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Quotes of the Day:
“The good man does not grieve that other people do not recognize his merits. His only anxiety is lest he should fail to recognize theirs.”
- Confucius
"A thankful heart is not only the greatest virtue, but the parent of all the other virtues."
- Cicero
"Prejudices, it is well known, are most difficult to eradicate from the heart whose soil has never been loosened or fertilized by education; they grow there, firm as weeds among rocks."
- Charlotte Brontë
1. U.S. diplomat calls for world not to stay silent on N. Korean human rights
2. Slow Boil: What to Expect from the DPRK in 2024
3. Is Diplomacy Between the U.S. and North Korea Possible in 2024?
4. U.S. calls on N. Korea to refrain from 'provocative' actions after claimed underwater nuclear weapons system test
5. EXPLAINED: Is North Korea Preparing for War?
6. 'Beyond Utopia' sheds light on NK defectors' quest for freedom
7. North Korea Tests New Solid IRBM With MaRV Payload
8. Relitigating the Past: How to Overcome Recent Court Cases and Strengthen the Japan-South Korea Relationship
9. Heard in Davos: What we learned from the WEF in 2024
10. Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say
11. Nuclear Consultative Group: What should be done in 2024?
12. ‘If I don’t have a dream, what on Earth is the point of living?’
1. U.S. diplomat calls for world not to stay silent on N. Korean human rights
We attended the screening of "Beyond Utopia" yesterday at the State Department. Despite the snow conditions there was a good turnout of "true believers" who support human rights in north Korea.
I cannot recommend strongly enough that everyone that people see "Beyond Utopia." I know a lot has been written about it but it really is a must see film. One thing I learned yesterday (from producer Sue Mi Terry) is that the entire escape of the Roh family was filmed and is real footage with no recreation scene. This film confirms so much of what we have assessed and actually know about the Kim family regime, indoctrination, social status (Songbun), and more.
One other thing I learned yesterday is the paradox of resilience and resistance. We say that we need both - the resilience to survive in the face of oppression and occupation and the will and capability to resist tyrannical rule. As I have mentioned before I have asked many escapees why the Korean people in the north do not rise and revolt against the regime and resist the rule of the Kim family regime. The short answer is always that they do not know what to do or how to resist . They have no tools nor any examples of how to resist. The paradox of resistance and resilience to me is that the Korean people in the north possess the highest level of resilience - e.g., they have survived 7 decades of the most oppressive rule and crimes against humanity with the only parallel in severity and depravity being Nazi rule. Yet the Korean people in the north possess little to no capability to resist because they have no frame of reference to even develop the concepts of resistance. This is where the Korean people in the north need the most help. The only way change will occur on the Korean peninsula is through change inside north Korea and it is the Korean people in the north who need to create that change. We can only help them - we cannot do it for them - and we can do that through a human rights upfront approach and sophisticated and comprehensive information campaign.
(LEAD) U.S. diplomat calls for world not to stay silent on N. Korean human rights | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 20, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS photo, more remarks in paras 15-16)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 19 (Yonhap) -- A senior U.S. diplomat made an emphatic call Friday for the international community not to remain silent about human rights abuses in North Korea, as "Beyond Utopia," an Oscar short-listed film on North Korean defectors, was screened at the State Department in Washington.
Uzra Zeya, the under secretary of state for civilian security, democracy and human rights, made the call at the film screening event intended to shine a light on the treacherous journeys North Korean defectors make in desperate search for freedom outside the reclusive North.
Directed by Madeleine Gavin, the documentary features the heart-wrenching story of two North Korean defector families who escaped the North before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
"We in the United States cannot sit by and do nothing. We must act to improve the lives of North Koreans because they deserve better," Zeya said at the event attended by diplomats, students, activists and North Korean defectors.
She added, "The international community must not stay silent about these abuses. We will continue to raise awareness of these issues and press for accountability for those responsible."
Uzra Zeya, the U.S. under secretary of state for civilian security, democracy and human rights, speaks before the screening of "Beyond Utopia," an Oscar short-listed film on North Korean defectors, at the State Department on Jan. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)
The official noted that this year marks 10 years since the landmark U.N. Commission of Inquiry report laid bare human rights violations by the North Korean regime.
"(The report) found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed and are ongoing," she said. "In the intervening decade, the human rights situation in the DPRK has only gotten worse."
DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Zeya also emphasized the need for unceasing efforts to urge Pyongyang to honor human rights of its people.
"We in the United States continue to call upon (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un and the DPRK regime to respect the human rights of North Koreans to allow North Koreans freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association and freedom of religion and belief," she said.
The under secretary also touched on the North's release in December of its own rights white paper that accused the West of violating human rights while dismissing criticism of its own dire conditions.
"We call upon the DPRK to come to the negotiation table where we are prepared to open a conversation about human rights and fundamental freedoms ... We're ready to talk about our own human rights record," she said.
Ambassador Julie Turner, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, led the screening event. She expressed hope that the film would galvanize more support for North Korean refugees from the general public.
"This film does an amazing job of capturing the difficult journey that North Korean refugees have to take in order to benefit from the same freedom that you and I have every day," she said. "We'll hopefully inject some new energy around the conversation focused on North Korean human rights."
Ambassador Julie Turner, U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, speaks before the screening of "Beyond Utopia," an Oscar short-listed film on North Korean defectors, at the State Department on Jan. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)
Joining the event virtually, Lee Shin-wha, South Korea's ambassador-at-large for international cooperation on North Korean human rights, expressed concern that North Korean human rights issues could be eclipsed by other ongoing global issues.
"In the context of the world's attention being drawn to crises such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, it is crucial to ensure that the issue of North Korean human rights does not turn into a forgotten crisis or what I call overburdened neglect," she said.
Lee Shin-wha, South Korea's ambassador-at-large for international cooperation on North Korean human rights, speaks virtually before the screening for "Beyond Utopia," an Oscar short-listed film on North Korean defectors, at the State Department on Jan. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)
'Beyond Utopia" has been shortlisted for Best Documentary Feature at the 2024 Oscars. It also won the Audience Award for U.S. Documentary at the Sundance Film Festival last year.
In an effort to raise public awareness, South Korea's foreign ministry also held an event screening the film with the attendance of over 100 ministry personnel in October.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 20, 2024
2. Slow Boil: What to Expect from the DPRK in 2024
Please go to the link to view the 3 charts with some interesting data. https://www.csis.org/analysis/slow-boil-what-expect-dprk-2024?utm
I do wish we would consider that slow boil that may be taking place inside north Korea and that could be internal instability that poses an existential threat to the regime.
And with Kim's recent pronouncements about reunification I think there is a real opportunity for a change to a US, ROK/US Alliance, and a trilateral strategy from JAROKUS (Japan, ROK, and the US).
It can be the Be Nice until it time to not be nice strategy that is Three Plus One - the three being a human rights up front approach, an aggressive, sophisticated, and holistic information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea (to solve the "Korea question") that rests on the foundation of the strong possible military capabilities and readiness of the ROK/US alliance with trilateral cooperation with Japan.
But we need to be very wary about the internal conditions in north Korea and what may result from them, e.g., war or regime collapse.
Slow Boil: What to Expect from the DPRK in 2024
csis.org · by Commentary by Victor Cha and Andy Lim Published January 16, 2024
Photo: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images
Though it appears things could not get any worse with Kim Jong-un, CSIS Korea Chair analysis indicates there will likely be an uptick in North Korean belligerence in 2024. North Korea exhibits a tendency to ramp up provocations during U.S. election years. While diplomacy could stave off some of the violence, Kim Jong-un has rejected all calls from the Biden administration to meet. Instead, the regime has more than doubled the number of tests since 2021, compared to under the previous U.S. administration. A Trump victory in November could conceivably reduce North Korean provocations and increase South Korean talk about going nuclear at the same time.
Slow Boil
There has been secular growth in North Korean provocations and missile testing over the past four U.S. administrations (see Figure 1). These have accelerated further over the past three years, representing a 112 percent increase of North Korean testing over the previous U.S. and South Korean administrations (see Figure 2).
Remote Visualization
The higher volume of testing over the past three years is due to a number of factors. One reason could be scientific and related to development and perfecting of weapons systems. That is, North Korea has an accelerated program of experimental testing for each class of missile it is developing—the latest instance being the January 14 test of an alleged intermediate range ballistic missile with a hypersonic warhead vehicle. A second cause for the frequency of demonstrations could be related not to developmental testing but to operational exercising of the short- and longer-range missile capabilities. We have seen North Korea carry out, for example, a series of short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launches, in conjunction with bomber runs. This is not experimental testing—rather, it is exercising of war plans. A third reason could be related to diplomacy (or lack thereof). A study by CSIS found that periods of sustained U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) bilateral diplomacy coincide with a relatively lower number of provocations compared with periods when diplomacy is absent.
Fasten Your Seat Belts
There is reason to believe that North Korean belligerence will increase in 2024. North Korea tends to ramp up provocations in U.S. election years. According to CSIS data, the average number of provocations between January 1 of a major U.S. election year (defined as either a midterm election or presidential election) through the State of the Union speech by the elected or reelected president the following year has increased by 375 percent (or by over 4.5 times) during the Kim Jong-un regime when compared with the average number of provocations during the preceding government of Kim Jong-il (see Figure 3).
