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1. Recommendations on North Korea Policy and Extended Deterrence

2. The New North Korean Threat

3. Experts: South Korea Seeks Enhanced US Nuclear Assurances Against North Korea

4. Warning lights flash faster and brighter on the Korean Peninsula

5. What's Needed to Put Nukes in S. Korea? It's Time to Start Planning, New Report Says

6. Yoon Comment Sparks Diplomatic Row Between South Korea, Iran

7. Food Insecurity in North Korea Is at Its Worst Since the 1990S Famine

8. The US has a new nuclear proliferation problem: South Korea

9. South Korea Grounds Its Position in the Central and East European Defense Market (Part One)

10. Yoon reaffirms commitment to nuclear treaty in Davos

11. South Korea Leader Dials Back Comments on Developing Nuclear Weapons

12. S. Korean Army chief to visit U.S. for talks with American counterpart

13. North Korea passes new defense budget

1. Recommendations on North Korea Policy and Extended Deterrence (CSIS)

Strategy proposals are emerging from various think tanks.

(Teaser: On 23 January another new strategy proposal will be released from the National Institute for Public Policy (https://nipp.org/). It will consist of a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive information and influence campaign, and the advancement of the strategic aim of a free and unified Korea. Robert Joseph, the principal author, chaired the group of experts that developed the strategy outlined in this document. The other members of the group included Robert Collins, Joseph DeTrani, Nicholas Eberstadt, Olivia Enos, David Maxwell, and Greg Scarlatoiu. All members of the group provided inputs and share in its authorship. I will of course forward it when it is published online on Monday)

Just to note: in the CSIS policy recommendations there is no discussion of unification.

The 30 page report can be downloaded here: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Korean_Commission_2023.pdf?VersionId=93zTcEue3STUbr6v8IfjQ6z6B_3mNTr4

Recommendations on North Korea Policy and Extended Deterrence

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The world is experiencing a number of tectonic shifts due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and related developments that present a perilous landscape for the U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) alliance as well as new opportunities for Washington and Seoul to navigate in the coming months.

The war in Ukraine has had multiple impacts on the Korean peninsula. It has reminded South Korea of the strategic importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance as a buffer against hostility from outside powers, while also intensifying concerns about South Korea’s vulnerability as a nuclear-weapons-free power facing a nuclear-armed North Korea. For North Korea, the war in Ukraine seems to have amplified the importance of nuclear weapons for its security while prompting Pyongyang to consider a new “first-use” nuclear doctrine as well as the operational deployment of tactical nuclear weapons—imitating Putin’s tactics in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine has also produced a favorable external environment for North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and missile programs. North Korea’s increasing weapons capabilities, its threats to use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes, and the vulnerability of U.S. national missile defense interceptors to North Korean multiple independent reentry vehicle technologies have led the South Koreans to question the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.

Collectively, these shifts in the strategic landscape call for the United States and its allies to reexamine traditional approaches to the North Korea nuclear issue and devise ways to increase the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. The recent election of South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol, whose positions on North Korea and regional issues align closely with those of the Biden administration, presents opportunities for the alliance to pursue new initiatives that will enhance the stability, security, and prosperity of the region.

This report, based on the work of a bipartisan commission co-chaired by John Hamre and Joseph Nye, presents actionable recommendations for navigating North Korea policy and strengthening U.S. extended deterrence during these uncertain times.

The publication of this report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No external sponsorship contributed to this report.

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John J. Hamre

CSIS President and CEO, and Langone Chair in American Leadership

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Joseph S. Nye Jr.

University Distinguished Service Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

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Victor Cha

Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair

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Katrin Fraser Katz

Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Korea Chair

Programs & Projects

Korea Chair

Center for Strategic and International Studies

1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

Tel: 202.887.0200

Fax: 202.775.3199

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2. The New North Korean Threat

Excerpts:

But enhancing deterrence against North Korea is only one part of the puzzle. Working with Japan, South Korea, and other allies, the United States also needs to make it more difficult for Kim to access the hard currency he needs to fund his WMD program. Given its escalating tensions with Beijing, the Biden administration cannot count on China to enforce tough sanctions. By working with its allies, however, the United States can do more to disrupt North Korean cyber-heists. If the West is able to cut off more of Kim’s sources of revenue, it will not only create a significant barrier to his WMD program. It is also possible that such financial pressure could ultimately force Kim to the negotiating table because it would threaten his ability to dole out the favors needed to buy off the North Korean elite.

North Korea’s WMD program is growing at an alarming rate. South Korea and the United States must address the situation before it becomes destabilizing and the strategic balance tilts in favor of North Korea, at which point it will be far more difficult for the West to respond. Such a robust, coordinated effort will require deepening and expanding the U.S.–South Korean alliance and bringing South Korea into closer cooperation with Japan, Washington’s other major ally in the region. Putting this approach into play will require overcoming political opposition in South Korea and Japan and greater attention in Washington, where the focus is understandably on the war in Ukraine. But the security imperative is clear and pressing.

The New North Korean Threat

Why the United States Needs to Address Pyongyang’s Nuclear Advances Now

By Sue Mi Terry

January 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Sue Mi Terry · January 19, 2023

Among the more overlooked geopolitical developments in 2022 was North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. During the year, it logged nearly 100 missile tests, a record for the country; several of them involved weapons of extraordinary range and potency. In November, the regime launched a Hwasong-17, an intercontinental ballistic missile that can carry multiple warheads and is capable of reaching the United States. A month later, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally oversaw the test of a powerful solid-fuel rocket engine—a crucial new capability for the country because solid-fuel rockets can be fired more quickly than liquid-fuel ones and are harder to detect and preempt.

Yet despite these developments, North Korea has not been a major focus for the United States in recent years. Although the country has posed a growing threat since 2006, when it first tested an atomic bomb, international efforts to slow down or stop its nuclear program have flagged. The last attempt by the United States to end the nuclear weapons program failed at the 2019 summit meeting in Hanoi between Kim and Donald Trump, and the Biden administration has not come up with any new ideas on how to achieve this. This is partly because the United States and its Western allies have been preoccupied by other pressing concerns, such as the war in Ukraine. But the West has also become, to some extent, inured to the North Korean threat.

This lack of attention is dangerous. Along with the accelerating number of tests, there are numerous other indications that Pyongyang’s efforts to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been rapidly expanding and evolving. Developments over the past few months in particular suggest that the nuclear program is entering a new and more dangerous phase. The risk that a miscalculation by Pyongyang could lead to a conflict is growing, particularly given its lack of communication with Washington. All of these developments make clear the urgent need for the United States and its allies to enhance deterrence of the North Korean regime.

Armed and Dangerous

North Korea’s pursuit of solid-fuel missiles provides a startling indication of its current aims. All three ICBMs North Korea has tested so far—the Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17—are liquid fueled. This is in accordance with the five-year plan set forth by the regime in January 2021 at its Eighth Party Congress, where it announced that it would soon be unveiling solid-fuel ICBMs that could be launched from both the sea and land. Pyongyang now appears to be making rapid progress toward that goal. Already, a series of new short-range ballistic missiles it has tested in recent years use solid fuel. It is now foreseeable that North Korea will conduct more solid-fuel engine tests on larger missiles. These include likely tests of a Pukguksong submarine-launched ballistic missile or a new solid-propellant ICBM. Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong recently warned that the latter may be tested on a full-range trajectory toward the United States rather than on a lofted trajectory into the Sea of Japan, the destination of its previous ICBM tests.

In the coming months, North Korea could also unveil multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology, which will allow its missiles to frustrate U.S. missile defenses. The recently tested Hwasong-17 is designed to carry multiple warheads and could thus theoretically strike Manhattan and Washington at the same time.

North Korea is the only country that has threatened first use of nuclear weapons so explicitly.

As if these missile tests weren’t alarming enough, there are many indications that Pyongyang will soon conduct its seventh nuclear test. Such a test could be used to showcase a more compact tactical nuclear warhead for battlefield use—a weapon that would increase the threat North Korea poses to Japan and South Korea as well as to U.S. forces stationed in both countries. Satellite imagery has made clear, for example, that the Punggye-ri testing site, located in mountainous terrain north of Pyongyang and close to the border with China, is ready for such a detonation at any time. Testing a tactical nuclear warhead would also be consistent with Kim’s announced weapons development goals.

North Korea has already demonstrated its ability to deploy tactical nuclear weapons over the past year. In September and October, it conducted a series of tests of short-range missiles, with one simulating the launch of a nuclear missile from an underwater silo and another rehearsing the launch of nuclear warheads that could target airports in South Korea. But the regime has yet to demonstrate that it has developed a smaller warhead that could arm these missiles. It will need to do that soon if Kim intends to deploy this capability within his announced five-year timeline.

In addition to rapidly enhancing North Korea’s WMD arsenal, Kim has also been lowering the threshold for its use. In September, North Korea announced five conditions under which it would launch a preemptive strike. Notably, these included not only when a nuclear attack on the country is imminent but also when its leaders believe that preparations may be underway for a nonnuclear strike on the North Korean leadership, a North Korean nuclear command structure, or important North Korean strategic targets. Pyongyang has also said it could use a nuclear weapon if it determines that it has no other way to prevent the expansion of a conventional war into one that would threaten the regime’s survival. Kim is clearly signaling that if a conventional, preemptive strike against the North is launched or even appears to be imminent, he reserves the right to respond with nuclear weapons. North Korea is the only country in the world that has threatened the first use of nuclear weapons so explicitly.

