Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 



Quotes of the Day:


“Any man can make mistakes, but only an idiot persists in his error.” 
- Cicero

“We have fought this war and won it. Now let us not be sanctimonious; nor hypocritical; nor vengeful; nor stupid. 
Let us make our enemies incapable of ever making war again, let us re-educate them, let us learn to live in peace and justice 
with all countries and all peoples in this world. To do this we must educate and re-educate. But first we must educate ourselves.”
-Ernest Heimingway

“The wise man doesn’t give the right answers, he poses the right questions.” 
- Claude Levi-Strauss


1. The First Rule of Fight Club and Irregular Warfare Should be the Same

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 22, 2023

3. How the U.S. Government Amassed $31 Trillion in Debt

4. Warp Speed: Ukraine’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle Program is Moving Fast

5. Former Navy SEAL, listed as a deserter, dies fighting in Ukraine

6. U.S. Military Vets in Ukraine Are Fighting Each Other in Court

7. Army Sees Signs it Might Hit Recruiting Target This Year

8. Special Operations News Update - January 2023 | SOF News

9. TikTok accused of spying on the US and corrupting youth

10. Biden’s Shadow War in Ukraine

11. Stocking Ukraine could generate foreign military sales boom

12. China’s Mad Dash Into a Strategic Island Nation Breeds Resentment

13. Xinjiang tour blatant propaganda

14. Pentagon Transfers Some Israel-based Artillery Shells to Support Ukraine

15. DATABASE: REPLACING WEAPONS NATO ALLIES SENT TO UKRAINE COULD YIELD $21.7 BILLION IN U.S. SALES

16. China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign

17. Maria Ressa's To-Do List

18. Japan soft-selling its remilitarization to the world

19. US warns overdose crisis will spread overseas without action from China

20. The Trouble With Trans-Pacific Trade

21. The PLA’s Weak Backbone: Is China Struggling to Professionalize its Noncommissioned Officer Corps?

22. China attacks, insults US on Twitter

23. An unlikely alliance: could US far right and progressives agree on defense cuts?

24. Soldiers from 101st Airborne, 10th Mountain divisions expected to deploy to Romania




1. The First Rule of Fight Club and Irregular Warfare Should be the Same



Sun, 01/22/2023 - 11:07am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/first-rule-fight-club-and-irregular-warfare-should-be-same

The First Rule of Fight Club and Irregular Warfare Should be the Same

 

By David Maxwell

 

“You have your way. I have my way. As for the right way, the correct way, and the only way, it does not exist.”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

 

Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers continue to contemplate the definition of irregular warfare (IW) and what it means for U.S. national security and defense strategy. Many electrons are flowing through cyberspace with debates and arguments about what constitutes irregular warfare, why it is or is not important, who should conduct it (e.g., specific forces or all forces) and how it should be taught in professional military education.

 



Recently a mentor and expert on China and Special Operations pointed some of us to a 2021 Modern Warfare Institute article, “China’s Irregular Approach to War: The Myth of a Purely Conventional Future Fight,” with this excerpt about China and irregular warfare.

 

The term “irregular warfare” does not itself appear frequently in Chinese military writing. Ironically, this is a sign of its centrality. Irregular warfare activities are so fully integrated with conventional tactics and operations that they are not identified as “irregular.” The leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) no longer sees utility in the conventional “people’s war” approach, which involved human-wave attacks in land-centric battles. The PLA is now preparing to fight concurrently across multiple domains, is focused on winning what it calls “informationized wars,” and takes information superiority as the driver of operational planning. Many elements of irregular warfare, such as psychological warfare, legal warfare, and cyberwarfare, are central to the PLA’s concept of information warfare and its theory of victory in a conventional conflict. In Chinese military writing and current operations, we find three principal elements of irregular warfare: the “three warfares,” special operations forces, and paramilitary forces.

 

The key point of this excerpt is that by not talking about irregular warfare China indicates its importance. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has evolved from its concept of “People’s War” which could be considered a loose parallel to large scale combat operations (LCSO) to a focus on a broader form of warfare which has been described in the seminal work of two PLA colonels in 1999 as “Unrestricted Warfare.”

 

Like the film “Fight Club,” it seems for the PLA’s the first rule of irregular warfare is to not talk about irregular warfare even as they are intensely practicing their own form of it. 

 

There are two observations from Unrestricted Warfare that reinforce this “rule.” First, "unrestricted warfare" is used only three times in the entire 224 page document; on the title page, in the introduction (page 12) and the last sentence of the last paragraph on the last page (page 219). Consider how many times the words “irregular warfare” are used in U.S. manuals, directives, and concepts. As a point of reference in one version of the Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Special Operations, the term “special operations” is used some 306 times. In the DODD 3000.7 Irregular Warfare “irregular warfare is used three times and IW is used 60 times. The U.S. military seems to violate the Chinese rules of IW - the first rule of IW is “don't talk about IW.” Maybe IW is just not that important in the U.S. Or perhaps it is.

 


 

U.S National Defense Strategies, Irregular Warfare, and Unrestricted Warfare

 

Like many, I have been guilty of assessing the importance of particular concepts by the simple standard of noting how many times the concept is mentioned in major strategic documents. In 2020 IW seemed very important. Then DOD published an entire irregular warfare annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) using “irregular warfare” 41 times and “IW” 46 times. Yet in the 2022 National Defense Strategy “irregular warfare” is only used twice, once in the context of Iran (page 15) and once associated with integrated deterrence (page 9). The department seems to have shifted to the “gray zone” (used 12 times) as the major descriptor for irregular warfare and the historical low intensity conflict. Perhaps like the Chinese, the Department is describing the centrality of irregular warfare by only using the terminology sparingly.

 

Since the Secretary of Defense has deemed China as the strategic pacing item for the Department of Defense, consider these excerpts from Unrestricted Warfare and note that the authors are applying the concept of Unrestricted Warfare against the United States. These excerpts really describe the heart of strategic competition and operations in the gray zone and the threats the U.S. and like-minded countries face. Again, these two excerpts are the only references to unrestricted warfare in the entire 224 page text indicting their importance to China.

 

Introduction:

 

 

War in the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated the right of weapons to label war and, with regard to the new starting point, has realigned the relationship of weapons to war, while the appearance of weapons of new concepts, and particularly new concepts of weapons, has gradually blurred the face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as a hostile act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country's economy be seen as a battle? Did CNN's broadcast of an exposed corpse of a U.S. soldier in the streets of Mogadishu shake the determination of the Americans to act as the world's policeman, thereby altering the world's strategic situation? And should an assessment of wartime actions look at the means or the results? Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, there is no longer any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly realize that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare. (page 12)

 

Conclusion: 

 

Although the boundaries between soldiers and non-soldiers have now been broken down, and the chasm between warfare and non-warfare nearly filled up, globalization has made all the tough problems interconnected and interlocking, and we must find a key for that. The key should be able to open all the locks, if these locks are on the front door of war. And this key must be suited to all the levels and dimensions, from war policy, strategy, and operational techniques to tactics; and it must also fit the hands of individuals, from politicians and generals to the common soldiers.

 

We [the PLA authors] can think of no other more appropriate key than "unrestricted warfare." (page 219)

 

 

In 1948, George Kennan would have described this as political warfare which arguably was a key guiding concept throughout the Cold War.

 

Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. 

 

In addition, consider this interview excerpt from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) editor's notes accompanying the translation of unrestricted warfare. It describes the type of strategic competition China assesses the U.S. is conducting.

 

In the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao interview, Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." Elaborating on this idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use the same approach against weak countries because "strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes . . .The United States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it." (see FBIS translation of the interview, OW2807114599) 

 

From this it is understandable why China has developed the “Three Warfares” to compete with the U.S. – psychological warfare, legal warfare (lawfare), and media or public opinion warfare.

 

Jargon and Buzzwords

 

We spend so much time on our jargon and terminology and we spend so much time debating and expending a lot of energy arguing over terminology. This has long been a hobby horse of mine. In "Threats and the Words We Use: A Thought Experiment" I use the arguments of Clausewitz and the late Colin Gray to say that we are too dependent on jargon. Rather than relying on doctrinal terms or worse, buzzwords or phrases, we need to be able to describe the strategic environment, U.S. national interests, and actions and activities in plain language. The following chart illustrates a history of trying to describe what Congress called Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in 1987. We try to come up with pithy new terms and it is possible that it has caused definition and terminology paralysis in strategic thinking.

 


 

The new buzzword, whatever it is, will not solve anything and certainly not everything.

 

Low Intensity Conflict and Irregular Warfare

 

Irregular warfare is today's low intensity conflict. The intent of the Nunn Cohen Amendment of Goldwater Nichols was that all things related to LIC were to fall under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) and, by extension, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and then by relation, USSOCOM). This is another important issue: Should we meet the Nunn-Cohen intent and have ASD SO/LIC responsible for overseeing all IW related activities for DOD?

 


 

But rather than understanding the changing character of war we have spent decades trying to come up with pithy new terms.

 

Every proposed term, whether old (e.g., political warfare 1948), relatively new one (e.g., asymmetric warfare or hybrid warfare), or the reincarnation of irregular warfare in 2007, or today’s gray zone have a lot of heavy accompanying baggage. All have “antibodies” among many constituencies in the national security community: DOD, Services, State, academia/think tanks, press, pundits, politicians, policy makers and the public. Every proposed term has resistance among one and often more of these constituencies. 

 

 


It may be time to stop focusing so hard on terms and definition. The two terms that are most appropriate for strategic competition with China today are irregular warfare and political warfare with irregular warfare as the military contribution to a national level political warfare strategy. Yet are two of the most disliked terms within the national security community. Yet if only their descriptions were provided there would likely be concession that the actions and activities described are necessary for strategic competition. Maybe irregular warfare and political warfare should simply be internalized with the national security community and the military and from this day forward should never be spoken of again. Instead, policymakers, strategists, and planners should shift to only describing the activities in plain to avoid the controversy generated by such terms. Rather than struggle for agreement on pithy new terms, it is time to direct the intellectual capital to understanding the strategic environment and developing policies, strategy and campaign using plain language free of jargon and buzzwords. The 2022 National Defense Strategy may be showing us the way forward on irregular forward by minimizing its use. The NDS recognizes the centrality of irregular warfare to U.S. national security and has done so by adopting the first rule and fight club and irregular warfare.

 

The above is naïve and pure fantasy. We will never give up the quest for the doctrinal term that will solve all our problems. It is in our DNA. And we cannot nor do we want to be like the Chinese (though we can learn lessons from them). Rather than argue over such terms as political warfare and irregular warfare and worse be afraid to use them when they correct describe the strategic environment and actions necessary for effective strategic competition in the gray zone. Now is the time to set agendas, equities, and petty arguments aside and bring intellectual rigor to appreciating the context, understanding the approach, and developing an approach that serves U.S. national security.

 

We should be reminded of Captain Willard (Martin Sheen) in Apocalypse Now when he said. “Shit. I'm still only in Saigon. …. Every minute I stay in this room, I get weaker, and every minute Charlie squats in the bush, he gets stronger.”  American policy makers, strategists, and planners cannot remain stuck on arguing about the definition of terms, especially irregular warfare. We grow weaker every day we do while the PLA gets stronger.

 

David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel and has spent more than 30 years in Asia as a practitioner and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Editor of Small Wars Journal. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation (where he focuses on a free and unified Korea), and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.

 

 


About the Author(s)


Dave Maxwell

Dave Maxwell is the Editor-in-Chief of Small Wars Journal. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He is a 30-year veteran of the US Army, retiring as a Special Forces Colonel. He has worked in Asia for more than over 30 years, primarily in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Colonel Maxwell served on the United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command / United States Forces Korea CJ3 staff where he was a planner for UNC/CFC OPLAN 5027-98 and co-author of the original ROK JCS – UNC/CFC CONPLAN 5029-99. He later served as the Director of Plans, Policy, and Strategy and then Chief of Staff for the Special Operations Command Korea. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTF-P), served as the G3 for the United States Army Special Operations Command and culminated his service as a member of the military faculty at the National War College. Following retirement, he served as the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Colonel Maxwell is a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies, and on the Board of Directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, the International Council of Korean Studies, the Council on Korean-US Security Studies, the Special Operations Research Association, the OSS Society, and the Small Wars Journal. He earned a B.A. in political science from Miami University, and an M.A. in Military Arts and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and an M.S. in National Security Studies from the National War College. Colonel Maxwell teaches Unconventional Warfare and Special Operations for Policy Makers and Strategists.
















2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 22, 2023


Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2023


Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 22:

  • Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin made uncredible threats of nuclear escalation as part of an ongoing information operation aimed at deterring the Western provision of further military aid to Ukraine.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and extraordinarily unlikely to use them against the West.
  • Russian milbloggers on January 22 continued to discuss the potential of a pending major Russian or Ukrainian offensive and speculated as to which areas present the highest priority targets.[37]
  • Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 22.[38] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an industrial facility in Kadiivka, Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[39]
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and the Donetsk City-Avdiivka areas.[40]
  • Russian sources claimed on January 22 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in two directions in Zaporizhia Oblast, with their main efforts focusing on Hulyaipole and Orikhiv.[41] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces Yevhen Yerin stated on January 22 that Russian forces are not conducting large-scale operations in the Zaporizhia direction.[42]
  • Russian occupation authorities continued commandeering civilian infrastructure in occupied territories at the expense of civilian health and safety on January 22.[43]


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 22, 2023

Jan 22, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan

January 22, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 22. This report focuses on the Kremlin’s recent marginalization of the Wagner Group following the culmination of the drive on Bakhmut and its return to reliance on conventional forces on the frontlines and the regular Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff apparatus. The report also analyzes the changing relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and its implications.

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s star has begun to set after months of apparent rise following his failure to make good on promises of capturing Bakhmut with his own forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin had likely turned to Prigozhin and Prigozhin’s reported ally, Army General Sergey Surovikin, to continue efforts to gain ground and break the will of Ukraine and its Western backers to continue the war after the conventional Russian military had culminated and, indeed, suffered disastrous setbacks.[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff, headed by Sergey Shoigu and Army General Valeriy Gerasimov respectively, had turned their attention to mobilizing Russian reservists and conscripts and setting conditions for improved performance by the conventional Russian military, but they had little hope of achieving anything decisive in the Fall and early Winter of 2022. Putin apparently decided to give Prigozhin and Surovikin a chance to show what they could do with mobilized prisoners, on the one hand, and a brutal air campaign targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure on the other. Both efforts failed, as Prigozhin’s attempts to seize Bakhmut culminated and Surovikin’s air campaign accomplished little more than inflicting suffering on Ukrainian civilians while expending most of Russia’s remaining stocks of precision missiles. Prigozhin seems to have decided in this period that his star really was on the ascendant and that he could challenge Gerasimov and even Shoigu for preeminence in Russian military affairs. Those hopes now seem to have been delusional.

Putin appears to have decided to turn away from relying on Prigozhin and his irregular forces and to put his trust instead in Gerasimov, Shoigu, and the conventional Russian military once more. Putin began to re-centralize control of the war effort under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early December.[2] He gave Gerasimov overall command of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine on January 11, subordinating Surovikin to Gerasimov along with two other deputies.[3] The Russian MoD announced large-scale reforms to expand and reconstitute the Russian Armed Forces on January 17.[4] Ukrainian intelligence and select Kremlin officials have also reported that Putin is preparing to launch a second wave of reserve mobilization to expand the Russian Armed Forces, and the Russian MoD has been attempting to improve the professionalism of its conventional forces and to test the effectiveness of its chains of command.[5] Such reforms and appointments mark a significant inflection in the Kremlin’s efforts to reconstitute its conventional military and a deemphasis of short-term mitigation efforts such as the use of irregular formations on the frontlines.

Putin’s decision to focus and rely on conventional Russian forces is marginalizing the Wagner Group and the siloviki faction that nevertheless continues to contribute to Russian war efforts in Ukraine. The siloviki faction is a small group of Russian businessmen and leaders with meaningful power bases and parallel military companies and includes individuals such as Prigozhin. Putin’s resubordinating to Gerasimov the Commander of the Aerospace Forces, Surovikin, whose October 8 appointment received widespread support from the siloviki faction, reversed a months-long trend of Putin’s efforts to placate the siloviki.[6] Ukrainian intelligence had previously reported that Prigozhin formed an alliance with Surovikin that enabled Wanger Group to receive heavy weapons from the Russian Armed Forces and that the two together rivaled Shoigu.[7] Surovikin’s demotion has likely disrupted Prigozhin’s ability to exploit his connections within the Russian military command to the benefit of himself and Wagner.

Putin is also attempting to rebuild the Russian MoD’s authority and reputation, both of which had been badly damaged by failures in 2022 and heavily attacked by the siloviki faction for many months. Putin’s turnabout became most evident when he pointedly did not credit Prigozhin or his Wagner forces for the capture of Soledar during a federal TV interview on January 15.[8] The Russian MoD also originally did not recognize Wagner as a participant in the Battle for Soledar, only to vaguely acknowledge Wagner assault units in a follow-up announcement on January 13.[9] Prigozhin and his allies had been fighting to claim credit for gains around Bakhmut and the capture of Soledar for some time, making Putin’s decision to walk back Russian MoD’s acknowledgment of Wagner a major defeat for Prigozhin.[10]

Putin may have felt threatened by Prigozhin’s rise and tactless self-assertion. Putin began to reintroduce himself as an involved wartime leader in December, ostentatiously meeting with his commanders and appearing with troops.[11] Prigozhin did not take the hint, if hint it was, but instead redoubled his efforts to assert himself by advertising the superiority and successes of his own troops.[12] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov may have indirectly accused Prigozhin of deliberately fueling the conflict between the Russian MoD and Wagner in public on January 16, another shot across Prigozhin‘s bow.[13] Putin had also been increasingly integrating State Duma officials whom Prigozhin had been heavily courting, such as Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Andrey Turchak, by appointing them to working groups aimed at addressing issues with mobilization among other things.[14]

Putin likely turned to Prigozhin’s irregular forces to get through the period following the Russian conventional military’s culmination after the reckless and costly push to seize Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. Wagner forces have fought in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine since the first days of the war and played important roles in offensive operations such as that to seize Popasna, Luhansk Oblast (40km east of Bakhmut) in April-May 2022.[15] Wagner forces assisted other Russian troops in the Battle of Severodonetsk, serving as the main assault forces alongside Rosgvardia elements in late June 2022.[16] Wagner forces shifted their focus to Bakhmut in early July 2022 while simultaneously reinforcing their units with recruited prisoners.[17] Wagner had begun to make some advances in the vicinity of Bakhmut and took the lead for this axis in August 2022, likely relying on arriving convicts.[18] Prigozhin later began the ostentatious construction of a set of fortifications called the Wagner Line throughout Luhansk, Donetsk, and Belgorod oblasts in October 2022 and began training Belgorod and Kursk people’s militias.[19]

Russia’s pushes on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which followed the unsuccessful Russian drive on Kyiv and the bloody Battle for Mariupol, had consumed much of its offensive combat power in Donbas and southern Ukraine.[20] Russian forces paid dearly to seize the two remaining large cities in Luhansk Oblast and faced a significant troop shortage that prompted Putin to launch volunteer recruitment campaigns throughout the country.[21] Putin had likely allowed Prigozhin to expand his forces with prisoner recruits in an effort to mitigate these personnel shortages and maintain momentum on some select frontlines by unconventional means. Prigozhin may have won Putin over to his idea of recruiting prisoners into Wagner—something the conventional Russian military likely could not have undertaken at that time—due to Wagner’s contributions in seizing Popasna and Severodonetsk.

