Quotes of the Day:

"We will never allow anyone to bully, oppress or subjugate China. Anyone who dares to try to do that will have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people."

– Xi Jinping, in a Tiananmen Square speech marking the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party, 1 July 2021

"For forty or fifty years past, Mr. H. G. Wells and others have been warning us that man is in danger of destroying himself with his own weapons, leaving the ants or some other gregarious species to take over. Anyone who has seen the ruined cities of Germany will find this notion at least thinkable. Nevertheless, looking at the world as a whole, the drift for many decades has been not towards anarchy but towards the reimposition of slavery. We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity. James Burnham’s theory has been much discussed, but few people have yet considered its ideological implications – that is, the kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of “cold war” with its neighbours."

-– George Orwell, "You and the Atom Bomb"(note this is when Orwell coined the term "Cold War.")

“Xi Jinping’s China has become a master of those multiple other ways to influence and coerce. Western leaders say they do not want a new Cold War, but it is a little too late for that. The Chinese Communist Party is already waging a form of cold war and until now it has been very effective because Western democracies have been largely absent from the battlefield. Far from trying to contain China, as Beijing frequently claims, the West has facilitated its rise, and is only now–belatedly–waking up to the reality of Xi Jinping’s China and the threat it represents to liberal democracies.”

– The Fire of the Dragon: China's New Cold War by Ian Williams

1. The Largest Small War (Korea)

2. Kim Jong Un fires vice premier "on the spot" ahead of party congress

3. ‘Leave while you still can’: Kim Jong Un fires vice premier at factory ceremony

4. North Korea-China trade surges 25% in 2025 to nearly reach pre-pandemic levels

5. Asia's nuclear reckoning and the crisis of US deterrence

6. N. Korea's Kim agreed to visit Seoul in 2018 but canceled day before announcement due to security concerns

7. South Korea's academy merger debate is not the U.S. model

8. Trump’s BFF Kim Jong Un Is Panicking After Decapitation Drama

9. Column: Venezuela lessons for North Korea air defenses

10. 1,000 K2 Black Panther Tanks Have a Message for the Russian Army

11. North Korea-linked hackers pose as human rights activists, report says

12. Military advised to establish joint operations command to prepare for wartime control transfer

13. S. Korea says invited to Trump's proposed peace board for Gaza11

14. China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?

15. 224 N. Korean defectors enter South last year, slightly down from 2024

1. The Largest Small War (Korea)

Summary:

The article argues that while the PRC is the pacing threat, north Korea remains a “persistent threat” that could generate the largest small war of the century. The NKPA is massive, heavily armed, WMD capable, and reinforced by special operations and paramilitary forces, though much of its equipment is obsolete and logistics are weak. Geography and firepower make any renewed war on the peninsula intensely destructive. An internal regime collapse could create a heavily armed failed state that demands intervention across five mission sets, under three block war conditions, with Chinese actions as a decisive wildcard for escalation or cooperation.

Excerpt:

While the Marine Corps prepares to deter America’s pacing threat, North Korea will continue to loom large in the future operating environment. Whether through another attack on the south, or a regime collapse and devolution into a failed state, North Korea will remain a substantial and persistent threat that cannot be ignored. Marines must continue to train for the spectrum of military operations they may operate within on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, Marines must continue to prepare for small wars, because a return to North Korea under any circumstance could be a return to small war operations. A North Korean contingency could in fact be the largest small war.

Comment: It is good to see someone thinking about the possibility of regime collapse in north Korea. Conflict in Korea (whether an attack on the South or regime collapse) will be the largest “through, with, and by” operation in US history as we assist our blood ally in achieving the only acceptable durable political arrangement in Northeast Asia that will secure, sustain, and advance ROK and US interests: a free and unified Korea - or a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK)

The Largest Small War

by Michael Hanson

|

01.20.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/20/the-largest-small-war/

Introduction

The 2022 US National Defense Strategy classifies North Korea as “the Persistent Threat” due to their long enduring status as an adversary to the US and key allies. Though much attention focuses on a North Korean attack on South Korea, an often-overlooked contingency is a North Korean state collapse where international forces are drawn in to secure this heavily armed and highly militarized country. Though Stand-In Forces and Marine Littoral Regiments are a primary focus of today’s Marine Corps, this piece warns about some of the other likely operations on the spectrum of conflict that Marines must be prepared to conduct. As a state collapse of North Korea portends a witch’s brew of many dangerous operations, a brief overview of the structure and capabilities of this heavily militarized state’s armed forces indicates such a contingency could indeed be the largest small war of the 21st century.

The Persistent Threat

In his initial guidance to the force, 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps General Eric Smith declared, “We prepare for the worst-case scenario – the pacing threat. If the day comes that we must face that threat, we will be ready. We accept some risk now to be ready for the future. This is what professional organizations do: prepare for the future.” The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is without a doubt the pacing threat of the United States of America, and war with the PRC represents the most daunting challenge facing the Joint Force. The Marine Corps is right to set the capabilities and armed forces of the PRC as the high standard to prepare against. Doing so will serve future Marines well, even if they are sent to respond to other contingencies. Despite this, there are other difficult challenges Marines must be prepared to confront. One of the foremost of these is the threat posed by North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). North Korea possesses significant capabilities and combat power. To be sure, many of these are obsolete, but they still remain very lethal. Though not a peer level adversary like the PRC, the sheer sum of North Korea’s capabilities makes it a formidable adversary nonetheless. This is so much so that the 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes the DPRK as a “persistent threat.”

North Korean Strategic Priorities

The priorities of the DPRK’s security strategy are quite simple. The security of the communist Kim regime presiding over an independent state is the primary strategic objective of North Korea. The DPRK’s secondary strategic objective is to be the dominant actor on the peninsula, and to maintain the capability to exert this influence. Its final strategic objective is to deter an attack by any external actor. To achieve these goals, the DPRK has become the most militarized country in the world with 1.3 million out of 25 million people under arms. Thus, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) possesses the fourth largest military in the world. Though the government of the DPRK does not publicize its military budgets, between $7 billion to $11 billion, or the equivalent of 20-30% of national GDP, is estimated per annual expenditure.

Antiquated Arsenal

North Korea is well known for its antiquated arsenal. The NKPA has not seen a major modernization of its military since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which was their primary supplier and benefactor. In the more than three decades since then, international sanctions have seriously limited the national budget, which inhibits the NKPA’s ability to upgrade and modernize. Most of North Korea’s conventional military forces field aging Cold War era Soviet Bloc or indigenously produced copies of Soviet weapons and equipment. The primary branch to receive resources that enable modernization is the Strategic Force, leaving the other military branches to modernize their capabilities only on the margins.

The Main Effort – Weapons of Mass Destruction

The North Korean People’s Army Strategic Force is perhaps the main effort of the first and second North Korean strategic objectives. Under the Strategic Force, North Korea maintains an arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. They also maintain an inventory of short range, medium range, intermediate range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles with which to deliver these weapons. The Strategic Force’s longest ranging weapons can reach the continental United States. North Korea sees these capabilities as their chief mechanism for deterrence from outside attack, but also references them as powerful tools to threaten and intimidate their neighbors.

Air and Air Defense Forces – The Weakest Link

The NKPA Air Force and Air Defense Forces are organized into a single branch. The mission of the NKPA Air Force is to defend North Korean airspace, conduct deep strikes, provide air support to ground forces, logistical support, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR), and insertion of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Air defenses consist of vintage Cold War systems including radars, surface to air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery. With 110,000 troops, the NKPA Air Force operates 300 helicopters, 300 transports, and over 900 combat planes. While the newest combat aircraft in its inventory date to the 1980’s, the NKPA still operates aircraft from the 1950’s. Due to fuel constraints, NKPA pilots are limited to only 15-25 hours a year. It is generally accepted that the NKPA Air Force would have a hard time operating in South Korean air space. An area of Air Force modernization is a steady development of Unmanned Aerial Systems.

Naval and Coastal Defense Forces – Area Denial

The NKPA Navy and Coastal Defense Forces are also formed into a single service branch. The mission of the NKPA Navy is the defense of North Korean ports, coastline, and territorial waters, as well as ISR and insertion of SOF. Though with only 60,000 sailors, the Navy is the smallest branch of the NKPA. However, the NKPA Navy operates one of the largest submarine fleets in the world, though they are old and significantly limited compared to modern submarines. The NKPA Navy does maintain a significant mine capability. Combined with submarines and coastal defenses, it is largely an area denial force. One area of modernization is the recent development of a submarine launched ballistic missile capability.

Ground Forces – The Principal Instrument

NKPA Ground Forces provide the Kim regime significant capabilities. With 1,000,000 active duty and 150,000 reservists, NKPA ground forces are the principal instrument of the NKPA and represent the largest threat to South Korea. The ground forces are primarily manned with infantry, but have significant numbers of armored vehicles and large amounts of rocket and howitzer artillery, some of which can range Seoul. However, the ground forces field significantly antiquated equipment from the 1960’s and 70’s. Despite its age, its durability and simple maintenance have enabled such equipment to remain serviceable for long. Some areas of modernization include indigenously made tanks and self-propelled artillery that appear to be comparable to late Cold War Soviet models. Logistics and sustainment are a significant weakness of NKPA Ground Forces. On the other hand, an area of primary concern is vast networks of underground bunkers, tunnels, gun emplacements, and supply points which are often reinforced with concrete and effectively camouflaged. These networks have been constructed and improved over decades and would be quite hard to destroy, likely requiring troops to clear manually in order to ensure their effective neutralization.