Along with its new policy for preemptive WMD use, the Kim regime has sought to cement its nuclear power status by declaring in September that it “will never give up” its nuclear weapons and that its weapons program is “irreversible” and “nonnegotiable.” In effect, Kim is asserting that North Korea will never again discuss denuclearization with the United States, even as it expands its nuclear forces and threatens a preemptive strike. This amounts to a destabilizing triple whammy.

Unconventional Threats

Although the United States and its close allies in Asia have watched Kim’s accelerating WMD program with growing concern, they have not yet mounted a response that can deter the North from its current path. Part of the issue is that Western policymakers and observers are not as concerned as they should be about recent developments. Some North Korea watchers, for example, have posited that the program is for defensive purposes only and that Pyongyang’s testing spree is simply a way to modernize its arsenal, allowing the regime to use it as leverage in future negotiations to win sanctions relief and other concessions. In this reading, the aim of the new first strike policy is merely to deter the United States from contemplating an attack on the regime. The logic of this argument is that Kim is not suicidal and knows that if he launches a first strike on the United States, it could lead to full-scale conflict and his own demise, as well as that of his regime.

Such reasoning, however, overlooks more unsettling possibilities. For a start, Kim may believe that through nuclear saber-rattling, he can achieve one of his main strategic goals, which is undermining the U.S.-South Korean alliance. He may calculate that even if he uses nuclear weapons preemptively against the South or U.S. bases in the region, the United States will not retaliate as long as his long-range ICBM force threatens the U.S. mainland. He may figure that Washington—particularly under a future isolationist president—will be unlikely to defend South Korea if by doing so it risks the incineration of American cities.

Moreover, even if Kim intends to avoid rather than initiate a conflict, his growing WMD program could lead to war. History provides ample examples—from World War I to the Cuban missile crisis—of situations in which a series of miscalculations led to or could have led to a catastrophic conflict. Imagine what would happen if a North Korean missile aimed at South Korean territorial waters were to strike South Korean fishing vessels, killing South Korean sailors. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol could order a limited retaliatory strike, precipitating further escalation into a wider conflict. This is hardly a far-fetched scenario: In 2010, tensions between the two countries dramatically ramped up after the North sank the South Korean naval corvette Cheonan and shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyong Island. Although Lee Myung-bak, then South Korea’s president, showed restraint under U.S. pressure after the attack on the Cheonan, the country’s forces responded with artillery fire after the shelling of the island. A future such confrontation could easily spiral out of control, especially in view of North Korea’s new first-strike policy.

71 percent of South Koreans now support acquiring nuclear weapons.

Nuclear and missile threats are not the only threats from the North the United States and its Asian allies need to be concerned about. The U.S. secretary of homeland security, Alejandro Mayorkas, said in October that North Korea has stolen as much as $1 billion worth of cryptocurrency and hard currency in the past two years to fund its nuclear program. To make up for the economic cost of international sanctions and the closing of the North’s border with China during the COVID-19 pandemic, the regime appears to have ratcheted up cyberthefts. In the future, North Korean hackers could use their cybersecurity capabilities for attacks as well as theft. Drones are yet another concern: on December 26, the North violated South Korean airspace by flying surveillance drones across the border for the first time in five years. Some of the drones entered the northern end of the 2.3-mile no-fly zone surrounding the presidential office in Seoul. That incursion prompted the South to scramble jets, fire warning shots, and fly its own drones into North Korean airspace.

These developments are causing South Korea and Japan to reconsider their existing policies toward North Korea, given their vulnerability as nonnuclear states facing a nuclear-armed rogue regime. Until now, they have relied on a robust conventional defense posture while counting on the United States to use its nuclear umbrella to shield them from nuclear attack. In December, however, Yoon described what he called a “serious threat” from the North that could lead to a dangerous miscalculation and spark a wider conflict and stepped up his call for closer security cooperation with the United States and Japan. In early January, he said that South Korea needed to strengthen its defense capabilities and suggested that the United States should expand its “extended deterrence,” including joint exercises and planning involving U.S. nuclear assets, and initiate a more active information exchange.

In late December, South Korea’s National Assembly approved a 4.4 percent hike in defense spending for 2023, bringing Seoul’s total defense budget next year to about $45 billion. The increase includes funding for new preemptive strike capabilities and a $440 million plan to counter the North’s drones. President Yoon went even further in January, stating that if the North’s nuclear threat continued to grow, South Korea would consider starting its own nuclear weapons program or ask the United States to redeploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Yoon’s comments mark the first time since the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from the South in 1991 that a South Korean president has publicly mentioned arming the country with nuclear weapons, an option that a large majority of South Koreans—71 percent, according to recent polls—support.

Meanwhile, Japan has made an unprecedented change in its own National Security Strategy in response to the increased threats from both North Korea and China. Under the plan unveiled by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in mid-December, Japan will increase its defense spending by a whopping 26.3 percent this year and more than 50 percent over the next five years, shattering its decades-old doctrine of limiting defense spending to one percent of GDP. Japan also plans to acquire long-range counterstrike capabilities it has long shunned, including several hundred U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles that could reach targets in both China and North Korea.

A Stronger Umbrella

Although the new approaches in Seoul and Tokyo are important steps for countering the North Korean threat, it is vitally important that both countries cooperate more closely with the United States. This could involve more joint military exercises like the ones held by South Korea, Japan, and the United States in October and November; computer simulations of a North Korean attack and drills; deeper intelligence sharing; and robust planning for the employment of the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella. The United States and South Korea should create a consultative group, bringing in both high-level security officials and unofficial observers to build greater support for sustained security cooperation and examine options for improving crisis management.

Washington should also take steps to strengthen its own security umbrella in the region. The United States should reaffirm its treaty-based collective defense commitments to both Japan and South Korea while also bolstering its regional deterrence and defense capabilities in a number of ways. These include augmenting missile defenses and rotating more nuclear-capable U.S. weapons systems into South Korea, such as B-52s and F-35s. As the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states, the United States will need to work more closely with South Korea and Japan to ensure “an effective mix of capabilities, concepts, deployments, exercises, and tailored options to deter and, if necessary, respond to coercion and aggression.”

But enhancing deterrence against North Korea is only one part of the puzzle. Working with Japan, South Korea, and other allies, the United States also needs to make it more difficult for Kim to access the hard currency he needs to fund his WMD program. Given its escalating tensions with Beijing, the Biden administration cannot count on China to enforce tough sanctions. By working with its allies, however, the United States can do more to disrupt North Korean cyber-heists. If the West is able to cut off more of Kim’s sources of revenue, it will not only create a significant barrier to his WMD program. It is also possible that such financial pressure could ultimately force Kim to the negotiating table because it would threaten his ability to dole out the favors needed to buy off the North Korean elite.

North Korea’s WMD program is growing at an alarming rate. South Korea and the United States must address the situation before it becomes destabilizing and the strategic balance tilts in favor of North Korea, at which point it will be far more difficult for the West to respond. Such a robust, coordinated effort will require deepening and expanding the U.S.–South Korean alliance and bringing South Korea into closer cooperation with Japan, Washington’s other major ally in the region. Putting this approach into play will require overcoming political opposition in South Korea and Japan and greater attention in Washington, where the focus is understandably on the war in Ukraine. But the security imperative is clear and pressing.

SUE MI TERRY is Director of the Asia Program and the Hyundai Motor–Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center. A former CIA analyst, she served on the National Intelligence Council from 2009 to 2010 and the National Security Council from 2008 to 2009.

Foreign Affairs · by Sue Mi Terry · January 19, 2023

3. Experts: South Korea Seeks Enhanced US Nuclear Assurances Against North Korea

Experts: South Korea Seeks Enhanced US Nuclear Assurances Against North Korea

January 18, 2023 10:29 PM

Christy Lee

voanews.com

WASHINGTON —

By expressing an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, South Korea is demonstrating an urgent determination to secure enhanced security assurances from the United States as the nuclear threat from North Korea grows, experts say.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said at a policy briefing on January 11 that Seoul could either build nuclear weapons or have them redeployed to the country to counter Pyongyang.

While South Korea has discussed over the years the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons, this marked the first time a South Korean president had expressed an interest in the arms since the U.S. withdrew them from the Korean Peninsula in 1991.

Yoon’s remarks came after Pyongyang’s New Year’s Day call for an “exponential increase” in the country’s nuclear arsenal. North Korea launched more than 90 ballistic and cruise missiles last year, a record.

Seeking assurance

“One interpretation of Yoon’s recent remarks is that they suggest a desire for more than merely a U.S.-ROK ‘alliance’ in the way that they have existed up to now, from the perspective of the South Korean administration,” said Edward Howell, a lecturer on North Korea at Oxford University in England. South Korea’s official name is the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The remarks “epitomize a sense of frustration that he wants more than simply a ‘security guarantee’ from the United States,” Howell said.

Warning lights flash faster and brighter on the Korean Peninsula

North Korea is growing more provocative, emboldened by its increasing nuclear arsenal

BY BRAD GLOSSERMAN
CONTRIBUTING WRITER
Jan 18, 2023
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Cue the Don Adams, Max Smart voice: “The old ‘frog in the boiling water” trick, eh?”

That was my reaction (inspired by the American comedy television series) upon reading Aidan Foster Carter’s recent analysis of North Korean behavior and his alarming conclusions about the year ahead. Pyongyang’s antics weren’t secret: They made headlines throughout 2022. Apparently, though, familiarity does breed some form of contempt — or at least a certain numbness.

Carter, one of the most astute — and amusing — analysts on the politics of the Korean Peninsula, warns that 2023 will be an anxious year, “bleaker than most,” with a very real risk of conflict, either the result of deliberate acts or miscalculation. Even more alarming is that every expert I surveyed, hoping for some reassurance, instead echoed his grim conclusions.