Prigozhin likely imagined that his efforts in Ukraine would continue to lend him military and political power in Russia. Prigozhin’s command over the Bakhmut direction and proximity to Putin likely gave him a false sense that he could use the victory in Bakhmut against the backdrop of Russian MoD’s military failures as a bargaining tool for his own commercial objectives such as the legalization of Wagner mercenary activity in Russia, expanding his political power within the Kremlin, or even displacing the authority of Shoigu. Western officials revealed in October that Prigozhin had harshly criticized the Russian MoD in a private conversation with Putin, claiming that Russian conventional forces were entirely reliant on Wagner forces.[22] Prigozhin had criticized former Commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, who was also responsible for the “central” group of forces in Ukraine, and Putin eventually dismissed Lapin.[23] Prigozhin had likely expected that further criticism of the Russian MoD and even Putin’s presidential administration would earn him a position near Putin.[24] The intensification of the Battle for Bakhmut in December and its subsequent culmination may also indicate that Prigozhin tried and failed to outshine the Russian MoD before the start of 2023.[25]

Prigozhin's recent apparent fall from grace and influence likely reflects the real limitations on his actual power. US and UK intelligence estimated that Prigozhin has approximately 50,000 fighters in Ukraine, of whom 40,000 are convicts and 10,000 contractors.[26] Prigozhin has been relentlessly throwing his fighters into bloody assault operations around Bakhmut at a high cost, while Putin has been conserving and training at least a portion of the men he mobilized into conventional Russian Army units.[27] Wagner Group is also likely relying on the Russian MoD’s logistical support and maintenance functions for its aviation and heavy military equipment.[28] Wagner’s forces are suffering from a lack of basic administrative organs and structures that are preventing Wagner from becoming an effective parallel military structure.[29] Prigozhin had likely believed in his own exaggerated view of the quality and importance of his largely convict-based force and his ability to outperform Russia’s conventional military, as well as his prospects of securing a spot in power nearer Putin. Certainly, his rhetoric and self-presentation had become overbearing and ostentatiously swaggering until things began to go south for him.

Putin had never fully given in to Prigozhin’s recommendations or demands throughout this transitional period and had likely always planned to put Prigozhin back into his place once the Russian conventional military improved enough to bear the burden of continuing the war. Putin had removed Lapin and appointed Surovikin—possibly on the advice of Prigozhin and his allies—but he did not grant most of Prigozhin’s desires. Prigozhin is still demanding that the Kremlin officially recognize the Wagner Group in Russia, even though Russian criminal law prohibits the operation of parallel military and mercenary formations.[30] Putin could have responded to numerous of Prigozhin’s requests and demands over many months and legalized Wagner’s operations in Russia, but he likely did not deem it necessary to weaken the Russian MoD and empower Prigozhin further to sustain a temporary force generation effort. Prigozhin had also called on the Russian State Duma and Prosecutor General’s office to fire and imprison St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for treason, claiming that Beglov had hindered Russia’s war efforts.[31] Prigozhin’s efforts along these lines went nowhere. Putin, on the other hand, met with Beglov in St. Petersburg on January 18 making clear that Beglov had won this round.[32] Prigozhin has also run into several bureaucratic obstacles when opening his Wagner Center in St. Petersburg and constructing the Wagner Line in Belgorod Oblast, obstacles that Putin could likely have demolished had he so desired.[33]

Putin’s turn on Prigozhin has positive and negative implications for Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. Putin is now marginalizing and distancing himself from a hard-to-control mercenary group composed predominantly of ill-disciplined convicts commanded in the most brutal manner. Prigozhin will likely continue to criticize the Russian MoD and the Kremlin and may even seek to turn the pro-war nationalist faction against Putin. But Prigozhin was already fueling the most extreme pro-war faction that had already been attacking the Russian MoD hammer and tongs and had even begun to come after Putin himself.[34] Prigozhin’s voice will likely carry less weight if Putin continues his marginalization, especially if Putin can convince the pro-war faction that he remains committed to his original notion of victory and intends to pursue it by more conventional means.

The marginalization of people like Prigozhin, who has had men executed with sledgehammers and hands out Wagner sledgehammers as gifts, is a good thing.[35] The return to prominence and influence of more professional military officers such as Gerasimov likely suggests a reduced likelihood that Putin will give in to the crazier demands of the far-right pro-war faction, possibly in turn further reducing the already-low likelihood of irrational Russian escalations. It can never be good to have people like Prigozhin near the center of power, so any indication that he is receding from power is positive. Prigozhin is not yet gone and will not likely leave Putin’s circle permanently. And he could rise again if Gerasimov and his cronies fail Putin once more. But Prigozhin is, for now, apparently an increasingly spent force in the Kremlin’s inner circles, and that is good.

But the re-emergence of the professional Russian military is also concerning. Prigozhin could never have established a formidable and sustainable national military apparatus. As long as Putin favored Prigozhin’s and others’ irregular approaches to continuing the war Putin postponed the day that Russian could re-establish a powerful conventional military. His re-embrace of Gerasimov and regular order has likely put Russia back on course toward rebuilding its military. NATO would do well to take note of this development as a matter of its own future security, beyond anything it might portend for Ukraine.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 22:

  • Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin made uncredible threats of nuclear escalation as part of an ongoing information operation aimed at deterring the Western provision of further military aid to Ukraine.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and extraordinarily unlikely to use them against the West.
  • Russian milbloggers on January 22 continued to discuss the potential of a pending major Russian or Ukrainian offensive and speculated as to which areas present the highest priority targets.[37]
  • Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 22.[38] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an industrial facility in Kadiivka, Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[39]
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and the Donetsk City-Avdiivka areas.[40]
  • Russian sources claimed on January 22 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in two directions in Zaporizhia Oblast, with their main efforts focusing on Hulyaipole and Orikhiv.[41] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces Yevhen Yerin stated on January 22 that Russian forces are not conducting large-scale operations in the Zaporizhia direction.[42]
  • Russian occupation authorities continued commandeering civilian infrastructure in occupied territories at the expense of civilian health and safety on January 22.[43]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.

ISW’s most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a potential major Russian offensive against northern Ukraine from Belarus appears increasingly unlikely. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as very low. ISW will continue reporting observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly.

Observed significant military activities in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicate an attack from Belarus is more likely:

  • Nothing significant to report.

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that is ambiguous:

  • Nothing significant to report.

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicates that an attack from Belarus remains unlikely:

  • Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated that there is currently no threat of a Russian offensive operation from Belarus and that the GUR has not observed a grouping and readiness of Russian forces in Belarus that would allow for such an operation.[44]
  • The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 22.[45]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.





[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/22/na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvnyh-masshtabnyh-dij-ne-zdijsnyuye-yevgen-yerin/

; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/22/rosiyany-rozikraly-likarnyu-v-skadovsku/

[44] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/nahnitannia-temy-zahrozy-napadu-na-ukrainu-z-boku-bilorusi-ie-rosiiskoiu-informatsiino-psykholohichnoiu-operatsiieiu.html

understandingwar.org



3. How the U.S. Government Amassed $31 Trillion in Debt


By spending more than it takes in?


Excerpts:


Economists disagree on the size and design of those responses. But they generally agree that by borrowing money in a sharp downturn, the federal government helped revive the economy and protect people and businesses.
“Not all debt is created equal,” said Lindsay Owens, an economic sociologist who is executive director of the liberal Groundwork Collaborative in Washington. “When we’re making critical investments, and stimulus, coming out of a recession, there are a lot of economic benefits to keeping money flowing in the economy, keeping unemployment from reaching astronomically high levels, keeping small businesses from defaulting.”
It is difficult to fully assign responsibility to individual presidents or parties for total levels of debt, because policy decisions often influence one another. By one crude measure, debt has been a bipartisan pursuit: It grew by $12.7 trillion when Mr. Bush and Mr. Trump, both Republicans, were in office, and by $13 trillion under the Democratic administrations of Mr. Obama and Mr. Biden.
That calculation ignores the reverberations that policy decisions can have even after presidents leave office. Mr. Bush’s tax cuts, for example, are still reducing federal revenue. Charles Blahous, a researcher at George Mason University who studies the federal budget, tried in a recent paper to apportion blame to presidents and parties in Congress for the federal deficit at various times.
For the 2021 deficit, he wrote, Mr. Trump bore the most blame, even though he was out of office. Mr. Biden was the runner-up.





How the U.S. Government Amassed $31 Trillion in Debt

The New York Times · by Jim Tankersley · January 22, 2023

Two decades of tax cuts, recession responses and bipartisan spending fueled more borrowing — contributing $25 trillion to the total and setting the stage for another federal showdown.

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Republicans are demanding deep spending cuts in exchange for allowing the government to continue borrowing to pay its bills.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times


By

Jan. 22, 2023

WASHINGTON — America’s debt is now six times what it was at the start of the 21st century. It is the largest it has been, compared with the size of the U.S. economy, since World War II, and it’s projected to grow an average of about $1.3 trillion a year for the next decade.

The United States hit its $31.4 trillion legal limit on borrowing this past week, putting Washington on the brink of another fiscal showdown. Republicans are refusing to raise that limit unless President Biden agrees to steep spending cuts, echoing a partisan standoff that has played out multiple times in the last two decades.

But America’s ballooning debt is the result of choices made by both Republicans and Democrats. Since 2000, politicians from both parties have made a habit of borrowing money to finance wars, tax cuts, expanded federal spending, care for baby boomers and emergency measures to help the nation endure two debilitating recessions.

“There have been bipartisan tax cuts and bipartisan spending increases” driving that growth, said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget and perhaps the pre-eminent deficit hawk in Washington. “It’s not the simple story of Republicans cut taxes and Democrats grow spending. Actually, they all like to do all of it.”

Few economists believe the level of debt is an economic crisis at the moment, though some believe the federal government has become so large that it is taking the place of private businesses, hurting growth in the process. But economists in Washington and on Wall Street are warning that failing to raise the debt limit before the government begins shirking its bills — as early as June — could prove catastrophic.

Despite all the fighting, lawmakers have taken few steps to reduce the federal budget deficit they have produced. It has been nearly a quarter-century since the last time the government spent less than it received in taxes.

Because spending programs today are so politically popular, and because retiring baby boomers are driving up the cost of programs like Social Security and Medicare every year, budget experts say it is unrealistic to expect the books to balance again for another decade or more.

The White House estimates that borrowed money will be necessary to cover about one-fifth of a $6 trillion federal budget this fiscal year — a budget that includes military spending, the national parks, safety net programs and everything else the government provides.

In just two decades, America has added $25 trillion in debt. How it got itself into this fiscal position has its roots in a political miscalculation at the end of the Cold War.

President Lyndon B. Johnson signing Medicare into law in 1965. In part because of the popularity and rising costs of programs like Medicare, federal deficits are expected to continue for at least a decade.Credit...Associated Press

In the 1990s, America reaped a so-called peace dividend. It reduced spending on the military, believing it would never have to invest as much in national security as it had when the Soviet Union was a threat. At the same time, a dot-com boom delivered the highest federal tax receipts, as a share of the economy, in several decades.

Understand the U.S. Debt Ceiling

Card 1 of 5

What is the debt ceiling? The debt ceiling, also called the debt limit, is a cap on the total amount of money that the federal government is authorized to borrow via U.S. Treasury securities, such as bills and savings bonds, to fulfill its financial obligations. Because the United States runs budget deficits, it must borrow huge sums of money to pay its bills.

The limit has been hit. What now? America hit its technical debt limit on Jan. 19. The Treasury Department will now begin using “extraordinary measures” to continue paying the government’s obligations. These measures are essentially fiscal accounting tools that curb certain government investments so that the bills continue to be paid. Those options could be exhausted by June.

What is at stake? Once the government exhausts its extraordinary measures and runs out of cash, it would be unable to issue new debt and pay its bills. The government could wind up defaulting on its debt if it is unable to make required payments to its bondholders. Such a scenario would be economically devastating and could plunge the globe into a financial crisis.

Can the government do anything to forestall disaster? There is no official playbook for what Washington can do. But options do exist. The Treasury could try to prioritize payments, such as paying bondholders first. If the United States does default on its debt, which would rattle the markets, the Federal Reserve could theoretically step in to buy some of those Treasury bonds.

Why is there a limit on U.S. borrowing? According to the Constitution, Congress must authorize borrowing. The debt limit was instituted in the early 20th century so that the Treasury would not need to ask for permission each time it had to issue debt to pay bills.

As the 20th century ended, America’s coffers were flush with tax revenue and light on military obligations, a combination that many leaders thought would hold up well into the future.

It did not last a year.

The dot-com bubble burst, cutting into tax revenue. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks spurred a furious rearmament push in Washington, as President George W. Bush mobilized wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Bush, a Republican, broke from historical precedent and did not raise taxes or issue war bonds to pay for those conflicts. (War bonds tend to pay lower interest than other government bonds, adding less to the debt.) Neither did his successor, President Barack Obama, who inherited those conflicts. The resulting spending added trillions of dollars to the national debt.

How Times reporters cover politics. We rely on our journalists to be independent observers. So while Times staff members may vote, they are not allowed to endorse or campaign for candidates or political causes. This includes participating in marches or rallies in support of a movement or giving money to, or raising money for, any political candidate or election cause.

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The Defense Department estimated last year that the direct costs for the wars in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan exceeded $1.6 trillion. Brown University researchers, who add indirect costs, particularly care for veterans of those wars and interest on the money borrowed to finance the military, found that the total cost was much higher: just under $6 trillion for all of America’s “War on terror” efforts in the wake of Sept. 11.

As military spending surged, federal revenue declined as a share of the economy. That decline was a direct result of tax cuts that Mr. Bush signed in 2001 and 2003. Those tax cuts were temporary, but in 2012, Mr. Obama struck a deal with congressional Republicans to make more than four-fifths of them permanent.

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a left-leaning think tank, has estimated that from 2001 through 2018, those tax cuts and the additional interest costs of borrowing to finance them added up to $5.6 trillion — or about one-third of the additional debt the government had incurred in that time.

In 2018, a new round of Republican tax cuts signed by President Donald J. Trump — which did not include spending cuts to offset their cost — kicked in. They were passed by some of the same lawmakers now contending that the government must not raise the borrowing limit without first taking steps to rein in debt.

Some conservatives claimed those cuts would “pay for themselves” by boosting economic growth and tax revenue, but independent analysts disagreed. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2018 that the law would add more than $1.2 trillion to the debt through the 2022 fiscal year, even after accounting for increased economic growth.

Federal revenue declined as a share of the economy after President George W. Bush’s tax cuts.Credit...Susana Raab for The New York Times

“If you’re going to have less revenue, you have to be willing to control the spending,” said Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office who now runs the conservative American Action Forum think tank. “The Achilles’ heel of the Republicans has been they love the tax cuts, but they are unwilling to be serious about spending.”

Some new, permanent spending programs also contributed to the debt. A Medicare prescription drug benefit, passed on a bipartisan basis under Mr. Bush, “clearly” increased deficits, costing more than $100 billion in 2022 alone, said Josh Gordon, health policy director for the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget in Washington.

Mr. Gordon said it was much harder to calculate the deficit impact of the Affordable Care Act, Mr. Obama’s signature health care expansion. The act has pushed up federal spending on Medicaid and health insurance subsidies. But it also raised some taxes. And the changes it made to the health care system have contributed — at least to some degree — to a reduction in Medicare spending compared with previous projections, offsetting some or all of the spending increases.

“You clearly wouldn’t want to give the A.C.A. all the credit” for the reduction in Medicare spending, Mr. Gordon said in an email, “but I do think it had a meaningful impact.”

Mr. Holtz-Eakin estimates a larger deficit effect from the Affordable Care Act. He also faults lawmakers for not doing more in the last two decades to reduce the growth in spending on Social Security and Medicare, which have already come under financial pressure from the first waves of retiring baby boomers.

The biggest — and often bipartisan — drivers of debt have been the federal responses to two sharp economic downturns: the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic recession. Shortly after Mr. Obama took office in 2009, inheriting a recession, he pushed Congress to approve a nearly $800 billion package of tax cuts and stimulus spending. Safety-net spending continued at high levels for the next several years as the economy recovered sluggishly.

Mr. Trump approved a much larger collection of aid packages, totaling more than $3 trillion, after Covid-19 swept the world in 2020. Mr. Biden took office the next year and signed a $1.9 trillion stimulus plan soon after.

Economists disagree on the size and design of those responses. But they generally agree that by borrowing money in a sharp downturn, the federal government helped revive the economy and protect people and businesses.

“Not all debt is created equal,” said Lindsay Owens, an economic sociologist who is executive director of the liberal Groundwork Collaborative in Washington. “When we’re making critical investments, and stimulus, coming out of a recession, there are a lot of economic benefits to keeping money flowing in the economy, keeping unemployment from reaching astronomically high levels, keeping small businesses from defaulting.”

It is difficult to fully assign responsibility to individual presidents or parties for total levels of debt, because policy decisions often influence one another. By one crude measure, debt has been a bipartisan pursuit: It grew by $12.7 trillion when Mr. Bush and Mr. Trump, both Republicans, were in office, and by $13 trillion under the Democratic administrations of Mr. Obama and Mr. Biden.

That calculation ignores the reverberations that policy decisions can have even after presidents leave office. Mr. Bush’s tax cuts, for example, are still reducing federal revenue. Charles Blahous, a researcher at George Mason University who studies the federal budget, tried in a recent paper to apportion blame to presidents and parties in Congress for the federal deficit at various times.

For the 2021 deficit, he wrote, Mr. Trump bore the most blame, even though he was out of office. Mr. Biden was the runner-up.

Margot Sanger-Katz contributed reporting.

The New York Times · by Jim Tankersley · January 22, 2023


4. Warp Speed: Ukraine’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle Program is Moving Fast


Excerpts:

While spring, technically, starts on March 20, 2023, the spring rainy season in Ukraine runs from the beginning of March to the end of June, with the period from the beginning of May to the end of June being the rainiest. By Milley’s ideal timeline, one might expect Ukrainian BFV training to finish by perhaps the end of April, translating to around the beginning of May before Ukraine deploys BFVs in combat.
DoD, however, has not provided any such estimate, perhaps for operational security reasons. Per Brigadier General Ryder, the Pentagon Press Secretary, “You’ll see the Bradleys arrive in the battlefield when they arrive.”


Warp Speed: Ukraine’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle Program is Moving Fast

19fortyfive.com · by Jeff Jager · January 17, 2023

The U.S. announced on January 5 that it would provide Ukraine with fifty Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV). Less than two weeks later, Ukrainians have begun training on BFVs in Germany, reflecting a rapidly developing program. Analysts have suggested a lengthy timeline likely exists for Ukraine’s eventual deployment of BFVs in combat against Russia.

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Foreign Affairs noted the extensive training timeline required for integrating BFVs into Ukraine’s military. The Washington Post assessed that, at a minimum, training Ukrainian units to use BFVs would take at least several months, while The Atlantic estimated a timeline of six months to a year.

