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Quotes of the Day:
"Take anything and everything seriously except yourselves."
– Rudyard Kipling
"Censorship, like charity, should begin at home; but, unlike charity, it should end there." - Clare Boothe Luce
"If you are able to state a problem, it can be solved."
– Edwin H. Land
1. North Korea uses Maduro arrest to justify nukes, but audience marvels at U.S. power
2. North Korean soldiers collapse during winter exercises as hunger and fatigue take toll
3. (ROK) Army's Special Warfare Command stages wintertime drills
4. In a turbulent world, Kim Jong Un’s regime looks more secure than ever
5. U.S. expert proposes S. Korea, U.S., others form 'collective economic deterrence' pact against Chinese pressure
6. Bookshelf: why the US failed to contain North Korea’s nuclear threat
7. Unification minister makes UNC-escorted visit to DMZ area
8. S. Korea becomes 1st nation to enact comprehensive law on safe use of AI
9. JCS vice chairman attends NATO Military Committee meeting in Belgium
10. Gov't urged to make all-out efforts to bring back N. Korean POWs in Ukraine
11. S. Korea says to seek consultation with UNC over push to reopen border trails inside DMZ
12. South Korea Economy Weakened in 2025 as Tariffs Took a Toll
13. PM departs for U.S. to meet with senior officials, possibly Vance
14. N. Korea ramps up 'people-first' policy push ahead of party congress
1. North Korea uses Maduro arrest to justify nukes, but audience marvels at U.S. power
Summary:
north Korea’s lectures meant to justify nuclear weapons backfired. By invoking the U.S. seizure of Nicolás Maduro, the regime intended to reinforce siege narratives and nuclear necessity. Instead, teachers and young workers fixated on the fact itself. A foreign president was taken. The United States could do that. The propaganda exposed power rather than fear, competence rather than threat. This is a classic cognitive slippage moment. The regime cannot fully control curiosity once it introduces real-world events. The audience compared slogans to facts and drew its own conclusions about reach and capability.
Comment: Message sent. Message received. More seriously: How should U.S., ROK, and ROK/U.S. alliance information and influence activities deliberately amplify these moments of unintended awe to erode regime narratives and stimulate questioning inside north Korea? How should our PSYOP or new Information Warfare Branch forces exploit this information to target the nKPA? How are VOA and RFA informing target audiences inside north Korea with this information or will they just continue to send lectures from Hillsdale College professors and content from One American Network News (OANN)?
North Korea uses Maduro arrest to justify nukes, but audience marvels at U.S. power
Despite regime intentions, lectures designed to justify nuclear weapons instead reminded North Koreans of American power as they questioned how a president could be kidnapped
By Eun Seol - January 22, 2026
dailynk.com
North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Sept. 13, 2024, that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un paid an on-site guidance visit to the Nuclear Weapons Institute and a "production base of weapon-grade nuclear materials,” where he inspected the production of nuclear warheads and nuclear materials and called for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
North Korea has conducted internal lectures criticizing the U.S. arrest and seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as a “U.S. act of gangsterism,” while once again justifying Pyongyang’s bolstering of its nuclear arsenal.
A Daily NK source in South Hamgyong province said recently that authorities “conducted a lecture for teachers in Hoesang district, Hamhung, in the afternoon of Jan. 5.” He said the lecture “justified North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, with the lecturer saying that the United States kidnapped the president of Venezuela and stressing that we don’t submit to U.S. threats because of our national power.”
According to the source, the lecturer criticized Maduro’s arrest as a “clear violation of sovereignty by the United States and an act of gangsterism.” He said that “given how conflicts around the world and U.S. invasions are worsening, we must bolster our nuclear strength one thousand-fold.”
In particular, the lecturer said that “because our self-defense as a strong military state has increased under the wise leadership of the Great Leader Kim Jong Un, enemies can’t touch us.”
The lecture also mentioned the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine USS Greeneville’s entry into the port of Busan, calling it “proof that the U.S. nuclear threat continues” and that “all U.S. moves are a standing nuclear threat toward us.”
Audience more curious about Venezuela than nuclear justifications
The lecture was convened to emphasize once again the justification for North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, but contrary to the authorities’ intention, the teachers who listened to it were more focused on whether the United States had actually captured President Maduro.
“Rather than the repeated justifications for nuclear weapons, it really felt like they were more interested in the international situation, namely, in what the heck happened in Venezuela.”
A lecture along the same lines was held at the Hamhung Youth Electric Appliances Plant.
“That lecture also emphasized the need for nuclear weapons and pride in our strengthened national defense,” the source said. “However, the young people who listened to it focused more on whether the Venezuelan president had really been kidnapped and the facts of the case, rather than on the lecture’s main subject.”
“How can you kidnap the president of another country?” the young people wondered. “If it’s true, the United States must be truly powerful.”
“Neither the teachers nor the young people cared much about the slogans and propaganda they’ve heard every lecture, but instead took interest in the Venezuelan president’s arrest,” the source said. “Contrary to the state’s intention, the lecture appears to have proven an opportunity to reawaken the public to just how powerful the United States is.”
In a Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s response to a reporter’s question carried by North Korea’s state-run KCNA on Jan. 4, the day after the United States arrested Maduro and brought him to New York, North Korea slammed the U.S. operation.
“The incident is another example that clearly confirms once again the rogue and brutal nature of the U.S. which the international community has so frequently witnessed for a long time,” the spokesperson said. “The Foreign Ministry of the DPRK strongly denounces the U.S. hegemony-seeking act committed in Venezuela as the most serious form of encroachment of sovereignty and as a wanton violation of the UN Charter and international laws with respect for sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity as their main purpose.”
Even though North Korea has not run news on what happened in Venezuela in the Rodong Sinmun or Korea Central TV—media consumed by local rather than international audiences—it has mentioned the incident in lectures, making active use of it in its propaganda to justify nuclear weapons development.
