Quotes of the Day:
“You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw”
- Vladimir Ilich Lenin
“The media’s the most powerful entity on earth. They have the power to make the innocent guilty and to make the guilty innocent, and that’s power. Because they control the minds of the masses.”
-Malcolm X
"Political action is the highest responsibility of a citizen."
- John F. Kennedy
1. What’s Driving North Korea to Consider Resuming Banned Weapons Tests
2. Kim Jong-un fired missiles despite losing more than $5 billion due to the sanctions and COVID-19 "Fecal Battle" begins. ISHIMARU Jiro
3. North Korea holds ‘emergency’ lectures nationwide, but citizens left wondering why
4. Who can protect America's national interests in Korea?
5. Leaders of U.S.,Japan reaffirm commitment to complete denuclearization of Korea
6. North Korea’s Missile Tests: Biden’s Options
7. Repeat of old tactics: North Korea should abandon brinkmanship approaches
8. Kim Jong Un won't be ignored: What North Korean missile tests mean
9. Lavrov hits out at US for placing ‘losing bet’ on continued sanctions against North Korea
10. Kim Jong Un Most Likely to Play ICBM Card, Lawmaker Says
11. Defense minister stresses military’s ‘will, efforts’ for OPCON transfer assessment
12. Moon’s Peace Process goes down the drain
13. Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?
14. Moon's peace initiative destined to fail
15. U.S. continues to see diplomacy as best way forward with N. Korea: Pentagon
16. “American Han” by E. J. Koh
1. What’s Driving North Korea to Consider Resuming Banned Weapons Tests
My take: Nature of the regime, its objectives, and its strategy. I am not sure there is a lot of uncertainty when it comes to north Korean decision making. The patterns are pretty visible.
Excepts:
North Korea has long made uncertainty its ally in managing relations with its bigger neighbors and opponents. Pyongyang’s planned review of its moratorium could just as easily signal a resumption of escalatory behavior or an opening for dialogue. The ambiguity itself is an advantage, as Pyongyang is seen as unpredictable and thus potentially willing to take actions that other more “rational” countries may not. This places the risk tolerance onus on South Korea and the United States, both from the aspect of the physical risk of the weapons systems, and the political risk of the sense of rising tensions and inability to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s development of a long-range nuclear deterrent and its more recent focus on an in-theater conventional deterrent enable Pyongyang to tailor its “threat” to South Korea, the United States or other regional powers — giving North Korea room to play off the priority and policy differences between these nations.
North Korea’s leadership may determine that a resumption of long-range tests is necessary to ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrence, and that it can simply re-impose its moratorium later in return for economic or security concessions. There is, after all, only a narrow window of opportunity for the North to take advantage of Moon’s final weeks in office, or risk the conservative candidate winning the March election and rescinding outreach to Pyongyang. Further, a new round of intensive testing like that seen in 2016-17 would significantly complicate the U.S. efforts to reshape the regional defense architecture to constrain China, incentivizing Washington to strike some deal with North Korea. The strengthening of its conventional deterrent may make Pyongyang more confident going into any new negotiations as well.
What’s Driving North Korea to Consider Resuming Banned Weapons Tests
This article was first published by Stratfor Worldview and is reprinted here with permission.
North Korea’s suggestion that it may resume long-range missile and nuclear tests risks renewing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but it could also signal an opening bid for potential negotiations. At a Jan. 19 Politburo meeting, North Korean officials accused the United States of violating commitments from the 2018 leaders’ summits, and said Pyongyang would “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.” North Korean leaders made a similar threat in January 2020. The most recent comments followed two sets of missile tests: one focused on the North’s hypersonic missiles, and the other on rail-launched short-range tactical guided missiles. The unusual January missile tests, coupled with the Politburo comments, raise concerns that North Korea may resume testing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, escalating tensions to levels last seen in 2016-17. There is a chance, however, that Pyongyang is using the review to position itself for the possible resumption of talks with South Korea and the United States.
A Question of Range and Deterrence
Over the past four years, North Korea has shifted focus to strengthening its conventional deterrent capabilities, while not eliminating its existing long-range nuclear deterrent. Since 2018, Pyongyang has tested numerous regional battlefield systems, including cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and maneuverable short-range ballistic missiles. Pyongyang has also stepped up testing and deployment of large caliber Multiple Rocket Launch Systems in recent years. Some tests (namely, those of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles and its rail-launched ballistic missiles) have demonstrated North Korea’s second-strike capability. But most of Pyongyang’s recent weapons tests have focused on systems designed to counter U.S. and South Korean missile defense systems in theater.
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In 2018, after two years of intensive testing of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, North Korea declared a self-imposed moratorium on such tests as part of its negotiations with the United States. In return, Pyongyang demanded that Washington lift sanctions and halt large-scale defense exercises with South Korea (which North Korea characterizes as hostile actions). Following the breakdown of summitry in Vietnam in early 2019, North Korea resumed testing short-range ballistic missiles but stuck to its moratorium on longer-range systems.
North Korea’s recent threat to review its “suspended activities” — which is shorthand for nuclear and long-range missile tests — serves two purposes. First, Pyongyang has legitimate concerns about the viability of these systems, and additional testing (particularly of its guidance systems) is important to ensure their use as a deterrent. Second, North Korea may be reverting to its old method of threatening an escalation to force negotiations, and then trade away the escalation for concrete economic gains. Pyongyang doesn’t have to resume long-range missile tests, for example. It can simply maintain its moratorium on testing in return for easing sanctions.
Timing and Context
North Korea’s push to renew attention to its missile program may reflect timing constraints for restarting dialogue with South Korea and the United States. With South Korea’s March 9 presidential election looming, and the two leading candidates running evenly in the polls, Pyongyang must consider whether it wants to accept South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s offer of dialogue (and an end of war declaration), or whether it considers such a move temporary at best — similar to the last-minute summit between former President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il. Moon is eager to strike a deal with Pyongyang before the end of his term, both to solidify his legacy and to lock the next administration into an engagement policy with the North. He has gained tacit backing from the United States and China to offer an end of war declaration to North Korea, but Pyongyang has so far considered this merely symbolic. Instead, Pyongyang demands a reduction of U.S. military activities on the Korean Peninsula and a reduction in sanctions, giving the North greater economic access to the international community. If Pyongyang intends to enter dialogue with Moon before the March elections, threatening to restart long-range missile tests would provide North Korea with an easy bargaining chip to trade away.
Pyongyang’s intent to restart tests or talks may also be shaped by its isolation during the COVID-19 crisis. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea rapidly closed its borders and significantly curtailed diplomatic contact. Internal restrictions may have impacted North Korea’s defense industry testing and development. Ballistic missile tests were cut nearly in half in 2020 and 2021 compared with earlier years under Kim Jong Un. The restart of tests this January may reflect both the pent-up backlog in testing cycles and the natural development cycle as North Korea shifted attention from long-range systems to shorter-range battlefield systems after the collapse of nuclear talks with the United States. But Pyongyang has not only resumed missile tests. The regime has also cautiously begun reopening some borders, as the country faces a food crisis and the economic impact of two years of self-imposed quarantine. While North Korea is still insecure about a broader reopening for fear of the uncontrolled spread of COVID-19, it is clear that Pyongyang is seeking to bolster its economy, and this requires re-engagement.
Amid increased U.S.-China tensions, North Korea sees a shifting regional security environment that may limit its options in the future as well. While the United States is adjusting its defense posture in the region to counter China, the same force structure is seen as increasingly threatening by North Korea. An expansion of U.S. anti-missile systems, the increased presence of U.S. strategic aircraft and submarines, and the potential positioning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the region are as much of a threat to North Korea as they are to China — if not more so. Further, as the United States and its regional allies and partners set their strategic sights on China, North Korea will be seen as a Chinese ally, thus leaving Pyongyang even further isolated and increasingly constrained. Pyongyang needs to act soon to reshape its own position in the region, either through stronger defense or through some opportunistic breakthrough with the West.