In my initial assessment, I stated that, depending on several factors, it could be a year or longer before Ukraine can start using BFVs to fight Russia. These factors include the BFVs the U.S. actually provides to Ukraine and the U.S. security cooperation teams responsible for implementing the program, among others. The information that has emerged over the last several days provides some insights into Ukraine’s BFV program, about which many details remain unclear.

Expedited Training

The rapid initiation of Ukrainian BFV training in Germany stands out as a largely unexpected development, even if some commentators had predicted a very condensed timeline. At least one video of Ukrainian BFV training appeared on social media, providing some very limited video documentation of the program. It appears the U.S. has planned an extremely aggressive training pipeline; on January 12, Pentagon Press Secretary Brigadier General Pat Ryder briefed that Ukrainian BFV “training will take weeks, not months.” On January 16, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley visited the U.S. base in Grafenwoehr, Germany where Ukrainian BFV training started on January 15, highlighting the importance of this program. A day earlier, Milley stated that training will “take a bit of time … Five, six, seven, eight weeks, who knows. We’ll see what happens here.” The timeline – just ten days – from program announcement on January 5 to initiation of training on January 15 is incredibly fast. Even backing up program initiation to early November 2022, when the plan to provide Ukraine BFVs apparently originated, means that, from program initiation to the beginning of training, at most two months transpired.

This is years faster than any of the U.S.’ other recent programs to provide BFVs to foreign partners.

Vehicles for Training and Battle

The actual vehicles the U.S. is providing for Ukrainian BFV training in Germany have clearly contributed to this expedited timeline. In the U.S.’s two most recent programs, providing BFVs to foreign partners (Lebanon and Croatia), the U.S. opted to refurbish (in the case of Lebanon) or provide old BFVs for refurbishment by the recipient (for Croatia).

In the Ukrainian case, it very much appears that the U.S. has chosen to provide operational BFVs already located in Europe, most likely in Germany, for initial training. Online commentary has suggested that the BFVs Ukraine is training on were provided from U.S. Army prepositioned stocks in Germany. This achieves at least two objectives. First, it has enabled rapid initiation of the training program, reducing a years-long process for refurbishment to a days-long process. Second, it ensures that the vehicles provided for Ukrainian BFV training are actually operational. The Department of Defense (DoD) has not, however, yet confirmed if the BFVs being used for training will also be delivered to Ukraine, or what variant of BFV Ukraine will receive. A Pentagon spokesperson had no additional information to offer when asked on further specifics on January 15.

It is also still unclear, or at least unconfirmed, which variant of the BFV the U.S. will provide to Ukraine. Multiple media reports, including an updated one on January 15 in Forbes, have stated the U.S. will provide Ukraine with the M2A2 Operation Desert Storm (ODS) variant. Many of these reports are circular, referring back to themselves or other articles for which the source of information is not provided.

It does seem possible, if not likely, though, that the U.S. would provide M2A2 ODS BFVs to Ukraine; the U.S. provided the same variant to Lebanon and plans to provide them to Croatia. The U.S., however, does not appear to have confirmed this publicly, when asked, DoD declined to provide any additional information; U.S. European Command has remained unresponsive to my information requests.

Questions about Variants Remain

While the M2 variant Ukraine will receive matters, because the operational capability of each variant differs, even the M2A2 ODS variant, updated in 1995 after the Gulf War, would provide Ukraine an incredible combat capability. There have been additional upgrades to the BFV since 1995: the M2A3, which features upgraded armor and other improvements, debuted in 2002, and the M2A4, which the U.S. Army started to receive in 2020, features a more powerful engine. While there also exist cavalry (M3), air defense (M6), field artillery observation (M7), and other BFV variants, Ukraine is expected to receive one of the M2 infantry fighting vehicle variants.

The mechanism through which the U.S. is providing BFV training has also likely expedited the training timeline. Unlike the case of Lebanon, in which the U.S. used a lengthy defense contracting process to provide BFV training, for the Ukrainian BFV training program the U.S. is using existing facilities and personnel.

The very short timeline—even using the two months since program discussions first appeared in the media—simply does not support the sort of contracting effort normally required for such large-scale security cooperation programs. This approach also suggests that actual U.S. military Bradley experts are highly involved in training Ukraine to use BFVs, which was not the case in Lebanon.

Ukrainian BFV training in Germany is part of the expanded combined arms training package announced at the start of 2023. BFV training apparently has started with classroom and academic instruction and will be followed by field training at increasing levels of organization, likely culminating in battalion-level maneuver training. This appears to follow a standard, if expedited, training progression, which would usually start with individual-level tasks, including simulated and live-fire gunnery for BFV crew qualification, and progress to section, platoon, company, and battalion-level maneuver training. General Milley on January 16 informed the press traveling with him that the Ukrainians in the BFV training program had departed Ukraine just a few days earlier, and that ideally BFV training would be complete “sometime before the spring rains show up” in Ukraine.

While spring, technically, starts on March 20, 2023, the spring rainy season in Ukraine runs from the beginning of March to the end of June, with the period from the beginning of May to the end of June being the rainiest. By Milley’s ideal timeline, one might expect Ukrainian BFV training to finish by perhaps the end of April, translating to around the beginning of May before Ukraine deploys BFVs in combat.

DoD, however, has not provided any such estimate, perhaps for operational security reasons. Per Brigadier General Ryder, the Pentagon Press Secretary, “You’ll see the Bradleys arrive in the battlefield when they arrive.”

About the Author: Jeff Jager, a retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO), served multiple FAO tours on the USEUCOM-USCENTCOM seam, including as an attaché in Cyprus, a U.S Army Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Officer Turkey, and a Foreign Military Sales Officer and ODC Chief in Lebanon. He also served as a military advisor at the Department of State. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy; an A.A. in Turkish from the Defense Language Institute; and three M.A.s (Turkish Army War College, security studies; Georgetown University, German and European studies; Webster University, international relations). He is currently a Ph.D. student in Salve Regina University’s international relations program. He can be contacted via LinkedIn.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations. Review of this material by DOPSR does not imply Department of Defense endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion.

19fortyfive.com · by Jeff Jager · January 17, 2023


5. Former Navy SEAL, listed as a deserter, dies fighting in Ukraine



Former Navy SEAL, listed as a deserter, dies fighting in Ukraine

navytimes.com · by Lolita Baldor · January 20, 2023

A former member of the U.S. special forces was killed this week in Ukraine, American officials said Friday. They said he was not fighting in an official capacity.

Daniel W. Swift is a former member of the Navy SEALs who has been listed in official records as having deserted since March 2019. The Navy did not provide further information about his U.S. military record, but said, “We cannot speculate as to why the former Sailor was in Ukraine.”

Swift joined the Navy in 2005 and a SEAL unit in 2007. He would leave the service and return in 2015, rejoining the SEALs a year later.

Rolling Stone reported that Adam Thiemann, a former U.S. Army Ranger who had fought in Ukraine with Swift and stayed in contact with his platoon, told the magazine that on the night of Jan. 14 and into the next morning Swift was involved in an operation in Bakhmut, a city in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Russian forces launched an anti-personnel rocket-propelled grenade at Swift and two other soldiers, knocking them down.

“An American intelligence official, who first told Rolling Stone about Swift’s death, said he suffered a massive traumatic brain injury and died early Thursday morning,” the magazine reported.

The Navy reported he died Wednesday.

At least five other Americans are known to have died fighting in Ukraine, according to State Department statements and reports from individual families.

The U.S. government has discouraged Americans from going to fight for Ukraine, citing concerns that they may be captured by Russian forces and held hostage. At least 6,000 people contacted the Ukrainian embassy in Washington during the opening weeks of the war seeking information about how to volunteer on behalf of Ukraine.

Half the potential volunteers were quickly rejected for lacking military experience, having a criminal record, or otherwise not being fit to serve, Ukraine’s military attaché said last year.

An unknown number of Americans have joined units of foreign fighters supporting Kyiv. Others are volunteering with aid groups and human-rights organizations.

The State Department declined to address Swift’s death specifically but said in a statement that it could confirm the recent death of a U.S. citizen in Ukraine.

“We are in touch with his family and providing all possible consular assistance,” the department said.

Associated Press Writer Nomaan Merchant contributed to this report.




6. U.S. Military Vets in Ukraine Are Fighting Each Other in Court

Certainly appears to be an ugly situation.

U.S. Military Vets in Ukraine Are Fighting Each Other in Court

Amid accusations of fraud and sexual misconduct, the founders of the high-profile Mozart Group are waging a personal war back home.


Peter Maass

January 20 2023, 1:50 p.m.

The Intercept · by Peter Maass · January 20, 2023

A month after Russia invaded Ukraine last February, a private American organization with an unusual name — the Mozart Group — was created to train Ukrainian soldiers who were scrambling to the front lines with little preparation. Initially composed of a handful of retired Marines, the Mozart Group attracted extensive media coverage as a noble effort by American volunteers to transfer their combat skills to the embattled Ukrainians.

Mozart’s name was an attention-getting retort to the Wagner Group, the notorious Russian paramilitary company accused of war crimes in Ukraine and elsewhere. In contrast, Mozart was described by the American veterans who formed it as a donor-funded initiative to provide humanitarian assistance as well as military training; its members do not engage in combat and say they do not even carry weapons. By August, Mozart deployed three teams of former soldiers — two teams for military training, one for extracting civilians from the front lines — with each one costing up to $100,000 a month in expenses, according to a fundraising email from the group’s public leader, former Marine officer Andy Milburn.

But war is a messy business, and last week a landmine exploded under the Mozart Group.

I’m in

Andy Bain, a businessman in Kyiv since the 2000s and a former Marine, filed a lawsuit in Wyoming, where Mozart is registered as a limited liability company, accusing Milburn of financial fraud, sexual misconduct, burglary, attempted bribery, avoidance of U.S. weapons-transfer regulations, and even threatening a retired American general. The lawsuit asks the court to remove Milburn from the company and order him to pay damages of more than $50,000. According to the suit from Bain — who says he is the majority shareholder of Mozart — Milburn presided over the group “in a manner which has caused senior Ukrainian military officers to remark ‘can’t he go home and stop saving our country.’”

Milburn, reached for comment by The Intercept, described the suit’s allegations as “completely ridiculous.” He added that he had “placed this matter in the hands of legal experts.”

The last few decades of global warfare have seen a profusion of private military companies operating with little scrutiny and engaging in widespread abuses. The most notorious after 9/11 was Blackwater, led by former Navy SEAL Erik Prince, whose highly paid mercenaries — mostly retired U.S. service members — ran amok in Iraq and were implicated in war crimes there, though Prince was not personally charged. Wagner’s troops have been accused of atrocities in pretty much every war zone where they fight.

Mozart casts itself in a different mold, as it claims its members are unarmed and help civilians in addition to soldiers; Milburn reacted with public anger when an American magazine described him as a “foreign fighter.” Nonetheless, Mozart has found a unique way of marching into controversy.

A day after Bain’s lawsuit was filed, Milburn responded with a barrage of counter-accusations in posts on Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. He described Bain as Mozart’s disgruntled former chief financial officer and said that Bain had been accused of financial and sexual misconduct. He also said Bain was “heavily invested in Russia,” which in wartime Ukraine is not a trivial accusation. And in a particularly surprising twist, Milburn even alleged that Bain had tried to sell Mozart to the Taliban. Milburn subsequently deleted those posts, though he told The Intercept he still stands by them.

“I apologize for allowing this individual to be affiliated with the Mozart Group,” Milburn wrote on Twitter. “We are reevaluating our vetting process and will not allow this to happen again.”

Bain, asked to respond to Milburn’s accusations, told The Intercept, “I am not going to comment on pending litigation, but recent posts and comments ensure defamation will be a much larger part of the proceedings than originally envisioned.”

The full story of what’s happening inside Mozart is not yet known. While it’s not unusual for a startup’s founding partners to have a falling out, it doesn’t tend to happen in an active war zone. And an intriguing subplot may involve an alleged effort to monetize Mozart’s high-profile work in Ukraine by turning it into a private military company with global aspirations.

While Milburn consistently presents Mozart as surviving off donations and being singularly devoted to saving Ukraine, the lawsuit accuses him of seeking military contracts in Armenia. That accusation does not seem unfounded: a recent article in Intelligence Online reported that Mozart “is now planning to become a conventional for-profit private military contractor (PMC) and expand into other war-torn areas.” The article said Mozart’s chief operating officer, former Marine officer Martin Wetterauer, confirmed it was “looking for new clients in other locations in the world.”

Whatever its outcome, the lawsuit calls into question the stability and credibility of what the New York Times described a few months ago as “one of the biggest private military companies in Ukraine.” It seems certain to lend strength to Russia’s vivid criticisms of not just Mozart but also the overall U.S. effort to aid Ukraine, as Mozart has been one of America’s most visible citizen-led initiatives.

Ukrainians train during courses with the Mozart Group, in the Donetsk region on Sept. 22, 2022.

Photo: Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images

From Iraq to Ukraine

From its birth, Mozart has been intricately connected to Milburn, who describes himself as the group’s founder.

A British-born American, Milburn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 2019 after more than three decades of service that included deployments in Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, most recently as deputy commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Central, which plans special operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. He has written a memoir about his career, “When the Tempest Gathers,” and has contributed military-themed articles to publications including The Atlantic, USA Today, The Hill, and Task & Purpose.

He traveled to Kyiv as a freelance journalist within weeks of the Russian invasion in February, filing five stories for Task & Purpose, a military website. His last story, published on April 2, was about a former Marine accused of rape in Ukraine, but that story was subsequently withdrawn and now carries an editor’s note that says it is “undergoing editorial review for standards and practices and will be unavailable until the review is complete.” Editors at Task & Purpose did not respond to messages from The Intercept about the editorial review; Milburn told The Intercept he stands by the story.

A day after that article was published, Milburn made what appears to be his first public mention of Mozart Group in an April 3 tweet that said it “comprises former US SOF [special operations forces] personnel who deliver critically required capabilities to front line units in Ukraine. The Group’s activities primarily consist of advising, training and equipping Ukraine SOF and Resistance units.” A day after that, his first fundraising effort on PayPal raised the maximum allowed, $20,000, “within hours,” he tweeted; half of the total, $10,000, came from a military contractor, Obsidian Solutions Group. Two weeks later, Milburn explained in an article for Newsweek that his work for Task & Purpose seemed “frivolous” with a war raging around him, so he decided to organize military training after people “who I knew from previous visits, who are now in the Ukrainian military, asked me for help.”

With U.S. military personnel largely staying out of the country and U.S. diplomats departing in the early days of Russia’s invasion, Milburn attracted a considerable amount of media attention: He was one of the few Americans on the ground with combat experience who was working with the Ukrainian military and willing to talk with journalists. He has been interviewed frequently on cable and broadcast TV, especially CNN and ABC, while major newspapers in the U.S., U.K., and France have published articles about him. A New York Times profile bore the headline, “An American in Ukraine Finds the War He’s Been Searching For.”

None of these stories hinted at the accusations Bain has now lodged against Milburn.

“Crazy American”

Bain announced his 12-page lawsuit in a LinkedIn post last week that challenged Milburn’s self-portrayal as Mozart’s founder. “At the outset of the war,” Bain wrote, “having lived in Kyiv near on 30 years and recognizing Ukraine’s dire need for basic military training, I contacted a retired U.S. Marine general friend asking if he knew anyone who could come develop training. He put me in contact with Andy Milburn, who came to Ukraine a few weeks later.” According to Bain’s post, “I registered, named and arranged financing to launch the Mozart Group with a goal of providing training and support as needed for the war.”

Bain’s LinkedIn post states that he owns 51 percent of the shares in Mozart Group, while Milburn owns 49 percent. In response to a request from The Intercept for documentation, Bain provided three pages from a 35-page “Operating Agreement” for Mozart. One of the pages shows a chart that attributes 51 percent of the company’s “units” to Bain and 49 percent to Milburn.

While Bain has not previously publicized his ownership of Mozart — it is not disclosed on the group’s website and has not been mentioned by Milburn — there is a public record of the two men collaborating. On April 10, they started a YouTube channel called “Two Marines in Kyiv,” which now hosts seven videos, most of which feature discussions between them. The channel’s “About” page describes Milburn as CEO of the Mozart Group and Bain as president of Ukrainian Freedom Fund, which according to its website is a nongovernmental organization that has raised more than $3 million since February for military and humanitarian aid.

Bain’s most serious allegations revolve around Milburn’s handling of donated money — what the suit describes as efforts to “facilitate the diversion of funds away from Mozart Group LLC.” The lawsuit alleges that Milburn was “insisting on personal compensation payments exceeding $35,000 per month from company accounts … and not accounting to the company for donated funds received which were received in personal or other accounts controlled by him.” At least some of Milburn’s personal fundraising was not hidden from donors: His social media solicitations for donations have included clear links to his Venmo and PayPal accounts, which he said was necessary because Mozart’s donation platform was not working at the time, possibly due to Russian interference. But until Bain’s suit, he had not been accused of misusing funds deposited into those or other accounts he controlled.

That wasn’t all, however. According to the suit, Milburn hired as his personal assistant a woman he met on a social media dating site and had a relationship with, paying her an annual salary of $90,000, which according to the suit was “at least four times more” than the going rate. The suit further alleges that Milburn made “unwanted sexual advances and propositions to a female office manager.”

The lawsuit even accuses Milburn of “orchestrating and participating” in the burglary of a warehouse leased by Bain’s Ukrainian Freedom Fund. In addition, it claims Milburn was intoxicated and broke Kyiv’s curfew, leading to his temporary detention by Ukrainian authorities on more than one occasion. And according to the suit, Milburn sent “hostile and caustic messages” to a retired commanding general of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe after the general declined to join Mozart (the retired general was not named). Milburn’s conduct, the suit added, exasperated senior Ukrainians.

“Defendant Milburn is now commonly referred to by Ukrainian military leadership as the ‘Crazy American,’” it alleges.

The Intercept · by Peter Maass · January 20, 2023


7. Army Sees Signs it Might Hit Recruiting Target This Year




Army Sees Signs it Might Hit Recruiting Target This Year

military.com · by Steve Beynon · January 20, 2023

The Army might be on track to meet its bullish recruiting goal this year after last year saw the service struggle to find recruits.

Since the start of the new fiscal year, which began in October, the Army has recruited some 18,500 new soldiers and has roughly another 13,000 in the pipeline in various stages of the recruiting process, Maj. Gen. Johnny Davis, head of the service's Recruiting Command, told Military.com on Thursday. If the Army can keep up that pace for each quarter of the year, it would hit its recruiting goal.

"This competition and war for talent is real," Davis said. "But things are getting better."

The first chunk of the fiscal year is generally seen as one of the most difficult times to recruit, as much of it falls during the holidays and brisk winter months in parts of the country. The Army's goal this year is to bring in 65,000 new soldiers, after falling 15,000 short of its 60,000 recruiting target last year. If it kept up its pace from the first quarter, the Army would bring in 74,000 recruits in 2023.

Army officials have said that much of the recruiting struggle is out of the service's direct control. Recruiters interviewed by Military.com say it isn't a lack of interest in service by young Americans, it's finding qualified candidates who can meet the service's standards, with many potential recruits either not meeting fitness standards to serve or performing poorly on the military's SAT-style entrance exam.

In addition, the service has been facing challenges from Military Health System (MHS) Genesis, a new electronic health record system that went operational last year and gives the military unprecedented access to an applicant's medical and mental health background during the recruiting process.

