Quotes of the Day:

“The good man does not grieve that other people do not recognize his merits. His only anxiety is lest he should fail to recognize theirs.” 

- Confucius

"A thankful heart is not only the greatest virtue, but the parent of all the other virtues." 

- Cicero

"Prejudices, it is well known, are most difficult to eradicate from the heart whose soil has never been loosened or fertilized by education; they grow there, firm as weeds among rocks." 

- Charlotte Brontë 

​1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 19, 2024

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 19, 2024

4. Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say

5. Heard in Davos: What we learned from the WEF in 2024

6. The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation

7. Disinformation poses an unprecedented threat in 2024 — and the U.S. is less ready than ever

8. Taiwan's Election Offers Strong Lessons on Disinformation

9. Fighting Disinformation in a Dangerous Year

10. China helps Pacific Islands with policing, not defence - ambassador

11. Will China Move Toward a ‘War-Driven’ Economy?

12. China’s Belt and Road and Its Alternatives: Competing or Complementary?

13. 21st Century Chinese Hegemony in the International System

14. Washington Is Exaggerating China’s Military Budgets

15. Goodbye to Davos — and good riddance

16. The free world comes out swinging

17. China courts global elite at Davos with largest presence in years

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative.
• Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do.
• US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026.
• Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea.
• Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale.
• The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions southeast of Kupyansk amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 19 that it will resume fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine when the period of positional fighting ends and will “continue to serve” after the war, presumably subordinated to Rosgvardia.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to leverage the provision of social benefits and healthcare to augment passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 19, 2024

Jan 19, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2024

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 19, 2024, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on January 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive "Steadfast Defender 2024" exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative. NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises begin this week and will continue through May 2024.[1] NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Chris Cavoli stated on January 18 that 90,000 personnel from all 31 NATO member states and Sweden will participate in "Steadfast Defender."[2] The exercises will reportedly include over 50 ships; over 80 fighter jets, helicopters, and drones; and at least 1,100 combat vehicles, including 133 tanks and 533 infantry fighting vehicles.[3] Cavoli stated that NATO ”will demonstrate its ability to reinforce the Euro-Atlantic area via trans-Atlantic movement of forces from North America...during a simulated emerging conflict scenario against a near-peer adversary.”[4] Chair of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer stated on January 18 that NATO must prepare for a conflict with Russia as NATO cannot take peace as ”a given” and must ”expect the unexpected.”[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on January 19 that Germany must consider that Putin may try to attack a NATO member in five to eight years, given threats from the Kremlin ”almost every day.”[6]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the initial announcement of the Steadfast Defender exercises in September 2023 and misleadingly claimed that NATO exercises have been increasingly provocative and aggressive in nature.[7] The Russian MFA claimed that NATO is continuing a ”demonstration of force” on Russia’s ”doorstep.” The Russian MFA claimed that Russia had regularly proposed de-escalation initiatives to NATO, called for NATO to abandon its provocative actions, and transferred Russian military exercises to the country’s interior. Russian sources claimed that NATO is using exercises to “wind up“ and incite the Baltic states to prepare for war with Russia and characterized such exercises as a "series of provocations."[8] Yulia Zhdanova, a member of the Russian delegation at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 1066th plenary meeting, similarly claimed on January 17 that NATO exercises on the Russian and Belarusian borders ”provoke a game of nerves” and ”compress the spring of escalation even more.”[9] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger dismissed Pistorius’ comments about a possible future Russian attack on NATO, claiming that European officials regularly make statements about the ”concept of the ’Russian threat’” and that few Germans actually agree with these statements.[10] The milblogger implied that the German government is attempting to artificially create a threat from Russia that doesn’t actually exist by paying experts to ”say the right words.”

The Russian information operation aimed at painting defensive NATO actions in response to real Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank as provocative seeks to deflect from recent aggressive Russian rhetoric and behavior towards NATO. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance.[11] Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.[12] Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated actors have also repeatedly attempted to set information conditions for future aggressive action against NATO member states and their neighbors.[13] Russian electronic warfare (EW) exercises in Kaliningrad may have caused unprecedently high levels of GPS jamming across northern and central Poland and the southern Baltic region on December 25-27, 2023 and January 10 and 16, 2024.[14] ISW continues to assess that Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 not to defend Russia against a nonexistent threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal he still pursues.[15]

Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 19 that US officials are advocating for Ukraine to take a more “conservative” operational approach focused on holding current territory and generating materiel and forces in 2024 for future counteroffensive operations in 2025.[16] One US official reportedly argued that a strategy of “active defense” would allow Ukraine to build out operational requirements and prepare for a counteroffensive in 2025.[17] US military doctrine defines an active defense as the ”employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.”[18] Ukrainian officials have stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active defensive operations in areas where Russian forces are engaged in localized offensive efforts.[19] An active defense throughout the theater, however, would require routine and widespread Ukrainian counterattacks and therefore still demand that Ukrainian forces commit considerable offensive capabilities to the front. FT reported that US officials believe that Ukrainian forces still could opportunistically exploit weak spots in the Russian defense while conducting a theater-wide active defense.[20] Limited opportunistic counterattacks - especially when not resourced adequately- are unlikely to result in gains commensurate with the resources they will inevitably consume, however.

A theater-wide defensive posture would cede the strategic initiative to Russia and permit Russia to launch major attacks at times of its choosing, forcing Ukraine to burn scarce resources it would supposedly be generating during a period of “active defense.” Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zahorodnyuk stated to FT that focusing on defense without any offensive component would be ”a mistake of historic proportions” for Ukraine as it would hand Russian President Vladimir Putin the initiative and allow Putin to double down on ongoing efforts to convince the West and the rest of the world that Ukraine cannot win the war.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov similarly stated that Ukrainian forces need to continue to press Russian forces, particularly through operations that target Russian logistics in occupied Crimea.[22] A Ukrainian ”active defense” into 2025 would cede the theater-wide initiative to Russian forces for at least a year and possibly longer, allowing the Russian command to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs over that period. This extended period of theater initiative would also give the Russian command significant control over determining what resources both Ukrainian and Russian forces must bring to bear. The Russian command would therefore have an ample operational window to conduct a series of campaigns of differing intensities across the theater in Ukraine that could be specifically designed to constrain and degrade critical Ukrainian operational capacities needed for a future counter-offensive.

Offensive and defensive operations place similar requirements and constraints on Ukrainian materiel and personnel, and Ukrainian defensive operations do not necessarily present Ukraine with more opportunities to husband materiel and expand reserves for future counteroffensive operations. Russian and Ukrainian forces rely on the same weapons and equipment to conduct both defensive and offensive operations. Equipment such as armored vehicles, artillery, and drones are just as critical for defending positions as they are for capturing positions. Defensive operations do not eliminate manpower requirements or losses, moreover, as holding positions and counterattacking can produce significant force requirements and losses, particularly when the aggressor can set the terms of battle each time. The stability of a defensive line relies in part on the ability of defending forces to conduct sufficient rotations, rapidly reinforce weakened sectors of the frontline, establish physical fortifications, and when necessary, conduct orderly withdrawals from threatened positions, all of which require significant resources and a significant amount of committed and immediately available manpower. Offensive operations have required more materiel and manpower than defensive operations in Ukraine as in most wars, but both Russian and Ukrainian forces have regularly suffered significant losses on the defensive as well.[23]

Just as defensive operations do not guarantee that Ukraine will be able to amass resources for future counteroffensives, offensive operations do not necessarily preclude Russia from continuing efforts to build out stockpiles of equipment and establish operational reserves. ISW currently assesses that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign is enabling Russian forces to conduct regular operational-level rotations but that Russian forces are unlikely to be able to rapidly establish operational reserves.[24] Russian forces have recently expended considerable amounts of equipment on failed offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine and are currently consuming artillery ammunition far faster than Russia’s gradually mobilized defense industrial base (DIB) can produce.[25] Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are funneling newly produced weapons and ammunition to the frontline for immediate use and not for expanding stockpiles for future operations.[26] These constraints on Russian materiel and manpower are not inevitable characteristics of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, however. Russian forces could ease these constraints while still conducting offensive operations if the Russian command changed the intensity or tactics of these operations, intensified force generation efforts, or significantly expanded efforts to mobilize Russia’s DIB. Granting Russia a year or more of holding the theater-wide initiative would allow the Russian command to choose freely between prioritizing its own offensive efforts and operational requirements, amassing its own resources for future use, and forcing Ukraine to expend the resources Kyiv would be seeking to amass for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Russian forces will likely choose to conduct localized offensive operations as well as larger offensive efforts throughout the theater in order to force Ukraine to commit scarce materiel and manpower to defensive efforts. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on January 19 that the entire eastern front from Kupyansk to Bakhmut is active and reported intensified Russian assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman and Bakhmut directions.[27] Fityo warned that while Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian tanks and armored vehicles, Russian forces have “a large reserve of resources.“[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have recently ”switched to the offensive” in certain areas of the Lyman direction, particularly west of Svatove and west and southwest of Kreminna.[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are likely preparing for larger-scale actions in the Lyman direction in the near future.[30] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces have begun a ”massive offensive” in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[31] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in the coming weeks.[32] Russian sources have repeatedly acknowledged Russia’s intent to continue active operations throughout Ukraine intended to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[33]

FT also reported, citing unspecified Ukrainian officials, that Russian forces are planning to conduct a large-scale offensive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024 and will attempt to capture the rest of the four illegally annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts).[34] FT’s unspecified Ukrainian sources did not rule out the possibility of Russian forces attempting to recapture Kharkiv of Kyiv cities.[35] German outlet BILD reported similar Russian plans on December 14, 2023, and ISW noted at the time that Russia’s reported plans for the war are generally consistent with ongoing localized offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[36] Russian offensive operations in Ukraine will likely not have to achieve significant territorial advances to force Ukraine to expend valuable and limited resources on defensive efforts. Ukrainian forces will likely be unable to husband materiel and personnel while defending against Russian offensive operations, localized or large-scale, that are meant to prevent them from doing so. Ukraine would risk consuming resources it hoped to conserve for its own counteroffensive operations in efforts to stop continuing Russian attacks, likely while losing ground, if it went over to the strategic defensive as some US officials are apparently recommending. The side in war that holds the initiative generally has the advantage, and it is unwise to suggest that Ukraine should cede that advantage to Russia for longer than is absolutely necessary.

US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026. CNN reported on January 19 that US President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines met with US lawmakers on January 17 to urge lawmakers to support additional security assistance to Ukraine.[37] Biden Administration officials highlighted air defense systems and artillery ammunition as key Ukrainian capabilities that could be depleted without additional US aid, ending Ukraine‘s ability to conduct long-range strikes against occupied Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.[38] An unspecified US official told CNN that getting as much aid to Ukraine approved as possible before 2025 is “on the minds of a lot of folks.“[39] CNN reported that unspecified US intelligence officials assess that the war will last at least two more years, with some assessing there may be up to five years of fighting. CNN reported that unspecified US officials do not believe that a short-term ”drop-off” in US assistance to Ukraine will have a major battlefield impact, but that a long-term lack of US assistance could allow Russia to regain momentum by stockpiling weapons produced domestically and by Iran and North Korea, however.[40] ISW continues to assess that the positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate and could be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West and Russia and that the collapse of Western aid to Ukraine would likely lead to the eventual collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military and significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.[41]

Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev stated on January 18 that Russia would "welcome" South Korea into the circle of Russia’s “friendly countries” and suggested that South Korean businesses should invest in the restoration of occupied Donbas.[42] Zinoviev claimed that South Korea does not want to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and warned South Korea against supplying military aid to Ukraine. Zinoviev also falsely claimed that Russian-North Korean cooperation is not violating any international sanctions. Recent direct signaling from South Korean officials suggests that South Korea is increasingly at odds with the Kremlin, particularly due to growing Russian cooperation with Pyongyang. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol stated on September 17, 2023 that Seoul believes that Russian and North Korean military-technical agreements may violate UN Security Council sanctions, and South Korean officials have recently warned that North Korea is increasing weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia.[43] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight published a report on January 19 mapping the logistics routes along which North Korea is transferring ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine, highlighting the dramatic impact of North Korean ammunition deliveries on the Russian war effort.[44] Continued Russian cooperation with North Korea is likely further driving South Korea away from Russia, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of these shifting dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale. Russian opposition sources reported that anywhere from “hundreds” to 1,500 supporters of imprisoned Bashkort activist Fail Alysnov protested in Bashkhortostan’s capital Ufa on January 19 and that Russian Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) detained at least 10 demonstrators.[45] Russian authorities sentenced Alysnov to four years imprisonment on January 11 for "inciting hatred" and publicized the ruling on January 17, prompting mass protests outside the courthouse in Baymak, Bashkortostan.[46] Footage published on January 19 shows dozens to hundreds of Alysnov’s supporters demonstrating in the center of Ufa, and footage published later in the day suggests that the protests concluded for the day.[47] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 19 that there were no mass riots in Bashkortostan and that local law enforcement is handling ”individual” local demonstrations.[48] A Russian political blogger, who reported on the initial protests and denounced Alysnov as a ”separatist” with ”neo-fascist” values, claimed that no more than 50 people protested in Ufa and that half had dispersed by midday – a claim inconsistent with footage of the actual protests.[49]

The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved an action plan for the State Concept of Migration Policy, which the Russian government will implement throughout 2024-2025.[50] The action plan includes six sections that address the entry of foreign citizens to Russian territory; the assimilation of foreigners into Russian society; the free movement of students, scientific personnel, and teaching staff between Russia and other countries; and the prevention of violations to Russian migration laws.[51] The action plan also requires the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) to submit proposals by March 20, 2024 to the Cabinet of Ministers on how to strengthen punishments for foreigners who violate Russian laws.[52] The plan also includes several provisions to facilitate the integration of migrants into Russia's domestic sphere including Russian language proficiency assessments and assimilation courses to help foreigners internalize Russian "traditional spiritual and moral values."[53] Migrants will also have to create a "digital profile" by the end of 2024, which will allow the Russian government to track arrivals of those coming from countries that have a visa-free entry regime with Russia, as well as to expand the collection of biometric data of foreigners who arrive at Moscow airports.[54] ISW previously assessed that Russia was using similar digital surveillance technologies to expand its societal control toolkit during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it appears that the Kremlin is applying such surveillance and control measures to monitor the activities of foreigners in Russia.[55] The Kremlin likely seeks to quickly enact this action plan in order to gain more oversight over foreigners and manage growing tensions with some migrant communities within Russia.[56]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[57] The decree directs the Russian Presidential Administration’s Foreign Property Management Enterprise and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with power and funds to search for, register, and legally protect “property,” though the exact parameters of what constitutes current or historical Russian property are unclear. The Kremlin may use the “protection” of its claimed property in countries outside of its internationally recognized borders to forward soft power mechanisms in post-Soviet and neighboring states ultimately aimed at internal destabilization.[58] A prominent milblogger responded to the decree by implausibly calling for Russia to start enacting the law in "Alaska" and throughout a significant portion of eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.[59]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative.
• Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do.
• US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026.
• Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea.
• Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale.
• The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions southeast of Kupyansk amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 19 that it will resume fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine when the period of positional fighting ends and will “continue to serve” after the war, presumably subordinated to Rosgvardia.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to leverage the provision of social benefits and healthcare to augment passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced on the Kupyansk-Svatove line southeast of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage posted on January 18 shows that Russian forces have advanced in the forest area east of Tabaivka (about 25km southeast of Kupyansk).[60] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces began a "massive offensive" in this area and advanced up to half a kilometer west of the railway in the direction of Krokhmalne and Tabaivka.[61] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian advances across the railway line in this area or any indicators that Russian forces have begun a "massive" offensive effort here. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo noted that Russian forces have intensified attacks along the Kupyansk-Lyman line in recent days and are advancing.[62] Fityo also stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 tanks and 14 BMP infantry fighting vehicles in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions over the past day, indicating that Russian forces have likely committed a substantial amount of armor to this area.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to pressure Ukrainian forces in the Synkivka area (northeast of Kupyansk).[64] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional engagements northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka.[65]

Ukrainian forces recently regained limited positions on the Kupyansk-Svatove line southeast of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage posted on January 19 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting a Russian position east of Berestove (just south of the Tabaivka-Krokhmalne area and 18km northwest of Svatove), forcing Russian troops to withdraw and retreat further east of Berestove.[66] Russian and Ukrainian forces reported that positional engagements continued near Svatove, particularly near Berestove and Makiivka (both northwest of Svatove).[67] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Western Military District [WMD]) are attacking Makiivka from the northeast.[68]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kreminna on January 19 amid continued positional engagements in the Kreminna area. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian forces advanced 1.42 kilometers wide and 330 meters deep towards Bilohorivka (11km south of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian advances in this area.[69] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and in the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[70] Mashovets noted that Russian forces in this direction have transitioned to offensive actions in the past several days and that elements of the 283rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, WMD) and 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking towards Terny.[71] Elements of the "Aida" group of the "Okhotnik" detachment of Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are reportedly fighting in the Serebryanske forest area.[72]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Siversk, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian forces made additional advances near Vesele (southeast of Siversk and northeast of Bakhmut) after allegedly capturing the settlement as of January 18, but ISW has not observed confirmation of the Russian claims from January 18 or 19.[73] The Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) continues to operate southeast of Siversk near Berestove.[74]

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on January 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Khromove, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made a tactical advance near Bohdanivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[76]

Russian forces reportedly advanced on the outskirts of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on January 19. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made tactical advances on the outskirts of Avdiivka; north of Avdiivka near Stepove; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[77] Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov claimed that small Russian infantry groups entered Avdiivka, and a Ukrainian soldier operating in the area reported that Russian forces marginally advanced in Avdiivka‘s residential sector in the eastern part of the city.[78] ISW has not observed any confirmation of reported Russian advances near or in Avdiivka, however. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that positional engagements also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; near the Coke Plant in northwestern Avdiivka, the “Blue Lakes” quarry immediately north of Avdiivka, and the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka; and east of Avdiivka near Kamyanka.[79] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that weather conditions in the Avdiivka direction recently allowed Russian forces to conduct mechanized assaults against the city on frozen ground, but that the ground then thawed and inhibited Russian mechanized attacks on January 18.[80] Barabash also stated that Russian forces no longer have a significant numerical advantage in first-person view (FPV) drones in this area of the front.[81]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 19 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Army Corps) were supposed to bypass the Avdiivka Coke Plant from Vesele and Kamyanka (both to the northeast) but that this plan stalled due to challenging terrain and the failure of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District) to capture a position near the quarry before the 114th Brigade attacked.[82]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on January 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued positional fighting west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka, Marinka, and Heorhiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[83] Mashovets reported that Russian forces conducted a tactical regrouping of forces operating in the Novomykhailivka-Kostyantynivka direction south to southwest of Marinka such that Russian forces operating in the area include: the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th MRD, 8th CAA, Southern Military District) in the Marinka-Pobieda direction; likely a reinforced battalion of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) in the Oleksandrivka-Novomykhailivka direction; and elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) in the Slavne-Novomykhailivka direction and near Solodke.[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on January 19. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Staromayorske and east and south of Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[85]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on January 19. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Verbove (east of Robotyne) and near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne).[86]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on January 19. Ukrainian and Russian forces stated that positional engagements continued near Krynky.[87] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces significantly reduced artillery and drone reconnaissance activity in southern Ukraine in the past day.[88] Humenyuk stated that the total number of Russian personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River is ”extremely high.” The Financial Times (FT) reported that a Ukrainian soldier operating near Krynky stated that Russian forces have at least four or five times more personnel than Ukrainian forces in the area.[89] FT reported that Ukrainian personnel stated that Ukraine’s goal on the east bank was to create a position from which Ukrainian forces could launch new attacks deeper into Russian-controlled territory, but that Ukrainian forces are suffering from logistics issues and are unable to transport larger weapons across the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces operating near Krynky have previously described difficulties with operating across the river and establishing positions on the east bank.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 19 that it will resume fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine when the period of positional fighting ends and will “continue to serve” after the war, presumably subordinated to Rosgvardia.[90] The “Vostok” Battalion claimed that it is “licking [its] wounds” and “putting [itself] in order” before returning to the frontline. The “Vostok” Battalion emphasized that it is not a “temporary formation” and has been operational for 10 years. The ”Vostok” Battalion stated on January 3 that it will continue to operate subordinated to Rosgvardia following the reported dissolution of the ”Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the DNR’s Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD).[91]