Special Operations Forces – The Wild Card

NKPA Special Operations Forces represent a unique threat, as no other countries maintain special forces of such character. Numbering over 200,000, NKPA Special Forces are the largest Special Operations Force in the world, though their equipment and training suggest they are not truly comparable to SOF forces of leading countries. Despite this, they are still equipped with the best equipment North Korea has to offer, are well trained, and are significantly more capable than traditional NKPA Ground Forces. Their mission is the infiltration of South Korea and destruction and assassination of key military as well as civil targets and individuals. The purpose is to disrupt South Korean rear areas to the point of creating a second front to shift South Korean forces, resources, and efforts away from the main front. They train to use multiple methods of insertion over air, sea, and land. Along with the Strategic Force, this branch has experienced the most modernization of NKPA forces.

Reserve and Paramilitary Forces – The Armed Masses

Finally, NKPA Reserve and Paramilitary Forces add a unique dimension to the North Korean military. About 25 percent of the population of North Korea is organized into auxiliary forces that augment NKPA main forces. Among these are the Reserve Military Training Units (RMTU), Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG), and Red Youth Guard (RYG). The 600,000 man RMTU’s are infantry and artillery forces organized into divisions, brigades, and regiments with the mission of sustaining proficiency in common skills in order to reinforce active-duty units should the need arise. The 5 million strong WPRG and 1 million strong RYG are structured into regiments and battalions under the control of North Korea’s communist party, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WKP). They are typically used for work projects such as agriculture and construction but include logistics and engineer units for the transportation and maintenance of infrastructure. These auxiliary forces are equipped with small arms and supplied by cache sites to enable a sustained resistance of their locality. North Korean males are discharged from the auxiliary forces at the age of 60.

Factors of Geography

Though the raw data summarizing these capabilities indicate North Korea is a formidable adversary, geographical context will diminish some of these threats. Korea is a peninsula divided by a single border across its neck. Though this border is known as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), on either side of it is the most fortified area in the world. Running from North to South along the length of the peninsula is restrictive, mountainous terrain that canalizes movement into three large corridors: the Kaesong-Munsan Approach (the same avenue of approach that North Korean forces used in their 1950 invasion of the South), the Chorwon Approach, and the East Coast Approach. These areas are well defended. Though the mass of the NKPA is formidable, it does not possess the logistical tail to support deep operations. Despite this, North Korea’s 200,000 strong Special Forces are an enormous threat. So too are North Korean weapons of mass destruction to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as long-range artillery that can range Seoul from the DMZ and reap untold death and destruction.

Yet, due to the aforementioned inhibiting factors, some have suggested that North Korea realizes this would be a futile effort and will not attempt another invasion of South Korea. The Marine Corps cannot take this assumption for granted and must be prepared to contribute to a defense of South Korea, as any attack from the North will be incredibly violent and highly destructive. Furthermore, Chinese intervention in a future Korean war, like the PRC’s involvement in the last one, cannot be ruled out. It is possible that Korea may be where Marines first encounter the pacing threat, ironically where it was encountered before.

Another Contingency

Even if North Korea never again invades South Korea, there is another possible contingency on the Korean Peninsula that the Marine Corps must be prepared for, that of the North Korean regime’s collapse. Such a collapse could be caused by a number of internal events outside of war, such as an economic collapse like that of the Soviet Union, a military coup against the current government, or a crisis of succession in the Kim family. According to a 2011 study,

“A particularly perilous collapse scenario would feature multiple powerful political and military leaders vying for control. North Korea could quickly become a warlord state, where competing civilian and military leaders claim to rule swaths of the country and battle one another for control of territory or resources.”

Given the aforementioned capabilities of the North Korean military, such an internal contest between competing actors or factions could be a catastrophically violent and destructive civil war, one that could spill outside of North Korea.

The authors of the study offer another “less dangerous” scenario, in an event where,

“North Korea’s civilian and military leaders were not jockeying for power and gathering military units behind them. In this more benign scenario, no one is clearly in control in Pyongyang; government and military leaders are fleeing the sinking North Korean ship and seeking asylum in China or elsewhere. Military units and security services are disintegrating, rather than rallying around particular leaders, and are heading home to their families…. North Korea would be left with a political vacuum and a leaderless and dissolving military.”

In either event, these scenarios might see the country devolve into the most heavily armed failed state in the world. Such a situation may spur outside intervention for a number of compelling reasons. The study lists “the outbreak of starvation and disease in North Korea; mass refugee flows across borders; ‘loose’ nukes and other forms of WMD; and the potential for ongoing insurgency and violence throughout the country,” as serious problems that outside countries have significant cause to contain.

Five Likely Mission Sets

The study identifies five mission sets that would be executed in any intervention in a North Korean regime collapse: “(1) stability operations, including direct humanitarian relief and policing of major cities and roads; (2) border control; (3) elimination of WMD; (4) disarmament of conventional weapons; and (5) deterrence or defeat of any military resistance.” These mission sets overlap in several ways. For instance, effective stability operations that ease suffering on the civilian population may decrease the number of refugees that would seek to flee the country. Border control would be necessary to control refugee flows and prevent conventional weapons and WMD’s from leaving the country. Likewise, WMD’s and conventional weapons would have to be secured before they could be disarmed. Finally, deterrence or defeat of any kind of resistance would be a prerequisite to any of these other missions. Some geographical areas of the country or elements of the former regime apparatus would inevitably be more challenging to submit or secure. With the weapons and capabilities available to former regime elements, insurgents, or criminal opportunists, any active resistance could be difficult to subdue.

The prospects of a North Korean regime internal collapse represent a perfect storm of difficult challenges and epitomize the continued relevance of the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak’s Three Block War concept. Under this classic concept, Marines can find themselves conducting humanitarian and stability operations in one area while engaging in high-intensity combat operations in near proximity, with ambiguous spaces in between. The unique factors inherent in such a North Korean problem set would undoubtedly present vexing dilemmas for troops on the ground, especially for small unit leaders and young Marines.

The Role of China

Yet still, another dangerous prospect remains in this nightmare scenario. The People’s Republic of China represents a true “wildcard” in any such scenario. Whether or not China intervenes or stays on its side of the Yalu River introduces a whole different set of prospects that are beyond the scope of this piece, though they must be acknowledged. One potential course of action is that the United States and China return to fighting each other on the Korean Peninsula as they did in the 1950’s, though such a conflict could very likely spread to other regions. Likewise, another even more daunting possibility, is a Chinese gambit to seize Taiwan while active hostilities with the United States already exist and American efforts are focused on the Korean Peninsula. In any event, it would be critical for the U.S. and China to cooperate in such an event of a collapse of the DPRK, not only to effectively defuse one volatile situation, but to prevent another one. In the best-case scenario, the pacing threat will act as a stabilizing force in a multinational effort, and American Marines will work with Chinese troops to bring stability to the Korean peninsula.

Conclusion – The Largest Small War

While the Marine Corps prepares to deter America’s pacing threat, North Korea will continue to loom large in the future operating environment. Whether through another attack on the south, or a regime collapse and devolution into a failed state, North Korea will remain a substantial and persistent threat that cannot be ignored. Marines must continue to train for the spectrum of military operations they may operate within on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, Marines must continue to prepare for small wars, because a return to North Korea under any circumstance could be a return to small war operations. A North Korean contingency could in fact be the largest small war.

Check out all of Small Wars Journal’s great content.

Tags: INDOPACOM, North Korea, small wars, US Marine Corps

About The Author

• 
  
• Michael Hanson
• Major Michael A. Hanson is a Marine Infantry Officer who currently serves in Warfighting at The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia, where the Marine Corps trains newly commissioned officers in the character and skills required to serve as provisional rifle platoon commanders. Over the course of six deployments, he has served in Iraq, Okinawa, Romania, and aboard ship, among other places. He is a member of the team behind The Connecting File, a Substack newsletter for company level infantry leaders. A frequent contributor to the Marine Corps Gazette and United States Naval Institute’s Proceedings, he began his passion for writing with The Small Wars Journal.

2. Kim Jong Un fires vice premier "on the spot" ahead of party congress

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un abruptly fired Vice Premier Yang Sung Ho “on the spot” during an inspection of the Ryongsong Machine Complex, blasting him and other economic officials as irresponsible and incompetent for project delays and “man made confusions.” The rare public purge signals tightened discipline before the upcoming Workers’ Party congress.

​Comment: KJU would never accept blame for any failure. There is no real due process in north Korea. Discipline takes place "on the spot."

World News Jan. 20, 2026 / 4:29 AM

Kim Jong Un fires vice premier "on the spot" ahead of party congress

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/20/Kim-Jong-Un-fires-official-vice-premier-Ryongsong-Machine-Complex/8981768899214/

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (C) fired a vice premier during an inspection of the Ryongsong Machine Complex in Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, state media reported Tuesday. Photo by KCNA/EPA

SEOUL, Jan. 20 (UPI) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un abruptly dismissed a vice premier during a factory inspection, state media reported Tuesday, in a rare public rebuke that comes as the country prepares for a key ruling party congress.

According to the official Korean Central News Agency, Kim fired Vice Premier Yang Sung Ho "on the spot" while presiding over the inauguration of the first stage of a modernization project at the Ryongsong Machine Complex on Monday.

Kim accused Yang and other economic officials of being "irresponsible, rude and incompetent," saying delays and "man-made confusions" in the project had caused economic losses and setbacks.

The Ryongsong Machine Complex, located in South Hamgyong Province, is a key heavy-industry plant that produces machine tools and equipment for factories nationwide. It has been highlighted as part of Kim's broader push to strengthen North Korea's machine-building sector, which he has repeatedly identified as central to economic self-reliance.

