade

8. Venezuelan Exiles Root for U.S. Military Action. Those Left Behind Oppose It.

9. Six Storylines to Watch in 2026

10. Why U.S. Military Combatant Commands Aren’t the Issue—The Military Services Are

11. Taiwan vows to defend sovereignty after China's military drill

12. China military drills near Taiwan 'unnecessarily' raise tensions: US

13. Intel ON FIRE: How Ukraine’s spies reshaped war in 2025

14. The Invisible Frontline: How encrypted networks and AI are rewiring Britain’s security

15. The Demographic Decline of China

16. The Waiting Game: Signposts of Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa

17. Seatbelts for Speeders: Why Beijing Ignores Washington’s Red Phone

18. Why Mechanized Warfare Will Still Be Decisive in the Next Land War

19. Sustaining at the Edge: Army Reserve Integration in the Indo-Pacific

20. Contrarians No More: AI Skepticism Is on the Rise

1. Happy New Year from Xinanigans!

Summary:

Erika Lafrennie argues that 2025 confounded the usual China forecasts of imminent collapse or imminent aggression. Instead, Beijing managed weakness while projecting confidence, operating through “controlled deterioration.” Her reporting emphasizes internal mechanics: a PLA that obeys but acts cautiously, a Party-state that censors information even from itself, and a leadership model sustained by metrics, discipline, and performance. She frames Xi not as a personality but as a repeatable governance method deployed across multiple domains to impose coherence and pressure, shape narratives, and use time as advantage. Key blind spots were the deepening of internal information controls, faster export of governance models to Latin America, and the utility of “strategic helplessness” amid divided US attention in 2025.

Comment: An excellent way to begin the New Year. I recommend we all consider the questions Erika Lafrennie seeks to answer. My assessment remains that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

Happy New Year from Xinanigans!

Jan 2, 2026

Erika Lafrennie

Jan 02, 2026

https://www.xinanigans.com/p/happy-new-year-from-xinanigans-2026?utm

Huangshan, Anhui Province. (Photo of the author)

At the start of 2025, the dominant predictions about China were familiar ones: either imminent collapse or imminent aggression. Neither occurred. Instead, we watched a system manage its own weaknesses while projecting confidence. Not stable, not spiraling, but operating through controlled deterioration.

Over the past year, I focused on what that looks like inside the system: a military that follows orders but operates with internal caution; a Party apparatus that censors information even from itself; and a leadership model that relies on metrics, discipline, and appearance to sustain authority.

Xinanigans was built to track these patterns. Over the course of 2025, that lens solidified into a clearer architecture—seven domains of governance warfare that explain how China organizes power at home, exports influence abroad, and shapes the strategic environment the US must operate within. That perspective guided everything from PLA internal dynamics to China’s growing role as an exporter of governance models.

What I Saw

I saw governance used as an instrument of pressure. Narrative used as a way to set constraints. Time used as an advantage rather than a variable.

And I watched Xi less as a personality and more as a method—a governance model that expresses itself across multiple domains at once, using administration, psychology, economics, and narrative to produce coherence where reality does not. What matters is not the man but the system he has engineered to endure beyond him.

What I Missed

I also missed things. I underestimated how far internal information controls would spread within the Party. I didn’t expect governance-model exports to Latin America to accelerate as quickly as they did. And I didn’t see how effective Beijing’s posture of “strategic helplessness” would be at a moment when US attention was divided.

These were blind spots in timing and emphasis, not in direction. But they matter. Mapping a system this large means adjusting the picture as it shifts.

What’s Next

In 2026, I’ll be tracking how Xi’s governance method evolves and spreads—not just as policy, but as a full-spectrum system of control. I’m especially interested in where the appeal is less about China itself and more about the structure it offers.

That means examining how different domains of governance warfare interact: how administrative pressure points shape economic incentives, how demographic strategy reinforces narrative infrastructure, how elite co-option travels through planning regimes, and how these dynamics together expand China’s influence abroad.

Xinanigans will stay grounded in the core questions that shape the work:

What signals is Beijing sending?
What stresses is it trying to manage?
Where are the fractures in the system?
How is its governance model being absorbed abroad?

And finally, thank you. The notes you send, the questions you raise, and the encouragement you offer mean more than you probably realize. I’m grateful to have you with me on this path.

V/r,

Erika

2. Full text: Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2026 New Year message

Summary:

Xi’s 2026 New Year message claims 2025 completed the 14th Five-Year Plan targets and advanced “Chinese modernization,” citing expected GDP near RMB 140 trillion, stronger science and technology, defense, and improved living standards alongside environmental gains. He highlights commemorations of World War II victory and “Taiwan Recovery Day,” and touts innovation progress in AI models, domestic chips, space exploration, major infrastructure, and new naval capabilities. He emphasizes cultural revival, social welfare measures, ethnic unity, and continued opening, including climate pledges and global governance initiatives. He reaffirms One Country, Two Systems and calls reunification “unstoppable,” while stressing Party discipline, anti-corruption, and launching the 15th Five-Year Plan.

Comment: "Taiwan Recovery Day?" I am fond of the meme that shows Taiwan recovering "West Taiwan" on the mainland. If I were advising the Chinese service of VOA and RFA I would recommend inviting experts to interpret this speech and provide some contrary views to the people in China. But we have no such service. All USAGM wants to do is contract with One American News Network and broadcast news stories that the people in China have no clue about (but it makes some politicians in the US feel good).

Full text: Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2026 New Year message

english.news.cn

Source: Xinhua

Editor: huaxia

2025-12-31 19:34:45

https://english.news.cn/20251231/6df33f2b24d545f28138477a3c713f3d/c.html?utm

Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers his 2026 New Year message in Beijing on Wednesday. (Xinhua/Yan Yan)

BEIJING, Dec. 31 (Xinhua) -- On New Year's Eve, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered his 2026 New Year message through China Media Group and the internet. The following is the full text of the message:

Greetings to all! Year after year, life opens a fresh chapter. As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes to you from Beijing!

The year 2025 marks the completion of China's 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development. Over the past five years, we have pressed ahead with enterprise and fortitude, and overcome many difficulties and challenges. We met the targets in the Plan and made solid advances on the new journey of Chinese modernization. Our economic output has crossed thresholds one after another, and it is expected to reach RMB 140 trillion yuan this year. Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights. Clear waters and lush mountains have become a salient feature of our landscape. Our people enjoy a growing sense of gain, happiness and security. The past five years have been a truly remarkable journey, and our accomplishments have not come easily. Your unwavering hard work has made our nation thrive and prosper. I salute you all for your exceptional diligence and invaluable contributions.

This year is full of indelible memories. We solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and established the Taiwan Recovery Day. These grand national events were majestic and powerful, and the glory of victory will shine through the pages of history. They are inspiring all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation to remember history, honor fallen heroes, cherish peace, and create a better future. They are rallying a mighty force for the great rejuvenation of our nation.

We sought to energize high-quality development through innovation. We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities. The Tianwen-2 probe began its star-chasing journey to explore asteroids and comets. Construction of the hydropower project at the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River started. China's first aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system was officially commissioned. Humanoid robots did kung fu kicks, and drones performed spectacular light shows. Inventions and innovations have boosted new quality productive forces and added colorful dimensions to our lives.

We endeavored to nurture our spiritual home with cultural development. There was a surging public interest in cultural relics, museums, and intangible cultural heritage. A new Chinese cultural site was added to the World Heritage List. Cultural IPs such as Wukong and Nezha became global hits. The younger generation came to deem classic Chinese culture as the finest form of aesthetic expression. The cultural and tourism sectors thrived. The "super league" football games in our cities and villages attracted numerous fans. Ice and snow sports ignited people's passion for the winter season. Tradition is now embracing modernity, and the Chinese culture is shining in even greater splendor.

We joined hands to build a better life and enjoyed it together. I attended celebrations in Xizang and Xinjiang. From the snow-covered plateau to both sides of the Tianshan Mountains, people of various ethnic groups are united as one, like seeds of a pomegranate sticking together. With white khatas and passionate singing and dancing, they expressed their love of the motherland and the happiness they enjoy. No issue of the people is too small; we care for every leaf and tend every branch in the garden of people's well-being. Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected, facilities have been upgraded to bring more convenience to the elderly, and each family with childcare needs has received a subsidy of RMB 300 yuan per month. When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.

We continued to embrace the world with open arms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin and the Global Leaders' Meeting on Women were very successful; and island-wide special customs operations were launched in the Hainan Free Trade Port. To better address climate change, China announced new Nationally Determined Contributions. After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war. China always stands on the right side of history, and is ready to work with all countries to advance world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for humanity.

Not long ago, I attended the opening ceremony of the National Games, and I was glad to see Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao coming together in unity and acting in unison. We should unswervingly implement the policy of One Country, Two Systems, and support Hong Kong and Macao in better integrating into the overall development of our country and maintaining long-term prosperity and stability. We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!

Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership's eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party's self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance. As a result, the conduct of our Party and government steadily improved. We must stay true to our original aspiration and founding mission, and pursue our goal with perseverance and dedication. We should continue to give a good answer to the question on how to maintain long-term governance put forth in a cave dwelling in Yan'an and prove ourselves worthy of the people's expectation in the new era.

The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set. We should focus on our goals and tasks, boost confidence, and build momentum to press ahead. We should take solid steps to promote high-quality development, further deepen reform and opening up across the board, deliver prosperity for all, and write a new chapter in the story of China's miracle.

The dream lofty, the journey long -- bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.

The sun of the new year will soon rise. May our great motherland stand in magnificence! May the fields across the country deliver good harvest! May our nation bathe in the glory of the morning! May you all enjoy life to the fullest, and achieve every success! May all your dreams come true! ■

english.news.cn

3. Iran’s heroic protesters need to hear that America is on their side

Summary:

The New York Post argues Washington should loudly back Iran’s renewed protests and warn Tehran against a wider crackdown. It cites chants of “Death to Khamenei” and reports security forces killed at least two in Lordegan. The board urges Secretary Rubio and POTUS to echo UN Ambassador Mike Waltz, contrasting this with Obama-era reluctance, and says public US support could bolster protesters and deter regime violence.

Comment: But how do we communicate with the Iranian people without VOA's Persian Service and Radio Farda?

Iran’s heroic protesters need to hear that America is on their side

New York Post · Post Editorial Board · January 1, 2026

By Post Editorial Board

Published Jan. 1, 2026, 5:33 p.m. ET

https://nypost.com/2026/01/01/opinion/irans-heroic-protesters-need-to-hear-that-america-is-on-their-side/

With the people of Iran once again rising in protest against their oppressors, America’s leaders should leave no doubt that they side with the forces of freedom — and warn the gang that rules the country that Uncle Sam is watching.

“Death to Khamenei” the crowds are now shouting; Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s response began to turn deadly Thursday, with security goons firing on a crowd in the southwestern city of Lordegan, killing at least two.

Words of support from Washington are vital now — to encourage the protests and make Tehran think twice about a harsher crackdown.

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UN Ambassador Mike Waltz spoke out Monday; Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Donald Trump should join him now.

Don’t be like President Barack Obama, who time and again flinched from publicly siding with Iranian protests, hesitating even to denounce Tehran’s bloody suppression of them.

Obama was busy trying to appease the regime into cooperating with his demented nuclear deal; Team Trump’s approach has already proved far more to the point: bombing Iran’s nuke program into smithereens.

Iran’s people have risen up repeatedly these last 15 years against the misrule of the so-called Islamic Republic, with their cries shifting from calls for reform to demands to end the oppression installed by the 1979 revolution.

These latest protests entered a fifth day Thursday, still growing all across the nation; the voices crying out for justice now need to hear that Trump is on their side.

And their rulers need to know America won’t turn an Obamaesque blind eye if they try another ruthless crackdown, or Thursday’s killings will surely be just a taste of the bloodbath to come.

New York Post · Post Editorial Board · January 1, 2026

4. Iranian Protesters Killed as Unrest Turns Violent on Fifth Day

Summary:

Iran’s economic protests turned deadly on day five, with at least five people killed in clashes with police on Thursday. Fars, linked to the IRGC, said three died outside a police station in Lorestan and two near a governor’s residence in Lordegan. The unrest began after merchants protested the rial’s sharp drop, amid sanctions-driven inflation and economic distress that worsened after a June war with Israel. Officials warned “rioting” would be met with a firm response, and analysts said repression is the regime’s default tool. WSJ notes rising coercion, citing over 1,870 executions in 2025, roughly double the prior year.

Comment: Is there a tipping point or can Iran population and resources control measure effectively suppress the protests? Will protests turn to resistance?

Iranian Protesters Killed as Unrest Turns Violent on Fifth Day

WSJ

Hard-liners have promised a harsher crackdown if protests spiral out of control

By Benoit Faucon

Updated Jan. 1, 2026 1:08 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iranian-protesters-killed-as-unrest-turns-violent-on-fifth-day-2ef703bd

Tehran merchants have been protesting amid an economic crisis. Fars News Agency/AFP/Getty Images

Violence erupted between Iranian protesters and police during unrest on Thursday, leaving at least five dead on the fifth day of demonstrations over the country’s economic crisis.

Three people were killed during a demonstration outside a police station in Lorestan Province in western Iran, according to Fars news agency, which is affiliated with the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Another two people were killed during a protest near the governor’s residence in Lordegan, another western Iranian province, Fars said.

It came a day after a 21-year-old member of the Basij—a volunteer force tasked with protecting the Islamic Republic—was killed after demonstrators threw stones in Kuhdasht in Lorestan, the state broadcaster IRIB reported. About a dozen members of law enforcement and the Basij were injured, according to the local deputy governor, Saeed Pour Ali.

Protests also continued to take place in Tehran and elsewhere in the country.

The demonstrations began on Sunday after merchants took to the streets to protest after a precipitous drop in the value of the rial, the country’s currency. International sanctions over Iran’s refusal to pare back its nuclear ambitions have led to widespread economic problems, including high inflation and a devaluation of its currency. A June war with Israel shattered its defenses and exposed its weaknesses.

Shops were closed this week in the Tehran Grand Bazaar. Majid Asgaripour/Wana News Agency/Reuters

The violence could spur the regime to crack down more firmly on protesters, say analysts.

“The only strategy the regime knows is repression,” said Saeid Golkar, an associate professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and Iran expert.

During the first few days of the protests, Iranian officials vowed to address the economic concerns that were highlighted by the demonstrations. But hard-liners have promised a fierce response if protesters turned to calling for the downfall of the Islamic Republic. Police violence resulted in hundreds of deaths in 2022 demonstrations over the country’s strict religious codes.

“Enemies will exploit” the situation, Pour Ali, the Lorestan deputy governor, said late Wednesday. “Rioting and destruction of public property have nothing to do with civil protests.”

Mohammad Movahedi-Azad, Iran’s prosecutor-general, warned this week that any attempt to turn economic protests into a tool of “insecurity” or “destruction of public property would face a legal, proportionate and firm response,” according to the judiciary-news agency Mizan.

Iran’s food inflation reached 64.2% in October, according to the World Bank, the second- highest level in the world after South Sudan. The rial has lost 60% of its value since the June war with Israel. Iran failed to clinch a deal with the U.S. over its atomic program that could have helped alleviate some of the stress sanctions have placed on its economy.

The economic crisis has been accompanied with mounting repression. More than 1,870 people had been executed in Iran in 2025, about twice as many as the prior year, according to data collected by the Washington-based Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, an advocacy group that documents human-rights violations in Iran. More than 490 people have been executed since Nov. 1, surpassing the total for all of 2021.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com

President Trump was meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida to discuss Phase 2 of the peace plan between Israel and Hamas. Photo: Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

Corrections & Amplifications

An earlier version of this article incorrectly said Iran failed to clinch a deal this year with U.S. over its atomic program, and that 1,870 people had been executed in Iran this year. In both cases, the events occurred last year. (Corrected on Jan. 1)

Appeared in the January 2, 2026, print edition as 'Iran Protests Turn Deadly'.

WSJ

5. Opinion | About the New Iranian Protests

Summary:

WSJ’s editorial board argues the new Iranian protests disprove claims that the Israel US strike on nuclear sites would rally Iranians to the regime. What began with Tehran Grand Bazaar merchants has spread to students, truckers, and drivers, driven by inflation, currency decline since the June war, and basic-service failures. Chants show a shift from economic grievance to anti regime politics. The regime’s initial caution gave way to arrests and lethal force, amid reports of mass detentions and a post war execution surge. The board urges the US to back protesters by restoring internet access, exposing regime enforcers, enforcing sanctions, and implementing the 2024 Mahsa Amini Act.

Comment: This seems like a very significant assessment. I wonder what the IC is reporting to our national leadership. This assessment provides a number of areas that we could take for action (depending on the outcome we are trying to achieve - tell us that and we can recommend options).

Opinion | About the New Iranian Protests

wsj.com

The Editorial Board

Updated Jan. 1, 2026 5:16 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/iran-protests-regime-ali-khamenei-masoud-pezeshkian-5ffe83cc

People walk past closed shops following protests in Tehran on Tuesday. Majid Asgaripour/Wana News Agency/Reuters

Remember the predictions from so many experts that a military strike on Iran’s nuclear sites would cause Iranians to rally behind their regime? You can junk that conventional wisdom. As 2026 dawns, the Iranian people are marching in protest only months after the Israel-U.S. attack.

The protests began among shopkeepers and merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, but they have spread to other cities and groups. Students in particular have joined, with support from truckers and bus drivers. Economic grievances are in the forefront amid 42% inflation, a currency that has lost 40% of its value against the dollar since the June war, and even a lack of water and reliable energy.

Economic protests can easily turn political, and the unrest is dangerous to the regime because deprivation is widespread. “Death to the dictator,” students chanted in the country’s northwest. In Tehran others chanted, “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, I give my life for Iran.”

The regime has typically responded to protests with beatings, arrests, torture and shootings. But this time its initial response was more cautious, as if it realized the danger of a broad anti-government uprising.

The regime sacked the central-bank chief as the fall guy for inflation, and it has rolled out “reformist” President Masoud Pezeshkian with a rare offer of dialogue. Iranians know he holds little real power, and the unpopular Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has remained quiet behind the scenes.

But as protests spread, repression has returned, with arrests and even some live fire. At least five protesters have been killed and there are many reports of arrests. Iran says it arrested 21,000 “suspects” during the June war, and human-rights groups have documented a surge of between 1,500 and 2,000 executions since then, most carried out in secret. This repression makes the continuing protests all the more remarkable.

All of which is an opportunity for the U.S. to show its support for the Iranian people. In 2009 Barack Obama made the mistake of staying mute as the regime crushed protesters. He wanted a nuclear deal with the Ayatollah.

Mr. Trump may be tempted by the same mirage, but if Iran wanted a deal it could have returned to the negotiating table after the war. Instead it still insists on domestic enrichment of nuclear fuel, and it is fast rebuilding ballistic missile stockpiles that could hit Israel or U.S. bases.

The State Department is issuing messages in Farsi to Iran, but the Iranians risking their lives deserve meaningful support. This can mean restoring internet access when the regime cuts it off, unmasking regime thugs, and much more. Mr. Trump can also implement the Mahsa Amini Act passed in 2024 to hold officials accountable for human-rights abuses.

Most important is to keep the economic pressure on the regime. That means enforcing oil sanctions against Iran with even half the vigor the U.S. has lately displayed against Venezuela. Iran has been able to evade sanctions enough that its oil exports are at new highs—two million barrels a day, 20 times the U.S. target. This mocks Mr. Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign.

None of this means the regime is in danger of immediate collapse, though dictatorships often look stable until the moment their rule ends. The Ayatollah depends on oil revenue to keep his commanders loyal and troops’ rifles aimed at their own people. If the money stops flowing, the loyalties of the regime enforcers may change.

Appeared in the January 2, 2026, print edition as 'About the New Iranian Protests'.

