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Quotes of the Day:
“The point is that we are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield.”
– George Orwell
"People's opinions are mainly designed to make them feel comfortable; truth, for most people, is a secondary consideration."
– Bertrand Russell
"When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness."
– Alexis de Tocqueville
1. “Two out of three South Koreans are ‘interested’ in North Korean human rights… regardless of political orientation”
2. South Korea’s President, Impeached and in Jail, Winning Support in Polls
3. Friend or foe? Trump’s threats against ‘free-riding’ allies could backfire
4. A Korean-style armistice for Ukraine?
5. The real insurrectionists in South Korea
6. FM Cho discusses alliance, N. Korea with new USFK commander
7. Incheon invites Trump to Operation Chromite commemoration event
8. Suicide and soap operas: North Koreans react to being Ukrainian POWs
9. Experts: “Trump Should Use Korea to Check China… Strengthening Defense Industry Cooperation Also Needed”
10. Editorial: S. Korea must prepare for Trump's risks, seize potential opportunities
11. Living in fear: N. Korea intensifies security inspections along Chinese border
12. CIO under fire for excessive restrictions on detained President Yoon
13. Rubio stresses refocus on national interest as guiding mission of American foreign policy
14. Lessons from Ukraine: Why the US Army Needs to Rethink Engineer Reconnaissance
15. North Korea tells United Nations it is a 'responsible nuclear state'
16. Former North Korean Senior Official: “Trump’s North Korean Condo Mention Was a Diplomatic Message”
1. “Two out of three South Koreans are ‘interested’ in North Korean human rights… regardless of political orientation”
Some good news. The path to unification is through human rights.
My 12 words:
Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
“Two out of three South Koreans are ‘interested’ in North Korean human rights… regardless of political orientation”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/north-korea-human-rights-south-interest-01212025095025.html
Seoul-Lee Jeong-eun leeje@rfa.org
2025.01.21
A North Korean defector being forcibly repatriated through Panmunjom on November 7, 2019.
/ Provided by the office of Tae Young-ho, People Power Party member
00:00 / 03:53
Anchor : A survey by a North Korean human rights group found that two out of three South Koreans are interested in the North Korean human rights issue . Reporter Lee Jeong-eun reports from Seoul .
The results of the '2024 North Korean Human Rights Public Perception Survey ' announced on the 21st by the North Korea Human Rights Database Center (NKDB), a South Korean North Korean human rights organization .
According to a press release distributed by NKDB on this day, the survey was conducted online in October of last year and targeted 1,000 adult men and women aged 19 or older residing in Korea .
According to this, 65.5% of respondents answered that they were ' interested ' in the North Korean human rights issue . By region, interest was highest in the Gwangju/Jeolla region at 69.8% , followed by Incheon/Gyeonggi (69%), Gangwon /Jeju (67.4%), and Daegu/Gyeongbuk (56.8%) .
In a meeting with foreign correspondents on the same day, NKDB Center Director Song Hanna diagnosed that 72.9% of conservative respondents and 68.8% of progressive respondents said they were interested in the human rights situation in North Korea, and that the general public recognizes that the human rights issue in North Korea transcends party affiliation .
The point is that the extreme differences in perception of North Korean human rights issues depending on political inclination are a characteristic of the Korean political world, not the sentiment of the Korean public .
[ Song Han -na , Director of the NKDB Center ] What is interesting is that concerns about the human rights situation in North Korea transcend political orientation . 72.9% of conservative respondents and 68.8% of progressive respondents expressed interest in this issue . This shows that the politicization of the North Korean human rights issue is a characteristic seen in the leadership and political discourse, and is far removed from public sentiment .
Center Director Song Hanna also pointed out that South Korea's conservative government has monopolized the North Korean human rights issue , while the progressive government has denied the issue .
Members of a North Korean human rights group protest against China's repatriation of North Korean defectors in Seoul in 2013. /AP
He also emphasized that civil society should be able to keep the government in check through independent and active activities under any government .
Ministry of Unification, Promoting Revision of North Korean Defectors Act … “ Preventing Recurrence of Forced Repatriation Incidents ”
Bush Center proposes ' comprehensive reorganization of North Korea policy centered on human rights '
The survey found that awareness of topics related to North Korean human rights issues was highest in the following order: public executions , human trafficking , and the repatriation of North Korean fishermen who defected in 2019 .
In particular, 82.5% of respondents answered that they remembered the incident of North Korean defectors being repatriated to North Korea, indicating that most South Koreans remember this as an example of human rights violations in North Korea .
The incident of forced repatriation of North Korean fishermen refers to the incident in November 2019 when the Moon Jae-in government of South Korea expelled two North Korean fishermen suspected of murdering 16 fellow fishermen through Panmunjom despite their expressing their intention to defect .
In 2022 , NKDB filed a complaint against seven Moon Jae-in government officials, including former National Security Office Director Chung Eui-yong , and related individuals on charges of abuse of power , dereliction of duty , illegal arrest and detention , extradition , and destruction of evidence .
The Seoul Central District Court is scheduled to hand down its first- trial verdict on the 19th of next month , about two years after the indictment in February 2023 .
The sampling error for this survey is ±3.1 percentage points at the 95% confidence level .
Since 2014, NKDB has conducted an annual survey of 1,000 South Korean citizens on their perception of human rights in North Korea .
This is Lee Jeong-eun of RFA's Radio Free Asia in Seoul .
Editor Yang Seong-won , Web Editor Lee Kyung
2. South Korea’s President, Impeached and in Jail, Winning Support in Polls
An important article.
Few in the English-language Korean media or the US media are calling attention to these important political shifts.
South Korea’s President, Impeached and in Jail, Winning Support in Polls
Liberal enthusiasm for ousting South Korea’s president is seen fading.
South Korea’s impeached president, Yoon Suk-yeol, languishing in jail following his short-lived attempt to impose martial law, can take comfort in the resurgence of his conservative adherents in the wake of the leftist drive to have him ousted, imprisoned, and possibly executed.
The wave of liberal enthusiasm for stripping Mr. Yoon of all power is fading while increasing numbers of Koreans recognize that he may have been justified in losing all patience with the Minju, or Democratic Party, which controls the national assembly. It was after the Minju blocked just about every bit of legislation that Mr. Yoon proposed that he issued a martial law decree on December 3. The Minju majority in the assembly quickly rejected it, forcing him to rescind the decree, and then began the campaign to destroy him by voting 10 days later to impeach Mr. Yoon.
Eager to wreak complete vengeance, the Minju needs the country’s constitutional court to oust Mr. Yoon from office by approving the impeachment motion. Simultaneously, a posse known as the Corruption Investigation Office for high-level officials has him in jail awaiting possible indictment for staging an insurrection, a crime that carries life imprisonment or the death penalty.
Poll results — on top of widespread, sometimes violent protests — show that the popular support on which Mr. Yoon’s enemies counted is waning. Increasingly, on the streets of Seoul and other large cities, speculation turns to the possibility of clashes between leftists and rightists; China is often blamed for spurring the left in a bid to dominate the South.
“More people want to keep Yoon-aligned PPP in power than not,” reads a headline in Joongang Daily on the English translation of an article published in Joongang Ilbo, one of Korea’s best-selling newspapers.
The poll, conducted for Joongang by a Seoul polling organization, Realmeter, showed 48.6 percent of 1,004 respondents support Mr. Yoon’s party. That figure compares with 46.2 percent who do not.
The poll does not say what percentage want Mr. Yoon to return to his duties as president. It does, though, show a measure of respect — if not popularity — for the man who made his mark as a public prosecutor before defeating the Minju leader, Lee Jae-myung, by a slim margin in 2022.
Facing charges of corruption in real estate dealings, Mr. Lee still hopes to win the presidency in a “snap” election that would have to happen 60 days after the constitutional court upheld the impeachment decree, stripping Mr. Yoon of the title of president. Regardless of the court’s decision, Mr. Yoon’s enemies are likely to go on trying to eviscerate him for the insurrection, or “coup against the government,” as they call his six-hour fling at martial law.
The Joongang Ilbo poll, though, clearly has many people thinking twice about the wisdom, or common sense, of persecuting a man who has stood up firmly against North Korea, in contrast to the record of his leftist predecessor, Moon Jae-in. From the American viewpoint, Mr. Yoon’s greatest accomplishment has been to enthusiastically approve joint exercises by American and South Korean troops — something Mr. Moon had rejected.
“It appeared that the PPP had recovered public support nearly 50 days after President Yoon’s botched imposition of martial law,” Joongang Ilbo said. “Public support for the PPP,” the paper noted, “dropped to 26.2 percent in the first week of December in an identical series of surveys by Realmeter.”
As is often the case in South Korea, regional differences mattered. Mr. Yoon is most popular in the southeastern region including the enormous, flourishing port of Busan and the industrial city of Daegu. In the southwestern region, including the restive city of Gwangju, a hotbed of opposition and the scene of a bloody revolt in May 1980, the Minju is favored.
Polls, though, are open to question and criticism, as Joongang Ilbo recognized in a previous article.The paper reported analysts saying that “small, inexperienced polling agencies” were “undermining the accuracy and neutrality of surveys.”