North Korea’s Next Move
North Korea has long made uncertainty its ally in managing relations with its bigger neighbors and opponents. Pyongyang’s planned review of its moratorium could just as easily signal a resumption of escalatory behavior or an opening for dialogue. The ambiguity itself is an advantage, as Pyongyang is seen as unpredictable and thus potentially willing to take actions that other more “rational” countries may not. This places the risk tolerance onus on South Korea and the United States, both from the aspect of the physical risk of the weapons systems, and the political risk of the sense of rising tensions and inability to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s development of a long-range nuclear deterrent and its more recent focus on an in-theater conventional deterrent enable Pyongyang to tailor its “threat” to South Korea, the United States or other regional powers — giving North Korea room to play off the priority and policy differences between these nations.
North Korea’s leadership may determine that a resumption of long-range tests is necessary to ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrence, and that it can simply re-impose its moratorium later in return for economic or security concessions. There is, after all, only a narrow window of opportunity for the North to take advantage of Moon’s final weeks in office, or risk the conservative candidate winning the March election and rescinding outreach to Pyongyang. Further, a new round of intensive testing like that seen in 2016-17 would significantly complicate the U.S. efforts to reshape the regional defense architecture to constrain China, incentivizing Washington to strike some deal with North Korea. The strengthening of its conventional deterrent may make Pyongyang more confident going into any new negotiations as well.
2. Kim Jong-un fired missiles despite losing more than $5 billion due to the sanctions and COVID-19 "Fecal Battle" begins. ISHIMARU Jiro
The people continue to suffer because Kim prioritizes nuclear and missile development over the welfare of the people.
Kim Jong-un fired missiles despite losing more than $5 billion due to the sanctions and COVID-19 "Fecal Battle" begins. ISHIMARU Jiro
(Photo) Women mobilized to collect compost in the bitter cold. Photographed in central North Korea in mid-January 2015 by Kim Dong-chul (ASIAPRESS).
The annual New Year's "manure battle" has begun in North Korea. Urban residents collect manure and bring it to farms as fertilizer. Quotas are imposed on all residents through workplaces, people's groups (neighbourhood associations), women's organizations, and schools.
Our reporting partner in North Korea, who contacted us at the beginning of the year, told us that "The quota for one month is one ton for those who are working and 500 kilograms for the retired elderly. All those who can hold a spoon are ordered to meet the quota, and there is a war for poop. If you go outside to relieve yourself, the poop will be gone within a minute. There are even no dog or cow droppings on the streets."
At a virtual meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea held at the end of last year, Kim Jong-un announced a policy of prioritizing agriculture, so this year's mobilization checks are even stricter than usual. That's a sign of the seriousness of the fertilizer shortage.
Table 1: Trends in North Korea's Trade with China (2016-2021, data from General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China)
◆ Launching a series of missiles despite having no money
Right before our reporting partner contacted us on January 5-17, North Korea launched a total of six missile tests into the Sea of Japan. The defence authorities of Japan and South Korea analysed the launch on January 11 as a hypersonic missile with a top speed of Mach 10. It is said to be difficult for existing missile defence systems to intercept it because it flies in an irregular orbit.
The primary purpose of the series of launches is to tirelessly advance missile technology, which of course, requires enormous amounts of money. North Korea's state-run media reports as if the economy still has plenty of room to grow, but the reality is severe.
In 2017, after the Kim Jong-un regime conducted repeated tests of nuclear bombs and missile launches, the UN Security Council stepped up economic sanctions. Then the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, and North Korea closed its border in January 2020, causing a dramatic drop in trade.
Table 2: Trends in North Korea's Trade with China (January-December 2021, data from General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China)
◆ Losing over $5 billion in the two years
Trade with China, which accounts for 90% of total trade, recorded $3,192.03 million in imports, $2,634.40 million in exports, and $5,826.43 million in total in 2016 before economic sanctions were tightened. However, in 2020, imports were reduced to $491.05 million (down 85% from 2016) and exports to only $48 million (down 98.2%), for a total of $539.05 million (down 91%).
In 2021, imports were 206.16 million USD (down 91.8% compared to 2016) and exports were 57.87 million USD (down 97.8%) for a total of 318.03 million USD (down 94.5%).
This means that based on 2016, China lost more than $5 billion in trade revenue in the two years from 2020 to 2021.
And that's not the whole picture. Tourism revenue, estimated to be around $170 million in 2019 before the Covid-19 pandemic, has dropped to zero. Income from the dispatch of workers to China and Russia must also have dropped considerably due to the Coronavirus, although there are no reliable statistics.
Needless to say, the state finances deteriorated. Last year, the Kim Jong-un regime finally had to suspend issuing banknotes. The government could no longer import special paper and ink for printing from China. With state-run companies and banks running out of money, the regime, as a last-ditch measure, issued a temporary money coupon called "Tonpyo" in August and September, which was an inferior version printed with domestically produced paper and ink.
(Photo) Newly issued temporary money coupons, "Tonpyo." Photo provided by a North Korean defector who obtained it (ASIAPRESS).
Now, many state-run factories are operating at a sluggish pace, and even the electricity and water supply to the residents has been disrupted. Yet Kim Jong-un's regime continues to pour money into missile tests while pushing people to collect manure in the bitter cold.
※ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
3. North Korea holds ‘emergency’ lectures nationwide, but citizens left wondering why
Comments from a number of us.
The only reason can be the regime's continued attempt to oppress and control the population by making them obey the ideology.
My comments:
The North Korean regime is “doing the only thing it knows how to do,” David Maxwell of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told RFA.
“Kim Jong-un is executing a political warfare strategy against the ROK, the U.S. and the international community. It is also preparing its warfighting campaign to be able to attack South Korea. These two lines of effort are not mutually exclusive, they are in fact mutually supporting and reinforcing," Maxwell said.
“The more capability military systems the regime possesses, the more likely it can negotiate from a position of strength. And these actions and negotiations can contribute to driving a wedge in the ROK/US alliance to try to achieve one of the regime's key objectives: to drive U.S. forces from the peninsula,” he said.
North Korea holds ‘emergency’ lectures nationwide, but citizens left wondering why
Attendees thought a major announcement was in the works. Instead, they listened to another talk on patriotism.
By Jieun Kim, Jae Duk Seo, Hye Jun Seo, Soyoung Kim, Jeong Eun Lee and Seung Wook Hong
2022.01.21
When North Koreans got the word to report to work for a special announcement, many expected a major announcement. Instead, they said they heard more of the same: directives about loyalty to the country and its leaders.
A day after the 6th Politburo meeting of the 8th Central Committee, North Korea’s government raced to tell its citizens what had transpired in emergency lectures convened nationwide in every government enterprise and neighborhood watch unit on Thursday. The answer, apparently, was not much.
“Today, they suddenly organized a special lecture session at every factory in Chongjin,” a resident of the northeastern city’s surrounding North Hamgyong province told RFA’s Korean Service Thursday.
“In most factories these days there are material shortages, so other than a few officials, the employees do not report for work. Instead, they are assigned to go make money outside the factory, but since they wanted to convene a special lecture on short notice, they activated the emergency contact network to bring all the employees in,” said the source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
North Korea’s manufacturing sector has been hit hard by the closure of the border with China and suspension of all trade that started at the beginning of the pandemic and only recently resumed. Many factories lay idle, unable to produce anything for lack of imported raw materials.
The source said that some of the employees were worried that something serious had happened to warrant calling them away from their outside jobs for a meeting on such short notice.
“But they were frustrated when the lecturer … just delivered an order from the Politburo to disseminate the decisions made during the Politburo meeting,” the source said.
The order to disseminate was the main decision that was disseminated, along with another order to show loyalty and patriotism in the workplace, according to the source.
Residents in nearby South Hamgyong province were also surprised by the lectures organized on such short notice, as these types of lectures usually take time to plan, a resident of the province told RFA.