Remote Visualization
In addition, North Korea tends to ramp up provocations around U.S.-ROK military exercises when these exercises are preceded by a period of non-dialogue in U.S.-DPRK relations, according to a previous CSIS study. The United States and South Korea will carry out annual major military maneuver exercises in the first quarter of the year, which is likely to be preceded or followed by North Korean provocations. Following on from the directives of the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral leaders’ summit at Camp David this past summer, moreover, the three allies plan to carry out the first named trilateral military exercise during the same time frame, which Pyongyang will almost certainly respond to.
All these patterns suggest 2024 will be a rocky year. This is not the fault of the Biden administration and its allies. North Korea has shown no interest in dialogue with the United States despite numerous efforts by the administration to make contact. White House officials informally count at least 20 occasions on which they have failed to elicit a response for dialogue without preconditions. Moreover, planned military exercises, whether bilateral or trilateral, are necessary to maintain the credibility of deterrence and hence peace on the peninsula.
For the Biden administration to set out a policy goal of staving off these provocations in 2024 would be effectively setting itself up for failure as North Korea is not interested in talking for now. Kim Jong-un’s New Year address has made clear his plan for least three more long-range rocket launches to put three more satellites into orbit.
Accepting that 2024 will see such provocations may sound too fatalistic of a choice for policymakers, but it also ensures that a unilateral lifting of sanctions or suspension of military exercises will not become wasted concessions that damage allied trust and defense readiness. Instead, the forthcoming provocations should serve as a platform for greater consolidation of U.S.-Japan-Korea security ties. This should not only include more and varied forms of trilateral exercising in missile defense, early warning data-sharing, intelligence-sharing, extended deterrence, and contingency planning but also consideration of a first-ever bilateral security declaration between Seoul and Tokyo. This could be along the lines of the first iteration of the Japan-Australia security declaration inked in 2007 which stated the common alignment on fundamental security principles. This might eventually build to a revised and more detailed declaration, just as Tokyo and Canberra did in 2022.
The United States could respond to ramped-up North Korean missile demonstrations with more pressure on China to regulate the behavior of its communist brethren. China reportedly has played a role in preventing the long-anticipated seventh nuclear test by the North. Although Beijing routinely maintains that its influence over Kim is limited, it jealously guards that influence whenever Pyongyang grows closer to other major powers in the neighborhood like the United States (Trump in 2018) or Russia (Putin today). In this regard, rampant missile shots by Kim could be used to motivate Xi Jinping to stop DPRK from further destabilizing China’s neighborhood through Kim’s recent and burgeoning military cooperation with Russia. Additional sanctions, if unable to organize through the UN Security Council, could be coordinated under the auspices of the G7 and the NATO + Asia Pacific Four (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand).
The Biden administration can pursue these policies in 2024 while still leaving open the prospects for diplomacy, however remote. Former U.S. diplomats have written on what could be put on offer as a form of “patient engagement” in return for a testing moratorium, human rights dialogue, and other threat reduction measures. Admittedly, this will not be easy.
What if Trump Wins in November?
A Trump victory in November could result in a decrease in North Korean provocations, but ironically, could also lead to an increase in South Korean support for acquiring its own nuclear weapons. Trump would likely befriend Kim Jong-un again and offer discontinuation of military exercises for a DPRK test ban. Indeed, the only year in which North Korea conducted no provocations was in 2018, when Trump made such a deal. This agreement, however, did little to achieve denuclearization and hurt allied military readiness.
At the same time, Trump's “America First” posture and his willingness to decouple intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats to the U.S. homeland from SRBM threats to nearby allies will undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and would retard much of the work accomplished by the Biden administration’s Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultative Group in shoring up the U.S. nuclear umbrella over its ally. Furthermore, Trump’s obsession with withdrawing troops from Korea (and from other allied bases) would rattle credibility in the U.S. security commitment. The result could be increased calls in South Korea among the public and policy elites for “going nuclear” regardless of the decreased tempo of North Korean provocations and missile exercises.
Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and holds the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Andy Sau Ngai Lim is an associate fellow with the CSIS Korea Chair.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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csis.org · by Commentary by Victor Cha and Andy Lim Published January 16, 2024
3. Is Diplomacy Between the U.S. and North Korea Possible in 2024?
We can execute the "Be nice until it's time to not be nice" strategy. As I have previously written
I am reminded of Patrick Swayze's character in the film Road House. If we want to be nice to north Korea then we need to be nice this way and follow this excellent advice (I think I might incorporate the Dalton Concept into a new alliance political warfare strategy - Be Nice to north Korea):
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Dalton: All you have to do is follow three simple rules. One, never underestimate your opponent. Expect the unexpected. Two, take it outside. Never start anything inside the bar unless it's absolutely necessary. And three, be nice.
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Dalton: I want you to be nice until it's time to not be nice.
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Dalton: If somebody gets in your face and calls you a c********r, I want you to be nice. Ask him to walk. Be nice. If he won't walk, walk him. But be nice. If you can't walk him, one of the others will help you, and you'll both be nice. I want you to remember that it's a job. It's nothing personal.
Is Diplomacy Between the U.S. and North Korea Possible in 2024?
Suppose the United States wished to have another run at diplomacy with North Korea. Is there a way forward? Arguably, yes. However, in the last year of the Biden administration, with a seriously contested election in the offing, it is hard to argue that the timing is just right.
The National Interest · by Robert Gallucci · January 11, 2024
North Korea has been on a different course in recent years than the path it seemed to follow in earlier decades. The transition from the Clinton-Bush administrations’ slow, drawn-out negotiations, interrupted by the North with bursts of provocation—sinking ships, shelling islands, shooting down helicopters, testing nuclear weapons—eventually evolved into something entirely different. Over the last three years, the North has shown no interest in protracted negotiations with the United States. Instead of provocations designed to draw attention and create bargaining chips, it has settled on steady, determined testing of long-range ballistic missiles to deter any attempt at regime change and acquiring fissile material for an expanded nuclear weapons arsenal to threaten “first use” of nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict.
The transition came after nearly a decade of a U.S. policy of “benign neglect” at the end of the Bush administration and over the Obama years. This was termed, at one point, “strategic patience,” but considered by many observers as just another version of containment: no negotiations, continued sanctions, and cultivation of our essential alliance relations. Then came the Trump administration, which started with a sharp rise in tensions, exchanges of threats and insults but rapidly evolved into summitry, marked by expressions of warm feelings that made it seem as though the two leaders could, indeed, “meet for lunch” and settle all that troubled relations between their two countries. That did not work out: the Trump administration was not up for “patient engagement,” and the North would eventually see that it was not.
So, the Biden team faced a wary North Korean leadership and a rapidly changing international scene. Asia was widely perceived as marked by a rising China and a fading America. Europe was the scene of a resurgent Russia, with only Ukraine to hold it back—the rest of Europe and the United States apparently prepared to accept Russian aggression if military assistance was not enough to prevent it. In this new world, the third generation of Kim leadership in North Korea has chosen to maintain relations with Beijing, embracing its essential role as a Chinese buffer state while aggressively improving its relations with Moscow, becoming a sort of arsenal of dictatorship.
Before reaching the unhappy conclusion that, since the prerequisites for diplomacy seem absent, we should expect “more of the same” in the coming year, it might be prudent to consider the possibility that we may not be so lucky. We should at least entertain the thought that nuclear war could break out in Northeast Asia in 2024.
How could that happen? Let’s count the ways. First, there’s everybody’s favorite crisis, the Taiwan contingency. Imagine a Beijing-perceived Taiwanese provocation leading to Chinese moves and prompting U.S. countermoves, with neither side certain how far the other is prepared to go. Yet, both sides intend to signal their determination not to back down. This is, roughly, U.S. policy. In this scenario, North Korea, with or without encouragement from China, acts to support China by issuing nuclear threats against U.S. assets and allies in Northeast Asia, posing for the United States the prospect of facing two nuclear weapons states in one theater—unless Russia chooses to make it three. Japan and South Korea have no nuclear weapons. They would depend on U.S. extended deterrence in this scenario, even though Seoul, at least, has no interest in becoming involved in a Taiwan contingency. This scenario requires serious thought because nation-states can be as opportunistic as their leaders.
In a less complicated scenario, imagine the North Korean leadership decides to use its nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery vehicles to compel South Korean compliance with the North’s political and territorial directives and to assure deterrence of U.S. intervention to honor its alliance with Seoul. It is essential in this scenario—and any others one might think of—that we understand what the United States would actually do is not the critical calculation. It is rather what the North Korean leadership believes it would do. The North may think that its developing ICBM capability will serve to not only deter a U.S. attempt at regime change but also undercut the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to its allies in Asia. That calculation might well determine whether or not nuclear war breaks out.
If we are truly concerned about the possibility of nuclear war, it is not enough to think through how deterrence might fail as North Korean and Chinese nuclear arsenals grow. One should consider the other ways a nuclear war might start, which have nothing to do with the failure of deterrence. Consider the possibility of an accidental or even an unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons by the North Korean military. They are, after all, relatively new to this “game” as compared to the other states with nuclear weapons. And North Korean rhetoric on its willingness to use its nuclear weapons should not give us confidence that this would be such a low-probability event.
Suffice it to say that the growing nuclear weapons arsenals in Northeast Asia, in the context of a competitive and even hostile political environment, should give us pause. At least, we should consider the risks we run when we make diplomacy a policy of last resort.
But suppose the United States wished to have another run at diplomacy with North Korea. Is there a way forward? Arguably, yes. However, in the last year of the Biden administration, with a seriously contested election in the offing, it is hard to argue that the timing is just right.