North Koreans living in regions along the border with China who learned about the Maduro seizure say that “nothing like the U.S. arrest of the Venezuelan president could ever happen in North Korea,” and that the United States “can’t invade since it’s afraid because we have nuclear weapons.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
2. North Korean soldiers collapse during winter exercises as hunger and fatigue take toll
Summary:
north Korea’s winter training is producing more collapses because the force is already depleted before the marches begin. Weekly 10 km loaded marches with roughly 20 kg of gear, sometimes in gas masks, are being imposed on troops weakened by chronic hunger, constant labor-tasking, and accumulated sleep debt. Commanders treat collapse as “lack of fortitude,” responding with insults and coercion instead of timely medical care. The regime may surge rations during the exercise window, but intermittent feeding cannot repair months of malnutrition and physical deterioration. The result is readiness theater that quietly degrades combat power.
Comment: If soldiers are collapsing in routine training, what does that imply about unit cohesion and battlefield endurance in the first month of a real war? How does this compare with the reports of nKPA experience in Putin's War? Relatively small number of troops sent to Russia could probably be better supported than the entire nKPA.
North Korean soldiers collapse during winter exercises as hunger and fatigue take toll
An unusually large number of troops are collapsing this year as chronic hunger, physical deterioration, and lack of rest combine with grueling weekly marches in extreme cold
dailynk.com
North Korean soldiers conducting training drills. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
As gear-laden North Korean soldiers trudge through the woods as part of their yearly winter exercises, which have been underway since Dec. 1, many are reportedly collapsing from exhaustion.
“Units with the V Corps, which is stationed in Pyonggang county, are having soldiers march in full gear every Saturday. Intense training in the extreme cold is pushing soldiers to their physical limits,” a source in North Korea’s Kangwon province told Daily NK recently.
According to the source, these forced marches in full gear, called loaded marches, are an integral part of the yearly winter exercises. They are considered necessary for developing soldiers’ physical strength and combat endurance.
In the V Corps’ Saturday marches this month, soldiers have trekked 10 kilometers through the hills while carrying 20 kilograms (44 pounds) of gear, including their weapons.
With these grueling exercises held every week, soldiers are reaching their physical limits and sometimes dropping to the ground from sheer fatigue.
“These loaded marches are tough to complete if you’re physically weak. Soldiers are expected to carry a heavy load for a distance that wouldn’t be easy to hike without any load at all. So every week, some soldiers fall by the wayside, unable to endure the strain,” the source said.
“Lack of fortitude” met with admonishment, not medical care
Exhausted soldiers are admonished by their commanders for “lack of fortitude.”
“If you can’t handle this kind of training, you’d have died ten times over in a real war,” one commander reportedly said.
“Pretend you’re at war and pick up the pace,” another was quoted as saying.
“If you have enough mental stamina, there’s nothing you can’t do,” another said.
“Officers are trying to bolster the physical and mental stamina of soldiers who may be called to fight in a war, but problematically, they aren’t showing any consideration for soldiers’ health. Soldiers end up having to be admitted to the hospital in a large number of cases,” the source said.
“It’s doubtful whether driving soldiers so hard without any consideration for their individual condition actually aids their physical or psychological training.”
Units in other corps are facing a similar predicament.
Units with the X Corps, stationed in Kapsan county, Ryanggang province, also have to perform loaded marches every week. There as well, soldiers have been regularly dropping with exhaustion during the grueling exercises.
“There’s a stretch where you have to march with your gas mask. That’s where a lot of soldiers run out of steam. Soldiers who collapse need immediate medical attention. But instead, they’re kicked and insulted by their officers, who accuse them of malingering,” a source in Ryanggang province said.
“An unusually large number of soldiers are collapsing during training this year,” the source said, pointing to nutritional inadequacies as well as soldiers’ physical deterioration and accumulated fatigue from being constantly assigned to public service projects.
“Soldiers nowadays are sent around the country for so many work projects they feel more like members of a labor brigade than a military unit. When those jobs are complete, they need a chance to rest and recuperate. But instead they’ve been sent straight to intense training, and that’s more than many can handle,” the source said.
“The biggest issue that needs to be addressed is soldiers’ diet. While they may receive larger portions and better-quality food for the duration of their training, North Korean soldiers have to deal with hunger on a routine basis. It doesn’t make sense to subject soldiers to intense training without feeding them properly.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
3. (ROK) Army's Special Warfare Command stages wintertime drills
Summary:
South Korea’s Army Special Warfare Command is running its annual winter special-operations exercise near Daegwallyeong Pass in Gangwon, a 1,407-meter mountainous area with wind chills down to minus 30°C. Over 12 days, troops practice rear-area infiltration, concealed observation, snow shelters and planning, exfiltration, and tactical skiing, with veteran commandos acting as opposing forces.
Comment: Compare our ROK Special Forces brothers and sisters with the nKPA experience to the north. And our American 1st Special Forces Group operators know this training area well. Fond (but cold) memories training with our counterparts. The last time I skied was in 1993 in this training area (military skiing) and on the weekends in off times at the Pyeongchang ski resort (where the 2018 Olympics were held) (still with military skis)
Army's Special Warfare Command stages wintertime drills | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122003400315
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- The Army's Special Warfare Command has been staging intensive wintertime drills aimed at enhancing its special operations capabilities under extreme weather conditions, the armed service said Thursday.
The 12-day drills have been taking place since earlier this month near Daegwallyeong Pass, located in a mountainous region in eastern South Korea, according to the Army. It said the training will run until February, without specifying when it began.
The exercise, which is held annually at the height of the winter cold in January and February, unfolds in a choppy mountainous region 1,407 meters above sea level, with the lowest apparent temperature of minus 30 C.
During the drills, troops infiltrate an opponent from the rear area and observe their target while covering themselves with snow and leaves during daytime, and dig out a shelter to discuss future operation plans during nighttime.
They also practice escaping from enemy territory after completing their mission, along with tactical ski training aimed at dodging the opponent's strikes.
Meanwhile, this year's drills have involved veteran command officers as opponents to simulate a realistic scenario.