“During the special lecture they said that the Central Committee decided on how everyone should celebrate the 80th birth anniversary of Kim Jong Il on Feb. 16, and the 100th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung on April 15,” said the source, referring to the late former rulers of the country, the father and grandfather of current leader Kim Jong Un.
“They also talked about the tense atmosphere surrounding the Korean Peninsula, ordering everyone to remember that they are descendants of the Great Leader, national founder Kim Il Sung, and warriors of General Kim Jong Un, both at work and at home.”
Dropping hints
The tenseness of the atmosphere likely refers North Korea recent tests of what it calls a hypersonic missile and precision strike weapons, which have drawn condemnations from the U.S. and South Korea.
North Korea said at the Politburo meeting that it would consider resuming nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches, which have been suspended since April 2018 due to a self-imposed moratorium, state media reported Thursday.
At Wednesday's meeting, in the presence of General Secretary Kim Jong Un, the politburo discussed countermeasures against the U.S. for its condemnations of recent weapons tests, which the report called “recklessly faulting for no reason the DPRK's legitimate exercise of sovereignty,” the report said, blaming the Biden administration for trying to deprive North Korea of its right to self-defense.
“The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee unanimously recognized that we should make more thorough preparation for a long-term confrontation with the U.S. imperialism,” the report said.
“It concluded to take a practical action to more reliably and effectively increase our physical strength for defending the dignity, sovereign rights and interests of our state,” it said.
The end of the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM testing is “only a matter of time,” the RAND Corp.’s Soo Kim told RFA.
“Kim may be eyeing a window of opportunity to pressure the U.S. to change its position on the North Korean nuclear issue. In signaling an end to the moratorium, perhaps Kim is articulating a ‘last, best chance’ for the Biden administration to take action before the situation escalates,” she said.
“However, I don’t think this means Kim will follow through right away. In making this announcement, he’s allowing both the U.S. and himself time to gauge and respond,” she said.
The North Korean regime is “doing the only thing it knows how to do,” David Maxwell of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told RFA.
“Kim Jong-un is executing a political warfare strategy against the ROK, the U.S. and the international community. It is also preparing its warfighting campaign to be able to attack South Korea. These two lines of effort are not mutually exclusive, they are in fact mutually supporting and reinforcing," Maxwell said.
“The more capability military systems the regime possesses, the more likely it can negotiate from a position of strength. And these actions and negotiations can contribute to driving a wedge in the ROK/US alliance to try to achieve one of the regime's key objectives: to drive U.S. forces from the peninsula,” he said.
The question about whether Kim Jong Un would remove the moratorium depends on several factors, including the Biden administration’s approach to denuclearization and the results of the upcoming South Korean election, Ken Gause of the Virginia-based CNA think tank told RFA.
“Kim Jong Un has to make an assessment about the Biden administration... The Biden administration is a very conventional administration and it's not likely to engage with North Korea the way the Trump administration did. And so, therefore, the possibility of getting sanctions relief is probably not very high,” Gause said.
“The only thing that kind of stands in the way of North Korea pushing off the moratorium is the fact that you still have a progressive administration in Seoul. … So, the question becomes not if they're going to get rid of the moratorium, but when are they going to get rid of the moratorium if the current situation stays,” Gause said.
North Korea must also consider its relationship with China if it decides to lift the moratorium, the Atlantic Council’s Robert Manning told RFA.
“I think that part of the reason for that they kept their moratoriums since 2018 is probably pressure from China that didn't want to see a new crisis between North Korea and the U.S.,” Manning said.
“I think anything that they do [that disrupts] the Olympics would be seriously frowned upon by Beijing,” he said.
The White House, the U.S. mission to the U.N., and the EU delegation to the U.N. reiterated to RFA that they preferred a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue, and voiced support for existing U.S. and U.N. sanctions.
Meanwhile, the South Korean National Intelligence Service on Friday said that North Korea is considering various means, including test-firing ICBMs, to pressure the United States.
Analysts in South Korea said that China could potentially use North Korea as a tool to keep the U.S. in check, meaning that Beijing would prefer the status quo.
“Isn't North Korea's value increasing as China's countermeasure against the U.S.?” said Park Young-ho, director of the Peace Research Institute Seoul.
“It seems that China's position is that it would be better for the parties involved in the Korean Peninsula to manage and maintain the situation rather than getting angry with North Korea,” he said.
Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
4. Who can protect America's national interests in Korea?
Political assessment of the presidential candidates.
Who can protect America's national interests in Korea?
The Hill · by Seung-Whan Choi, opinion contributor · January 21, 2022
On March 9, South Koreans will elect their eighth president since the country was transformed into a democracy in 1987. Currently, Korean voters are sizing up two candidates: Lee Jae-myung from the progressive, ruling Democratic Party and Yoon Suk-yeol from the conservative People Power Party. Koreans appreciate that, although Lee served well as the former governor of Gyeonggi Province, Yoon, as the former prosecutor general, contributed to the fight against government corruption. Koreans trust that the next president — whoever that will be — must be the nation’s guardian against unjustified foreign aggression.
To what extent does each candidate’s foreign policy align with America’s national interests? Given that America and Korea have been strong allies, it is crucial that the two countries continue to form a united front against any future security threat in East Asia. In particular, they must work together to fend off the emerging challenges of China to maintain regional peace and stability. America, whose hegemonic power seems to have declined in recent decades, needs the help of South Korea, a country that has enjoyed prosperity largely because of the sacrifice of young U.S. men and women in uniform.
Which Korean presidential candidate, then, is better suited to America’s national interests?
Yoon Suk-yeol promotes foreign policy that is in sync with U.S. interests. He emphasizes that, since America is Korea’s close ally and China is only a neighboring country, Korea must satisfy America’s request to upgrade the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system deployed in South Korea in 2017. Although the THAAD purports to defend South Koreans against North Korean missile threats, it has provoked China’s objections on the grounds that it has hurt China’s security interests in the region.
Yoon dismisses Beijing’s concerns and supports Washington’s security plan. He prefers to create a close security alliance among America, Japan and Korea vis-à-vis China, even though the latter two countries do not get along. Yoon also supports the notion that North Korea must be punished until it corrects its rogue behavior, dismantles its nuclear weapons program, and improves its human rights record. Yoon proposes preemptive strikes against Pyongyang when Seoul faces an imminent threat of nuclear missile attacks.
Lee Jae-myung espouses foreign policy that takes a balanced position between America and China. He does not want to lose the country’s long-term best friend, America, but recognizes the rising influence of China on South Korea’s economy and defense (e.g., China has emerged as the top export and import partner for South Korea). He wants to avoid possible conflict with Beijing because Beijing previously retaliated against Seoul whenever it sided with Washington. He foresees another harsh reprisal from Beijing if he endorses the upgrade of the THAAD, if he forms a new security alliance with America and Japan against China, or if he ignores North Korea and helps America impose further political and economic sanctions on the North Korean dictatorship.
As of today, it may appear that Yoon should be America’s man, since his foreign policy agenda better suits the Biden administration, whose Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, tries to keep the rising Chinese power at bay. However, Yoon’s election as the next president might cause problems because of his lack of experience and knowledge of foreign affairs. Yoon appears to have been repeating what his foreign policy advisers tell him to say. His words seem to be memorized foreign policy points, but does he understand the intricacies of each issue? Lack of expertise may have made Yoon reluctant to debate Lee, or others, on foreign policy. When Yoon answers a journalist’s question without a script, his response is often off the mark and causes public uproar.
If Yoon succeeds in his presidential bid, he will get “on-the-job” training in foreign affairs. Such an approach would not compromise America’s national interests as long as there is no major crisis on the Korean peninsula. However, significant crises almost certainly will occur in the coming years.