Carter, an honorary research fellow at Leeds University, has been a Korea watcher for over half a century. Among his many outlets is Comparative Connections, the triennial (that’s three times a year) journal on Indo-Pacific relations that I write for and edit: His is the North-South Korea chapter.

In the most recent issue, which was released this week, he cataloged a long and expanding list of North Korean provocations. In 2022, North Korea fired more than 90 cruise and ballistic missiles, more than any other year on record. For comparison, it conducted four missile tests in 2020. On just one day last year, Nov. 2, it launched 27 ballistic and surface-to-air missiles, three and half times the number of missile tests in all of 2021. Last year, it also fired nearly 1,000 artillery shells toward the maritime buffer zone that divides the two countries’ offshore waters.

In September, North Korea adopted legislation that created a new doctrine, effectively threatening pre-emptive strikes against its neighbors. In November, Pyongyang ended its self-imposed moratorium on intercontinental missile tests, in effect since 2018, with the launch of the Hwasong-17, a liquid-fuel missile thought capable of hitting any target in the United States. The following month, it tested a solid-fuel rocket engine that would make its missiles more mobile and quicker to launch (both because they can be fueled in advance).

A report released earlier this month from the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA), a think tank associated with South Korea’s Ministry of Defense, claims that the North has as many as 80 or 90 nuclear weapons and wants to have a stockpile of 300, which would make it the world’s fourth largest nuclear power, trailing only the U.S., Russia and China. Last year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated North Korea had 20 assembled nuclear weapons and enough fissile material to make up to 55.

That study assumes ominous proportions following the release in January of remarks by supreme leader Kim Jong Un in early December to the Workers Party of Korea. In the remarks, he called for “an exponential increase” in the North’s nuclear weapons and ordered the mass production of lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons, which are essentially for battlefield use. Kim said he wants a new ICBM “whose main mission is a quick nuclear counterstrike,” ostensibly to target the U.S., which would be used in conjunction with those tactical weapons.

Nor is that the end of the provocations. The North has branched out, dispatching on Dec. 26 five drones into the South that flew over the country for five hours. One of which — it was confessed a couple of weeks later after initial denials — penetrated a 3.7-km-radius no-fly zone that surrounds the presidential office in Seoul. The South reportedly retaliated by sending its own drones into the North and threatened to send them “deep into North Korea in accordance with the principle of proportionality … as far as Pyongyang and the launch station at Tongchang-ri (a major rocket launch site).”

I remember reading about each of those incidents. I also mentally filed each away in the “nothing new here” category. Insert here the “frog in boiling water” meme.

Ralph Cossa, my former boss at Pacific Forum who, as a military intelligence analyst and a think tank observer, has probably spent more time than is healthy talking with North Koreans and thinking about their country, warned that “we are paying insufficient attention to North Korea and there is a good chance things are going to get worse this year, even if not kinetic.”

That doesn’t mean that the deterrent has weakened. The U.S. along with its ally South Korea and other regional allies and partners can defend the South. North Korea’s new capabilities, including its expanding nuclear arsenal, don’t alter the fundamentals of peninsular defense and deterrence.

But the possibility of misunderstanding, miscalculation or missteps is real. The pattern of provocations could encourage Pyongyang to think it has deterred Seoul or Washington. Evans Revere, a former State Department official who worked on Korean Peninsula issues for much of his career and continues to think about them, pointed to the drone flights as proof, calling them “a remarkably bold move and the North got away with it. … We should expect Pyongyang to again test the South’s defenses in the days to come.”

Both Cossa and Revere argued that its nuclear arsenal fueled the North’s penchant for risk taking. Revere noted Pyongyang’s belief that its possession of nukes gives it “cover” to engage in conventional military adventurism, adding that “Kim Jong Un may now believe he can intensify military pressure on the South without fear of retaliation.”

Cossa warned that Kim appears to have learned that “Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling” effectively kept the West from more active intervention in Ukraine and “it is not a great leap of logic to assume that the North’s powerful nuclear sword will be sufficient to keep the U.S./UNC (United Nations Command) at bay if they grab or shoot up an island or attack a ROK ship or demilitarized zone outpost.” Adventurism will be encouraged by a belief that China and/or Russia would provide diplomatic cover if Pyongyang did so.

The North is likely also motivated by frustration triggered by its inability to move Washington and Seoul away from hard-line positions, to be more accommodating and to make dealing with Pyongyang a priority — and on its terms. Provocations remind them, and the world, that North Korea is an important regional actor and ignoring or downplaying it has very real consequences.

North Korea isn’t the only government experiencing frustration; South Korea is too and the government there is making its displeasure increasingly plain. The tit-for-tat drone dispatch was intended to be reciprocal but it looked reflexive rather than reasoned.

The North’s steady acquisition of nuclear capabilities alarms and angers the South because of the impact it has on security and regional status. During a policy briefing last week, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol said for the first time that his country may build its own nuclear weapons or ask the U.S. to redeploy them on the Korean Peninsula. Building them “won’t take a long time for us … given our scientific and technological capabilities.” (He added, though, that his preference was to strengthen the alliance with the U.S.) This followed an announcement that the allies were considering the possibility of holding joint nuclear exercises; if you think Pyongyang was angered by the resumption of U.S.-South Korea military exercises, you ain’t seen nothing yet.

Revere writes that Yoon “seems determined to make North Korea pay a price for its adventurism. Indeed, he seems to believe the ROK has no choice but to do so in order to prevent Pyongyang from raising the stakes with future military challenges.”

Gibum Kim, an analyst at KIDA, agreed, distinguishing Yoon’s readiness to take a harder line than his predecessor, the government of progressive President Moon Jae-in. “The dynamic is different,” he explained in an email. While the government in Seoul remains open to engagement, “it’s emphasizing robust defense readiness and deterrence against the DPRK’s increasing nuclear and missile threat.”

Like Revere and Cossa, Kim worries that North Korea will continue to test Yoon’s resolve, as well as that of the alliance. He also agrees that “military aggression doesn’t feel like a distant possibility,” after the Ukraine invasion.

Fortunately, we’ve all been forced to acknowledge that grim reality. As long as we aren’t numbed by or habituated to the steady erosion of peace and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, we can prepare and respond to Pyongyang’s provocations. That should reduce the prospect of a North Korean miscalculation, an important first step to maintain peace on the peninsula.

Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of “Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” (Georgetown University Press, 2019).

5. What's Needed to Put Nukes in S. Korea? It's Time to Start Planning, New Report Says

One focus of planning must be potential for civil unrest and north Korean subversion, and the necessary counterintelligence activities that must take place.. There will be threats but also opportunities.

It is very likely that there will be significant protests if nuclear weapons return to the peninsula. There will be the natural ant-nuclear and anti- American sentiment and activists will act. Given the now limited number of US military bases in Korea (where nuclear weapons would likely be stored) all US bases will be vulnerable to protests.

However, north Korea will likely use the United Front Department and the Cultural Exchange Bureau to fund these activities to subvert the ROK government, create unrest, and drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. They will sue reecruited agents and unwitting "useful idiots." But this poses opportunities for the alliance. First is that this strategy can be exposed and attacked. Second, counterintelligence organizations can focus on identifying and breaking these north Korea organizations operating in the South.

My point is that re-introducing nuclear weapons is not all about only deterring the north by the proximity of US nuclear weapons. It will cause problems that require advanced and anticipatory planning but those problems also bring opportunities that can be exploited.

What's Needed to Put Nukes in S. Korea? It's Time to Start Planning, New Report Says | Air & Space Forces Magazine

airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · January 19, 2023

Jan. 19, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

An independent, bipartisan commission is recommending the U.S. and South Korea begin “pre-decisional” discussions about what it would take to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the region should tensions reach a point where such a move is warranted.

The 14-member Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Commission on the Korean Peninsula, comprised of former diplomats and defense officials, as well as academics, concluded that redeploying nuclear weapons is not necessary under present conditions. But its report and recommendations, released Jan. 19, acknowledge the “perilous landscape” for the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

Members of the panel include retired Army Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea; Randall G. Schriver, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs; Richard L. Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State; and Katrin F. Katz, former director of Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs for the National Security Council.

INorth Korea spate of recent nuclear missile tests have increased tensions on the peninsula, with U.S. aircraft flying show-of-force missions alongside South Korean fighters and, last week, Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol announcing that his country may be forced to either ask the U.S. to redeploy nuclear arms on the peninsula or to develop nuclear weapons of its own.

Yoon’s comments sparked a wave of debate over nuclear proliferation; a public poll in South Korea suggested growing support for countering the North’s nuclear program with one of its own.

Brooks offered a cautious outlook at a virtual event for the report’s release. “Under the present circumstances, especially given the second purpose of extended deterrence, which is to prevent proliferation,” Brook said, “nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula…is not helpful at the present time or needed.”

But as part of a series of recommendations for bolstering extended deterrence, the commission did include “one door that was left open,” Brooks said.

“The allies should consider tabletop planning exercises for the possible redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea,” the recommendation states. “This planning should be explicitly pre-decisional. The timeline and scope of weapons … should be left deliberately ambiguous. Decision-making would be calibrated to shifts in the security environment and the North Korean threat level.”

Planning exercises should consider factors such as storage facilities for nuclear weapons, joint training on nuclear safety and security, and “certifying Korea-based U.S. F-16 units or F-35 replacements for combined exercises and nuclear missions,” the report adds.

