Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Without inspiration the best powers of the mind remain dormant; there is a fuel in us which needs to be ignited with sparks.

– Author Unknown, but widely attributed to Johann Gottfried von Herder

"The person who tries to live alone will not succeed as a human being. His heart withers if it does not answer another heart. His mind shrinks away if he hears only the echoes of his own thoughts and finds no other inspiration."

– Pearl S. Buck

"The foundation of our resilience is people. Ordinary people. Ordinary Heroes. Among us. With us in the formation.

To all those who serve in the Armed Forces and other parts of the Defence Forces of Ukraine, I express my respect and deep gratitude.

To all those who help, support and believe in us, I bow to the ground.

Eternal memory and honour to all those who have fallen for freedom.Ukraine will stand and win."

– Valerii Zaluzhnyi General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

1. Martin Gurri: Trump Has a Mandate to Lead. What Comes Next?

2. TikTok Restoring Service for U.S. Users, After Trump Signals He Will Save It

3. Adapting to Big Change: The New Challenges of Modern Warfare

4. Trump to Call for ‘Revolution of Common Sense’ in Inaugural Address

5. First Israeli Hostages Released Under Gaza Cease-Fire

6. Drone Makers Looking to Steer Clear of China Fear Beijing’s Wrath

7. Biden pardons Fauci and Milley in an effort to guard against potential revenge by Trump

8. Donald Trump has sweeping plans for a second administration. Here's what he's proposed

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2025

10. Iran Update, January 19, 2025

11. Colluding with the Communists: The Dixie Mission to Mao

12. TikTok, RedNote and the Crushed Promise of the Chinese Internet

13. TikTok Butters Up Trump, Again and Again

14. Welcome to Weimar 2.0 by Robert D. Kaplan

15. The US Pivot to Asia Depends on Peace in Ukraine

16. Why China probably isn't panicking over Trump

17. Biden’s bitter legacy on Ukraine

18. Tracking Trump’s national-security conflicts of interest

19. China’s Soft Power Play: How Video Games Are Boosting Beijing’s Global Influence

20. Donald Trump 2.0 and The Next Era of Superpower Competition

21. The Trump-Biden-Trump Foreign Policy

1. Martin Gurri: Trump Has a Mandate to Lead. What Comes Next?

Appropriately I think, the first article of the day on inauguration day comes from the Free Press.

Excerpts:

What we learn will determine the sense and direction of our political crisis. The crucial question is whether the system can be reformed. Evidently, Trump was elected to do just that. To the extent that he can persuade his voters that change is possible—that their revolt was a legitimate gesture, armed with a militant program—Trump can begin to restore the public’s trust in the institutions and the principles that sustain them, very much including democracy.

There’s a human dimension to reform, too. It has long been apparent that our current elite class must be replaced by people who feel at home in the twenty-first century. By recent standards, including that of his first-term cabinet, Trump’s new advisers and appointees are relatively youthful. Vance is 40, Gabbard and Kash Patel are in their 40s, while Musk, at 53, is somewhere between a perpetual child and an elder statesman. Besides enjoying the full vigor of life, members of this crowd have few memories of Vietnam, Watergate, or even Monica Lewinsky. Their eyes are fixed on the present and the future—beyond the digital culture that so distresses our decrepit elites to the next tidal waves of disruption, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain technology.

Of course, the odds are stacked against them. Failure is more likely than not. But it would be the crowning irony of Trump’s improbable trajectory if the motley collection of pirates and adventurers presently around him turn out to be the next American ruling class.

Martin Gurri: Trump Has a Mandate to Lead. What Comes Next?

https://www.thefp.com/p/martin-gurri-trump-has-a-mandate-inauguration?utm

During his first term of office, Trump’s energies were concentrated on negation. This time around, all thoughts are turned to action.

By Martin Gurri

01.19.25 —

Inauguration

and

Politics

One year before Donald Trump even declared his first White House run, Martin Gurri predicted the rise of populism with his seminal book, The Revolt of the Public. The former CIA analyst also foresaw Brexit, BLM, and MAGA before those movements were in the national consciousness. Now, a decade after Martin’s book came out, we are ushering in a second Trump term. In his latest column for The Free Press, reprinted from Discourse, Martin imagines what the next four years will look like now that the public has revolted—and their candidate has a true mandate to lead. —The Editors

There is a radical dissatisfaction with the social and political status quo across the democratic world. The people in charge are distrusted and despised by the public: They are thought to be in business for themselves and indifferent to the concerns of ordinary people. From government agencies to the scientific establishment, the institutions that buttress modern society have been tainted by the corruption and poor performance of the ruling elites. The public has come to view these institutions as cash cows for the haves—and an oppressive machinery for bleeding the have-nots.

I analyzed the causes of this upheaval in my 2014 book, The Revolt of the Public. In brief, I argued that institutional elites have failed to adapt to the vast flows of information of the digital age. They reside at the top of great hierarchies that tower uneasily over a flattened socioeconomic landscape—and they want nothing to change. They crave the eternal preservation of the twentieth-century regime, in which they wielded unquestioned authority and had the power to conceal their dirty secrets. In pursuit of this ideal—fondly labeled “our democracy”—they have grown ever more reactionary and antidemocratic over the decades.

In Britain and Brazil today, you can land in jail for voicing antiestablishment opinions on social media. Here in the U.S., the Biden administration erected a censorship apparatus to mute online dissidence—and, we recently learned, “debanked,” or cast out of the financial system without right of appeal, those engaged in disfavored operations.

The Revolt Gains Legitimacy

With the triumphant second coming of Trump, the revolt of the public has entered a new phase. The cordon sanitaire that isolated the president-elect from all respectable political and cultural gatekeepers has tumbled like the walls of Jericho. Yesterday, he was Hitler—opposing him was a moral imperative. Today, having risen out of the depths of disgrace, he heads a movement that contains much of the energy and excitement to be found in this country.

Before his victory, Trump received the endorsement of accomplished personalities like Elon Musk and Tulsi Gabbard. They shared a hostility to the abuses of the Biden administration and felt untroubled and unashamed in the presence of the new Hitler. After the election, a steady stream of repentant celebrities made the pilgrimage to the holy land of Mar-a-Lago. Joe Scarborough of MSNBC, a rabid anti-Trumpist, came to beg forgiveness. Mark Zuckerberg, whose part in the censorship scheme had been less than honorable, flew in with the prevailing winds. Even the ethereal Justin Trudeau, mandarin by blood and temperament, paid homage to the new prince before he fell on his sword earlier this month.

It now feels as if the doors of history, long locked and rusted in place, have suddenly groaned open to the unknown. The world looks upside down. Not long ago, NFL players were taking the knee during the national anthem to protest the very existence of Trump. In 2024, they were doing the goofy Trump dance, golf swing and all.

The normalization of Trumpism endows the revolt of the public with legitimacy it has heretofore lacked. This is a potentially fatal breach in the defenses of the old regime. Previously, politicians had to play inside the lines drawn by their institutional masters, or else be shunned as extremists, racists, fascists—morally beyond the pale of mere politics. The original cordon sanitaire was applied to Marine Le Pen and her National Rally in France. Most recently, her party received 40 percent of the vote and leads a sizable contingent in parliament, yet it is treated like a pariah by every government coalition. Le Pen’s supporters are, in effect, disenfranchised. That is the point of the exercise.

Similar excommunications have been hurled at other antiestablishment parties, such as Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). They can exist but are never allowed to govern. In Romania, judges actually nullified the results of a presidential election because an unacceptable “far-right” populist had won. Along similar lines, the judicial persecution of Trump rested on the premise that he exerted a uniquely evil influence over “our democracy” and had to be destroyed by all available means.

Once it becomes unacceptable to demonize populism, democratic politics will devolve back to a competition over the issues. That should terrify establishment parties like the Democrats. The political obsessions of the elites—open immigration, energy “transition,” race- and sex-based “equity”—are at best irrelevant to the public’s concerns, at worst highly unpopular. These pet projects can only be imposed from above as moral imperatives—as electoral issues, they are losers. Opposition to immigration, for example, has been the fuel that propelled populists to power in Hungary, Italy, and Austria. The elites seem to sense this. Kamala Harris ran against the grain of her own and the Biden administration’s progressive record, and Bernie Sanders explained the U-turn by stating that Harris wanted “to win the election.”

But if the Democrats and their institutional allies are no longer able to vilify populism, and at the same time are deprived of the progressive agenda, what is left for them to do or say? The catastrophic failure of the Biden-Harris experiment has brought elite politics to the edge of a stark ideological wilderness, where the only justification for power is the will to attain it.

The Birth of Programmatic Populism

Matters stand differently on the other side of the divide. In the most significant mutation of this second phase of the revolt, populism has begun to evolve a governing program. To grasp the consequential nature of this development, we should remember that the public’s rage against the status quo has forever been stuck on negation. The public is always against, always bashing at the institutions without offering alternatives, an approach that logically leads to nihilism—the love of destruction for its own sake.

By and large, populists have followed the same route. They have railed against the system but lacked a positive program. Once elected, they are placed in the awkward position of being in charge of a system they detest, resulting in a flurry of symbolic gestures—flying on commercial airlines, for example—and in untrammeled nihilistic rhetoric.

So it was with the first Trump administration. We heard, loud and clear, what Trump was against: immigration, the news media, Nancy Pelosi, etc. He often spoke in crudely nihilistic terms. But what was his positive vision for the country? It was hard to say. Trump was trapped in a life-and-death struggle with his political antagonists—maybe it was unfair to expect soaring ideals from him at that juncture. But the fact remains that his energies, during his first term of office, were concentrated on negation.

This time around, all thoughts are turned to action. Trump’s ambitious program will advance on many fronts—unshackling the economy and restoring the worth of citizenship, for example—but the main strategic thrust is an effort to tame Leviathan, that is, to narrow the democratic gap between modern government and the public. Trump means to grapple with, and if possible cauterize, the festering sources of revolt. His instrument will be the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, an advisory group led by Musk that aims at “sweeping change,” including the dismantling of “antidemocratic” structures in the federal behemoth. Redundant units and regulatory agencies lacking explicit congressional approval are certain to fall, with proportionate “reductions in force.” The goal appears to be to enhance accountability as well as to increase efficiency and savings.

Many factors explain the transformation from Trump 1.0 to the current program-oriented upgrade. Four years of exile in Mar-a-Lago brooding over his first term may well have deepened Trump’s sense of mission. Proximity to lively minds like Musk’s no doubt enlarged his thinking. The big win on November 5 opened the way for big changes. All this is true. But Trump in his second term also has had the advantage of a precedent and a precursor. An important element in the elaboration of his governing program, I believe, was the strange and sudden rise of Javier Milei in Argentina.

Milei and the Chainsaw Approach to Government

Superficially, Milei is the very model of a twenty-first-century populist: big hair, foul mouth, prone to outrageous statements, always at the center of attention. Like Trump, he was a TV and YouTube personality rather than a member of the political class. Yet Milei differs from the breed in two significant respects. One, he’s a trained economist. He can dazzle an audience with technical jargon. Two, he’s a fanatical libertarian who worships at the altar of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. He ran for president on a program to fix the moribund Argentine economy by drastically shrinking the bloated and intrusive Argentine government—his symbol was the motosierra, or chainsaw, with which he proposed to hack away at that tentacular monster.

Once elected, Milei made good on the threat. He has sharply devalued the currency, killed most subsidies, laid off 50,000 public employees, privatized or eliminated entire ministries—and these activities were conducted in a spirit of magnificent showmanship. The effect on the economy has been mixed, but this much is clear: Despite the pain of the amputations, Milei remains a popular figure, and he has persuaded the public that the chainsaw strategy—cutting government—is preferable to raising taxes.

Trump’s economic instincts are far from libertarian. In fact, as Branko Milanovic has observed, he appears to be an old-fashioned mercantilist. His fixation with tariffs would have elicited a stern corrective lecture from Friedman. Musk, however, is a zealous advocate of the free market, and there can be no question that Milei’s anti-bureaucratic onslaught has set the example for DOGE that the two men expect to follow.

Here, parenthetically, we see the confusion of doctrines attendant on Trump having attracted a band of talented eccentrics, not only DOGE but also Gabbard, Robert Kennedy Jr. and J.D. Vance, who are united in their repudiation of the status quo but disagree about much else. Whether harmony can flow from this chorus of soloists will depend on the president-elect’s skill as a conductor.

DOGE, in any case, was set up with Trump’s blessing and appeals to his populist inclinations—after all, it endows with programmatic reality his old promise to “drain the swamp.” The federal bureaucracy has been condemned, as in a horror movie, to wait, with mounting panic, for the advent of a chainsaw massacre. As for the contradictions of the Trump coalition, these could be reconciled with a hybrid strategy: protectionist and mercantilist in its face to the world but radically libertarian in its approach to government and the domestic economy.

Can such a chimerical construct work? We will find out soon enough.

What we learn will determine the sense and direction of our political crisis. The crucial question is whether the system can be reformed. Evidently, Trump was elected to do just that. To the extent that he can persuade his voters that change is possible—that their revolt was a legitimate gesture, armed with a militant program—Trump can begin to restore the public’s trust in the institutions and the principles that sustain them, very much including democracy.

There’s a human dimension to reform, too. It has long been apparent that our current elite class must be replaced by people who feel at home in the twenty-first century. By recent standards, including that of his first-term cabinet, Trump’s new advisers and appointees are relatively youthful. Vance is 40, Gabbard and Kash Patel are in their 40s, while Musk, at 53, is somewhere between a perpetual child and an elder statesman. Besides enjoying the full vigor of life, members of this crowd have few memories of Vietnam, Watergate, or even Monica Lewinsky. Their eyes are fixed on the present and the future—beyond the digital culture that so distresses our decrepit elites to the next tidal waves of disruption, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain technology.

Of course, the odds are stacked against them. Failure is more likely than not. But it would be the crowning irony of Trump’s improbable trajectory if the motley collection of pirates and adventurers presently around him turn out to be the next American ruling class.

2. TikTok Restoring Service for U.S. Users, After Trump Signals He Will Save It

The irony.

From backing a ban to being hailed as a savior: Inside Trump’s TikTok shift

https://apnews.com/article/trump-tiktok-ban-da11df6d59c17e2c17eea40c4042386d

TikTok Restoring Service for U.S. Users, After Trump Signals He Will Save It

President-elect says he will issue an executive order; app says it will work on a long-term solution with incoming administration

https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-goes-dark-for-u-s-users-while-trump-signals-he-will-save-it-0370b227?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Elizabeth Wollman and Georgia Wells

Updated Jan. 19, 2025 9:08 pm ET

TikTok started restoring service on Sunday for U.S. users just over 14 hours after halting it. Photo: Alex Kent/Getty Images

President-elect Donald Trump rode to TikTok’s rescue on Sunday, working on the eve of his new presidency to try to undo a ban effort that he helped initiate during his first term.

The popular social-media app started restoring service on Sunday for its 170 million U.S. users just over 14 hours after halting it in response to a bipartisan national-security law requiring TikTok to shed its Chinese ownership or shut down in the U.S.

The restoration of service came after Trump, who has been indicating for weeks that he wanted to help the app, said Sunday he would issue an executive order on Monday to reinstate the service in the U.S. and that he wants the country to have an ownership position in the app.

“Welcome back!” read a message the TikTok app showed users Sunday. “As a result of President Trump’s efforts, TikTok is back in the U.S.!” The company separately said Trump had provided the assurance needed for TikTok and its partners to restore service. It said TikTok would work with the incoming president on a long-term solution to the law’s requirements.

The weekend’s frenetic moves capped a yearslong saga that has seen a complete change in the president-elect’s position. While legal challenges could still complicate Trump’s plan, his move sets him up to potentially play the hero to the Chinese-owned app that he once said is a national-security threat—as well as to its wealthy U.S. investors, its largely young base of users, and the millions of American businesses and social-media entrepreneurs who use TikTok to connect with customers and fans.

Even before the weekend, Trump planned to have TikTok Chief Executive Shou Chew at his inauguration on Monday, along with U.S. tech luminaries including Mark Zuckerberg, whose Meta Platforms owns TikTok rival Instagram.

The law, signed by President Biden in April after passing with strong Republican support in Congress, required divestment of Chinese ownership in TikTok because of concerns that China’s government could use the app to surveil or propagandize American users. The law took effect Sunday after TikTok failed to present any such deal for consideration, and after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected its claims that the law is unconstitutional.

The Biden White House had offered repeated public assurances that it wouldn’t take any action to enforce the law on his last day in office. But TikTok said those weren’t sufficient to ensure legal protection, including for partners such as Oracle, which hosts TikTok’s American service in its data centers.

“I’m asking companies not to let TikTok stay dark!” Trump wrote in a post Sunday morning on his own platform, Truth Social. He said his executive order would pave the way for a deal that he said would protect national security.

TikTok and parent ByteDance have portrayed themselves as independent of China. Photo: Richard B. Levine/ZUMA PRESS

Trump’s promised move raises a number of questions that leave the legal landscape uncertain. The TikTok law allowed for the possibility of a 90-day extension before being enforced, but it isn’t clear that the president-elect can invoke it under the current circumstances—and after the ban had already taken effect.

More broadly, a president can’t nullify a federal law through an executive order, though he has considerable discretion about whether to enforce it.

The ban’s supporters warned companies that they still faced serious legal risk for assisting TikTok, no matter Trump’s pledge.

“Any company that hosts, distributes, services, or otherwise facilitates communist-controlled TikTok could face hundreds of billions of dollars of ruinous liability under the law, not just from DOJ, but also under securities law, shareholder lawsuits, and state AGs,” Sen. Tom Cotton (R., Ark.) said on X. “Think about it.”

Trump’s post said he wants the U.S. to have a 50%-ownership position in a joint venture, although he didn’t provide further details about how such a joint venture would be structured. “By doing this, we save TikTok,” he wrote.

The statement suggests Trump could be setting a low bar for what needs to change to keep the app online in the U.S. ByteDance, TikTok’s Chinese parent, has said it is already roughly 60% owned by global institutional investors, many of which are big U.S. financial firms—including BlackRock, General Atlantic and Susquehanna International Group, co-founded by Republican megadonor Jeff Yass.

Those American investors together could already own nearly half of ByteDance, and by extension TikTok and its U.S. operations—as of 2023 Susquehanna alone owned about 15%, The Wall Street Journal reported.

TikTok and parent ByteDance have portrayed themselves as independent of China, but their ability to do any divestiture deal to satisfy the U.S. law has been constrained by Beijing. In recent days, Chinese officials have internally discussed options including allowing a trusted non-Chinese party such as Elon Musk to invest in or take control of TikTok’s U.S. operations.

In August 2020, Trump issued an executive order that effectively banned TikTok for U.S. use unless it was sold to an American company, asserting that China’s authoritarian government would have access to user data.

Adapting to Big Change: The New Challenges of Modern Warfare

19fortyfive.com · by Wallace Gregson · January 19, 2025

“Big Change” is upon us, and the rate is accelerating. We must adapt quickly and comprehensively throughout our national security enterprise, including the defense industrial sector. We must learn to be comfortable with continuous change by leading it.

The Challenges in Asia

Asia is home to the biggest challenge to US national defense policy, strategy, and operational concepts.

Our allies primarily form the First Island Chain fronting on the East and South China Seas.

War with China or Russia is not unlikely; it can happen at any time and includes the potential for a near-term major war.

We are in a period of rapid, accelerating, profound changes in geopolitics, economics, and technology, mainly with weapons technology.

We have work to do in our defense industrial base. We are no longer the arsenal of democracy. We had to appeal to our allies to supply Ukraine with artillery ammunition because we could not produce it in the quantities needed.

The era of unchallenged air and sea superiority is most assuredly over, as shown by China’s massive dredging and building project in the international waters of the South China Sea.

Our armed forces must adapt quickly to the new realities of ubiquitous, pervasive surveillance and high-speed weapons accurate at a distance.

We survived “Big Change” before, particularly in Asia. It might be helpful to look back at what we did then and find lessons for today.

Lessons from History

As is well known, throughout WW II in the Pacific, we emphatically validated our pre-war operational concept of seizing control of the seas and the air above.

Ironically, the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the signing of the surrender documents on the deck of the USS Missouri meant that our WW II strategic concept was no longer meaningful or convincing to the public.

The United States Navy possessed the largest fleet in its history and had less reason to maintain as significant a fleet as ever. The fifteen battleships, one hundred aircraft carriers, seventy cruisers, three hundred and fifty destroyers, over one hundred amphibious ships, and two hundred submarines of the United States Navy floated in virtual solitary splendor upon the earth’s waters.

Critics were not slow to declare the Navy finished.

One general remarked: “To maintain a five-ocean navy to fight a no-ocean opponent … is a foolish waste of time, men, and resources.”

Another: “Why should we have a Navy at all? There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force.”

Things did not entirely turn out as the angry generals recommended. And we did get many things right in this turbulent post-war era. NSC-68, a remarkably short document by today’s standards at 58 pages, set forth a comprehensive strategy and theory of victory for the Cold War emerging from the turbulence of the late 1940s. Presented to President Truman in

Post-War Events

April of 1950, it described possible policy choices: a return to isolation, war, continued diplomatic and negotiating efforts, or “the rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.” The last choice aligned with the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement.

While leadership was pondering the choices, North Korea’s Kim IL Sung, with Soviet backing, invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Korea had not been part of our security planning, but President Truman, fearing the potential precedent for Europe of a loss of Korea to naked Communist aggression, promptly responded.

In a “no plan” environment, while demobilizing, reorganizing, and struggling with roles and missions for the services, US forces responded as best they could. US forces deployed to Korea from Japan and the United States. We charged a famous commander, Douglas MacArthur, who was “too big to fail” in today’s jargon, with the mission. The new United Nations resolved to join the fight with forces drawn from 16 countries, thanks to the absence of the Soviet representative and his veto when the issue was decided.