The paper railed against “excessive pollster activities,” which it said could “negatively affect voters’ behaviors toward political surveys” conducted via random calls, sometimes to temporary numbers. “Voter fatigue with political polls can undermine accuracy,” it said. “People who are fed up with incoming calls from pollsters will likely decline them.”
3. Friend or foe? Trump’s threats against ‘free-riding’ allies could backfire
Rather than berating allies the Trump administration has the opportunity to galvanize their cooperation in strategic competition as well as deterrence. They are more willing to cooperate than ever because they know their interests align with the US versus China.
In terms of Korea" free riding" we should consider its position (both geographically and strategically) and the contributions it makes and can make. South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, and is a critical partner in the Arsenal of Democracy and supports the rules based international order. In short it is a key partner in strategic competition versus the PRC. South Korea is not only critical to peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in Japan, but its strategic location also supports trilateral cooperation to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific to include the defense of Taiwan. And it provides a higher percentage of GDP spending on defense than any NATO ally (less Poland and Estonia) in addition to funding 93% of the largest US military base outside the US while providing more than $1billion in facilities and services to pay for the incremental costs of US forces stationed outside the US. In 2023, South Korean companies committed to U.S. projects totaling $21.5 billion, making South Korea the largest investor in the U.S. that year. This surge in investment is attributed to U.S. policies like the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, which offer incentives for advanced technology manufacturing. Consequently, more than half of South Korea's outbound investment flowed to the U.S. in 2023, up from 18% in 2019. These developments highlight the strengthening economic ties between South Korea and the United States, with South Korean investments playing a significant role in the U.S. economy.
I do not mean to sound like a cheerleader for South Korea. I am a cheerleader for US national security interests and our alliance with South Korea is vital for US national security interests in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific and it supports US interests around the world.
When the political turmoil settles in South Korea and the opposition party has significantly damaged its standing through its now apparent anti-democratic actions, President Trump will be pushing on an open door in South Korea.
Friend or foe? Trump’s threats against ‘free-riding’ allies could backfire - Asia Times
Trump will be more demanding of allies but line between reasonable and coercive policy will be hard to draw
asiatimes.com · by Nicholas Khoo · January 21, 2025
Donald Trump is an unusual United States president in that he may be the first to strike greater anxiety in allies than in adversaries.
Take the responses to his pre-inauguration comments about buying Greenland, for instance, which placed US ally Denmark at the center of the global foreign policy radar screen and caused the Danish government – which retains control of the territory’s foreign and security policies — to declare Greenland isn’t for sale.
Canada is also in Trump’s sights with trade tariff threats and claims it should be the 51st US state. Its government has vociferously opposed Trump’s comments, begun back-channel lobbying in Washington and prepared for trade retaliation.
Both cases highlight the coming challenges for management of the global US alliance network in an era of increased great power rivalry – not least for NATO, of which Denmark and Canada are member states.
Members of that network saw off the Soviet Union’s formidable Cold War challenge and are now crucial to addressing China’s complex challenge to contemporary international order. They might be excused for asking themselves the question: with allies like this, who needs adversaries?
Oversimplifying complex relationships
Trump’s longstanding critique is that allies have taken advantage of the US by under-spending on defense and “free-riding” on the security provided by Washington’s global network.
In an intuitive sense, it is hard to deny this. To varying degrees, all states in the international system – including US allies, partners and even adversaries – are free-riding on the benefits of the global international order the US constructed after the Cold War.
But is Trump, therefore, justified in seeking a greater return on past US investment?
Since alliance commitments involve a complex mix of interests, perception, domestic politics and bargaining, Trump wouldn’t be the deal-maker he says he is if he didn’t seek a redistribution of the alliance burden.
The general problem with his recent foreign policy rhetoric, however, is that a grain of truth is not a stable basis for a sweeping change in US foreign policy.
Specifically, Trump’s “free-riding” claims are an oversimplification of a complex reality. And there are potentially substantial political and strategic costs associated with the US using coercive diplomacy against what Trump calls “delinquent” alliance partners.
US military on parade in Warsaw in 2022: force projection is about more than money. Image: Getty Images via The Conversation
Free riding or burden sharing?
The inconvenient truth for Trump is that “free-riding” by allies is hard to differentiate from standard alliance “burden sharing,” where the US is in a quid pro quo relationship: it subsidizes its allies’ security in exchange for benefits they provide the US.
And whatever concept we use to characterise US alliance policy, it was developed in a deliberate and methodical manner over decades.
US subsidization of its allies’ security is a longstanding choice underpinned by a strategic logic: it gives Washington power projection against adversaries and leverage in relations with its allies.
To the degree there may have been free-riding aspects in the foreign policies of US allies, this pales next to their overall contribution to US foreign policy.
Allies were an essential part in the US victory in its Cold War competition with the Soviet-led communist bloc and are integral in the current era of strategic competition with China.
Overblown claims of free-riding overlook the fact that when US interests differ from its allies, it has either vetoed their actions or acted decisively itself, with the expectation reluctant allies will eventually follow.
During the Cold War, the US maintained a de facto veto over which allies could acquire nuclear weapons (the UK and France) and which ones could not (Germany, Taiwan, South Korea).
In 1972, the US established a close relationship with China to contain the Soviet Union – despite protestations from Taiwan, and the security concerns of Japan and South Korea.
In the 1980s, Washington proceeded with the deployment of US missiles on the soil of some very reluctant NATO states and their even more reluctant populations. The same pattern has occurred in the post-Cold War era, with key allies backing the US in its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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The problems with coercion
Trump’s recent comments on Greenland and Canada suggest he will take an even more assertive approach toward allies than during his first term. But the line between a reasonable US policy response and a coercive one is hard to draw.
It is not just that US policymakers have the challenging task of determining that line. In pursuing such a policy, the US also risks eroding the hard-earned credit it earned from decades of investment in its alliance network.
There’s also the obvious point that it takes two to tango in an alliance relationship. US allies are not mere pawns in Trump’s strategic chessboard. Allies have agency.
They will have been strategizing how to deal with Trump since before the presidential campaign in 2024. Their options range from withholding cooperation to various forms of defection from an alliance relationship.
Are the benefits associated with a disruption of established alliances worth the cost? It is hard to see how they might be. In which case, it is an experiment the Trump administration might be well advised to avoid.
Nicholas Khoo is associate professor of international politics and principal research fellow, Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs (Christchurch), University of Otago
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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asiatimes.com · by Nicholas Khoo · January 21, 2025
3. A Korean-style armistice for Ukraine?
It is amazing how the legacy of the (unended) Korean War continues to this day. I want to go back and re-read Dean Acehson's book Present at the Creation and review all the strategic thinking that went into the decisions to support the Republic of Korea and going to the UN for a mandate to defend the South. Some of their thinking was prescient and may continue to manifest effects in the 21st century. Then I will review Eisenhower's biography to study what went into the strategic discussions about the Armistice Agreement. Then we should re-read Admiral C. Turner Joy's book How Communists Negotiate to prepare to do negotiation battle with Putin. Perhaps national security officials in the Trump administration should do the same.
A Korean-style armistice for Ukraine? - Asia Times
Trump may table the idea of an armistice agreement to stop the war but the Russians will likely demand considerably more
asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · January 21, 2025
The New York Times reports that US officials are planning to propose an “armistice” for Ukraine, allegedly similar to how the Korean War ended in 1953. However, an Armistice Agreement like the Korean one does not align with Russia’s goals and probably can’t be achieved if limited to a ceasefire.
The 1953 agreement was reached after difficult negotiations that involved the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, the former Soviet Union and United Nations forces. Its main provisions were:
- suspending open hostilities;
- withdrawing all military forces and equipment from a 4,000-meter-wide zone, establishing the Demilitarized Zone as a buffer between the forces;
- both sides will not enter the air, ground or sea areas under control of the other;
- an arrangement for the release and repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and
- a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to ensure adherence to the truce terms.
The Korean armistice is now 72 years old. For the most part, it has prevented open war involving North and South Korea.
The demilitarized zone, or DMZ, in Korea is about 160 miles long and 2.5 miles wide. Running through the DMZ is a Military Demarcation Line (MDL) which is where the opposing forces were when an armistice was reached.
The DMZ does not extend to the Yellow Sea which was not included in the armistice. The DMZ itself does not follow the 38th parallel north which was the boundary agreed by the US and the USSR at the end of World War II, although parts of the DMZ follow the 38 parallel.
Other than the Yellow Sea issue (including a number of islands that are heavily militarized), the DMZ is reasonably close to a final border should North and South Korea ever normalize their relations and sign a peace treaty.
The North Koreans have hinted, from time to time, that they are seeking a peace agreement (and especially US recognition and US security assurances), while the issue in South Korea is far more divisive and uncertain, fearing that normalization could undermine stability in South Korea and lead to a deal where US and allied forces would be withdrawn.
President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stand on the North Korean side in the Demilitarized Zone, June 30, 2019, at Panmunjom.
The Ukraine issue is territorial, military and political. Russia annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces in September 2022 and Crimea in 2014. While the borders of Crimea are generally well recognized, the borders of the four provinces are not so clear.
Based on the official Ukrainian Oblast designations, Russia does not fully control any of these territories and fighting is going on as the Russian army appears to be aiming at occupying as much territory as possible before negotiations start. Assuming that a deal could be made on borders, there are a host of questions that are more complicated.