Videos

wsj.com

6. Trump Warns Iran Against Shooting Protesters

Summary:

POTUS warned Tehran against violently suppressing nearly weeklong protests driven by Iran’s economic crisis. In a social media post, he said if Iran “shots” and kills peaceful protesters, the United States would “come to their rescue,” adding it is “locked and loaded,” though the specific response is unclear. Iran’s hard-liners used the threat to portray demonstrators as foreign agents, while senior official Ali Larijani cautioned US interference could destabilize the region and endanger US forces. Rights groups report seven dead, 33 injured, and 119 arrests across at least 32 cities, with additional fatalities reported by Fars and Hengaw.

Comment: Are the Iranian people hearing POTUS' voice? If so, how? If not, why not?

But are we in any way serious about intervention? What does that mean? What are the options being presented to POTUS by the IC, State, and the Pentagon? (Rhetorical question- I do not expect this to be answered in public - but I would imagine Congress will be demanding to be informed).

Trump Warns Iran Against Shooting Protesters

WSJ

The president’s threat to intervene comes as Tehran’s hard-liners promise a harsher crackdown if demonstrations spiral out of control

By Benoit Faucon

Jan. 2, 2026 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-warns-iran-against-shooting-protesters-efd580ea

A screen grab of images posted on social media on Wednesday, shows protesters attacking a government building in southern Iran. UGC/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

President Trump threatened to intervene if Iran cracks down violently on ongoing protests, putting more pressure on Tehran as it tries to contain discontent with its spiraling economy.

The warning came after demonstrations that have run for nearly a week turned deadly, with clashes between protesters and police leaving several dead.

“If Iran shots [sic] and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue,” the president said on social media. “We are locked and loaded and ready to go.”

It wasn’t clear what action the U.S. might take. The U.S. has slapped sanctions on Iranian perpetrators of human-rights violations during previous waves of unrest, but Trump has pursued a more muscular foreign policy, including bombing Iranian nuclear sites over the summer, even as he pushes forward peacemaking efforts in Gaza and elsewhere.

Trump warned earlier this week during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Iran would face military strikes if it tried to rebuild its ballistic-missile or nuclear programs, which were badly damaged during the 12-day war in June.

President Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Palm Beach, Fla., on Monday. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Iran’s leaders have acknowledged legitimate economic grievances in the protests, but hard-liners used Trump’s threat to paint some of the demonstrators as troublemaking agents of the country’s enemies. Ali Larijani, a top Iranian national security official, warned the U.S. against interfering in internal matters, saying it would create chaos in the region and implying it could put American soldiers at risk.

Iran has little ability to counter any strike after Israel shattered its air defenses during the war. But it was able to launch missile barrages that, while doing no strategic damage, stretched U.S. and Israel defenses and left dozens dead. Iran and its militia allies have also previously attacked American bases in the region.

The Iranian protests have left seven people dead, at least 33 injured and 119 under arrest, according to the group Human Rights Activists in Iran. The demonstrations, which began in Tehran, have spread to at least 32 cities, the group said in a report late Thursday.

The protests continued Friday in Tehran and elsewhere in the country. Protesters buried a demonstrator who was killed late Thursday in Fooladshahr, in Iran’s central province of Isfahan, according to the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, another Iranian rights group.

Three other people were killed Thursday during a demonstration outside a police station in Lorestan Province in western Iran, according to Fars news agency, which is affiliated with the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Another two people were killed during a protest near the governor’s residence in Lordegan, another western Iranian province, Fars said.

A 21-year-old member of the Basij—a volunteer force tasked with protecting the Islamic Republic—was killed after demonstrators threw stones in Kuhdasht in Lorestan, the state broadcaster IRIB reported. About a dozen members of law enforcement and the Basij were injured, the local deputy governor, Saeed Pour Ali, said in comments reported by IRIB.

The demonstrations began Sunday after merchants took to the streets to protest after a precipitous drop in the value of the rial, the country’s currency. International sanctions over Iran’s refusal to pare back its nuclear ambitions have led to widespread economic problems, including high inflation and a devaluation of its currency. The June war with Israel shattered its defenses and exposed its weaknesses.

Iranian shopkeepers and traders protested in Tehran on Monday. EPA/Shutterstock

The violence could spur the regime to crack down more firmly on protesters.

“The only strategy the regime knows is repression,” said Saeid Golkar, an associate professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and an Iran expert.

Enemies will exploit the situation, Pour Ali, the Lorestan deputy governor, said late Wednesday. “Rioting and destruction of public property have nothing to do with civil protests,” he said.

Iran’s food inflation reached 64.2% in October, according to the World Bank, the second highest level in the world after South Sudan. The rial has lost 60% of its value since the June war with Israel. Iran has failed to clinch a deal with the U.S. over its atomic program that could have helped alleviate some of the stress sanctions have placed on its economy.

The economic crisis has been accompanied with mounting repression. More than 1,870 people were executed in Iran in 2025, about twice as many as the prior year, according to data collected by the Washington-based Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, an advocacy group that documents human-rights violations in Iran. More than 490 people have been executed since Nov. 1, surpassing the total for all of 2021.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com

WSJ

7. Opinion | China Seeks Power, Not Only Trade

Summary:

Ram Charan argues China’s projected 2025 trade surplus, topping $1 trillion, reflects economic coercion, not normal commerce. He says Beijing builds massive excess capacity, subsidizes exports, and uses an undervalued currency to flood markets at marginal cost, wiping out competitors and creating strategic chokeholds, illustrated by threats to cut magnet supplies that would disrupt US defense, EVs, and other sectors. Charan urges treating this as strategic conflict and organizing a coalition with core allies to coordinate tariffs, export controls, and currency pressure. He recommends a Manhattan Project-like allied expert unit, sustained public messaging, rebuilding domestic capacity via a Department of Manufacturing across critical sectors, and quickly rationalizing tariff tools.

Comment: Fascinating assessment and recommendations. A Manhattan Project for economic warfare. Earlier this week I linked an article about the need for economic warfare strategists. This would seem to validate that recommendation.

Opinion | China Seeks Power, Not Only Trade

WSJ · China Seeks Power, Not Only Trade

To wipe out competition, it builds excess capacity, then floods the market with subsidized exports.

Ram Charan

Jan. 1, 2026 1:32 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/china-seeks-power-not-only-trade-f436a958

Tangshan Port in Tangshan, China, Dec. 15. Liu Mancang/Zuma Press

China’s trade surplus with the rest of the world will top $1 trillion for 2025. That isn’t merely a matter of selling goods to willing buyers. It is economic conquest on a scale the world has never seen. It has happened—and will continue to happen—because the Chinese have the power to crush any industry anywhere in the world.

Example: In October Beijing threatened to cut off magnet supplies to the U.S. Within days, American industries from defense to electric vehicles faced paralysis, and the chokehold affected several other critical sectors: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, chemicals.

China’s power—which Xi Jinping can exercise at will—consists of 90% excess production capacity. That means it can identify a key industry, build the capacity to produce 90% of global demand, and then flood markets with subsidized exports, priced at marginal cost, backed by a 20% undervalued currency. That quickly wipes out competition.

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President Trump needs to treat this less like a trade dispute and more like a war. Fighting back requires America to organize its allies the way Franklin D. Roosevelt built a winning coalition in World War II. Here are five steps he should take:

First, stop fighting alone. America and its core allies—Europe, Japan, South Korea, Israel and the United Kingdom—represent roughly $60 trillion in combined gross domestic product. China plus Russia, Iran, North Korea and others in its orbit total approximately $25 trillion.

Mr. Trump has been pressuring allies individually—tariffs on Europe and other allies, friction with Japan and South Korea. The partners we need are rattled. Mr. Xi is watching this and smiling. He knows if these countries ever coordinate on issues like tariffs, export controls and currency pressure, his industrial machine will break down.

Second, create an expert unit with allied representation—a working group that operates like the Manhattan Project, led by a globally recognized CEO with China experience, staffed by executives who have built businesses at scale and understand what Beijing is doing. Include game theorists who think four moves ahead, chemical engineers who understand how to apply reverse chokeholds on China, and operators who can execute at speed.

Third, accept that this is a long fight. It will last years, possibly decades. Mr. Trump must bring America along: the press, the public, business leaders. Make the case daily using authentic data, not spin.

Fourth, ask Congress to create a Department of Manufacturing. Rebuild capacity in 10 critical industries where China seeks dominance: bio-pharma, artificial intelligence, aerospace, high-tech ships, robotics, advanced rail, electric vehicles, power equipment, advanced agriculture and new materials. Self-sufficiency isn’t isolation. It is survival.

Fifth, clean up the tariffs within 90 days. If the Supreme Court strikes them down, use reciprocal duties by commodity. Negotiate with allies. Get it done fast. Show coordination, not chaos.

In any two-player game, each side tests what the other can’t tolerate. China has shown its weapon: the ability to attack our economy at will. We need a counterforce that creates a threshold of pain Beijing can’t bear.

America and its allies control inputs that China’s factories can’t produce: ultra-pure chemicals for semiconductors, specialty catalysts for refineries, precision equipment for rare-earth processing, agricultural protein that China imports by the tens of millions of tons. These are small-dollar imports on which tens of billions of Chinese industrial output depend.

This leverage has never been used because we haven’t coordinated. When America and its allies deploy export controls together, the Chinese have no good answer. Their processing operations degrade. Their industrial machine stalls. That is the threshold of pain that will bring Beijing to the table for good-faith negotiation.

Mr. Charan is an adviser to CEOs and boards and author of “China’s 90% Model,” forthcoming in February. His clients have included Chinese companies.

Journal Editorial Report: Tariffs and the Fed dominated the markets.

Appeared in the January 2, 2026, print edition as 'China Seeks Power, Not Only Trade'.

WSJ · China Seeks Power, Not Only Trade

8. Venezuelan Exiles Root for U.S. Military Action. Those Left Behind Oppose It.

Summary:

Ryan Dubé reports a sharp split between Venezuelans abroad and those still inside the country over US military action against Nicolás Maduro. Polling cited shows about 64% of Venezuelans living abroad support US intervention to depose Maduro, versus 34% inside Venezuela, where daily survival and fear of chaos drive opposition. Exiles, many facing hardship and backlash across Latin America, see US force as the only realistic path to democratic restoration and a chance to return home. Those remaining worry an oil blockade or strikes would deepen economic pain and instability, and they would bear the immediate consequences. The diaspora’s growing political influence in Washington and Miami is pushing harder-line strategies.

Comment: Of course, where you stand depends on where you sit. And it is easy to call for revolution or invasion if you sit in the US. How many of those in the US are willing to ruck up, don a chute, and jump back into or land on the beaches of Venezuela to free their homeland? (Probably more than we know though I would hate to read about another Bay of Pigs).

Venezuelan Exiles Root for U.S. Military Action. Those Left Behind Oppose It.

WSJ

Millions who fled Nicolás Maduro’s repressive rule see U.S.-led military action as the only hope for a return to democracy

By Ryan Dubé

Jan. 1, 2026 10:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/venezuelan-exiles-root-for-u-s-military-action-those-left-behind-oppose-it-01d3afe0

Venezuelan opposition supporters rallying in Santiago, Chile, in 2024. Protests were held worldwide after a disputed presidential election in Venezuela that year. Ivan Alvarado/Reuters

LIMA, Peru—The millions of Venezuelans who have fled the rule of Nicolás Maduro stand largely in solidarity with compatriots who stayed behind—except on the question of U.S. military intervention to change the regime.

Most of the eight million Venezuelans living in exile see American military action as the best shot to bring back democracy in a country they fear they may otherwise never see again, polls show.

And many say regime change would persuade them to return home after years in foreign countries, mostly in South America, where they have taken low-level jobs and increasingly face anger from local populations from Chile to Colombia. They have watched with anticipation as the U.S. moved military assets to the Caribbean, conducted deadly airstrikes on boats allegedly tied to the regime and blocked some oil exports.

Yamileth Chávez, now in Lima, Peru, said she sees enforced regime change as Venezuela’s only hope. Yamileth Chávez

“It’s my greatest hope,” said Yamileth Chávez, who in 2018 fled Venezuela’s oil-rich state of Zulia, where she owned a pet store, to Peru’s capital, Lima, where she drives an Uber. “The regime won’t leave by playing nice.”

President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio haven’t said the military buildup’s goal is to oust Maduro, and have all but ruled out an invasion to topple him. But senior administration officials like White House chief of staff Susie Wiles, in a candid interview with Vanity Fair, have said regime change is the desired outcome, and Trump has said Maduro’s days are numbered.

About 64% of Venezuelans living abroad support a U.S. military intervention to depose Maduro, compared with 34% in the country, according to a recent AtlasIntel poll. Some 55% of Venezuelan migrants believe a U.S.-led military intervention is the most viable path to restoring democracy, compared with 25% for those in Venezuela, the poll showed.

“We’ve dreamed of this and needed this for so many years,” said Orleans Tovar, who arrived in Peru nearly eight years ago with a dozen family members.

While people living in Venezuela also want Maduro gone, they are more focused on surviving rapidly increasing food prices than a Trump administration military buildup and threats of land strikes, heightened after Trump’s recent disclosure of a U.S. strike on a dock in Venezuela.

Orleans Tovar, now living in Peru, has for years dreamed of regime change to restore Venezuelan democracy. Orleans Tovar

Freddy Márquez, a lawyer in Caracas, said his family managed rising food prices over Christmas. But he worries the oil blockade will hammer what’s left of Venezuela’s economy and fears U.S. intervention.

“It would be catastrophic,” he said. “Things are calm, but you can feel the tension.”

Carlos Romero, a retired political-science professor and consultant in Caracas, said people inside Venezuela have had “a sort of delayed reaction to the situation and actions of the Trump government. People are focused on the day-to-day.”

Venezuelans are fearful of speaking out in a country where the state tortures dissenters. They are also more apprehensive about the possible messy aftermath of U.S. military strikes, since they would deal with the consequences.

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And they recall how previous attempts to oust Maduro failed, including Trump’s so-called maximum-pressure campaign in 2019.

“The diaspora is more willing to roll the dice and hope for the best than those who live in Venezuela and have more on the line,” said Michael Shifter, a scholar on Latin America at the Inter-American Dialogue policy group.

Exiled communities—most notably the Cubans who fled Fidel Castro’s communist island 67 years ago—often back tougher strategies to bring about political change back home. Their activism lobbying the U.S. government to heighten pressure on the countries they fled can influence foreign policy in the host nation.

After a decade of economic calamity and repression, Venezuela’s most consequential political constituency may now be among the millions who left, whose leaders in Washington and Miami have articulated strategies for regime change.

The country’s leading opposition activist, the Nobel Peace laureate Maria Corina Machado, has mostly worked against Maduro inside the country. But she leads a large group of exiled activists, many of whom meet with senior American diplomats, Treasury officials and conservative South Florida lawmakers to advocate for a harder line on Maduro. They have also pitched an economic-recovery strategy to show they can run the country with minimal upheaval the day after Maduro is overthrown.

Venezuelan migrants seeking to leave Chile in early December amid anti-immigrant rhetoric from the incoming president but were blocked from entering Peru. Alexander Infante/Reuters

Venezuelans abroad have struggled, leaving parents and small children behind as they spread out across the globe. Some fled to the U.S. after trekking through treacherous jungles only to now face the risk of deportation by the Trump administration.

In Latin America, where nearly seven million of the more than eight million who have fled Venezuela reside, they have faced a backlash from some politicians who blame them for violent crime—though many are victims of criminal gangs that joined the exodus. Chile’s incoming president, José Antonio Kast, has even vowed to deport illegal migrants, largely from Venezuela.

“You’ll leave with only the clothes on your back,” he said.

Many of the exiled Venezuelans survive as street vendors, delivery drivers and maids. They live in democracies and don’t face the risk of imprisonment for speaking out. And so many of them are calling for swift measures—an invasion or airstrikes if need be—so they can return home to a democracy.

“We’d go back and give what’s left of our life so that future generations can have a decent country, a country that we once had with democracy,” said César Pastrán, 63, a former university professor in Venezuela who now works in a call center in Chile.

César Pastrán, now in Chile, would like to return to Venezuela to help rebuild democracy. CÉSAR PASTRÁN

Maduro says he isn’t going anywhere and sees Trump’s military threats as a bluff. Maduro believes the only way the U.S. can remove him is by sending in troops, which analysts say is improbable.

Katherine Fuentes, a 33-year-old Venezuelan in Bogotá, Colombia, would support a U.S. invasion to remove Maduro from power.

“If we want to see a better country for our children in the future, unfortunately I think it has to happen,” said Fuentes, a mother of two who was driven from Venezuela in 2017 because of hunger. “I’d be really happy if Maduro falls.”

Katherine Fuentes in Bogotá, Colombia, would support a U.S. invasion to oust the regime. Katherine Fuentes

Milena Carreño, a 44-year-old in Lima, dreams of reuniting with her mom back in Venezuela, whom she hasn’t seen since she left nearly nine years ago. Her brothers and sisters, who also emigrated, now live in Spain, Brazil and Chile.

But she is skeptical that Maduro is going anywhere.

“I’d like to think that this time is different…but I doubt it,” she said. “The Venezuelan government always comes out on top, which is so frustrating.”

Write to Ryan Dubé at ryan.dube@wsj.com

The U.S. is dedicating serious firepower to taking out alleged drug boats around South America. Here’s how the AC-130J Ghostrider gunship and MQ-9 Reaper drone work.

WSJ

9. Six Storylines to Watch in 2026

Summary:

WSJ’s Damian Paletta flags six durable 2026 political storylines ahead of the November 3 midterms: the economy as the decisive voter driver amid solid growth but labor-market uncertainty; a rare mid-decade redistricting push that could tip House control; renewed fights over voting rules as POTUS presses to curb mail and early voting; Democrats’ leadership and message vacuum, with “affordability” and a potential Minnesota Medicaid scandal looming; GOP infighting as the party balances the Trump era with a post Trump succession struggle; and a calendar of unifying national moments, including the Winter Olympics, a possible Artemis II mission, the US hosted FIFA World Cup, and the July 4 semiquincentennial celebrations.

Comment: Post on our work political dashboard to observe for these over the next year. Although political they will eventually have long term national security implications.

Six Storylines to Watch in 2026

WSJ

Plus, Trump speaks to the WSJ about his health, Venezuelan expatriates back U.S. military action and five challenges facing Zohran Mamdani

By Damian Paletta

Jan. 2, 2026 6:56 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/six-storylines-to-watch-in-2026-6ec9cbb1

Jim Lo Scalzo/EPA/Shutterstock

Good morning. The midterm elections are 44 Tuesdays from today (think about all the TACOs between now and Nov. 3!) There will undoubtedly be a number of plot twists through the year that we don’t see coming. But here are storylines that are likely to endure:

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WSJ Politics

Politics. Power. People. Washington Coverage Chief Damian Paletta brings you an expert guide to what’s driving D.C. every day.

Economy: Both Republicans and Democrats agree that the economy will motivate voters this year. The economy grew at a brisk pace in the third quarter, and the White House sees a big boost coming as benefits from the 2025 tax law kick in. But will the wobbly labor market find its footing or stumble?
Redistricting: A number of states are working on a rare, mid-decade redistricting push. If the midterms are close, this could determine who controls the House in 2027 and beyond.
Voting rules: President Trump has long pushed to block mail-in voting and restrict early voting. As the midterms approach, where do the voting rules change?
Democrats: They don’t technically have a leader or even really a unifying message at the moment. How many times can they say “affordability” in 2026 and expect magic results? Does the Minnesota Medicaid scandal widen?
Republicans: There is an unusual amount of GOP infighting at the moment, prompting Vice President JD Vance to call for unity. The party is both in the midst of the Trump era and eyeing the post-Trump era. Can both eras occur at once?
Red, white and blue: This year will contain a number of big, patriotic moments for the country that might end up bringing a deeply divided nation a bit closer together. The Winter Olympics begin in February. The Artemis II could launch this spring, the first NASA mission with astronauts to go near the moon since 1972. The FIFA World Cup begins in June and many of the games will be played in the U.S. The country’s 250th birthday will be celebrated all across the country on July 4.