In the past, recruiters would sometimes skirt around scrutinizing a recruit's medical history to avoid a bumpy application process. But the new system might be an overcorrection, with recruiters saying the application process has been clogged up -- sometimes making it take months longer to get someone in uniform or disqualifying seemingly qualified applicants because of minor injuries, certain types of prescriptions or mental health diagnoses that are years old. In some cases, the applicant might lose interest in military service during the delays, a situation that has spiked in the past year, according to Davis.

"What we know is the process for contact to contract time is longer," Davis said. "What we don’t want is for that future service member to find another career. This is just a year old; we are all working hard to address this. Your broken toes from 21 years ago … something that happened 7 years ago and they have to locate those records. I think we're going to get past that."

Though there are no plans to bring in more recruiters, at the center of the Army's strategy are efforts to boost quality of life for its 8,500 recruiters and expand training, Davis said. That includes better explaining benefits and giving recruiters more options on where they get stationed.

Recruiters often face long working hours trying to hit their quota and time away from their families. Quotas vary, but generally amount to one recruit per month. Recruiters routinely sink significant time into applicants who change their mind about enlisting or otherwise turn out to not be eligible for service, leading to a morale problem that makes the job particularly difficult.

This month, the service's recruiting school was extended from six weeks to eight with much of that training focusing on briefing students on their benefits, such as the Leased Government Housing Program, which can make it easier for recruiters to find housing in high-cost areas where the housing allowance they would otherwise get from the Army isn't enough.

The Army also started a new financial incentive for recruiters this month. For every applicant who makes their way to basic training and scores in the top 50th percentile on the entrance exam, recruiters will earn $150. Recruiters are eligible for the bonus only if they've already hit their quota and the high-scoring applicant is an additional recruit. Recruiters also earn $75 for additional applicants who score between the 31st and 49th percentiles -- which is generally the lowest academic performance for automatic acceptance into the Army.

Army officials estimate only 23% of young Americans are eligible for service, mostly due to obesity and low academic ability. The service is increasingly relying on a new set of courses for applicants who are slightly too overweight or performed poorly on the ASVAB to come into compliance with military standards. The Army this month expanded that effort from a pilot program in Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to Fort Benning, Georgia -- which can accommodate roughly 12,000 troops who otherwise wouldn't have been eligible to join. That figure comes close to making up the recruiting shortfall last year.

Army planners are looking to expand the program even further to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

"What we're not willing to do is lower standards." Gen. James McConville, the Army's top officer, said at an Association of the United States Army conference Wednesday. "Quality is more important than quantity. But what we are willing to do is invest in young men and women."

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · January 20, 2023


8. Special Operations News Update - January 2023 | SOF News


Special Operations News Update - January 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 23, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo: SOF winter warfare training above the Arctic Circle, Kiruna, Sweden. (Photo from SOCEUR video by SPC Liem Huynh, February 24, 2018).

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Flintlock 2023. SOCAF will conduct Flintlock 2023 in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire March 1-15, 2023. Approximately 1,300 service members from 30 participating nations with be involved in the exercise. “Africa SOF, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa Announce Flintlock 2023”, DVIDS, January 13, 2023.

Silver Star Award for NSW Legend. On January 17, 2023, the Silver Star was awarded to Rear Adm. Keth Thomas Richards for his actions 50 years ago in Vietnam. Subsequent to his heroic actions during the Vietnam conflict he would continue to serve in the U.S. Navy. His final post was as commander of Naval Special Warfare Command from 1996 to 1999. “Silver Star Awarded to Naval Special Warfare Legend”, Navy.mil, January 19, 2023.

24th SOW D-Cell – Training in Alaska. The Agile Combat Employment concept of the Air Force is one that a sub-unit of the 24th SOW has been conducting for decades. It has recently spent some time training in Alaska. “24th Special Operations D-Cell, Pioneers of the ACE Concept, Hone Arctic Skills in Alaska”, Pacom.mil, January 20, 2023.

SF’s ‘Sling’. Members of the 3rd Special Forces Group is involved in the development and testing of a mortar system that will modernize firepower capabilities for SOF units. The 120 mm mortar system can be used on small 4×4 wheeled vehicles and be put into use very quickly. “Fort Bragg Special Forces soldiers are testing a new mortar system. Here’s what it can do.”, Yahoo! News, January 15, 2023.

SOF Vehicle Upgrades. Special Operations Command is searching for vehicle integration kits that will enhance or expand the tactical capabilities of its ground transport vehicles. “Special Operators Look for Easy Vehicle Upgrades”, National Defense, January 20, 2023.

Frank Sobchak Now With MWI. Retired Colonel Frank Sobchak, former Special Forces officer, has joined the Modern War Institute as the chair of the irregular warfare studies for 2023. He has taught at West Point, the Joint Special Operations University, and several other educational institutions. (MWI, Jan 17, 2023).

Howell on Joby Aviation Advisory Board. Lt. Gen. (ret) Scott Howell, a former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has been appointed to serve on the advisory board of Joby Aviation, Inc. He had served in special operations for more than two decades and deployed extensively. Howell was a career special operations helicopter pilot with more than 2,600 hours of flight experience. (Vertical Magazine, Jan 11, 2023).

SOCOM and C2I Software Update. The United States Special Operations Command is looking for a platform that can integrate its separate systems used in mission data storage as well as in intelligence, planning, and execution. (ExecutiveBiz, Jan 13, 2023).

Awards for CV-22 Crew’s Part in Rescue. In October 2020, U.S. Navy SEALs rescued an American who was held hostage in West Africa. Their insert and exfil was conducted by Special Operations Airmen in aircraft that required multiple mid-air refuelings. Read more in “Airmen honored at Kirtland for daring rescue mission”, Albuquerque Journal, January 11, 2023.

Suicide in SOF Ranks. The Army SOF community has experienced its share of suicides and there are ongoing efforts by U.S. Army Special Operations Command to reduce incidences among the ranks. “It can happen to anyone”, The Fayetteville Observer, January 18, 2023. See also “Army Special Operators Seek to Reduce Suicide with ‘Bottom-Led’ approach”, Defense One, January 17, 2023.

Training for Combat Diver School? The quicker you learn the techniques of swimming, treading, and other water competency skills the better the odds of passing. “Try This Military Swim Workout to Prepare for Special Ops, Diver or Rescue Swimmer Training”, Military.com, January 2023.

Drug Use in USASOC? According to a press release by the United States Army Special Operations Command the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) more than a dozen USASOC soldiers assigned to Fort Bragg, NC are being questioned on alleged drug use. “Over a dozen Army Special Operations Command soldiers investigated for alleged drug use”, Task & Purpose, January 9, 2023.

‘MARSOC 3’ Update. Two Marine Raiders are in the midst of a trial on charges of involuntary manslaughter. They were involved in an incident in 2019 at an off-base nightclub in Irbil, Iraq while deployed with Marine Special Operations Command that resulted in the death of a retired Green Beret. “As 2 of the ‘MARSOC 3’ go on trial for homicide, the 3rd gets immunity”, Marine Corps Times, January 17, 2023.

920th Rescue Wing – 60 Years! This United States Air Force Reserve unit has a storied history – beginning with the flying of C-123 Provider cargo aircraft. Over time it transitioned to WC-130 cargo aircraft. Now it is a rescue wing with C-130s and HH-60 helicopters. “920th Rescue Wing marks 60th year since activation”, Air Force, January 15, 2023.

Covert Semi-Sub. Washington State University has unveiled a new unmanned semi-submarine to support secret military operations. At only 1.5 feet long, it will show only 10% of its body above the water surface. “US Develops Unmanned Semi-Sub for Covert Military Operations”, The Defense Post, January 18, 2023.

3rd SFG(A) Cook Killed in Shooting. SSG Jimmy Smith was killed during a shooting on January 18 in Raeford, NC. He was a culinary specialist in Group Support Battalion. Smith joined the Army in 2016. Before his assignment to 3rd Group he had served with the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea and the 82nd Abn Div at Fort Bragg, NC. “Soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group killed in North Carolina shooting”, Task & Purpose, January 20, 2023. See also “3rd SF Group soldier killed in shooting”, Army Times, January 20, 2023.

SOF Role Changing? The recent National Defense Strategy has verbiage in it that changes up the mission of the U.S. special operations forces. Read more in “The Changing Role of Special Operations Forces”, Special Operations.com, January 8, 2023.

SOCSOUTH Cdr Interview. Marine Brigadier General Peter Huntley took command of Special Operations Command South in July 2022. His career began with a tour in the 1st Ranger Battalion as an enlisted man. He then went to college and was commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps. One of his assignments was as the Operations Officer of UK’s 45 Commando. “Meet SOCSOUTH’s New Commander”, South Dade Newsleader, January 20, 2023.

Cancer in SOF. The Military Special Operations Family Collaborative hosted a live Q& with several experts on cancer trends in the special operations community. “SOF Health Deep Dive: Cancer in SOF”, MSOFC, December 19, 2022.

All Army Soldiers to Wear Green Beret. (Caution: humor zone). Over 20 years ago, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Eric Shinseki, decided that all U.S. Army soldiers would wear the Black Beret – a move he said would ‘boost morale’. The Rangers, present and past, went ballistic. A compromise was reached where the Rangers would don tan berets. In time, the Black Beret was deemed impractical for the general Army population for everyday use. It afforded no protection from the elements; was hot in the summer, didn’t keep ears warm in the winter, keep the rain out of your eyes, provided no protection from the sun, looked frumpy, and required two hands to don. Years later the policy was changed allowing the wear of brimmed ‘patrol cap’ for wear with the ‘everyday uniform’. Army soldiers celebrated that they could ditch the ill-fitting black wool berets and that they could stop wearing ‘a wet sock on my head‘. However, the incoming Sergeant Major of the Army, a Green Beret with decades of SOF experience, has recently announced a new uniform policy. Read more in “New SMA: All soldiers will now wear green beret”, Duffel Blog, January 20, 2023.


International SOF

France’s GIGN. Aidan Hickey writes about France’s primary counterterrorism and hostage rescue unit – formed in 1973 as a direct response to the 1972 Munich Massacre. “GIGN: The Hostage Rescue Primacy of the Gendarmerie Intervention Group”, Grey Dynamics, January 6, 2023.

Russia Recruiting Afghan SOF. Former Afghan elite commandos who fled to Iran after the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021 are being recruited by Russia. “Why is Russia Recruiting Former Afghan Soldiers for its War Against Ukraine?”, The Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2023.

Lithuanian SOF. Aitvaras is one of the most secretive units in the Lithuanian military. “A glimpse into lives of Lithuanian special operations soldiers”, LRT, January 10, 2023.

French SOF Leaving Burkina Faso. A 2018 military accord that allowed the presence of French troops in the African country of Burkina Faso has been suspended. Some 400 French special forces troops had been in the country engaged in operations against al-Qaeda and ISIL factions. Russia has been making headway in the region at the expense of France and other western nations. “Burkina Faso demands departure of French troops”, Aljazeera, January 22, 2023.

SOE Ends. On January 15, 1946, the Special Operations Executive was dissolved by UK Prime Minister Clement Attlee. The SOE was the British counterpart to the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS).


SOF History

National Intelligence and SOF Museum. A site in northern Virginia may soon be the home for the National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations. The museum is projected to open in 2027. “Defense bill OKs future national intelligence museum”, Military Times, January 20, 2023.

Air America’s Secret War in Laos. Author Marc Phillip Yablonka provides a short bio of Air America pilot Louisianan Allen Cates and his time in Laos. “With Air America, that meant flying in Laos”, Hmong Daily News, January 7, 2023.

OCPW Established. On January 15, 1951, the Army established the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare headed by Brigadier General Robert McClure.

OEF-P. Twenty years ago, on January 15, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines began to support the Republic of Philippines counterterrorism efforts. Special Operations Command – Pacific (SOCPAC) formed the nucleus of OEF-P. https://sof.news/sof/oef-p/


Ukraine Conflict

Former Navy SEAL KIA in Ukraine. Daniel W. Swift, a former Navy Special Warfare Operator First Class, died on January 18, 2023 after suffering injuries in combat (Yahoo! News, Jan 20, 2023) while fighting with Ukrainian forces in Dnipro. He was a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Swift is the sixth known American to die in the war. He joined the Navy in 2005 (VOA, Jan 21, 2023) and was assigned to a SEAL unit in 2007.

Ukrainian SOF and Foreign Operators. Since February 2021, thousands of volunteer from other countries have gone to Ukraine to fight the Russians. Many of them are former special operators of elite units from other European countries as well as other nations around the world. Read more in “Special Operations: Ukraine Integrates Foreign Operators”, Strategy Page, January 12, 2023.

Wagner Group – Terrorist Organization? A bill likely to be introduced to the U.S. Congress in the coming year is the HARM Act – or Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries. Read more in “The Case for Designating Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization is Still Compelling”, Lawfare Blog, January 18, 2023.

Mozart Group – in a Court Battle. The two owners of the U.S. entity assisting the Ukrainian military are now at odds with each other with a court case in the States and an ongoing battle on social media. The ‘non-profit’ has been engaged in training Ukrainian military units and in humanitarian assistance. The public face of the Mozart Group has been Andy Milburn, author of When the Tempest Gathers and a career U.S. Marine officer with significant time in MARSOC. “U.S. Military Vets in Ukraine Are Fighting Each Other in Court”, The Intercept, January 20, 2023.

No Tanks for Ukraine. Defense leaders around the world met in Germany last week to discuss the Russian invasion of Ukraine and how to assist Kyiv over the next several months in resisting the aggressor. Ukraine was disappointed in the group not coming to an agreement on providing main battle tanks to Ukraine. President Zelensky expressed his regret over lack of a decision; saying that the modern Western tanks would offer more firepower than the Soviet-era tanks it is currently fielding against the Russians. Several European nations who have the German Leopard 2’s want to ship them to Ukraine; but can’t, without Germany’s approval.


Commentary

USSOCOM and ‘Competition Campaigning’. Jonathan Schroden, the director of the Special Operations Program at CNA Corporation, has penned an essay that addresses the topic of ‘competition campaigning’ and its implications for USSOCOM. He provides some recommendations that would help USSOCOM be the DoD’s premier force for competition over the next several decades. “Competition Campaigning: What it Looks like and Implications for US Special Operations Command”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 20, 2023.

SOF and UN Peace Operations. A Ghanian officer argues that SOF units should augment UN peace operations forces that are deployed to crisis regions around the world. Read more in “Contemporary Need for Special Forces in United Nations Peace Operations”, Small Wars Journal, January 5, 2023.

SOCOM, IWFC, and IW. James Armstrong, a former Army Infantry officer, provides some interesting (and questionable) comments in his article about irregular warfare education and the special operations community. “Developing Mastery of Irregular Warfare is a Pipe Dream if the DOD is Forced to Rely on SOCOM”, Small Wars Journal, January 3, 2023.

Maxwell on Irregular Warfare. An interesting article has been provided by Col (Ret.) David Maxwell, a Special Forces officer with a deep knowledge of doctrine and special operations. He explores the many terms used in the past and the present that are related to Irregular Warfare (IW) and the quest to define IW. “The First Rule of Fight Club and Irregular Warfare Should be the Same”, Small Wars Journal, January 22, 2023.


National Security

“Political Warfare”. An introductory explanation is provided in a publication entitled What Is “Political Warfare”? This short 2-page Congressional Research Service pub provides a synopsis of the background, present day challenges, and description of political warfare. CRS, PDF, Jan 9, 2023. View more pubs about political warfare here.

Syria’s Kurds and the Way Forward. Turkey, long an opponent of the Assad regime in Syria, may soon be (incrementally) normalizing relations with its long-time dictator. This would directly threaten the position of U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds – as both Syria and Turkey would like to remove the control the Kurds have over parts of northeastern Syria. The U.S. should get out in front of this possible reconciliation between Turkey and Syria to protect the interests of the Kurds. One way is to help the Kurds reach a political agreement with both nations. Read more on this topic in “A New Path for Syria’s Kurds”, War on the Rocks, January 18, 2023.

The Border Crisis. The U.S. southern border is in the midst of a historic surge in illegal migrant crossings. Despite its association with the Trump administration, the current admin has expanded “Title 42”; the controversial pandemic health rule. The slowing of ‘legal crossings’ – migrants seeking asylum at U.S. border crossings means that there will be an uptick in illegal border crossings. “IntelBrief: Biden’s Visit to U.S. Southern Border Highlights Historic Migrant Surge”, The Soufan Center, January 17, 2023.

Afghan Commando Detained at Border. An Afghan special operations soldier who fled Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover in August 2021 crossed the U.S. southern border seeking asylum. He has been detained for months by the Customs and Border Patrol and is facing deportation back to Afghanistan. “Lawmakers seek to free Afghan soldier detained at U.S.-Mexico border”, Axios, January 21, 2023.


Upcoming Events

February 4, 2023. Birmingham, AL

20th SFG(A) Reunion / Dining Out

20th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

April 5-6, 2023. San Diego, California

Warrior West

ADS

May 8-11, 2023. Tampa, Florida

SOF Week

USSOCOM


Books, Pubs, and Reports

Pub – “The Position of the Special Operations Forces Soldiers on the So-called Global War on Terrorism”, by Marcin Lason, Defense & Security Analysis, January 6, 2023.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2157942

Sentinel. The January 2023 issue of Sentinel had been posted online. Published by Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association, this 20-page PDF has a number of good articles.

Infantry. The Winter 2022-2023 issue of Infantry has been published by the U.S. Army Infantry School. This 54-page PDF features a number of articles; this issues’ theme is mountain warfare.

IW Books. Dr. Kevin Stinger, a retired U.S. Army colonel, provides us with ten book recommendations for 2023. Read about the books in “Irregular Warfare Center 2023 Book Recommendations”, Irregular Warfare Center, January 3, 2023. (Editor’s note: Two these I have read – No Moon as Witness and

Book Review – Somalia’s Forever War. An active duty U.S. Army Special Forces officer with assignments to Somalia and other parts of Africa reviews a book about the Somali conflict. He provides insight into Mary Harper’s Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al Shabaab (2019). “Al-Shabaab and the Grim Realities of Somalia’s Forever War”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 3, 2023.


Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – SF SGM Shares Stories of Career and Afghanistan. An active duty SF SGM, Chuck Ritter, talks about his career in Special Forces, combat in Afghanistan, working with Afghan special operations kandaks, a firefight between the Taliban and SFODA 3335 / 6th SOK, and getting wounded in combat. “Surrounded Special Forces Fight Through Hundreds of Taliban”, Black Rifle Coffee, January 17, 2023, YouTube, 21 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7ERVuDKHao

Video – SF Dog Handler Shares His Story on Career. An Army veteran who spent time with the 82nd Airborne Division, 7th Special Forces Groups, and other SOF units recounts his career in the military. This includes his time as a K-9 handler. “USASOC Operator Rick Hogg”, Combat Story, YouTube, January 14, 2023, 1 hour 40 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bgSEFTa3q10

Podcast – The Arctic Heats Up: Global Competition in the High North. Brigadier General Shawn Satterfield, the commanding general of Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH), is a guest on this podcast by the Irregular Warfare Podcast at Modern War Institute at West Point, December 30, 2022, 45 minutes. https://mwi.usma.edu/the-arctic-heats-up-global-competition-in-the-high-north/

Podcast – Warrior Mindset with Nick Lavery. A ‘warrior’s warrior’ talks with the hosts about the importance of sacrifice, determination, work ethic, and having a purpose for life. Nick is a SF NCO who suffered some severe wounds in Afghanistan, recovered, and redeployed once again. The Pinelander, January 13, 2023, 1 hour. https://pinelander.podbean.com/e/episode-058-the-year-ahead-january-13-2023/

Podcast Channels

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

sof.news · by SOF News · January 23, 2023


9. TikTok accused of spying on the US and corrupting youth


The young people I talk to are not at all convinced of the danger of TikTok.



