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Quotes of the Day:
"Success is measured by your discipline and inner peace."
– Mike Ditka
"Knowledge is power. Information is power. The secreting or hoarding of knowledge or information may be an act of tyranny camouflaged as humility."
– Robin Morgan
"No cause is left but the most ancient of all, the one, in fact, that from the beginning of our history has determined the very existence of politics, the cause of freedom versus tyranny."
– Hannah Arendt
1. The Inaugural Address January 20, 2025
2. Trump Administration Day 1 Actions and Orders
3. President Trump's America First Priorities
4. Organization of the National Security Council and Subcommittees
5. Everything Trump said about national security on Day 1
6. Trump Pardons Nearly All 1,500 Jan. 6 Rioters
7. Two Americans Freed by Taliban in Prisoner Swap
8. Hamas Is Effectively Back in Control in Gaza
9. Trump takes credit for defeating ISIS; now he must fight its comeback
10. Trump’s First Day in Office: Signing Orders, Spinning Yarns, Settling Scores
11. The Who’s Who of Trump’s Exclusive Inauguration Ceremony
12. UC grad who resigned from Marine Corps joining U.S. Dept. of Defense after online controversy (Stuart Scheller)
13. American Exceptionalism Is Back
14. SASC pushes forward Hegseth nomination for defense secretary
15. How Biden’s Bureaucrats are Working to Obstruct Trump’s Next Term
16. Warfare's New Equation
17. Don't Listen to Putin: Ukraine's Kursk Offensive Was a Success
18. Fielding 3D Printing to Enhance the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s Readiness
19. Army experimenting with what the 'edge' is for cloud computing capabilities
20. The U.S. Needs Soldiers, Not Warriors
21. No Biden Pardon for Ukraine Impeachment Hoaxer Alexander Vindman
22. Putin Is Not Yet Desperate
23. Ending War Is Hard to Do
24. China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes
25. A New Playbook for Irregular Warfare: How the United States Can Win Without Fighting
26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025
27. Iran Update, January 20, 2025
1. The Inaugural Address January 20, 2025
The Inaugural Address – The White House
whitehouse.gov · by kparnitzke · January 20, 2025
Remarks
The Inaugural Address
January 20, 2025
U.S. Capitol
Washington, D.C.
12:10 P.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you very much, everybody. (Applause.) Wow. Thank you very, very much.
Vice President Vance, Speaker Johnson, Senator Thune, Chief Justice Roberts, justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, President Clinton, President Bush, President Obama, President Biden, Vice President Harris, and my fellow citizens, the golden age of America begins right now. (Applause.)
From this day forward, our country will flourish and be respected again all over the world. We will be the envy of every nation, and we will not allow ourselves to be taken advantage of any longer. During every single day of the Trump administration, I will, very simply, put America first. (Applause.)
Our sovereignty will be reclaimed. Our safety will be restored. The scales of justice will be rebalanced. The vicious, violent, and unfair weaponization of the Justice Department and our government will end. (Applause.)
And our top priority will be to create a nation that is proud, prosperous, and free. (Applause.)
America will soon be greater, stronger, and far more exceptional than ever before. (Applause.)
I return to the presidency confident and optimistic that we are at the start of a thrilling new era of national success. A tide of change is sweeping the country, sunlight is pouring over the entire world, and America has the chance to seize this opportunity like never before.
But first, we must be honest about the challenges we face. While they are plentiful, they will be annihilated by this great momentum that the world is now witnessing in the United States of America.
As we gather today, our government confronts a crisis of trust. For many years, a radical and corrupt establishment has extracted power and wealth from our citizens while the pillars of our society lay broken and seemingly in complete disrepair.
We now have a government that cannot manage even a simple crisis at home while, at the same time, stumbling into a continuing catalogue of catastrophic events abroad.
It fails to protect our magnificent, law-abiding American citizens but provides sanctuary and protection for dangerous criminals, many from prisons and mental institutions, that have illegally entered our country from all over the world.
We have a government that has given unlimited funding to the defense of foreign borders but refuses to defend American borders or, more importantly, its own people.
Our country can no longer deliver basic services in times of emergency, as recently shown by the wonderful people of North Carolina — who have been treated so badly — (applause) — and other states who are still suffering from a hurricane that took place many months ago or, more recently, Los Angeles, where we are watching fires still tragically burn from weeks ago without even a token of defense. They’re raging through the houses and communities, even affecting some of the wealthiest and most powerful individuals in our country — some of whom are sitting here right now. They don’t have a home any longer. That’s interesting. But we can’t let this happen. Everyone is unable to do anything about it. That’s going to change.
We have a public health system that does not deliver in times of disaster, yet more money is spent on it than any country anywhere in the world.
And we have an education system that teaches our children to be ashamed of themselves — in many cases, to hate our country despite the love that we try so desperately to provide to them. All of this will change starting today, and it will change very quickly. (Applause.)
My recent election is a mandate to completely and totally reverse a horrible betrayal and all of these many betrayals that have taken place and to give the people back their faith, their wealth, their democracy, and, indeed, their freedom. From this moment on, America’s decline is over. (Applause.)
Our liberties and our nation’s glorious destiny will no longer be denied. And we will immediately restore the integrity, competency, and loyalty of America’s government.
Over the past eight years, I have been tested and challenged more than any president in our 250-year history, and I’ve learned a lot along the way.
The journey to reclaim our republic has not been an easy one — that, I can tell you. Those who wish to stop our cause have tried to take my freedom and, indeed, to take my life.
Just a few months ago, in a beautiful Pennsylvania field, an assassin’s bullet ripped through my ear. But I felt then and believe even more so now that my life was saved for a reason. I was saved by God to make America great again. (Applause.)
Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.)
Thank you very much. (Applause.)
That is why each day under our administration of American patriots, we will be working to meet every crisis with dignity and power and strength. We will move with purpose and speed to bring back hope, prosperity, safety, and peace for citizens of every race, religion, color, and creed.
For American citizens, January 20th, 2025, is Liberation Day. (Applause.) It is my hope that our recent presidential election will be remembered as the greatest and most consequential election in the history of our country.
As our victory showed, the entire nation is rapidly unifying behind our agenda with dramatic increases in support from virtually every element of our society: young and old, men and women, African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, urban, suburban, rural. And very importantly, we had a powerful win in all seven swing states — (applause) — and the popular vote, we won by millions of people. (Applause.)
To the Black and Hispanic communities, I want to thank you for the tremendous outpouring of love and trust that you have shown me with your vote. We set records, and I will not forget it. I’ve heard your voices in the campaign, and I look forward to working with you in the years to come.
Today is Martin Luther King Day. And his honor — this will be a great honor. But in his honor, we will strive together to make his dream a reality. We will make his dream come true. (Applause.)
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.)
National unity is now returning to America, and confidence and pride is soaring like never before. In everything we do, my administration will be inspired by a strong pursuit of excellence and unrelenting success. We will not forget our country, we will not forget our Constitution, and we will not forget our God. Can’t do that. (Applause.)
Today, I will sign a series of historic executive orders. With these actions, we will begin the complete restoration of America and the revolution of common sense. It’s all about common sense. (Applause.)
First, I will declare a national emergency at our southern border. (Applause.)
All illegal entry will immediately be halted, and we will begin the process of returning millions and millions of criminal aliens back to the places from which they came. We will reinstate my Remain in Mexico policy. (Applause.)
I will end the practice of catch and release. (Applause.)
And I will send troops to the southern border to repel the disastrous invasion of our country. (Applause.)
Under the orders I sign today, we will also be designating the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. (Applause.)
And by invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, I will direct our government to use the full and immense power of federal and state law enforcement to eliminate the presence of all foreign gangs and criminal networks bringing devastating crime to U.S. soil, including our cities and inner cities. (Applause.)
As commander in chief, I have no higher responsibility than to defend our country from threats and invasions, and that is exactly what I am going to do. We will do it at a level that nobody has ever seen before.
Next, I will direct all members of my cabinet to marshal the vast powers at their disposal to defeat what was record inflation and rapidly bring down costs and prices. (Applause.)
The inflation crisis was caused by massive overspending and escalating energy prices, and that is why today I will also declare a national energy emergency. We will drill, baby, drill. (Applause.)
America will be a manufacturing nation once again, and we have something that no other manufacturing nation will ever have — the largest amount of oil and gas of any country on earth — and we are going to use it. We’ll use it. (Applause.)
We will bring prices down, fill our strategic reserves up again right to the top, and export American energy all over the world. (Applause.)
We will be a rich nation again, and it is that liquid gold under our feet that will help to do it.
With my actions today, we will end the Green New Deal, and we will revoke the electric vehicle mandate, saving our auto industry and keeping my sacred pledge to our great American autoworkers. (Applause.)
In other words, you’ll be able to buy the car of your choice.
We will build automobiles in America again at a rate that nobody could have dreamt possible just a few years ago. And thank you to the autoworkers of our nation for your inspiring vote of confidence. We did tremendously with their vote. (Applause.)
I will immediately begin the overhaul of our trade system to protect American workers and families. Instead of taxing our citizens to enrich other countries, we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens. (Applause.)
For this purpose, we are establishing the External Revenue Service to collect all tariffs, duties, and revenues. It will be massive amounts of money pouring into our Treasury, coming from foreign sources.
The American dream will soon be back and thriving like never before.
To restore competence and effectiveness to our federal government, my administration will establish the brand-new Department of Government Efficiency. (Applause.)
After years and years of illegal and unconstitutional federal efforts to restrict free expression, I also will sign an executive order to immediately stop all government censorship and bring back free speech to America. (Applause.)
Never again will the immense power of the state be weaponized to persecute political opponents — something I know something about. (Laughter.) We will not allow that to happen. It will not happen again.
Under my leadership, we will restore fair, equal, and impartial justice under the constitutional rule of law. (Applause.)
And we are going to bring law and order back to our cities. (Applause.)
This week, I will also end the government policy of trying to socially engineer race and gender into every aspect of public and private life. (Applause.) We will forge a society that is colorblind and merit-based. (Applause.)
As of today, it will henceforth be the official policy of the United States government that there are only two genders: male and female. (Applause.)
This week, I will reinstate any service members who were unjustly expelled from our military for objecting to the COVID vaccine mandate with full back pay. (Applause.)
And I will sign an order to stop our warriors from being subjected to radical political theories and social experiments while on duty. It’s going to end immediately. (Applause.) Our armed forces will be freed to focus on their sole mission: defeating America’s enemies. (Applause.)
Like in 2017, we will again build the strongest military the world has ever seen. We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end — and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. (Applause.)
My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier. That’s what I want to be: a peacemaker and a unifier.
I’m pleased to say that as of yesterday, one day before I assumed office, the hostages in the Middle East are coming back home to their families. (Applause.)
Thank you.
America will reclaim its rightful place as the greatest, most powerful, most respected nation on earth, inspiring the awe and admiration of the entire world.
A short time from now, we are going to be changing the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America — (applause) — and we will restore the name of a great president, William McKinley, to Mount McKinley, where it should be and where it belongs. (Applause.)
President McKinley made our country very rich through tariffs and through talent — he was a natural businessman — and gave Teddy Roosevelt the money for many of the great things he did, including the Panama Canal, which has foolishly been given to the country of Panama after the United Spates — the United States — I mean, think of this — spent more money than ever spent on a project before and lost 38,000 lives in the building of the Panama Canal.
We have been treated very badly from this foolish gift that should have never been made, and Panama’s promise to us has been broken.
The purpose of our deal and the spirit of our treaty has been totally violated. American ships are being severely overcharged and not treated fairly in any way, shape, or form. And that includes the United States Navy.
And above all, China is operating the Panama Canal. And we didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back. (Applause.)
Above all, my message to Americans today is that it is time for us to once again act with courage, vigor, and the vitality of history’s greatest civilization.
So, as we liberate our nation, we will lead it to new heights of victory and success. We will not be deterred. Together, we will end the chronic disease epidemic and keep our children safe, healthy, and disease-free.
The United States will once again consider itself a growing nation — one that increases our wealth, expands our territory, builds our cities, raises our expectations, and carries our flag into new and beautiful horizons.
And we will pursue our manifest destiny into the stars, launching American astronauts to plant the Stars and Stripes on the planet Mars. (Applause.)
Ambition is the lifeblood of a great nation, and, right now, our nation is more ambitious than any other. There’s no nation like our nation.
Americans are explorers, builders, innovators, entrepreneurs, and pioneers. The spirit of the frontier is written into our hearts. The call of the next great adventure resounds from within our souls.
Our American ancestors turned a small group of colonies on the edge of a vast continent into a mighty republic of the most extraordinary citizens on Earth. No one comes close.
Americans pushed thousands of miles through a rugged land of untamed wilderness. They crossed deserts, scaled mountains, braved untold dangers, won the Wild West, ended slavery, rescued millions from tyranny, lifted billions from poverty, harnessed electricity, split the atom, launched mankind into the heavens, and put the universe of human knowledge into the palm of the human hand. If we work together, there is nothing we cannot do and no dream we cannot achieve.
Many people thought it was impossible for me to stage such a historic political comeback. But as you see today, here I am. The American people have spoken. (Applause.)
I stand before you now as proof that you should never believe that something is impossible to do. In America, the impossible is what we do best. (Applause.)
From New York to Los Angeles, from Philadelphia to Phoenix, from Chicago to Miami, from Houston to right here in Washington, D.C., our country was forged and built by the generations of patriots who gave everything they had for our rights and for our freedom.
They were farmers and soldiers, cowboys and factory workers, steelworkers and coal miners, police officers and pioneers who pushed onward, marched forward, and let no obstacle defeat their spirit or their pride.
Together, they laid down the railroads, raised up the skyscrapers, built great highways, won two world wars, defeated fascism and communism, and triumphed over every single challenge that they faced.
After all we have been through together, we stand on the verge of the four greatest years in American history. With your help, we will restore America promise and we will rebuild the nation that we love — and we love it so much.
We are one people, one family, and one glorious nation under God. So, to every parent who dreams for their child and every child who dreams for their future, I am with you, I will fight for you, and I will win for you. We’re going to win like never before. (Applause.)
Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.)
Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.)
In recent years, our nation has suffered greatly. But we are going to bring it back and make it great again, greater than ever before.
We will be a nation like no other, full of compassion, courage, and exceptionalism. Our power will stop all wars and bring a new spirit of unity to a world that has been angry, violent, and totally unpredictable.
America will be respected again and admired again, including by people of religion, faith, and goodwill. We will be prosperous, we will be proud, we will be strong, and we will win like never before.
We will not be conquered, we will not be intimidated, we will not be broken, and we will not fail. From this day on, the United States of America will be a free, sovereign, and independent nation.
We will stand bravely, we will live proudly, we will dream boldly, and nothing will stand in our way because we are Americans. The future is ours, and our golden age has just begun.
Thank you. God bless America. Thank you all. Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you. (Applause.)
Thank you. (Applause.)
END 12:40 P.M. EST
whitehouse.gov · by kparnitzke · January 20, 2025
2.Trump Administration Day 1 Actions and Orders
So many actions on Day 1. They can all be accessed at this link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
You can find all the cabinet and many sub-cabinet appointments and acting Chairman
3. President Trump's America First Priorities
President Trump's America First Priorities
whitehouse.gov · by kparnitzke · January 20, 2025
Briefings & Statements
President Trump’s America First Priorities
January 20, 2025
MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN
- President Trump will take bold action to secure our border and protect American communities.
- This includes ending Biden’s catch-and-release policies, reinstating Remain in Mexico, building the wall, ending asylum for illegal border crossers, cracking down on criminal sanctuaries, and enhancing vetting and screening of aliens.
- President Trump’s deportation operation will address the record border crossings of criminal aliens under the prior administration.
- The President is suspending refugee resettlement, after communities were forced to house large and unsustainable populations of migrants, straining community safety and resources.
- The Armed Forces, including the National Guard, will engage in border security, which is national security, and will be deployed to the border to assist existing law enforcement personnel.
- President Trump will begin the process of designating cartels, including the dangerous Tren de Aragua, as foreign terrorist organizations and use the Alien Enemies Act to remove them.
- The Department of Justice will seek the death penalty as the appropriate punishment for heinous crimes against humanity, including those who kill law enforcement officers and illegal migrants who maim and murder Americans.
MAKE AMERICA AFFORDABLE AND ENERGY DOMINANT AGAIN
- The President will unleash American energy by ending Biden’s policies of climate extremism, streamlining permitting, and reviewing for rescission all regulations that impose undue burdens on energy production and use, including mining and processing of non-fuel minerals.
- President Trump’s energy actions empower consumer choice in vehicles, showerheads, toilets, washing machines, lightbulbs and dishwashers.
- President Trump will declare an energy emergency and use all necessary resources to build critical infrastructure.
- President Trump’s energy policies will end leasing to massive wind farms that degrade our natural landscapes and fail to serve American energy consumers.
- President Trump will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord.
- All agencies will take emergency measures to reduce the cost of living.
- President Trump will announce the America First Trade Policy.
- America will no longer be beholden to foreign organizations for our national tax policy, which punishes American businesses.
DRAIN THE SWAMP
- The President will usher a Golden Age for America by reforming and improving the government bureaucracy to work for the American people. He will freeze bureaucrat hiring except in essential areas to end the onslaught of useless and overpaid DEI activists buried into the federal workforce. He will pause burdensome and radical regulations not yet in effect that Biden announced.
- President Trump is announcing an unprecedented slate of executive orders for rescission.
- President Trump is planning for improved accountability of government bureaucrats. The American people deserve the highest-quality service from people who love our country. The President will also return federal workers to work, as only 6% of employees currently work in person.
- President Trump is taking swift action to end the weaponization of government against political rivals and ordering all document retention as required by law. President Trump is also ending the unconstitutional censorship by the federal government. No longer will government employees pick and require the erasure of entirely true speech.
- On the President’s direction, the State Department will have an America-First foreign policy.
BRING BACK AMERICAN VALUES
- The President will establish male and female as biological reality and protect women from radical gender ideology.
- American landmarks will be named to appropriately honor our Nation’s history.
whitehouse.gov · by kparnitzke · January 20, 2025
4. Organization of the National Security Council and Subcommittees
Hitting the ground running.
Organization of the National Security Council and Subcommittees – The White House
whitehouse.gov
Presidential Actions
Organization of the National Security Council
and Subcommittees
January 20, 2025
January 20, 2025
National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-1
SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council
and Subcommittees
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the following:
As President, my highest priority and responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of the United States and its people. The national and homeland security threats facing the United States are complex and rapidly evolving. These issues often do not fit neatly into the categories that single departments and agencies are designed to optimally address, a fact recognized and exploited by our strategic competitors and adversaries in their adoption of whole-of-government and even whole-of-society approaches.
The United States Government’s decision-making structures and processes to address national security challenges must therefore be equally adaptive and comprehensive. They must be able to competently design and execute cooperative and integrated interagency solutions to address these problems, and protect and advance the national interests of the United States. Therefore, to advise and assist me in this endeavor, I hereby direct that my system for national security policy development, decision-making, implementation, and monitoring shall be organized as set forth in this Memorandum. This Memorandum prevails over any prior orders, directives, memoranda, or other Presidential guidance related to the organization of the National Security Council (NSC or Council).
A. The National Security Council and Supporting Staff
1. Functions, Responsibilities, and Chairs.
(a) Functions and Responsibilities. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended (the Act), established the NSC to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) has the distinct purpose of advising the President on matters pertaining to homeland security. The NSC shall convene as the HSC on topic areas agreed to in advance by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security (Homeland Security Advisor). Along with its subordinate committees and staff, the NSC shall be the President’s principal means for coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national and homeland security policies, strategies, activities, and functions, their integration across departments and agencies within their purview, and for long-term strategic planning.
(b) Chairs. The President will chair the NSC. When the President is absent from a meeting of the Council, he may appoint a Cabinet-level official to chair.
2. NSC Staffing Responsibilities of the National Security Advisor.
(a) Role of the National Security Advisor. The National Security Advisor shall be responsible, as appropriate and at the President’s direction, for determining the agenda for the NSC, ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared, and recording and communicating Council actions and Presidential decisions in a timely manner.
(b) Role of the Homeland Security Advisor. When convened as the HSC, the duties referenced in subsection (2)(a) shall be the responsibility of the Homeland Security Advisor.
3. Designating NSC Members, Attendees, and Invitees.
(a) Membership. The NSC membership consists of the statutory members set forth in section 101(c)(1) of the Act (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)):
- The President;
- The Vice President;
- The Secretary of State;
- The Secretary of the Treasury;
- The Secretary of Defense;
- The Secretary of Energy;
- The Director of the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy;
and additional members hereby designated by the President pursuant to section 101(c)(1) of the Act:
- The Attorney General;
- The Secretary of the Interior;
- Chief of Staff to the President (White House Chief of Staff); and
- The National Security Advisor.
When the NSC convenes as the HSC, members shall also include:
- The Secretary of Homeland Security; and
13) The Homeland Security Advisor.
(b) NSC Meeting Attendees. The National Security Advisor retains the discretion to determine the attendee list for all meetings of the NSC, including by requesting the attendance of any senior official of the Executive Branch. The Homeland Security Advisor retains this same discretion when the NSC convenes as the HSC. This discretion shall be exercised based on the policy relevance of attendees to the issues being considered, the need for secrecy on sensitive matters, staffing requirements, and other considerations.
As regular practice, the National Security Advisor and Homeland Security Advisor shall include as additional non-voting attendees:
- The Director of National Intelligence (non-voting advisor);
- The Assistant to the President and Principal Deputy National Security Advisor (non-voting advisor and principal notetaker) or, when convening as the HSC, the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (non-voting advisor and principal notetaker);
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (non-voting advisor); and
- The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (non-voting advisor).
(c) NSC Regular Invitees. Unless specifically restricted, these officials are invited to attend any NSC and HSC meeting as non-voting advisors:
- The Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President;
- The Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy;
- The Assistant to the President for Policy; and
- The Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal Counsel to the National Security Advisor.