Among them are the rights of citizens on both sides of any demarcation line, trade between Ukraine and Russia, whether key utilities can be restored and utilized such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power complex, water supply to Crimea from Ukraine, the status of ports and port and storage facilities on the Black Sea, the status of military ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, the location of long-range weapons and the presence of NATO forces on Ukraine’s soil.
Additional issues include the status of Ukraine’s armed forces, Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO, types of security guarantees, oil and gas transit and related sanctions on Russia.
An armistice would need to cover the presence of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk area (Russia has liberated about 50% of the Kursk incursion, but it could take months before the Ukrainians are finally pushed out if the war continues).
When the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, United Nations Forces were stationed in South Korea, and Chinese “volunteers” were in the North. Ukraine is different: officially there are no NATO forces (strictly defined) in Ukraine, although the Russian army is in Ukraine.
Numerous reports say that a number of NATO countries (UK, France and even Germany) are preparing to send troops to Ukraine when an Armistice is agreed and to offer Ukraine security guarantees. One problem is that an Armistice monitoring force and an Armistice military deployment that would provide security guarantees to Ukraine are not the same thing.
Under the original Minsk agreements (2014, 2015) the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was supposed to monitor the Minsk agreements. OSCE sent observers, not an army. OSCE then had 57 members including Russia and Ukraine. Essentially the deal was to end hostilities and to grant autonomy to Luhansk and Donetsk (although both would remain territories inside Ukraine). The deal was never implemented.
Russia’s war objectives, as we understand them, include not only recognition of the annexed areas but the demilitarization of Ukraine and an agreement that Ukraine will not become a NATO member. Whether this includes security guarantees with major NATO countries is not clear. It is hard to see how an Armistice Agreement could be concluded without addressing these issues.
The US view is that Russia is hurting enough economically and its losses in the Ukraine war serious enough to incentivize the Russians to accept an Armistice, that would include some sort of buffer zone, essentially freezing the conflict and conceding some Ukrainian territory on a de facto, but not de jure basis. In this context, such a deal on these broad terms would be similar to the 1953 Korean Armistice.
After signing annexation treaties, Vladimir Putin joined hands with the four men Russia put in charge of the occupied regions.
Obviously, the Russian outlook does not align with the one under development in Washington. Russia is not looking for an armistice but for a comprehensive deal with the US and NATO.
A temporary Armistice Agreement (essentially a ceasefire in place) might be possible if it was linked to agreed political steps, but it seems unlikely to be accepted as any long-term solution. Biden administration informants have hinted at a 10-year or even 20-year pause, but that idea does not have much traction for Russia as it would allow Ukraine to rebuild its army and its weapon stockpile.
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President Trump has some cards to play. He could send more aid to Ukraine to prolong the conflict but it is doubtful this is Trump’s aim. He can offer sanctions relief to the Russians, even some accommodation with NATO.
At the same time, the new administration knows how fragile Ukraine itself is, with its military losing one battle after another, short on manpower, encountering popular resistance to the enforced draft, and suffering high casualties.
It is hard to predict where any of this will go but President Trump has signaled his desire to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin, starting with a phone call in the days ahead. Trump will table the idea of an Armistice Agreement: the Russians will demand considerably more.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
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asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · January 21, 2025
4. The real insurrectionists in South Korea
An important essay. This is strategic competition between two members of the Dark Quad (PRC and nK) and their allies in the radical Korean left.
It is imperative that the ROK/US alliance recognize their strategy to subert South korea to create effects to undermine South Korea to damage and eventually break the ROK/US alliance.
In is crucial to understand the strategic of the Dark Quad and the radical Korean left to create dilemmas for the US and to provide freedom of action for the PRC in Northeast Asia and set the conditions for a north align South korea to eventually domination of the Korean peninsula by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State to the north.
It is key that the Korea watchers, the pundits, and the press EXPOSE these strategies.
And it is critical that policy makers and strategists in the ROK US alliance devise policies and strategies to attack these strategies (with a superior political warfare strategy)
The real insurrectionists in South Korea - Asia Times
Leftist opposition has launched de facto coup by seeking to overwhelm executive office with judicial power applied in entirely dubious ways
asiatimes.com · by Jason Morgan, Kenji Yoshida · January 22, 2025
When South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol issued his now-infamous martial law decree in the early hours of December 3, 2024, it seemed to many observers that his fate was sealed. With no apparent reason for the decree beyond reining in some recalcitrant lawmakers in the legislature, Yoon’s martial law move looked like a massive overreaction.
While reserving judgment on whether the president’s actions were unconstitutional, without having exhausted other political options, we argued at the time that Yoon’s martial law was a political misstep.
Even if Yoon survived the subsequent impeachment proceedings, we wrote, he had consigned his presidency to permanent lame-duck status—a long fade-out into oblivion. And so, it seemed to us then, the post-martial-law Yoon administration would limp along in ignominy.
But one thing stays constant then and now. A martial law declaration is a political question, one made at the discretion of the chief executive. Recall that when Yoon declared martial law on December 3, he was doing so as the sitting president. Martial law is something he had every right to declare. So, there was never any broad constitutional question at stake in that regard.
Whether declaring martial law without an apparent justifiable cause amounts to an egregious unconstitutional act–that is, an impeachable offense–is a matter for the Constitutional Court to resolve. Similarly, whether Yoon’s martial law decree constitutes an act of insurrection, as opposition parties so claim, is a question for the same court and criminal courts to address.
To that end, the question surrounding Yoon’s December 3 declaration is entirely soluble under the local constitution and law. It should have begun and ended as a straightforward question of what is allowed under the Constitution.
But Yoon’s opponents–namely the opposition Democratic Party and the investigative agency probing Yoon–have changed the stakes. If anything, their decision to recklessly escalate tensions in response to Yoon’s martial law gambit has inadvertently bolstered the argument for its necessity.
Let’s begin with the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials’ (CIO) fixation on arresting a sitting president on allegations of inciting an insurrection. After one failed attempt, the CIO on January 15 apprehended Yoon from his residence under a controversial warrant issued by the Seoul Western District Court.
Four days later, judge Cha Eun-kyung from the same court granted a formal arrest of the president, extending the detention for another 20 days, including the initial 48 hours allowed under local law.
Besides the unprecedented nature of such warrants in South Korean history, they are almost certainly illegal. The CIO, first and foremost, does not have jurisdiction to investigate the president on insurrection charges.
This investigative agency was created in 2020 under the leftist Moon Jae-in administration, which sought to rein in the prosecution, an institution the left had generally viewed as overpowered. By its own guidelines, the CIO’s authority is confined to investigating high-ranking officials, namely judges, public prosecutors and police officers, for corruption and the like.
But to gain an upper hand in a turf war among other investigative agencies over this “case of the century,” the CIO pressed forward with absurd reasoning that it had the right to probe the president for abuse of power, with insurrection charges being a natural extension of that crime.
In other words, the CIO decided that Yoon was guilty of insurrection–even before the CIO arrested him for it–and then used that presumption of guilt to justify an expansion of its scope of power to include a sitting president.
Even more astounding, the courts actually bought their argument. Two judges issued arrest warrants and one recently granted a formal arrest warrant against Yoon by ignoring the Criminal Procedure Act and never addressing exactly how the CIO has jurisdiction over the case.
More egregiously, during the execution of the second arrest warrant on January 15, the CIO and its authorities reportedly coerced the military commander at the presidential residence into authorizing their entrance.
According to news reports, this was done using falsified documents. The paperwork lacked the required seal of the Presidential Security Service’s chief, and instead, an unrelated scrap of paper bearing the stamp of a military commander was affixed to the official document, rendering the entire arrest procedurally invalid.
As if detaining Yoon weren’t enough, the CIO has lately escalated matters by preventing the president from meeting anyone other than his attorneys—not even his wife, the First Lady. And all this is taking place as Yoon’s trial at the Constitutional Court, determining whether he will be reinstated or formally removed from office, is pending decision.
For his part, Yoon is rightly pushing back. This is a classic example of the fruit of the poisonous tree: if the source (CIO’s jurisdictional overreach and illegal warrants) is tainted, everything derived from it is inherently compromised.
The chaos unleashed by the CIO is only half the story, however. Let us now turn our attention to the madcap maneuvers of the main opposition Democratic Party and their run-amok impeachment obsession.
Since the December 3 martial law declaration, the party has impeached President Yoon and the first acting president Prime Minister Han Duk-soo, the latter under an arbitrary rule set by the speaker of the parliament from the Democratic Party.
They have even gone so far as to threaten impeachment against the current acting president Choi Sang-mok and everyone in the line of succession if their demands are not met. This is on top of some two dozen impeachment motions against state officials and prosecutors filed by the Democratic Party since Yoon’s inauguration in May 2022. Several prosecutors involved in the ongoing probes into opposition leader Lee were also impeached.
For the past six weeks, moreover, the Democratic Party has relentlessly promoted the notion that Yoon incited insurrection on December 3, aggressively shaping the narrative for public consumption. But perhaps realizing the uphill battle of proving insurrection—a charge with a high burden of proof and in Yoon’s case very little proof—they are now pivoting away from it.