TikTok accused of spying on the US and corrupting youth

In a mix of paranoia and puritanism, the Chinese app is facing a cabal from US officials.

By Arnaud Leparmentier (New York (United States) correspondent)

Published on January 22, 2023 at 14h58 Time to

2 min. Lire en français

Le Monde · by Arnaud Leparmentier

DPA/PHOTONONSTOP

For cinephiles, Rapid City, located at the foot of Mount Rushmore in the United States, might bring to mind Soviet spies chasing Cary Grant in Alfred Hitchcock's North by Northwest (1959).

Some 60 years later, the city was dealing with suspected spies of a different kind: the Chinese and their popular social media app, TikTok.

City councilman Jason Salamun proposed a ban on the app in Rapid City, citing national security risks but he was opposed by councilwoman Laura Armstrong. She argued that Rapid City had other priorities and that there was no evidence of Chinese espionage.

In the end, the council rejected the proposal in early January, much to the satisfaction of Ms. Armstrong. "I'm not a big supporter of the Chinese government but getting caught up in what I see as media McCarthyism is not the way to go," she told the Wall Street Journal.

The US has been involved in a campaign against TikTok for the past two and a half years, mixing anti-Chinese paranoia and puritanism, with the app being accused of leading young people astray with content promoting sex and offering dangerous advice on diet, alcohol, and drugs.

The state of Indiana has even launched a lawsuit against the app. Despite accusations, TikTok has surpassed its US competitors including Instagram and has around 100 million users. In the small town of Rapid City, is being used everywhere, from firefighters resorting to it to recruit to the garbage collection company educating citizens on waste disposal.

Read more Why are US states banning TikTok?

In December 2022, South Dakota's governor, Republican Kristi Noem, banned the use of TikTok on all state-owned devices, blindsiding many. The local tourism department, which had 60,000 subscribers, had to remove its application, public broadcasting had to do the same and the state's six universities were also affected.

The question that had arisen was whether TikTok should be banned on the motive that the company could collect private data and use it for the benefit of the Chinese Communist Party and manipulate the American population.

'Trojan horse'

The fight against TikTok began in August 2020 under the administration of former US president Donald Trump who had already sought to ban telephone equipment produced by Chinese company Huawei, citing concerns that the company could potentially spy on or manipulate Americans remotely.

We are interested in your experience using the site.

However, facing the political impossibility of banning TikTok, Trump tried to "Americanize" it by forcing its parent company, ByteDance, to sell TikTok's activities in the US.

Microsoft had expressed interest in acquiring TikTok but a deal fell through when it became clear that the company founded by Bill Gates would not have access to the software that makes TikTok so effective.

​

Le Monde · by Arnaud Leparmentier


10. Biden’s Shadow War in Ukraine



Excerpts:

While robust, the latest U.S. $2.5 billion aid package to Ukraine announced on January 19th is not nearly enough. It includes 59 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and 90 Stryker armored personnel carriers. What is glaringly missing from the package is exactly what Ukraine needs most. Namely Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB), M1 Abrams tanks, and fast jets such as the F-16.
These weapons, as part of a combined arms team, would provide the necessary offensive capability to maneuver and shape the battlefield and provide operational reach beyond Ukraine’s borders. They would also enable Kyiv to strike cruise missile and drone launching points, interdict Russian forces before they can arrive on the battlefield, target ammunition, fuel, and supply depots, as well as Russian command and control centers.
They would also allow Zelensky to take the fight to Russia instead of being forced to wait for Russia to bring the fight to Ukraine on Putin’s terms. Most importantly, they would afford no sanctuary to Russian forces.
Zelenskyy is not afraid of Putin’s shadows. He made clear early on when he refused Biden’s offer to evacuate him. Zelensky is the Winston S. Churchill of the 21st century. He has offered his blood, his sweat, and his toil. It is now time the West offers its own in defense of democracy.
In the words of U.S. General George S. Patton, “never let the enemy pick the battle site.” That core element of operational art seems to have been forgotten by our Secretary of Defense, retired Army General Lloyd Austin, and the President’s senior military advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley. It’s time the Biden administration lost its fear of Putin’s outsized shadows. Ukraine’s existence and the lives of its valiant people depend on it.


Biden’s Shadow War in Ukraine | Article | KyivPost

Strategic ambiguity with regard to Kyiv is tantamount to strategic certainty for Moscow. The West needs to be bolder and more decisive about winning.


Jon Sweet

By Jon Sweet

Mark Toth

By Mark Toth

January 22, 2023, 9:47 am | Comments (0)

kyivpost.com · by Jon Sweet

In his 1998 novel A Clash of Kings, George R.R. Martin presciently characterized the deepening divide between Russian President Vladimir Putin’s resolve to wage total war in Ukraine and the West’s hesitancy to respond decisively. As Martin noted, “Power resides only where men believe it resides,” often merely as “a shadow on the wall.” Yet even imaginary “shadows can kill. And ofttimes a very small man can cast a very large shadow.”

Putin is, allegorically speaking, that small man. Far too much respect, if not fear, is being afforded to him and Russia by the United States and NATO. The West, seemingly, is at times far too disquieted about what Russia may do versus what they are doing now on the battlefields across Ukraine. Instead of forcefully mitigating Russia’s devolving strategy of attrition warfare, targeting civilians, and striving to weaken international support, the West is continuing to enable Putin to freely commit overt war crimes.

Dnipro, tragically, was ground zero in the latest round of Russian drone and cruise missile attacks on Jan. 14. This time a Kh-22 air-launched cruise missile, designed for use against aircraft carriers, slammed into a residential building killing 45 civilians including 6 young children and injuring another 79.

Russia is continuing to fire cruise missiles into Ukraine from ground, air, and sea platforms as they have since the beginning of the war. These largely militarily insignificant missile fires are being launched from Crimea, Belarus, Russia, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov. In wanton defiance of the Geneva Convention, they deliberately target civilian neighborhoods and workplaces in an attempt to terrorize the Ukrainian citizenry into submission, striking hospitals, schools, bomb shelters, and trains carrying refugees to Poland.

As residents of Dnipro conducted grim recovery operations, Ukrainian soldiers arrived in Ft. Sill, Oklahoma on Jan. 15 to begin training on the Patriot missile system. While welcomed news, it provides little comfort to the families who lost relatives in Dnipro, particularly as this weapon system could have intercepted and destroyed the Kh-22.

Training that typically lasts a year for U.S. soldiers is being accelerated, but it is, exasperatingly, a glaring example of NATO meeting Ukrainian weaponry needs well after the fact. These troops are needed now to operationalize and man the batteries provided by the U.S., the Netherlands, and Germany to defend against future Russian cruise missile attacks. Instead, families throughout Ukraine will potentially be without an effective air defense for upwards of six months, given that Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder indicated training would last “several months.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has consistently pleaded with the West for assistance against this type of aerial assault on his country. Initially last March, he called for the establishment of a no-fly zone. Once U.S. President Joe Biden refused, Zelensky changed his request to ground-based air defense systems to protect his citizens and the nation’s critical infrastructure. Ukraine was again denied when the U.S. and Brussels, seemingly afraid of Putin’s shadows on the wall, viewed the request as a “non-starter,” and refused to place NATO soldiers in a position that could lead to a direct confrontation with Russia.

Ten months later, finally, Patriot batteries are being committed to defend Ukraine, though they will not likely be in place until at least July. The lag time between commitment and utilization is literally killing Ukrainians.

The process of getting Ukraine the military equipment it needs in real time is too slow, and the petty political and diplomatic bureaucracy bogging down military assistance packages significantly contribute to this lag time. The maddening stand-off between the U.S. and Poland on one side and Germany on the other regarding M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 tanks is only one such inexcusable example.

Yes, the logistics involved in transferring equipment to Ukraine is a challenge. Yes, training Ukrainian soldiers on new platforms and keeping those systems up and running on the battlefield present even greater challenges. Fueling and repairing the turbine engine of an M1 Abrams tank while under fire are not easy tasks either. But, to date, the Ukrainian army has proven itself to be highly adaptable on and off the battlefield.

Moreover, we are now 11 months into a war that threatens the very existence of Ukraine and its national and cultural identity. This is also a war that is fundamentally threatening global democracy and European security. The reactive manner in which the Biden Administration and NATO collectively respond to the Russian threat is needlessly creating a dangerous lag between action and reaction, while putting Ukrainians at risk.

Russians have been reducing cities to rubble for decades – it’s a tactic of brutality and terrorism built into their doctrine. Russian General Sergey Surovikin built his reputation on this kind of warfare. Where is the predictive analysis? The Red Teaming? Wargaming? Why are we not further out in front of this, anticipating Russian actions and setting conditions to counter them?

The West is severely underestimating Putin’s resolve and the callous extent to which he is willing to respond to his general’s battlefield failures, including targeting civilians, weaponizing winter, and adopting a strategy of battlefield attrition. The Biden administration’s “just enough” strategy is far too reactive and rarely proactive. Wars are not won by playing defense. Wars are won by going on the offensive.

And yet, inexplicably, because of Putin’s outsized shadows on the wall, the Biden administration’s unwavering approach to this war is to restrict Kyiv’s combat operations to inside the borders of Ukraine. We can think of no other war in modern history wherein the aggrieved nation was forced to afford arbitrary sanctuary to its aggressor.

The fear of Ukraine using weapons provided by the U.S. and NATO to strike back at targets beyond their borders is unnecessarily paralyzing decision makers in Washington and Brussels, despite Ukraine’s having successfully weaponized Soviet Tu-141 reconnaissance drones to strike targets deep within Russia. The unintended consequence of this approach, however, is that it is preventing the West from anticipating the next threat and putting the right weapons systems in place before they are needed.

This avoidable blind spot is also preventing replicating the notable, if not legendary, success of the introduction of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) onto the battlefield. HIMARS dynamically changed the course of the war and shifted significant momentum to Ukraine. But the system came at a price that is now marginalizing its effectiveness. Restrictions on its munitions – specifically, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and its range of approximately 70-kilometers, and where they could fire. Russia simply adapted to the range limitations, placed high value targets outside their range, and moved others to sanctuary beyond Ukrainian territory in Russia and Belarus.

Dnipro, however, may prove to be the next to last piece of the Jenga puzzle for Putin in Ukraine, and Zelensky’s resilience may finally be paying off despite the horrific cost. The resulting outpouring of new Western financial pledges and donations of military equipment and ammunition to Ukraine by world leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland are sending a clear message to the Kremlin. The free world remains united in their support against Russian aggression. The U.S., United Kingdom, Denmark, Latvia, Canada, Germany, Estonia, Finland, and many others are giving Ukraine a much needed second wind as spring approaches.

But is it enough of what Ukraine needs to win, or is it more just “weakening Russia” and prolonging the war at Kyiv’s expense? What is the Biden administration’s endgame strategy? Yes, Washington is providing billions of dollars in support – military hardware, ammunition, training, and humanitarian assistance, but there is no discernable end state.

Washington’s message, for now, is disappointingly clear. We stand by you and the defense of Ukraine. You can kill as many Russians as you need, but you cannot go beyond your borders with our weapons to do it. There is no stated purpose like “defeat Russia,” or “restore Ukrainian territorial integrity,” including the Donbass and Crimea.

Strategic ambiguity for Kyiv is tantamount to strategic certainty for Moscow. That is an unacceptable status quo. Constraining funding and limiting Ukraine to a defensive war within their borders will likely turn Putin’s “special military operation” into the very “forever war” Biden claimed he would no longer support after pulling U.S. forces out of Afghanistan.

While robust, the latest U.S. $2.5 billion aid package to Ukraine announced on January 19th is not nearly enough. It includes 59 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and 90 Stryker armored personnel carriers. What is glaringly missing from the package is exactly what Ukraine needs most. Namely Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB), M1 Abrams tanks, and fast jets such as the F-16.

These weapons, as part of a combined arms team, would provide the necessary offensive capability to maneuver and shape the battlefield and provide operational reach beyond Ukraine’s borders. They would also enable Kyiv to strike cruise missile and drone launching points, interdict Russian forces before they can arrive on the battlefield, target ammunition, fuel, and supply depots, as well as Russian command and control centers.

They would also allow Zelensky to take the fight to Russia instead of being forced to wait for Russia to bring the fight to Ukraine on Putin’s terms. Most importantly, they would afford no sanctuary to Russian forces.

Zelenskyy is not afraid of Putin’s shadows. He made clear early on when he refused Biden’s offer to evacuate him. Zelensky is the Winston S. Churchill of the 21st century. He has offered his blood, his sweat, and his toil. It is now time the West offers its own in defense of democracy.

In the words of U.S. General George S. Patton, “never let the enemy pick the battle site.” That core element of operational art seems to have been forgotten by our Secretary of Defense, retired Army General Lloyd Austin, and the President’s senior military advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley. It’s time the Biden administration lost its fear of Putin’s outsized shadows. Ukraine’s existence and the lives of its valiant people depend on it.


Copyright 2023. Jonathan E. Sweet and Mark C. Toth. All rights reserved.

Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), DIA, NSA and NGA. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics. Follow him on Twitter @JESweet2022.

Mark Toth is a retired economist, historian and entrepreneur who has worked in banking, insurance, publishing, and global commerce. He is a former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, and has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world, including London, Tel Aviv, Augsburg, and Nagoya. Follow him on Twitter @MCTothSTL.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Kyiv Post.


kyivpost.com · by Jon Sweet



11. Stocking Ukraine could generate foreign military sales boom



Stocking Ukraine could generate foreign military sales boom

Defense News · by Ryan Brobst · January 20, 2023

Replacing the military equipment transferred to Ukraine by the United States’ NATO allies could lead to roughly $21.7 billion in foreign military sales or direct commercial sales for American industry, according to research by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Military and Political Power.

At the same time, backfilling the weapons these allies have sent to Ukraine with U.S. equipment could improve their capabilities and build a more effective military deterrent while lowering the Pentagon’s cost to procure these weapons. It would also enhance the quality of the weapons U.S. warfighters wield and strengthen U.S. defense industrial base capacity.

In addition to the $26.7 billion worth of security assistance the United States has committed (as of Jan. 20) to Ukraine since Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, other NATO members have contributed billions of dollars’ worth of equipment. It is difficult to calculate precisely the cumulative value because many countries, unlike the United States, do not publish detailed lists.

CMPP relied on open-source information from the military analysis site Oryx to establish a baseline regarding the types and quantities of arms non-U.S. NATO countries have committed to Ukraine. It then identified an analogous U.S. system and used data from Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcements of FMS sales to estimate the unit price of the respective American system. The center then added the cost of all replacement systems the U.S. could and would likely provide, which totals roughly $21.7 billion as of Dec. 5.

Admittedly, such analysis is somewhat imprecise, given the uncertainty in forecasting future decisions by allied governments. The research project, therefore, required several assumptions, which certainly can be debated.

Some countries may not replace equipment sent to Ukraine at a 1:1 ratio or may seek to acquire different American equipment than predicted. Moreover, some governments will buy equipment from non-U.S. manufacturers instead.

At the same time, the actual amount of equipment provided to Ukraine (and likely needing replacement) is almost certainly understated in this research due to some equipment being provided in unknown quantities or in secret. Additionally, many NATO allies are increasing their defense budgets significantly.

NATO countries (not including the United States) have cumulatively increased their real defense spending each year since 2015, and those levels of defense spending are likely to increase further following Russia’s latest invasion. Poland, for example, is raising its defense spending from 2.2% of its gross domestic product to 3%, which will help Warsaw purchase more military equipment.

Replacing the (often legacy) equipment NATO members have donated to Ukraine with modern American systems will improve the capabilities of individual NATO members and the alliance’s combined ability to deter aggression. For example, replacing Soviet legacy multiple launch rocket systems such as the BM-21 with High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, which have proven very effective against the Russian military, would allow NATO members to strike adversaries with greater precision and from greater range. Replacing Soviet-era T-72 tanks sent to Ukraine with M-1 Abrams tanks would yield similar benefits.

In addition, an alliance in which individual member countries employ more common equipment is one that can train and operate together more effectively and use more efficient logistics and sustainment systems.

Increasing production to backfill NATO members will also bring benefits for the Pentagon, U.S. service members and American taxpayers. Foreign military purchases of American equipment increase the quantities produced, which “may help lower unit costs by consolidating purchases for FMS customers with those of DoD,” according to the DSCA. That can help stretch the U.S. defense budget.

Increased and predictable multiyear demand for arms can incentivize the U.S. defense industry to invest additional money into research and development at the company’s own expense. Higher rates of investment in R&D can lead to more advanced weapons, helping ensure U.S. warfighters are wielding the best capabilities possible wherever they deploy, including in the Indo-Pacific region and the Middle East.

Increased demand for American equipment and munitions will also incentivize the U.S. defense industrial base to create much-needed additional production capacity. Current U.S. industrial base production capacity cannot adequately support the Pentagon’s most significant military modernization effort in four decades and arm Ukraine to defeat Putin’s invasion while ensuring Taiwan has the means to deter an invasion from Beijing.

To be sure, investments in additional production capacity often don’t yield fruit for some time. Moreover, any additional production capacity created in the short term should be used first to equip American forces and beleaguered democracies such as Israel, Taiwan and Ukraine confronting grave current or prospective threats. With the exception of allies on NATO’s eastern flank, shipments of American arms to Europe should only come after those urgent requirements are addressed.

Regardless, decisions now to eventually backfill NATO allies with American arms to replace those sent to Ukraine will help strengthen U.S. and transatlantic security and enable the United States to once again become the arsenal of democracy. That will have benefits far beyond Europe.

Ryan Brobst is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power.



12 China’s Mad Dash Into a Strategic Island Nation Breeds Resentment



​Bonaparte - mistakes - interrupt​

China’s Mad Dash Into a Strategic Island Nation Breeds Resentment

For years, Beijing has thrown its wealth and weight across the globe. But its experience in the Solomon Islands calls into question its approach to expanding its power.

The New York Times · by Damien Cave · January 23, 2023


Messages scrawled on a burned building criticized the Chinese presence in the Solomon Islands.

For years, Beijing has thrown its wealth and weight across the globe. But its experience in the Solomon Islands calls into question its approach to expanding its power.

Messages scrawled on a burned building criticized the Chinese presence in the Solomon Islands.Credit...

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By​ Damien Cav​e​​

Photographs by Matthew Abbott

Damien Cave has been writing about Chinese influence in the Solomon Islands since 2019. He and Matthew Abbott spent about a week in the Solomons reporting this story.

  • Jan. 23, 2023

Down a dirt road outside the Solomon Islands’ capital city, past Chinese construction projects and shops where Chinese merchants sell snacks, a tribal chief tried to explain what it feels like to have a rising superpower suddenly take an interest in a poor, forgotten place desperate for development.

“At first,” said the chief, Peter Kosemu, 50, as he sat in the shade on Guadalcanal, the largest of the Solomon Islands, “most people just wanted to see what was going on.”