When a crisis arises in East Asia, America needs an ally that is capable of promptly dealing with it on its own. Although Lee may not appear to be the better partner for America as of today, he could be a better problem-solver, given the negotiation skills and the knowledge that he acquired as governor of Gyeonggi Province. To resolve political crises swiftly, Lee would rely on the principles of democratic politics: cooperation, collaboration and compromise.
In contrast, Yoon, who was an elite prosecutor until March 2021, learned to see things in black or white. His lack of democratic political experience could make him less likely to be an astute president. Since Yoon possesses amateur leadership and has demonstrated all-or-nothing thinking, his foreign policy probably would be confrontational and bring about negative consequences in the event of an unforeseen contingency on the Korean peninsula. Lee has been an experienced democratic leader and would be a safer bet for America’s national interests.
The Hill · by Seung-Whan Choi, opinion contributor · January 21, 2022
5. Leaders of U.S.,Japan reaffirm commitment to complete denuclearization of Korea
No surprise. Japan and the US are in synch on this.
(LEAD) Leaders of U.S.,Japan reaffirm commitment to complete denuclearization of Korea | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks from U.S. administration official on outcome of the U.S.-Japan summit from 7th para; ADDS photo)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on Friday.
The leaders also condemned North Korea's recent ballistic missile launches in their virtual bilateral summit, according to the White House.
"The two leaders condemned the recent ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which are in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions," the White House said of the U.S.-Japan summit in a press release, referring to North Korea by its official name.
The North conducted four rounds of missile launches since the start of this year, including the test firing of what Pyongyang claims to be a new hypersonic missile in two of those four launches.
"Toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both leaders committed to maintain close coordination on DPRK issues moving forward, in lockstep with the Republic of Korea (ROK)," the press release said.
The Biden-Kishida summit marked the first of its kind since the Japanese leader took office in October.
A senior U.S. administration official said the U.S. president and the Japanese leader sought to send a clear message to North Korea.
"Both countries, obviously, strongly condemned the provocations that we've seen from North Korea, made clear that the two countries were prepared for diplomacy," the official said in a telephonic press briefing.
"But given what North Korea had undertaken, I thought it was extremely important to have clear statements of vigilance and purpose," the official added.
The official said the U.S. was also concerned by North Korea's recent statement that it may consider restarting "temporarily-suspended activities," which many believe hinted at resuming its nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile testing.
"We're concerned by those statements. We are in close consultation with all our allies and partners and other countries in the Indo Pacific and we've sent a very clear message to North Korea in an effort to dissuade them from further provocative steps," said the official while speaking on condition of anonymity.
"The United States and South Korea remain open to diplomacy but such a set of steps would be most unwelcome, particularly at this delicate time in Northeast Asia and globally more generally," he added.
North Korea has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests since November 2017, despite its leader Kim Jong-un announcing in 2019 that he no longer felt bound by such restrictions.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. North Korea’s Missile Tests: Biden’s Options
Sigh... another misguided belief that an end of war declaration will have a positive effect on Kim Jong-un.
Conclusion:
The United States should not give up on a diplomatic way to reduce the risk of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. If Seoul is willing to end the Korean War, the United States should do more to champion this course of action. Diplomacy comes with its own set of uncertainties and challenges, but both maintaining the status quo and increasing pressure will have more dangerous consequences.
North Korea’s Missile Tests: Biden’s Options
Since the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea summit at Hanoi in February 2019, North Korea and the United States have been locked in a diplomatic impasse.
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In the first three weeks of January 2022 North Korea conducted four ballistic missile tests. The Biden administration was content to put North Korea on the back burner in 2021, but Washington may not have the luxury of keeping Pyongyang near the bottom of its priority list for much longer.
North Korea claimed that the new missile’s warhead is a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that uses small fins to conduct maneuvers while traveling through the atmosphere at very high speed. This is the second type of HGV tested successfully by North Korea. In September 2021, Pyongyang test launched the Hwasong-8, which has an HGV warhead shaped more like a wedge rather than the conical warhead of the new, unnamed missile.
Since the collapse of the North Korea-U.S. summit at Hanoi in February 2019, North Korea and the United States have been locked in a diplomatic impasse. Neither the Trump nor Biden administration ratcheted up U.S. pressure on North Korea. Kim, for his part, has conducted ballistic missile tests but has refrained from testing nuclear weapons and missiles that could threaten U.S. territory. The Biden administration has repeatedly offered to meet with North Korean negotiators without preconditions. However, after the high-profile failure at Hanoi, North Korea has refused to engage with the United States unless it takes steps to demonstrate that renewed negotiations will be different.
Maintaining the current diplomatic stalemate is likely to become more difficult as North Korea improves its missile forces. Deterring a North Korean attack is relatively easy compared to coercing North Korea to give up its nuclear forces, but the requirements for deterrence are a moving target. If Pyongyang continues to improve its missile forces, Seoul will likely ask Washington to take steps to enhance its ability to protect against a more capable adversary. At one extreme end, this could lead to a redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, which would likely deepen China-U.S. animosity and could spark a crisis with North Korea.
Other less controversial options could include deployments of more missile defense systems or greater U.S. support for advanced South Korean capabilities similar to the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal between the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Such an approach would prioritize maintaining the South Korea-U.S. alliance, but it also creates an action-reaction cycle that could make Northeast Asia more volatile in the long run.
The United States could try and force North Korea back to the negotiating table by ratcheting up economic and military pressure. The Trump administration tried this approach in 2017. While Trump did get a summit with Kim in 2018, the path there was very perilous and could have easily led to a war with a high chance of nuclear use. North Korea has repeatedly shown a willingness to meet U.S. pressure with pressure of its own so taking this path is likely to result in another crisis.
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The Biden administration’s decision to respond to the second of January’s missile tests with new sanctions on North Korean individuals involved in the missile program was shortly followed by the third missile test of the month. This does not mean that a return to 2017 is likely, but Biden should be cautious about applying additional pressure as it is likely to beget North Korean escalation rather than bring it to heel.
Finally, the United States could take actions to address North Korea’s request for a demonstration of seriousness to restart diplomacy. The Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea appears willing to try this approach with its insistence on issuing a declaration to end the technically ongoing Korean War, but Moon doesn’t have much time left in office.
The United States should not give up on a diplomatic way to reduce the risk of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. If Seoul is willing to end the Korean War, the United States should do more to champion this course of action. Diplomacy comes with its own set of uncertainties and challenges, but both maintaining the status quo and increasing pressure will have more dangerous consequences.
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Eric Gomez
Eric Gomez is the director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute.
7. Repeat of old tactics: North Korea should abandon brinkmanship approaches
The Korea Times recognizes the north Korean playbook.
Repeat of old tactics
North Korea should abandon brinkmanship approaches
North Korea has said it would consider resuming "all temporarily-suspended activities," in an apparent threat to restart the testing of nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). At a politburo meeting of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, the reclusive country's leader Kim Jong-un decided to "review all trust-building measures and consider restarting such activities," according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Thursday.
This can be interpreted as the North's intention to forego Kim's declaration in April 2018 for a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons and ICBMs. The North's announcement came on the same day as U.S. President Joe Biden's press conference marking the first anniversary of his inauguration and the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) held a behind-the-scenes meeting to discuss North Korea's repeated firing of ballistic missiles. Yet the UNSC failed to take additional retaliatory measures against the North due to opposition from China and Russia.
The motives behind the North's reliance on such military provocations are clear.
First, Pyongyang has been grappling with the worst ever economic crunch due to the U.S.-led international sanctions, and the unrelenting COVID-19 pandemic, which led the reclusive nation to adopt further lockdowns, coupled with its strenuous bids to build up nuclear capabilities.
According to the Bank of Korea, the North's external trade in 2020 dwindled by more than 20 percent from the previous year while its economic size backtracked to the level in 2003. As the North has failed to find a breakthrough solution to such diverse problems, it has been desperate to extract further concessions from the United States and other countries by threatening to test nuclear weapons and ICBMs, according to experts.