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Speaking at the inauguration ceremony, Kim said he had sharply criticized Yang at a ruling party plenary meeting in December and had monitored his conduct afterward.

"To my surprise, watching how he was behaving himself later, I found him unaware of his responsibility at all," Kim was quoted as saying.

"Here today, you are dismissed, comrade vice premier," the North Korean leader declared.

The public firing of a senior official is uncommon in North Korea and appears intended to reinforce discipline among economic managers ahead of the upcoming Ninth Congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea.

The congress, which is widely expected to be convened in January or February, is seen as a venue for the leadership to review policy performance, announce a new five-year economic plan and signal shifts in military and foreign policy priorities.

Kim has inspected weapons factories and military facilities in recent weeks, underscoring the regime's parallel focus on defense and industrial production ahead of the congress.

At a key ruling party meeting last month, Kim pointed to what he called "shortcomings and evil practices that must be corrected," language analysts say may precede personnel reshuffles.

3. ‘Leave while you still can’: Kim Jong Un fires vice premier at factory ceremony

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un publicly sacked Vice Premier Yang Sung Ho at the Ryongsong Machine Complex, telling him to “leave while you still can” and using the spectacle to warn cadres about chronic incompetence and corruption. He blamed Yang and former premier Kim Tok Hun for sabotaging key modernization plans, then framed the real problem as a rotten cadre system that rewards self protection and skepticism of Party policy. Rather than reform incentives, Kim doubled down on ideological education and loyalty. Ryongsong’s upgrade, tightly linked to weapons plants and the “20×10” rural plan, shows regime priority on armaments and controlled industrial revival before the Ninth Party Congress.

Comment: This must have been quite a spectacle. Political theater for the 9th Party Congress? I wonder where Yang Sung Ho is today? KJU believes in the Chinese sayings:

"Kill a chicken to frighten the monkey"

"Punish one, teach a hundred"

"Kill one, terrify a thousand." 

I am reminded of Sun Tzu's parable of teaching the sovereign's concubine to march.

But more seriously: how does Kim’s choice to rely on ideological purges instead of material incentives constrain north Korea’s ability to build a competent technocratic elite for sustained weapons and economic modernization?

What signals should we read in the linkage between Ryongsong, missile production plants, and the upcoming Ninth Party Congress about the regime’s near term force development and resource allocation priorities? We are going to be reading the tea leaves of the 9th Party Congress for days to come.

‘Leave while you still can’: Kim Jong Un fires vice premier at factory ceremony

North Korean leader warns of chronic incompetence among party officials, disrupting his hopes for economic development

Colin Zwirko January 20, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/leave-while-you-still-can-kim-jong-un-fires-vice-premier-at-factory-ceremony/

Kim Jong Un at the Ryongsong Machine Complex on Jan. 19 | Images: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 20, 2026)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un publicly fired a top economic official and warned party cadres over what he sees as chronic incompetence at a ceremony for upgrading an industrial machine factory Monday, according to state media.

Pyongyang described the upgrade project as key to improving the economy, while NK News analysis suggests Kim’s attention on the factory is related to plans to upgrade weapons production capabilities as well.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Tuesday that Kim dismissed Vice Premier of the Cabinet Yang Sung Ho during a speech at the Ryongsong Machine Complex, saying “leave on your own feet while you still can, before it is too late.” 

Kim said he gave Yang several chances to correct egregious mistakes in planning the “first-stage modernization project” of the complex and that while he must be removed, he still should not be considered “anti-Party.”

Top weapons production-related officials joined Kim, like Kim Yong Hwan (far right) and Jo Chun Ryong (third from right) | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 20, 2026)

The DPRK leader described how Yang “tried to make a fool of the Party Central Committee” by coming up with fake, unrealistic and self-serving solutions, even at last month’s party plenum. Kim reportedly gave him another chance but found he “possessed no sense of responsibility whatsoever.”

“He is a person who is originally only capable of being the way he is, and is unsuitable for entrusting with heavy responsibility,” he said, adding the larger problem is related to fixing the Workers’ Party of Korea’s (WPK) cadre appointment process.

Kim called for purging the party of “people who are prisoners of immediate difficulties, who view Party policy skeptically, who are habituated to self-protection, who cannot properly sense the currents of the changing world around them, and who cannot keep pace to the point of impeding our advance.”

He also called for punishing former Cabinet Premier Kim Tok Hun, who recently disappeared from public view, saying he and others at the factory have “neglected policy guidance” and “only played the role of spectators.” 

The party voted to make Pak Thae Song the new cabinet premier in Dec. 2024, while Kim Tok Hun appeared to retain the leader’s trust as he shifted to take charge of the party’s economic affairs department until disappearing after the Dec. 2025 plenum.

Kim Jong Un tours new production lines at the Ryongsong Machine Complex | Images: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 20, 2026)

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According to Kim on Monday, the party has a severe problem with officials trying to benefit themselves through attaining important positions — what he has described numerous times in recent years as chronic corruption.

The solution is to double down on ideological education as a means of forming perfectly altruistic individuals ready to carry out his orders without question, he suggested. He did not mention any change to incentives or pay as a means of motivating competent work.

Kim opened a new party cadres training school in Pyongyang in 2024 to address the problem, describing rampant corruption at the time as well.

Monday’s event at the Ryongsong Machine Complex, located in Hungnam near Hamhung on the east coast, was meant as an occasion to spur “independent development and technological progress of the national economy,” KCNA reported.

Installing new production lines has “delivered a telling blow to flunkeyism, defeatism and mysticism about technology,” Kim reportedly told workers on Monday.

Kim Jong Un gives a speech at the Jan. 19 event at the Ryongsong Machine Complex | Images: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 20, 2026)

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The “first stage” project for Ryongsong reportedly kicked off after Kim’s last public visit to the factory in Nov. 2023.

Ryongsong oversees major weapons factories like the February 11 Plant producing nuclear missiles, but the machine complex reportedly builds heavy machinery for use at other industrial factories and power plants. 

Kim said weapons plant officials were even brought in to advise about layout and design problems during the Ryongsong upgrade project.

The appearance of top weapons officials like Jo Chun Ryong, Kim Yong Hwan and Ko Pyong Hyon close to the leader during Monday’s ceremony suggests the modernization project may be primarily connected to recently announced plans to build and upgrade a large number of arms plants.

Kim said the Ryongsong Machine Complex must be modernized in order to achieve a self-reliant economy and assist with the “20×10” rural development project. 

NK News has found that so far, new light-industry factories under the 20×10 project have been furnished mostly with basic Chinese production lines and machinery as North Korea’s domestic industry continues to flounder.

Meanwhile, Tuesday’s report described the ceremony as taking place in the “lead-up to the Ninth Congress of the WPK,” though state media has yet to announce a date. The congress is widely expected within the next few months. 

Edited by Alannah Hill

4. North Korea-China trade surges 25% in 2025 to nearly reach pre-pandemic levels

​Summary:

north Korea’s trade with China jumped 25% in 2025 to $2.74 billion, almost back to the 2019 pre-pandemic level of $2.79 billion. December was the strongest month since 2017, driven mainly by imports, which hit $257.4 million, while exports rose to about $53 million. Pyongyang is leaning hard on Chinese supplies of fabrics, oils, and other inputs, while continuing its niche export mix of wigs, fake hair products, ferrosilicon, ores, and electricity. The rebound reflects both a diplomatic thaw after Kim’s visit to China and Beijing’s quiet willingness to cushion sanctions through expanded, if partly hidden, trade.

Comment: How do our economics experts assess this? How does near-full restoration of China trade change the leverage calculus for sanctions, deterrence, and any future pressure campaign aimed at forcing nuclear or economic concessions from Kim Jong Un? Do sanctions even have an effect on KJU's thinking anymore?

North Korea-China trade surges 25% in 2025 to nearly reach pre-pandemic levels

Bilateral exchanges total $2.79 billion after finishing on strongest month for trade since 2017

Anton Sokolin January 20, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-china-trade-surges-25-in-2025-to-nearly-reach-pre-pandemic-levels/

The Sino-Korean border nearby the city of Tumen in Feb. 2017 | Image: NK News

North Korea’s trade with China nearly recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2025, increasing 25% on-year after ending on the strongest month for bilateral exchange since 2017.

The cumulative trade volume between the two countries reached $2.74 billion last year, data released by China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC) shows, far exceeding the $2.2 billion and $2.3 billion recorded in 2024 and 2023, respectively.

The figure also approached the $2.79 billion in trade during the last pre-pandemic year of 2019, underscoring a recovery after a multiyear slump during the pandemic due in large part to heightened border controls.

The surge in bilateral trade in 2025 took place amid an apparent thaw in diplomatic relations, marked by leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to China in September and talks with President Xi Jinping.

In December alone, North Korea saw its trade skyrocket to over $310 million, up from $280 million in the previous month. The figure is the highest monthly total since Nov. 2017, when it hit nearly $366 million.

The expansion came on the back of rising imports from China. North Korea brought in $257.4 million worth of goods in December, up from nearly $244 million in November. It is the highest figure since Oct. 2019, when Pyongyang’s imports stood at $270 million.

North Korea also posted growth in exports to China last month. It shipped nearly $53 million worth of goods to its neighbor, the highest figure since $54.7 million in Dec. 2017.

Fabrics, soybean oil and human hair dominated North Korea’s imports last month, with China reporting fewer sanctioned deliveries despite an active smuggling trade in goods ranging from computers to cars.

North Korea’s traditional exports like wigs and fake hair products led the way in November, alongside other usual exports like ferrosilicon, tungsten ore and electricity.