4. Right to Propose Agenda Items.
Any NSC member attending a meeting in a voting capacity may propose, in advance and in accordance with a timeline set by the National Security Advisor or his designee, agenda items for their consideration.[1] The National Security Advisor will determine whether to include these items on the agenda. The Homeland Security Advisor shall have this same discretion when the Council is convened as the HSC.
5. The National Security Council Staff.
(a) Staff Fusion. There is a single NSC staff within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) that serves both the NSC on national security matters and the HSC when the Council is considering homeland security matters. The staff is headed by a single Executive Secretary, in accordance with section 101(e)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(1)) and section 905 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 495).
(b) Purpose. The purposes of the National Security Advisor and subordinate staff are to
(i) advise and assist the President in the course of conducting activities that relate to or affect the carrying out of the President’s constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties pertaining to national or homeland security, pursuant to the Presidential Records Act of 1978, as amended;[2]
(ii) advise and assist the other members of the NSC (and the NSC when convening as the HSC), and others in the White House;
(iii) help the President plan and set priorities, in accordance with section II of the Message of the President in the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977;
(iv) advise and make recommendations to the President with respect to, and establish, integrated domestic, foreign, and military policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national and homeland security, pursuant to sections 2 and 101(b)(1) of the Act (50 U.S.C. 3002, 3021(b)(1));
(v) coordinate, facilitate, monitor, oversee, and review Administration policies and their implementation with respect to national security, and make resulting recommendations to the President;
(vi) help the President resolve major conflicts among departments and agencies with regard to national security, in accordance with section II of the Message of the President in the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977.
(c) Fair, Balanced, and Thorough Processes. In accordance with sections I and II of the Message of the President in the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, the NSC staff shall ensure that the processes it organizes, coordinates, and manages fairly and thoroughly gather the facts, intelligence, and other relevant information necessary to NSC decisions; fully analyze the issues; consider a full range of views and options; assess the prospects, risks, costs, and implications of each option; and distill these options for the President, other NSC principals, and senior officials participating in the subsidiary committees of the NSC or HSC, in a fair, balanced, and organized way. The National Security Advisor and subordinate NSC staff shall represent the views and differences of NSC principals and other senior officials to the President with accuracy and fidelity.
(d) Policy Development. In accordance with sections I and II of the Message of the President in the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977,[8] the NSC staff shall facilitate the development and refinement of interagency policy options, and develop additional options besides those proposed by departments and agencies as necessary, both to complement, supplement, and enhance their work, and to offer the President and other NSC principals and other senior officials a sufficiently broad menu of operationally feasible options for consideration, deliberation, and decision.
B. The Principals Committee
1. Principals Committee Establishment.
(a) (i) Functions and Responsibilities. The Principals Committee (PC) shall continue to serve as the Cabinet-level senior interagency forum for considering policy issues that affect the national security interests of the United States. The PC shall develop options and recommendations for the President on national security and homeland security matters requiring the President’s attention, and with the Committee’s full consensus shall set priorities, issue policy guidance, and facilitate coordination and integration on national security policy and implementation issues as appropriate that do not require Presidential attention.[9] Issues involving matters that are statutorily authorized for decision by a principal, or delegated to a principal by the President, can be coordinated and decided by the principals without requiring Presidential attention.
(ii) Voting and NSC Referral. Consensus is reached when all voting (i.e., non-advisory) attendees present either vote affirmatively for the same decisional option or formally abstain, and all such votes shall be recorded and minuted. Issues for which the Committee fails to reach consensus shall be referred to the NSC for decision, with a formal nonconcurrence required by at least one non-advisory attendee present for such a referral. Whether an issue requires Presidential attention, and the Committee attendees’ positions on the issue itself, shall be separately polled. If a voting attendee does not concur with the determination that Presidential consideration is not required, the issue shall be referred, along with the results of the PC’s deliberation on the issue itself and its recommendations, to deliberation by the NSC.
(b) Role of the National Security Advisor. The PC shall be convened and chaired by the National Security Advisor. The Chair shall determine the agenda, location, and meeting materials, in consultation with the appropriate attendees.
(c) Substitute Chairs. At his sole discretion, the National Security Advisor may delegate authority to convene and chair or co-chair the PC to an appropriate attendee of the NSC or EOP policy council senior official. The Homeland Security Advisor, who is Chair when the PC considers matters that would be raised to the NSC convening as the HSC, may similarly delegate such duties.
(d) Right to Propose Agenda Items. Any PC member attending in a voting capacity may propose, in advance and in accordance with a timeline set by the Chair, agenda items for consideration by the PC. The Chair will determine which, if any, shall be included.
2. Executive Secretary Responsibilities and Process.
(a) Responsibilities. The Executive Secretary shall ensure that the necessary papers are prepared, serve as executive secretary of the PC, and shall record and communicate accurately, and in a timely manner, the Committee’s conclusions and decisions, what was not decided, and any responsibilities for implementation by departments and agencies or taskings to the Deputies Committee or subsidiary policy coordination committees that have been agreed or assigned, if appropriate.[10] The Executive Secretary shall generally be assisted in these tasks by the senior directors and other NSC staff by the senior directors and other NSC staff.
(b) Dispute Resolution Process. If a PC voting attendee disputes that the conclusions or decisions of the PC were correctly minuted, this must be communicated in writing to the Executive Secretary and the National Security Advisor (and any substitute Chair if appropriate) within three business days, although those officials may allow additional time if exigent or extenuating circumstances require it. If resolution of the dispute cannot be achieved, and any necessary amended report of the PC proceedings was issued within a week of the dispute being communicated, the disputing attendee may appeal the matter to the White House Chief of Staff or, should that official so designate, to the White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, whose decision shall be final.
3. Principals Committee Attendees and Invitees.
(a) Principals Committee Attendees.
(i) The National Security Advisor retains the discretion to determine the attendee list for all PC meetings on national security. The Homeland Security Advisor retains this same discretion when chairing the PC. This discretion shall be exercised based on the policy relevance of attendees to the issues being considered, the need for secrecy on sensitive matters, staffing needs, and other considerations. As regular practice, the National Security Advisor and Homeland Security Advisor shall include as additional non-voting attendees:
1) The Director of National Intelligence;
2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
3) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
4) The Principal Deputy National Security Advisor;
5) the National Security Advisor to the Vice President; and
6) The Executive Secretary (principal notetaker).
(ii) PC Regular Invitees. Unless specifically restricted, these officials are invited to attend any PC meeting as non-voting advisors:
- The Assistant to the President and Counselor to the President;
- The Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy;
- The Assistant to the President for Policy; and
- The Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal Counsel to the National Security Advisor.
(iii) Staffing Invitees. At the discretion of the Chair, staff members of the NSC or other appropriate EOP policy councils may be invited to attend specific PC meetings to assist the Executive Secretary in the performance of their executive secretary duties.
C. The Deputies Committee
1. Deputies Committee Establishment.
(a) Functions and Responsibilities. The Deputies Committee (DC) shall continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of and, where appropriate, decision making on, policy issues that affect the national security interests of the United States. The DC shall review and monitor the work of the interagency national security process, including the interagency groups established pursuant to section D below. The DC shall work to ensure that issues brought before the NSC, the NSC when convening as the HSC, and the PC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The DC shall also focus significant attention on monitoring the implementation of these policies and decisions and shall conduct periodic reviews of the Administration’s major national security and foreign policy initiatives.
(b) Role of the Principal Deputy National Security Advisor. The DC shall be convened and chaired by the Principal Deputy National Security Advisor. The Chair shall determine the location, agenda, and meeting materials in consultation with the DC attendees.
(c) Substitute Chairs. At his sole discretion, the Principal Deputy National Security Advisor may delegate authority to convene and chair or co-chair the DC to an appropriate regular attendee of the DC or other appropriate EOP official. The Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security (Deputy Homeland Security Advisor) shall chair meetings when considering issues that would be raised when the NSC is convened as the HSC. The Deputy Homeland Security Advisor has similar delegatory authority.
(d) Right to Propose Agenda Items. Any DC member attending in a voting capacity may propose, in advance and in accordance with a timeline set by the Chair, agenda items for consideration by the DC. The Chair will determine which, if any, shall be included.
2. Executive Secretary Responsibilities and Process.
(a) General. The Executive Secretary shall ensure that the necessary papers are prepared, and shall record and communicate accurately, and in a timely manner, the Committee’s conclusions and decisions, what was not decided, and any responsibilities for implementation by departments and agencies or taskings to subsidiary policy coordination committees that have been agreed or assigned, if appropriate. The Executive Secretary shall generally be assisted in this task by the senior directors and other NSC staff.
(b) Dispute Resolution Process. If a DC voting attendee disputes that the conclusions or decisions of the DC were correctly minuted, this must be communicated in writing to the Executive Secretary and the Principal Deputy National Security Advisor or the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, as relevant, within three business days, although those officials may allow additional time if exigent or extenuating circumstances require it. If resolution of the dispute cannot be achieved, and any necessary amended report of the PC proceedings issued within a week of the dispute being communicated, the disputing attendee may appeal the matter to the White House Chief of Staff, or should that official so designate, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, whose decision shall be final.
3. Designating Deputies Committee Regular Attendees and Invitees.
(a) Deputies Committee Attendees. The Principal Deputy National Security Advisor retains the discretion to determine the attendee list for all DC meetings.
The Deputy Homeland Security Advisor retains this same discretion when chairing DC meetings. This discretion shall be exercised based on the policy relevance of attendees to the issues being considered, the need for secrecy on sensitive matters, staffing needs, and other considerations.
As regular practice, the Principal Deputy National Security Advisor shall include as DC attendees:
- The Deputy Secretary of State;
- The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury;
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
- The Deputy Attorney General;
- The Deputy Secretary of Energy;
- The Deputy Director of National Intelligence (non-voting advisor);
- The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (non-voting advisor);
- The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (non-voting advisor);
- The Executive Secretary of the NSC (non-voting advisor and principal notetaker); and
- The National Security Advisor to the Vice President.
When homeland security issues are on the DC agenda, the DC’s regular attendees will also include:
11) The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security; and
12) The Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (chair).
(b) DC Regular Invitees. These officials are invited to attend any DC meeting:
- The Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and
- The Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Policy Strategist.
D. Policy Coordination Committees
Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple Executive departments and agencies typically shall be accomplished by Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs), with participation primarily occurring at the Assistant Secretary level. As the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination and integration of national security policies, PCCs shall develop and provide policy options and analyses for consideration by higher echelon committees of the national security system. PCCs shall ensure timely responses to, and implementation and monitoring of, decisions, directives, objectives, instructions, inquiries, tasking, and policy guidance of and by the President, National Security Advisor, and the higher-echelon committees of the national security system.
PCCs shall be established at the direction of the National Security Advisor or Homeland Security Advisor, in consultation with the White House Chief of Staff or her designee. Members of the NSC staff will chair the PCCs.
PCCs shall review, coordinate, integrate, and monitor the implementation of Presidential decisions in their respective national security and homeland security policy areas. The Chair of each PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, shall invite representatives of departments and agencies to attend meetings of the PCC where appropriate. The Chair of each PCC, with the agreement of the Executive Secretary, may establish subordinate working groups to assist that PCC in the performance of its duties.
Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) chartered under the aegis of the process established by National Security Memorandum-2 (NSM–2) may continue to be operated as PCCs by the NSC staff until renewed or discontinued by the National Security Advisor.
E. General
(a) The President and the Vice President may attend any meeting of any entity established by or under this directive.
(b) This document is part of a series of National Security Policy Memoranda, which have replaced both National Security Memoranda and National Security Study Memoranda as the instrument for communicating relevant Presidential decisions. This directive shall supersede all other existing Presidential directives and guidance on the organization or support of the NSC and the HSC where they conflict, including National Security Memorandum–2 of February 4, 2021 (Memorandum on Renewing the National Security Council System), which is hereby revoked. This document shall be interpreted in concert with any Presidential directives governing other policy councils and offices in the EOP mentioned herein, and with any Presidential directives signed hereafter that implement this document or those Presidential directives.
whitehouse.gov
5. Everything Trump said about national security on Day 1
Excerpt:
“My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and a unifier. That’s what I want to be: a peacemaker and a unifier. I’m pleased to say that as of yesterday, one day before I assumed office, the hostages in the Middle East are coming back home to their families,” Trump said, seemingly taking credit for the Biden administration’s negotiated release of Israeli hostages and ceasefire in the Hamas-Israel war.
Everything Trump said about national security on Day 1
From reclaiming the Panama Canal to border security, President Donald Trump’s inauguration speech touched on a variety of military-related issues.
By Lauren C. Williams
Senior Editor
January 20, 2025 07:09 PM ET
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
Within minutes of becoming commander-in-chief for the second time, President Donald Trump vowed to send troops to the U.S.-Mexico border, reinstate service members dismissed for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine, and reclaim the Panama Canal.
“The Golden Age of America begins right now,” he said in opening remarks. “That is why each day under our administration of American patriots, we will be working to meet every crisis with dignity and power and strength. We will move with purpose and speed to bring back hope, prosperity, safety and peace for citizens of every race, religion, color and creed.
For American citizens, January 20, 2025, is Liberation Day.”
Trump’s first speech of his second term was speckled with campaign promises and criticisms of the previous administration—especially its support of Ukraine.
“We have a government that has given unlimited funding to the defense of foreign borders, but refuses to defend American borders or more importantly, its own people,” he said, before suggesting the military aid sent to Ukraine harmed the country’s ability to support victims of hurricanes in North Carolina and fires in Los Angeles. The U.S. has sent about $77 billion in military aid to Ukraine, nearly a third of which has been equipment from Pentagon stockpiles.
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Russian leader Vladimir Putin congratulated Trump ahead of the inauguration, inviting him to talk about Ukraine and nuclear arms. Trump did not mention Russia’s war on Ukraine by name.
Trump’s inauguration speech largely stuck to known administration priorities, from the border to renaming landmarks. Here’s a quick rundown:
U.S.-Mexico border
“First, I will declare a national emergency at our southern border,” Trump said, signaling his intent to use the military in mass deportations of undocumented persons. “And I will send troops to the southern border to repel the disastrous invasion of our country.”
Trump’s list of first priorities also included designating drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations.
National Guard troops have been deployed for border security since 2018.
Reinstating troops
“This week I will reinstate any service members who were unjustly expelled from our military for objecting to the COVID vaccine mandate, with full back pay,” Trump declared. “And I will sign an order to stop our warriors from being subjected to radical political theories and social experiments while on duty. It’s going to end immediately.”
In 2017, Trump reinstated a ban to keep transgender Americans from serving in the military—a policy he promised during his campaign to again reinstate in his second term. During his inauguration speech, the president said the U.S. will create a “colorblind and merit based” society, and official policy would only recognize “male and female” genders.
Moreover, earlier this month, senators grilled Trump’s pick for defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, for remarks about the military lowering its standards so women could serve.
“Our armed forces will be free to focus on their sole mission: defeating America’s enemies,” he said.
Trump vowed to build up the military and to measure success by winning battles and ending and avoiding wars.
“My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and a unifier. That’s what I want to be: a peacemaker and a unifier. I’m pleased to say that as of yesterday, one day before I assumed office, the hostages in the Middle East are coming back home to their families,” Trump said, seemingly taking credit for the Biden administration’s negotiated release of Israeli hostages and ceasefire in the Hamas-Israel war.
Panama, a new Gulf and re-renaming landmarks
“A short time from now, we’ll be changing the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America. And we will restore the name of a great president, William McKinley, to Mount McKinley, to where it should be and where it belongs,” Trump said.
In 2015, President Barack Obama renamed the tallest peak in the U.S., Alaska’s Mount Denali, in honor of indigenous Alaskans and traditions.
Trump also alleged that Panama has broken its treaty to the U.S. through increased fees, and said the U.S. is “taking it back.”
“President McKinley made our country very rich through tariffs and through talent. He was a natural businessman and gave Teddy Roosevelt the money for many of the great things he did, including the Panama Canal, which has foolishly been given to the country Panama.”
Additionally, in less scripted remarks to supporters following inauguration, Trump referred to Jan. 6 rioters as “hostages,” explaining why he omitted them from his first speech.
“I was going to talk about the J6 hostages. But you’ll be happy because, you know, it’s action, not words, that count. And you’re going to see a lot of action,” he said.
Trump has promised blanket pardons for Jan. 6 defendants.
Ahead of the inauguration, President Joe Biden signed a slew of preemptive pardons for individuals who could be political targets of the Trump-Vance administration, including retired Gen. Mark Milley, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Anthony Fauci, Biden’s chief medical advisor, and congressional members who were involved with the House Select Committee that investigated the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol.
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
6. Trump Pardons Nearly All 1,500 Jan. 6 Rioters
At the risk of "whataboutism" are these "offsetting pardons?"
Most importantly, will this end the weaponization of DOJ for political purposes?
As an aside has there ever been this much use of the pardon power by two presidents in such a short span of time?
Is the use of the pardon power more important than ever as one of the powers that solely rests with the president that in some ways gives him the ultimate power to protect against injustice.
Trump Pardons Nearly All 1,500 Jan. 6 Rioters
Action comes after Biden immunizes family and other potential GOP targets before departing
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Updated Jan. 21, 2025 12:18 am ET
The incoming and outgoing presidents at Monday’s inauguration. Photo: Kenny Holston/Associated Press
WASHINGTON—President Trump pardoned Monday nearly all of the 1,500 people charged in connection with the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, hours after outgoing President Joe Biden immunized from prosecution family members and other potential targets of the incoming administration.
Trump’s sweeping clemency delivered on his polarizing campaign pledge to pardon supporters who joined in what federal judges and prosecutors have called an attack on American democracy.
The new president made the announcement after arriving at the White House, effectively wiping away four years of prosecutions, including more than 1,100 convictions in what Justice Department officials have described as the largest investigation in U.S. history.
While pardoning virtually all of those charged, Trump commuted the sentences of more than a dozen others.
“They’ve been treated very unfairly,” Trump said in the Oval Office. “The judges have been absolutely brutal. The prosecutors have been brutal.”
“I see murderers from this country get two years, one year, and maybe no time, but they’ve already been in jail for a long time,” he said.
Among the recipients of clemency from Trump were leaders of far-right groups, including the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys, who had been found guilty of seditious conspiracy and other offenses in connection with the Capitol attack.
Trump pardoned former Proud Boys chairman Enrique Tarrio, who was sentenced in 2023 to 22 years in prison, and commuted the sentence of Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes, who was ordered to spend 18 years behind bars for plotting to prevent the peaceful transfer of power.
A prisoner looks out of the window of the cell block on Saturday and waves to participants at a nightly Jan. 6 vigil outside of the Washington, D.C., Central Detention Facility. Photo: Christopher Lee for WSJ
The breadth of the pardons contradicted the “case-by-case” approach Trump and his allies had signaled ahead of his inauguration. And it flew in the face of admonitions from Republican allies who’d voiced opposition to the notion of pardoning Jan. 6 defendants who’d assaulted police.
More than 140 police officers were injured guarding the Capitol as Congress convened to certify former Biden’s 2020 election victory.
Of those incarcerated people who received pardons, Trump said, “We hope they come out tonight, frankly.”
The pardons will give limited immediate benefit to more than 700 defendants convicted in connection with the Capitol attack who had either completed prison terms or were never ordered behind bars.
Trump’s proclamation also directed the Justice Department to dismiss all pending cases related to the Jan. 6 attack, including hundreds of prosecutions in which defendants were awaiting trial or sentencing.
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Donald Trump was sworn in as the nation’s 47th president inside the Capitol Rotunda. He declared in his second inaugural address that “America’s decline is over.” Photo: Jim Watson/AFP; Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
The dueling sets of pardons by Biden and Trump reflected the enormous distrust and disdain between the two men, as well as their clashing views on the violent riot that has divided Americans living in a charged political climate.
Biden acknowledged it was an extraordinary move to grant pre-emptive pardons to people who haven’t been charged with wrongdoing, but said he couldn’t stand idly by while his family and high-profile officials faced threats of retribution with Trump back in power.
“I believe in the rule of law, and I am optimistic that the strength of our legal institutions will ultimately prevail over politics,” Biden said. “But these are exceptional circumstances, and I cannot in good conscience do nothing.”
Trump blasted Biden’s pardons, which also covered members of the House committee that investigated the Capitol attack. “The brother, the whole deal, was pardoned,” Trump said during a rally after his swearing in. “Can you imagine that?”
A prominent name on Biden’s pardon list was Dr. Anthony Fauci, who served as the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Before his retirement in 2022, Fauci helped lead the effort to fight the Covid-19 pandemic under both Trump and Biden.
Trump has repeatedly criticized Fauci, who became vilified by many on the right for supporting safety precautions and shutdowns and for opposing unproven treatments such as the antimalaria drug hydroxychloroquine pushed by Trump.
Fauci defended social-distancing measures and other policies from the early months of the pandemic, saying the steps were based on science available at the time.
Dr. Anthony Fauci at a Senate committee hearing in 2022. Photo: Rod Lamkey/Zuma Press
Fauci said that he had committed no crime, but that the threats “create immeasurable and intolerable distress for me and my family.” He added: “For these reasons, I acknowledge and appreciate the action that President Biden has taken today on my behalf.”
Another on the pardon list was retired Gen. Mark Milley, who has repeatedly clashed with Trump. In his 2023 retirement speech, Milley said the military shouldn’t bow to “wannabe dictators.” He called Trump a “fascist” in a book by Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward. Trump has suggested Milley should face death for treason.
In a statement, Milley said he was “deeply grateful.” He said he didn’t “wish to spend whatever remaining time the Lord grants me fighting those who unjustly might seek retribution for perceived slights.”
Biden also pardoned members and staff of the House committee that investigated the Jan. 6 Capitol riot, as well as police officers who testified before the committee.
Trump had aimed vitriol at a number of committee officials, including former Wyoming Rep. Liz Cheney, a Republican, now-Sen. Adam Schiff (D., Calif.) and Rep. Bennie Thompson (D., Miss.), the select committee’s former chairman.