The U.S. Air Force today bases A-10s and F-16s at both Osan and Kunsan Air Bases and has not announced plans to replace them with F-35s, but over time, F-35s will supplant those older platforms. The U.S. withdrew its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991.

Considering logistical steps for supporting nuclear arms in South Korea is necessary to ensure preparedness for all possible contingencies, Katz argued.

“I think it’s somewhat irresponsible to not think about those things and talk about it fully in the abstract,” Katz said. “So I don’t think we should be fearful of talking about the thing itself, and I think there’s a little bit of that right now.”

The commission also recommended the U.S. consider shifting its strategic and nuclear posture in the region, such as whether it would make sense to maintain a “continuous presence of … either U.S. submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles or strategic bombers, or investing in infrastructure in South Korea to [support] U.S. dual-capable aircraft.”

The Air Force regularly deploys bombers to the Indo-Pacific through its Bomber Task Forces, typically basing those deploying units in Guam and flying missions to Australia and Japan. Recently, however, B-52 nuclear-capable bombers and a B-1B Lancer flew with South Korean fighters near the peninsula, in response to North Korean missile tests.

The commission also recommended maintaining existing military exercises, expanding cooperation in space “to enhance reconnaissance capabilities,” and providing South Korea direct access to the Space-Based Infrared System for missile warning. The U.S. recently agreed to extend cooperation in Space with Japan, another strong ally in the region.

National Security

airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · January 19, 2023

6. Yoon Comment Sparks Diplomatic Row Between South Korea, Iran

The fundamental question is was President Yoon wrong? Is Iran not the enemy of UAE?

Excerpts:

Yoon’s comments during his UAE visit, which have been criticized by his political opponents at home as “diplomatically disastrous,” came as the UAE attempts to hedge in its relationship with Iran, a major business partner. The UAE also is home to around 3,500 American troops at Al Dhafra Air Base, a naval outpost in Fujairah and other locations.

The UAE has spent billions of dollars purchasing South Korean surface-to-air missile systems in part of efforts to protect itself against aerial threats. Those threats include long-range drone attacks by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels — weapons likely built by Iran or with Tehran’s help.

Yoon Comment Sparks Diplomatic Row Between South Korea, Iran

President Yoon Suk-yeol’s comments describing Iran as the “enemy” of the UAE during a trip to that country triggered a diplomatic spat.

thediplomat.com · by Kim Tong-hyung · January 20, 2023

South Korea and Iran have summoned each other’s ambassadors in a diplomatic spat triggered by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s comments describing Iran as the “enemy” of the United Arab Emirates during a trip to that country this week.

While visiting South Korean special forces stationed in the UAE on Monday, Yoon described the hosts as South Korea’s “brother nation” tied by growing economic and military cooperation, and then compared the threat he said UAE faces from Iran to the threat South Korea faces from nuclear-armed North Korea.

“The security of our brother nation is our security,” Yoon said. “The enemy of the UAE, its most-threatening nation, is Iran, and our enemy is North Korea.”

Yoon’s remarks triggered an irritated response from Iran’s Foreign Ministry, which said it was investigating Yoon’s “interfering statements.” South Korea’s government insists Yoon was trying to encourage the South Korean troops in the UAE and didn’t intend to comment on Iran’s foreign relations, urging against an “unnecessary overinterpretation” of his comments.

About 150 South Korean troops are stationed in the UAE, engaging in combined special forces training and other joint military activities. The deployment, which began in 2011, grew out South Korea’s deal with the UAE to build the country’s first nuclear power plant.

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South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong on Thursday called Iranian Ambassador Saeed Badamchi Shabestari to the ministry to explain Seoul’s stance “once again,” ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk said in a briefing.

Lim said the meeting came in response to the summoning of South Korea’s ambassador to Tehran by the Iranian Foreign Ministry on Wednesday over Yoon’s comments.

Lim said Shabestari told Cho that he would “faithfully” convey Seoul’s explanation of Yoon’s comments to his bosses in Tehran, but didn’t provide further details about the conversation.

“As we explained several times, (Yoon’s) reported comments were meant to encourage our troops serving their duties in the UAE, and had nothing to do with Iran’s foreign relations, including South Korea-Iran relations,” Lim said. “Our government’s will to develop relations with Iran remains unchanged.”

The Iranian Foreign Ministry said on its website that its deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, Reza Najafi, lodged a “strong protest” over Yoon’s “meddlesome comments” after summoning South Korean Ambassador Yun Kang-hyeon.

Najafi said during the meeting that Yoon’s comments were “tantamount to interference” in what he described as Iran’s friendly relations with most Gulf states and undermined “peace and security in the region,” the ministry said.

Najafi also mentioned friction between Iran and South Korea over billions of dollars in Iranian funds remaining in Seoul, frozen by U.S. sanctions over Iran’s collapsed nuclear deal with world powers. Iran held a South Korean oil tanker for months in 2021 amid the dispute.

Najafi said South Korea’s failure to resolve the issue could prompt Tehran to reconsider bilateral ties, according to his ministry.

Najafi also took issue with separate comments by Yoon on North Korea and questioned whether South Korea is considering acquiring its own nuclear weapons in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a suggestion Lim dismissed as “groundless.”

In a meeting with defense officials in Seoul last week, Yoon entertained the possibility of South Korea pushing for a redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons or seeking a deterrent of its own if North Korea’s growing nuclear threat gets out of control.

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But Yoon made clear those scenarios weren’t part of his official policy and emphasized his “realistic” goal of strengthening South Korea’s defense under its alliance with the United States, including joint military planning potentially involving U.S. assets, and boosting the South’s own capability to retaliate to deter North Korean attacks.

“The comments of our president were intended to (emphasize the importance) of strengthening the effectiveness of the (U.S.) extended deterrence to counter North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile threats,” Lim said, referring to the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea with the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear ones.

“Our country has been sincerely carrying out our nonproliferation obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and there has been no change to our willingness to carry out those obligations,” Lim said.

Yoon’s comments during his UAE visit, which have been criticized by his political opponents at home as “diplomatically disastrous,” came as the UAE attempts to hedge in its relationship with Iran, a major business partner. The UAE also is home to around 3,500 American troops at Al Dhafra Air Base, a naval outpost in Fujairah and other locations.

The UAE has spent billions of dollars purchasing South Korean surface-to-air missile systems in part of efforts to protect itself against aerial threats. Those threats include long-range drone attacks by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels — weapons likely built by Iran or with Tehran’s help.

Kim Tong-hyung

Kim Tong-hyung reported for the Associated Press from Seoul, South Korea.

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thediplomat.com · by Kim Tong-hyung · January 20, 2023

7. Food Insecurity in North Korea Is at Its Worst Since the 1990S Famine

I know I am beating a dead horse ( or sounding like chicken little who worries about the sky falling), but we need to be very observant for indicators of instability and we need to be reviewing and updating contingency plans for north Korean internal instability and the possibility for regime collapse.

Kim Jong Un has created a situation that could be far worse than the Arduous March of 1994-1996.

Graphs and charts at the link.

Food Insecurity in North Korea Is at Its Worst Since the 1990s Famine

BY: LUCAS RENGIFO-KELLER
JANUARY 19, 2023

https://www.38north.org/2023/01/food-insecurity-in-north-korea-is-at-its-worst-since-the-1990s-famine/

Source: Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)

North Korea is dealing with a complex humanitarian emergency that has food insecurity at its core.[1] As of August 2022, both quantity and price data point to a deteriorating situation, made worse by the regime’s choice to self-isolate in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Food availability has likely fallen below the bare minimum with regard to human needs, and on one metric, is at its worst since the country’s famine in the 1990s. The Kim regime has insisted on maintaining a failed economic model and remains committed to its nuclear program. For these reasons, the amount of diplomatic leverage conferred by aid may be minimal. Resolving North Korea’s chronic food insecurity would require, among other things, strengthening property rights, opening and revitalizing the industrial and service sectors of the economy, and embracing an export-oriented model. The regime, which fears internal competition and its own demise, has so far proved itself unwilling to pursue such reforms.

Economic Mismanagement and Hunger

North Korea is no stranger to mass hunger. During the 1990s, the country suffered a catastrophic famine. Estimates vary widely, but it’s believed that anywhere from 600,000-1 million people, or about three to five percent of the prefamine population, died as a result.[2] North Korea’s chronic food insecurity is the product of decades of economic mismanagement and the internal and external policies of the incumbent political regime. Throughout its history, North Korea has pursued the goal of national food security through an economically irrational policy of self-sufficiency. In a narrow sense, the approach has worked in that most of the grain consumed in North Korea is produced domestically. However, achieving adequate agricultural output in North Korea’s unfavorable soils has, ironically, generated a heavy reliance on imported goods and left the country exposed to global shocks, diplomatic conflicts, and adverse weather.[3] Furthermore, the state’s arbitrary crackdowns on independent donju (entrepreneurs) blunt incentives and starve the economy of investment and growth.

North Korea responded to COVID-19 by self-isolating and severely limiting internal movement, which worsened its food insecurity. It used armed troops to close its borders to people and trade beginning in January 2020, which further disrupted an economy that was already under stress from chronic mismanagement and multilateral sanctions. The regime apparently failed to secure enough paper and ink from China to print its own money; since the fall of 2021, it has been forced to issue nearly worthless scrip, or money coupons, introducing confusion and distorting currency markets. Furthermore, as of June 2022, the border shutdown appears to have failed as the country admitted to there being a major outbreak of the virus amidst its malnourished, unvaccinated population. The war in Ukraine is an additional stressor by—at least temporarily—driving up global prices of food, energy and fertilizer. China’s recent decision to abandon its zero-COVID policies will likely increase global demand and may raise commodity prices further.