GAC is expected to release a detailed breakdown of traded items with North Korea this week, potentially allowing a full tally of the DPRK’s 2025 commodity trade.

Edited by Bryan Betts

5. Asia's nuclear reckoning and the crisis of US deterrence

​Summary:

Patrick Cronin argues Asia is entering a nuclear reckoning as extended U.S. deterrence frays. China and north Korea are expanding their arsenals. By the mid-2030s, Beijing could hold theater escalation dominance, making current U.S. guarantees to Seoul and Tokyo operationally hollow. Both allies now openly debate nuclear latency as a hedge, driven less by ambition than by doubt about Washington and Trump’s transactional instincts. Cronin urges a surge in real, usable conventional power, industrial capacity, and tighter trilateral planning to delay proliferation, not wish it away with summits and slogans.

Comment: Perhaps we should support nuclear latency and factor that into an even border extended deterrence concept? On the other hand, how can Washington strengthen deterrence enough to satisfy Seoul and Tokyo without locking them into permanent nuclear subordination that their own publics will eventually reject?

Asia's nuclear reckoning and the crisis of US deterrence - Asia Times

asiatimes.com · Patrick M Cronin · January 20, 2026

Question is no longer whether Seoul or Tokyo pursues nuclear latency but whether US can forestall those crucial decisions

by Patrick M Cronin

January 20, 2026

https://asiatimes.com/2026/01/asias-nuclear-reckoning-and-the-crisis-of-us-deterrence/

Extended deterrence in Northeast Asia faces an unprecedented credibility crisis as nuclear multipolarity forces US allies toward once-unthinkable nuclear futures.

Both South Korea and Japan are debating military options to counter authoritarian strategic threats and to compensate for waning US security guarantees as China and North Korea expand their arsenals.

Allied nuclear hedging reflects hard projections. By the mid-2030s, China’s theater nuclear dominance could render extended deterrence operationally meaningless.

A tripolar nuclear order would give China escalation dominance in theater forces. Given deployment lag times, decisions to pursue indigenous strategic capabilities must be made soon.

Korean strategic thinking has crystallized into a tripartite logic: the alliance remains vital, extended deterrence is unreliable and nuclear independence may become necessary. Tokyo’s reconsideration mirrors Seoul’s calculus, pointing to the need for serious allied coordination on nuclear contingencies.

While the allies differ on managing Taiwan and North Korea, they have little option but to forge closer bonds against multiple nuclear adversaries and shifting US priorities.

Trump’s transactional approach compounds pre-existing doubts about US nuclear guarantees. Questions about credibility predate Trump and extend beyond Asia, but mixed messaging fuels suspicion that Washington will backstop allies with nuclear weapons. The White House appears reticent to repeat that any North Korean nuclear use would end the regime.

Japanese elite debate has moved from taboo to contingency planning, though public opposition remains substantial. Beneath intense diplomatic engagement lies an increasingly explicit expert debate driven by uncertainty rather than ambition.

Revising Japan’s three non-nuclear principles would establish the groundwork for rapid weaponization should deterrence fail.

China’s alarm at Japan’s possible nuclear awakening reveals proliferation anxieties now cut both ways. A recent Chinese report branding Japan a “potential nuclear threat” signals real trepidation that proliferation may soon extend beyond North Korea, with consequences that Beijing cannot control.

Meanwhile, Seoul confronts a starker dilemma. North Korea’s designation of South Korea as its principal enemy carries far greater weight if confidence in the nuclear-armed United States erodes.

Estimates of Pyongyang’s arsenal hinge on uncertain assumptions about weaponization of its growing fissile-material stockpile, which is one reason why KIDA’s Lee Sang-kyu assesses the force as already in the triple digits, not the roughly 50 often cited.

That uncertainty underpins arguments for a South Korean “nuclear-ready” option as former foreign minister Song Min-soon contends in his book, “Good Fences, Good Neighbors.”

Additionally, China’s expanding power looms in the background, while North Korea’s deepening partnership with Russia adds a strategic wild card neither Washington nor Seoul has fully reckoned with.

President Lee Jae-myung’s strategy of bolstering ties with Japan while balancing China reflects a desire to substitute insurance for lack of US assurance. But insurance may eventually require indigenous capabilities beyond Seoul’s three-axis defense system for defense, preemption, and punishment.

Korean planners doubt that Trump has North Korea top of mind, a skepticism that is accelerating Seoul’s transition toward self-reliant deterrence. That perception reinforces the consensus that South Korea must operate as a do-it-yourself fighting ally, making expedited modernization and wartime OPCON transfer practical necessities.

Greater Korean self-reliance doesn’t mean alliance rejection. It means recognizing that credible deterrence requires sufficient conventional forces (including a nuclear-powered submarine) and industrial capacity, with nuclear weapons as a contingency of last resort.

Prospective adversaries will not see it that way, and they may resort to diplomacy as an immediate response. Thus, the gravest near-term risk lies not in proliferation but in premature Trump-Xi or Trump-Kim summitry trading alliance credibility for vague promises of strategic stability or illusory denuclearization.

Xi wants stability so China can achieve political ambitions without fighting; Kim wants regime survival through acceptance as a nuclear power, free from sanctions and facing a weaker alliance. Summits ignoring these realities would repeat past failures amid a period when allies face serious trade-offs.

The Indo-Pacific’s emerging nuclear reality of multiple adversaries, anxious allies and a constrained defense industrial base requires abandoning both deterrence orthodoxy and diplomatic wishful thinking. Allies must generate real military and industrial power, while the US confronts that rebuilding its defense industrial base will take years.

Averting allied proliferation requires unglamorous alliance strengthening. Credibility is built by power that can actually be used, not weapons held in reserve, and this requires coordinated conventional buildups in counterforce missiles, autonomous systems and a far greater capacity for defense production.

The question is not whether Seoul or Tokyo pursues nuclear latency to shorten timelines to a bomb, but whether Washington can mobilize conventional capabilities to forestall that decision.

All three democracies should accelerate conventional capabilities to sidestep that reckoning as long as possible. But they should no longer shy away from debating it either.

Patrick M Cronin is Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute and scholar in residence at Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Strategy and Technology (CMIST).

asiatimes.com · Patrick M Cronin · January 20, 2026

6. N. Korea's Kim agreed to visit Seoul in 2018 but canceled day before announcement due to security concerns

​Summary:

Kim reportedly agreed at the Sept. 2018 Pyongyang summit to visit Seoul that December, with Seoul quietly preparing logistics, before north Korea abruptly canceled on security grounds, citing concerns after the Venezuelan drone attack. The claim comes solely from ex–Blue House aide Youn Kun-young’s new memoir and interview, not contemporaneous records.

Comment: Some speculate that one of Kim's worries is the question of how South Korea treats its own presidents, what might happen to him?  If this visit was genuinely agreed and then canceled at the last moment, why has no corroborating evidence emerged from other Moon-era principals or U.S. officials, and what incentives might Youn now have to dramatize or selectively frame these events?

Is this somehow laying the foundational rationale for renewed attempts at engagement? E.g, we almost had him last time but for security issues?

World News Jan. 20, 2026 / 4:40 AM

N. Korea's Kim agreed to visit Seoul in 2018 but canceled day before announcement due to security concerns

By Chae Yun-hwan, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/20/Kim-Jong-Un-visit-Seoul-2018-security-concerns-Youn-Kun-young/5311768901607/

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, seen here at a December plenary meeting, had agreed to visit Seoul in late 2018 before abruptly canceling the trip, a South Korean lawmaker said Tuesday. File Photo by KCNA/EPA

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had agreed to visit Seoul in late 2018 amid then warming inter-Korean ties, but the planned trip was abruptly canceled a day before its announcement apparently due to security concerns, a South Korean lawmaker said Tuesday.

Rep. Youn Kun-young of the ruling Democratic Party, who at the time served as a key presidential aide in charge of state affairs planning and monitoring, said the two Koreas had agreed on Kim's trip to Seoul following then President Moon Jae-in's visit to Pyongyang earlier that year.

"Kim's visit had been agreed upon during the inter-Korean summit in September 2018 and was in the works behind the scenes," Youn, who published his memoir, said in an MBC radio interview. "There was commotion with the date fixed for Dec. 1."

Youn noted that officials scoured for available hotels in the capital as an entire building had to be reserved for the hundreds of security personnel accompanying Kim.

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He said they had planned for Kim to board South Korea's high-speed KTX train as the North's leader said he wanted to ride the train. They had also scheduled a performance at the Gocheok Sky Dome in Seoul and a trip to Samsung Electronics' facilities.

The North, however, called off the trip just a day before it was to be announced, Youn said, pointing to security concerns and Pyongyang's relations with Washington as possible reasons behind the cancellation.

"The North's logic was there were concerns for Kim's safety as there was a drone terror attack against Venezuela's president at the time," he said.

The lawmaker said Pyongyang may have avoided the no-deal summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump in Hanoi the next year if the North's leader had visited Seoul.

Youn also noted that Kim had remarked the North could not hand over nuclear weapons to future generations when he visited Pyongyang in March 2018 as part of a special delegation.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

7.  South Korea's academy merger debate is not the U.S. model

​Summary:

South Korea is debating merging its three service academies to promote jointness and fix perceived hierarchy and rivalry, with cost savings lurking in the background. The U.S. never did this. It kept West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy separate, preserving distinct operational cultures, and achieved jointness through assignments, joint PME, and promotion incentives controlled by civilians. The article warns that Seoul’s merger first approach could harden elite networks without improving combat integration if personnel and promotion reforms lag behind. True jointness rests on career architecture and civilian authority, not on structural consolidation that might be sold as efficiency.