That said, it is not wrong to consider what it would take to attract Pyongyang to discussions with Washington. The answer is simple but not easy. The United States must genuinely seek normalization of relations and keep denuclearization as a longer-term goal rather than a first step in the process. On the table for initial discussion would be sanctions relief, the character of military exercises with the ROK, and improvements in the North’s human rights policies— something in which Pyongyang has shown interest in the past and is essential to normalization. Simple, perhaps, but not easy.
About the Author: Ambassador Robert Gallucci
Ambassador Robert Gallucci is currently a Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Special Envoy for the U.S. Department of State, focused on the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. He served as the chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and as Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission following the first Gulf War. Upon leaving public service, Ambassador Gallucci served as Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University for thirteen years before he became president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
The main image and intext images are from Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Robert Gallucci · January 11, 2024
4. U.S. calls on N. Korea to refrain from 'provocative' actions after claimed underwater nuclear weapons system test
We have to say this. But we cannot expect that this will have any effect on the Kim family regime.
(3rd LD) U.S. calls on N. Korea to refrain from 'provocative' actions after claimed underwater nuclear weapons system test | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 20, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with State Department comment)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 19 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Friday called on North Korea to refrain from further "provocative" and "destabilizing" actions, and to return to dialogue, after Pyongyang claimed to have tested an underwater nuclear weapons system under development.
The North's defense ministry said the country conducted an "important" test of the Haeil-5-23 system, denouncing this week's naval drills between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan as "reckless confrontation hysteria," according to the Korean Central News Agency.
"We call on the DPRK to refrain from further provocative, destabilizing actions and return to diplomacy," a State Department spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"In particular, we encourage the DPRK to engage in substantive discussions on identifying ways to manage military risks and create lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula," the official added, reiterating the U.S. harbors no hostile intent toward the North.
Commenting on the North's weapons test, John Kirby, the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said that the U.S. is in contact with South Korea.
"I don't have a lot of specific information. We're not in a position where we can validate those claims," Kirby told a press briefing.
"We're in touch obviously with our South Korean partners to see whatever information context they might have about that. So I can't verify the claims by the North," he added.
Kirby pointed out that if Pyongyang had actually tested the claimed weapon, it underscores the North Korean regime's continued provocations.
"There's little doubt that they continue to pursue advanced military capabilities to threaten their neighbors, to threaten the region," he said.
Regarding the North's hardening rhetoric against Seoul and Washington, Kirby stressed the need to take it "seriously."
"You have to take rhetoric like that seriously from a man in charge of the regime that continues to pursue advanced military capabilities, including nuclear capabilities," he said. "(North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un ought to focus more on feeding his people than on buying and purchasing advanced military capabilities."
Separately, a Pentagon spokesperson reiterated the U.S.' security commitment to South Korea and Japan.
"We have been very clear on the threat posed by the DPRK military programs, and our commitment to the defense of the ROK, Japan, and our commitment to uphold regional peace and stability," the spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency.
"We will continue to work with the both the ROK and Japanese governments to address the threats posed by the DPRK," the official added, noting the U.S. is monitoring North Korean activities. ROK stands for South Korea's official name.
From Monday through Wednesday, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan conducted trilateral naval drills that involved USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. The drills followed Pyongyang's latest launch of a hypersonic missile.
A set of file photos, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 8, 2023, show the North testing an underwater nuclear-capable attack drone named the Haeil from April 4-7. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 20, 2024
5. EXPLAINED: Is North Korea Preparing for War?
There are so many articles with similar headlines. I offer this one because it is published in the Kyiv Post in Ukraine. Even the Ukraine media thinks the topic is significant for the Ukrainian media and perhaps the Ukrainian people.
EXPLAINED: Is North Korea Preparing for War?
Pyongyang has long been developing nukes and missiles, and Kim has been waiting for an opportune moment to conduct his much-anticipated seventh nuclear test.
by AFP | January 19, 2024, 10:19 am | Comments ( 1)
kyivpost.com · January 19, 2024
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has declared the South his country’s “principal enemy”, jettisoned agencies dedicated to reunification and outreach, and threatened war over “even 0.001 mm” of territorial infringement.
But is the fiery rhetoric a sign of a real shift? AFP takes a look at what we know:
What’s happened?
After years of worsening ties, Pyongyang made it official this week: declaring Seoul its main enemy, abolishing agencies dedicated to reunification and threatening to occupy the South during war.
It’s a big shift, as “in the past when there was risk of an armed conflict, there was a back channel to keep it in control, but now there is none of that,” said Hong Min, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.
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North Korea has gotten rid “of any inter-Korean mechanisms to prevent conflicts from spiralling out of control,” he added.
“The North’s labeling of the South as its ‘principal enemy’ isn’t just rhetorical -- the words could carry into action.”
Will he invade?
Kim said he had no intention of starting a war -- but also none of avoiding one.
He’s declared he will no longer recognise the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas, known as the Northern Limit Line, and his military recently staged days of live-fire artillery drills in the area.
This has created “a growing possibility of the two sides getting into a military skirmish, which could lead to a wider conflict,” Hong said.
Other Topics of Interest
Unless bold and brave leadership is shown now, the world will find itself mired in a third war or face a period of calamitous, worsening change.
In addition, Pyongyang has been drawing closer to Moscow, including -- Washington and Seoul claim -- sending missiles for Russia’s war in Ukraine in exchange for help with their satellite program.
Seoul, for its part, has threatened a “multiple times stronger” response to any provocation, a hawkish approach that carries risks as an editorial in the Hankyoreh newspaper pointed out this week.
“It is never wise for both South and North Korea to take a no-prisoners approach in inter-Korea dealings,” it said.
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“As North Korea becomes more reckless, we hope that the government will focus its efforts... to manage the situation,” it added.
What’s next?
The two Koreas are now “at the highest probability of being dragged into armed conflict”, said Choi Gi-il, professor of military studies at Sangji University.
“Let’s say civilian and military casualties incur from a future Northern provocation. We target the point of origin with shells. But will we also strike them with air power?” he said.
In 2010, when the North shelled the remote South Korean border island of Yeonpyeong, killing four, Seoul’s F-16 jets were “in the air ready to strike but then-president Lee Myung-bak called it off” to avoid escalating the situation.
“But if we have a similar incident, there’s no guarantee that air power will not be used given hawkish calls” from Seoul’s administration, Choi said.
And Pyongyang’s response could see the peninsula “reach a full-fledged war in the worst case scenario,” he said.
No chance of rapprochement?
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The prospects for inter-Korean reconciliation have long been dim, but now Kim has told Seoul to its face that he views them as his number one enemy, Soo Kim, policy practice area lead at LMI Consulting and former CIA analyst, told AFP.
“He’s not only closed the door to rapprochement -- he’s put a padlock on it to make it clear to the South Koreans where he stands on their relationship,” she added.
But the new rhetoric from Pyongyang doesn’t necessarily “change the calculus for North Korea,” she said.
Pyongyang has long been developing nukes and missiles, and Kim has been waiting for an opportune moment to conduct his much-anticipated seventh nuclear test.
“These weapons weren’t developed overnight, and the Kim regime’s plans to use them as tools of coercion, threats, and bargaining have been their modus operandi for decades,” she added.
Why is Kim doing this?
Kim’s new messaging on South Korea “appears to be an ideological adjustment for regime survival, justifying Kim’s focus on nuclear missiles,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.
Despite years of Covid-linked border closures, and strict controls on the flow of information domestically, North Koreans “are increasingly aware of their country’s economic failings compared to South Korean successes,” he said.
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“So Kim is doubling down on military prowess against external threats for his domestic legitimacy,” he said.
South Korea is also set for a general election in April, where President Yoon Suk Yeol’s party is trying to win back control of the country’s parliament.
“Kim may also be trying to politically punish the Yoon administration for its policies toward Pyongyang ahead of South Korea’s legislative elections in April,” Easley said.
kyivpost.com · January 19, 2024
6. 'Beyond Utopia' sheds light on NK defectors' quest for freedom
An incredibly powerful documentary. Again, I commend this to anyone who has ever given a thought to north Korea and the suffering of the Korean people in the north.
'Beyond Utopia' sheds light on NK defectors' quest for freedom
The Korea Times · January 19, 2024
The actual cast members of the documentary film "Beyond Utopia" pose during a press conference held at CGV Yongsan I'Park Mall in Yongsan District, Seoul, Friday. Yonhap
Pastor Kim Sung-eun's rescue efforts highlighted in documentary
By Pyo Kyung-min
Narrating the harrowing journey of two families escaping North Korea in pursuit of freedom, the documentary film "Beyond Utopia" is set to make its long-awaited debut in South Korea later this month.
The film illuminates Kim Sung-eun, a pastor who, in the past decade, has rescued over 1,000 North Koreans fleeing their homes in search of improved living conditions. Offering a two-hour glimpse into the actual defection process, the film follows the Roh family and the son of another defector, Lee So-yeon, all aided by Kim.
To mark its official release, a premiere event on Wednesday welcomed the real-life protagonists, including Kim, Roh's family and Lee, to CGV Yongsan I'Park Mall in Yongsan District, central Seoul. The event also hosted Culture, Sports and Tourism Minister Yoo In-chon, press and some 300 other attendees.
Reflecting on his ongoing efforts, Kim shared that he had rescued seven more North Korean defectors just days before attending the event.
"Every walk in the jungle near the Vietnamese border feels like my last, yet I persevere, compelled by the sheer number of individuals reaching out for assistance," he said.