Foreign nationals serving with the Russian military in Ukraine detailed their experiences with corruption and poor medical treatment in footage published on January 19. Social media footage purportedly showed a Chinese national expressing his desire to end his contract with the Russian military and return to China due to concern that he will die of an otherwise treatable unspecified illness contracted on the front.[92] The Chinese national claimed that Russian military doctors are unable to treat him and that he contacted the Chinese Embassy in Russia but was turned away since he voluntarily signed a military service contract.[93] The Chinese national appealed to other Chinese citizens to contact the Chinese government on his behalf and secure his return to China.[94] Another video posted to social media shows an interview with a reported Ethiopian national in Ukrainian custody who claimed to have joined the Russian military after being promised a Russian passport in exchange for military service.[95] The reported Ethiopian prisoner of war claimed that Russian authorities told him that he would be able to fulfill his military service in Russia and would not have to fight in Ukraine.[96] The reported Ethiopian national claimed that he signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on December 3, 2023, and that Ukrainian forces captured him on January 7.[97] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces are quickly sending poorly trained personnel to reinforce assault elements in Ukraine, and it is possible that Russia is similarly quickly deploying poorly trained migrants and foreign recruits to the front.[98]

Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on January 19 that at least 207 graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School have died fighting in Ukraine, an estimated 4.5 percent of the school’s total number of graduates since 2014.[99] Mobilization News reported that four of the 25 (16 percent) graduates of the school’s class of 2016 have already died in Ukraine and that another graduate is in Ukrainian custody.[100]

Russian schools reportedly continue to use drones to teach Russian children and college students how to operate combat drones, likely to militarize Russian youth and set long-term conditions for future force generation efforts. Russian opposition outlet Vedomosti reported on January 19 that educational institutions in 52 Russian federal subjects (regions) purchased 1.2 billion rubles worth of drones for drone combat and “homeland defense” courses in 2023.[101] Vedomosti reported that there was a surge in drone purchases in November and December 2023 following the Russian Ministry of Education’s draft order that could enable Russian schools to teach courses on drone combat within ”homeland defense” courses.[102] Vedomosti reported that Russia’s top three federal subjects in drone purchases are the Republic of Bashkortostan (411.5 million rubles or $4.67 million), Moscow Oblast (181.5 million rubles or $2.06 million), and the Republic of Chechnya (74.1 million rubles or $840,000).[103] Vedomosti reported that Russian schools will likely purchase additional drones in 2024.[104]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Ukraine's “Army of Drones” initiative reported on January 19 that Russian forces are equipping tanks with Sania anti-drone electronic warfare (EW) systems that allow Russian forces to suppress individual drones and drone swarms within a range of 1.5 kilometers.[105] The system reportedly only degrades first-person view (FPV) drones while not interfering with other signals and automatically turns off after downing the drone.[106]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on January 18 that Ukrainian forces used a Ukrainian-made drone to strike a target in St. Petersburg.[107] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on unspecified Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18.[108] Kamyshin stated that the Ukrainian drone flew more than 1,250 kilometers towards its target and emphasized that Ukraine needs more drones.[109] Ukraine produced 50,000 FPV drones per month as of December 2023 and plans to produce a total of one million FPV drones in 2024.[110]

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved changes to a government resolution on January 19 that will exempt conscripted employees of critical enterprises within Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) from military service.[111] The amended resolution provides exemptions to Ukrainian DIB employees regardless of military rank, age, or specialty and places no restrictions on the number of employees that may receive an exemption.[112] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Nataliya Kalmykov stated at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers that Ukrainian defense-industrial enterprises must work like clockwork to increase production capacity of weapons and equipment.[113]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to leverage the provision of social benefits and healthcare to augment passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on January 19 that Russian occupation authorities are targeting elderly and sick Ukrainian residents who need government assistance to survive as part of Russian efforts to force Ukrainians to obtain Russian passports.[114] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Territorial Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund stated on January 19 that they are operating a mobile office in occupied Luhansk Oblast where residents can register for compulsory medical insurance policies, likely meant to coerce passportization in exchange for medical insurance.[115]

Russian federal subjects continue to establish patronage networks with occupied areas of Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on January 19 that the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug is supporting infrastructure projects in and sending humanitarian supplies, vehicles, and construction equipment to occupied Donetsk Oblast.[116]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials are intensifying efforts to misrepresent French support for Ukraine as escalatory in an effort to constrain ongoing and future French security assistance to Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned French Ambassador to Russia Pierre Levy on January 19 to discuss a Russian strike on Kharkiv City on January 16 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) alleged killed and wounded “French mercenaries.”[117] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the Russian MFA presented Levy with evidence about ”French mercenaries” serving in Ukraine and alleged that this represents an escalation with Russia and makes France an accomplice to Ukrainian ”war crimes.”[118] The Russian Embassy in France also condemned recent French security assistance to Ukraine and suggested that France is placing support for Ukraine above the lives of civilians.[119] Russian officials likely intensified information operations aimed at France in reaction to France’s January 18 announcement that it launched a coalition to expand Ukrainian artillery capabilities and will send up to 72 Caesar artillery systems to Ukraine in 2024 as well as French President Emmanuel Macron’s announcement on January 16 that he would finalize a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine in February 2024 and that France would send 40 SCALP missiles and ”several hundred” bombs to Ukraine in the coming weeks.[120]

Likely Kremlin-affiliated actors continue efforts to accuse the West of mistreating Russians and Russian-speakers abroad. The German-based Association for the Prevention of Discrimination and Isolation of Russian Germans and Russian-speaking Fellow Citizens in Germany (VADAR) called on January 19 for the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) and German intelligence agencies to disclose information about Germany’s policy towards its Russian-speaking population.[121] VADAR made the calls in response to an article published by German outlet BILD on January 16 about a reported German MoD document detailing a hypothetical Russian attack against NATO.[122] Russian actors routinely allege mistreatment of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the West in an effort to justify Russia’s overall objectives to weaken and dismantle Western alliances.[123] The Kremlin has repeatedly used appeals to ”compatriots abroad,” which includes both ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, as a pretext for escalation with neighboring countries and to justify the objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[124]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on January 19 that the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is part of Belarus’ strategic deterrence.[125] Khrenin stressed that Belarus’ updated military doctrine, which the Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 16, aims to prevent military and political situations from escalating and considers Russian tactical nuclear weapons as deterrence mechanisms.[126] ISW continues to assess that Russian use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 19, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-19-2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated Chem Ranger commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on January 18. 
• The Houthis continued to frame US airstrikes in Yemen as part of a US regional “escalation” on January 19. The Houthis and their allies throughout the region—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq—threatened on January 17 and 18 to expand the war in the Middle East by targeting other US and UK interests outside of the Red Sea region. 
• Iranian officials explicitly stated on January 19 that the January 15 IRGC missile strikes in Idlib Province, Syria, were meant to signal Iran’s ability to attack Israel directly. 
• Iranian-backed political actors are continuing to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq.  
• Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker. 
• Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in three areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. 
• Israeli forces under the command of the Menashe Brigade concluded a 45-hour counter-terrorism operation in Tulkarm on January 19. 
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it shot down a US Air Force (USAF) MQ-9 Reaper drone in Diyala Province, Iraq, on January 18. 
• Iran and Pakistan continued to deescalate tensions following the exchange of strikes on each other’s territory in recent days. 

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 19, 2024

Jan 19, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 19, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. 

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated Chem Ranger commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on January 18. 
• The Houthis continued to frame US airstrikes in Yemen as part of a US regional “escalation” on January 19. The Houthis and their allies throughout the region—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq—threatened on January 17 and 18 to expand the war in the Middle East by targeting other US and UK interests outside of the Red Sea region. 
• Iranian officials explicitly stated on January 19 that the January 15 IRGC missile strikes in Idlib Province, Syria, were meant to signal Iran’s ability to attack Israel directly. 
• Iranian-backed political actors are continuing to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq.  
• Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker. 
• Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in three areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. 
• Israeli forces under the command of the Menashe Brigade concluded a 45-hour counter-terrorism operation in Tulkarm on January 19. 
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it shot down a US Air Force (USAF) MQ-9 Reaper drone in Diyala Province, Iraq, on January 18. 
• Iran and Pakistan continued to deescalate tensions following the exchange of strikes on each other’s territory in recent days. 

The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated Chem Ranger commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on January 18.[1] The missiles landed in the water near the ship but did not damage the ship or its crew.[2] This attack marks the third Houthi attack on a US-owned ship this week.[3] The Houthis have conducted 30 attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters since October 17.[4]

The Houthis continued to frame US airstrikes in Yemen as part of a US regional “escalation” on January 19. The Houthis and their allies throughout the region—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq—threatened on January 17 and 18 to expand the war in the Middle East by targeting other US and UK interests outside of the Red Sea region.[5] Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam said that the United States is protecting Israel by conducting airstrikes in Yemen.[6] US airstrikes seek to degrade the Houthis’ ability to conduct piratical and terrorist attacks on global shipping in the Red Sea.[7] The United States conducted preemptive strikes on January 17 targeting 14 missiles that the Houthis had prepared to fire on commercial vessels in the Red Sea.[8] Abdulsalam said that the Houthis do not want the conflict to expand but that the Houthis will continue targeting Israeli ships.[9] Abdulsalam also said that the Houthis do not intend to target Saudi Arabia or the UAE and added that the Houthis' truce process with Saudi Arabia is ongoing.[10] Abdulsalam acknowledged that the Houthis have benefitted from Iranian military support but that the Iranians do not control Houthi decision-making.[11]

A senior Houthi official claimed that the Houthis will provide safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea.[12] Houthi official Mohammed al Bukhaiti told Russian media that the Houthis would only target ships linked to Israel and its allies. The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting a Russian tanker south of Yemen on January 12, however.[13]

Iranian officials stated on January 19 that the January 15 IRGC missile strikes in Idlib Province, Syria, were meant to signal Iran’s ability to attack Israel directly. Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media said that IRGC missile strikes in Idlib targeted the Islamic State (IS), “Jabhat al Nusra,” and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).[14] Jabhat al Nusra rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al Sham in 2017.[15] Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Kazem Sedighi said during his sermon on January 19 that the IRGC launched the missiles from Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran—rather than Kermanshah Province in western Iran—to demonstrate that IRGC missiles can reach Israeli territory.[16] Western media noted on January 17 that the range at which the IRGC fired the Kheibar Shekan missile toward Idlib is nearly the range required for Iran to target Tel Aviv, Israel.[17] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned on January 19 that the IRGC will “change the angle” of its missiles to target Israel if Israel “makes a mistake.”[18] Ghalibaf was implying that Iran has the capability to strike Israel directly but has thus far chosen not to.  

Iranian-backed political actors are continuing to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq. Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmed al Asadi claimed that US forces have committed “repeated crimes” in Iraq during an interview with Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled Al Ahed on January 18.[19] Asadi also stated that Iraqi sovereignty is “a red line.” Iranian-backed Iraqi actors frequently frame US self-defense strikes against Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as crimes and violations of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[20] Asadi is a member of the We Build Coalition, a political party headed by Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.[21] Asadi previously served as the spokesperson for the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iraqi security service containing several Iranian-backed Shia militias.[22] He also leads the 6th PMF Brigade (Kataib Jund al Imam).[23] The Fatah Alliance, which is also headed by Ameri, appointed Asadi as its spokesperson in 2018.[24]

State of Law Coalition member Adnan al Sayadi claimed that the presence of US forces in Iraq is “absolutely unjustified” and that Iraq can solve its “crises and problems” without foreign support during an interview with Al Ahed on January 18.[25] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors frequently argue that the presence of US-led coalition forces is no longer justified because the Iraqi Security Forces can independently protect Iraq from threats such as ISIS. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[26]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker. Iraqi parliamentarians voted for a new speaker on January 13, but no candidate won the 165-vote majority required.[27] The National Progress Alliance candidate, Shaalan al Karim, was 13 votes short of winning the speakership.[28] The National Progress Alliance is headed by former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi, whom the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court dismissed in November 2023.[29] Iraqi media previously reported that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—are trying to prevent Karim from becoming parliament speaker and instead install their preferred candidate, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[30] Mashhadani is a member of the Azm Alliance, which is headed by Muthanna al Samarrai.

Iranian-backed Badr Organization member Yousef al Kalabi accused Karim of “glorifying” Saddam Hussein’s regime during an interview with Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH)-controlled Al Ahed on January 18.[31] Iranian-backed politicians in Iraq frequently use accusations of ”terrorism” or ”support for Saddam Hussein” to enflame anti-Sunni sectarian sentiment.[32] Several representatives, including a member of AAH’s political wing, similarly called for referring Karim to the Accountability and Justice Commission for “promoting and glorifying Saddam Hussein’s regime” on January 14.[33] Kalabi also claimed that two representatives supporting Karim offered bribes to other representatives to sway the election results in favor of Karim.[34]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri claimed on January 18 that a new parliament speaker will soon be elected “within the [Shia Coordination] Framework.”[35] Ameri’s statement is noteworthy given that the Shia Coordination Framework is not responsible for and does not have the authority to choose the parliament speaker. Iraqi parliament speakers are elected by the Council of Representatives and must win an absolute majority of 165 votes to win the speakership.[36]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in three areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. CTP-ISW previously assessed on January 16 that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas.[37] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 5th Infantry Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) clashed with several armed Palestinian fighters on January 19 in unspecified areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[38] The IDF used air support and tank fire to assist its forces during the clashes.[39] A Palestinian activist reported on January 19 that Israeli vehicles reentered several towns and neighborhoods of the northern Gaza Strip and engaged Palestinian fighters.[40]

The military wing of Hamas, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed that it detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and anti-personnel improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli forces east of Jabalia.[41] Palestinian militias have sustained daily attacks on Israeli forces around Jabalia since January 16.[42] The last time Palestinian militias claimed attacks in the Jabalia area for four consecutive days was between December 24 and 27, 2023.[43] The al Qassem Brigades detonated an anti-personnel IED and fired small arms at Israeli soldiers inside and around a building in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City on January 19.[44]

Palestinian militias are also attacking Israeli forces in southwestern Gaza City, namely in Zaytoun and Sheikh Ijlin neighborhoods. The al Qassem Brigades conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor in southern Gaza City on January 19.[45] The military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Quds Brigades, mortared an IDF position in Zaytoun.[46] A Palestinian activist noted on January 19 that Israeli forces had advanced into Sheikh Ijlin and that IDF ”snipers” remained in Zaytoun.[47]

The IDF 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 19.[48] Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting the 179th Armored Brigade during its operations, according to the IDF. Israeli forces captured small arms, RPGs, and other unspecified military equipment in the building that the Palestinian fighters fired from.[49]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 19.[50] Israeli forces raided a training camp of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade and located tunnels, weapons, and life-size models of Israeli tanks and military vehicles.[51] The IDF reported that the camp served as a meeting place for senior Hamas officials.

Palestinian fighters continued their attempt to defend against Israeli clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades reported on January 19 that its fighters returned from the front lines in eastern Khan Younis City and reported that they fired an anti-tank guided RPG at an Israeli tank.[52] The militia also claimed that it detonated a Shawaz EFP targeting three Israeli tanks. Al Qassem Brigades fighters also fired a sniper rifle targeting Israeli ground forces in the same sector.[53] The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades claimed separate attacks on Israeli forces and armor south of Khan Younis City.[54]

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed regional security Israel’s shift to “low-intensity operations” in the Gaza Strip in a phone call with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on January 18.[55] The pair also discussed humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip and “instability in the West Bank.” Austin “emphasized” the importance of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip and “acknowledged” Israeli security “concerns” on the Israel-Lebanon border.

Hamas International Relations head Musa Abu Marzouk met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on January 19 to discuss “achieving a ceasefire.”[56] Bassem Naim, a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau in the Gaza Strip, accompanied the Hamas delegation.[57] Russian officials “stressed the need for the speedy release of civilians, including three Russian citizens,” held hostage by Hamas since October 7, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry.[58] Bogdanov added that Russia “supports the rights of the Palestinian people.”[59]

The Gaza Strip continues to experience the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 19 that the Gaza Strip entered the eighth day of the telecommunications blackout.[60] The director of a Palestinian telecommunication provider told CNN on January 19 that Israeli military activity has severed the underground fiber optic line connecting internet and cellphone towers in the Gaza Strip to Israel and the West Bank.[61]

The al Quds Brigades launched one rocket salvo from the Gaza Strip targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel on January 18 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.[62] CTP-ISW previously reported that only the al Qassem Brigades launched a rocket salvo into southern Israel on January 18.[63]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces under the command of the Menashe Brigade concluded a 45-hour counter-terrorism operation in Tulkarm on January 19. Israeli forces “searched” approximately 1,000 buildings and arrested over 37 wanted individuals, including several unidentified senior militia members.[64] IDF engineering forces identified “dozens” of IEDs buried under roads in Tulkarm.[65] Unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated multiple IEDs targeting Israeli vehicles in Tulkarm. Palestine media claimed that one IED disabled an Israeli armored vehicle.[66] Israeli forces destroyed five weapons manufacturing facilities, four militia observation posts, and over 400 charges, and seized various small arms and military equipment.[67] Israeli forces also directed an airstrike that targeted Palestinian fighters who had targeted Israeli forces with IEDs.

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across the West Bank.[68] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters attacked an Israeli vehicle outside Ramallah.[69] Unidentified Palestinian fighters set fire to tires in the street in an attempt to restrict the movement of Israeli forces operating in Tammoun, Tubas.[70]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 19.[71] LH continued to target Israeli military positions along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF Air Force struck LH military infrastructure, including rocket launch sites, in multiple locations in southern Lebanon.[72]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it shot down a US Air Force (USAF) MQ-9 Reaper drone in Diyala Province, Iraq, on January 18.[73] The group claimed that the USAF launched the drone from Ali al Salem Airbase in Kuwait. An unspecified Pentagon official confirmed to Kurdish media that a US drone “crashed” in Diyala Province.[74] IRGC-affiliated media published videos of the MQ-9 crashing in Diyala Province.[75]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Erbil Province, Iraq, on January 18.[76]

Iran and Pakistan continued to de-escalate tensions following the exchange of strikes on each other’s territory in recent days. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[77] The Pakistani armed forces responded with cross-border strikes targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[78] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian reiterated Iran’s respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and emphasized that Pakistan is Iran’s “friend, brother, and neighbor” during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart Jalil Abbas Jilani on January 19.[79] Iranian state media reported that Abdollahian and Jilani "agreed to reduce tensions.”[80] The Pakistani Foreign Ministry similarly reported that Jilani underscored the "close brotherly relations” between Iran and Pakistan and called for cooperation between the two countries based on the "spirit of mutual trust and cooperation.”[81]

The Sistan and Baluchistan Province Law Enforcement commander announced the arrest of four individuals who shot at an unspecified “military headquarters” in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 19. The commander said that Law Enforcement Command officers found handguns and a Kalashnikov rifle.[82] The shooting follows a rise in insecurity and terrorist activity in southeastern Iran since mid-December. The Baloch Salafi Jihadi group Jaish al Adl has conducted three attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan since December 15.[83] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named the Islamic State Khorasan Province—conducted a suicide attack on January 3 during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani in Kerman Province.[84]

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 19, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-19-2024

Key Takeaways

• Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te won the Taiwanese presidential election on January 13. The DPP did not secure a majority in the Legislative Yuan and will face opposition from the KMT and Taiwan’s People’s Party in the legislative body.
• Nauru severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 15.
• Head of the CCP International Department Liu Jianchao commented on the need for stronger “international cooperation” during an interview at the US Council on Foreign Relations on January 9.
• President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed on November 15, 2023, to resume high-level military-to-military communication.
• The CCP views United States-led strikes against the Houthis as escalating regional tensions.
• A second PRC-brokered ceasefire in northern Myanmar failed to stop the fighting between the Myanmar junta and rebel groups.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, JANUARY 19, 2024

Jan 19, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 19, 2024 

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War 

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute 

Data Cutoff: January 18 at 5pm ET 

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. 