This is an edition of the Politics newsletter, bringing you an expert guide to what’s driving D.C. every day. If you’re not subscribed, sign up here.

People and Policies I’m Watching

Trump’s Friday: President Trump is scheduled to receive his intelligence briefing at 5:30 p.m. ET. At 6:30 p.m., Trump is scheduled to meet with David Perdue, the U.S. ambassador to China.

A new year for the markets: After the New Year’s Day holiday, markets will be open today for their first session of 2026.

What I’m Following

Alex Wong/Getty Images

Trump’s health. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, President Trump—the oldest man to assume the office—said he has eschewed some advice from his doctors and regrets getting advanced imaging.

Trump warns Iran against shooting protesters. President Trump threatened to intervene as Tehran’s hard-liners promise a harsher crackdown if demonstrations spiral out of control. It wasn’t clear what action the U.S. might take.

Venezuelan exiles root for U.S. military action. The Trump administration’s increased pressure on Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro is raising hopes for regime change in Venezuela’s diaspora, most of whom live in South American countries from Colombia to Peru and Chile. Some polls show greater support among the diaspora—which numbers some 8 million migrants—for stronger U.S. actions to oust Maduro than people living inside the country.

The White House upends prosecution of white-collar crime. White-collar law enforcement all but died in the first year of Trump’s second term. From undoing Biden-era prosecutions to abandoning the pursuit of bribery, crypto and public corruption cases, we’ll walk through all the ways this is so.

What Else Is Happening

The five challenges Zohran Mamdani faces as New York City mayor.
Chief Justice John Roberts hails judicial independence in his annual report.
The next class of senators won’t be able to dodge the Social Security crunch.
The U.S. has stepped back from imposing trade-killing duties on Italian pasta makers.

What I’m Reading

We went to the day cares Nick Shirley visited. Here’s what we found. (Minnesota Star Tribune)
Clyburn, 85, considers what’s next as colleagues retire. (Charleston Post and Courier)
Trump touts economy, auctions painting at Mar-a-Lago New Year’s Eve gala. (Palm Beach Post)

This Week in Washington History

On this day in 1980, President Jimmy Carter asked Congress not to ratify SALT II, a treaty designed to reduce the number of nuclear warheads held by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, after Moscow invaded Afghanistan. Washington also recalled its ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in protest at the invasion.

About Me

I’m Damian Paletta, The Wall Street Journal’s Washington coverage chief. I’ve covered Washington for 22 years as a reporter and editor. I’ve covered the White House, Congress, national security, the federal budget, economics and multiple market meltdowns.

WSJ Politics brings you an expert guide to what’s driving D.C., every weekday morning. Send your feedback to politics@wsj.com (if you’re reading this in your inbox, you can just hit reply). This edition was curated and edited in collaboration with Alistair Dawber, Joe Erwin and Yolanda McBride. Got a tip for us? Here’s how to submit.

WSJ

10. Why U.S. Military Combatant Commands Aren’t the Issue—The Military Services Are

Summary:

Robert Farley argues that proposed reforms to combatant commands miss the deeper problem. The military services still control procurement, training, and doctrine, and those bureaucratic seams slow adaptation as warfare changes. He notes the United States has restructured before, citing the creation of the Air Force and, more recently, the Space Force, and he points to redundancy debates such as “multiple air forces” and overlapping roles. Farley uses drone-centric fighting in Ukraine as evidence that modern combat is reshaping institutions, including in Russia and Ukraine. He concludes the United States should seriously examine whether today’s service structure is optimized for tomorrow’s war.

Comment: Dr. Farley is taking on a huge rice bowl? What do you do without services? And those arguments about redundancies in aircraft (or watercraft) could lead to the (unserious) argument that all we need is the Army because it has more aircraft and watercraft than the other services (note I use aircraft and not airpower and watercraft and not war ships).

Why U.S. Military Combatant Commands Aren’t the Issue—The Military Services Are

19fortyfive.com · Robert Farley · January 1, 2026

Synopsis: Pete Hegseth has floated reorganizing combatant commands—but the larger, harder reform would be reshaping the military services themselves.

-The services still dominate procurement, training, and doctrine, and bureaucratic divides can slow adaptation even as modern war changes fast.

A U.S. Army M1 Abrams, assigned to 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, fully emerges from the tank firing point to engage the simulated enemy at Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria, March 5, 2025. 1st Armored Division, a rotational force supporting V Corps, conducts training with engineers and tank operators in the European Theatre to maintain readiness and instill fundamental Soldier skills that are vital in maintaining lethality. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Kyle Kimble)

-The creation of the Air Force and Space Force shows the U.S. can remake institutions when strategy demands it; critics now argue redundancy has grown, with “multiple air forces” and overlapping roles.

-Meanwhile, drone-centric fighting in Ukraine is driving institutional change in Russia and Ukraine.

-The op-ed argues the U.S. should at least consider whether today’s service structure is optimized for tomorrow’s warfare.

Hegseth’s Pentagon Reorg Has a Message: The Services Are the Real Target

Earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth floated the idea of a significant reorganization of the Pentagon’s combatant command system. The overhaul would substantially revise the system established in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was itself a major revision of the 1947 National Security Act.

While details remain vague, there is no indication Hegseth or President Donald Trump have abandoned these ambitions—although they have also done little to engage Congress or the rest of the national security bureaucracy.

But combatant commands are small fry. If U.S. leaders want to reorganize the combatant command system, why not take on a much bigger target?

Why not contemplate reorganizing the military services?

X-37B. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Services Reorganization for the U.S. Military?

The services still drive procurement, and procurement is the biggest problem facing the Pentagon right now. Training and doctrine are similarly in the hands of the services, and while significant steps have been made to integrate these processes across the services, bureaucratic divides leave gaps in communication and planning.

Weighed against the costs of bureaucratic division is what the services provide: long-term continuity of culture, planning, and tradition that structures the U.S. defense enterprise and provides a foundation for the future.

The idea of a major revision of the services is not new. The story of the founding of the U.S. Air Force is well known, but the birth of the U.S. Space Force is a far lesser-known story, despite its recency. Yet the Space Force significantly modified how the Department of Defense does business.

In 2014, this author proposed abolishing the U.S. Air Force and folding its assets into the Army and Navy.

A recent op-ed by Harrison Kass suggested doing the same thing to the U.S. Marine Corps. Both arguments rested in large part on redundancy: Why does the United States need four air forces and two armies?

And why does the U.S. Space Force require its own special warfare capabilities? Such questions may have answers, but the people associated with the organizations should provide them.

Developments in modern combat suggest reform may be necessary sooner rather than later. Learning from contemporary wars can be dangerous.

But over the past two years, the character of combat has changed in dramatic ways. Drones now account for most casualties on both sides of the fight in Ukraine, and the omnipresence of drones has changed the ways in which infantry, armor, artillery, and aircraft interact.

Operational changes have already produced institutional change in both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. Russia, for example, has begun a reorganization of its armed forces to manage drone warfare—a step Ukraine took a year earlier.

US Navy Littoral Combat Ship. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

It is premature to argue the U.S. armed forces are unprepared for the kind of warfare seen in Ukraine, and they are trying to learn lessons about the integration of tactics and technology at the front.

Further, the U.S. concept of operations largely focuses on avoiding the kind of war that Russia and Ukraine are now fighting. Still, it’s worth wondering whether the uniformed military services as constituted are up to the challenge of adapting to new realities and preserving longstanding advantages in conventional warfare.

It is never wrong to question the institutions that protect U.S. security and further U.S. interests. If it was in the interest of the United States to create new military services in 1947 and 2019, it may be in its interest to unmake one today.

Unsurprisingly, Hegseth has taken the easy path in pursuit of surface-level reform.

A deeper approach requires both a revolutionary mindset and the capacity to engage in serious negotiations with Congress, the services, and the Pentagon’s civilian bureaucracy.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley, University of Kentucky

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · Robert Farley · January 1, 2026

11. Taiwan vows to defend sovereignty after China's military drill

Summary:

Taiwan President Lai Ching te said Taiwan will defend its sovereignty and strengthen national defense after China fired dozens of rockets toward the island during the “Justice Mission 2025” drills, the largest by area and closest yet, involving warships and aircraft. Lai warned 2026 is a crucial year and urged opposition lawmakers to approve a proposed $40 billion defense spending increase now stalled in parliament. He also offered cross strait engagement on an equal, dignified basis if Beijing respects Taiwan’s democratic way of life. China denounced Lai’s remarks and Xi reiterated that “reunification” cannot be stopped. The US urged Beijing to halt military pressure and pursue dialogue.

Comment: I am sure the use of "sovereignty" irritates Xi.

Taiwan vows to defend sovereignty after China's military drill

Reuters · Yimou Lee

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-vows-defend-sovereignty-after-chinas-military-drill-2026-01-01/

Summary
Taiwan president determined to boost defend sovereignty
Proposal to boost military spending stuck in parliament
China's Xi says 'reunification' cannot be stopped
U.S. urges China to halt military pressure against Taiwan

TAIPEI, Jan 1 (Reuters) - Taiwan President Lai Ching-te said on Thursday the island is determined to defend its sovereignty and boost its defence in the face of China's increasing expansion, after Beijing fired rockets towards the island as part of military drills.

The international community is watching to see whether the Taiwanese people possess the resolve to defend themselves, Lai said in a New Year's speech broadcast live from the presidential office in Taipei.

The U.S. State Department said later on Thursday that China's military activities near Taiwan and others in the region "increase tensions unnecessarily" and urged Beijing to halt military pressure against the democratically governed island.

"As president, my stance has always been clear: to resolutely defend national sovereignty and strengthen national defence," Lai said, noting China had targeted Taiwan's newly added combat capabilities as a "hypothetical adversary" in their drills this week.

He said that demonstrated the need for increasing defence procurement, urging opposition parties to support his plan to boost Taiwan's defence spending by $40 billion, a proposal currently stuck alongside other issues in a political deadlock in the opposition-controlled parliament.

"Whether China can achieve its goals on schedule is one thing," Lai said when asked about a U.S. report saying China was preparing to have the capability to win a fight for Taiwan by 2027.

"The coming year, 2026, will be a crucial one for Taiwan," he said, adding Taiwan must "make plans for the worst, but hope for the best."

"We are willing to engage in exchanges and cooperation with China on an equal and dignified basis, promoting a peaceful and shared environment across the strait," Lai said. "As long as China acknowledges the existence of the Republic of China, respects the Taiwanese people's desire for a democratic and free way of life."

China claims Taiwan as its own territory, and it has not ruled out using force to take it under Chinese control. Taiwan rejects China's claims.

Item 1 of 3 Explosive barrels placed by Taiwan military at the Tamsui river, as part of a series of emergency combat readiness drills, in response to China conducting "Justice Mission 2025" military drills around Taiwan, in Taipei, Taiwan, December 31, 2025. REUTERS/Ann Wang

[1/3]Explosive barrels placed by Taiwan military at the Tamsui river, as part of a series of emergency combat readiness drills, in response to China conducting "Justice Mission 2025" military drills around Taiwan, in Taipei, Taiwan, December 31, 2025. REUTERS/Ann Wang Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

CHINA FIRED DOZENS OF ROCKETS AS PART OF DRILLS

After Lai's address, China said he was trying to deceive Taiwanese and mislead international public opinion.

"Lai-Ching-te's address is riddled with lies and reckless assertions, hostility and malice," a spokesperson for China's Taiwan Affairs Office said in comments reported by state broadcaster CCTV.

Lai's speech came just two days after the Chinese exercises named "Justice Mission 2025". China fired dozens of rockets towards Taiwan and deploy a large number of warships and aircraft near island in a show of force that drew concern from Western allies including the European Commission and Britain.

Taipei condemned the drills as a threat to regional security and a blatant provocation. Beijing announced late on Wednesday that it had completed the drills, saying its military would continue to strengthen their combat-readiness.

China's President Xi Jinping struck a familiar tone on Taiwan in his New Year's address late on Wednesday, repeating last year's warning to what Beijing considers as separatist forces that China's "reunification" with Taiwan can not be stopped.

"We urge Beijing to exercise restraint, cease its military pressure against Taiwan, and instead engage in meaningful dialogue," U.S. State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said in a statement on Thursday.

The drills, China's largest by area and the closest yet to Taiwan, forced the island to cancel dozens of domestic commercial flights and dispatch military jets and warships to monitor the exercises.

The Chinese manoeuvres began 11 days after the United States had announced a record $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan. China's military said for the first time that the drills were aimed at deterring outside intervention.

Reporting by Yimou Lee, Writing by Liz Lee, additional reporting by Ted Hesson, Jasper Ward and Matt Spetalnick in Washington; Editing by Chris Reese, Neil Fullick and Nick Zieminski

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

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Yimou Lee

Thomson Reuters

Yimou Lee is a Senior Correspondent for Reuters covering everything from Taiwan, including sensitive Taiwan-China relations, China's military aggression and Taiwan's key role as a global semiconductor powerhouse. A three-time SOPA award winner, his reporting from Hong Kong, China, Myanmar and Taiwan over the past decade includes Myanmar's crackdown on Rohingya Muslims, Hong Kong protests and Taiwan's battle against China's multifront campaigns to absorb the island.

Reuters · Yimou Lee

12. China military drills near Taiwan 'unnecessarily' raise tensions: US

Summary:

The US State Department said China’s war games around Taiwan “unnecessarily” raised regional tensions and urged Beijing to show restraint, end military pressure, and pursue meaningful dialogue. The drills reportedly involved missiles plus dozens of aircraft, naval ships, and coastguard vessels simulating a blockade of Taiwan’s main ports, which Taipei condemned as highly provocative. China defended the exercises as legitimate and warned other countries to stop “stirring up trouble,” urging adherence to the one China principle. POTUS said he was not concerned about the live fire drills, citing his relationship with Xi. The show of force followed US approval of an $11 billion Taiwan arms package and continued a pattern of major exercises since 2022.

China military drills near Taiwan 'unnecessarily' raise tensions: US

China defended the drills as "legitimate" on Friday (Jan 2), and warned countries to "stop stirring up trouble on the Taiwan Strait issue".

02 Jan 2026 01:27PM

(Updated: 02 Jan 2026 01:35PM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-military-drills-taiwan-tensions-us-5780501

Video footage from China's People's Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command released on Dec 30, 2025, shows a Chinese rocket launcher firing rockets in an undisclosed location. (Image: Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation…see more

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WASHINGTON: Chinese war games around Taiwan "unnecessarily" spiked tensions in the region, the United States State Department said on Thursday (Jan 1), calling on Beijing to "cease its military pressure".

"China's military activities and rhetoric toward Taiwan and others in the region increase tensions unnecessarily. We urge Beijing to exercise restraint, cease its military pressure against Taiwan, and instead engage in meaningful dialogue," State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott said in a statement.

Beijing launched missiles and deployed dozens of fighter jets, navy ships and coastguard vessels on Monday and Tuesday to encircle Taiwan, saying the drills simulated a blockade of the self-ruled island's main ports.

Taipei condemned the exercises as "highly provocative".

China claims that Taiwan is part of its territory and has refused to rule out using force to annex it.

"The US supports peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, including by force or coercion," Pigott said.

China again defended the drills as "legitimate" on Friday, and warned countries to "stop stirring up trouble on the Taiwan Strait issue".

"We urge relevant countries and institutions to strictly abide by the one-China principle," a Chinese defence ministry spokesman said in a statement responding to calls for restraint, including from the US.

US President Donald Trump said Monday he was not concerned about China's live-fire drills, appearing to brush aside the possibility of counterpart Xi Jinping ordering an invasion.

"I have a great relationship with President Xi. And he hasn't told me anything about it," Trump told reporters when asked about the exercises.

"I don't believe he's going to be doing it," Trump said in apparent reference to an invasion.

Beijing's show of force came after the Trump administration approved a US$11 billion arms package for Taiwan.

The US has been committed for decades to ensuring Taiwan's self-defence, while staying ambiguous on whether the US military would intervene in an invasion.

China's latest exercises were the sixth major round of manoeuvres since 2022, when a visit to Taiwan by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi enraged Beijing.

13. Intel ON FIRE: How Ukraine’s spies reshaped war in 2025

Summary:

RBC-Ukraine’s Andrii Chernyak portrays Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) in 2025 as a full-spectrum strike, collection, and messaging enterprise that reshaped battlefield dynamics. He highlights long-range drone campaigns that allegedly cut Russian oil refining output by about 21%, paired with systematic suppression of Russian air defenses, including claimed strikes on S-300/S-400 networks and assets in occupied Crimea. The column details HUR active-operations units reinforcing hard fronts, audacious helicopter insertions, and joint actions that stabilized threatened sectors. It spotlights Magura sea drones, including missile engagements against aircraft, plus cyber, logistics disruption, POW work, and strategic communications. The theme is endurance through integrated intelligence-driven action.

Comment: Long read. Worthy of reflection to see what we can learn from Ukraine. Multiple videos at the link.

What are three letters that describe a "full-spectrum strike, collection, and messaging enterprise?" OSS. Just saying.

Intel ON FIRE: How Ukraine’s spies reshaped war in 2025

Ukraine, Tue, December 30, 2025 - 22:58

https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/opinion/intel-on-fire-how-ukraine-s-spies-reshaped-1767123014.html

Head of Defense Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov with intelligence officers (all photos provided by the MOD’s Defense Intelligence)

Author: Andrii Chernyak

Ukrainian military intelligence operations, combat activities, and achievements in 2025 – a column by Defense Intelligence representative Andrii Chernyak for RBC-Ukraine.

On the horizon, the afterglow was fading. The weary sun slowly plunged into the fiery lava of its own light, hiding behind the skeletal outlines of forest belts — just a little longer, and they would be completely swallowed by the violet of dusk. The time had come.

At one of the top-secret locations, several vehicles arrived simultaneously. Their headlights reflected a bluish silhouette — its propellers, wings, and landing gear. Shadows moved around as Defense Intelligence (HUR) special forces checked the readiness of long-range Bober and Liutyi drones, packed with explosives.

The engine roared — and the first one was off: it lifted from the ground, gained altitude above the treetops of bare trees, caught the last red clots of sunlight with its wings, and headed in the opposite direction. That night, Russia’s blood and iron of war would burn once again: oil refineries, defense industry facilities, air defense systems, and enemy aviation and naval assets.

The target coordinates were obtained by intelligence operatives. Enemy firepower on land, in the air, and at sea — capable of covering hundreds and thousands of kilometers — is in the arsenal of HUR fighters. Often, this cutting-edge weaponry is produced with the direct involvement of, or in close cooperation with, HUR’s own tech specialists.

An entire system of experts and machines within Ukraine’s military intelligence structure works to continuously gather new data and verify the results achieved by their brothers-in-arms — the masters of the martial arts of war in the 21st century.

And finally, the mechanisms for the timely public demonstration of Ukraine’s strength and resilience in the fourth year of the most brutal war in Europe since World War II.

Demonstrations — for ourselves, for the eternal enemy, for the entire world.

In 2025, the vast and complex mechanism of the HUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine functioned flawlessly and effectively — facts bear this out. Together with all of the state’s Security and Defense Forces, Ukrainian military intelligence operatives created true masterpieces of military art — operations that few in the world would dare to attempt, few would believe possible, and that armed forces across the globe now seek to learn from.