The Army's Special Warfare Command points at a target while concealing themselves using snow and other things found on the ground in the eastern province of Gangwon, in this photo provided by the Army on Jan. 22, 2026. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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Related Articles
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 22, 2026
4. In a turbulent world, Kim Jong Un’s regime looks more secure than ever
Summary:
Andrei Lankov argues the Kim regime is safer because the outside world now rewards buffers, not breakouts. China needs a stable north Korea as strategic depth in great power rivalry, and Russia’s war economy gives Pyongyang cash and relevance. Meanwhile, Washington and Seoul have pulled back from democracy promotion and sustained information pressure, and South Korean public appetite for unification is thinning. Inside the country, cheap surveillance tech, phones, data analytics, and AI strengthen a tightening police state. The implication is grim: sanctions and denuclearization hopes fade, while arms control and hard deterrence become the only practical tools.
Comment: Never say never. As one our members of the north Korean Young Leaders' Assembly says:
Change is coming.
Make human rights a priority
Do not be frustrated because change has not yet come.
Change is coming.
But...
If China now treats north Korea stability as a core interest, where is the leverage point that changes Beijing’s cost-benefit calculus?
And then...
How should the ROK/U.S. alliance strategy link deterrence, information pressure, and economic statecraft so that “regime security” becomes a liability, not an asset, for Pyongyang and support creating the conditions for change within north Korea?
In a turbulent world, Kim Jong Un’s regime looks more secure than ever
Great power competition and US retreat from exporting democracy have quashed hope for radical change in North Korea
Andrei Lankov January 22, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/in-a-turbulent-world-kim-jong-uns-regime-looks-more-secure-than-ever/
Image: KCNA, edited by NK News
For most of my life as a North Korea watcher, I assumed that at some point in the foreseeable future the country would either disappear (through absorption into the successful South) or change dramatically (through transformation into a China-style “developmental dictatorship”).
This was more or less a majority view until the late 2010s or so, with countless publications discussing the coming end of North Korea.
However, recent trends have forced me to reconsider these long-held views.
As great power competition ramps up, the DPRK has become more strategically important than ever to China in its confrontation with the U.S. The war in Ukraine has also pushed Russia firmly on North Korea’s side.
At the same time, both the U.S. and South Korea have pulled back from information campaigns targeting Pyongyang, while declining interest in unification has led to growing acceptance of permanent division.
The result is that the most likely scenario for the next couple of decades is no change and more of the same, with major implications for diplomacy and military planning.
Kim Jong Un with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and other world leaders at China’s military parade in Sept. 2025 | Image: Rodong Sinmun
NORTH KOREA BETWEEN GREAT POWERS
A lot has changed to cause me and many of my colleagues to change our expectations. Let’s start with North Korea’s foreign environment.
Just seven or eight years ago, North Korea faced massive pressure from what could then still be plausibly described as the “international community.” In the late 2010s, both Russia and China didn’t merely support the U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea but, for a while, actually implemented them.
But everything changed with the world’s abrupt shift back to 1900s-style great-power politics. The U.S. decision to treat China as a rising challenge to American economic and military security, to be countered unconditionally and at all costs, transformed Beijing’s perception of North Korea. It is no longer merely a troublesome neighbour, but a highly useful buffer zone whose long-term stability is vital to China’s security.
Russia’s war in Ukraine, similarly driven by revived “spheres of influence” logic, has also been a boon for the North Korean economy, which has earned good money by selling ammunition, weapons and even manpower to a distant front line.
I would not overestimate the Russian factor, though. The DPRK will likely spend the profits, however big, very quickly on economically meaningless prestige projects.
China is the far more important partner. It has a vested interest in maintaining North Korea’s stability for as long as the Sino-U.S. rivalry continues — likely for decades to come.
This means that now, and in the foreseeable future, North Korean government can request Chinese aid at almost any time, and it will arrive. The assistance will be modest, no doubt, but still sufficient to keep the country afloat.
Moreover, a serious domestic crisis in North Korea would be treated in Beijing not as a humanitarian problem, but as a direct challenge to China’s national security. In an extreme scenario, even direct Chinese military intervention, aimed at suppressing such internal crises, cannot be ruled out.
China cannot afford instability, let alone regime change, on its border, and it has the means to prevent unwelcomed outcome. It also helps that, in today’s Trumpian world, where might and only might makes right, such a move would be met with more resignation than outrage.
Donald Trump at the White House | Image: White House (Jan. 9, 2026)
DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT
At the same time, the pressure regime faces is weaker than it has been in decades.
For much of the post Cold War era, the U.S. and other Western democracies invested heavily in exporting liberal and democratic ideas and supporting the flow of information into closed societies. That effort is now visibly shrinking.
In 2025, Radio Free Asia and Voice of America were forced to halt their Korean-language radio broadcasts due to U.S. government cuts and the ensuing funding turmoil, and a full restoration remains uncertain. For North Korea’s leadership, which has long regarded outside information as the most serious long-term threat to its political survival, this is unambiguously good news.
South Korea has scaled back most of its broadcasting toward North Korea as well. In part, this reflects the instincts of the current administration in Seoul: They are left-leaning nationalists who have long tried to avoid offending Pyongyang’s sensibilities.
But the change goes beyond the politics of any one government. The South Korean public is steadily losing interest in unification with the North. Across the political spectrum, more and more South Koreans, instead of striving toward unification, prefer to manage a division that they see not as a temporary anomaly but as a fait accompli.
Of course, one could argue that this shift might be reversed when Democrats return to power in the U.S., or conservatives in South Korea. But things are not that simple: Even if the pendulum swings back, new administrations will be less enthusiastic about restarting initiatives they know are unpopular with voters.
North Koreans record with their smartphones at a housing ceremony. | Image: KCTV (Dec. 2025)
PERFECT PANOPTICON
Even as the international environment turns unusually favorable for Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s domestic prospects are improving too. There’s a simple reason: Modern technology tends to work well for authoritarian regimes.
The combination of big-data analytics and AI, combined with ubiquitous mobile phones that report owners’ whereabouts and facial-recognition software, is set to expand the North Korean state’s surveillance capacity beyond anything one could have imagined a decade ago.
By analyzing online behaviour, social networks and daily routines at scale, the security apparatus will be able to flag politically “suspicious” individuals before those individuals have fully articulated, or even recognised, their own dissent.
With the cost of such technologies steadily falling, and with no meaningful legal or political constraints on their use, North Korea’s rulers will be able to build one of the world’s most capable surveillance systems.