Rather, they have amended articles of impeachment to claim that Yoon failed to follow proper procedures when declaring martial law. This is quite the about-face for a party that, just a while ago, was steadfast in accusing Yoon of spearheading an insurrection, deploying the term as if it were a mantra and repeating it 29 times in their impeachment article.
What, then, is driving the Democratic Party’s perilous behavior? Beyond their clear intent to end a conservative presidency, they are seizing this moment to pave an unobstructed path for their leader, Lee, to ascend to the helm.
With two of Lee’s liberal rivals, Cho Kuk and Song Young-gil, recently imprisoned, and no viable contender emerging from the ruling party, Yoon’s fall would all but ensure Lee’s rise. For this reason, the party is intent on crushing any attempts to sabotage their plan, even if it means further elevating the tension already paralyzing South Korean society and politics.
Earlier this month, the Democratic Party unveiled the Minju Police Box, an online platform inviting citizens to report individuals for allegedly spreading false information about the December 3 martial law declaration. Unsurprisingly, what qualifies as false information remains entirely subjective.
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Despite mounting criticism over censorship, the opposition has doubled down, pledging to track and pursue legal action against those accused of conspiring in an insurrection by spreading “false claims.”
One opposition lawmaker has even floated the idea of monitoring Kakaotalk, South Korea’s most widely used messaging app. Already, the party has filed police complaints against ten conservative Youtubers and several ruling party lawmakers.
But perhaps what the opposition party and the CIO have overlooked in their calculations is the very real possibility that their hotheaded pursuits could spectacularly backfire–which they clearly have.
Yoon’s supporters, who initially seemed to have been taken aback by Yoon’s declaration of martial law and resigned to the political consequences of that seemingly rash decision, are rallying decisively to his defense.
The South Korean electorate appears to have seen through the opposition’s facade. The president’s ratings have now surpassed 50% and the ruling People Power Party’s ratings have overtaken that of the opposition Democratic Party.
By escalating the martial law issue by means of injudicious use of judicial authority, the South Korean oppositionists have, ironically, sidelined the martial law issue and energized Yoon’s base like never before.
The tables have turned. The left is caught in a political whirlpool over the martial law debacle, while the right is taking the moral high ground, fighting for the survival of the country.
Because the calculus is different now, most South Korean conservatives are no longer concerned with the fate of Yoon alone but also with that of the constitutional order. South Korea, it would seem, is undergoing a coup d’etat by the left seeking to overwhelm executive power with judicial power applied in entirely dubious ways.
Many are in South Korea are thus asking the question: who are the real insurrectionists?
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asiatimes.com · by Jason Morgan, Kenji Yoshida · January 22, 2025
5. FM Cho discusses alliance, N. Korea with new USFK commander
The FM met with the new ROK/US Combined Forces Commander which belongs to the Republic of Korea in partnership with the US. When will the Korean press recognize the importance of the ROK/US CFC to the South and start emphasizing it to educate the Korean people? The ROK US/CFC (nor the UNC) should be an afterthought.
Excerpt:
Brunson took office as the USFK commander in December. He also serves as the commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.N. Command that oversees the armistice of the 1950-53 Korean War.
FM Cho discusses alliance, N. Korea with new USFK commander | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 22, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul met with the new top commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) on Wednesday and discussed the bilateral alliance and North Korea issues, Cho's office said.
In the meeting with Gen. Xavier Brunson, Cho highlighted that the commander's role in leading the U.S. troops in Korea is important for maintaining and strengthening the alliance and the allies' combined defense posture, the foreign ministry said in a release.
Cho also asked the general to do his part to ensure the key achievements of the alliance, including extended deterrence and the trilateral cooperation with Japan, continue to be implemented and developed.
Brunson, in turn, reaffirmed the United States' unwavering commitment to South Korea's defense and maintaining a strong combined defense posture through joint exercises, noting such efforts will ensure the stability of the region, according to the ministry.
The two sides also discussed the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region and agreed to bolster communication to maintain a robust alliance, the ministry added.
Brunson took office as the USFK commander in December. He also serves as the commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.N. Command that oversees the armistice of the 1950-53 Korean War.
Gen. Xavier Brunson (L), top commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, poses with Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Jan. 22, 2025, in this photo provided by Cho's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 22, 2025
6. Incheon invites Trump to Operation Chromite commemoration event
It would be great to have POTUS to attend. I would like to have him visit the MacArthur museum there and have a photo of him taken next to the MacArthur exhibit observing the Incheon landing:
Incheon invites Trump to Operation Chromite commemoration event
The Korea Times · January 21, 2025
Incheon Mayor Yoo Jeong-bok, right, poses with U.S. President Donald Trump's close aide John Mark Burns in Washington, Sunday. Courtesy of Incheon Metropolitan City
By Jhoo Dong-chan
Incheon Mayor Yoo Jeong-bok invited U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance to the 75th anniversary event for Operation Chromite slated for September, the city official said Tuesday.
Operation Chromite was the code name for an amphibious assault on the port city of Incheon during the Korean War that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of the United Nations Command.
According to the official, the invitation is expected to be delivered via Trump’s close aide, John Mark Burns.
“The historic significance of Operation Chromite is similar to Operation Overlord,” Yoo said in the invitation letter. Operation Overlord was the code name for the Allied Forces’ Normandy Invasion in World War II.
“This will display the strong bond of the Korea-U.S. alliance if President Trump comes to the event.”
Yoo met Burns on the second day of his four-day trip to the United States.
“Operation Chromite is of historic significance since the United Nations Command managed to reverse the war situation and retook Seoul during the Korean War,” Yoo said during a meeting with Burns.
“Not many Korean War veterans are still alive now. Incheon Metropolitan City wants to express a token of gratitude for their sacrifice before it is too late.”
Burns said he would do his best to invite Trump and Vance to the event.
Yoo also met Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Cho Hyun-dong on the first day of the trip.
During his meeting with the ambassador, the mayor said he also plans to invite leaders of the eight United Nations members who fought in the Korean War as well as U.S. governors and veterans for the commemoration event.
The Korea Times · January 21, 2025
7. Suicide and soap operas: North Koreans react to being Ukrainian POWs
Suicide and soap operas: North Koreans react to being Ukrainian POWs
Politico · by Veronika Melkozerova · January 21, 2025
The capture of two North Korean soldiers definitively proves Pyongyang is sending military support to Russia.
North Korea has sent some 12,000 soldiers to join its Russian ally. | Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty Images
January 21, 2025 3:46 pm CET
By
KYIV — One of the North Korean soldiers recently captured by Ukraine first tried to commit suicide, but then asked to watch Korean romance movies, said the Ukrainian paratroops who captured him.
“He was already wounded in a battle, but remained relatively calm until the evacuation vehicle arrived,” one of the soldiers of the 95th assault brigade told the Ukrainian Airborne Forces’ press service in a video interview published on Tuesday. “We were escorting him to the road where there were some concrete pillars … and suddenly he ran and hit his head on the pillar.”
North Korea has sent some 12,000 soldiers to join its Russian ally in trying to expel Ukrainian troops in Russia’s Kursk region after Kyiv’s surprise offensive last August.
The North Koreans showed up on the battlefield in late October, and have since earned a grim reputation among Ukrainians for apparently preferring to kill themselves rather than surrender.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said North Korea has seen 4,000 dead or wounded soldiers since joining the war.
On Jan. 11, Ukrainian forces managed to capture two North Koreans alive; they were taken to Kyiv, where South Korea’s spy agency has been assisting, for medical treatment and interrogation.
Neither the Kremlin nor Pyongyang, which signed a limitless partnership treaty with each other last summer, have confirmed North Korea’s participation in the war against Ukraine. Kyiv has even reported Russians were instructed to burn the faces of dead North Koreans to make them difficult to identify.
That makes capture of the two North Koreans of enormous propaganda value to Ukraine. During video interrogations, published by Zelenskyy, the North Korean POWs said they were told they were being deployed to Russia for training and then fighting, and that they were issued fake Russian military IDs.
The Ukrainian paratroopers who captured both said they found one soldier wounded in a trench after a failed Russian assault on Ukrainian positions.
“He was lying there, with his head and an arm wounded. He had a grenade, a knife and a sausage on him. I asked him to drop everything, but he refused to drop the sausage because it was food, so we let him keep it,” a Ukrainian soldier said.
After the North Korean tried to kill himself by ramming his head into a pillar, the paratroops passed him on to another unit.
“He calmed down. Other soldiers treated his wounds and fed him. Later, he even asked to turn on romance movies for him in Korean,” said the soldier.
Related Countries
North Korea Russia Ukraine
Related People
Volodymyr Zelenskyy
Politico · by Veronika Melkozerova · January 21, 2025
8. Experts: “Trump Should Use Korea to Check China… Strengthening Defense Industry Cooperation Also Needed”
A followup article from VOA journalist Eunjung Cho with a number of Korea watchers. Some of us mention the importance of South Korea to US strategic competition with China.
This is a Google translation of a VOA report.
Experts: “Trump Should Use Korea to Check China… Strengthening Defense Industry Cooperation Also Needed”
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7945271.html
U.S. experts on the Korean Peninsula have suggested that the Trump administration in its second term use South Korea to check China. They also emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation with South Korea, a defense industry powerhouse. Reporter Cho Eun-jung reports.