Culture, Sports and Tourism Minister Yoo In-chon, center, talks with the cast after attending the premiere event of "Beyond Utopia" at CGV Yongsan I'Park Mall, Yongsan District, Seoul, Wednesday. Yonhap
According to Kim, more than 50,000 North Koreans are currently detained in China, with over 200 people seeking his help.
"What constantly drives me to aid them lies in their role as living witnesses, capable of exposing the perils of communism and the dire human rights conditions of North Korea."
This is why Kim is especially satisfied with the South Korean release of "Beyond Utopia."
"Currently, in China, providing assistance to North Korean defectors is illegal; people are thrown in jail for helping them. The Chinese government, which should be speaking up about North Korean human rights issues, maintains a deliberate silence," he said.
"My hope is for this film to serve as a catalyst in enlightening not only the South Korean people but also the whole world on these matters, ultimately contributing to enhancing human rights for North Koreans."
Culture, Sports and Tourism Minister Yoo In-chon, left, claps during a premiere event of "Beyond Utopia," held at CGV Yongsan I'Park Mall, Yongsan District, Seoul, Wednesday. Yonhap
Directed by American filmmaker Madeleine Gavin, the documentary is a contender for the 96th Academy Awards' Documentary Feature Film category. It also earned international acclaim with an Audience Award at the 2023 Sundance Film Festival.
The film's authenticity was evident at the premiere, with every scene portrayed without exaggeration or distortion. The audience collectively experienced a range of emotions, from empathy to disbelief and gratefulness.
Lee's heart-wrenching story of separation from her son in North Korea moved many to tears with her poignant depiction of motherhood.
In a trembling voice, she articulated her "only wish."
"Through this movie, I aspire for the harsh reality of North Korea to face widespread criticism and I hope that one day, my son and I may reunite to share a meal together," Lee said.
Also present were the two young daughters of the Roh family. Roh Jin-hae, the eldest daughter, touched the hearts of those in attendance with her sincere aspirations and gratitude.
"I didn't expect such a large turnout," she said. "Observing all of you, I too harbor a dream — to grow into an admirable adult like yourselves, paying close attention to what is right."
"Beyond Utopia" will hit local theaters on Jan. 31.
The Korea Times · January 19, 2024
7. North Korea Tests New Solid IRBM With MaRV Payload
Excerpt:
Only a marginal improvement. Given the niche role IRBMs probably fill in Pyongyang’s operational plans, adding a solid-propellant system would provide only a marginal improvement. Solid-propellant missiles are safer and easier to operate in the road-mobile deployments used by the liquid HS-12 and the new IRBM, but North Korea has some 35 years of successfully operating road-mobile liquid missiles. Using the same first and second stages for the HS-18 ICBM and the new IRBM could offer logistical advantages, but devoting stage production to IRBMs would come at the cost of HS-18 production.
North Korea Tests New Solid IRBM With MaRV Payload
On January 14, North Korea conducted the initial flight test of its first solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The missile apparently used the first two stages of the Hwasong (HS)-18, a three-stage, solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Using booster stages that have already been developed for the HS-18 will expedite the development of this new missile. Based on past practice, it will likely be deployed after only one or two more flight tests.
The new missile carried a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) previously flown on smaller missiles in 2022, rather than a traditional reentry vehicle (RV). IRBM MaRVs, which can use their maneuverability to complicate missile defenses, make sense for Pyongyang, given ongoing US efforts to strengthen the missile defense of Guam, which is at least 3,300 kilometers (km) from North Korea. If the IRBM is intended for deployment with a traditional RV as well, it is highly likely that North Korea will flight test it in that configuration at least once.
It remains to be seen whether the solid IRBM will be produced and deployed in parallel with or instead of the current, liquid-propellant HS-12 IRBM, given the relatively limited number of targets North Korea presumably sees lying between medium (1,000-3,000 km) and ICBM (5,500+ km) ranges. If Pyongyang sees an extensive need to cover targets within medium range with solid missiles, it would be more cost-effective to develop a new medium-range missile based on the IRBM/HS-18’s first stage than to deploy more of the new IRBMs.
Given the niche role IRBMs probably fill in Pyongyang’s operational plans, adding a solid-propellant system would provide only a marginal improvement. Solid-propellant missiles are safer and easier to operate in the road-mobile deployments used by the liquid HS-12 and the new IRBM, but North Korea has some 35 years of successfully operating road-mobile liquid missiles. Using the same first and second stages for the HS-18 ICBM and the new IRBM could offer logistical advantages, but devoting stage production to IRBMs would come at the cost of HS-18 production.
Information to Date
South Korea announced a suspected IRBM had been launched by North Korea on January 14 from in or around Pyongyang that flew about 1,000 km. Japan reported that the missile flew to the northeast for at least 500 km at a maximum altitude of about 50 km, landing in the sea. The next day, North Korean media confirmed the “test-fire of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile loaded with a hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead,” reporting that the successful test “was aimed at verifying the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.” An accompanying photograph depicted a two-stage solid-propellant missile in the early stages of flight, carrying a conical, finned payload.
Launch of a suspected intermediate-rate ballistic missile on January 14, 2024. (Source: Korean Central News Agency [KCNA])
Analysis
This is the initial flight test of North Korea’s first solid-propellant IRBM. Pyongyang had announced conducting static (ground) tests of the first- and second-stage rocket motors for a solid IRBM in November 2023, which was the first indication from North Korea that this system was in the works. The photo released by North Korea indicates that the new IRBM uses the first and second stages of the Hwasong (HS) -18 three-stage, solid-propellant ICBM.
Hwasong-18 ICBM in flight. (Source: KCNA)
The conical, finned payload appears to be the same as that flown on January 5 and 11, 2022 on a shortened, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) version of the HS-12 liquid-propellant IRBM. At that time, North Korea suggested development of the payload, which it termed a “hypersonic glide vehicle,” had been completed. That said, it is unclear how extensively the conical, finned payload has maneuvered in testing to date, including on January 14.
While technically “hypersonic,” since it reaches a maximum velocity exceeding Mach 5,[1] this payload is a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) rather than the wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles (BGVs) used in Chinese, Russian and US “hypersonic missiles.”[2] North Korea apparently flight tested its first version of a MaRV in 2017 on a variant of the Scud short-range ballistic missile. MaRVs are less maneuverable and less technically demanding to develop than BGVs, which can maneuver more drastically, over a larger area, and for a longer portion of the missile’s flight than MaRVs.
Implications
Deployment likely to be soon. The possibility of an IRBM version of the HS-18 ICBM was flagged in 38 North in April 2023. The Soviets took the same path in the 1970s in using the first two stages of the original SS-16 solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM to create the later SS-20 IRBM. Using booster stages that have already been developed for the HS-18 will expedite development of the new IRBM, which the North is likely to suggest has begun deployment after one or two more flight tests. IRBM-related motor- and flight testing will add to the North’s confidence in the reliability of the parent HS-18 (and vice-versa).
Complicates Guam missile defense. Initial testing of the new IRBM with a MaRV rather than a traditional reentry vehicle (RV) was a surprise. If the IRBM is also intended for deployment with a traditional RV, it is highly likely that North Korea will flight test it in that configuration at least once.
The key comparative advantage of the North Korean MaRV probably is in using its maneuverability to complicate missile defenses, and IRBM MaRVs make sense for Pyongyang given ongoing US efforts to strengthen the missile defense of US bases in Guam (at least 3,300 km from North Korea). North Korea also probably aspires to develop MaRVs equipped with terminal sensors that could maneuver the warhead to precisely hit its target, but it is unlikely to have that capability at IRBM ranges at present. Therefore, this could be one of many areas where technological assistance from Russia would be useful.
Add to or replace liquid IRBM production? It remains to be seen whether the solid IRBM will be produced and deployed in parallel with or instead of the liquid HS-12 IRBM. There are good reasons for North Korea to retain both solid and liquid strategic missiles, as it almost certainly is doing with ICBMs. But the relatively limited number of targets North Korea presumably sees lying between MRBM (1,000-3,000 km) and ICBM (5,500+ km) range—Guam, perhaps US bases in the Philippines and Midway, and possibly US missile defense radars in the Aleutians—may argue for concentrating on producing only one IRBM type. Pyongyang may, however, also see IRBMs as useful for covering targets within MRBM range, such as portions of Japan and Okinawa. If Pyongyang sees an extensive need to cover targets within medium range with solid missiles, it would be more cost-effective to develop a new MRBM based on the IRBM/HS-18’s first stage (which could also carry MaRVs) than to deploy more of the new IRBMs.
Only a marginal improvement. Given the niche role IRBMs probably fill in Pyongyang’s operational plans, adding a solid-propellant system would provide only a marginal improvement. Solid-propellant missiles are safer and easier to operate in the road-mobile deployments used by the liquid HS-12 and the new IRBM, but North Korea has some 35 years of successfully operating road-mobile liquid missiles. Using the same first and second stages for the HS-18 ICBM and the new IRBM could offer logistical advantages, but devoting stage production to IRBMs would come at the cost of HS-18 production.
- [1]
- A traditional reentry vehicle delivered at IRBM ranges would exceed Mach 5 and, thus, technically also would be “hypersonic.”
- [2]
-
North Korea flight tested a BGV once in October 2021. It is unclear whether the test succeeded. See Vann H. Van Diepen, “Six Takeaways From North Korea’s “Hypersonic Missile” Announcement,” 38 North, October 13, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/10/six-takeaways-from-north-koreas-hypersonic-missile-announcement.