As is well known, the first months of the war included more than a few near-run engagements as we struggled to avoid being ejected from the Asian mainland by an army that did not exist on VJ Day in 1945. We committed to something new and unexpected, a “limited war” with limited aims underneath a nuclear threat less than five years from demanding “unconditional surrender” from our enemies.

We reversed our occupation policy with Japan. We realized that a successful Japan was needed to resist Communist pressure. Out was the goal of total Japanese disarmament. It was the gradual emergence of an armed Japanese Self-Defense Force from the national police. We signed the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan in San Francisco in 1951. Among other things, this formally ended our post-war occupation of Japan, save for Okinawa Prefecture, where the US remained the occupying power until 1972. The long-lasting military alliance between the United States and Japan began.

We also became comfortable operating from our offshore sanctuaries, particularly Japan. Our unchallenged air and sea superiority was exploited from both a mobile naval presence offshore coupled with power projection and sustainment from a safe Japan. North Korea and China had no ability to project power seaward, and the sea and air were secure maneuver space for the US. Japan’s sanctuary role led to its designation as the formal home of the UN Command Rear. Seven bases in Japan still fly the UN flag along with Japanese and American flags, signaling the UN’s continued commitment.

In short order, exploiting sea and air control from a mobile seabase and offshore sanctuaries became a key strategic and operational concept and the foundation of our influence, policy, strategy, and operations in the Western Pacific. This advantage served us well in the last century.

But now this is under threat. Ubiquitous, pervasive surveillance coupled with high-speed weapons accurate at great distances threatens the territory, infrastructure, and lives of our allies, as well as our forces at sea and ashore.

The current environment is not a checkmate but cannot be left unattended. It demands a comprehensive response across our government and industry like that created in response to “Big Change” in the previous era. Can we do that again?

About the Author: Wallace C. Gregson

Wallace C. Gregson served as a former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2009-11) and is currently a senior advisor at Avascent International. Gregson last served as the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Bases, Pacific, headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. He is a senior advisor to General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems.

19fortyfive.com · by Wallace Gregson · January 19, 2025

4. Trump to Call for ‘Revolution of Common Sense’ in Inaugural Address

I am all for common sense (and the basis of all American common sense is found in the US Constitution).

Trump to Call for ‘Revolution of Common Sense’ in Inaugural Address

In his speech, excerpts of which were shared with The Wall Street Journal, the incoming president will proclaim a ‘new era of national success’

https://www.wsj.com/politics/trump-to-call-for-revolution-of-common-sense-in-inaugural-address-a6d94c59?mod=WSJ_home_mediumtopper_pos_2

By Alex Leary

Jan. 20, 2025 5:00 am ET

Donald Trump is expected to describe what he views as the most pressing national problems and his solutions for them. Photo: Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—President-elect Donald Trump will call for a “revolution of common sense” during his inaugural address, according to prepared remarks, as he caps a historic comeback and embarks on an agenda that includes mass deportations, steep tariffs and slashing the size of the federal government.

“I return to the presidency confident and optimistic that we are at the start of a thrilling new era of national success. A tide of change is sweeping the country,” Trump is expected to say, according to remarks shared with The Wall Street Journal. “My message to Americans today is that it is time for us to once again act with courage, vigor and the vitality of history’s greatest civilization.”

While a combative Trump in his 2017 address lamented “American carnage,” his speech has been designed to be more optimistic, people familiar with the drafting say, though Trump is known to veer off script. At the same time, the 47th president is expected to dispense with some of the lofty rhetoric of his predecessors and describe in blunt terms what he views as the most pressing national problems and his solutions for them.

Trump is expected to sign several executive orders at the U.S. Capitol following his swearing-in, part of a flurry of day-one action.

Freezing temperatures forced the inauguration inside the Capitol, the first time since Ronald Reagan’s second inauguration in 1985. Washington is heavily barricaded, but officials weren’t expecting widespread protests, a sign of the diminished public opposition to Trump, whose comfortable victory in November has left Democrats demoralized and without a clear leader.

People gathered for a rally Sunday ahead of Trump’s inauguration in Washington, D.C. Photo: Shuran Huang for WSJ

Trump for now enjoys mostly unified Republican support and the party narrowly controls the House and Senate, giving him a chance to pursue his ideas, which include building on the massive tax-cut package enacted in his first term and boosting American fossil fuels. Since the election he has outlined provocative plans, including a bid to acquire Greenland, pointing to its strategically important location. He also is pledging to upend the Justice Department, which he has accused of pursuing politically motivated investigations against him and other Republicans.

During a rally Sunday, Trump promised to “act with historic speed and strength and fix every single crisis facing our country” and he exulted in his victory in what was one of the most tumultuous elections in modern times, including a near assassination in July.

Thousands of his supporters have arrived in Washington. Hotels, bars and restaurants over the weekend were packed, reflecting a more festive atmosphere than his first inauguration, when some Americans were reluctant to embrace him. Pedicab drivers downtown were ferrying customers around while blaring Trump’s unofficial theme song, “Y.M.C.A.” by the Village People.

Trump plans to issue dozens of executive orders in his first few days, with immigration, border security and energy production at the forefront, and plans to travel to states to highlight those actions, according to people involved in the planning. He will also move to gut federal diversity programs.

Trump intends to issue an executive order on Monday to reinstate TikTok, buying more time to work out a deal for the platform to shed its Chinese ownership or close in the U.S. On Friday, he is scheduled to tour fire-ravaged Los Angeles.

At 78, Trump will be the oldest president to take the office, supplanting the mark set by his predecessor, Joe Biden, whose age became a focal point in the campaign, forcing the stunning turn of events that led to him being replaced on the ticket by Vice President Kamala Harris.

Former Ohio Sen. JD Vance will be sworn in as vice president, and at age 40, will be the third youngest in history to hold the job.

A new Wall Street Journal poll found that voters want a less assertive set of policies than Trump promised during the campaign, including on immigration and his plans to replace thousands of career civil-service workers with people chosen by the president.

Still, Trump enters the White House with more support than when he first took office. He further broadened the GOP coalition during his campaign, attracting more working-class voters and Black and Hispanic people, largely over his economic message. Inflation has cooled significantly from the pandemic and Trump inherits an overall strong economy.

He has moderated vows of quickly bringing down food prices and has backed away from his boast of swiftly ending the war in Ukraine. Elon Musk, who will oversee a Department of Government Efficiency outside advisory panel, has dialed back talk about the size of cuts that can be achieved.

Musk, the world’s richest man, will attend the inauguration, cementing his outsize role in the new administration. Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg also plan to attend, former adversaries of Trump who have worked on a rapprochement. Scores of other leading executives are attending—eager to further curry favor with the incoming president—including TikTok Chief Executive Shou Chew.

The nation’s capital is heavily barricaded, but officials weren’t expecting widespread protests. Photo: Bing Guan for WSJ

Biden will attend, as will former Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Former first lady Michelle Obama isn’t attending, underscoring tensions with Trump, who has for years attacked her and her husband. Trump skipped Biden’s inauguration four years ago, angry over his loss and fresh off the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol riot, where his supporters tried to stop the certification of the vote. More than 1,500 people have been charged in connection with the attack, and Trump has suggested he is planning to pardon many of them.

Trump’s attempts to overturn the election led to indictments in Washington and Georgia but he outlasted those prosecutions and others. Earlier this month he was sentenced in New York in a hush-money payment case, making him a felon, but he faced no punishment.

His ability to withstand the legal cases was just part of his comeback. The GOP establishment in Washington was ready to move on from him after his 2020 loss to Biden, but Trump banked on his supporters across the country sticking with him. He beat back more than a dozen rivals and easily captured the GOP nomination. Along the way, Trump faced two assassination attempts, one that left him bloodied yet defiant on a rally stage in Butler, Pa.

The last defeated president to mount a successful comeback was Grover Cleveland, who was denied re-election in 1888 before rebounding in 1892.

Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com

5. First Israeli Hostages Released Under Gaza Cease-Fire

Photos at the link: https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-cease-fire-begins-after-last-minute-delay-a9e987ed?st=s3pXcF&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

First Israeli Hostages Released Under Gaza Cease-Fire

Three women were turned over to Israel. Around 90 Palestinian prisoners will be freed by Israel in first round of exchanges.

Drone Makers Looking to Steer Clear of China Fear Beijing’s Wrath

U.S. companies see risks in working with Taiwan as it tries to build a ‘democratic supply chain’

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/drone-makers-looking-to-steer-clear-of-china-fear-beijings-wrath-8fea8508?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Joyu Wang

Follow

in Taipei and

Heather Somerville

Follow in San Francisco

Updated Jan. 19, 2025 11:36 pm ET

A drone hovers during a press tour inside the Asia UAV Al Innovation Application R&D Center in Chiayi, Taiwan. Photo: Ritchie B Tongo/Shutterstock

China dominates the global market for the small, inexpensive drones that have transformed the world’s battlefields—and Beijing hasn’t been shy about keeping the industry under its thumb.

For U.S. companies, dependence on China has become untenable, particularly as Beijing shows it is willing to cut off their access to essential supplies.

In Taiwan, that spells opportunity. Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun, who heads a government program to develop the island’s drone sector, said in a recent interview that the development of a “democratic supply chain” starring Taiwan is an inevitability.

However, recent examples of Beijing punishing companies for their ties to Taiwan have made U.S. businesses cautious in their efforts to avoid China in the production of drones, an industry where commercial ambitions and national security intersect.

American companies also worry they will find themselves in the crossfire of any rising tensions between the U.S. and China after President-elect Donald Trump takes office.

“It’s not just let’s swap out of China and go to Taiwan,” said Mike Sims, co-founder and chief executive of U.S. startup Empirium, a marketplace that helps companies including drone makers find China-free parts and services. “It’s essentially just a delicate business environment.”

The delicacy of working with Taiwan is a challenge to Taiwan’s aspirations to become a powerhouse drone-parts supplier and build a drone army to defend itself against a potential invasion by China, which claims the island as its own.

U.S. drone maker Skydio experienced the perils of relying on Chinese supply in October, when Beijing blacklisted the company.

A drone made by Skydio, which has been blacklisted by China. Photo: Clara Mokri for WSJ

Skydio had found itself cut off from the Chinese batteries it needed.

China’s government said it was responding to Skydio’s sales in Taiwan, where the company’s drones are used by the National Fire Agency. The company has also delivered drones to Ukraine for use in its war with Russia.

“This action makes clear that the Chinese government will use supply chains as a weapon to advance their interests over ours,” Skydio Chief Executive Adam Bry wrote in an October blog post. “No Western drone manufacturer is safe,” he added.

The company approached the Taiwan government, and Taipei saw an opening. Taiwan officials connected Skydio with local battery suppliers, according to Cheng and other people familiar with the matter.

Skydio is in talks with these suppliers, which are part of a government-backed coalition to bolster Taiwan’s domestic drone industry. It has also approached other Taiwanese suppliers about filling the gap left by China.

The company hasn’t settled on a new battery supplier and is speaking with manufacturers in other countries. It said it expects to have a full stock of batteries in the spring. China’s sanctions forced it to scale back the number of batteries on its drones from three to one. Limiting batteries curtails the drones’ performance.

Skydio, meanwhile, has been outspoken with policymakers and regulators about the risk of the U.S. being so dependent on Chinese drones, including those of Shenzhen DJI Technology, the world’s largest small-drone manufacturer. The U.S. government has declared DJI to be a national security threat.

Taiwanese Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun says her country has a great business opportunity. Photo: Joyu Wang for WSJ

Many U.S. drone companies will likely buy sparingly from Taiwan’s suppliers and source their parts from around the globe, having paid the price for their singular reliance on China.

Working with Taiwan comes with some unquantifiable costs, companies say—chiefly, that Beijing would punish any company that does business there or, in a more drastic scenario, seize the island and take ownership of its industries.

Taiwan, and its boosters, are undaunted.

“You kind of have to find the natural substitute to China, and it’s Taiwan,” said Sims. “We see this as a gold rush in a way. I think it’s going to be a boomtown.”

Taipei has plans to invest at least $1.35 billion over four years in its effort to foster domestic drone capacity and cut out China.

“This ‘non-red’ trend, it’s a huge potential business opportunity for Taiwan,” Cheng said, using another term for the shift away from China. “We’ll be keeping a close eye on the requirements from key partners like the U.S., especially around requests for excluding Chinese components,” Cheng said.

Taiwan is bracing for further shifts in the tense relationship between Beijing and Washington, with Trump threatening tariffs on China from the moment his term in the White House begins on Monday.

Beijing is finding ways to strike back. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said last month that it was imposing sanctions on more than a dozen additional U.S. drone-technology companies, including some that supply drones to Ukraine in its war with Russia. Many of the companies had already moved to suppliers outside of China.

China dominates the world’s supply of batteries, motors, sensors and rare-earth materials that are vital to parts of the defense industry. Nearly all the components in first-person-view drones—those that use real-time video feeds, the type widely used in Ukraine—are manufactured in China, even though many were invented in the U.S., according to a study by Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Edlyn Levine and Fiona Murray.

“It is the absolute dominance of the supply chain,” said Murray.

Taiwan sees its expertise in making advanced semiconductors and other tech products as the groundwork for a competitive drone industry. This year the government is putting at least $10 million into research and development for drone chips, Cheng said.

Cybersecurity is another critical area where her government is working to ensure Taiwanese-made drones meet Western standards, she said.

Taiwan plans to invest at least $1.35 billion over four years to foster drone capacity. Photo: ritchie b tongo/Shutterstock

Taiwanese supplies tend to be slightly more expensive than their Chinese counterparts, but cost less than supplies from tech hubs in other democracies such as South Korea and Japan.

Seattle-based BRINC Drones gets critical components from Taiwan, and is leaning on a mix of Taiwanese, American and other allied suppliers to stay clear of China, executives said.

China’s dominance, however, remains daunting. China has a grip on the ingredients for many of the components used in drones and other defense-related products. China supplies more than 90% of the magnets needed for motors. Batteries are built with minerals that come from China or are processed in China.

Manufacturers around the world are nervous to do business with a company blacklisted by China for fear of retaliation from Beijing.

“China intends to weaponize its control over drone components,” said Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank. “The Chinese understand our supply chains better than we do.”

China has blocked the export of certain critical minerals to the U.S., including gallium, which is used in equipment needed by the U.S. military.

There are also some essential drone parts that Taiwan manufacturers are finding too costly to assemble, such as the gimbal system, which combines an optical lens with thermal sensors and stabilizers. Taiwan produces the parts, but most are shipped to China for assembly.

Taiwanese suppliers could produce entire batteries domestically to ensure supply-chain security, as long as keeping costs low isn’t the main priority, said Joe Chiu, who co-leads an Economy Ministry-backed consortium to explore export opportunities.

However, Chiu, an executive of Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, which makes jet fighters for the Taiwanese Air Force, said suppliers also fear retaliation from Beijing, given some still have business ties or operations in China.

“They also have to think about geopolitical tensions,” Chiu said. “They want to do business with both sides, but they just can’t afford to risk offending either one.”

Chiu noted that Taiwanese suppliers who are in talks with their American counterparts would want to keep a low profile.

“If a company has nothing to do with China,” he said, “they really wouldn’t have to worry about this at all.”

Write to Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com and Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com

7. Biden pardons Fauci and Milley in an effort to guard against potential revenge by Trump

Wow on so many levels. I did not think he would do this.

But in some ways this could be a gift to the Trump administration. Now it does not have to waste America's time on revenge and spiteful prosecutions to satisfy its political base and it can get on with the real and important business of the nation.

Biden pardons Fauci and Milley in an effort to guard against potential revenge by Trump

AP · by COLLEEN LONG · January 20, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden has pardoned Dr. Anthony Fauci, retired Gen. Mark Milley and members of the House committee that investigated the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, using the extraordinary powers of his office in his final hours to guard against potential revenge by the incoming Trump administration.

The decision by Biden comes after Donald Trump warned of an enemies list filled with those who have crossed him politically or sought to hold him accountable for his attempt to overturn his 2020 election loss and his role in the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. Trump has selected Cabinet nominees who backed his election lies and who have pledged to punish those involved in efforts to investigate him.

“The issuance of these pardons should not be mistaken as an acknowledgment that any individual engaged in any wrongdoing, nor should acceptance be misconstrued as an admission of guilt for any offense,” Biden said in a statement. “Our nation owes these public servants a debt of gratitude for their tireless commitment to our country.”

It’s customary for a president to grant clemency at the end of his term, but those acts of mercy are usually offered to everyday Americans who have been convicted of crimes. But Biden has used the power in the broadest and most untested way possible: to pardon those who have not even been investigated yet. And with the acceptance comes a tacit admission of guilt or wrongdoing, even though those who have been pardoned have not been formally accused of any crimes.

“These are exceptional circumstances, and I cannot in good conscience do nothing,” Biden said, adding that “Even when individuals have done nothing wrong — and in fact have done the right thing — and will ultimately be exonerated, the mere fact of being investigated or prosecuted can irreparably damage reputations and finances.”

Fauci was director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health for nearly 40 years and was Biden’s chief medical adviser until his retirement in 2022. He helped coordinate the nation’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and raised the ire of Trump when he refused to back Trump’s unfounded claims. He has become a target of intense hatred and vitriol from people on the right, who blame him for mask mandates and other policies they believe infringed on their rights, even as tens of thousands of Americans were dying.

Mark Milley is the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and called Trump a fascist and detailed Trump’s conduct around the deadly Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection.

Biden is also extending pardons to members and staff of the Jan. 6 committee, including former Reps. Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger, both Republicans, as well as the U.S. Capitol and D.C. Metropolitan police officers who testified before the committee.

Biden, an institutionalist, has promised a smooth transition to the next administration, inviting Trump to the White House and saying that the nation will be OK, even as he warned during his farewell address of a growing oligarchy. He has spent years warning that Trump’s ascension to the presidency again would be a threat to democracy. His decision to break with political norms with the preemptive pardons was brought on by those concerns.

Biden has set the presidential record for most individual pardons and commutations issued; he announced on Friday he would commuting the sentences of almost 2,500 people convicted of nonviolent drug offenses. He previously announced he was commuting the sentences of 37 of the 40 people on federal death row, converting their punishments to life imprisonment just weeks before Trump, an outspoken proponent of expanding capital punishment, takes office. In his first term, Trump presided over an unprecedented spate of executions, 13, in a protracted timeline during the coronavirus pandemic.

AP · by COLLEEN LONG · January 20, 2025

8. Donald Trump has sweeping plans for a second administration. Here's what he's proposed

The scorecard.

A useful roll-up to keep track of forthcoming potential actions. National Security and Defense are at the end for those who concern themselves with those issues.

Donald Trump has sweeping plans for a second administration. Here's what he's proposed

By BILL BARROW

Updated 9:58 AM EST, January 19, 2025

AP · January 19, 2025

Follow live updates on President-elect Donald Trump’s return to Washington

WASHINGTON (AP) — Donald Trump has promised sweeping actions in his second administration.

The president-elect has outlined a wide-ranging agenda that blends traditional conservative approaches to taxes, regulation and cultural issues with a more populist bent on trade and a shift in America’s international role.

Trump’s agenda also would scale back federal government efforts on civil rights and expand presidential powers.

A look at what Trump has proposed:

Immigration

“Build the wall!” from his 2016 campaign has become creating “the largest mass deportation program in history.” Trump has called for using the National Guard and empowering domestic police forces in the effort.

Still, Trump has offered few details of what the program would look like and how he would ensure that it targeted only people in the United States illegally.

He has pitched “ideological screening” for would-be entrants and ending birthright citizenship, which almost certainly would require a constitutional change. He has said he would reinstitute first-term practices such as the “remain in Mexico” policy, as well as limiting migrants on public health grounds and severely limiting or banning entrants from certain majority-Muslim nations.

Altogether, the approach would not just crack down on illegal migration, but curtail immigration overall.

Abortion

Trump played down abortion as a second-term priority, even as he took credit for the Supreme Court ending a woman’s federal right to terminate a pregnancy and returning abortion regulation to state governments.

At Trump’s insistence, the GOP platform, for the first time in decades, did not call for a national ban on abortion. Trump maintains that overturning Roe v. Wade is enough on the federal level.

Trump said in October that he would veto a federal abortion ban if legislation reached his desk — a statement he made only after avoiding a firm position in his September debate against Democratic nominee Kamala Harris.

Anti-abortion activists march outside of the U.S. Supreme Court during the annual March for Life in Washington, Friday, Jan. 21, 2022. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana, File)

It is unclear if his administration will aggressively defend against legal challenges seeking to restrict access to abortion pills, including mifepristone, as the Biden administration has.

Anti-abortion advocates continue to wage legal battles over the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the drug as well as the agency’s relaxed prescribing restrictions.

Trump is also unlikely to enforce Biden’s guidance that hospitals must provide abortions for women who are in medical emergencies, even in states with bans.

Taxes

Trump’s tax policies broadly tilt toward corporations and wealthier Americans. That’s mostly due to his promise to extend his 2017 tax overhaul, with a few notable changes that include lowering the corporate income tax rate to 15% from the current 21%.

That also involves rolling back Democratic President Joe Biden’s income tax increases on the wealthiest Americans and scrapping Inflation Reduction Act levies that finance energy measures intended to combat climate change.

The Marriner S. Eccles Federal Reserve Board Building is seen in Washington, Nov. 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana, File)

Those policies notwithstanding, Trump has put more emphasis on new proposals aimed at working- and middle-class Americans: exempting earned tips, Social Security wages and overtime wages from income taxes.

It’s noteworthy, however, that his proposal on tips, depending on how Congress might write it, could give a backdoor tax break to top wage earners by allowing them to reclassify some of their pay as tip income. That prospect, at its most extreme, could see hedge-fund managers or top-flight attorneys taking advantage of a policy that Trump frames as being designed for restaurant servers, bartenders and other service workers.

Tariffs and trade

Trump’s posture on international trade is to distrust world markets as harmful to American interests.

He proposes tariffs of 10% to 20% on foreign goods — and in some speeches has mentioned even higher percentages.