Comment: South Korea is not the US. But... how might a cost driven academy merger in South Korea inadvertently erode healthy service cultures and civilian control in ways the U.S. system has deliberately avoided despite higher institutional overhead? Does having a single academy really promote "jointness?" And the heretical question: What is so good about jointness? I believe it is very important in the US but I think South Korea has to articulate its reasons for and the pursuit of jointness and demonstrate how a unified service academy will contribute to the benefits of jointness.. Otherwise this will simply be a cost saving exercise. South Korea is not the US.

World News Jan. 19, 2026 / 11:08 PM / Updated Jan. 19, 2026 at 11:08 PM

South Korea's academy merger debate is not the U.S. model

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/19/military-academies-to-promote-jointness-among-army-navy-ari-force/4251768865365/

1 of 2 | Army, Navy, Air Force and nursing academy cadets　salute during the welcome ceremony at Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Yokosuka Naval Base in Yokosuka, Kanagawa-Prefecture, Japan on Thursday, November 7, 2024. File. Photo by Keizo Mori/UPI | License Photo

Jan. 19 (Asia Today) -- The Lee Jae-myung administration is weighing a plan to integrate South Korea's three military academies as a defense reform card meant to boost jointness among the Army, Navy and Air Force. Supporters frame it as a structural fix for long-standing rivalry and imbalance among the services.

But the most common point of comparison - the United States - points in a different direction. Washington did not pursue jointness by merging service academies. It preserved separate institutions and distinct service identities, then made joint experience unavoidable through assignments and promotions.

In the United States, officer education starts with the idea that each service's operational culture is fundamentally different. West Point produces Army officers shaped by land warfare traditions. Annapolis trains Navy and Marine Corps officers in a maritime and expeditionary culture. The Air Force Academy develops officers in an environment that treats airpower alongside space and cyber as core domains.

The American system's real lever is not education consolidation but career architecture. Joint duty is widely treated as a gatekeeper for senior promotion, and joint professional military education is built into the path to advancement. Jointness is enforced institutionally through personnel and promotion systems rather than left to preference or rhetoric.

South Korea's debate starts from a different diagnosis. The focus is not only on operational coordination but also on internal hierarchies, class networks and friction among academy communities. The proposed solution seeks to change the structure by merging schools, aiming to achieve jointness through education integration rather than through operational and personnel reform.

That approach carries a risk that is easy to underestimate: integration without firm civilian control can strengthen elite cohesion more than it strengthens joint capability. The American lesson is not that separate academies prevent jointness - it is that jointness becomes real when civilian authority over assignments and promotions is settled first.

There is also a cultural argument embedded in the U.S. model. Many U.S. military leaders distinguish jointness from homogenization. Jointness, in this view, is cooperation among different professional cultures, not the flattening of those cultures into one standardized identity. Preserving expertise and tradition is not nostalgia but a way to keep distinct operational competencies intact.

If South Korea chooses a path unlike the U.S., it must answer a basic question: Is there a personnel and promotion system strong enough to enforce jointness without merging academies? If the answer is no, then an academy merger risks being read as power restructuring rather than reform - a reorganization that tightens networks without necessarily improving battlefield integration.

The policy debate should therefore be less about whether a merger looks bold and more about whether South Korea has the mechanisms that actually create joint forces: assignment rules, promotion incentives and civilian control that cannot be bypassed. Without those, "integration" may produce the appearance of jointness while leaving its foundations unfinished.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

8. Trump’s BFF Kim Jong Un Is Panicking After Decapitation Drama

​Summary:

Don Kirk argues that POTUS’s commando raid to seize Nicolás Maduro has deeply unnerved Kim Jong Un. Decades of U.S.–ROK “decapitation” drills were abstract. Caracas turned the concept into proof of concept. Former negotiators say north Korea knows Washington has long planned options to “get Kim.” A north Korean TV report about Maduro’s capture is portrayed as regime messaging that such an operation could target Kim, his sister, and his daughter. The piece concludes that a real U.S. decapitation strike is both tempting and terrifying, heightening Kim’s dependence on nuclear weapons as his ultimate shield.

Comment: What former negotiators have said we have long planned options to "get him?" :-) But I hope we can exploit this for positive influence effects.

Trump’s BFF Kim Jong Un Is Panicking After Decapitation Drama

The Daily Beast

The U.S. president’s surprise Venezuela raid is reverberating in dangerous ways on the Korean Peninsula.

Donald Kirk

Updated Jan. 19 2026 7:00AM EST 

Published Jan. 19 2026 6:07AM EST 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is getting the message: He’s vulnerable to the same quick hit that President Trump ordered to pluck Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro from power and toss him into custody in New York.

The brazen Jan. 3 raid on Caracas by U.S. forces almost certainly struck more fear into the potbellied dictator than any military drills or aerial shows of force ever could. In doing so, it’s also ramped up the risks of a potential nuclear showdown as Kim goes into panic mode, triggered by the same American president who has routinely boasted of the pair’s “very good relationship.”

“The operation to ‘rendition’ the president of Venezuela demonstrates the capabilities that have to be of concern to North Korea,” says Sydney Seiler, former national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council. The word “rendition,” as used by Seiler, is CIA-speak for capturing an enemy operative and sending him elsewhere for prosecution, or even torture and killing.

A handout photo provided by Dong-A Ilbo of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the South and North Korea on June 30, 2019 in Panmunjom, South Korea. Dong-A Ilbo via Getty Images/Getty Images

The other key word is “decapitation,” which Kim is well aware the Americans have been practicing in annual military exercises for years. “What’s appealing is that decapitation is the quickest way to terminate a conflict,” Seiler, who visited North Korea on negotiating teams before the North cut off all communications after the failure of Kim’s meetings with Trump in 2019, told the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“Decapitation would be helpful in trying to deter North Korea,” Seiler believes. “Without Kim Jong Un,” he notes, North Korea would have no leader, no one who would know how to lead its outsized, underfed armed forces of 1.2 million troops, much less anyone in charge of its nuclear program.

Kim Jong Un’s Daughter, 13, Fuels Succession RumorsKIM JONG YOUNG

Tom Sanders

Kim betrayed his deepest fears of a plot like the fracas in Caracas by authorizing release for North Korean audiences of a film all about the capture of Maduro. The film “Days and Nights of Confrontation,” could not have aired on North Korean state TV at a more propitious moment, days after elite U.S. troops seized Maduro and his wife. The message is clear: what’s to stop the Americans from repeating themselves in North Korea?

The film epitomizes “the trend of racy, Hollywood-style content aimed at appealing to young people,” says a South Korean website, NK News, that tracks North Korea. “Surely Mr. Kim and his family, including his fiery younger sister Yo-Jong, and his beloved teenage daughter, Ju-ae, would make great targets.” In one fell swoop the Americans could wipe out the dynasty that Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il-Sung, founded when the Soviet Union installed him as leader of the northern half of the divided Korean peninsula after the Japanese surrender in 1945.

Capturing Kim is not a new idea for American “rendition” experts.

President Donald Trump and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un talk before a meeting in the Demilitarized Zone on June 30, 2019, in Panmunjom, Korea. BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images

“Some White House aides believed his death would paralyze his country,” writes Joel Wit, who also joined negotiating teams to North Korea, inspecting the nuclear site at Yongbyon north of Pyongyang after North Korea signed an agreement in 1994 to stop producing nukes. “Go get Kim Jong Un, we were postured to do that,” says Wit in his tell-all book, Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea. One official is quoted as saying: “Everyone, including the North Koreans, knew killing him as part of the war plan.”

Maybe the U.S. would have to marshal more than the 150 or so aircraft, and a few hundred troops, including the U.S. Army’s elite Delta Force, that were needed to grab Maduro, but Kim is well aware his family and entourage could be hustled aboard a helicopter bound for an American warship long before the Russians and Chinese could respond in support of North Korea’s military establishment, ill-fed, ill-trained and not at all ready to leap to their leader’s instant defense.

President Donald Trump met with Kim Jong Un at the start of their historic U.S.-North Korea summit, at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty

If capturing Kim sounds like mission impossible, consider his frequent appearances inspecting industrial and agricultural projects, reviewing troops, and presiding at ceremonies. He also shows up periodically at missile launches, perhaps the best time of all to catch him just as he’s making a show of pressing the button. The Americans, moreover, are steeped in the knowledge of what it will take to get him. U.S. forces have been training for years to go after him. Annual U.S.-South Korean exercises once routinely wound up with a mock “decapitation” of “the North Korean leader,” without explicitly naming Kim.

The U.S. command in Korea dropped the word “decapitation” from the war games in deference to their South Korean ally, who reminded them such language might not help in attempts at fruitless talks with the North Koreans, who now refuse to talk anyway. The word is gaining currency again with Maduro’s capture—while raising the question in Pyongyang of who might come next on the American hit list.

Kim Jong Un was shown on Sept. 16, 2017, celebrating the launching drill of the ICBM Hwasong-12. Kim vowed to complete North Korea’s nuclear force despite sanctions, saying the final goal of his country’s weapons development was “equilibrium of real force” with the United States, state media reported. STR/AFP via Getty

“North Korea’s Kim expected to cling to [his] nuclear security blanket after Venezuela,” blared one headline in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. “The United States’ decapitation operation against Venezuela will reinforce North Korea’s nuclear ambitions,” read another. That warning should prompt Trump to act quickly to get rid of a nuisance who’s been plaguing the region for years with bombastic harangues, threatening his enemies with a nuclear holocaust while his own people suffer from hunger and disease.