Thompson and Cheney, the former vice chair of the select committee, said in a joint statement that they had been pardoned “not for breaking the law but for upholding it.” They called Biden’s actions “‘extraordinary circumstances’ when public servants are pardoned to prevent false prosecution by the government.”
In the waning minutes of Biden’s presidency, the White House said he had pardoned his sister, Valerie Biden Owens, and her husband, John T. Owens, and his two brothers, James B. Biden and Francis W. Biden, along with James Biden’s spouse, Sara Jones Biden.
“My family has been subjected to unrelenting attacks and threats, motivated solely by a desire to hurt me—the worst kind of partisan politics. Unfortunately, I have no reason to believe these attacks will end,” Biden said.
Last year, Biden pardoned his son, Hunter Biden, wiping away criminal convictions on tax and gun charges.
President Biden and President-elect Donald Trump departed the White House on Monday morning en route to the Capitol. Photo: Alex Brandon/Associated Press
While past presidents have issued controversial pardons to protect allies, donors and family members, Biden’s moves were unprecedented in sweep. The threats from Trump were also without parallel. During his campaign, Trump vowed to press the Justice Department to prosecute people he considered part of a political opposition.
Biden also commuted the life sentence of indigenous activist Leonard Peltier, who has been in prison since his conviction for the 1975 killings of two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents during a standoff at the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota. Peltier will spend the remainder of his sentence in home confinement. Activists have spent decades lobbying for clemency for Peltier, who is 80.
The FBI urged Biden to reject the clemency bid. “Peltier is a remorseless killer, who brutally murdered two of our own,” former FBI Director Christopher Wray has written.
Sadie Gurman contributed to this article.
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the January 21, 2025, print edition as 'Riot Defendants Win Sweeping Pardons'.
7. Two Americans Freed by Taliban in Prisoner Swap
Two Americans Freed by Taliban in Prisoner Swap
Last-minute deal is capstone in Biden’s campaign to release dozens of Americans detained abroad
https://www.wsj.com/world/two-americans-freed-by-taliban-in-prisoner-swap-06e4a270?mod=latest_headlines
By Shan Li
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and Esmatullah Kohsar
Jan. 21, 2025 5:11 am ET
Ryan Corbett with his children in Afghanistan in 2020. Photo: Anna Corbett/Associated Press
As one of its last acts in office, the Biden administration struck a deal to free two Americans held in Afghanistan in exchange for one Taliban member held in a U.S. prison.
The Taliban released Ryan Corbett and another American in exchange for Khan Mohammed, who was serving two life sentences for drug trafficking for the Taliban. Corbett’s family confirmed his release, but neither the Taliban nor U.S. officials have named the second American.
In a statement, the Taliban said it appreciated the U.S. for actions “that contribute to the normalization and expansion of relations between the two countries.”
The last-minute deal was the final capstone in Biden’s campaign to release dozens of Americans detained abroad. The Taliban has long wanted Muhammad Rahim al Afghani, an alleged associate of Osama bin Laden now held in Guantanamo, as part of any deal. But talks were in danger of collapsing last week over Biden’s insistence that any trade for Rahim include an American, Mahmoud Habibi, who disappeared in Afghanistan in 2022. The Taliban has denied holding him.
Roger Carstens, Biden’s top hostage negotiator, traveled to Qatar this month to make an exchange offer that the Taliban rebuffed. Photo: Kent Nishimura for WSJ
Corbett’s detention has gained public attention as his family pushed for the Biden administration to strike a deal. Earlier this month, his wife, Anna Corbett, had a call with Biden and met with then President-elect Donald Trump at his Mar-a-Lago resort.
Before the Taliban takeover in 2021, Corbett lived for years in Afghanistan supervising projects for several nonprofits. He returned in 2022 to work on his microlending and consulting business when he was detained.
His family released a statement on Tuesday saying that Corbett was on his way home and praising both the Trump and Biden administrations for their help in securing his release.
At least two other Americans, Habibi and George Glezmann, remain captive in Afghanistan. Corbett’s family members expressed regret that they were not released.
“It was our hope that Ryan, George and Mahmoud would be returned to their families together,” the statement said. “We cannot imagine the pain that our good fortune will bring to them.”
Negotiations over the prisoner swap with Afghanistan proved one of the most difficult for the Biden administration.
Roger Carstens, Biden’s top hostage negotiator, traveled to Doha, Qatar, this month and offered to exchange two imprisoned Afghans in return for Glezmann and Corbett, an offer that the Taliban rebuffed. In November, Biden authorized a trade for three Americans—Habibi, Corbett and Glezmann—that the Taliban also rejected.
The released Afghan, Mohammed, was convicted in 2008 on narco-terrorism charges. He was accused of participating in a Taliban plot to obtain rockets to attack a U.S. military base in Afghanistan and selling heroin and opium intended for export to the U.S.
Write to Shan Li at shan.li@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
8. Hamas Is Effectively Back in Control in Gaza
Video at the link.
Hamas Is Effectively Back in Control in Gaza
With no alternative following a cease-fire with Israel, the militant group has a moment to assert power
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-is-effectively-back-in-control-in-gaza-0b0e0a16?mod=latest_headlines
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Armed and uniformed Hamas militants parade through the streets in an apparent show of strength. Photo: Dawoud Abu Alkas/Reuters
By Omar Abdel-BaquiFollow
and Summer SaidFollow
Jan. 20, 2025 11:00 pm ET
After Israeli troops stood down when a cease-fire came into effect in the Gaza Strip, Hamas began sending thousands of its forces onto the streets to establish control.
The deployment—envisioned by the agreement that pauses the fighting while the combatants exchange hostages for prisoners—highlights how the U.S.-designated terrorist group remains the dominant power in the territory. Israel hasn’t been able to destroy the group or empower an alternative.
Hamas punctuated its authority Sunday by parading armed and uniformed militants through the streets flashing V-signs to cheering crowds. When Hamas transferred the first Israeli hostages to the Red Cross, Arab mediators said they could see fighters from Hamas’s core Nukhba Force unit clad in full military gear and armed.
The open show of force after months of being pushed underground was a signal that aid groups and governments will need to cooperate with Hamas as reconstruction efforts get under way in the coming weeks—an outcome Israel has hoped to prevent.
“The Hamas presence on the ground armed is a slap in the face to the Israeli government and army,” said Gershon Baskin, a former Israeli hostage negotiator who is now Middle East director for the diplomacy advocacy group International Communities Organization. “It highlights that Israel’s goals for the war were never achievable.”
The fragile truce between Israel and Hamas pauses a war that is among the deadliest in modern Middle Eastern history, one that has reduced much of Gaza to rubble and killed around 47,000 people in the enclave following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, which killed about 1,200 people and left another 250 held hostage.
Hamas sent thousands of its forces onto the streets to establish control after the cease-fire came into effect. Photo: Hadi Daoud/Zuma Press
If it holds, the cease-fire could ease tensions in the region after more than a year of a conflict that drew in the U.S. and Iran and its allied militias across the Middle East. But it also raises substantial questions about how Gaza will be governed after the fighting.
During the 15-month conflict, Israel has battered Hamas in one part of Gaza before moving on to fight in other areas, leaving behind vacuums that have turned lawless as militants tried to reconstitute their forces and criminal gangs battled for control. The lack of order snarled aid deliveries and created new threats for ordinary Palestinians already struggling with the fighting and deprivation.
The U.S. and Israel’s own security establishment pressed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to come up with a plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, but so far he hasn’t done so. The Palestinian Authority, which oversees much of the occupied West Bank, has said it is ready for the job, but Netanyahu, opposed to a two-state solution, doesn’t want it involved. Hamas has stepped into the breach.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar said Sunday that the current deal is only for a temporary cease-fire and that a permanent end to the war would depend on Hamas abdicating power in later stages of the negotiations. He said Israel has yet to fulfill its war aims of dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, and indicated it is prepared to re-displace Palestinians if hostilities are renewed.
“There is no future of peace, stability and security for both sides if Hamas stays in power,” Sa’ar said.
Under the cease-fire agreement struck last week, police overseen by Hamas will assume responsibility for managing law and order among Palestinians generally. They will also maintain the movement of displaced Palestinians in the southern part of Gaza back to their homes in the north. About 90% of Gaza’s population has been internally displaced.
Hamas police forces won’t be allowed near Israeli troops or enter the buffer zones near the border with Israel, according to security protocols agreed by Hamas, Israel and the mediators of the deal.
The police officers can carry weapons only when necessary and would be monitored by teams of Egyptian and other Arab observers, who are to be stationed in at least 13 locations across Gaza. Egypt, along with Qatar and the U.S., brokered the deal. Under that agreement, the Hamas forces are supposed to wear distinct blue uniforms, and their numbers will vary based on the population densities of different areas.
Palestinians gathered near the hostage handover in Gaza City on Sunday. Photo: Khaled Dawood/Zuma Press
Trucks of humanitarian aid waited Sunday at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Photo: mohamed hossam/Shutterstock
The mere presence of armed militants on the streets of Gaza doesn’t violate the cease-fire deal, but any attempt to rearm or threaten Israelis would, an Israeli security official said.
A major point in the first phase of the cease-fire revolves around significantly increasing the amount of aid entering Gaza, with Hamas patrolling major routes and accompanying aid trucks and distributors alongside the United Nations.
Looting of aid convoys by criminal gangs within Gaza has been rampant during the war. Increasing supplies will help reduce this by making the commodities less valuable to thieves, and a police presence will make those items less accessible to criminals.
“There have been security forces out on the streets, and they are more visible around the main junctions, which is something they have not been able to do without the risk of being killed for several months,” Sam Rose, a senior official with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, the largest aid group in Gaza, said in a phone interview from the enclave.
The amount of aid that entered Gaza on Sunday is more than what humanitarian groups could often bring in throughout an entire week during the fighting, Rose said.
Frustration with Hamas in Gaza has grown as the war dragged on. On social media, Palestinians urged Hamas to accept a deal even if it meant giving up on some of its demands. Community leaders, business people and the heads of prominent families made a number of appeals in recent weeks for the Palestinian Authority to take over the enclave again.
Current and former Israeli officials have floated a number of plans for governing the Gaza Strip after the fighting ends. Most involve some form of Arab or multinational force working with representatives of Palestinians on the ground. Top Israeli defense officials repeatedly said the only real alternative is the Palestinian Authority.
Since the truce, police overseen by Hamas are able to operate more openly. Photo: dawoud abu alkas/Reuters
Palestinians amid the rubble of collapsed buildings in the northern Gaza Strip. Photo: omar al-qattaa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken laid out a plan last week that would have the Palestinian Authority administer and ultimately secure the Gaza Strip.
The authority—which polling shows is unpopular in the West Bank—ran the Gaza Strip until being ousted by Hamas in 2007. It recently has been trying to assert a role for itself in a new power struggle with Hamas.
The rivalry has recently turned violent at times. Hamas detained Palestinian Authority officials in Gaza last year, and the authority recently stepped up a campaign to go after Hamas militants in the West Bank.
There are, however, some signs of cooperation. The Islamist group agreed to relinquish its control of the important Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt, allowing Palestinian Authority officials to operate it alongside Egypt and the European Union.
For now, however, Hamas has the monopoly of force. Israel believed that Hamas had up to 30,000 fighters arranged into 24 battalions before the war in a structure that loosely resembled a state military. The Israeli military says it has killed about 17,000 fighters—including leader Yahya Sinwar—and detained thousands more.
Hamas hasn’t said how many fighters it has lost, but it has been reorganizing and recruiting under the command of Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed. Hamas is also believed by Israel to have several battalions left in areas of central Gaza where Israel’s military was less active than in other areas of the enclave.
“I am not convinced that Hamas believes they could return to governing Gaza, but for now there is certainly no one on the ground except them that could take over,” Baskin said.
—Dov Lieber contributed to this article.
Write to Omar Abdel-Baqui at omar.abdel-baqui@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the January 21, 2025, print edition as 'Hamas Retakes Effective Control of Gaza'.
9. Trump takes credit for defeating ISIS; now he must fight its comeback
Excerpts:
But, as Trump plans to tackle the broader Middle East crisis rooted in the conflict in Gaza and Israel-Iran tensions, the Russia-Ukraine war and an array of pressing foreign and domestic policy issues, the ever-evolving threat of ISIS may test his "peace through strength" approach to upholding national security."
The Islamic State threat is now emanating from more vectors or regional branches," Lucas Webber, senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, told Newsweek. "Since Trump's first term, IS-Khurasan Province has expanded its vision globally and has ramped up its international terrorist activities.
"This is indicated by an increased amount of successful external operations—such as those in Iran, Turkey, and Russia in 2024—as well as numerous plots foiled in Central Asia, Europe, and North America," Webber said. "In addition, ISKP has built out a robust propaganda apparatus that publishes in more languages than any other branch since IS in Iraq and Syria at the height of the caliphate."
As far away as Somalia and Pakistan, Webber added, ISIS' international charters have "become increasingly important to the larger organization" and have "expanded its international financial, recruitment, and militant operations capabilities."
"The Trump administration should increase focus on detecting and disrupting IS activity online as the organization and its followers are exploiting social media and messaging applications to attract followers, recruit, fundraise, and incite violence," Webber said. "As the New Orleans attack demonstrates, IS maintains the ability to project influence online to reach and inspire followers to take violent action."
Trump takes credit for defeating ISIS; now he must fight its comeback
Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · January 19, 2025
President-elect Donald Trump has frequently counted the U.S.-led coalition victory over the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria as one of the most consequential achievements of his previous administration.
Yet ISIS today has found fertile ground to spread beyond its initial homeland and accelerate operations abroad. The group is tied to daily attacks across Asia and Africa, as well as plots throughout Europe and even a deadly New Year's rampage in the United States.
Now the next U.S. leader, set to be inaugurated Monday amid ramped-up security following at least two recent assassination attempts, must again grapple with the international jihadi militants considered to be one of the greatest threats to global peace.
"The past few years, we've seen an ISIS surge around the world: not just in its traditional heartland of Syria and Iraq, but also from its increasingly deadly and capable affiliates in West Africa and Afghanistan," Nathan Sales, who previously served as the White House's counterterrorism envoy during Trump's first term, told Newsweek.
"The latter—ISIS-K—is particularly worrisome as it has shown the ability to carry out external operations in the region, and has its sights set on Europe and the American homeland," Sales said. He is now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and Middle East Programs.
ISIS-K, short for the group's self-designated Khorasan province, has ambitions beyond Afghanistan, envisioning a state also that encompasses parts of neighboring Iran, Pakistan, India and Central Asia, extending to northwestern China as well. While opposed by every government in the region, ISIS-K has exploited insecurity and international rivalries to entrench itself as one of the world's deadliest and most unpredictable non-state actors in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
"Unfortunately, the Biden administration has dismantled most American counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan, leaving ISIS-K to grow more or less unchecked," Sales said. "Americans may want to turn the page on 20 years of the global war on terrorism, but the terrorists get a vote, and they're voting to keep fighting."
Newsweek has reached out to the Trump transition team for comment.
"We defeated ISIS in record time," said President-elect Donald Trump, seen beside ISIS fighters holding their flag in this Newsweek illustration, during his election victory speech. "We defeated ISIS in record time," said President-elect Donald Trump, seen beside ISIS fighters holding their flag in this Newsweek illustration, during his election victory speech. Photo-illustration by Newsweek/Getty/Associated Press
Biden oversaw the end of the longest war in U.S. history in August 2021, pulling troops out of Afghanistan in line with a deal struck with the Taliban by the first Trump administration. Trump's decision to exit Afghanistan was finalized in February 2020 as ISIS' global power appeared to be waning.
Upon taking office in 2017, Trump inherited the most intensive phases of the war being waged against ISIS in Iraq and Syria by a U.S.-led coalition established by then-President Barack Obama. As Iran aided militias battling the group in both nations and Russia mounted an unprecedented direct intervention in support of the Syrian government, the Pentagon-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defeated the group in its final outpost of Baghuz in eastern Syria in February 2019.
The U.S.-claimed win would become a cornerstone of Trump's touted accomplishments. "We defeated ISIS in record time," Trump said in his 2024 election-night speech, having bested outgoing President Biden's designated successor, Vice President Kamala Harris.
But the group that once asserted control over territory roughly equivalent to the size of Virginia would not simply vanish. In addition to maintaining insurgencies in Iraq and Syria, ISIS continued to thrive in the form of its international affiliates, frustrating U.S. efforts to pivot the focus of foreign-policy initiatives toward great power competition with the likes of China and Russia.
"There is a misconception that foreign terrorist threats, particularly from ISIS, have diminished to low-cost risks," Andrew Borene, a former senior officer at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, told Newsweek. "However, counterterrorism is far from a dead effort.
"Over the past four years, ISIS has evolved from a territorial caliphate into a decentralized network that operates as a 'terror innovation hub,'" Borene said. Today, he is executive director for global security at risk intelligence company Flashpoint. "This transformation allows ISIS to inspire and support a global network of affiliates and lone actors, amplifying their reach and impact."
For Biden, ISIS-K's most devastating blow came in the form of a suicide bombing that killed 13 U.S. soldiers and nearly 170 Afghan civilians as the president oversaw the chaotic withdrawal from Kabul. The backlash was compounded by the U.S. retaliatory strike that ultimately killed 10 civilians wrongfully suspected of having ties to the attack by the U.S. military's admission.
The group continued to entrench itself as the Taliban seized Kabul, defying the newly established government's crackdowns. Despite being deprived of any formal territorial control, ISIS-K has managed to establish a sophisticated multimedia presence not only undermining the Taliban's legitimacy but also targeting disaffected audiences in neighboring nations across Asia.
"The group's ability to leverage encrypted platforms, social media, and dark web forums has significantly enhanced its capacity to radicalize individuals and coordinate attacks remotely," Borene said. "This poses an ongoing threat not just to U.S. interests abroad but to global stability as a whole."
While already wreaking havoc in Afghanistan, ISIS-K claimed two operations last year that garnered global attention. The January attack on a memorial procession in Kerman for Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a drone strike ordered by Trump four years earlier, and the attack on a concert at Crocus City Hall in Russia last March claimed the lives of 102 and 145 people, respectively. The attacks demonstrated the group's thirst for vengeance against those who intervened against its initial rise in Iraq and Syria over a decade ago.
Just one day before ISIS-K's massacre outside of Moscow, U.S. Central Command chief General Michael Kurilla testified before Congress that "ISIS-Khorasan retains the capability and the will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months with little to no warning."
To fight back, Borene advised that the next administration pursue "a comprehensive and multilayered approach" involving partnerships with European allies and partners such as India and Arab states to disrupt ISIS-K networks, while also exerting military pressure.
On the homefront, "initiatives should focus on disrupting ISIS's online propaganda and recruitment pipelines, which remain a significant driver of lone-wolf attacks and global coordination," Borene said. He added that the use of artificial intelligence and predictive analytics could "identify patterns of radicalization and help preempt potential threats."
"By integrating kinetic action, regional partnerships, and domestic counterterrorism initiatives," Borene said, "the administration can mitigate the threat posed by ISIS while addressing the root causes of instability that enable its resurgence."
ISIS vehicles used for suicide car bombings and a map of the group's self-proclaimed states are seen at Iran's Museum of Resistance, on March 24, 2024. Khorasan is the easternmost region. ISIS vehicles used for suicide car bombings and a map of the group's self-proclaimed states are seen at Iran's Museum of Resistance, on March 24, 2024. Khorasan is the easternmost region. Kaveh Kazemi//Getty Images
Instability has been a key driver of ISIS' rise and its continuity following the fall of the so-called "caliphate" first proclaimed in 2013 by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was killed in a U.S. raid ordered by Trump in 2019. A decade after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq gave way to rampant insurgencies, ISIS morphed out of an Al-Qaeda splinter that Baghdadi would expand to Syria as the neighboring nation underwent a civil war raging since 2011.
That same year, a NATO intervention aided rebels to overthrow longtime Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, opening the floodgates for a flow of battle-hardened militants to Africa's Sahel region. As was the case in the Middle East and Afghanistan, ISIS' West Africa Province (ISWAP) cultivated local partnerships by capitalizing on existing conflicts between government forces and insurgents, including Nigeria's powerful Boko Haram, to establish itself as a major player in the region.
"Groups like ISIS-K in Afghanistan and ISWAP in West Africa have exploited ungoverned spaces to recruit fighters and destabilize regions," Borene said. "Their operations demonstrate the continued relevance of ISIS affiliates in driving global instability."
ISIS-K has emerged as one of the group's most active and ambitious affiliates, but the recent upheaval in Syria's near-14-year internal strife has also created a complex situation for the U.S. in one of ISIS' core territories.
With Middle East tensions already soaring over the war between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement, backed by the Iran's regional Axis of Resistance coalition, Syria's long-reigning Assad family was suddenly toppled last month at the hands of a rapid rebel offensive. At the helm of the campaign, and now effectively ruling the nation is the man who previously allowed ISIS founder Baghdadi to export his ideology to Syria, Abu Mohammed al-Golani.
Golani, now going by his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, ultimately rejected a merger between his Al-Qaeda-loyal Nusra Front and Baghdadi's ISIS in 2013. Three years later, he rescinded ties to Al-Qaeda as well, claiming a purely anti-government stance and rebranding the Nusra Front to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, finally coalescing with like-minded Islamists to establish Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.
Since overseeing the ousting of Assad, Sharaa has continued to disavow his jihadi past. The SDF remains skeptical amid its ongoing clashes with Turkey-backed factions allied with HTS. Vice President-elect JD Vance has also expressed doubts regarding the supposed Sharaa's supposed reorientation.
As with ISIS, HTS is designated by the U.S. to be a terrorist organization.
But Trump's former special envoy for Syria and the coalition to defeat ISIS, James Jeffrey, told Newsweek that "the U.S. should coordinate with the Damascus government on a plan to eliminate ISIS," given HTS' track record in opposing the rival jihadi group.
When it comes to Afghanistan, however, where the U.S. had also hoped for cooperation with former Al-Qaeda ally the Taliban against ISIS, Jeffrey said that "the administration's options are more limited."