A jockey truck passes a stack of 40-foot China Shipping containers, July 5, 2018, at the Port of Savannah in Savannah, Ga. (AP Photo/Stephen B. Morton, File)

He promises to reinstitute an August 2020 executive order requiring that the federal government buy “essential” medications only from U.S. companies. He pledges to block purchases of “any vital infrastructure” in the U.S. by Chinese buyers.

DEI, LGBTQ and civil rights

Trump has called for rolling back societal emphasis on diversity and legal protections for LGBTQ citizens. He has also called for ending diversity, equity and inclusion programs in government institutions, using federal funding as leverage.

Transgenders rights supporters rally outside of the Supreme Court, Wednesday, Dec. 4, 2024, in Washington. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana, File)

On transgender rights, Trump promises generally to end “boys in girls’ sports,” a practice he insists, without evidence, is widespread. But his policies go well beyond standard applause lines from his rally speeches.

Among other ideas, Trump would roll back the Biden administration’s policy of extending Title IX civil rights protections to transgender students, and he would ask Congress to require that only two genders can be recognized at birth.

Regulation, federal bureaucracy and presidential power

Trump seeks to reduce the role of federal bureaucrats and to cut regulations across economic sectors.

He frames all regulatory cuts as an economic magic wand. He pledges precipitous drops in household utility bills by removing obstacles to fossil fuel production, including opening all federal lands for exploration — even though U.S. energy production is already at record highs.

Trump promises to unleash housing construction by cutting regulations — though most construction rules come from state and local government. He also says he would end “frivolous litigation from the environmental extremists.”

The approach would in many ways strengthen executive branch influence. That power would come more directly from the White House.

He would make it easier to fire federal workers by classifying thousands of them as being outside civil service protections. That could weaken the government’s power to enforce statutes and rules by reducing the number of employees engaging in the work and, potentially, impose a chilling effect on those who remain.

Trump also claims that presidents have exclusive power to control federal spending even after Congress has appropriated money. He argues that lawmakers’ budget actions “set a ceiling” on spending but not a floor — meaning the president’s constitutional duty to “faithfully execute the laws” includes discretion on whether to spend the money. This interpretation could set up a court battle with Congress.

As a candidate, he also suggested that the Federal Reserve, an independent entity that sets interest rates, should be subject to more presidential power. Any such move would represent a momentous change to how the U.S. economic and monetary systems work.

Education

The Department of Education would be targeted for elimination in a second Trump administration.

That does not mean that Trump wants Washington out of classrooms. He still proposes, among other maneuvers, using federal funding as leverage to pressure K-12 school systems to abolish tenure and adopt merit pay for teachers and scrap diversity programs at all levels of education.

He calls for pulling federal funding “for any school or program pushing Critical Race Theory, gender ideology, or other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on our children.”

The U.S. Department of Education building is seen in Washington, Nov. 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana, File)

In higher education, Trump proposes taking over accreditation processes for colleges, a move he describes as his “secret weapon” against the “Marxist Maniacs and lunatics” he says control higher education.

Trump takes aim at higher education endowments, saying he will collect “billions and billions of dollars” from schools via “taxing, fining and suing excessively large private university endowments” at schools that do not comply with his edicts. That almost certainly would end up in protracted legal fights.

As in other policy areas, Trump isn’t actually proposing limiting federal power in higher education but strengthening it. He calls for redirecting the confiscated endowment money into an online “American Academy” offering college credentials to all Americans without a tuition charge. “It will be strictly non-political, and there will be no wokeness or jihadism allowed — none of that’s going to be allowed,” Trump said on Nov. 1, 2023.

Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid

Trump insists he would protect Social Security and Medicare, popular programs geared toward older Americans and among the biggest pieces of the federal spending pie each year.

There are questions about how his proposal not to tax tips and overtime wages might affect Social Security and Medicare. If such plans eventually involved only income taxes, the entitlement programs would not be affected.

Exempting those wages from payroll taxes would reduce the funding stream for Social Security and Medicare outlays. Trump has talked little about Medicaid during this campaign, but his first administration reshaped the program by allowing states to introduce work requirements for recipients.

Affordable Care Act and health care

As he has since 2015, Trump calls for repealing the Affordable Care Act and its subsidized health insurance marketplaces.

In September, he insisted he had the “concepts of a plan.” In the latter stages of the campaign, Trump played up his alliance with former presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a longtime critic of vaccines and of pesticides used in U.S. agriculture. Trump repeatedly told rally crowds that he would put Kennedy in charge of “making America healthy again.”

Trump has picked Kennedy to be his health secretary.

Climate and energy

Trump, who claims falsely that climate change is a “hoax,” blasts Biden-era spending on cleaner energy designed to reduce U.S. reliance on fossil fuels.

He proposes an energy policy — and transportation infrastructure spending — anchored to fossil fuels: roads, bridges and combustion-engine vehicles. “Drill, baby, drill!” was a regular chant at Trump rallies.

Attendees listen as Republican presidential nominee former President Donald Trump speaks during a campaign event at Alro Steel, Aug. 29, 2024, in Potterville, Mich. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon, File)

Trump says he does not oppose electric vehicles but promises to end all Biden incentives to encourage EV market development. Trump also pledges to roll back Biden-era fuel efficiency standards.

Workers’ rights

Trump and Vice President-elect JD Vance framed their ticket as favoring America’s workers. But Trump could make it harder for workers to unionize.

In discussing auto workers, Trump focused almost exclusively on Biden’s push toward electric vehicles. When he mentioned unions, it was often to lump “the union bosses and CEOs” together as complicit in “this disastrous electric car scheme.”

In an Oct. 23, 2023, statement, Trump said of the United Auto Workers, “I’m telling you, you shouldn’t pay those dues.”

National defense and America’s role in the world

Trump’s rhetoric and policy approach in world affairs is more isolationist diplomatically, non-interventionist militarily and protectionist economically than the U.S. has been since World War II.

The details are more complicated.

President Donald Trump speaks during the NATO summit, Dec. 4, 2019, in Watford, England. (AP Photo/ Evan Vucci, File)

He pledges expansion of the military, promises to protect Pentagon spending from austerity efforts and proposes a new missile defense shield — an old idea from the Reagan era during the Cold War.

Trump insists he can end Russia’s war in Ukraine without explaining how.

He summarizes his approach through another Reagan phrase: “peace through strength.” But he remains critical of NATO and top U.S. military brass.

“I don’t consider them leaders,” Trump said of Pentagon officials that Americans “see on television.” He repeatedly praised authoritarians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

___ Associated Press writer Amanda Seitz contributed to this report.

AP · January 19, 2025

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2025

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023. Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since February 2023.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tolstoho Street in western Chasiv Yar. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian forces captured the Novopivnichnyi and Desyata microraions in Chasiv Yar, advanced in the workshop area of the Refractory Plant, and in northern Chasiv Yar. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 18 and 19. Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian small and medium-sized assaults on the grounds of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar. Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the Russian "Terek" Cossack Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps), and drone operators of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are all reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction; additional elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself.

Key Takeaways:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Russian volunteer military detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.

10. Iran Update, January 19, 2025

Iran Update, January 19, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-19-2025

Hamas released three female Israeli hostages after the ceasefire went into effect. Hamas handed over the three hostages to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Gaza City. The ICRC confirmed that the hostages were in “good condition” before the ICRC transferred them to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the southern Gaza Strip. The IDF then transported the hostages to a medical facility in southern Israel for further examination. Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners as part of the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 19. Israel is expected to release 1,904 Palestinian prisoners during the first phase of the ceasefire. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent published a list of 67 Palestinian prisoners included among the 1,904 prisoners scheduled for release. Most of these prisoners were members of Palestinian militia groups, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Fatah, and participated in attacks that targeted Israeli civilians and soldiers.

The IDF withdrew from areas in the northern and southern Gaza Strip on January 19. The IDF 84th and 933rd Infantry Brigades (162nd Division) withdrew from Jabalia and Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip. Geolocated footage obtained on January 19 showed that the IDF withdrew from the northern Gaza Strip and deployed in the IDF-designated buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s northeastern boundary. Israeli forces simultaneously withdrew from some areas of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, according to footage posted by a Palestinian journalist. The IDF remains in other, designated areas of the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi corridor.

Gazans began to return to the northern Gaza Strip from IDF-designated humanitarian zones in the southern and central Gaza Strip amid IDF withdrawal from these areas on January 19. Part of the ceasefire agreement requires the IDF to facilitate the return of Palestinian civilians to their homes in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued instructions to Gazans that warned Gazan civilians not to approach Israeli forces near the Netzarim Corridor, the Philadelphi Corridor, and the Rafah border crossing. The IDF spokesperson added that movement around these areas remains “dangerous” due to “IDF activities” there. The IDF spokesperson also instructed Gazans to not approach the IDF-designated buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s northern and eastern boundaries.

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip Ceasefire: The IDF withdrew from areas in the northern and southern Gaza Strip on January 19.

Iraqi Intelligence Community: Iran and its partners in Iraq are continuing to try to gain control over the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS).

West Bank: The IDF Central Command said it will deploy new forces to the West Bank to dissuade and prevent Palestinian militia attacks. Israel will release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank as part of the ceasefire-hostage deal, which informed the IDF decision to deploy new forces.

Syrian Defense Ministry Negotiations: Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra rejected Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi’s proposal that the SDF join the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc.” The SDF is very unlikely to disarm itself while engaged in defensive operations against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attacks by groups that have repeatedly committed atrocities against Kurdish populations elsewhere in Syria.

Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA also appear to be deploying and reinforcing elements along SDF frontlines on the Euphrates River and near Ain Issa.

11. Colluding with the Communists: The Dixie Mission to Mao

I know it goes without saying but there is still so much we can learn from history.

This conclusion is why assessments are so critical. We must have a DEEP (I say again deep) understanding of the "human terrain" and all that encompasses from politics and economics to culture and history. Who is really focused on developing that deep understanding in conflict and contested areas (as well as friendly areas that are vulnerable to malign actors) around the world?

Conclusion.

The Dixie Mission reveals the unique relationship that the United States had with the Chinese Communist Party prior to the PRC and portrays the challenges that the US government continues to face in assessing and selecting potential partners to conduct guerrilla warfare. One diplomatic report on the situation in China shares an honest assessment of the complexity in identifying partners within a divided state: “although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group, but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct…. chaos in China will be inevitable, and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated.” The support of guerrilla warfare often happens at the tactical level, but always has operational to strategic consequences militarily and for the associated implications to the US government. Initial contact with resistance groups requires clear political goals, overarching military objectives, and support to ensure a successful transition to extend military reach through guerrilla warfare.

From my Eight Points of Irregular/Special Warfare:

https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html

4. Assessment - must conduct continuous assessment to gain understanding - tactical, operational, and strategic. Assessments are key to developing strategy and campaign plans and anticipating potential conflict. Assessments allow you to challenge assumptions and determine if a rebalance of ways and means with the acceptable, durable, political arrangement is required. Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it. Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.

5. Ensure US and indigenous interests are sufficiently aligned. If indigenous and US interests are not sufficiently aligned the mission will fail. If the US has stronger interest than the indigenous force we can create an “assistance paradox” - if indigenous forces believe the US mission is "no fail” and the US forces will not allow them to fail and therefore they do not need to try too hard. They may very well benefit from long term US aid and support which may be their objective for accepting support in the first place.

6. Employ the right forces for the right mission. US SOF, conventional, civilian agency, indigenous forces. Always based on assessment and thorough understanding of the problem and available resources and capabilities. Cannot over rely on one force to do everything.

If I were advising the special operations community I would recommend a standing UW (or IW) PIR for every SOF operators (SF, PSYOP, and CA) deployed anywhere (and everywhere) in the world:

UW Standing “PIR” For Resistance

Assessments – Special Forces Area Study/Area Assessment, PSYOP Target Audience Analysis, and Civil Affairs Civil Reconnaissance
Who is the resistance?
Leaders, groups, former military, in or out of government, etc.
Why is there a resistance or the potential for resistance?
What are the underlying causes/drivers?
What are the objectives of the resistance?
Do they align with the US and friends, partners, and allies? If not, who with?
What is the resistance narrative?
How is it shaping the information environment?
Where is it operating?
From where is it getting support?
When did it begin?
When will it/did it commence operations?
How will it turn out?
E.g., what is the assessment of success or failure of the resistance?
Most important - An expert recommendation: Should the US support or counter the resistance and if so how?

Colluding with the Communists: The Dixie Mission to Mao

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/20/colluding-with-the-communists-the-dixie-mission-to-mao/

by Cody Chick

01.20.2025 at 06:00am

As the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) President Xi Jinping has promised to “reunify” Taiwan and the PRC, the United States is attempting to rapidly modernize and shift resources in support of Taiwan to deter PRC aggression. Unbeknownst to many, before the United States held such a tenuous relationship with China, the US military closely worked with Mao Zedong and the founding Communist leaders during World War II, particularly through the shared approach of guerrilla warfare. During that period, the Chinese Communists implemented guerrilla warfare as their primary form of fighting, enabling the Communists to withstand superior weapons and military might by the Japanese and the Nationalist government since 1927. the Chinese Communists implemented guerrilla warfare since their first clash with the Nationalist government in 1927. During WWII, the United States recognized the apparent corruption and relative combat ineffectiveness of the Nationalist government against the Japanese, and various American leaders looked curiously at the Chinese Communists as a vastly untapped resource, a potential catalyst for a change in the war. In a memorandum to the Secretary of War in February 1944, acting Secretary of State Stettinius highlighted the estimated 500,000 Nationalist soldiers dedicated to containing the Communists instead of the Japanese, writing, “If harmony could be restored between these two factions in China, it might be expected that troops from both groups would be available for use against the enemy.” Sent as the United States Army Observer Group (colloquially referred to as the Dixie Mission for its purpose in “rebel territory”) with the mission to assess the feasibility of partnering with the Chinese Communists, the Dixie Mission was later deemed a diplomatic failure and has largely been lost in memory regarding US-Sino relations. Still, this remarkable point in history draws attention to the military relationship between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, and provides contemporary lessons on guerrilla warfare, particularly in the context of a future potential conflict involving Taiwan reunification.

The PRC’s Perspective on Unconventional Warfare

Before examining historical lessons on unconventional warfare through the Dixie Mission’s cooperation between the CCP and the United States, it is important to see the PRC’s perspective today. Examining the PRC’s history, in addition to examining their strategic documents, helps understand the PRC’s view on guerrilla warfare. In addition, this also helps make sense of the potential deployment of PRC forces and their counteractions in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait. For the PRC, guerilla warfare and the “Peoples’ Army” largely contributed to fighting Japan in World War II and driving the Nationalist Kuomintang out of mainland China. Until 1993, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) strategic guidelines focused on preparing for a large invasion first from the United States and then the Soviet Union. For both threats, the PLA planned an active defense to attrit the invader, with the 1964 and 1977 Military Strategic Guidelines specifically declaring guerrilla warfare as its primary form of operations.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the PLA’s strategic guidelines has been based on a peripheral war involving Taiwan, what most recently has been termed “winning informationized local wars.” The PLA’s modernization under Xi Jinping has published little in the use of guerrilla warfare but has made great strides advancing military capabilities within the Army, Air Force, Navy, Rocket Force, and now the Information Force. Because of an improving economy through the past few decades, the PLA no longer needs to use guerrilla power. Nonetheless, the use of irregular warfare is still deeply embedded in the PLA’s strategy.

While guerrilla warfare is no longer predominately used by the PLA, it plays an instrumental role for both the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The Maritime Militia for example, has been the lead element for protecting territorial interests in the South China Sea. This allows the PRC to operate in the gray zone with coercion, limited conflict, and defensive layers to escalate force to the Coast Guard and then the Navy, with the additional benefit of expanding their intelligence network to thousands of fishing vessels. The PAP’s 660,000 personnel are charged with the missions of internal security and augmentation to the PLA. The PAP’s role is commonly seen as fighting the “three evil forces” at home and abroad: terrorism, separatism (claimed in Taiwan and Tibet), and extremism (claimed in Xinjiang Province). The PAP has had extensive experience in Xinjiang Province to suppress social unrest. In a conflict with the ROC, the PAP could likely be used in urban centers to conduct stability operations and counterinsurgency with their experience in population control.

Prior to the PLA’s massive military modernization, the US Observer Group watched Mao firsthand shape the CCP’s military strategy. The Dixie Mission remains one of the first efforts of military cooperation between the United States and the PRC, providing valuable insight into the Communist leaders and their perceptions of guerrilla warfare. The US Army Observer Group reveals the work of military and political officials’ role in initial contact with a guerrilla force, highlighting the complex dynamics that can inform preliminary coordination with surrogate forces or guerrillas today. The Dixie Mission’s tasks, organization, challenges, and results each shed light on US-Sino relations today and informs the use of guerrilla warfare within the greater context of large-scale combat operations.

Searching for Untapped Resources: The Mission to Reach the Communists

Foreign Service Officer John Davies initially recommended an observation group to the Chinese Communists in a memo to General Stillwell. Davies argued a strong case in favor of observing the Communists, as the last time the US interacted with them was six years prior in 1938. In that year, Marine officer Captain Evan Carlson was the first official US observer, and reporter Edgar Allen Snow embedded with the Communists, writing Red Star over China, which described his observations and interviews of Mao and the Communist Guerrillas. Within the memo that would eventually reach President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Davies claimed that in Communist China there is: (1) a base of military operations in and near Japan’s largest military concentration and second largest industrial base, (2) perhaps the most abundant supply of intelligence on the Japanese enemy available to us anywhere, (3) the most cohesive, disciplined and aggressively anti-Japanese regime in China, (4) the greatest single challenge in China to the Chiang Kai-shek government, (5) the area which Russia will enter if it attacks Japan, and (6) the foundation for a rapprochement between a new China and the Soviet Union.

With the only intelligence on the Chinese Communists coming from Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government, General Stilwell was interested in getting his own view and assessing the potential to partner against Japanese forces. Even with Stilwell’s input, Chiang Kai-Shek refused to approve of the US Observation Group. Indeed, Chiang Kai-Shek had a difficult history with the Chinese Communists that cemented his position against them, even being forced by his own generals to cooperate with the Communists against the Japanese in the Xian Incident. The Dixie Mission was accepted after FDR pressured Chiang Kai-Shek, using his considerable leverage with the Lend-Lease program followed by a visit from Vice President Henry Wallace.

Today’s proponents of guerrilla warfare have common cause with the Dixie Mission; that is, guerrilla warfare is often selected in a weakened state containing multiple actors competing for power. This dilemma raises policy questions on the feasibility of cooperating with units that are antagonistic to each other, or even in direct conflict with each other despite the presence of an external enemy. The strength of the guerrilla units is often demonstrated in their relationship with the local communities, which extends the guerrillas’ resiliency through intelligence and sustainment networks. The political undertones of partnership with indigenous forces must be balanced with the actual ability to disrupt the occupying force, and the end states that are desired from each party.

After months of pushback by Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States Army Observer Group to the Chinese Communist set off on July 22, 1944. Colonel David Barrett, a day before departing Chungking for the Communists’ headquarters in Yenan, realized the group had no official mission to execute besides the general concept of observing. In response, Intelligence Officer for the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, Colonel Dickey, hastily wrote a memorandum requesting the collection of any information related to Communist forces, Japanese forces, weather, economic and naval intelligence. The exceedingly broad directive suggested the rushed manner that CBI headquarters initiated the Dixie Mission, a potentially strategic objective.

Only months after the Dixie Mission started, Special Emissary for the President of the United States, Major General Patrick Hurley, arrived in Yenan with the purpose of bridging the diplomatic divide between the Communists and Nationalists. On September 7, 1944, without any forewarning to the Observer Group, Hurley landed in Yenan to meet the key Communist leaders. While Hurley had little experience or background in Chinese affairs, he had been selected by the President for his political acumen and particular skill in negotiations. As he was oft to remind those around him of the strong deal he made once between the state of Mexico and the Sinclair Oil Company. Over the course of the next year, Hurley mediated between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in an effort to officially unite forces against Japan.

Unbeknownst to the special emissary of the Dixie Mission, the OSS was working with John Davies to collaborate with the Chinese Communists against the Japanese. In the winter of 1944, three days of meetings – led by OSS representative Lieutenant Colonel Wilis Bird – were held with Zhou Enlai and the Chief of Staff for the Communist Army, Ye Jianying. During the talks, they discussed the use of an American Airborne Division to work with Communist Forces. Additionally, plans were conceived for the OSS to advise and assist Communist forces in guerrilla warfare, intelligence and sabotage, including the 650,000 in the Communist army and 2.5 million from the People’s Militia. While the Observer Group had been sent to conduct an initial assessment, there were representatives within the Dixie Mission that were disjointedly at different levels in terms of their willingness to cooperate with the Chinese Communists.

The Dixie Mission’s beginnings serve as a warning to future observation groups – understand the political ramifications and clearly define the purpose for the mission. While the US maintains “strategic ambiguity” in its relationship with Taiwan, leaders at the highest levels need to know their limitations, purpose, and their red lines. The US’s position is highly volatile due to the political nature between the PRC and the ROC, and the military needs to ensure it clearly knows its mission and boundaries in security cooperation to reduce risk of strategic miscalculation.

Organization of the Observer Group

The Dixie Mission lasted from 1944–1947, consisting of two contingents, with the first being a group of nine personnel commanded by Colonel David Barrett, and the second arriving shortly after on August 7, 1944. The contingent included personnel from the State Department, CBI G2, OSS, Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff, (an OSS and Army Air Force initiative), Air Ground Aid Service, Navy and assorted Army representatives (refer to figure two). While Barrett headed the observation group, each sub-group had their own stakeholders for reporting and interests, with an overly broad mission that loosely unified the group. Partitions within the Dixie Mission could be seen as political and military, covering intelligence, operations and recovery.