All these creations, these results of struggle, serve to protect our cities and villages from Russian barbarism, to drain as tangibly as possible the drunken vampires of Moscow and reduce their armada, and — through action — to instill confidence that tomorrow the sun will rise over Ukraine once again and the fight for our free life will continue.

'Sanctions' against Russian oil

In 2025, HUR special units became a key component of the long-range strike campaign carried out by Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces, aimed at sharply reducing the aggressor’s sources of revenue for waging war.

As a result of Ukraine’s so-called "sanctions" — the term used by the media to describe our long-range strikes — Russia’s oil refining output fell by nearly 21%.

"Do you understand what kind of losses this means? These are enormous sums of money. Russia’s economy is built precisely on this — oil, gas, and, so to speak, gold. That’s it. There is nothing else," said Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the HUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, describing Ukraine’s "sanctions" policy against the aggressor state’s oil refining sector in one of his interviews.

The gas transportation infrastructure of the aggressor state, Russia — like its oil transportation network — was affected by mysterious adverse geological phenomena that even metal pipelines could not withstand. This happened recently, for example, to the Central Asia–Center main gas pipeline in the Volgograd region; earlier, in July, to a section of a main gas pipeline in the city of Langepas in the Tyumen region; and in October, to all three lines of the Koltsevoy petroleum products pipeline in the Moscow region.

At peak moments, Russia even experienced fuel shortages. Resource scarcity caused by the war, along with other negative consequences for the economy and financial sector, is something the population of the aggressor state must feel — something Moscow and its occupying army must feel. And they do.

Thus, this is an important result — one that can and should be taken pride in, especially at a time when the impact of economic sanctions against Russia has fallen short of the expectations of the Ukrainian people, against whom Russia continues to wage a genocidal war.

Elusive Prymary (Ghosts) in Crimea

Successful strikes on the oil refining infrastructure of the aggressor state, Russia, as well as on its defense industry facilities, are the result of extensive and complex work.

For the process of weakening the aggressor to be effective, it is not enough to have precise data obtained through cyber capabilities, space-based, human, and OSINT intelligence. It is equally important that a capable long-range drone or missile can reach its target without obstruction.

Accordingly, the destruction of Russia’s air defense systems became a key vector of HUR combat operations.

In 2025 alone, just one military intelligence special unit — the Prymary (Ghosts) — destroyed or disabled Russian air defense assets worth billions of dollars.

The now-traditional systematic video reports released by the Prymary documenting their combat operations are a true source of pride for every Ukrainian, offering historic footage of strikes against Russian military facilities, including those located in temporarily occupied Crimea. High-value radar systems, launchers, and command posts of S‑300 and S‑400 air defense systems were set ablaze, along with Russian Pantsir, Buk, and Tor systems, as well as military vessels, helicopters, and aircraft.

For the first time in history, the Prymary tracked down and struck two Russian Be‑12 Chaika amphibious aircraft equipped with expensive systems designed for submarine detection and anti-submarine warfare.

Alongside the Prymary, other special units and components operate within Ukraine’s military intelligence, employing long‑range drones and missiles and striking the aggressor during combined attacks by Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces. Their results likewise undermine Moscow’s military potential.

The gaps created in the enemy’s defensive systems through Ukraine’s precision strikes make it possible to penetrate to strategic depth and achieve military objectives.

Land. Active operations

The difficult situation along the line of contact with the Russian occupation army left no alternative but to increase the size and strengthen the quality of training of the HUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine’s active operations units, to scale up the unmanned component, and to employ the force of military intelligence special operations troops in the most challenging sectors.

The Active Operations Department of Ukraine’s HUR, which unites special units such as Kraken, Artan, Shamanbat, the International Legion, and a number of other technological detachments, continuously showcased footage of the methodical destruction of Muscovites — their vehicles, weapons, military equipment, and drones — from various sectors of the front. This was carried out during close-range firefights, via FPV drone raids and heavy bomber drops, artillery strikes, and successful sabotage operations.

An important combat achievement was the joint, complex operation by the HUR special unit Artan and the Third Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Lyman direction. As a result of coordinated actions, including assault operations, it was possible to stabilize the situation along the designated sector of the front, improve positions, and destroy a regiment of Russian forces.

"Together with HUR, we achieved an operational-tactical result in the Lyman direction. This continues the tradition dating back to the liberation of Moshchun and the helicopter breakthrough to Mariupol —standing shoulder to shoulder with each other. I am grateful for the exemplary cooperation," said the commander of the Third Army Corps, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi.

The operation of the Tymur Special Unit in Pokrovsk also generated significant attention, involving HUR aviation. The landing of troops from Black Hawk helicopters, as part of a comprehensive mission to reinforce the city’s defense, was executed with such audacity that it sparked discussions among commentators about the advisability of taking such a risk.

However, war itself is inherently risky. HUR Chief Kyrylo Budanov reminded of this in a year-end interview for Suspilne and explained the significance of the operation near Pokrovsk — the situation was complicated, with Russian forces already reporting the alleged occupation of the city. A city very symbolic for Ukraine, where composer Mykola Leontovych once created his famous "Shchedryk" ("Carol of the Bells").

Nothing other than the use of helicopters could have ensured the rapid concentration of a significant number of forces at a precise point, to hold positions for the arrival of adjacent units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, repel the enemy, and disrupt active Russian infantry assaults. Thanks to the true heroism of the HUR pilots and special forces, combined with coordinated actions of the involved units, the pace of the Russian advance was halted.

Operations by HUR special units to neutralize enemy forces in the Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv regions —particularly along the Kupiansk direction — were also critical for stabilizing the situation and improving the tactical position of Ukrainian forces.

In the counterstrike to retake Kupiansk at the end of the year, planned and executed by the Khartiya National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) Corps and Armed Forces units, HUR special forces also participated. The success of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces in Kupiansk exposed yet another lie by Putin and his generals about the alleged capture of the city, and once again demonstrated that quality planning and technological solutions on the battlefield can outweigh brute force.

Such episodes of success are especially important against the backdrop of complex diplomacy, which intensified in the fourth year of the exhausting war.

The situation on the front remains tense and volatile, particularly in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. These areas require heightened attention — according to military intelligence assessments announced at the end of 2025 by the HUR chief, Donbas and Zaporizhzhia remain a priority in Russia’s conquest plans for 2026.

Kyrylo Budanov factor

Throughout 2025, HUR Chief Kyrylo Budanov continued to follow his personal principle — being alongside special forces fighters where it is most difficult, where the support and words of a general are critically important.

Budanov took to the Black Sea on patrol boats and joined HUR special forces carrying out missions on oil and gas platforms. He was present with the special forces during the operation in the Pokrovsk direction, and shortly before Christmas, he visited the positions of intelligence operatives in the Zaporizhzhia region.

The well-deserved combat awards that Budanov presented to soldiers for their professionalism and courage undoubtedly serve as motivation, but the very presence of a combat general in the sector is a factor that boosts morale and confidence.

A Hero of Ukraine, an outstanding combat general standing alongside troops in the so-called "kill zone," where Russian FPV drones reach — this remains etched in the memory of every soldier and officer who risk their lives daily, fight, build the combat glory of HUR, and write the history of Ukraine.

'From the shadow of the past to the light of victory'

In mid-2024, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the parliament) passed a law allowing citizens serving sentences in penitentiary facilities to take part in combat. Within HUR, as in other components of the Security and Defense Forces, units were formed that included former inmates.

Despite all the organizational challenges, the sensitivity of the issue, and its unique nature, the results of these units demonstrated their extremely high combat capability.

One such assault unit — Artan X, part of the HUR special unit Artan — held defensive positions for nearly the entire year along designated sectors of the front in the Zaporizhzhia direction, as well as in other parts of the line of contact.

The fighters of X captured Russian prisoners, destroyed enemy forces, and demonstrated the highest level of combat brotherhood — each soldier ready to risk their life to save a comrade.

In May 2025, on the Zaporizhzhia front, three fighters from the unit who infiltrated enemy positions for reconnaissance and sabotage purposes were captured by Russian forces, but were successfully rescued by their comrades through precise FPV drone strikes.

According to the commander of Artan X, callsign Favoryt, there were isolated cases of disciplinary issues among the personnel, but most of the men do not waste their "second chance" — everyone who proves themselves in combat enjoys the same privileges as other soldiers. They receive salaries, have leave time to spend with their families, and are able to dream and plan for the future.

The experience of Artan X and other HUR combat units, which include former convicts among their ranks, is a strong example of a policy that has strengthened Ukraine’s defense capabilities.

Magura. Evolution

Magura — the HUR combat surface drone operated by the specialists of Group 13 — has rightfully become a symbol of victory over Russia in the Black Sea.

In 2025, the world witnessed new historic achievements and the evolution of Magura drones — journalists, military experts, volunteers, and philanthropists were presented for the first time with the latest HUR surface drone modifications:

The ruthless killer of the Russian fleet — the V5 kamikaze drone, which sank a number of expensive enemy ships and vessels, effectively pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of occupied Crimea to Novorossiysk Bay;
The multifunctional W6P platform, equipped, among other things, with modules for machine guns and other systems, allowing effective patrolling of the Black Sea waters and, if necessary, performing evacuation missions;
The elegant hunter of Russian military aviation — the V7 model, armed with two air-to-air missiles.

On May 2, 2025, HUR special forces, for the first time in the history of warfare, destroyed two Russian Su-30 fighter jets with missiles launched from a Magura sea drone.

Exactly one year ago, on December 31, 2024, the specialists of Group 13 became the first in the world to destroy two enemy Mi-8 helicopters with missiles launched from a sea drone. Another helicopter was damaged.

"Today, aircraft no longer approach our boats directly — they understand that the risk of being shot down is too high. Sometimes they try to strike from a long distance, but in most cases, the missiles or bombs fail to reach the target. They simply run out and return to the airfield empty," described the combat results the commander of Group 13, callsign Trynadtsiatyi (Thirteen).

The unique success of Magura at sea and in the air over maritime areas, as well as the results achieved by other naval drones in service with Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces, are already being studied by NATO militaries.

In the autumn of 2025, Ukrainian naval drones carried out missions for the first time during the Alliance’s large-scale REPMUS military exercises held in Portugal. And in December 2025, Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro and President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy reached an agreement on the joint production of combat naval drones.

'Ophthalmology' by HUR

Special operations, whose involvement HUR neither officially confirms nor denies, and for which the Muscovites themselves blame Ukrainian military intelligence, also deserve a special place in military art textbooks.

In February 2025, there was a series of explosions of the FPV goggles used by Russian occupier units operating drones. Dozens of such incidents occurred.

The "ophthalmology" session for Russian drone operators was carried out by delivering pre-rigged FPV goggles to enemy units under the guise of volunteer, i.e., free, equipment.

The devices exploded the moment they were turned on, right on the heads of the Muscovites. After information about the FPV goggles operation surfaced, the media began drawing parallels with the famous Mossad mission involving booby-trapped pagers. In both cases, it’s a level of supreme skill and ingenuity that truly makes your eyes pop out of their sockets.

Combat units of the Russian army that use drones are actually a serious problem, as the aggressor has shown the ability to rapidly scale their unmanned capabilities. This involves the mass deployment of various types, both combat and reconnaissance drones.

One such enemy unit is the so-called Rubikon center. The stretches of the front where Rubikon forces are deployed become particularly difficult, which is why HUR special forces, together with other components of the Defense Forces, spare no resources in neutralizing the enemy — essentially conducting a real hunt for the operators.

One notable episode occurred in November 2025, when special forces from the Active Operations Department of Ukraine’s HUR identified a Russian Rubikon command post and deployed an FP-2 drone equipped with a warhead weighing over 105 kilograms — eliminating the officers and operators of the enemy unit.

Cutting the logistical lines of the Russian army, both on occupied Ukrainian territories and within the aggressor state itself, is a systematic effort carried out by HUR special forces as well as the resistance movement.

Explosions at enemy depots and bases, attacks on military trains, and strikes on the railway infrastructure used by the Russian occupying army slow down its operations and get under the skin of the Muscovite leaders.

Struggle must become everyone’s responsibility

The landmark operations and significant achievements mentioned above, which demonstrate the development of Ukraine’s HUR, of course, do not cover all areas of activity.

HUR continues to provide Ukraine’s military-political leadership with reliable and accurate information, on the basis of which critically important decisions are made. This is an unquestionable priority and the main task of the intelligence service.

HUR is involved in the negotiation process aimed at ending the war — "multilateral and complex," as characterized by Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov.

The coordination headquarters for POWs, headed by Kyrylo Budanov, continues the fight for the release of Ukrainian military personnel and civilians from Russian captivity.

HUR specialists, together with colleagues from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carry out complex evacuation missions — rescuing Ukrainian citizens who find themselves in danger during armed conflicts in various parts of the world.

HUR experts continue to conduct sophisticated operations in the cyberspace of the aggressor state — breaching systems, infiltrating networks, acquiring terabytes of critical data, and disabling the digital infrastructure of key Russian facilities.

The HUR team continues to maintain the open database on Russia’s sanctions evasion mechanisms, War&Sanctions: foreign components in the aggressor’s weapons, Russia’s shadow tanker fleet, drone and missile design, the structure of the aggressor’s military-industrial complex, and data on Russian kidnappers of Ukrainian children. These sections are constantly updated and serve as an important source of information for Ukrainian and international media, experts, and officials.

HUR’s strategic communications department implements a number of projects in the field of national information security and, through public communication, strengthens the status of the intelligence service — directly influencing trust in and the development of military intelligence.

HUR recruiters enhance the agency’s ranks with intelligent and courageous personnel, cooperating, in particular, with Ukraine’s leading universities.

All of this is important. But the most crucial factor, on which diplomacy, political processes, and the future depend, is armed struggle — the demonstration of intelligent and armed strength — the work carried out by HUR units on land, at sea, and in the air; on the front lines, in occupied territories, within the aggressor state of Russia, and everywhere in the world where Ukraine’s interests must be defended.

Ukrainians must not harbor illusions or hope for a miracle. It will not be easy. Only our resilience and readiness to endure, together, the long, exhausting, and complex path of struggle determine our reality and shape the contours of our future. Therefore, Lieutenant General Budanov’s assessment, expressed at the beginning of 2025, remains relevant for 2026, "For victory to come, it must become the responsibility of every person."

14. The Invisible Frontline: How encrypted networks and AI are rewiring Britain’s security

Summary:

Hamzeh Abu Nowar argues Britain is facing a new “digital insurgency” in which encrypted platforms and AI enable fast, decentralized mobilization that can fuel protests, crime, or extremism without formal leadership. He describes rapid Telegram-driven coordination that blends open and encrypted networks, compressing warning time and outpacing incident-driven policing. The Synnovis ransomware disruption illustrates how coordinated digital activity can turn technical attacks into public crises through speed and narrative pressure. Abu Nowar says UK institutions focus too much on content and ideology, not behavioral coordination patterns. He urges earlier pattern detection across platforms, mapping convergence zones, ethical defensive AI, and breaking silos between crime, extremism, and influence teams to preserve security without censorship.

Excerpt:

The next wave—driven by encrypted platforms and AI-assisted deception—will arrive faster and leave fewer traces for investigators to follow. Recognizing the behavioral logic of this new Digital Insurgency is the first step toward meeting it with the agility and accountability that democracy demands.

Comment: How do we deal effectively with "digital insurgency?" Are we ready for the "next wave?"

The Invisible Frontline: How encrypted networks and AI are rewiring Britain’s security

by Hamzeh Abu Nowar

01.02.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/02/the-invisible-frontline/

Encrypted networks and artificial intelligence are enabling new forms of decentralized mobilization. Britain’s institutions must learn to track behavior, not just words.

When a Telegram channel created only hours before a protest swelled from a few dozen members to thousands—sharing maps, live videos and minute-by-minute instructions—the unrest that followed looked less like a spontaneous gathering and more like an operation rehearsed in secret.

This kind of rapid escalation reflects a shift in mobilization logic, where encrypted platforms enable fast-forming coordination that prioritizes speed, anonymity, and adaptability over formal organization or leadership.

Incidents like this have become increasingly common across Britain’s towns and cities in 2025, reflecting a broader pattern of digital mobilization that is testing how the country anticipates and responds to disorder.

I call this pattern Digital Insurgency—a hybrid mode of mobilization that blends insurgent tradecraft, online anonymity and rapid coordination across encrypted platforms.

It is not an organization but a behavior: fast-forming, decentralized coordination that can serve any cause or crime. The same coordination logic is used by activists, criminals and extremists alike—decentralized organization, disciplined migration between platforms and rapid amplification.

This matters because it undermines the way Britain’s security institutions currently detect and respond to unrest. When coordination is fast-forming, decentralized, and encrypted, threat assessment based on ideologies, visible leadership, or organizations arrives too late. A more effective response requires shifting from incident-driven enforcement toward earlier recognition of behavioral coordination patterns—without expanding censorship or mass surveillance.

From Protest To Pattern

Recent unrest linked to online coordination shows how public networks and encrypted channels now feed each other, shrinking the time institutions have to verify or respond.

Information, instructions, and narratives move rapidly between open platforms and encrypted channels, allowing coordination to scale publicly while planning and adjustment remain concealed. This convergence leaves institutions with little time to validate intent or disrupt activity before events spill into the public domain.

The same behavior has been observed in digital crime. The 2024 ransomware attack on Synnovis, an NHS pathology provider, disrupted patient care and exposed data—turning a cyber intrusion into a public crisis.

What makes the Synnovis incident relevant is not the intrusion itself, but how coordinated digital activity amplified its impact—rapidly transforming a technical cyberattack into a public crisis. In doing so, it demonstrates how decentralized coordination can escalate localized events into broader systemic disruption.

Speed, coordination and narrative pressure now shape both activism and extortion.

While the actors and motivations vary—from cybercriminals to extremists and protest movements—the coordination methods increasingly overlap, blurring the boundaries between domains that policing and policy teams have traditionally treated as distinct.

For years, policing and policy teams treated terrorism, organized crime and influence operations as separate domains.

Digital technology has blurred those boundaries. Dark-web marketplaces borrow from insurgent logistics; extremist movements use smuggling-style networks; propaganda fuses politics and marketing. Profit and ideology now coexist in the same online ecosystems, making disruption less about motive than about method.

Together, these shared digital ecosystems create an enabling environment in which decentralized actors—regardless of motive—can adopt insurgent-style coordination, learn from one another’s methods, and operate below traditional thresholds of attribution and enforcement.

Britain’s Blind Spots

Two weaknesses leave the UK especially exposed.

These weaknesses are structural rather than episodic, reflecting how institutions are organized to respond to discrete incidents rather than to anticipate and analyze emerging patterns of coordination.

First, responses remain incident-driven. Arrests and flashpoints prompt action, but little effort goes into understanding the ecosystem that produces them. What looks like a one-off event is often a repeatable, platform-driven chain reaction.

Second, analysis still privileges content over behavior. Legislation such as the Online Safety Act has rightly pushed platforms to police illegal and harmful material. What remains underdeveloped is the capacity to analyze the behavioral coordination behind fast-moving mobilization—the patterns that precede incidents.

Tracking those signals offers earlier warning than content moderation alone.

AI as Accelerant and Defense

Artificial intelligence accelerates both sides of this contest. Generative tools create convincing personas, translate messages at scale and flood platforms with near-identical variations that slip past automated filters. Deepfakes and synthetic audio lower the cost of deception. Yet the same technology can strengthen defense.

The National Cyber Security Centre has publicly assessed how AI is reshaping the cyber threat and has issued guidance on building and defending AI systems. Those insights now need to reach policing and civic institutions faster. The contest is one of speed: attackers prototype in days; institutions often react in months.

If this gap persists, small and loosely connected actors will continue to outpace centralized institutions, exploiting delay to test tactics, refine coordination, and normalize disruption before countermeasures are in place. Over time, this dynamic rewards adaptive behavior and erodes deterrence, making rapid coordination—rather than scale or capability—the decisive advantage.