"Occasional bombing can help at the margins but does not solve the problem," he added. "Enhanced intelligence to ascertain when/if Khorasan starts planning to target U.S. or ally/partner targets is about the most Washington can do."
Jeffrey also emphasized that the current threat posed by ISIS to the West should be put into perspective.
"ISIS, however subdued, will always have a limited capacity to inspire one-off attacks by lone-wolf terrorists such as seen on January 1 in New Orleans and recently in Europe," Jeffrey said. "But major organized attacks in the West as seen in 2015-16 appear now beyond its capabilities.
"Its operations in the African Sahel and Mozambique are more threatening as ISIS units operate in large numbers and control terrain and finances," Jeffrey added. "But African nations have shown little interest in more active, especially on-ground, American or Western support, so U.S. strategy can, as with ISIS-Khorasan, do little more than monitor in hope of catching in time any major new capability or threat."
People look at a blocked-off road from Canal Street after at least 15 people were killed on Bourbon Street on January 1 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The attack was tied to a U.S. Army veteran... People look at a blocked-off road from Canal Street after at least 15 people were killed on Bourbon Street on January 1 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The attack was tied to a U.S. Army veteran who allegedly proclaimed allegiance to ISIS. ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP/Getty Images
But, as Trump plans to tackle the broader Middle East crisis rooted in the conflict in Gaza and Israel-Iran tensions, the Russia-Ukraine war and an array of pressing foreign and domestic policy issues, the ever-evolving threat of ISIS may test his "peace through strength" approach to upholding national security.
"The Islamic State threat is now emanating from more vectors or regional branches," Lucas Webber, senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, told Newsweek. "Since Trump's first term, IS-Khurasan Province has expanded its vision globally and has ramped up its international terrorist activities.
"This is indicated by an increased amount of successful external operations—such as those in Iran, Turkey, and Russia in 2024—as well as numerous plots foiled in Central Asia, Europe, and North America," Webber said. "In addition, ISKP has built out a robust propaganda apparatus that publishes in more languages than any other branch since IS in Iraq and Syria at the height of the caliphate."
As far away as Somalia and Pakistan, Webber added, ISIS' international charters have "become increasingly important to the larger organization" and have "expanded its international financial, recruitment, and militant operations capabilities."
"The Trump administration should increase focus on detecting and disrupting IS activity online as the organization and its followers are exploiting social media and messaging applications to attract followers, recruit, fundraise, and incite violence," Webber said. "As the New Orleans attack demonstrates, IS maintains the ability to project influence online to reach and inspire followers to take violent action."
Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · January 19, 2025
10. Trump’s First Day in Office: Signing Orders, Spinning Yarns, Settling Scores
Trump’s First Day in Office: Signing Orders, Spinning Yarns, Settling Scores
President and his top aides return to the White House and say they are ready to transform Washington—and the world
https://www.wsj.com/politics/trumps-first-day-in-office-signing-orders-spinning-yarns-settling-scores-775335ab?mod=WTRN_pos2&cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=cx_160&cx_artPos=1
By Meridith McGraw
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Jan. 20, 2025 9:25 pm ET
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Donald Trump was sworn in as the nation’s 47th president inside the Capitol Rotunda. He declared in his second inaugural address that “America’s decline is over.” Photo: Jim Watson/AFP; Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
After delivering a sober inaugural address that called for a new “golden age in America,” President Trump cannonballed into an overflow room at the Capitol, where he shed the teleprompter and told the assembled crowd what was really on his mind.
“I had a couple of things to say that were extremely controversial, but between JD and Melania, and everybody else, they said, ‘Please, sir. It’s such a beautiful unifying speech. Please, sir, don’t say these things,’” Trump said, referring to Vice President JD Vance and first lady Melania Trump.
“I think this was a better speech than the one I gave upstairs,” Trump concluded after 30-plus minute remarks in which he signaled his plans to pardon those convicted of criminal offenses in connection to the Jan. 6, 2021 Capitol riot and delivered an extended riff on his wife’s sore feet. Later in the day, the president pardoned roughly 1,500 defendants involved in the Jan. 6 riot.
Four years after he left Washington, and less than two hours after he became president again, Trump made clear that he would govern on his own terms and had no interest in muting the persona that helped secure his return to the White House.
President Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office on Monday. Photo: Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images
His first day in office showed that he will continue to ping-pong between the serious and the stunning, participating in official Washington rituals one minute and whipping up his devoted supporters the next. And while former President Joe Biden was tightly managed by his advisers, Trump has made clear that he will resist efforts by friends, allies and advisers to constrain him.
Unlike in 2017, when Trump arrived in Washington as an outsider with few political ties, this time he returns with greater knowledge about how to pull the levers of government, how to enact his agenda—and how to plow through those who might stand in his way.
Trump’s team spent months assembling dozens of executive orders—some incremental, some significant—so that they were ready for the incoming president to sign Monday, a show of force aimed at flexing his power. The pace of change in less than 24 hours was staggering: Trump says he put in place a federal hiring freeze, ordered government workers back to the office five days a week, moved to end birthright citizenship, took steps to withdraw from a major international climate accord and called for the end of government-backed diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives. Many of his actions will be challenged in court.
Trump throws Sharpies to the crowd after signing executive orders at Capital One Arena. Photo: Angela Weiss/AFP/Getty Images
In the coming weeks and months, the president’s advisers have pledged to go further. They are drawing up plans to slash federal spending, attempt to fire thousands of career government employees and conduct mass deportations.
There are other notable indications that while Trump was the same man, his second term might be different. Among those present for Trump’s inauguration were tech and media giants such as Meta Platforms’ Mark Zuckerberg and Amazon’s Jeff Bezos. Both men had long been the subject of Trump’s ridicule. During the presidential campaign, he suggested he might throw Zuckerberg in jail.
But there they were, lined up behind him as he delivered his second inaugural address, sitting next to other powerful executives who had come to show their respect to the incoming commander in chief.
It wasn’t just Trump who was returning to the White House. Several members of his senior staff were reclaiming desks that they sat in just four years ago.
One official described arriving in the White House during the first term and not knowing where the restrooms were, or which areas were off limits. It felt like “starting on the first day of school,” the official said. But this time, many Trump staffers are returning as White House veterans who know the rhythms of the West Wing.
Karoline Leavitt, who served in Trump’s first term as an intern and later as an assistant press secretary, arrived Monday at the White House as the president’s top spokeswoman. She helped press aides, many of whom didn’t work for Trump four years ago, to send out a flurry of transcripts and executive orders.
“Feels good to be back!” Leavitt said.
People at the Penn Quarter Sports Tavern in Washington, D.C., watch the president speak. Photo: Sophie Park for WSJ
Trump White House staff and advisers, including incoming chief of staff Susie Wiles and billionaire Elon Musk, arrived on Monday afternoon to get settled into their offices. Musk, who is leading the newly created Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, is expected to work out of an office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, just steps from the West Wing.
Trump, appearing in the Oval Office on Monday night, held court with reporters for roughly 45 minutes, taking questions on immigration, tariffs and foreign policy as he used a large black Sharpie to sign executive orders.
A reporter asked if he had read the letter that Biden had left for him. Trump then opened the resolute desk and held up the letter—addressed to “47”—for the cameras, joking that he might be willing to read it out loud.
“What a great feeling,” Trump said when asked about what it was like to walk back into the Oval Office. “One of the better feelings I have ever had.”
Annie Linskey contributed to this article.
Abandoned bags and belongings at the line to Capital One Arena on Monday. Photo: Christopher Lee for WSJ
Write to Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com
11. The Who’s Who of Trump’s Exclusive Inauguration Ceremony
Please go to the link to see the interactive view. (for those of us who could not attend :-) )
https://www.wsj.com/politics/trump-inauguration-who-attended-seating-chart-47cb48bf?st=LJfLbQ&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
The Who’s Who of Trump’s Exclusive Inauguration Ceremony
The new president was flanked by tech billionaires, corporate executives and international leaders
By Adrienne TongFollow
, John McCormickFollow
and Amrith RamkumarFollow
Jan. 20, 2025 9:00 pm ET
President Trump’s inauguration Monday was attended by politicians, tech executives and other notable guests, with the event moved indoors because of subfreezing temperatures in Washington. The Capitol Rotunda, where the ceremony took place, only seats about 600 people. Family and the president’s closest confidants were seated behind him during the swearing-in ceremony.
12. UC grad who resigned from Marine Corps joining U.S. Dept. of Defense after online controversy (Stuart Scheller)
What about the hiring freeze? I guess there are exceptions. OPM is the real kingmaker in the administration.
I guess all those positions that had the incumbent resign before January 20th will not be filled. :-)
Hiring Freeze
January 20, 2025
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/hiring-freeze/
As part of this freeze, no Federal civilian position that is vacant at noon on January 20, 2025, may be filled, and no new position may be created except as otherwise provided for in this memorandum or other applicable law. Except as provided below, this freeze applies to all executive departments and agencies regardless of their sources of operational and programmatic funding.
This order does not apply to military personnel of the armed forces or to positions related to immigration enforcement, national security, or public safety. Moreover, nothing in this memorandum shall adversely impact the provision of Social Security, Medicare, or Veterans’ benefits. In addition, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may grant exemptions from this freeze where those exemptions are otherwise necessary.
UC grad who resigned from Marine Corps joining U.S. Dept. of Defense after online controversy
wlwt.com · by Todd Dykes · January 20, 2025
CINCINNATI —
The second inauguration of President Trump represents a full-circle moment for Stuart Scheller and his loved ones, especially his parents Stu Sr. and Cathy.
"We are just so excited that Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth has honored our son," Stu Scheller Sr. said.
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On Monday, Stuart Scheller, a graduate of both Anderson High and UC, announced on Facebook that he'll be joining the Dept. of Defense as a senior advisor with a focus on personnel and readiness.
"This is the beginning to restore our military," Stu Sr. said.
Scheller - a decorated Marine who served for 17 years, rising to the rank of Lt. Col. - has been on his own quest for restoration since he made a critical post, in uniform, on social media.
"I demand accountability," Stuart Scheller said in August 2021.
Scheller blasted military leaders for the way the U.S. left war-scarred Afghanistan three-and-a-half years ago, a chaotic operation that left 13 service members dead.
His comments sparked a firestorm that led to a stint in jail and, ultimately, to Scheller's resignation.
Last week, Defense Secretary nominee Pete Hegseth mentioned the 43 year-old Scheller during his confirmation hearing.
"The only person held accountable in those moments was a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who had the courage to stand up and say, 'Someone should be held accountable for that.' His name is Stu Scheller," Hegseth told members of a Senate Committee.
Stu Scheller Sr. said that recognition and his son's new post at the Dept. of Defense represent more than just a poignant comeback.
"He's a fighter. He's a warrior," Stu Sr. said. "He took a stand for what was right. He spoke truth to power. .. Stuart's going to make a difference in our military. .. We are so excited about the future."
In his Facebook post, Stuart Scheller said he was offered the Dept. of Defense job two weeks ago. He said he waited until Monday, Inauguration Day, to make the announcement to avoid complicating Hegseth's confirmation process. In his post, Scheller said Hegseth is the defense secretary "warfighters deserve."
wlwt.com · by Todd Dykes · January 20, 2025
13. American Exceptionalism Is Back
There is nothing wrong with American Exceptionalism (AE). No one should ever apologize for it. But we should think deeply about what it means.
Here are some thoughts on AE from key historical leaders and scholars (observers).
Jefferson's Statement on American Exceptionalism.
- ----- To the Citizens of Washington, March 4, 1809
The station which we occupy among the nations of the earth is honorable, but awful. Trusted with the destinies of this solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights, and the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible of its benign influence. All mankind ought then, with us, to rejoice in its prosperousness, and sympathize in its adverse fortunes, as involving everything dear to man. And to what sacrifices of interest, or convenience, ought not these considerations to animate us? To what compromises of opinion and inclination, to maintain harmony and union among ourselves, and to preserve from all danger this hallowed ark of human hope and happiness.
- Winthrop: “City on A Hill”
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JFK: “Shining City on a Hill” – every President since
- Three Types of AE:
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Arrogant: superior, no country can compare – manifests itself in ideas such as we will never put under military forces under a foreign commander.
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Activist: Must export “Jeffersonian Democracy” – e.g., “make the world safe for Democracy.”
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Benign: An example should others choose to follow the ideals (“Freedom is a plant that could only grow and flourish in a favorable environment” - similar to de Tocqueville’s later description of American and its unique conditions as being “exceptional.”)
- Empire of Liberty: Jefferson an Exemplar or Crusader?
- Jefferson's broad views:
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“Sought to advance the course of Liberty by remaining separate from the world. Only by avoiding the enormous economic and constitutional threats produced by entangling alliances and foreign wars would America fulfill its mission as an example for oppressed peoples everywhere.”
- “Free political and economic institutions would flourish in America only if they take root elsewhere.”
- Make world safe for Democracy?
- Jefferson – real father of “Soft/Smart Power?” He had
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“…an inordinate degree of faith in his ability to ‘concur without war’ – to secure objectives of the U.S. by economic and peaceable means of coercion
- Jefferson: An exemplar or a crusader?
- We can cherry pick his ideas to make either case.
Winthrop:
The concept can be traced back to John Winthrop when he gave a sermon to his congregation to inspire them to survive in the New World. The metaphor of the “City on a Hill” which is most often associated with American Exceptionalism comes from this key excerpt from his sermon:
"Now the only way to avoid this shipwreck, and to provide for our posterity, is to follow the counsel of Micah, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly with our God. For this end, we must be knit together in this work as one man. We must entertain each other in brotherly affection. We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of other’s necessities. We must uphold a familiar commerce together in all meekness, gentleness, patience and liberality. We must delight in each other; make other’s conditions our own; rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together, always having before our eyes our commission and community in the work, as members of the same body. . . . The Lord will be our God, and delight to dwell among us, as his own people, and will command a blessing upon us in all our ways, so that we shall see much more of his wisdom, power, goodness and truth, than formerly we have been acquainted with. We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when he shall make us a praise and glory that men shall say of succeeding plantations, “the Lord make it like that of New England.” For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world. We shall open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of God . . ."
Alexis de Tocqueville in his seminal work, Democracy in America, wrote:
“The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one. Their strictly Puritanical origin, their exclusively commercial habits, even the country they inhabit, which seems to divert their minds from the pursuit of science, literature, and the arts, the proximity of Europe, which allows them to neglect these pursuits without relapsing into barbarism, a thousand special causes, of which I have only been able to point out the most important, have singularly concurred to fix the mind of the American upon purely practical objects. His passions, his wants, his education, and everything about him seem to unite in drawing the native of the United States earthward; his religion alone bids him turn, from time to time, a transient and distracted glance to heaven. Let us cease, then, to view all democratic nations under the example of the American people.”
American Exceptionalism Is Back
Trump has assembled a potentially powerful coalition of tech moguls and populists.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/american-exceptionalism-is-back-trump-tech-moguls-and-populists-powerful-coalition-b3834bd4?mod=hp_opin_pos_4&mc_cid=be7ad1ecbc#cxrecs_s
By Walter Russell Mead
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Jan. 20, 2025 5:21 pm ET
President-elect Donald Trump gestures as he walks with his wife Melania after a church service on the day of his inauguration in Washington, Jan. 20. Photo: Matt Rourke/Associated Press
Zurich
As the world braces for the second coming of Donald Trump, many fear and some hope that his return to power means the end of American exceptionalism. I think Mr. Trump’s return means exactly the opposite. His remarkable political recovery demonstrates the enduring strength of American cultural forces that have, for more than two centuries, made America uniquely hospitable to the disruption and chaos that dynamic capitalism inevitably brings.
Mr. Trump’s MAGA coalition has at least temporarily brought together two groups who are at daggers drawn in much of the world: angry populists seeking to defend the identities and, as they see it, the traditional values of their societies, and entrepreneurial tech lords pushing for deregulation and the rapid deployment of cutting-edge technologies that will likely displace many blue-collar workers.
It will take some fancy footwork by Mr. Trump to keep these rival wings of his coalition together, but the job isn’t impossible. American populists are typically more pro-capitalist than populists in Europe and elsewhere, and America’s tech lords have less reason to object to the populist elements of the MAGA agenda than do the leaders of more traditional industries and firms. There is a large set of issues on which Mr. Trump’s base and his tech allies agree, and even their differences offer more room for compromise than many observers expect.
MAGA’s hatred of entrenched bureaucracies and the smug professional classes who run key American institutions meshes very comfortably with the tech agenda. The economic reform American populists seek is less about restraining the power of large corporations than about restraining the power of the bureaucracies that hamper businesses large and small. And while many blue-collar Trump constituents may fear and resent the effect of artificial intelligence and other revolutionary technologies on employment, much of the president’s base will cheer if tech displaces large numbers of bureaucrats, bankers and lawyers. That base won’t support technology regulations or demand antitrust suits aimed at preventing the automation of upper middle class professional jobs.
Meanwhile, the elements of the MAGA agenda that raise eyebrows in C-suites and economics departments, such as industrial protectionism and immigration restriction, are less worrisome for the tech lords than for many other businessmen. Tech firms are less vulnerable to the consequences of tariff and trade barriers than companies like Walmart. And while the tech industry’s staunch defense of the H-1B visa program enrages some populists, the tech industry is far less dependent on low-wage immigrant labor than many other economic sectors. Overall, a compromise in which Mr. Trump’s tech allies support caps on unskilled immigration and tight border controls while keeping the door open for migrants with the skills tech needs seems within reach.
The combination of reshoring production and restricting the growth of the labor force may be a net positive for tech. Faced with paying U.S. wages to production employees, manufacturers will invest much greater resources in technology that allows them to keep their head counts low. That is good for the national economy and productivity overall. It is even better for the tech sector.
Meanwhile, protectionism, immigration and deregulation will support blue-collar labor demand even as the technology revolution disrupts one industry after another. That looks important. Robo-taxis are already beginning to roll across the streets of American cities. How long will the members of the Teamsters Union be needed to drive trucks?
This is how American exceptionalism works. While much of the West remains gridlocked among antigrowth greens, sullen socialists clinging to unsustainable welfare states and technophobic regulators more interested in blocking potentially dangerous technologies than in developing world-beating companies, American populists have aligned with tech moguls around a program of deregulation that will accelerate the transformation of the American economy.
The pro-enterprise streak in American populism runs deep. The colonists who revolted against Britain wanted, among other things, the freedom to conduct their business without the restrictions that British policy sought to impose. Andrew Jackson’s populists weren’t capitalism-hating socialists who wanted to introduce central planning or stifle the animal spirits of American entrepreneurs. They hated the Eastern coastal elite and its domination of finance, but they wanted to decentralize and democratize capitalist opportunity, not crush it.
The MAGA-populist/tech-lord coalition is a volatile one, and keeping it together will be taxing. It is too early to tell how successful the second Trump administration will be. But as your peripatetic Global View columnist attends this week’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he will be cautioning participants against underestimating the potential of America to renew itself in unlikely and even unseemly ways. In aligning U.S. policy with the needs of the most dynamic, future-facing elements in the economy, the MAGA movement and its newfound technology allies may be more consequential than many critics understand.
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Wonder Land: Donald Trump used to be accused of breaking norms. Now it’s ‘disruption.’ Question is: will this approach work in 2025? The answer doesn’t break easily into yes or no. Photo: Valerie Plesch/Bloomberg News
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Appeared in the January 21, 2025, print edition as 'American Exceptionalism Is Back'.
14. SASC pushes forward Hegseth nomination for defense secretary
I think this has been overlooked in the media.
SASC pushes forward Hegseth nomination for defense secretary - Breaking Defense
Hegseth’s nomination is set to come to the Senate floor later this week, where it is expected to pass along party lines.
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · January 20, 2025
(L-R) Hosts Brian Kilmeade, Katie Pavlich and Pete Hegseth with Lee Greenwood (C) as he visits “FOX & Friends” at Fox News Channel Studios on May 27, 2022 in New York City. (Photo by Roy Rochlin/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON — The Senate Armed Services Committee has narrowly approved the nomination of Pete Hegseth to be the next secretary of defense, with Republicans using their single-vote majority to push the embattled nominee through to the next stage of the process.
A source familiar with the vote said SASC members reported Hegseth out of committee along party lines in a 14-13 vote this evening. Hegseth’s nomination is set to come to the Senate floor later this week, where it is also expected to pass along party lines.
Hegseth, a Fox News host and National Guard veteran, was tapped by President Donald Trump to lead the Pentagon in November. In the following weeks, allegations of sexual misconduct and whistleblower reports alleging that Hegseth abused alcohol while on the job at Fox News and as the former president of Concerned Veterans for America threatened to topple his nomination. Hegseth has denied all allegations of sexual misconduct and has pledged to stop drinking if named secretary of defense.
During his confirmation hearing last week, Hegseth tried to make the case that he had reformed after making mistakes in his past, and that his combat experience would result in a Defense Department with improved lethality and readiness.
He also tempered previous comments about women in the military by stating he would support women in ground combat roles if they could meet the same physical standards as men, though he noted the administration would conduct a review to ensure those standards had not been eroded.
Republicans largely offered support for his previous military service and “warrior ethos,” but Democrats questioned his character, his ability to lead a massive bureaucracy after previously managing a workforce of only around a hundred people, and whether his softened position on women in combat would hold after his confirmation.
“I do not believe that you are qualified to meet the overwhelming demands of this job,” said Sen. Jack Reed, the top Democrat on the committee and the only Democrat to have been given a meeting with Hegseth prior to the hearing. “We must acknowledge the concerning public reports against you. A variety of sources, including your own writings, implicate you with disregarding laws of war, financial mismanagement, racist and sexist remarks about men and women in uniform, alcohol abuse, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and other troubling issues.”
After the hearing, Hegseth finally secured the support of Sen. Joni Ernst, a sexual assault survivor and combat veteran who previously indicated she was unsure whether she help underwrite Hegseth’s nomination.