Due to the pressures of economic mismanagement, North Korea’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and rising global prices, food insecurity once again appears to be deepening. In April 2021, in a speech to the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Cell Secretaries, Kim Jong Un invoked the “Arduous March”—code for the 1990s famine. He returned to the food security theme in his December 2021 address before the WPK’s Central Committee, eschewing belligerence and emphasizing the central goal of rehabilitating the country’s rural economy and achieving national food security in the long run.

However, North Korea’s secrecy impairs an honest assessment of humanitarian needs. This piece aims to fill those gaps by triangulating quantity, price and other forms of evidence to assess the country’s food insecurity. The author of this paper has concluded that the grain balance estimates produced by the United Nations (UN) are implausible as they indicate that North Korea has avoided famine in only two of the last 25 years. The substitution of alternative estimates of local harvests and human consumption yields a more plausible yearly estimate, but even this more optimistic assessment indicates that as of the 2020-21 harvest cycle, the country’s food supply has probably failed to satisfy minimum human needs. Put simply, North Korea teeters on the brink of famine.

Food Insecurity in North Korea: A Graphical Analysis

Given the opaque nature of the regime, any assessment of the North’s food supply would be subject to some uncertainty. For this reason, this paper relies on several different data sources to arrive at reasonable estimates. Figure 1 shows two alternative estimates of North Korea’s grain balance. One line is constructed from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Programme (FAO/WFP) figures.[4] The other adjusts these estimates on both the demand and supply sides. On the supply side, the FAO production estimate has been replaced by the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) estimate of North Korean production, and the FAO’s estimate of imports has been replaced by the average taken from the UN COMTRADE, USDA and the FAO.[5] On the demand side, the FAO’s human consumption requirement is adjusted downward by 20 percent.[6] The adjusted estimate indicates that North Korea’s net grain balance has fallen below minimum human needs. It should be noted that the human needs consumption estimate is a lower bound in that food would have to be distributed equally across the population to avoid hunger, which is, practically speaking, inconceivable.

North Korean authorities regularly impede the collection and dissemination of price data, but several NGOs use informants to collect and report price data, some using cell phones connected to the Chinese cellular network. In addition, Seoul-based Daily NK and Osaka-based Asia Press consistently report data. These sources are widely used, including by the Korea Development Institute. Both sources point to a sharp increase in rice and corn prices, with corn prices increasing more than rice prices. As the price of rice—the country’s preferred grain—rises, households are forced to shift to cheaper, less preferred grains, such as corn, barley and millet, and, in the worst case, turn to grasses and foraging for other plant sources of food. Thus, the relative price of corn-rice can be interpreted as a signifier of household distress. Figure 2 shows an increase in the corn-rice relative price following the border closure in January 2020 and the issuance of scrip in the fall of 2021.

Figure 3 shows the 12-month average rolling price correlation between different cities. It suggests that the regime’s draconian border closures and limits on mobility have led to a disintegration of domestic prices across cities.[7] The law of one price, which states that prices tend to converge spatially in flexible, frictionless markets due to arbitrage pressures, has been broken. More specifically, prices in Hyesan have become unanchored from Sinuiju and Pyongyang. Since the main overland trade conduit runs from Sinuiju to Pyongyang, imports and/or aid may have helped to stabilize prices along this supply line (particularly regarding rice and Pyongyang being the politically privileged capital city), but not in more marginal areas, such as Hyesan.

Figure 3. Twelve-month Rolling Correlations of North Korean City Rice and Corn Prices

Figure 4 shows the data from Daily NK and Asia Press, along with global prices for rice and corn, respectively, as expressed in dollars using the parallel exchange rate. (In order to ensure greater comprehensibility, the separate Daily NK city figures have been averaged.) Two things are striking about these graphs: first, North Korean internal food prices appear to be higher than global prices—sometimes by a large margin. Second, this divergence significantly widened beginning in early 2021, thereby signaling a breakdown in the North Korean food supply.

Figure 4. Rice and Corn Prices in North Korea vs. the World

Conclusion

The evidence presented thus far points to a significant deterioration in living conditions and an ongoing complex humanitarian emergency with food insecurity at its core. The long-term solution to North Korea’s chronic food insecurity lies partly in a resolution of the nuclear issue —potentially bringing about significant economic sanctions relief, along with a less militaristic and revanchist position, as well as resumed trade with the US and its allies. The initiation of domestic economic reforms would unshackle the economy’s productive capacity and allow North Korea to export industrial products and tradable services, earn foreign exchange and import bulk grains on a commercially sustainable basis, just like its neighbors South Korea, Japan and China. However, the North Korean top brass has refused to adopt deep reforms, and for as long as that is the case, North Koreans will continue to live at the mercy of global shocks.

It appears the regime has finally acquired vaccines, albeit from an unknown source and only after repeatedly refusing offers of vaccines from multiple donors. It apparently embarked on a vaccination campaign in September 2022 with an unknown level of success. Even if one assumes a high vaccination rate, it’s worth noting that the pandemic is hitting an immunologically naïve population that is afflicted by hunger and extraordinarily high rates of tuberculosis. These deficiencies may constrain the country’s ability to re-open to international trade and the cross-border movement of people going forward. If China—a healthy, well-nourished country with a relatively high vaccination rate—is suffering significantly from the pandemic’s recent onslaughts, one can imagine how difficult it must be for North Korea.

Yet, despite these fundamental public health challenges, North Korea continues to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, having successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in December 2022. In fact, the regime had a record breaking year for missile launches amid a deadly pandemic and the threat of famine. Under such circumstances, it is understandable if countries either sought to steer aid toward more deserving recipients (e.g., the numerous countries that have more profound food emergencies) or to link the provision of humanitarian assistance with other diplomatic goals. In any event, the diplomatic leverage conferred by the granting of aid seems to be low. North Korea appears to be committed to its nuclear posture, and the lack of accountability allows the regime to prioritize its narrow militaristic goals to the detriment of its citizens’ living standards. This style of governance is in keeping with what Kim Jong Il, who presided over the country’s famine in the 1990s, once said: “One can live without candy, but one cannot live without bullets.”[8]

[1]
I would like to thank Dr. Marcus Noland, whose research I assisted and drew from.
[2]
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and Suk Lee, “Analysis on 2008 Census of North Korea and Problems,” Korea Development Institute, 2011, https://www.kdi.re.kr/kdi_eng/publications/publication_view.jsp?pub_no=12403.
[3]
Local conditions for agriculture are challenging: the land is largely mountainous, the ratio of population to arable land is high and the cold climate limits growing seasons and opportunities for double cropping. The main growing season accounts for roughly 90 percent of cereals production, though over half of potato production comes from an early season crop in the spring and is an important source of sustenance for the “lean months” preceding the main harvest.
To offset these natural limitations and maximize yields, the regime developed an agricultural system that is intensive in the use of industrial intermediates, which include fertilizer, insecticide and electrically driven irrigation systems that were originally installed by Soviet engineers. Agriculture was collectivized and subjected to a high degree of centralized bureaucratic control.
[4]
“Special Alert: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” The Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Programme (FAO/WFP), 1996-2021 The FAO uses selective field sampling to generate estimates of yields. However, due to the agency’s official status, it is diplomatically restricted from acknowledging official North Korean representations, although the final call is the FAO’s. This dynamic is important due to the fact that North Korea has shown a past tendency to understate supply during bad times in order to maximize assistance.
[5]
Unlike the FAO, the USDA and the (South) Korean Rural Development Administration (KRDA) do not have direct access to North Korea but are also free to ignore North Korea’s official figures. Instead, they primarily rely on satellite imagery, including thermal imagery, to estimate dry land crop yields, and in the case of the South Korean government, the operation of experimental farms that mimic North Korean agricultural techniques.
[6]
Heather Smith, “The Food Economy: Catalyst for Collapse?” in Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, ed. Marcus Noland (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998).
[7]
“Disintegration,” in this case, refers to when prices in different cities lose their anchor and begin moving independently. In a well-integrated market, this would not happen.
[8]
Jei Guk Jeon, “North Korean Leadership: Kim Jong Il’s Balancing Act in the Ruling Circle,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 768, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993617.

8. The US has a new nuclear proliferation problem: South Korea

I think we are getting ahead of ourselves. As I reflect on President Yoon's commanets and hen read the new CSIS report, I think all of this is likely laying the groundwork to return US nuclear weapons to the peninsula. So the ROK will not go nuclear itself but the US may honor the ROK demand to return nuclear weapons. With the growing public lack of confidence in US extended deterrence (e.g., Ukraine, Afghanistan withdrawal, etc - as irrational as it is to use those as examples). and the inability to actually "prove" we will use our deterrent capabilities when the time comes, the redeployment of US nuclear weapons to the peninsula may be the best way to shore up the confidence in extended deterrence as well as create another dilemma for Kim Jong Un.

The US has a new nuclear proliferation problem: South Korea

By Lauren Sukin | January 19, 2023

https://thebulletin.org/2023/01/the-us-has-a-new-nuclear-proliferation-problem-south-korea/

thebulletin.org · · January 19, 2023

US President Joe Biden participates in a joint press conference with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on May 21, 2022, in Seoul, South Korea. On January 11, 2023, President Yoon said that if North Korea’s nuclear threat continues to grow, his country will press the United States to redeploy nuclear weapons in the South, or else it may build a nuclear arsenal of its own. (Photo White House / Cameron Smith, via Wikimedia Commons)

Last week, Seoul officially put its nuclear option on the table, for the first time since 1991. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared the country would consider building its own arsenal of nuclear weapons if the threat it faces from nuclear-armed North Korea continues to grow.