John Service and Raymond Ludden represented the State Department with occasional visits by John Davies, to assess whether there was a potential to unify the government between Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao’s Communists. Major General Hurley would also make it his mission to create a treaty amenable to both parties to concentrate them against the Japanese occupation. In a large shift that would affect the Dixie Mission, General Stilwell was removed from command in October 1944, and Ambassador to China, Clarence Gauss, resigned and was immediately replaced by Hurley.

Militarily, Colonel Barrett sought to assess the effectiveness of the Communist forces, personally traveling to observe the Japanese Resistance Political Military University, while others like Colonel Peterkin (OSS), Captain Colling, Ray Ludden, and Major Casberg were sent on surveys across Northern China to assess guerrilla operations, civilian support, and assist in down pilot recovery missions. Within these, the OSS increasingly saw the opportunity to work with Mao’s extensive intelligence network.

Several of the Dixie members taught classes to the Communist forces. In his memoir, Spirit of Yenan, John Colling reflects on teaching demolition and sabotage techniques in Yenan: “I was sent to Yenan in part because of my expertise in demolition and guerilla warfare. There were four demonstrations in total and attendance at each averaged about 1,000.” Likewise, OSS members looked for ways to coordinate intelligence, establishing a microfilm lab and teaching the Chinese Communists to use it.

The Dixie Mission served as a partner feasibility assessment that would have international implications for years to come. It represents a unique moment in time before Mao’s rise to power when the United States may have been able to shape a shared partnership with the Chinese Communist Party. Strategically, partnership with the Chinese Communists would have partially isolated Russia from neighboring allies post-WWII and set a different trajectory in Sino-US relations. While it was unknown how beneficial the Communists would be to the war effort, the relative shortcomings of the Nationalists’ government compelled many in the China Theater to look for alternative ways to get additional support. The selection of indigenous partners to support US objectives can have strategic consequences in the near and long-term. The dynamics between the United State military and groups it chooses to partner with has had far-reaching strategic implications for decades. During the Cold War, the United States was more willing to support certain groups or leaders who would oppose the Soviet Union, despite their own crimes against humanity. Training the Contras in Nicaragua and providing assistance to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War both became points of contention that have been domestically condemned, and have raised suspicion on the intentions of US military assistance internationally. In today’s information age, it is more important than ever for the United States to select partners that embody the same values and share the same objectives.

Organizational and Mission Challenges

The first obstacle for the Dixie Mission was sanctioning a mission through the Nationalists government to cooperate with the Nationalists’ domestic enemies for the past decade – the Communists. Since the Chinese revolution – which overthrew the imperial government – China was shaped by feuding warlords, and then extensively by the political aims of unification by both the Nationalists and Communists. Following the Japanese invasion in 1937, both Chinese groups attempted to temporarily reconcile differences to fight a shared enemy, but their political convictions and Chiang Kai-Shek’s resolve (and possible attempt to hold his power) proved the efforts futile. The United States ultimately had the leverage to push the Observer Group forward, but it arguably meant a significant loss of face for Chiang Kai-Shek as his leadership and military prowess were inherently questioned.

The second issue faced by the Dixie Mission was a disjointed effort between the political and military portions of the Observer Group. Politically, Major General Hurley was completely invested in brokering a negotiation (see figure three) between Communists and Nationalists to unify a combined front, which had been attempted and failed twice previously. Militarily, the OSS, with no communication to Hurley, already began discussing the potential of guerrilla warfare with the Communists and to prepare for large-scale combat operations after the European Theater closed.

Additionally, during the time of negotiations, Mao discreetly asked the naval representative of the Dixie Mission, Lieutenant Herbert Hitch, to send a letter directly to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King. The letter entailed a request for military support, stating that the Communists, upon US request, would secure a 25-mile perimeter on the Shandong Peninsula with over 250,000 soldiers. Unfortunately, once Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist government heard the observer group moving forward with military plans without an explicit deal, negotiations crumbled. Writing to Hurley, Stilwell said, “The 18th Group Army (Reds) will be used. There must be no understanding on this point. They can be brought to bear where there will be no conflict with Central Government troops, but they must be accepted as part of the team during the crisis.” In Stilwell’s perspective, the Communists were valuable enough with or without the Nationalists’ approval.

The Effects from the Dixie Mission

The United States Observer Group to Yenan served as a means to explore if the Chinese Communists would work in cooperation with the Nationalists and the US to dispel the Japanese forces. The group was recalled on August 16 1945, and many members of the group would later be labeled as pro-communist based on their reports, and their careers sequentially shelved. But the Dixie Mission, as the only official medium between the United States and the Chinese Communists at the time, did provide valuable insight into the methods used by the Communists, and contributed in several ways to the war effort by training, sabotage, and rescues.

The Observer Group managed to take battlefield tours, visiting guerrilla bases near enemy lines, weapons factories, and observing their interactions with the local populace and the Japanese. In his book, Yenan!: Colonel Wilbur Peterkin and the American military mission to the Chinese Communists, 1944–1945, US Air Force Historian William Head chronicles Peterkin’s experiences with the Dixie Mission, particularly during his visits to other Communist areas outside of Yenan. During one expedition, Peterkin witnessed how guerrilla fighters had created underground passages below a village: “During the days following, Peterkin inspected secret tunnels used by the Communist guerrillas and peasants…The guerrillas and peasants scattered the soil over nearby fields so as to cloak their tunnel digging efforts. Some tunnels led to secret rooms built under peasant houses…The tunnels frequently provided the main secret route of guerrilla passage from one village to another.” In another visit, Peterkin toured a weapons factory, “within twenty-five miles of the Japanese lines, a munitions plant that turned out rifles and pistols made from railroad steel using hand-powered lathes.” The Dixie Mission provided rare first-hand experience to examine the Communists’ support and sustainment for guerrilla warfare.

Likewise, the Dixie Mission gave the US observers an overview of their intelligence network. At Yenan, observers interacted with Japanese Communist Okano Susumu, who oversaw the Japanese war prisoners, defectors, and their interrogations. The Communists refined interrogation techniques and were very successful in causing Japanese soldiers to defect and share intelligence. From defectors, they created psychological warfare groups designed to encourage Japanese to surrender. Colonel Barret noted about 150 Japanese prisoners in Yenan, who would be interviewed by the Dixie Mission. Barret and John Colling, serving in the Dixie Mission for the OSS, both noted the depth and scope of intelligence that the Communists utilized with informants and clear communication in Tokyo. Barret noted how the Communists received Tokyo newspaper Asahi 10 days after publishing, and Colling noted, “the League also operated an intelligence network that ran from behind Japanese lines in China to Tokyo, which assisted my top secret ‘Apple Project’ in finding out the actual results of the B-29 bomber raids on Japanese cities.” The OSS and Air Ground Aid Group worked extensively to tap into the Communists’ intelligence network and were at least successful in utilizing it for recovery operations saving approximately 300 Americans airmen from crashed landings.

The Dixie Mission not only conducted assessments of the Communist guerrillas, but utilized the expertise from several of its members to train and share US tactics, techniques, and procedures in terms of weapons, training, and planning. Colonel Barrett had directed the Observer Group’s expert in demolitions, John Colling, to give a demonstration and instruct the Communist soldiers in the use of explosives. Colling recalled teaching methods for disrupting railways, “I was sent to Yenan in part because of my expertise in demolition and guerilla warfare… My repertoire was quite diverse; I destroyed wide gauge railroad tracks by using a new explosive called Composition C.” Likewise, he witnessed how the Communists would make mines out of rock that Japanese metal detectors could not read, using command wire to detonate under a mule cart track all with minimal resources in the local economy. This subject matter exchange was one example that revealed techniques and capabilities to both units and fostered a shared determination against the Japanese forces in China.

Less known about the Dixie Mission is some of the observers’ participation in kinetic operations while with Communist guerrillas. As Colonel Peterkin moved to a “Japanese Resistance Base” near enemy lines, he targeted and called for fire on Japanese supply lines. As historian Head writes, “Peterkin was pleased to hear that his earlier request to the 14th Air Force to bomb Anyang had been fulfilled. A Japanese armored train had been destroyed.” Similarly, as John Colling visited forward bases near Japanese borders, he recorded and participated in a raid against a blockhouse, a Japanese fortified defensive position. After several days of calling for the blockhouse’s surrender by defected soldiers who joined the Japanese Emancipation League (JEL), Colling and the guerrilla unit of 40 soldiers built tunnels, emplaced explosives, and destroyed the blockhouse. While kinetic operations were infrequent for observers, they did join at times and assist.

Over the course of two years, the United States Army Observer Group managed to assess a wide survey of capabilities from the Chinese Communists and their guerrilla forces. From kinetic operations, search and rescues, expanded intelligence, training techniques, or additional weather stations, the Dixie Mission provided a new source of information on the growing Communist power in China. While Major General Hurley and the mission never successfully negotiated a cooperative partnership between Nationalists and the Communists against Japan, the mission maintained a continual touchpoint with Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and the rising leaders of the Communist government following the war. For guerrilla warfare, the Observer Group revealed tactics and techniques unique to the Communists and learned firsthand from their expert on the matter, Mao Zedong.

Contemporary Applications

The Dixie Mission not only represents a unique point in time where the United States built diplomatic relations with Mao Zedong prior to the founding of the PRC, but also sheds light on the differing aspects of choosing partners and their leadership for strategic purposes. Throughout the 20th century, the United States has sided with certain factions or leaders and faced the consequences of both good and bad assessments. The Dixie Mission reflects the importance of partner assessments, political rivalry, population support, and the use of intelligence.

Partner Assessments

Operationally, the Dixie Mission represents a common dilemma for partner assessments today and in the future. As an external actor, it is difficult to support resistance or military groups in one country when they have opposing viewpoints or end states. Major General Hurley worked tirelessly to negotiate an agreement between the Communists and Nationalists, but ultimately the years of bloodshed between both groups and an unwillingness to compromise prevented a unified effort against the Japanese. Also, it reveals the truth that US involvement with a resistance force provides that force with increased legitimacy as a military and political actor to the international community. While there were many positives that came from the Dixie Mission, it lacked a unified mission and message which ultimately caused US relations to both the Nationalists and Communists to suffer. Partner feasibility assessments need to examine cultural group dynamics, desired goals, and a potential partner’s ability to cooperate with other indigenous forces. Partner selection today is too important to leave for last-minute groups of opportunity but deserves a deeper assessment over time of goals and objectives, with a clear end state.

Political Interests and Inter-service Competition

Guerrilla warfare will succeed or be heavily impeded based on political backing or division. Like in special operations, a principle of guerrilla warfare is working in politically-sensitive environments that can have operational to strategic ramifications. As such, the political cost of guerrilla warfare and the potential consequences are often too high to support. For the US Army Observer Group, McCarthyism and the hunt against anyone who appeared to support communism had a detrimental effect on the mission. In his preface, John Colling noted, “[W]e returned with complimentary reports, which were subsequently silenced by the politics of McCarthyism, and rendered unnecessary by the dropping of the atomic bomb. Most Dixie Mission members were dismissed from further meaningful government duty.” The Observer Group primarily served to assess if military cooperation was possible, but political negotiations and interest were inherently ingrained as the Chinese Communists remained a potential alternative with ideological differences to Chiang Kai-Shek’s government.

Units or agencies that conduct initial contact and partner feasibility assessments today need a clear mission, operational authorities, and political support to develop a comprehensive assessment. Colonel Barrett, the commander of the group, received an overly broad mission the day before he left for Yenan. Once with the Communists, many members of the mission came from different services with different agendas, which at times conflicted and hurt their collective mission. Without a clear mission from military and political leaders, the Dixie Mission eventually damaged its negotiations with the Communists because of differing agendas.

Operational authorities are also essential – currently statutory code 127d and 127e enable irregular warfare in combatting terrorism and special operations in conditions short of traditional armed conflict. Establishing authorities to conduct irregular warfare during traditional armed conflict needs to occur prior to a crisis or conflict to ensure special operations forces (SOF) can respond rapidly. Using intelligence to identify potential resistance groups prior to conflict also allows for a faster response and can expedite political decision-making when necessary.

Population Support

The US assessment of the communist guerrillas highlighted a fundamental quality for successful guerrilla warfare – public support. One Chinese historian reflected on the Communists’ balance of fighting and garnering public support: “Guerrillas could not realistically engage large bodies of Japanese regular troops. The main achievement of the Communist armies in the war was to win the support of peasants and the respect of the Chinese people.” Others both experienced and read reports on the significant differences between how Nationalist and Communist soldiers treated the local people. The heavy repression from the Japanese forces enabled the Communist guerrillas to gain local support as they positively made efforts to help in small towns and villages, subsequently growing their intelligence net, resiliency and overall support. As Peterkin toured across Communist country, he also saw how villages would aid the guerrillas in concealment and caches, building a three-mile-long tunnel system in one area with multiple secret and booby-trapped entrances connecting different houses. In his book, On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao affirmed:

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained…. The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

The Chinese Communists treated public support as a fundamental quality required to survive and see eventual success against Japanese occupation. Because of public support, the Communists maintained certain advantages from guerrilla warfare, namely political support of the population and the ability to conceal or ambush from urban and rural areas because of local cooperation.

With over 20 years of experience in counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has clearly seen the critical relationship that exists between an insurgent or guerrilla force and the population. “Winning the hearts and minds” of the populace requires a level of competence and legitimacy and includes the ability to meet core grievances and the needs of the public. C.M. Woodhouse, a British Special Operations Executive agent who supported the Greek resistance during World War II wrote, “There has never been a successful guerrilla war conducted in an area where the populace is hostile to the guerrillas, and conversely it is virtually impossible to stamp out a guerrilla war in an area where the populace continues to support the guerrillas.” In order to gain public support, the public first needs sufficient will to resist occupying powers. Positing a conflict or occupation of Taiwan by the PRC, the ROC has invested extensively in civil-military integration and cooperation, enabling the public to understand the military’s role and overall political goals. Civil-military integration and the use of guerrilla warfare could be well set up as the ROC prepares for an asymmetric battle according to its National Defense Strategy. However, it is still to be determined if the populace of Taiwan has the desire and will to resist if necessary.

Human Intelligence

Lastly, the Communists’ methods of interrogations, detainment, and use of Japanese defectors along with psychological warfare should be further studied for modern relevance. Japanese soldiers during WWII were known for their radical adherence to duty and honor, by and large preferring suicide to surrender. For the purposes of intelligence, Japanese preference for death over capture significantly hindered collection from Japanese prisoners of war or defectors. Primary sources from the time noted a distinct difference between how Nationalists treated Japanese prisoners of war, versus the Communists’ care of prisoners. In Stilwell and the American Experience, Tuchman noted, “No one had ever seen the prisoners claimed by the Kuomintang except for a token group which was always the same, like the captured helmets.” In contrast, John Colling described how the Communists shifted from Chinese traditions of captive abuse to humane treatment.

In The Spirit of Yenan, John Colling recalls the process of receiving Japanese prisoners of war, and how the Communists used it to their advantage. For example, Japanese forces instated a regulation that any soldier who was absent for three days would be executed. The Communists in return, would treat the Japanese prisoners well, giving them clothes, food, cigarettes, and a “guest house” with a mix of re-education classes and a liberal amount of free time. After three days, prisoners were allowed to leave, but also knew they would go back to harsher conditions and perhaps be executed if they returned to their unit. This was all done through the Japanese Emancipation League (JEL), so prisoners were received and treated by former Japanese soldiers. The JEL heavily emphasized re-education, and reportedly found that the Communists were able to capture approximately 2500 Japanese soldiers, and about 300 joined the JEL in anti-war propaganda. While Japanese soldiers of the time were often ideologically driven to fight and serve their country, the Chinese Communists found effective ways to reduce unit cohesion and increase their own human intelligence. Treatment of detainees matters and can either help or hinder intelligence gathering activities. Additionally, this historical review of CCP treatment of prisoners reveals a deeper focus on psychological operations, which, combined with information operations, can be highly effective.

Conclusion

The Dixie Mission reveals the unique relationship that the United States had with the Chinese Communist Party prior to the PRC and portrays the challenges that the US government continues to face in assessing and selecting potential partners to conduct guerrilla warfare. One diplomatic report on the situation in China shares an honest assessment of the complexity in identifying partners within a divided state: “although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group, but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct…. chaos in China will be inevitable, and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated.” The support of guerrilla warfare often happens at the tactical level, but always has operational to strategic consequences militarily and for the associated implications to the US government. Initial contact with resistance groups requires clear political goals, overarching military objectives, and support to ensure a successful transition to extend military reach through guerrilla warfare.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense. 

Tags: China, Guerrilla Warfare, irregular warfare, Mao, Security Partners

About The Author

Cody Chick
Cody Chick is a graduate from The Citadel with a Bachelor of Arts in International Politics and Military Affairs and is a Major in the United States Army. He earned a minor in East Asian Affairs at The Citadel and studied abroad in the People’s Republic of China to study history, language and culture. He recently graduated with a MS degree in Defense Analysis with certificates in Strategic Leadership and also Regional Security Studies for East Asia and the Indo-Pacific at the Naval Postgraduate School.

12. TikTok, RedNote and the Crushed Promise of the Chinese Internet

TikTok, RedNote and the Crushed Promise of the Chinese Internet

China’s internet companies and their hard-working, resourceful professionals make world-class products, in spite of censorship and malign neglect by Beijing.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/20/business/tiktok-red-note-china-internet.html

Credit...Dongyan Xu

By Li Yuan

Jan. 20, 2025

Updated 2:09 a.m. ET

The Chinese social media app RedNote is full of cute, heartwarming moments after about 500,000 American users fled to it last week to protest the looming U.S. government ban on TikTok.

Calling themselves “TikTok refugees,” these users paid the “cat tax” to join RedNote by posting cat photos and videos. They answered so many questions from their new Chinese friends: Is it true that in rural America every family has a large farm, a huge house, at least three children and several big dogs? That Americans have to work two jobs to support themselves? That Americans are terrible at geography and many believe that Africa is a country? That most Americans have two days off every week?

Americans also posed questions to their new friends. “I heard that every Chinese has a giant panda,” an American RedNote user wrote. “Can you tell me how can I get it?” An answer came from someone in the eastern province of Jiangsu: “Believe me, it’s true,” the person deadpanned, posting a photo of a panda doing the laundry.

I spent hours scrolling those so-called cat tax photos and chuckled at the cute and earnest responses. This is what the internet is supposed to do: connect people. More important, RedNote demonstrated how competitive a random Chinese social media app can be from a purely product point of view.

With access to an online population of one billion and an army of hard-working, resourceful engineers, China’s internet platforms are world-class in their design, functionality and user experience — as is demonstrated by TikTok and now by RedNote, or Xiaohongshu in Chinese.

Image

The office of Xiaohongshu, or RedNote, in Shanghai.Credit...Alex Plavevski/EPA, via Shutterstock

But why aren’t more people outside China using Chinese apps?

For a while, the Chinese internet giants seemed to be poised to take over the world. Remember the excitement when Alibaba listed its initial public offering in New York in 2014, when Didi took over Uber in China in 2016, when Facebook was imitating WeChat, and when a partner from the Silicon Valley firm Andreessen Horowitz preached the power of WeChat? At one point, five of the world’s 10 largest internet companies measured by market capitalization were Chinese. Now Tencent, the WeChat creator and game company, is the only one left in those ranks.

The biggest Chinese internet companies still make products that can compete with any in the world. Their employees work harder than their Silicon Valley counterparts. (Many work a “996” schedule — 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week.) In the face of U.S. semiconductor bans, they have managed to make impressive developments in artificial intelligence. But the world seems to have forgotten China’s internet leaders, except for seeing them as part of a technological and geopolitical threat.

The industry didn’t live up to its promises. Why? What happened?

In 2017, I wrote a column at another publication with the headline, “Behind the Great Firewall, the Chinese internet is booming.” I told English-speaking readers to think beyond China’s urge to censor and copy Western businesses because China was being digitized on a scale and at a speed that was mind-boggling.

That year, Tencent’s revenue grew 56 percent, while revenue at Alibaba, the e-commerce giant, surged 60 percent. Didi raised nearly $10 billion in funding, mostly from international investors.

All of these feel like a lifetime ago. It’s a lot more difficult for Chinese internet companies to thrive now.

The country is mired in the worst economic downturn since the Mao era. Few people believe the 5 percent growth rate the government announced for 2024. Consumer confidence is low — both Uniqlo and Starbucks, two consumer brands that had thrived in China for years, are losing customers to cheaper brands.

When the country’s economy suffers, it’s hard for one of its pillar industries to do well. The tech companies’ earnings have reflected that.

Image

Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey, left, and Senator Edward Markey of Massachusetts at a news conference on TikTok on Thursday.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

As China’s population continues a steady decline — it fell a third consecutive year — the big tech platforms are running out of new users. WeChat has about 1.4 billion accounts, bigger than the Chinese population. Even a second-tier social media app like RedNote, which is popular among young, urban and affluent female users, amassed more than 300 million users. For such companies, international expansion is the natural next step.

ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, is the envy of the industry because of the success of its overseas businesses, which have been growing at a much faster rate than its domestic operations.

But the U.S. effort to ban TikTok highlights how hard it is for Chinese internet companies to expand overseas. As the Chinese Communist Party tightens its grip on the country’s private sector, it’s increasingly difficult for the world to entrust their citizens’ personal data to Chinese companies, which ultimately answer to Beijing.

There are good reasons that the outside world, including the U.S. government, doesn’t trust these companies. In a country where the government owns much of everything and wields power randomly and often ruthlessly, the private sector has been on its toes. The internet companies are heavily censored and must self censor to survive. All the big ones, with no exception, have had their apps removed from app stores or been fined or disciplined by regulators in recent years.

It’s well known that China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is no fan of the digital sector, unless it is being used to advance his agenda of national rejuvenation.

“The real economy is the foundation of a nation’s economy and the source of its wealth,” he said in 2018. “Economic development must never deviate from the real economy toward excessive reliance on the virtual economy.”

In that speech and on other occasions, Mr. Xi made it clear that he put a higher priority on advanced manufacturing than on the internet and liked the state-owned enterprises more than the private sector.