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Andrew Yeo, Brookings Institution Korea Chair
Andrew Yeo, the Brookings Institution Korea Chair, said, “Even if President Trump demands a greater burden on the alliance (from South Korea), I recommend maintaining the size of the U.S. military presence in South Korea at the current level.”
[Recording: Yeo Chairperson] “I would make recommendations that would enable Trump to, I think leverage that alliance when it comes to things like US force presence of USFK troops. I would suggest even if he's going to ask for a greater alliance burden share, my recommendation is to maintain that force level, to not lower the number of troops especially if there's concerns about China, Chinese aggression within the region in order to sustain whether it's deterrence or denial, whatever strategy you prefer I think you still need to sustain US force presence.”
“The U.S.-South Korea alliance adds value to the United States and can become part of the America First policy,” Yeo said in a phone call with VOA on the 21st.
He specifically said that he “recommends that President Donald Trump utilize the US-South Korea alliance” to contain China during his second term.
“If there are concerns about China, such as coercive actions in the region, the level of US troop deployment (on the Korean Peninsula) should be maintained to deter China or pursue a ‘denial strategy,’” the spokesperson said.
“A key partner in the competition with China”
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia Pacific Strategy Center
David Maxwell, vice president of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center, also said in a phone call with VOA on the 20th, “Korea is a country that plays a key role in the strategic competition with China.”
[Recording: Vice President Maxwell] “In short, it's a key player in strategic competition versus the PRC. And South Korea is not only critical to peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in Japan, but its strategic location also supports trilateral cooperation to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, which includes the defense of Taiwan.”
He continued, “Korea not only plays an important role in the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and Japan, but also supports trilateral cooperation (between the U.S. and Korea and Japan) to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific based on its strategic location.”
He added that the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy supported by South Korea also includes the defense of Taiwan.
Scott Snyder, President, Korea Economic Institute (KEI)
Scott Snyder, director of the Korea-America Economic Institute, also said, “If the alliance was revitalized under the Biden administration, it will be reconstructed under the Trump administration,” adding that cooperation to respond to China will continue to expand.
[Recording: Director Snyder] “So I think that we will see a continued expansion of coordination as related to how to effectively deal with the China threat. It doesn't mean that North Korea will be abandoned as a focus of concern, but as the US thinks about China, the types of expectations and the mechanisms for achieving deterrence against both North Korea and China may be readjusted in various ways. The really important thing is that South Korea is an invaluable partner to the United States in Northeast Asia. And as threats evolve, that cooperation through the Alliance, I think, will remain a bedrock for the US strategy.”
“With the U.S. focusing on China, expectations and mechanisms for building deterrence against North Korea and China could be readjusted in a variety of ways,” he said.
“What’s really important is that South Korea is a very important partner for the United States in Northeast Asia,” he continued. “As threats evolve, cooperation through alliances will be the foundation of America’s strategy.”
“We must promote cooperation in the defense industry, including shipbuilding”
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation
Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, told VOA in a telephone interview on the 20th that since the war in Ukraine, the U.S. stockpile of ammunition and missiles has been “dangerously low,” and that President Trump “needs to strengthen cooperation with our allies, especially South Korea, which has a very developed defense industry.”
[Recording: Researcher Klingner] “So it's clear that we need to have greater coordination with our allies, particularly South Korea, which has such an impressive defense industry, that we need to lower the barriers for greater co-development and co-production of weapons systems, as well as ammunition and missiles.”
He continued, “We must lower the barriers to joint development and joint production of weapons systems, ammunition and missiles.”
Regarding cooperation in the shipbuilding industry, he said, “Korea has a very impressive shipbuilding industry,” and “I expect cooperation related to all auxiliary ships, support ships, and logistics ships that strengthen the combat power of the U.S. Navy, although it may not be U.S. warships.”
“We must recognize Korea’s contributions with a long-term perspective”
There were also suggestions regarding President Trump's perception and approach toward Korea.
Sydney Seiler, former National Intelligence Analyst for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council (NIC)
Sidney Seiler, former director of the National Intelligence Council’s North Korea policy division, told VOA on the 20th, “President Trump will act with a specific worldview and perspective on issues of common interest between the U.S. and South Korea,” adding, “I urge President Trump to have a long-term perspective (regarding South Korea).”
[Recording: Former analyst Sylar] “I would only urge the president to think of the long term. You'll want to make some near-term headlines by reaching out to countries that have these large trade deficits, reaching out to countries that aren't paying enough for their national defense. But you’ll think about longer-term, when guided along the right path, the US-ROK relationship is of value to the United States and Americans across socio-economic spectrum all can benefit from this alliance.”
While President Trump may want to make short-term headlines by reaching out to countries with which the U.S. has a trade surplus and those that are not paying enough for their defense, he said, “We need to remember that in the long term, the U.S.-South Korea alliance is valuable to the United States and can benefit the entire socio-economic spectrum of the U.S..”
Robert Manning, Stimson Center Senior Fellow
Robert Manning, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, also said, “I urge President Trump to reconsider his stance toward Korea,” adding, “Trump wants to attract a lot of investment into manufacturing, but Korea has already invested hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. manufacturing.”
Deputy Representative Maxwell also said, “South Korea has provided the world’s largest overseas US military base,” and “South Korea has been very friendly to the alliance, and the Trump administration should respect and acknowledge that.”
This is Eun-Jeong Jo from VOA News.
9. Editorial: S. Korea must prepare for Trump's risks, seize potential opportunities
There are opportunities.
Editorial: S. Korea must prepare for Trump's risks, seize potential opportunities
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/01/22/AY5KZ4D2IVBZ5I2UILXFMIWL7Y/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.01.22. 10:19
U.S. President Donald Trump holds up an executive orders after signing it at an indoor presidential inauguration parade event in Washington on Jan. 20. /AP-Yonhap News
U.S. President Donald Trump unleashed a wave of Make America Great Again (MAGA) policies on his first day in office. Regarding the Korean Peninsula, he stated that Kim Jong-un is “now a nuclear power,” adding that he “liked him” and suggesting that Kim would be “happy” with his return. During a video call with U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, Trump asked, “How’s Kim Jong-un doing?” and described him as “a tough cookie with very bad intentions.” While others around Trump had referred to North Korea as a “nuclear state,” this was the first time he personally made that reference. Trump also declared that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier,” emphasizing his negotiating skills.
Trump is unlikely to formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. He had previously rejected a dangerous nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un. However, he may leverage his relationship with Kim to highlight his own accomplishments, with the risk of crossing red lines. Trump is likely to claim that the U.S. is safer due to the dismantling of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the freezing of its nuclear program, possibly in exchange for lifting sanctions. If this occurs, it would represent a worst-case scenario for South Korea.
Seven years ago, Trump had advisors to keep him in check, but now his administration is filled with loyalists. It is likely that he will soon demand a significant increase in defense cost-sharing, using the potential withdrawal of U.S. troops as leverage. South Korea must establish a communication channel with Trump, particularly through Acting President Choi Sang-mok and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A passive stance on security matters is not always the best strategy. Trump has expressed openness to South Korea and Japan developing their own nuclear weapons. If he crosses certain lines, South Korea may have no choice but to pursue its own nuclear capabilities.
Trump has instructed to review existing trade agreements, which may include the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). While he did not announce a 10-20% universal tariff on that day, it is likely to be implemented soon. Subsidies for South Korean companies investing in the U.S. could also be reduced or eliminated.
Nonetheless, Trump’s top priority in foreign policy is containing China. South Korea could become a key partner in this endeavor, and it has been repeatedly confirmed that Trump is well aware of this. South Korea’s advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, nuclear power, and shipbuilding, are crucial to realizing America First policies. Trump has already requested cooperation from South Korean shipbuilders and reached an agreement on nuclear energy exports. Unexpected opportunities may arise across both security and economic sectors. While preparing for the risks associated with Trump, South Korea must seize these opportunities.
10. Living in fear: N. Korea intensifies security inspections along Chinese border
The irony is that the regime is the one living in fear. So it is trying to execute its own strategic strangulation campaign against the Korea people. The question is will this blow back on the regime in the future.
Living in fear: N. Korea intensifies security inspections along Chinese border - Daily NK English
In North Korea, sudden financial improvements often trigger suspicion, especially in border regions where many rely on forbidden activities like smuggling
By Eun Seol - January 21, 2025
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · January 21, 2025
FILE PHOTO: A border patrol checkpoint in Pungso county, Ryanggang province, can be seen in this photo, which was taken in February 2019. (Daily NK)
In North Korea’s North Hamgyong province, a wave of arrests by state security agents has residents living in constant fear, with many wondering not if, but when they’ll be targeted in what locals describe as a campaign of terror.
According to a source who spoke with Daily NK on Jan. 17, residents in the Chinese border areas of Hoeryong, Musan county, and Onsong county learned in early December that 30 Ministry of State Security inspectors had been deployed to their region. The news came through workplace announcements and neighborhood watch units.
The campaign’s intensity became clear on Jan. 4, when six ministry inspectors stormed the home of a woman in her twenties around 11 p.m. After searching her residence, they handcuffed her and dragged her out by her hair. Her screams echoed through the apartment building, drawing neighbors who witnessed the disturbing scene.
