Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“There are only two kinds of men: the righteous who think they are sinners, and the sinners who think they are righteous.”

– Blaine Pascal

“Knowing is not enough, we must apply. Willing is not enough, we must do.”

– Goethe

“I will accept any rules that you feel necessary to your freedom. I am free, no matter what rules surround me. If I find them tolerable, I tolerate them; if I find them too obnoxious, I break them. I am free because I know that I alone and morally responsible for everything I do.”

–Robert A Heinlein – The Moon is a Harsh Mistress

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 21, 2024

3. Foreign countries own at least 40 MILLION acres of US land

4. Ukraine’s $30 Billion Problem: How to Keep Fighting Without Foreign Aid

5. Military ends rescue search for Navy SEALs lost in maritime raid on ship with Iranian weapons

6. Special Operations News Update - January 22, 2024 | SOF News

7. The Defense Secretary and the Chain of Command: Why Critics Are Wrong About Austin's Emergency

8. How China is winning the Middle East

9. Missile barrage on US base in Iraq leaves personnel being evaluated for brain injuries, officials say

10. As U.S. and Militias Engage, White House Worries About a Tipping Point

11. Extended CR handcuffs federal agency 2024 hiring plans, new contracts

12. In first, UK test fires $13-per-strike DragonFire laser weapon against ‘aerial targets’

13. War is Boyish and Fought by Boys

14. Empty Promises? A Year Inside the World of Multi-Domain Operations

15. War Books: Understanding WMD

16. Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War By Eric Schmidt

17. Iran is waging its own war on terrorIran is waging its own war on terror

18. Taiwan says it spots six more Chinese balloons, one crossed island

19. Israel Uncovers Hamas Tunnel Where Hostages, Including Children, Were Held in 'Inhumane Conditions'

20. Three GOP leaders have produced a smart plan for Ukraine. Will MAGA listen?

21. The Futile Legacy of Mao Zedong

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes.
Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece.
Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages.
Russian forces advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the front.
Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on January 21 that likely Russian military commanders are mistreating troops at a training ground in Volgograd Oblast.
Russian federal subjects continue to foster patronage networks in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 21, 2024

Jan 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2024

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 21, 2024, 3:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on January 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes. Ukrainian media, citing unnamed sources within Ukrainian special services, reported that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Shcheglovsky Val Plant in Tula City, Tula Oblast and the “Novateka” plant and gas terminal near the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[1] The Shcheglovsky Val Plant reportedly manufactures Pantsir-S and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, and the Ust-Luga complex reportedly processes stable gas condensate into light and heavy naphtha, diesel, kerosene, and naval fuel.[2] Russian sources amplified footage claiming to show explosions in Tula City and Ust-Luga, presumably the results of successful Ukrainian strikes.[3] Geolocated footage published on January 20 shows additional explosions over Smolensk City, indicating possible Ukrainian strikes in the area.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed five drones over Tula, Oryol, and Smolensk oblasts.[5] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18.[6]

A Russian insider source claimed on January 21 that Russian air defense coverage over Leningrad Oblast is poor and indicated that Russian air defenses in Leningrad Oblast are likely not arrayed to defend against strikes from the south.[7] Russian air defense systems in Leningrad Oblast are most likely positioned to defend against strikes from the northwest and west, as Russia has historically arrayed its air defense in the area to defend against hypothetical NATO attacks.[8] The Russian military is currently reforming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) with the expressed intent to prepare for a potential future conventional war against NATO and may be arranging military assets in a way to posture along the border with NATO members.[9] Ukrainian strikes in Leningrad Oblast may prompt Russian forces to reposition short-range air defense systems along expected flight routes of Ukrainian drones to defend potential targets of strategic value. Russian forces using short-range systems such as the Pantsir may not be able to cover all important potential targets in Leningrad Oblast without bringing additional systems into the area, and continued Ukrainian strikes in deep rear areas in Russia may thus increase pressure on Russia’s air defenses overall.

Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece. Members of the Moldovan delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Joint Control Commission (JCC) demanded during a JCC meeting on January 18 that the JCC conduct an investigation into Russian peacekeepers for using small arms, drones, and imitation weapons during an exercise allegedly repelling a sabotage attack on the peacekeepers’ outpost in the Moldovan security zone on December 22, 2023.[10] The Moldovan authorities stated that the Russian peacekeeping forces’ presence and use of these weapons inside the security zone violates JCC protocols and that the Russian peacekeeping forces had not properly disclosed some of these weapons and drones as part of their arsenal. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed in response on January 21 that Moldovan authorities have been increasingly pressuring Russian-backed breakaway republic Transnistria by calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers and through economic pressure.[11] The milblogger claimed that the Moldovan government imposed “double” duties on Transnistrian businesses that amount to roughly $16 million over an unspecified timeframe and that will raise the cost of living in Transnistria. Recent changes to the Moldovan Customs Code require Transnistrian businesses to pay import customs duties to the Moldovan government, whereas previously Transnistrian businesses only paid duties to the Transnistrian government.[12] The milblogger claimed that this pressure supports the “forceful reintegration” of Transnistria into Moldova and that Russia should prepare for further escalation, reminiscent of recent accusations from Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky.[13] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger’s claims and Krasnoselsky’s accusations are likely part of an information operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova, which borders NATO member Romania, and justifying any future Russian escalation in the region.[14]

Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages. The North Korean Foreign Ministry stated on January 20 that Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his willingness to visit North Korea “at an early date” (presumably in 2024) during his recent meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.[15] Putin last visited North Korea in 2000, and his renewed interest in deepening Russian–North Korean relations is likely part of increasing Russian efforts to procure munitions from abroad.[16] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated in a January 21 interview that North Korea provided a “significant amount of artillery ammunition,” which allowed Russia to “breathe a little.”[17] Budanov suggested that Russian forces would likely experience operationally significant artillery ammunition shortages without North Korean–provided ammunition.[18] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023 and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce in total two million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells annually, which resulted in a deficit of 500,000 shells in 2023 and will likely result in a similar deficit in 2024.[19]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes.
Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece.
Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages.
Russian forces advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the front.
Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on January 21 that likely Russian military commanders are mistreating troops at a training ground in Volgograd Oblast.
Russian federal subjects continue to foster patronage networks in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly advanced northwest of Svatove amid continued positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on January 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krokhmalne (northwest of Svatove) and approached the eastern outskirts of Berestove (northwest of Svatove).[20] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently captured a four-kilometer-wide section of the R-07 (Svatove-Kupyansk) highway near Krokhmalne and an unspecified section of the R-07 highway near Novoselivske.[21] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured Krokhmalne, and Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo acknowledged that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the settlement.[22] ISW observed geolocated imagery published on January 20 indicating that Russian forces captured Krokhmalne, and Russian sources claimed that the imagery shows elements of the Russian 47th Guards Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) in the settlement.[23] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on January 21 that positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, northwest of Svatove near Krokhmalne and Stelmakhivka, and west of Svatove near Kolomyichykha.[24] Fityo stated that Russian forces have lost 7,055 personnel in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions so far in January 2024 and that Russian forces lost roughly 14,000 personnel in these directions in December 2023.[25]

Positional engagements continued in the Lyman direction on January 21. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred northwest of Kreminna near Zhytlivka, west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka, southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted at least 13 assaults in the Lyman direction on January 21 as compared to at least 24 assaults on January 19 and at least 25 assaults on January 20.[27] A Ukrainian soldier who recently fought in the Serebryanske forest area stated in an interview published on January 21 that Russian forces have been able to use the forested area to better conceal artillery systems and rely on the forest’s reduced visibility to commit larger groups to assaults.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on January 21, but there were no confirmed changes in this area of the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, in the direction of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and northwest of Horlivka near Pivnichne and Shumy.[29] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate northwest of Bakhmut.[30]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances south and southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on January 21 shows that Russian forces advanced in the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area along Soborna Street (south of Avdiivka) and along a tree line southwest of Avdiivka.[31] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced along Kolosova and Lermentova streets, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this alleged advance.[32] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove; near the Avdiivka Coke plant in northwestern Avdiivka; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske.[33] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are preparing to intensify activity in the Avdiivka direction and have concentrated over 40,000 personnel in the area.[34] Tarnavskyi noted that Russian forces have not conducted any airstrikes in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) in the past two days.[35] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps), the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District), and the “Veterany” Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Volunteer Assault Corps) are operating south of Avdiivka.[36] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Avdiivka.[37]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on January 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting west of Donetsk City near Marinka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[38] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Heorhiivka.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne) and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[40] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 237th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) unsuccessfully attempted to push Ukrainian forces out of positions west of Verbove over the past day [41] Mashovets also reported that elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd MRD, 5th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) conducted unsuccessful assault operations near Robotyne.[42]

Positional fighting continued on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on January 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued in and near Krynky on the east bank.[43] Elements of the Russian 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army) reportedly continue to operate near Krynky.[44]

Russian and occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful missile strikes targeting occupied Crimea on January 21. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted three Ukrainian missiles over the Black Sea near the western coast of Crimea on January 21.[45] Crimean occupation authorities temporarily closed the Kerch Strait Bridge due to the strike.[46] Russian officials periodically close the bridge for safety reasons following Ukrainian strikes likely due to the threat of further strikes that may target the bridge.[47]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on January 21 that likely Russian military commanders are mistreating troops at a training ground in Volgograd Oblast. Mobilization News reported that unspecified actors, likely Russian commanders, are beating and abusing personnel in the “242nd Regiment of military unit No. 46217,” likely the 242nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), at a training center in Volgograd Oblast.[48] The 20th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade is based in Volgograd City.[49] Russian military personnel told Mobilization News that they have to sleep in unheated tents and purchase their own uniforms and equipment and that no one is training them.[50] The personnel reported that they only rehearse formations before the arrival of high-ranking officers.[51]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on January 21 that elements of the Russian 94th Operational Regiment (46th Separate Operational Brigade, Rosgvardia’s North Caucasus District) returned to occupied Ukraine and intend to rotate into an unspecified “critical” sector.[52]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 19 that Russian company HiderX is creating an “invisibility suit” that will camouflage and shield Russian military personnel from Ukrainian thermal imaging equipment.[53] HiderX told TASS that the suit is coated in an unspecified chemical composition and based completely on Russian technology. HiderX stated that the suit weighs roughly 350 grams and can fit in a pocket and that testing for the suit will be completed by the end of January 2024.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimenkov met with Christian Moore, the political advisor of the US Embassy in Ukraine, on January 21 and discussed Ukraine’s progress in reforming its procurement system to be in line with NATO standards.[54] Klimenkov stated that Ukraine is working to reform its procurement organization, budget process, and institutions to adhere to NATO standards.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian federal subjects continue to foster patronage networks in occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on January 21 that ophthalmologists from the Republic of Mordovia are treating patients in occupied Kalanchak Raion, Kherson Oblast, and that over four teams totaling 30 doctors from the Republic of Mordovia have treated patients and helped develop medical infrastructure in occupied Kalanchak Raion in 2023.[55]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Kremlin is attempting to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine as necessary to prevent Ukrainian strikes on Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine. Russian sources claimed on January 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a market in occupied Donetsk City with Western-provided weapons.[56] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accused the West and Ukraine of violating international law and claimed that the strike demonstrates Russia’s need to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine in order to prevent security threats originating from Ukrainian territory.[57] The New York Times reported on January 21 that it cannot independently confirm the actors behind the strike, and Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on the strike.[58]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2024

Key Takeaways:

The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war. The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas.
Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.
Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21.
Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 21, 2024

Jan 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 21, 2024

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

CTP-ISW published abbreviated updates on January 20 and 21, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, January 22, 2024.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel–Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war. The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas.
Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.
Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21.
Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.

The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war.[1] The plan contains three parts that will occur over a 90-day period, according to the Wall Street Journal. Hamas would first release all civilian hostages in return for Israel releasing “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners. Israel would also withdraw its forces from population centers in the Gaza Strip, allow freedom of movement throughout the Gaza Strip, end “surveillance,” and double the flow of humanitarian aid into the strip. Hamas would release all female Israeli soldiers and return the bodies of dead hostages to Israel in the second stage. Finally, Hamas would release the remaining Israeli soldiers and fighting-age males, while Israeli forces withdraw from the strip completely. An Egyptian official told the Wall Street Journal that the parties to the agreement are considering “safety guarantees” for Hamas’ political leadership and the formation of an “international fund” for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. After the 90-day period, the plan would lead to a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the relaunching of a process to form a Palestinian state.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his rejection of a “ceasefire” in exchange for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas in a video published on January 21.[2] Netanyahu was not explicitly responding to the US-Egyptian-Qatari plan. Netanyahu noted that an end to the war that leaves Hamas intact means that the next October 7 attack is “a matter of time.” Netanyahu laid out the Israeli war aims—"deradicalization” of Palestinian society, demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and the destruction of Hamas—in the Wall Street Journal on December 25, 2023.[3]

The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas. Hamas will be able to rebuild its governance capabilities in the Gaza Strip, which allowed it to generate funds for its operations prior to its October 7 attack.[4] Hamas would essentially have access to the same resource pools that it had prior to the war. Hamas fighters are already reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces cleared in the northern Gaza Strip, which will facilitate Hamas’ reconstitution.[5] This reinfiltration process would accelerate under the implementation of the first phase of the proposed plan, in which Israeli forces would leave Gazan cities and towns.[6] “Safety guarantees” for Hamas’ political leadership would protect some of the planners of the October 7 attacks, possibly including Yahya Sinwar. Sinwar is Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip. He closely collaborates with Hamas military leaders Mohammad Deif and Marwan Issa.[7] Sinwar also founded and led Hamas’ internal security apparatus and is responsible for the deaths of many Palestinians and Israelis in that role.[8]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.[9] Palestinian fighters moved the hostages prior to the tunnel’s capture by Israeli forces. The IDF said that the tunnel entrance was inside the home of a Hamas fighter. Palestinian fighters placed boobytraps inside the tunnel and posted guards outside the tunnel. The IDF killed the guards to make entry into the tunnel system. Israeli forces discovered five prison cells where Hamas kept the hostages. Israeli forces also captured Hamas intelligence documents and weapons inside the tunnel. The IDF said that there were 20 hostages held in the tunnel system at a time, according to unspecified testimonies. The IDF said that Hamas held some of the hostages who it released in the November 2023 exchange deal inside this tunnel.[10] The IDF published children’s drawings as proof the hostages had been held there. Israeli media reported that the drawings belonged to five-year-old Emilia Aloni, one of the hostages freed in November 2023.[11] The IDF destroyed the tunnel after IDF forces searched it.

The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) conducted clearing operations in Maghazi in the central Gaza Strip.[12] Yiftach Brigade armor and engineers destroyed a Hamas weapons factory and a rocket launch site in Maghazi camp.[13] Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades at the brigade during the operation. The IDF said that the brigade killed over 30 Palestinian fighters during the engagement.[14] The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, conducted indirect fire attacks on Israeli armor and infantry advancing north from Bureij, roughly a kilometer north of Maghazi.[15] Al Quds Brigades “snipers” fired at Israeli forces northeast of Bureij camp.[16]

Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia on January 21. The al Qassem Brigades—the military wing of Hamas—fired anti-tank munitions at Israeli armor in Jabalia City. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—and the National Resistance Brigades—the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that it clashed with Israeli dismounted infantry east of Jabalia refugee camp.[17] The National Resistance Brigades also fired thermobaric rockets at Israeli infantry.[18]

Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21. This is the largest number of indirect fire attacks into Israel since January 7.[19] Three Palestinian militias mortared Israeli armor at the Sufa military site near the southern tip of the Gaza Strip.[20] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the military wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the Mujahideen Brigades, launched rockets at Nahal Oz in a combined operation on January 21.[21] The al Quds Brigades launched rockets at Kissufim.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.[23]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.[24] LH said it fired rockets at a civilian area in retaliation for an Israeli strike in southern Lebanon that unsuccessfully targeted a senior LH field commander.[25]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli military site in the Golan Heights.[26] The group said that the attack occurred on January 20.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.[27] The group claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces stationed at al Shaddadi in Hasakah Province and US forces stationed at al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province.

3. Foreign countries own at least 40 MILLION acres of US land

Graphics at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-12983609/America-40-MILLION-acres-land-militry-bases-China-Russia-Iran.html

Just a reminder:

“The Capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”

― Vladimir Ilich Lenin

Foreign countries own at least 40 MILLION acres of US land

Foreign developers - including Chinese, Russian, Iranian and Venezuelans - now own at least 40M acres of US land near military bases from coast-to-coast: Government admits it does NOT know full extent of land grab

A watchdog claims the US government is not keep tabs on foreign land owners
The report revealed there at least 40 million acres owned other countries
That includes China, Russia, Iran and other American adversaries
READ MORE: Chinese billionaire Chen Tianqiao's $85 MILLION purchase of Oregon is missing from government records

By STACY LIBERATORE FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

PUBLISHED: 15:49 EST, 19 January 2024 | UPDATED: 18:06 EST, 19 January 2024

Daily Mail · by Stacy Liberatore For Dailymail.com · January 19, 2024

At least 40 million acres of US farmland, pastures and forests are owned by foreign investors, which officials warn ‘may have consequences for national security.’

A new watchdog report found that foreign ownership of US land - including buyers from adversarial nations like China, Russia and Iran - has increased by 40 percent since 2016, with some plots near sensitive military facilities.

As well as espionage concerns, there is growing alarm about the integrity of America's food supply chains.

But the estimates could be the tip of the iceberg because the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which did the report, told DailyMail.com that US officials are not 'reliably' tracking data on land owners.

The new Congressional analysis has caused fury among Democrats and Republicans, who demanded the Biden Administration clamp down on purchases ‘from adversaries' to shore up America's defenses.