It will.

North Korea launched over 90 missiles in 2022. Those tests accompanied a major revision in North Korea’s nuclear strategy, which now allows the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in the early stages of a crisis. Experts expect North Korea’s ramped-up nuclear aggression will continue into the new year. Many even expect Pyongyang to conduct a new nuclear test, which would be the country’s first since 2017 and a watershed event against a backdrop of global turmoil.

South Korea faces strong strategic reasons to continue developing its own nuclear arsenal. While the United States has tried to keep a lid on South Korea’s nuclear ambitions, few traditional nonproliferation or counterproliferation policies are well-poised to reverse the current nuclearization of the North. It’s time for a new approach.

South Korean nuclear ambitions. South Korea faces an increasingly capable nuclear adversary in its northern neighbor. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, first tested in 2006, has grown rapidly. The country now hosts dozens of nuclear weapons and continues to diversify its arsenal, building more sophisticated delivery capabilities, which include intercontinental missiles capable of reaching the United States. North Korea makes dozens of threats (usually against the United States) every month, many of them nuclear in nature. North Korea has been exceptionally belligerent lately, testing more nuclear-capable missiles in the past year than it did in the previous five years combined.

South Korea has a complicated relationship with its western neighbor, too. South Korea relies heavily on China for trade, but Seoul’s strong military alliance with the United States contributes to Chinese views of encirclement. So far, South Korea has walked a tightrope between its biggest military partner and biggest trade partner. But that won’t last. Most South Koreans consider that China will be their country’s biggest threat in the next 10 years.

South Korea has a troubled security environment, and the US security guarantee to South Korea is intended to make sure those threats don’t materialize. The guarantee offers reassurance that Seoul will be protected against any adversary. The guarantee is one of the United States’ strongest. The two countries boast significant military cooperation. The US military currently stations approximately 28,500 servicemembers in South Korea, regularly participates in large-scale military exercises with South Korean forces, and, under current policy, would fight under joint command with South Korean forces if a war were to break out.

But even with all this, the security guarantee doesn’t seem to be enough to keep down the bubble of proliferation advocates. Policymakers in South Korea have long called for a return of US tactical nuclear weapons, and a handful of more conservative politicians have occasionally suggested that the state would be better off with its own nuclear arsenal. Increasingly, this conversation has gone mainstream. The debate was even a key talking point and part of the conservative party platform in the last South Korean presidential election.

For years now, most South Koreans have supported the idea of the country building its own nuclear weapons. By 2022, such support had grown to over 70 percent. Russia’s continued use of nuclear threats in the Ukraine war may bring that number even higher, as nuclear anxiety grows. South Koreans are keenly aware that the United States and its allies have been effectively deterred by Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and they worry that a similar situation could repeat itself in Asia. Public support for South Korea building its own nuclear weapons has no doubt contributed to the policy’s rise out of the fringe and into the spotlight.

Is the US security guarantee enough? If South Korea is so concerned about nuclear threats from North Korea, a solution is to get reassurance that the United States will come to its aid in a fight against Pyongyang—or so the logic goes. But it isn’t that simple.

The United States and South Korea already have a tight-knit relationship, and faith in the US security guarantee is already high: At least 6 in 10 South Koreans are confident that the United States will fight with them against North Korea, if need be.

US politicians have regularly emphasized the criticality of the US-South Korean relationship, and the recent Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review made some usually heavy-handed promises in South Korea’s defense, even stating that “any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime. There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.”

“Midnight is upon us”—the Cuban Missile Crisis as seen at the time, in one person's words

But perhaps, a very credible security guarantee is just not enough—or perhaps it is even part of the problem. My research finds that, even when South Koreans have faith in the US alliance, many still don’t see it as a reliable solution to their perceived nuclear risks. In surveys, the more South Koreans believe the United States would use its nuclear weapons to defend them, the more they shy away from the US alliance and prefer that their own government build independent nuclear capabilities.

Although counterintuitive at first sight, the rationale is simple: Why would South Koreans trust the United States to be adequately cautious with its nuclear weapons—refraining from using them unless absolutely necessary? After all, the previous US president promised to rain down “fire and fury” on the Peninsula.

South Koreans have significantly higher levels of trust in their own government’s ability to make responsible nuclear choices than they do in an ally. Moreover, most South Koreans believe that their continued alliance with the United States will end up dragging Seoul into a nuclear war it otherwise could have avoided.

And understandably, South Koreans don’t want a nuclear war.

Any nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula—even if only North Korea were targeted—would likely have devasting environmental and health effects throughout the Peninsula. And Seoul is less than 200 kilometers (124 miles) from Pyongyang. Even in the event that North Korea invaded South Korea, most South Koreans still say in polls that they would prefer not to use nuclear weapons unless North Korea had already used them first.

Logically, South Koreans can’t take it for granted that this preference will be reflected in US policy. The US nuclear doctrine makes it clear that the United States carves out the right to “nuclear first use,” a tactic that involves launching nuclear weapons at an opponent before they have the chance to launch their own. Given that North Korea’s missiles can now reach the US homeland, any warfighting strategy for the United States is likely to prioritize destroying these assets—and a first strike would be the easiest way to accomplish that goal. For this reason, a credible US nuclear security guarantee alone won’t alleviate South Korea’s nuclear anxieties.

Build or borrow? President Yoon was quick to note that, even now, South Korea has options other than building its own nuclear arsenal. One of these is to request that the United States re-deploy some of its tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. The United States withdrew its South Korea-based arsenal of approximately 100 nuclear weapons in 1991 to move past the Cold War. No US nuclear weapons have been stationed in the country since.

The re-deployment of these weapons, however, would do little to resolve the core issues of the current crisis—and maybe quite the opposite. Deployed US nuclear weapons in South Korea would heighten North Korea’s fears that the United States is preparing for the decapitation strategy it so boldly announced in its recent National Defense Strategy. There is also a moral hazard: Having nearby US nuclear weapons may embolden some in South Korea to push back harder against North Korea’s threats, making tensions even worse.

Moreover, unless these weapons were operated under South Korean command—a contingency that is extremely unlikely—issues around transparency, cooperation, and trust in US nuclear planning would still remain.

Re-deploying nuclear weapons would certainly be a signal of US interest in defending South Korea, but what’s needed now is a combination of commitment and caution. Forthright communication about when and why nuclear weapons would be used, combined with clear indicators about how nuclear use will be avoided is more important for the United States than simply showing it has the muscles. Those have been on display for decades already.

Redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons would also leave South Korea vulnerable to many of the same risks as they would incur by building their own arsenal. In this sense, even opting for US redeployment over nuclear proliferation—although it may put less strain on the alliance in the short term—remains dangerous.

The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons would not resolve the domestic political pressures at play in South Korea. Polling from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs finds that two-thirds of South Koreans would prefer for their government to build its own nuclear weapons than to accept the re-deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons, while below 10 percent prefer US weapons over South Korean ones. Outright opposition to US tactical nuclear weapons is also strong—at 40 percent, compared to just 26 percent opposed to South Korea building its own nuclear weapons. These figures suggest that a different strategy is called for, one that recognizes the need for more South Korean agency in the nuclear planning process.

Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does North Korea have in 2022?

Can stopgaps succeed? If neither cementing the guarantee nor redeploying tactical nuclear weapons is the answer, what can the United States do instead? One option can be to fight back against South Korea’s urge to build nuclear weapons with tried-and-tested nonproliferation policies. Nonproliferation leverages both carrots—security guarantees intended to protect a vulnerable country from nuclear threats—and sticks—sanctions and other punishments intended to dissuade this country from building nuclear weapons. Understandably, the US approach with its allies generally prioritizes carrots, but that may not continue to work with South Korea.

Could, therefore, counterproliferation strategies succeed?

Well, they did in the 1970s. When former South Korean President Park Chung-Hee embarked on a covert nuclear weapons acquisition program, the United States responded by threatening to scale back its support for South Korea and to reduce its military presence there. The pressure from Washington was a key component of Park’s decision to end the program—although domestic politics and concerns about the country’s international reputation also contributed to that decision.

But what worked in the past may not work today. In the 1970s, South Korea didn’t face nuclear threats as obvious as those it faces in 2023. The withdrawal now of US forces would be much more likely to convince Seoul that the only way to stop North Korea is to deter Pyongyang on its own.

Studies of South Korean public opinion show that support for nuclear proliferation remains relatively high, even when it is well understood by the public that building nuclear weapons would have a significant cost to the quality of South Korea’s alliance with the United States. Threatening to walk away, then, might just leave the United States looking regretfully over its shoulder.

Other counterproliferation policies have had mixed results. Experts argue that the threat of sanctions can often dissuade countries not to pursue nuclear weapons. However, once sanctions are imposed, they do little to reverse existing programs. Instead, targeted countries adapt, and the isolation that sanctions produce can cement the perceived need for stronger, more independent military forces.

South Korea may already be past the point at which sanctions would be useful. Multiple studies have found that South Koreans who support nuclear proliferation are not deterred by the threat of sanctions. Instead, South Koreans already anticipate that proliferation would result in significant sanctions—yet they would support the policy anyway.