“She was just an ordinary woman who made a living selling clothes with her grandmother,” the source explained. “But she’d caught attention recently because her standard of living had noticeably improved. She started dressing better and bought new furniture and appliances, including a TV.”
In North Korea, sudden financial improvements often trigger suspicion, especially in border regions where many rely on forbidden activities like smuggling and processing remittances. Such lifestyle changes are typically viewed as evidence of illegal earnings.
While North Koreans know that state security agents and their informants closely monitor such changes, many feel compelled to take risks to survive. “The only way to make money here is to do things the government bans,” the source noted. “There’s even a saying that ‘money is found before the barrel of a gun.’ Still, everyone knows to keep a low profile even if they have money.”
Despite advance warning of the inspectors’ arrival, residents couldn’t simply abandon their means of survival. Many took precautions, such as lying low and destroying smuggled goods, but arrests continue. “The woman they took had just improved her lifestyle after one successful venture, yet they still targeted her. There’s fear because it seems no one is safe,” the source said.
Though these inspections aim to maintain regime stability, some argue they achieve the opposite effect. “Yes, they’re trying to protect the country,” the source reflected, “but arbitrarily arresting people only breeds distrust. A fearful population doesn’t strengthen the regime – it gradually weakens it.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · January 21, 2025
11. CIO under fire for excessive restrictions on detained President Yoon
CIO under fire for excessive restrictions on detained President Yoon
Critics argue the CIO's letter ban and visitor restriction on President Yoon Suk-yeol is "unprecedented"
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/01/22/4LJ4SFNUIZGSDEOGNCVVOB3WRE/
By Lee Min-jun,
Lee Jae-eun
Published 2025.01.22. 16:33
Detained South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at his third impeachment trial held at the Constitutional Court on Jan. 21, 2025. / News1
South Korea’s Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) issued an order on Jan. 21 prohibiting detained President Yoon Suk-yeol from sending or receiving letters following a ban on meeting visitors other than his lawyers.
The CIO cited the “potential risk of destroying evidence” for imposing such restrictions, but many legal experts have criticized these measures as excessive, arguing they violate the president’s fundamental human rights and undermine his right to defense. Many see the measures as retaliation for Yoon’s refusal to comply with previous summonses. The CIO made a second attempt to forcibly bring in Yoon for questioning on Jan. 21, the day he attended his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court.
After attending the third hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court, Yoon went to the Armed Forces Seoul District Hospital for medical treatment. However, unaware of Yoon’s whereabouts, the CIO sent six prosecutors and investigators to the Seoul Detention Center at around 5:00 p.m. to conduct a forced interrogation or door-to-door investigation. But Yoon had already left for the hospital at 4:43 p.m. in a Ministry of Justice convoy.
The detention center chief authorized Yoon’s hospital visit based on advice from the facility’s medical officer. “The doctor had recommended treatment for around a month, to the point that delaying it further was no longer an option,” Yoon’s legal team explained. Yoon returned to the detention center at 9:10 p.m., and the CIO left empty-handed at 9:47 p.m.
During a briefing, an official from the CIO said that the decision to ban Yoon from sending and receiving letters was made at around 3:00 p.m. on Jan. 20 to prevent the potential destruction of evidence. The restrictions on correspondence and meetings with visitors other than his lawyers will remain in effect until Yoon is formally indicted.
Critics argue the measures are unprecedented and discriminatory. Former Presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak were allowed to exchange letters and meet visitors other than their lawyers when they were detained. Park was only prohibited from corresponding with her co-defendant, Choi Seo-won (formerly Choi Soon-sil). Former lawmaker Lee Seok-ki, arrested in 2013 on charges of plotting an insurrection, faced similar restrictions, but he was permitted visits from immediate family.
“Imposing both measures on President Yoon is excessive and paints him as a shameless criminal who would use family members to destroy evidence,” said a lawyer. Yoon’s attorney, Yoon Gap-keun, described the correspondence ban as “an anti-human rights act, imposed without clear evidence of any risk of evidence destruction.”
President Yoon Suk-yeol headed for the Armed Forces Seoul District Hospital around 4:43 p.m. right after his impeachment trial held at the Constitutional Court on Jan. 21, 2025. / Newsis
CIO Chief Oh Dong-woon said on Jan. 1 that the law would be enforced strictly yet with civility. However, recent events have cast doubt on the civility of the process. The executions of the first and second arrest warrants, carried out on Jan. 3 and Jan. 15 at the presidential residence in Hannam-dong, Yongsan District, were broadcast live, and appeared more forceful and theatrical than respectful.
Yoon’s attorney visited the CIO on Jan. 8 to file a notice of appearance and requested a meeting with the investigative team, but the CIO rejected the request. Yoon’s legal team later said he would comply with court proceedings if charges were filed or a preliminary arrest warrant was requested, but the CIO maintained its stance, saying, “The policy to execute the arrest warrant remains unchanged.”
Critics say the CIO appeared fixated on arresting Yoon by deploying large police forces for the operations. Some criticized that the CIO only appeared fixated on arresting Yoon by deploying a large police force for the operation. The CIO opted for a similar approach on Jan. 20 when it attempted to forcibly bring in Yoon for questioning. “The CIO seems less concerned about conducting an investigation and more focused on publicly humiliating the president,” a former deputy prosecutor remarked.
12. Rubio stresses refocus on national interest as guiding mission of American foreign policy
No one should be afraid of or put off by this statement. This should be obvious to everyone. Our allies certainly understand and respect this since all countries must put their interests first. But we need to understand that alliances are critical to US national security interests (as well as to those of our alliance partners).
Rubio stresses refocus on national interest as guiding mission of American foreign policy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 22, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- New Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday reiterated the Trump administration's refocus on the United States' national interests as the guiding mission of its foreign policy, which he said seeks to make America "safer, stronger, and more prosperous."
A day after assuming office, Rubio outlined his department's priorities, including curbing mass migration and securing borders; rewarding performance and merit; stopping censorship and suppression of information; and doing away with climate policies that he said weaken America.
"President Trump has given me a clear direction to place our core national interest as the guiding mission of American foreign policy," he said in a statement.
"Every dollar we spend, every program we fund, and every policy we pursue must be justified with the answer to three simple questions: Does it make America safer?, Does it make America stronger?, Does it make America more prosperous?," he added.
This photo, released by Reuters, shows new U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaking to reporters at the State Department in Washington on Jan. 21, 2025. (Yonhap)
He pledged to pursue a "more innovative, nimble, and focused" State Department.
"This will require replacing some priorities, deemphasizing some issues, and eliminating some practices," he said.
The secretary reaffirmed Trump's focus on border security.
"The State Department will no longer undertake any activities that facilitate or encourage mass migration," he said. "Our diplomatic relations with other countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, will prioritize securing America's borders, stopping illegal and destabilizing migration, and negotiating the repatriation of illegal immigrants."
His priorities included removing climate initiatives -- that weaken America -- in pursuit of "energy dominance."
"While we will not ignore threats to our natural environment and will support sensible environmental protections, the State Department will use diplomacy to help President Trump fulfill his promise for a return to American energy dominance," he said.
He also called for a return to the "basics of diplomacy" by eliminating a focus on what he called "political and cultural causes that are divisive at home and deeply unpopular abroad."
"This will allow us to conduct a pragmatic foreign policy in cooperation with other nations to advance our core national interests," he said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 22, 2025
13. Lessons from Ukraine: Why the US Army Needs to Rethink Engineer Reconnaissance
Excerpt:
Reconnaissance extends beyond understanding the enemy’s maneuver plan, composition, and disposition. It involves numerous branch plans to comprehend the holistic operational picture through constant surveillance and analysis. Real-time lessons from the war in Ukraine and past US Army battles highlight that information on the modern battlefield is critical. Engineer reconnaissance supports the overall maneuver plan by informing commanders on how to best utilize limited combat power and counter enemy engineer efforts.
Lessons from Ukraine: Why the US Army Needs to Rethink Engineer Reconnaissance - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Adam Martin · January 22, 2025
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As the US Army modernizes and prepares for the challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield, it naturally seeks lessons from the war in Ukraine—lessons on everything from maneuver to drones to command post survivability and beyond. To not seek out these lessons would be a wasted opportunity—after all, the ongoing conflict is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. And in fact, Ukraine offers a glimpse into the future of warfare, but what it reveals are some striking parallels with that last major war in Europe. One of the areas in which this is most true is engineer reconnaissance. If the conduct of the war in Ukraine over the past three years is any indication—and there is little reason to expect otherwise—modern warfighters should prepare for the largest obstacle belts seen since World War II.
Russia’s Deep and Layered Defensive Lines
Current Russian defensive tactics in Ukraine—and the toll these tactics have taken on Ukrainian engineers—illustrate the complexities of large-scale combat operations. Russian obstacle belts are layered with dragon’s teeth, mines, wire obstacles, antitank and antivehicle ditches, infantry entrenchments, and protected artillery and vehicle positions. These obstacles aim to attrit attacking Ukrainian forces and retain captured land. The need for engineer reconnaissance is paramount in this evolved battlefield. Attacking forces require real-time intelligence before assaulting heavily defended positions.