Foreign countries own at least 40 million acres of US farmland, pastures and forests, which officials claimed ‘may have consequences for national security.’ However, a watchdog said the government is not 'reliably' tracking data on land owners. Pictured is only farmland ownership

Democratic Senator Jon Tester said: ‘While we learn more about the specifics around this unfolding situation, it highlights the need for Congress to do more to protect American agricultural security and prevent our foreign adversaries from controlling our country’s food supply while also gaining access to land near sensitive military sites.’

Republican Representative Dan Newhouse also shared his outrage after GAO released its findings.

'This report confirms one of our worst fears: that not only is the e United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) unable to answer the question of who owns what land and where, but that there is no plan by the department to internally reverse this dangerous flaw that affects our supply chain and economy,' Newhouse said.

'Food security is national security, and we cannot allow foreign adversaries to influence our food supply while we stick our heads in the sand.'

Chinese firms own 346,915 acres of American agricultural land as of December 2022

The GAO's findings revealed the USDA collects the required data on paper forms and noted the agency 'does not share timely data on foreign investments in agricultural land collected under the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, as amended (AFIDA).'

AFIDA requires foreign persons acquiring or transferring agricultural land to report information about the transaction to USDA.

'USDA also does not sufficiently verify and conduct quality reviews to track the accuracy and completeness of its collected data,' the report reads.

'Without improving its internal processes, USDA cannot report reliable information to Congress or the public about where and how much U.S. agricultural land is held by foreign persons.'

While 40 million acres only makes up a small amount of the 1.3 billion acres of private land in the US, the GAO report warned the data was sparse and unreliable.

For example, the GAO pointed out that Chinese billionaire Chen Tianqiao's $85 million purchase of Oregon timberland is missing from government records.

Kimberly Gianopoulos, director of GAO, told DailyMail.com: 'Recent reporting about Chen Tianqiao (pictured) holding 200,000 acres of agricultural land does not appear to be accounted for in USDA’s data'

Tianqiao earned his $4 billion fortune from online gaming and spent $85 million of it to purchase 198,000 acres in Oregon in 2015 but did not become known until this week

Kimberly Gianopoulos, director of GAO, told DailyMail.com: 'Recent reporting about Chen Tianqiao holding 200,000 acres of agricultural land does not appear to be accounted for in USDA’s data.'

Tianqiao has held executive roles in organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China-based investors and companies own croplands in 28 states, equating to a total of 186,823 acres, according to a report from the USDA that includes data up to 2022 - the latest available.

The firms own more than $2 billion worth of US farmland, up from just $162 million a decade ago, according to the latest USDA figures.

Most of the land claims are in Texas with 192,000 acres, followed by 49,000 acres in North Carolina and Missouri and Utah with 34,000.

AFIDA data has shown 131,000 acres in Val Verde County, Texas is owned by a Chinese-based billionaire.

Local realtors told DailyMail.com in September that David Frankens, from Lufkin, East Texas, sold the land to Sun Guangxin, a former captain in the Chinese military, for an estimated $110 million between 2016 and 2018.

A report written by former CIA officials, seen by DailyMail.com, suggested the Chinese billionaire could be considered a national security risk by US authorities due to his extensive links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Data from the USDA report, released last month, shows that investors from 99 countries have a claim on US land.

The list includes the Republic of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela.

Combined, investors of those adversarial nations own about 95,000 acres of agricultural land.

Data from the USDA report shows that investors from 99 countries have a claim on US land. The list includes the Republic of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela

The new Congressional analysis has caused fury among Democrats and Republicans, who demanded the Biden Administration clamp down on purchases ‘from adversaries' to shore up America's defenses

The are four Cuba-based investors who own 858 acres in the US across three states and Puerto Rico.

The Russian Federation consists of four investors who hold 73 acres in four states and North Korea includes a whopping 32 investors who bought 4,839 acres, according to the USDA report.

A total of 22 investors based in Iran own 2,463 acres and Venezuela's 100 investors own 28,218 acres.

In 2022, China’s Chemical manufacturing company Fufeng Group purchased 300 acres of farmland in North Dakota - 20 minutes from Grand Forks Air Force Base that is home to sensitive military drone technology.

Air Force Major Jeremy Fox wrote a memo shortly after Fufeng Group bought the land for $2.6 million.

Local realtors told DailyMail.com in September that David Frankens (left), from Lufkin, East Texas, sold 131,000 land to Sun Guangxin (right)

Guangxin's land grab means he owns seven percent of all land in Val Verde County. The site of his proposed wind farm sits to the north east of the county, but he already earns royalties from wind turbines operated on his land by a French firm at Rocksprings

He argued that the Fufeng property is located at just the right location for the company to intercept communications coming from the Air Force base.

'Some of the most sensitive elements of Grand Forks exist with the digital uplinks and downlinks inherent with unmanned air systems and their interaction with space-based assets,' Fox wrote.

South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem recently shared a statement regarding foreign land purchasing, while throwing her support for 'Congressman Mike Gallagher’s preventing the Chinese Communist Party and other nations that hate America from owning American agricultural land.'

‘In the last decade, China's holdings of American ag land have increased by 5,300 percent,' Noem shared on X.

She also penned a letter to Gallagher, which reads: ‘The states and Congress must work together to defend our nation from the Chinese Communist Party, especially given the lack of sufficient action from the Biden Administration.’

The congressional USDA report determined that Canadian investors own the largest portion of foreign-held US agricultural land with 12.8 million acres.

Following the North American country are investors from the Netherlands (4.9 million acres), Italy (2.7 million acres), the UK (2.5 million acres) and Germany (2.3 million acres).

The total 40.8 million acres covers agricultural land and nonagricultural land.

Forestland accounted for 47 percent of all foreign-owned land, cropland accounted for 29 percent and pasture and other agricultural land for 22 percent. Nonagricultural land (such as homesteads and roads) accounted for two percent.

Daily Mail · by Stacy Liberatore For Dailymail.com · January 19, 2024

4. Ukraine’s $30 Billion Problem: How to Keep Fighting Without Foreign Aid

Graphics at the link.

Excerpts:

In the longer term, Ukraine and its partners are discussing how the war effort can become self-sustaining, through measures including boosting tax collection and building up domestic military production.

“We recognize that we need to increase our capabilities, financial and military,” said Zykova, the deputy finance minister. She said the government is increasing funding for the production of weapons and drones.

The U.S. and its partners are also exploring using some of the $300 billion in frozen Russian central-bank reserves to back loans to Ukraine.

Economists warn that those efforts could take years to bear fruit. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s economic progress is being undercut by unstable Western aid, said Matteo Patrone, head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s operations in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian economy likely grew about 5% in 2023, according to the central bank. The annual rate of consumer inflation rose 5.1% in December, down sharply from 26% at the start of 2023.

“The bitter irony is that the macroeconomic situation of Ukraine is very good given the circumstances and this goes entirely to the credit of Ukrainian authorities,” said Patrone. “Wasting all that work would add insult to injury.”

Ukraine’s $30 Billion Problem: How to Keep Fighting Without Foreign Aid

Kyiv could delay salaries, return to printing money if funding from U.S. and EU falls through

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-30-billion-problem-how-to-keep-fighting-without-foreign-aid-86c9865b?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Chelsey Dulaney

Updated Jan. 22, 2024 12:00 am ET

President Biden met with Volodymyr Zelensky in September as the Ukrainian leader lobbied Washington for support. PHOTO: DREW ANGERER/GETTY IMAGES

Ukraine will run out of money within months and be forced to take painful economic measures to keep the government running if aid from the U.S. or Europe doesn’t come through, according to economists and Ukrainian officials.

The U.S. and the European Union, Ukraine’s largest financial backers, have promised Kyiv billions of dollars in new financial and military aid. But pledges from both have been upended by infighting in Washington and in Brussels. While political leaders insist those aid packages will pass eventually, timing is critical for Ukraine.

The country faces a $40 billion-plus financial shortfall this year, slightly smaller than 2023’s gap. Funding from the U.S. and EU was expected to cover some $30 billion of that. The money is needed to keep the government running and is used to fund salaries, pensions and subsidies to the population.

Congressional Leaders Signal Progress on Ukraine Aid and Border Talks

Military ends rescue search for Navy SEALs lost in maritime raid on ship with Iranian weapons

BY LOLITA C. BALDOR

Updated 5:26 AM EST, January 22, 2024

AP · January 21, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — The 10-day search to rescue two Navy SEALs lost in the Arabian Sea during a mission to board a ship and confiscate Iranian-made weapons has been ended and the sailors are now considered deceased, the U.S. military said Sunday.

In a statement, U.S. Central Command said the search has now been changed to a recovery effort. The names of the SEALs have not been released as family notifications continue.

Ships and aircraft from the U.S., Japan and Spain continuously searched more than 21,000 square miles, the military said, with assistance from the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, the U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command, University of San Diego – Scripts Institute of Oceanography and the Office of Naval Research.

“We mourn the loss of our two Naval Special Warfare warriors, and we will forever honor their sacrifice and example,” said Gen. Erik Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command. “Our prayers are with the SEALs’ families, friends, the U.S. Navy and the entire Special Operations community during this time.”

According to officials, the Jan. 11 raid targeted an unflagged ship carrying illicit Iranian-made weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Officials have said that as the team was boarding the ship, one of the SEALs went under in the heavy seas, and a teammate went in to try and save him.

The commandos had launched from the USS Lewis B. Puller, a mobile sea base, and they were backed by drones and helicopters. They loaded onto small special operations combat craft driven by naval special warfare crew to get to the boat.

In the raid, they seized an array of Iranian-made weaponry, including cruise and ballistic missile components such as propulsion and guidance devices and warheads, as well as air defense parts, Central Command said. It marked the latest seizure by the U.S. Navy and its allies of weapon shipments bound for the rebels, who have launched a series of attacks now threatening global trade in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over Israel’s war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The seized missile components included types likely used in those attacks.

The U.S. Navy ultimately sunk the ship carrying the weapons after deeming it unsafe, Central Command said. The ship’s 14 crew were detained.

AP · January 21, 2024

6. Special Operations News Update - January 22, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - January 22, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 22, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Navy explosive ordnance disposal technicians practice free fall techniques during a vertical wind training exercise in Virginia Beach, Va., Dec. 15, 2023. The maneuvers help train jumpers to respond to midair malfunctions. Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Jackson Adkins.

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SOF News

VBSS – a “Sketchy Mission”. Two Navy SEALs went missing during a Visit, Board, Search and Seizure operation off the coast of Somalia searching for Iranian weapons enroute to Yemen. “Navy SEALs describe how boarding a ship is a team’s ‘sketchiest’ mission”, Task & Purpose, January 15, 2024. After a 10-day exhaustive search the U.S. Navy has been unable to recover the two missing SEALs. Their status had been changed to deceased. “CENTCOM Status Update on Missing Navy SEALs”, CENTCOM, January 21, 2024.

10th SFG(A) and Their Woodcarver. Sebastian Demmel, a German woodcarver, has spent a lifetime cultivating a bond with U.S. Special Forces Soldiers. He has received the title of Honorary Green Beret from U.S. Special Operations Command and is an Honorary Original of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). “German Woodcarver engraved into SOF hearts and history”, DVIDS, January 17, 2024.

SOF Promotions.

Navy Captain Liam M. Hulin has been nominated for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half). Hulin is currently serving as commanding officer, U.S. Special Operations Command Forward, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Peter D. Huntley for appointment to the grade of major general. Huntley is currently serving as commander, U.S. Special Operations Command South, Homestead, Florida.

Fitness for SOF Recruits. Stew Smith, a former Navy SEAL, provides advice to those who want to be physically fit for the training ahead of them during special operations selection and qualification. “How to Cross-Train Effectively for Special Operations Jobs”, Military.com, January 17, 2024.

SF Col (Ret) Chats about Cruise Ships. Mark Mitchell, a former Special Forces colonel, talks about how to optimize your cruise experience. “A Veteran’s Guide to Cruising on the High Seas”, AARP, January 18, 2024.

AFSOC’s Aircraft. Chrisian D. Orr profiles the various aircraft that Air Force Special Operations Command uses to support the ‘operators’ of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. “The Aircraft of the U.S. Air Force’s Special Forces”, National Interest, January 19, 2024.

Passing of CSM (Ret.) Clark. On January 18, 2024, retired Command Sgt. Maj. David L. Clark passed away. His service to the nation spanned a total of 70 years. He spent decades in the U.S. Army Special Forces and later as a civilian working in the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. Read more about the career of Clark in “Special Forces recognizes long-time Fort Bragg Veteran, employee”, The Fayetteville Observer, September 1, 2022. Obituary (legacy.com)

GB Running for Congress. Derrick Anderson is a candidate to represent one of Virginia’s congressional districts – hoping to take the seat from a Democrat. (Washington Examiner, Jan 18, 2024)

Retiring. Vice Adm. Collin Green is retiring after 38 years’ service in the U.S. Navy – most of it with the Naval Special Warfare community. His last position was SOCOM Deputy Commander. During his command he served as commander of SOCSOUTH, NSWC, NSW Task Force Iraq, and Navy SEAL and SWCC teams.

New Sniper Weapon? A new rifle may likely replace the M107 and MK15 systems. “US special ops on the hunt for cutting edge sniper rifle to compete with Russia, China”, by Michael Lee, Fox News, January 13, 2024.

International SOF

GRU Spetsnaz. Read up on the training, equipment, weapons, operations, and more of one of Russia’s premier special operations forces. The GRU was first formed up in 1950, the main missions were espionage, reconnaissance, sabotage, counterintelligence, and other like operations. “GRU Spetsnaz: The Batman of Russia”, by Wes Martin, Grey Dynamics, January 18, 2023.

Russian Paramilitaries in Eurasia. There are several ways that ‘semi-state’ organizations can advance the Kremlin’s interests in other countries. Read about it in “Potential Russian Uses of Paramilitaries in Eurasia”, Center for a New American Security, January 17, 2024.

SOF History

Ravens Over Laos. Marc Yablonka explores the history of the Ravens who flew missions over Laos from 1967 to 1972. They were volunteer ‘sheep-dipped’ U.S. Air Force pilots – trained Foward Air Controllers – that worked in a highly secret government program. “Ravens Flew High and Low Over Laos”, Hmong Daily News, January 15, 2024.

Delta in Panama. In the early stages of the US invasion of Panama Delta conducted an operation to rescue Kurt Muse – a US citizen held by the Panamanian authorities. “Operation Acid Gambit: Delta Force in Panama”, Grey Dynamics, January 17, 2024.

CIG. On January 22, 1946, President Truman directed the establishment of Central Intelligence Group, forerunner of CIA. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/1996-2/the-creation-of-the-central-intelligence-group/

MACV-SOG. On January 24, 1964, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) was established. It was a highly classified, multi-service U.S. special operations unit that conducted operations during the Vietnam War in Indochina. It conducted reconnaissance missions, capture of enemy soldiers, rescued downed pilots, and rescued POWs throughout Southeast Asia. Individuals assigned to MACV-SOF came primarily from U.S. Army Special Forces. However, members of the U.S. Navy SEALs, Air Force, Marine Corps, and CIA were present in the organization as well.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Assistance_Command,_Vietnam_%E2%80%93_Studies_and_Observations_Group

1/75th. On January 25, 1974, General Creighton Abrams directed the activation of the first battalion-sized Ranger unit since World War II. HQ U.S. Army Forces Command issued General Orders 127 directing the activation of the 1st Ranger Battalion 75th Infantry with the effective date of January 31, 1974. The battalion was to be an elite, light, and very proficient infantry unit. (USASOC)

https://www.soc.mil/rangers/1stbn.html

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

IDF Moves Some Troops Out of Gaza. Thousands of personnel from the Israel Defense Forces have left the Gaza Strip – many reservists who are returning to civilian life. IDF operations against remaining Hamas fighters are continuing – it what could be termed a ‘low intensity conflict’. The region is in the midst of a week-long communications blackout due to damaged infrastructure. Negotiations for the remaining hostages captured by Hamas during the October 7th terrorist attacks (SOF News) have not yielded results. Much of the fighting is now centered in and around Khan Younis (Google Maps) – the largest city in southern Gaza.

And Now Lebanon and the West Bank? Seth Frantzman writes that the IDF drawing down troop levels in Gaza and preparing for a possible conflict in southern Lebanon. “IDF shifts focus from Gaza to Lebanon, West Bank”, The Long War Journal, January 17, 2024.

Paper – Lessons from Israel’s Forever Wars, by Graham Allison and Raphael J. Piliero, Belfer Center, Harvard University, January 2024, PDF, 38 pages. Description and PDF.

References:
Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.
Israel-Hamas War: Insights from RAND

Ukraine Conflict

Black Sea Update. Glen E. Howard updates us on the maritime aspect of the Ukraine – Russia War. (map NSI) There is a feeling in the Ukraine military that it is ‘winning’ the fight for the Black Sea and isolating the Russian-occupied (since 2014) Crimean Peninsula. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been the target of numerous sea and air strikes (sea drones and cruise missiles) forcing some Russian naval ships to reposition from the Black Sea to the naval port at Sevastopol. Since April 2022, when the Ukrainians sank the Russian Flag Ship of the Black Sea Fleet, Russian naval activity has been lessened. The Russian naval blockade of Odessa has been halted and Ukrainian grain shipments have resumed. The Ukrainian military is now looking at options for Crimea. Certainly, the future destruction of the Kerch Straits Bridge is a key factor, which would cut of one of the two logistical routes to Crimea. “The Black Sea is now the center of gravity for the Ukrainian War”, The Hill, January 17, 2024.

U.S. Aid for Ukraine – Not So Much. U.S. House Republicans are holding firm on their quest for increased border security before sending more money to Ukraine. The Senate has crafted a compromise deal that encompasses a number of issues, but the House is reluctant to accept it. The Ukraine aid is one of the few bargaining chips House Republicans have to fix the border security problems. Some conservatives are losing interest in supporting Ukraine; but others see a danger in the appeasement of Russia. Larry Provost thinks “Reagan Would Be Ashamed of Our Anti-Ukraine Stance”, Newsmax, January 17, 2024.