The expectation that proliferation would result in sanctions is probably correct. A South Korean nuclear weapons program would almost certainly violate the obligations to nuclear nonproliferation and the peaceful, civilian use of transferred nuclear technologies that Seoul agreed to when it signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. This agreement, which remains in force until 2040, currently bans uranium enrichment in South Korea, at least without prior approval, as well as some types of plutonium reprocessing. Those capabilities would be needed for a robust nuclear weapons program. Violating its nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States could therefore trigger sanctions against Seoul. It would even legally enable the United States to demand that technology transferred under the agreement be returned. This is unlikely to be sufficient to stop a South Korean nuclear program if Seoul committed to one, but it does emphasize that the United States—if it so chose—could levy very heavy costs.

The United States can also advance nonproliferation through leading by example. Making it clear to South Korea that the global nonproliferation regime is critical—and that a South Korean withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be unacceptable—could help dissuade Seoul. After all, the country is highly concerned with its hard-earned international reputation, and unilaterally leaving a major international treaty would be no small step.

The United States can also commit itself to policies that prioritize restraint and arms control. Demonstrating its ability to embrace a more cautious attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons may diminish some of the concerns about Washington’s willingness to escalate to nuclear use, and it would model valuable norms in the nuclear space—norms that could perhaps even help balance against the behavior of other nuclear countries.

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thebulletin.org · by François Diaz-Maurin · January 19, 2023

9. South Korea Grounds Its Position in the Central and East European Defense Market (Part One)

Beating the horse again, the South is now a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.

South Korea Grounds Its Position in the Central and East European Defense Market (Part One)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 10

https://jamestown.org/program/south-korea-grounds-its-position-in-the-central-and-east-european-defense-market-part-one/

By: Jakub Bornio

January 18, 2023 04:18 PM Age: 2 days

Korean K239 Chunmoo rocket artillery system (Source: Defense Post)

Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine has become a game-changer for the architecture of international security—and not only from a regional perspective. Most recently, it provided a window of opportunity for South Korean security and energy companies to deepen engagement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

Over the past few years, South Korea has witnessed rapid and spectacular growth in its arms exports. The country, which for 2017–2021 was the eighth-largest arms exporter accounting for 2.8 percent of the global share, increased the value of its exports by an enormous 177 percent as compared to 2012–2016 (Sipri.org, March 2022). What is more, as reported by the Korea Eximbank, this trend continued throughout 2022 and will most likely increase moving forward (Nikkei Asia, September 29, 2022). Yet still, for that period, only one-fourth of South Korea’s arms exports reached Europe, with the United Kingdom alone accounting for more than half of those imports (Armstrade.sipri.org, accessed January 15). This, however, may very well change as the war in Ukraine has pushed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to significantly and rapidly develop their military potential.

Already in June 2022, this shift began to materialize when Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak signed agreements for the purchase of 1,000 K2 main battle tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft from South Korea. The total net value of the contracts signed by Korean companies Hyundai Rotem, Hanwha Defense and Korea Aerospace Industries amounts to $8.77 billion. This bilateral cooperation intensified even more in October 2022, when Poland decided to purchase 218 K239 Chunmoo rocket artillery systems with logistics packages and ammunition supply worth $3.55 billion. All four deals represent the largest arms contracts in the history of the Korean military industry (Polskieradio.pl, August 27, 2022).

The scale of arms purchases from South Korea is also unprecedented from the Polish perspective. Their implementation—combined with other deals from American and domestic contractors—would make Poland one of the largest non-nuclear military powers in Europe. And this is strategically critical given the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and the necessity to deter Moscow on NATO’s eastern flank. What is more, if Warsaw is to continue further arms deliveries to Kyiv, replacements for the donated armaments are essential. Unquestionably, Ukraine needs such assistance as it is unlikely that the war will end soon. And Poland should have the ability to sustain this aid as the Technical Modernization Plan announced in 2019 assumes that the Polish military plans to replace the vast number of post-Soviet armaments still in its arsenal, including T-72 tanks and their Polish-developed PT-91 tanks (Polska-zbrojna.pl, October 10, 2019). Around 300 of these tanks are left after Poland donated more than 200 to Ukraine. This shift is even more likely as it is counterproductive to keep four active types of tanks in the Polish arsenal. What could come next, in this context, is the replacement of the post-Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) with the Korean-manufactured AS-21 Redback. This IFV was already tested by the Polish Armed Forces in late 2022 (Pap.pl, Nov 26, 2022).

In Poland, the South Korean offer was seen favorable for several reasons. To begin with, the Korean industry offers a rapid pace of manufacturing and deliveries. The first batch of 10 K2 tanks and 24 K9 self-propelled howitzers were already delivered to Poland in December 2022. Another “gap-filling” delivery of 180 K2 tanks will be deployed by 2025 and an additional 24 K9 howitzers by the end of 2023 (Dziennikzbrojny.pl, July 24, 2022). Warsaw expects the first 12 FA-50s to be delivered by mid-2023 (Yonhap News Agency, July 28, 2022).

In truth, the speed of delivery was one of the key arguments for the K239 Chunmoo deal as well. At first, Poland wanted to purchase 500 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), but when it became obvious that such a giant supply would be impossible in such a tight timeframe, Warsaw decided to proceed with the deal for the Korean alternative. The first batch of Chunmoo systems is expected to reach Poland sometime in 2023. Furthermore, such large-scale contracts include beneficial offset agreements. Delivery for the rest of the tanks are planned to start in 2026 and will include modernized and partly “Polonized” equipment in its K2PL version. The K2PL will be largely manufactured in newly established industrial plants in Poland. This will trigger the transfer of know-how and technologies from South Korea, which would improve the production and service capacities of the technically backward and long-neglected heavy military industry in Poland (Defence24.pl, September 23; December 9, 2022). That, in turn, would create logistical facilities that are not only essential for maintenance but could also provide an opportunity to become South Korea’s production hub for further arms deliveries to Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

A great example of this is Hanwha Defense’s aims to combine its potential with the Polish Armaments Group (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa) in the production of the K9 howitzer. To this end, the new K9PL version will be produced in Poland starting in 2026. These two companies have already enjoyed some past cooperation, as Hanwha Defense has supplied the K9 Thunder chassis for the AHS Krab self-propelled howitzer designed in Poland. The Krab’s generally successful production, however, cannot meet the urgent requirements of the Polish Armed Forces due to the Polish Armaments Group’s low production capacity, which is only now being boosted. Nevertheless, the Polish Ministry of Defense continues to expand the purchase of home-grown howitzers (Defence24.pl, September 5, 2022). In this context, it is interesting that the K9 and Krab systems may be merged into one project, starting with development work in 2025–2026 (Dziennikzbrojny.pl, July 24, 2022).

Additionally, in striking these deals with Poland, South Korea had a “doctrinal” predominance that resulted from the Law and Justice–led government’s decision to resign from any major military purchases with its European partners. This policy has been only recently reversed as Poland acquired two observation satellites and a receiving station from French Airbus (Notes From Poland, December 29, 2022). One should not exclude, however, that such a deal may have been a one-off.

A few factors undergird such reasoning. Poland’s policy of not buying Western European weapons was politically motivated and most likely resulted from Warsaw’s distrust of some Western European states, including France. This distrust was caused by Western Europe’s decades-long ambiguous policy toward Russia, which has only started to dissipate following Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, given the Polish policy of putting all its eggs in the American basket, South Korea is a political beneficiary of its close ties with the United States.

Finally, these arms purchases were in fact a “package deal.” On October 31, 2022, the Polish Energy Group (Polska Grupa Energetyczna) signed a deal on developing a nuclear plant with South Korean state-owned Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP). What is more, KHNP vice director added that the offer included additional investments in the semiconductor, battery and hydrogen industries (Energetyka24.pl, July 22, 2022). Additionally, the Korean offer was much cheaper that its, for example, German equivalent (Nikkei Asia, September 9, 2022).

As Russia’s war against Ukraine moves into a more protracted phase, the Korean-Polish deal represents only the tip of the iceberg for the overall impact South Korea’s arms exports could have for defense and security in Central and Eastern Europe.

10. Yoon reaffirms commitment to nuclear treaty in Davos

For all those wringing their hands about worries that South Korea is going to go nuclear. If the US decides to redeploy nuclear weapons, President Yoon may be the catalyst for doing so. Or perhaps the ROK and the US have been coordinating this as an information and influence activities campaign to support the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula.

Yoon reaffirms commitment to nuclear treaty in Davos | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · January 20, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol reaffirmed South Korea's commitment to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), saying it would be "realistic" and "rational" to abide by the nuclear treaty.

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Yoon said he remains committed to working closely with Washington against North Korea's nuclear threats.

"I can assure you that the Republic of Korea's realistic and rational option is to fully respect the NPT regime," Yoon was quoted as saying, referring to South Korea by its official name. "I'm fully confident about the U.S.' extended deterrence."

For this goal, he said the two countries are "preparing a stronger joint planning and joint execution in operating the U.S. nuclear assets on the Korean Peninsula."

The remarks came after Yoon hinted at the possibility of Seoul's own nuclear armament as a way to defend the nation during a policy report by the foreign and defense ministers earlier this month.

A presidential official later explained the comment should be understood as Yoon "stating his firm commitment amid the escalating threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons."

The WSJ assessed that Yoon "dialed back" his remarks on developing Seoul's own nuclear weapons.

On Japan's push to strengthen its military capacity, Yoon said he understands the move and emphasized the importance of trilateral security cooperation.

"I believe that trilateral cooperation is very important, and, in this regard, I don't see many problems about Japan strengthening their own capabilities."

On the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act that is feared to hurt South Korean automakers, like Hyundai Motor Co. and Kia Corp., in the U.S. market, Yoon said the most important issue would be the "actual execution of law and relevant provisions," and to make sure Korean firms won't be "exposed to too much risk."