Ukraine’s Response
Outnumbered and lacking both firepower and air superiority, the Ukrainian military has adapted its methods for attacking fortified positions. In August 2024, Ukrainian forces succeeded in conducting a breach of Russia’s defensive lines near the Russian town of Novyi Put by identifying and attacking weak points in the Russian defensive line. Extensive intelligence analysis, likely provided by drones, supplemented their limited forces. Ukrainian commanders understand that sending soldiers toward heavily defended positions without a clear understanding of the enemy defense is a waste of combat power. This lesson was hard learned during breach operations supporting the 2023 summer counteroffensive.
A study by the Royal United Services Institute indicates that many failures in the 2023 summer counteroffensive could have been prevented with adequate engineer reconnaissance. The study identified that Ukrainian engineers were poorly trained and equipped for large-scale breaches. Using US-provided mine-clearing line charges and Soviet UR-77 mine-clearing vehicles, the Ukrainians failed to grasp the depth of the emplaced minefields, often lacking enough line charges to complete lanes through the obstacle belts. Additionally, engineers lacked sufficient mine plows and demining vehicles, leaving military vehicles stuck in breach lanes and vulnerable to antitank guided missiles. Due to heavy losses in engineer combat power, the Ukrainian military resorted to dismounted clearance of minefields. Most of this explosive hazard clearance took place at night, straining Ukrainian logistical capabilities.
The US Army must learn from the Ukrainian military’s experience and appreciate the necessity of tactical engineer reconnaissance. To apply engineer expertise effectively before executing such operations, the Army should forward-deploy engineers to assess enemy obstacles, avenues of approach, potential bypass routes, and weak points in obstacle belts—ultimately to enable commanders to estimate the combat power necessary to maneuver forces through enemy defenses.
Engineer Reconnaissance in US Army Doctrine
Doctrinally, the US Army offers a foundation for understanding engineer reconnaissance in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-34.81. The publication outlines the who, what, and why of engineer reconnaissance. Yet the publication falls short in key areas. First, greater attention to should be paid to the role of tactical reconnaissance, which sits on a spectrum with technical reconnaissance on the other end. Tactical reconnaissance is essential for mobility, countermobility, and survivability to support maneuver commanders during large-scale combat operations. Mobility support must include identifying route status and condition, crossing-site reconnaissance, identifying complex or restrictive terrain, and obstacle reconnaissance. Countermobility operations should emphasize reconnaissance for engagement area development to provide commanders with ground-to-map intelligence on feasibility and logistical requirements. Reconnaissance for survivability must focus on terrain, enabling leaders and soldiers to understand its impact on both friendly and enemy operations.
Second, changes in Army force structure must drive changes in the way engineer reconnaissance capabilities are organized and assigned. The Army’s engineer reconnaissance manual outlines the capabilities and limitations of the engineer reconnaissance team (ERT). ERTs have generally been task-organized, with a cavalry squadron assigned tactical control. However, due to Army restructuring, this relationship is no longer possible. ERTs should now be task-organized to their parent engineer battalion or a supported maneuver battalion where engineer subject matter expertise resides through either the operations cell or task force engineer.
Lastly, leaders must dedicate training to develop subject matter expertise necessary to conduct tactical reconnaissance. For example, an engineer reconnaissance team on ground must understand the indicators that drive the intelligence reported. These may include subtle disturbances in soil representing heavy equipment operations, berm and antitank ditch characteristics, signs of enemy minefields, and other obstacle characteristics that assist in determining obstacle intent. Understanding these details and reporting accurate intelligence directly drives planning of the friendly attacking force and gives the commander an understanding of enemy fortifications.
Logistical support is crucial for extended operations, but ERTs can be sustained by the higher headquarters with which they have a command and support relationship. Geographic dislocation increases the risk assumed by the commander, but a tactical loss of a team or squad is more acceptable than a failed breach. Adequate structuring of ERTs at the tactical level increases the likelihood of operational success.
Concept Integration
The mission of engineer reconnaissance is to support maneuver warfare, with the goal of informing the maneuver commander and enabling decision-making. Integration is crucial in shaping how engineer reconnaissance supports maneuver commanders.
At combat training centers, ERTs often function as ad hoc organizations used as strike teams or to supplement scouting operations. This underutilization stems from a knowledge gap within the Army. With limited doctrinal reference, leaders rely on best practices and observations from training rotations at combat training centers. Integration begins with the commander’s dialogue and advocating for the capability to higher headquarters. Staffs must then incorporate this capability.
A brigade engineer must understand the ERT capability as well as the engineer commander to utilize it effectively. The brigade engineer’s participation in the targeting working group and recommendation of engineer-specific targets provide the ERT with a purpose in the overall maneuver plan. Depending on the operation phase, the brigade engineer will recommend targets aligned with obstacle intelligence or engagement area development intelligence, which ultimately feeds into the higher headquarters information collection plan.
Integration with the maneuver company or platoon must begin with a mutual understanding of the higher headquarters’ intent to collect intelligence on engineer-specific priority intelligence requirements. This requires subordinate maneuver commanders to understand their role in supporting the engineers in executing the brigade’s intent. Engineer reconnaissance reports are fed through the supporting maneuver command channels up to the higher headquarters. The integration of ERTs and understanding their mission to support the overall maneuver plan is crucial for informing senior commanders’ decision-making and affecting subordinate maneuver commanders’ execution.
Reconnaissance extends beyond understanding the enemy’s maneuver plan, composition, and disposition. It involves numerous branch plans to comprehend the holistic operational picture through constant surveillance and analysis. Real-time lessons from the war in Ukraine and past US Army battles highlight that information on the modern battlefield is critical. Engineer reconnaissance supports the overall maneuver plan by informing commanders on how to best utilize limited combat power and counter enemy engineer efforts.
Captain Adam Martin currently serves as team chief and OC/T (observer, coach, trainer) assigned to the 3-364th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 189th Infantry Brigade (CATB). His previous assignment was as a sapper company commander and he has served in infantry and Stryker brigade combat teams.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image: A soldier assigned to the 317th Brigade Engineering Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, operates the Anduril Ghost X medium-range reconnaissance drone during exercise Combined Resolve 25-1 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels Training Area, Hohenfels, Germany, January 14, 2025. (Credit: Spc. Thomas Dixon, US Army)
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Adam Martin · January 22, 2025
14. North Korea tells United Nations it is a 'responsible nuclear state'
The regime doth protest too much. This is a direct response to urloang standing criticism that north Korea is not a responsible member of the international community. It never has been and never will be a responsible state as long as the Kim family regime is in power.
World News Jan. 22, 2025 / 5:23 AM
North Korea tells United Nations it is a 'responsible nuclear state'
By Thomas Maresca
North Korea claimed it was a "responsible nuclear state" at a United Nations conference Tuesday. The remarks came amid high tensions on the Korean Peninsula, including the North's launch of several short-range ballistic missiles on Jan. 14. Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA-EFE
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (UPI) -- North Korea defended its right to maintain a nuclear weapons program at a United Nations disarmament conference in Geneva on Tuesday, shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump surprised allies by referring to the North as a "nuclear power."
"As a responsible nuclear weapons state, we will continue to make efforts to prevent all forms of war and to protect peace and stability," Jo Chol Su, North Korea's permanent representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said during the conference.
Jo blamed the United States for an "astronomical amount of arms buildup and undisguised nuclear proliferation."
"The U.S. and its allies keep on supplying high-tech military hardware ... resulting in conflicts and bloodshed in many parts of the world," Jo said.
Related
The North Korean representative pointed to recent trilateral air exercises held by the United States, South Korea and Japan, which included U.S. B-1B strategic bombers, as creating a dangerous climate in the region.
"The military provocations struggling for superiority of strength on the Korean Peninsula, the biggest hotspot in the world, escalate the tensions to the worst, causing a grave situation of possible outbreak of the most destructive thermonuclear war," Jo said.
Tensions have been high on the Korean Peninsula since the beginning of the year, with North Korea firing what it claims is a new hypersonic missile as well as a salvo of short-range missiles ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump's inauguration Monday.
While signing a raft of executive orders on his first day in the Oval Office, Trump touted his positive relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and acknowledged Pyongyang's nuclear status.
"I was very friendly with [Kim]," Trump told reporters during a press availability. "He liked me, I liked him. We got along very well."
"Now, he is a nuclear power," Trump said. "I think he'll be happy to see I'm coming back."
South Korea has been quick to dismiss the possibility of accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, a status granted only to five countries under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT.
"North Korea's status as a nuclear state cannot be recognized, and North Korea's denuclearization must continue to be pursued as a prerequisite for permanent peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but also around the world," Seoul's Defense Ministry said last week after Defense Secretary nominee Pete Hegseth also referred to Pyongyang as a "nuclear power."
Trump's return to the White House has led to speculation that he may look to revive nuclear negotiations with Kim. During his first term, Trump held two high-profile summits with the North Korean leader and met him briefly a third time at the DMZ.
The diplomatic outreach failed to result in a nuclear deal, however, and Pyongyang has accelerated the development of its weapons programs in the intervening years. North Korea's growing military relationship with Russia is a particular concern for Washington and its allies.
The North has sent munitions and missiles to Russia, as well as more than 12,000 troops to aid Moscow's war effort against Ukraine in the southwestern Kursk region, according to U.S. officials. Washington has warned that Russia intends to share advanced satellite and space technologies with Pyongyang in exchange.