Video – Ukraine Briefing Featuring Ambassador Michael McFaul. At this briefing on January 18, 2023, Spirit of America CEO Jim Hake spoke with Ambassador Michael McFaul, former US Ambassador to Russia and discussed why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a global security threat, what Putin and Russia might try to do next, and why US support of Ukraine’s fight for freedom still matters. Spirit of America, January 18, 2024, YouTube, 30 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8GkOPpz9pE&t=2s

Commentary

Measuring Resiliency. Robert S. Burrell describes a twelve-step analysis process that planners, statesmen, or practitioners can use to frame a country or region in terms of resilience and resistance. “A Guide for Measuring Resiliency”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, January 16, 2023.

Arctic Security. Sonner Kehrt has concerns about the ability of the United States to conduct and sustain military forces and operations in the High North (map NSI). Read more in “US Military Can’t Sustain Arctic Operations, ‘Let Alone Dominate,’ Experts Say”, The War Horse, January 18, 2024.

National Security

SECDEF Released. After hospitalization for two weeks at Walter Reed Hospital for treatment of prostate cancer Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has been discharged and is now ‘working from home’ on a temporary basis. Austin received heavy criticism for keeping his cancer prognosis and stay in ICU secret from leading members of DoD, the National Security Council, Congress (Washington Examiner, 15 Jan 2024), and the White House. In addition, he delegated his authority to his deputy who had no idea that he was in ICU. (Editorial note: we will likely have a new SECDEF prior to the November election).

“Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Released From Hospital”, DOD News, January 15, 2024.
“Statement From Secretary of Defense on Hospital Release”, DOD News, January 15, 2024.
“Austin Leaves Hospital, Returns Home”, DOD News, January 18, 2024.

Border Security. The House of Representatives Judiciary Commitee is considering a resolution that would condemn the Biden Administration’s open border policies and urge the President to provide more security to the border. See synopsis at Congress.gov. A major concern of Republicans are the thousands of migrants who enter each day requesting asylum and the transport of fentanyl (CBP 17 Jan 2024) across the border. The Department of State recently met with Mexican officials to discuss several topics to include illegal migration, criminal smuggling networks, and fentanyl trafficking. “Discussions with Mexican Officials on Migration at the Department of State”, U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2024.

Report – Army Organization. The Congressional Research Service has updated Defense Primer: Department of the Army and Army Command Structure, CRS IF10544, updated January 16, 2024, PDF 2 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10544

Information Operations

DoS and Information Manipulation. The U.S. Department of State has published a Fact Sheet entitled “The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation”, DoS, January 18, 2024. View Fact Sheet. “This Framework seeks to develop a common understanding of this threat and establish a common set of action areas from which the United States, with its allies and partners, can develop coordinated responses to foreign information manipulation and protect free and open societies.” The ‘Framework’ calls for five Key Action Areas to build societal resiliency to foreign disinformation.

Deepfakes. Videos created with artificial intelligence are very realistic and can sway viewers to believe in false narratives. More the 40 countries are due to hold significant elections over the next year and it will be harder and harder for votes to separate fact from fiction. News reporters are frequent targets – they find themselves saying things on the web that they never said. “Deepfakes a ‘Weapon Against Journalism’ Analyst Says”, Voice of America, January 20, 2024.

Al-Shabaab’s IO Campaign. The Somali terrorist group has a robust and highly disciplined information operations organization. The counterinsurgency effort against this group must understand the vital importance and integrated nature of its online operations. “Decoding al-Shabaab’s Social Media Strategy”, CTC Sentinel, January 2024.

Great Power Competition

Weaponized Migration. Russia has frequently used a sudden influx of refugees into another country as a way to distract Western governments, forcing spending, and causing military forces to augment border security. This tactic has been used frequently against Nordic and East European countries. “People as a Weapons System: Moscow and Minsk’s Continued Attempts to Weaponize Migration”, by Rick Chersicla, Irregular Warfare Initiative, January 18, 2024.

Putin, IO, and the Baltic States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has stepped up rhetoric on Russian ethnic minorities in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. “Putin may be setting information conditions for escalation against Baltics”, LRT.lt, January 17, 2024.

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Asia

Pakistan – Iran Exchange Airstrikes. Last Tuesday (Jan 16th) Iran launched missiles at targets in Pakistan that had terrorists of Iranian nationality. In retaliation, early on Thursday morning (Jan 18th) Pakistan launched missile and aircraft strikes against what it says were targets containing Pakistan terrorists located in Iran. The terrorists targeted by Pakistan were likely from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). See map of Iran and Pakistan region (NSI).

Paper on Nagorno-Karabakh. Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian write about the history of the Karabakh Conflict and the outlook for the future. A Frozen Conflict Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Eurasia Program, January 2024, PDF, 40 pages.

Latin America

Drug Cartel ‘Hitwomen’. The drug cartels are increasing their presence and influence in Central and South America. Women are becoming more involved in the criminal landscape. In Mexico, women represent about 6 percent of active personnel in criminal groups. Read more in “Hitwomen on the Rise in Latin American Cartels”, by Julieta Pelcastre, Dialogo Americas, January 18, 2024.

Mexican Army Visits Fort Liberty (FBNC). A Mexican Army specialty unit collaborated with Special Operations Command – North (SOCNORTH) and 1st Psychological Operations Battalion on the adaptation of new mission capabilities and technology. “Mexican and U.S. Army Psychological Operations Leaders Strengthen Partnership”, DVIDS, January 19, 2024.

Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Afghanistan

Report – Taliban Rule at 2.5 Years. Haroun Rahimi and Andrew Watkins examine governance of Afghanistan and its foreign relations over the past few years since the Taliban took power in August 2021. CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2024, PDF, 16 pages.

Surviving in Afghanistan. Child marriages have skyrocketed across Afghanistan due to an economic collapse and dim future prospects for girls under Taliban rule. Selling a daughter into marriage can bring enough to feed a family for a year and many families take that desperate step for survival. “In the new Afghanistan, it’s sell your daughter or starve”, The Washington Post, January 15, 2024. (subscription)

Middle East

Yemen Attacks Continue. The U.S. military has been conducting significant attacks against targets to warn the Houthis from making drone and anti-ship missile attacks against international commercial shipping and warships. However, Yemen (map by NSI) is continuing to threaten the sea lanes (Washington Examiner, 15 Jan 2024). In addition to conducting attacks against land-based targets in Yemen the U.S. Navy has been conducting Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. One VBSS operation resulted in the loss of two Navy SEALs (SOF News, 16 Jan 2024) As a result of the attacks the Department of State has announced the designation of the Houthis as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group.’ (DoS, Jan 17, 2024). President Trump had designated the Houthis as a terrorist group, but President Biden reversed that in 2021.

Lost Reaper. There are news reports that a U.S. MQ9 Reaper has exploded in the air and crashed in Diyala Province near Baghdad, Iraq on January 18, 2024. Militant groups claim they have shot it down. Iraqi security forces recovered the aircraft.

SOF News Book Shop

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Podcasts, Videos, and Journals

Podcast – Of Green Berets and Secret CIA Missions. James Stejskal is a former Green Beret, CIA case officer, and now a book author. He is interviewed by Jeff Stein on the Spytalk podcast. (Jan 2024)

Podcast – Words Matter: Irregular Warfare Definitions and Constructs. Robert S. Burrell, Richard Tilley, and David Ucko discuss the definition of IW. The Trident, January 2024. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1/

Special Warfare Magazine. The latest issue is now online. https://www.swcs.mil/Special-Warfare/Special-Warfare-Archive/fbclid/IwAR1RppmOHzMtXi5RmxUe9lZhum6sHnEK6j4eamdKPnFCYOPKQMd4_7YN6sI/

CTC Sentinel. The January 2024 issue is now posted online. This monthly journal by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has some interesting articles about the Taliban rule, risks of generative AI exploitation, al-Shabaab’s social media strategy, and left-wing terrorism in Germany. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/january-2024/

Infantry. The Winter 2023-2024 issue is now available online. Several interesting topics are presented in this issue to include SBCTs, C2, leadership, Russian airborne mechanized raids, breaching and clearing operations, and more. PDF, 60 pages.

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sof.news · by SOF News · January 22, 2024

7. The Defense Secretary and the Chain of Command: Why Critics Are Wrong About Austin's Emergency

What is a "distributed" Department of Defense command system?

The Defense Secretary and the Chain of Command: Why Critics Are Wrong About Austin's Emergency

Military.com | By Lawrence J. Korb and Stephen Cimbala

Published January 19, 2024 at 4:45pm ET

military.com · January 19, 2024

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was recently hospitalized for prostate cancer surgery and apparently incommunicado for a few days in early January. Although Austin never lost consciousness or went under general anesthesia, some members of Congress and media commentators have described the situation as reckless and irresponsible and one of great peril for the United States. These critics contend that, by failing to inform the president or the White House staff in good time, Austin left open the possibility of disruption of the civilian and military chains of command by ambiguous delegation of authority during his absence.

Much of that criticism is misplaced, some of it motivated by partisan discontent with the Biden administration's national security policy, while some commentators are simply misinformed. There are at least two reasons these criticisms are simply wrong, and a few reasons the critics are misguided in their complaints.

First, the military chain of command runs from the president, to the secretary of defense, to the combatant commanders who are in charge of the unified or specified warfighting commands for the armed forces. The president is the commander in chief of the armed forces and can issue orders at any time with or without the secretary of defense. In fact, on Jan. 11, the Biden administration and the British struck dozens of Houthi targets in Yemen, a matter that President Joe Biden had discussed with his national security team on Jan. 1. Not only did Austin participate in that meeting, he also directed the operation on Jan. 11 from his hospital room.

In the absence of the secretary of defense, presidential orders would go directly to the combatant commanders and to the deputy secretary of defense, who would presumably inform their staff. In this case, the deputy secretary of defense apparently was informed that Austin was temporarily unavailable and received the delegation of authority, although whether she was informed the reasons why is less clear.

Second, in the extreme and unlikely situation that a timely response to attack is necessary while the civilian delegation of authority in the Pentagon is ambiguous, and the president and secretary are unavailable, the combatant commanders are authorized to respond to imminent threats. They are required to promptly notify the president, the secretary of defense, the national security adviser and other principals if emergency action is taken. For example, a nuclear missile attack on a U.S. military base overseas, or even worse, on the American homeland, would not be ignored by a paralyzed chain of command.

Setting aside the fact that there never was a risk to the military's ability to manage threats during Austin's medical emergency, public officials should be careful not to convey to the world the mistaken impression that the United States is a helpless sleeping giant if one or more officials in the defense chain of command are temporarily out of pocket. Bureaucracies have their faults, but one of their redeeming features is that there is always someone backstopping his or her immediate superior who is, or should be, prepared to step in and assume command.

But beyond the logistics of the hubbub, Austin has served his country for decades as a military officer, much of it in combat, and now as a cabinet official. He is entitled to a presumption of good faith, especially under the exigent medical conditions. There are grounds to question how the process of intradepartmental and interagency communication worked in early January and how it might be improved, and Congress should work with the Department of Defense on a postmortem. Jeff Zients, the White House chief of staff; Kelly E. Magsamen, Austin's chief of staff; and Robert P. Storch, the Pentagon's inspector general, have all already opened investigations into what happened and why.

However, this episode does raise the issue about whether the Pentagon as a one-size-fits-all military headquarters is perhaps a dated World War II-era construct. We should ask if it's time to consider whether a distributed Department of Defense command system that is more adapted to the technology of the 21st century should replace the five-sided pyramid next to Arlington, Virginia.

-- Lawrence J. Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, is a retired Navy captain and a former assistant secretary of defense.

-- Stephen Cimbala is a professor of political science at Penn State University, Brandywine.

military.com · January 19, 2024

8. How China is winning the Middle East

Excerpts:

As with U.S. arms sales, Beijing seeks not just profit via arms transfers, but to expand its presence and partnerships. In Saudi Arabia, China has worked to weave itself into Mohammed bin Salman’s national industrialization goals, including providing Chinese designed missiles for the Saqr drone, as well as reports of potential manufacture of the JF-17 inside Saudi Arabia. And the Falcon Shield 2023 joint exercise pointedly derived its name from the Hongdu L-15 Falcon, the PLA Air Force light combat and training aircraft purchased by the UAE in February.

Each of these prongs expands China’s presence and influence in the region. According to China’s state media, the UAE and China are likely to conduct further, more wide-ranging exercises in the future, deepening ties between the two countries and further entrenching China and Chinese interests in the region. Military experts in China went further, describing how via the exercises, the two militaries can “draw on each other’s strengths,” with official media reporting that the Emirati pilots would bring “rich practical experience…conducive to the common progress of both parties.” Much of this “experience” originally came via the Emiratis' years of joint training and exercises with the U.S. Air Force.

How China is winning the Middle East

China is working to present itself as a responsible alternative to the U.S. in the Middle East, just as many are questioning Washington’s long-term commitment to the region.

By KEVIN NGUYEN and PETER W. SINGER

defenseone.com · by Kevin Nguyen

Amid the recent catastrophes in the Middle East—the renewed Israel-Hamas war; widening violence in Lebanon, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea—one player counts the past year a success: China.

Beijing stacked up strategic win after win, not just expanding its economic presence, but convening leadership summits, brokering peace deals, and even holding a joint military training exercise with one of the U.S.’s most important allies in the region. While shifts in power and influence often become evident only after the fact, history could one day look back on 2023 as the year that China truly began to win the Middle East.

It is easy to see why states in the Middle East have sought closer ties with China. Collaborating with a military powerhouse that is not Washington helps them shed U.S. dependency—a goal that even close allies like the UAE have expressed repeatedly in the past decade.

But what are China’s goals? A look at Chinese sources reveals efforts in the political, economic, diplomatic, and military realms.

Build economic ties

Chinese sources frequently talk up the centuries-old links between China and the Middle East; they note, for example, the UAE has historically been home to over 100,000 ethnic Chinese. But as with its other global initiatives, the original linchpin of Beijing’s efforts are economic. China sees great economic opportunity in the Middle East, especially with the energy-rich Gulf states, whose ties with China have steadily grown over the last decade.

“Belt and Road Initiative'' partner countries have increased their imports of Chinese products by 8.9% in the past decade alone, while in 2021, bilateral trade between the Persian Gulf countries and China grew at a record 44.3%. When the global economy slowed in 2022, trade between the Gulf countries and China still grew 27.1%, a stark contrast to the falling trade between China and both Japan and the United States.

This is further reflected in financial trends: over 42 trillion RMB (about $6 trillion) was used for international payments in 2022, raising it to the world’s 5th most popular currency. Beijing has already expressed a desire to use these ties to take on the American “monopoly” in oil-producing countries, which carry a “dollar hegemony.”

China views these tightening economic ties as a means to expand its political influence in the region. For instance, China’s “Official Policy Document on Arab Countries” describes the advantages of “wooing” Arab states through investment and trade, aerospace technology through the Beidou navigation system, as well as “cooperation in weapons and equipment” and “joint military training.”

This pathway is illustrated by the relationship between China and the UAE. Closer judicial and economic cooperation in the early 2000s led to alignment on the “Taiwan Issue” in 2010. Chinese leader Xi Jinping made an official visit in 2018, followed by naval “goodwill” missions in 2020. In 2022, the UAE and China held meetings on counter-terrorism and de-radicalization, which were followed by August’s Falcon Shield 2023 joint air force training exercise. Notably, the exercise was held in China’s restive Xinjiang region, where the Chinese government has reportedly detained more than 1 million Muslims in reeducation camps.

Reduce American power

Many of China’s earliest strategic gains in the Middle East were with states that have been traditionally hostile to the United States. In 2021, for instance, Beijing and Tehran entered a 25-year agreement covering political, economic, and military areas. This, of course, complicates U.S. policy in the region.

But more recently, Beijing has targeted longstanding U.S. allies with growing success. Soon after their 2023 joint military exercise, for instance, the UAE announced that it will join the China-aligned BRICS bloc this month. Saudi Arabia is also reported to be considering joining.

These traditional U.S. allies note how closer economic ties with China also provide a kind of balance to the security focus of the U.S. and keep their countries from becoming overly reliant on Washington. Last August, for example, Qatar’s Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman al-Thani said, “In the same year we were designated as a non-NATO ally to the US, we also signed three new energy deals with China.”

China has been keen to present itself as a responsible alternative to the U.S. in the Middle East, just as many are questioning Washington’s long-term commitment to the region or balking at U.S. demands. For instance, observers noted that the UAE pulled out of the US-led maritime coalition, which protects UAE’s sea lanes, just as Washington was asking states to reduce their ties with Russia and China.

Thus, China’s narrative in this effort is one of not just opportunity for Middle Eastern states, but constant subtle or overt comparison between U.S. and Chinese goals in the region. For instance, China’s Consul General in Dubai, Li Xuhang, published an article in the UAE’s Manifesto newspaper. Titled “China is an Opportunity for The World,” the article juxtaposed the economic opportunities for the UAE and wider region brought about by the Belt and Road Initiative with the “zero-sum Cold War mentality” and “confusing noise” from American “China threat” rhetoric. Similarly, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman, he talked up China’s commitment to “mutually similar political environments” as the non-democracies of the region. Even before the latest wave of anger at the U.S. support for Israel’s offensive in Gaza, this narrative has met with positive effect. Deputy Secretary-General of the Arab League, Hussam Zaki, provided a typical statement, stating, “Arab countries can no longer find sincere friends like China in the world.”

Beyond the region

Beijing’s regional diplomatic feats—for example, brokering a resumption of diplomatic relations between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran or hosting an emergency summit of Muslim foreign ministers to pressure Israel to stop its military operations in Gaza—also are viewed for their effect upon issues closer to home. Much of the CCP’s early regional outreach centered on the Taiwan issue, as Beijing and Taipei contested diplomatic recognition. Today, with only 12 of the 193 United Nations member states still keeping formal ties with the Republic of China, that battle has largely been won. Yet it will remain a primary concern for the CCP as long as the issue remains. The Chinese Consul General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Wang Qiming, recently said Beijing would “continue to carry out friendly exchanges with other countries around the world on the basis of adhering to the one-China principle.”