Despite the North's bids to pressure the U.S. to make further concessions, the situation is not favorable for Pyongyang as the U.S. is now engrossed in efforts to find solutions in other major diplomatic affairs involving growing disputes with China, Russia's possible invasion into Ukraine and nuclear deal with Iran.
Against this backdrop, it is not appropriate for the Moon Jae-in administration to stick to its pursuit of the declaration of a formal end to the Korea War. This does not necessarily mean it should abandon efforts to find a solution through dialogue. On the other hand, the government needs to take resolute and prompt measures to cope with the lingering threats from North Korea to mitigate a sense of insecurity among the people.
Last but not least, we would like to stress the significant roles of major presidential candidates. This is because the North will likely conduct missile and nuclear weapons tests to impress the new president of the South, whoever it will be, as it did when Moon took office. The candidates should come up with their own ideas on how to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat and how to place it in the delicate relations between the U.S. and China.
8. Kim Jong Un won't be ignored: What North Korean missile tests mean
Excerpts:
But the North Korea playbook includes carrots as well as sticks. Kim knows that his threat (or promise) of forthcoming ICBM tests will shake the Biden administration’s relatively complacent North Korea policy and create congressional pressure to “do something.”
...
If past is prologue, along with more tests, Kim may be trying to parlay tests into U.S. concessions, such as easing UN sanctions and/or suspending U.S.-South Korea military exercises to restart nuclear diplomacy on his terms.
Kim’s goal is to be accepted as a nuclear state, like Israel or Pakistan, and treated as a normal nation. This could rouse interest in freezing their nuclear and missile programs — for a price. Pressure for action could tempt the Biden administration to explore such talks.
Over 25 years of nuclear diplomacy, North Korea has often displayed tactical brilliance in shaping the agenda. Now, Pyongyang may be doing just that.
Kim Jong Un won't be ignored: What North Korean missile tests mean
The Hill · by Robert A. Manning, Opinion Contributor · January 21, 2022
In case you were puzzled about the recent barrage of North Korean ballistic missile tests – four sets of tests so far in January – it’s now clear. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has delivered his punch line: It’s about to get worse.
At a Jan. 20 Politburo meeting, Kim reportedly presented the stick, and a subtle hint of a carrot. Denouncing U.S. “hostile policies,” he instructed officials to “reconsider in an overall scale the trust-building measures that we took on our own initiative… and to promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily suspended activities.”
What does this mean? During the period of warm and fuzzy diplomacy starting in 2018, with love letters to ex-President Trump and Trump-Kim summitry, Kim imposed a moratorium on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear tests. This carried over into the Biden administration, perhaps because since January 2020, fearing COVID-19, North Korea sealed all its borders and went full porcupine — even rejecting World Health Organization offers of 6.2 million vaccines.
COVID-19 has been a dominant factor shaping developments on the Korean Peninsula. It has reinforced Pyongyang’s inward – if not paranoid – tendencies even at the expense of battering its already precarious economy. One significant consequence of this situation has been a shift toward more state control of the jangmadang, private markets, along with a tightening of Kim’s control over social and cultural life — down to censoring films, music and clothing. COVID-19 fears have almost certainly been a factor behind such steps, as well as a factor in Pyongyang’s resistance to nuclear negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea. Kim is now starting to open up a tiny crack, resuming cross-border traffic with China.
Kim suddenly resumed his testing efforts with two missile tests in September, followed by the recent salvos. Some see the tests as a provocation, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken said recently, “to get our attention.” The flip side of the moratorium has been a corresponding tacit, informal understanding since 2018 that the U.S. would tolerate short and medium range missile tests – which violate U.N. Security Council resolutions – with minor opprobrium.
This state of affairs carried over from Trump to Biden but now may have run its course. The U.S. response to the recent tests was to sanction six North Koreans involved in procuring missile technology. Nonetheless, Pyongyang cited these sanctions as a rationale for further tests due to the U.S. “hostile policy.” It is all depressingly familiar, right out of the North Korea playbook.
But the tests have multiple purposes, from shoring up Kim’s domestic legitimacy to forcing a U.S. response. First and foremost, however, as Kim outlined a year ago, in his nine-hour report at the Workers Party Congress, he intends to build a vast array of sophisticated new weapons systems, which he has been following through on. These range from ICBMs that can reach the U.S. heartland to rail-launched medium range missiles, cruise missiles, tactical missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles to multi-warhead and submarine launched missiles.
These new capabilities raise questions about Pyongyang’s intentions: Is the mission deterrence, offensive action, coercive diplomacy or even reunification by force?
This full-spectrum nuclear arsenal appears an effort to achieve a survivable nuclear triad with its estimated 20-50 nuclear weapons, perhaps altering the military balance. In fact, North Korea’s continued cycle of tests appear to give it a new ability to evade U.S. missile defenses with cruise and hypersonic glide vehicles difficult for U.S. radars and sensors to detect.
This will require intense U.S. consultation with South Korea, and secondarily, with Japan to adapt and upgrade defenses. Some of Kim’s tactical weapons may imply not just a porcupine defense but potential offensive intent.
But the North Korea playbook includes carrots as well as sticks. Kim knows that his threat (or promise) of forthcoming ICBM tests will shake the Biden administration’s relatively complacent North Korea policy and create congressional pressure to “do something.”
After a policy review last April, the U.S. has constantly repeated offers to meet “anytime, anywhere” without preconditions to restart nuclear diplomacy, suggesting a variety of possible formulas. All have been ignored by Pyongyang.
After months of efforts by South Korean President Moon Jae-in to put forward an “end of war declaration” to replace the 1953 Armistice agreement, Kim’s action seems a definitive no. Moon, whose term ends in March, sees North-South reconciliation as his legacy, which has been thoroughly undermined by Kim. Another possible purpose for Kim’s new gambit may be to set the stage for a fresh start with Moon’s successor after March elections.
But the fact that Kim’s directive was aimed solely at the U.S. may be a subtle effort to force a U.S. response in what promises to be a year from hell for Biden’s foreign policy, on top of Russia-Ukraine, China and Iran quandaries. Kim knows that an ICBM test would create a pseudo-crisis, forcing a Biden response.
If past is prologue, along with more tests, Kim may be trying to parlay tests into U.S. concessions, such as easing UN sanctions and/or suspending U.S.-South Korea military exercises to restart nuclear diplomacy on his terms.
Kim’s goal is to be accepted as a nuclear state, like Israel or Pakistan, and treated as a normal nation. This could rouse interest in freezing their nuclear and missile programs — for a price. Pressure for action could tempt the Biden administration to explore such talks.
Over 25 years of nuclear diplomacy, North Korea has often displayed tactical brilliance in shaping the agenda. Now, Pyongyang may be doing just that.
Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He was a senior counselor to the undersecretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2004, a member of the U.S. Department of State policy planning staff from 2004 to 2008 and on the National Intelligence Council strategic futures group from 2008 to 2012. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.
The Hill · by Robert A. Manning, Opinion Contributor · January 21, 2022
9. Lavrov hits out at US for placing ‘losing bet’ on continued sanctions against North Korea
From Russia's TASS news agency.
I doubt there was a significant discussion of north Korea in Geneva this week.
Lavrov hits out at US for placing ‘losing bet’ on continued sanctions against North Korea
The Foreign Ministry has great expectations for the draft of the political and humanitarian resolution, which stipulates an easing of sanctions against North Korea along humanitarian lines and in other spheres
MOSCOW, January 21. /TASS/. Washington is ‘definitely making a losing bet’ by carrying on with its sanctions pressure against North Korea and refusing to accept a draft resolution - proposed by Russia and China - on easing these restrictions in a number of spheres, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Friday.
"Unfortunately, the United States and its European allies are still not ready to accept it [the resolution], and they are definitely making a losing bet by gambling in favor of the policy of sanctions and pressure on Pyongyang, while not offering any constructive ideas in response," the top Russian diplomat argued.