He and many others have watched China rush headlong into seemingly every corner of the economy and politics of this South Pacific nation over the past three years, spurring fears in the West that Beijing is trying to set up an outpost that could play a strategic role in any future conflict with the United States and its allies.

China has opened a large embassy, started construction on a stadium complex and signed secretive deals with the government on security, aviation, telecommunications and more. Many islanders liken it to seeing carpenters waltz unannounced into your kitchen, drawing up plans, tearing down and building, with little explanation.

The longer it has gone on, the more curiosity about China’s big spending and lending has given way to concern and a simmering anger that comes from asking questions never answered. Workers at the stadium — including many who commute from where Mr. Kosemu lives — complain about unfulfilled promises on pay. Residents fret that the prime minister and Chinese officials are undermining democracy, as politicians who resisted China’s plans, or just asked tough questions, have reported that their rivals are suddenly flush with money and pro-China messages that the public is expected to simply accept.

“There’s no proper consultation with the people,” Mr. Kosemu said. “No one is happy about it.”


Honiara, the Solomons’ capital. The country’s increasingly autocratic government has welcomed China’s investments.

Chinese and Malaysian workers at the domestic terminal of Honiara’s airport.

For years, Beijing has thrown its wealth across the globe to fuel its economy, gain geopolitical influence and blunt criticism. The Solomon Islands has been portrayed by Chinese state media as a model of what China’s international efforts can accomplish, suggesting an unstoppable march toward dominance by America’s main competitor.

“Chinese modernization offers humanity a new choice,” China’s leader, Xi Jinping, said at the Communist Party congress in late October, when he secured a third term and was beginning to re-engage China with the world after a Covid hiatus.

But in the Solomons, a nation of about 700,000 people and around 1,000 islands in the sea lanes between Australia and the United States, recent experience suggests there is a cost to Beijing’s confident, money-driven approach to expanding its power around the globe.

For many islanders, China is productive, yes, and attentive, but they see it less as a benign partner than as an imperious and corrupting force that raises the risk of conflict.


By The New York Times

Anti-government riots led to the torching of Chinese businesses in November 2021. Among the protesters’ main concerns was the way that China’s influence seemed to tilt economic opportunity to politicians and places that were more willing to do Beijing’s bidding.

The government has shown no sign of changing course. In September, the Solomons delayed its 2023 national election, declaring it lacked the capacity to host in the same year both a vote and the Pacific Games, which will take place at the new stadium. As it has embraced Chinese technological infrastructure, the government has also taken on debt that the World Bank recently described as unsustainable.

Understand the Situation in China

The Chinese government cast aside its restrictive “zero Covid” policy, which had set off mass protests that were a rare challenge to Communist Party leadership.

  • Rapid Spread: Since China abandoned its strict Covid rules, the intensity and magnitude of the country’s outbreak has remained largely a mystery. But a picture is emerging of the virus spreading like wildfire.
  • A Tense Lunar New Year: For millions of holiday travelers, the joy of finally seeing far-flung loved ones without the risk of getting caught in a lockdown is laced with anxiety.
  • Digital Finger-Pointing: The Communist Party’s efforts to limit discord over its sudden “zero Covid” pivot are being challenged with increasing rancor on the internet.
  • Economic Challenges: Years of Covid lockdowns took a brutal toll on Chinese businesses. Now, the rapid spread of the virus after a chaotic reopening has deprived them of workers and customers.

Some American officials worry that China’s goal in the Solomons is to create a client state, securing deepwater ports and satellite communication sites. The country’s prime minister signed a security deal in April that gives China a right to send police officers or naval vessels to the country with few limitations.

The port in Honiara. A security deal signed last year lets China send naval vessels to the country with few limitations.

Police officers during a drill in Auki, in Malaita Province. Dozens of Solomon Islands police officers have traveled to China for training, raising worries about tactics they might bring home.

As Beijing’s priorities have shifted from development to defense, fears of its strong-arm tactics are increasing. Surveys show negative views of China are soaring worldwide.

“China is much less successful than is commonly assumed,” said Audrye Wong, a political scientist at the University of Southern California. “They think paying off people is a quicker and more efficient way of achieving the things the Chinese government wants. The reality is it often creates a backlash and doesn’t work.”

‘They Don’t Understand Us’

Every evening just before 6 p.m., workers stream out of the stadium complex in the capital, Honiara, that is being built by a Chinese state-owned company with what officials have described as a generous $50 million grant from the Chinese government.

Signs out front boast of friendship, cooperation and safety in Chinese and English. But after work recently, at a food stand across the street, employees called all of that a lie.

“Everyone wants to strike because of the poor payment and lack of safety,” said Lenny Olea, 35, a driver. “We need to get this fixed.”

Workers at the construction site for a Chinese-funded stadium complex in Honiara. Some employees have complained about low pay and lack of safety.

The stadium is being built by a Chinese state-owned company with what officials have described as a generous $50 million grant.

Mr. Olea said he was making $1.20 an hour less than what he used to make at a hotel, after promises of extra money for food and transportation never materialized. A dozen others said that they had received no safety training, and that their Chinese foremen communicated with sign language and hit them in the head if they got something wrong.

“They don’t understand us,” Mr. Olea said.

The Chinese Embassy denied a request by The New York Times to speak with the ambassador. The Chinese company, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, did not respond to emailed questions about the workers’ complaints.

Since the government of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare switched allegiance from Taiwan in 2019, saying it would aid the country’s development, more Chinese companies have set up in the Solomons. Islanders tell stories of warm interactions with Chinese merchants who migrated decades ago. But many complain that newer arrivals treat workers (and customers) like peons — owners often ring up sales from a platform that lets them tower over all who enter.

Some provincial leaders have resisted Chinese investment.

A small supermarket in Honiara owned and operated by Chinese citizens. Some have lived in the Solomon Islands for many years, while others are new to the country.

Daniel Suidani, the premier of Malaita, has refused to let China do any infrastructure work in his province, arguing that he has not seen it add any real value elsewhere in the country.

The premier of Malaita Province, Daniel Suidani, explained that he had welcomed projects from Japan and other countries but blocked attempts by China to do infrastructure work because he had not seen it add value elsewhere in the country. He said Chinese officials had worked with politicians in Parliament seeking to undermine him, funneling aid to their districts, rather than asking him about what the province needed.

“So far, the truth is no one has come,” he said.

That lack of consultation remains a source of frustration across the country.

The Solomons’ Indigenous roots include an abiding respect for dialogue. A broad conversation with the community is often required before major decisions are made.

China has operated with a more top-down approach. “What we have seen with the presence of China are pushy advisers,” said Celsius Talifilu, who worked for Mr. Sogavare until late 2019 and now works for Mr. Suidani.

Several Chinese-owned shops and warehouses were burned during antigovernment protests in November 2021.

Residents in Burns Creek, a squatters’ settlement outside Honiara. The lack of transparency about China’s plans has become a source of frustration.

In places like Burns Creek, where around 10,000 people — many from Malaita — have built homes in a grassy flood plain, the lack of transparency has fueled a slow gas leak of resentment.

“People stay quiet in this country until it reaches a climax they can’t accept,” said Joe Kelesi, 39, an elder at the Bethlehem Worship Center. “Until something sparks their disappointment.”

‘This Is State Capture’

Outside the Chinese Embassy, posters show splashy renderings of future projects and photos of Mr. Sogavare with Chinese officials. It has the feel of a movie theater marquee, with Mr. Sogavare as the star.

Volatile and charming, he has grown more defensive as he has become more intertwined with Chinese projects. He has told reporters there will be no Chinese military bases in the country, but after watching Chinese police train with Solomon Islands officers for the first time, he declared: “I feel safer.”

Auki Harbor, in Malaita, where Japan helped build a new jetty. Officials have welcomed investments from international partners other than China.

Crossing a bridge on the way to Auki’s market. A proposal to modernize the bridge by a Chinese-owned company was rejected by Mr. Suidani.

Leaked documents point to how the security agreement may have come together. Meeting minutes from the Sogavare government showed that, in August 2021, money from the Chinese government went to 39 of 50 members of Parliament from a “national development fund” previously financed by Taiwan — about $25,000 each.

A signed letter from Mr. Sogavare, 67, explained that the money had come from the Chinese Embassy.

Internal memos seen by The Times also identify another set of slightly larger Chinese payments that followed the unrest in November 2021, directed to those who had voted to keep Mr. Sogavare from losing a no-confidence vote.

Three months later, a draft of the security deal emerged.

In August, Mr. Sogavare also announced that a Chinese state-owned company, China Harbor Engineering Company, would build 161 cellular towers from Huawei, another Chinese company, with a $70 million loan from the Chinese government.

China Harbor’s offices are in the same green building as the Solomons’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Neither responded to requests for comment, nor did Mr. Sogavare’s office.

A hospital in Malaita Province where a manager recently received a new pickup truck from the Chinese Embassy.

Children coming home from school in Malaita. China’s efforts with the communities in the Solomon Islands have included giving out school bags.

Opposition leaders accuse China of encouraging the election delay and mounting what they say has been a bribery campaign to keep allies in power. According to civil society groups, Chinese money has been used to buy laptops for Chinese propaganda videos displayed at community gatherings.

Peter Kenilorea Jr., the deputy opposition leader, said that two government officials had recently offered nearly $2 million to one of his father’s cousins to run against him; a little over a year ago, he added, another relative had been asked to run for about $750,000.

The dollar amounts were far above what he believed would be possible without Chinese cash.

And China continues to spend and give. A few months ago, the Chinese ambassador gave a new pickup truck with “China Aid” painted on the side to a small hospital’s psychiatric unit.

Matthew Wale, the opposition leader, said: “This is state capture, happening in real life.”

The United States and Australia have tried to counter Chinese influence. Australia will give more than $100 million in aid to the Solomon Islands this fiscal year. American military doctors also recently performed free surgeries alongside local doctors on an American hospital ship in Honiara’s harbor.

A logging camp near Bina Harbor, where the United States and its allies are looking at investing in a tuna cannery as a way to counter Chinese development promises.

A garbage truck from Chinese officials in Honiara.

“China never does this kind of thing,” said Dr. Catherine Tirri, 40, as she observed a fistula surgery. “China doesn’t do service.”

A more skeptical question followed: Would there be any American follow-up? A plan to reopen a long-closed embassy has been caught up in red tape, limiting the U.S. presence to three diplomats (and a dog) living and working out of hotel rooms, with an interim embassy scheduled to open later this year.

In the meantime, Mr. Kosemu, the tribal chief, said frustration with China and its proxies keeps intensifying.

“The people have had enough of making requests to the government and being ignored,” he said. “Protests may be the only way to make them listen.”

Children walking between houses on Bulabu Island, an artificial island in Malaita.

The New York Times · by Damien Cave · January 23, 2023



13. Xinjiang tour blatant propaganda





Xinjiang tour blatant propaganda

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/01/20/2003792883

  • By Gulfiye Y and Abdurehim Gheni Uyghur

Thirty Muslim leaders and academics from 14 Islamic countries visited the Uighur homeland of Xinjiang in China at the invitation of the Chinese government on Jan. 8. Most of the invitees are members of the World Muslim Communities Council — including clerics and intellectuals from Albania, Bahrain, Bosnia, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates — led by Ali Rashid al-Nuaimi.

China was very selective about who was invited to “tour” the region. No independent journalist made the cut and all invitees were connected to some form of government entity. The whole affair was blatant propaganda, with the delegation a willing participant.

With the exception of Albania, none of the listed countries were signatories of the Joint Statement on Behalf of 50 Countries in the UN General Assembly Third Committee on the Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang, China, which was signed on Oct. 31 last year, or the joint statement on the human rights situation in Xinjiang at the 47th Session of UN Human Rights Council signed on June 22, 2021, in Geneva, Switzerland. Those who were on the Human Rights Council also voted “no” to a UN debate on China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims on Oct. 6 last year. China chose well.

The participants were treated to a series of guided tours and staged events. Apparently no one thought to ask for off-tour impromptu visits to mosques, cemeteries, markets, cultural events or even residential areas and talk with local people.

The cultural events were staged “indigenous” shows of merriment and happiness, in isolation of any occasion. This was the extent of any “investigation” into the Uighur situation.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated: “Xinjiang-related issues are not human rights issues at all, but issues of counter-terrorism, de-radicalization and anti-separatism,” and as such it was of little surprise that one of the first stops of the tour was a visit to the Museum of Combating Terrorism and Extremism in Urumqi.

“We congratulate China on the completion of the counterterrorism plan in Xinjiang,” al-Nuaimi said in a statement, adding that “caring for Muslims in China is a great necessity,” while “respect for identity, religion and belonging need to be fortified by an educational discourse.”

He also wrote that “the level of attention that we found in Xinjiang embodies the determination of the Chinese leadership to serve all components of the people in the region.”

It would be a waste of time and energy to refute the obvious fallacy of such trash, something even Chinese could not have done better if they had composed it for their “guests.”

The only statement missing from this love-fest was to declare the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in full expression in Xinjiang.

However, the entire world is aware of the Uighur genocide.

This was a red-carpet welcome, five-star hotel and lavish banquet event with no deviation from the set plan, a complete reality disconnect billed as being in the interests of historic “friendship, cooperation and alliance” between the Islamic civilization and China.

This puts the legitimacy of the entire mission into question and makes it an irrelevant, monstrous falsehood, an embarrassment and a millstone of shame on these individuals and their organizations.

However, their testimony would help continue the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative to the detriment and demoralization of Uighurs everywhere.

There are Uighurs, Tibetans, South Mongolians, Hong Kongers and others whose human rights do not exist in occupied East Turkistan, Tibet and other regions in China.

I have had no communication with family or many friends for more than five years. I am not alone in this: Many of the Uighur diaspora similarly have no communication with, nor knowledge of, the status of relatives and friends.

For me, this is personal. Nineteen family members are missing. For more than five years I have had no word of whether any are alive or dead, imprisoned, or have suffered some atrocity. Many friends are missing. Evidence of the atrocities is unquestionable and unbearable. My family is the evidence of China’s genocide against Uighurs.

I see the lack of concrete results in the many human rights efforts by organizations and governments despite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The so-called intelligent clerics testifying to the utopia of the Uighur add to that pain.

These Muslim clerics and intellectuals have contravened the teachings of the Koran by lying about fellow Muslims and delivering them into the hands of an adversary. Islam and communism are incompatible. Eternal shame be upon them.

However, I fight on as one can. Why would I conduct my one-person protest every week if what the delegation reported was true?

I have made every effort to contact family through different channels. Others, who somehow got through to loved ones, see and hear their fear through their refusal to talk.

Hundreds of Uighur intellectuals are imprisoned or missing — such as Ilham Tohti and Rahile Dawut. How do these clerics explain this, condemning them all as terrorists, separatists and extremists, in line with the Chinese narrative?

These 30 individuals have unleashed a backlash that should haunt them forever.

They participated willingly, as they could have turned down the invitation knowing that it was a propaganda show. Their stab at the heart of Uighurs demonstrates how fragmented the world is on the topic of genocide.

Gulfiye Y and Abdurehim Gheni Uyghur are Uighurs living overseas.



14. Pentagon Transfers Some Israel-based Artillery Shells to Support Ukraine






Pentagon Transfers Some Israel-based Artillery Shells to Support Ukraine

fdd.org ·  · January 20, 2023

Latest Developments

The Pentagon is reportedly using part of a military stockpile it has maintained in Israel for decades to send hundreds of thousands of artillery shells to help the Ukrainian military defeat the Russian invasion. According to the New York Times, the United States has transferred approximately half of an expected total of 300,000 rounds of 155mm howitzer shells to Ukraine. The move represents a notable use of the Israel-based stockpile to aid a partner outside the region and compensate for insufficient domestic munitions production capacity in the United States.

Expert Analysis

“Washington should continue to help Ukraine defeat Putin’s unprovoked invasion, but Congress would be wise to push the Pentagon for updates on efforts to modernize and fully replenish War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel as quickly as possible. Washington and Jerusalem should also conduct regular military exercises that practice pulling equipment from the stockpile in a contingency.” — Bradley Bowman, Senior Director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power

Stockpile in Israel One of Many Throughout the World

The United States military maintains stockpiles of mission-essential equipment, supplies, and munitions forward-positioned in allied nations around the world. These stockpiles can be used to support the U.S. military and partner forces rapidly when conflicts erupt. Such stocks enable combat forces to quickly draw equipment they need, often long before equipment can arrive from the United States or elsewhere.

The Pentagon uses the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) to store precision-guided munitions, artillery shells, and other equipment. According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States began to stockpile military equipment in Israel in 1984 and in 1989 altered the terms of the stockpile to allow Israel access during emergency situations. The Pentagon allowed Israel to withdraw equipment from the stockpile during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014. During bilateral training exercise Juniper Falcon in February 2019, U.S. officers simulated the transfer of munitions from WRSA-I to the Israel Defense Forces. Israel helps offset some of the costs associated with WRSA-I.

U.S. Has Underinvested in Defense Production

Insufficient U.S. defense industrial capacity makes it difficult to equip U.S. forces with the munitions they need while simultaneously providing Ukraine and Taiwan the quantities of munitions they urgently need. Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has committed to Ukraine more than $26.7 billion in security assistance. Artillery systems and their associated munitions have figured prominently in those shipments. Examples include 160 155mm howitzers; up to 1,094,000 155mm artillery rounds; over 5,800 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds; 72 105mm howitzers; and 370,000 105mm artillery rounds, according to the Department of Defense. Those amounts are in addition to a total of 65,000 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds the United States has provided.

Related Analysis

“America’s Arsenal is in Need of Life Support,” by Bradley Bowman and Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

“Washington is Waking Up on Weapons for Taiwan,” by Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman

fdd.org ·  · January 20, 2023


15. DATABASE: REPLACING WEAPONS NATO ALLIES SENT TO UKRAINE COULD YIELD $21.7 BILLION IN U.S. SALES



Please go to the link to view the chart. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/01/20/database-replacing-weapons-nato-allies-sent-to-ukraine-could-yield-217-billion-in-us-sales/


DATABASE: REPLACING WEAPONS NATO ALLIES SENT TO UKRAINE COULD YIELD $21.7 BILLION IN U.S. SALES

By Ryan Brobst and Bradley Bowman

‍

January 20, 2023

Replacing the military equipment transferred to Ukraine by the United States’ NATO allies could lead to roughly $21.7 billion in foreign military sales (FMS) or direct commercial sales for American industry. At the same time, backfilling the weapons these allies have sent to Ukraine with U.S. equipment could improve their capabilities and build a more effective military deterrent while lowering the Pentagon’s cost to procure these weapons. It would also enhance the quality of the weapons U.S. warfighters wield and strengthen U.S. defense industrial base capacity.


‍FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) has developed a comprehensive database of U.S. systems, and their respective FMS sale estimates, that could replace the military equipment transferred to Ukraine by the United States’ NATO allies. CMPP relied on open-source information from the military analysis site Oryx to establish a baseline regarding the types and quantities of arms non-U.S. NATO countries have committed to Ukraine, and used data from Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcements of FMS sales to estimate the unit price of the respective replacement American system. The database is available below, as are assumptions and notes related to this research project.


For a copy of the full database and media inquiries, please contact press@fdd.org. For more information, see this article published in Defense News.