Chinese experts also discuss how these efforts matter to other domestic troubles. For example, Falcon Shield 2023’s location was not selected by happenstance. As Professor Zhu Weilie of Shanghai International Studies University said, it was meant to warn “Uyghur separatists [in Xinjiang] who seek support in the Islamic world, reminding them that such seeking is in vain.”

Military gains

The arms trade also factors heavily into China’s efforts in the Middle East, aligning with China’s larger aim to supplant Russia as the preferred alternative to Western industry as an arms supplier. Overall, Chinese arms sales to the Middle East jumped by 80% in the last decade. Here again, while China primarily targeted U.S. adversaries such as Iran—which is reportedly set to buy the J-10C as well as the less advanced FC-1 Xiaolong fighter aircraft, paying via oil and natural gas exchange—it has expanded to essentially every U.S. ally in the region except Israel.

This growth has succeeded even as the U.S. continues to serve as the security guarantor of those states, and despite efforts by multiple U.S. administrations to limit it. For instance, while U.S. forces have become more and more embroiled in efforts to defend energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, culminating with the strikes on Houthi drone and missile targets this last week, Saudi Arabia is reportedly in talks to purchase the Sky Saker FX80 and CR500 vertical take-off and landing drones, Cruise Dragon 5 and 10 loitering munitions, and the HQ-17AE short-range air defense system. And while Egypt has received more than $50 billion in military aid from the U.S. since 1978, including $1.3 billion in the last year, it is reportedly in negotiations to buy China’s J-10C multirole fighter.

As with U.S. arms sales, Beijing seeks not just profit via arms transfers, but to expand its presence and partnerships. In Saudi Arabia, China has worked to weave itself into Mohammed bin Salman’s national industrialization goals, including providing Chinese designed missiles for the Saqr drone, as well as reports of potential manufacture of the JF-17 inside Saudi Arabia. And the Falcon Shield 2023 joint exercise pointedly derived its name from the Hongdu L-15 Falcon, the PLA Air Force light combat and training aircraft purchased by the UAE in February.

Each of these prongs expands China’s presence and influence in the region. According to China’s state media, the UAE and China are likely to conduct further, more wide-ranging exercises in the future, deepening ties between the two countries and further entrenching China and Chinese interests in the region. Military experts in China went further, describing how via the exercises, the two militaries can “draw on each other’s strengths,” with official media reporting that the Emirati pilots would bring “rich practical experience…conducive to the common progress of both parties.” Much of this “experience” originally came via the Emiratis' years of joint training and exercises with the U.S. Air Force.

Kevin Nguyen is a junior Chinese language analyst at BluePath Labs, currently studying for his Master's in Chinese Language and Culture at George Washington University.

Peter Singer is Senior Fellow at New America, Professor at Arizona State University, and Managing Partner of Useful Fiction LLC.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Nguyen

9. Missile barrage on US base in Iraq leaves personnel being evaluated for brain injuries, officials say

Missile barrage on US base in Iraq leaves personnel being evaluated for brain injuries, officials say

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

In the latest escalation against U.S. forces in the Middle East, Iranian-backed militias launched a barrage of ballistic missiles and rockets at Al-Assad airbase in western Iraq on Saturday that left several U.S. personnel being evaluated for traumatic brain injuries, according to a statement from U.S. Central Command.

Most of the incoming missiles and rockets were intercepted by the air defense systems at the base, which is used by both the Iraq and U.S. militaries, but some impacted the base, officials said.

"At approximately 6:30 p.m. (Baghdad time) on January 20, multiple ballistic missiles and rockets were launched by Iranian-backed militants in Western Iraq targeting al-Assad Airbase," CENTCOM said in a statement.

"Most of the missiles were intercepted by the base’s air defense systems while others impacted on the base. Damage assessments are ongoing," it added. "A number of U.S. personnel are undergoing evaluation for traumatic brain injuries. At least one Iraqi service member was wounded."

Iraqi police in Babylon discovered a land attack cruise missile of Iranian design that failed to launch on Jan. 3.

U.S. Central Command

MORE: What is happening between Iran and Pakistan?

Saturday's attack appears to be the largest of the more than 140 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria since mid-October that the U.S. says have been carried out by Iranian-backed militia groups.

Much like the attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by Houthi militants, the attacks on U.S. bases are said to be taking place in solidarity with Palestinians in the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.

The vast majority of the attacks in Iraq and Syria have been carried out using Iranian-made drones and rockets, but Saturday's attack included ballistic missiles which have only been rarely used in the attacks and are seen as escalatory.

It is unclear how the United States will respond to this latest attack on U.S. forces in Iraq which have in the past triggered retaliatory airstrikes against Iranian-backed militias.

On Jan. 4, a U.S. military drone strike in Baghdad killed a senior leader of one of those militias that have also been incorporated into the Iraqi military's command structure.

That strike led to calls for the U.S. to pull out the 2,500 troops still in Iraq as part of the decade-old mission to counter the Islamic State terror group.

An additional 900 U.S. troops are also deployed to Syria to prevent a resurgence by the Islamic State, according to the Pentagon.

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

10. As U.S. and Militias Engage, White House Worries About a Tipping Point

NEWS ANALYSIS

As U.S. and Militias Engage, White House Worries About a Tipping Point

The number of attacks on American troops in the Middle East increases the risk of deaths, a red line that could lead to a wider war.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/us/politics/us-militias-tipping-point.html

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President Biden boarding Marine One on Sunday. The latest attack on American troops over the weekend resulted in no deaths, but Mr. Biden and his advisers worry it is only a matter of time. Credit...Yuri Gripas for The New York Time

By Peter Baker

Reporting from Washington

Jan. 21, 2024

Another day, another barrage of rockets and another spark that American officials fear could set off a wildfire of violence across the Middle East.

The latest attack on American troops in the region over the weekend resulted in no deaths, but President Biden and his advisers worry that it is only a matter of time. Whenever a report of a strike arrives at the White House Situation Room, officials wonder whether this will be the one that forces a more decisive retaliation and results in a broader regional war.

The assault on American troops based at Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq on Saturday night was by one measure the most successful believed to be carried out by a militia sponsored by Iran since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on Oct. 7. Two out of an estimated 17 rockets and short-range ballistic missiles fired at the base made it through air defense systems. An unspecified number of American military personnel were reported injured, but none were said to have been killed.

But it was just the latest in a regular string of relatively low-level assaults that have become a way of life in the Middle East for U.S. forces since the Hamas attack. As of Thursday, Iranian-backed militias had already carried out 140 attacks on American troops in Iraq and Syria, with nearly 70 U.S. personnel wounded, some of them suffering traumatic brain injuries. All but a few have been able to return to duty in short order, according to the Pentagon.

American forces have at times mounted retaliations, but in limited fashion to avoid instigating a full-fledged conflict.

Biden administration officials have regularly debated the proper strategy. They do not want to let such attacks go without a response, but on the other hand do not want to go so far that the conflict would escalate into a full-fledged war, particularly by striking Iran directly. They privately say they may have no choice, however, if American troops are killed. That is a red line that has not been crossed, but if the Iranian-backed militias ever have a day of better aim or better luck, it easily could be.

“The administration confronts a problem without a risk-free solution,” said Aaron David Miller, a longtime Middle East peace negotiator now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “They don’t want to strike Iran directly for fear of escalation, which only widens the margin for pro-Iranian groups, including the Houthis, to strike at U.S. forces. At some point, if U.S. forces are killed, they’ll have no alternative but to respond directly against Iranian assets.”

While there have been no known American fatalities from enemy fire since Oct. 7, two Navy SEALs went missing this month during a nighttime commando raid on a boat carrying Iranian-made ballistic-missile and cruise-missile components to the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. On Sunday, U.S. Central Command said that the SEALs had died and it had ended its search. One of the SEALs slipped off a boarding ladder or was swept off by a high wave, while the other jumped in to try to save him, according to news reports.

Critics of Mr. Biden have complained that he has been too passive, even after the United States launched six airstrikes in 10 days against Houthi forces. The Houthis have been attacking merchant and military vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in what they call retaliation for Israel’s military operations against Hamas in Gaza.

The critics contend that Mr. Biden has emboldened Iran by not acting more firmly, not just since Oct. 7 but also through his whole administration. Mr. Biden has unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a new agreement with Iran that would restrain its nuclear weapons program, and he facilitated the release of frozen Iranian assets in exchange for the release of Americans held prisoner.

Senator Tom Cotton, Republican of Arkansas, derided the American operations against the Houthis as “very limited pinprick strikes against a bunch of goat herders in Yemen” and asserted that Mr. Biden had not moved strongly enough to deter Iran. “Joe Biden’s weakness and indecision and half measures have failed totally to protect Americans,” he said on the Hugh Hewitt radio show last week.

The White House has rejected the argument that Mr. Biden has been too soft on Iran, pointing to sanctions that his administration has imposed on 500 individuals, companies or government entities. “There’s been a lot of effort here to hold Iran accountable for their destabilizing activities,” John F. Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said on Friday.

Image

John F. Kirby, a National Security Council spokesman, defended the administration’s response to Iran on Friday.Credit...Bonnie Cash for The New York Time

There are so many brush fires and so many players with matches in the region that it is not hard to imagine the conflict deteriorating into something even deadlier. Israel continues to hammer Hamas in Gaza while exchanging fire across the Lebanese border with Hezbollah, taking on two groups backed by Iran, even as American troops fight with Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria. Iran blamed Israel for an airstrike on Damascus, Syria, on Saturday that killed five Iranian military figures. Iran for its part has fired missiles into Iraq, Syria and Pakistan, prompting Pakistan to mount its own airstrike against Iran.

Mr. Biden’s team is trying to manage all those flashpoints at the same time it is trying to find a way to press Israel to scale back its war against Hamas to a more surgical operation with fewer civilian casualties. So far, according to Gaza health officials, more than 25,000 people have been killed, some of them Hamas combatants but most of them women and children.

A senior Biden administration official was leaving for the region on Sunday to seek a new agreement between Israel and Hamas to release some or all of the 120 hostages still believed to be held in exchange for at least a pause in the fighting, according to two American officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities.

The official, Brett McGurk, the president’s Middle East coordinator, planned to travel to Cairo to meet with Abbas Kamel, the chief of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service and widely considered the nation’s second-most-powerful official. As part of the trip, previously reported by Axios, Mr. McGurk will also head to Doha, Qatar, to meet with the country’s prime minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani.

At the same time, administration officials said they were worried the conflict in the region might be getting worse, not better.

“We have to guard against and be vigilant against the possibility that, in fact, rather than heading towards de-escalation, we are on a path of escalation that we have to manage,” Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, said last week during an appearance at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

“It remains a central locus of our strategy,” he added. “Try to ensure that we manage escalation across the Middle East to the maximum extent possible, taking every possible measure that we can in that regard, and ultimately get on a path of diplomacy and de-escalation.”

Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent for The Times. He has covered the last five presidents and sometimes writes analytical pieces that place presidents and their administrations in a larger context and historical framework. More about Peter Baker

11. Extended CR handcuffs federal agency 2024 hiring plans, new contracts

Extended CR handcuffs federal agency 2024 hiring plans, new contracts

federaltimes.com · by Molly Weisner · January 19, 2024

In a flurry of activity yesterday on Capitol Hill that had nothing to do with the snowfall, Congress avoided a government shutdown for the third time in recent months by passing another short-term funding measure to keep federal operations open for a few more weeks.

The good news is that no federal employees or service members will receive furlough notices come Saturday. The bad news is that there is still no fiscal 2024 budget in place a quarter of the way through the year, and agencies are in a rinse-and-repeat cycle of prepping for a shutdown and then being yanked off the ledge by a continuing resolution. Congress previously passed continuing resolutions on Sept. 30 and Nov. 17. The House sent the measure to the President’s desk Thursday evening.

And while a CR keeps the lights on with money locked in at fiscal 2023 levels, the budget gambit means that no new spending initiatives can proceed. Effects on agencies largely depend on how they’re funded. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs was able to give HR employees at 15% raise starting today thanks to independent funding under the PACT Act. Other agencies that need annual appropriations may not have much wiggle room after they implemented the President’s mandated 5.2% pay raise. Some have been unable to extend offers to new hires, even if there’s a position to be filled.

“While we commend Congress for working together to avert a government shutdown, this must be the last stopgap measure for this fiscal year,” said Max Stier, president and CEO of the Partnership for Public Service, in a statement. “Repeated last-minute, short-term agreements are no way to fund our government or serve the public interest.”

The funding deadlines have been extended to March 1 and March 8. The structure of the two-step continuing resolution, which was devised by Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson in November, has been preserved, meaning upon expiration, some agencies could shut down, while others could remain open.

Funds for the departments of Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Energy, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development would run out first, along with certain parts of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and military construction. Everyone else — including the department of Defense and State — would be next.

It’s not clear why agencies are grouped together in the first tranche, but perhaps it’s because they fund programs, like veterans issues and transportation safety, that seemed more likely to get bipartisan support first.

“I think the choice of bedfellows was based on work that the Senate had already done that would probably be acceptable to the House,” said Tori Gorman, policy director for the Concord Coalition, a nonpartisan organization educating the public about federal budget issues.

In the end, though, policy riders about the abortion pill, Mifepristone, in the Agriculture-Food and Drug Administration bill and climate initiatives in the transportation bill have prolonged debate anyway.

Agencies have repeatedly said that while a shutdown is disruptive, so too is constantly having to prepare to initiate a lapse plan that never materializes.

“It does put handcuffs on agencies in terms of spending money, which I guess is kind of the plan to really cut government spending and reduce the size of government, and that’s what the GOP is running on, in part,” said John Mahoney, a federal employment attorney at the Law Firm of John P. Mahoney.

Government shutdowns become more lengthy, costly, history shows

For those who remember, there was a time when shutdowns spanned less than a week, sometimes just a few hours, if they even happened at all.

Before the CR passed, lawmakers made some progress in agreeing to topline appropriations levels that would set up negotiations on each of the 12 appropriations bills in the coming weeks. The deal sets non-defense spending at $772 billion and $886 billion for defense.

Additionally, the longer the government goes without a budget, the closer it gets to deadlines this year and next imposed by the debt limit deal.

The Fiscal Responsibility Act penalizes the government for not having enacted appropriations bills by January and reduces funding levels by 1% come May. A similar timeline applies for 2025.

“Republicans negotiated these same levels with the White House last June, but they immediately went back on their word because MAGA extremists demanded drastic funding cuts and extreme social policy riders,” said Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., ranking member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. “After seven wasted months, enough is enough.”

The odds of going a full year under a CR are not zero.

It is possible for short-term budgets to fund all discretionary functions for a year, according to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Even though Congress has a constitutional requirement to pass a budget, there’s no “budget jail” to really enforce that, said Gorman.

“Negotiating the top line numbers, from where I sit, that’s low hanging fruit,” said Gorman.

The labor-intensive work really begins with negotiating spending caps on each of the appropriations bills, called 302(b) allocations, and agreeing on what policy riders are adopted, she said.

“Some of these things can’t be negotiated at the staff level,” Gorman added.

The House has 12 in-session days between Friday and the first March deadline. The Senate has 17 after breaking for two weeks in February.

On only six of those days will both chambers be in session together.

About Molly Weisner

Molly Weisner is a staff reporter for Federal Times where she covers labor, policy and contracting pertaining to the government workforce. She made previous stops at USA Today and McClatchy as a digital producer, and worked at The New York Times as a copy editor. Molly majored in journalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

12. In first, UK test fires $13-per-strike DragonFire laser weapon against ‘aerial targets’

Excerpts:

Despite the innovation lab not disclosing which targets were specifically hit during the trials, London’s Times newspaper reported that DragonFire engaged “drones from several positions miles away.” It also claimed Dstl scientists have forecast the weapon could be operational off a Royal Navy ship within five years.

The Dstl statement does confirm an ambition for DragonFire to advance to an operational environment, though no timeline is mentioned.

...

A MoD spokesperson told Breaking Defense that no ship has been selected to host the weapon “at this point of the trials,” but “it’s possible the laser would be in service before the end of the decade.”

Dstl said that the laser has an operating cost “typically less than £10 ($13) per shot” and is designed as a line-of-sight system, with a classified range. As the weapon purportedly also offers “pinpoint accuracy” it could be used in the future to provide the UK with more precise targeting than other weapons, while cutting down on expensive ammunition.

“DragonFire exploits UK technology to be able to deliver a high power laser over long ranges,” added Dstl. “The precision required is equivalent to hitting a £1 coin from a kilometre away.”

In first, UK test fires $13-per-strike DragonFire laser weapon against ‘aerial targets’ - Breaking Defense

The UK lauded the test of the laser air defense weapon, developed by Britain’s defense innovation unit, just weeks after an American admiral said it was time to be more "intellectually honnest" about what the class of weapons can do.

breakingdefense.com · by Tim Martin · January 19, 2024

The UK has test fired the DragonFire high energy laser weapon against ‘aerial targets’ for the first time (UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory)

BELFAST — A high energy laser, estimated to cost less than £10 ($13) a shot, has hit airborne targets at a test range in northwest Scotland, the first time the UK said it has achieved such a firing.

Developed by Britain’s defense innovation unit, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), and with industry partners Leonardo, MBDA and QinetiQ, the DragonFire laser directed energy weapon (LDEW) trial held at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Hebrides test range, saw the system successfully execute a “high-power firing” that engaged “aerial targets,” according to a DSTL statement published today.

Despite the innovation lab not disclosing which targets were specifically hit during the trials, London’s Times newspaper reported that DragonFire engaged “drones from several positions miles away.” It also claimed Dstl scientists have forecast the weapon could be operational off a Royal Navy ship within five years.