Flights of heavy American bombers do little or nothing to remove the threats posed by America’s foes. Kim knows he can laugh off another aerial show of intimidation or a useless meeting with Trump. The threat of a Maduro-style capture is far more effective. Kim’s worst fear is that the Americans, after rehearsing “decapitation” for years, will decide it’s time to finally put their plan into effect, stifling Asia’s leading terrorist just as suddenly as they whisked Maduro and his wife off to jail in New York.

The Daily Beast

9. Column: Venezuela lessons for North Korea air defenses

​Summary:

The column argues that Venezuela’s experience showed Russian air defenses failed not because the missiles were “bad” but because the system lacked real integration. Modern air defense is a network of sensors, C2, comms, and interceptors; if electronic warfare and cyber attacks break those links, even advanced systems are blinded. Applied to north Korea, the piece stresses that dense, layered defenses around Pyongyang mean little if aging Soviet and newer systems are poorly networked, rarely trained under realistic jamming, and controlled by a brittle, overcentralized command structure. Hardware is visible; true capability is integrated, resilient, and practiced.

Comment: If a U.S.–ROK campaign prioritizes degrading north Korea’s radars, datalinks, and command nodes in the opening hours, how much real deterrent value would Pyongyang’s touted “stealth killing” air defenses actually retain? The message is if you are dependent on Soviet/Russia style air defenses you will not have effective air defense.

World News Jan. 19, 2026 / 11:12 PM / Updated Jan. 19, 2026 at 11:12 PM

Column: Venezuela lessons for North Korea air defenses

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/19/column-venezuela-lessons-for-nkore-air-defenses/5301768866629/

A demonstrator holds a US and Venezuelan flag outside the Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida on Saturday, January 3, 2026. President Nicolas Maduro has been charged in the US after he was captured and flown out of Venezuela, following a series of airstrikes that mark an extraordinary escalation in the Trump administration's months-long campaign against the country. Photo by Nicole Combeau/UPI | License Photo

Jan. 19 (Asia Today) -- The New York Times reported last Monday that Russia's vaunted air defense systems proved largely ineffective over Venezuela during a combined attack that blended stealth, electronic warfare and cyber operations. The point was not that the missiles were "bad." It was that modern air defense lives or dies on integration, connectivity and training.

That lesson matters on the Korean Peninsula because North Korea has spent years building an air defense network around Pyongyang and other strategic sites, mixing older Soviet-era systems with newer Russian-made equipment and domestically produced surface-to-air missiles. On paper, that sounds like an upgrade. In practice, Venezuela suggests the bigger question is whether North Korea can operate those pieces as a coherent, resilient system once the shooting starts.

Hardware is not a network

Russian-made systems such as the S-300 family, Buk series and shorter-range point-defense weapons have long been marketed as tools that can raise the cost of air operations. But Venezuela underscored a hard truth: even advanced interceptors can be neutralized if the kill chain is disrupted.

Air defense is not a collection of launchers. It is a network of sensors, command-and-control nodes, communications links and interceptor batteries that must share data in real time. Break the links and you blind the system. Jam the radios, spoof the sensors, attack the data paths and the "fearsome arsenal" becomes a set of isolated components.

North Korea's layered defense, and its weak seams

North Korea's air defenses are often described as dense and layered: surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, early-warning radars and overlapping coverage designed to protect Pyongyang and key infrastructure. Density can complicate an attacker's planning, especially at lower altitudes.

But density is not the same as modernization. Much of the North's inventory is widely assessed as aging, with limited networking and limited redundancy in communications under electronic attack. Even where newer systems exist, their combat effectiveness depends on sustained training and on a command structure capable of rapid, secure decision-making in a contested environment.

North Korea also claims its newer surface-to-air missiles can counter stealth aircraft and electronic warfare while engaging multiple targets. The problem is not the claim. The problem is verification and execution. Without demonstrable performance and realistic exercises that stress the system under jamming and cyber disruption, the deterrent value of those claims is uncertain.

The Venezuela scenario Pyongyang should fear

If a multi-domain attack succeeds in stripping away "eyes and ears" - degrading radars, jamming links, confusing track data, disrupting command nodes - then the defender can be left with launchers that cannot receive reliable targeting information. That is how an air defense "network" can fail even when it still has missiles on rails.

North Korea's vulnerabilities are clearest in three areas.

First is training. Advanced systems demand constant, demanding drills that simulate real combat conditions, including degraded communications and competing tracks.

Second is command-and-control. A modern air defense fight is a data fight. If the command system is slow, brittle or overcentralized, it becomes a single point of failure.

Third is communications resilience. In an environment shaped by electronic warfare and cyber operations, reliable, high-speed, hardened networks are not optional. They are the system.

Civilian readers should take one takeaway

North Korea may possess air defense equipment, including systems inspired by Russian designs. That does not automatically translate into the ability to stop airpower. The true measure is integrated defense: trained personnel, resilient networks and a command structure that can function when the electromagnetic spectrum is hostile and the data layer is under attack.

The Venezuela case is a warning that should not be dismissed as a distant anecdote. It is a reminder that in modern war, hardware is only the visible part of capability. The decisive factor is whether the system can fight as a system.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

10. 1,000 K2 Black Panther Tanks Have a Message for the Russian Army

​Summary:

Poland is filling the armor gap left by donating Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine by buying and then building up to 1,000 South Korean K2 Black Panthers. The K2 is a lighter, highly mobile, fourth-generation main battle tank with advanced fire control, autoloader, and adaptive suspension shaped by Korean Peninsula terrain. Seoul offered what Europe and the U.S. would not: speed, scale, and deep tech transfer. Early K2s were delivered quickly as “gap fillers.” The K2PL variant will be produced in Poland, with added armor, anti drone and EW systems, and full NATO network integration, restoring mass while rebuilding Poland’s armor industry.

1,000 K2 Black Panther Tanks Have a Message for the Russian Army

19fortyfive.com · Isaac Seitz · January 20, 2026

Facing a critical shortage of armor after donating hundreds of Soviet-era vehicles to Ukraine, Poland is rapidly modernizing its land forces with the South Korean K2 Black Panther. Unlike the heavier M1 Abrams, the 55-ton K2 features a fourth-generation design with an autoloader and hydropneumatic suspension optimized for rough terrain. The massive deal includes 180 immediate “gap filler” tanks and a long-term plan to produce the heavily modified “K2PL” variant domestically.

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/01/best-tank-on-earth-k2-black-panther-have-a-message-for-the-russian-military-and-nato/

Why Poland Ordered 1,000 Advanced South Korean K2 Black Panther Tanks

In the last ten years, Poland has been trying to substantially modernize its tank forces, especially as the war in Ukraine threatens to escalate into a wider conflict.

K2 Black Panther. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

K2 Black Panther. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

K2 Black Panther. Image: Creative Commons.

Poland already possessed a sizable number of Soviet-era tanks, but since most of these have been donated to Ukraine, it has since been acquiring other Western models like the Leopard 2 and the M1 Abrams. In 2020, however, Poland took an interest in acquiring and producing South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks.

Since then, the K2 has become a staple of the Polish Land Forces, with around 180 tanks delivered and more to be produced domestically. Some even say the K2 Black Panther might even be the best tank on Earth, surpassing even the legendary M1 Abrams.

The K2: One of the Most Advanced Tanks in the World

The K2 Black Panther is a fourth-generation main battle tank developed by South Korea over a period spanning the mid-1990s to the late 2000s.

Designed by South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development and produced by Hyundai Rotem, the tank entered service with the Republic of Korea Army in 2014. Its development was shaped by the operational demands of the Korean Peninsula, where mountainous terrain, river obstacles, and the presence of a numerically superior adversary demanded a tank that emphasized mobility, situational awareness, and precision fire rather than sheer weight alone.

In physical terms, the K2 weighs approximately 55 to 56 metric tons, making it lighter than the American M1 Abrams but still heavily protected. It is armed with a 120-millimeter L/55 smoothbore gun fitted with an autoloader, allowing the crew to be reduced to three.

The tank incorporates a highly advanced fire-control system that enables hunter-killer operations, engagement while moving, and effective night and all-weather combat. Its hydropneumatic suspension system allows the vehicle to adjust its posture dynamically, improving gun depression, cross-country mobility, and survivability in uneven terrain. These characteristics place the K2 among the world’s most technologically sophisticated main battle tanks.

The Ukraine War: Poland Prepares for War

Prior to 2022, the Polish Army was in transition, but not in any state of urgency. The Polish Army operated a mix of German Leopard 2A4 and 2A5 tanks, domestically modernized PT-91 Twardy tanks derived from the T-72, and a large number of older Soviet-era T-72 variants.

Russian T-72 tank from Ukraine War. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Russian T-72 tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

While this set up is far from ideal, it was considered adequate for a NATO member under the assumption of alliance reinforcement and gradual modernization over decades. That assumption collapsed after Poland’s decision to transfer hundreds of tanks to Ukraine during the first year of the war.

The donation of T-72s and PT-91s was helpful for Ukraine but created an immediate capability gap for Poland. Entire armored brigades were left undermanned or reliant on aging vehicles with limited survivability against modern anti-tank weapons. Poland now faced a paradox: it needed not dozens, but hundreds of modern main battle tanks, and it needed them within a few years rather than a decade. Existing European production lines, particularly for the Leopard 2, could not scale fast enough to meet this demand. American Abrams deliveries, while vital, were constrained by long training pipelines, logistics demands, and high operating costs.

M1E3 Tank at the Detroit Auto Show. Image Credit: 19FortyFive.

M1E3 Tank at the Detroit Auto Show. Image Credit: 19FortyFive.com

Why South Korean Tanks?