Image

The San Jose, Calif., office of ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok.Credit...John G Mabanglo/EPA, via Shutterstock

That set the tone for the crackdown on Alibaba, Ant Group, Didi and Tencent’s video game business in 2020 and 2021. The harsh “zero Covid” restrictions in 2022 that crippled the country’s economy plunged some of the biggest internet companies into financial losses for the first time in years.

Also around this time, the Chinese government’s wolf warrior diplomacy and its alliance with Russia forced many countries to rethink their views of China as an important part of the global economy. Some now see it as a threat to democratic systems and world peace. Perceptions of China deteriorated in many Western countries, and fewer people are interested in visiting China compared with a decade ago.

Chinese internet companies and investors are increasingly caught between their authoritarian government at home and suspicion, even hostility, abroad.

Most Western investors now deem China’s tech industry not worth investing in because of the geopolitical tension and the country’s unpredictable policies.

U.S. university endowments and pension funds stopped giving venture capital firms money to invest in Chinese start-ups. A generation of Chinese investors who helped create some of the most successful tech companies have taken up golfing, marathoning and hiking.

Investors in global stock markets are equally uninterested in Chinese internet firms.

An investor who was not authorized to speak publicly told me recently that in 2017, when she joined a hedge fund that managed more than $100 billion, about 40 percent of the fund’s emerging market holdings were Chinese tech stocks. Now they are less than 3 percent.

The ecosystem that cultivated a vibrant tech sector is broken. Fewer investments mean fewer start-ups, far fewer overseas initial public offerings and much lower stock valuations than their American counterparts. RedNote, the social media app that American TikTok users have taken up, was founded in 2013 and has yet to go public.

These companies remain competitive, the investor said. But in the eyes of the world, she added, they’re no longer relevant.

Li Yuan writes The New New World column, which focuses on China’s growing influence on the world by examining its businesses, politics and society. More about Li Yuan

A version of this article appears in print on Jan. 20, 2025, Section B, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Chinese Tech Had Promise And Esteem. Now What?. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

13. TikTok Butters Up Trump, Again and Again

Is the US political and legal system being upended by TikTok and Chinese political warfare (unrestricted warfare and three warfares: psychological warfare, legal warfare and public opinoine or media warfare)?

TikTok: the ultimate political warfare tool on various levels.

TikTok Butters Up Trump, Again and Again

The app has repeatedly name checked the president-elect in pop-up messages and statements, as it navigates a ban in the United States unless it is sold to a non-Chinese owner.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/19/technology/tiktok-trump-messages-ban.html

TikTok’s repeated mentions of President-elect Donald J. Trump are a stark example of how badly TikTok and its Chinese owner, ByteDance, need his support.Credit...Shannon Stapleton/Reuters

By Sapna Maheshwari

Published Jan. 19, 2025

Updated Jan. 20, 2025, 8:29 a.m. ET

Many tech leaders and companies have courted President-elect Donald J. Trump in recent weeks. From Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg to Amazon’s founder Jeff Bezos, they have visited Mr. Trump at Mar-a-Lago, flattered him on X and donated to his inaugural fund.

But TikTok has taken those methods to the next level.

As the Chinese-owned social app fights a federal law that bans it in the United States unless it is sold, it publicly referenced and then thanked Mr. Trump for his support in statements and in videos since Friday. It even built its flattery right into the app so its 170 million American users could see it:

“As a result of President Trump’s efforts, TikTok is back in the U.S.!,” a pop-up message on Sunday read.

TikTok’s chief executive, Shou Chew, filmed his own thank-you video to Mr. Trump last week, even referring to the president’s personal TikTok account. Mr. Chew has also visited Mr. Trump at Mar-a-Lago, and has been invited to sit in a position of honor on the dais at Mr. Trump’s inauguration on Monday.

TikTok “will go to any lengths to please the authorities” while facing this ban, said Anupam Chander, a professor of law and technology at Georgetown University and an expert on the global regulation of new technologies.

“TikTok is seeking the president’s favor in these ways because their very existence in this country depends on him,” Mr. Chander said in an interview on Sunday. “He’s their lifeline and so they are making sure that they stay on his good side.”

TikTok did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Mr. Trump may not be able to save the app in the long-term as he has declared. He vowed early Sunday to issue an executive order to give ByteDance, TikTok’s Chinese owner, more time to make a sale that would satisfy the law, but it’s not clear if he can extend the timeline now that the law has taken effect — or if he has a sale in mind that would meet the terms of the law. Mr. Trump appears to be committed. Even before his post promising an executive order, he posted to the social media platform Truth Social in all-caps: “SAVE TIKTOK!”

Trump Inauguration: Live Updates

Updated Jan. 20, 2025, 8:08 a.m. ET25 minutes ago

The Biden administration also sought to make it clear this weekend that TikTok did not need to shut down on Sunday to satisfy the law, calling the decision to go dark “a stunt.”

“We have laid out our position clearly and straightforwardly: actions to implement this law will fall to the next administration,” Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House press secretary, said in a statement.

Mr. Trump’s support for TikTok is relatively new. During his first term, he tried to ban the app in the country unless ByteDance sold it to an American company.

But in March 2024, he flipped his stance, around the time of a meeting with Jeff Yass, a billionaire investor and Republican megadonor who owns a significant share of ByteDance. Mr. Trump has said they did not discuss the company. Mr. Yass helped found the trading firm Susquehanna International Group.

TikTok has also sought a line into Republicans and the Trump campaign through Tony Sayegh, a former Treasury official in Mr. Trump’s administration. Mr. Sayegh, who leads public affairs for Susquehanna, was a core part of the Trump campaign’s decision to join TikTok this summer.

Mr. Trump was an instant hit on TikTok, where he now has over 14 million followers. Several members of his family, including Donald Trump Jr. and his granddaughter Kai Trump, have also joined the app.

TikTok in limbo

TikTok Evaded a Ban Again and Again, Until Now

Jan. 17, 2025

What We Know About the TikTok Ban

Sapna Maheshwari reports on TikTok, technology and emerging media companies. She has been a business reporter for more than a decade. Contact her at sapna@nytimes.com. More about Sapna Maheshwari

14. Welcome to Weimar 2.0 by Robert D. Kaplan

Wow.

Conclusion:

Weimar is now a permanent condition for us, as we are connected enough by globalization and technology to affect each other intimately without having the possibility of true global governance. And that is not the worst outcome—since, had Hitler not arrived, Weimar might ultimately have righted itself. There are quite a few Weimar democracies in the developing world—such as Lebanon, Nigeria, and Bangladesh—and quite a few of them may yet succeed. The key is to make constructive use of our fears about Weimar, so as to be wary about the future without giving in to fate.

Welcome to Weimar 2.0

Today’s global powers are running a strange simulation of the weak and wobbly republic that governed Germany before World War II.

January 17, 2025, 3:00 PM

By Robert D. Kaplan, the Robert Strausz-Hupé chair in geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Robert D. Kaplan

Geopolitics
Science and Technology
Europe

Today, China, Russia, and the United States, to say nothing of the mid-level and smaller powers, are all running a strange simulation of the Weimar Republic: that weak and wobbly political organism that governed Germany for 15 years from the ashes of World War I to the ascension of Adolf Hitler.

the book cover for Waste Land by Robert D. Kaplan

This article is adapted from Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis by Robert D. Kaplan (Random House, 224 pp., $31, January 2025).

America’s Weimar syndrome may be obvious with the reelection of the institution-destroyer Donald Trump as president. But the entire world is one big Weimar now, connected enough for one part to mortally influence the other parts, yet not connected enough to be politically coherent. Like the various parts of the Weimar Republic, we find ourselves globally in an exceedingly fragile phase of technological and political transition.

I see no Hitler in our midst, or even a totalitarian world state. But don’t assume that the next phase of history will provide any relief to the present one. It is in the spirit of caution that I raise the subject of Weimar.

Analogies can be futile, I know, since no thing is exactly like another. Yet they are often the only way to communicate and explain. While on the one hand an analogy is an imperfect distortion, on the other hand it can create a new awareness, another way to see the world. It is only through an analogy that I can begin to describe the depth of our global crisis. We have to be able to consider that literally anything can happen to us. This is the usefulness of Weimar.

A crowd of soldiers fills the scene with the columned edifice of the Brandenburg Gate ahead of them.

Front-line troops return from the World War I through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on Nov. 12, 1918.Walter Gircke/ullstein bild via Getty Images

What, exactly, was Weimar? The great German historian Golo Mann called Weimar a sprawling and unwieldy “empire without an emperor.” World War I—which lasted four long years, and which ordinary Germans thought originally would be a triumph—ended in defeat, 1.75 million German military deaths, and almost a half-million German civilian deaths. The country was shattered, the royal imperial governing structure had collapsed, and Germany was on the verge of social chaos. It was in that context that leading German politicians and lawyers, meeting in the Thuringian town of Weimar, devised a new constitutional arrangement that sought to avoid the autocratic tendencies of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Otto von Bismarck before him.

But the new arrangement was just too weak to withstand the pressures of what was to come. There was no night watchman to keep the peace between its constituent parts. The federal states (Länder) legislated through the Reichsrat (upper house of parliament), retaining all rights not explicitly transferred to the central government. The nation as a whole elected the head of state, or Reich president. The president then appointed the chancellor, who with his cabinet ran the government at the behest of the Reichstag, the lower house, which was elected by the people. Two-thirds of Germany was still called Prussia, and was governed under different rules than the Länder. As for Bavaria—which, like Prussia, was a state within a state—there was constant talk of separation from the Reich.

If all this seems like a far more complicated version of the U.S. Constitution with its separation of powers and 50 states, it was—and it was made more unwieldy by economic and social anarchy. There was catastrophic inflation during the early Weimar years and catastrophic depression toward the end: a result of a very difficult postwar economy, made worse by reparations demanded by the Treaty of Versailles and by world economic dislocations.

Germany during the Weimar period from 1918 to 1933 was a vast and barely united world unto itself, where the rules of order scarcely applied. It was less a government than a system of belligerent and far-flung competing parts, given the regional differences of a sprawling and, in historical terms, recently united Germany. Weimar’s “normal state was crisis,” writes the late historian Gordon A. Craig.

Soldiers wearing helmets and long dark coats stand next to an armored vehicle with a skull and crossbones on it.

Government troops armed with a flamethrower and a tank march through Berlin in 1920. Hulton Archive/Getty Images

Soldiers stand in rows with their fists raised in salute.

Members of the Reichsbanner, set up to oppose extremists on Germany’s left and right, muster at Magdeburg, Germany, in 1932. Archiv Gerstenberg/ullstein bild via Getty Images

In that sense, Weimar was like our planet today: intimately connected, so as to have crises that cut across oceans, whether it be COVID-19, a global recession, great-power conflicts, Middle East wars, or unprecedented climate change. To recall Weimar is to emphasize and admit the growing interdependencies of our own world, and to accept moral responsibility for it. Like Weimar’s interrelated German states, all countries are now connected in ways in which a crisis for one can be a crisis for all. The Weimar phenomenon, therefore, becomes one of scale.

Weimar was one long cabinet crisis where everything always seemed to be at stake. Central authority exhausted itself just trying to preserve order, and in the final Weimar years, all anyone could talk about in Germany was daily politics. It was truly a permanent crisis, with one breathless series of headlines following another. The public and politicians both were caught up in the moment, in all of its intensity, unable to concentrate on what might come next because the present was so overwhelming.

Mann writes: “Divided and alienated from itself, led by weak or reluctant politicians, the nation was confronted by problems the hopeless confusion of which would have daunted a Bismarck.”

A man leans over a table in an ornate room with other men sitting at tables around him observing the treaty signing.

German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann signs the Locarno pact between Germany, France, Britain, Belgium, and Italy in 1925. Imagno/Getty Images

It wasn’t all doom and gloom. The years of the mid- and late 1920s that were associated with Gustav Stresemann—a liberal realist politician, by all accounts brilliant, who served as both a chancellor and foreign minister—constituted a time of economic growth, cultural blossoming, and political compromises and reconciliations. There was a distinct sense for a while that things were getting better and that Germany was finally emerging out of postwar chaos. Stresemann’s diplomacy virtually removed the restrictions placed upon German sovereignty by the Versailles peace treaty after Germany’s defeat in World War I, except for the question of armaments. There was another bout of optimism, at least momentarily, when the fiscal conservative Heinrich Brüning emerged in early 1930 to lead a fairly nonpartisan cabinet of national emergency.

However, Brüning’s gifts as a technocrat were not matched by his political instincts: He lacked the ability to compromise and maneuver at a time when he was trying to force tough economic choices and hardships, including wage cuts and a tightening of credit, upon the population and the political parties. “Had Brüning been a Bismarck, he might, despite the daunting … circumstances, have been able to pull this off,” Craig writes. But Brüning’s government struggled on until it collapsed in 1932.

Audio adapted with permission of Random House Audio from Waste Land by Robert D. Kaplan, read by Robert Petkoff.

Brüning’s cabinet of technocrats had been eaten away by extremist forces in the streets, both Nazis and communists. It may have been the last real chance the Weimar Republic had to right itself. History is Shakespearean as well as geopolitical, a matter of contingencies, and if Brüning had not had the personal limitations that he did, the history of the 20th century might have been vastly different.

The more abject the disorder, often the more extreme the tyranny to follow, and that brings us to Weimar’s last chapter.

Weimar’s house of cards culminated in 1932 with its next-to-last chancellor, Franz von Papen, a rightist authoritarian and amateur horseman without a political base, a man whom Mann describes as “vain,” “irresponsible,” and “pitifully superficial.” Von Papen’s government just couldn’t get anything done and didn’t last the year. Indeed, at this point there was endless cabinet jockeying but no real governance. Yet even after von Papen left office, he remained a close advisor to President Paul von Hindenburg.

When asked why Hindenburg, bowing to the advice of von Papen and a few others, had named Hitler as chancellor on Jan. 30, 1933, von Papen replied, “We have [only] hired him.” “We have framed him in,” added one of von Papen’s friends, believing that Hitler could easily be controlled in that role. Mann asks what the meaning of human existence is when “such a lightweight” as von Papen could “determine the course of world history.” Again, there are large, overwhelming forces of geography, culture, and economics, and there are also contingencies based on pivotal personalities. History blends the two.

Adolf Hitler in uniform with his face stern marches forward with other men in similar garb behind him. A bench and building are seen at left with trees in the background.

Adolf Hitler marches to the Reichstag in Berlin on Jan. 30, 1933, the day he took his seat as chancellor of the Reich.General Photographic Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

Weimar constituted a vacuum eventually filled by Nazi totalitarianism. But our world today must have a different destiny. Like Weimar, it is an interconnected system of states in which no one really rules. But world geography is still a factor. The Earth is vast enough that no individual political force can really replicate what happened to Germany at the end of Weimar, a loose-limbed republic that covered only the geographical center of Europe. So rather than risk the rise of another Hitler, we are forced to wallow in one emergency or another without pause, as crises seep and ricochet across the globe.

Weimar is now a permanent condition for us, as we are connected enough by globalization and technology to affect each other intimately without having the possibility of true global governance. And that is not the worst outcome—since, had Hitler not arrived, Weimar might ultimately have righted itself. There are quite a few Weimar democracies in the developing world—such as Lebanon, Nigeria, and Bangladesh—and quite a few of them may yet succeed. The key is to make constructive use of our fears about Weimar, so as to be wary about the future without giving in to fate.

gandhi-salt-march-senor-salme-illustration-sitegandhi-salt-march-senor-salme-illustration-site

The Indian Anti-Colonial Movement Never Ended

It’s where we actually are in history.

A photo illustration of a roll of money on a globe stand to illustrate the era of plenty.A photo illustration of a roll of money on a globe stand to illustrate the era of plenty.

The World’s Biggest Crisis Is the End of Scarcity

How our era of plenty has created the global problems that plague us today.

Geography is not disappearing. But it is shrinking. Because of digital communications, cyber technology, intercontinental missiles, jet travel, space satellites, and so much else, different parts of the globe now affect each other as intimately as different parts of Germany did in the 1920s and early 1930s, with all of its factions and power centers.

The smaller the world becomes because of technology, the more that every place in it matters. Every river and mountain range becomes strategic. A coup in Niger, like what happened there in 2023, that undermines anti-terrorism activities across a vast region of Africa, exposes the fragility of our world as much as an economic crisis in China. Think of an old wristwatch: so small, but once you start to take it apart, it suddenly becomes vast and complicated. Such is our globe today and in the coming decades.

Will this new global Weimar have the cataclysmic fate of the old German one? Or will it find a measure of stability like in 1920s Germany during the Stresemann years? For that interregnum might have continued indefinitely were it not for the Great Depression that afflicted the entire developed world and sent Weimar spiraling downward. COVID-19 and climate change, despite all the trouble they have caused, have not yet had the very targeted and cataclysmic effect on the globe that the Great Depression had on Germany, which brought Hitler to power. But give it all time. Climate change and pandemics are relentless—and this is to say nothing of wars and great-power fractures.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the British geographer Halford Mackinder electrified much of the intellectual world with his now famous “pivot” theory, which stated that since the Eurasian supercontinent was soon to be connected by railways, the “heartland,” or vast center of Eurasia, held the key to world power, as it was equidistant from all the strategic points in any direction. In building to that conclusion, Mackinder fathomed that the great European imperial powers, by expanding their political control into the most distant corners of Africa and Asia, had essentially mapped out the entire earth. There was no more room left to expand, meaning that their energies could no longer be expended in faraway conquests of jungles and deserts, and so the great powers would increasingly turn on each other.

According to Mackinder’s theory, wars would become worldwide in scale, as every place could be contested. Thus did Mackinder vaguely intuit two world wars and the Cold War decades before they happened.

“Every explosion of social forces,” Mackinder wrote in 1904, “instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will [henceforth] be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements” in between “will be shattered in consequence.” Almost everywhere there will be consequential and connected human habitation, thus every place will become of critical importance. There will be no place to escape to. The great powers will be trapped together on a finite planet.

World War I may have represented the first time in such stark terms that the great powers of Europe and North America were all bound up in one system. But attrition of the same phenomenon—a tightening and shrinking Earth on account of technology—adds up to big change. Indeed, World War II saw all the major continents of the temperate zone—Europe, North America, and Asia—integrated into the same destructive conflict system: a world system that was only deepened and intensified during the almost half-century-long Cold War. And since then, into the 2020s, there has been a steady advance of high-tech military acquisitions that has made the world and its conflicts increasingly claustrophobic. Because every place is strategic, the possibilities of conflict become more numerous than ever. And yet no global government has ever been on the horizon.

Meanwhile, the great Eurasian land powers of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are locked in a conflict against a constellation of forces including the United States, its western Pacific allies, Ukraine, Israel, and moderate Sunni Arab states. A high-end arms race is underway in the Indo-Pacific region with a focal point of Taiwan and the South China Sea. A breakout of military hostilities there between the world’s largest and second-largest economies could be an extinction-level event for world financial markets, as well as for supply chains.

Truly, we are all trapped with each other. Isolationism, a concept that originated when it took a week to get to Europe by steamship, is not an option; neither is muscular interventionism, since it would be unsustainable given all the accelerating crises and the possibility of being periodically caught in a quagmire. As in Weimar, the need for wise global leadership and effective, rapid-fire decision-making increases by the day, just as it seems to recede before us. A tightening international crisis demands increased cooperation among states, even as globalization—which is a shallow vehicle compared to the naked territorial interests of these same states—is not nearly advanced enough to sustain it. The first half of the 21st century may be as frightening and revealing as the first half of the 20th.

Books are independently selected by FP editors. FP earns an affiliate commission on anything purchased through links to Amazon.com on this page.

Foreign Policy · by Robert D. Kaplan

15. The US Pivot to Asia Depends on Peace in Ukraine (Comaprison to the Korean War)

An interesting historical comparison to the Korean War. However, I do not think some of the sides are willing to make some of the concessions recommended here.

Excerpts:

To reach a durable deal, both Russia and Ukraine must eschew any future hostile action aimed at altering the territorial status quo. Ukraine will not be required to formally cede the land conquered by Russia, but it will have to use diplomatic avenues and not force to pursue its reintegration. In return for its restraint, Ukraine should receive sizable levels of military and economic aid aimed at rebuilding the country’s military and economy and providing a future deterrent to renewed Russian attack. Offensive action by Ukraine will nullify the agreement and lead to the withdrawal of future U.S. aid.

As part of the deal, Russia should receive sanctions relief, but sanctions will be reimposed in the event of renewed Russian aggression. In the event of such an attack taking place, aid to Ukraine should ramp up significantly, providing an additional deterrent to Moscow.

Finding the means of paying for aid to Ukraine will be difficult but not impossible. Europe should be enlisted to fund part of the aid package, but the United States must pay for its share as well. Indeed, a peace agreement provides an opportunity to reset the conversation among the American public and Congress about aid, which many have grown weary of providing. Rather than being asked to fund an indefinite commitment with no clear end goal, Americans will be asked to pay for a concrete agreement that could bring stability to Eastern Europe for a generation. The more realistic and sustainable the agreement, the easier it will be to justify the expense.

Given that the alternative is another destabilizing conflict in which the United States would inevitably become implicated, even skeptics of supporting Ukraine ought to realize this isn’t such a bad deal after all. These skeptics have different motivations, with some urging that the United States should focus its attention on China and others weary of overseas commitments altogether. But as Truman and Eisenhower realized in the 1950s, freezing a conflict in place is ultimately much more sustainable and desirable than allowing it to erupt again, when the costs it will impose on the United States are much higher. For both an incoming president who boasts of pursuing “peace through strength” and for his advisers who have their eyes on both China and the forces of domestic isolationism, it would be the wisest, cheapest and most sustainable course.

The US Pivot to Asia Depends on Peace in Ukraine

thediplomat.com

In the 1950s the U.S. carried out a pivot from Asia to Europe – despite the outbreak of the Korean War. Trump can learn from that history.