The Dstl statement does confirm an ambition for DragonFire to advance to an operational environment, though no timeline is mentioned.

“Building on this research, the MOD recently announced its intention to fund a multi-million-pound programme to transition the technology from the research environment to the battlefield,” added the innovation lab.

A MoD spokesperson told Breaking Defense that no ship has been selected to host the weapon “at this point of the trials,” but “it’s possible the laser would be in service before the end of the decade.”

Dstl said that the laser has an operating cost “typically less than £10 ($13) per shot” and is designed as a line-of-sight system, with a classified range. As the weapon purportedly also offers “pinpoint accuracy” it could be used in the future to provide the UK with more precise targeting than other weapons, while cutting down on expensive ammunition.

“DragonFire exploits UK technology to be able to deliver a high power laser over long ranges,” added Dstl. “The precision required is equivalent to hitting a £1 coin from a kilometre away.”

The latest trial, builds on previous testing which included a “first static high-power laser firing” by the UK. The £100 million DragonFire program, first launched in 2017, is jointly funded by the MoD and industry. MBDA provide the laser weapon’s command and control and target tracking systems, Leonardo makes the advanced beam director and optics with QinetiQ contributing the precision laser source.

The High cost of naval-based missiles have been on display in the Red Sea recently like when the UK’s HMS Diamond Type 45 destroyer, the USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, US destroyers and F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets repelled a barrage of 18 drones, two anti-ship cruise missiles and a single anti-ship ballistic missile, per The Times.

The British destroyer used Sea Viper missiles, estimated to cost more than £1 million ($1.3 million) per unit to hit several of the incoming targets. The relatively cheap costs of drones makes for a huge disparity between conventional weapons destroying swarms, and militaries the world over have been eyeing laser weapons as a way to take on such a role at a fraction of the cost.

LDEW technology projects typically have long research and development phases largely because, from an engineering perspective, sustaining power and beam stability required to stay on a target and destroy it at range, is considered highly difficult. A moving target poses an even greater challenge.

US Navy Rear Adm. Fred Pyle, Director of the Surface Warfare Division or ‘N96’ and responsible for managing the service’s laser technology weapon efforts, said earlier this month that the US Navy and industry should be more “intellectually honest” with one another about capabilities of laser systems, whilst criticising a “tendency to over promise and under deliver.”

He stressed continued invest by the Navy in directed energy capabilities, acknowledging the technical issues at hand, saying, “It requires space, weight, power and cooling, which can be a challenge on our current surface combatants.”

The US looks to be a step ahead of the UK on the road to achieving entry to service with a naval-based high-energy laser as the Navy and Lockheed Martin have partnered to install the manufacturer’s High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) on the guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88).

13. War is Boyish and Fought by Boys

I am not sure the headline editor chose the right headline.

We should really think hard about this excerpt. How do we eliminate the weakness while protecting our strength?

While this is a book review of a number of books we should really focus and reflect on John Waters entire first paragraph.

Excerpt:

Author Robert Kaplan once shared with me what he believes is the military's greatest weakness: “The general officer corps is sometimes asked to be strategic and understand the world beyond their capability. They are creatures of systems and lack the imagination to truly understand the world.” To the credit of those senior-most leaders, our noncommissioned officer corps is among the best in history.

War is Boyish and Fought by Boys

By John Waters

January 20, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/20/war_is_boyish_and_fought_by_boys_1006227.html

Author Robert Kaplan once shared with me what he believes is the military's greatest weakness: “The general officer corps is sometimes asked to be strategic and understand the world beyond their capability. They are creatures of systems and lack the imagination to truly understand the world.” To the credit of those senior-most leaders, our noncommissioned officer corps is among the best in history. Corporals, sergeants and petty officers have led, bled and persevered time and again, deploying relentlessly to combat zones around the world. Officers deserve credit for promoting the best junior enlisted leaders and extending the trust necessary for intrepid, twentysomething-year-olds to lead squads and teams into harm’s way. In “small wars” such as Iraq and Afghanistan, nearly all the glory belongs to these “small unit” leaders. But their senior officers failed to see through the mystery and marketing, to stop deceiving themselves about effects achieved on backwater battlefields, to stop talking about the number of patrols conducted or IEDs found or raids performed and to ask inconvenient questions about whether it mattered. For years, countless military officers advised that one more year, one more operation, one more raid could be the turning point, redeeming the sacrifices made by thousands of young Americans and their Afghan partners. One lesson of our recent small wars is that all civilians—members of Congress, journalists and everyday Americans, too—ought to tighten the reins.

In his insightful new book, The Hollow Crown: Shakespeare on How Leaders Rise, Rule, and Fall (Basic Books), military historian Eliot A. Cohen examines power through the characters of Shakespeare’s plays. More than a few of the plays selected feature military generals, including the late tragedy Coriolanus about a fatally flawed Roman general who achieved success on the battlefield but failed to comprehend, let alone navigate, the slippery turns of the world. Pride, writes Cohen, was his downfall. Coriolanus “has a boy’s pride, a boy’s lack of judgment, a boy’s soaring self-image, a boy’s generosity, and a boy’s foolish self-absorption.” But Coriolanus’s boyishness is not unique. Quoting Herman Melville’s poem “The March into Virginia,” Cohen reminds us that all wars are boyish and fought by boys: “the champions and enthusiasts of the state.” What follows is part one of our conversation on Shakespeare, power and the skills missing in the great military leader who attempts to exercise political power. Part two will appear next week.

How do we get our hands on power? Inherit it, acquire it, seize it. Your chapter on acquiring power demonstrates how the people we find most appealing can be the most deceptive, too.

I think that’s true in the case of Henry V, who I find fascinating but also loathsome. Shakespeare plays it such that people who watch the play tend to fall in love with Henry V. But you lay out the evidence and you find that he’s a manipulator, an egotist, a deceiver.

“Being a deceiver” is true of most who acquire power, not just warrior-king Henry V, right?

There is an element of artifice or manipulation or contrivance in acquiring power as opposed to when you’re either the son of the king or picked by the king to inherit power. The larger point is that even inheriting is never enough; you have to earn power once you’ve got it. You’ll find this to be true when you look at any executive—hanging onto power will be as much of a challenge as acquiring it.

Battle of Agincourt

Telegraph

Henry V’s father Henry Bolingbroke (King Henry IV) “distorts reality.” You note that Bolingbroke has an unlimited capacity for violence but presents himself as calm and cool. This trick helps him claim the throne. What is the difference between Henry IV and Henry V?

Bolingbroke is deceptive but unlike his son, Henry V, who is better at deceiving then he is, Bolingbroke’s deception usually consists of not saying much or being in the background or making a simple gesture to look better than he really is. Bolingbroke orders the killing of King Richard II but then, in public, says he feels terrible and turns on the guy who did the deed. But what he doesn’t do is portray himself as someone other than who he truly is. It’s a kind of deception, but not the thorough-going variety.

Henry V, meanwhile, becomes different people depending on what he wants. He plays the humble, honorable soldier when he wants to seduce the French princess, Catherine. He plays one of the boys when he wants to win the Battle of Agincourt, though his previous soliloquy reveals Henry V doesn’t believe he has anything in common with foot soldiers. Remember that because he had such limited performance range, Henry IV was never able to secure the crown in a comfortable way; he was constantly worried about traitors and rebellion. Henry IV worried constantly about challenges, including from his own son. Henry V has the political gift to talk in a different way than the way he really talks, and you see it in that creepy scene where he seduces Catherine, or how he talks to his old friend Falstaff. He’s a true chameleon.

How rare in politics is that chameleon quality?

There’s plenty of people who can lie or be deceptive but play a different personality? That’s much more difficult. I cannot think of anyone who immediately comes to mind in modern American politics who shares that capacity. Going back into history, Teddy Roosevelt could talk science to scientists, philosophy to philosophers, and ranching to cowboys; that was a real gift. In TR’s case, I think it was much more sincere than Henry V, and that accounts for his astonishing popularity. Churchill had a similar gift. He gave speeches so thoughtful that they inspired Harold Nicholson, an intellectual and sophisticate, and at the same time roused common people. Churchill could do that in the same speech; it’s no accident that he was steeped in Shakespeare.

Roman General Coriolanus was someone who could not speak to multiple audiences.

No.

Coriolanus comes from the life of Roman general Caius Marcius Coriolanus, a hero who leads an army to protect Rome only to be banished after he fails to gain support from Rome’s plebeians. Later, he is killed by his own allies after leading a Volscian army against Rome. Why was Coriolanus unwilling to receive the adulation of Rome’s common folk?

What you see in this play is a one-dimensional leader, extraordinarily inspiring for people who are soldiers or want to be soldiers but without any of the other political gifts. He has a terrible temper. He doesn’t know how to speak in a convincing way to the plebeians, though he can be quite eloquent. He is awful at controlling his temper. When he decides to bring peace between Corioles and Rome, he’s regarded as a traitor by his new friends and is killed by them.

Coriolanus

2012

He was an excellent leader in the military sense of the word, but he lacked the versatility—the qualities of deception—to acquire political power. The people want to gawk, to see the scars of battle worn by the great Coriolanus. But he refuses to show them his scars. Why?

Coriolanus views this as disgraceful, to show off his wounds. “I had rather have my wounds to heal again / Than hear say how I got them,” is what he says in Act 2, scene 2. It goes to his sense of honor. He feels that it would make it look like he had done this just to be rewarded for his service, when he views his service as his own reward.

He’s like a boy. And “like a boy he is astonished and outraged by craftiness and duplicity.”

In this way, Coriolanus is done in by his own sense of honor. “Better it is to die, better to starve, / Than crave the hire which first we do deserve,” is how he expresses this feeling. “Why custom wills, in all things should we do’t, / The dust on antique time would lie unswept, / And mountainous error be too highly heapt / For truth to o’er-peer. Rather than fool it so, / Let the high office and the honour go / To one that would do thus.” I think he feels as many veterans do that whatever suffering he endures is private and that it’s an intrusion into a private, precious piece of themselves that is completely unwarranted and disgraceful. The reaction of my veterans in the class was very strong.

Ultimately, Coriolanus failed to navigate the “slippery turns.” There’s a quotation in your book from Ariel Sharon, the Israeli general-turned-politician who navigated those turns quite well. As a war veteran and military leader entering the world of politics, he said:

The same person enters the political world and finds that he has one mouth to speak with and one hand to vote with, exactly like the man sitting next to him. And that man perhaps has never witnessed or experienced anything profound or anything dramatic in his life. He does not know either the heights or the depths. He has never tested himself or made crucial decisions or taken responsibility for his life or the lives of his fellows. And this man—it seems incredible—but this man too has one mouth and one hand.

"The Hollow Crown"

By Eliot A. Cohen

Yes, there’s a parallel passage in Charles de Gaulle’s book The Edge of the Sword. He’s saying that these are very different worlds, politics and military. Coriolanus reminds us of the truth that different forms of excellence in leadership are often not fungible. It’s a dimension of our civil-military relations that being in the military for 30 years will mold you like the academy or the Catholic Church. You get a certain set of experiences or certain outlook and that makes it difficult to relate to people from a different domain. Shakespeare’s characters are each one distinct and different, and he teaches us to look carefully at people. He doesn’t deal in stereotypes but in individuals.

John J. Waters is the author of the postwar novel River City One (Simon and Schuster), and a former deputy assistant secretary of homeland security.

14. Empty Promises? A Year Inside the World of Multi-Domain Operations

Excerpts:

All this means that armed services should be prepared to pivot their efforts from the “thinkers” to the “doers” at training centers and better refine the actual feedback mechanisms between new ideas and the needs and realities of battlefield experience. Concept development should be informed by insights distilled from ongoing wars, as well as from exercises and experimentation within joint forces. It should also seek to articulate theories of success against specific adversaries. Finally, the effective implementation of multi-domain operations depends on the availability of mature technologies, in sufficient numbers, deployed by trained and ready forces.

...

In conclusion, are the promises of multi-domain operations empty? Not necessarily. By the criteria identified above, the Chinese approach actually appears quite robust. It has a clear enemy, a theory of success, seemingly clearer inter-service and political-military relations, and is based on existing military capabilities. Regrettably, Western military organizations cannot say the same. They have their work cut out for them to make sure that multi-domain operations delivers on its many promises.

Empty Promises? A Year Inside the World of Multi-Domain Operations - War on the Rocks

DAVIS ELLISON AND TIM SWEIJS

warontherocks.com · by Davis Ellison · January 22, 2024

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2023 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China report noted a 2021 “core military concept” in China centered on multi-domain precision warfare. The concept is “intended to leverage a [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.”

Sound familiar? It should. It is nearly an exact mirror image of multi-domain operations, the warfighting concept initially developed by the U.S. Army since at least 2015 that has since been copied across NATO. Despite its faddishness, or perhaps because of it, the multi-domain operations concept is now guiding the transformation and modernization of Western armed forces and of their peers. Yet, there are real concerns about whether multi-domain operations will mature into a fully functional warfighting concept or whether it will go by the wayside like effect-based operations in the past.

For nearly a year, we visited some of the main centers for thinking on multi-domain operations. We sat with planners in the Pentagon, officers in the German and Dutch army headquarters, strategists from the Israel Defense Forces, and experts and operators from France, Denmark, and NATO. One of us even worked on the NATO concept once upon a time. We appraised the state of multi-domain operations development with a primary question in mind: Will it actually help to win wars? If so, how?

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What we found is that there are few clear answers to these questions. New concepts are often highly optimistic, uncoordinated with other services and allies, and lack any clear theory of success. A warfighting concept is a description in general terms of the application of military art and science within a defined set of parameters. For many contemporary concepts, what has stood out is a mish-mash of ideas, visions, and terms that often have little to do with one another. For some, multi-domain operations is just another step in another revolution in military affairs, with images of missiles and satellites and networks all linked up to destroy an enemy. For others, it is a call for new energy to be put into whole-of-government style integration that can deter everything, everywhere, all of the time.

Far more important is the impact this thinking has on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces in the field have been forced to toss out the maneuver-centric concepts taught to them by their NATO trainers as they have fought to overcome Russian defensive lines. Israeli forces were caught out by a massive surprise attack by Hamas, despite Gaza being perhaps the most heavily surveilled area on the planet, and the war in Gaza has already ground into intense urban combat, contrary to the expectations of the Israeli multi-domain concept. Claims to be able to see all, move quickly, and strike anywhere in order to rapidly resolve a conflict with minimum civilian impact are once again being challenged. Maneuver-centered, multi-domain operations style thinking seems to be making empty promises.

All this means that armed services should be prepared to pivot their efforts from the “thinkers” to the “doers” at training centers and better refine the actual feedback mechanisms between new ideas and the needs and realities of battlefield experience. Concept development should be informed by insights distilled from ongoing wars, as well as from exercises and experimentation within joint forces. It should also seek to articulate theories of success against specific adversaries. Finally, the effective implementation of multi-domain operations depends on the availability of mature technologies, in sufficient numbers, deployed by trained and ready forces.

What Makes a Good Warfighting Concept

In the past, warfighting concepts have helped military organizations win wars. The development of combined arms warfare during World War I and the embrace of mechanization ahead of World War II are archetypes of this success. AirLand Battle (Follow-On Forces Attack in NATO parlance), developed in the 1980s as part of the U.S. Army’s post-Vietnam transformation, set the conceptual stage for the lopsided Gulf War victory. The centrality of precision-guided airpower across warfighting concepts would seemingly be proved again over Kosovo in 1999.

For the joint warfighting concepts above to be successfully adopted and implemented, a number of factors needed to be in place. A shared understanding across services and allies with aligned incentive structures contributed to the concepts’ actual formal adoption. Military officers enlisted the support of civilian leaders. In the cases above, clear threats focused the concepts on actual operational challenges, rather than theoretical ones. This then allowed for the articulation of a theory of success that spelled out defeat mechanisms that actually made a testable argument, which then drove exercise programs. The technology was sufficiently mature and available in sufficient numbers.

Our research has revealed a gloomy picture for the state of multi-domain operations development in NATO countries and some of their closest partners. Few of the conditions listed above are in place in the cases we studied, creating real risks that new concepts overpromise, underdeliver, and distract vital attention away from solving concrete strategic and operational challenges.

Babylonian Confusion

Multi-domain operations concept development has lacked clarity and worsened confusion across multinational efforts. Across the cases we studied, there was a wide variation of terms and meanings. “Multi-domain” is followed by a range of terms, chiefly “operations” (Denmark, NATO, and the United States), “integration” (the United Kingdom), “maneuver” (Israel) and “deterrence” (Taiwan). Multimilieux/multichamps is the French term, while Germany references Multidimensionalität. “Domain” and “dimension” often take on different meanings, with some (Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, and the United States) referring explicitly and only to the five military domains (air, sea, land, cyber, space), while others (the United Kingdom and Taiwan) understand the term more broadly to possibly include other government functions. This gallery of terms becomes even more complex outside of English, where the terms “domain” and “dimension” are sometimes used interchangeably, such as in German and Hebrew.

Even within individual concepts, language and even images confound as much as explain. Take the case of the U.K. Multi-Domain Integration Joint Concept Note, and the image below taken from it.

Figure 1. Image Source

The concept’s working definition of multi-domain integration is:

The posturing of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power, allies and partners; configured to sense, understand and orchestrate effects at the optimal tempo, across the operational domains and levels of warfare.

So the concept is simultaneously strategic, operational, and tactical, encompasses nearly all state functions, and is highly dependent on exploiting a “window of opportunity.” This is classic “buzzword bingo,” and actually makes it less easy to understand the concept. Ambiguous and vague language, filled with generalities, is quite likely the result of significant bureaucratic compromise. Form, in other words, trumps substance.

Poor Regime Fit

In many cases, the multi-domain operations concept does not sit well within existing political and military structures. This is particularly the case when a new concept seems to put the military or defense in a leading or coordinating role for other ministries or departments. The British concept, which carries an implicit centrality for the military in a coordination role for all security affairs, has been at odds with the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office and Parliament. The concept is then less digestible within the British political-military system as it proposes an outsized role for defense.