The Foreign Ministry has great expectations for the draft of the political and humanitarian resolution, which was proposed by Russia and China. It stipulates an easing of sanctions against North Korea along humanitarian lines and in other spheres that are not connected with the nuclear missile program, which would serve as a serious incentive to revive the political discourse by all the countries involved.
"We proceed from the stance that under the current pandemic conditions, a provision of assistance to the people of the DPRK would be a timely and responsible step on behalf of the global community," the ministry said in a statement.
"Moreover, the adoption of this resolution would help build confidence among the countries involved and could serve as a strong incentive to reinvigorate the political dialogue," the statement continued.
The diplomatic agency also stated that in 2022, Moscow intends to continue to promote Russian-Chinese approaches toward a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, which are stipulated by the 2017 joint roadmap.
"We believe that the only way to resolve the problems on the Korean Peninsula is through political dialogue, which may serve to find ways of satisfying the legitimate concerns of all parties involved, even regarding security guarantees," the Russian Foreign Ministry added.
10. Kim Jong Un Most Likely to Play ICBM Card, Lawmaker Says
Perhaps.
Kim Jong Un Most Likely to Play ICBM Card, Lawmaker Says
January 21, 2022, 4:47 AM EST
North Korea may be looking at test firing its first intercontinental ballistic missile in more than four years as the strongest move it could soon make to ratchet up tensions with the U.S., a South Korean lawmaker said after a briefing by the country’s spy agency.
“The most probable card for provocation that North Korea could play would be firing an ICBM,” opposition lawmaker Ha Tae-keung of the told reporters Friday after being briefed by National Intelligence Security officials in a parliamentary committee. NIS officials weren’t immediately available for comment.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un this week indicated he may end a more than four-year-old freeze on major weapons tests. Forcing a crisis with Washington may be 38-year-old Kim’s best chance to break a diplomatic stalemate that has kept crippling sanctions in place and left the economy smaller than when he took power a decade ago.
The last time Kim’s regime tested a nuclear weapon as well as an ICBM to deliver a warhead to the U.S. mainland was in 2017. Kim then started a moratorium on tests of atomic bombs and long-range missiles to pave the way for unprecedented talks with former President Donald Trump.
Despite three face-to-face meetings, talks between Kim and Trump resulted in no tangible steps to wind down North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. As the discussions sputtered, Kim’s state was busy adding to its stockpile of fissile material and developing new missile systems to deliver nuclear weapons to U.S. allies in Asia.
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While North Korea has refrained from ICBM launches, it has conducted tests of new missile systems designed to evade U.S.-operated interceptors with ranges to strike South Korea and Japan, which host the bulk of American troops in the region. The absence of tests that directly threaten the U.S. has made it easier for President Joe Biden to avoid another confrontation with Kim, like when Trump threatened to unleash “fire and fury” against the regim
North Korea has already in January conducted the most ballistic missiles tests in a month since 2019, while promising a “stronger and certain reaction” to a fresh round of U.S. sanctions against people accused of securing materials for the regime’s weapons program. In the past week, North Korea resumed rail-borne trade with its biggest benefactor China, in another sign it needs outside help.
The Firing Line
Ballistic missile tests under Kim Jong Un
Sources: South Korea Ministry of Defense and Center for Nonproliferation Studies
South Korea’s spy agency said 20 train cars a day have been transporting food, building materials and medical supplies from China to North Korea since Monday, Ha told reporters.
Cheon Seong-whun, a former security strategy secretary at South Korea’s presidential Blue House said the latest moves indicate a heightening of tensions in the “vicious cycle” of provocations.
He sees an ICBM launch as a strong possibility as well as a possible launch of a rocket to deliver a satellite. This would serve two purposes in showing that North Korea can match South Korea’s space program after it launched a new rocket in October and help Pyongyang advance its technology for an ICBM.
11. Defense minister stresses military’s ‘will, efforts’ for OPCON transfer assessment
I think President Moon must be the target audience for this message.
But the correct message is readiness first in order to prepare for OPCON transition.
Yonhap – Defense minister stresses military’s ‘will, efforts’ for OPCON transfer assessment
SEOUL, Jan. 19 (Yonhap) — South Korea’s Defense Minister Suh Wook called on all armed services Wednesday to unify their “will and efforts” to ensure this year’s planned assessment required for the envisioned transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) will proceed successfully.
Suh made the remarks during a meeting of top commanders to evaluate South Korea’s efforts to retake OPCON from the United States, as the allies are set to stage the full operational capability (FOC) assessment later this year.
Defense Minister Suh Wook (C) attends a meeting with top commanders to discuss progress in South Korea’s efforts to retake wartime operational control from the United States at the defense ministry in Seoul on Jan. 19, 2022, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
During their annual defense ministerial talks in December, Seoul and Washington agreed to conduct the assessment this fall. Later, Seoul officials said the allies will discuss the possibility of holding it earlier than planned, but its exact timing has yet to be announced.
“Especially, the minister stressed the need for all armed services to unify their will and efforts for a successful FOC assessment,” the defense ministry said in a press release.
The minister also portrayed the conditions-based OPCON transfer as an essential task to achieve the goal of “steadfast” defense under the mindset that “our defense is our responsibility,” according to the ministry.
Wednesday’s meeting was attended by top South Korean defense officials, including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Won In-choul and top commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
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12. Moon’s Peace Process goes down the drain
I think it was long ago DOA.
Or unlike Kim Jong-un's abilities, this could be a take off on a movie: "Failure to Launch" or the actual syndrome it was satirizing.
Failure to Launch Syndrome
Call it failure to launch or Peter Pan syndrome, it’s the phenomenon of adult children not making the transition to adulthood. The Savvy Psychologist explores why Peter Pans stay on the launchpad
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/failure-to-launch-syndrome/
Moon’s Peace Process goes down the drain
Posted January. 21, 2022 07:41,
Updated January. 21, 2022 07:41
Moon’s Peace Process goes down the drain. January. 21, 2022 07:41. .
North Korea implied on Thursday that it will revisit the moratorium on nuclear testing and ICBM firing currently in place. “The party’s politburo directed related departments to consider getting back in operation all sorts of activities that have been put to a tentative end and reviewing trust-building actions taken preliminarily and actively,” reported the North Korean state media outlet. This warning seemingly implies that it can cross the red line built between Pyongyang and Washington to suspend nuclear and ICBM tests, which was declared right before the summit talk between the two nations in Singapore in 2018.
North Korea’s moves made right on the 1st anniversary of U.S. President Joe Biden’s leadership may target discussions on North Korean sanctions scheduled to happen early this morning at the United Nations Security Council. Since Pyongyang carried out a series of provocations such as a couple of ultrasonic missiles following the onset of this year, Washington has not only declared unilateral sanctions but also proceeded with U.N.-level bans. Pyongyang’s message is no different from warning about a return to the extreme confrontation with Washington back in 2017 depending on how the Biden administration will react.
The suspension on nuclear testing and ICBM launches has played a key role in managing to maintain such a tepid standstill of today, which turned confrontation to dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. If North Korea breaks the core link of the situation, the security landscape on the peninsula will only go back to the days five years ago when Pyongyang and Washington used to exchange warnings in fury such as ‘a sea of fire’ and ‘flame and rage’ amid extreme tensions. Given that it has been more than four years since it performed the 6th nuclear test and launched the Hwasong-15 ICBM, a withdrawal from the moratorium may signal Pyongyang’s display of more potent and advanced nuclear and ICBM capabilities than before, according to experts.
Although we may need to wait and see whether North Korea will put such apocalyptic provocation in action immediately, it is expected that Pyongyang will put growing pressure on Washington while looking at how it reacts. The U.S. government is already busy finding ways to handle the power struggle with China and respond to Russia’s provocative moves against Ukraine. Nevertheless, any hasty provocative decision by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may lead Washington to take reckless countermeasures with no desired benefits in its hands. Added to this, China will not sit on its hands while North Korea runs amok right before the opening of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics considering that it has put its neighboring nation under control since their trade activities got back to normal.