By Martijn van Ette and Andrew Gawthorpe

January 18, 2025

U.S. General Douglas MacArthur (3rd from left), members of his staff and Korean Army officers, discuss the North Korean invasion of South Korea, June 29, 1950.

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We don’t yet know the precise approach that the incoming Trump administration will take to negotiating peace in Ukraine, but we do know that an attempt by Washington to force an end to the conflict is almost definitely coming. Underlining the strategic challenge in the Pacific, the president-elect has consistently called for an end to the conflict and the significant drain on U.S. military resources that it represents. And although there is much to criticize in Trump’s rhetoric about the war, he is responding to a genuine problem: Washington needs peace in Ukraine in order to focus on other global challenges, particularly the rise of China.

But if American policymakers are hoping to cut a deal to end the war and promptly pivot their attention to the Pacific, they may be disappointed. If a peace or ceasefire agreement can be reached in Ukraine, it will almost definitely be based on the current line of de facto territorial control. This is unlikely to satisfy either party. Russia’s significant but failed attacks on Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odessa at the outset of the conflict indicate that Vladimir Putin’s objectives were larger than solely creating a land bridge between Donbass and the Crimea. In his statements about the war, Putin has also frequently questioned the validity of Ukrainian sovereignty and the separate identity of its people. This indicates that he has goals that are unlikely to be satisfied by an occupation of a mere 20 percent of Ukraine’s land.

Likewise, Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly stressed the need for the complete restoration of Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders, including Crimea. Only after Trump won the U.S. presidential election did Zelensky admit that Kyiv may need to cede de facto control over territory to Russia as part of a negotiated agreement. This tactical shift toward emphasizing that the territory will be won back by diplomacy will not necessarily last among Ukraine’s leadership, particularly as public sentiment remains opposed to territorial concessions.

A poll held in October this year by the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology indicates that 58 percent of respondents are unwilling to offer territorial concessions in return for peace, and a separate Gallup poll in November found that only roughly a quarter of Ukrainians support territorial concessions in return for peace. These data points could be the seeds of a future revanchist challenge to the new negotiated status quo which, as Ukraine’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba recently warned, could reignite the conflict and endanger Europe’s security once again.

If the United States wants to create a solid foundation for peace in Europe to enable its much-discussed “pivot to Asia,” any peace settlement has to include mechanisms to prevent future challenges to the settlement that might flow from Ukrainian and Russian dissatisfaction. In crafting such a settlement, the Trump administration can learn from a surprising place: the history of the early Cold War in Asia. Between the emergence of the Iron Curtain in 1947 and the resolution of the Korean War in 1953, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations carried out a pivot from Asia to Europe. And they did it despite budgetary constraints, divisive domestic politics, and the outbreak of a major war in the region from which they were trying to disengage. Facing the problem of how to cut back their commitment to Asia while ensuring that instability there would not suck the United States back in, they crafted policies that the Trump administration can learn from today.

The Pivot to Europe

Before North Korea broke through the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea in 1950, the Truman administration was trying to disengage from Asia. Part of the reason was economic. The return of the U.S. economy to normalcy following World War II had not gone entirely smoothly, with concerns about both inflation and the deficit making substantial increases in defense spending unpalatable. There was also political pressure to cut overseas commitments, stemming both from a perceived need to focus on domestic concerns that had been neglected due to the war and a growing belief that sustained high defense spending and taxes it required would undermine the free market and the American way of life. These difficulties reinforced the perception that the United States was overstretched globally and that it would need to cut its commitments to regions of lesser importance to U.S. security interests.

Facing these pressures, Truman administration policymakers decided to prioritize Europe over Asia. Both had been major theaters of World War II, and the U.S. had a substantial military presence in both. But looking forward, the administration viewed the maintenance of stability and pro-American regimes in Europe as more essential to U.S. interests than in mainland Asia. It was also the region facing the starkest challenges, both from Soviet expansionism and from economic shortages, which American policymakers feared would increase the appeal of Communism. The result was a “pivot to Europe,” visible in policies such as the founding of NATO and the Marshall Plan.

At the same time, the pivot involved the administration seeking to disengage from mainland Asia. The Truman administration had long been skeptical of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and with the defeat of the Japanese, the main reason to tolerate their perceived incompetence and corruption vanished. After the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communists in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the administration explored recognizing its government and signaled that it would recognize Taiwan as a sovereign part of China.

This disengagement was embodied in a famous speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in which he announced that the U.S. did not view the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, or mainland Asia as a whole as part of its “defensive perimeter” and would not defend them. With a ramping up of engagement in Europe and a disengagement from Asia, the “pivot to Europe” was set.

The Korean War Interrupts the Pivot to Europe

But then Kim Il Sung intervened. By ordering the invasion of South Korea, the North Korean leader upended the Truman administration’s calculations. Even as American policymakers wanted to pivot their attention to Europe, they also felt that they could not ignore naked aggression in Asia. Soon, American soldiers would be fighting in Korea – and the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be in the Taiwan Strait to act as a deterrent to any Chinese designs on Taiwan, which the United States had so recently foresworn any interest in defending.

Despite this, the war in Korea didn’t change the basic sense that Truman – and later Eisenhower – had that Europe was more important to the U.S. than Asia was. Echoing arguments made today about the need to defend Ukraine in order to uphold U.S. credibility, they viewed defending South Korea as necessary in large part so that its fall would not inspire communist aggression elsewhere, particularly in Europe. This also meant that there were limits to how far U.S. policymakers would go to defend South Korea, just as there are limits today to how far Washington will go to defend Ukraine. This became evident when the Truman administration rejected General Douglas MacArthur’s push to expand the war to the Chinese mainland, which the administration thought would have made the European theater dramatically less secure. As General Omar Bradley famously explained, to do so would have meant fighting the “wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”

As a result of their focus on Europe, the Truman administration placed a high priority on ensuring that the Korean War would end in a durable ceasefire, despite the fact that neither party would achieve their goal of reunifying the peninsula under their own leadership. They also sought durable stability across the Taiwan Strait, a goal that was again complicated by the existence of two revisionist regimes disillusioned with the status quo.

Part of the solution to the problem came through the paradox of what we might call “disengagement through entanglement.” Washington attempted to actually intensify its ties to both Chang Kai-shek’s Taiwan and Syngman Rhee’s South Korea. Eisenhower signed bilateral security treaties with South Korea in October 1953 and Taiwan in December 1954. But it included in these treaties conditions and constraints that barred either regime from engaging in revanchism and restarting conflicts which might suck Washington in. Chiang agreed to halt attacks on the mainland, and Rhee ceded operational control over his military and agreed to Washington having a veto on offensive action against the North. With the conflicts defused and these constraints in place, the United States was then able to move its attention elsewhere.

In return for foregoing revanchist objectives against their communist adversaries, both states received significant amounts of military and economic aid as part of the final security agreement. They also came under the umbrella of U.S. military deterrence. When China sparked several crises in the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s by bombarding Taiwanese islands, Washington not only publicly considered the use of nuclear weapons and sent air and naval forces to the region as a deterrent, but also provided logistical support to Nationalist forces on the frontlines. Chiang had given up his dream of uniting the mainland, but in return he benefitted from the protection of the U.S. military. Facing that might, Mao eventually backed down.

American policymakers had achieved their dual goals of deterrence and constraint, stabilizing the theater that they viewed as a second priority and thus being able to focus attention on their first. Ultimately, the victory would prove fleeting, and the United States would end up fighting another land war in Asia. But next time it would be in Vietnam, not Korea or across the Taiwan Strait. These latter two have remained more or less stable to the present day, a testament to the U.S. success at stabilizing them. And the way in which they did it could have lessons for Trump.

Lessons for the Trump Administration

What might “disengagement through entanglement” look like in Ukraine? One crucial difference is that Washington is highly unlikely to give Kyiv any guarantee that it will come to its direct military aid in the event of a renewed war with Russia. Zelenskyy’s wish to join NATO is likely to be unfulfilled. But given Ukraine’s vulnerable situation, it will hardly be in a position to turn down a deal with the right combination of incentives and constraints. By offering one, Washington can achieve the balance of deterrence and entanglement necessary to freeze the conflict.

To reach a durable deal, both Russia and Ukraine must eschew any future hostile action aimed at altering the territorial status quo. Ukraine will not be required to formally cede the land conquered by Russia, but it will have to use diplomatic avenues and not force to pursue its reintegration. In return for its restraint, Ukraine should receive sizable levels of military and economic aid aimed at rebuilding the country’s military and economy and providing a future deterrent to renewed Russian attack. Offensive action by Ukraine will nullify the agreement and lead to the withdrawal of future U.S. aid.

As part of the deal, Russia should receive sanctions relief, but sanctions will be reimposed in the event of renewed Russian aggression. In the event of such an attack taking place, aid to Ukraine should ramp up significantly, providing an additional deterrent to Moscow.

Finding the means of paying for aid to Ukraine will be difficult but not impossible. Europe should be enlisted to fund part of the aid package, but the United States must pay for its share as well. Indeed, a peace agreement provides an opportunity to reset the conversation among the American public and Congress about aid, which many have grown weary of providing. Rather than being asked to fund an indefinite commitment with no clear end goal, Americans will be asked to pay for a concrete agreement that could bring stability to Eastern Europe for a generation. The more realistic and sustainable the agreement, the easier it will be to justify the expense.

Given that the alternative is another destabilizing conflict in which the United States would inevitably become implicated, even skeptics of supporting Ukraine ought to realize this isn’t such a bad deal after all. These skeptics have different motivations, with some urging that the United States should focus its attention on China and others weary of overseas commitments altogether. But as Truman and Eisenhower realized in the 1950s, freezing a conflict in place is ultimately much more sustainable and desirable than allowing it to erupt again, when the costs it will impose on the United States are much higher. For both an incoming president who boasts of pursuing “peace through strength” and for his advisers who have their eyes on both China and the forces of domestic isolationism, it would be the wisest, cheapest and most sustainable course.

Authors

Guest Author

Martijn van Ette

Martijn van Ette is a doctoral candidate and staff member on the “American foreign policy and liberalism” research group at Leiden University in The Netherlands.

Guest Author

Andrew Gawthorpe

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on U.S. foreign relations at Leiden University. He is currently the principal investigator of the “American foreign policy and liberalism” research group at the university.

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16. Why China probably isn't panicking over Trump

Excerpts:

Here, Trump’s policies won’t help. There’s hope the “Tariff Man” act is meant to conifer China into a huge trade deal. Bessent is perceived to be a proponent of this plan.

Other Trump advisers, not so much. These include Peter Navarro, who co-wrote a book titled “Death By China.” And trade czar Robert Lighthizer, who’s hinted at Trump 2.0 considering its own currency devaluation gambit.

But the tariff threats also could blow up on Washington in ways US lawmakers might not appreciate.

Take the risk of China hitting back in a variety of ways, warns Takatoshi Ito, a Columbia University economist who served as Japan’s deputy vice minister of finance. “If other countries adopt retaliatory tariffs, total exports from the US — and global trade overall — may well decline,” Ito says.

“Moreover, high US tariffs would fuel domestic inflation, forcing the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, which would probably cause the US dollar to appreciate, causing exports to fall and imports to rise.”

This has economists doubting if the Fed will cut rates at all in 2025. “Inflation is above target and the Fed was primarily cutting to ensure a strong labor market, which has been met,” write Bank of America economists. “This means no further cuts needed,” adding they “see risks for the next Fed move more skewed to a hike versus cut.”

Others are more sanguine about overheating risks. “Core inflation isn’t accelerating, and that’s the story,” says Jamie Cox, a managing partner at Harris Financial Group.

“The market may have had its hair on fire about inflation running away again, but the data do not support that conclusion. What we are seeing is the typical ebb and flow of the data as inflation is being pushed out of the system,” Cox says.

But Trump’s policies could exacerbate inflation risks in short order – and further threaten the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency.

In recent testimony to Congress, Bessent said keeping the dollar at the very center of global trade and finance is a top Trump 2.0 priority. That might be easier said than done as Washington’s fiscal excesses collide with a new Trump team spoiling for fights everywhere.

Why China probably isn't panicking over Trump - Asia Times

IMF estimates Trump’s tariffs, if fully implemented as threatened, could redound more severely on US than China

asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · January 20, 2025

As Donald Trump returns for a second round of shaking up the global economy — especially China — he may end up doing far more damage at home than abroad.

Though this argument has been made here and there since the US president-elect’s win on November 5, the picture the International Monetary Fund is painting about the next four years is worth considering.

On the eve of Trump’s January 20 inauguration, the IMF’s chief economist, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, counts the ways tariffs, trade curbs and blunt force responses to waning US competitiveness could backfire on the biggest economy.

The bottom line: the next wave of tariffs Trump 2.0 threatens could make trade dislocations worse, reduce investment, distort market pricing mechanics, disrupt supply chains and spook global markets in chaotic and unproductive ways.

The tariffs alone, Gourinchas worries, “are likely to push inflation higher in the near term.”

Huge tax cuts in an economy at or near full employment could hasten America’s path toward overheating. Trump’s mass deportation hopes would cause even greater disruptions for restaurants, construction and myriad other businesses already short of workers. Labor costs could surge as a result, intensifying inflation pressures.

Even Trump’s promised deregulatory Big Bang might not go as Treasury Secretary-nominee Scott Bessent argues. Yes, the US might “boost potential growth in the medium term if they remove red tape and stimulate innovation,” Gourinchas says.

But, he adds, “excessive deregulation could also weaken financial safeguards and increase financial vulnerabilities, putting the US economy on a dangerous boom-bust path.”

When “we look at the risk for the US, we see an upside risk on inflation,” Gourinchas notes.

As Gourinchas’ institution points out, Trump is fortunate to inherit a US economy that’s recovered from the Covid-19 crisis better than peers. The IMF expects 2.7% US growth in 2025, faster than the 2.2% it predicted back in October.

That hasn’t stopped Trump from signaling a fresh stimulus boom to come. On top of making permanent the Republican Party’s US$1.7 trillion 2017 tax cut, Trump promises additional corporate tax cuts. Trump also has hinted at reprising his 2017-2021 role as Federal Reserve-basher-in-chief.

Back then, Trump cajoled his handpicked Fed chairman, Jerome Powell, into cutting interest rates at a moment when the buoyant US economy didn’t need it. Trump attacked the Fed in speeches, press conferences and on social media. Trump even mulled firing Powell. By 2018, the Fed surprised world markets by suddenly adding liquidity, ending efforts to normalize rates post-Lehman Brothers crisis.

On the campaign trail last October, Trump mocked Powell’s policymaking team. “I think it’s the greatest job in government,” Trump told Bloomberg. “You show up to the office once a month and you say, ‘let’s say flip a coin’ and everybody talks about you like you’re a god.”

Team Trump also argues that presidents have the right to demand that the central bank do their bidding. In August, Trump said the “Federal Reserve is a very interesting thing and it’s sort of gotten it wrong a lot.”

He added “I feel the president should have at least stayed there, yeah. I feel that strongly. I think that, in my case, I made a lot of money. I was very successful. And I think I have a better instinct than, in many cases, people that would be on the Federal Reserve or the chairman.”

One motivation may be paying for Trump’s fiscal plans. The lower US rates go, the more latitude Trump may believe his administration has to add to the $36 trillion national debt.

This raises obvious threats to Asia’s vast holdings of US Treasury securities. China is the second-biggest holder of Treasuries with about $770 billion worth. Japan is Washington’s top banker, with US$1.1 trillion of US debt. Altogether, Asia’s largest holders of dollars are sitting on about $3 trillion worth of exposure.

Yet it also means that policy mistakes in Washington could be transmitted Asia’s way at blistering speed.

Beyond the risk of financial shocks from the US, China is very much on Trump’s mind as Beijing’s nearly $1 trillion trade surplus angers his administration. At more than 5% of gross domestic product (GDP), China’s surplus is the most since 2015.

This speaks to how Trump 1.0 failed to alter global trade dynamics. Eight years after Trump entered the White House for the first time, China is, by some measures, more reliant on exports today. Yet this reliance puts China directly in harm’s way as Trump 2.0 makes good on its 60% tariff threat.

That could exacerbate the domestic challenges Xi Jinping’s Communist Party faces, including deflationary currents, weak retail sales, slumping property prices and a yuan under downward pressure. As a result, mainland bond yields are at record lows.

Some economists think the IMF is missing the point.

“The IMF really needs to find a way to talk about global trade that includes the risks coming from China’s industrial policies and unbalanced pattern of growth, not just the risks from the US,” says Brad Setser, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Setser argues that “it’s totally reasonable to talk about the risks coming from the US. But it isn’t reasonable to ignore the risks from China just because China doesn’t use tariffs to bring its imports down … and the IMF doesn’t mention Chinese imports at all here.”

Yes, Setser concludes, “Trump’s tariffs will have an impact – but right now the main factor slowing global trade is the fact that China’s imports — in volume terms — aren’t growing. And the IMF should care about the gap between China’s export volume and import volume growth.”

Economist Katrina Ell at Moody’s Analytics notes that a “lift in government spending helped to hide some of the economy’s weaknesses. As China’s economic woes mounted in the second half of the year, local governments were instructed to offer more support. And that they did, with government expenditure growth rising in each month since June.”

Despite the extra spending helping the economy record its fastest quarterly expansion since March 2023, EIl says, “it wasn’t enough to break the shackles of deflation. The GDP deflator fell 1.2% in 2024, marking the second consecutive year of falls.”

Overall, Ell says, “China ended the year strongly. But much of that came from temporary sugar hits. Under the hood, China’s problems haven’t gone away. We expect growth to slow to 4.3% in 2025 as tariffs drag down exports and investment.”

Odds are, more Chinese stimulus is on the way, says Zhiwei Zhang, president and chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management.

“The shift of policy stance in September last year helped the economy to stabilize in Q4, but it requires large and persistent policy stimulus to boost economic momentum and sustain the recovery,” Zhang says.

For now, China’s exports will probably remain strong in the near term as companies try to “front-run” higher tariffs, says Zichun Huang of Capital Economics. “Outbound shipments are likely to stay resilient in the near-term, supported by further gains in global market share thanks to a weak real effective exchange rate,” Huang notes.

Yet China’s priority should be to stop its run of seven straight deflationary quarters, says Larry Hu, chief China economist at Macquarie Bank.

“We don’t bet against policymakers’ will and ability to deliver 5% real GDP growth in 2025, but can they achieve higher inflation?” Hu reckons. “It will largely depend on the fiscal and housing stimulus, which is key to boosting domestic demand.”

Here, Trump’s policies won’t help. There’s hope the “Tariff Man” act is meant to conifer China into a huge trade deal. Bessent is perceived to be a proponent of this plan.

Other Trump advisers, not so much. These include Peter Navarro, who co-wrote a book titled “Death By China.” And trade czar Robert Lighthizer, who’s hinted at Trump 2.0 considering its own currency devaluation gambit.

But the tariff threats also could blow up on Washington in ways US lawmakers might not appreciate.

Take the risk of China hitting back in a variety of ways, warns Takatoshi Ito, a Columbia University economist who served as Japan’s deputy vice minister of finance. “If other countries adopt retaliatory tariffs, total exports from the US — and global trade overall — may well decline,” Ito says.

“Moreover, high US tariffs would fuel domestic inflation, forcing the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, which would probably cause the US dollar to appreciate, causing exports to fall and imports to rise.”

This has economists doubting if the Fed will cut rates at all in 2025. “Inflation is above target and the Fed was primarily cutting to ensure a strong labor market, which has been met,” write Bank of America economists. “This means no further cuts needed,” adding they “see risks for the next Fed move more skewed to a hike versus cut.”

Others are more sanguine about overheating risks. “Core inflation isn’t accelerating, and that’s the story,” says Jamie Cox, a managing partner at Harris Financial Group.

“The market may have had its hair on fire about inflation running away again, but the data do not support that conclusion. What we are seeing is the typical ebb and flow of the data as inflation is being pushed out of the system,” Cox says.

But Trump’s policies could exacerbate inflation risks in short order – and further threaten the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency.

In recent testimony to Congress, Bessent said keeping the dollar at the very center of global trade and finance is a top Trump 2.0 priority. That might be easier said than done as Washington’s fiscal excesses collide with a new Trump team spoiling for fights everywhere.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · January 20, 2025

17. Biden’s bitter legacy on Ukraine

Now that we seem to know more about the outgoing President's cognitive status, was it him or his misguided advisors who know all the international relations theory there is to know that were making the decisions?

This is a brutal critique and take down of the outgoing President.

Excerpts:

There’s a clear message in the results of American hesitancy: if the United States doesn’t stand up for democratic values, no one else is likely to lead. America remains an indispensable nation for freedom-seeking people all over the world – if we’re courageous enough to answer the call.

The Biden administration’s drip-drip-drip of aid to Ukraine, and the long delays for much-needed military equipment, hobbled Ukrainian efforts to kick the Russians out of their country. Every request was like pulling teeth, until the United States ultimately decided to provide the systems or permission.

Months, even years, of deliberation and bureaucratic wrangling, only eventually to yield: HIMARS, ATACMS, F-16s — and the permission to shoot into Russian territory. All sought by Ukraine, all eventually provided – a cat and mouse game that took too long and cost too much.

And then there are Biden’s personal faults: his selfish, unpatriotic decision to run for reelection despite a pledge to the contrary – and his lack of self-awareness about, or dismissal of, his declining mental faculties.

Rather than secure his legacy as a president who bridged a gap between his political generation and the next, Biden left his party in chaos when it became clear that his decline could no longer be hidden from the public.

The resulting electoral disaster yielded Trump – a candidate who fanned the flames of anti-Ukraine hatred in the Republican Party, and made stopping aid to the vulnerable country a cornerstone of his foreign policy platform.

The Counteroffensive with Tim Mak

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Biden’s bitter legacy on Ukraine

Being merely better than the alternative is not enough. Ukrainians have suffered terribly – and will in the future – due to the outgoing president’s selfishness and timidity.