“As I serve on the Armed Services Committee, I will work with Pete to create the most lethal fighting force and hold him to his commitments of auditing the Pentagon, ensuring opportunity for women in combat while maintaining high standards, and selecting a senior official to address and prevent sexual assault in the ranks,” Ernst said in a statement last week.
Also this evening, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to approve former Sen. Marco Rubio’s nomination to lead the State Department.
“We are glad to have worked in a bipartisan way to ensure that one of our own, Senator Marco Rubio, could be positioned to quickly take the helm of the State Department,” said its chairman Jim Risch, R-Idaho, and Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, the committee’s ranking Democrat, in a statement. “We believe that Senator Rubio has the skills, knowledge and experience to lead the department, and his unanimous vote in committee reflects that. We hope to see his nomination pass the full Senate without delay.”
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · January 20, 2025
15. How Biden’s Bureaucrats are Working to Obstruct Trump’s Next Term
I am sure the new administration's policies will undo any of these actions (which are wrong.)
But the bigger point should be that the proper place for opposition to the President's policies is in Congress (and the voting booth) where compromises should be hashed out. Executive branch officials (uniformed and civilians in all agencies) provide their best analysis and recommendations to their principles (and ultimately the President) and then implement decisions. They must not obstruct or resist those decisions. If they are morally opposed there is only one option, resign. But to obstruct lawful and constitutional policies is not service to our nation.
All this talk of resistance is undemocratic. Opposition yes, Resistance no. Opposition leads to compromise (or it should). Resistance leads to destruction. Where is the loyal opposition these days? (again a naive thought, I know)
How Biden’s Bureaucrats are Working to Obstruct Trump’s Next Term
Embedded activists are “burrowing in” to career roles ahead of the inauguration.
The American Conservative · by The American Conservative · January 20, 2025
With mere hours left in President Biden’s term, his loyal political appointees are scrambling to secure cozy civil service jobs in the federal bureaucracy before President Donald Trump’s team arrives. This maneuver, frequently known as “burrowing in,” isn’t a mere bureaucratic formality. It is one of the very tactics that allowed Obama-era officials to undermine Trump’s first term from within. Now, thanks to lax oversight, committed partisan activists are once again looking to stand in opposition to Trump’s America First agenda.
Once these last-minute conversions from political activists to career civil service are granted, the bureaucrat is given full public sector protections. Keep in mind the number of bureaucrats greatly outweigh the number of political appointees Trump will get to set in place. There were about 4,700 posts requiring presidential appointment in March 2024. This is dwarfed by the total of 2.3 million non-defense, non-postal workers reported the same month. Furthermore, with a 2024 survey of federal employees suggesting 43 percent would vote Democrat versus 33 percent for Republicans, a plurality of the bureaucracy is already highly mobilized against the incoming President.
When Biden partisan appointees are embedded in this environment, you can expect these new “career” employees to be armed with the political know-how, network, and willingness to throw a wrench in the plans of their new boss. Left unaddressed, this quiet takeover stands to cement an unaccountable class of bureaucrats, loyal to Biden’s worldview, inside our government.
You might think federal law would block partisan loyalists from sneaking into career positions that influence national policy. After all, federal law does guarantee that personnel management shouldn’t allow unfair treatment based on political affiliation, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has enacted rules on burrowing in, including a reporting requirement mandated by Congress. In reality, these guardrails, which largely took effect after the Obama administration already abused the process, leave the door wide open for ideologically-driven hires to embed themselves against the best interests of the incoming administration.
A 2016 Government Accountability Office review proves this point: during the Obama administration, eight different agencies implemented 17 political-to-career conversions that violated OPM’s own policies. That wasn’t a mere technical glitch; instead, it was an active effort to defy the rules designed to protect the first Trump administration from subversion.
Leandra English provides a clear case study in how burrowing in can blow up. She worked as an Obama appointee in OPM, where her boss (another Obama appointee) oversaw her conversion into a senior career spot at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) mere days before President Trump took the oath of office. Less than a year later, in November 2017, English ended up atop the controversial agency. When she was replaced, English sued, launching a legal battle that tied up the legitimate leadership choice for months. While the Trump administration ultimately prevailed in court, immeasurable damage was done. A deregulatory effort at the CFPB wound up stalled, proving just how much chaos a single, embedded partisan can cause.
OPM’s mandated reporting only goes through September 30, 2024 (before the 2024 election concluded), but we already know that 30 Biden appointees had applied for conversion to career slots in 2024 alone. Successful conversions often see jaw-dropping pay raises. On average, partisan appointees re-entering the government snagged salary bumps around 19 percent. In one case this past year, there was a pay hike of 74 percent, amounting to an eye-popping $87,000 raise.
Once shielded by bureaucratic protections, these holdovers can quietly obstruct Trump’s agenda from the inside. When politically motivated actors operate behind the scenes, they can delay, derail, or outright defy orders with near impunity. After all, research shows that only 4,000 tenured federal employees were dismissed for poor performance or misconduct in all of fiscal year 2021—one-quarter of one percent of the entire federal workforce. It’s a very real threat that imperils both effective governance and the fundamental principle that the elections decided by the American people should have consequences.
Just as the Constitution begins Article I by granting all legislative power to Congress, it starts Article II by providing that the “executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The federal bureaucracy, as sprawling and imperious as it is, has elevated itself over and against the interests of the sole constitutional wielder of executive power. The practice of burrowing highlights how politically savvy saboteurs can undermine a President from inside his own branch of the federal government. Fortunately, there are a number of reforms that could be implemented to prevent damage from current burrowing and reduce the practice going forward.
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First, just as DOGE has promised to lend scrutiny to last-minute Biden spending sprees, the incoming staff at OPM should review all recent conversions from Biden political appointee to career employee. This includes ensuring a timely publication of its report that covers burrowing from October 2024 through January 20, 2025. OPM must also impose an immediate moratorium on political-to-permanent conversions to prevent late-movers from the Biden administration from sneaking past the gatekeepers. Finally, OPM shouldn’t be afraid to re-open any personnel cases where its procedures were not followed properly in the weeks leading up to January 20.
These short-term actions are important, but one long-term solution lies with the reimplementation of Schedule F. Created by Executive Order in the first Trump administration, it would reclassify confidential policymaking roles in an effort to prevent bureaucrats from undermining the Chief Executive of the country, the President. Despite being oft-maligned by the left, Schedule F would strongly discourage rabid partisans from burrowing in when they could be discovered and fired more easily.
All Americans should want our incoming President to be successful and unhindered by partisan saboteurs. The stakes are high: we face a national debt of $36 trillion and rising, a regulatory state that has prevented economic growth, a growing culture of government dependence. Restoring American greatness will require a government that is ready to make it happen, led by a President who is committed to a vision of government of, by, and for the people. Burrowing stands in direct opposition to this mission—which is why the incoming administration must be keenly aware of the risk it poses.
The American Conservative · by The American Conservative · January 20, 2025
16. Warfare's New Equation
I am afraid our defense industrial base does not do "low cost at scale."
Excerpts:
China understands the concept of mass –the PLA reportedly submitted a purchase order of 1 million attack drones. Our adversaries are out producing us right now and doing more to integrate modern warfare doctrine into their fighting force.
Our new administration needs to take note and build off the work of programs like the Replicator Imitative but take these concepts to a whole other level.
We need more low-cost systems at scale. We need more attention to the integration of these systems into our warfighters training concepts. We need to focus more on lethality to deter and if necessary, defeat our adversaries.
This is what it takes to defeat a peer adversary. A whole-of-nation approach. We are already behind.
Warfare's New Equation
By Andy Yakulis
January 21, 2025
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/21/warfares_new_equation_1086002.html?mc_cid=be7ad1ecbc
Warfare's New Equation: Why Numbers, Not Just Technology, Will Win Future Wars
Modern Warfare has become a battle of numbers. Yet no longer is the main data point the number of troops but rather the number of systems and their cost. Reporting from the modern battlefields in Ukraine, the Red Sea, and Gaza, and Northern Israel frequently comes with a cost analysis. What was the cost of the missile to shoot down one drone? Or how much did a drone cost to destroy a tank? Mass matters now more than ever because warfare has become democratized. Small, one-way drones - which have effectively become piloted munitions, are relevantly cheap yet extremely effective.
The U.S. military industrial complex has created incredibly complex, expensive, exquisite products for the last half-century. The USS Ford Aircraft Carrier takes the number 1 spot at $13 billion, with other platforms, such as the F35, costing between $80m to $100m per aircraft. While The U.S. was building such systems, China has been focused on cheaper systems that, in mass, can destroy these large systems. Sure, the USS Ford has defenses, but if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fires five DF-21 missiles that cost $25m each at the U.S. Navy's crown jewel, only one needs to get through. The cost of the PLAN to destroy a $13 billion asset could be only $125 million. Or about 1% of the cost of its target.
In the Red Sea, the U.S. Navy has been shooting down Houthi attack drones that cost around $40,000 with two $ 1 million missiles. The targeted drone is 2% of the cost of the U.S. missiles required to shoot it down.
The numbers of war have been pushed front and center in Ukraine. The battlefield in Eastern Europe is now littered with hundreds of thousands of drones. Reporting indicates that the Ukrainian forces are using anywhere between 20,000 and 40,000 drones per month, with Russian numbers likely similar. The reason for the use of so many drones is that a one-way attack drone often referred to as a kamikaze drone or suicide drone and sometimes called an FPV (First Person View) Drone, can be built for under $1000. The drone can fly (one-way) up to 25km (with an extended-range antenna) and can carry a required munition to destroy a variety of targets. Ukrainians and Russians have spun up drone training academies to teach their soldiers to fly drones instead of shooting rifles or missile systems.
Thankfully, our U.S. military understands the importance of the numbers game and has been paying attention to the prevalence of low cost on the modern battlefield. The Department of Defense, knowing it needed to find a way to mass produce smaller, more attributable or one-way systems, created the Replicator Initiative to “field attritable, autonomous systems at a scale of multiple thousands [and] in multiple domains within the next 18-to-24 months."
On a recent trip to Ukraine, I saw the vision of DoD’s Replicator Initiative. Thousands of drones. Tens of thousands. Small attritable drones built for one purpose: mass production to overwhelm and defeat a peer adversary. The amazing Ukrainian entrepreneurs I met with weren’t building exquisite systems; rather, they assembled an ad hoc manufacturing force: young boys, old women, and old men all side by side, working together to build small, cheap, one-way drones. The average price point I found was between $500 and $800 per drone, including the battery. Visiting one of the many drone facilities hidden throughout Ukraine - the locations of which are kept a secret for fear of Russian targeted attacks - I saw the mass-produced scale in action. An assembly line that serpentined through rooms all interconnected, and in every corner, 1000s and 1000s of drones stacked up, ready for combat. The scale of the operation was impressive, but equally impressive was the buzz of activity. Everyone was working fast and hard to keep pushing their part of the process down the line. This was a people at war, doing their part to fight for freedom.
I saw firsthand what it took to defeat a peer adversary- the scale of which the world has never seen before. I saw the spirit of a country banded together to do what they could - in this case - to make drones. Some soldering, some packing boxes, some assembling flight components, some flight testing, some quality controlling. All working relentlessly for one common goal. To defend their nation. Their efforts have produced an incredible result. Last year Ukrainian built somewhere between 1.1 million and 1.5 million one-way attack drones.
I commend the efforts of the U.S. DoD to attempt to produce our version of mass drones - in the fall of 2023, Deputy Secretary Hicks launched the Replicator Initiative and the concept of replicating best practices.
Recently, the DoD announced phase 2 of the Replicator Initiative. With the first tranche of drones on contract for Replicator 1, the program is moving to phase 2, which is geared towards CUAS - a vital area that needs innovation and investment. I completely agree with the focus on counter-UAS. Considering the deaths of U.S. service members at Tower 22 and the reportedly 0% of Ukrainian casualties from FPV stiles, CUAS is a righteous effort.
Yet Replicator 1 is not complete. We are still an order of magnitude off. Our forces still need mass. Not 100 drones. Not 1,000 drones. But over 100,000 drones per month.
China understands the concept of mass –the PLA reportedly submitted a purchase order of 1 million attack drones. Our adversaries are out producing us right now and doing more to integrate modern warfare doctrine into their fighting force.
Our new administration needs to take note and build off the work of programs like the Replicator Imitative but take these concepts to a whole other level.
We need more low-cost systems at scale. We need more attention to the integration of these systems into our warfighters training concepts. We need to focus more on lethality to deter and if necessary, defeat our adversaries.
This is what it takes to defeat a peer adversary. A whole-of-nation approach. We are already behind.
Let’s go.
Mr. Yakulis is CEO and a co-founder of Vector and a former Army special-operations commander.
17. Don't Listen to Putin: Ukraine's Kursk Offensive Was a Success
Don't Listen to Putin: Ukraine's Kursk Offensive Was a Success
19fortyfive.com · by Kris Osborn · January 20, 2025
Key Points and Summary: Ukraine’s Kursk offensive demonstrated a tactical shift from defensive operations to effective Combined Arms Maneuvers.
-Supported by Western-supplied heavy armor like Challenger 2 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, Ukraine leveraged ISR capabilities to identify weak points in Russian defenses.
-The offensive showcased Ukraine’s ability to take and hold ground using precise artillery fire and long-range rockets to enable armored breakthroughs.
-While Russian counteroffensives have regained territory, the Kursk assault highlighted Ukraine’s evolving strategy and adaptability in modern warfare.
-Despite challenges in sustaining gains, Kursk remains a key example of Ukraine’s growing capability to counter Russian advances.
Kursk Offensive: Why Ukraine’s Tactics Shifted the War’s Momentum
These days, the narrative in most media outlets is that the war in Ukraine has now flipped to where Russia has most of the momentum and is slowly clawing back territory. And yet, just a few months ago, Ukraine’s Kursk ‘invasion’ was praised as a significant success.
However, even now, with North Korea entering the war to help Russia in this key sector, some say Ukraine made a mistake with this military undertaking.
If taking the long view, the Kursk offensive appears to have been largely successful in some key respects.
While “holding” ground continues to be a challenge for Ukrainian forces, and key factors are likely contributing to this, the Kursk offensive showed that classic mechanized maneuver operations with heavy armor were effective against Russian defenses.
Kursk: A Success for Ukraine? Yes.
While there are current Russian offenses that are taking ground slowly, and it may not be clear exactly how much “taken” ground Ukrainian troops will be able to hold, the Kursk offensive has proven highly effective in a number to a certain degree.
There are several interesting and key variables likely contributing to this, such as Ukraine’s effective use of ISR (Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance) and the progressive arrival of large amounts of heavy armor.
Prior to the arrival of British Challenger 2 tanks, German Leopard IIs, and US-provided Bradleys, the Ukrainian force was largely defensive.
Although quite effective, the Ukrainians used anti-armor weapons, hit-and-run ambush-style tactics, and dispersed formations to blunt, slow-down, or simply destroy Russia’s armored assault.
However, before Kursk and some other minor incursions, artillery fire, and land-fired rockets, such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), the Ukrainians did not “take” and “hold” new ground.
NATO Leopard 2 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
This did not seem to happen until the Pentagon and other allies began sending heavy armor and logistical support to Ukraine in the form of tactical trucks, medical supplies, troop transport support, and of course, heavy armor.
Disaggregated and largely defensive maneuvers were quite effective, yet “breaking” through an enemy perimeter in any kind of larger maneuver formation would likely require the use of heavier armor.
It would seem reasonable to posit that perhaps Ukraine saw a weaker point along the Russian perimeter and planned a classic Combined Arms Maneuver assault.
Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has operated with ISR from NATO and the West and has also used innovative tactics to develop and launch its own drones and surveillance systems. This would suggest that Ukraine did in fact have the ability to “see” or “survey” the Russian perimeter to assess potential areas of attack.
Should Ukraine essentially “know” where Russian defenses were weakest, they might be well positioned to launch a counteroffensive. A traditional Combined Arms Maneuver assault would have likely involved using long-range land rockets to soften defensive lines, followed by closer-in artillery fire used for both precise and suppressive attacks to enable heavier forces to “maneuver” into attack formations.
Ukraine’s Kursk Assault Was No Failure
While results or outcomes remain unclear, the Kursk offensive did represent a decided and significant tactical and strategic “shift” for Ukraine as its military demonstrated it could take and “hold” ground behind Russian defenses.
Instead of simply attacking with long-range ground fire, something which has proven quite effective, the Ukrainians have been able to conduct heavier Combined Arms Maneuvers with the support of ISR and more heavily armored vehicles.
An M1A2 Abrams SEP V2 main battle tank, assigned to Cold Steel Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, fires a M865 target practice cone stabilized discarding sabot with tracer on December 9, 2021, at the National Training Center and Fort Irwin training area.
About the Author: Kris Osborn
Kris Osborn is the Military Technology Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
19fortyfive.com · by Kris Osborn · January 20, 2025
18. Fielding 3D Printing to Enhance the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s Readiness
Fielding 3D Printing to Enhance the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s Readiness
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/21/fielding-3d-printing-to-enhance-the-173rd-airborne-brigades-readiness/
by Tucker Chase
|
01.21.2025 at 06:00am
The US Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade should field expeditionary three-dimensional (3D) printing capabilities to increase its combat readiness. As the Army’s contingency response force in Europe, the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s ability to innovate and rapidly deploy are crucial for supporting US military operations in Europe, Africa, and Central Command. The Army should equip the brigade with large-scale, deployable metal and plastic printers. Doing so will enable swift tactical solutions and serve as a model for the Army’s modernization efforts in preparation for future conflicts.
Leveraging Initial Success
Though nascent, the Army is prioritizing additive manufacturing in combat in preparation for large-scale conflicts. The Army recognized the benefits of 3D printing with the launch of the Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence (AM CoE) in 2019. In 2024, the AM CoE built the world’s largest hybrid additive and subtractive apparatus, the Jointless Hull, capable of printing an entire M1 Abrams tank. Additionally, Additive Manufacturing Research estimates the DoD will grow its 3D printing budget from $0.3 billion in 2023 to $1.8 billion by 2032. Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan, AMC’s acting commander, emphasizes the “growth requirements coming primarily out of units in Europe.”
In Europe, the 173rd Airborne Brigade began 3D modeling to print spare parts near the front lines. The Brigade Support Battalion uses the Raise3D Pro2 and MakerGear Ultra One while the brigade’s innovation team employs the Prusa Mk4S 3D printer. Recognizing the benefits, the brigade appointed an innovation officer and is acquiring two more printers to test and validate functionality for its Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). To build on this success, the brigade should procure containerized, large-scale 3D printers capable of operating in austere environments.
3D Printer-Material Analysis
A key cost driver in additive manufacturing is the decision to use either metal or polymer. Metal prints are more durable, resistant to weather, chemicals, and impact, and offer diverse material properties. However, some polymers can compete with metals in corrosion resistance and strength, making them ideal for prototyping due to their lighter weight (60-70% lighter than aluminum). The brigade should prioritize deployability, functionality, volume, speed, and cost when deciding on which direction to go. Until dual-capable printers are available, the brigade should buy both types, prioritizing large-scale metal printers at the brigade level and small-volume polymer printers at the battalion level.
The printer and accessories are only a fraction of the total cost of additive manufacturing. Additional expenses include maintenance, filament, and software subscriptions. The value of metal 3D printing relies on its impact and return on investment, calculated by comparing acquisition costs (ranging from $150k to over $1M) to savings. For instance, Shukla Medical projected their Markforged Metal X to pay for itself in under two years by in-sourcing prototyping. The system, costing $150k-$175k, would save $1,000 per prototype with 10 units per month, leading to $10k in monthly savings and breakeven in about 18 months. The 173rd Airborne Brigade also subscribes to SOLIDWORKS 3D CAD and Shapr3D for its Prusa 3D printers. To offset these costs, the brigade should seek designation as a test and fielding force under the Army’s 15-year, $4.5 billion modernization plan.
173rd Airborne Brigade is Ideal for Field Testing
173rd Airborne Brigade is the optimal unit for field testing containerized deployable 3D printers. This unit is ideal because 3D printing could save money and time for international shipments, introduce possible R&D opportunities with NATO militaries, and enhance combat lethality as a contingency response force. For example, in 2017, Soldiers in South Korea identified a fire-suppression cap fault that rendered their Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles non-mission capable. To avoid the estimated five-month delivery wait for replacement parts, they 3D-printed the 284 needed replacement caps. Lt. Gen. Aundre Piggee, the Army G-4 at the time, noted that, “it was only a small cap that was the issue, and we 3D printed a fix for it. Just 1,472 non-mission-capable days saved – for about $2.50 per part.” This highlights how 3D printing might help the 173rd Airborne Brigade maintain a higher rate of readiness just by reducing international shipping costs and reducing non-mission-capable readiness days through on-the-spot-manufacturing.
Furthermore, industrial-sized printers could support lightweight maneuverability and promote collaboration between NATO partners. In 2017, The Automated Construction of Expeditionary Structures (ACES) demonstrated the flexibility of expeditionary printers, by successfully printing a 512 square-foot concrete structure. ACES reduced construction materials by half and reduced manpower by 62% compared to traditional plywood structures. This is advantageous for the 173rd Airborne Brigade because it is expected to rapidly deploy to locations of questionable security with only mission-essential equipment. The ability to deploy and then identify which type of structure or tool best suits the brigade’s materiel requirements enables greater speed and flexibility maintaining readiness. Additionally, 3D printing presents an opportunity for the 173rd Airborne Brigade to further interconnect with NATO members through information sharing. Recently, the British Army showcased their additive manufacturing capabilities by printing metal and plastic spare parts in under an hour during the Steadfast Defender NATO Exercise. Their software also enables information sharing amongst NATO members. The 173rd Airborne Brigade should field test 3D printers, ensuring the US Army remains a leader in militarized technology, fostering greater collaboration and interoperability within NATO.