Emerging decentralized communication tools—some enhanced by AI for anonymity and automation—further complicate attribution and response. These hybrid actors operate in a gray zone: below the threshold of open conflict but beyond the reach of traditional enforcement.

How To Respond Without Becoming The Society We Fear

A democratic response must be smart, transparent and proportionate. Four priorities stand out:

Track behavior, not only speech. Invest in tools that measure coordination across platforms—when and how messages spread, not just what they say—shifting detection away from incident-driven response toward earlier recognition of emerging mobilization patterns.
Map convergence zones. Identify intersections where darknet markets, encrypted apps and public forums share data and logistics; these are breeding grounds for hybrid operations, addressing institutional blind spots created by siloed monitoring and fragmented jurisdiction.
Use AI defensively and ethically. Systems should be auditable and overseen by humans, flagging patterns for analysts rather than automating removals—countering both scale disadvantages and bias introduced by purely content-based enforcement.
Break institutional silos. Treat crime, extremism and influence operations as overlapping domains requiring joint analysis and lawful rapid response. The Prevent strategy, for instance, can evolve by pairing narrative monitoring with behavioral analytics—reducing delays caused by domain-specific mandates and slow coordination between agencies.

These steps are not about censorship or surveillance theatre. They’re about giving democratic institutions the situational awareness they need to see patterns before incidents spiral.

A healthy democracy must tolerate dissent; the goal is to prevent the weaponization of technology that turns grievance into orchestrated disorder.

Seeing The Next Wave

If Britain continues reacting incident by incident, it will remain on the back foot.

If it adopts a mindset of pattern recognition, it can close a dangerous blind spot and protect both public order and civil liberty.

The next wave—driven by encrypted platforms and AI-assisted deception—will arrive faster and leave fewer traces for investigators to follow. Recognizing the behavioral logic of this new Digital Insurgency is the first step toward meeting it with the agility and accountability that democracy demands.

Check out all the great things Small Wars Journal has to offer.

Tags: AI, behavioral surveillence, cyber security, decentralizaed mobilization, encrypted networks, network analysis, UK

About The Author

Hamzeh Abu Nowar
Hamzeh Abu Nowar is a Senior Analyst at HM Services and Consultancy, focusing on how emerging technologies are transforming security, intelligence and influence operations across the Middle East and North Africa.

15. The Demographic Decline of China

Summary:

Philip Huffman argues China’s long-term strategic advantage, its 1.4 billion population, is eroding as fertility collapses and the population begins a steep decline. He traces the problem to the 1979 one-child policy, which drove fertility down and produced lingering effects: high living costs, delayed marriage, rising divorce, widespread contraception and abortion, and a major gender imbalance. Beijing’s shift to two and then three-child limits, plus provincial subsidies, longer maternity leave, and expanded fertility care, has not reversed the trend. Huffman cites Europe’s failed pro-natalist experiments as a warning that incentives may not restore births. He contrasts this with US demographic resilience via sustained immigration, concluding China’s aging and shrinking workforce will constrain future power.

Excerpt:

What does this mean for the U.S. and China in the years to come? Looking at the year 2100, China will have lost much of its demographic advantage over the U.S. as the Chinese population will have decreased from 1.4 billion to 525 million. The U.S., in contrast, will have increased its population to 430 million, assuming continuing levels of immigration. In losing over 700 million people, China will experience demographic decline as it struggles to meet labor demands and is saddled with an increasingly aging population. There will be fewer Chinese workers, soldiers, leaders, doctors, teachers, and innovators to aid the economy and uphold the state. In contrast, the U.S. is much better positioned in the long run for economic growth as its population increases and thus labor and innovation increase. Of course, 600 million Chinese people still outnumber 430 million Americans, but America will not be stuck with the same problems that a declining China will have, and thus America is much better prepared to maintain its global position in the long term.

Comment: Does demographic decline cause defeat?

Essay| The Latest

The Demographic Decline of China

by Philip Huffman

01.02.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/02/the-demographic-decline-of-china/

A village bulletin in China detailing family planning policy.

Introduction

Over the past half century, China has experienced massive growth—from the world’s 10th largest economy in 1980 to the number two spot today. It boasts a massive and expanding military, advanced technology, and a wide range of natural resources. Perhaps though, the greatest Chinese asset is the Chinese people, 1.4 billion of them to be exact. While the U.S. is still ahead of China as the world’s economic power and its military continues to have an edge, its population of 340 million is dwarfed by the behemoth of the Chinese population of 1.4 billion. That’s at least 4 Chinese people for every American. China’s population has been key to its strength: the economic output of a Chinese citizen per year is $12,600, which is far below the U.S. average of $82,700, but since there are 1.4 billion Chinese people, the total economic output of the country is around $18 trillion and that’s much closer to the U.S. total which is at around $29 trillion. If China had America’s civilian to active military ratio (0.4%) then it would have an active military of 5.4 million—giving it the potential to overpower the U.S. active military which stands at 1.4 million. With such a large population, it’s no wonder that China has made incredible strides in AI and quantum computing with its incredible supply of human capital. The country is still seen as the world’s factory as it has an overabundance of cheap labor, and it remains one of the world’s largest markets. However, although China has benefited massively from its large population, its demographic future is in danger.

The One Child Policy

China’s size is a massive challenge to the U.S. right now, but in the long run China will eventually lose its massive demographic advantage. China’s population may be big, but it has a bigger problem: it is shrinking rapidly. By 2100, studies estimate that China’s population will shrink to around 525 million people, which is a decrease of over 50% from its current population. That’s an incredible loss of educators, workers, soldiers, and leaders. But why such a dramatic decline? The answer goes back to the one-child policy under Deng Xiaoping which started in 1979. The belief then (which is still held by some people now) was that the world’s resources could not support the massive increase in population and that there should be some method of population control. With China’s rapidly expanding population, there were fears of widespread famine and unrest; thus, the Chinese government enacted the one-child policy under which every family could only have one child. To enforce this policy, Chinese officials would fine families and deny benefits for 2nd or 3rd children. In some cases, there were forced abortions and sterilizations. Because Chinese couples were limited to one child, many chose to get rid of their first child if it was a girl or disabled since a healthy son would bring in more wealth and pass on the family name. Many of these babies were adopted by foreign families, with U.S. families adopting over 80,000 Chinese babies over the past 25 years.

The policy was effective, as fertility rates plummeted from 6.5 children born per woman in 1968 to 1.7 children born per woman in 2015. It worked a little too well, however, as the Chinese government began to worry about a decreasing population instead of overpopulation, leading the government to change the policy in 2015 to allow 2 children born per family and then raise that limit to 3 children per family in 2021. However, fertility rates did not increase, instead they continued to decline. China’s fertility rate today stands at 1 child born per woman. To demonstrate how devastating that number is, imagine you have 100 Chinese people who are all married. Now because half of those 100 are women that means that 50 women will have 50 children if they all have 1 child per woman. Again, only 25 of those 50 children will be women who will then each have only one child. Again, half of these 25 children will be women who will then give birth to 12-13 children. Thus, within 4 generations, the number of people per generation decreases from 100 to 13, decreasing by 87%.

Lingering Problems

Although the one-child policy is gone, the question as to why Chinese couples are not having kids with their newfound freedom persists. There are multiple reasons behind this: the legacy of the one-child policy, wide-spread access to abortion and contraception, late marriages, rising divorce rates, and a high cost of living. The gender imbalance caused by the one-child policy (there are about 25 million more men than women in China) also is a factor as there are less women to get married and have children. There is also a sense that the demographic problem is a vicious cycle. Since demographic decline will contribute to economic decline, more and more people will feel the pressure to avoid the expense of children, and thus indirectly cause greater economic decline, and thus further enforce demographic decline.

Can China stop the demographic decline? The data is shaky. There exist multiple provinces that have natalist policies (the national government has so far only encouraged and set guidelines for marriage and having children). In Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province, parents who have a 2nd child will receive a sum of 5,000 yuan ($693) and 20,000 yuan ($2,775) for a 3rd child. In Shenzhen, a city in Guangdong province, couples that have a 3rd child will receive 19,000 yuan ($2,636). In Jinan, the capital of Shandong province, the local government has promised a monthly subsidy of 600 yuan ($83) for a 2nd or 3rd child until the child turns 3. In Liaoning province, officials have offered nurseries subsidies of up to 365 yuan ($50) per child per month that they take in. There has also been an extension of maternity leave throughout the provinces beyond the mandated amount of 98 minimum, with most provinces now providing 158-180 days or 5-6 months of maternity leave. Furthermore, there has been an increase of fertility care in health insurance. In Beijing, there have been 16 new reproductive health clinics. The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region has started providing IVF and other fertility services as part of its provincial health care system and Gansu province is now reimbursing fertility treatments. The national government has also made it a point to encourage marriage and childbirth. In some municipalities, local officials call young married women on a regular basis to inquire when they intend to have children. Slogans from government media which used to be “one child is good” are now “have more children for the country”, “three children is just right”, and “childbearing is a family responsibility and social duty.”

The European Example

Despite this messaging and the expansion of pro-natalist policies, there has not been a significant increase in births. It may be too early to assume that these policies are a failure since the Chinese government dropped the One-Child policy only about 10 years ago. Would it be wrong to assume that eventually the childbirth subsidies will increase to such a level that will lead to a significant rise in births? How could one even think that these policies will not work? The answer is simple: look at Europe. European countries have several advantages over China in the scope of child rearing. There is no history of the one-child policy and there is a good work-life balance and extensive maternity and paternity paid leave. Europeans outrank China on the Human Development Index and on the Happiness Index. Europeans are healthier, happier, richer, and have a better standard of living than the Chinese. To have a child in Europe is far easier than in China—there is no anti-child culture and it is more affordable for the Europeans to have children. In Hungary, perhaps the most generous in terms of natalist policies, a woman under 40 can apply for an interest-free loan of €30,000, and repayment is forgiven once she has her 3rd child. Women who have 4 or more children are tax exempt. Larger families also have access to daycare and housing subsidies and grants to purchase 7-seater vehicles. For large families, France offers 400 per month, while Germany offers 250 euros per month per child. In Sweden, Norway, and Iceland, parental leave can exceed 400 days. Yet for all of these pro-natalist policies, Europe’s TFR (Total Fertility Rate) has continued to decline. Even in the case of Hungary, with its generous policies, it has experienced a decrease from a recent increase of 1.6 to 1.5.

The theory is that since Europeans, even with their higher quality of life, happiness, and economic opportunities, have not been significantly affected by their countries’ generous pro-natalist policies, then it should hold the same for China. Currently, the economic situation makes copying these European policies unsustainable in China. Local governments are already in trouble as they face billions in debt due to a collapsing housing market. To increase spending for natalist policies that fail to turn the birth rate around may be an unwise choice for local Chinese governments. The pressure to work, the shadow of the one-child policy, the bitterness at the government for its hypocrisy, and limited economic means and social mobility all make the natalists policies ineffective at turning the birth rate around. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the Chinese population will continue to decline, regardless of what the government does.

Implications for the U.S.

The next question is what does China’s demographic decline mean for the U.S.? If the global trend is declining population due to lower birth rates, then why would the U.S. not be in the same situation as China? Our TFR is 1.6, much higher than China’s 1, but still far below the replacement level of 2.1, thus meaning that by natural births and deaths, the U.S. population is in decline. In comparison to Europe and East Asia, it has few policies that one could call pro-natalist. There is no federal mandated parental leave in the U.S., no universal healthcare, and no nation-wide federally supported day-care system. Yet, there is little concern in the U.S. about falling birth rates since the population has been increasing due to immigration. In 2023, the U.S. foreign-born population reached a record 47.8 million people, which make up about 14.3% of the population. The U.S. is an attractive destination as it is seen as a land of upward social mobility, opportunity, wealth, tolerance, and freedom. Every year since the 1990s, the U.S. has let in over a million people every year. If immigration remains high and the TFR is stable, the U.S. population will reach 430 million by 2100, an increase of over 20%. Historically, immigration to the U.S. has been high and assimilation into American society has generally been successful. In general, by the 3rd generation of immigrants, English fluency is achieved completely while the foreign language of parents and grandparents is weak or unknown. Furthermore, by the 3rd generation, most children of immigrants identify more as American than their parents or grandparents. This has to do with the fact that American identity is defined not along ethnic lines, but along active participation in American society. Furthermore, the process to become a U.S. citizen is relatively straight-forward, and it takes at least 5 years to become a citizen. Lastly, anyone born on U.S. soil is assured citizenship, making all children of immigrants born in the U.S. automatic citizens, further integrating immigrant families into U.S. society.

Put this in contrast with China, where the number of foreign born is less than one million (excluding immigration from Taiwan, Macau, and Hong Kong). Even though China has experienced massive economic growth, it has brought in few immigrants. This is because there are strict rules affecting migration. The logic behind such rules is as simple as China’s status as an authoritarian state, and the fact that accepting large numbers of immigrants causes social and political change that threatens the CCP’s power. Furthermore, Chinese identity is not identified by participation in Chinese society, but rather by Chinese ethnicity. Chinese citizenship can only be obtained when one is a child of a Chinese citizen. It is almost impossible to become a naturalized citizen in China without Chinese ethnicity. Given China’s authoritarian nature and its lack of a naturalization process, it fails to attract long term immigrants who want to integrate into and contribute to Chinese society. It is unlikely that China will change its immigration and naturalization policies, as to do so would relinquish control of its citizenry and change the very definition of what it is to be Chinese.

Conclusion

To summarize, China’s birth rate has dropped dramatically over the past 40 years, mainly thanks to the one-child policy. Local Chinese governments have begun to offer a wide variety of child and family-oriented benefits and subsidies. However, these policies have had little to no effect and do not come close to reversing the population decline. An examination of even more generous European natalist policies that have also failed to raise the birthrate, suggests that if China improved its policies it would be to no avail. In contrast, the U.S. population is set to increase—not naturally, but through immigration. China, in comparison to the U.S., is not an attractive destination for migrants, given its authoritarian nature, lack of naturalization process, and a cultural understanding of Chinese identity firmly rooted in ethnicity.

What does this mean for the U.S. and China in the years to come? Looking at the year 2100, China will have lost much of its demographic advantage over the U.S. as the Chinese population will have decreased from 1.4 billion to 525 million. The U.S., in contrast, will have increased its population to 430 million, assuming continuing levels of immigration. In losing over 700 million people, China will experience demographic decline as it struggles to meet labor demands and is saddled with an increasingly aging population. There will be fewer Chinese workers, soldiers, leaders, doctors, teachers, and innovators to aid the economy and uphold the state. In contrast, the U.S. is much better positioned in the long run for economic growth as its population increases and thus labor and innovation increase. Of course, 600 million Chinese people still outnumber 430 million Americans, but America will not be stuck with the same problems that a declining China will have, and thus America is much better prepared to maintain its global position in the long term.

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Tags: China, Demographics, economics, Great Power Competition, Population Growth

About The Author

Philip Huffman
Philip Huffman is a junior undergraduate student at the University of Scranton, studying Political Science, History, and Foreign Languages. He has special interests in demography, East Asia, and diplomacy. He aims to attend graduate school and hopes to work on Capitol Hill.

16. The Waiting Game: Signposts of Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa

Summary:

The authors argue Russia’s surge as a security partner in Africa after the Sahel coups may be nearing “peak Russia.” They contend Moscow’s mercenary model, now branded as Africa Corps after Wagner’s 2023 upheaval, has failed to suppress insurgencies, fueled human rights abuses, and deepened grievances, leaving client regimes increasingly exposed as Western forces have withdrawn. Russia’s strategy is portrayed as regime protection in exchange for access to illicit markets and natural resources, with logistics vulnerable to Syrian basing and war costs in Ukraine. They propose three signposts of coming failure: rising anti-Russian or anti-junta protests and regime change; forced Russian drawdowns due to external pressure or resource constraints; and greater client openness to Western security cooperation tied to democracy and human rights.

Excerpt:

Whatever the proximate cause, the Wagner memorial statues will come down eventually, and with them, Russian influence across the continent. The United States and its allies must be patient, but must move quickly when the opportunity presents itself to cooperate with re-democratizing partners. Only once pro-Russian regimes die or show a willingness to reform should a containment strategy in the African Sahel shift to one of active engagement and partnership.

The Waiting Game: Signposts of Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa

by John J. Chin, by Haleigh Bartos, by Aleksaundra Handrinos

01.01.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/01/the-waiting-game-signposts-of-russias-coming-failure-in-africa/

Russia has expanded its footprint in Africa in recent years. In the wake of a wave of coups since 2020, Russia used social media disinformation to stoke anti-French sentiment and offer military aid to become the security partner of choice for a number of regimes, most notably the members of the new Sahel Alliance formed in 2023 by juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. By 2024, Russian mercenary forces had established a clear presence in six countries.

As 2025 draws to a close, it is easy to be pessimistic about the future of democracy, counter-terrorism, and Western influence in Africa. In July, French forces withdrew from Senegal, marking the end of France’s permanent military presence in West Africa. French forces had already been kicked out of Mali (August 2022), Burkina Faso (February 2023), Niger (December 2023), Chad (January 2025), and the Ivory Coast (February 2025). France’s new Command for Africa (CPA) only has a military base in Djibouti, and some forces in Gabon have left the continent. Likewise, European-manned UN peacekeepers in Mali left in December 2023, while U.S. forces were forced to withdraw from expensive and recently U.S.-constructed bases in Niger by September 2024.

However, we may already be nearing “peak Russia” in Africa. If it took over a decade for most of the Sahel region to reject Western — and especially French — security assistance amidst rising post-Arab Spring insurgencies, it may take much less time to expose the failure of Russia’s growing mercenary forces in Africa and the costs of relying on Russia as a security guarantor.

Not only have Russian forces proved unable to quell domestic instability in most places they operate, but they have also left a trail of human rights abuses and exacerbated local grievances in the process. Africa is now the global epicenter of jihadist terrorism, accounting for over half of all terrorist casualties globally. With most Western forces expelled, it will become harder over time to blame Western ‘neo-colonial’ failures – above all dependence and alleged exploitation by former Western colonizers – for tomorrow’s sorry state of security.

Russian clients in the region appear shaky. In Mali, an ongoing blockade is threatening stability and testing the staying power of the military junta. Moscow’s image as a credible alternative to Western partners has already suffered. Russia’s popularity in the region will likely continue to drop in coming years as it struggles to resource operations and effectively counter terrorism.

The real question is not whether but how quickly Russia’s weaknesses as a primary security partner will be exposed. With Russia’s economy under pressure and a costly stalemate in Ukraine continuing, how long can Russia’s Africa Corps sustain its efforts? To gain insight into these questions, we briefly survey Russia’s recent growing military footprint in Africa, and then offer policymakers signposts or indicators that Russian forces may be ripe to fail in Africa.

The Evolution of Russia’s Footprint in Africa

Russia’s security influence in Africa has waxed and waned over time. According to our calculations using the formal bilateral influence capacity (FBIC) dataset, the Soviet Union saw its security influence capacity increase mightily during the first three decades of the Cold War. It then declined sharply in the 1980s as Soviet forces were exhausted in Afghanistan and collapsed with the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. In the decades since, Russian security influence has partially rebounded (see Figure 1A). By 2024, Russia had the least economic influence capacity in Africa among major powers (see Figure 1). However, Russia and China had the most significant security influence capacity on the continent – a function of arms sales and military aid (FBIC data also underestimates Russian influence due to mercenary deployments).

Figure 1: Security vs. Economic Influence Capacity in Africa of Major Powers, 1960-2024

Russia’s unbalanced engagement in Africa reflects its state capture strategy, whereby regime protection services are offered in exchange for access to illicit markets and natural resources. Whereas China has made significant economic investments in Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s engagement is far more transparently extractive and is a source of revenue. For example, Russia’s exploitation of gold mines, particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), has helped Moscow weather Western sanctions and help fund its conflict in Ukraine.