Key Takeaways

• Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te won the Taiwanese presidential election on January 13. The DPP did not secure a majority in the Legislative Yuan and will face opposition from the KMT and Taiwan’s People’s Party in the legislative body.
• Nauru severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 15.
• Head of the CCP International Department Liu Jianchao commented on the need for stronger “international cooperation” during an interview at the US Council on Foreign Relations on January 9.
• President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed on November 15, 2023, to resume high-level military-to-military communication.
• The CCP views United States-led strikes against the Houthis as escalating regional tensions.
• A second PRC-brokered ceasefire in northern Myanmar failed to stop the fighting between the Myanmar junta and rebel groups.

Taiwan

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te won the Taiwanese presidential election on January 13. Lai won by a margin of nearly seven percentage points over the second-place Kuomintang (KMT) candidate.[1] Lai’s election signals continuity with the cross-strait policy and diplomatic strategy of the incumbent administration of Tsai Ing-wen, during which Taiwan has favored closer cooperation with the United States at the expense of relations with the PRC.

Lai’s victory is a defeat for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP conducts constant influence operations against Taiwan to erode support for the DPP and steer perceptions of a Chinese national identity that lends legitimacy to the CCP. The CCP’s influence operations were especially intense during Taiwan’s election season, ranging from covert to overt and varied in target audience. Some of the most salient examples include the mass posting of disinformation content to social media, subsidizing trips to the PRC for local political and business leaders, and warning of armed conflict by framing the election as a choice between peace and war. The DPP’s reelection represents the failure of PRC interference in Taiwan’s democracy and highlights the prevalence of the Taiwanese identity that the DPP champions.

The PRC’s response to the results has so far been minimal compared to the political and military pressure it has exerted on Taiwan. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) issued a statement focusing on the DPP’s weaker mandate compared to previous elections, stating that “the DPP can by no means represent mainstream public opinion on the island.”[2] The PRC did not expand its military posturing immediately after the election. PLA ADIZ violations remained within the bounds of normal activity until a modest spike on January 17 and 18, when 29 PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line over the two days.[3] These actions are consistent with the PRC’s responses to Taiwan’s last presidential election. The TAO similarly dismissed Tsai’s 2020 reelection and declared the PRC’s absolute intolerance for so-called separatism.[4] The PRC also sailed the newly commissioned Shandong aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait immediately before Tsai Ing-wen’s reelection in January 2020 but did not take aggressive actions in the week after.[5]

The DPP did not secure a majority in the Legislative Yuan and will face opposition from the KMT and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) in the legislative body. None of the three major parties won a majority through the legislative elections. The DPP won 51 seats, which is a 10-seat loss compared to the last election. The KMT gained 14 seats for a total of 52, putting it ahead of the DPP by 1. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) secured 8 seats, which positions it to play a decisive role on divided issues in legislative decision-making. Two independent candidates who are aligned with the KMT also won seats.[6] A divided legislature will pose challenges for the incoming DPP administration’s ability to pass legislation. The DPP last led a minority government under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, during which the KMT-led opposition frequently blocked arms procurement from the United States, for example. The KMT-led opposition also blocked other policy initiatives, such as amendments to voting laws and regulations governing party assets and state-owned property.[7]

The DPP will likely face opposition to its defense policies in the Legislative Yuan. Lai has promised to continue former President Tasi Ing-wen’s deterrence-focused national defense strategy, which entails robust defense spending, arms procurement, and military reforms.[8] The expansion of defense-related spending under the Tsai administration was often funded by special budgets, which the DPP’s political opponents deem fiscally irresponsible.[9] The KMT and TPP expressed similar views about defense spending throughout the campaign. KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP chairman candidate Ko Wen-je sharply criticized Tsai and the DPP for lack of fiscal discipline during the election campaign, despite Taiwan’s debt levels trending down over Tsai’s tenure.[10] Hou promoted a strong national defense strategy but emphasized that Taiwan should prioritize easing tensions with the PRC over reckless spending on several occasions.[11] Ko advocated for defense expenditure of up to 3% of GDP but disagreed with the DPP on the allocation of funds.[12]

Seat allocation in the Legislative Yuan

The Legislative Yuan is set to elect a speaker on February 1. Former KMT presidential hopeful Han Kuo-yu announced his candidacy on January 18 and is the top contender for the role given the KMT’s plurality.[14] Han is a divisive figure in Taiwanese politics, notorious for his pro-Beijing platform that contributed to popular dissatisfaction with his incumbency and subsequent removal from office as mayor of Kaohsiung.[15] The role of the speaker is consequential for the DPP’s relative political power. The speaker is responsible for guiding legislative processes, such as setting the legislative agenda, voting on laws, and presiding over sessions. Control over legislative proceedings means the speaker can prioritize or delay legislation based on political alignment and steer debates on policies proposed by the executive branch.

The handful of TPP legislators will play a decisive role in the election of the speaker. Cooperation between the KMT and TPP since last November to “work together to maximize their presence” in the Legislative Yuan has fueled speculation that the parties will elect Han to be the legislative speaker.[16] Lingering resentment between the TPP and KMT after bitter negotiations to form a joint presidential ticket failed also threatens to complicate the two parties’ cooperation, however.[17]

Ko may use the TPP’s political leverage in the Legislative Yuan to selectively cooperate with the DPP on some policies. Lai and Ko each presented housing policies that emphasized increasing the availability of social housing.[18] The two candidates also advocated for investment in technology and innovation to increase economic competitiveness.[19] Ko’s flexible policy position has led many to regard him as an opportunist who will act according to political interests rather than ideological alignment.[20]

Nauru severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 15. Nauru cited the “One China Principle” and UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 as the basis for its decision.[21] UN Resolution 2758 recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of “China” to the United Nations and removed the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a UN member. Nauru previously cut ties with Taiwan in favor of the PRC in 2002, then switched back to relations with Taiwan in 2005. Without Nauru, Taiwan now has 12 “diplomatic allies” with which it has formal diplomatic relations.[22]

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) “strongly condemned” the decision and accused the PRC of manipulating Nauru with offers of financial aid. The MOFA claimed that Nauru had been asking for “a huge amount of financial aid that surpassed what Taiwan would normally provide to diplomatic allies.” It said that the switch in recognition was a means for the PRC to “suppress Taiwan” and called it “revenge against democratic values” following Taiwan’s January 13 elections.[23] The MOFA also issued a statement refuting the “fallacious” use of UN Resolution 2758, pointing out that the resolution does not mention Taiwan and does not say Taiwan is part of the PRC.[24]

Taiwan’s Central News Agency cited unnamed Taiwanese officials who claimed Nauru had asked Taiwan for 2.6 billion NTD (about 82 million USD) in financial aid, over half of Nauru’s national budget. The money was intended to cover a revenue gap primarily caused by Australia’s closure of its Nauru Regional Processing Center for asylum seekers. The unnamed sources said that the PRC took advantage of Taiwan’s inability to afford this amount and agreed to provide the requested aid in exchange for Nauru cutting ties with Taiwan and recognizing the PRC.[25] Australian Minister for International Development and the Pacific Pat Conroy said Nauru informed Australia that it would cut ties with Taiwan but did not ask Australia for financial aid to fill the hole in its budget.[26]

The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said the PRC “welcomes and appreciates” Nauru’s decision and claimed it “fully demonstrates once again that the one-China principle is the aspiration of the people and the general trend.” It did not directly respond to Taiwan’s accusations that the diplomatic switch was related to Taiwan’s elections.[27] It denied engaging in “money diplomacy” to lure Nauru but said cooperation with the PRC promised “broad prospects and will bring unprecedented development opportunities for Nauru.”[28]

China

Head of the CCP International Department Liu Jianchao commented on the need for stronger “international cooperation” during an interview at the US Council on Foreign Relations on January 9. He stated that “for domestic circulation to function well, it does need stronger international cooperation, more foreign trade, and better use of FDI [Foreign Direct Investment].”[29] Liu’s remark about domestic circulation is a reference to “dual circulation,” which is an economic strategy that involves the creation of a self-sustaining domestic economy with links to international markets.[30] The strategy aims to reduce the PRC’s vulnerabilities to sanctions during crises by leveraging foreign investment and trade to bolster the country’s economy without becoming reliant on international markets. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously explained on June 7, 2023, that the strategy will “ensure the normal operation of the national economy under extreme circumstances.”[31] The dual circulation strategy is the CCP’s response to international anti-globalization trends, supply chain challenges, and the need for China to adopt a new innovation-driven “development pattern.”[32]

Xi’s emphasis on ”institutional openness to advance high-level financial opening up” to become a financial power during a January 17 speech to the Party School of the CCP Central Committee aligns with this dual cycle strategy.[33] The emphasis on international economic engagement to buttress domestic circulation is a key tenant of creating a dual circulation economy. Other CCP policies are not consistent with the strategy, however. Chinese state security raids on foreign firms, such as the Mintz Group, Bain & Company, and Capvision Partners in early 2023 run counter to the party’s effort to gain foreign investment as part of this strategy.[34] These raids create uncertainty over whether capital invested in the PRC is safe from arbitrary state actions and whether foreign firms’ personnel can safely operate in the country.

President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed on November 15, 2023, to resume high-level military-to-military communication. They agreed to restart the US-China Defense Policy Coordination (CDPC) Talks, the US-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings, and telephone conversations between theater commanders.[35] The CDPC Talks occurred on January 8-9 under the leadership of US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase and Deputy Director of the Central Military Commission Office for International Military Cooperation Major General Song Yanchao.[36] The official PRC Ministry of National Defense readout of the CDPC urged the United States to “reduce military presence and provocation in the South China Sea…and stop manipulating and hyping-up relevant issues.”[37]  The MMCA and theater command-level talks have yet to be scheduled.

The United States views military-to-military talks as a means of escalation management to prevent and control crises. The CCP views these talks as a bargaining chip to manipulate United States behavior to the party’s benefit, however. An action that the CCP deems unfavorable by the United States would be grounds, in the party’s view, to cut off military-to-military dialogue. The party previously did this by cutting off high-level military dialogue in the aftermath of then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.[38] This precedent indicates that the CCP will continue to use military-to-military dialogue opportunities to shape United States behavior in the lead up to at least the May 20 ROC presidential inauguration.

Israel-Hamas War

The CCP changed its messaging about the Houthis attacks on maritime shipping by explicitly calling on the Houthis to stop the attacks. The PRC abstained on January 10 from UN Resolution 2722 which condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[39] In explanatory remarks, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Zhang Jun did however “call on the Houthi armed forces to immediately stop harassing civilian ships and respect the freedom of navigation of all countries.”[40] This is a shift in PRC rhetoric to explicitly recognize the Houthis as instigators of regional instability.

The CCP views the United States-led strikes against the Houthis as escalating regional tensions, however. PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin called on January 4 for all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe.[41] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning also expressed concern on January 12 about the alleged ”escalation of tensions in the Red Sea” after United States-led strikes on Houthi positions on January 11.[42] A joint PRC MFA and Arab League statement on January 16 called on “all parties to cool down the situation…and effectively maintain regional peace and stability.”[43] The bigger problem from the CCP’s perspective is not the hostilities instigated by the Houthis, but rather the United States-led counterstrikes. The party views the willingness of the United States and allies to strike Houthi positions as risking wider regional escalation, which would threaten PRC economic interests in the region.

Myanmar

A second PRC-brokered ceasefire in northern Myanmar failed to stop the fighting between the Myanmar junta and rebel groups. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning announced on January 12 that the PRC had mediated a formal ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar junta government and three ethnic armed groups. Ceasefire negotiations took place in Kunming, Yunnan in the PRC on January 10 and 11. The MFA claimed that the two sides agreed to implement the ceasefire immediately, to address disputes and concerns through peaceful negotiation, and not to undermine the safety of Chinese people living in the border area and Chinese projects and personnel in Myanmar.[44] Unnamed officials who attended the negotiations told Radio Free Asia that the ceasefire applied only to Shan state in northern Myanmar and did not specify a given length of time. An “ex-military official” said the ceasefire was not sustainable and it had resulted from PRC pressure on both sides. The official said the PRC was concerned about the war negatively impacting industrial products from the PRC’s Yunnan Province, which borders Myanmar’s Shan State.[45] Myanmar’s military broke the ceasefire on January 13, however, one day after it was announced. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army rebel group reported 19 artillery strikes by the military on targets throughout Shan and northern Myanmar.[46]

The PRC previously negotiated a ceasefire on December 14, which also immediately failed to stop the fighting.[47] The PRC’s interests in the Myanmar civil war include re-opening trade disrupted by the fighting, ensuring the safety of PRC nationals and projects, protecting border security, and cracking down on telecommunications fraud centers in northern Myanmar which have defrauded and kidnapped PRC nationals. The PRC has maintained ties with both the junta and multiple rebel groups in pursuit of these goals.[48]

The CCP may also seek to negotiate a ceasefire to bolster its diplomatic reputation. The PRC has often portrayed itself as a promoter of global peace, security, and stability, for example through its Global Security Initiative and its ongoing calls for peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars.[49]

4. Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say

As an aside I do believe there is evidence of cooperation directly and indirectly between north Korea and the Houthis.

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/08/03/Report-North-Korea-supplying-missiles-to-Yemen-rebels/3021438619655/

 AUG. 3, 2015 / 12:52 PM

Report: North Korea supplying missiles to Yemen rebels

North Korea-made weapons are being traded in the Middle East despite heavy U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang.

And there is this information from the 2019 Report of the UN Panel of Experts:

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/028/82/PDF/N1902882.pdf?OpenElement

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to violate the arms embargo and has attempted to supply small arms and light weapons and other military equipment to Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as to Libya and the Sudan, via foreign intermediaries, including Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali in the case of the Houthi rebels. The Panel continued investigations into designated entities and individuals in Asia who clandestinely procured centrifuges for the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and attempted to sell a wide range of military equipment to armed groups and Governments in the Middle East and Africa. (Page 4)

...

97. The Panel investigated efforts by the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and KOMID to supply a wide array of conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthi group in Yemen through a known proxy, Syrian national Hussein al-Ali, and his Syrian-registered company Consulting Bureau for Marketing. The Panel was given access by a Member State to an invitation letter dated 13 July 2016 from Houthi leader Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami to the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, a KOMID subsidiary, to meet in Damascus “to discuss the issue of the transfer of technology and other matters of mutual interest”. According to the Member State “a protocol of cooperation between Yemen and North Korea” was then negotiated involving “Naif Ahmad Al Qanis, Houthi ambassador in Damascus and Syrian arms broker Hussein Al Ali”. According to the Member State, this involved a “vast array of military equipment, including Kalahsnikov, PKC machine guns, RPG-7, RPG-29, Fagot missiles, Igla missiles, tanks, air defence systems, ballistic missiles”. The Panel has yet to receive replies from Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami, Naif Ahmad al-Qanis and Hussein al-Ali to the Panel’s request for information on their role in these negotiations and attempts to broker and supply such weaponry from or on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (Page 44)

Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say

By Samia Nakhoul and Parisa Hafezi

January 20, 20246:26 AM ESTUpdated an hour ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-hezbollah-commanders-help-direct-houthi-attacks-yemen-sources-say-2024-01-20/?utm

[1/2]Supporters of the Houthi movement rally to denounce air strikes launched by the U.S. and Britain on Houthi targets, in Sanaa, Yemen January 12, 2024. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah/File Photo Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Summary

• Iran supplied drones and precision-strike missiles - sourcesIran provides know-how, data, intelligence in Red Sea - sourcesHouthis trained on advanced weapons in Iran last month - sourceAttacks show Iran's ability to threaten naval security

DUBAI, Jan 20 (Reuters) - Commanders from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Lebanon's Hezbollah group are on the ground in Yemen helping to direct and oversee Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, four regional and two Iranian sources told Reuters.

Iran - which has armed, trained and funded the Houthis - stepped up its weapons supplies to the militia in the wake of the war in Gaza, which erupted after Iranian-backed militants Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, the four regional sources said.

Tehran has provided advanced drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, precision-strike ballistic missiles and medium-range missiles to the Houthis, who started targeting commercial vessels in November in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, the sources said.

IRGC commanders and advisers are also providing know-how, data and intelligence support to determine which of the dozens of vessels travelling through the Red Sea each day are destined for Israel and constitute Houthi targets, all the sources said.

Washington said last month that Iran was deeply involved in planning operations against shipping in the Red Sea and that its intelligence was critical to enable the Houthis to target ships.

In response to a request for comment for this story, the White House pointed to its previous public comments about how Iran has been supporting the Houthis.

In his weekly news conferences, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani has repeatedly denied Tehran is involved in the Red Sea attacks by the Houthis. The IRGC public relations office did not respond to request for comment.

Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam denied any Iranian or Hezbollah involvement in helping to direct the Red Sea attacks. A Hezbollah spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.

The Houthis, who emerged in the 1980s as an armed group in opposition to Saudi Arabia's Sunni religious influence in Yemen, say they are supporting Hamas by striking commercial ships they say are either linked to Israel or are heading to Israeli ports.

Their attacks have affected global shipping between Asia and Europe through the Bab al-Mandab strait off Yemen. That has triggered U.S. and British air strikes on Houthi targets in the country, opening a new theatre of conflict linked to the war in Gaza.

The Gaza conflict has also sparked clashes between Israel and Hezbollah militants along the Lebanese border, as well as attacks by Iran-linked groups on U.S. targets in Iraq and Syria.

"The Revolutionary Guards have been helping the Houthis with military training (on advanced weapons)," an Iranian insider told Reuters. "A group of Houthi fighters were in Iran last month and were trained in an IRGC base in central Iran to get familiar with the new technology and the use of missiles."

The person said Iranian commanders had travelled to Yemen as well and set up a command centre in the capital Sanaa for the Red Sea attacks which is being run by the senior IRGC commander responsible for Yemen.

REGIONAL STRATEGY

The Red Sea attacks fit in with Iran's strategy of expanding and mobilising its regional Shi'ite network of armed militias to project its influence and show its ability to threaten maritime security in the region and beyond, two analysts said.

They said Tehran wanted to show that the Gaza war could be too costly for the West if it drags on - and could have catastrophic consequences in the region as things escalate.

"The Houthis are not acting independently," said Abdulaziz al-Sager, director of the Gulf Research Center think-tank, who based his conclusion on a close analysis of the capabilities of the group, which has an estimated 20,000 fighters.

"The Houthis, with their personnel, expertise and capabilities are not that advanced. Dozens of vessels cross through Bab al-Mandab daily, the Houthis don't have the means, resources, knowledge or satellite information to find the specific target and attack," he said.

White House national security spokeswoman Adrienne Watson also said last month that Iranian-provided tactical intelligence had been critical in enabling the Houthis to target ships.

According to two former Yemeni army sources, there is a clear presence of IRGC and Hezbollah members in Yemen. They are responsible for supervising military operations, training and reassembling missiles smuggled into Yemen as separate pieces, the two people said.

Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think-tank, said: "It is clearly the case that the Iranians are helping identify the target and the destination. There is no local Houthi capacity to do that."

One senior regional source who follows Iran and who spoke on condition of anonymity said: "The political decision is in Tehran, the management is Hezbollah, and the location is the Houthis in Yemen."

Attacks by Yemen's Houthi militants on ships in the Red Sea are disrupting maritime trade through the Suez Canal, with some vessels re-routing to a much longer East-West route via the southern tip of Africa.

WEAPONS AND ADVICE

Houthi spokesperson Abdulsalam said the group's aim was to target Israeli ships heading to Israel without causing any human or significant material losses. U.S. and British strikes on Yemen would not force them to back down, he said.

"We don't deny that we have a relationship with Iran and that we have benefited from the Iranian experience in training and military manufacturing and capabilities but the decision taken by Yemen is an independent one that has nothing to do with any other party," he said.