Fielding 3D Printers into the Formation
The US Army aims to equip Soldiers with 3D printing tools to address tactical challenges. This initiative connects depots, arsenals, plants, and Soldiers through a digital archive of approved 3D designs. In 2012, the Army tested this concept using the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF), which deployed two 20-foot mobile Expeditionary Labs. Each lab included a Stratasys Fortus 250mc printer and communications systems linking forward teams to REF headquarters. REF also supported the ARDEC initiative by digitally sharing 3D blueprints with other services. In 2020, Gen. Gus Perna, the head of Army Materiel Command, emphasized the need for on-the-ground 3D printers to address “readiness drivers” – frequent breakdowns of critical equipment. He clarified that additive manufacturing would complement, not replace, traditional supply chains, aiming to enhance battlefield readiness.
The 173rd Airborne Brigade should field either the Spee3D or xCell for expeditionary 3D modeling. The Australian-made Spee3D WarpSPEED3D printer is the best option because it is battle tested by Ukraine, energy-efficient, deployable, and rapidly prints large parts. The Spee3D is already being tested in Ukraine’s battlefield since 2023, where seven WarpSPEED3D metal additive printers were donated. Its cold spray additive technique is ideal for combat because it does not require lasers or gases. Additionally, the WarpSpee3D is expedient, energy-efficient, and produce parts up to one meter in diameter or 40kg, with a manufacturing rate of 100g per minute. For example, the company printed a 4.5-pound aluminum bronze gunner’s ratchet in 60 minutes. The machine is user-friendly with on-screen instructions and Spee3D offers a 15-day training program. Most importantly, this 3D printer is highly deployable as Calum Stewart, Spee3D’s Director of Defense Programs, stated, “you can pick it up, put it in the back of a truck, put it down, set it up, and have it up and running in 45 minutes.”
The second-best option for the 173rd Airborne Brigade to field test is the xCell. This American-made, semi-automated, expeditionary system specializes in producing high volumes of UAS and spare parts. Notably, the xCell can assemble a drone in under 24 hours. Firestorm Labs currently offers two container models – 20ft and 40ft. While still in development, the xCell is a viable option, especially since Firestorm Labs is financially backed by Lockheed Martin. Its deployability and focus on UAS printing make the xCell a strong fit for the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s needs.
Leading from the Front
As 3D printing becomes more affordable and accessible, new security risks may emerge. In 2021, a Pentagon watchdog published a report exposing the cybersecurity threats residing in the DoD additive manufacturing programs. The report discussed concerns that an adversary could compromise a service’s 3D printing design data to re-create and use this information for the enemy’s advantage. In 2016, RAND Corporation demonstrated this cybersecurity threat when university researchers hacked a 3D printing system, altering drone propeller code. The printed propeller appeared perfect, yet microscopic faults in its blade produced failure, revealing risks as additive manufacturing could print mission essential parts like helicopter engine components. If fielded containerized 3D printers, the 173rd Airborne Brigade should take a holistic approach to hardening its 3D printing software against cybersecurity threats.
The 173rd Airborne Brigade should lead NATO’s tactical containerized 3D printing efforts. In the end, the benefits of additive manufacturing far outweigh the costs. As the battlefield evolves, 3D printing offers immediate value to the Brigade. The Army should prioritize the 173rd Airborne Brigade in its long-term fielding plan, leveraging the Brigade’s leadership in innovation to address key challenges such as certification, safety, intellectual property, and compression of need-to-solution timeline.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Tags: Airborne Operations, emerging disruptive technologies, innovation, military innovation
About The Author
- Tucker Chase
- First Lieutenant Tucker Chase is an Army Public Affairs Officer in the 173rd IBCT (A) who holds a bachelor’s degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the United States Military Academy. He also served as a research assistant for the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI) and been published in the Modern War Institute and IWI.
19. Army experimenting with what the 'edge' is for cloud computing capabilities
Army experimenting with what the 'edge' is for cloud computing capabilities
“We need to be very, very, very careful in this space to not do the opposite of what we're trying to do as an Army, which is reduce complexity at the tactical” level, CIO Leonel Garciga said.
By
Mark Pomerleau
January 17, 2025
defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · January 17, 2025
The Army is conducting experiments to determine what its edge is at echelon and what tools those forces will require.
One such capability is edge computing and cloud. Once a prominent fixture for buzzword bingo, where government and industry types opined on deploying, the service is beginning to take a slightly different view on who will need these technologies and how feasible it will be to deliver them given the speed of war in the future.
“Somebody asked me the other day about ‘we need to scale this cloud thing all the way at the tactical edge.’ I was like, ‘to do what?’ … That’s not how the Army fights,” Leonel Garciga, Army chief information officer, said Friday at AFCEA’s Northern Virginia Chapter Army IT Day. “If we’re learning anything in Ukraine is these micro things that are happening, you’re not going to be doing that in the cloud, you’re not going to be scaling all these services. I think we really need to start focusing on building that [concept of operation] of how we’ve got to fight, so it can drive the right capabilities at echelon.”
Garciga added that the Defense Department needs to understand how it’s going to fight in the future and build capabilities that are needed at echelon and at the tactical edge. That also means determining what the edge is, which will vary across theaters, units, services and agencies.
“Broader, across the department, the Navy is going to look a little different, that’s a thing. Air Force is going to look a little different. Combat support agencies [are] going to look a little different. I think at echelon, what we call ‘edge’ matters,” he said.
Using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency as an example of a combat support agency, Garciga noted that NGA’s edge is a region.
The Army has been trying to simplify its network and remove complexity from smaller units so they can be unburdened to focus on fighting rather than running the network.
Saddling them with more edge capabilities could run counter to that initiative.
“We need to be very, very, very careful in this space to not do the opposite of what we’re trying to do as an Army, which is reduce complexity at the tactical” level, Garciga said. “It’s like somebody came here, they said, ‘oh we got to do this at BCT, or we got to push this data all the way down to the platoon.’ I’m like, ‘isn’t that the opposite of where we’re going as an Army?’ We have made a conscious decision to reduce complexity, why are we bringing complexity back down?”
Other officials explained how the Army is working to define what the edge is, who needs what capabilities, and what their roles are.
“I think it depends on your role. Like maybe future ops, current ops in the brigade or in a company, if that’s their role, maybe they need edge compute. We’ve got to stop thinking of the Army as everybody has. It’s what is your role — and then you get that on-demand capability. I think that’s what we’ve got to experiment with,” Mark Kitz, program executive officer for command, control, communications and network, told DefenseScoop on the sidelines of the event. “If you’re a battalion commander and you have a company of small form factor [unmanned aerial systems] that’s collecting data, they may need edge compute in order to collect and process that data — whereas the other companies may be running patrol or perimeter security, they may not necessarily need edge compute. Thinking about roles in a tactical formation may help us get to some of these decisions about edge compute and what the edge compute means operationally.”
Kitz said the Army will be experimenting with what edge compute could look like at the Project Convergence Capstone 5 event later this year. Questions officials will be seeking to answer include: what data would soldiers have access to and how is it secured it?
Those questions and answers will factor into the ongoing development of one of the service’s top initiatives, Next Generation Command and Control, a completely new approach to how the Army plans to operate on the battlefield that aims to provide commanders and units with a better path to information, data and command and control through agile and software-based architectures.
According to Kitz, as that effort rolls out, the next questions will be: what can the Army put at the platoon level or the company level and beyond, to determine at what echelons would small form factor compute look like and what transport can be taken advantage of?
Officials conducting NGC2 experimentation efforts have stated that they are defining the platoon level as the tactical edge.
“We can’t go back to the cloud for everything that we’re going to do. It won’t be available. We started thinking through all right, what are we going to need to be able to process at the tactical edge, once again, defining the platoon as that tactical edge?” Col. Mike Kaloostian, chief digital and artificial intelligence officer at Army Futures Command, said at the Army’s Technical Exchange Meeting last month. “What can we do? What new edge compute capabilities, what low [size, weight and power], high-capacity edge compute capabilities exist so we can experiment and just learn from right now, and we can deploy those micro services to the edge? We can host and process certain data flows and data sets at the edge and see, and just ensure that we are not always going back to the cloud for everything and further driving down the latency.”
As part of the experimentation efforts, Kitz reiterated that the Army will embark upon exploring what the edge looks like, because “I don’t know that we know the answer to that.”
Written by Mark Pomerleau
Mark Pomerleau is a senior reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare, cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, intelligence, influence, battlefield networks and data.
In This Story
defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · January 17, 2025
20. The U.S. Needs Soldiers, Not Warriors
I'm afraid the subtleties and nuances of military service and the difference between a soldier and a warrior are lost on the public. A warrior is an overused term that has many positive and many negative traits. Nor do most of us recall history and certainly not the classics. No one will win arguments with the public (or politicians) referencing the classics (regardless of how relevant they remain).
But I doubt this editorial or others like it will prevent nominee Hegseth's confirmation.
The U.S. Needs Soldiers, Not Warriors
Pete Hegseth has vowed to bring a warrior culture back to the Department of Defense. It’s a terrible idea.
By Eliot A. Cohen
The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · January 21, 2025
In his contentious confirmation hearing, Donald Trump’s nominee for secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, affirmed that his mission is “to bring the warrior culture back to the Department of Defense.” It is a terrible idea.
The archetype of the Western warrior is Homer’s Achilles. Superbly fit, the “swift runner” Achilles is magnificent in battle. He is an individualist, with dazzling armor and a troop of admiring Myrmidons who would follow him anywhere. His prowess in combat is unsurpassable. He is brought down only by a poisoned arrow (a sneaky weapon if ever there was one) fired by the wimpy Paris, whose seduction of Helen had started the Trojan War.
He is also the man who comes close to killing his boss, Agamemnon, over a favorite concubine; sulks in his tent; and weeps when he feels dishonored until his mother (a goddess) comforts him. In a rage over the death of his friend Patroclus in a fair fight, Achilles not only kills the Trojan prince Hector but then drags his body around Troy for his horrified parents and widow to see. An intervention by the gods is all that prevents the body from being ripped apart by this treatment, although Achilles’s initial hope (snarled at the dying Hector) was that dog packs and birds would rend the corpse of the man who fought to defend his city from the horrors of a sacking.
Achilles is a warrior, not a soldier. History has had plenty of warrior types, including some (think Geronimo) whom we celebrate even after vanquishing them. But let us remember that the brave (and yes, they are brave) ghazi fighters of the Islamic State and the mercenary killers of the Wagner Group had and have warrior cultures. Warriors are people who exult in killing, who prize individual courage and daring, who obsess about honor (often in self-destructive ways), who frequently take trophies from the bodies of their enemies, and whose behavior on and off the battlefield often veers into atrocity.
Soldiers are different. They are servants of the state. In well-governed countries, they are bound by discipline, the rule of law, and commitment to comrades and organizations—not to self-glorification. Their virtues are obedience, stoicism, perseverance, and competence. They serve a common good, and duty, not glory, is their prime motivation.
The distinction matters. If Europe and the United States overran large parts of the planet, it was because they deployed disciplined soldiers against, in many instances, more numerous warriors. Even well-organized warriors—think of Shaka’s Zulus, or the Iroquois confederacy—could rarely defeat well-drilled infantry. The British General C. E. Callwell’s Small Wars, a manual on imperial warfare, explains the outcomes of those and many other fights far better than Homer’s Iliad.
To be sure, these are ideal types, and in reality they may coexist, although with one set of qualities predominating. Arguably, for example, the armies of the Confederacy were more like warriors (the rebel yell, J. E. B. Stuart’s plumed hat, Pickett’s death-defying charge), and the Union more like soldiers (repeating rifles, rumpled Ulysses S. Grant, an ever-tightening naval blockade). We know how that turned out. It is no coincidence that one book that tries to explain the Confederacy’s exceptionally high losses, particularly among general officers, bears the title Attack and Die. Southern warriors liked to charge with the bayonet. And atrocities such as the Fort Pillow massacre of African American troops and the cruelty and mismanagement of Andersonville Prison had a lot to do with nonsoldierly behavior.
The infatuation with warrior culture—the strut and swagger, the desire to battle mano a mano—is not atypical of a certain kind of junior officer, which is what Hegseth was in the National Guard. It is a world apart from how the armed forces operate at scale, and from the extraordinarily complex business of the Department of Defense.
You don’t want Achilles in a nuclear submarine, you don’t need El Cid maintaining your stealth bomber, and you surely do not want Crazy Horse presiding over the urgent problem of renovating the American defense industrial base.
I have known some great soldiers (using the term to include sailors, airmen, and Marines), and by and large they are wary of warrior culture. They know that violence on the battlefield can easily spin out of control; they know that a very large part of their duty is the orchestration of large and intricate organizations and complex technologies. They prefer steadiness to impulse, calculation to intuition, and, above all, thoughtfulness about their profession to raging glorification of bloodshed. Jim Mattis and David Petraeus (to mention just two) are readers (and writers) of books; the special operators Stan McChrystal and William McRaven are anything but yellers and screamers.
And those are just the military people. Secretaries of defense are civilians, or should be. The appointment of Mattis in the first Trump administration could be supported on the grounds that an erratic new president needed someone in that position who would temper his wilder instincts. Typical for Trump though, he was disappointed to learn that Mattis was not, in fact, known as “Mad Dog” and hated the president’s use of the nickname. The appointment by President Joe Biden of another retired general, Lloyd Austin, was but one of a number of unforced errors that made his administration in many respects a failure.
The civilian secretary of defense should be tough and highly experienced—Bob Gates or, earlier, Melvin Laird—as well as a capable organizer, a respected counselor, a shrewd politician, and a forceful leader from outside military culture. The defense secretary’s job is often to represent civilian values to the military (think racial integration and acceptance of homosexuals in military service) and military values to the civilian world. They must administer a sprawling department with millions of civilian and military members, set an enormous range of policies, and, most important, exercise the consistent civilian oversight of military operations, which a president cannot. They are not in the warrior business. Indeed, some of the most effective secretaries have had negligible military experience, or none whatsoever.
Hegseth, quite apart from his turbulent personal life, has no qualifications for this position. The organizations he ran failed or lost considerable sums of money; his testimony (before an admittedly less-than-exacting set of interrogators) revealed broad areas of ignorance about defense. He seems to have gotten the nod because of his servility to Trump, and the tough-guy bluster of a resentful junior officer raging against higher-ups—an altogether common type throughout history, a trope rather than a qualification.
And this warrior-culture rhetoric is potentially dangerous. In his first term, President Trump reversed a number of decisions that the military made to enforce discipline—restoring rank and the coveted SEAL trident pin to Eddie Gallagher, and pardoning other officers convicted of or headed to trial for war crimes. Trump could do much worse with a secretary of defense who thinks his job is to free up the tough guys to do tough-guy things. Hegseth’s sneers at judge advocate general officers—military lawyers—were not merely juvenile but dangerous.
The real peril here is not a plot to destroy American liberties but fecklessness and ignorance about what it takes to build, strengthen, and direct a military that is powerful but not, in relative terms, as dominant as it once was. Half a century ago, the great student of management, Peter Drucker, said that running the Department of Defense might well be impossible. Perhaps, but it is most certainly impossible in the hands of someone whose idea of leadership of that organization is a jutting jaw, bravado, and war paint.
The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · January 21, 2025
21. No Biden Pardon for Ukraine Impeachment Hoaxer Alexander Vindman
Ouch. I do not usually send out Brietbart reports but I think it is the only media outlet covering this (in its own way).
No Biden Pardon for Ukraine Impeachment Hoaxer Alexander Vindman
Breitbart · by Kristina Wong · January 20, 2025
Former President Joe Biden, just hours before he left office, issued a flurry of preemptive pardons for his political allies — including retired Gen. Mark Milley, Dr. Anthony Fauci, and members of the J6 Committee — but skipped one for Ukraine impeachment hoaxer Alexander Vindman.
Vindman’s wife, Rachel Vindman, took to Bluesky to whine about being left off the pardon list.
“Whatever happens to my family, know this: No pardons were offered or discussed. I cannot begin to describe the level of betrayal and hurt I feel,” she posted.
It is not clear why she wanted a pardon for her husband and what she believed he could be charged for.
Vindman, a staffer at the National Security Council, had kickstarted an impeachment of President Donald Trump in 2019 after he listened in on a call between Trump and the Ukrainian president and complained that Trump tried to withhold military aid from Ukraine in exchange for dirt on his political opponent then-Vice President Joe Biden’s son.
Vindman then testified as the star witness in the House impeachment hearings chaired by then-House Intelligence Committee Adam Schiff (D-CA). Trump was ultimately acquitted by the Senate.
Vindman, a Ukrainian immigrant and retired lieutenant colonel, is a staunch supporter of U.S. taxpayer funded-military aid for Ukraine, and during his testimony revealed Ukraine offered him the job of defense minister three times. He and his brother, Eugene Vindman — who is now a Virginia congressman — have launched a business providing logistical support for military equipment being used in the Ukraine War.
Follow Breitbart News’s Kristina Wong on “X”, Truth Social, or on Facebook.
Breitbart · by Kristina Wong · January 20, 2025
22. Putin Is Not Yet Desperate
Keep this in mind as we debate the future actions in support of Ukraine.
Excerpts:
Putin’s ultimate goal remains unchanged. He wants to deny Kyiv the ability to chart an independent foreign policy and maintain a strong military—in essence, to take away Ukraine’s sovereignty. None of the cease-fire proposals currently on the table meet his maximalist demands. For Putin, Ukraine is not merely a geopolitical flash point but an obsession that dictates his long-term strategy. If he were to agree to a cessation of hostilities in the near term, it would likely be part of a plan to regroup, restock, and prepare for renewed aggression. In Putin’s current calculus, the specter of a sovereign, self-reliant Ukraine poses a far graver threat to Russia than the more distant prospect of economic degradation.
If Western capitals cannot bank on the imminent collapse of the Russian economy, they must face the reality that Russia will pose an immense challenge for the next year or more. The United States and Europe will need to sustain Ukraine through this critical period, working together to bolster sanctions enforcement and finding ways to manage potential shifts in U.S. policy or fractures within the European Union. Eventually, the cumulative toll of Russia’s war economy will need to be paid. The West should be planning for that contingency now in order to capitalize on the opportunity when economic collapse becomes an urgent, unavoidable reality for Putin. But Ukraine’s backers should not expect that moment to arrive any time soon.
Putin Is Not Yet Desperate
Foreign Affairs · by More by Alexandra Prokopenko · January 21, 2025
Economic Pain Won’t Turn the Tide in Ukraine
Alexandra Prokopenko
January 21, 2025
A Russian soldier training in the Krasnodar region, Russia, December 2024 Sergey Pivovarov / Reuters
Alexandra Prokopenko is a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. She worked at Russia’s central bank until early 2022.
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The newly inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump has promised a swift end to the war in Ukraine. Faced with the unattractive alternative of continuing to fight without the assurance of further U.S. backing, Kyiv and its Western partners are now considering how to secure an acceptable deal with Moscow. In his Senate confirmation hearing to become U.S. secretary of state, Florida Senator Marco Rubio cited economic sanctions on Russia as a key source of leverage that could bring about a peaceful resolution. Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, meanwhile, has stated that “time is not on Russia’s side,” especially if the West ramps up aid to Ukraine and intensifies the sanctions on Moscow. By applying enough pressure now, the thinking goes, Ukraine and its backers can enter talks from a favorable position, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will be forced to engage in good-faith negotiations that end in a satisfactory settlement.
It is true that Putin’s current strategy is unsustainable. He is trying to simultaneously wage war in Ukraine, maintain high social and infrastructure spending to create an illusion of normality for his domestic constituents, and preserve macroeconomic stability. It is impossible to do all three in perpetuity. Achieving the first and second goals requires large outlays of cash, which fuel inflation and thus prevent the achievement of the third goal. And the cracks in the Russian economy are becoming increasingly apparent.
The problem for the West is timing. Political leaders want the war to end quickly. Some analysts have also suggested that in the coming months, the pressure on Russia could be so great that Putin will have to seek an off-ramp to stabilize the economy and safeguard his hold on power. But Western hopes rest on a false assumption. Russia’s economic challenges are not yet so acute that they will make a meaningful difference in the war in the near term. For at least the next year, the Kremlin should be able to keep its overheating economy from exploding into a full-blown crisis. Putin will likely still have the resources to sustain his brutal campaign in Ukraine—and perhaps the incentive to wait out the West.
WAR ABOVE ALL
The Kremlin is prioritizing the war above all else. Defense and security needs have dominated federal spending every year since the full-scale invasion in 2022, reaching 40 percent of total expenditures in the 2025 budget and representing more than eight percent of the country’s GDP. Most of this money has gone to arms production and military salaries. Since the beginning of the war, Russia has doubled its production of armored vehicles, and some ammunition manufacturers have ramped up production fivefold. Russia has also begun to mass produce inexpensive Shahed military drones, originally designed in Iran, in order to conserve its arsenal of relatively expensive missiles. Meanwhile, Moscow is devoting significant funds to expand its army. The military recruits 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers every month, offering hefty enlistment payments to lure men to the frontlines. The estimated cost of this recruitment effort is between $16 billion and $25 billion a year—a figure that excludes additional expenses to provide handouts for wounded soldiers and to compensate the families of the deceased because official statistics are classified.
The Kremlin’s spending spree has propped up the economy, and on the surface, growth and low unemployment have given the appearance of stability. From 2022 to 2024, additional government spending amounted to a fiscal stimulus of more than ten percent of total GDP. Banks issued preferential loans worth more than $150 billion, and overall corporate credit expanded by almost 20 percent in 2024. This money was mostly allocated to the construction, agricultural, and retail sectors, as well as to the military-industrial complex. The latter became a key driver of economic growth. Manufacturing industries—the sector to which the military-industrial complex belongs—grew by 7.6 percent in the first nine months of 2024, according to official statistics. Wholesale and retail trade, which are driven by consumer demand, grew by eight percent. Unemployment in Russia almost halved between February 2022 and December 2024, falling from 4.1 percent to 2.3 percent.
But the initial wartime economic expansion is slowing down. Between the second and third quarters of 2024, Russian GDP growth dropped from 4.1 percent to 3.1 percent. Industries involved in defense production are still expanding, but at rates well below their peaks in 2023. The Russian economy, in other words, is starting to hit a wall.