The Wagner Group was first observed in eastern Ukraine in 2014, fighting alongside pro-Russian separatists, but its intervention in Africa was still a few years away. Wagner’s initial endeavors into Africa can be traced to the Central African Republic, Libya, and Sudan—conflicts that Moscow exploited to test its reach and capabilities on the continent, starting as early as 2017.

Over the next several years, the Wagner Group made a name for itself as it offered African countries security assistance and an alternative to Western partners (principally France and secondarily the U.S.). Eventually, the Wagner Group grew its clientele to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, countries fighting extremism that have rebuffed Western assistance in exchange for military support from the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps. Moscow is actively deepening relationships with Chad and Senegal and trying to court other regimes.

After years of denials, in 2023, Putin admitted Wagner forces had operated at Moscow’s behest. The Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s subsequent death triggered Wagner’s rebrand and partial replacement with Africa Corps, now supervised by Russian military intelligence, with 70-80% of staff being Wagner veterans. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria briefly imperiled Russia’s access to the base at Khmeimim in Latakia, which is a crucial refueling hub for Russian supply lines to its forces in Africa, as well as its naval base at Tartus. However, flights resumed last month, and Russia is negotiating to keep access to the two bases.

In 2025, the Russian Wagner Group, or the Africa Corps armed forces are deployed in the CAR, Libya, Sudan, the Sahel Alliance states, and Equatorial Guinea. At the same time, African citizens – motivated by higher pay and bonuses – are being recruited to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

Central African Republic

In the CAR, Russia provided an elite security service to keep the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadera afloat. Wagner forces waged a violent war that also killed civilians and non-combatants, but entrenched information operations convinced many Central Africans that Russia brought stability and peace. Last December, a bronze statue of now-deceased Yevgeny Prigozhin and his right-hand man, Dmitry Utkin, was unveiled in Bangui. In return, Moscow inserted itself into an illicit fuel supply chain in the CAR and earned practically exclusive rights to the gold mines. Russia was able to extract $2.5 billion from gold mines alone in 2022. This early success led to additional invitations from other actors seeking armed Russian muscle.

Libya

In Libya, the Wagner Group has supported Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The Wagner Group, among other ventures, provided intelligence, advised security forces, and helped Haftar build credibility throughout the country—in part, likely because Wagner is behind a massive media effort to glorify him. Earlier this year, Russia transferred military equipment to al-Khadim and Matan al-Sarra bases in Libya when access to its Syrian bases was in doubt. Yet continued Russian access is predicated on the continued power of Libya’s eastern warlord, and would be undermined by moves towards political and national reconciliation.

Sudan

In Sudan, Wagner had trained troops for both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since 2018. After civil war erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, the group initially backed the RSF, which had been instrumental in enabling access to gold mines for smuggling. However, in the spring of 2024, Wagner shifted its support to the SAF in exchange for weapons for the ability to establish a naval base on the geopolitically valuable Red Sea coast. The United States has accused Wagner of avoiding exclusive support and funding both warring groups. In November 2025, the Kremlin announced the suspension of its prior plan for a naval base in Port Sudan due to increasing domestic instability, according to the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service.

The Sahel Alliance Countries

Since 2020, Russia has continued to ride the populist anti-colonial sentiment that is being driven by “opportunistic illiberal regimes” in the Sahel. In particular, the post-coup regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have used Russian forces as a form of regime-proofing.

Mali. In 2019, Mali’s government signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia, which saw Bamako receive several attack helicopters and weapons as part of the deal, opening the door for Russia’s involvement in the Sahelian nation. Following a coup in 2020, the Wagner Group arrived in Mali at the new junta’s request. Since its arrival, Wagner has built up its presence near the airport in Bamako. By summer 2025, the Wagner Group announced its mission in Mali was coming to an end, as the first Africa Corps units arrived in January 2025 and assumed more responsibilities. Despite keeping the junta afloat, resentment within Mali’s military reportedly grows in part due to preferential treatment for Russian mercenaries. Popular unrest grows at the inability of the Africa Corps to reliably break a terrorist fuel blockade into Bamako in recent months.

Burkina Faso. After coming to power in a September 2022 coup, the new Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traoré’ forced French forces out and hailed Russia as a “strategic ally.” The former junta leader, Lt. Col. Paul Henri Sandaogo, had reportedly resisted recommendations to ally with Russia. The first Africa Corps personnel arrived in late 2023. Despite Africa Corps’ presence, terrorist violence has only escalated, with the country becoming the world’s worst-hit country according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. Some 60% of the country remains under the control of jihadists, whom some worry may be able to conquer Ouagadougou.

Niger. Following a coup in July 2023, members of Africa Corps deployed in Niger in December 2023, the same month that French forces departed the country. The following year, U.S. forces left Niger after extensive discussions with the junta, leaving behind its $110 million base. After Niger’s junta called for US troops to leave, Russian troops, in low numbers, were deployed in May 2024 to an airbase that previously saw American personnel. Niger now ranks fifth in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, just one spot behind Mali.

Equatorial Guinea

In November 2024, approximately 200 Africa Corps troops deployed to Equatorial Guinea to help defend the regime of long-time personalist strongman Teodoro Obiang. The first public demonstration of Russian military force in the country occurred on 9 May 2025 as part of Victory Day celebrations in Malabo, with over 40 Russian soldiers participating.

Three Signposts for Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa

How will we know when the tide has turned against Russia in Africa? These three signposts will be signals for Western democracies that they may have opportunities to re-engage and seek to restore security cooperation conditional on basic commitments to human rights and democracy.

Signpost 1: Anti-Russian/regime protest and regime change in client states.

Popular support for military rule in the Sahel alliance from Mali to Niger can only decline as these Russian-backed regimes fail to tame the insurgencies that are their raison d’être, continue to perpetrate human rights abuses (and endorse abuses by Russian forces), and refuse to hold elections or return to civilian rule. Despite democratic backsliding in the region, support for democracy continues to be robust across most of Africa. This is unlikely to change. Rising mobilization against repression in the Sahel of the kind seen in Latin America, protesting military abuses during the “dirty wars” in the late 1970s and 1980s, is the first sign of Russian trouble.

These earliest warning signs are already starting to appear. This past April, in the CAR, thousands protestedagainst Touadera’s plans to run for a third presidential term with Wagner backing. Pro-democracy protests broke in Mali this past May, even before the recent blockade has only revealed the growing fecklessness of the Russian-backed junta led by Assimi Goita. Russian-backed regimes may become new targets of Gen Z protests spreading on the continent.

Signpost 2: Russia is asked to draw down troops or is forced to give pressure outside Africa.

This would be a more concrete sign of imminent Russian failure, though whether it occurs voluntarily or is compelled (like the French before them) remains to be seen. The Russian economy may continue to cool in 2026. Given mounting losses in Ukraine and uncertainty over whether U.S.-brokered peace diplomacy will be successful, Russia may be forced to retrench some of its global commitments going forward. This is precisely what happened in the 1980s as Soviet economy faltered and resources were depleted in a stalemated war in Afghanistan; the Soviets were forced to reduce economic and military aid to clients from Angola to Ethiopia.

As the Russian forces’ ruthless image crumbles (as it has recently in Mali), tottering regimes may seek to bring in more Russian forces, not less. That escalatory cycle in the short run cannot and won’t last forever. As the imbalance of power between Moscow and its partners begins to level (at least to some degree), this raises the possibility that various countries, currently in the pocket of Moscow, will become more discriminating in their view of Russian support.

Signpost 3: Openness to Western terms of cooperation increases.

Western setbacks may be temporary, particularly outside the Sahel alliance. Though U.S. forces had to withdraw from Chad briefly in 2024, they returned last September. Some West African littoral countries remain open to cooperation with Western security partners. For example, Nigeria has recently announced that it will seek France’s, not Russia’s, counter-insurgency aid.

Whatever the proximate cause, the Wagner memorial statues will come down eventually, and with them, Russian influence across the continent. The United States and its allies must be patient, but must move quickly when the opportunity presents itself to cooperate with re-democratizing partners. Only once pro-Russian regimes die or show a willingness to reform should a containment strategy in the African Sahel shift to one of active engagement and partnership.

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Tags: Counter-terrorism, Geopolitics, Great Power Competition, Wagner Group

About The Authors

John J. Chin
John J. Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état, which was named one of the best historical materials published in 2022-2023 by the American Library Association.
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Haleigh Bartos
Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University.
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Aleksaundra Handrinos
Aleksaundra Handrinos is a student at Carnegie Mellon University, majoring in ethics, history, and public policy as well as international relations and political science.
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17. Seatbelts for Speeders: Why Beijing Ignores Washington’s Red Phone

Summary:

Carla Freeman and Allison McFarland argue U.S. efforts to build reliable crisis “hotlines” with China have produced agreements but little crisis utility, because Beijing often refuses calls or suspends military contacts when tensions spike. The article traces repeated failures in 1999 Belgrade, the 2001 EP-3 collision, Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit, and the 2023 balloon incident, with a few exceptions such as 2020 reassurance messaging. Parcover contends Beijing views hotlines as “seatbelts for speeders” that legitimize U.S. operations and constrain China’s ability to exploit crises for leverage and escalation control. She urges more modest goals: slow escalation by building resilient channels that survive crises, including low-profile standing talks, a nonpartisan NSC coordinator, strengthened Track-2 conduits, and possibly a text-based hotline with receipt acknowledgments.

Excerpt:

Some argue that only a Cuban Missile-style crisis could catalyze the kind of robust communications mechanisms that proved essential in reducing escalation risks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, as Washington and Beijing increasingly face off militarily across all domains, diplomatic contact grows more constrained and contrived, and the dangerous trope that conflict is inevitable takes hold. Waiting for a crisis to force cooperation is a gamble neither side can afford to take.

Seatbelts for Speeders: Why Beijing Ignores Washington’s Red Phone

warontherocks.com · January 2, 2026

Carla P. Freeman and Alison McFarland

January 2, 2026

https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/seatbelts-for-speeders-why-beijing-ignores-washingtons-red-phone/

In early November, after meeting China’s defense minister, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth performed a longstanding ritual in military relations between the United States and China: He announced that the two countries would “set up military-to-military channels to deconflict and de-escalate” problems between them. Like most rituals, this one is unlikely to have any practical effect. The pursuit of effective crisis communications channels between the American and Chinese militaries to mitigate the risk of crisis escalation has been a work in progress since President Bill Clinton was in office. Progress, however, has been halting and largely unproductive. Washington and Beijing, it is true, have managed to negotiate multiple agreements on crisis communications mechanisms, but when actual crises erupt, Beijing rarely uses these links.

Nevertheless, Washington persists in pursuing these connections — and for good reason. When, in 1950, Washington did not ask Beijing if it should take seriously indirect warnings that China would intervene in the Korean conflict if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel, the results were calamitous. In contrast, during America’s Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union, institutionalized crisis communications channels were critical to escalation prevention. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington and Moscow set up a crisis “hot line” that the two nuclear-armed powers went on to use dozens of times as they worked to ensure that their war remained a cold one. In 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger described the direct communications link between the United States and Soviet Union as “invaluable in major crises.” The success of this tool inspired the creation of bilateral hotlines between other nuclear powers and crisis-prone countries.

Fifteen years later, in April 1998, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan announced the establishment of the first link for crisis communications between Washington and Beijing in the form of “a secure presidential phone-link … [that] will help our leaders to communicate rapidly, directly and candidly whenever the need should arise.” This followed the signing of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement in January of the same year. In the early 2000s, U.S. defense officials proposed to the Chinese military that the two sides establish a hotline for crisis management and confidence building. In February 2008, the two sides reached an agreement to set up such a quick communication link in the form of a defense telephone link. The two countries expanded the defense telephone link in 2015 to include video teleconference communications. They also identified this link as a mechanism for conveying information under a 2014 bilateral understanding to notify each other of “major military activities.” In 2016, Beijing and Washington instituted a hotline on cybercrime and related issues.

Yet, when bilateral tensions between Washington and Beijing have spiked to risky levels, these carefully negotiated mechanisms have generally failed to function as the United States has anticipated. Experience with the U.S-Soviet hotline may have led U.S. officials to expect that messages sent by one side through a hotline would be seen as urgent and deserving of a swift reply. But Beijing evidently sees things differently.

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Even at the leader-to-leader level, the crisis communications channels established between Washington and Beijing have failed to normalize rapid bilateral communications in crises. Following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin refused to answer President Bill Clinton’s call for several days and suspended bilateral miliary-to-military contacts. Similarly, after a 2001 midair collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 intelligence aircraft and a Chinese air force J-8 interceptor, China’s foreign ministry waited — for 12 hours — to answer a call from the U.S. ambassador in Beijing, Admiral Joseph W. Prueher. The defense telephone link seems not to have been used during this incident. During the controversial 2022 visit by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, both Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley were unable to reach Chinese counterparts. In February 2023, Beijing refused Austin’s call via the defense telephone link after the U.S. Navy shot down a Chinese high-altitude balloon that crossed into U.S. airspace, although the U.S. understanding was that mutual concerns about this type of contingency was precisely why the two sides established the defense telephone link. These failures contrast with the successful use of the defense telephone link in the fall of 2020, when Milley was able to reassure his Chinese counterpart that President Donald Trump was not going to manufacture a pre-election crisis (an “October surprise”) with China.

Aside from a few success stories, the general pattern of Chinese behavior during crises is to suspend communications and suspend or terminate agreements for routine military-to-military contacts. Yet, in the wake of bilateral political-military crises, China has routinely engaged in negotiations on crisis communications and renewed military-to-military ties. For example, the two sides began negotiations that led to the 1998 presidential phone link after the 1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation.

These negotiations have rarely been easy. U.S. efforts to negotiate a defense telephone link, for instance, took years to bear fruit. The two sides did not reach agreement until February 2008— after a year bookended by China’s debris-generating antisatellite missile test in February 2007 and Beijing’s denial of permission for U.S. Navy warships to make a Hong Kong port call ahead of a storm in November 2007. At other times, China has been more open to negotiation. In May 2014, following a surge in bilateral tensions after Washington indicted Chinese hackers with alleged ties to the People’s Liberation Army and China suspended its participation in the U.S.-Chinese cybersecurity working group, Washington and Beijing concluded two nonbinding memoranda of understanding. These two agreements, aimed at mitigating military crises, were the Notification of Major Military Activities Agreement and the Rules of Behavior Memorandum of Understanding. In 2020, after an escalation in U.S.-Chinese tensions that included harsh words surrounding the COVID-19 virus, the expelling of U.S. journalists from China, and the closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston, the two sides established a Crisis Communications Working Group.

This pattern suggests that the United States should reset its expectations about China’s use of crisis communications mechanisms. Clearly, China sees negotiating such mechanisms and other bilateral dialogues as a useful diplomatic activity in terms of improving bilateral confidence and restoring diplomatic ties, including military-to-military relations. However, the pattern supports expert assessments that Chinese leaders are skeptical of the value of rapid bilateral communications and other guardrails in most crises. Beijing, say the experts, does not see the establishment of a code of conduct as a tool for de-escalation, but rather as an instrument that legitimizes the very U.S. activities that Beijing seeks to prevent, such as U.S. military operations near China. In other words, for Chinese leaders, hotlines and other crisis management mechanisms are effectively a form of “seatbelts for speeders” that embolden rather than constrain risky and aggressive American behavior.

Moreover, Chinese strategists see crisis communications less as a useful way to mitigate the potential for escalation and more as a potential constraint on China’s ability to maximize potential gains from crises. Published pieces by Chinese experts portray crises as opportunities to signal resolve, manipulate situations for strategic advantage, and create negotiating leverage. Chinese military strategists began refining a concept of “escalation control” for crises two and a half decades ago. Today, the Chinese military’s response to political-military crises appears to draw on a concept of “effective control” of crises aimed at shaping and controlling them, including through escalatory tactics, to support a strategic position that serves China’s domestic stability and growing international objectives.

Furthermore, Chinese and American perspectives of what constitutes a genuine crisis may differ fundamentally. This is illustrated by comparing Washington’s effective use of the defense telephone link during the 2020 “October surprise” with the failure to make a connection to Beijing following the 2023 balloon incident. In the first case, where China saw military action by the United States as potentially imminent, China appeared to welcome communication from the United States clarifying its intentions. In the second, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe refused Defense Secretary Austin’s outreach, with the Chinese Defense Ministry contending that the United States had “not created the proper atmosphere” for dialogue and exchange.

Beijing’s reluctance to use crisis communications mechanisms may also be inspired by perceived asymmetries in military power between the two countries. Peking University’s Hu Bo contends that whereas the United States and Soviet Union were militarily balanced, the United States and China are not. This power asymmetry erodes mutually credible deterrence, impeding China’s ability to act as openly and freely as the United States in the process of building and negotiating crisis management mechanisms. There is also the argument that the United States and the Soviet Union confronted reciprocal nuclear risk — what scholar Thomas Schelling described as a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” that motivated efforts to reduce the risk of escalation. In contrast, Tsinghua University’s Wu Riqiang argues that Beijing “prioritizes building its retaliatory capability over reassurance and risk reduction and maintaining a high level of secrecy, both of which go against U.S. arms control principles.”

Another point of discrepancy is the organizational asymmetries between the two sides. On the U.S. side, more individuals down the chain of command may be empowered to engage in real-time decision-making. In contrast, the Chinese system is designed for downward rather than upward flows of information, limiting the authority and decision-making capacity of those not in the highest leadership positions. Furthermore, lower-level officials would be exposed to charges of foreign influence were they to interact directly with a foreign government. As a result, no one in the Chinese system wants to communicate with the United States until the top leadership in consultation with relevant actors within China’s party-state have decided on a response, which may take days if not longer.

Finally, Beijing sees the U.S. focus on crisis communications mechanisms as a distraction from what it believes should be the major thrust of bilateral interactions: forging stability in the relationship as a whole. China sees stability in addressing the “root cause” of the instability, which lies in the political context — namely, Washington’s failure to accept the legitimacy of China’s political system and respect China’s “core interests.”

Washington should move beyond the notion that negotiating and establishing crisis mechanisms with Beijing will provide a reliable way to mitigate the risk of escalation during actual crises. This does not mean abandoning such efforts entirely. These negotiations serve valuable functions for routine military-to-military communications and post-crisis diplomatic engagement. But policymakers should not mistake participation in negotiations for a genuine desire by Beijing for mechanisms that institutionalize rapid communications with Washington in a crisis. Looking at Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, several U.S. government officials described witnessing the events surrounding this visit as “watching two trains on a collision path.” Although there was a sense that neither side wanted to escalate the situation to conflict, each “believed it was well within its rights to undertake the actions it did.” Thus, all that could be done was to seek to manage the situation.

This is the sobering reality facing U.S.-Chinese relations today. It may not be possible to move the trains off the tracks and completely avoid crises. If that is indeed the case, then the United States should adopt a more modest but still valuable goal: slowing the trains down as much as possible to reduce uncertainty, harm, and escalation. This can be achieved through modest efforts to introduce more certainty on the U.S. side.

Instead of expecting that once crisis communications channels are established, Washington can rely on them, U.S. policymakers should consider establishing or supporting communications channels that will not become targets of suspension or cancellation in U.S.-Chinese political-military crises. These include not only governmental but also extra-governmental communications mechanisms.

With respect to governmental channels, the United States may want to draw a lesson from the 1950s, when U.S.-Chinese tensions were acute, leading President Dwight D. Eisenhower to threaten China with nuclear annihilation eight times, by some counts. However, even amid these tensions, the Eisenhower administration agreed to regular talks with China, which were quietly sustained by the two governments despite mutual nonrecognition in international fora until U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China in 1971. Reportedly, the talks may have been little more than structured shouting matches. However, they are credited with denting the risk of U.S.-Chinese conflict at multiple decisive intervals. Low-profile meetings between designated American and Chinese officials might serve this function.