CategorySystemQuantityAdjusted QuantityCountryDate of DeliveryAnalogous U.S. SystemEstimated Unit Cost of U.S. systemNotes on Unit Cost EstimationSource for Unit Cost EstimationExpected FMS/DCS Sale $ Amount (Adjusted Quantity x Estimated Unit Cost)Other NotesTank*

T-72M1*

40*

40*

Czech Republic/ Germany*

Apr-22*

M1A2 Abrams*

$24,000,000*

Poland purchased 250 Abrams tanks in 2022 for $6 billion*

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a2-sepv3-main-battle-tank

$960,000,000*

Some delivered from Czech stocks in exchange for 15 Leopard 2A4 MBTs and 1 Büffel ARV through the 'Ringtausch' programme. Therefore the Czech Republic already had their stocks replaced, so unlikely to order replacements from U.S.

Tank

T-72M1

Unknown Quantity

1

Czech Republic/ Bulgaria

May or June 2022

M1A2 Abrams

$24,000,000

Poland purchased 250 Abrams tanks in 2022 for $6 billion

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a2-sepv3-main-battle-tank

$ 24,000,000

Purchased by Czechia from Bulgaria and delivered to Ukraine. Therefore the country of origin is Bulgaria even though the Czech Republic donated them to Ukraine, as Bulgaria would need the replacements, not the Czech Republic

Tank

T-72M(R) and T-72M1(R)

230+

230

Poland

April 2022 and onwards

M1A2 Abrams

$24,000,000

Poland purchased 250 Abrams tanks in 2022 for $6 billion

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a2-sepv3-main-battle-tank

$ 5,520,000,000


Tank

T-72A

8+

8

North Macedonia

July or August 2022

M1A2 Abrams

$24,000,000

Poland purchased 250 Abrams tanks in 2022 for $6 billion

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a2-sepv3-main-battle-tank

$ 192,000,000


Tank

M-55S

28

28

Slovenia/ Germany

Oct-22

M1A2 Abrams

$24,000,000

Poland purchased 250 Abrams tanks in 2022 for $6 billion

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a2-sepv3-main-battle-tank

$ 672,000,000

From Slovenian stocks in exchange for 45 MAN 8x8 trucks through the 'Ringtausch' programme. However, because MAN 8x8 trucks are not tanks, Slovenia may order replacement tanks in the future.

Tank

Upgraded T-72M1

90

90

Czech Republic/ Netherlands/ United States

To be delivered

M1A2 Abrams

$24,000,000

Poland purchased 250 Abrams tanks in 2022 for $6 billion

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a2-sepv3-main-battle-tank

$ 2,160,000,000

Purchased by the Netherlands and U.S. from Czechia, upgraded and delivered to Ukraine. Therefore, Czechia may order replacement tanks in the future.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

BVP-1

5+

5

Czech Republic

Apr-22

M2A2 Bradley

$9,961,000

Croatia purchased 76 M2A2 Bradleys in 2020 for $757 million

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-bradley-fighting-vehicle-refurbishmentmodernization

$ 49,805,000


Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

Pbv 501A

56

56

Czech Republic

Apr-22

M2A2 Bradley

$9,961,000

Croatia purchased 76 M2A2 Bradleys in 2020 for $757 million

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-bradley-fighting-vehicle-refurbishmentmodernization

$ 557,816,000


Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

BWP-1

40

40

Poland

Apr-22

M2A2 Bradley

$9,961,000

Croatia purchased 76 M2A2 Bradleys in 2020 for $757 million

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-bradley-fighting-vehicle-refurbishmentmodernization

$ 398,440,000


Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

BVP M-80A

35

35

Slovenia

Jun-22

M2A2 Bradley

$9,961,000

Croatia purchased 76 M2A2 Bradleys in 2020 for $757 million

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-bradley-fighting-vehicle-refurbishmentmodernization

$ 348,635,000


Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)*

BMP-1A*

40*

40*

Greece/ Germany*

October 2022 and onwards*

M2A2 Bradley*

$9,961,000*

Croatia purchased 76 M2A2 Bradleys in 2020 for $757 million*

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-bradley-fighting-vehicle-refurbishmentmodernization

$398,440,000*

From Greek stocks in exchange for 40 Marder IFVs through the 'Ringtausch' programme. Therefore Greece already had their stocks replaced, so unlikely to order replacements from U.S.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)*

BVP-1*

30*

30*

Slovakia/ Germany*

Nov-22*

M2A2 Bradley*

$9,961,000*

Croatia purchased 76 M2A2 Bradleys in 2020 for $757 million*

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-bradley-fighting-vehicle-refurbishmentmodernization

$298,830,000*

From Slovak stocks in exchange for 15 Leopard 2A4 MBTs through the 'Ringtausch' programme. Therefore Slovakia already had their stocks replaced, so unlikely to order replacements from U.S.

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)

YPR-765

Several Dozen

1

Netherlands

May-22

Stryker

$3,889,000

North Macedonia purchased 54 Strykers in 2021 for $210 million, split among several Stryker variants

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/north-macedonia-stryker-vehicles

$ 3,889,000


Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)

M113

50

50

Lithuania

June 2022 and onwards

Stryker

$3,889,000

North Macedonia purchased 54 Strykers in 2021 for $210 million, split among several Stryker variants

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/north-macedonia-stryker-vehicles

$ 194,450,000


Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)

FV103 Spartan

35

35

United Kingdom

Jun-22

Stryker

$3,889,000

North Macedonia purchased 54 Strykers in 2021 for $210 million, split among several Stryker variants

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/north-macedonia-stryker-vehicles

$ 136,115,000


1/9



* Rows noted with an asterisk are situations where a NATO member donated equipment, but it is highly unlikely that they will order a U.S.-produced system to replace the equipment. These rows were not included in calculating the $21.7 billion total.


Assumption 1: NATO members will replace each unit of transferred equipment with a comparable unit of U.S.-produced equipment

‍Assumption 2: Those replacements will take the form of modern U.S. systems through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program or through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)


‍Note 1: In some cases, it was not possible to identify a U.S.-produced equivalent system

‍Note 2: Costs were generally estimated by finding the unit cost from previous FMS sales listed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; some inaccuracy will result from inflation, economies of scale, rounding, changes in cost after approval date, or differing amounts of peripheral equipment included in the sale

‍Note 3: Costs are rounded to the nearest $1,000

‍Note 4: If the quantity of systems donated was unknown, (1) was entered in the "adjusted quantity" column

‍Note 5: Systems donated directly by the United States are not included in this dataset, as they would not be replaced through FMS/DCS programs



16. China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign



Human rights is not only a moral imperative, it is a national security issue.


Excerpts:

The CCP’s attack on the native peoples of Xinjiang has also shredded Beijing’s international reputation, at least among the world’s advanced economies. People in democratic countries have long expressed concerns about human rights in China—this has been a constant. But according to polling by the Pew Research Center, the moment when opinions of China in advanced economies turned dramatically negative occurred over the course of 2017 and 2018. This was before the Hong Kong protests, before the pandemic, and before the CCP supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The sharp decline does correspond with Trump’s trade war against China, but outside of the U.S. Republican Party, few sympathized with his unilateral imposition of tariffs. That leaves the concentration camps as the remaining well-timed independent variable—the factor most likely to have turned opinion in Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Europe against Beijing.
China, of course, does not need to heed its own people’s opinions when making policy, let alone those of other states. The country’s government is now a personalist dictatorship, and currently it seems that only Xi could make the decision to reverse course in Xinjiang. This does not inspire confidence. As the prolonged zero-COVID policy vividly illustrated, China’s leader displays a reckless disregard for what have been bedrock principles of the Chinese party-state since 1979: prioritizing economic growth, preserving amicable access to the advanced economies of the world, and maintaining a harmonious balance among China’s ethnic groups.
But zero COVID also suggests that Xi, and the Chinese party-state, can change course. After protests made it clear that China could not lock down indefinitely, the CCP lifted its controls, implicitly acknowledging that COVID-19 will not go away and that the economic and social cost of trying to contain it was simply too high. The Uyghurs are not going away, either. If the world maintains its sanctions and scrutiny, over time it can make the price of brutalizing China’s minorities unacceptable.



China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign

How the World Can Stop Beijing’s Brutal Oppression

By James Millward

January 23, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by James Millward · January 23, 2023

Starting in late 2017, Uyghur and Kazakh émigrés from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China began hearing frightening reports from relatives and friends at home—or began losing contact with those relatives and friends entirely. Through early 2018, journalists and researchers began to flesh out the story: in the vast Central Asian territory annexed by China in 1949, also known to many exiles as Eastern Turkestan, the government was rounding up people who do not belong to the country’s Han ethnic majority (including the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group) and locking them in camps. At their peak, these facilities interned between one and two million people, and detainees were subjected to psychological and physical torture, rape and sexual assault, forced administration of pills and injections, persistent hunger, and sleep deprivation. Beijing at first denied the existence of what Chinese government documents and signs on the facilities labeled “concentrated educational transformation centers,” but officials later admitted to establishing “vocational training centers,” which they claimed would end extremism and alleviate poverty.

With their clear echoes of genocides in the twentieth century, the camps prompted outrage from international organizations, human rights groups, and governments—some of which sanctioned Chinese companies and officials in response. Although the Chinese Communist Party dismissed the criticisms as “lies,” it appeared to respond. By 2019, authorities had moved many of the internees out of the camps, announcing that they had “graduated.” This suggests that the CCP does, in fact, care about international opprobrium.

But the change was largely cosmetic, and most of the internees have not been freed. Many of the camps have simply been converted into formal prisons and detainees given lengthy prison sentences, like several hundred thousand other non-Han people who have been imprisoned since the start of the crisis. Over 100,000 other internees have been transferred from camps to factories in Xinjiang or elsewhere in the country. Some Uyghur families abroad report that their relatives are back home, but under house arrest. And Beijing has also been forcing tens of thousands of rural Uyghurs out of their villages and into factories under the guise of a poverty alleviation campaign. Today, the total numbers of non-Han Chinese people in coerced labor of one form or another may well exceed the numbers interned in camps from 2017 to 2019.

The camps were just the most famous aspect of the CCP’s broad-spectrum program of assimilation and repression. The party has also disparaged and restricted the use of the Uyghur language; prohibited Islamic practices; razed mosques, shrines, and cemeteries; rewritten history to deny the longevity of Uyghur culture and its distinctiveness from Chinese culture; and excised indigenous literature from textbooks. These scars on the cultural landscape remain. The vaguely worded counterextremism and antiterrorism laws, implemented from 2014 to intern people for everyday religious and cultural expression, are still on the books. The infrastructure of control that made southern Xinjiang look like a war zone a few years ago—intrusive policing, military patrols, checkpoints—is less visible now. But that is because digital surveillance systems based on mobile phones, facial recognition, biometric databases, QR codes, and other tools that identify and geolocate the population have proved just as effective at monitoring and controlling local residents.

The state continues to incentivize, and likely coerce, Uyghur women to marry Han men while promulgating propaganda promoting mixed marriages. (Uyghurs very rarely married non-Uyghurs before the current crisis.) Uyghur children are being institutionalized in boarding schools, where they are forced to use the Chinese language and adopt Han cultural practices. There is little data about these schools, but escaped children tell of beatings and hours of basement confinement for speaking Uyghur. If the “educational transformation centers” were reminiscent of twentieth-century concentration camps, the Xinjiang boarding schools have re-created the brutal residential institutions designed to deracinate indigenous children in Australia, Canada, and the United States. They also contribute to China’s broader colonial policy to Sinicize the region by moving Han people into Xinjiang and suppressing Uyghur birth rates.


Despite the ongoing abuses, the world has paid little attention to the atrocities in Xinjiang over the last few years. Instead, focus has drifted to other news relating to China—primarily the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing was able to convene the Winter Olympics as planned in February 2022, with only symbolic protests from democratic countries. The atrocities did not stop Chinese leader Xi Jinping from being named head of the CCP for a historic third term, or from stacking the Politburo standing committee with close loyalists. It has not prevented him from meeting with foreign leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden.

For now, it may seem as if Xi is getting away with his brutal actions in Xinjiang. But the saga in the province is not yet over. U.S. and European sanctions could impinge more on China’s economy as time goes on, provided that governments vigorously enforce them. These economic costs would come on top of the severe reputational costs that Beijing has incurred for its behavior, including worsened relations with Europe, as well as with the United States. It is unclear if these penalties will ultimately matter to Xi, who now wields nearly unconstrained political power and is willing to subject his country to economic and social pain in pursuit of his aims. But Xi is capable of correcting course when his policies become disastrously costly. If the world keeps up the economic and rhetorical pressure, it can convince China to end its efforts to repress and assimilate the non-Han peoples of Xinjiang.

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

When news of the internment camps in Xinjiang first broke, it fell to the United States to set the tone for how the international community would respond. Yet the United States was slow. Although journalists, researchers, and a few Chinese Kazakhs and Uyghurs who fled the country had made the extent of the atrocities obvious, Congress, despite rare bipartisan agreement, failed to quickly pass a bill addressing Uyghur human rights. According to The South China Morning Post, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin did not want anything to upset his negotiations with Beijing over a trade deal. As The New York Times has reported, Apple, Coca-Cola, and Nike also lobbied to weaken the sanctions bill, lest it harm their business interests.

But Washington’s worst mistake came from U.S. President Donald Trump. According to his former national security adviser, in June 2019, at the height of the internments, Trump told Xi in person that the concentration camps were “exactly the right thing to do.” These words’ disastrous impact on millions of human lives should be remembered together with Trump’s rhetoric supporting Putin’s adventurism in Ukraine and his attempt to extort Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as among the former president’s gravest sins in office. It is conceivable that Xi, like Putin, has isolated himself amid yes men and is prone to doubling down on irrational, self-defeating decisions. Trump’s vocal greenlight—one of the few comments on Xinjiang that Xi may have heard from outside his circle—likely prolonged and deepened the ethnic cleansing.

Still, the administration did eventually list a number of Xinjiang individuals and entities for export bans and global Magnitsky sanctions, and Congress did eventually pass the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in 2020. On the last full day of the Trump administration, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a determination that China was committing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. His successor, Antony Blinken, affirmed this decision. In December 2021, Biden signed a new, stronger sanctions law—the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act—which prohibited imports of “any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” in Xinjiang unless they are proven not to be linked to forced labor. Absent reliable third-party supply chain auditing in the Uyghur region, this law effectively bans imports of nearly everything connected to Xinjiang. To date, there are over 100 Xinjiang-related U.S. sanctions in place against Chinese companies, government agencies, and individuals.


The world has paid little attention to the atrocities in Xinjiang over the last few years.

Other governments have joined Washington’s campaign. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have all sanctioned the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the latter a massive state-owned conglomerate dedicated to colonial exploitation and settlement in the Uyghur homeland. Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, and the Netherlands have joined Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States in formally denouncing the CCP’s Xinjiang actions as genocide. Nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, including the independent groups Uyghur Tribunal and the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, have reached similar findings about the nature of Beijing’s actions, which they have backed up with copious documentation and opinions from international jurists.


Unfortunately, the most important international organization—the United Nations—has a more mixed record. In August 2018, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination forced Chinese officials to publicly explain what was happening in Xinjiang for the first time. A Chinese spokesperson responded two days later by denying the existence of reeducation centers already documented by researchers, including from satellite photos. But after that staunch initial challenge, the UN has tiptoed around the issue. Whenever UN member states have had to take sides over Xinjiang, Beijing has won. Twenty-two nations (18 European countries, and Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand) signed a letter to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights calling on China to stop the mass detentions in Xinjiang. But Beijing quickly mobilized 37 states to sign a counter-letter asserting that all was well in the Uyghur Region. Last June, 19 members of the UN Human Rights Council voted against a motion to debate the contents of the council’s critical report on human rights in Xinjiang, and 11 members abstained. Only 17 voted to hold the debate.

China’s success in such showdowns exploits the unwillingness of states with their own poor human rights records to condemn human rights abuses elsewhere, and it depends on the fear that angering Beijing might cut off Chinese investment. Cuba voted against debating the report, and even Ukraine abstained. Beijing also exerts intense behind-the-scenes pressure to shape how the UN approaches Xinjiang issues. This strategy was particularly evident, if cloaked, in the activities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. After a prolonged negotiation, High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet visited Xinjiang in May 2022, on a five-day COVID-19 “closed loop” tour that she stressed was “not an investigation.” In an awkward press conference concluding her visit, Bachelet echoed Beijing’s explanations that the camps were counterterrorism and job training programs. She adopted Chinese terminology, referring to the internment facilities as “vocational education training centers”—even though, according to former detainees, no vocational training took place in the camps. Beijing’s control over Bachelet’s agenda and selection of the people she talked to likely set the parameters for what her short visit could achieve.

But ultimately, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report that was far more critical of China’s behavior. When finally released, a few minutes before midnight on the last day of Bachelet’s term as High Commissioner, the report detailed grave concerns that Beijing was committing crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, backed up by voluminous documentary evidence and interviews with 40 Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uyghur firsthand witnesses. CCP authorities who had gloated over Bachelet’s May press conference now denounced her report as “a patchwork of false information that serves as political tools for the U.S. and other Western countries to strategically use Xinjiang to contain China.” But the report still never applied the UN’s own definition of genocide to Xinjiang—a glaring omission. And the failure of the Human Rights Council to even debate the report rendered it a dead letter, at least within the UN.

WHAT WORKS

It is still hard to judge the impact of sanctions on the economy and officials in Xinjiang. Import bans are difficult to enforce, and fruits and nuts in packaging indicating their Xinjiang origins were for sale in Asian markets throughout the Washington, D.C., area in 2022—although, after activists publicized the fact that fruit was still getting through, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized several shipments of Xinjiang red dates in New Jersey in January 2023. Customs agents are more focused on interdicting Chinese textiles, but cotton from Xinjiang hides in opaque supply chains and is processed in third countries into garments that stock U.S. stores. Any pain that sanctions may have caused so far has been masked by the more severe economic impact of China’s COVID-19 lockdowns (which were implemented in Xinjiang harder and for longer than anywhere else). In any case, the CCP has shown itself willing to spare no cost in pursuing Xinjiang policies. The conversion of the province into a digitally securitized gulag was phenomenally expensive, but Beijing did not blink. The budget to support Han settlers in the Uyghur Region seems inexhaustible.

Nevertheless, as COVID-19 lockdowns lift, and as time goes on, the sanctions may begin to bite. They could, for example, prompt international and potentially even Chinese corporations to realize that connections to Xinjiang put them in a precarious position. The U.S. government has signaled that it considers corporate compliance with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act just as important as compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. That means that companies importing goods to the United States from Xinjiang, and in some cases from elsewhere in China, have to actively prove that such products were not tainted by forced labor. Third-party auditing, such as that done by the Better Cotton Initiative, is impossible in Xinjiang thanks to official Chinese interference, and so global firms currently dealing with Xinjiang may conclude that they have to leave the region, and perhaps the country. Already, manufacturers of solar energy equipment are developing the capacity to produce polysilicon (of which 50 percent of the world’s supply now comes from Xinjiang) in other countries.