Under these circumstances, it is surely clear that the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative devised by President Moon Jae-in is on the brink of being thwarted shamefully with only less than four months left before his term ends. Some members of the current administration still seem persistent in realizing a declaration of end of war before President Moon leaves. However, it is time to look squarely at the realities. The only way to handle North Korea is to be careful about the worst-case scenario while cooperating with the international community to find solutions.
13. Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?
As an aside this is one of the reasons why Kim Jong-un does not trust agreements with the US or the international community (to include Russia). This example is especially true with Ukraine since they gave up nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees.
Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?
Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images - The Conversation
This diplomatic activity manifested in security assurances for Ukraine embedded in what has become known as the Budapest Memorandum. With the entrance of Ukraine into the international order as a non-nuclear state, Russia, the United States and the U.K. pledged to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” The memo reaffirmed their obligation to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.” The signatories also reaffirmed their commitment to “seek immediate” UN Security Council action “to provide assistance to Ukraine … if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression.” These assurances upheld obligations contained in the U.N. charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.
In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its current threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, it’s fair to ask: What is the significance now of the Budapest Memorandum?
An armed man, believed to be a Russian serviceman, patrols outside a Ukrainian military base in 2014, during Russia’s move to annex Crimea. VASILY MAXIMOV/AFP via Getty Images
Ukrainian regrets
The memorandum, signed in 1994, is not legally binding.
Nonetheless, it embeds and reaffirms the solemn assurances that are the hallmark of the international system. These include respect for state sovereignty, the inviolability of international borders and abstention from the threat or use of force.
Ukraine’s decision to give up nuclear weapons signaled its desire to be seen as a member in good standing of the international community, rather than an outlier.
Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses a crowd in Moscow on March 18, 2018, during an event celebrating the anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images
‘No changing of borders by use of force’
Whether the strong actions – such as the promise of military support for Ukraine and the threat of sanctions on Russia, backed by diplomacy by the United States and its allies – will be enough to deter Russia is uncertain and, many say, unlikely.
The size and scope of Russian military buildup are deeply troubling: Shifting 100,000 troops across Russia’s vast territory is a costly operation. The Kremlin is unlikely to pull back that kind of force without any diplomatic or military wins, such as closing the door to Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, which the United States has ruled out.
International law matters, but it does not determine what states do. Strong deterrence, diplomacy and international solidarity can influence Russian decision-making. The U.S. is also actively working with Ukraine, an essential element to a successful diplomatic and deterrence strategy.
Ultimately, however, the de-escalation decision is Russia’s to make. The role of the U.S., its NATO allies, and Ukraine is to make sure the consequences of Russia’s decisions are clear to the Kremlin and that they can be carried out with strong and united Western backing in the event Russia chooses the path of war.
Read more:
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
14. Moon's peace initiative destined to fail
And of course Kimmihght ask why would he trust the ROK and the US on this?
Moon's peace initiative destined to fail
gettyimagesbank
North Korea waits for result of South Korea's presidential election
By Kang Seung-woo
In his New Year speech on Jan. 3, President Moon Jae-in said he will pursue an "irreversible path to peace" on the Korean Peninsula until his term ends in May, with many believing that he referred to his drive to formally end the Korean War.
However, his ambitious pledge appears to have been dampened as North Korea has threatened to lift its moratorium on nuclear and inter-continental ballistic missile tests ― a pause that has served as both a feat in the South Korean leader's inter-Korean peace initiative and a motive for his end-of-war declaration push.
Last September, Moon proposed declaring an end to the 1950-53 Korean War at the United Nations. And since then, Seoul has promoted it as a catalyst for peace talks with Pyongyang. But the totalitarian state announced, Thursday, that it had decided to restart all temporally-suspended activities in light of what it called a U.S.' hostile policy.
The North Korean leader declared a halt to all nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in April 2018, while engaging in talks with former U.S. President Donald Trump.
"President Moon will continue to reach out to North Korea, but any chance of concluding an end-of-war declaration or any progress in North-South relations is gone for his administration," U.S. Naval War College Professor Terence Roehrig said.
"North Korea has shown almost no interest in engaging Seoul and Washington and that will not change during Moon's remaining months in office."
Joseph DeTrani, a former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, echoed Roehrig's view.
"With the recent missile launches of hypersonic and short range ballistic missiles from North Korea, I doubt that there's much public support in the U.S. for moving forward with an end-of-war declaration or other initiatives to get North Korea to return to negotiations," DeTrani said.
Since Moon's proposal, South Korean and U.S. diplomats have been meeting frequently to discuss the issue.
"There's considerable disappointment that Pyongyang continues to build nuclear weapons and enhance its ballistic missile capabilities, while the ROK and the U.S. ― and others ― try to convince North Korea to return to negotiations," DeTrani added.
The ROK refers to the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London, also said that it would be difficult for President Moon's peace initiative to be successful at this point.
"This would probably need meetings with North Korea for discussion. But Pyongyang continues to be unwilling to let people in or to fly its own diplomats out due to the pandemic. This makes negotiations very difficult for the time being," he added.
In fact, North Korea has remained unresponsive to South Korea's overture.
When North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency announced that the country decided to consider resuming nuclear or ICBM tests, it was mainly focused on criticizing the United States for its hostile actions against Pyongyang.
However, it failed to refer to South Korea, raising speculation that the Kim Jong-un regime thinks that there is nothing to achieve with the Moon administration and is waiting for the next South Korean government.
"There is little likelihood North Korea will do much with an administration that will be out of office soon," Roehrig said.
President Moon Jae-in attends a Cabinet meeting at Cheong Wa Dae, Jan. 4. Korea Times photo Daniel Sneider, a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University, also said, "I also guess that the North Korean leadership has its eyes on the South Korean elections and would not want to do something that undermines the chances of a progressive victory."
He added: "That said, I don't see any prospect for an end of war declaration ― which in any case has no meaning ― or any other last minute North-South initiative. Everyone is waiting for the election results."
Even though North Korea has threatened to resume nuclear or ICBM tests, experts believe that it would not be easy to put the plan into practice due to China which does not want an escalation of tensions in the region.
"China is privately cautioning Kim Jong-un to refrain from having another nuclear test or ICBM launch, knowing this will incite the U.S. and the U.N. Security Council to impose even harsher sanctions," DeTrani said.
"If the North complies, I think China will continue to provide humanitarian and other assistance to North Korea, regardless of United Nations sanctions. I think, at least for the foreseeable future, North Korea will heed this advice and continue to perfect their arsenal of missiles, to include hypersonic and cruise missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, in line with Kim Jong-un's pronouncement at the Eighth Congress of the Workers Party in January 2021."
Sneider also said, "One big question is what the Chinese want to happen at this point. The resumption of trade between North Korea and China is a major development and will give Beijing even more leverage over Pyongyang. I assume that for now the Chinese, with the Winter Olympics coming, are not interested in a major escalation of tensions and will restrain the North Koreans to some extent."
Roehrig also said China will not be happy with a nuclear or ICBM test.
"Particularly if any test comes soon and overshadows the upcoming Olympics. But also in the long-term, Beijing wants regional stability and a return to the tensions of 2016 and 2017 is not what it wants," he added.
When it comes to a possible nuclear test, Pacheco Pardo said North Korea was less likely to detonate a nuclear bomb.
"As for nuclear tests, I think that North Korea is less likely to conduct one because it has declared itself a nuclear power and wants to project the image of being a responsible one," he said.
"'Responsible nuclear powers' don't need to conduct nuclear tests."