South Korea’s defense industry offered a solution that European manufacturers could not match at the time: industrial scale, speed, and political flexibility. Hyundai Rotem was already producing K2 tanks in serial quantities for the Republic of Korea Army and had the capacity to quickly divert production.

More importantly, the South Korean government demonstrated a willingness to negotiate extensive technology-transfer and local-production arrangements, something that Germany and the United States have historically been reluctant to do for frontline armor systems.

This difference proved decisive. Poland did not simply want to buy tanks; it wanted to rebuild its own tank-building capability, which had largely atrophied after the end of PT-91 production in the late 2000s. South Korea’s offer aligned with this ambition, framing the K2 not as a one-time acquisition but as the foundation of a long-term industrial partnership. The geopolitical incentives were also aligned, as Seoul viewed Poland as its entry point into the European defense market and NATO supply chain.

From Procurement to Production

In July 2022, Poland and South Korea signed a massive agreement covering up to 1,000 K2 Black Panther tanks, along with K9 self-propelled howitzers, Chunmoo rocket artillery systems, and FA-50 aircraft. The first phase of the K2 program called for the delivery of 180 tanks in a modified configuration known as the K2GF, or “gap filler” variant.

These vehicles were produced in South Korea but adapted for Polish and NATO requirements, allowing them to be fielded quickly with minimal doctrinal disruption. Deliveries of the K2GF began within months, an unprecedented timeline by European standards. Polish armored units began training on the platform in 2023, and by 2024, the first operational battalion had reached readiness. This rapid fielding alone would have justified the decision from a purely military standpoint, but the longer-term significance of the program lay in its second phase.

The decisive step in Poland’s K2 program was the move from procurement to domestic production. Subsequent executive contracts signed in 2024 and 2025 established the K2PL variant, a heavily modified version of the tank tailored to Polish operational requirements and built increasingly in Poland. Initial K2PL units would be assembled in South Korea, but the majority are to be produced at the Bumar-Łabędy plant in Gliwice under the Polish Armaments Group.

The K2PL incorporates additional armor packages, anti-drone sensors, electronic warfare systems, and full integration with Polish and NATO battlefield management networks. These changes reflect lessons drawn directly from the war in Ukraine, particularly the threat posed by loitering munitions, massed artillery, and battlefield surveillance drones.

Crucially, the production agreement includes technology transfer sufficient to allow Poland to maintain, repair, and modernize the tanks without permanent dependence on foreign suppliers.

About the Author: Isaac Seitz

Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.

19fortyfive.com · Isaac Seitz · January 20, 2026

11. North Korea-linked hackers pose as human rights activists, report says

​Summary:

Genians reports that north Korea linked Konni hackers are running “Operation Poseidon,” a sophisticated spearphishing campaign against South Korean targets. They impersonate north Korean human rights groups and financial institutions, hiding malicious links behind trusted ad-tracking and redirection URLs such as Google Ads and compromised WordPress sites. Victims are funneled to malware disguised as PDFs or financial notices, enabling long term access and espionage. Konni overlaps with Kimsuky and APT37, reinforcing the picture of a coordinated, state backed cyber apparatus that helps finance Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. Traditional email filters struggle because the delivery path looks legitimate.

Comment: More broadly I know one renowned human rights advocate who has been continually attacked by malign cyber actors. I think almost everyone who is connected to "Korea watching" has been touched by cyber warriors from north Korea.  But this article raises important questions: How vulnerable are north Korea focused NGOs and research institutes worldwide, given that their mission makes them especially likely to open “urgent” documents about human rights or sanctions? (Need for cyber hygiene and cyber civil defense and defense of networks)

What specific alliance cyber defenses, beyond basic spam filtering, are needed to blunt this full spectrum DPRK cyber program that now operates at near China and Russia levels of sophistication?

World News Jan. 19, 2026 / 2:56 AM

North Korea-linked hackers pose as human rights activists, report says

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/19/North-Korea-hackers-Konni-spear-phishing-APT-Genians/5761768807686/

North Korean hackers have impersonated human rights organizations and financial institutions in South Korea to lure targets into opening malicious files, according to a report released Monday by cybersecurity firm Genians. File Photo by Stephen Shaver/UPI | License Photo

SEOUL, Jan. 19 (UPI) -- North Korea-linked hackers are using emails that impersonate human rights organizations and financial institutions to lure targets into opening malicious files, according to a threat intelligence report released Monday by South Korean cybersecurity firm Genians.

The campaign, dubbed "Operation Poseidon," has been attributed to the Konni hacking cluster, a group linked by security researchers to Pyongyang-backed cyber operations and known for conducting long-running advanced persistent threat, or APT, campaigns.

"The threat actor was identified as repeatedly employing social engineering tactics by impersonating North Korean human rights organizations and financial institutions in South Korea," the Genians Security Center report said.

Genians said Konni has overlapping targets and infrastructure with other North Korea-linked threat groups, including Kimsuky and APT37, which have been tied to cyber espionage, surveillance and influence operations targeting South Korean government agencies, researchers and civil society groups.

Related

• U.S. sanctions North Koreans over cybercrime money laundering
• United States, South Korea, Japan address North Korean IT threats
• U.S. sanctions North Korean hacker for crimes benefitting Kim Jong Un's arms programs

According to the report, the spearphishing emails relied on links that appeared trustworthy because they passed through legitimate online advertising and click-tracking systems commonly used to track user engagement. By embedding malicious destinations behind trusted tracking URLs, the attackers were able to bypass email security filters and reduce suspicion among recipients.

The links ultimately redirected victims to servers hosting malicious files. Genians said the scheme exploited Google Ads redirection URLs and poorly secured WordPress sites to deliver malware payloads, with the files often disguised as PDF documents or financial notices.

Security experts say APT campaigns are among the most challenging to defend against because they combine long-term access with carefully crafted social engineering designed to bypass conventional defenses.

"Considering the comprehensive nature of these attack characteristics, 'Operation Poseidon' is classified as a sophisticated APT campaign that is difficult to counter through any single security solution," the Genians report said.

The findings come as North Korea, under heavy international sanctions, has increasingly turned to hacking and cybertheft to help bankroll its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

An October report by the 11-country Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team described North Korea's cybercrime apparatus as "a full-spectrum, national program operating at a sophistication approaching the cyber programs of China and Russia."

The report added that "nearly all the DPRK's malicious cyber activity, cybercrime, laundering and IT work is carried out under the supervision, direction and for the benefit of entities sanctioned by the United Nations for their role in the DPRK's unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs."

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.

In November, the U.S. Treasury Department assessed that North Korea had stolen more than $3 billion over the past three years in attacks on financial systems and cryptocurrency platforms.

Genians urged organizations and individuals to remain cautious when receiving unsolicited emails.

"Since similar attacks impersonating financial institutions are likely to continue in the future, extra caution is required," the report said. "Users should not assume a document is legitimate based only on the email subject or filename."

12. Military advised to establish joint operations command to prepare for wartime control transfer

​Summary:

A special advisory committee urged Seoul to create a new joint operations command to unify wartime and peacetime command as South Korea prepares for OPCON transfer within President Lee Jae Myung’s term. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would shift toward strategy, force development and overseas deployments. The committee also pressed to redefine Strategic Command, stand up a space command, and scrap the overlapping Drone Operations Command. To strengthen deterrence against north Korea, it called for rapid deployment of high power anti ballistic missiles, L SAM, and satellites, plus 10 percent annual R&D growth and legal reforms after the 2024 martial law scandal.

Excerpt:

"(The committee) suggested establishing a joint operations command for unifying the command structure and enhancing the completion of wartime and peacetime operational command," the ministry said in a release.

Comment: I have to call attention to the use of the word "command" in this excerpt. No country ever gives up command of their military South Korea has never given up command of its military despite the MacArthur memo of 1950. President Rhee demonstrated command of his military when he ordered ROK forces to advance across the 38th parallel in contravention of MacArthur's orders. And through history the ROK has always demonstrated its command of its military even during the tragic events of Kwangju. This is important because this is the heart of the sovereignty issue. The ROK has never given up command of its forces just as the US does not give up command of its forces. The ROK and US decide to provide forces to the bilateral combined to be under its operational CONTROL. This is a deliberate decision by each nation's National Command and Military Authorities. And most importantly, the US does not command and control ROK forces. The bilateral combined command the ROK/US CFC exercises operational control over both ROK and US forces but sovereign command remains with their respective nations. This is because the ROK/US CFC answers to the Military Committee and both nations have equal ownership of the ROK/US CFC. So the talk about OPCON transition being a sovereignty issue is a red herring and that should not be an argument for OPCON transition. Providing forces to the ROK/US CFC is not an infringement on ROK sovereignty just as it will not be for the US when the ROK/US CFC is commanded by a ROK General.

The fundamental question must always be: how should the ROK and US organize their forces to defend the ROK and US and fight and win? (and train and equip). How we do that will not be and never has been an infringement on sovereignty and it would be helpful if the ROK and US governments informed and educated their citizens to this fact.

(LEAD) Military advised to establish joint operations command to prepare for wartime control transfer | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260120002951315

(ATTN: ADDS details throughout)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- A special advisory committee tasked with reforming the military has called for establishing a joint operations command as South Korea pushes for a handover of wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington, the defense ministry said Tuesday.

The recommendation by the committee, comprising civilian, government and military officials, comes as South Korea seeks to achieve the conditions-based OPCON handover from Washington within President Lee Jae Myung's five-year term ending in 2030.

"(The committee) suggested establishing a joint operations command for unifying the command structure and enhancing the completion of wartime and peacetime operational command," the ministry said in a release.

Under the plan, the envisioned command is expected to spearhead the military's operational function currently led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS will instead focus on other roles, such as establishing military strategy, building military power and dispatching military units for overseas deployment.