8. Relitigating the Past: How to Overcome Recent Court Cases and Strengthen the Japan-South Korea Relationship
Conclusion:
The recent reconciliation between Japan and South Korea was confronted with its first serious challenge in a series of recent court cases. Whether current or similarly situated future litigation causes the bilateral relationship to stumble has yet to be seen. How the leadership of Japan and South Korea responds to this challenge will go far in dictating whether the relationship continues to rise or once again falls down.
Relitigating the Past: How to Overcome Recent Court Cases and Strengthen the Japan-South Korea Relationship
thediplomat.com
Two recent legal rulings in South Korea are once again threatening to unravel the relationship.
By Cornelius Cornelssen
January 20, 2024
Fall down seven times, get up eight. This Japanese proverb about resilience also applies to Japan’s relationship with South Korea. After a 2018 ruling by the South Korean Supreme Court set off a diplomatic spiral within Japan-South Korea relations, 2022 saw a dramatic improvement in bilateral ties. Since then, numerous meetings between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol have led to shared priorities, collaboration, and military cooperation.
Amid this rapprochement, however, two recent legal rulings in South Korea are once again threatening to unravel the relationship. Late last year, the Seoul High Court ordered the Japanese government to compensate former “comfort women” – women and girls used for sexual slavery during World War II – thus revisiting a fraught historical issue that has proven fatal to bilateral relations in the past. Separately, but equal in diplomatic sensitivity, the Korean Supreme Court upheld a ruling that ordered two Japanese companies to pay damages to South Korean plaintiffs for wartime forced labor.
While each issue has previously led to a deterioration in Japan-South Korean ties, there are indications that this time may be different.
Much of the cautious optimism rests with Yoon. His predecessor, Moon Jae-in, was far more antagonistic toward Japan, abandoning a 2015 Japan-South Korea agreement intended to settle the comfort women issue “finally and irreversibly.” The Moon administration also supported South Korean plaintiffs seeking compensation from Japanese firms for World War II-era forced labor. It was a 2018 ruling on this matter, similar to the one handed down in December, that precipitated a trade dispute, frayed relations, and – at a low point – saw Moon threaten to end the Japan-South Korea military – information sharing agreement.
The Yoon administration, which took office in May 2022, struck a different tone early on, prioritizing improved relations with Japan. In consultation with plaintiffs, it devised a compensation fund in an effort to resolve the entanglement created by the 2018 ruling. Japan was cautiously receptive, and the relationship has since vastly improved. The United States has publicly and privately encouraged compromise between two of its treaty allies, culminating in the much-lauded Camp David summit in August 2023.
Amid a new chapter in Japan-South Korea relations, the recent rulings may jeopardize this progress. But two factors suggest that won’t happen.
The first lies in the cases themselves. The forced labor cases are brought against private Japanese businesses, not – as in the recent comfort women case – against Japan itself. At first glance, this distinction is important. While a court may be willing to order the seizure of private assets to satisfy a judgment, such enforcement against sovereign assets presents more complicated legal questions. First among them is whether the ruling violates the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Excluding a small minority of exceptions, national and indeed international courts have been reluctant to overrule state immunity.
In theory, the difference in respondents provides Yoon with a degree of flexibility with the comfort women ruling. Faced with either the diplomatic crisis of enforcing a judgment against a sovereign state or doing nothing, Yoon would likely choose the latter. The legal distinctions between these cases, however, are unlikely to sway South Korean public opinion on matters of historical grievance. Yoon and the ruling party may conclude that remaining silent on such a visceral issue, especially so close to the April 2024 legislative election, would be politically untenable. The comfort women and forced labor cases therefore offer, in a practical sense, a distinction without a difference.
Yoon himself, however, represents the second – and strongest – reason for optimism. Nothing in his policies or statements suggests he is willing to allow the courts to jeopardize South Korea’s relationship with Japan. To this end, immediately following the ruling in December, the South Korean Foreign Ministry publicly indicated that the foundation created to fund the 2018 judgment would be used to compensate the new forced labor plaintiffs.
Regarding the comfort women ruling, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin indicated that the Yoon administration respects the 2015 comfort women agreement. Where previous South Korean administrations have been quick to criticize Japan and win easy domestic points, Yoon has shown marked restraint.
His previous efforts have also created a path forward for the present rulings: funding the settlements extrajudicially. In initially setting up this mechanism in March 2023 for forced labor plaintiffs, Yoon demonstrated that he understands the importance of plaintiff and public buy-in. Where the 2015 solution to comfort women compensation was perceived as an imposed, top-down plan, Yoon consulted with forced labor plaintiffs and has been largely successful in winning their participation. Applying these lessons to the recent comfort women ruling, Yoon should revisit the 2015 agreement in an attempt to revitalize that framework.
For its part, Japan must be a willing partner. While previous attempts at reconciliation have failed, resulting in a Japanese sense of skepticism and fatigue toward South Korea and issues of historical grievances, Japan should recognize the opportunity presented by the Yoon administration for a durable alliance.
After each recent judgment, Japan released what have become customary statements calling on the South Korean administration to curtail litigation and uphold the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and South Korea and the 2015 comfort women agreement. But Japan must be cautious. Suggesting that the South Korean administration overrule the judiciary could be interpreted as both interference in Korean domestic affairs and dismissive of the separation of powers in a democratic peer.
Kishida, however, has shown a nuanced understanding of the scrutiny with which South Koreans view Japan on matters of history, as well as the perils of a diplomatic misstep. By visiting the Seoul National Cemetery, avoiding the Yasukuni Shrine, and expressing remorse for Japan’s colonial and wartime acts, Kishida has demonstrated that he is a willing partner in the project of bilateral improvement.
Yet whether Kishida can also revisit the 2015 comfort women agreement remains uncertain. Record-low approval numbers for his Cabinet and the expanding corruption scandal plaguing his Liberal Democratic Party have left Kishida with limited political latitude for leading a new initiative to address the issue of historical grievance. Furthermore, the new year was marked with twin disasters: a crippling earthquake and an aviation accident. Questions are being raised about the level of government response. Winning support for a revitalized 2015 agreement, or something similar, would be a difficult task for Kishida in the current domestic climate.
But in the context of newfound cooperation with South Korea, a framework that was agreed upon and viable as recently as 2015 may be possible in the near future. With such a gesture, Japan would take a significant step in memorializing the progress made in the bilateral relationship. For its part, South Korea would have a tangible remedy for a rapidly aging group of plaintiffs and, important for public approval, a remedy with official contribution from Japan. Furthermore, as the recurrent nature of the recent litigation demonstrates, these court cases are not isolated. A framework would provide both countries with a preemptive solution for future cases.
Nothing can erase the history between South Korea and Japan, but Kishida and Yoon together represent the best opportunity to significantly reduce the likelihood that this history threatens the priorities that both countries share in the present.
The recent reconciliation between Japan and South Korea was confronted with its first serious challenge in a series of recent court cases. Whether current or similarly situated future litigation causes the bilateral relationship to stumble has yet to be seen. How the leadership of Japan and South Korea responds to this challenge will go far in dictating whether the relationship continues to rise or once again falls down.
Authors
Guest Author
Cornelius Cornelssen
Cornelius Cornelssen is a Council on Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs Fellow. He clerked for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York and is previously of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP and IOM-UN Migration. He is a former Fulbright Scholar and graduate of the Penn State Honors College and the University of Chicago Law School.
thediplomat.com
9. Heard in Davos: What we learned from the WEF in 2024
My bias is showing- What was not heard in Davos? No one in Davos is concerned with north Korea and its threats. Per one of my many great Sergeants Major: "The house that is not burning does not make the news."
Heard in Davos: What we learned from the WEF in 2024
https://www.reuters.com/world/heard-davos-what-we-learned-wef-2024-2024-01-19/?utm
Reuters
January 19, 202411:55 AM ESTUpdated 14 hours ago
Flags hang outside the pavilion during the 54th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, January 18, 2024. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab
DAVOS, Switzerland, Jan 19 (Reuters) - World leaders and business executives left the freezing temperatures of the Swiss mountain resort of Davos after a week of high-stakes meetings about key world issues.
Here's what we learned:
MIDDLE EAST
Gaza dominated the agenda of the World Economic Forum (WEF), but leaders failed to produce clear details on any practical pathway to Palestinian statehood, or a ceasefire between Israel and Gaza's Palestinian militant group Hamas.
The war is slowing down the economy of the entire region, said Qatar's finance minister. The head of the Palestine Investment Fund estimated at least $15 billion would be needed to rebuild houses in Gaza alone. Arab states said they would not fund reconstruction unless there was a lasting peace.
"We agree that regional peace includes peace for Israel, but that could only happen through peace for the Palestinians through a Palestinian state," Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan told a WEF panel.
RED SEA
Attacks by Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi group on ships in the Red Sea would drive the cost of goods from Asia to Europe much higher, logistics giant DP World said. CEOs at Davos said they were gaming out alternative supply routes. Yemen's vice president and Iran's foreign minister said the attacks would not stop until Israel ended the war in Gaza.
"If it's in the short term, tankers might be available ... But if it's longer term, it might be a problem," said Amin Nasser, CEO of oil giant Saudi Aramco.
CHINA
Premier Li Qiang told Davos China's economy was open for business and highlighted its potential for foreign investment, but investors remained cautious amid sluggish post-pandemic recovery and tensions with the United States. Asked how helpful a closed-door lunch with Li was, one CEO said "medium", underscoring the scepticism about China's charm offensive.