15. U.S. continues to see diplomacy as best way forward with N. Korea: Pentagon
We will continue to lead with diplomacy. And diplomacy must never stop. I heard a comment from a pundit reference Ukraine saying that at some point diplomacy will end. Diplomacy must never end. Even if we end up in conflict or war, diplomacy must always continue. Rounds of talks might end or negotiations may be halted but diplomacy must always continue.
U.S. continues to see diplomacy as best way forward with N. Korea: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- The United States continues to seek complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and believes diplomacy is the best way to achieve such a goal, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said Friday.
He, however, also highlighted the importance of fully implementing U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions to prevent the North from further advancing its missile capabilities.
"Obviously, we don't want to see the North Korean military program continue to be able to pose a threat to our South Korean allies or to the region. So we continue to call on Kim Jong-un to sit down and discuss the way forward," Kirby said in a press briefing, referring to the North Korean leader.
"So our view hasn't changed. We want to see the complete, verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula. We believe that diplomacy is the best track to take to get there and we're willing to sit down (with) no preconditions," he added.
North Korea on Thursday (Seoul time) hinted at resuming its nuclear and long-range missile testing, saying it will consider restarting "all temporarily-suspended activities."
Pyongyang has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests since November 2017.
North Korea's statement followed its four short-range missile launches since the start of this year.
Kirby noted the North continues and will continue to test missiles, "So they can learn. So they can improve."
"Without getting into specific intelligence assessments, we have every expectation they do continue to improve their capabilities, both in terms of potential range and in precision," he said. "And obviously, we're taking that threat very, very seriously."
Washington, together with seven other members of the UNSC including Britain, Japan and France, earlier sought to push for additional U.N. sanctions against North Korea for its latest missile tests.
The move has been blocked by China and Russia, both close neighbors of North Korea and veto power-wielding permanent members of the UNSC.
"These ballistic missile launches are violations of Security Council resolutions. We continue to call on Pyongyang to cease that activity and for everybody involved in the international community to actually live up to the sanctions that have already been put in place," said Kirby, adding not every country was doing so.
"China has influence over Pyongyang. We know that and we certainly hope that they'll use that influence to the betterment not only of them and the region but to the whole world," he added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
16. “American Han” by E. J. Koh
An interesting read for those who think about Korea. Here is the blurb that came with the email that flagged this poem. I recommend reflecting on this if you have any focus on or connection to Korea.
I love words for which there is no English equivalent, because they prompt us to contemplate meaning and interpretation in creative ways. In this prose poem, E. J. Koh, a translator herself, attempts to define the Korean word han, typically expressed as “grief” or “resentment.” The poem is biting (It’s not a word but a war. The word I thought belongs to me only belongs to the Korean border) and examines han with different tools: history, cultural criticism, and personal narrative. Reading the poem is an exercise in self-analysis, perfect for those cold winter days that seem to encourage introspection.
— Morgan Ome, assistant editor
American Han
Culture is not a piece of baggage that immigrants carry with them; it is not static but undergoes constant modification in a new environment.
—Sau-ling Cynthia Wong
Against the fear of a general death, and against the loss of connection, a sense of life is affirmed, learned as closely in suffering as ever in joy.
—Raymond Williams
i
I can see for the first time a troubling of the word born of the thirty-five-year-long Japanese occupation of Korea, the division of the country by US and Soviet forces after WWII, the ongoing war at one of the most militarized borders in the world. I can see, too, an era further away. The word names the feeling that arises as you are buried alive with your dead husband. It’s harder to weigh a word with a history that permanently exiles its victims. So on one side I write the word han while on the other a historian on a panel erases it. He says, “Koreans outside of Korea can’t know han.” The historian confesses a discrimination between us. “My han is the original han.” I am not Korean as I thought but a perpetual outsider. It’s not a word but a war. The word I thought belongs to me only belongs to the Korean border. But if I am not uncanny, melancholy, or nostalgia, then as I see the word now and, because I can’t unsee myself in it and must continue to live within and outside of this world nevertheless, I am the word.
ii
When I give a talk about han in DC, a young man in the audience has a panic attack. Then it happens again at a virtual talk in SF to an older woman, though I don’t know until later. Both the man and woman say the room started to spin when I kept saying the word han. In psychiatry, the word causes dizziness and heart palpitations. The consequences are real.
How poet Kim Hyesoon defines autobiography as autotestimony: she is narrating her historical death. So on one side is how she has died while on the other is how she remains living. If I am the word, saying the word is to narrate my death. I meet the consequences here. This might be an answer to why han is trouble. The word brings up the question of how one has died and how one could remain alive.
iii
My mother would try to take her life (with a kitchen knife) in the name of han. Then what does that do for me, with the word so deeply tied to my own throat?
The closest word I have to describe this is an opera singer’s duende. Federico García Lorca says, “The duende does not come at all unless he sees that death is possible.” There’s something more. To have han is to be a child who hoped to be loved in a manner she understood but accepts any love, because pain cannot lessen a hope for love.
iv
In an online discussion group, han is called a meaningless word. “Only an embarrassing artifact. Like the possession of demons. Possessed people suffer, too. But the answer isn’t to take demons seriously. There’s no usefulness in the word. Why not call it what it is, trauma, without ethno-essentialism? What’s the difference between suffering of a Korean and a Rwandan genocide survivor or a Jewish Holocaust survivor?” The argument says the word has damaged Koreans, convinced them of their sorrow. It says Koreans but especially Koreans outside of Korea—Korean Americans, mixed-race Koreans, adoptee Koreans, queer Koreans—and their obsession with han is delusional. We’ve sabotaged ourselves where healing is possible. We’ve condemned ourselves to terrible pain.
v
To hear the word has nothing to do with me. I’m aware of how I now know two scholars writing about han who have given up because of the fear and repercussions if we do recognize the word as displaced persons of war and as perpetual outsiders of history, and I share their fear.
(deleted)
(the world spins)
vi
I’m grateful to the historian. After his panel, he changes his mind. I resent him also.
Then can han change—transform? Can I talk about han as a Korean American, about how han is doing something different with my throat?
vii
A visitor writes on my page:
Han is ethnocentric and has been cancelled by actual Koreans.
I write:
Consequences are the homogenization of Korean experiences and
erasure of features of marginalized literature. (deleted)
viii
Han is not just trauma, vague in western circles for colonization and war, historical defeat and inhumanity. Han, not as an illness, but a way of thinking about our lives. Han specific to Korea but not limited to Korea. Han as exile by native Koreans. Han as crossing the Pacific. The word brings me closer to the truth of living as a perpetual outsider and against the definition of han as nationhood. The earth’s han, face pockmarked over a hundred years of bombing. It is not only a suffering but a suffering that is avoidable and is not avoided, a suffering that breaks us and need not break us.
ix
I go back to the discussion group. The war is ongoing. “The word wasn’t cancelled ... but [Korean natives] lost interest in the idea they felt no longer described their life experiences.”
“As for your conception of han as a universal idea that is a recognition of hardship and sorrow ... I just do not know if that can be called han in thetraditional sense ... I don’t know if it’s appropriate to use the same word ... with little connection to the original han.” “Again ... wrong ... define in contexts ... century ... vagueness of han ... malleable ... out of style ... Korean ... dropped ... language ... ”
x
xi
Truth is I want a world where the word does not exist. The trouble is the way it shrugs off anything. Steven Yeun’s character in Burning smiles and says: “There’s something in your heart. There’s a stone in your heart. The stone is making you suffer. That’s why you can’t fully enjoy things. That’s why you can’t eat tasty food and appreciate it. That’s why you can’t tell a man you like that you like them ... You have to remove it.”
I want to make clear ... I believe the word ... killed ... and the word still lives ... no denying people who suffered ... they make it truthful ... what is interrogated is the word ... and its history ... not the dead and the living ... not the word as we each feel it in our bones ... keep in ... I may not have to discard the word ... if I lead ... with its shadow ... limitations ... its horrors ... what remains is a sense of life ... recognizable ... as relief ... then as mine ...
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