The U.S. government might also consider creating a nonpolitical, bureaucratic coordinator position affiliated with the National Security Council to serve as a point of contact for U.S.-Chinese relations. Building trust and interpersonal connections is a key part of managing the relationship. Washington is unable to control turnover on the Chinese side, which has recently seen dramatic shifts, but it can try to address the natural turnover that occurs within the U.S. political system. The designation by the United States of a nonpartisan coordinator who can weather administrative differences and maintain relations with the Chinese leadership offers a potential channel for real-time communication during crises to help avoid miscalculation.

In addition to these governmental mechanisms, Chinese and U.S. experts alike have pointed to the vitality of Track-2 exchanges — unofficial, non-governmental channels — that can serve as resilient mechanisms of communication during points of high tension in bilateral relations. Washington’s success in reassuring Beijing that Trump was not going to engineer an “October surprise” in 2020 is partly attributable to the role played by Track-2 actors — in particular, Track-2 channels that communicated Chinese concerns to the U.S. defense apparatus. Such nongovernmental forums as the U.S.-China Military-to-Military Initiative (formerly the Sanya Dialogue), which brings together retired four-star generals and admirals from both sides, offer potential conduits for mutual reassurance in crises. Independent institutions with close ties to the U.S. government have long had a special legitimacy in exchanges between the United States and China. The hollowing out of such congressionally funded institutions as the Wilson Center and the U.S. Institute of Peace (the latter of which employed both of us before it was shuttered) undermines these important avenues for communication.

There may be technical ways forward as well. Global risk expert Christian Ruhl makes a case for incorporating a text-based hotline. Ruhl points out that a text-only channel could be more easily protected against damage to its infrastructure, particularly during a conflict. A text-based system might also help overcome the proscription in China’s hierarchical political and military system against individual officials engaging in real-time communication with foreign interlocutors. Notably, the first hotline between the United States and Soviet Union involved telegraphs rather than phone calls to “allow time to carefully read and then respond.” It can serve a similar function here. Further, as Ruhl also observes, a text-based system could include a “mechanism for acknowledging receipt of information without having to formally issue a reply.” This enables a lower-level official to provide reassurance without commitment, potentially reducing time between communications and speeding up the crisis management process.

Some argue that only a Cuban Missile-style crisis could catalyze the kind of robust communications mechanisms that proved essential in reducing escalation risks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, as Washington and Beijing increasingly face off militarily across all domains, diplomatic contact grows more constrained and contrived, and the dangerous trope that conflict is inevitable takes hold. Waiting for a crisis to force cooperation is a gamble neither side can afford to take.

BECOME A MEMBER

Carla P. Freeman is director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies where she is also a senior lecturer in international affairs. She rejoined the school early in 2025 after working for several years as a senior expert on the China team at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Alison McFarland is a Ph.D. student in politics at Princeton University where she focuses on Chinese foreign policy and conflict studies. She previously worked on the China team at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · January 2, 2026

18. Why Mechanized Warfare Will Still Be Decisive in the Next Land War

Summary:

Rutter and Paul argue mechanized warfare remains decisive, but only under rare, deliberately created “windows of opportunity” in a battlefield made transparent by drones, precision fires, and pervasive electronic warfare. Drawing on Iraq 2003 experience and lessons from Ukraine since 2022, the authors contend large armored assaults now face structural limits, so success depends on briefly blinding enemy sensing, isolating defenses, breaching obstacles rapidly, and synchronizing combined arms. They cite Ukraine’s costly 2023 offensive as a caution and limited breakthroughs where disruption and surprise briefly worked. Recommendations include shifting investment from platform upgrades toward unmanned systems, EW, and AI-enabled C2; faster acquisition and modular “right to repair”; doctrine and training built around episodic maneuver; and resilient logistics under constant surveillance and attack.

Excerpts:

Critics argue the Russo-Ukrainian War shows mechanized forces have lost their edge. A battlefield filled with drones and sensors punishes large armored formations, favors defense, and makes surprise nearly impossible. First-person-view drones and precision strikes exploit weaknesses while artillery remains the top killer. Without air superiority, breaking through defenses under constant surveillance becomes extremely costly, as Ukraine’s 2023 offensive proved. Every meter gained came at a heavy price. These realities lead some to claim that tanks are relics in an age of attrition and sensors.

Yet this conclusion misreads the evidence. Mechanized warfare is conditional, not obsolete. It may no longer define entire campaigns, but it can still deliver decisive results under rare, carefully created conditions. Recognizing this is critical to avoid preparing for a war that can’t be fought or won. Wars are still decided by who controls ground at key moments, not by who dominates sensors forever. Mechanized forces can still matter, but without the right conditions, today’s battlefield sharply limits what they can achieve. Ukraine’s success at Kursk proved that when attackers disrupt enemy surveillance or use electronic warfare, deception, and coordinated firepower, mechanized breakthroughs remain possible. Now more than ever, success depends on creating or exploiting brief windows of opportunity. When those windows open, mechanized formations are still the only force that can deliver speed, shock, and seize terrain at scale. But they should evolve by integrating new technologies, using speed and deception, adapting force structure and doctrine, and training hard for complex operations. Tomorrow’s battlefield will punish slow learners. The side that can set conditions, mass mechanized forces, and strike decisively will win.

Why Mechanized Warfare Will Still Be Decisive in the Next Land War

warontherocks.com · January 2, 2026

Scott Rutter and Matthew C. Paul

January 2, 2026

https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/why-mechanized-warfare-will-still-be-decisive-in-the-next-land-war/

Mechanized warfare is not dead. Observers have been debating this topic since the Ukrainian military and volunteers beat back the Russian assault on Kiev in 2022. The professional discourse that has ensued often devolves into disputes about specific technologies or weapon systems and their perceived value on the future battlefield. Everyone is missing the big picture.

Frontlines in Ukraine today present eerie similarities to World War I but with advanced technologies inhibiting mechanized attacks. In rare cases, these same technologies have created windows of opportunity to make mechanized attacks possible. Larger windows create decisive breakthroughs, and smaller windows create suicidal bottlenecks.

We take a different perspective and draw diverging conclusions about offensive mechanized warfare. These are based in part on our own combat experience in Iraq in 2003 and from 20 years leading major Army modernization projects.

We evaluate the data and analyses from the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2022 and derive where and how mechanized forces can be decisive under modern conditions. Our core claim that future armies should create and control windows for mechanized attacks follows directly from these works and from U.S. Army operational lessons.

Modern battlefield conditions now impose inherent structural limits on mechanized attacks. These limits can no longer be dismissed as temporary obstacles or setbacks. They make mechanized warfare conditional rather than obsolete. What is underexamined is not whether mechanized warfare still works, but whether future campaigns can realistically generate, protect, and exploit the narrow conditions under which it works at all. We strive to test that claim by examining when mechanized forces fail and why, while offering our own fresh insights. Lastly, we offer recommendations for how the U.S. Army can posture its people, processes, and technologies to prepare for the next major war. If the Army misreads mechanized warfare’s future, it risks designing forces for wars that cannot be fought or won.

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Windows of Opportunity for Mechanized Attacks

In 2003, the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division executed a 350-mile mechanized attack from Kuwait to Baghdad, toppling Iraq’s regime in 21 days. That success depended on conditions that strongly favored the attacker: overwhelming technological advantages, complete control of the air, clear visibility of the battlefield through intelligence collection and monitoring, and reliable supply lines. Most of those advantages no longer exist today.

The battlefield has become far more complex. Electronic attacks on communications and sensors, once limited, are now common and can disrupt operations as much as land, air, or sea threats. Large armored forces can still be effective, but making them work now requires much more preparation, coordination, and time than it did in Iraq. That campaign is not a model that can simply be repeated. Future operations are more likely to depend on short, intense breakthroughs combined with tightly coordinated actions to overcome evenly matched opponents and heavily contested battlefields.

Evidence from Ukraine shows mechanized forces suffer when commanders fail to dominate with firepower, intelligence, and electronic warfare. A 2022 assessment noted that strong enemy surveillance and precision strikes shorten the attacker’s decision time and make it hard to mass forces. But it also found that when attackers create brief windows of deception, surprise, isolation, firepower dominance, and combined-arms coordination, mechanized breakthroughs still succeed. U.S. Army lessons from Ukraine’s failed summer 2023 offensive emphasize that success depends on disrupting enemy surveillance, synchronizing electronic warfare, using smoke and deception, and breaching obstacles quickly and at the right moment. A recent 2025 analysis agrees, highlighting autonomy, information dominance, electronic warfare, contested logistics, and evolving air defense as key conditions for maneuver.

In Ukraine, success depends on brief openings in time and space. Since 2022, those openings have been too brief and too small for either side to make many major, lasting breakthroughs. Neither side controls the air, and both can see and strike each other with similar effectiveness, broadly speaking. Drones, loitering munitions, and precision fires have exposed vulnerabilities and limited the utility of mechanized forces. Under these conditions, large armored attacks are extremely costly and hard to exploit. At this point, armored vehicles rarely reach the front lines, let alone break through enemy defenses.

Ukraine’s failed 2023 offensive underscored this reality. Russian forces had layered and formidable defenses as well as the ability to see Ukrainian forces coming. As a result, Ukraine could not achieve operational surprise. By contrast, Ukraine’s temporary success in Russia’s Kursk region the next year came only after it found a weak point and briefly blinded Russian sensing and communications. However, this was the exception to the new rule: The battlefield is so transparent now that surprise and rapid exploitation are usually impossible, except in rare cases. Success now depends less on mechanized formations themselves and more on the ability to rapidly create and exploit rare openings through deception, disruption, and concentrated support. In future wars, such opportunities are likely to be even fewer, shorter, and more localized. The burden is shifting from concealment of forces to concealment of intent. This favors forces designed for episodic concentration rather than sustained armored campaigning.

Armies spend most of their time on defense, but, ultimately, offensive actions are required to end wars. The U.S. Army’s credibility and deterrence against future land wars will be diminished once it loses its ability to mount an attack to seize and hold ground. Consequently, the Army ought to apply the right lessons to the right resources and investments now to preserve mechanized warfare for future generations.

Preparing for the Next War

The U.S. Army should learn lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War, but it should be careful and selective in how it applies those lessons to its future investment strategies, training, force structure, and doctrinal changes.

First, the Army needs a better balance in its investments. Right now, most funding goes to upgrading tanks and other traditional platforms, while spending on unmanned systems and electronic warfare lags behind. Mechanized forces have delivered decisive results in past wars, so the Army should keep improving them — but not in isolation. Upgrades like better protection, reduced visibility to sensors, and the ability to work with unmanned systems are important. However, the chances to use large armored attacks are shrinking, not growing. To keep mechanized forces relevant, armies need to shift from perfecting platforms to enabling short bursts of overwhelming power at the right moment. That means investing in technologies that can create and control those brief windows through deception, electronic warfare, and rapid coordination so mechanized attacks can still succeed when conditions allow.

Investing in unmanned systems and electronic warfare, especially when paired with advanced information technology and AI, can make mechanized attacks far more effective. AI-powered command systems can quickly process data from drones, satellites, and sensors to spot targets, predict enemy moves, and suggest actions in seconds. This gives commanders a huge edge in decision-making. Unmanned systems also help create surprise, aid in deception, and can take on the riskiest jobs, like clearing obstacles and minefields under fire. The Army should also prioritize first-person-view drones that can fly farther, see more clearly, resist jamming, and deliver powerful strikes. The trade-offs can be simple. For example, skipping one major vehicle upgrade could fund thousands of these drones. These investments would make future mechanized forces faster, more precise, and harder to stop. Some worry this approach could weaken the Army for long wars, and that’s a valid concern. But building for a big armored push that never happens is an even bigger risk.

Second, the ability to adapt and innovate will decide who sets the pace in future wars and who can create openings for mechanized attacks. The side that can quickly integrate new technologies will have the edge. For example, Ukraine built a huge domestic drone industry with hundreds of manufacturers producing millions of drones for scouting, precision strikes, and electronic warfare. What really matters is speed. Ukrainian forces can tweak drone software and hardware in just days to counter Russian jamming. This rapid innovation has helped Ukraine open a window for a mechanized attack by knocking out artillery and disrupting Russian units deep behind the front lines.

New reforms in how the U.S. military buys equipment are essential for success on future battlefields. The Army needs faster delivery, flexible requirements, and funding that can adjust as conditions change so it doesn’t waste time building the wrong things. The Army and its stakeholders also need to accept that there is no perfect solution for every possible fight over the next 50 years. Trying to achieve that has led to long delays, cost overruns, and gear that doesn’t fit the mission. Instead, the Army should focus on modular designs that soldiers can upgrade or adapt quickly in the field. Rather than chasing perfection, we need platforms that can be configured for specific situations. Soldiers should have the tools and interfaces to modify hardware and software as conditions change. And “right to repair” should mean more than fixing broken parts: It should allow soldiers to adapt equipment that no longer works for the fight they are in. In the next National Defense Authorization Act, Congress should weigh this requirement more heavily than the defense industry’s fight to protect intellectual property.

Third, the Army needs to prepare better for mechanized attacks. Technology alone won’t win wars. Trained leaders and soldiers using that technology will. As the Army works to develop new game-changing tools, it should also adapt how it organizes and fights. If the Army fails to update force structure, doctrine, and training, even the best technology will fall short. One report on the Russo-Ukraine War emphasizes that people and processes are required to adapt to technology, not the other way around. We agree. Yet the Army sometimes does the opposite, hesitating to scale new roles, unit structures, and tactics, even during active conflicts.

Old doctrine assumes maneuver is the default way to fight. Future doctrine should treat it as a rare, deliberate act that is planned, resourced, and protected. “Cover and concealment” now means more than hiding vehicles: It includes deception and protection from enemy sensors on land, in the air, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Speed alone no longer guarantees success. Constant movement can expose attackers instead of overwhelming defenders. Mechanized attacks should use speed only when the conditions are right — striking hard across multiple domains at the right moment, then dispersing before the enemy reacts. Winning may take several blows, not one big push. U.S. Army force structure should reflect this by shifting toward electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integrated into smaller, more agile mechanized units. Success doesn’t happen by chance. Ukraine’s failed 2023 offensive showed what happens when troops lack training and struggle with new technology. In 2003, before the invasion of Iraq, American armor units drilled repeatedly on breaching defenses and seizing ground. That fight was far simpler than what’s coming. Future mechanized warfare will require mastery of combined arms across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Large-scale, realistic training is essential.

Future mechanized units won’t have the time or the safety to prepare in the open like our unit did before the 2003 Iraq invasion. Back then, our rehearsals were effectively invisible. Today, they would be spotted by commercial satellites and disrupted by drones and long-range strikes. The answer may be advanced synthetic training environments. These tools can speed up preparation and give soldiers and leaders realistic battlefield practice on demand and in secure settings where the enemy can’t watch. Cloud-based simulations linked to real vehicles, weapons, and soldier devices could replace many live exercises. They should update constantly with the latest intelligence so training reflects real battlefield conditions. And they shouldn’t just teach tactics, they should also account for the human toll of combat. Reports like “Conflict in Focus: Lessons from Russia-Ukraine” offer insights to help make these simulations more realistic and human-centered.

Fourth, logistics still wins wars. If mechanized warfare depends on narrow windows of opportunity, logistics often decides how long those windows stay open. Success may hinge less on enemy resistance and more on whether U.S. forces can keep fuel, ammunition, and repair moving under constant enemy surveillance and attack. Mechanized offensives fail when supply can’t keep up. Early Russian attacks in 2022 collapsed because their columns outran their fuel and repair support. Ukraine faced similar problems in 2023 when its forces broke through defenses but couldn’t push farther because ammunition and recovery vehicles lagged behind. To avoid this, the Army should invest in fuel-efficient vehicles, autonomous resupply, modular systems, and even 3D-printed parts, while training to sustain mechanized forces under fire.

Conclusion

Picture a future war where both sides have equal surveillance and electronic warfare capabilities. Decisions will need to be made in minutes, and chances to strike may last only hours. Mechanized forces will win only if they move immediately, use deception, and coordinate firepower at lightning speed. The next war will favor armies that act in seconds — not those that spend weeks planning.

Critics argue the Russo-Ukrainian War shows mechanized forces have lost their edge. A battlefield filled with drones and sensors punishes large armored formations, favors defense, and makes surprise nearly impossible. First-person-view drones and precision strikes exploit weaknesses while artillery remains the top killer. Without air superiority, breaking through defenses under constant surveillance becomes extremely costly, as Ukraine’s 2023 offensive proved. Every meter gained came at a heavy price. These realities lead some to claim that tanks are relics in an age of attrition and sensors.

Yet this conclusion misreads the evidence. Mechanized warfare is conditional, not obsolete. It may no longer define entire campaigns, but it can still deliver decisive results under rare, carefully created conditions. Recognizing this is critical to avoid preparing for a war that can’t be fought or won. Wars are still decided by who controls ground at key moments, not by who dominates sensors forever. Mechanized forces can still matter, but without the right conditions, today’s battlefield sharply limits what they can achieve. Ukraine’s success at Kursk proved that when attackers disrupt enemy surveillance or use electronic warfare, deception, and coordinated firepower, mechanized breakthroughs remain possible. Now more than ever, success depends on creating or exploiting brief windows of opportunity. When those windows open, mechanized formations are still the only force that can deliver speed, shock, and seize terrain at scale. But they should evolve by integrating new technologies, using speed and deception, adapting force structure and doctrine, and training hard for complex operations. Tomorrow’s battlefield will punish slow learners. The side that can set conditions, mass mechanized forces, and strike decisively will win.

BECOME A MEMBER

Scott Rutter served over 20 years in the U.S. Army, culminating as a battalion commander during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He is a former Fox News military analyst and currently works in the medical and defense industries. He is the president of Valor Network Inc (which has no business interests related to the arguments above).

Matthew C. Paul is an Army officer with a combined 27 years of service in infantry and acquisition assignments, including multiple combat tours in the Middle East. His career as a former infantry commander and current acquisition project manager spans leadership in ground combat and modernization efforts across the Army.

Rutter and Paul are co-authors of Damn Fine Soldiers.

The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Lance Cpl. Frank Sepulveda Torres via DVIDS

warontherocks.com January 2, 2026

19. Sustaining at the Edge: Army Reserve Integration in the Indo-Pacific

Summary:

Joshua Koncar argues that sustainment is the decisive vulnerability in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, where distance, contested access, and China’s modernization can erode US advantage. He stresses the Army’s theater-setting role and notes that almost 80 percent of Army combat support and combat service support capability sits in the reserve components, yet Army Reserve formations are underused in the region. He proposes ARSENAL, a Title 10 construct that prepositions tailored Army Reserve logistics and enabling units west of the date line to close gaps in force, space, and time. ARSENAL would leverage Operation Pathways sites, reduce mobilization delays, strengthen distribution hubs, and improve cost effectiveness while feeding data for predictive logistics.

Sustaining at the Edge: Army Reserve Integration in the Indo-Pacific - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Joshua Koncar · January 2, 2026

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/sustaining-at-the-edge-army-reserve-integration-in-the-indo-pacific/

Eisenhower was right—wars are won or lost on logistics. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific, where America’s long-standing military advantage could evaporate from a failure to sustain the force. The theater’s staggering distances, its complex logistics, and the growing threat of China’s military modernization demand a forward-postured combat capability ready to defend American interests and guarantee a free and open Indo-Pacific. Sustaining a joint force in this region poses an unparalleled strategic challenge, and the urgency has never been greater.