Heightened war spending is also creating distortions. The government is funding its 2025 military budget by raising taxes on households and corporations and funneling almost all the additional revenue directly to the military. Outside the defense sectors, meanwhile, budgets for social services, national economic programs, and even internal security and law enforcement are either stagnating or getting cut. The deprioritization of the civilian economy will put the brakes on growth and exacerbate social inequalities. Chronic underfunding in parts of the government will take a toll, too. Without sufficient resources or staff, institutions such as the Interior Ministry and the Federal Penitentiary Service will struggle to fulfill their mandates, leading to a rise in criminality and domestic insecurity.
CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION
Structural constraints on Russia’s economic growth will become increasingly difficult to ignore. Most important, the country is running out of production capacity and has a workforce deficit. Factories are operating at 81 percent of capacity, compared with prewar levels of less than 60 percent, and 73 percent of firms report labor shortages. An estimated 1.6 million jobs remained unfilled in December as unemployment numbers dipped. The tight labor market has driven up wages, particularly in industrial areas. In the Kurgan region, where Russia’s only producer of armored personnel carriers is located, salaries have soared by 33 percent since 2022. Pay has risen nearly as much in the Volga and Ural regions, two defense manufacturing hubs. This wage growth has squeezed business profitability, and its uneven distribution has worsened existing regional inequalities.
Domestic demand is rising, a result of aggressive war-related spending by the state and increased consumption by households that are profiting from rapid growth in both military and civilian wages. But because of the limits on production, the Russian economy cannot meet this demand, and it has therefore become more reliant on imports. The greater demand for foreign currency has weakened the ruble, which, combined with rising wages, has produced inflation.
Putin’s current strategy is unsustainable.
That inflation, a direct consequence of the Kremlin’s pivot to a war economy, imposes a significant cost on Putin’s core supporters. For some households, wages are rising faster than inflation. But the wages and benefits of pensioners and public-sector workers, including teachers, doctors, and law enforcement personnel, are tied to the official inflation rate, reported at nine percent in December. And depending on their consumption patterns, many households encounter a real inflation rate of more than 20 percent. Everything is becoming more expensive, from food and services to cars and housing and utilities. These rising costs are generating inequality and starting to fuel dissatisfaction, especially as the Kremlin prioritizes spending on defense over spending on social programs, utilities infrastructure, and other forms of support that could alleviate people’s economic burden.
The Russian government has found inflation difficult to control. Although the central bank previously aimed to reduce inflation to four percent by 2025, it delayed this target to mid-2026. A related problem, the weakening ruble exchange rate—the result of increased demand for imports generating a higher need for foreign currency—has also proved intractable. The government’s tools for stabilizing the ruble are limited. In peacetime, more foreign currency was flowing into Russia through international funds; the central bank could also intervene in the financial market to flatten fluctuations in the value of the ruble. But sanctions have frozen half of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves, and the central bank is saving the rest for emergencies. Capital controls introduced in 2023 have constrained the central bank’s ability to use monetary policy effectively, and already sky-high interest rates leave little room for further hikes. The Russian National Wealth Fund, too, has few liquid assets it could use to strengthen the ruble exchange rate.
These problems are likely to persist as a result of sanctions and the resource-driven nature of Russia’s economy. Geography limits Russia’s export volumes: its buyers are primarily in China, India, and a few other Asian countries that Russia can reach only by sea. As new tankers are sanctioned, the ability of Russian companies to transport goods is increasingly constrained, and difficulties with cross-border transactions and the threat of secondary sanctions make it hard to find new customers. Overall, sanctions raise operational costs for Russian exporters. Foreign currency earnings are thus unlikely to increase. With Russia’s current account surplus eroded by surging expenditures and its import dependence deepening the ruble’s weakness and fueling inflation, interest rates will remain in the double digits for the foreseeable future. Business margins are shrinking, and there is little room to turn things around with technology exports—Russia lacks technological innovation with high export potential, a consequence, in part, of nearly three years of sanctions and war—or through productivity growth, which has been stifled by sanctions that prevent technology imports that could boost labor efficiency.
THE LONG GAME
Putin may be able to manage the economic fallout of his war in the short term. Businesses can survive a year of double-digit interest rates on loans if they cancel investments. With $31 billion in the National Wealth Fund, the government should be able to solve, temporarily, the financial problems of corporations it deems “too big to fail”—although it may have only enough cash on hand to throw money at a problem once. The authorities could create a larger financial cushion by issuing war bonds that entrepreneurs and households are obliged to buy. Substantial payouts to soldiers and the broader spike in salaries have also improved standards of living for many Russians, which for now is keeping a lid on public discontent and giving the Kremlin some breathing room.
By 2026, the limits of Russia’s economic model will be impossible to ignore. Federal budget projections for 2026 and 2027 foresee modest reductions in defense spending, but given the high expense of replenishing depleted arsenals and the vested interests of Russia’s military-industrial complex, a more significant drawdown is unlikely even if the war in Ukraine ends this year. In the meantime, inflation will produce more pain across Russian society, and the costs of a war-driven economy will mount, worsening structural problems and pushing Russia toward a reckoning.
The problem for the West is timing.
Until that reckoning arrives, however, simmering economic problems are unlikely to overpower the forces that keep Putin bent on continuing the war in Ukraine. The possibility of popular pressure is low. For many Russians, dignity has come to mean state-provided salaries and pensions rather than political or civil liberties. Public sentiment may change as inflation continues to bite. But the idea that Putin’s wartime leadership means economic prosperity and national pride, and that peace would bring decline and humiliation, will be difficult to shake from the public consciousness.
Putin’s ultimate goal remains unchanged. He wants to deny Kyiv the ability to chart an independent foreign policy and maintain a strong military—in essence, to take away Ukraine’s sovereignty. None of the cease-fire proposals currently on the table meet his maximalist demands. For Putin, Ukraine is not merely a geopolitical flash point but an obsession that dictates his long-term strategy. If he were to agree to a cessation of hostilities in the near term, it would likely be part of a plan to regroup, restock, and prepare for renewed aggression. In Putin’s current calculus, the specter of a sovereign, self-reliant Ukraine poses a far graver threat to Russia than the more distant prospect of economic degradation.
If Western capitals cannot bank on the imminent collapse of the Russian economy, they must face the reality that Russia will pose an immense challenge for the next year or more. The United States and Europe will need to sustain Ukraine through this critical period, working together to bolster sanctions enforcement and finding ways to manage potential shifts in U.S. policy or fractures within the European Union. Eventually, the cumulative toll of Russia’s war economy will need to be paid. The West should be planning for that contingency now in order to capitalize on the opportunity when economic collapse becomes an urgent, unavoidable reality for Putin. But Ukraine’s backers should not expect that moment to arrive any time soon.
Alexandra Prokopenko is a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. She worked at Russia’s central bank until early 2022.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Alexandra Prokopenko · January 21, 2025
23. Ending War Is Hard to Do
Excerpts:
Both of the broad settlements described above would be Nobel-worthy, and the Trump administration would do well to pursue them. Plausible arrangements can now be worked out to shut down the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and move toward new structures of regional security. The critical question is whether Russia and Israel want that.
A deal that allows Russia to get sanctions lifted and keep control of most of the Donbas and Crimea while letting the rest of Ukraine go should be acceptable to Moscow—unless what Moscow always really wanted out of the war was complete submission. During the negotiations over a settlement, it might demand not just outright control over the fifth of Ukrainian territory it has conquered but indirect control over the rest, as well. If it does that, the United States and Europe will have to choose between accepting those terms—essentially, defeat—or continuing to support Ukraine in holding out against Russian attacks. The most significant obstacle to a deal, in other words, may be the extent of Putin’s demands on postwar Kyiv. And if Russia is unyielding and the Trump administration unwilling to accept humiliation, the White House could find itself sticking with the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy for much longer than it expects. In fact, this is probably the likeliest outcome this year, and not the worst—for it would be better than a bad deal on Moscow’s terms.
In Gaza, meanwhile, a settlement that leads to durable postwar stability there, a new round of peace talks, and a U.S.-Israeli-Saudi coalition enabling the effective containment of Iran would be a diplomatic and strategic coup for all involved. But getting there, even with the recent cease-fire, will require Kissingerian negotiating heroics and difficult compromises from all the parties. Hard-liners in Netanyahu’s cabinet, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have already voiced strenuous opposition to giving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza any path toward eventual self-determination and independence, and yet holding out hope for such a path is likely to be necessary for any broader regional peace deal. So the question will eventually become how large and durable a settlement Netanyahu wants to make, and how much he is personally willing to risk for it. And if he chooses not to go big, scotching real peacemaking, the Trump administration may yet again find itself adopting a more Biden-like policy toward Jerusalem than many expect—because without postwar progress toward decolonization of the occupied territories, the entire Gaza operation will end up having been just one more massive, futile exercise in what the Israelis call “mowing the lawn.”
In Ukraine and Gaza, the wars’ endgames may be approaching. Plausible settlements are available that could acceptably serve the belligerents’ core interests—at least, better than continued fighting would. What remains to be seen is whether the politicians in charge want to grasp the nettles in peace or choose instead to continue gambling for resurrection on the battlefield.
Ending War Is Hard to Do
Foreign Affairs · by More by Gideon Rose · January 21, 2025
Can Trump Reach Real Settlements in Ukraine and Gaza?
Gideon Rose
January 21, 2025
A Ukrainian soldier firing a mortar towards Russian troops in Kharkiv, Ukraine, January 2025 Sofiia Gatilova / Reuters
Gideon Rose is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End.
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Ending the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are at the top of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy agenda, and many expect the new administration to change American policy in both. It may well try to. But unless Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu play along, Trump could easily find himself shifting back toward the Biden administration’s approach in both theaters—because U.S. interests and geopolitical realities don’t change with the election returns.
Popular discussion often approaches war through the prisms of morality or law or justice. Beneath all of these, however, lie interest and power. Every war begins with differing views on the belligerents’ relative power, as each side thinks itself strong enough to achieve important goals by fighting. As the battlefield tests their relative strength, the situation becomes clearer and views converge. When both sides agree on their relative power, having marked their ambitions to market, the war’s endgame begins.
In both Ukraine and Gaza, many things have become clearer over time: how much military and economic potential the belligerent coalitions have, how easily that potential can be transformed into usable power, how likely that power is to be deployed in the field, and what it can and can’t accomplish there. This new clarity could help produce settlements of both wars in the coming year, based on realistic assessments of which objectives each side cares most about and can afford. Whether the settlements last, however—whether they produce peace rather than merely a pause in fighting—will depend on the details.
The United States has three major interests in the European struggle: saving Ukraine, protecting Europe, and checking Russia. A plausible settlement now might be able to achieve solid if limited results in all three areas—so long as postwar Ukraine gets adequate security guarantees and financial support.
The United States also has three major interests in the Middle Eastern conflict: protecting Israel, checking Iran, and saving the possibility of Palestine. Achieving the first two goals now seems possible, but the third—necessary for any long-term regional peace and stability—will be tougher to pull off. It will require going beyond the recent cease-fire agreement to pathways for eventually ending the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
The Trump administration should pursue peacemaking in both theaters, and it has a legitimate chance at not one but two Nobel Prizes as it does so. But it needs to be wary, since all the other players in the endgames have their own agendas and will fight the peace as grimly as they have the wars.
SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 came as a shock primarily because of its scale and brazenness. Putin’s revanchist desires were no secret, but his willingness to launch a full-on war of conquest represented a new and grave challenge not just to his neighbor but to regional security and the global liberal order at large. The United States and Europe responded by keeping Kyiv in the fight and enabling it to push back and regain some lost territory. Then the struggle settled into a grinding war of attrition, with both sides spending enormous amounts of blood and treasure for minor changes in territory. Ukraine and its backers bet that at some point Putin would tire of the effort and decide to cut his losses. Instead, he hung on and doubled down, mortgaging the future of his country on a gamble that the other side’s will would break first. These days, Putin’s bet is looking good, and the question is what happens now.
Trump campaigned on a pledge to end the war quickly. Most presume this will involve efforts to secure a negotiated arrangement allowing each side to keep much of the territory it currently holds. (That’s the reason for the intense combat this fall and winter.) Ukraine and most of its supporters abhor this idea on the grounds that it would reward Russian aggression and let Russia illegally grab a significant chunk of Ukraine. They are correct, and this is not the sort of outcome many had hoped to see. Still, such a deal might now represent the least bad alternative plausibly available—and, carefully structured, it could satisfy all parties’ interests well enough to be acceptable.
What drove Russia to invade was not the threat created by NATO expansion but rather Ukraine’s steady shift toward the West in recent decades. The war was supposed to stop this movement and bring Ukraine back securely into vassal status, whether formally reincorporated into Russia proper or nominally independent with a puppet government in Kyiv beholden to Moscow. A settlement near current battle lines could split the difference, allowing Russia to retain de facto control of the eastern fifth of the country while allowing the rest to move on and pursue its own independent destiny. The key is making sure that rump Ukraine has the security and aid to live securely after the fighting stops, rather than just sputtering along until renewed Russian attacks finish it off a few years later. These concerns could be addressed with strong post-settlement security guarantees, and the Trump administration should insist on them. It would be a terrible irony if the same war that finally brought Finland into NATO resulted in the simultaneous Finlandization of another, larger Russian neighbor farther south.
In Ukraine and Gaza, plausible settlements are available.
This kind of a settlement would leave Europe facing a militarized aggressor with a track record of successful conquest. But it would also buy time for a newly enlarged and energized NATO to rearm and prepare for the long haul. Moscow is hurting more than it lets on and will be in no position to attack other targets for a while. And by the time it regains its strength, NATO can easily be significantly stronger still, ensuring that deterrence continues to hold.
As for Russia, Putin would naturally proclaim such a settlement a great victory, but in truth, his “special military operation” would have cost his country dearly. More than half a million dead and wounded, hundreds of billions of dollars wasted, relations with the West disrupted, and the country’s diplomatic and moral capital squandered, all for the privilege of becoming a garrison state and a Chinese satellite—history will consider this not a triumph but a disaster. Other potential aggressors will take heed, thus ultimately strengthening the liberal order rather than undermining it.
Given what is now known about the relative strength and commitment of all relevant parties, a settlement that ends the fighting and lifts the sanctions while seriously checking renewed Russian attacks and allowing a truly independent Ukraine to restart life would serve core U.S., European, and even Ukrainian interests—even if such a settlement ceded Russia practical control over conquered territory and allowed it to escape accountability for its aggression and crimes.
GOOD BETS?
Hamas’s attack on October 7 was also a shock less for its intentions than for its scale and success. It, too, posed a grave challenge not only to its target but to regional and global order. Israel went after the attackers and the United States provided support. When Hamas chose to go to ground inside Gaza and hide among its people, Israel followed it down, leveling the territory and its population to get at its enemy. As the costs and controversy of the fighting in Gaza increased, and as Israel clashed with Hezbollah and Iran, as well, the Biden administration tried to rein in its partner, getting it to accept an end to the fighting. But the Netanyahu government pressed on, defying all its critics and continuing to pound its foes, betting that a brutal demonstration of effective hard power would more than compensate for a loss of soft power—and within its brutal region, might even constitute its own form of soft power, as well. These days, that bet is looking good, too.
In Gaza, Israel has devastated Hamas, rendering the group incapable of posing a major security threat for the foreseeable future. In Lebanon, it has decimated Hezbollah, wiping out its leadership, destroying its weapons, and greatly reducing the threat to Israel’s north. Israel has killed high-level Iranian officials operating abroad, knocked out air defenses inside Iran, and successfully defended against Iran’s return volley, demonstrating its ability and willingness to strike Tehran again at will whenever it chooses. And the sudden fall of the Assad regime in Syria added yet another blow to the Islamic Republic, which is in its weakest position in years. All this has reshaped the balance of power in the region, establishing Israeli dominance and significantly containing Iran’s influence—a situation that could be locked in and enhanced by a durable settlement to the current fighting.
Last week’s cease-fire in Gaza, involving an end to the fighting and the return of the remaining hostages, is a crucial first step in that process. But unless other steps follow, the embers of the conflict will flare up again soon. The challenge now is therefore to sustain the cease-fire and add an arrangement stabilizing postwar Gaza with the contribution of countries from North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf. That, in turn, could pave the way for a deal normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would be a true game-changer for the region as a whole.
The Biden administration tried hard to get this sequence going in 2024. But it had trouble doing so because Hamas was intransigent and because the Israeli concessions required in the later rounds of the process would require Netanyahu to break with the most extreme parts of his current political coalition, something he was loath to do. Having held out for the arrival of a new, more friendly administration in Washington, however, the Israeli leader finally agreed to move forward, and the fruits of the Biden administration’s efforts are starting to fall into the Trump administration’s lap.
EMBERS OF FUTURE WAR
Both of the broad settlements described above would be Nobel-worthy, and the Trump administration would do well to pursue them. Plausible arrangements can now be worked out to shut down the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and move toward new structures of regional security. The critical question is whether Russia and Israel want that.
A deal that allows Russia to get sanctions lifted and keep control of most of the Donbas and Crimea while letting the rest of Ukraine go should be acceptable to Moscow—unless what Moscow always really wanted out of the war was complete submission. During the negotiations over a settlement, it might demand not just outright control over the fifth of Ukrainian territory it has conquered but indirect control over the rest, as well. If it does that, the United States and Europe will have to choose between accepting those terms—essentially, defeat—or continuing to support Ukraine in holding out against Russian attacks. The most significant obstacle to a deal, in other words, may be the extent of Putin’s demands on postwar Kyiv. And if Russia is unyielding and the Trump administration unwilling to accept humiliation, the White House could find itself sticking with the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy for much longer than it expects. In fact, this is probably the likeliest outcome this year, and not the worst—for it would be better than a bad deal on Moscow’s terms.
In Gaza, meanwhile, a settlement that leads to durable postwar stability there, a new round of peace talks, and a U.S.-Israeli-Saudi coalition enabling the effective containment of Iran would be a diplomatic and strategic coup for all involved. But getting there, even with the recent cease-fire, will require Kissingerian negotiating heroics and difficult compromises from all the parties. Hard-liners in Netanyahu’s cabinet, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have already voiced strenuous opposition to giving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza any path toward eventual self-determination and independence, and yet holding out hope for such a path is likely to be necessary for any broader regional peace deal. So the question will eventually become how large and durable a settlement Netanyahu wants to make, and how much he is personally willing to risk for it. And if he chooses not to go big, scotching real peacemaking, the Trump administration may yet again find itself adopting a more Biden-like policy toward Jerusalem than many expect—because without postwar progress toward decolonization of the occupied territories, the entire Gaza operation will end up having been just one more massive, futile exercise in what the Israelis call “mowing the lawn.”
In Ukraine and Gaza, the wars’ endgames may be approaching. Plausible settlements are available that could acceptably serve the belligerents’ core interests—at least, better than continued fighting would. What remains to be seen is whether the politicians in charge want to grasp the nettles in peace or choose instead to continue gambling for resurrection on the battlefield.
Gideon Rose is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Gideon Rose · January 21, 2025
24. China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes
Every one of us has a role in cyber defense.
Excerpts:
Although the Trump administration is unlikely to rely on new regulations or legislation to harden the defense of American networks, it can lead on the harmonization of cyber standards across multiple federal agencies, reducing compliance costs and providing greater clarity to the private sector on cybersecurity priorities. This standardization could begin under the Office of the National Cyber Director. Under Biden, the ONCD began a study on how demands placed on critical infrastructure operators, who are often subject to multiple regulators, might be standardized and simplified. The ONCD could continue this work by implementing the study’s recommendations and streamlining the regulations that govern how federal agencies must respond to cyberattacks, which are numerous and sometimes conflicting. Such steps would free up resources that are currently used for compliance to instead be invested in greater cyberdefense. In addition, U.S. business sits on the cusp of a wave of investment in artificial intelligence applications, cloud services, smart energy grids, and high-speed connectivity. To ensure such technology remains secure, the new administration should coordinate with the private sector to incentivize parallel investments in cybersecurity talent and technology.
The United States should also conduct more hunt forward and disruptive operations to hurt Chinese operators and the infrastructure they use to launch attacks. Trump’s incoming national security adviser, U.S. Representative Mike Waltz, told CBS News, “We need to start going on offense and start imposing, I think, higher costs and consequences to private actors and nation state actors that continue to steal our data, that continue to spy on us.” But offensive cyber-operations occur out of sight. They should be accompanied by highly publicized warnings to Beijing that the United States is willing to respond to large-scale espionage operations that target U.S. citizens en masse.
Sanctions and indictments against individual hackers and small technology firms that support cyber-operations have not worked. The Trump administration should instead consider sanctioning—with its Asian and European partners that also suffer from Chinese cyber-operations—the Chinese officials who authorize the cyber-operations that steal intellectual property, install malware on critical infrastructure for destructive attacks, indiscriminately expose widely used systems to exploitation, or otherwise cross the line of political military espionage.
The new administration will likely not end Chinese cyber-espionage simply by increasing diplomatic pressure and offensive cyber-operations. But if it more concertedly goes on the offensive and hardens the country’s capacity to defend against cyber-operations, it can help prevent another breach on the scale of Salt Typhoon.
China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes
Foreign Affairs · by More by Adam Segal · January 21, 2025
The “Salt Typhoon” Hack Revealed America’s Profound Vulnerability
Adam Segal
January 21, 2025
Computer code above a Chinese flag, July 2017 Thomas White / Reuters
Adam Segal is the Ira A. Lipman chair in Emerging Technologies and National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. From April 2023 to July 2024, he was a Senior Adviser in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
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Over the last few months, U.S. government officials have revealed details about a sophisticated Chinese cyber-operation called “Salt Typhoon.” The campaign, which U.S. investigators believe is connected to China’s Ministry of State Security, has targeted at least nine telecommunications and infrastructure firms in the United States as well as other targets in dozens of other countries. Over the past year or two—investigators have not yet been able to determine the exact duration of the operation—the hackers geolocated and recorded the calls of millions of Americans and gained access to the texts and phone calls of a more select group of high-level officials and politicians, including now U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, according to Politico. Chinese-sponsored cyber-espionage is not new, but Salt Typhoon was unprecedented in its breadth. The full extent of the breach, and the degree to which hackers still have access to that information, remains unknown, but the vice chair of the Select Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Mark Warner, has called the attack “the worst telecom hack in our nation’s history.”