"I'm glad that people are all talking," JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon after the Li lunch.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Talk of AI rippled through Davos meeting rooms and panels, its promise touted on signs and its security risks invoked by China's premier. While conversations included how to regulate the burgeoning technology and how to apply it to scientific discovery, the question of how to monetize it persisted.
"Everyone's like, yeah, I can build these cool demos," said Cloudflare (NET.N), opens new tab CEO Matthew Prince, "but where's the real value?"
DEBT RESTRUCTURING
Argentina's newly-elected President Javier Milei made his debut with a speech on the main Davos stage - and then quickly sat down with the International Monetary Fund's managing director Kristalina Georgieva to discuss his plan to navigate his country's debt maze. Ghana will re-engage with its international bondholders as the country seeks to build on momentum in debt restructuring.
"Free enterprise capitalism is the only tool we have to end hunger and poverty," said Milei.
ECONOMY
Heads of global banks warned of inflationary pressures from increased shipping costs and the possibility of oil price rises. Bank executives fear the market is mispricing interest rate cuts, and that geopolitical risks could cause volatility.
"It's a big year in general with many elections around the world which could change potentially the way fiscal stimulus is handled around the globe," said Suni Harford, President Asset Management and Group Executive Board Lead for Sustainability and Impact at UBS.
BANKING
Consolidation of European banks was discussed behind closed doors, but executives say cross-border mergers are difficult to achieve without uniform regulation across the region. Selective mergers of national players were seen as more likely.
ENERGY
While several panels focused on the end of fossil fuels, the head of Aramco told Reuters demand for oil would not peak any time soon. The number of energy executives in Davos was smaller than in years past. Oil bosses from Shell, TotalEnergies and Aramco met on the sidelines to discuss how to help decarbonise industries they supply, three industry sources said.
UKRAINE
With other crises jostling for attention, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy put Ukraine on the Davos agenda early. Talks with more than 80 national security advisers from around the world led to Switzerland offering to host peace talks. Zelenskiy also met with Wall Street's Jamie Dimon and other bank leaders to seek financing for Ukraine's reconstruction.
"Ukraine can prevail in this war but we must continue to empower their resistance," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, urging Kyiv's Western allies to continue arms deliveries and financial support.
GENDER
The WEF said that around 28% of the total of 3,000 participants, including 350 heads of state and government and ministers, who gathered in Davos this year were women.
"This year marks a significant milestone in the 54-year history of the Annual Meeting, as we expect to welcome more than 800 women to Davos — the highest number in our records," it said.
Reporting by Reuters Davos team; Editing by Leela de Kretser, Alexander Smith and Mark Potter
10. Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say
As an aside I do believe there is evidence of cooperation directly and indirectly between north Korea and the Houthis.
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/08/03/Report-North-Korea-supplying-missiles-to-Yemen-rebels/3021438619655/
AUG. 3, 2015 / 12:52 PM
Report: North Korea supplying missiles to Yemen rebels
North Korea-made weapons are being traded in the Middle East despite heavy U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang.
And there is this information from the 2019 Report of the UN Panel of Experts:
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/028/82/PDF/N1902882.pdf?OpenElement
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to violate the arms embargo and has attempted to supply small arms and light weapons and other military equipment to Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as to Libya and the Sudan, via foreign intermediaries, including Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali in the case of the Houthi rebels. The Panel continued investigations into designated entities and individuals in Asia who clandestinely procured centrifuges for the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and attempted to sell a wide range of military equipment to armed groups and Governments in the Middle East and Africa. (Page 4)
...
97. The Panel investigated efforts by the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and KOMID to supply a wide array of conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthi group in Yemen through a known proxy, Syrian national Hussein al-Ali, and his Syrian-registered company Consulting Bureau for Marketing. The Panel was given access by a Member State to an invitation letter dated 13 July 2016 from Houthi leader Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami to the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, a KOMID subsidiary, to meet in Damascus “to discuss the issue of the transfer of technology and other matters of mutual interest”. According to the Member State “a protocol of cooperation between Yemen and North Korea” was then negotiated involving “Naif Ahmad Al Qanis, Houthi ambassador in Damascus and Syrian arms broker Hussein Al Ali”. According to the Member State, this involved a “vast array of military equipment, including Kalahsnikov, PKC machine guns, RPG-7, RPG-29, Fagot missiles, Igla missiles, tanks, air defence systems, ballistic missiles”. The Panel has yet to receive replies from Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami, Naif Ahmad al-Qanis and Hussein al-Ali to the Panel’s request for information on their role in these negotiations and attempts to broker and supply such weaponry from or on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (Page 44)
Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say
By Samia Nakhoul and Parisa Hafezi
January 20, 20246:26 AM ESTUpdated an hour ago
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-hezbollah-commanders-help-direct-houthi-attacks-yemen-sources-say-2024-01-20/?utm
[1/2]Supporters of the Houthi movement rally to denounce air strikes launched by the U.S. and Britain on Houthi targets, in Sanaa, Yemen January 12, 2024. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah/File Photo Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Summary
- Iran supplied drones and precision-strike missiles - sourcesIran provides know-how, data, intelligence in Red Sea - sourcesHouthis trained on advanced weapons in Iran last month - sourceAttacks show Iran's ability to threaten naval security
DUBAI, Jan 20 (Reuters) - Commanders from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Lebanon's Hezbollah group are on the ground in Yemen helping to direct and oversee Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, four regional and two Iranian sources told Reuters.
Iran - which has armed, trained and funded the Houthis - stepped up its weapons supplies to the militia in the wake of the war in Gaza, which erupted after Iranian-backed militants Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, the four regional sources said.
Tehran has provided advanced drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, precision-strike ballistic missiles and medium-range missiles to the Houthis, who started targeting commercial vessels in November in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, the sources said.
IRGC commanders and advisers are also providing know-how, data and intelligence support to determine which of the dozens of vessels travelling through the Red Sea each day are destined for Israel and constitute Houthi targets, all the sources said.
Washington said last month that Iran was deeply involved in planning operations against shipping in the Red Sea and that its intelligence was critical to enable the Houthis to target ships.
In response to a request for comment for this story, the White House pointed to its previous public comments about how Iran has been supporting the Houthis.
In his weekly news conferences, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani has repeatedly denied Tehran is involved in the Red Sea attacks by the Houthis. The IRGC public relations office did not respond to request for comment.
Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam denied any Iranian or Hezbollah involvement in helping to direct the Red Sea attacks. A Hezbollah spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.
The Houthis, who emerged in the 1980s as an armed group in opposition to Saudi Arabia's Sunni religious influence in Yemen, say they are supporting Hamas by striking commercial ships they say are either linked to Israel or are heading to Israeli ports.
Their attacks have affected global shipping between Asia and Europe through the Bab al-Mandab strait off Yemen. That has triggered U.S. and British air strikes on Houthi targets in the country, opening a new theatre of conflict linked to the war in Gaza.
The Gaza conflict has also sparked clashes between Israel and Hezbollah militants along the Lebanese border, as well as attacks by Iran-linked groups on U.S. targets in Iraq and Syria.
"The Revolutionary Guards have been helping the Houthis with military training (on advanced weapons)," an Iranian insider told Reuters. "A group of Houthi fighters were in Iran last month and were trained in an IRGC base in central Iran to get familiar with the new technology and the use of missiles."
The person said Iranian commanders had travelled to Yemen as well and set up a command centre in the capital Sanaa for the Red Sea attacks which is being run by the senior IRGC commander responsible for Yemen.
REGIONAL STRATEGY
The Red Sea attacks fit in with Iran's strategy of expanding and mobilising its regional Shi'ite network of armed militias to project its influence and show its ability to threaten maritime security in the region and beyond, two analysts said.
They said Tehran wanted to show that the Gaza war could be too costly for the West if it drags on - and could have catastrophic consequences in the region as things escalate.
"The Houthis are not acting independently," said Abdulaziz al-Sager, director of the Gulf Research Center think-tank, who based his conclusion on a close analysis of the capabilities of the group, which has an estimated 20,000 fighters.
"The Houthis, with their personnel, expertise and capabilities are not that advanced. Dozens of vessels cross through Bab al-Mandab daily, the Houthis don't have the means, resources, knowledge or satellite information to find the specific target and attack," he said.
White House national security spokeswoman Adrienne Watson also said last month that Iranian-provided tactical intelligence had been critical in enabling the Houthis to target ships.
According to two former Yemeni army sources, there is a clear presence of IRGC and Hezbollah members in Yemen. They are responsible for supervising military operations, training and reassembling missiles smuggled into Yemen as separate pieces, the two people said.
Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think-tank, said: "It is clearly the case that the Iranians are helping identify the target and the destination. There is no local Houthi capacity to do that."
One senior regional source who follows Iran and who spoke on condition of anonymity said: "The political decision is in Tehran, the management is Hezbollah, and the location is the Houthis in Yemen."
Attacks by Yemen's Houthi militants on ships in the Red Sea are disrupting maritime trade through the Suez Canal, with some vessels re-routing to a much longer East-West route via the southern tip of Africa.
WEAPONS AND ADVICE
Houthi spokesperson Abdulsalam said the group's aim was to target Israeli ships heading to Israel without causing any human or significant material losses. U.S. and British strikes on Yemen would not force them to back down, he said.
"We don't deny that we have a relationship with Iran and that we have benefited from the Iranian experience in training and military manufacturing and capabilities but the decision taken by Yemen is an independent one that has nothing to do with any other party," he said.