As part of the structural reform, the military was also advised to redefine the role and mission of the Strategic Command to ensure its strategic autonomy and underscored the need for launching a space command to respond to changes in the space security landscape and future warfare trends.

The Drone Operations Command was advised to be scrapped in consideration of overlapping features with respective functions within military branches, according to the ministry.

This undated photo, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows flags flying at the defense ministry compound. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Addressing deterrence against North Korean threats, the committee called for the early deployment of key assets, such as high-power, high-precision anti-ballistic missiles and a long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) interception system, as well as military satellites.

The committee also called for an annual average of a 10 percent hike in the defense research and development budget for cutting-edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence, defense semiconductors and robotics, according to the ministry.

Meanwhile, the committee also proposed rebuilding the military, as former President Yoon Suk Yeol's botched martial law bid in late 2024 has led to a massive dismissal of involved senior military officers.

The committee called for revising military law to reflect more detailed rules on assessing whether an order is legitimate and exempting those who defied unlawful orders from their superiors from punishment.

Also included among the measures are scaling down the commanding authority of the martial law commander in the event of a martial law imposition.

"The defense ministry plans to take into account the details announced by the committee in the defense reform policy following a review of its validity," ministry spokesperson Chung Binna said in a press briefing.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 20, 2026

13. S. Korea says invited to Trump's proposed peace board for Gaza

​Summary:

POTUS invited South Korea to join a proposed Gaza Peace Board, with Seoul reviewing participation as part of a 60 nation list despite Israeli objections.

S. Korea says invited to Trump's proposed peace board for Gaza | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · January 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260120008800315?section=national/diplomacy

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump has invited South Korea to join his proposed Board of Peace for Gaza and Seoul's potential participation is "under review," the foreign ministry said Tuesday.

The ministry confirmed the invitation to the initiative, described by Trump as aimed at building peace and reconstructing the war-ravaged region. Trump has made the offer to about 60 countries, including Canada, France, Turkey, China and Israel, as well as the European Union.

The offer was also extended to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"The invitation was received only recently and a decision on participation will be made after taking into account which countries will be involved," a foreign ministry official said. "It will take time to be reviewed."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voiced opposition to the proposal that he said was not coordinated with his country, a party to the devastating war in the Palestinian territory.

This AP photo shows U.S. President Donald Trump waving to the media as he walks on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington on Jan. 20, 2026. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · January 20, 2026

​14. China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?

​Summary:

South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung used his January 4 state visit to Beijing to pursue “pragmatic diplomacy,” seeking economic gains and reduced friction with China while preserving the U.S. alliance. He signed multiple MOUs on trade, tech and supply chains, but core disputes over Yellow Sea maritime issues, THAAD-linked cultural sanctions, and north Korea remain unresolved. Xi Jinping pressed historical narratives and “right side of history” language to pull Seoul away from Washington and Tokyo, while Lee tried to hedge on Taiwan and Japan. Lee’s balancing act now depends on whether U.S. China tensions intensify further or stabilize soon.

Comment: If U.S.–China confrontation deepens, what is Seoul’s breaking point where “pragmatic diplomacy” gives way to a forced strategic choice between Washington and Beijing?

China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?

Jan 16, 2026

• 
  
• Richard Weitz
• Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

South Korea has recently proven atypically successful in straddling regional tensions involving China, but Beijing’s strained relations with Washington and its allies will sorely test Seoul’s pragmatic diplomacy in 2026. 

https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-rok-relations-on-the-rebound

South Korea's President Lee Jae Myung has called for a "new phase" in ties with China as he met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Monday, January 4, 2026.

On January 4, Lee Jae Myung became the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to travel to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2019. During his four-day state visit, Lee met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Chairman of the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji, and other senior PRC leaders. Lee stated that, "Korea-China relations will advance to an entirely new stage through this visit to China." This will almost certainly not be the case. 

The visit did address a wide range of important topics. However, the trip did not resolve any of the main differences between the two countries. The two governments deferred several sensitive questions to future discussions between the PRC and ROK officials. Implementing the economic and commercial agreements will depend on the capacity and willingness of many public and private sector actors to transform memoranda of understanding (MOUs) into concrete business projects. The pledge to "restore strategic dialogue channels in various fields, including between the diplomatic and security authorities of both countries,” was also vague. 

Lee has termed his approach “pragmatic diplomacy.” Upon his return from China, he explained that, "In a ruthless international order where there are no eternal enemies, friends or rules, the fate of the Republic of Korea hinges on pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests.” After winning a snap presidential election and assuming office in early June, Lee initially focused on shoring up relations with the United States. More recently, he has concentrated on improving ties with the PRC and the DPRK. 

Lee’s visit made some progress on enhancing economic ties. The two governments signed MOUs to expand cooperation in more than a dozen areas, including supply chains, digital technology, business startups, intellectual property, child welfare, and environmental preservation. Lee’s delegation included many senior executives, who joined the president at the China-Korea business forum, where Lee called for expanding consumer goods sales and artificial intelligence cooperation. However, concerns about industrial espionage and U.S. export controls will continue to limit Sino-ROK high-tech trade. 

Lee secured only a vague promissory note to end China’s undeclared “Korean wave ban” on ROK cultural products, which began after the ROK angered the PRC by deploying a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in 2016. The sides reportedly agreed to begin by engaging in sports and games, such as football (soccer) and baduk (Go). They deferred expanding academic, entertainment, media, and youth exchanges to interagency deliberations. Following the trip, though, ROK Presidential Chief of Staff Kang Hoon Sik acknowledged that China was unlikely to halt its informal ban anytime soon. 

The governments also deferred their dispute over the Yellow (West) Sea to future vice-ministerial-level talks on maritime and ocean issues. The South Koreans have complained about illegal Chinese fishing in their territorial waters and China’s placing various metallic structures in the jointly managed Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). This is located between each country’s coastal territory but inside their overlapping exclusive economic zones. PRC representatives termed these structures fish farms, though some observers view them as the same kind of creeping territorial expansion through artificial islands that Beijing has employed in the South China Sea. Lee unsuccessfully proposed drawing a border line in the middle of the PMZ. 

Regarding North Korea, Lee repeated the same appeal to Xi that he made the previous November on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju: that Beijing use its influence with Pyongyang to rein in its nuclear program and resume diplomatic engagement with Seoul. Xi responded that patience was needed. His government committed only “to continue exploring creative ways to reduce tensions and build peace on the Korean Peninsula.” Official Chinese statements, including during Lee’s visit, no longer call for the Peninsula’s denuclearization. On the positive side, the Chinese side did not display major public concern about the South’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, which ROK officials said they explained in detail to the PRC counterparts. 

Xi made an overt effort to pull South Korea away from Japan and possibly the United States. In his meeting with Lee, Xi explicitly referred to both nations’ war of liberation against Japan: “Over 80 years ago, China and the ROK made great sacrifices in resisting Japanese militarism and achieved the victory. Today, it is all the more important for the two sides to join hands to defend the victorious outcomes of World War II, and safeguard peace and stability of Northeast Asia.” Xi also urged Lee to "firmly stand on the right side of history and make correct strategic choices." 

In his own comments, Lee also referenced the two countries’ historical partnership and visited a building in Shanghai where the Korean government-in-exile had met during Imperial Japan’s occupation of Korea. Lee also distanced himself from the Japanese-U.S. line regarding Taiwan. He helped defuse the issue by telling the PRC media in advance of his trip that he respected the “One China” policy.” 

Lee understandably wanted to keep South Korea from suffering Japan’s fate of heightened PRC denunciations and sanctions, which the ROK also experienced a decade earlier. When he visited Japan the following week, Lee avoided making public comments regarding China or Taiwan even while affirming intent to maintain robust relations with Japan. However, the two governments did discuss strengthening supply chains, an acknowledgement that PRC sanctions on Japan also impose costs on the ROK due to the three countries’ economic interdependencies. 

Other Asian governments face the same challenge as the Lee administration: how to balance the imperative of dealing with an increasingly assertive and economically preeminent China with their interest in sustaining economic and security ties with the United States and its allies. Lee has thus far adroitly juggled South Korea’s diverse interests through pragmatism and multi-vector diplomacy. But the viability of this strategy will be sorely tested if Sino-U.S. relations undergo a renewed downturn over trade, Taiwan, North Korea, or the many other policy differences between Beijing and Washington.

​15. 224 N. Korean defectors enter South last year, slightly down from 2024

​Summary:

South Korea received 224 north Korean defectors in 2025, down slightly from 236 in 2024 but above 2023’s 196, bringing the cumulative total to 34,538. Numbers plunged during COVID due to Pyongyang’s border controls and may stabilize as defectors stranded in third countries like China gradually make their way south.

224 N. Korean defectors enter South last year, slightly down from 2024 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 20, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260120004200315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Jan. 20 (Yonhap) -- A total of 224 North Korean defectors entered South Korea for resettlement last year, slightly down from the previous year, a unification ministry official said Tuesday.

The 2025 total includes 198 female defectors and 26 male counterparts, bringing the cumulative number of North Korean defectors who have resettled in the South to 34,538, the official said.

Inflows of North Korean defectors significantly dwindled during the COVID-19 pandemic amid Pyongyang's tight border controls, before rebounding to 196 in 2023 and 236 in 2024, according to the official.

The official said inflows of North Korean defectors may remain at similar levels down going forward, as those who have stayed in third countries, such as China, as stopover points are expected to enter South Korea.

Paintings wishing for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula are on display on July 13, 2025, in Seoul at a culture event marking the North Korean Defectors' Day. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 20, 2026

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com