TAKING STOCK
What does all this mean for the outside world?
First, we should finally discard not only the long-obsolete pipe dream of denuclearization,” but also inflated expectations about the effectiveness of sanctions.
The only realistic way to reduce the ever-growing risks of North Korean nuclear weapons is to pursue an arms control agreement that limits its ability to expand and improve its arsenal. To be meaningful, an agreement will need to be anchored in measures that are difficult to reverse, including the physical dismantlement of nuclear infrastructure — in exchange for hefty compensation, of course.
At the same time, robust deterrence remains essential. South Korea will need to retain the capacity to defend itself even under worst-case assumptions (that is, without direct U.S. support). In the long run, this will intensify pressure for far more autonomous deterrent capabilities, because conventional weapons, however advanced, are not an adequate answer to North Korea’s nuclear threat.
The coming decades are likely to be defined by a painful search for limited compromises alongside stubborn deterrence. It will be a risky and expensive era, to be sure.
But the reality is that the option of radical transformation, and with it a complete and perfect solution that still seemed possible just a decade ago, is simply not on offer any more.
Edited by Bryan Betts
5. U.S. expert proposes S. Korea, U.S., others form 'collective economic deterrence' pact against Chinese pressure
Summary:
Victor Cha argues South Korea cannot deter Chinese economic coercion alone, especially if Beijing retaliates over Seoul’s nuclear-powered submarine project. He proposes a “collective economic deterrence” pact with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other G7 partners. The idea mirrors NATO’s Article 5: coercion against one triggers automatic collective retaliation, raising the cost of Beijing’s pressure tactics without seeking a trade war. Cha calls China an unreliable partner that enables north Korea and ignores sanctions, and he urges tighter trilateral coordination. He also wants Washington to use the 2027 G7 presidency to organize the pact.
Comment: This is airport on Victor's Foreign Affairs essay I forwarded yesterday.
U.S. expert proposes S. Korea, U.S., others form 'collective economic deterrence' pact against Chinese pressure | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122000200315
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. expert on Wednesday floated the idea of South Korea, the United States, Japan and other countries working together to form a "collective economic deterrence" pact to counter China's economic pressure, amid concerns that Seoul could face Beijing's retaliation for its nuclear-powered submarine project.
Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), proposed it in an article published on the website of Foreign Affairs magazine, saying its goal is not to initiate a trade war with China, but to "stop China's coercion."
He also portrayed China as an "increasingly unreliable partner" for South Korea, arguing that Beijing has done little to stop Pyongyang's nuclear armament and refuses to comply with various U.N. Security Council sanctions on the recalcitrant regime.
"Individually, no country in the region has the political or economic heft to stand up to China. But collectively, they have enough leverage," he said in the article, titled "South Korea Can Stand Up to China: With Its Allies, Seoul Has Enough Leverage to Push Back."
"South Korea's best option is to work with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other G7 countries to organize a collective economic deterrence pact to stop China's economic aggression," he added.
This photo, taken on Sept. 19, 2025, shows Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaking during a press meeting in Seoul. (Yonhap)
His article came as U.S. President Donald Trump has approved South Korea's push to secure nuclear-powered submarines amid speculation that the U.S. might think that the Asian ally's acquisition of the strategic maritime assets would help deter growing Chinese threats.
The submarine project has stoked fears that as the project evolves, China might take economic retaliatory steps against South Korea as it did unofficially after Seoul announced a decision in 2016 to host a U.S. missile defense battery on its soil.
Cha pointed out that the proposed pact will need to "deem coercion against one to be coercion against all and for which there would be automatic retaliation" -- similar to the collective security agreement of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's founding treaty.
"The purpose of a collective economic deterrence pact would not be to start a trade war with China. Instead, the goal is simply to stop China's coercion. China suffers no cost for its threats or pressure campaigns on its neighbors because it assumes -- correctly -- that no single target would dare to retaliate," he said.
"But the threat of real costs could make Beijing think twice."
Taking explicit steps against China could be a policy challenge to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, as under his "pragmatic" diplomatic approach, he has sought to improve relations with Beijing while maintaining a robust alliance with the U.S.
His efforts for stable ties with China culminated in his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier this month, where the leaders sought to build personal rapport as seen in Lee taking selfies with Xi, using a Xiaomi smartphone.
But Cha said that the bonhomie between Lee and Xi is unlikely to last, as he pointed to the deal between Lee and Trump over Seoul's submarine project.
This photo, taken on Jan. 5, 2026, shows President Lee Jae Myung (L) taking a selfie with Chinese President Xi Jinping after a state dinner at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
"Beijing will not forget about the nuclear submarine deal," he said. "China, in response to other geopolitical slights, has sanctioned at one point or another almost every Korean product, ranging from music to cosmetics to television shows to kimchi."
The expert highlighted the importance of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan working together to counter China's pressure, saying that the three countries have not done enough to support each other despite their earlier commitment to cooperating against it.
He, in particular, underscored the economic leverage that the three countries hold over China.
"There are 327 goods worth more than $23.19 billion that these three allies trade with China and on which Beijing is more than 70 percent dependent," he said.
He also called on the Trump administration to use its G7 presidency in 2027 to lead the effort to organize the economic deterrence pact "rather than levying tariffs on its allies," while urging Trump to voice U.S. opposition to China's economic pressure campaigns directly to Xi when Trump visits Beijing in April.
"Doing so would deter China by signaling that Beijing faces costs if it continues to pressure Japan or targets U.S. companies (perennial targets of Chinese coercion), and it would preempt Chinese retaliation against South Korea for its nuclear-powered submarine agreement with the United States," he said.
This file photo, released by Reuters, shows U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping talking as they leave after a bilateral meeting at Gimhae International Airport in Busan, South Korea on Oct. 30, 2025. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 22, 2026
6. Bookshelf: why the US failed to contain North Korea’s nuclear threat
Summary:
Robert Wihtol reviews Joel Wit’s Fallout and argues the United States failed to contain north Korea’s nuclear program across six administrations. He credits missed chances under Clinton and George W. Bush, but assigns the decisive failure to Obama’s “strategic patience” and to Trump’s inability to convert summit theater into a durable agreement. Sanctions tightened, yet enforcement was uneven and north Korea was not a top priority as capabilities accelerated. Trump’s pressure and outreach produced Singapore, then collapsed at Hanoi because core issues and sequencing were unresolved and team infighting hollowed out preparation. Wit urges shifting toward arms control now, while keeping long-term denuclearization as an aim.