But a security official close to Iran said: "The Houthis have drones, missiles and everything needed for their fight against Israel but they needed guidance and advice on shipping routes and ships, so it has been provided to them by Iran."
When asked what kind of advice Tehran offered, he said it was similar to the advisory role taken by Iran in Syria, ranging from training to overseeing operations when needed.
"A group of Iranian Guards members are in Sanaa now to help the operations," the security official said.
Iran sent hundreds of Revolutionary Guards to Syria, alongside thousands of Hezbollah fighters, to help train and organise Shi'ite militia fighters from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan to prevent the downfall of President Bashar al-Assad during the Sunni-led insurgency that erupted in 2011.
Washington and Gulf Arab states have repeatedly accused Iran of arming, training and financing the Houthis, who follow an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam and are aligned with Tehran as part of its anti-Western, anti-Israel "Axis of Resistance" alongside Lebanon's Hezbollah and groups in Syria and Iraq.
While Iran has denied having any direct role in the Red Sea attacks, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has praised the Houthis, whose Zaidi sect is an offshoot of Shi'ism, saying he hoped their strikes would last "until victory".
TRAIN AND EQUIP
A leader within the coalition of pro-Iranian groups denied there were any commanders from the IRGC or Hezbollah on the ground in Yemen right now.
He said a team of Iranian and Hezbollah military experts had gone to Yemen earlier in its civil war to train, equip and build the manufacturing military capability of the Houthis.
"They came and helped the Houthis and left, just as they did with Hezbollah and Hamas," he said, adding that the military capabilities of the Houthis should not be underestimated.
The person said the Houthis knew the terrain and the sea well and already had the systems in place for attacking ships, including high-precision equipment from Iran.
During the chaotic years after the 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Yemen, the Houthis tightened their grip on the country's north and seized the capital Sanaa in 2014, pushing a Saudi-led coalition to intervene militarily months later.
When Hamas attacked Israel, Iran had little choice but to demonstrate support for the Palestinian group after years of anti-Israel rhetoric but was worried that using Hezbollah would trigger massive Israeli retaliation, analysts said.
Iryani at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies said a major war between Israel and Hezbollah would be disastrous for Lebanon - and endanger the future of the group that has become the most important in Iran's "Axis of Resistance".
By contrast, the Houthis were in a unique strategic position to have a huge impact by disrupting global maritime activity with little effort, he said.
Additional reporting by Mohammad Ghobari in Aden and the Washington bureau; Writing by Samia Nakhoul; Editing by Angus McDowall and David Clarke
11. Nuclear Consultative Group: What should be done in 2024?
The paradox of the NCG: it must inform and educate the Koreas and American people about extended deterrence and the processes of consultation and decision making without compromising the processes of decision making so as not to undermine extended deterrence.
Although I have to defer to all the expert nuclear deterrence theorists, I think nuclear deterrence theory is in need of an update? Given the nuclear weapons that exist throughout the world in the hands of other than great powers, we must ask whether traditional nuclear deterrence theory remains effective or if we really need to take a critical look at it and possibly make some radical changes.
Nuclear Consultative Group: What should be done in 2024?
The Korea Times · January 16, 2024
By Ahn Ho-young
Ahn Ho-young
It’s a new year. We come across a lot of geopolitical and economic forecasts for the new year: tensions in U.S.-China relations; wars continuing to rage in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip; major elections in more than 40 countries, including Korea and the United States; and how all of these developments will impact Korea’s security and economic landscape.
Amid all these forecasts and concerns, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised the level of threat against South Korea through his statement at the Central Committee Plenary Meeting held in Pyongyang at the end of December. He redefined relations between the two Koreas as hostile and belligerent, and vowed that North Korea would make every possible effort to overpower the whole of South Korea's territory, employing all the available capabilities and resources, including nuclear weapons.
This heightened threat from Kim himself will lead to increasing calls in South Korea for the re-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, or even South Korea’s own nuclear weapons development program. However, for the time being, the most realistic measure we can take is to fully implement and utilize the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which was launched in July last year. The NCG had its second meeting in Washington, D.C., last December. At the meeting, the NCG adopted the work plan for 2024, which clearly reflected its commitment to timely and full implementation.
First of all, the NCG agreed to work out by this coming June the guidelines necessary to regulate the nuclear consultation processes in times of crisis and contingencies. Before the NCG, there was an important credibility issue with the U.S.' extended deterrence. It was because of the perception that the extended deterrence was a unilateral offer by the U.S. over which South Korea did not have any say. The adoption of the guidelines must help to meet the objective of “joint planning and joint implementation,” and remove the credibility gap.
Second, the NCG agreed to continue to develop security and information-sharing protocols. However, in the multi-faceted security consultations between Korea and the U.S., one piece of information, that the U.S. does not share with Korea, is the information concerning U.S. nuclear assets and their operations. The NCG’s work on security and information-sharing protocols is expected to lead to enhanced sharing of quality information with Korea, an essential element for the success of the NCG.
Third, through the NCG, it was agreed that the expansion of exercises, simulations and training between the two militaries will be implemented. Military commanders repeatedly emphasize the importance of training and exercises. That is generally true. With respect to the NCG in particular, the importance of training and exercises cannot be overemphasized for the simple reason that extended deterrence against North Korea involves two militaries and weapons under systems of conventional nuclear integration (CNI). It is a highly sophisticated operation.
Other than the three points summed up above, the 2nd NCG reviewed progress and adopted a work plan for such important topics as strategic communications and risk reduction practices. The NCG’s progress so far has been solid and credible, which hopefully will continue in the new year. On top of them, I wish to make several suggestions for the future progress of the NCG.
First, when we complete the work regarding the guidelines for nuclear consultation by June, we will have to work out the operational plan for CNI in accordance with those guidelines. The Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) for Korea was amended after 10 years on the occasion of the Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul last November. At the time, General Shin Won-sik, Korea’s Minister of National Defense, said that the TDS would be further developed to an “operational level.”
Second, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the guidelines and the operational plan, Korea must expedite and complete its plan to modernize and enhance its conventional capabilities based on the three pillars of its Kill Chain for preemptive strikes, the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) program. It is encouraging that the Korean Ministry of National Defense’s Mid-term Plan for 2024-28 designated the three pillars as the top priority of the plan.
Third, for the effective sharing of nuclear-related information, it is necessary to detach Korean officers to work at the U.S. Strategic Command. A Working Group has been set up under the NCG. Korean officers at the Working Group must be sent to the U.S. Strategic Command to work together with their U.S. counterparts, modeled on the way the officers of the two countries have so successfully worked together at the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command in Korea since 1978.
The author is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He served as Korean ambassador to the U.S. and vice foreign minister.
The Korea Times · January 16, 2024
12. ‘If I don’t have a dream, what on Earth is the point of living?’
Read this article on the very well put together web page here: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/northkorean-uk-escapes/index.html
This article reminds me of the thought about how many very talented artists of all types in north Korea (from musicians and dancers to sculptors and more) who are only allowed to perform their art in support of Kim Jong un and his regime. Imagine if we can unleash their creativity when unification occurs?
‘If I don’t have a dream, what on Earth is the point of living?’
Three North Korean immigrants in the UK talk about their escapes and dreams.
By Seo Hye Jun and Jamin Anderson for RFA Korean
2024.01.19
rfa.org
>>> See the special page here.
New Malden in southwest London is one of the largest Korean enclaves in all of Europe. It has all the trappings of Koreatowns the world over: a high concentration of Korean restaurants, businesses tailored to Korean speakers, and even non-Korean “tourists” from other parts of the city, looking for something a little different.
Ethnic enclaves like New Malden are full of immigrants who left their home country for one reason or another to try to make it in a new country, and while most of the 20,000 ethnic Korean residents there are first-, second- or third-generation immigrants from South Korea, there are about 700 New Malden residents who are from the North.
Though they are no longer living under the repressive North Korean government and have resettled in a new land, many are still struggling to find their place in the world, but some remain steadfast in pursuit of their dreams.
Dreaming on canvas
On most days, Lee Myung-gwan wakes up in his second floor studio apartment above a Korean restaurant, puts on his construction work clothes, climbs down the creaky stairs and heads off to the job site.
Construction work may pay the bills, but 40-year-old Lee’s passion is for art.
One of his masterpieces, a 3D painting titled “Turtle Ship” that took two years to complete – with painstakingly carved wood and other solid media – hangs between a refrigerator and boxes of ingredients in the restaurant below.
The painting depicts two turtles swimming near a “turtle ship,” a Korean warship known for its armored roof that was used against Japanese invaders during the Imjin War in the late 16th century. It has become a symbol of Korean independence – and in a way, the painting has come to symbolize Lee’s own freedom.
“There are two turtles over there. One turtle represents the unknown me in my heart and the other turtle represents me searching for my ego in reality,” said Lee, who goes by the artist name Surl Lee.
Though he aspires to have his work hung in galleries and museums, the humble display has become a metaphor for how his life in the U.K. has turned out so far; he has escaped his repressive homeland and made a life for himself in a new country, but he isn’t yet as established as he’d hoped he would be.
Lee’s passion for art is hereditary, he explained.
“My grandfather was a potter in North Korea,” he said. “I was naturally exposed to a lot of pottery from a young age. I even drew along while looking at my grandfather’s collection of work. That’s why back then, I used to think that when I grew up, I wanted to become a great artist.”
‘I can’t live in this country’
Lee first escaped from North Korea at age 16, in the winter of 1997.