In the U.S. case, inter-service rivalry has been particularly strong and has had a direct impact on efforts to institutionalize multi-domain operations across the whole joint force. The U.S. Army and Air Force led competing development efforts, while the Navy and Marine Corps developed their own service-specific approaches that focused very narrowly on the Western Pacific. Importantly, differing service processes in training, budgeting, and procurement hinder joint efforts by locking implementation into service-specific channels.

At the lowest level, within the services themselves, tensions can be found as well. For many countries pursuing multi-domain operations, namely the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Israel, the army division has been envisaged as the most appropriate echelon within which to locate it. However, this has not been consistent across cases. Both the United States and Israel have multi-domain units (the U.S. Multi-Domain Task Force and the Israeli Ghost unit) that sit at different levels. In the U.S. case it is effectively a series of theatre-level missile brigades (based in both Europe and the Pacific), and in the Israeli case it is an experimental special forces battalion. Who “does” multi-domain operations remains contentious in Israel in keeping with the long-running rivalry within the army between the airborne and armored corps.

There is dissonance between and within each of these three levels. Concepts stressing a “whole-of-government” type approach risk civil-military tension over command, while those that emphasize precision-strike systems risk inter-service rivalries over who owns these new capabilities or who leads in command. And while these are, largely, peacetime debates, tensions have persisted in wartime, making them all the more crucial to understand.

Technological Immaturity

Much of the technological emphasis in multi-domain operations concepts is on speed: speed in communication, speed in action, and speed in movement. From a certain perspective, positing that war can be resolved early and quickly, this makes perfect sense. Another view, however, is that constantly pushing for speed ignores tempo, and that operations can spin out of control of both commanders and political leaders. Additionally, linking tactical and operational speed to strategic outcomes is itself an unproven assumption. Alongside this is the simple material fact that many of these game-changing capabilities just are not there yet. This is especially true for European forces that continue to face significant shortages in these capabilities.

Most concepts fall prey to this technological overconfidence, particularly in the field of communications. Assured connectivity in combat is central to nearly all multi-domain operations work. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and NATO all place some style of next-generation command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the core of their concept, assuming an assured availability of strong networks in the relatively near future. In reality, and despite a significant amount of attention in recent years, the level of assured connectivity upon which much multi-domain operations thought is predicated is far from realistic. Given that Russian, Chinese, and Iranian forces have invested heavily in electronic warfare capabilities and degrading their opponent’s battlefield connectivity over the past decades, this remains a blind spot. That a significant amount of conceptual and even higher strategic-level work is being done on the assumption of technological maturity is a serious flaw in the current generation of efforts.

There is little reason to assume that the speed and decisiveness imagined by multi-domain operations concepts is technologically feasible or leads to the outcomes desired. High-level efforts in recent years such as the U.S. Joint All-Domain Command and Control system have yet to take major steps. This hubris poses a risk that continues to pervade thinking on the Western way of warfare.

Vague Threats

It seems self-evident that a military concept should designate a specific adversary. If the envisaged result is to compel an enemy to do your will, it makes sense that the adversary and the threat it poses is explicitly taken into account. Many concepts, however, fail to single out adversaries and offer only the vaguest threat descriptions. Though the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Denmark are implicitly focused on Russia and NATO’s eastern front, this does not translate into detailed threat descriptions based on enemy approaches. NATO itself is aided in its specificity in that the alliance, through its 2022 Strategic Concept, has two threats that it has agreed to identify: Russia and terrorist organizations. For the United States this is arguably more challenging as its efforts must span global interests. The U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations concept is implicitly designed around both a Baltic and Taiwan scenario, implicitly identifying the main problem as ensuring maneuverability in a missile-dominated environment.

For countries that still face very direct threats at their borders, such as Israel, Taiwan, or South Korea, this is not a problem. Their concepts identify adversaries and contain clear threat descriptions. The major NATO states do not, which poses a problem from both a strategy-making and defense-planning perspective.

No Theory of Success

Very few of the countries explicitly formulate a theory of success. Only France, Israel, and Taiwan make a tentative causal case for how the new approaches envisioned within their respective multi-domain operations concepts will lead to defeating an opponent.

In practice, such an argument could look like: “IF NATO forces adopt a multi-domain operations approach that incorporates long-range precision fires alongside forward defensive systems, THEN these forces can effectively defeat a Russian attack along the eastern front, BECAUSE these divisions can effectively target rear-echelon targets while blunting assaults by frontline Russian units.”

What appears in the hypothetical above is a defeat mechanism. Described by Eado Hecht, a leading Israeli military analyst, these mechanisms describe the various processes that cause the damage that is intended to defeat an enemy. Such a mechanism can be rigorously tested, falsified, and refined at training centers.

Naturally, any fully developed theory is imperfect. There is nothing guaranteeing that the NATO example above would work (and in Ukraine, evidence suggests it wouldn’t). However, it can be tested in joint exercises, tried in simulations, and measured against observations from contemporary conflicts so that it can be improved and reapplied.

Opaque Risks

A key element that is often missed in new warfighting concepts, and indeed in many assessments of them, is the inherent risk in adopting a new approach. Each new concept involves implicit trade-offs that carry risks. By prioritizing one or another threat, selecting specific capabilities, or proposing new organizational structures, choices are made whose drawbacks are rarely made explicit. At present, none of the cases we studied assesses risks in the way described above. If risk is noted, it is only to argue for the risks if the respective concept is not implemented and funded, a calculation as influenced by bureaucratic considerations as it is by threat perceptions.

There are at least four risks that stem from an uncritical approach to developing multi-domain operation-type concepts: the possibility for commanders to become overloaded by an overly broad span of control; an over-reliance on connectivity; a mechanistic, over-engineered approach that becomes top heavy; and the assumption that the whole is ultimately more than the sum of its parts. Each has and will continue to derail new work if unaddressed.

The Way Ahead

Spending a year with multi-domain operations operators and strategists, we fear that it risks remaining a fashionable idea that is not implemented at scale. The “why” but especially the “how” of multi-domain operations simply does not have a clear or entirely convincing argument. This is not to say it is impossible to improve prevailing concepts going forward, but the current trajectory is not promising. With this in mind, we offer several recommendations.

First, shift from what Buzz Philips calls the “thinkers” to the “doers,” without severing the ties. It is almost impossible to test, invalidate, and revisit ideas if they are not being experimented with. For multi-domain operations to progress, it needs to leave the staff office and go to the training center.

Second, stop trying to make war “not war” by being overly clever. New concepts cannot erase attrition from the battlefield or lift the fog of war. Attempts to do so are quixotic at best. Focus on concrete operational problems and build solutions from there.

Third, be specific about adversaries and articulate how multi-domain operations can help defeat them. Task strategists to formulate defeat mechanisms that make clear, causal claims about how a new idea will resolve a tangible military problem posed by enemy forces. Practice these in wargames, simulations, and exercises at the national and the international level.

Fourth, continue to align efforts within NATO and within allies’ forces on terms and core ideas. New concepts, particularly for smaller and middle powers, should be multinational by design and language and concepts should be aligned.

Finally, consider the availability of the technologies that are at the core of visions of multi-domain operations. Draw up roadmaps for these technologies with direct links to different force mixtures. Recognize that capacity is just as much if not more important than qualitative capability. Quantity is a quality. Mass cannot be effectively substituted, certainly not in wars of attrition.

In conclusion, are the promises of multi-domain operations empty? Not necessarily. By the criteria identified above, the Chinese approach actually appears quite robust. It has a clear enemy, a theory of success, seemingly clearer inter-service and political-military relations, and is based on existing military capabilities. Regrettably, Western military organizations cannot say the same. They have their work cut out for them to make sure that multi-domain operations delivers on its many promises.

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Davis Ellison is a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Ph.D. candidate in the King’s College London Department of War Studies.

Tim Sweijs is the research director at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a senior research fellow at the Netherlands’ War Studies Research Centre.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Davis Ellison · January 22, 2024

15. War Books: Understanding WMD

Few people in the national security community offer us as much clarity of thought about WMD than Al Mauroni.

War Books: Understanding WMD - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Al Mauroni · January 19, 2024

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Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We invite a participant to recommend five books and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

This week’s installment of War Books, originally published in 2019, features a set of books on weapons of mass destruction recommended by Al Mauroni, director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the U.S. Government’s Policy.

When looking for books on the general category of weapons of mass destruction, there’s not a lot of original, insightful literature. Much of it is technically focused on describing the dangerous nature of chemical and biological warfare agents or the historical use of said weapons in the past. Books specifically discussing nuclear weapons or the general discussion of arms control and deterrence are much more numerous, largely due to our fascination with the tremendously devastating effect that they can have. But books on how to develop policy to counter adversaries with chemical and biological weapons, not so much. In part, my desire to write books on the policy aspects of chemical and biological weapons came from what I saw as a deficit in our national security literature. That said, there are a few fundamental texts that I would strongly recommend.

Seth Carus, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”

One of the great challenges of our WMD policy is the failure to adequately define exactly what “weapons of mass destruction” are. There is a great deal of debate on the proper legal, military, and diplomatic definition. The original definition created by the United Nations in 1948 to address the new class of weapons was good enough for the Cold War, but after Aum Shinrikyo’s use of nerve agent in Tokyo’s subway in 1995, that changed. The threats of CBRN terrorism, pandemic disease outbreaks, and radiological incidents caused policy makers to use “WMD” in different forms. Carus explains how these six different definitions have implications in their use within the national security enterprise. This is an absolute “must read” for everyone, whether in the WMD community or in the larger defense establishment.

L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud

L. F. Haber is the son of Fritz Haber, the famous scientist who initiated Germany’s chemical weapons program in 1915 with his formulation of how to project a gas cloud against the enemy trenches using cylinders of chlorine. Most books cover the tactical use of chemical weapons in World War I either from a moral aspect or as a novelty. This book’s value is how Haber describes the relationship between the chemists who were formulating the weapons and defensive measures such as respirators and the soldiers who looked skeptically on this new form of warfare. Haber calls the use of chemicals in World War I a failure, even as the Germans led the development of new gas weapons, because the military never committed to the use of it, the execution of the program was “amateurish,” and the defensive measures were good enough to contain the threat. There are other books that cover the US and British programs during World War I, but none cover the German program in such depth.

Frederic Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints

This is an older book—published in 1968 when there was a slew of books critical of the US military’s chemical-biological weapons program—but it is an invaluable review of the development of US. defense policy on chemical weapons between 1915 and 1945. This book was instrumental in causing me to pursue a career as a defense policy analyst, due to its excellent review of the evolution of the US chemical weapons program and the debates held within US administrations over this timeframe. While the Cold War period saw a much greater pace of modernization for the US chemical-biological weapons program, this period remains the basis for how politicians and senior military leaders often view modern chemical warfare issues today. DoD policy views on chemical warfare topics have not matured as quickly as other technical areas in the defense world. Brown’s final chapter draws important differences in how the defense establishment viewed chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, a discussion that the term “WMD” often obscures.

Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program

Ken Alibek’s book Biohazard, released in 1999, offered a well-detailed discussion of the former Soviet Union’s biological warfare program and the views of senior Soviet officials during a time when the Soviet Union was supposed to be complying with the Biological Weapons Convention. Leitenberg and Zilinskas go much deeper past Alibek’s limited focus on Biopreparat into a thorough analysis of Russia’s past efforts in part based on interviews with another Russian defector, Vladimir Pasechnik. It would be impossible to cover all the topics addressed in this 700-page book, but suffice it to say, this is the ultimate source for understanding the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program and their perspective on arms control. The chapter on the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979 is particularly well-developed, more than most narratives in other sources.

Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al Qaeda

Jonathan Tucker was an outstanding researcher in the field of chemical weapons, and he died too soon in 2011 at the age of 56. His book War of Nerves was released in 2007, detailing a modern history of chemical warfare. The title is slightly misleading as the book was not focused on nerve agents and it does feature much more information about the US government’s program rather than other nations. Tucker’s narrative on the 1968 Dugway Proving Ground incident is unfortunately grounded in the popular narrative that the US military caused the sheep deaths (which I dispute in my own book). Other points of his book are decidedly not favorable to the US government, despite his access to government archives. But his research is top-notch and he does talk about the contemporary policy aspects facing US national security leaders. It may be the best historical review of chemical warfare in the past twenty years.

Al Mauroni is the director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the U.S. Government’s Policy.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or those of any institution the author is affiliated with, including the Air University and US Air Force.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Al Mauroni · January 19, 2024

16. Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War By Eric Schmidt

Excerpts:

Meanwhile, in both Europe and the United States, war fatigue is setting in and support for Ukraine is beginning to crack. Waning financial and military aid from the West could turn the conflict’s fragile stalemate into an opening for Russia. Russia has enough ammunition stocks and production lines to continue fighting for at least another year; Ukraine will need to secure additional Western ammunition supplies if it is to plan that far into the future. Ukraine also needs antiaircraft and attack missiles to strike fast-moving airborne targets. Recognizing that U.S. weapons that rely on GPS may not stand up well to Russian electronic warfare, Ukrainian startups are working around the clock to develop advanced drones that can resist spoofing and jamming. Only with more and better weapons systems—both offensive and defensive—can Ukraine turn the tide on the battlefield. Filling this gap in innovation and procurement will require sustained financial and technical support from Kyiv’s allies.

The prognosis could change with a decisive shift on the battlefield, but for now neither Russia nor Ukraine is expecting a swift end to the fighting. To avoid a protracted war, the West needs to back a concerted military effort to push back Russian forces and a diplomatic effort to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The alternative is years of further suffering for those in the war zone. While I was in Kyiv in December, ten Russian missiles were launched and intercepted by air defenses, including U.S.-supplied Patriot missiles, in the middle of the night. Fifty-two people in my neighborhood were injured by falling debris—including six children.

Ukrainians’ deep love for their country fuels their resilience and determination, even as they face constant reminders of the deadly reality of war. Putin is betting that internal divisions and divided attention will turn Western capitals away from the Ukrainians’ fight for survival as the conflict enters a difficult new phase. Only by neutralizing the advantages that Russia has gained can Ukraine and its allies prove him wrong.

Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War

How Kyiv Can Close the Innovation Gap With Russia

By Eric Schmidt

January 22, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Eric Schmidt · January 22, 2024

It’s winter in Ukraine again. The snow is piling up, the temperature is dropping, and the days are short. During the long nights, nearly two years into the full-scale war, the skies above the entire 600-mile frontline are filled with Ukrainian and Russian drones. In past centuries, the machinery of war would grind to a halt when harsh conditions pushed human endurance to its limits. The two most famous military campaigns in this part of the world—Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 and Hitler’s in 1941—succumbed to devastating casualties as the season changed. Today, the hapless infantry who still fill trenches and strongpoints across Ukraine are contending with the same unforgiving winter. But the drones that have come to dominate this war are limited only by their battery lives—shortened by the cold—and the availability of night-vision cameras.

In the early months of the war, the frontlines shifted rapidly as Ukrainian forces pushed back the Russian offensive. Ukraine held the upper hand in drone warfare, adapting commercial technologies and introducing new weapons to keep Russian forces on the back foot. Since October 2022, however, little territory has changed hands. The Ukrainian army has scored some recent wins, including precise attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet and on targets deep inside Russian territory. The Russian army, too, has faced headwinds, losing the equivalent of almost 90 percent of the soldiers and equipment it began the war with, according to some reports. But Russia has also adjusted its strategy, and the conflict is now moving in its favor. Moscow shifted its defense industry to a war footing, and current military spending is more than twice prewar levels. It has also launched thousands of drones—including the Iranian-designed Shahed model now assembled in both Iran and Russia—with new capabilities to target expensive Western-supplied defenses in Ukraine.

After Russian troops first marched on Kyiv, Ukrainian forces were praised for the technological ingenuity that helped them thwart their more powerful invader. Now, Russia has caught up in the innovation contest and Ukraine is struggling to maintain the flow of military assistance from its external partners. In order to undercut Russia’s advantage in this phase of the war, Ukraine and its allies will need to not just ramp up defense production but also invest in developing and scaling technologies that can counter Russia’s formidable new drones.

BATTLE IN THE SKIES

I first visited Ukraine in September 2022 at the invitation of the Ukrainian-based Yalta European Strategy forum. Witnessing firsthand the devastation of the Russian invasion, I was blown away by the determination, resilience, and resourcefulness of the Ukrainian people, culture, and tech industry. The trip inspired me to dedicate time and resources to Ukraine’s battle for democracy, supporting both humanitarian causes and Ukraine’s tech ecosystem. I have since returned to Ukraine several times to learn from Ukrainian partners. Conversations during my most recent visit, in December 2023, emphasized the value technology has brought to Ukrainian offensives and the challenge presented by Russia’s new materiel and drone tactics.

The use of drones has underpinned many of Ukraine’s recent successes on the battlefield. In its campaign in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian military has relied largely on drones and, as of November 17, claimed to have destroyed 15 Russian naval vessels and damaged 12 more since the initial 2022 invasion. Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s maritime forces have kept sea lanes in the region clear enough for grain shipments, which are vital to Ukraine’s economy, to resume. The drone strikes have also denied Russia the option to fire missiles on Ukrainian territory from offshore ships and have weakened Russia’s defense of Crimea and position in the Black Sea—a symbolic, economic, and military victory for Ukraine.

Ukrainian drone strikes have also reached deeper and deeper into Russia in recent months. Over one week in August, a series of attacks targeted six Russian regions and set a military airfield ablaze. Ukraine has proved that it is willing and able to extend the range of its military operations, and Ukrainian officials have warned that as the war continues they will take more of the fight to Russian territory.