But a security official close to Iran said: "The Houthis have drones, missiles and everything needed for their fight against Israel but they needed guidance and advice on shipping routes and ships, so it has been provided to them by Iran."

When asked what kind of advice Tehran offered, he said it was similar to the advisory role taken by Iran in Syria, ranging from training to overseeing operations when needed.

"A group of Iranian Guards members are in Sanaa now to help the operations," the security official said.

Iran sent hundreds of Revolutionary Guards to Syria, alongside thousands of Hezbollah fighters, to help train and organise Shi'ite militia fighters from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan to prevent the downfall of President Bashar al-Assad during the Sunni-led insurgency that erupted in 2011.

Washington and Gulf Arab states have repeatedly accused Iran of arming, training and financing the Houthis, who follow an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam and are aligned with Tehran as part of its anti-Western, anti-Israel "Axis of Resistance" alongside Lebanon's Hezbollah and groups in Syria and Iraq.

While Iran has denied having any direct role in the Red Sea attacks, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has praised the Houthis, whose Zaidi sect is an offshoot of Shi'ism, saying he hoped their strikes would last "until victory".

TRAIN AND EQUIP

A leader within the coalition of pro-Iranian groups denied there were any commanders from the IRGC or Hezbollah on the ground in Yemen right now.

He said a team of Iranian and Hezbollah military experts had gone to Yemen earlier in its civil war to train, equip and build the manufacturing military capability of the Houthis.

"They came and helped the Houthis and left, just as they did with Hezbollah and Hamas," he said, adding that the military capabilities of the Houthis should not be underestimated.

The person said the Houthis knew the terrain and the sea well and already had the systems in place for attacking ships, including high-precision equipment from Iran.

During the chaotic years after the 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Yemen, the Houthis tightened their grip on the country's north and seized the capital Sanaa in 2014, pushing a Saudi-led coalition to intervene militarily months later.

When Hamas attacked Israel, Iran had little choice but to demonstrate support for the Palestinian group after years of anti-Israel rhetoric but was worried that using Hezbollah would trigger massive Israeli retaliation, analysts said.

Iryani at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies said a major war between Israel and Hezbollah would be disastrous for Lebanon - and endanger the future of the group that has become the most important in Iran's "Axis of Resistance".

By contrast, the Houthis were in a unique strategic position to have a huge impact by disrupting global maritime activity with little effort, he said.

Additional reporting by Mohammad Ghobari in Aden and the Washington bureau; Writing by Samia Nakhoul; Editing by Angus McDowall and David Clarke

5. Heard in Davos: What we learned from the WEF in 2024

 My bias is showing- What was not heard in Davos? No one in Davos is concerned with north Korea and its threats. Per one of my many great Sergeants Major: "The house that is not burning does not make the news."

Heard in Davos: What we learned from the WEF in 2024

https://www.reuters.com/world/heard-davos-what-we-learned-wef-2024-2024-01-19/?utm

Reuters

January 19, 202411:55 AM ESTUpdated 14 hours ago

Flags hang outside the pavilion during the 54th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, January 18, 2024. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

DAVOS, Switzerland, Jan 19 (Reuters) - World leaders and business executives left the freezing temperatures of the Swiss mountain resort of Davos after a week of high-stakes meetings about key world issues.

Here's what we learned:

MIDDLE EAST

Gaza dominated the agenda of the World Economic Forum (WEF), but leaders failed to produce clear details on any practical pathway to Palestinian statehood, or a ceasefire between Israel and Gaza's Palestinian militant group Hamas.

The war is slowing down the economy of the entire region, said Qatar's finance minister. The head of the Palestine Investment Fund estimated at least $15 billion would be needed to rebuild houses in Gaza alone. Arab states said they would not fund reconstruction unless there was a lasting peace.

"We agree that regional peace includes peace for Israel, but that could only happen through peace for the Palestinians through a Palestinian state," Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan told a WEF panel.

RED SEA

Attacks by Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi group on ships in the Red Sea would drive the cost of goods from Asia to Europe much higher, logistics giant DP World said. CEOs at Davos said they were gaming out alternative supply routes. Yemen's vice president and Iran's foreign minister said the attacks would not stop until Israel ended the war in Gaza.

"If it's in the short term, tankers might be available ... But if it's longer term, it might be a problem," said Amin Nasser, CEO of oil giant Saudi Aramco.

CHINA

Premier Li Qiang told Davos China's economy was open for business and highlighted its potential for foreign investment, but investors remained cautious amid sluggish post-pandemic recovery and tensions with the United States. Asked how helpful a closed-door lunch with Li was, one CEO said "medium", underscoring the scepticism about China's charm offensive.

"I'm glad that people are all talking," JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon after the Li lunch.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Talk of AI rippled through Davos meeting rooms and panels, its promise touted on signs and its security risks invoked by China's premier. While conversations included how to regulate the burgeoning technology and how to apply it to scientific discovery, the question of how to monetize it persisted.

"Everyone's like, yeah, I can build these cool demos," said Cloudflare (NET.N), opens new tab CEO Matthew Prince, "but where's the real value?"

DEBT RESTRUCTURING

Argentina's newly-elected President Javier Milei made his debut with a speech on the main Davos stage - and then quickly sat down with the International Monetary Fund's managing director Kristalina Georgieva to discuss his plan to navigate his country's debt maze. Ghana will re-engage with its international bondholders as the country seeks to build on momentum in debt restructuring.

"Free enterprise capitalism is the only tool we have to end hunger and poverty," said Milei.

ECONOMY

Heads of global banks warned of inflationary pressures from increased shipping costs and the possibility of oil price rises. Bank executives fear the market is mispricing interest rate cuts, and that geopolitical risks could cause volatility.

"It's a big year in general with many elections around the world which could change potentially the way fiscal stimulus is handled around the globe," said Suni Harford, President Asset Management and Group Executive Board Lead for Sustainability and Impact at UBS.

BANKING

Consolidation of European banks was discussed behind closed doors, but executives say cross-border mergers are difficult to achieve without uniform regulation across the region. Selective mergers of national players were seen as more likely.

ENERGY

While several panels focused on the end of fossil fuels, the head of Aramco told Reuters demand for oil would not peak any time soon. The number of energy executives in Davos was smaller than in years past. Oil bosses from Shell, TotalEnergies and Aramco met on the sidelines to discuss how to help decarbonise industries they supply, three industry sources said.

UKRAINE

With other crises jostling for attention, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy put Ukraine on the Davos agenda early. Talks with more than 80 national security advisers from around the world led to Switzerland offering to host peace talks. Zelenskiy also met with Wall Street's Jamie Dimon and other bank leaders to seek financing for Ukraine's reconstruction.

"Ukraine can prevail in this war but we must continue to empower their resistance," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, urging Kyiv's Western allies to continue arms deliveries and financial support.

GENDER

The WEF said that around 28% of the total of 3,000 participants, including 350 heads of state and government and ministers, who gathered in Davos this year were women.

"This year marks a significant milestone in the 54-year history of the Annual Meeting, as we expect to welcome more than 800 women to Davos — the highest number in our records," it said.

Reporting by Reuters Davos team; Editing by Leela de Kretser, Alexander Smith and Mark Potter

6. The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation

A framework. Good. The way forward must be a strategy, campaign plans, implementing instructions, specific tasks, and responsibilities. I do not mean to be critical of this initial effort but there is still a way to go. The battlespace of the human mind and human terrain (which is what we are talking about here) is complex and complicated but it is where all future battles will be fought on some level. 

Excerpts:

The Framework serves as a tool for diplomatic engagement on the threat of foreign information manipulation. It will deepen cooperation between like-minded partners, establish a common operating picture, and support the development of resilient, fact-based information ecosystems. The Framework is based on five Key Action Areas: (1) national strategies and policies; (2) governance structures and institutions; (3) human and technical capacity; (4) civil society, independent media, and academia; and (5) multilateral engagement.

The Way Forward:

• A broad coalition of like-minded partners is key to successfully countering foreign information manipulation, as each country brings different strengths, capacities, and resources to offer.
• The United States calls on partner countries committed to promoting open and fact-based information environments, free from foreign information manipulation, to endorse the Key Action Areas included in the Framework and to begin working towards a coordinated approach to this transnational threat.

The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation

FACT SHEET

JANUARY 18, 2024

https://www.state.gov/the-framework-to-counter-foreign-state-information-manipulation/

Foreign information manipulation and interference is a national security threat to the United States as well as to its allies and partners. Today, the U.S. Department of State is announcing an important new tool for addressing this problem: The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation. This Framework seeks to develop a common understanding of this threat and establish a common set of action areas from which the United States, with its allies and partners, can develop coordinated responses to foreign information manipulation and protect free and open societies.

Authoritarian governments use information manipulation to shred the fabric of free and democratic societies. They manipulate social discourse, skew national and international debates on subjects of critical importance, and undermine democratic institutions. This transnational threat requires a coordinated international response.

The Framework serves as a tool for diplomatic engagement on the threat of foreign information manipulation. It will deepen cooperation between like-minded partners, establish a common operating picture, and support the development of resilient, fact-based information ecosystems. The Framework is based on five Key Action Areas: (1) national strategies and policies; (2) governance structures and institutions; (3) human and technical capacity; (4) civil society, independent media, and academia; and (5) multilateral engagement.

National Strategies and Policies:

• Effectively addressing foreign state information manipulation requires countries to go beyond “monitor-and-report” approaches, to include developing and implementing strategies to counter this threat.
• These policies should ensure safeguards for freedom of expression, protection for marginalized groups, transparency in media ownership, and a commitment to protect elections from foreign malign influence.

Governance Structures and Institutions:

• Marshaling and administering a national-level approach to countering foreign state information manipulation requires designated governance structures and institutions within governments.
• The ability to organize dedicated government institutions to lead and coordinate national efforts, international engagement, and fact-based digital communication on foreign information manipulation is key to this effort.

Human and Technical Capacity:

• Effectively countering foreign state information manipulation requires technical means and human capacity to maintain threat awareness.
• Building effective capacity includes investing in digital security tools that can detect foreign state information manipulation and ensuring interoperability between government partners working to counter this threat.

Civil Society, Independent Media, and Academia:

• Civil society, independent media, and academia can play essential roles in informing and supporting government-led initiatives to counter foreign state information manipulation.
• Countering foreign state information manipulation is best done when governments protect and support the role of independent media, promote independent fact checking and media and digital literacy, and welcome public advocacy on the issue.

Multilateral Engagement:

• Multilateral organizations that leverage international cooperation to counter and build resilience against foreign state information manipulation are indispensable to alleviating information and capability shortfalls across partner nations.

The Way Forward:

• A broad coalition of like-minded partners is key to successfully countering foreign information manipulation, as each country brings different strengths, capacities, and resources to offer.
• The United States calls on partner countries committed to promoting open and fact-based information environments, free from foreign information manipulation, to endorse the Key Action Areas included in the Framework and to begin working towards a coordinated approach to this transnational threat.

By committing to these five Key Action Areas, the United States with its partners and allies can begin working bilaterally and multilaterally to build societal resiliency to foreign disinformation.

For media inquiries, please contact the Global Engagement Center at GECMediaContacts@State.gov.

7. Disinformation poses an unprecedented threat in 2024 — and the U.S. is less ready than ever

Excerpts:

Watchers are further challenged by the lack of transparency from social media companies. So-called black boxes surround the algorithms that serve up content, and the inability to see what is happening on the platforms in real time has only gotten worse.

“We’re flying blind,” said Mike Caulfield, a research scientist at the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public who studies election rumors.

The delay in catching false narratives early is essentially giving disinformation a head start, Caulfield said, and could mean a delay in fact-checking efforts and context from journalists.

Risks to national security, safety and voting rights aside, the larger threat from the coming wave of disinformation might be in widened partisan divides and weakened public trust.

“The direct effect of disinformation might not be as high as we think it is,” said Joshua Tucker, co-director of New York University’s Center for Social Media and Politics, referring to voting preferences. “But the indirect effect is people losing confidence in journalism, losing confidence that there’s an objective truth out there, and believing that anything could be disinformation.”

Disinformation poses an unprecedented threat in 2024 — and the U.S. is less ready than ever

The U.S. presidential election comes at a time of ideal circumstances for disinformation and the people who spread it. 

Jan. 18, 2024, 8:20 AM EST

By Brandy Zadrozny

NBC News · by Brandy Zadrozny

Disinformation poses an unprecedented threat to democracy in the United States in 2024, according to researchers, technologists and political scientists.

As the presidential election approaches, experts warn that a convergence of events at home and abroad, on traditional and social media — and amid an environment of rising authoritarianism, deep distrust, and political and social unrest — makes the dangers from propaganda, falsehoods and conspiracy theories more dire than ever.

The U.S. presidential election comes during a historic year, with billions of people voting in other elections in more than 50 countries, including in Europe, India, Mexico and South Africa. And it comes at a time of ideal circumstances for disinformation and the people who spread it.

An increasing number of voters have proven susceptible to disinformation from former President Donald Trump and his allies; artificial intelligence technology is ubiquitous; social media companies have slashed efforts to rein in misinformation on their platforms; and attacks on the work and reputation of academics tracking disinformation have chilled research.

“On one hand, this should feel like January 2020,” said Claire Wardle, co-director of Brown University’s Information Futures Lab, who studies misinformation and elections, referring to the presidential contenders four years ago. “But after a pandemic, an insurrection and a hardening of belief that the election was stolen, as well as congressional investigations into those of us who work in this field, it feels utterly different.”

The threat disinformation poses falls on a spectrum. Research suggests it has little direct effect on voting choices, but spread by political elites, especially national candidates, it can impact how people make up their minds about issues. It can also provide false evidence for claims with conclusions that threaten democracy or national health, when people are persuaded to take up arms against Congress, for example, or decline vaccination.

Solutions for the enormity of that threat are piecemeal and distant: the revival of local news, the creation of information literacy programs, and the passage of meaningful legislation around social media, among others.

“Repairing the information environment around the election involves more than just ‘tackling disinformation,’” Wardle said. “And the political violence and aftermath of Jan. 6 showed us what’s at stake.”

Primed for disinformation

The most likely Republican presidential nominee is also the former president — whose time in office was marked by lies told in a failed effort to remain there, falsehoods Trump continues to cling to. Disinformation in service of the lie that the election was “stolen” — disseminated through a network of television, radio and online media — has proven staggeringly effective with Republicans. The toll from that belief extends to distrust in future elections.

On one hand, real consequences have come for spreaders of disinformation. Lies about Covid and the election have reportedly cost some prominent doctors and news anchors their jobs. Millions of dollars have been awarded in civil courts to victims of disinformation. Hundreds of federal criminal convictions have come from the Jan. 6, 2021, riot. And people who allegedly participated in a scheme to overturn President Joe Biden’s victory, including state GOP officials, lawyers and Trump himself, face criminal charges.

Whether networks like Fox News or individuals like Rudy Giuliani would be as eager to promote disinformation in 2024 in the face of such consequences remains to be seen. But some predictable players and newcomers in right-wing media have already signaled a willingness to contribute.

“Right-wing media see a demand for content that is pro-Trump and leaning into conspiracy theories,” said A.J. Bauer, an assistant journalism professor at the University of Alabama who studies conservative media.

In addition to national websites known for disinformation, new local hyperpartisan news organizations might also factor in, Bauer said, with claims acting as fodder for larger national conspiracy theories.

“These outlets could be looking for examples of hyperlocal voter fraud or intimidation, even if it’s not real,” Bauer said.

Real stakes

It’s not only voters, but smaller loci of influence made up of state lawmakers, election officials and poll workers moved by disinformation who stand to affect the upcoming election.

“Election denialism and the misinformation that comes from the far right was in clear view on the federal level” with the 2020 election, said Christina Baal-Owens, executive director of Public Wise, a nonpartisan voting rights organization that tracks local election administration officials who have questioned the legitimacy of the 2020 election. “What was less clear was a threat that was hiding in plain sight, a movement working on the local level.”

Public Wise has counted more than 200 people who attended, funded or organized the Jan. 6 attempted insurrection and won office in 2022. In Arizona alone, ​​more than half of constituents are represented by state legislators who are professed election deniers.

“We’re looking at a well-organized movement that is working to affect elections across the country,” Baal-Owens said. “They have the ability to determine how people vote, how votes are counted, and whether or not they’re certified.”

The Capitol breach was the most visible example of political extremism bleeding into real-world violence. But 2020 was also marked by violence, or the threat of it, at state capitols and Covid lockdown protests, a trend experts fear will continue.

“We’re watching out for voter vigilantism,” said Joan Donovan, an assistant professor of journalism and emerging media studies at Boston University, who studies political violence. “People organizing in Telegram channels and showing up to ballot boxes with guns,” Donovan said, in states that allow it, was an emerging tactic in 2020 and the midterms, by activists who said they were deterring voter fraud.

“I think that’s going to be the next wave,” Donovan said.

Old lies, new tech

Over the weekend, far-right political activist and Trump ally Laura Loomer seeded an early conspiracy theory about the Iowa caucus count. Loomer’s complicated claim of corruption mirrored previous unfounded rumors floated in 2020.

The falsehoods may remain the same for now, but the technology used to manufacture propaganda has improved. Advances in artificial intelligence, from chatbots to audio and video generators, have made easy-to-use media manipulation tools available to the public. A World Economic Forum survey named misinformation and disinformation from AI as the top global risk over the next two years — ahead of climate change and war.

Scammers have found success with so-called deepfakes, mostly in manufacturing AI-generated videos of celebrities hawking products like health supplements or cryptocurrency. Even as campaigns begin to use AI in ads and states rush to legislate around them, the much-publicized threat of the technology to elections has yet to materialize. More often, cheap AI is being used to create propaganda, mostly from Trump loyalists.

Content that uses synthetic media from self-described “meme teams,” who serve as volunteers, according to the Trump campaign, is already being shared by Trump on his social media platform, Truth Social. These memes malign other candidates and their spouses, attorneys and judges involved in prosecuting Trump, journalists, and state politicians and election officials deemed enemies of the Trump camp.

“Granted it’s hokey and not believable in any way, shape or form, but it’s only a matter of time until something works,” said Ben Decker, the chief executive of Memetica, a digital investigations company. “The disinformation narratives, the meme wars, they’re back. That content is going to overpopulate certain parts of the public square.”

The effect on the wider world is clear, Decker said: “Harassment of public officials, members of the media and civil society groups is going to run rampant.”

A potential greater threat lies in generative AI tools’ ability to personalize misinformation, making it harder for social media platforms to moderate because it appears authentic, said Laura Edelson, an assistant professor at Northeastern University and co-leader of Cybersecurity for Democracy, who studies political misinformation.

“It’s going to be a lot harder this cycle as people are washing misinformation through generative AI tools,” Edelson said. “Misinformation will be more effective inside insular communities and harder to detect. Platforms need to be building new tools.”

Instead, Edelson and others say, platforms are cutting the teams tasked with moderation to the bone. Since 2021, the largest social media companies have reportedly deprioritized efforts to guard against viral falsehoods, tech critics said.

Elon Musk’s X has led the way as social media platforms including Meta and YouTube have retreated from enforcement and policy and slashed content moderators and trust and safety teams, said Rose Lang-Maso, campaign manager at Free Press, a digital civil rights organization.

“Without policies in place that moderate for content and without enough content moderators to actually do the moderating, it makes it more possible for bad actors to increase abuse online and offline,” Lang-Maso said. “Platforms are really abdicating the responsibility to users.”

Meta, YouTube and X have denied reports that they are ill-prepared to prevent the spread of election disinformation.

“Content misleading voters on how to vote or encouraging interference in the democratic process is prohibited on YouTube,” YouTube spokesperson Ivy Choi said in a statement to NBC News. “We continue to heavily invest in the policies and systems that connect people to high-quality content, and our commitment to supporting the 2024 election is steadfast.”

A spokesperson for Meta declined to comment but shared a news release about the company's plans for the 2024 elections.

Who’s watching?

The first challenge of combating disinformation in the 2024 cycle might be in identifying it.

The social media space has become fragmented with the ascendancy of alternatives including Substack, Telegram, Threads and Rumble as viable spaces for political actors and extreme content. And a pressure campaign by conservative activists may affect how many trained eyes are available to be on the lookout.