Kim Il-hoon, South Korea's deputy permanent representative to the U.N. in Geneva, condemned North Korea's military cooperation with Russia as a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions at the disarmament conference Tuesday.
"The capture of two North Korean soldiers in Kursk clearly demonstrates that North Korean troops are engaged in combat," he said. "Many young soldiers' lives are being compromised to fulfill the objective of the North Korean regime."
Kim added that North Korea's rejection of its long-standing goal of peaceful reunification with the South has raised the specter of a nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
"North Korea redefined inter-Korean relations as 'two hostile states' at the end of 2023, scrapping the seven-decade-long policy of unification overnight and eliminating the psychological hurdle to justify a preemptive nuclear strike on fellow Koreans in the South," Kim said.
16. South Korea’s President, Impeached and in Jail, Winning Support in Polls
An important article.
Few in the English-language Korean media or the US media are calling attention to these important political shifts.
South Korea’s President, Impeached and in Jail, Winning Support in Polls
Liberal enthusiasm for ousting South Korea’s president is seen fading.
DONALD KIRK
Jan. 22, 2025 04:00 AM ET
nysun.com
South Korea’s impeached president, Yoon Suk-yeol, languishing in jail following his short-lived attempt to impose martial law, can take comfort in the resurgence of his conservative adherents in the wake of the leftist drive to have him ousted, imprisoned, and possibly executed.
The wave of liberal enthusiasm for stripping Mr. Yoon of all power is fading while increasing numbers of Koreans recognize that he may have been justified in losing all patience with the Minju, or Democratic Party, which controls the national assembly. It was after the Minju blocked just about every bit of legislation that Mr. Yoon proposed that he issued a martial law decree on December 3. The Minju majority in the assembly quickly rejected it, forcing him to rescind the decree, and then began the campaign to destroy him by voting 10 days later to impeach Mr. Yoon.
Eager to wreak complete vengeance, the Minju needs the country’s constitutional court to oust Mr. Yoon from office by approving the impeachment motion. Simultaneously, a posse known as the Corruption Investigation Office for high-level officials has him in jail awaiting possible indictment for staging an insurrection, a crime that carries life imprisonment or the death penalty.
Poll results — on top of widespread, sometimes violent protests — show that the popular support on which Mr. Yoon’s enemies counted is waning. Increasingly, on the streets of Seoul and other large cities, speculation turns to the possibility of clashes between leftists and rightists; China is often blamed for spurring the left in a bid to dominate the South.
“More people want to keep Yoon-aligned PPP in power than not,” reads a headline in Joongang Daily on the English translation of an article published in Joongang Ilbo, one of Korea’s best-selling newspapers.
The poll, conducted for Joongang by a Seoul polling organization, Realmeter, showed 48.6 percent of 1,004 respondents support Mr. Yoon’s party. That figure compares with 46.2 percent who do not.
The poll does not say what percentage want Mr. Yoon to return to his duties as president. It does, though, show a measure of respect — if not popularity — for the man who made his mark as a public prosecutor before defeating the Minju leader, Lee Jae-myung, by a slim margin in 2022.
Facing charges of corruption in real estate dealings, Mr. Lee still hopes to win the presidency in a “snap” election that would have to happen 60 days after the constitutional court upheld the impeachment decree, stripping Mr. Yoon of the title of president. Regardless of the court’s decision, Mr. Yoon’s enemies are likely to go on trying to eviscerate him for the insurrection, or “coup against the government,” as they call his six-hour fling at martial law.
The Joongang Ilbo poll, though, clearly has many people thinking twice about the wisdom, or common sense, of persecuting a man who has stood up firmly against North Korea, in contrast to the record of his leftist predecessor, Moon Jae-in. From the American viewpoint, Mr. Yoon’s greatest accomplishment has been to enthusiastically approve joint exercises by American and South Korean troops — something Mr. Moon had rejected.
“It appeared that the PPP had recovered public support nearly 50 days after President Yoon’s botched imposition of martial law,” Joongang Ilbo said. “Public support for the PPP,” the paper noted, “dropped to 26.2 percent in the first week of December in an identical series of surveys by Realmeter.”
As is often the case in South Korea, regional differences mattered. Mr. Yoon is most popular in the southeastern region including the enormous, flourishing port of Busan and the industrial city of Daegu. In the southwestern region, including the restive city of Gwangju, a hotbed of opposition and the scene of a bloody revolt in May 1980, the Minju is favored.
Polls, though, are open to question and criticism, as Joongang Ilbo recognized in a previous article.The paper reported analysts saying that “small, inexperienced polling agencies” were “undermining the accuracy and neutrality of surveys.”
The paper railed against “excessive pollster activities,” which it said could “negatively affect voters’ behaviors toward political surveys” conducted via random calls, sometimes to temporary numbers. “Voter fatigue with political polls can undermine accuracy,” it said. “People who are fed up with incoming calls from pollsters will likely decline them.”
nysun.com
16. Former North Korean Senior Official: “Trump’s North Korean Condo Mention Was a Diplomatic Message”
Excerpts:
“ The coastal condo that President Trump mentioned (on the 20th ) is presumed to be the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone ,” said Ri Jeong-ho, head of the Korea Prosperity Development Center and a former senior official in Room 39 of the North Korean Workers’ Party who appears on RFA’s weekly program. “ This is a message with a context that has continued from the past . ”
He said in a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 20th , " It is possible that President Trump and General Secretary Kim exchanged letters and discussed the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone even after the failure of the Hanoi summit . "
Former North Korean Senior Official: “Trump’s North Korean Condo Mention Was a Diplomatic Message”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/trump-north-korea-condo-capabilities-tourism-01212025145551.html
WASHINGTON-Jamin Anderson andersonj@rfa.org
2025.01.21
Wonsan Galma Coastal Tourist Area, scheduled to open in June next year.
/Korean Central News Agency
00:0003:39
Anchor : U.S. President Donald Trump mentioned North Korea's coastal condominiums immediately after his inauguration, drawing attention to the background and intention behind his remarks . A former North Korean official analyzed that this remark was not a simple, impromptu idea , but a diplomatic message with a context that has continued from the past . Reporter Jamin Anderson reports .
[ President Trump ] We had a great time . I think ( Kim Jong Un ) would be happy to see me back . I think he has the potential to build a ton of condos . North Korea has a lot of coastline .
These are remarks made by President Trump during an executive order signing ceremony in the Oval Office of the White House on the 20th .
U.S. President Donald Trump (right) signs a stack of executive order documents one by one in the Oval Office of the White House on the 20th, his first day in office. /Yonhap News
He mentioned North Korea during a conversation about security threats to the United States and mentioned beachfront condos.
This is not the first time President Trump has made such remarks.
At a press conference held in Singapore in June 2018 for the US-North Korea summit, he also revealed that he had proposed building a hotel to then-North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong -un, saying, “ North Korea has a great beach ” and “ we could build the best hotel in the world . ”
“ The coastal condo that President Trump mentioned (on the 20th ) is presumed to be the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone ,” said Ri Jeong-ho, head of the Korea Prosperity Development Center and a former senior official in Room 39 of the North Korean Workers’ Party who appears on RFA’s weekly program. “ This is a message with a context that has continued from the past . ”
He said in a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 20th , " It is possible that President Trump and General Secretary Kim exchanged letters and discussed the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone even after the failure of the Hanoi summit . "
[ Representative Lee Jeong-ho ] There is speculation that there have been frequent exchanges of letters between President Trump and General Secretary Kim recently . In those letters, there may have been things like, "It's okay to visit Pyongyang once," or there may have been talk about condos . It seems like that kind of connection is continuing .
In fact, General Secretary Kim visited the Wonsan Galma Coastal Tourist Zone in Gangwon Province with his daughter Ju-ae at the end of December and toured several facilities, including a newly built hotel .
As the tourist area is set to officially open in June of this year after 10 years of construction , interest in its background is growing in conjunction with President Trump's remarks .
This is particularly interesting to President Trump, who has a background in real estate, and could serve as an economic incentive for North Korea to denuclearize, Lee explained .
Representative Lee also revealed that in a meeting with U.S. government officials ahead of the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit, General Secretary Kim pointed out that the country was making efforts to develop the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone at the time .
[ Representative Lee Jeong-ho ] At the time, in a meeting attended by Matthew Pottinger, the White House National Security Council's Asia Director, and Senior Advisor Allison Hooker, I mentioned that Kim Jong-un was obsessed with building the Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone ( as a condition for negotiations on denuclearization ) . I suggested that this could be a more stimulating and advantageous way for us to diplomatically lead negotiations .
This discussion still serves as a valid strategic element in President Trump's dialogue with North Korea, and this statement also suggests that it is based on what was discussed in past negotiations .
Kim Jong- un tours Wonsan and Galma District with his much-eldered daughter Ju-ae
[ Room 39, Lee Jung-ho's Eyes ] " Kim Jong- un Reconstructs Official Residence and Office to Invite Trump "
[ Room 39, Lee Jung-ho's Eyes ] " Kim Jong - un May Have Already Sent a Letter to Trump "
As President Trump has made positive remarks about North Korea since his first day in office, attention is being paid to how this will affect the resumption of dialogue between the two countries .
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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