Comment: My assessment for our failure: The single most important reason is because of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. The desire and need for nuclear weapons by the resume was greater than any threat, economic coercion, or enticements and concessions. And the second reason for our failure is our lack of understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim Family regime, a failure to understand the regime's political warfare with juche characteristics and its blackmail diplomacy.
A shift to arms control now means a victory for KJU's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies, unless and only unless we would use those talks to conduct our own superior political warfare campaign to create the conditions for change inside north Korea. But if we attempt arms control negotiations with the belief we can reach a substantive and enforceable agreement then we are destined for continued failure due to the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime (and our lack of understanding). (yes I know I sound like broken record)
Bookshelf: why the US failed to contain North Korea’s nuclear threat | The Strategist
aspistrategist.org.au · Robert Wihtol · January 22, 2026
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bookshelf-why-the-us-failed-to-contain-north-koreas-nuclear-threat/
Bookshelf: why the US failed to contain North Korea’s nuclear threat
22 Jan 2026|Robert Wihtol
When Barack Obama took over the US presidency in 2009, North Korea could barely muster one nuclear weapon and had just a handful of missiles that could reach Japan. Yet despite tight international sanctions, tough external pressure and on-again-off-again negotiations, barely a decade later Pyongyang had managed to develop advanced nuclear weapons capable of striking cities in the continental United States.
Joel Wit’s latest book, Fallout, explains how the world’s strongest superpower allowed North Korea, which still considers itself at war with the US, to develop a nuclear arsenal that threatens global stability. Wit does so by chronicling the policies and negotiating strategies of six US administrations to contain North Korea.
A well-known expert on Northeast Asia, Wit worked for the US State Department and several think tanks for two decades and participated in key negotiations with Pyongyang. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the Henry L Stimson Center.
As Wit sees it, the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W Bush missed several opportunities to curtail North Korea’s nuclear program. However, he points to Obama and Donald Trump as being most responsible for the US’s failed efforts. The Obama administration neglected to contain North Korea’s rapidly growing nuclear threat, and once it was there, the Trump administration failed to roll it back.
Based on more than 300 interviews with his contacts in Pyongyang and decision-makers in Washington, Beijing and Seoul, Wit provides a vivid account of the international discussions, internal debates and behind-the-scenes wrangling that shaped the US’s North Korea policy.
For eight years, the Obama administration adopted a policy of strategic patience, unrealistically assuming that international sanctions would suffice to contain North Korea’s weapons development. When Pyongyang in 2013 tested a miniaturised nuclear device and completed construction of a new uranium enrichment plant, Washington responded by tightening sanctions.
But North Korea was not a priority, and enforcement of sanctions was patchy.
The advent of the Trump administration marked a major shift. Trump wanted to step up pressure on Pyongyang but was also open to negotiations. The initial result was a heated public exchange of insults, with Trump famously referring to Kim Jong Un as the ‘little rocket man’ and Kim calling Trump a dotard.
However, behind the scenes a US advisor to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres sounded out whether Pyongyang was open to a meeting with Trump. This triggered a quick thaw in relations, with North Korea joining the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea, and Trump and Kim meeting in Singapore the same year. But the summit in Hanoi that followed was a failure, and the parties walked away without even a joint communique.
Wit’s detailed post-mortem of the Hanoi summit provides valuable guidance for how future negotiations should—and should not—be conducted. He details the hurried pre-summit discussions and reminds us that even as Trump and Kim were travelling to Hanoi, the two key issues—denuclearisation and the lifting of sanctions—had not been resolved. The collapse of the talks should not have been a surprise.
In-fighting within Trump’s team, particularly between secretary of state Mike Pompeo and national security advisor John Bolton, played a role. So too did Kim’s excessive confidence that Trump wanted a deal. Wit credits Trump’s unorthodox approach for setting the stage for the summit, but blames his short attention span for its breakdown. ‘The president couldn’t sit still long enough to close the deal.’ Most importantly, preparatory negotiations were woefully inadequate.
Since then, Pyongyang has strengthened its cooperation with Moscow, supporting Russia’s war on Ukraine and introducing a major new obstacle to the resumption of talks.
Looking ahead, Wit suggests that the US may need to recognise that North Korea is a nuclear state and shift from a policy focused on denuclearisation to one with two objectives: denuclearising North Korea in the long term; and reducing the threat of nuclear war in the short term. According to Wit, there are indications that Secretary of State Marco Rubio might support such an approach.
However, the US administration’s national security strategy is firmly focused on the western hemisphere, with new geopolitical hotspots emerging in Latin America, the Middle East and even Greenland. With less than three years to the next US presidential elections, the question is not when Trump and Rubio will shift their focus to Asia, but whether they will have the time and patience needed to address the security challenges of the Korean peninsula.
Author
Robert Wihtol is an adjunct faculty member at the Asian Institute of Management and former Asian Development Bank country director for China and director general for East Asia.
Image of Trump and Kim at a social dinner at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi in 2019: Joyce Boghosian/Trump White House Archived/Flickr.
AI contributed no ideas to this article—Robert Wihtol.
aspistrategist.org.au · Robert Wihtol · January 22, 2026
7. Unification minister makes UNC-escorted visit to DMZ area
Summary:
South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young visited areas near the DMZ under U.N. Command escort, UNC said. He toured a designated DMZ Education and Orientation Program site and walked segments of the ROK Peace Trail south of the Southern Boundary Line. UNC noted 15 such sites support safe, stable access.
Comment: South of the South Barrier Fence is not in the DMZ but adjacent to the southern boundary. But I hope this is helping to reduce tension between the ROK and UNC.
Unification minister makes UNC-escorted visit to DMZ area | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 21, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260121006900315
SEOUL, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on Wednesday visited peace trail routes and other areas near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, the U.N. Command (UNC) said.