Republican politicians and activists responded to the wave of disinformation in 2020 by targeting the researchers, universities, tech companies and journalists who pointed it out. Using social media campaigns, the courts and congressional committees, far-right critics have aired unfounded accusations that efforts to curtail disinformation around the election and the pandemic were part of a plot to censor conservatives. Some researchers said those partisan campaigns, which have included burdensome information requests and threats of reputational and legal harm to institutions, have had a chilling effect on new research going into 2024.

Watchers are further challenged by the lack of transparency from social media companies. So-called black boxes surround the algorithms that serve up content, and the inability to see what is happening on the platforms in real time has only gotten worse.

“We’re flying blind,” said Mike Caulfield, a research scientist at the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public who studies election rumors.

The delay in catching false narratives early is essentially giving disinformation a head start, Caulfield said, and could mean a delay in fact-checking efforts and context from journalists.

Risks to national security, safety and voting rights aside, the larger threat from the coming wave of disinformation might be in widened partisan divides and weakened public trust.

“The direct effect of disinformation might not be as high as we think it is,” said Joshua Tucker, co-director of New York University’s Center for Social Media and Politics, referring to voting preferences. “But the indirect effect is people losing confidence in journalism, losing confidence that there’s an objective truth out there, and believing that anything could be disinformation.”

NBC News · by Brandy Zadrozny

8. Taiwan's Election Offers Strong Lessons on Disinformation

Taiwan's Election Offers Strong Lessons on Disinformation

thecipherbrief.com

Fine Print

January 16th, 2024 by Walter Pincus, |

Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010. He was also a team member for a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 and the George Polk Award in 1978.

View all articles by Walter Pincus

OPINION — Taiwan’s Presidential election last Saturday took place amid widespread concerns that China would use Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven disinformation to affect the outcome.

Apparently, it didn’t. The election came off close as generally expected with Taiwan’s current vice president, Lai Ching-te, and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) declaring victory, while his two opposition rivals both conceded defeat. According to Taiwan’s Central Election Commission, Lai won with just over 40% of the total votes, Kuomintang (KMT) party candidate Hou Yu-ih got 33.49% of the votes, with Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je getting 26.45%.

In a December 19, 2023, article, Taiwan’s Election: 2024’s Canary in the Coal Mine for Disinformation against Democracy, Dylan Welch, China Technology Analyst at the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, wrote that Taiwan was experiencing “a surge in AI-generated disinformation, including images, videos, audio, and text, all aimed at influencing electoral outcomes. The island not only finds itself at the epicenter of this new wave of tech-enabled electoral meddling but is also pioneering responses to navigate this unprecedented challenge in digital democracy.”

With the U.S. facing its own Presidential election this November, I thought it worthwhile to look into the Taiwan experience after reading in Welch’s article that Taiwan had adopted “pioneering responses” to the AI-driven digital election threat.

Today’s constant barrage of information makes it easy for countries to wage disinformation campaigns and your emotions are the weapon of choice. Learn how disinformation works and how we can fight it in this short video. This is one link you can feel good about sharing.

As Welch put it, “Because of the relentless barrage of disinformation, the country’s model for countering disinformation is one of the world’s most developed.”

Although Taiwan had been a major target for Chinese misinformation for years, a turning point was reached in 2018, after Su Chii-Cherng, a Taiwanese diplomat in Osaka, Japan, committed suicide after Chinese media outlets distributed a fake story claiming that he failed to help Taiwanese citizens escape during a typhoon there.

The fake story, posted on major Taiwan social media sites, was that Chinese diplomats in Japan had sent buses to rescue stranded Taiwanese tourists at Osaka’s Kansai International Airport, but the tourists only could board if they identified as “Chinese.” That led to a Taiwanese public outcry against Su, the Taiwan diplomat on scene — and his assumed incompetence — which led to his committing suicide.

In 2019, Taiwan’s legislature passed the 2019 Anti-Infiltration Law that blocked foreign entities from spreading misinformation or otherwise interfering in Taiwan’s elections. The act did not mention China, but its target is Chinese actors and Taiwanese citizens with connections to China. In 2020, after the DPP government objected to continued disinformation spread on Chinese media platforms, Taiwan banned several of them from the Taiwanese market.

Since 2020, every Taiwanese ministry has established a team to detect disinformation campaigns and rapidly respond with a counter-narrative. The Department of Cyber Security protects websites and databases from hackers.

As of December 2023, Welch wrote, “There have been fines leveled at television stations for broadcasting information that was found to be false. There have [also] been concerns that the law will impede freedom of speech in Taiwan.”

Taiwan has also developed an ecosystem of independent civil organizations working on disinformation. Doublethink Lab, which was founded in 2019 and describes itself as “researching malign Chinese influence operations,” has a monitoring hub using AI and human arbiters to detect Chinese information operations before they reach the mainstream.

CoFacts calls itself a Taiwan “information checking platform operated through crowd collaboration and chatbot to have discrete messages of unknown credibility carefully reviewed and discussed through the joint efforts of the public.” According to Al Jazeera, “Cofacts automatically responds to fake or misleading messages circulated on the LINE [Taiwan-based] messaging app with a sourced report. Fact checks are written and reviewed by a group of more than 2,000 volunteers, including teachers, doctors, students, engineers and retirees – anyone who wants to be a fact-checker can become one.”

The Taiwan Fact Check Center is another civic society group whose chatbot onLINE social media – a version of Facebook — allows users to check for disinformation or misinformation against a database that is updated by its team of fact checkers.

Taiwan FactCheck Center CEO, Eve Chiu, explained that her group monitors different social media platforms and exposes false information items that may have been presented in the mainstream media as “Breaking News” or “Exclusives.” but which were actually taken from faked social media or misquoted government documents.

For example, last August, when Taiwan’s Vice President Lai, who at the time was a presidential candidate, visited Paraguay, a document with his signature appeared that apparently gave Paraguay a large amount of money for its social housing. It created a negative uproar in Taiwan which was having its own debate about social housing. Chiu’s fact checkers found the document was a fake, created to discredit Lai. In reality, it was a copied Paraguayan government paper dated 2018, but signed by Taiwan’s then-President Tsai Ing-wen.

Chiiu described it as, “Almost the same. Even the location of the stamp, even the signature – right hand signature is the same. This has been [a remade] document. And it’s [a] very sophisticated way to do this fake document and post it.”

In November, the Taiwan FactCheck Center flagged a video posted online that showed DPP’s front-runner Lai, oddly claiming that the opposition represents the majority view in Taiwan. However, the FactCheck Center pointed out the possibility of AI manipulating his voice because Lai’s mouth appeared to move in an unnatural way. Taiwanese authorities later confirmed the video as a deepfake, according to later news reports.

When rumors developed on line that DPP’s vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim is a U.S. citizen, FactCheck Center publicized that while Hsiao once held U.S. citizenship, she had renounced it in 2002.

Auntie Meiyu is said to be the most widely used chatbot app for Taiwanese private chat groups. In 2018, it was first developed to deal with disinformation sent by family elders in a family chat group. Since 2020, it has used advanced AI technology to prevent communication fraud.

As its website says, “Add Auntie Meiyu into your group chat! She will silently lurk in the chat room and never interrupts your conversation. Auntie Meiyu will speak up only when she notices some questionable information being posted. She then provides verified information and helps you identify fake news.”

You can, according to its website, “Ask Auntie Meiyu directly about any specific news or articles with a private message. If there are no related news or sources, you can also contribute by reporting the rumor along with any relevant information.”

Taiwan’s trust-tech company Gogolook, in 2022, was recommended for users by the Central Election Commission. Gogolook also said Auntie Meiyu had been adopted by over 520,000 users; and that Auntie Meiyu verified/debunked suspicious information 1.67 million times in 2022.

Not all deepfake videos were created with the intent to affect elections, although they may have appeared that way.

Last November, Taiwan’s Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) warned about fraudulent crypto currency advertisements circulating online that featured a video clip of Taiwan President Tsai and Vice President Lai discussing a crypto investment. Using technology, the video mimicked the voices of Tsai and Lai and adjusted original footage to make their lips match their words. The Chinese-language ads had clickable links promising easy money, according to the CIB.

Coming in the midst of Taiwan’s Presidential election campaign, some attributed it to the Chinese attempting to influence voting, but the CIB described it as a scam using the political leaders to lure investors.

Welch wrote that “Chinese influence operations are strategically aimed at swaying Taiwan’s election to favor of an agenda of so-called peaceful reunification, which would lead to support of the KMT Party.”

On December 21, Taiwanese authorities arrested online journalist Lin Hsien-yuan, whose poll showed for the first time, that KMT’s candidate Hou leading to win the presidential election. The poll results briefly went viral in Taiwan, according to Radio Free Asia. Lin had pretended to have interviewed or polled 300 people. Taiwanese prosecutors, using the Anti-Infiltration Act, said Lin’s findings were faked and may have been encouraged by Chinese Communist Party officials from across the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan, population some 24 million, for its January 2024 election built up governmental, media and private defenses against misinformation, fake news videos, false AI-generated hosts and voice-overs that circulated on YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, TikToc, and X.

With a population of 336 million, can the U.S. do anything similar via government, media and private groups, before the November 2024 election?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

9. Fighting Disinformation in a Dangerous Year

Excerpts:

NATO communications in the run-up to Russia’s full-fledged invasion are part of a new template for fighting disinformation. But this is not a job for one government, one organisation, or just communicators alone.

To be effective, fighting disinformation must be a collective, layered and networked effort, including proactive communications of democratic values and goals; stronger regulation of AI; more robust content moderation by big digital platforms; and increased media literacy and societal resilience.

The year 2024 will be a defining one. Democracies must defend themselves by demonstrating strength and unity in what they say and do. They need to get savvier about technology, and use it based on democratic values. Otherwise, they risk further eroding public trust and enabling the rampant disinformation driven by divisive populists and authoritarian adversaries.

Fighting Disinformation in a Dangerous Year

Oana Lungescu18 January 2024

rusi.org

As 2023 ended, a video of Marine Le Pen addressing her New Year’s wishes to French voters in Russian was viewed half a million times.

The AI-altered video, with the hashtag #MarinePoutine, played on the long-standing Kremlin links of Le Pen’s far-right National Rally. But the deepfake also caused embarrassment for President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renaissance party, whose spokesperson posted it ostensibly to show the impact of fake content – even though the government has been pushing for strict regulations on AI.

The video illustrates the dilemmas faced by democracies in an age of disinformation. But it also shows the need for new ways to inoculate citizens against this virus.

It followed a Washington Post investigation on Russia’s efforts to undermine support for Ukraine and weaken NATO resolve through far-right parties such as National Rally. Notably, the article was based not just on interviews, but on intelligence.

Kremlin documents obtained by an unnamed European security service and seen by the Washington Post revealed that top aides to Russian President Vladimir Putin directed messaging to the French public aiming to boost ‘the fear of World War III’ and to increase the number of people in France who are reluctant ‘to pay for another country’s war’ and who want ‘dialogue with Russia on the construction of a common European security architecture’. The documents also showed that in June 2023, a Kremlin strategist directed a Russian troll farm employee to create a ‘200-character comment by a middle-aged French person’ who considers Europe’s support for Ukraine to be ‘a stupid adventure’ promoted by the US, which leads to inflation and ‘falling living standards’.

Fertile Ground

National Rally called the Washington Post report ‘a cabal against [it]’, and the party continues to lead in opinion polls ahead of European Parliament elections in June.

More widely, concerns are growing that disinformation – turbocharged by Russia’s war in Ukraine, the erosion of trust in institutions, and the rapid rise of generative AI – will find fertile ground in this historic election year. As an unprecedented two billion people are expected to go to the polls, including in the EU, the UK, the US and India, the World Economic Forum’s annual risk report ranks misinformation and disinformation as the biggest short-term global risk.

In Europe, deepfakes have already been deployed in last year’s election campaigns in Slovakia and Poland. A study of Germany, Italy and Bulgaria tracked false claims aimed at increasing hostility towards Ukrainian refugees and blaming the war on NATO and Ukraine itself. While it is hard to establish a causal relation between disinformation narratives and popular support, citizens of the three countries had more doubts about military support to Ukraine than the EU average. The study welcomed national counter-disinformation efforts, as well as the creation of the EDMO taskforce on European Parliament elections, but called for more steps to increase resilience.

Concerns are growing that disinformation – turbocharged by Russia’s war in Ukraine, the erosion of trust in institutions, and the rapid rise of generative AI – will find fertile ground in this historic election year

In the US, a recent poll showed that nearly six in 10 adults believe that AI tools will increase the spread of false and misleading information during the presidential election in November. According to the poll, US citizens generally see preventing AI-generated disinformation as a shared responsibility and want more regulation. President Joe Biden has set in motion federal guidance for AI. Meanwhile, the EU is in the final stages of agreeing an AI Act.

From Debunking to Prebunking

Just as the disinformation landscape evolves, strategies to fight it are also evolving. NATO provides a case in point.

After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the alliance created Setting the Record Straight, an online portal dedicated to debunking Russian myths. The portal exposes Russia’s litany of false claims, countering them with facts based on verified sources. In 2021, as Russia started to prepare its full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, NATO moved up a gear from debunking to prebunking.

Simply put, prebunking aims to teach individuals how to spot false claims before encountering them, rather than trying to counter them afterwards. It was pioneered by William J McGuire in the 1960s as he sought a ‘vaccine for brainwash’ for US troops during the Korean War. The idea was that just as the body gains immunity to a virus after a vaccine, exposure to a small dose of propaganda could immunise the mind.

Building on McGuire’s work, Sander van der Linden, a professor of social psychology at the University of Cambridge, and his colleagues have developed ways to pre-empt misinformation and disinformation related to elections, Covid-19 and climate change. They include games such as Bad News, Go Viral! (developed with the UK government) and Harmony Square (developed with the US Department of State's Global Engagement Center and the Department of Homeland Security). The games help build psychological resistance to online misinformation by getting players to use the techniques and types of content prevalent in the production of viral fake news, following the principle that prevention is better than cure.

Bold Moves

In the months preceding Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the US, the UK and NATO took bold moves to counter the Kremlin’s claims that it had no intention to attack and that, on the contrary, it was the West and Ukraine that were aggressive. They did so through proactive communications, largely based on the declassification of an unprecedented amount of intelligence. For instance, the US outlined a Russian plan to create a phoney video that could be used as a pretext for invasion, while the UK revealed that Moscow would try to stage a coup in Ukraine and install a pro-Kremlin puppet.

At the same time, US officials disclosed, step by step, the concrete indicators of Russia’s invasion plans, such as moving blood supplies near Ukraine, while the UK Ministry of Defence started posting daily intelligence updates on military developments on the ground, which it continues to this day.

Democracies must defend themselves by demonstrating strength and unity in what they say and do. They need to get savvier about technology, and use it based on democratic values

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s statements to the media were also a major driver of NATO communications, reaching billions of people around the world. For example, in November 2021, as Russia claimed it was conducting mere exercises, he warned of the unexplained ‘large and unusual’ concentration of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders, with ‘heavy weapons, artillery, armoured units, drones, electronic warfare systems and tens of thousands of combat ready troops’, and called on Russia to show transparency and de-escalate.

Ten days before the invasion, following Putin’s claim that ‘it is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory’, the NATO Secretary General made clear that ‘everything is now in place’ for Russia to attack. He called again on Putin to step back from the brink, establishing firmly who the aggressor was. Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine had arguably been taken long before, so the main aim of Stoltenberg’s messaging was to maintain NATO unity and support for Ukraine.

While it is hard to correlate public opinion with specific communications, a survey commissioned by NATO, published in June 2022, showed support for alliance membership at an unprecedented 72%, with Russia viewed unfavourably by 68% of respondents, an increase of 27% since the previous year. Significantly, 67% perceived Russia’s invasion as affecting the security and safety of their own countries.

The June 2023 survey shows similar results, with 65% of respondents in favour of continued support to Ukraine. Recent signs of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ will put these figures to the test, unless the US and other allied countries continue to make the case to their publics why Russia’s war in Ukraine fundamentally affects their own current and future security.

A New Template

NATO communications in the run-up to Russia’s full-fledged invasion are part of a new template for fighting disinformation. But this is not a job for one government, one organisation, or just communicators alone.

To be effective, fighting disinformation must be a collective, layered and networked effort, including proactive communications of democratic values and goals; stronger regulation of AI; more robust content moderation by big digital platforms; and increased media literacy and societal resilience.

The year 2024 will be a defining one. Democracies must defend themselves by demonstrating strength and unity in what they say and do. They need to get savvier about technology, and use it based on democratic values. Otherwise, they risk further eroding public trust and enabling the rampant disinformation driven by divisive populists and authoritarian adversaries.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.

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10. China helps Pacific Islands with policing, not defence - ambassador

This appears to support in part my thesis on China. It all starts with surveillance and control of the people or the Chinese euphemism - "Social stability."

My thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

China helps Pacific Islands with policing, not defence - ambassador

By Kirsty Needham

January 17, 20241:32 AM ESTUpdated 3 days ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-helps-pacific-islands-with-policing-not-defence-ambassador-2024-01-17/?utm

SYDNEY, Jan 17 (Reuters) - China has a strategy to help Pacific Island nations with policing, not defence, and its growing presence in the region should not alarm Australia, China's ambassador to Australia said on Wednesday.

Ambassador Xiao Qian also told reporters that Nauru's decision this week to form diplomatic relations with China at the expense of Taiwan was "their own choice" and would not impact Australia's ties with Nauru, a tiny nation of 12,500 that uses the Australian currency.

Pacific neighbours Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, with Solomon Islands later striking security and policing pacts with China that sparked alarm in Canberra and Washington.

Australia, concerned by the strategic location of the Pacific Islands as a battleground in World War Two, has said security should be provided by countries within the region that share democratic values, and not China.

Xiao told reporters that Pacific Islands countries want to have political ties with China, sell products to the Chinese market, and receive investment and help from China in infrastructure, telecommunications and maintaining social order.

Security "is part of the relationship between China and Pacific Island countries, to help them to social stability," he said.

"It is not a strategy for military security, its a strategy to help policing their nation for social stability and basic order," Xiao said, adding that there was "no need for any so-called anxiety on the part of Australia".

Australia's ties with China have stabilised after a visit by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Beijing in November, the first in seven years by an Australian leader, and China wanted to further improve the relationship, Xiao said.

Defence was an area "we need to work harder on," he said, also saying that China had lodged a diplomatic protest with Australia over its congratulations to Taiwan, which China claims as its own, over the election of a new president.

Albanese said on Wednesday that Australia respected Taiwan's democratic processes in its election, and also respected the decision by Nauru to change diplomatic ties.

He declined to comment on whether Australia would seek a new security agreement with Nauru, but said security deals recently struck by his government with Pacific nations Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu were "very significant".

Ties between Australia and its largest trading partner China improved last year after China lifted some trade blocks imposed in 2020 on a raft of Australian exports.

Reporting by Kirsty Needham; Editing by Christopher Cushing, Miral Fahmy and Michael Perry

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

11. Will China Move Toward a ‘War-Driven’ Economy?

Excerpts:

That being said, a centralized economy does not equate to a planned economy, and this is primarily due to the infusion of a market element. Unlike the planned economy era, when there was no market in China, the centralized economy model acknowledges the existence of a market that will continue to expand with economic growth, albeit subject to a certain degree of central control. Significant projects, along with fiscal and financial resources, can be leveraged for indirect control over the market within this framework.

As it stands, the Chinese central government is likely to exert more control in key strategic sectors via central enterprises in the future, and concurrently policy systems and resource allocation of the country may enable a degree of control over competitive sectors occupied by private enterprises. Therefore, market entities and government institutions, not just in China but in other countries, should prepare to adapt to these impending changes.

Will China Move Toward a ‘War-Driven’ Economy?

thediplomat.com

A full pivot to war preparations is unlikely, but China will continue to shift toward a fully centralized economy.

By Kung Chan and He Jun

January 20, 2024

Credit: Depositphotos

In the aftermath of the profound impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the surge in anti-globalization sentiments, and escalating geopolitical competition, the landscape of the global economy has undergone substantial transformations.