In April, Admiral Sam Paparo, commander of Indo-Pacific Command, highlighted the pressing need to address the escalating threat posed by China’s aggressive military modernization and assertive behavior. He emphasized that Beijing’s provocative maneuvers around Taiwan are not mere exercises but “dress rehearsals for forced unification.” This assessment aligns with US intelligence, indicating that Xi Jinping has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, and Beijing drove the point home when it began its largest wargames yet around the island just days ago.

The joint force has no alternative: It must be prepared for large-scale combat operations in a contested environment encompassing nearly half of the Earth’s surface—and projecting and sustaining combat power will be crucial to ensuring this preparedness. Robust, flexible, and resilient sustainment networks are urgently required to deter our enemies and, if necessary, fight and win decisively. And the Army will play an integral role.

The Army’s Role in Joint Logistics

The United States Army provides the foundation for joint sustainment in the Indo-Pacific by setting the theater, including establishing logistics partnerships, beginning or refining host-nation service agreements, and gaining access to critical infrastructure nodes. Sustainment supports the Army’s strategic role of prevailing in large-scale ground combat operations by providing freedom of action, prolonged endurance, and extended operational reach. “The Army’s role in theater-wide sustainment cannot be overstated,” Admiral Paparo noted earlier this year. “As the Department of Defense’s executive agent for much of our logistics enterprise, the Army provides the backbone of our ability to sustain combat power across the region.”

Given this obligation, it’s significant that almost 80 percent of the Army’s combat support and combat service support units reside in the reserve components. The 1993 “Offsite Agreement” created a new division of labor, with the National Guard largely mirroring the Regular Army, and the Army Reserve specializing in combat support and service support at the corps level and above. Considering the magnitude and complexity of potential sustainment demands in the Indo-Pacific, the Army’s combat elements cannot fight and win without essential theater support capabilities that are situated almost exclusively in the Army Reserve. Despite this reality, Army Reserve formations remain largely underutilized in the Indo-Pacific. If the Army’s logistical backbone sits mainly in the reserve, can the joint force risk operating without it?

Integrating Army Reserve Strategic Enablers and Logistics in the Indo-Pacific

Comprised of 172,000 soldiers delivering more than 56 percent of the Army’s sustainment, medical, and distribution capabilities, the Army Reserve will play a pivotal role in every future contested environment. Nearly ten thousand Army Reserve soldiers are mobilized or deployed to support combatant commands worldwide. However, very few deploy to support the Indo-Pacific Command under Title 10 mobilization authority, leaving critical enabling capabilities on the sidelines. The joint force has an opportunity to mitigate strategic risk by proactively mobilizing tailored Army Reserve sustainment formations west of the international date line. The key to leveraging this opportunity is the creation of a new operational construct: the Army Reserve Strategic Enablers and Logistics (ARSENAL) concept.

The ARSENAL concept offers an innovative, proactive solution to address critical Indo-Pacific sustainment gaps. By mobilizing specialized Army Reserve units under Title 10 authority, ARSENAL would deliver enduring, cost-effective support to joint operations while providing reserve soldiers meaningful operational experience. This initiative would align strategic priorities with operational demands to keep the joint force agile amid emerging threats. By leveraging the Army Reserve’s existing force structure and employing it in the priority theater now, this proposal would help the joint force achieve positional advantages that become clear when considered through the lens of the operational factors of force, space, and time.

Force

Deploying enduring ARSENAL forces would provide critical capabilities that enhance operational effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific. The Army Reserve boasts the most force structure in key support enablers, including quartermaster, transportation, medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations. Unique, low-density ARSENAL formations and equipment can conduct theater-opening operations, distribute ammunition, provide maintenance support, and establish water purification sites. The Army Reserve contains approximately 85 percent of the Army’s bulk petroleum capacity and 59 percent of its medical forces, essential capabilities needed at the outset of hostilities.

The ARSENAL concept would also provide invaluable training opportunities, delivering soldiers real-life sets and reps in the priority theater. Although the Army Reserve participates in several exercises in the Indo-Pacific theater, barriers limit full integration. For example, Title 10 limits service on active duty during Ready Reserve training periods thirty days each year. With travel distances, time zone acclimation, and equipment integration, valuable training days are consumed quickly. With enduring ARSENAL forces in the area of responsibility, risk to force would be significantly reduced.

Additionally, reserve forces can help facilitate Indo-Pacific campaigning activities through joint theater distribution center operations. Anchored by modular distribution hubs, these centers provide essential capabilities like multiclass warehouse storage, central receiving and shipping points, motor transportation, and container management. Army Reserve units like the adaptive and versatile transportation theater opening elements can conduct command and control, conduct terminal operations, and establish initial distribution networks at joint theater distribution centers to enable force projection.

Employing ARSENAL units would improve logistics networks, provide realistic in-theater training, and increase campaigning activities in the priority theater. Although the efficient use of force is crucial for maximizing combat effectiveness and sustaining military operations, units must be postured to exploit positional advantages.

Space

US Army Pacific’s theater strategy outlines four key geographic regions that codify joint interior lines of communication: the northern, central, southern, and western approaches. Aligning the requisite logistics capabilities with these four approaches bolsters combat credibility while empowering operational-level commanders to execute a myriad of contingencies.

The proving ground? Operation Pathways—a series of international training exercises involving over forty multinational engagements led by US Army Pacific. The theater army uses this initiative to test and rehearse sustainment tasks, including joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, and joint logistics and petroleum over-the-shore operations with reserve, joint, and multinational partners. Established Operation Pathways exercises in Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan are excellent potential ARSENAL locations due to their strategic axes of approach. Plus, US forces already operate in these countries, lowering the threshold for host-nation diplomatic acceptance.

Finally, placing ARSENAL units in geopolitically and operationally relevant locations, alongside programmed Pacific Deterrence Initiative infrastructure investments, would strengthen logistics networks and reduce implementation costs. The revived Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines and the updated Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia create new opportunities for ARSENAL units to maintain a presence in key terrain. In 2023, the Philippines and the United States revived their agreement, granting the Department of Defense access to nine Philippine bases, including four near the South China Sea. This renewal shows a shared commitment to regional deterrence and aligns with US Army Pacific’s plans for positional advantage. The renewed Compacts of Free Association strengthen US military cooperation with three strategically located nations. Palau has even requested a US military presence and encouraged the secretary of defense to use the compact to facilitate stationing. With growing interest in US force presence and construction projects planned in the Philippines, Palau, and Micronesia, the joint force can leverage these agreements and Pacific Deterrence Initiative infrastructure to station ARSENAL soldiers while limiting costs.

The Indo-Pacific region encompasses more than half of the world’s population, 65 percent of its oceans, and 25 percent of its land. Distributed sustainment concepts are crucial for mitigating risk and ensuring the joint force can effectively project and sustain combat power. By leveraging Operation Pathways exercise locations and geopolitical opportunities, ARSENAL could reinforce key geographic approaches and reduce risk to large-scale combat operations.

Time

As Napoleon aptly noted, “The loss of time is irreparable in war. . . . Operations only fail through delays.” The ARSENAL concept would offer a solution to mitigate critical time constraints that often hinder large-scale mobilization operations and reliance on strategic military lift. By maintaining an enduring presence in the Indo-Pacific, ARSENAL units can lessen the time required to position unique sustainment capabilities, ensuring the joint force is better postured to respond swiftly to contingency conflicts.

In a study of reserve component mobilization for the First Gulf War, the RAND Corporation estimated that Army Reserve units can be airport-ready within twenty-four days, with sealift deployments taking twenty-nine to forty-two days, depending on unit equipment density. Given these timelines, reserve units will be unlikely to be fully mission-capable in theater with their gear within forty-five days of a contingency conflict. A more recent 2019 report confirmed these findings: Based on time-phased force and deployment data, the report’s authors concluded that even smaller reserve units are likely to have trouble meeting demands in the first thirty to sixty days of a conflict, assuming there is no early mobilization. Compounding the issue, a finite number of available trainers and training space constraints at mobilization sites can limit the number of reserve units that can mobilize at any given time. With ARSENAL units already in place, the joint force would significantly mitigate risk to mobilization time.

Additionally, past efforts to test large-scale mobilization operation preparedness should serve as a harbinger of its potential complexity. In 1978, Exercise Nifty Nugget was the first set of exercises to stress the mobilization pipeline, involving over two thousand personnel from multiple federal agencies. Nifty Nugget exposed several readiness gaps, including bureaucratic redundancies, a lack of coordination in troop and equipment movement, and ineffective transportation platforms and logistics infrastructure.

Shortfalls in strategic lift capability also present unacceptable risks. The US military’s sealift capacity relies on an aging fleet, with vessels averaging over forty years old. A 2019 exercise revealed that only 40 percent of Military Sealift Command and Maritime Administration vessels were ready to support a sealift operation within five days, which could severely delay reserve unit deployments.

Time is the most significant risk to large-scale combat operations. In a contested logistics environment, adversaries can impose time delays by hindering mobilization operations from home station to training site, from fort to port, and from point of embarkation to debarkation in theater, underscoring the need for action.

The Operational Reserve Value Proposition

Critics may contend this approach will overburden the Army Reserve and prove too costly to implement. However, the Total Force Policy developed in the 1970s enables the rapid organization of Army Reserve units tailored to support a full range of missions, including overseas contingency operations. And building and deploying unique Army Reserve formations is not a novel concept. The Army Reserve validated the feasibility of the ARSENAL concept in 2020 by creating and mobilizing tailored urban augmentation medical task forces to support US hospitals during the COVID-19 response.

Moreover, mobilizing reserve components instead of maintaining active component rotational forces is inherently cost-effective. A US Government Accountability Office report highlights the cost savings, concluding that reserve personnel generally cost less than active personnel when in use. Additionally, with a slight increase in overseas operating costs, ARSENAL can save operations and maintenance dollars by providing in-theater maintenance and sustainment support, making campaigning more cost-effective.

Finally, valuable data from ARSENAL operations can help inform artificial intelligence algorithms and train machine learning models to support predictive logistics initiatives. Collecting data from a broader range of locations enhances the accuracy and effectiveness of predictive analytics by providing a more comprehensive and diverse dataset. For example, during Operation Mojave Falcon, the largest training event in the Army Reserve’s history, an operational data team was employed—a forward-leaning initiative that integrates advanced data analytics into Army operations. Incorporating these teams in ARSENAL operations can empower commanders and staff by rapidly transforming massive amounts of operational data into actionable insights, enabling faster, more informed decision-making. By leveraging AI-driven analytics, the Army can more accurately anticipate soldiers’ needs, ensuring that vital supplies reach their destination on time and in the right location, ultimately providing an advantage to the warfighter.

Recommendations

Force: Moneyball Logistics

Employing cost-effective ARSENAL units with low-density, high-impact logistics capabilities will strengthen sustainment networks and reinforce joint interior lines of communication. The joint force can leverage Title 10 authority to request tailored ARSENAL units, equipped with the personnel and resources necessary to achieve initial operational capability, while maintaining the flexibility to rapidly scale up to 100 percent full operational capability when required.

Space: Consider the Approach

Aligning ARSENAL units with each of the four theater army avenues of approach ensures that the right capabilities are in the right place at the right time. Furthermore, overlaying those forces on joint theater distribution centers in geopolitically advantageous key terrain will bolster positional advantages and lower implementation costs.

Time: Augment Rapid Home Station Mobilization

Optimizing the rapid home station mobilization model can improve the flow of reserve forces into the region by bypassing legacy mobilization sites. Growing this initiative across the Indo-Pacific would address the need for rapid mobilization without relying on mobilization force generation installations stateside.

World War II in the Pacific theater was a war of distances and advanced bases, driven and constrained by logistics. By 1945, over 1.8 million ground soldiers were serving somewhere in the Pacific or Asia. Historians note that the US military was ill-prepared logistically for such a large-footprint, manpower-intensive Pacific campaign at the outset of World War II. Shall we allow history to repeat itself?

If achieving positional advantages is foremost to the theater army’s success, we must be postured to sustain them. As currently organized, the Army Reserve contains a significant portion of the Army’s total logistics capability. Despite its ready-made mobilization capacity, reserve formations aren’t optimally positioned for large-scale combat operations, and deployment to the Indo-Pacific will undoubtedly face delays. The ARSENAL concept would mitigate strategic risk, reinforce combat credibility, enhance the joint force’s integrated deterrence, and facilitate campaigning. Indo-Pacific Command needs an ARSENAL. America’s Army Reserve can deliver.

Joshua Koncar currently serves as an executive officer in the Army Reserve. He is a former Senate Fellow and a graduate of the MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics Fellowship. Joshua earned his undergraduate degree from Thiel College and holds advanced degrees from the George Washington University, the US Naval War College, and Liberty University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Staff Sgt. Tristan Moore, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Joshua Koncar · January 2, 2026

20. Contrarians No More: AI Skepticism Is on the Rise

Summary:

Rob Wright reports that skepticism toward artificial intelligence is rising as 2025 ends, driven by fears of an AI investment bubble, falling stocks, and weak returns on many enterprise GenAI pilots. Critics argue vendors have overpromised while underdelivering, with chatbots proving unreliable outside narrow use cases and infrastructure costs outpacing profits. Economists warn of a dot-com–style correction, while researchers question inflated claims about AI reasoning and workforce impact. Although AI has shown promise in cybersecurity, benefits remain uneven and costly. Analysts conclude AI will endure, but spending is likely to slow as investors and enterprises demand clearer value, realistic expectations, and tighter use-case discipline.

Contrarians No More: AI Skepticism Is on the Rise

Concerns about an economic bubble bursting, along with doubts regarding return on investment, suggest the tide may be turning for the artificial intelligence industry.

https://www.darkreading.com/cybersecurity-operations/contrarians-no-more-ai-skepticism?utm

Rob Wright, Senior News Director, Dark Reading

December 31, 2025

Source: Brain light via Alamy Stock Photo

As 2025 comes to a close, some of the artificial intelligence industry's biggest skeptics may be poised for a victory lap.

In recent months, AI has taken some hits on several fronts. First and foremost, there are increasing fears about an AI bubble potentially popping as major stocks have dipped. Additionally, several studies have shown many companies have yet to achieve the return on investment they'd hoped for with their generative AI (GenAI) pilots.

Meanwhile, threat actors have continued to take advantage of GenAI platforms for malicious activities, and concerns have grown about the technology's adverse effects on the workforce (not to mention society in general). All of these factors, critics say, have added up to a notable shift in public sentiment — and not in a positive direction.

As a result, some of the most well-known AI critics are claiming their predictions have been validated, whether they're about massive AI spending failing to deliver results or lofty promises about general artificial intelligence falling short.

Gary Marcus, emeritus professor of psychology and neural science at NYU and a notable AI skeptic, tells Dark Reading that the shift has underscored one of his long-held beliefs. "Most of the public is NOT enthusiastic about AI; it's the media and the industry that is enthusiastic," he says in an email.

Some critics have focused primarily on the economics of the AI boom. Tech entrepreneur and Stanford University lecturer Jerry Kaplan, for example, said in a recent essay that the AI bubble is real, and investments in AI companies are unlikely to keep up with the massive infrastructure spending on data centers and GPUs. "We may be heading for a duet combining the 'greatest hits' of the 2000 dot-com bubble and the 2008 housing crisis," he wrote.

Others have focused more on the technical aspects of today's GenAI platforms. Melanie Mitchell, computer scientist and professor at the Santa Fe Institute, has argued that the industry is overestimating the cognitive and humanlike reasoning capabilities of AI models and that better and more rigorous testing is needed. And whether it's financial or technical skepticism or both, many enterprises are still searching for the use cases and bottom-line value that the industry has promised.

AI Tools: Where's the Value?

A common thread among skeptics and critics is that AI companies have generally overpromised and underdelivered on what their tools can do for businesses. "My own view is that a more sophisticated form of AI, not yet invented, will truly be life-changing, but chatbots aren't reliable enough to be all that helpful to most people (except, for example, programmers) and that the costs to society are high," Marcus says.

Rich Mogull, chief analyst at the Cloud Security Alliance, says enterprises have been subjected to pervasive AI marketing since 2022, and some vendors have "rammed down it their throats." But expected cost savings have yet to materialize.

"Enterprises want to get the value out of the technology, but we're also hearing from them that the providers have to figure out the use cases to get that value — where it's actually providing value and not just costing more money," Mogull says.

In a recent speech at the University of Washington, Cory Doctorow, author and special adviser to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argued that AI is stuck in a kind of quagmire. AI coding assistants, for example, can replace entry-level developers (the kind that are paid cheaply on a contract basis), but that won't generate the kind of value that enterprises truly want.

"For AI to be valuable, it has to replace high-wage workers, and those are precisely the experienced workers, with process knowledge, and hard won intuition, who might spot some of those statistically camouflaged AI errors," Doctorow said in his speech.

The senior coders are a key part of the equation because they're the ones that will spot AI-generated errors, hallucinations, and bugs. But a higher-earning developer, Doctorow argues, is exactly the kind of role that technology executives want to eliminate and replace with AI.

Ultimately, Marcus says faith has waned in AI tools largely because industry leaders like Sam Altman and Elon Musk are "constantly overpromising" what AI can do for organizations. "Some people played with the tech and ultimately found they couldn’t count on it," he says.

Cybersecurity Benefits Come at a Cost

If there's been a bright horizon for the AI industry this year, it's likely been in cybersecurity. Vendors have long embraced machine learning and AI in their products and internal services, but some of the newer applications of the technology have produced compelling results.

"If you look at the work done by the AI Cyber Challenge, for example, the auto-identification and patching of vulnerabilities is wild," Mogull says. "That works, and it's potentially very impactful."

Still, in its 2025 AI Maturity in Cybersecurity Report, Arkose Labs found that only about half the enterprises it surveyed had realized measurable benefits despite widespread adoption.

And many critics have expressed concerns about the high costs of such applications — both to the individual customer and the providers themselves. Additionally, some cybersecurity experts have argued that organizations are overstating the threat of AI-driven cyberattacks to incentivize purchasing AI solutions. For example, noted security researcher Kevin Beaumont recently criticized a now-deleted MIT study that claimed 80% of ransomware attacks were powered by AI.

Despite glaring cases of "AI washing" and exaggerated threats, Mogull believes there are a lot of areas in cybersecurity where AI is already providing value. "But how much is it going to cost? We've got to work through a lot of details about integrating AI into how we do things," he says.

Too many AI pilots, however, have been deployed without considering those details and defining the use cases. Mogull said he worked with an organization recently that fell into that trap after consultants told management that they could use AI and automation to downsize a particular team by 75%.

"Without going into details, the things that team did didn't have a single use case for AI," he says. "I couldn't even imagine a viable use case. It's one of those areas where generative AI brought zero value."

AI Bubble Soon to Pop?

AI companies have continued to feed their models with vast amounts of data and supporting infrastructure to make them more powerful and even achieve artificial general intelligence (AGI). But Marcus, as well as other skeptics, have criticized the "all you need is scale" approach, arguing that not only is it wrong but that it's created the apparent economic bubble we're in. And 2026 could be when the spending and investments start to really pull back.

"Many people have a huge incentive to keep building the infrastructure, but the vibe has changed," Marcus says. "Loans will get more expensive, stock prices are coming down, and profits (except for Nvidia) are few and far between."

Even if there's a bubble, Mogull says AI isn't a completely overhyped technology and is here to stay. But he remains cautious, given the growth demands on many of the AI companies and risks they pose to the greater economy.

"We saw this with the internet and the dot-com boom. Is the Internet here to stay? Hell yes. Are dot coms still around? Yes, they run our lives," he says. "But it was a rough road getting to the other side if you didn't play your cards right."

About the Author

Rob Wright

Senior News Director, Dark Reading

Rob Wright is a longtime reporter with more than 25 years of experience as a technology journalist. Prior to joining Dark Reading as senior news director, he spent more than a decade at TechTarget's SearchSecurity in various roles, including seni

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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