"The minister's visit was conducted at a designated Demilitarized Zone Education and Orientation Program site," the U.S.-led UNC said, noting 15 sites have been designated for such a purpose to uphold the safety and stability of the area.
"The minister also walked the established ROK Peace Trail routes south of the DMZ's Southern Boundary Line," it said, referring to the trail routes stretching from Ganghwa to Goseong near the inter-Korean border. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
The UNC is an enforcer of the armistice that stopped the fighting in the 1950-53 Korean War and oversees activities inside the DMZ -- a buffer zone between the two Koreas since the three-year conflict ended without a peace treaty.
This July 25, 2025 file photo, provided by the unification ministry, shows Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (R) visiting the truce village of Panmunjom near the inter-Korean border. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 21, 2026
8. S. Korea becomes 1st nation to enact comprehensive law on safe use of AI
Summary:
South Korea enacted the AI Basic Act, creating a nationwide framework for “trustworthy” AI use, with special obligations for high-risk systems in hiring, lending, and medical contexts. Providers must notify users when AI is involved, manage safety risks, and watermark AI-generated content to curb deepfakes and misinformation. The law gives the government investigative and fining authority, with penalties up to 30 million won and a one-year grace period. Large global platforms meeting revenue, Korea-sales, or daily-user thresholds must appoint a local representative. The science ministry also opened a support desk to answer compliance questions.
Comment: Can we make the use of AI "safe?" Can a law do that? WIll this law do that?
World News Jan. 22, 2026 / 3:36 AM
S. Korea becomes 1st nation to enact comprehensive law on safe use of AI
By Kang Yoon-seung, Yonhap News Agency
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/22/korea-South-Korea-law-safe-use-AI-artificial-intelligence-first-nation/9501769069791/
South Korea on Thursday formally enacted a comprehensive law governing the safe use of AI models. OpenAI, whose CEO Sam Altman is seen here at a 2023 Seoul event, is among the companies now required to designate a local representative under the law. File Photo by Yonhap
South Korea on Thursday formally enacted a comprehensive law governing the safe use of artificial intelligence (AI) models, becoming the first country globally in doing so, establishing a regulatory framework against misinformation and other hazardous effects involving the emerging field.
The Basic Act on the Development of Artificial Intelligence and the Establishment of a Foundation for Trustworthiness, or the AI Basic Act, officially took effect Thursday, according to the science ministry.
It marked the first governmental adoption of comprehensive guidelines on the use of AI globally.
The act centers on requiring companies and AI developers to take greater responsibility for addressing deepfake content and misinformation that can be generated by AI models, granting the government the authority to impose fines or launch probes into violations.
Related
In detail, the act introduces the concept of "high-risk AI," referring to AI models used to generate content that can significantly affect users' daily lives or their safety, including applications in the employment process, loan reviews and medical advice.
Entities harnessing such high-risk AI models are required to inform users that their services are based on AI and are responsible for ensuring safety. Content generated by AI models is required to carry watermarks indicating its AI-generated nature.
"Applying watermarks to AI-generated content is the minimum safeguard to prevent side effects from the abuse of AI technology, such as deepfake content," a ministry official said.
Global companies offering AI services in South Korea meeting any of the following criteria -- global annual revenue of 1 trillion won (US$681 million) or more, domestic sales of 10 billion won or higher, or at least 1 million daily users in the country -- are required to designate a local representative.
Currently, OpenAI and Google fall under the criteria.
Violations of the act may be subject to fines of up to 30 million won, and the government plans to enforce a one-year grace period in imposing penalties to help the private sector adjust to the new rules.
The act also includes measures for the government to promote the AI industry, with the science minister required to present a policy blueprint every three years.
Following the implementation of the act, the science ministry said it has launched a support desk tasked with offering advisory services to businesses.
The support desk will work to respond to businesses' general inquiries within three days and those requiring in-depth legal review within 14 days, according to the ministry.
"The AI Basic Act stands at the center of South Korea's AI industry and the realization of an AI-based society," Second Vice Science Minister Ryu Je-myung said in a release.
"The support desk will serve as a guide to help the act take root in the local industry," Ryu added.
Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.
9. JCS vice chairman attends NATO Military Committee meeting in Belgium
Summary:
South Korea’s JCS vice chairman, Lt. Gen. Kwon Dae-won, attended NATO’s Military Committee meeting in Brussels (Wednesday to Thursday) as part of NATO’s engagement with South Korea as an Asia-Indo-Pacific partner. He met with Adm. Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, the committee chair, and other senior officers to exchange assessments of the security environment.
Comment: Korea is a member of NATO IP4 - (Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand)
JCS vice chairman attends NATO Military Committee meeting in Belgium | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122006500315
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) attended a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) highest military committee in Belgium this week to boost cooperation, officials said Thursday.
Lt. Gen. Kwon Dae-won joined the NATO Military Committee's meeting in Brussels from Wednesday to Thursday, after the collective security bloc invited South Korea as an Indo-Pacific partner, according to the JCS.
Kwon met with Adm. Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chair of the military committee, along with other senior military officials, to share thoughts on the current security conditions.
At a session set for Thursday, the vice chairman plans to assess the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and call for international cooperation to deal with security threats.
This year marks South Korea's 11th time participating in the meeting since 2010.
This photo, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on Jan. 22, 2026, shows JCS Vice Chairman Kwon Dae-won (R) posing with Adm. Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chair of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee, during a meeting in Brussels. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 22, 2026
10. Gov't urged to make all-out efforts to bring back N. Korean POWs in Ukraine
Summary:
A lawmaker urged Seoul to mobilize all diplomacy to bring two north Korean POWs held by Ukraine to South Korea, citing reports they want to defect. He urged special envoys to Kyiv, arguing the Third Geneva Convention and non-refoulement bar forced return to north Korea there now.
Comment: The morally right thing to do. Does this test the Lee Administration?
Gov't urged to make all-out efforts to bring back N. Korean POWs in Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122007800315
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- The government should mobilize all diplomatic resources to bring back two North Korean prisoners of war held captive in Ukraine, an opposition lawmaker said Thursday, as media reports have said the North Koreans want to defect to South Korea.
Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the main opposition People Power Party also called for President Lee Jae Myung to send special envoys to Kyiv for negotiations with Ukraine authorities to help repatriate the North Koreans to South Korea.
"They are not simply enemies of Ukraine, but potential members of South Korea who yearn for freedom," Yu said in a statement, citing recent media reports that showed the two captives expressed their desire to be sent to South Korea.
Yu said the two should not be repatriated to North Korea under the Third Geneva Convention and the international principle of non-refoulement, or not forcing refugees back to countries where they face the risk of persecution.
He urged President Lee to dispatch a special envoy to Ukraine to finalize the repatriation process by negotiating directly with local authorities.
North Korea has deployed thousands of troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the war against Ukraine since October 2024. Yu met the two North Korean prisoners of war during his visit to Ukraine in February last year.
Yu Yong-weon, a lawmaker of South Korea's ruling People Power Party, gives an interview with Yonhap News Agency at the National Assembly in Seoul in this file photo taken March 7, 2025, about his recent meetings with two North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine. The two photographs Yu is holding were taken from his meetings with the soldiers in Kyiv on Feb. 25. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 22, 2026
11. S. Korea says to seek consultation with UNC over push to reopen border trails inside DMZ
Summary:
South Korea’s unification ministry will consult UNC to reopen three DMZ Peace Trail segments inside the DMZ in Paju, Cheorwon, and Goseong, closed in April 2024 amid heightened tensions. Minister Chung frames reopening as a confidence-building step under the Lee Jae Myung government and argues the Armistice does not bar peaceful DMZ use. UNC signaled friction, stressing those paths remain under UNC jurisdiction, that restrictions persist due to security considerations, and that DMZ access is reviewed case by case with safety, security, and Armistice compliance paramount.
Comment: Again, is this helping to reduce friction between the ROK and the UNC? If Seoul presses this issue, how does it avoid turning “peaceful use” into an Armistice compliance showdown with UNC?
(LEAD) S. Korea says to seek consultation with UNC over push to reopen border trails inside DMZ | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122005451315
(ATTN: ADDS reaction from UNC in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Thursday it will seek consultations with the U.N. Command (UNC) over its move to reopen three shuttered trail sections within the inter-Korean buffer zone of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
In 2019, South Korea launched 11 trail routes, known as the DMZ Peace Trail, along key border cities and towns near the buffer zone, including Gimpo, Paju and Yeoncheon, providing a rare glimpse into generally inaccessible forest and security sites to the public.
Three sectors of the trails in the localities of Paju, Cheorwon and Goseong inside the DMZ were, however, closed to the public in April 2024 on national security grounds amid escalated tensions with North Korea.
This photo, provided by the unification ministry, shows Minister Chung Dong-young during a visit to a closed trail section within the Demilitarized Zone in Goseong and other border facilities on Jan. 21, 2026. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"The government is pushing to restore three sectors of the DMZ Peace Trail, which are situated within the DMZ," a unification ministry official said.
The remarks by the ministry official came a day after Unification Minister Chung Dong-young visited one of the closed trail sections in Goseong, where he renewed his commitment to reopening the trail to the public.
"I will make efforts to have the Peace Trail reclaim its full course by reopening the (closed) sections within the DMZ, in line with the Lee Jae Myung government's measures to preemptively restore trust (with North Korea)," Chung said during the trip.
Reopening the three closed DMZ trail sections within this year was part of the ministry's policy plans reported to Lee last month.
The trail restoration plan is, however, likely to face objections from the U.S-led UNC, which oversees the DMZ as the South-side enforcer of the armistice to the 1950-53 Korean War.
The official said that the unification ministry plans to advance the plan through consultations with the UNC, while emphasizing that the armistice, which is military in nature, does not restrict the peaceful use of the DMZ.
Addressing Chung's escorted visit to the peace trail route Wednesday, the UNC stressed that walking paths located inside the DMZ fall under its jurisdiction.
"Three walking paths located inside the DMZ remain restricted due to ongoing security considerations and fall under UNC jurisdiction, and existing DMZ access policies and procedures remain unchanged," it said.
"For more than 70 years, the UNC has administered the DMZ under the Armistice Agreement to prevent escalation and preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula. All access to the DMZ is reviewed carefully, case by case, with safety, security, and Armistice compliance as the top priorities," it said."
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
Related Articles
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 22, 2026
12. South Korea Economy Weakened in 2025 as Tariffs Took a Toll
Summary:
South Korea’s export driven economy slowed sharply in 2025, expanding 1.0 percent after 2.0 percent in 2024. The Bank of Korea reported GDP fell 0.3 percent quarter over quarter in the fourth quarter, with year over year growth easing to 1.5 percent. Government spending and private consumption softened as cash stimulus tapered, while construction, facility investment, and exports also dipped after two strong quarters led by semiconductors. Markets stayed upbeat, with the Kospi topping 5000. Officials expect a 2026 rebound as tariff headwinds ease and AI investment rises, though won weakness and geopolitics remain risks for households and planners alike.
Comment: Can South Korea’s expected AI-driven rebound offset structural dependence on exports if trade frictions return?
If tariffs and geopolitics again constrain growth, how much strategic autonomy does Seoul really have over its economic future?
South Korea Economy Weakened in 2025 as Tariffs Took a Toll
WSJ
The country’s export-reliant economy expanded 1.0% last year
By Kwanwoo Jun
Follow
Updated Jan. 21, 2026 7:40 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/economy/south-koreas-economy-meets-2025-growth-target-73514acb
Government spending and private consumption weakened during the final stretch of 2025. jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
South Korea’s economy contracted quarter-over-quarter in the final three months of 2025, bruised by a year of tariffs and political turmoil that slowed annual growth to a five-year low.
The export-reliant economy expanded 1.0% for the year, as the Bank of Korea had expected after lowering its forecast to account for the hit from U.S. trade policies and domestic political strife. The economy grew 2.0% in 2024.
South Korea’s exports have been resilient in the face of tariffs and authorities have rolled out fiscal stimulus to help offset sluggishness in construction investment and domestic demand, fueling expectations that 2026 will mark a recovery.