China, too, felt these shifts, distinct from the era of globalization. China’s private enterprises are grappling with escalating challenges in their operations. The business milieu is witnessing a persistent deterioration, prompting a discernible erosion of confidence in the future market.

Geopolitical factors have now instilled apprehensions among foreign enterprises contemplating investments in China. On one hand, concerns loom regarding potential sanctions and constraints from the Western world, while on the other, there is a palpable unease that China may respond disproportionately to Western actions, thereby exerting pressure on foreign investments.

Concurrently, ordinary consumers, influenced by unfavorable expectations concerning economic prospects, employment, income growth, and capital markets, find their confidence notably subdued, a trend reflected in China’s consumption and investment figures.

With all these factors in mind, the future trajectory of the Chinese economy has sparked diverse perspectives. Within the country itself, some have proposed that China is shifting toward a “war-driven economy.” According to such a view, Chinese investment strategies ought to align with this premise, with emphasis placed on the military industry, cutting-edge technologies, food security, supply and marketing cooperatives, large-scale community canteens, and low-end consumption. Conversely, promoting high-end consumption, large-city strategies, and individual wealth creation should be discouraged.

However, the reality is that it is highly improbable for China to engage in actual warfare. Historically, a “war-driven” economy has proven incompatible with a thriving economy. If the focus is on war, the economy suffers, and vice versa. It should be kept in mind that a sustained state of preparedness for war, subordinating the economy to this objective, is not synonymous with normal defense investments.

The logic of the war-driven economy has a major flaw. Under such circumstances, the economy becomes a long-term liability, either sacrificed for war or weighed down by the colossal military apparatus and its need for substantial economic support. Infrastructure is in fact materialized debt, which requires upfront investments and incurs ongoing maintenance costs. Regardless of infrastructure type, excessive quantity inevitably leads to repayment obligations, and this means there is an inherent incompatibility between a “war-driven” and a sustainable economy.

If a war-driven economy is not China’s chosen path, the future Chinese economy is more likely to gravitate toward centralization. This economic model, characterized by dominance from state power, achieves control over resources. The centralized economy is distinguished by two features.

The first is the effective coverage and control in strategic fields, implying that the Communist Party or giant state-owned enterprises will exert control over nearly all industries with significant value. This includes traditional sectors like commercial banking, insurance, securities, telecommunications, oil, coal, grain, electricity, infrastructure, automotive manufacturing, and critical mining, where central or state-owned enterprises already wield dominance. However, even sectors like real estate, semiconductors, venture capital, bank card clearing, digital technology, and asset management – all areas traditionally dominated by private enterprises – are gradually leaning toward this centralized economy model.

Second, there will be a dominant concentration in competitive fields. While private enterprises have historically been the primary players in areas characterized by market competition, such as the internet, retail, textiles and apparel, internet finance, photovoltaics, electric vehicles, and batteries, under the centralized economy model the central government will systematically control almost all private enterprises through policy frameworks.

That being said, a centralized economy does not equate to a planned economy, and this is primarily due to the infusion of a market element. Unlike the planned economy era, when there was no market in China, the centralized economy model acknowledges the existence of a market that will continue to expand with economic growth, albeit subject to a certain degree of central control. Significant projects, along with fiscal and financial resources, can be leveraged for indirect control over the market within this framework.

As it stands, the Chinese central government is likely to exert more control in key strategic sectors via central enterprises in the future, and concurrently policy systems and resource allocation of the country may enable a degree of control over competitive sectors occupied by private enterprises. Therefore, market entities and government institutions, not just in China but in other countries, should prepare to adapt to these impending changes.

Authors

Guest Author

Kung Chan

Kung Chan is the founder of the Beijing-based think tank ANBOUND and is a renowned Chinese scholar on geopolitics and public policy.

Guest Author

He Jun

He Jun is the director of the Macro-Economy Research Center and senior researcher at ANBOUND.

thediplomat.com

12. China’s Belt and Road and Its Alternatives: Competing or Complementary?

Excerpts:

The implications of these three points are clear. First, the fragmentation of the BRI limits the ability of Chinese officials to unilaterally extract geopolitical and economic benefits and allows for greater agency on the part of participant countries. This indicates that the concerns expressed by the United States and its partners can be partially managed through greater engagement with the BRI and its participant countries.

Second, there may be more complementarity than often assumed between the BRI and the various infrastructure initiatives proposed by the U.S. and its partners. This means that greater attention should be paid to how these initiatives can leverage the positive outcomes of a given proposal to the benefit of the proponent and host country, as well as how to mitigate some of the negative outcomes.

A purely competitive framing of economic initiatives is unlikely to be salient, especially given the growing gap in infrastructure investment in the Global South.

China’s Belt and Road and Its Alternatives: Competing or Complementary?

thediplomat.com

Promoting various economic corridors as “alternatives” to the BRI misses the mark, for three reasons.

By Zenel Garcia

January 20, 2024

Credit: Depositphotos

Since President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has invested over $1 trillion in thousands of projects around the world. This has addressed some of the projected infrastructure investment gap in the Global South; however, it has also sparked significant geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between China and the U.S., as well as its partners. As a result, many of these actors have resorted to promoting their own economic corridors to “compete” with the BRI in the hopes of mitigating what they perceive as growing Chinese influence.

This approach misses the mark on three accounts. The first is that the formulation and implementation of the BRI has been, and continues to be, fragmented due to domestic and international stakeholders, thus making it difficult for Beijing to unilaterally extract geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. The second is that some of the corridors meant to compete with the BRI predate it and have facilitated its emergence. The third is that these corridors may be complementary rather than outright competitors.

Conventional accounts frame the BRI as a Chinese grand strategy that is reshaping the international system to its favor. Implicit in that argument is that China can generate geopolitical and geoeconomic influence through the BRI due to its role in Chinese lending and investment.

However, the origins and evolution of the BRI indicate that it is fundamentally fragmented. The BRI originated from provincial-level initiatives dating back to the 1990s. This domestic dynamic continues because provincial officials remain key players in shaping the way in which BRI projects are formulated and implemented. Even state-owned enterprises play a vital role in this process. Internationally, participant countries are also crucial in determining which BRI projects are selected and implemented in their countries. Consequently, while Chinese officials may desire to extract geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits from the BRI, evidence suggests that these two factors limit their capacity to do so effectively.

Despite these limitations, the United States and its partners have moved forward with announcing competing initiatives. Ironically, some of these initiatives predate the BRI, and have played a role in facilitating its development. This is the case with the East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor promoted by Japan in Southeast Asia.

Both corridors have been incorporated into Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific strategy. However, they originated in 1998 as part of the U.S.-Japan-led Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Program, which has had Chinese provincial participation since its inception in 1992. The groundwork of what makes up the BRI’s Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor began with Yunnan’s and Guangxi’s provincial initiatives, and have been enhanced by GMS investment since the 1990s.

While this case is not illustrative of all infrastructure initiatives, it does expose an inherent tension in the discourse: that these “competing” corridors may in fact be complementary. This is especially true from the perspective of the participant countries. After all, if a power plant is built through Chinese capital by Chinese firms, and an industrial park is built with Japanese capital by Japanese firms, the net effect is that these projects have the potential to address the participant country’s energy and industrial capacity.

There is also complementarity from the proponent’s perspective. Using the example above, a Japanese-funded and built industrial park naturally benefits from access to reliable energy supplies regardless of whether the United States or China funds and builds it. This is evident from India’s proposed East Coast Economic Corridor, which is likely to benefit directly and indirectly from established BRI and GMS corridors. Furthermore, the reality is that projects along the BRI and “competing” corridors are funded through Chinese and external lenders, and are often operated through multinational joint ventures, thus complicating simplistic competitive framings.

The implications of these three points are clear. First, the fragmentation of the BRI limits the ability of Chinese officials to unilaterally extract geopolitical and economic benefits and allows for greater agency on the part of participant countries. This indicates that the concerns expressed by the United States and its partners can be partially managed through greater engagement with the BRI and its participant countries.

Second, there may be more complementarity than often assumed between the BRI and the various infrastructure initiatives proposed by the U.S. and its partners. This means that greater attention should be paid to how these initiatives can leverage the positive outcomes of a given proposal to the benefit of the proponent and host country, as well as how to mitigate some of the negative outcomes.

A purely competitive framing of economic initiatives is unlikely to be salient, especially given the growing gap in infrastructure investment in the Global South.

Authors

Guest Author

Zenel Garcia

Zenel Garcia is an associate professor of Security Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. His research focuses on the intersection of international relations theory, security, and geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia.

thediplomat.com

13. 21st Century Chinese Hegemony in the International System

​Graphics at the link: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/01/18/21st-century-chinese-hegemony-in-the-international-system/

Conclusion​:

China’s efforts in recent decades have proven its tenacity to become the global hegemon. The declining economic performance of the US and Europe create an opening for China to play to its strengths. Many believe that the US is the everlasting global power, but if one recalls the trends of historic geopolitics, it is evident that “hegemonic competition is cyclical and inevitable, as rising powers supplant enfeebled ones in a Darwinian struggle for survival.” (Beeson, 2006, p.543). Despite the reconstruction period following WWII which championed the US as the formidable global hegemon, it is clear that, “the West. including the US itself, is not anymore strong enough today, neither economically nor technologically, to ‘overpower’ a new adversary bloc from within the ‘Global South’ nurtured by ‘emerging markets,’” (Lambert, 2023, p. 5).

With Chinese hegemony already being prevalent in the Indo-pacific region, China has begun its expansion plans towards the Western hemisphere. While it is clear that Europe is of premier interest to China, the internal issues and lack of a cohesive, united front by the European Union make the region attractive and seemingly easy to overcome for China. Additionally, the European economy is currently facing “huge debt levels, high employment and low growth,” (Liu, 2016). The prevalence of Chinese vigor over the 30+ European ports and being Europe’s largest export market, entails a expansionist relationship between China and Europe in the future. The emergence of the BRI is a huge growth engine for European prosperity and they must collaborate with China to proliferate its economy, this includes eliminating “economic frictions and trade protectionism tendencies,” (Liu, 2016). The ever-weakening euro currency, along with BRICS’ plans of de-dollarization and the Chinese yuan’s recognition in the global scheme foreshadows a Chinese dominated world.

US hegemonic decline and Chinese economic determination provide a clear trajectory for Chinese hegemony in the coming years. While a transition in geopolitical power may be inevitable in the future, it does not necessarily entail catastrophe. China’s efforts in inter-regional connectivity has created many positive outcomes for Global South countries in dire need for support. Additionally, China’s soft power approach presupposed a more militarily peaceful international system. The global narratives in international relations have morphed into economic power over military capability, where “governments may opt to turn more to economic statecraft rather than military build-up in defense and pursuit of national interests,” (Lambert, 2023, p. 7). As we begin to transition out of a war-like international system, it is up to the global masters to decide what happens next.

21st Century Chinese Hegemony in the International System

China has made monumental strides in integrating itself into the international system through geopolitical blocs, the Belt and Road initiative, establishing institutions in other regions, and increasing its industrial capacity.

BY

ALEXIA J. BUTLER

BY

ALEXIA J. BUTLER

JANUARY 18, 2024

Abstract: The Western European Region has historically sat at the summit of international affairs but was overcome by its own colony, the United States of America (USA), in the former half of the twentieth century. While the European Union still stands as a great power in the global scheme, new data implies that the East Asian region will take the reins on European affairs and commerce on its path to global hegemony. Since the end of the Second World War, The United States has been the most significant global power in the international sphere. With the globe’s largest economy, the US dominates in finance, military, leadership, business, and international trade and institutions. However, the presence of American hegemony has been slowly declining with a shift of power balances in the international system from Western supremacy to East Asian ascendancy. The East Asian region has become the most important economic area in the world. The US’ top competitor, China, has made milestones in its economic, military, diplomatic, and technological power. Currently, China is the leading international exporter of goods, surpassing the US a few years prior. In the last decade, China has made monumental strides in integrating itself into the international system through geopolitical blocs, the Belt and Road initiative, establishing institutions in other regions, and increasing its industrial capacity. It is likely that by the 22nd century, China and the East Asian region will have overcome Europe and the bulk of Africa if their strategies continue to move undisturbed, ultimately leading to Chinese hegemony. To what extent are the economic pursuits of China facilitating Chinese hegemony in Europe and eventually the international system?

Introduction     

Chinese Rise to Economic Superpower vs. U.S. & EU | Source: Statista 2023

While it is clear that today’s Western order has long since been established and accepted into the global system, its durability has been questioned in the previous decades. Today, we are seeing international affairs transform to adjust to the “comparative decline of the ‘old superpower’, i.e., the US, and the rise of China as a ‘new superpower’ that is increasingly capable of challenging America as the dominant hegemony, not just in Asia but also in other parts of the world,” (Lambert, 2023, p.6). Since the dawn of the 2000s, China has assumed the hegemonic role in the Asian region and is now showing a great deal of potential towards global hegemon status, at a rapid rate. The country’s economic prowess is seemingly targeting economically vulnerable areas of the world, such as Europe and Africa.

To understand the contemporary global liberal order led by the United States, one must understand the movements following the conclusion of World War II. It is known that the original hegemonic region of the world was Europe, spearheaded by Britain for centuries. Following World War II (WWII), Britain proved faulty in its ability to regulate the international system especially while facing economic challenges from the United States and Germany. After WWII, a war grounded in Western Europe, the region was left in a complete reconstructive period, which championed the US as the strongest remaining power. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the US immediately swooped in with a variety of commitments to autonomous states and new reforms to shape an international system that strategically advantaged them. US hegemony was even more amplified following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As economies continue to emerge worldwide, the unipolar system implemented after WWII “is being replaced by a more global balance of power, and more precisely, a more multipolar international order is in the making,” (Lambert, 2023, p. 5).

The so-called glory days of US hegemony began in the 1950s, as it was responsible for half of the world’s gross product and “sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production,” (Du Boff, 2003). Around 47 percent of the globe’s direct investment stock was American. Within this period, it is noted that “Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, [had] a combined gross domestic product seven-tenths that of the United States.” (Du Boff, 2003). Other attributes of its economic dominance included “producing 40% of the world’s product and being responsible for 82% of major inventions, discoveries, and innovations. Its businesses controlled 59% of the world’s oil reserves… [with] a monopoly of atomic weapons,” (Keohane, 1991, pg.436).

While these accolades illustrate the US’ undenied spot at the top, numerous downsides foreshadowed their temporary hegemonic power. To begin, the US was “unable to prevent communist revolutions in China and Cuba, and suffered a costly defeat in Vietnam,” (Keohane, 1991, pg.436). Around this same time, the US engaged itself in the Korean War as a means to prevent communism from spreading to the Southern region of Korea. The Northern area of Korea was backed by China and the war escalated far more than originally planned, which resulted in the US withdrawing its troops in 1949 and signing a ceasefire treaty with both China and North Korea in 1953. This was an incredible win for China and an emasculating global perspective on the world’s hegemon. There were also several disputes about trade, finances, and oil within international organizations like the United Nations and NATO where autonomous allies would not take heed of US advice, foreshadowing an increasing disobedience to American order. Not to mention America’s current financial situation with the Congressional Budget Office of the US claiming that “current projections, [suggest] US federal debt may rise from at pay with GDP (2022) to 180 percent of GDP in 2051,” (2022).

EU views as China Hegemon | Source: Statista 2023

 Historically, America was originally a branch broken off from the British tree, but it is now Europe that is dependent on America to keep them stable. In sectors such as defense and economy, US’ power and influence decline is synonymous with Europe’s. We have seen this connection numerous times throughout the fluctuations of American influence. When the stock market crashed in the US, also known as the 2008 global financial crisis, it “severely undermined the European economy… with huge debt levels, high unemployment and low growth,” (Liu, 2016, p. 38). It is also known that “for decades, Europeans have counted on their American ally to provide military security through NATO,” (Ham, 2011, p.108). In terms of European economics, the EU is facing its own internal hardships with the complications of continuing the single currency, power imbalances, economic stagnation, and a deteriorating geopolitical context. In the case of China, we are seeing Chinese institutions and ports being established all over the European region, not to mention the Belt and Road Initiative of 2013 that has overcome much of Eurasia. In the modern day, the structure of the EU is relatively weak as there is a lack of “military capabilities and strategic vision to deal with the dawning global environment… [as well as] no shared notion of ‘European interests,’” (Ham, 2011, p.113). These issues briefly explain the foreseeable Chinese takeover of the European region amid the fall of American hegemony.

While the 1950s era was a glorious time for the United States, this period for China was suffused with tumultuous movements as the country was preceding a communist revolution, reconstruction, consolidation, and law reform period. However, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 immediately strained their relationship and set the stage for “several decades of limited U.S. relations with mainland China,” (CFR, 2023). By 1953, China had begun its transition to socialism through its First Five-Year Plan which prompted China’s expeditious industrialization period. This plan also formulated Soviet-Chinese relations as “the Soviet Union provided both material aid and extensive technical advice on [the plan’s] planning and execution,” (Britannica, 2023). This is important to note as this assistance was the inception of modern-day Russian-China relations and the division of US-China relations.

In modern times, the US is still the most powerful country, but its persistence in interfering “in the internal affairs of other countries, pursue, maintain, and abuse hegemony, advance subversion and infiltration, and willfully wage wars, [brings] harm to the international community,” (MFAPRC, 2023) making it increasingly unpopular. In contrast, China has been building its network, dominance, and alliances over the past few decades with a centric goal of becoming the world’s new hegemon. The United States is indeed the pinnacle of military capability, but when analyzing contemporary geostrategy, economic power is the true key to controlling the international system. China’s economic strategy is pummeling Europe and the US as the country has already surpassed both in many economic sectors. Countries that have normally allied with the US may find themselves “likely to collaborate more with China economically, and even prospectively challenge the US over strategic leadership,” (Lambert, 2023, p.5). Not to mention, with the emergence of BRICS centered around a Russian-Chinese core, the United States nor the EU are capable of overpowering the two on a technological, economic, or defense level. As predicted by Standard Chartered Bank of London, China will be the #1 economy by 2030, with a GDP of $64.2 trillion, while the US sits at #3 with $31 trillion.

China has taken several unique approaches towards hegemony which have been successful thus far. These include the emergence of the BRICS bloc, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the establishment of ports in Europe. In the past, the commotion in the international system consistently dealt with the United States, European, and Soviet Union affairs, but the collapse of the USSR and ever-weakening American and European order has provided an open window for Chinese Hegemony. The Western command will be difficult to overturn, but China’s rapid reform proves its determination to apex the international scheme.

When evaluating the prospect of China becoming the new world hegemon, many do not take serious consideration. This is due to the idea that the United States is at an uncompetitive spot in the international system, but one must look into the past to strategically foresight the future. For centuries, Britain was the ultimate power whose colonialism stretched far throughout the four hemispheres. The European region is the true creator of written history and civilization and is still a major power today. However, much of its current success is dependent on the United States and China. It was not until WWII that a wedge in global power was created and the US was able to swiftly assume the responsibility of global hegemon. Flash forward to today, the US’ tendency to spread itself too thin has created various wedges for other powers to sneak in and overcome. This paper explains how China is taking this very opportunity.

Research and Methodology

Gathered in November 2023, the trusted sources used to support this research are from online, free, and publicly available databases. All initiatives, strategies, and plans included in this paper have been active from the late 20th century to the present. With the combination of qualitative, survey, and exploratory research along with inductive reasoning, my research aim is to analyze the economic movements of China and how it has strategically formulated Chinese hegemony in Europe and the international system in the coming decades.

Source: Beijing Review

First, I interpreted the rise of the United States as the global hegemon despite originally being a project of the British. The evolution of the British-American relationship remains a common theme throughout the paper as it was interesting to note the paradigm of global power shifts with the emergence of Chinese hegemony. I included various statistics confirming American hegemony in the 1950s while comparing it to the Chinese position at this time to assert how far China has come in the international scheme of great power. Then, I exposed America’s shortcomings in connection with China’s influence over North Korea to expose China’s first “win” in response to American insecurity. Following this, I included America’s current behavior to foreshadow the fall of its power by the latter half of this century.