It was the height of the Arduous March, the term used by North Koreans to describe a 1994-1998 famine that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. According to some estimates, more than 2 million people – about 10% of the population - died.
Lee fled to China to look for better living conditions – and his mother, who had escaped previously. But he was caught by Chinese authorities and sent home against his will.
He spent the next year in a labor camp, digging out a riverbed to prevent flood damage.
“I was going through such a difficult time in prison, and so I asked myself, ‘Is it a crime to go look for my mother?’ and ‘I’m still a minor,’ There were a lot of feelings of animosity like this.”
“So, I thought, ‘I can’t live in this country. I have to get out somehow.’”
Upon Lee’s release, he was branded with a criminal record and considered by society to be a traitor, so there was no way that Lee could even hope to be allowed by the government to pursue a career in art.
To stay would have meant menial jobs and a bare-bones existence, he explained.
“Even if I were to live in that country, it wouldn’t feel like I'm actually breathing,” said Lee. “I would have to live under surveillance all the time. What hope could I have living in a country where I can't do what I want?”
About a year after his first attempt, he crossed the border into China again - and eventually moved to Britain in 2014.
Loneliness, prejudice
It's now been nearly 10 years since he landed in London with the dream of becoming a painter, but he still does manual labor. Facing numerous barriers, he has not been able to break into the London art scene.
“I met a gallery director, and the more we talked, the more it stung. They told me I was not qualified,” said Lee. “They said that people would only recognize me if I met certain qualifications, such as a diploma or a lot of experience.”
But his biggest battle is with extreme loneliness, he said.
“When I tell people I am from North Korea, people start off immediately prejudiced,” said Lee. “From that point on, it’s like a wound that I am not even aware of. Every time I meet people though, that’s how the conversation goes.”
“I want to live as an artist, but I am afraid that my dreams are fading away in the face of poverty,” said Lee. “People call me thoughtless and immature. They ask ‘Why are you still dreaming, as if you were playing like a child at this age? Why are you still dreaming when you are already 40 years old?’”
He paused and smiled.
“There is meaning in life only when I have the will to live and the desire to achieve it. If I don’t have a dream, what on Earth is the point of living?”
He picked up a carving knife and began cutting materials for his next masterpiece.
Musical freedom
About a 30-minute drive from New Malden, in the suburb of Molesey, guitarist Jeon Yeyoung makes a cappuccino in her kitchen on the second floor of a red-bricked apartment building. She adds a bit of honey, and this is how she starts her day.
Classical guitars line the walls of her living room, and several of her friends have come to visit her on this day.
One comments how relaxed she seems.
Jeon laughs. Before she left North Korea to pursue her musical dreams, that was not a feeling she was familiar with.
“In North Korea, it was like ‘Relaxed? What does that mean?’” she said. “I can’t imagine leisure, relaxation or anything like romance. That kind of thing does not fit in North Korea.”
Jeon was the youngest daughter to a family with a good background. In North Korea, loyalty to the state and its leadership are calculated across several generations and people are given a sort of caste-like categorization called songbun.
Given her relative privilege, she was allowed to learn music. She started with the gayageum, a traditional Korean 12-stringed instrument, but the first time she saw her older brother playing the guitar, she fell in love with the six-stringer.
“I met my first guitar teacher when I just turned 10. Every word the teacher said got my heart beating,” she said. “He told me, “I will make you the best guitar player in [North] Korea!’”
This is how her dream started, she said.
“Do children in North Korea have dreams? No. But with those words, it was the first time that I had an expectation that I would make something of myself,” she said. “That small seed has now become my dream.”
But even though she was talented and showed promise, she was still limited in North Korea.
Jeon is playing Romance D’Amour.
Jeon’s dream was further cemented the first time she heard her guitar teacher play “Raindrops,” a song composed by renowned U.S. guitarist George C. Lindsay. But North Korean musicians are forbidden from playing anything that does not glorify the country or its leadership, at least publicly.
“The teacher wouldn’t give me the sheet music for ‘Raindrops.’ He told me, ‘Don’t even think about learning it,’” she said.
“But I thought this song was so pretty that every time I went to the teacher, I asked, ‘Please play that song,’ and I played it as I heard. I kept memorizing it. I went home and copied what I heard.”
Water in the desert
The song carries special meaning for her.
“It felt like water drops in the desert. In a waterless desert, a single drop of water has tremendous power. When you feel thirsty, the most powerful thing is water.”
As an artist, she yearned to play whatever she wanted to. She yearned for freedom.
At the age of 17, Jeon was all set to join the prestigious music propaganda team, but instead was suddenly assigned to farm labor in the countryside.
Jeon did not want to give up her dreams of becoming a talented guitarist, so when her family was sleeping, she ran away from home. To pay her university tuition, she had no choice but to take jobs doing the same kind of menial work that she had run from.
She cleaned hotels and helped out at beauty salons and the hard work took a toll on her hands, giving her swollen, achy joints. This made it difficult to practice guitar.
Jeon recalls the moment she had had enough of being told what to do. She was cleaning the office of the hotel where she worked.
“One day, the manager, her name was Amanda, she told me to clean the car park where there were a lot of cigarette butts scattered about,” she said.
“So I told her, ‘When you first signed the contract, didn't you say it was for office cleaning?’ But she said she can tell me what to do because she is the manager,” Jeon said, her voice getting louder and faster as she recounted the tale.
“I knew the word ‘labor exploitation’ in Korean, but I didn’t know the word in English,” she said. “I used to use an electronic dictionary. I said to Amanda, ‘You wait,’ and took an electronic dictionary from my backpack and said, ‘Exploitation!’”
This was the first time that she had mustered up the courage to speak up for herself.
After much hard work and study, Jeon earned a master's degree in classical guitar from the prestigious Guildhall School of Music and Drama.
But Jeon said she actually felt sad when it was all over.
“After graduating last year, I thought I would be free now, but slowly, in my mind, I sometimes think, ‘I didn’t do anything good for my parents, why was I born like this, why did I come out like this?’”
These guilty feelings that she had suppressed over many years finally burst out in a way that she was not able to handle on her own. She needed a place to share her feelings with likeminded people.
This is how she found Connect: North Korea, a nonprofit organization that supports people who have escaped North Korea and settled in the U.K.
She had previously been avoiding escapees, and even other Koreans, but now she teaches guitar lessons to children of other North Koreans through the organization.
“In the past, I wanted to forget that I came from North Korea. Maybe I was pretending,” she said. “But if I think about it, we North Korean people have a kind of pain. I also have a heartache. Would you say this is how North Koreans feel when they view other North Koreans?”
Political freedom
About a three-and-a-half hour drive to the northwest of New Malden is Denton, a town in Greater Manchester that Timothy Cho hopes to represent in the district council.
Cho, a 34-year-old candidate for the Conservative Party, is walking from house to house to encourage people to vote for him in the next local election.
Although he has lost in multiple elections, simply running is a victory for Cho.
“I experienced a dictatorship system and did not know the meaning of elections,” he said. “But when I came here, I could become a candidate and run for office. … Each vote is very precious.”
Cho’s story started half a world away, living on the streets of his North Korean town as a kotjebi, or flower swallow, the Korean term used to describe homeless beggar children.
His parents had fled the country, leaving him behind to fend for himself – and he was branded as a traitor because of what they did.
Cho was kicked out of school, forbidden from joining the military, and had to eke out a living without even a roof over his head.
“At that time I was thinking, ‘No matter what I do in this country, in the end, I will be the child of a traitor and so will my children,’” said Cho. “I made up my mind at that time and escaped North Korea.”
Over the next few years, Cho escaped to China and was forcibly repatriated and sent to prison – four times.
Eventually the cycle was broken when he finally made it to the U.K. in 2008.
The Ark
Cho’s mental health was suffering when he arrived, but there were people who would help him recover in the new community that he would eventually call home.
In a two-story house located in a quiet residential part of Denton is a shelter called the Ark. Even though Cho is busy campaigning, he stops by and shares a warm meal with the people who helped him early on.
“I still come here often. The people here are like family to me,” he said. “These people pray a lot for the Korean Peninsula.”
All told, about 3,000 North Korean escapees live in the U.K., the largest community of North Korean diaspora in Europe.
Cho stayed at the Ark when he was a college student. He said the staff and others who were staying at the shelter taught him, a lonely escapee, the meaning of family.
Initially he had hoped to become a dentist, but one day he came across a video featuring another escapee who aspired to learn English and tell the world about North Korea’s human rights abuses.
It was then that all the pain of his past became overwhelming, and he decided to become an activist.
“I can’t wait to see North Korea open,” he said. “I wish that the North Korean people could meet a leader who properly serves the people, allows them to freely engage in market economic activities, and allows travel between South and North Korea.”
Now this one-time beggar child is trying to represent the people in his community – an impossibility if he was in North Korea.
The people of Denton South went to vote on May 4, but even that day, Cho was busy going from house to house asking people to vote.
A couple walked past him and gave him encouragement.
“I voted for you,” one of them said.
Early in the vote count it appeared that Cho had a chance at winning a council seat. He was neck-and-neck with the leading Labour Party candidate.
At 2 a.m., the results were finally announced: "Cho, Timothy. Conservative Party candidate, 666." It was not enough to win a seat. He ranked fourth, behind three Labour Party candidates.
Still, he was not downcast.
“Whether I win or lose, I have no regrets about this election,” he said. “I am grateful, and the challenge will never stop.”
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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