The 0.3% on-quarter drop in gross domestic product in the final months of 2025 were in part due to a high comparison base effect, following a revised 1.3% expansion in the third quarter, preliminary data from the bank showed.
On a year-over-year basis, the economy expanded 1.5% in the fourth quarter, slowing from a revised 1.8% expansion in the prior quarter.
The latest figures undershot market expectations but seem to have done little to dent investors’ mood, with South Korea’s stock benchmark Kospi surging to surpass 5000 for the first time on Thursday morning, continuing what has been a strong rally over the past year.
Economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal had forecast growth of 0.2% from the previous quarter and 1.5% from the prior year for the final quarter.
Government spending and private consumption weakened during the final stretch of 2025, as fiscal stimulus—including cash handouts aimed at boosting consumer spending and business activity—tapered off.
In the final three months of the year, construction and facility investments—as well as exports—fell from the previous quarter.
Solid outbound shipments paused after powerful growth in the previous two quarters, driven by brisk demand for semiconductors despite challenges from U.S. tariffs and global trade uncertainty.
South Korea’s economy is widely expected to regain its footing this year after a 2025 trade deal between Seoul and Washington tamed tariff headwinds. The overhang from the political crisis sparked by then-President Yoon Suk Yeol’s short-lived martial-law declaration in late 2024, has also cleared.
As a chip-making and electronics powerhouse, the economy stands to benefit from the boom in artificial intelligence—a sector the government has pledged to keep investing in and make a pillar of growth.
But persistent weakness in the won and renewed geopolitical frictions abroad continue to pose risks.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance said earlier this month that it expects the economy to grow 2.0% in 2026, up from its earlier forecast of 1.8%.
The International Monetary Fund has also raised its growth forecast for South Korea by 0.1 percentage point to 1.9% this year.
Write to Kwanwoo Jun at Kwanwoo.Jun@wsj.com
Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
WSJ
13. PM departs for U.S. to meet with senior officials, possibly Vance
Summary:
South Korea’s Prime Minister Kim Min seok left for a five day trip to Washington and New York to press senior U.S. officials on tariffs and trade, with a possible meeting with Vice President J.D. Vance. A November deal set 15 percent reciprocal tariffs, but new memory chip tariff threats add strain.
Comment: What specific concessions can Seoul credibly offer that protect its semiconductor base without deepening strategic dependence on Washington?
PM departs for U.S. to meet with senior officials, possibly Vance | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122004900315
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- Prime Minister Kim Min-seok departed for the United States on Thursday on a visit expected to focus on resolving bilateral trade issues through meetings with senior U.S. government officials, including possibly U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance.
Kim departed via Incheon airport, west of Seoul, for Washington, without holding a press conference at the airport, which is typical of senior government officials leaving on overseas business trips.
The prime minister's office earlier said he plans to meet with senior U.S. officials, lawmakers and Korean residents during a five-day trip to Washington and New York.
This is his first overseas trip as prime minister and the first solo trip to the U.S. by any prime minister since South Korea's democratization in 1987.
Sources said a meeting with Vance is being arranged, which would allow the two sides to discuss ongoing tariff and trade issues.
Under a deal reached in November, Washington agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on South Korean goods to 15 percent while Seoul committed to invest US$350 billion in the U.S.
A new challenge has emerged, however, as Washington has since announced plans to impose separate tariffs on memory chip makers that do not build facilities in the U.S., putting additional strain on South Korean semiconductor companies.
"This visit is expected to positively contribute to the stable maintenance and strengthening of South Korea-U.S. relations," Kim's office said in a press release Wednesday.
Prime Minister Kim Min-seok (2nd from R) arrives at Incheon airport, west of Seoul, on Jan. 22, 2026, to leave for the United States. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · January 22, 2026
14.N. Korea ramps up 'people-first' policy push ahead of party congress
Summary:
North Korea is escalating its “people-first” policy messaging to rally domestic support ahead of its first Workers’ Party congress in five years. State media and official outlets emphasize projects aimed at improving public well-being and fulfilling “people’s long-cherished wishes,” though observers note such slogans often mask deeper authoritarian control and discipline campaigns among officials. The push coincides with personnel reshuffles and economic planning expected at the congress, where a new five-year development vision will be announced. Kim Jong Un has publicly disciplined senior officials for perceived failures, underscoring a dual strategy of welfare rhetoric and elite accountability to solidify legitimacy before the political event.
Comment: If KJU really wanted to adopt a credible people first policy he would adapt the US SOF truth of "people are more important than hardware" and revise it to say "people are more important than the party and regime." And then live up to that. (note my sarcasm)
N. Korea ramps up 'people-first' policy push ahead of party congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 22, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260122003500315
SEOUL, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is ramping up its "people-first" policy push to win public support in the run-up to an upcoming party congress, according to a North Korean newspaper Thursday.
The Rodong Sinmun, the most widely read newspaper in North Korea published by the ruling party, ran a front-page article emphasizing "the party's absolute sense of service" to the people.
The "people-first" principle is one of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's key policy principles, illustrated by his signature regional development projects aimed at improving living standards.
"The people are the revolutionary root and life of the party," the article said.
"It is our party's firm stance that any projects aimed at realizing the people's long-cherished wishes should be carried out willingly and as promptly as possible, regardless of advantages or disadvantages or the cost of any effort," it said.
The newspaper claimed that the ruling Workers Party of Korea is striving to carry out "tasks aimed at improving people's well-being with ever higher goals and standards without being satisfied."
The emphasis on public well-being comes as the regime is tightening discipline among officials ahead of its first party congress in five years, expected to convene next month. North Korea is expected to unveil a five-year economic development vision and carry out a personnel reshuffle at the congress.
The dual stance appears aimed at drumming up public support for the party in the run-up to the congress.
While attending a ceremony at a machinery plant in Hamhung on Monday, Kim fired the vice premier for the machinery industry in a rare public dismissal of an official, chastising "defeatism, irresponsibility and passiveness" among officials.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) attends a ceremony inaugurating a hot spring resort in North Hamgyong Province on Jan. 20, 2026, in this Korean Central News Agency photo published the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 22, 2026
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