I then go back to explain the rise of the Chinese Government since the 1950s and its success in the previous decades to portray its elegant and swift rise to power. Including the Soviets’ contribution to this success provided a basis to elaborate on the mutually beneficial Chinese-Russian relationship as well as the emergence of BRICS. I used reliable sources that have been measuring China’s linear movement in overcoming its surrounding regions, with Europe being one of the primary attainment goals.

This allowed me to delve into the importance of Europe in this matter as, according to the Rimland theory, whoever controls the regions in the rimland, will control the world. While the origin of America was codependent on Britain’s supremacy, the roles have reversed in modern times with America as the hegemon with vast control over the Western hemisphere. However, with the predicted trajectory of modern America, the fall of its hegemony would immediately correspond with the fall of Europe, a great victory for the Chinese agenda. I included primary and secondary research on European Union dilemmas and their dependency on American aid, economics, trade, and defense. With this research, I was able to formulate an educated prediction of European welfare amid a global power shift from America to China. I also briefly touched on the economic initiatives of China such as the BRI, BRICS, and the establishment of Chinese institutions in Europe to widen the readers’ view on the Chinese strategy to surpass European power.

 While conducting this research, I used the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework by analyzing international actors, historical backgrounds, institutional settings, incentive structures, policies, and more to develop the subsequent Chinese hegemony. Taking the most influential initiatives such as the Belt and Road initiative, the formation of the BRICS Bloc, and establishing Chinese institutions beyond their immediate scope, I was able to examine how each strategy has contributed to China’s successful economic position and hegemonic prowess. I conclude with supporting evidence of Chinese economic strategy to further convince the reader that Chinese dominance in Europe is forthcoming, thus generating a new world order summited by China.

Contemporary Chinese Power

Today, it is clear that China is far greater than its tumultuous past and is underway to become a formidable global force. In comparison to American economic power in the 1950s, it is as if China has mirrored these successes today. Having quadrupled the size of its economy since the late 1970s, China now “has become one of the world’s major manufacturing centers and consumed roughly a third of the global supply of iron, steel, and coal while accumulating massive foreign reserves,” (Ikenberry, 2008, p.26). The country has increased its military spending to over 18 percent yearly while extending its diplomatic ties to Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Originally portrayed as an emerging market, China has now taken over the international stage “as both a military and an economic rival–heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power,” (Ikenberry, 2008, p.26).

China-European Land Sea Express Route | Source: Research Gate

Before, onlookers questioned the importance of China in the future of international relations, but now this is not the case. By joining crucial organizations such as the World Trade Organizations (WTO) and BRICS, China has maintained its position as a rising great power in the international political system. The country continues to “sustain impressive economic growth and is projected to double the size of the American economy by 2025, while the United States and other status quo market economies recover from the shock of the Western Financial Crisis of 2008,” (Farrell, 2015, p.3). The BRI project of 2013, acts as a modern-day Silk Road giving China a huge advantage in economic influence and networking. Since 2016, China has set up 31 container seaport terminals in the European region (See APPENDIX E) widening the scope of maritime control in the area. For the purposes of this discussion, what will be examined in this paper are Chinese institutions and ports in Europe, the BRI, and other Chinese economic pursuits that are inevitably leading to a transition in global influence.

The Fall of Europe and the Rise of China

The European region has been facing trying times, with many issues in terms of cooperation, economic growth, and currency. These issues contribute to the constant looming fear of member states leaving the EU, especially following BREXIT. China is well aware of these weaknesses, hence its increased interest in Europe. As a result, the country has implemented several plans to maintain economic control over the region. These plans include the Chinese 16+1 format, Chinese commercial port investments, the BRI, and induction of European members into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

The Chinese 16+1 format of 2012 engages China with 16 European countries as a unique approach to regional cooperation. This format promotes Chinese-European business and investment relations through the Belt and Road Initiative and enhances collaboration in infrastructure, transportation logistics, and investments. China is also bolstering goals in cultural exchanges and education by enhancing tourism and sending and welcoming students abroad. Some infrastructures that have been produced from this cooperation include the Budapest-Belgrade railway connecting Hungary and Serbia and the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Route.

Chinese firms currently have “been developing economic interests in ports in European countries, including Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Italy,” (Jacobs, 2023, p.1). Specifically in terms of Greece, it is known that China Ocean Shipping Company, Limited (COSCO) now holds one of the largest shares of this salient port that acts as a maritime crossroad between Europe and Asia. This port also has routes to the Middle East and Africa, due to its unique position in the heart of the Mediterranean. The Piraeus Port creates a maritime road to assist the BRI. Unexpectedly, the prevalence of COSCO in the Piraeus Port is embraced by the Greeks as it gave “scholarships to employee’s children…, created more job opportunities, and blended Eastern wisdom with Greek culture,” (Ran, 2023). Amid the Chinese takeover, the port’s efficiency has increased significantly with faster intakes of cargo, shipment times, maintenance and appliances. It is noted that in 2018, “the port’s container throughput increased to 4.91 million TEUs (Twenty-foot equivalent unit) under COSCO’s management from 680,000 TEUs before the Chinese company arrived,” (Ran, 2023). COSCO’s management has increased the crane loading and unloading speeds to the #1 velocity in European ports with 27 TEUs per hour, while originally 15 per hour. This year, the Piraeus Port Authority (PPA) has established the best performance numbers in its history with, “profits before taxes increased by 48.8%, totalling US$52 million, compared to US$35 million in the same period in 2022,” (Konton, 2023). Today, China holds 31 European port terminals and this number continues to grow as Europe is in dire need of economic reform and assistance.

Countries of the BRI | Source: Green Finance & Development Center

The AIIB, a Chinese initiative, currently has 26 European member states with 18 being in the EU. It is presumed that this bank is an “alternative to the US-led post-WWII Bretton Woods System,” (Lambert, 2023, p. 11). The AIIB is a multilateral development bank whose mission is towards the prosperous economic development of Asia, at the expense of other regions’ money and institutions hence the heavy dependence on the European member states. Essentially, China is offering loans to European member states as a means to bolster their own development agenda. It is estimated that China has invested over 250 billion euros into Europe for its inter-regional connectivity plans. These investments are not just ports and trade routes, but “nuclear power stations, theaters, historic buildings, football teams, and more,” (Haralambides, 2019). It seems as if the Chinese are more keen to engage in dialogue with the “European South ” of Europe, than those who are more financially plentiful. This strategy has made many believe in China’s economic strategies as debt-trap diplomacy, where China is “extending excessive loans to borrowers… [knowing] that the debtor will be unable to repay. The alleged aim is to extract economic or political concessions from the debtor country and/or to eventually swap debt with equity,” (Haralambides, 2019). We have seen this in the case of China’s control of the Piraeus Port and numerous European investments in the AIIB.

The 2013 Belt and Road Initiative

Despite the creation of Chinese economic isolation tactics by the US such as the Trans-Pacific Partnerships (TPP) also coined as the “Obama Doctrine,” and Biden’s “Build Back Better World” (B3W), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has prospered in the global arcade. The BRI mirrors the efforts of the ancient Silk Road, connecting China with Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While this ambitious initiative portrays incredible growth for China and the Asian region, it is also seen as a debt trap for borrowing governments and a decoy masking Chinese-led military expansion and economic development.

APPENDIX C: Source: Leisden Asia Centre

As seen in the appendix C, the BRI has a hefty presence in East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. Many are under the assumption that the BRI is simply an extensive trade route for Chinese economic advancement. However, Xi Jinping’s[3] visions includes, “creating a vast network of railways,, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossing…to expand the international use of Chinese currency,” (McBride et. al., 2023). In addition to these enterprises, China has made monumental efforts to create jobs abroad and enhance the use of the Chinese 5 tech network. As of August 2023, there have been 155 countries-accounting for three-fourths of the world’s population and over 50 percent of global GDP- that have signed on to projects. Appendix E shows an accurate representation of what parts of the world have joined the Belt and Road Initiative.

APPENDIX E: Chinese port investments in Europe | Source: Maritime Economics and Logistics

With efforts to promote a more assertive China and pushback on U.S. influence and hegemony, China hopes the BRI provides avenues to “develop new trade linkages, cultivate export markets, boost Chinese incomes, and export China’s excess productive capacity,” (McBride et. al., 2023). It is proven that the BRI has been successful in completely reconstructing previous trade routes and allowing China to be at the center rather than the U.S. and Europe. However, the BRI has not been immune to criticism with a rising number of low-income BRI countries voicing their struggle “to repay loans associated with the initiative, spurring a wave of debt crises,” (McBride et. al., 2023). There have also been spurs about the BRI’s contribution to climate change with half of its spending consisting of nonrenewable energy investment. The BRI has its benefits and malefits, but its exponential growth is a direct threat to U.S. and European influence in the international system. 

The Emergence and Effects of the BRICS Bloc

Created in 2009, BRICS is an intergovernmental organization consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa while spearheaded by China. It is evident that BRICS’ efforts are to counter the West economically and politically, specifically the Group of Seven (G7) countries- the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.K, considering their rising tensions with Russia and China[4]. The G7 “is an informal bloc of industrialized democracies that meet annually to discuss issues such as global economic governance, international security, and energy policy,” (Lieberman, 2023). The five BRICS nations know that extending their membership will greatly advance their goal of overcoming G7 influence, hence their August Summit of 2023. The summit was held for the 14 countries who formally applied to join BRICS. As a result, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Argentina, Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will be joining the bloc in January 2024. What these countries have in common is that they are massive energy and oil exporting countries which certainly help BRICS achieve its global advancement goals.

BRICS is a direct contributor to a transition in geopolitical powers, tantalizing the influence and capacity of the US and Europe each day. A clear example of BRICS’ goal to overcome western hegemony was entailed in its discussions at the summit of 2023 about beginning the process of de-dollarization “to reduce the reliance on the U.S. dollar and promote the use of national currencies in international trade,” (O’Kane, 2023). However, the bloc has many constraints and future obstacles.

Firstly, BRICS has existed since 2009, but is just beginning to truly gain influence in the international system. Since US and Western influence has dominated the globe for several centuries, it may take decades for countries to truly transition from its accustomed western grasp, to an eastern approach. Secondly, the debt-trap set by China as a facade of increasing economic prosperity in other countries is already evident and being detested. Countries will become wary of the bloc and China, if financial crisis matters continue to create debt-holes for nations. Third, BRICS may create a power vacuum of other states who want to join the effort in changing the global narratives, which may work to counter BRICS itself. Some groups of emerging economies that have already been rumored include MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey) as well as Poland, Thailand, Nigeria, and Argentina who seem to continually be left out of the global power discussion despite showing great economic promise. Lastly, and presumably the most wild card event of the BRICS emergence, is the case of a possible World War 3 or a repeat of the Cold War, but between the US and China. It is clear that the BRICS alliance focuses greatly on countering US hegemony and with these new discussions of changing the international currency from USD, creating trade routes and blocs excluding the US, and taking part in war alliances that are in contrast to Western aims, may very likely create an abruption in the global system. BRICS dominance equates to Chinese hegemony as the bloc is driven by Chinese economic strategies and military capabilities. The group is determined to lead the global south economically, while overtaking Europe in the process.

Supplementary Chinese Economic Pursuits and Advantages

BRICS and the BRI are not the only contributors to the coming Chinese hegemony. The country has been working in a plethora of areas to push its hegemonic agenda. China’s vision of international order amid U.S. power decline changes the hegemonic token as one earned by master economics rather than military capability and control. The following is a list of Chinese economic pursuits in the global system that is advancing its likelihood to global power in the coming years.

Beijing has pursued several attempts to emphasize the attractiveness of China in terms of culture, landscape, and education to advance the globalization of China in the international scheme. For example, they have begun establishing Confucius Institutes in every continent of the world to promote the study and knowledge of Chinese customs. Admittedly since 2011, the “China Radio International is broadcasting in English, 24 hours a day, and the number of foreign students enrolled in China’s universities has tripled from 36,000 to more than 100,000 over the past decade, with more than 75% of these students coming from Asia,” (Ham, 2011, p.110). Around 500,000 foreign students are now pursuing education in China with this number increasing yearly by 10%. Chinese citizens themselves are now climbing the list as the most well-traveled citizens which increases cultural exchange and image for China.

In 2014, “Li Keqiang visited 13 countries over the course of five diplomatic trips abroad and signed more than 250 agreements on trade and economic cooperation with a combined value of about $140 billion,” (Beijing Review, 2015, p.19). A few years following, the Chinese Renminbi became the 5th international reserve currency. Just last year, the Chinese yuan became the 5th most traded currency in the global foreign exchange market.

In regard to technology, China is making massive strides in becoming a technological superpower. Artificial intelligence is the key to the digital evolution which is spearheading the modern technological revolution era that the developing world is currently in. China has strenuous amounts of data and technological advancements which allows AI to thrive. Governmental plans and processes have already begun to meet AI requirements, suggesting an AI race between the US and China in the coming years. China already has huge technology giants such as Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, SenseTime, and WeChat which are pummeling American technological statistics. Not to mention the new Temu site which serves as an international shipment hub that directly counters Amazon. Most importantly, China has Huawei, a 5G network company based in Shenzhen which sets China in an undisputed leading position in terms of 5G telecommunications.

While China’s economic pursuits may be the most notable, it is also building up its military capabilities. As of today, “China has the largest navy with 730 military vessels, [while the US] has 484 naval vessels,” (Wisevoter, 2023). The country is obtaining more advanced frigates, flight engines, aircraft carriers, submarines and more. Not to mention its unwavering military alliance with Russia, who has proven its military aggressivity time and time again. The US has split the world into military command districts which strategically coincides with the main world regions. China is beginning to do the same, with its overseas military bases in Cuba, Cambodia, Djibouti, and Tajikistan. China is hunkering down on all aspects of power and is swiftly making its way to world domination one region at a time.

Conclusion

China’s efforts in recent decades have proven its tenacity to become the global hegemon. The declining economic performance of the US and Europe create an opening for China to play to its strengths. Many believe that the US is the everlasting global power, but if one recalls the trends of historic geopolitics, it is evident that “hegemonic competition is cyclical and inevitable, as rising powers supplant enfeebled ones in a Darwinian struggle for survival.” (Beeson, 2006, p.543). Despite the reconstruction period following WWII which championed the US as the formidable global hegemon, it is clear that, “the West. including the US itself, is not anymore strong enough today, neither economically nor technologically, to ‘overpower’ a new adversary bloc from within the ‘Global South’ nurtured by ‘emerging markets,’” (Lambert, 2023, p. 5).

With Chinese hegemony already being prevalent in the Indo-pacific region, China has begun its expansion plans towards the Western hemisphere. While it is clear that Europe is of premier interest to China, the internal issues and lack of a cohesive, united front by the European Union make the region attractive and seemingly easy to overcome for China. Additionally, the European economy is currently facing “huge debt levels, high employment and low growth,” (Liu, 2016). The prevalence of Chinese vigor over the 30+ European ports and being Europe’s largest export market, entails a expansionist relationship between China and Europe in the future. The emergence of the BRI is a huge growth engine for European prosperity and they must collaborate with China to proliferate its economy, this includes eliminating “economic frictions and trade protectionism tendencies,” (Liu, 2016). The ever-weakening euro currency, along with BRICS’ plans of de-dollarization and the Chinese yuan’s recognition in the global scheme foreshadows a Chinese dominated world.

US hegemonic decline and Chinese economic determination provide a clear trajectory for Chinese hegemony in the coming years. While a transition in geopolitical power may be inevitable in the future, it does not necessarily entail catastrophe. China’s efforts in inter-regional connectivity has created many positive outcomes for Global South countries in dire need for support. Additionally, China’s soft power approach presupposed a more militarily peaceful international system. The global narratives in international relations have morphed into economic power over military capability, where “governments may opt to turn more to economic statecraft rather than military build-up in defense and pursuit of national interests,” (Lambert, 2023, p. 7). As we begin to transition out of a war-like international system, it is up to the global masters to decide what happens next.

[1] Current President of the People’s Republic of China

[2] Following Russia’s suspension from the G7, then G8 due to its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea,the G7’s future has been challenged by continued tensions with Russia, and, increasingly, China… The G7 has imposed coordinated sanctions on Russia…, including a cap on the price of Russian Oil. The group also launched a major global infrastructure program to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” (Liberman, Council on Foreign Relations 2023)

TAGSChinaEconomicsfeaturedSecurityUSA

Alexia J. Butler

Alexia J. Butler is currently a SIT's Graduate Institute graduate student pursuing a Master's degree in Diplomacy and International Relations. She has a Bachelor of Arts in International Political Science with a certificate in Global Peace and Security. Butler has done numerous research articles on international power dynamics, climate change, sustainability, and human rights violations.

​14. Washington Is Exaggerating China’s Military Budgets

From the Quincy Institute. It takes two to tango. While the Biden administration (according to Hartung) may be up for "re-balancing" the US-China relationship, is the Chinese Communist Party up for it too? The enemy (or strategic competitor) has a vote.

Excerpts:

Thankfully, there are signs that the Biden administration may be open to rebalancing the U.S.-China relationship to increase the emphasis on cooperation and dialogue as a way to create guardrails against the outbreak of war. Military-to-military communications between the United States and China have recently been revived, and after the summit meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping last year, commitments were made to commence discussions on nuclear weapons and the military uses of AI. Now it’s crucial that there be substantive follow up on these pledges by both sides.

Whether the question is protecting Taiwan without resorting to war or heading off the possibility that China might outpace the United States in military power over the long term, leaning too heavily on military scenarios and arms buildups at the expense of intensive communication and diplomacy is more likely to undermine U.S. security than enhance it.

It’s time to put debates about spending levels and military holdings in perspective, and instead engage in a comprehensive assessment of the best way to build a relationship with China that is less likely to provoke a conflict and more likely to curb Beijing’s more aggressive instincts.

Ultimately, the size and shape of the Pentagon budget should be influenced by a rebalancing of U.S. security policies toward China. Whether a fresh look at that strategy is possible in the current political environment in Washington remains to be seen. But given what’s at stake, advocates of a new course need to make themselves heard, loud and clear.

Washington Is Exaggerating China’s Military Budgets

Pentagon and congressional hawks are overestimating their rival.

By William D. Hartung, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

Foreign Policy · by William D. Hartung

• Military
• China

January 17, 2024, 2:48 PM

The U.S. Congress has just reached a tentative agreement to appropriate $886 billion for the Defense Department and related work on nuclear weapons at the Energy Department, and if all goes as planned, the Biden administration will release its new budget request in early February. The central justification for this spending—which is at one of the highest levels since World War II—is China, which the Pentagon routinely refers to as the “pacing threat” driving U.S. strategy.

Assessing the potential military threat from China is an art, not a science. Information regarding the details—how much the Chinese are spending, how the funds are being spent, whether the technologies they are investing in will work as advertised, how long it will take to get from the research stage to workable systems, and how the military spending will trend over the next 10 to 15 years—is hard to come by due to both a lack of transparency and the inherent difficulties involved in predicting the pace of technological development.

But there is ample evidence to suggest that China hawks in the Pentagon and Congress are overstating China’s military capabilities while underplaying the value of dialogue and diplomacy in addressing the challenges that Beijing poses to the United States and its allies.

One key front in the debate on Pentagon spending is the controversy over how much China actually spends on its own military. There’s no debate that Chinese spending has substantially increased over the past two decades as its economy has skyrocketed. Yet the most recent analysis by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—the standard source for global comparisons of military outlays—suggests that the United States still outspends China by a healthy margin of 3-to-1.

But the Heritage Foundation and other critics argue that the standard approach understates China’s military investments by a substantial margin, for two reasons. Firstly, official Chinese reporting omits key military-related activities, including a full accounting of research and development on new weapons systems and the cost of defense capabilities in space. Secondly, Chinese currency goes further than that of the United States due to cheaper costs for key inputs, including but not limited to personnel in the armed forces and the weapons industry.

Taking these factors into account, officials such as Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan have suggested that Chinese spending is roughly comparable to the United States and rising at a higher rate.