For now, drones are most heavily concentrated along the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. When asked to identify the best tank-killing weapon in their arsenals, Ukrainian commanders of all ranks give the same answer: first-person-view (FPV) drones, which pilots on the ground maneuver while watching a live feed from an onboard camera. These drones have made tank-on-tank engagement a thing of the past. A Ukrainian battle commander also told me that FPV drones are more versatile than an artillery barrage at the opening of an attack. In a traditional attack, shelling must end as friendly troops approach the enemy trench line. But FPVs are so accurate that Ukrainian pilots can continue to strike Russian targets until their fellow soldiers are mere yards away from the enemy.

THE TIDE TURNS

In other ways, however, Kyiv has lost its advantages in the drone war. Russian forces have copied many of the tactics that Ukraine pioneered over the summer, including waging large coordinated attacks that use multiple types of drones. First, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones hover high above the ground to survey the battlefield and identify targets from afar. They then relay the enemy’s location to pilots operating low-flying, highly maneuverable FPV drones, which can launch precision strikes against both stationary and moving targets, all from a safe distance from the frontline. After these drones eliminate initial targets, military vehicles fight through minefields to begin the ground assault. Since late 2022, Russia has used a combination of two domestically produced drones, the Orlan-10 (a surveillance drone) and the Lancet (an attack drone), to destroy everything from high-value artillery systems to combat jets and tanks. Ukraine surpassed Russia in drone attacks early in the conflict, but it has no combination of drones that match Russia’s dangerous new duo.

At the same time that the Orlan-Lancet team has become decisive in battle, Russia’s superior electronic warfare capabilities allow it to jam and spoof the signals between Ukrainian drones and their pilots. If Ukraine is to neutralize Russian drones, its forces will need the same capabilities. A limited number of Ukrainian brigades have acquired jamming equipment from U.S. suppliers or domestic startups. Without it, the combination of Russian attack drones and Russian jamming of Ukrainian drones threatens to push Ukrainian forces back into the territory that they fought so hard to free early in the war.

Most Western-supplied weapons have fared poorly against Russia’s antiaircraft systems and electronic attacks. When missiles and attack drones are aimed at Russian sites, they are often spoofed or shot down. U.S. weapons in particular can often be thwarted via GPS jamming. A small number of U.S. F-16 fighter jets are set to arrive in Ukraine later this year, and they should quickly get to work targeting Russia’s own jets, which are currently devastating Ukrainian defenses with guided bombs. But it is not clear how even the F-16s will perform amid active electronic warfare and against the long-range missiles deployed by Russian aircraft.

Russian forces have copied many of the tactics that Ukraine pioneered.

Russia has ramped up its military offensives in spite of the harsh winter weather, and increased production capacity has played a big role in the latest advance. Ukrainian officials estimate that Russia can now produce or procure around 100,000 drones per month, whereas Ukraine can only churn out half that amount. International sanctions have not stopped other types of Russian military production, either. Russia has doubled the number of tanks built annually before the invasion, from 100 to 200. Russian companies are also manufacturing munitions far more cheaply than their Western counterparts, often compromising on safety to do so: a 152-millimeter artillery shell costs around $600 to produce in Russia, whereas a 155-millimeter shell costs up to ten times that much to produce in the West. This economic disadvantage will be difficult for Ukraine’s allies to overcome.

After months of relative calm in Kyiv, Russia has also resumed regular drone attacks on Ukraine’s capital. So far, Ukrainian forces have managed to detect and shoot down nearly all of the incoming aircraft, but this protection will be difficult to sustain as Moscow introduces technological upgrades to drones, increases domestic production, develops new ways to evade detection, and launches high-volume attacks that simply overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Here, too, Ukraine is at an economic disadvantage—one of Russia’s drones of choice, the Shahed, is far less expensive than the air defense systems required to neutralize it.

Even though Russian cyberwarfare has had relatively little effect so far, the Ukrainian military’s reliance on mobile data and smartphones to coordinate operations leaves it vulnerable to future attacks. A recent uptick in Russian attempts to shut down cellular networks across Ukraine could have severe consequences. With Russian capacity expanding on multiple fronts in this fight, Ukrainian commanders have become less optimistic than they were just a few months ago. Their focus has turned from offensive operations to defending their current positions and keeping their forces intact.

WINNING THE DRONE WAR

The next few months will be difficult for Ukraine. When I visited Kyiv in December, the government officials and military officers I talked to shared their fear that Russian President Vladimir Putin would announce a second round of mass conscription and a major offensive in eastern Ukraine after Russia’s election in March. Russia’s resilient war economy, expanded materiel production, and population edge, combined with uncertainty about the West’s continued support of Ukraine—especially in a U.S. election year—give Putin reason to double down. Meanwhile, the home-field advantage that Ukraine enjoyed in the early days of the invasion has eroded. Russian troops have settled in on Ukrainian soil and littered eastern Ukraine with land mines, which injure and kill Ukrainian combatants and civilians alike even in areas that the Ukrainian army has won back. The growing strength of Russia’s defenses in eastern Ukraine helps explain the disappointing outcome of Ukraine’s long-heralded summer offensive, too. As Russian forces now probe parts of the frontline for weakness, the Ukrainian military has adopted an “active defense” position. It has been able to stymie Russian assaults, but that success often comes at a high cost.

In this phase of the war, as the frontlines stabilize, the sky above will fill with ever-greater numbers of drones. Ukraine aims to acquire more than two million drones in 2024—half of which it plans to produce domestically—and Russia is on track to at least match that procurement. With so many aircraft deployed, any troops or equipment moving on the ground will become easy targets. Both armies will therefore focus more on eliminating each other’s weapons and engaging in drone-to-drone dogfights. As technological advances increase the range of drones, their operators and other support systems will be able to stay hundreds of miles from the battle.

But remote operation of a drone-centric war will not necessarily lower the human cost. In fact, developments so far suggest that the opposite is true. As Ukrainian military officials explained to me in December in Avdiivka, a city in the Donetsk region, ground assaults remain an integral part of Russia’s drone targeting strategy. The Russian army sends groups of poorly trained draftees and convicts to attack the Ukrainian frontline, forcing Ukrainian troops to respond and reveal their camouflaged positions. Now visible to the drones overhead, the Ukrainian positions are then pounded by Russian artillery. I heard estimates of around 100 to 200 people dying on each side every day in this type of combat—and the number could rise as the lethality and quantity of drones increase.

Russia and Ukraine will focus more on eliminating each other’s weapons and engaging in drone-to-drone dogfights.

Meanwhile, in both Europe and the United States, war fatigue is setting in and support for Ukraine is beginning to crack. Waning financial and military aid from the West could turn the conflict’s fragile stalemate into an opening for Russia. Russia has enough ammunition stocks and production lines to continue fighting for at least another year; Ukraine will need to secure additional Western ammunition supplies if it is to plan that far into the future. Ukraine also needs antiaircraft and attack missiles to strike fast-moving airborne targets. Recognizing that U.S. weapons that rely on GPS may not stand up well to Russian electronic warfare, Ukrainian startups are working around the clock to develop advanced drones that can resist spoofing and jamming. Only with more and better weapons systems—both offensive and defensive—can Ukraine turn the tide on the battlefield. Filling this gap in innovation and procurement will require sustained financial and technical support from Kyiv’s allies.

The prognosis could change with a decisive shift on the battlefield, but for now neither Russia nor Ukraine is expecting a swift end to the fighting. To avoid a protracted war, the West needs to back a concerted military effort to push back Russian forces and a diplomatic effort to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The alternative is years of further suffering for those in the war zone. While I was in Kyiv in December, ten Russian missiles were launched and intercepted by air defenses, including U.S.-supplied Patriot missiles, in the middle of the night. Fifty-two people in my neighborhood were injured by falling debris—including six children.

Ukrainians’ deep love for their country fuels their resilience and determination, even as they face constant reminders of the deadly reality of war. Putin is betting that internal divisions and divided attention will turn Western capitals away from the Ukrainians’ fight for survival as the conflict enters a difficult new phase. Only by neutralizing the advantages that Russia has gained can Ukraine and its allies prove him wrong.

ERIC SCHMIDT is Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project and former CEO and Chair of Google. He is a co-author, with Henry Kissinger and Daniel Huttenlocher, of The Age of AI: And Our Human Future.
MORE BY ERIC SCHMIDT

Foreign Affairs · by Eric Schmidt · January 22, 2024

17. Iran is waging its own war on terror

From the Quincy Institute. (and doing so while it supports terrorism by its proxies???)

Iran is waging its own war on terror

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Ibrahim Al-Marashi · January 22, 2024

Just like the US should show restraint in retaliating against its enemies, Tehran must too

Jan 22, 2024

On Saturday, an alleged Israeli airstrike killed five senior members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps in Damascus. On the same day, an Iraqi Shi’a militia affiliated with Iran launched a salvo of ballistic missiles at Al-Asad base in Iraq, housing U.S. forces, resulting in injuries to U.S. personnel. Normally Iraqi militias use drones or rockets, not the ballistic missiles preferred by the Islamic Republic.

These attacks occur at an inflection point for Iran.

From Jan. 15 to Jan. 16, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted military strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan, primarily in retaliation for an attack within its borders on Jan. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its branch in Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for the inciting explosions, which killed close to 90 people in Kerman, Iran, in one of the deadliest terrorist strikes in the Islamic Republic since 1979.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, vowed the “terrorist attack” would be met with a “harsh response.” Yet Iran targeted alleged bases of Kurdish and Baluch separatists in Iraq and Pakistan, respectively, and ISIS remnants in Syria, not Afghanistan. This demonstrates that Tehran feels emboldened to strike any group it deems a threat, using the Jan. 3 attack as a cover. Iran previously showed more restraint responding to domestic terror attacks from 2017 to 2020.

An analysis of the string of events that led to Iran’s recent retaliation demonstrates that a regional war is erupting in the Middle East after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, even beyond the recent U.S. and UK strikes in Yemen. While the U.S. has yet to acknowledge this fact, the history of terrorist attacks within Iran demonstrates why it believes the fighting is linked to other events and sheds light on how Tehran will lash out.

When terrorist attacks occur in Iran, they rarely generate media coverage, showing an unfortunate indifference to Iranian lives. However, Iran too wages its own war on terrorism. An examination of past attacks and how Iran responded demonstrates that the Islamic Republic’s “harsh response” — its own counter-terrorism strategy — is an attempt to establish deterrence, as the U.S. and Israel seek to do the same in the region.

The spiral of violence in January 2024

On Dec. 25, 2023, an Israeli strike killed Iranian general Seyed Razi Mousavi in Damascus. At the same time, the U.S. targeted the Iraqi militia Kataib Hizballah, which cooperates with the Islamic Republic, in retaliation for allegedly launching drones at U.S. forces in Erbil.

On Jan. 1, 2024, the U.S. sunk three attacking speedboats in the Red Sea, killing 10 Houthis. On Jan. 2, an Israeli drone strike killed Hamas’s deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut. On Jan. 3, the ISIS attack in Iran occurred. On Jan. 4, the U.S. assassinated “Abu Taqwa,” a mid-level leader of the Iraqi militia Harakat al-Nujaba in a drone strike in Baghdad, for his role in attacks on American targets in the region, allegedly at the behest of the Islamic Republic. Then the U.S. and UK launched air strikes on Jan. 11 and 17th on Houthi targets all over Yemen, a militia allied with Iran, followed three days later with the Israeli attack in Damascus.

The Islamic Republic will see the timing of these attacks as intrinsically linked.

The ISIS terrorist attacks occurred near the tomb of General Qassem Soleimani, in his hometown, targeting mourners who had congregated there for the fourth anniversary of his assassination. Soleimani, who headed the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, was killed in the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, by a U.S. drone strike.

There had been speculation about the various actors who may have conducted the attack. From the Islamic Republic’s perspective, its enemies are ISIS and its branch in Afghanistan; Arab, Kurdish, and Baluchi separatists; the Iranian exile Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK) Organization; as well as Israel and/or the U.S. Iran might very well blame all of those actors for working in unison.

The attack in Kerman bore the hallmarks of an ISIS operation and was claimed by the terrorist group. Ethnic separatists usually chose Iranian military targets. Israel tends to conduct targeted assassinations of Iranian scientists, or recently an Iranian general in Syria. But Islamic State’s attacks are indiscriminate, and Soleimani did organize the Iraqi militias to combat the terrorist group in Iraq, giving ISIS a reason to retaliate.

Between exiles, ethnic rebellions, and ISIS

After 1979, the nascent Islamic Republic had to deal with two problems in its western Kurdistan Province, which has a significant Kurdish population, and its southern Khuzestan province, which has a significant Arab population. Both areas proved problematic as the Iranian state sought to overcome ethnic differences between Persian nationalism and Kurdish and Arab aspirations by reconciling them under the banner of an Islamic Republic.

There were a few bouts of violence in the early 1980s, particularly with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I), but the provinces remained quiet until 2003, when the Bush administration was allegedly responsible for stoking Iranian ethnic rebellions during its War on Terror. An ethnic Sunni Baluch rebellion erupted in addition to dissent in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and among Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijani population, which is larger than the population of the republic of Azerbaijan itself.

Al-Qaida never struck in Iran, but ISIS, with its virulent anti-Shi’i ideology, attacked the majority Shi’a nation. In June 2017, four ISIS terrorists launched a brazen assault on Iran’s parliament, killing 18.

Iran’s ballistic counter-terrorism strategy

In retaliation, on 18 June, 2017, the IRGC launched six domestically-produced Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, with a range of over 400 miles, against Islamic State targets in Syria’s eastern province of Deir Ezzor.

While the target may have been ISIS, the strike sent a signal to Riyadh in the aftermath of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statement that Saudi Arabia would take its “battle” with the Islamic Republic inside of Iranian territory, made at the height of the Saudi-Iranian cold war in the Middle East. The missiles, after all, also had the range to strike Riyadh.

The IRGC again launched missiles in early September 2018 against the KDP-I, exiled in bases in Iraq, in retaliation for their alleged attacks on Iranian military forces. In the most recent attack in January, the IRGC launched a dozen ballistic missiles and suicide drones at targets in northern Iraq, claiming it targeted a Mossad base there that was used to organize the Jan. 3 Kerman bombings, killing at least four people. In reality, Iran most likely sought to deter the KDP-I from future attacks.

Back in 2018, ISIS attacked an Iranian military parade on Sept. 22 in Ahvaz (“Ahwaz” in Arabic). The al-Ahwaz National Resistance, an umbrella movement for Arab separatist groups, also claimed responsibility for that attack. However, the Ahvaz group had never conducted such a brazen attack before, preferring to sabotage Iran’s pipeline facilities, usually at night. ISIS, on the other hand, had attacked Iran’s parliament in 2017 in broad daylight.

Furthermore, for reasons of domestic consumption, it was more convenient that ISIS was the culprit for the 2018 Ahvaz attack. If Tehran were to blame the Ahvaz group, it would serve as an admission of the government’s failure to address the depressed conditions in the Khuzestan province as well as in Kurdistan and Baluchistan — conditions that have led to grievances and pushed some locals to adopt terrorism. Second, the Ahvaz group did not have any military bases outside of Iran to retaliate against.

Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles to strike the ISIS-held town of Hajin in eastern Syria. When it lost all of its territory in the east of Syria, ISIS allegedly kept some networks alive in the rebel-held Idlib. Even though the Jan. 3 attack was claimed by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) the IRGC justified attacking Syria instead of Afghanistan by claiming that ISKP terrorists receive training in Idlib from ISIS and are then transferred to Afghanistan by the U.S. In reality, an attack on Afghan soil would have disrupted already tense relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In the restive Sistan-Baluchestan province, bordering Pakistan, Iranian military forces were targeted twice in domestic terrorist attacks in 2019. The first hit a base of the Basij, the paramilitary force affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, coinciding with the Islamic Republic’s celebration of the 40th anniversary of the revolution that brought down the shah.

Another attack followed, killing 20 Revolutionary Guards in a suicide bomb operation. Both were claimed by the Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), formed in 2012 to fight on behalf of Baluchi Sunnis, who complained of discrimination by the Shi’a government. The Islamic Republic did not respond to those attacks since this Baluch group operates clandestinely within the Sistan-Baluchistan province and out of the Baluchistan province in Pakistan. At that point, Iran did not want to violate the sovereignty of its neighbor. However, last week it did retaliate for a different set of attacks in mid-December, when the Baluch group attacked an Iranian police station in the town of Rask, killing at least 11 officers.

The year 2020 witnessed two major losses for Iran. After Soleimani’s death in January 2020, Iran launched 22 Fateh ballistic missiles at two Iraqi bases housing American forces. In December 2020, Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in his car by a sophisticated machine gun contraption controlled remotely. Israel and its alleged ally the MeK rarely take credit for the string of assassinations that have targeted Iran’s nuclear scientists, with Iran issuing condemnations, but little more. The fact that Iranian allies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen have struck Israel or its interests since Oct. 7 serves as an indirect retaliation in their regional conflict.

The Islamic Republic has sought to mollify domestic audiences by demonstrating that it retaliated for recent attacks on Iranian soil and will consider its mission accomplished. Further retaliation would jeopardize its gains. Iran has already won a regional conflict by reviving its Hamas-Hezbollah-Houthi “Axis of Resistance” since October. Yet the people of Iran endured a loss.

Nevertheless, the recent events have demonstrated the interconnected and interdependent nature of the Middle East, and how a set of attacks in Iran are related to the ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea.

Ibrahim Al-Marashi

Ibrahim Al-Marashi is Associate Professor of Middle East History at California State University San Marcos, and an advisory board member of the International Security and Conflict Resolution (ISCOR) program at San Diego State University. He is the co-author of Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (2008), The Modern History of Iraq (2016), and A Concise History of the Middle East (2025).

18. Taiwan says it spots six more Chinese balloons, one crossed island

Taiwan says it spots six more Chinese balloons, one crossed island

Reuters

January 21, 20249:13 PM ESTUpdated 11 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-says-it-spots-six-more-chinese-balloons-one-crossed-island-2024-01-22/

Chinese and Taiwanese flags are seen in this illustration, August 6, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

TAIPEI, Jan 22 (Reuters) - Taiwan's defence ministry said it had detected six more Chinese balloons flying over the Taiwan Strait on Sunday, one of which crossed the island, the latest in a spate of such balloons the ministry says it has seen over the past month-and-a-half.