Yoon said he would like to visit China for a meeting with his counterpart, Xi Jinping, but did not elaborate on a possible date.

President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 19, 2023. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · January 20, 2023

11. South Korea Leader Dials Back Comments on Developing Nuclear Weapons

If we see the return of US nuclear weapons we will be able to credit not only Kim Jong Un for providing the justification but Presint Yoon for the influence campaign to make it happen.

South Korea Leader Dials Back Comments on Developing Nuclear Weapons

Yoon Suk Yeol says in an interview at Davos that his focus is on working with the U.S. on North Korea proliferation

https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-leader-dials-back-comments-on-developing-nuclear-weapons-11674154870?mod=world_lead_pos2

By Matt MurrayFollow

Jan. 19, 2023 2:01 pm ET

DAVOS, Switzerland—South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol dialed back recent remarks that Seoul could develop its own nuclear weapons, saying in an interview that his focus is on working closely with the U.S. on North Korean proliferation.

Noting that South Korea, a nonnuclear nation, is part of the decades-old Non-Proliferation Treaty aimed at curbing nuclear arms, Mr. Yoon said: “I can assure you that the Republic of Korea’s realistic and rational option is to fully respect the NPT regime…I’m fully confident about the U.S.’s extended deterrence.”

Mr. Yoon said earlier this month after a meeting with defense officials that South Korea might develop its own nuclear weapons if North Korea doesn’t halt its weapons program. That prospect has long been opposed by U.S. officials and would inflame already strained relations with North Korea, though polls show it is favored by a majority of South Koreans.

Mr. Yoon emphasized his country’s close focus with the U.S. and Japan on contingencies and planning for the U.S. nuclear umbrella as North Korea expands its arsenal, which includes the development of drones and short-range ballistic missiles widely seen as a direct threat to South Korea.

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“We are preparing a stronger joint planning and joint execution in operating the U.S. nuclear assets on the Korean Peninsula,” he told The Wall Street Journal in Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.

Mr. Yoon said he understood Japan’s renewed push to bolster its military for self-defense, describing those efforts as inevitable in its effort to strengthen its security given growing threats in the region.

He emphasized that Japan, whose 20th-century occupation of Korea remains a historical sore point, is working with the U.S. and South Korea to deter Pyongyang, saying: “I believe that trilateral cooperation is very important and, in this regard, I don’t see many problems about Japan strengthening their own capabilities.”

Mr. Yoon also said South Korea would continue to strengthen its ability to counter such asymmetric North Korean capabilities as cyberwar and intelligence. And he said he saw little chance currently that Pyongyang would abandon its weapons program.

South Korea is one close U.S. ally whose economy could face hits from recently passed laws in the U.S. The bill dubbed the Inflation Reduction Act subsidizes electric vehicles assembled in the U.S., which could hurt South Korean auto makers, while the Chips Act aims to limit semiconductor sales to China, Seoul’s biggest trading partner, while bolstering manufacturing in the U.S. South Korea sees semiconductors as a central industry and the U.S. law as a potential competitive challenge.

Mr. Yoon said the U.S. and South Korea have been discussing guidelines on the IRA and he is confident that agreements can be reached that protect South Korean companies. The Chips Act, he said, “is a complicated issue, but what is most important is that in the actual execution of the law and relevant provisions, we will do our best so that Korean companies won’t be exposed to too much risk.”

Mr. Yoon also said he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had agreed to visit one another’s countries during a meeting at the G-20 in Indonesia in November, but declined to share timing on possible visits. “At an appropriate date I would like to pay a visit to China,” he said.

Appeared in the January 20, 2023, print edition as 'Seoul Curbs Talk of Nuclear Weapons'.

12. S. Korean Army chief to visit U.S. for talks with American counterpart

S. Korean Army chief to visit U.S. for talks with American counterpart | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · January 20, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park Jeong-hwan will depart for the United States later this week for talks with his U.S. counterpart and other officials on bilateral defense cooperation, his office said Friday.

His nine-day trip that runs through Jan. 29 has been arranged under a program inviting top commanders of U.S. allies, according to the Army.

During the trip, Park plans to meet with senior U.S. military officials, including Army Chief of Staff Gen. James C. McConville, for talks on security coordination and other issues.

"The purpose of this visit is to solidify the South Korea-U.S. alliance, the linchpin of our security, and expand and deepen the scope of exchange and cooperation between the two countries' Armies," the armed service said in a statement.

Park also plans to visit key U.S. Army units, including the Futures Command and the Training and Doctrine Command.

At the units, Park is expected to hold talks on developing future-oriented ties between the two countries' armies, such as sharing advanced science technologies and combat development systems, as well as expanding combined exercises and people-to-people exchanges, according to the South Korean Army.

This file photo, provided by the Army on Jan. 12, 2023, shows the armed service's Chief of Staff Park Jeong-hwan (C) inspecting the operational posture of border guards at the inter-Korean border. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · January 20, 2023

13. North Korea passes new defense budget

North Korea passes new defense budget

Defense News · by Kim Tong-Hyung, The Associated Press · January 19, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament has passed a budget that sustains a high level of defense spending, despite the country’s economic troubles as leader Kim Jong Un pushes for an aggressive expansion of his nuclear arsenal.

State media reports indicated Kim didn’t attend the Supreme People’s Assembly’s two-day session that ended Wednesday. Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency didn’t mention any comments by assembly members toward the United States or South Korea in Thursday’s report on the meetings.

The assembly convened weeks after Kim called for an “exponential increase” of nuclear warheads, mass production of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons targeting “enemy” South Korea and the development of more advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to reach the U.S. mainland.

His statements during a major political conference in December underscored an intensifying nuclear standoff with the United States and its allies in Asia after he pushed North Korea’s weapons tests to a record pace in 2022.

The North fired more than 70 missiles last year, including multiple ICBM launches, and conducted a series of tests it described as simulated nuclear attacks on South Korean and American targets.

Analysts say Kim’s aggressive arms expansion and escalatory nuclear doctrine are aimed at forcing the United States to accept the idea of North Korea as a nuclear power and to gain leverage in negotiations for economic and security concessions.

KCNA said the assembly’s members projected overall state spending would increase by 1.7% this year but made no mention of the actual size of the budget.

See the weapons on display during North Korea’s latest parade

One of the weapons showcased at the brightly illuminated Kim Il Sung Square was North Korea’s biggest and newest ICBM, the Hwasong-17.

By Kim Tong-hyung, AP and Hyung-jin Kim, AP

The assembly’s members devoted 15.9% of this year’s national budget to defense spending, the same proportion as last year, to support efforts on “further bolstering up the war deterrence both in quality and quantity” and “defending the dignity and security of the country and the people,” KCNA said.

It’s difficult to gauge how much money North Korea would be spending on its military capabilities, considering the poor quality of the limited statistics it discloses.

According to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers” report, North Korea possibly spent around $4 billion on defense in 2019, which would have amounted to 26% of its estimated gross domestic product, the highest proportion among 170 countries it reviewed.

Experts say North Korea’s weapons development is driven by a Soviet-style party-military complex where the ruling party leadership surrounding Kim exercises full control over defense industries and faces scant constraints in concentrating national resources on arms capacities.

KCNA’s report on the assembly meetings hinted that North Korea was struggling to revive a moribund economy battered by mismanagement, U.S.-led sanctions over Kim’s nuclear ambitions, and COVID-19-related border closures.

Finance Minister Ko Jong Bom lamented unspecified shortcomings in raising tax revenues from state companies. He urged economic workers to strengthen their “ideological resolve” and put broader national interests ahead of the interests of their own units, KCNA said.

Ko said this year’s budget should be “implemented without fail” to financially support efforts to bolster the country’s defense capabilities and economy. He said 45% of this year’s budget would be spent on a huge umbrella category covering efforts for “developing the economy and improving the people’s standard of living.”

North Korean officials have described 2023 as a crucial year for accomplishing Kim’s economic goals set under a five-year development plan that goes through 2025.

The pandemic, which significantly slowed progress, forced North Korea to shield its poor health care system with strict border controls that reduced trade with China — its main ally and economic lifeline — and decimated domestic industrial production that heavily relies on imported materials.

During the December political conference, ruling party members identified key economic projects for 2023, highlighted by construction and agricultural activities, which are less dependent on trade.

The assembly’s members also passed a new law aimed at protecting the “cultured” dialect specific to the capital Pyongyang region, apparently a move to stem South Korean and foreign cultural influences.

They also discussed strengthening the surveillance activities of the Central Public Prosecutors Office to establish a “revolutionary law-abiding spirit,” reflecting the determination of Kim’s government to exert control of the people in the face of deepening economic challenges.

Kim last appeared at the assembly in September, when he declared his country would never abandon the nuclear weapons he clearly sees as his strongest guarantee of survival. The assembly passed legislation authorizing preemptive nuclear attacks in a broad range of scenarios where it may perceive its leadership as under threat, including conventional clashes or conflicts that wouldn’t necessarily amount to war.

Alarmed by the growing North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea and Japan are scrambling to strengthen their defenses in line with their alliances with the United States.

In an interview with The Associated Press last week, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said his government was discussing with the Biden administration joint military planning potentially involving U.S. nuclear assets.

The allies plan to hold a tabletop exercise next month to sharpen their responses if North Korea uses a nuclear weapon. Yoon’s government has also said it would urge Washington to deploy strategic military assets near the Korean Peninsula more often.

In December, Japan made a major break from its strictly self-defense-only post-World War II principle, adopting a new national security strategy that includes the goals of acquiring preemptive strike capabilities and cruise missiles to counter growing threats from North Korea, China and Russia.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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