Senior lawmakers and U.S. officials have begun using encrypted apps to make cell phone calls and send texts. The Biden administration issued guidance to infrastructure operators on how to mitigate the threats, banned Chinese telecommunications firms from operating in the United States, and convened discussions with U.S. telecom CEOs and cybersecurity firms. In his last week in office, U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order that, among other things, requires companies selling software to the federal government to prove publicly that they have met cybersecurity standards. A more sustained policy response, however, will fall to Trump. Many of his staff will be familiar with the threat that Chinese hackers present, but they will be less familiar with how sophisticated and technologically capable their adversary has truly become.
The threat of cyber-espionage can never be eliminated. The Chinese leadership not only views the information gathered in these operations as critical to the country’s national security and foreign policy interests but also believes that the United States conducts the same operations against China. Aggressors in these types of attacks have the advantage over the defenders, and China cannot be talked out of spying. But that does not mean these attacks should just be endured. The new Trump administration can better stymie its adversaries by modernizing technology, providing greater support to critical infrastructure operators, and expanding U.S. efforts to disrupt and impose costs on Chinese hackers.
NEW AND IMPROVED
Salt Typhoon is the latest in a long string of Chinese-backed cyber-espionage campaigns. China dedicates significant resources to gathering information on foreign agencies, institutions, and individuals who might promote policies that harm Chinese interests or influence international debates on topics of importance to Beijing. The last high-profile operation before Salt Typhoon took place in 2023, when Chinese hackers exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft-based email accounts to gain access to Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s account and steal tens of thousands of emails from State Department officials working on East Asian and Pacific affairs. In the last week of 2024, the Treasury Department informed Congress that Chinese hackers had accessed workstations and unclassified documents in the Office of Financial Research and targeted the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which administers economic sanctions against countries, firms, and individuals. Over the last two decades, Chinese hackers have penetrated the networks of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State; the White House; the presidential campaigns of both John McCain and Barack Obama; and the embassies, foreign and defense ministries, and parliaments of U.S. allies and partners around the world.
China has much to gain from these campaigns. The theft of some data sets could, for instance, aid Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence operations. In addition to location data, calls, and texts, Salt Typhoon has compromised the surveillance systems that telephone companies allow law enforcement to access when authorities are conducting criminal and national security investigations. By entering through these backdoors in U.S. telecom systems, Chinese intelligence could have seen which of its operations are being monitored by the FBI. From 2014 to 2018, Chinese hackers stole the personal data of over 20 million federal employees from the Office of Personnel Management, as well as the credit information, passport numbers, travel plans, and health data of tens of millions of Americans in hacks of the private companies Anthem, Equifax, Marriott, and United Airlines. This data could have helped Chinese intelligence officers compel individuals to spy for Beijing, and it may have assisted Chinese counterintelligence in identifying and tracking U.S. spies around the world. It is also possible that the metadata from U.S. telecommunications—that is, information about whom a call was placed to and how long it lasted, but not the content of the call itself—could be employed to diversify the domestic data used to train Chinese artificial intelligence systems.
DIPLOMACY, DEFENSE, AND DISRUPTION
The U.S. government has so far responded to these types of attacks with diplomacy, by strengthening the defenses of domestic networks, and by seeking to disrupt the attacks of adversaries. These tactics have yielded mixed results. So far, diplomatic tools have not been effective in stopping or deterring cyber-espionage. The Chinese foreign ministry denies that Beijing is behind cyber-operations, publicly calls out the United States for being the real “Empire of Hacking,” and claims that Washington is using cybersecurity issues to “vilify China.” China’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center and the Chinese cybersecurity firm 360 Digital Security Group have also released reports, trumpeted by the state’s English-language newspaper Global Times, that claim that another Chinese operation known as “Volt Typhoon”—which the United States discovered in the early months of 2023 but which had been active since mid-2021, according to Microsoft—is in fact the work of an international ransomware gang and that U.S. spy agencies have created false narratives about the origin of the attacks in order to raise their budgets.
To be sure, the United States does engage in cyber-espionage, spying on the political leaders, foreign ministries, and militaries of potential adversaries. But the key difference between U.S. actions and those of Washington’s rivals is that, in their own cyber-espionage, the United States and its allies target only legitimate national security interests and are not interested in seeking economic gains, collecting a disproportionate amount of data on populations, or causing harm to third parties.
In the first week of this year, the Treasury Department sanctioned a Beijing-based cybersecurity company, Integrity Technology Group, for supporting a hacking campaign known as “Flax Typhoon” that targeted organizations within U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. The members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have publicly called out China this sort of interference, sometimes with the support of other countries, attributing cyberattacks to Chinese-backed groups. Although these actions are effective in warning vulnerable targets about Chinese campaigns and in creating a shared understanding among U.S. allies about what types of cyber operations are considered legitimate, they have had no noticeable effect on curbing the scale and scope of Chinese cyber-espionage.
China has made itself a peer competitor in cyberspace.
To better shield the United States from these covert campaigns, the Biden administration employed executive actions and sought voluntary commitments from U.S. industry. Working with the private sector, federal agencies have developed new safeguards and standards for railways, pipelines, and the aviation sector. In April 2024, Biden signed a new National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure, which tasked an agency within the Department of Homeland Security with coordinating efforts to protect critical infrastructure, especially those underpinning national security, public health, and safety. The memorandum also directed U.S. intelligence agencies to share information about cyberthreats with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure. In response to Salt Typhoon, current Federal Communications Commission Chair Jessica Rosenworcel proposed new rules that would oblige telecom operators to secure their networks, introduce an annual certification requirement for those providers to maintain cybersecurity risk management plans, and apply fines—or even criminal penalties—if they failed to comply. This rule and other regulations are likely to be revisited (and potentially rescinded) by the incoming Republican-controlled Federal Communications Commission and Congress, which view the private sector as overburdened. The Trump administration is unlikely to introduce new regulations to raise cybersecurity standards.
But even if bolstered, cyberdefense regulations would not be enough to protect the United States from outside cyberthreats. Attackers will continue to find weaknesses across networks and devices. They have increasingly breached networks by targeting third-party suppliers of software. Cybersecurity talent is scarce, and replacing old equipment can be expensive. Salt Typhoon, for example, may have exploited vulnerabilities in hardware that can be addressed only by upgrading equipment, which would cost the public and private sectors billions of dollars. Given such challenges, a better defense could require greater offense.
Republicans may doubt the utility of stiffer regulations in protecting the country from cyberthreats, but they have already taken steps to advance, or at least lay the groundwork for, offensive tactics. During his first term, Trump relaxed restrictions on offensive cyber-operations through National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, and the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act preauthorized “appropriate and proportional action in foreign cyberspace to disrupt, defeat, and deter” any “active, systematic, and ongoing campaign of attacks against the Government or people of the United States in cyberspace” by China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia.
One such tactic that the United States already employs is what the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy called “defending forward,” or disrupting malicious cyber-activity at its source. Public details of these operations are scarce, but according to The Washington Post, the United States mounted cyber-operations during both the 2018 midterm elections and the 2020 presidential election to stop hackers, including an operation preventing TrickBot, one of the world’s largest botnets, from being used in attacks on U.S. targets. In addition, U.S. Cyber Command, which is part of the Department of Defense, works with partner countries to conduct “hunt forward” operations that search for malicious cyber-activities, copying and publicly exposing malware on public websites, such as VirusTotal, before it can be used against other targets. According to its commander, General Timothy Haugh, Cyber Command conducted 22 missions in 17 different countries in 2023. The Department of Justice also plays a role in disruption. In December 2023, Chinese-sponsored hackers were detected using home and small-business Internet routers to mask attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure. To thwart these attacks, a U.S. court authorized the FBI to delete the malware and to disconnect infected routers from a botnet without the owners’ permission.
VIRTUAL SECURITY
The incoming Trump administration will face a more capable China than the first Trump administration did. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put it in 2024, “China remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks.” China has made itself a peer competitor in cyberspace by investing in new technology and training, developing closer connections between the Ministry of State Security and cybersecurity researchers, and building a competitive domestic ecosystem of private companies willing to support the state’s cyber-operations.
Although the Trump administration is unlikely to rely on new regulations or legislation to harden the defense of American networks, it can lead on the harmonization of cyber standards across multiple federal agencies, reducing compliance costs and providing greater clarity to the private sector on cybersecurity priorities. This standardization could begin under the Office of the National Cyber Director. Under Biden, the ONCD began a study on how demands placed on critical infrastructure operators, who are often subject to multiple regulators, might be standardized and simplified. The ONCD could continue this work by implementing the study’s recommendations and streamlining the regulations that govern how federal agencies must respond to cyberattacks, which are numerous and sometimes conflicting. Such steps would free up resources that are currently used for compliance to instead be invested in greater cyberdefense. In addition, U.S. business sits on the cusp of a wave of investment in artificial intelligence applications, cloud services, smart energy grids, and high-speed connectivity. To ensure such technology remains secure, the new administration should coordinate with the private sector to incentivize parallel investments in cybersecurity talent and technology.
The United States should also conduct more hunt forward and disruptive operations to hurt Chinese operators and the infrastructure they use to launch attacks. Trump’s incoming national security adviser, U.S. Representative Mike Waltz, told CBS News, “We need to start going on offense and start imposing, I think, higher costs and consequences to private actors and nation state actors that continue to steal our data, that continue to spy on us.” But offensive cyber-operations occur out of sight. They should be accompanied by highly publicized warnings to Beijing that the United States is willing to respond to large-scale espionage operations that target U.S. citizens en masse.
Sanctions and indictments against individual hackers and small technology firms that support cyber-operations have not worked. The Trump administration should instead consider sanctioning—with its Asian and European partners that also suffer from Chinese cyber-operations—the Chinese officials who authorize the cyber-operations that steal intellectual property, install malware on critical infrastructure for destructive attacks, indiscriminately expose widely used systems to exploitation, or otherwise cross the line of political military espionage.
The new administration will likely not end Chinese cyber-espionage simply by increasing diplomatic pressure and offensive cyber-operations. But if it more concertedly goes on the offensive and hardens the country’s capacity to defend against cyber-operations, it can help prevent another breach on the scale of Salt Typhoon.
Adam Segal is the Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. From April 2023 to July 2024, he was a Senior Adviser in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Adam Segal · January 21, 2025
25. A New Playbook for Irregular Warfare: How the United States Can Win Without Fighting
A review of an important new book.
As an aside, while "winning without fighting is the acme of skill" actually we should be emphasizing "what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy's strategy." Only by attacking the enemy's strategy can you have any chance of winning. with or without fighting. That is the more important dictum from Sun Tzu in my opinion.
A New Playbook for Irregular Warfare: How the United States Can Win Without Fighting
irregularwarfare.org · by Christian Trotti · January 21, 2025
During the final stretch of the 2024 American presidential election, the Department of Justice seized 32 web domains linked to ‘Doppelganger,’ an aggressive Russian disinformation campaign to influence American voters. Meanwhile, China has continued to exploit the US sanctions regime to promote its own currency, the renminbi, as a viable alternative to the dollar. And while wildfires and winter storms ravage expansive regions of the country—not long after Hurricanes Helene and Milton had exposed glaring deficiencies in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) planning and budget—forecasters and politicians alike grapple with an increasingly grim future defined by extreme weather and climate change.
What do these challenges have in common? According to the siloed US national security enterprise, perhaps not much. But that assumption betrays a critical lack of vision. In reality, Americans are under siege every day, often by forces that they neither perceive nor understand. The United States is at war—not kinetically, but instead on the intangible battlefields of internet chat groups, currency exchanges, security cooperation agreements, and natural disaster responses. As the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) warns, the contemporary security environment is best described as an era of strategic competition and transnational crises. And the simultaneity of these challenges will be a defining feature of American foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century.
How should the US government conceive of this new “Great Game” in which it is uncomfortably enmeshed? How does one measure a state’s relative position in the ongoing geopolitical clash? And what does ‘winning’ mean in this environment? These questions serve as the primary impetus for Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century—a new book by Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman which establishes a holistic vocabulary and strategic framework for outcompeting America’s adversaries. In a modern era of ‘irregular’ challenges that often fall below the traditional threshold of armed conflict, the United States must employ a more expansive toolset of non-kinetic and cost-effective means, drawing upon American advantages and undermining enemy weaknesses.
Strategic Drift
Today’s threat landscape is daunting. A renewed era of strategic competition—featuring revisionist autocratic actors such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations—is at the forefront of national security concerns. But Winning Without Fighting also adopts the idea, which underpins the 2022 NSS, that the world has entered an “age of crises” or a “world of the polycrisis.” Indeed, the concurrent threats posed by the increasing (and often mutually-reinforcing) effects of climate change, health crises, mass migration, and the introduction of disruptive technologies will challenge the resilience of all national governments, consuming increasing amounts of economic and military power to counter them effectively. Experts may debate whether strategic competition or transnational crises pose the more significant problem, but the United States must manage both.
However, America is strategically adrift. The US government, having failed to secure meaningful military success in any recent conflict, has determined the best way to succeed is to double down on preparing for a large-scale conventional operation while neglecting to recognize that its adversaries are already waging an asymmetric war using all instruments of power. As a result, America’s leaders often pursue a narrowly cast military-, technology-, and deterrence-centric strategy—instead of a more appropriate whole-of-society approach leveraging both kinetic and non-kinetic tools of military, economic, and information statecraft, as well as national resilience. At best, this flawed construct inadequately employs the necessary tools of competitive statecraft and produces suboptimal strategic outcomes; at worst, it could precipitate strategic defeat.
Strategic Culture
This dependence on overwhelming military force is rooted deep in American strategic culture. Relying on the work of Colin Gray and Tom Manhken, Winning Without Fighting argues that American strategic culture suffers from a binary conception of war and peace incompatible with the gray-zone style of competition in which it is currently enmeshed. This binary also extends to the definition of war itself, which Americans conceive of solely as military conflict—in contrast to the more holistic Chinese view of warfare, which also encompasses economic and informational competition, and to Russian strategic culture, which prefers authoritarian governance and strategic depth in the form of a well-controlled near abroad. And while military power remains necessary in a world that features a stalemated Russo-Ukrainian War and an escalating Middle East conflagration, it is not sufficient.
This strategic culture deeply affects the framing of national security issues in the policy discourse. Even when the government develops sound conceptual frameworks for competing below the threshold of war—such as “irregular warfare,” the “competition continuum,” and even “integrated deterrence”—these supposedly whole-of-society concepts are often solely or mostly led by the Department of Defense (DoD) rather than the interagency process. They often focus disproportionately on the role of applied violence rather than the large toolset of non-kinetic means at America’s disposal. Instead, the United States needs a more holistic strategic framework.
Irregular Warfare: The Ends
Winning Without Fighting advances irregular warfare (IW) as the concept that should guide US foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century. While every term is flawed, IW captures two essential areas of focus: 1) the ‘irregular’ nature of today’s competition, which should involve a greater reliance on non-kinetic means of competitive statecraft; and 2) the idea that such competition is indeed ‘warfare,’ even when it is waged non-kinetically, thereby instilling greater urgency and purpose into an American policy discourse that often neglects peacetime threats. Therefore, Winning Without Fighting arms policymakers, experts, and students with the vocabulary for addressing today’s challenges—if the threat landscape is marked by ‘strategic competition’ and an ‘era of crises,’ then the predominant domain will be the ‘gray zone’ between war and peace, where ‘irregular warfare’ must be the prevailing strategic concept.
So, what does IW look like? Winning Without Fighting articulates three relative ends that the United States should always aim to achieve to bolster its competitive standing while diminishing that of the adversary. First is power, or the ability to affect others’ behavior. This often involves coercive military and economic tools “to compel our enemy to do our will,” in the words of Carl von Clausewitz. Second is influence, or the ability to affect others’ perceptions. And third, is legitimacy, or the collective belief among a relevant population that a certain actor or action is rightful. Influence and legitimacy require a greater reliance on tools such as informational statecraft, which can shape leaders’ and populations’ views of facts and reality, and national resilience, which can bolster a government’s legitimacy among people under siege. To prevail in irregular warfare, the United States must pursue all three objectives simultaneously.
Irregular Warfare: The Means
While the United States must pursue the same long-term ends (power, influence, and legitimacy) as its adversaries, it should not use the same means. Autocracies like China and Russia have certain advantages, especially their ability to marshal state resources and control information. However, democratic states have advantages, too, including their economic vitality, more extensive networks of allies and partners, and the legitimacy of their political institutions. American strategies have traditionally neglected fundamental US advantages across the economic, informational, and resilience elements of statecraft. However, US IW strategies prevailed during the Cold War and could prevail again today. Winning Without Fighting develops the foundation for a more holistic strategic approach based on the purposive integration of all instruments of statecraft and the more balanced participation of the agencies that wield them, with a particular focus on non-kinetic means that can generate power, influence, and legitimacy.
The first set of tools is military statecraft. While the United States must continue investing in conventional and nuclear forces to deter great-power war, it also has a variety of non-kinetic tools that are too often underutilized. Ironically, the United States ‘wrote the book’ on non-kinetic military statecraft during the Cold War—using a variety of interpersonal tools (e.g., Key Leader Engagements and International Professional Military Education), organizational tools (e.g., Foreign Military Sales), and systemic tools (e.g., global force posture) to enhance military power, influence, and legitimacy among its allies and partners. These tools represent major advantages in IW struggles as adversaries seek to entice countries into their spheres of influence. Therefore, US military statecraft must be at the core of future IW efforts to combat enemy military and paramilitary threats worldwide while bolstering and expanding the American alliance architecture.
Second is economic statecraft. The academic literature and policy discourse often focus too much on sanctions and embargoes. However, American-led or -influenced economic institutions have been at the center of the global economy since the end of World War II, and the dollar is still the international currency of choice. Therefore, Winning Without Fighting chronicles the diverse economic tools available to American policymakers, dividing them into a useful typology of trade-based tools (e.g., boycotts and embargoes, import and export controls, and tariffs), capital-based tools (e.g., asset freezes, financial sanctions, and the provision or withdrawal of aid), and domestic policies (e.g., fiscal, monetary, and industrial policy).
Third is information statecraft. While the United States should never imitate its adversaries’ draconian manipulation of information, including mis- and disinformation campaigns, it has various advantages to leverage in this space. Information sharing (e.g., funding credible news outlets and promoting radio and TV broadcasting), international agreements on the right to information, and the prosecution of actors who perpetrate illegal information operations can help bring greater clarity and even truth to a murky information environment. And in more intense campaigns, infrastructure destruction—such as blocking internet access or targeting radio transmission towers—can help stall the adversary’s use of mis- and disinformation.
Lastly, Winning Without Fighting proposes the addition of a new instrument of national power: resilience, invoking the National Intelligence Council’s 2017 Global Trends report, which argues that “measuring a state’s resilience is likely to be a better determinant of success in coping with future chaos and disruption than traditional measures of material power alone.” The tools of resilience and the agencies responsible for ensuring national resilience (e.g., FEMA, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) have traditionally existed outside the national security sphere. But today, these agencies and their capabilities are critical for defending and advancing power, influence, and legitimacy. The states likely to prevail in IW are those capable of withstanding and mitigating severe shocks like climate change, pandemic disease, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns. Therefore, resilience must be a priority for every presidential administration regardless of political party. But unlike other proposals for a “a grand strategy of resilience,” or one “based on resilience,” the authors of Winning Without Fighting emphasize that resilience is one element of a broader, more holistic approach.
However, it is not enough to employ these means. Good strategies are always flexible, adaptable, and robust, and thus policymakers must be able to assess their progress toward the overall ends over long time horizons. Winning Without Fighting develops a matrix of different military, economic, information, and resilience metrics, relating them to power, influence, and legitimacy, respectively. It also encourages the development of a more formal government-wide measurement framework and a culture of assessment to ensure that any IW strategy is meeting its goals.
Educating the Next Generation
Irregular warfare is not a battle or campaign—it is a long-term, multi-generational struggle. Winning Without Fighting not only articulates a strategic framework for current policymakers but also builds a common vocabulary for future decision-makers. It is a comprehensive primer for anyone interested in exploring America’s history, preferences, and outlook concerning IW, and it is meant to help students and practitioners alike reframe their thinking about strategic competition and America’s place in global politics. As we enter 2025, this strategic framework should guide important upcoming decisions on military competition, trade wars, countering harmful narratives, and combating dangerous transnational crises.
Christian Trotti is a Master of Arts candidate, Graduate Teaching Assistant, and Graduate Research Assistant at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. His research and published analysis focus primarily on defense strategy, military operations, force planning, irregular warfare, and technological and organizational innovation in national security. Trotti served as a Research Assistant for Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action. Syrskyi stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall–Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump. Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government. Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
- Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.
- Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
- A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.
27. Iran Update, January 20, 2025
Iran Update, January 20, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-20-2025
Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26. Hamas released three female Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19. Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank in exchange.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) facilitated the entry of 630 humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip on January 19. Israel is required to support the entry of 600 aid trucks into the Gaza Strip daily during the first phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.
The IDF fired warning shots at approaching Gazans in the Gaza Strip on January 20. Palestinian medical officials reported that IDF injured eight Gazans in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF also injured two individuals in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF warned Gazans on January 19 to avoid approaching Israeli forces in designated areas.
Key Takeaways:
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Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.
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West Bank: The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”
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Northern Syria: Likely Arab tribal forces have engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in several locations along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in SDF-controlled territory.
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Northern Syria: Anti-SDF outlets have continued to circulate unconfirmed reports that the HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed forces to the SDF-SNA frontlines near Manbij. An HTS decision to send fighters to reinforce the SNA would represent a significant departure from current HTS efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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