But proponents of the view that China spends much more on its military than is commonly understood are overstating the case. Even analyses that dramatically boost Chinese figures to account for a larger range of items and the differential purchasing power put Beijing’s spending at a little more than half of Washington’s—around 59 percent, according to a study conducted by Peter Robertson, a professor of economics. Robertson has attempted to adjust purchasing power as relates to specific military items, a concept he calls military-purchasing power parity (PPP) but he acknowledges that doing so can provide only a rough estimate at best: “[c]aution is . . . required since the military-PPP values discussed here are based on very aggregate data and involve approximations.” Based on what we do know, Chinese spending figures alone are thus not a reason to increase the Pentagon budget.

But that’s not the end of the story. Spending alone is not a good measure of relative military capabilities, intentions, or likely outcomes in specific scenarios. The United States substantially outpaces China in the numbers and sophistication of traditional military platforms such as major aircraft carriers (11 in the U.S. fleet compared to 3 in China), nuclear weapons (by a ratio of 10-to-1), and advanced combat aircraft (nearly 3-to-1). Concerns about China’s larger number of ships are counterbalanced by the fact that the U.S. Navy has more than twice as much tonnage, which reflects the possession of larger ships with greater range and more firepower.

But uncertainty about the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding plans, the vulnerability of large carriers to modern missiles, and the funds wasted on vessels such as the dysfunctional Littoral Combat Ship could combine to erode U.S. advantages in naval firepower over time. In addition, Chinese progress in anti-access/area-denial systems could complicate the U.S. ability to effectively employ offensive systems in a conflict.

But the greatest area of concern is the ability of either side to rapidly develop and deploy next-generation systems, such as hypersonic weapons, unpiloted vehicles, and advanced communications and targeting systems that incorporate artificial intelligence. Both the United States and China are investing in these technologies, but it is too early to tell if either side is likely to gain a decisive advantage.

The differences in the relative size of the US. and Chinese holdings of key weapons systems are just one variable in comparing their military capabilities. Importantly, they do not capture the question of relative military power in the Western Pacific, where China holds a geographical advantage and has increased its capabilities considerably compared to a few decades ago.

But a report by the Quincy Institute that proposed a new U.S. defense strategy for Asia points out that the answer is not to simply race to reestablish U.S. military superiority in the region: “Efforts by the United States to restore military dominance in the region through offensive strategies of control . . . would . . . prove financially unsustainable; they could also backfire by exacerbating the risk of crises, conflict, and rapid escalation in a war.”

In the place where the risk of a U.S.-China conflict is most likely—Taiwan—a robust diplomatic strategy needs to be developed to accompany and supplant the emphasis on how to win a war with China.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan would be a disaster for all parties concerned. According to a series of war games conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), while the United States could “win” a war to defend Taiwan from a Chinese amphibious assault, it would be a Pyrrhic victory. As described by CSIS, “The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years.” A recent analysis by Bloomberg Economics estimated that a war over Taiwan could cost the global economy $10 trillion.

CSIS did not assess the potential impacts of a nuclear confrontation between China and the United States, but it is safe to say that such an exchange at any level would have catastrophic consequences.

As for the question of the likely balance in emerging technologies, it is imperative that these systems be carefully tested, and that their usefulness be assessed realistically. A rush to deploy artificial intelligence-driven weapons would increase the risk of malfunctions that could cause unintended episodes of mass slaughter, or even trigger an accidental nuclear war. Global security expert Michael Klare has outlined these dangers in a report on the implications of emerging defense technologies that was released by the Arms Control Association last year.

However much the U.S. invests in next-generation technology, it will not be a panacea. The notion of trusting in technology as the decisive factor in warfare is a common refrain from the U.S. national security state, as evidenced by the enthusiasm for the “electronic battlefield” in Vietnam or the so-called revolution in military affairs that reached peak hype during Donald Rumsfeld’s second tenure as secretary of defense during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

But even when the systems enabling networked warfighting and more accurate munitions were made to work, in a number of key conflicts, they were not able to help Washington meet its stated objectives because they were ill-suited to the nature of the wars being fought. This was true in Vietnam as well as in the decadeslong wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Motivation, local knowledge, nationalist backlash against a foreign military presence, and the creation of cheap counter-weapons such as improvised explosive devices undermined the value of sophisticated U.S. technology.

Despite the lessons learned from the wars of this century regarding the limits of advanced technology, the Pentagon seems to be in thrall to a new wave of techno-enthusiasm, convinced that it can come up with miracle weapons that would help win a war with China, or even deter Chinese aggression by their very existence.

This attitude was displayed most clearly in an August 2023 speech by Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks to the members of the arms industry’s largest trade group, the National Defense Industrial Association. She used the occasion to announce the launching of the replicator initiative, which entails a crash program to produce items such as “swarms of drones” that can hit up to a thousand targets in 24 hours.

Hicks made it clear that the new initiative was aimed at China:

“To stay ahead [of China], we’re going to create a new state of the art … leveraging attritable, autonomous systems in all domains—which are less expensive, put fewer people in the line of fire, and can be changed, updated or improved with substantially shorter lead times … We’ll counter the PLA’s [China’s People’s Liberation Army] mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit, harder to beat.”

Later in her remarks, Hicks suggested that the approach embodied in the replicator initiative would have a profound effect on the calculations of Chinese leaders: “We must ensure the PRC leadership wakes up every day, considers the risks of aggression, and concludes, ‘today is not the day’—and not just today, but every day, between now and 2027, now and 2035, now and 2049, and beyond.”

A more likely outcome of a U.S. rush to deploy AI-driven weapons would be an accelerated, high-tech arms race with Beijing, accompanied by an increased risk of nuclear escalation due to a blurring of the lines between nuclear and conventional weapons.

Thankfully, there are signs that the Biden administration may be open to rebalancing the U.S.-China relationship to increase the emphasis on cooperation and dialogue as a way to create guardrails against the outbreak of war. Military-to-military communications between the United States and China have recently been revived, and after the summit meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping last year, commitments were made to commence discussions on nuclear weapons and the military uses of AI. Now it’s crucial that there be substantive follow up on these pledges by both sides.

Whether the question is protecting Taiwan without resorting to war or heading off the possibility that China might outpace the United States in military power over the long term, leaning too heavily on military scenarios and arms buildups at the expense of intensive communication and diplomacy is more likely to undermine U.S. security than enhance it.

It’s time to put debates about spending levels and military holdings in perspective, and instead engage in a comprehensive assessment of the best way to build a relationship with China that is less likely to provoke a conflict and more likely to curb Beijing’s more aggressive instincts.

Ultimately, the size and shape of the Pentagon budget should be influenced by a rebalancing of U.S. security policies toward China. Whether a fresh look at that strategy is possible in the current political environment in Washington remains to be seen. But given what’s at stake, advocates of a new course need to make themselves heard, loud and clear.

Foreign Policy · by William D. Hartung

15. Goodbye to Davos — and good riddance

Hard to argue with the sentiment in the conclusion here:

Trump’s followers are not stupid. They realise that Davos man preaches austerity for the masses, all while investment banks achieve higher profits and use private jets. Opposing oppressive elites is exactly what democracy is about. The eclipse of the top-down dream at Davos marks a return to the norms of political life, where the opinions and interests of citizens take preference over the preening of the powerful.

Goodbye to Davos — and good riddance

unherd.com · 

by Joel Kotkin

Friday, 19

January 2024

The world envisioned by the WEF has collapsed

by Joel Kotkin

Emmanuel Macron speaks in Davos this week. Credit: Getty

Once widely considered the gathering of the elite of a future world government, the World Economic Forum is leaving a legacy of increasing irrelevance. To be sure, the snow was good; the AI art installation and occasional forays into witchcraft may have stirred some; but the whole thing has devolved into a cocktail party for the self-important, with diminishing bearing on world politics.

The interconnected world envisioned by the WEF is disintegrating. Indeed, it has fallen victim to the resurgence of history and the rise of powers determined to return us to the glories of the Middle Ages. Davos existed in a world that believed in Francis Fukuyama’s end of history, but ended up looking a lot more like Samuel Huntington’s bleak vision in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Huntington was the first to describe “Davos man”, and appears to be accurate in having predicted his demise.

The growing irrelevance of what Adrian Wooldridge has labelled “the progressive aristocracy” can even be seen in the less than enthusiastic press coverage. Politico describes the contemporary Davos crowd as a “smart set” which “sounds dumb.” In the Wall Street Journal, Walter Russell Mead, pronounces “the humiliation of Davos man”. Even the establishmentarian Financial Times has to admit that “the hubris among the Davos set is palpable.”

The Forum maintains some cheerleaders for policies which have weakened liberal democracies around the world while serving the interests of the rising illiberal powers. The grandees don’t have to travel far to see the results of their “reset” as nearby Germany’s industrial machine collapses, with even its last solar panel plant about to go belly-up.

Green jobs increasingly seem to be reduced to the low-wage service type. The forced march towards renewables has only rewarded China, even as the country embarks on a coal-plant building spree and emits more greenhouse gases than all developed countries put together. The much-ballyhooed “energy transition” has favoured a China that already produces more than four times as many batteries as second-placed United States, and which controls critical raw materials including large concentrations of rare earths, lithium, copper and cobalt. China can thank the gnomes of Davos when it reaches its stated aim of becoming the leading global superpower by 2050.

Other “Great Reset” notions, like the arrogant assumption that large corporations and investment banks could mandate a better world, lie in ruins. The whole ESG movement, which sought to reward “right-thinking” executives, is falling apart, in large part because it makes no economic sense. Even millennials and Gen Z have adopted negative attitudes towards such elaborate virtue-signalling. An estimated $5 trillion in ESG assets has dissolved in just two years. What’s more, enlightened capitalist funds around the world are in free fall, notably renewable energy stocks, while traditional energy firms enjoy record profits.

From the beginning, the idea that corporate elites’ primary responsibility involved imposing positive values on their own societies was fatally flawed, in large part because economic powers such as China and Russia have no such scruples. More important still, the oligarchs are finding out that the peasants are becoming increasingly sceptical about an agenda — including the notion of climate reparations — that promises to further bring down their standard of living.

Today it’s not globalist smoothies like Emmanuel Macron but rough and ready anti-globalists who are elbowing their way to prominence. The rebellion that started with the French gilets jaunes in 2018 has metastasised and spread to other countries. In the US even educated voters, as well as minorities, are discovering a greater affinity for Donald Trump, who for all his significant flaws is broadly attuned to the popular mood.

Trump’s followers are not stupid. They realise that Davos man preaches austerity for the masses, all while investment banks achieve higher profits and use private jets. Opposing oppressive elites is exactly what democracy is about. The eclipse of the top-down dream at Davos marks a return to the norms of political life, where the opinions and interests of citizens take preference over the preening of the powerful.

unherd.com · 

16. The free world comes out swinging

Do we accept this conclusion? Is this what really happened in Dvaos?

Conclusion:

But this past week, at least, there seemed to be a feeling in the famed Alpine village that the advantage has shifted in favor of the free world.

The free world comes out swinging

gzeromedia.com · by John Ivison · January 19, 2024

Davos 2024: Making AI Work for the World

WATCH

everything is political

January 19, 2024

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken looks on as US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan speaks, while they meet with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy (not pictured) during the 54th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 16, 2024.

Jess Frampton

As the Davos jet set arrived in the Swiss Alps earlier this week, the weather matched the mood: gloomy, with much to be gloomy about.

A barometer on global cooperation released by the World Economic Forum suggested that in almost every category – trade, innovation, health, and security – the picture is as turbulent as a brooding J.M.W. Turner seascape.

The study suggested cooperation is being eroded by conflict and competition from autocracies around the world. In the WEF’s Chief Economists Outlook, 56% of the respondents said they expect the global economy to weaken this year, in part because of geopolitical uncertainty.

Events in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea are precarious, and the Western response is half-hearted, appearing to confirm Russian President Vladimir Putin’s view that democracies are weak and hamstrung by the need to win votes.

Attendees in need of a pick-me-up may have lamented the decision not to repeat the experiment of micro-doses of mind-expanding magic mushrooms that were on offer last year.

Democracies strike back

Strangely though, the clouds cleared, literally and metaphorically, as the week progressed, and leader after leader took to the stage to proclaim their optimism about the world in 2024.

Maybe it is because Western politicians were in such close proximity to the new masters of the technology universe – AI pioneers like Open AI CEO Sam Altman – and their unshakeable confidence that we are on the cusp of a new era of tech-driven prosperity.

Maybe it’s because the global elite are simple people with simple tastes – the best of everything – and Davos is obliging them.

Whatever the explanation, there was a spring in the step of many of last week’s keynote speakers. The democracies were striking back, based on their faith in the resiliency of their systems and their belief in the shortcomings of their adversaries.

The feeling is in line with the conclusion of the aforementioned barometer – that cooperation can co-exist with elements of great power rivalry, and that instances of cooperation can build mutual trust.

Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, said on Tuesday that we have entered a new complex reality of strategic competition in an age of interdependence. This will be an era that builds on the core institutions that have kept the peace since 1945, one where the existing rules – “that crime doesn’t pay” – remain in force, he said.

Rivalry with countries like China means “a small yard with high fences,” Sullivan said, to ensure that technology like advanced semiconductors is not used to undermine America's national security. But he said that does not mean a technology blockade, pointing to a carve-out on commercial chips.

And he said recent agreements, such as renewed military-to-military communications and moves to reduce the export of fentanyl from China that followed Biden’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in San Francisco last November show cooperation remains possible.

China’s conciliatory signals

The large Chinese delegation in Davos was led by Premier Li Qiang, who gave his own speech on Tuesday. He sounded like someone more interested in securing a better deal for China in this new world order than in blowing it up. He said China is seeking to rebuild trust by safeguarding the multilateral trading system. Beijing is committed to a policy of opening up to foreign investment “and will open the door still wider,” he added, to keep fostering a “market-oriented, law-based and world-class business environment.”

Naturally, Chinese leaders who witnessed an outflow of foreign investment in the third quarter of last year would make conciliatory noises, particularly in a room filled with executives from Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds.

But Xi will have noted the world’s response to Putin’s aggression and is likely all too conscious that China cannot further alienate its trading partners at a time when it faces economic challenges. Those range from its shaky property sector to high levels of government debt, and from a lack of consumer confidence to demographic challenges.

Sullivan said his job is to worry but that he remains optimistic. “The more others seek to undermine stability, the more it brings our partners together,” he said.

He explained that people around the world are more interested in improving their own lives than in any “imperial projects or ambitions.” He said the democratic model remains more attractive than one based on coercion or intimidation and that violent disruption will fail.

Consensus-building efforts

However, for that to happen, countries have to come together and work toward a common interest, such as stopping Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, he added.

It was a theme reiterated by French President Emmanuel Macron in his address to the forum on Wednesday. He said Davos is always a venue for a global conversation and this year it should be realistic but optimistic, noting that “decisions that can change things are within our hands.”

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Wednesday offered a riposte to the idea that Russia is winning in Ukraine because of Vladimir Putin’s limitless tolerance for casualties and the failure of sanctions to cripple the Russian economy. He said Russia is weaker militarily, economically, and diplomatically than when Putin invaded two years ago. “Europe has severed its energy dependency on Russia. Ukrainians are more united than they’ve ever been. NATO is stronger, is larger, and will be larger still in the coming weeks."

“Putin has already failed in what he set out to do. He set out to erase Ukraine from the map, to eliminate its independence, to subsume it into Russia. That has failed and it cannot, will not succeed,” he said.

As Sullivan noted, nothing in world politics is inevitable. The election of Donald Trump would significantly alter the geopolitical calculus, potentially ending military assistance to Ukraine, giving China free rein to meddle in the South China Sea, and sparking trade wars with even the closest US allies.

But this past week, at least, there seemed to be a feeling in the famed Alpine village that the advantage has shifted in favor of the free world.

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gzeromedia.com · by John Ivison · January 19, 2024

​17. China courts global elite at Davos with largest presence in years

Is the global elite compenised by CHina?

China courts global elite at Davos with largest presence in years

KEY POINTS

• China returned to Davos in full force this week as it attempts to thaw relations with the international community and court investment following years of Covid lockdowns.
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• China’s 2024 Davos delegation is estimated to be the largest since 2017, when President Xi Jinping led an 80-strong cohort up the Swiss mountain.
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• “Choosing investment in the Chinese market is not a risk, but an opportunity,” China’s Premier Li Qiang said in a keynote address Tuesday.
• 
  

CNBC · by Karen Gilchrist · January 18, 2024

Participants walk in the street of the Alpine resort of Davos during the World Economic Forum.

Fabrice Coffrini | Afp | Getty Images

Davos, SWITZERLAND — China returned to Davos in full force this week as it attempts to thaw relations with the international community and court investment following years of Covid-19 lockdowns and rising geopolitical tensions.

A delegation led by Chinese Premier Li Qiang is estimated to be the largest since 2017, when President Xi Jinping led an 80-strong cohort of Chinese business leaders and billionaires up the Swiss mountain.

Addressing the forum Tuesday, Li, China's second in command, said the country was open for business, seemingly downplaying a recent crackdown on private industry which has spooked investors and prompted hefty outflows of foreign cash.

"Choosing investment in the Chinese market is not a risk, but an opportunity," he said.

Li went on to meet for lunch with a host of top business leaders, including the CEOs of JPMorgan, Bank of America, Standard Chartered and Blackstone. Also present was the governor of the People's Bank of China.

He was joined by several other high ranking ministerial representatives including the Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu and Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

Outside the main congress center, one group of Chinese delegates CNBC spoke to said they were attending for a broad brush of issues including "finance and trade and commerce."

"It's a great time to tell the China story," another Chinese tech executive said.

Raising concerns in Washington

The amped up Chinese presence has reportedly ruffled feathers in Washington amid U.S. concerns about Beijing's growing global influence.

A U.S. State Department document dated Jan. 12 said that "10 state ministers" would be included in Beijing's Davos delegation, prompting the White House to step up its charm offensive, according to Politico.

The document dubbed the presence a "pseudo state visit," with the Chinese delegation also expected to meet with Swiss counterparts in the capital, Bern, later in the week. In response, the schedule of Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, also attending Davos, was reportedly updated to include a meeting with Swiss officials.

The State Department did not immediately respond to a CNBC request for comment on Blinken's amended agenda.

It comes as relations between the U.S. and China have grown increasingly fractured amid national security concerns and rising geopolitical tensions, particularly over Taiwan and Russia. That has prompted Washington to embark on a "de-risking" strategy, including curbing trade of some critical technologies.

Li Qiang, China's premier, delivers a special address on the opening day of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, on Tuesday, Jan. 16, 2024.

Bloomberg | Bloomberg | Getty Images

Li, in his keynote address, pushed back against the move, saying that tech innovations should not be used as a way to restrict or contain other countries.

"To keep the competition healthy and bring out the greatest vitality, the only way is to enhance cooperation," he said.

The comments speak to the confliction other countries face, including Switzerland and Europe more broadly, in picking alliances in the standoff between the world's two largest economies. Europe, a close ally of the U.S., is equally aware of how important the Chinese market is for its domestic companies.

Still, confidence in China has been knocked by the country's prolonged and stringent Covid lockdowns, as well as its broader clampdown on key industries, including Big Tech.

Notably, Xi's 2017 entourage included Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, and Wang Jianlin, chairman of property developer Dalian Wanda, both of whom have since fallen out of favor with Chinese authorities amid a clampdown on private business and a collapse in the country's property market.

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Davos 2024: World Economic Forum

As a result, Chinese firms are now investing more abroad than foreign firms are investing in China. Foreign investors withdrew $12 billion from China in the third quarter of 2023. Meanwhile, international investors have withdrawn around $25 billion from the Chinese stock market since August 2023.

Ian Bremmer, president and found of the Eurasia Group, said that China's increased Davos presence indicated that Xi acknowledges the challenges Beijing now faces in re-establishing its reputation on the international stage.

"It's necessary for a country that's underperforming economically in a big way," Bremmer told Semafor.

"Xi recognizes it; [it] implies better managed relations for the West with China at least in the near term," he added.

The World Economic Forum did not respond to a CNBC request for confirmation on the number of Chinese delegates in attendance.

CNBC · by Karen Gilchrist · January 18, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com