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/bidens-bitter-legacy-on-ukraine?utm

Tim Mak and Myroslava Tanska-Vikulova

Jan 20, 2025

Editor’s note: As we enter a new administration, we finish the last with a retrospective on the outgoing president’s legacy, using a personal story to illustrate our point.

It’s the type of journalism we specialize in: human narrative to illustrate a broader news point. If you support this unique method, sign up for a subscription to support us.

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“There was no sign of any trouble,” 46 year old Natalia Stepanenko remembers, about the April morning that would change her life forever.

Like many others, her family was fleeing the Russian advance, seeking to get on an evacuation train from the hub city of Kramatorsk to western Ukraine.

Originally from the settlement of New York, in the Donetsk Region, her husband had called to tell her to take the children and leave. As she did, she burnt his military uniform, destroying evidence in the house that he served in the Ukrainian armed forces.

It was a sunny, unremarkable morning on April 8th, 2022. While Natalia and her daughter waited for the train, volunteers handed out tea and sweets.

“Delicious,” she remembers.

That’s the last clear memory she had.

“I turned around, and I don't understand what happened. When I came to, my ears were plugged, I was lying down for some reason,” she said.

And at first, there was “such silence, no sirens.”

That’s when the screaming began.

Ukrainian mother Natalia Stepanenko sits in a wheelchair after losing part of her left leg during a Russian cluster munition attack on the Kramatorsk train station in early April 2022. (Photo by Scott Peterson/Getty Images)

President Joe Biden leaves office with a checkered record on Ukraine.

There’s no doubt that Biden took steps to organize Western support for the country. He also showed personal courage when he visited Kyiv, the first American president to visit a war zone not controlled by the U.S. military. And he is right that, as he said in his final Oval Office farewell speech, Putin has failed in his effort to totally subjugate Ukraine.

But too often the United States under Biden’s tenure yielded to Putin’s threats, acting with excess caution while Ukrainians died or were gravely injured.

The United States failed to intervene more forcefully in the initial stages of the war, and declined to rally NATO to close the skies over Ukraine.

The lack of air defense in Kramatorsk in April 2022 was one of the results of this hesitation.

On that day, the Russian military used a deadly cluster munition on the crowded group of fleeing refugees at the Kramatorsk train station, killing 63 civilians and wounding some 150. Nine children were among the dead, and 34 among the wounded.

Natalia awoke to find that her daughter Yana didn't have any sneakers on.

It didn’t really click for her that Yana’s legs had been blown to shreds. It was an unfathomable nightmare. The station was covered in some kind of haze. Body parts lay all over the platform. Disfigured civilians lay motionless, covered in blood.

"Mommy, I'm going to die," her young daughter cried out.

She remembers telling Yana that this wouldn’t happen.

Some men came running over, put tourniquets on Yana and carried her away -- Natalia didn't know where. They also put a tourniquet on Natalia's leg, which saved her life. A man sat next to her and asked her not to close her eyes.

She lost consciousness despite her best efforts.

Natalia and Yana together during a happier period.

***

There’s a clear message in the results of American hesitancy: if the United States doesn’t stand up for democratic values, no one else is likely to lead. America remains an indispensable nation for freedom-seeking people all over the world – if we’re courageous enough to answer the call.

The Biden administration’s drip-drip-drip of aid to Ukraine, and the long delays for much-needed military equipment, hobbled Ukrainian efforts to kick the Russians out of their country. Every request was like pulling teeth, until the United States ultimately decided to provide the systems or permission.

Months, even years, of deliberation and bureaucratic wrangling, only eventually to yield: HIMARS, ATACMS, F-16s — and the permission to shoot into Russian territory. All sought by Ukraine, all eventually provided – a cat and mouse game that took too long and cost too much.

And then there are Biden’s personal faults: his selfish, unpatriotic decision to run for reelection despite a pledge to the contrary – and his lack of self-awareness about, or dismissal of, his declining mental faculties.

Rather than secure his legacy as a president who bridged a gap between his political generation and the next, Biden left his party in chaos when it became clear that his decline could no longer be hidden from the public.

The resulting electoral disaster yielded Trump – a candidate who fanned the flames of anti-Ukraine hatred in the Republican Party, and made stopping aid to the vulnerable country a cornerstone of his foreign policy platform.

Despite all this, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan claims Kyiv’s survival as a key Biden administration accomplishment:

“I believe that our legacy has already been substantially defined on Ukraine. And it can be defined in two words: Kyiv stands.”

Kyiv stands now, in 2025, not because of the Biden administration, but because of Ukrainian sacrifice during the early battles around the capital city. In fact, the vast majority of American military aid heralded by the Biden administration did not arrive until after the Ukrainians had already won the Battle for Kyiv in April 2022.

In hindsight the first tranches of equipment authorized by the White House in March 2022 were useful but not game-changing: Javelin missiles, grenade launchers, ammunition, body armor, medical equipment and radar systems.

It is obvious that Russia, not the United States, holds primary responsibility for this terrible war. But where Biden and his administration could have acted, they did so haltingly.

“[H]is approach was often too cautious and too hesitant, holding back on delivering the decisive support needed to tip the balance,” former UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps told Bloomberg recently.

The slow, viscous nature of the aid led to Ukrainian accusations which we hear frequently – that the United States isn’t committed to Ukraine actually winning the war, but instead harbors the sinister intention to use Ukrainian lives to weaken Russian military strength.

And then there are even more cynical takes.

“They don't do enough because it's probably profitable for them. A lot of weapons are produced all over the world and they have to be sold somewhere,” said Olena Khalimonova, who was also at Kramatorsk on the day of the attack.

She rushed outside to find her son, covered in blood, with 32 pieces of shrapnel in his body.

“There is a war, there is a market. Politicians don't care. They make money out of it,” she said.

While the Biden administration has displayed a genuine desire to help, they’ve lacked a decisive urgency to guide Ukraine towards victory.

“Part of the responsibility lies with [the United States],” Natalia said. “If they had helped us more, we would not have had so many deaths… They give and then they think about whether to give or not to give. And here people are dying. I think they don't care how many children die… how many have already been buried.”

***

When Natalia woke up, she didn't know what had become of her daughter. It turns out Yana had been taken to a succession of hospitals, ultimately ending up in Dnipro.

Natalia had shrapnel that tore into her colon, and lost part of her left leg.

Yana lost both of her legs, but like her, survived.

The two were united, and by August, her daughter had been fitted for two prostheses, and began rehabilitation in the United States.

Yana in rehabilitation in the United States, 2022:

Natalia marveled at her then-10 year old daughter's tenacity -- the child insisted on walking an hour a day to build her strength, when only prescribed 15 minutes of walking. She ultimately developed a passion for running, and ran in a charity marathon in Boston just last year.

Yana at a charity Boston Marathon in the U.S. on April 4, 2024. Photo by Iryna Zaslavets from the rehabilitation center Unbroken

But through it all, despite the kindness of American doctors and physical therapists and donors, Natalia reserves a special derision for American politicians who she doesn’t believe has done enough.

“Aren't they shown pictures of our ruined cities, our wounded children, our military men who are left without two legs, without an arm, without sight?” she asks.

“They either don't know or ignore it.”

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NEWS OF THE DAY:

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

TRUMP PLANS TO CALL PUTIN IN COMING DAYS: President-elect Donald Trump has instructed his aides to arrange a phone call with Vladimir Putin in the days following his inauguration.

According to CNN’s sources, the call will have one purpose: to discuss a face-to-face meeting in the coming months to try to end the war in Ukraine. Trump and his team are aiming for a settlement plan that could be implemented in the first months of his presidency.

Any personal meeting would reflect a sharp departure from Biden's approach. The outgoing president has not spoken directly to Putin in nearly three years. To what extent Trump plans to continue the Biden administration's strategy of providing Kyiv with weapons and intelligence remains to be seen.

OIL PRICES FALL AMID TRUMP'S LIKELY ACTIONS: Oil prices dipped on Monday amid speculation that Trump might ease restrictions on Russia's energy sector in exchange for progress on ending the Ukraine war. Market uncertainty surrounds Trump’s inauguration, with expectations of significant policy shifts. These include lifting a moratorium on liquefied natural gas export licenses. Despite recent sanctions on Russian oil impacting supply, analysts caution that any price gains could be short-lived depending on Trump’s actions.

UKRAINE-MADE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM: Ukraine is working to develop its own air defense system as a deterrent against the Oreshnik missile, according to Oleksandr Syrskyi, the head of the Ukrainian military. The Oreshnik is an intermediate-range Russian ballistic missile that can carry nuclear warheads, and Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia may have up to 10 such missiles. Current air defense systems are not able to shoot down the Oreshnik due do its high speed and altitude.

RUSSIANS RECRUIT WOMEN FOR THE WAR: Russia's so-called volunteer military units are increasing the number of personnel in the so-called volunteer military units by recruiting women to join the Russian armed forces. The former head of Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin, said that the Russian Combat Army Reserve is recruiting specialists and unskilled men and women from all over Russia to participate in the fighting in Ukraine.

18. Tracking Trump’s national-security conflicts of interest

Is this tilting at windmills?

These issues no longer matter to voters.

We have to deal with the world and situation as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.

Tracking Trump’s national-security conflicts of interest

Experts say the businessman-turned-president has even more entanglements this time around.

By Sarah Sicard

January 20, 2025 09:21 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Sarah Sicard

It is a quirk of constitutional checks-and-balances interpretation that presidents are generally exempt from laws that seek to prevent U.S. officials from acting in their own interests instead of the country’s. Still, modern chief executives have customarily taken steps to reduce such conflicts of interest—particularly to keep the prospect of personal gain or foreign pressures from emboldening or even empowering America’s enemies.

Not Donald Trump.

During his first term as president, Trump declined to divest his global businesses, leading to more than 3,400 conflicts of interest, as counted in 2020 by the Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.

Now, as he returns to the Oval Office, policy experts and watchdog organizations say Trump’s record, 2024 campaign, and transition process suggest that his second-term conflicts of interest will be far more numerous, blatant, and dangerous.

“I think that that people have essentially internalized and normalized that we have a president coming in who is going to disregard basic ethical principles use the presidency for his own benefit, in ways that might result in decisions that are not in the interest of the American people,” CREW President Noah Bookbinder said. “I hope the American people will express real concern about this.”

Defense One spoke with experts from CREW, Public Citizen, and the Campaign Legal Center, three organizations that track Trump’s conflicts of interest, about business dealings that could lead to national-security vulnerabilities.

Hotels, golf courses, and more

Many of the Trump Organization’s overseas business ventures that represented conflicts of interest in 2016 remain so: hotels, buildings, golf courses.

Others are new. Trump's business ties to the most powerful Arab nation have deepened since he first took office. CREW reported that during the earliest days of Trump’s first term, Saudi lobbyists spent nearly $300,000 on stays at his luxury hotel. Close ties remained between the Trump Organization and Saudi officials who continued to support his business interests. In turn, President Trump went to bat for the Saudi regime after the 2018 murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

More recently, the Trump Organization began working with a Saudi regime-tied firm on a state-backed golf resort in Oman. And UAE developer DAMAC Properties, a Trump partner in one Dubai golf course with plans for a second, said it will invest at least $20 billion in U.S. data centers.

Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who is expected to retain close ties to the administration during this term, founded a private equity firm that received an initial $2 billion investment from a Saudi fund with ties to Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Last month, Kushner said his fund had received another $1.5 billion from Qatar and UAE investors.

“Kushner is running a multi-billion dollar investment fund that's backed by the Saudi government in a situation where there's internal documents published showing that the Saudis didn't think that he was a serious investment advisor, but someone they wanted to invest in to stay connected to Trump,” Weissman said.

As of September, the three-year-old fund had yet to return any profits to its investors, who have paid fees of $112 million, the New York Times reported.

Even something as small as a golf tournament represents a potential conflict of interest for the president. Saudi-backed golf league LIV Golf announced that it intends to host a tournament at a Trump locale.

“We're already seeing the Saudi-controlled golf tour announcing an event at Donald Trump's Doral Country Club at some point this year,” Bookbinder said.

Trump also has business ties to China, which the incoming president’s own team has called America’s most pressing threat.

In 2017, the Center for American Progress reported on several of these, including Trump Organization trademark applications that had languished for years until its CEO became U.S. president. As well, Trump was literally in debt to the Chinese government.

“Trump has been dependent on Chinese money for quite a while,” CAP wrote. “According to an investigation by The New York Times, Trump holds 30 percent ownership of an office building in Manhattan at 1290 Avenue of the Americas, for which four lenders, including the state-owned Bank of China, provided a $950 million loan in 2012.”

But money began flowing the other way once Trump took office. Financial documents recently released by House Democrats reveal that the Chinese government and other state-controlled entities spent more than $5.5 million on Trump-owned properties when he was last in office.

Then there’s Russia, the main antagonist of America’s NATO allies and the belligerent in the ongoing war on European soil. Trump has long sought to extend his real-estate empire into Russia, and he is a voluble fan of Vladimir Putin. It is well-established—by a GOP-led Senate committee and Robert Mueller’s special-counsel investigation—that Moscow has sought to help Trump and that members of his team, at least, welcomed the assistance. Still, questions about Trump’s ties to Moscow have never been conclusively resolved. That is not expected to change in his second term.

“There's a lot of evidence that Russia did act in various ways to try to help Donald Trump,” Bookbinder said. “It seems like over the years, Putin has been generally supportive of and aligned in some ways with Donald Trump, and it seems like Trump knows that and may act accordingly.”

Other ventures

Trump’s ventures beyond real estate present their own potential conflicts.

Take World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency company that Trump launched in September with his sons and two other men. The company is also partnered with the Tron crypto platform, which reportedly has ties to Iran-backed terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah.

“It’s highly unusual for a presidential candidate to embark on a new business just weeks before Election Day, and even rarer for one to aggressively promote a venture designed to benefit himself and his family,” the New York Times wrote. “But throughout his political career, Mr. Trump has engaged in business dealings that ethics experts have flagged as problematic.”

Just days before his second inauguration, the president-elect "launched and promoted a new cryptocurrency venture, raising fresh ethical questions about his attempts to monetize the incoming administration’s deepening political ties to the industry," the Washington Post reported.

Cryptocurrency as “a way to channel money to Trump is just unprecedented,” Weissman said. “You're paying money for basically nothing except for access to the President.”

Trump also owns the social media platform Truth Social, on which he spends a significant amount of time and benefits financially. Caputo noted that foreign actors could invest in Truth Social “to help raise the value of the company, which leaves an opening for, again, the conflicts of interest to present themselves.”

People

To a greater degree than in his first term, Trump is surrounding himself with businesspeople in a position to benefit from their roles in government.

“Trump has pretty consistently shown a willingness to use his political power and the presidency to help those who he perceives as helping him, and some of those folks may have business interests and personal interests that don't align with the public interest,” Bookbinder said.

Among those helpers is Elon Musk, the billionaire businessman who contributed $250 million to Trump’s campaign and in return has been tapped to head a Department of Government Efficiency whose purported missions include slashing government spending and cutting federal employees.

“I think the Musk issue is a gigantic conflict of interest,” said Robert Weissman, president of Public Interest.

Brian Hughes, Trump-Vance transition spokesperson, told Defense One, "The transition team will ensure the Department of Government Efficiency and those involved with it are compliant with all legal guidelines related to conflicts of interest."

The CEO of X, Tesla, and SpaceX is deeply—some say dangerously—enmeshed with China, having borrowed heavily from Chinese banks and become dependent on Chinese factories to make Tesla vehicles. For example, InsideEVs reported that he took $1.4 billion in loans from Chinese government-backed financial institutions to build a Tesla gigafactory in Shanghai.

But Musk is also a major supplier to the Pentagon through his Starlink satellite network, which Aerospace America called “a near monopoly of some 6,500 satellites in low-Earth orbit.”

The U.S. military has increasingly relied on Starlink to provide satellite internet.

In a letter, Senators Jack Reed, D-R.I., and Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., from the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, requested an investigation into Musk concerning intelligence vulnerabilities related to Starlink, as they drew attention to his business dealings and behaviors.

“Dependence on Starlink is deeply unhealthy for democracy and for our national security, even if [Musk] weren't whispering to the President all the time, but even more so now that he is,” Weissman said.

Trump has also tapped Steve Witkoff. a World Liberty Financial partner and fellow New York real estate mogul, to be his envoy to the Middle East. As the New York Times put it, Witkoff “will soon be negotiating with leaders of nations that are past, and potentially future, lenders to or buyers of his family real estate projects.” One of Witkoff’s embattled New York hotel projects drew foreign investment with ties to funds from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

“This is a volatile region,” said Danielle Caputo, legal counsel for the Campaign Legal Center. “There's a lot going on and to learn that nominees who will be serving in these roles have interests that aren't just the public's interest or the country's interests, it really would make an individual question, ‘Is this person acting in my best interest, or are they acting in their own personal financial interests?’”

As a government employee, Witkoff would in fact be beholden to criminal and civil conflict-of-interest laws that would force him to step away from his business pursuits. But he may attempt to sidestep those regulations by claiming to serve as Trump’s nongovernmental advisor.

A new term

Last month, when the BBC asked Trump spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt about the conflicts of interest, she said that at the beginning of his first term, "President Trump removed himself from his multi-billion-dollar real estate empire to run for office and forewent his government salary. Unlike most politicians, President Trump didn't get into politics for profit – he's fighting because he loves the people of this country and wants to make America great again."

In fact, Trump handed control of his businesses to his two oldest sons in 2017 but pointedly retained ownership.

Now, as he declines once again to remove himself from his business activities, watchdog organizations expect the emergence of new national-security vulnerabilities as his second term begins.

“We want a president acting in the interest of Americans, not in [his own] financial interests,” Weissman said. “The [Foreign Emoluments Clause] of the Constitution says that a president can't be getting things of value from foreign governments or domestic governments, but it's very hard to run a big international business without violating that.”

defenseone.com · by Sarah Sicard

19. China’s Soft Power Play: How Video Games Are Boosting Beijing’s Global Influence

I received a briefing on this in 2020 from a Taiwanese risk manager whose warnings continue to fall on deaf ears.

Of China's three warfares, this is psychological warfare on a scale we cannot comprehend because most of us do not not play video games and do not recognize the power and threat.

But this article is one small step that we should be taking:

1. Recognize the enemy's strategy.

2. Understand the enemy's strategy.

3. EXPOSE the enemy's strategy.

4. Attack the enemy's strategy (with our own superior political warfare strategy).

But we won't. There is too much money to be made in the gaming industry for American companies and companies around the world for them to worry about the psychological manipulation aspects of gaming and China's influence activities.

As per my fictional Xi Jinping quote." The Americans will buy the rope from the PRC that they will use to hang themselves."

China’s Soft Power Play: How Video Games Are Boosting Beijing’s Global Influence

thediplomat.com · by Shaoyu Yuan

Tencent’s dominance in the gaming world has turned digital entertainment into a powerful vehicle for projecting China’s culture and influence globally.

January 16, 2025

Credit: Depositphotos Subscribe for ads-free reading

China’s global ambitions are no longer confined to infrastructure megaprojects or its booming trade networks. The country has found an unlikely but effective tool for soft power: video games. At the heart of this strategy lies Chinese tech giant Tencent, whose dominance in the gaming world has turned digital entertainment into a powerful vehicle for projecting China’s culture and influence globally.

For decades, soft power – a country’s ability to attract and persuade others through cultural appeal rather than coercion – has been shaped by Western forces. Hollywood movies, American music, and Japanese anime have long been the main cultural exports dominating global pop culture. But China, too, is now stepping into this space with a surprising contender: its rapidly growing gaming industry.

Tencent’s Global Gaming Empire

Tencent, China’s largest tech conglomerate, has quietly established itself as a global leader in the gaming industry over the past decade. Through acquisitions and investments, the company has built a gaming empire that spans the globe. Tencent owns Riot Games, the developer behind “League of Legends,” one of the most popular e-sports titles in the world. It holds a 40 percent stake in Epic Games, creators of “Fortnite,” a cultural juggernaut with a player base exceeding 400 million worldwide.

Tencent’s strategy is simple yet powerful: invest in games that captivate international audiences while integrating elements of Chinese culture into the gaming experience. This approach does not rely on overt messaging or propaganda. Instead, it weaves subtle threads of Chinese history, mythology, and aesthetics into engaging, interactive platforms that appeal to millions worldwide.

Take “Honor of Kings,” Tencent’s flagship mobile game and one of the world’s most played titles. Originally designed with heavy Chinese cultural themes, the game has expanded globally under the name “Arena of Valor.” However, in recent years, Tencent has brought “Honor of Kings” – complete with its rich Chinese mythology – directly to Western markets, signaling confidence that global audiences are now ready to embrace culturally specific content.

The Cultural Footprint in Gaming

What sets China’s gaming soft power apart is its subtlety. Games are not didactic tools but immersive experiences that allow players to engage with Chinese culture on their own terms. Characters inspired by ancient Chinese figures, such as the legendary craftsman Lu Ban or the Monkey King from the classic novel “Journey to the West,” are seamlessly integrated into games like “Honor of Kings” and “Fortnite.” These inclusions don’t just add novelty; they introduce global audiences to Chinese folklore and history in a way that feels natural and entertaining.

Another game, “Black Myth: Wukong,” developed by Chinese studio Game Science, has generated significant buzz for its breathtaking visuals and compelling adaptation of “Journey to the West.” While Western games have long borrowed Chinese themes in superficial ways, “Black Myth” offers a more authentic experience rooted in Chinese mythology. Its international popularity highlights a growing appetite for culturally rich content beyond the Western-centric narratives that have historically dominated the gaming industry.

Tencent’s influence extends beyond individual titles. The company plays a central role in the booming global e-sports industry, which has become a cultural phenomenon in its own right. Games like “League of Legends,” under Tencent’s stewardship, have created international tournaments watched by millions. These events often feature Chinese branding, sponsors, and even nods to Chinese cultural elements, further embedding China’s influence into global gaming culture.