The ministry earlier this month, in a strongly worded statement, accused China of threatening aviation safety and waging psychological warfare on the island's people with the balloons, days before Taiwan's Jan. 13 elections.

China's defence ministry, which last month declined to comment on the balloons, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. China claims Taiwan as its own territory, despite the strong objections of the government in Taipei.

The potential for China to use balloons for spying became a global issue last February when the United States shot down what it said was a Chinese surveillance balloon. China said the balloon was a civilian craft that accidentally drifted astray.

In the latest incident, revealed by the ministry on Monday in its daily report on Chinese military activities over the past 24 hours, it said six balloons had flown over the strait's sensitive median line on Sunday.

However, only one crossed Taiwan island, at its southern tip, according to a map the ministry provided.

The other five balloons flew to the north of Taiwan but did not fly over land, the ministry said.The balloons all headed east before vanishing, it added.

The Taiwan Strait's median line previously served as an unofficial barrier between Taiwan and China, but Chinese fighter jets, drones and now balloons regularly fly over it.

China says it does not recognise the existence of the median line.

Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Stephen Coates

19. Israel Uncovers Hamas Tunnel Where Hostages, Including Children, Were Held in 'Inhumane Conditions'

Do not let Hamas control the narrative. We need to tell the story of Hamas' brutality.

Photos at the link.

Israel Uncovers Hamas Tunnel Where Hostages, Including Children, Were Held in 'Inhumane Conditions'

IDF shared photos from the tunnel showing plastic furniture, oscillating fans, sleeping bags and even a child’s drawings that were done in crayon

Published 01/20/24 10:23 PM ET|Updated 01/20/24 10:23 PM ET

Zachary Rogers

themessenger.com · January 21, 2024

Israeli Defense Forces claim troops recently discovered a tunnel where hostages of Hamas, including children, were believed to be held “in harsh and inhumane conditions.”

IDF Spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said troops discovered the tunnel in southern Gaza’s Khan Younis by means of “precise intelligence,” according to The Times of Israel, and that an entrance to the vast tunnel network was found beneath the home of a Hamas commander.

Israeli troops had to fight and kill Hamas gunmen when they first entered the tunnel, Hagari added. No hostages were found, but troops did discover a part of the tunnel that contained evidence hostages were held there.

IDF shared photos of the makeshift space, which included plastic furniture, oscillating fans, sleeping bags and even a child’s drawings and scribblings that were done in crayon.

IDF shared photos of the makeshift space, which included plastic furniture, oscillating fans, sleeping bags and even a child’s drawings and scribblings that were done in crayon.Israeli Defense Forces

“The tunnel was rigged with explosives and blast doors designed to protect the terrorists and prevent the advancement in finding our hostages,” Hagari said in the statement.

“After walking about a kilometer in the tunnel, at a depth of about 20 meters underground, the soldiers found a central chamber where, according to testimonies of hostages who returned from Gaza, we understand that they spent most of their time,” Hagari added.

Further into the tunnel, IDF troops found five narrow holding cells complete with mattresses and toilets. Hagari says that according to testimonies from freed hostages, around 20 hostages were held in that tunnel space at various times.

Further into the tunnel, IDF troops found five narrow holding cells complete with mattresses and toilets.Israeli Defense Forces

Hagari said the hostages were held there “under harsh conditions without daylight, in dense air with little oxygen, and terrible humidity that makes breathing difficult.”

“Some of them were released about 50 days ago, and some are still held in Gaza and may be under even harsher conditions, including very elderly people who need medication and help,” Hagari said. “Hamas committed and continues to commit crimes against humanity, holding innocent people, children, women, men, some sick, very elderly people, in harsh and inhumane conditions.”

It is believed that 132 hostages still remain in Hamas captivity after its Oct. 7 attack on Israel, although how many of them remain alive is uncertain.

Hagari said that the crayon drawings were made by 5-year-old Emilia Aloni, who was freed back in November.

IDF shared photos of the makeshift space, which included plastic furniture, oscillating fans, sleeping bags, and even a child’s drawings and scribblings that were done in crayon.Israeli Defense Forces

themessenger.com · January 21, 2024

20. Three GOP leaders have produced a smart plan for Ukraine. Will MAGA listen?

The 18 page plan can be downloaded here: https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Proposed-Plan-for-Victory-in-Ukraine.pdf?utm

Excerpts:

In short, the plan is right on target. Were it not for its unnecessarily disrespectful language about President Joe Biden — whom the three generally refer to as “Biden,” just as they refer to “Putin,” thereby setting up an equivalence between the two — the document could easily serve as a bipartisan set of policy proposals.

Read page 6 of the plan:

“House Republicans believe President Biden should present a credible plan for victory and arm Ukraine with the weapons it needs to win as soon as possible.” An obvious point, but one worth emphasizing given the Biden administration’s roundly criticized “too little, too late” policy of providing weapons.

“Since the first day of the war, Biden’s debilitating hesitation to provide critical weapons to Ukraine has delayed a Ukrainian victory.”

True, too, alas. Now we get to the core of the plan:

“Ukraine needs the longest-range variant of ATACMS, F-16s, and sufficient quantities of cluster munitions, artillery, air defenses, and armor to make a difference on the battlefield. … A path to victory for Ukraine will require (1) providing critical weapons to Ukraine at the speed of relevance, (2) tightening sanctions on the Putin regime, and (3) transferring [$300 billion of] frozen Russian sovereign assets to Ukraine.”

Three GOP leaders have produced a smart plan for Ukraine. Will MAGA listen?

BY ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/21/24 2:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4419534-three-gop-leaders-have-produced-a-smart-plan-for-ukraine-will-maga-listen/

A Ukrainian soldier looks at the sky after hearing the sound of a nearby drone, at the Bakhmut frontline, in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine on January 13, 2024. (Photo by Ignacio Marin/Anadolu via Getty Images)

The “Proposed Plan for Victory in Ukraine,” authored by three prominent Republican congressmen, may be one of the most important documents to come out of Washington in the last two years.

Drafted by Chairman Michael McCaul of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Mike Rogers of the Armed Services Committee, and Chairman Mike Turner of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the plan is both a decisive repudiation of the pro-Russian stance of MAGA Republicans and their spiritual leader, Donald Trump, and a slap in the face of Democrats who aren’t sure how they want the Russo-Ukrainian war to end.

In short, the plan is right on target. Were it not for its unnecessarily disrespectful language about President Joe Biden — whom the three generally refer to as “Biden,” just as they refer to “Putin,” thereby setting up an equivalence between the two — the document could easily serve as a bipartisan set of policy proposals.

Read page 6 of the plan:

“House Republicans believe President Biden should present a credible plan for victory and arm Ukraine with the weapons it needs to win as soon as possible.” An obvious point, but one worth emphasizing given the Biden administration’s roundly criticized “too little, too late” policy of providing weapons.

“Since the first day of the war, Biden’s debilitating hesitation to provide critical weapons to Ukraine has delayed a Ukrainian victory.”

True, too, alas. Now we get to the core of the plan:

“Ukraine needs the longest-range variant of ATACMS, F-16s, and sufficient quantities of cluster munitions, artillery, air defenses, and armor to make a difference on the battlefield. … A path to victory for Ukraine will require (1) providing critical weapons to Ukraine at the speed of relevance, (2) tightening sanctions on the Putin regime, and (3) transferring [$300 billion of] frozen Russian sovereign assets to Ukraine.”

Ukrainian policymakers can take pride in the fact that this is precisely what they’ve been arguing since Russia invaded on February 24, 2022. It appears to have taken over 20 months for American policymakers to recognize the obvious — during which time tens of thousands of Ukrainians and hundreds of thousands of Russians have needlessly died in Putin’s mad escapade. But, when one is trapped, like Ukraine, between the Scylla of Russian imperialism and the Charybdis of Western torpor, one needs to be thankful for any movement toward sobriety.

The three Republicans conclude their plan with an outright rejection of the geopolitically nonsensical belief that one can and should negotiate with Putin immediately. Instead, the congressmen correctly state that their “strategy will ensure Ukraine is able to make the needed advances on the battlefield to force Putin to the negotiating table. If Ukraine doesn’t negotiate from a position of strength, there can be no lasting peace.”

Exactly.

The plan then goes on to make a variety of ancillary arguments, some on target, some not. Among the former is the recognition that “as a percentage of GDP, the U.S. ranks just 30th in total assistance to Ukraine, with Poland, the Baltic states, the UK, Norway, and others contributing more in terms of this metric. In terms of security assistance by GDP, the U.S. ranks 14th. Europe has also committed more non-security assistance to Ukraine than the United States.” In a word, the Europeans are no deadbeats. (Which, by the way, means that the ongoing deadlock in Washington over immigrants and aid for Ukraine and Israel is not as debilitating for Ukraine as some may think.)

Also on target is the plan’s concern with questions of human rights: “Russian forces have committed countless war crimes in Ukraine, including executions, torture, and rape. Russia has also kidnapped tens of thousands of Ukrainian children and sent them to so-called re-education camps in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Those responsible for these crimes must face justice.”

Indeed. My only quibble is that the document should have mentioned Russia’s leading war criminal, Putin, by name.

Less persuasive is the trio’s claim that “President Trump understood Putin only respects strength” and their evident belief that Trump wasn’t acting by seat-of-the-pants spontaneity but actually had a foreign policy vision. That’s at least open to debate.

Whatever the document’s flaws, its plan for victory in Ukraine proposes a set of policy initiatives that should be amenable to pragmatically oriented Republicans and Democrats, who represent the majority in both houses of Congress.

It would be a tragedy if MAGA politics superseded commonsense.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”

21. The Futile Legacy of Mao Zedong

Excerpts:

An important problem with Xi’s retreat to Maoism is the absence of Mao. Give the latter his due: Charismatic and driven from the start, he took a weak and divided movement from defeat to triumph and cast off centuries of Western and Japanese imperialism. In contrast, Xi is a colorless apparatchik who carefully ascended a party structure created by others. He wants Mao’s control without having earned, brutally and bloodily, Mao’s power.

Opposition exists but is futile. Wall Street Journal reporter Lingling Wei reported on a meeting at which a forlorn liberal administrator who had worked on stock market reform “signaled me to a corner of the venue. … ‘The whole thing about getting listed companies to set up party committees,’ he said, ‘is a reversal of what we had tried to do.’ Then he walked away without saying anything else.”

Indeed, China may be slipping back toward the Soviet Union in terms of political sentiment, if not economic achievement. People are still much better off than before, but a sense of ennui, even despair, afflicts those who desire personal freedom to enjoy their material bounty and personal opportunity to shape the social order around them. Xi, like Leonid Brezhnev, insists that soulless apparatchiks are the center of society.

It appears to be the fate of every nation that the worst will get on top, sometimes. However, as Friedrich Hayek predicted, they will do so more often in communist systems.

China is proving the rule. There was Mao. Now there is Xi. With Xi celebrating Mao, hopefully there won’t be another.

The Futile Legacy of Mao Zedong

Xi Jinping wants to be a new Great Helmsman. It won’t work.

By Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Doug Bandow

Politics
China

January 19, 2024, 11:54 AM

Just after Christmas, the People’s Republic of China’s increasingly authoritarian leader-for-life Xi Jinping celebrated Mao Zedong’s 130th birthday. Xi led the Politburo’s Standing Committee in a requiem in the Great Hall of the People for the infamous Red Emperor, the greatest mass murderer in modern if not all human history. The members thrice bowed before the grand killer’s statue and remembered his “achievements.”

Mao’s thoughts are a “spiritual treasure” and would “guide our actions in the long term,” Xi said. The Chinese people must “work to enable our party to adhere to its original mission … maintain vitality and vigor, and ensure that our party never degenerates, never changes its color, and never loses its flavor.” Under Mao, Xi said earlier last year, the Chinese Communist Party developed a “brand new form of human civilization.”

Ironically, by strengthening his arbitrary rule, Xi is actually making an eventual counterreaction more likely. Ever-tightening repression poisons the entire system. Fear exiles honesty and accountability in policymaking, leading to more and bigger mistakes, including at the top. State centralization and politicization are reversing the very forces that spurred economic growth. The determination to indoctrinate as well as regulate already has spawned antagonistic youth movements that challenge authority. Political stability is likely to be only temporary; when Xi passes from the scene, the succession fight is likely to be more bitter and fraught.

Not everyone agrees with Xi. On a recent trip to China, I met an academic colleague who expressed profound pessimism, which he said many intellectuals and others shared. In the past, he observed, they at least could look forward to some change every five or 10 years, when a new party general secretary (and president) was chosen.

But no longer. Not only is Xi president for life, but the party is also rapidly reverting back to the habits of the Maoist era.

Yet Xi was not alone in reveling in the supposed achievements of the Great Helmsman. Mao’s birthplace in the southern Hunan province, which I’ve visited, has long been a major tourist destination. Today, it may be the one place in China where a dissident can covertly promote revolution. As a Nikkei report on the anniversary observance noted, “The younger attendees on Tuesday seemed particularly inclined to chant slogans considered more extreme in their rhetoric. Those included such slogans adopted by China’s Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution as ‘No crime in revolution!’ and ‘To rebel is justified!’”

However, as Xi concentrates his power, I wonder who these young visitors think they’re rebelling against.

Right now, Xi’s power seems unshakeable. But so did Mao’s during his lifetime. Almost immediately after he died, policies began to change—and had shifted on the ground even beforehand. Within a decade or two, the country was almost unrecognizable.

Some of the devotion to Mao was real, and he retains some fervent fans. When I visited his impressive mausoleum in Tiananmen Square a few years ago, the lines were long. Many people bought flowers from vendors before entering to set before Mao’s massive bronze statue in the entryway. Some visitors seemed genuinely overcome with emotion. However, capitalism ultimately triumphed: On exiting, everyone passed by stalls marketing overpriced Mao tchotchke.

That the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to cling to Mao to maintain its revolutionary credentials is embarrassing, but hardly surprising. Mao remains one of China’s most recognizable symbols. His portrait hangs on the Gate of Heavenly Peace on Tiananmen Square’s northern edge. His mausoleum dominates the space and is much more impressive than Vladimir Lenin’s dark and dank resting place. And Mao’s face adorns China’s currency.

All this was built on a pile of corpses. The CCP consolidated power with campaigns against so-called counterrevolutionaries, landlords, and other enemies, killing 5 million or so Chinese. In 1950, Mao made the decision to enter the Korean War to save North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. Some 200,000 Chinese soldiers died, along with untold thousands killed by them in a war prolonged by two-and-a-half years. In 1956, Mao initiated the Hundred Flowers Campaign or Movement, in which he encouraged the people to speak freely. Apparently shocked after receiving criticisms rather than encomiums, he responded with the Anti-Rightest Movement, in which millions were killed.

In 1958, Mao’s fertile mind came up with his worst idea yet: the so-called Great Leap Forward, simultaneously collectivizing farming and decentralizing manufacturing. Estimates of total deaths vary widely, but perhaps the most comprehensive account came from a party member and Xinhua reporter. Yang Jisheng figured: “[T]he Great Famine brought about 36 million unnatural deaths, and a shortfall of 40 million births.”

Mao’s final flight into pure madness was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The murderous mix of party purge, civil war, and social collapse may have caused as many as 2 million deaths.

Mao’s death was almost as consequential as his life. Pragmatic revolutionary Deng Xiaoping won the resulting power struggle and moved China down the course of economic reform. However, Deng, like Mao, rejected political liberalization and orchestrated the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, which was followed by purging millions of party members.

The CCP recognized that Mao had made mistakes, but it was unable to let go of the legacy of the national founding father altogether. Mao was still 70 percent right, the official verdict decided. (Contrast the Soviet Union’s Nikita Khrushchev, who was able to take Joseph Stalin’s legacy down entirely, in part because of Lenin provided a convenient alternative state founder.)

Even after Tiananmen, China remained far freer than under Mao. However, that was then. In almost every way, Xi has shoved his nation backward.

Independent journalists and human rights lawyers are gone. Internet controls are tighter. Repression of churches is more intense. Academic exchanges are more limited. Controls over Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hong Kongers have metastasized. Companies host party cells. Business is being made to serve the CCP.

And Xi has greatly strengthened party and personal control and uses both propaganda and coercion to insist that everyone thinks like him. He has tried to control history, presenting an idyllic version of the party’s bloody past. There is a burgeoning personality cult, though it seems perfunctory, lacking the ardor and intensity that more often surrounded Mao, at least during the latter’s life.

An important problem with Xi’s retreat to Maoism is the absence of Mao. Give the latter his due: Charismatic and driven from the start, he took a weak and divided movement from defeat to triumph and cast off centuries of Western and Japanese imperialism. In contrast, Xi is a colorless apparatchik who carefully ascended a party structure created by others. He wants Mao’s control without having earned, brutally and bloodily, Mao’s power.

Opposition exists but is futile. Wall Street Journal reporter Lingling Wei reported on a meeting at which a forlorn liberal administrator who had worked on stock market reform “signaled me to a corner of the venue. … ‘The whole thing about getting listed companies to set up party committees,’ he said, ‘is a reversal of what we had tried to do.’ Then he walked away without saying anything else.”

Indeed, China may be slipping back toward the Soviet Union in terms of political sentiment, if not economic achievement. People are still much better off than before, but a sense of ennui, even despair, afflicts those who desire personal freedom to enjoy their material bounty and personal opportunity to shape the social order around them. Xi, like Leonid Brezhnev, insists that soulless apparatchiks are the center of society.

It appears to be the fate of every nation that the worst will get on top, sometimes. However, as Friedrich Hayek predicted, they will do so more often in communist systems.

China is proving the rule. There was Mao. Now there is Xi. With Xi celebrating Mao, hopefully there won’t be another.

Foreign Policy · by Doug Bandow

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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