A Digital Silk Road of Influence

China’s embrace of gaming as a soft power tool fits within its broader strategy under the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative – the digital arm of the Belt and Road Initiative. While the DSR is often associated with infrastructure like fiber-optic cables and 5G networks, it also promotes the global reach of Chinese digital services, including e-commerce, payment systems, and entertainment platforms like Tencent’s games.

This strategic push ensures that Chinese-developed games are accessible worldwide, particularly in developing markets where China is actively expanding its digital footprint. By establishing itself as a technological leader and cultural exporter, China is positioning its digital platforms – and the narratives they carry – at the center of global digital culture.

A Mixed Reception

While Tencent’s gaming portfolio has achieved immense commercial success and cultural impact, it has not been without controversy. Some critics point to concerns about the export of China’s digital governance model, which emphasizes state control over internet content. Tencent, like other Chinese tech giants, maintains close ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), raising questions about the intersection of state interests and corporate strategy.

Tencent’s success in global gaming also highlights a broader tension between cultural exchange and influence. On one hand, games like “Honor of Kings” and “Black Myth: Wukong” showcase Chinese culture, fostering greater appreciation among international audiences. On the other, the integration of Chinese narratives into widely consumed entertainment raises concerns about the subtle influence of state-backed initiatives in shaping global perceptions.

A New Era of Cultural Diplomacy

Despite these challenges, China’s use of gaming as a soft power tool represents an innovative shift in cultural diplomacy. Video games are uniquely positioned to engage global audiences in ways that traditional media cannot. They are interactive, immersive, and deeply social, offering opportunities for cultural exchange that feel organic and engaging rather than top-down.

For China, this strategy well facilitates with a departure from its previously assertive diplomatic posture, often referred to as “wolf warrior diplomacy.” Instead of confrontation, China’s gaming industry offers collaboration, cultural storytelling, and shared entertainment experiences. This softer approach has the potential to reshape how global audiences perceive China, presenting it not just as a rising power but also as a vibrant cultural force.

As video games continue to grow as a dominant form of global entertainment, China’s strategic investments in this sector are likely to yield long-term cultural dividends. Tencent’s success highlights how digital entertainment can serve as a bridge for cultural exchange, positioning China as a key player in shaping the future of global digital culture.

Whether through mythological heroes in “Honor of Kings” or e-sports spectacles watched by millions, China’s gaming industry is redefining the role of digital platforms in soft power. For Beijing, the next frontier of global influence is not just on land or sea – it’s in the immersive worlds where millions of players log in, explore, and connect every day.

This article expands on the findings of a research paper published in The Pacific Review; an international relations journal covering the interactions of the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

Authors

Guest Author

Shaoyu Yuan

Shaoyu Yuan is a Dean’s Dissertation Fellow at Rutgers University’s Division of Global Affairs.

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thediplomat.com · by Shaoyu Yuan

20. Donald Trump 2.0 and The Next Era of Superpower Competition

Excerpts:

The agenda on defense and security competition is even more fraught with tension. Under Trump, the U.S. defense industrial base and armed forces will face a fundamental transformation and focus on strategic outcomes rather than social experimentation. A true pivot to Asia appears likely, requiring greater cost-sharing with allies and expanded cooperative efforts in space, global chokepoints, and cyberspace.

However, the region’s primary defense flashpoints—Taiwan and the South China Sea—are ripe for confrontation. Taiwan faces mounting psychological pressure with revelations of China’s military modernization and narrative warfare. For instance, China’s ambassador to Australia accused Taiwanese vice president Lai Ching-te of pursuing independence, making it clear psychological pressure will only mount on Taiwan in the months ahead. At the same time, China’s revelations of new portable bridge docks and large Type 076 amphibious platforms capable of integrating uncrewed systems suggest steady progress toward invasion capabilities.

The South China Sea will also see more roiled waters. The Philippines has complained that China’s escalating gray-zone operations, such as deploying massive coast guard vessels to challenge its territorial claims, are pushing Manila “to the wall.”

This superpower contest will likely involve simultaneous conflicts and growing cooperation among revisionist powers like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. As John Ratcliffe said during his confirmation hearing to become director of the CIA, the “increasing coordination among America’s rivals” constitutes as grave a security challenge as the United States has ever faced. Contingency planning will become increasingly complex.

President Trump prioritized China during his first term. Eight years later, a new era of superpower competition has arrived. The only question now is the course it will follow.

Donald Trump 2.0 and The Next Era of Superpower Competition

As Trump re-enters the White House, he no doubt believes that conflict with China can be avoided as long as the United States negotiates from a position of strength.

The National Interest · by Patrick M. Cronin · January 20, 2025

Donald Trump’s inauguration as the forty-seventh president of the United States marks the beginning of a new era of superpower competition.

Last week, Washington experienced a fleeting sense of normalcy with Senate confirmation hearings and President Joe Biden’s farewell address. Even the theatrics of Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth’s hearing and Biden’s warnings of a “tech-industrial complex” seemed restrained compared to the political storm that is expected to follow Trump’s inauguration at noon on Monday.

In his second inaugural address and through a series of executive orders, President Trump will unequivocally assert that U.S.A., Inc. is under new management.

Monday also signals the start of what Beijing once described as a “new type of great power relations.” Although this may be round two of the Trump-Xi matchup, there is no doubt that the two leaders’ ice-breaking phone call last Friday represented the opening jockeying for strategic advantage between the two most powerful men in the world.

Xi Jinping telephoned, shortly after official Chinese data showed Beijing had met its 5 percent GDP growth target for 2024, to let President Trump know he was giving him face by dispatching Vice President Han Zheng to attend the inauguration. Xi has been busily preparing potential retaliatory moves in the event of further tariffs and export controls. Yet, the phone call intended to get ahead of the curve of what is sure to be lively debates between competing camps within the Trump administration.

Indo-Pacific observers are watching how the tug-of-war between “peace-through-strength” defense hawks and advocates of Big Tech and trade engagement will unfold.

China is “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted,” Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio asserted in his confirmation hearing. Rubio blamed China for lying, hacking, and cheating its way to superpower status. He emphasized the urgent need to clear the backlog of arms sales to Taiwan and reduce America’s dependence on China.

Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Waltz underscored bipartisan support for countering China during the U.S. Institute of Peace’s “Passing the Baton” event, a quadrennial handoff I helped to initiate as USIP Director of Studies in 2001. Waltz commended the Biden administration’s strategic cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies through minilateral initiatives like AUKUS, the Quad, and trilateral agreements involving the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. These partnerships provide a foundation for navigating the likely turbulence ahead.

However, these traditional strong-defense views are not the only deeply-held convictions within the new administration. A host of economic and defense challenges awaits, ranging from the rescue of TikTok to the looming threat of Taiwan’s forced unification with China, and a number of key officials are laser-focused on prosperity. Emblematic of this perspective was Treasury Secretary nominee Scott Bessent’s call for a “new economic golden age.” His “3-3-3” plan prioritizes energy dominance, GDP growth, and fiscal management. Proposed measures include cutting taxes, deregulating supply chains, encouraging new investments, leveraging tariffs, and negotiating more favorable trade deals, including with China.

Of course, President Trump sits atop a cohort of senior officials with diverse views. Both hardliners and pragmatists hope to emulate Sun Tzu and “win without fighting.” At least, as Senator Rubio acknowledged in his own confirmation, President Trump believes that conflict with China can be avoided; negotiation from strength is the key.

The newfound influence of Big Tech CEOs in the Trump administration is a reminder of the innovative and industrial clout of the private sector. Amid intensifying competition with China, companies have not been sitting idly by during the Biden administration. For example, Apple’s decision to move some operations to India reflects a trend toward reducing dependence on China, just as China’s decision to impede that move suggests that Beijing is in no hurry to see offshoring. Meanwhile, others fear Trump tariff enforcement will follow friendshoring. Singapore’s former ambassador to the United States, Chan Heng Chee, has warned that Southeast Asian countries like Singapore could become “collateral damage” if the U.S. enforces strict trade protections.

The new administration’s immediate agenda is ambitious. It includes ending the war in Ukraine, reshaping the Middle East, and potentially holding another meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. However, an anticipated meeting between Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping later this year will serve as a defining moment in this new era of superpower competition. Events leading up to this summit will shape the strategic landscape.

Key economic challenges include negotiating a deal to save TikTok, even as “refugees” flee to Chinese apps like Xiaohongshu (literally “Little Red Book” or RedNote). Bilateral economic relations hinge on clarity regarding trade and technology policies, such as the “small yard, high fence” approach articulated by the previous administration. Strategic concerns like semiconductor chip controls and data security will dominate discussions in the months ahead. However, export controls alone are unlikely to outpace China’s progress, much like how eighteenth-century France was unable to prevent England’s industrial revolution.

For Trump, the pressing question is how to approach a second trade deal. China’s two-speed economy is marked by slow consumption and construction but fast industrial production and exports. Xi has been preparing to counter tariffs with Beijing’s playbook of restrictions on critical minerals, regulations, and self-sufficiency measures. But in many ways, the specifics of a deal are less important than the overall competition over the rules of the road writ large.

David Rennie of The Economist offers insight into China’s ambitions. Having spent the past six years in the country, Rennie observes that China seeks to revise the U.S.-led post-World War II order, positioning itself as a defender of the status quo against “America First” policies. China’s Xi aims to replace universal democratic values with “universal security,” promoting a world order conducive to techno-authoritarianism—a point echoed by Biden’s warning about a “tech-industrial complex” in his farewell address.

Economic interdependence constrains both nations. Trump risks a backlash from tariffs. Xi relies on advanced markets to support China’s export-driven strategy while striving for self-reliance.

The competition will intensify in the Global South, especially among BRICS nations. China has expanded its influence beyond Asia to Africa and Latin America. Xi recently gifted Sri Lankan president Anura Kumara Dissanayake a $3.7 billion state-of-the-art oil refinery adjacent to the Hambantota Port, itself a product of Belt and Road Initiative largesse. Xi also recently engaged with Vietnam’s general secretary as Russia promoted Vietnam’s inclusion in BRICS. Both of these and many other moves by Xi Jinping suggest China hopes to outflank the Trump pressure campaign by forging new ties in emerging markets.

China is also strengthening ties with Europe and advanced Asian economies. If President Trump’s gambit to buy Greenland or otherwise appears to bully America’s allies and partners, China is prepared to swoop in and exploit such tensions. As Chinese scholar Wang Jisi warns, “Now it’s America’s turn to make mistakes.”

The agenda on defense and security competition is even more fraught with tension. Under Trump, the U.S. defense industrial base and armed forces will face a fundamental transformation and focus on strategic outcomes rather than social experimentation. A true pivot to Asia appears likely, requiring greater cost-sharing with allies and expanded cooperative efforts in space, global chokepoints, and cyberspace.

However, the region’s primary defense flashpoints—Taiwan and the South China Sea—are ripe for confrontation. Taiwan faces mounting psychological pressure with revelations of China’s military modernization and narrative warfare. For instance, China’s ambassador to Australia accused Taiwanese vice president Lai Ching-te of pursuing independence, making it clear psychological pressure will only mount on Taiwan in the months ahead. At the same time, China’s revelations of new portable bridge docks and large Type 076 amphibious platforms capable of integrating uncrewed systems suggest steady progress toward invasion capabilities.

The South China Sea will also see more roiled waters. The Philippines has complained that China’s escalating gray-zone operations, such as deploying massive coast guard vessels to challenge its territorial claims, are pushing Manila “to the wall.”

This superpower contest will likely involve simultaneous conflicts and growing cooperation among revisionist powers like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. As John Ratcliffe said during his confirmation hearing to become director of the CIA, the “increasing coordination among America’s rivals” constitutes as grave a security challenge as the United States has ever faced. Contingency planning will become increasingly complex.

President Trump prioritized China during his first term. Eight years later, a new era of superpower competition has arrived. The only question now is the course it will follow.

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is the Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute and teaches at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Security and Technology (CMIST), Carnegie Mellon University.

Image: Fasttailwind / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Patrick M. Cronin · January 20, 2025

21. The Trump-Biden-Trump Foreign Policy

I hope to have a piece with a similar perspective soon. But my focus will be on allies.

Excerpts:

For all the differences, however, there will likely be far more continuity between the two administrations than meets the eye. Across administrations—even ones as different as those of Biden and Trump—foreign policy is something like an iceberg. The visible portion is gleaming and jagged and draws much of the attention. Yet it also has a far bigger and underexamined foundation, one that tends to remain mostly unchanged. Even as they focus on Trump’s differences in style and substance, observers should not ignore the potential stability in the United States’ approach to the world. Otherwise, they may misunderstand policy, attributing it to a specific president, rather than more firmly rooted in bipartisan consensus and likely to endure.

...

Trump will usher in departures, sometimes dramatic ones, in American foreign policy. But those changes will comprise just a fraction of the total. The stability of U.S. interests and values, the role of Congress, and the realities of today’s world will demand a significant measure of constancy. Although it is bent on reversing Biden’s approach, the incoming team may itself be surprised to find out how much the two administrations share.

The Trump-Biden-Trump Foreign Policy

Foreign Affairs · by More by Richard Fontaine · January 20, 2025

American Strategy’s Strange Continuity

Richard Fontaine

January 20, 2025

U.S. President Joe Biden and President-elect Donald Trump at the White House in Washington, D.C., November 2024 Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Richard Fontaine is CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain.

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Today, U.S. President Donald Trump will sweep back into power promising a new American approach to the world. As he was in 2017, Trump has been harshly critical of his predecessor’s foreign policy and pledged major differences in priorities and style. His supporters cheer the return to an “America first” attitude, one that emphasizes toughness, seeks concrete benefits from any foreign engagements, and centers on hardheaded dealmaking. His detractors fear a cramped, short-term worldview combined with an erratic, transactional approach to a complicated international environment. Either way, much of the world now braces for significant policy departures and prepares for a major lurch in U.S. foreign policy.

To be sure, a second Trump era promises significant changes after four years of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden firmly committed to supporting Ukraine, defending Taiwan militarily, fulfilling the United States’ climate change commitments, and centering democracy in U.S. foreign policy. He stressed the benefits of the United States’ alliances and the threats that China and other revisionist powers pose to the global order. Trump, on the other hand, questions the need to continue aiding Ukraine, declines to commit to Taiwan’s protection, downplays climate change, and deprioritizes the promotion of democracy and human rights. He often portrays U.S. allies as free riders enriching themselves under U.S. protection and emphasizes the unfairness of trade deficits with countries such as China more than any systemic risks these countries might pose. The new president will surely spend his first weeks in office issuing executive orders and other directives aimed at visibly reversing Biden’s policies.

For all the differences, however, there will likely be far more continuity between the two administrations than meets the eye. Across administrations—even ones as different as those of Biden and Trump—foreign policy is something like an iceberg. The visible portion is gleaming and jagged and draws much of the attention. Yet it also has a far bigger and underexamined foundation, one that tends to remain mostly unchanged. Even as they focus on Trump’s differences in style and substance, observers should not ignore the potential stability in the United States’ approach to the world. Otherwise, they may misunderstand policy, attributing it to a specific president, rather than more firmly rooted in bipartisan consensus and likely to endure.

PICKING UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF

In 2021, Biden pledged to be everything that Trump was not. Biden reentered the Paris climate accord after his predecessor’s withdrawal, emphasized NATO’s importance after Trump was critical, and assured allies that “America is back.” Whereas Trump made his first overseas trip as president to Saudi Arabia, Biden pledged to make the regime in Riyadh a pariah. The president stopped Trump’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization, quickly patched up burden-sharing disputes with Asian allies, and began planning Summit for Democracy gatherings, the first of which he hosted in December 2021.

On many other issues, however, Biden retained the essence of Trump’s approach. Key documents issued during Trump’s first term characterized China and Russia as strategic competitors of the United States, a framing Biden embraced. Biden kept the Trump-era tariffs on China and expanded controls on technology transfers that began under Trump. He executed the Afghanistan withdrawal agreement negotiated between Trump’s team and the Taliban, remained outside the Iran nuclear deal, and, like Trump—but unlike President Barack Obama—provided lethal aid to the government in Ukraine. Biden sought to extend the Abraham Accords, a key Trump-era foreign policy success in the Middle East, and over time, he attempted to make Saudi Arabia a U.S. treaty ally. The two administrations could hardly have been more different in style and rhetoric. In the underlying substance of their policies, however, there was more continuity than the casual observer might have appreciated.

Many such areas of constancy will almost certainly remain in the next Trump presidency. The incoming administration’s approach to Israel, for instance, will likely be broadly similar, combining military support with protection both from Iranian missiles and diplomatic attacks at the United Nations and elsewhere. Policy toward Saudi Arabia will be comparable now that Biden has embraced the government in Riyadh and seeks regional normalization. Under Trump, Washington is poised to continue to see China as its foremost global challenger and endeavor to build domestic sources of strength. Even as the new administration rails against U.S. allies on issues such as defense spending and trade, it is likely to seek tighter partnerships abroad, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to better compete with Beijing. The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which was established in 2007, revived by Trump, and upgraded by Biden—will endure, just as the AUKUS defense technology sharing pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is likely to do. Trump will probably back the bipartisan effort to deepen ties with India, an effort Biden supported but that predated him by several administrations. Biden and Trump also share a fondness for an economic protectionism that combines tariffs, “Buy America” provisions, import substitution, reshoring domestic manufacturing, and skepticism of multilateral trade agreements.

Stylistic differences between the two will remain obvious, but even here there will be exceptions. Trump is often seen as the unilateralist, offering too little consideration to the concerns of the United States’ closest allies. Yet Biden unilaterally withdrew U.S. forces from Afghanistan over the warnings of some of those very allies. Trump issues foreign policy diktats by social media, abjuring international consultation and consensus, but the Biden administration itself announced export controls on technology to China without the agreement of U.S. partners. Both presidents emphasize the power of personal relationships with world leaders and their own prowess in navigating them, albeit in very different ways.

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE

Foreign policy stability across U.S. administrations is nothing new. Even in controversial areas and frequently in spite of campaign promises to the contrary, presidents often retain a good deal of their predecessor’s foreign policy. During his first presidential campaign, Obama railed against the excesses of President George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” and then, as president, he went on to bomb more countries than Bush did. As a first-term candidate, Trump denounced NAFTA and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement but then signed on to new versions with mostly cosmetic changes. For all of his carping about NATO’s free-riding obsolescence, Trump oversaw the alliance’s expansion, backing the addition of Montenegro during his first year in office.

Administrations of very different stripes can nevertheless share similarities because fundamental American realities change slowly. The deep wellsprings of U.S. foreign policy—the geographic, economic, and political conditions that shape Washington’s approach—are relatively stable. Policymakers tend to identify national interests and values in similar ways, even if their methods for attaining them vary significantly.

Fundamental American realities change slowly.

For many decades, for example, Washington has tried to prevent Eurasia from being dominated by a hostile power. It has insisted on maritime freedom, critical for a country that trades significantly by sea. The United States’ interest in stable supplies of Middle Eastern energy, along with concerns about terrorism and long-standing support for Israel, gives Washington an interest in ensuring geopolitical stability in that region. It seeks open international markets for its goods, stations its military forces abroad, urges allies to strengthen their defenses, and seeks to deny nuclear weapons to adversarial countries, such as Iran and North Korea.

Examples of long-standing policy continuity are legion. The United States has, for instance, pursued political change in Cuba since the days of President Dwight Eisenhower. It has harangued NATO members to spend more on defense since President John F. Kennedy. Washington has retained diplomatic ties to China since President Richard Nixon, prepared to use military force to defend interests in the Middle East since President Jimmy Carter, and pursued missile defense since President Ronald Reagan. Each administration since President Bill Clinton’s has negotiated (usually unsuccessfully) with North Korea and each one has pursued an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

The U.S. Congress plays a role in ensuring a measure of stability. As Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, for example, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires U.S. support for the island. It has kept the Cuban embargo in force regardless of different presidents’ skepticism. When Carter tried to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea in 1977, Congress intervened, and it did so again when Trump made similar noises, prohibiting the removal of troops below a specified level. When Trump expressed warmth toward Russia early in his first term, Congress moved to enshrine into law four Obama-era executive orders that sanctioned Moscow. It has also passed legislation requiring congressional approval for a U.S. withdrawal from NATO.

NEW BOSS, OLD RULES

Even if an administration’s policy substance—as expressed in laws, strategy documents, international agreements, and the disposition of military forces—remains the same, it still, of course, has significant power to shake things up. To undermine NATO deterrence, the commander in chief does not need to withdraw from the pact; he can simply suggest that the United States will not defend an ally under attack. If a president is unhappy with Japan, he might threaten to withdraw U.S. troops if Tokyo does not cough up more funding for host nation support. The 2020 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement eliminates tariffs, but during the transition period, Trump said he might levy 25 percent tariffs on the other two members anyway.

For all that, foreign policy’s underlying tendency toward continuity could lead the Trump administration in surprising directions. A weakened, frightened Iran may well try to negotiate with the new team, and Trump, like Obama, might pursue a deal to cap Tehran’s uranium enrichment. Rather than seeking to end North Korea’s nuclear program through high-level summitry or the threat of force, as he did in his first term, Trump may well rely on deterrence and containment—just as other presidents have. The new administration might pick up where Biden left off on Israeli-Saudi normalization efforts and could continue some support to Ukraine. Trump will likely seek, like Obama and Biden, to prioritize the Indo-Pacific in U.S. foreign policy and will face challenges, as did they, in doing so. He will also probably try to avoid direct military conflict with other countries, as Biden has done with Russia, in Afghanistan, and in the Middle East.

Trump will usher in departures, sometimes dramatic ones, in American foreign policy. But those changes will comprise just a fraction of the total. The stability of U.S. interests and values, the role of Congress, and the realities of today’s world will demand a significant measure of constancy. Although it is bent on reversing Biden’s approach, the incoming team may itself be surprised to find out how much the two administrations share.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Richard Fontaine · January 20, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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PICKING UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE

NEW BOSS, OLD RULES