Nor are the sanctions the only penalty Beijing is paying. The CCP’s “Wolf Warriors” may respond to international outcry with indignant retorts and a flurry of disinformation. But the diplomatic and reputational damage to China is real—and perhaps even greater than the potential economic penalties. The CCP, for example, had a chance to improve Chinese-European ties after the Trump administration’s isolationism and insults upset U.S. allies. But by responding to EU sanctions over Xinjiang with an ill-considered battery of sanctions on European Parliament members across the political spectrum, Beijing squandered the opportunity. Instead, China’s tit-for-tat effectively scuttled the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with Europe, a trade deal it had spent years negotiating.

China’s budget to support Han settlers in the Uyghur Region seems inexhaustible.

The brutality of CCP colonialism in Xinjiang has been particularly devastating to China’s relationship with Taiwan. In December 2022, Taiwan’s legislature passed an unprecedented cross-party resolution recognizing China’s “genocide” against the Uyghur people. The Xinjiang atrocities are a major reason why “one country, two systems”—long the CCP formula for “reunifying” mainland China with Taiwan—is dead, and Beijing’s toolbox for peacefully addressing the Taiwan issue thereby depleted. With military force looking like the only option, the CCP’s increased bellicosity toward Taiwan has exacerbated tensions with the United States. In this regard, Xi’s effort to enhance China’s security through a crackdown in Xinjiang has backfired spectacularly.

The CCP’s attack on the native peoples of Xinjiang has also shredded Beijing’s international reputation, at least among the world’s advanced economies. People in democratic countries have long expressed concerns about human rights in China—this has been a constant. But according to polling by the Pew Research Center, the moment when opinions of China in advanced economies turned dramatically negative occurred over the course of 2017 and 2018. This was before the Hong Kong protests, before the pandemic, and before the CCP supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The sharp decline does correspond with Trump’s trade war against China, but outside of the U.S. Republican Party, few sympathized with his unilateral imposition of tariffs. That leaves the concentration camps as the remaining well-timed independent variable—the factor most likely to have turned opinion in Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Europe against Beijing.


China, of course, does not need to heed its own people’s opinions when making policy, let alone those of other states. The country’s government is now a personalist dictatorship, and currently it seems that only Xi could make the decision to reverse course in Xinjiang. This does not inspire confidence. As the prolonged zero-COVID policy vividly illustrated, China’s leader displays a reckless disregard for what have been bedrock principles of the Chinese party-state since 1979: prioritizing economic growth, preserving amicable access to the advanced economies of the world, and maintaining a harmonious balance among China’s ethnic groups.

But zero COVID also suggests that Xi, and the Chinese party-state, can change course. After protests made it clear that China could not lock down indefinitely, the CCP lifted its controls, implicitly acknowledging that COVID-19 will not go away and that the economic and social cost of trying to contain it was simply too high. The Uyghurs are not going away, either. If the world maintains its sanctions and scrutiny, over time it can make the price of brutalizing China’s minorities unacceptable.

Foreign Affairs · by James Millward · January 23, 2023



17. Maria Ressa's To-Do List



Excerpts:

Now, Ressa says, she wants to focus all her energy on “2024, which is, I believe, the tipping point for democracy globally. As of now, 60 percent of the world is living under autocracy. We’ve rolled back to 1989.” By that, she means that the level of democracy experienced by the average person around the world has reverted to 1989 levels. The number of liberal democracies was down to 34 in 2021, the lowest it has been since 1995. Closed autocracies are on the rise. Thirty-five states now suffer from major deteriorations in freedom of expression at the hands of governments, compared with only five a decade ago. The situation is particularly bad in the Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, according to a report last year by the Varieties of Democracy Institute at the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.
For Ressa, today’s democratic backsliding also calls to mind September 1972, when the elder Marcos declared martial law, citing a national crisis of communism and crime, and promised to build what he called “the New Society” while retaining for himself virtually unlimited presidential powers. Marcos oversaw the torture, kidnapping, and extrajudicial executions of tens of thousands of citizens. At least 50,000 people—many of them human-rights activists, journalists, labor leaders, and church workers—were arrested and detained from 1972 to 1975 alone, according to Amnesty International.

Maria Ressa's To-Do List

Maria Ressa is focused on three things: avoiding prison, fixing the entire internet, and saving democracy.

By Adrienne LaFrance

The Atlantic · by Adrienne LaFrance · January 19, 2023

Last May, when it became clear that Ferdinand Marcos Jr. would ascend to the presidency of the Philippines, Maria Ressa, the Nobel laureate (and Atlantic contributing writer) who has become legendary in her fight for freedom of the press and democracy, was despondent. “This is how it ends, I said to myself that evening,” Ressa wrote in her book How to Stand Up to a Dictator. “You can’t have integrity of elections if you don’t have integrity of facts. Facts lost. History lost. Marcos won.”

Marcos’s win represented a decisive victory for authoritarianism in the Philippines. The new president is the son and namesake of the dictator and kleptocrat Ferdinand Marcos, who ruled the Philippines from 1965 to 1986. His victory also represented a direct threat to Ressa. Marcos’s supporters are among those who, like his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, have targeted and harassed both Ressa and Rappler, the Manila-based news organization she co-founded and runs.

This week, however, Ressa is celebrating an unexpected victory of her own. A Philippine court acquitted her, and Rappler, of four charges of tax evasion—charges drummed up in “a brazen abuse of power” that was intended “to stop journalists from doing their jobs,” she told reporters who had gathered outside the courthouse after her acquittal. The charges would have carried a maximum prison sentence of 34 years if she were convicted. “Of course it was emotional,” she said, her voice breaking repeatedly. “Today, facts win. Truth wins. Justice wins.” When I spoke with Ressa shortly after the verdict, she told me she was feeling “triumphant.” Also: very tired.

Her fight is nowhere near over. Before her acquittal, Ressa had 10 criminal charges against her, all brought under the former presidential administration in quick succession, prompted by Rappler’s aggressive coverage of the administration’s corruption during the country’s drug wars. “We kind of live in this uncertainty,” she said, referring to the remaining pending cases, which include another charge of tax evasion and her appeal of a cyberlibel conviction. (That conviction stems from a publishing decision that Rappler made before the cyberlibel law even existed.) But in some ways, she told me, “we’ve been through the worst already. We survived six years of Rodrigo Duterte and we did our job.”

Ressa’s steadfastness and devotion to that story, despite Duterte’s attempts to silence her, helped earn her the Nobel Prize in 2021. Several journalists who have spoken out against government corruption have been murdered in the Philippines, including 23 under the Duterte administration and two since Marcos took office last year. In September, the radio journalist Renato Blanco was fatally stabbed. In October, the broadcast journalist Percival Mabasa was shot dead in what police claim was a hit ordered by the country’s prisons chief.

Now, Ressa says, she wants to focus all her energy on “2024, which is, I believe, the tipping point for democracy globally. As of now, 60 percent of the world is living under autocracy. We’ve rolled back to 1989.” By that, she means that the level of democracy experienced by the average person around the world has reverted to 1989 levels. The number of liberal democracies was down to 34 in 2021, the lowest it has been since 1995. Closed autocracies are on the rise. Thirty-five states now suffer from major deteriorations in freedom of expression at the hands of governments, compared with only five a decade ago. The situation is particularly bad in the Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, according to a report last year by the Varieties of Democracy Institute at the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.

For Ressa, today’s democratic backsliding also calls to mind September 1972, when the elder Marcos declared martial law, citing a national crisis of communism and crime, and promised to build what he called “the New Society” while retaining for himself virtually unlimited presidential powers. Marcos oversaw the torture, kidnapping, and extrajudicial executions of tens of thousands of citizens. At least 50,000 people—many of them human-rights activists, journalists, labor leaders, and church workers—were arrested and detained from 1972 to 1975 alone, according to Amnesty International.

During this tumultuous time in the Philippines, Ressa was in the third grade. She had just moved from Manila to New Jersey. She was not thinking primarily about martial law. She was trying to figure out what a pajama party was.

It’s a party where everyone wears pajamas, her mother told her. But when she showed up to her friend Sharon’s house dressed for bed, she saw that none of the other girls was in pajamas. “I turned in panic to my mom, who sheepishly admitted she didn’t really know what a ‘pajama party’ was, either,” Ressa wrote in her autobiography. Ressa remembers how her friend shrugged it off and quickly helped her inside the house to change. Her lesson from that day: “When you take a risk, you have to trust that someone will come to your aid; and when it’s your turn, you will help someone else. It’s better to face your fear than to run from it, because running won’t make the problem go away. When you face it, you have the chance to conquer it. That was how I began to define courage.”

Few people have had their courage tested the way Ressa has in recent years. For now, she has a to-do list with three very big priorities on it: (1) avoid prison, (2) fix the internet, and (3) save democracy. “If we don’t put any guardrails—significant guardrails—around technology, we’re jumping off the cliff,” she told me. “What’s at stake is the future of journalism and the survival of democracy.”

Ressa co-founded Rappler in 2012, in part because she could see the immense potential of the web—and she was drawn to the idea of harnessing people’s snap emotional reactions for good. People like to think of the internet as a marketplace of ideas, but Ressa understood early on that its current architecture makes it first and foremost a marketplace of feelings. So while sites like Facebook built algorithms that invisibly rewarded and prioritized posts that elicited anger, Rappler gave its readers a mood map, crowdsourcing reactions to articles and sharing the findings openly. “If you actually go through the exercise of identifying how you feel, you’re more prone to be rational,” she told me at the time. “If you can identify how you feel, will you be more receptive to the debate that’s in front of you? I hope.”

Ressa built Rappler in a far sunnier era of web history, when people were still celebrating the Arab Spring as a success for democracy, and the big social platforms seemed like they had the potential to be positive forces. Today she puts it starkly: “Social media prioritizes the spread of lies over facts,” she told me. “Our information ecosystem, it’s corrupted right now. If your information ecosystem is corrupted, then that leads to the corruption of your institutions. And when you don’t have working institutions, you don’t have checks and balances. We’re electing illiberal leaders democratically, and they’re corrupting the institutions from within. And when the institutions are corrupted, when that happens, you lose your freedom.”

Yet despite horrific targeted harassment, death threats, and attempts by some of the most powerful men in the world to silence her, Ressa has been relentless in her belief that it does not have to be this way. She believes that global democratic decline is a temporary condition; that authoritarianism will be beaten back; that the people and the press can be free; that tyranny will be stopped. She believes all of this because, for one thing, she is basically the Energizer Bunny of Nobel Peace Prize winners, and also because she knows that any other outcome would be intolerable. “Compared to others in hiding, in exile, or in jail, I am lucky,” she wrote in her latest book. “The only defense a journalist has is to shine the light on the truth, to expose the lie—and I can still do that.”

Ressa has watched in real time as government operatives have attacked her and her news organization, attempted to discredit her and destroy her livelihood, and charged her with numerous crimes to frighten her into submission. You can see why Ressa has argued that we ought to treat this technocultural moment not as a beginning but as an ending—as the aftermath of a war. She argues for the creation of NATO-like partnerships and a new Declaration of Human Rights to protect democratic values in the age of the social web. The outcome she is after may not come to pass. The solutions she poses may not be exactly right. But what she is fighting for is most certainly worth the risk.

The Atlantic · by Adrienne LaFrance · January 19, 2023



18. Japan soft-selling its remilitarization to the world


Excerpts:


In an op-ed for Nikkei Asia, the UK leader declared, “Japan is our closest security partner in Asia and the UK is Japan’s closest security partner in Europe…Between us is an unbreakable bond that reaches halfway around the world.”
In parallel, Japan is also negotiating an information-security agreement with Canada, another G7 member, which has also vowed to expand its strategic and naval footprint in the Indo-Pacific.
Growing defense cooperation with Europe and Canada allows Japan to hedge against any potential shifts in American foreign policy. Nevertheless, with the prospect of war over nearby Taiwan looming, Kishida has also doubled down on defense coordination with its most important ally, the US.
For his part, Biden fully supported Japan’s new defense direction and emphasized the need for even greater defense cooperation in the coming years amid shared concerns over China in the Indo-Pacific.
“Let me be crystal clear: the United States is fully, thoroughly, completely committed to the alliance and more importantly to Japan’s defense,” Biden said following his meeting with Kishida in Washington, thus welcoming a more powerful and self-reliant Asian ally.


Japan soft-selling its remilitarization to the world

Prime Minister Kishida goes on a diplomatic offensive in the West as Tokyo cranks up defense spending to counter China


asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · January 23, 2023

MANILA – Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida kicked of the new year with a series of high-profile visits across key Western allied nations, including the United States.

In Washington, he held “very productive” talks with US President Joe Biden on strengthening bilateral cooperation in critical industries, particularly semiconductors, as the West contemplates decoupling from its decades-long dependence on China.

Earlier, the Japanese leader also met counterparts in Europe where he signed new defense agreements to augment military interoperability and joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Together with the United Kingdom and Italy, Japan hopes to produce under the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP).


Kishida’s diplomatic offensive comes amid a historic defense build-up at home, with Japan aiming to double its defense spending as a share of its gross domestic product (GDP), the third largest in the world, over the next five years.

By allocating a whopping US$315 billion (43 trillion yen), Japan aims to modernize its defense capabilities and close its military gap with rival powers.

Notwithstanding international concerns over Japan’s potential return to militarism, the country’s new defense posture, best encapsulated by its new National Security Strategy (NSS), enjoys significant public support at home, according to recent surveys.

During a speech at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington this month, the Japanese leader called for a united stance vis-à-vis Beijing, arguing “[i]n managing relations with China, it is absolutely necessary for Japan, the US and Europe to work together as one.”

The Kishida administration’s latest moves suggest that Japan is seeking to both enhance cooperation with Western allies faced with a rising China as well as strengthen its own defensive capabilities as an increasingly autonomous power in the Indo-Pacific.


Over the past two decades, various Japanese leaders, most prominently the late prime minister Shinzo Abe, made a concerted effort to revisit the country’s post-war pacifist constitution.

Then-prime minister Shinzo Abe (L) chats with an officer of the Maritime Self Defense Force during a fleet review at Sagami Bay off Kanagawa Prefecture in 2006. Photo: AFP / Kazuhiro Nogi

Perturbed by China’s growing military capabilities and rising assertiveness in adjacent waters, including close to the Japanese-administered Senkaku islands, Abe, Japan’s longest-serving post-war leader, systematically relaxed constitutional and political restrictions on the country’s ability to project power beyond its immediate borders.

Under the vaguely-defined doctrine of “collective self-defense”, the Abe administration reinterpreted Article 9, or the “peace clause”, of Japan’s Constitution in order to enable Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to join US military operations overseas in the event of a major contingency.

The former Japanese leader also oversaw a significant increase in the country’s defense spending as part of broader efforts to enhance the SDF’s ability to engage in modern warfare. Soon, Japan also deployed, for the first time since the end of World War II, armored vehicles to overseas military drills between US and regional allies.

Under Abe’s watch, Japan also engaged in unprecedented efforts to share defense technology and collaborate on the development of new weapons systems in tandem with like-minded powers such as India.


Japan also expanded its maritime security aid, thus paving the way for deepened institutionalized defense dialogue with key Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam, which have been at the forefront of resisting China’s expanding maritime footprint across the South China Sea basin.

Nevertheless, Abe always fell short of fully revising the country’s pacifist constitution, a task that has been passed onto his proteges, including Kishida, whose ruling coalition now enjoys a significant majority in the Japanese legislature.

Although intra-coalition disagreements have hobbled a concerted push to overhaul the country’s post-war constitution, public support for such a move has been steadily on the rise in recent years amid growing fears about China and its rising assertiveness.

Against a seismic shift in the country’s domestic politics and public attitudes, Japan released a landmark NSS document last month, which warned of the “most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II” due to efforts of revisionist powers “seeking to unilaterally change the status quo by force.”

“China has intensified coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are rapidly increasing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including in Japan, but also with the entire international community,” the NSS says.


A simulated Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Japan would be quickly dragged into a conflict between the US and China over the nearby self-governing island. Image: Facebook

Although Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party pushed for labeling China as a “threat” in the NSS, the eventual document, in a nod to the more pacifist members of the ruling coalition (i.e. Komeito), instead settled for less confrontational language that characterized the Asian powerhouse as “the greatest strategic challenge that Japan has ever faced.”

A notable element of the NSS is the emphasis on the need for Japan to develop a “counter-strike capability”, namely allowing the SDF to target bases and command-and-control centers of enemy states in the event of a contingency.

Accordingly, Japan is expected to augment its network of missile defense systems, especially Type-12 standoff missiles coupled with US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of about 1,600 kilometers, over the next half a decade.

Describing China’s and North Korea’s growing military capabilities as “a real threat,” the NSS maintains that its “counter-strike capability” is a purely deterrent measure that will only be applied “in light of individual and specific circumstances” and that “there is no change in the fact that pre-emptive strikes … are not permitted” per the country’s pacifist constitution.

In particular, the Japanese government maintains that developing new military capabilities will have to strictly meet three preconditions, namely (i) that an armed attack has occurred or is imminent, (ii) that there is no other way to halt an attack, and that (iii) the use of force is limited to the minimum necessary.

At a press conference shortly after the new NSS’ approval, Kishida warned that the region is “at a historical crossroads” and that his country’s “new security policy is a major shift from the postwar security policy.”

Nevertheless, the Japanese leader maintained that the country’s defensive buildup and new strategic orientation is “within the scope of the Constitution” and that “Japan’s path as a peaceful nation will remain unchanged.”

Given Japan’s World War II atrocities in the region, its recent military build-up, with defense spending increasing by a whopping 20% this year, is bound to face criticism overseas, especially in neighboring South Korea and China. Kishida was thus intent on securing, support from major allies across the world during his five-country trip.

His tour of fellow Group of Seven (G7) countries this month saw Kishida meeting and discussing ways to enhance bilateral defense cooperation with French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

In the UK, Kishida secured a new Reciprocal Access Agreement (RCA), which would further enhance military interoperability between the two nations. Along with Italy, the two countries are also working on a sixth-generation fighter jet, which will enhance their combat capabilities in the succeeding decades.

Britain’s Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (R) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (L) sign a defense agreement during a bilateral meeting at the Tower of London on January 11, 2023. Image: Pool

In an op-ed for Nikkei Asia, the UK leader declared, “Japan is our closest security partner in Asia and the UK is Japan’s closest security partner in Europe…Between us is an unbreakable bond that reaches halfway around the world.”

In parallel, Japan is also negotiating an information-security agreement with Canada, another G7 member, which has also vowed to expand its strategic and naval footprint in the Indo-Pacific.

Growing defense cooperation with Europe and Canada allows Japan to hedge against any potential shifts in American foreign policy. Nevertheless, with the prospect of war over nearby Taiwan looming, Kishida has also doubled down on defense coordination with its most important ally, the US.

For his part, Biden fully supported Japan’s new defense direction and emphasized the need for even greater defense cooperation in the coming years amid shared concerns over China in the Indo-Pacific.

“Let me be crystal clear: the United States is fully, thoroughly, completely committed to the alliance and more importantly to Japan’s defense,” Biden said following his meeting with Kishida in Washington, thus welcoming a more powerful and self-reliant Asian ally.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · January 23, 2023



19. US warns overdose crisis will spread overseas without action from China



My question is: does the fentanyl crisis represent a line of effort in China's unrestricted warfare?  


Is this an act of subversion to cause a society to crumble from within?


US warns overdose crisis will spread overseas without action from China

White House drugs tsar says Beijing needs to tighten rules on supply of raw materials to make fentanyl

Financial Times · by Jamie Smyth · January 22, 2023

Washington is increasing pressure on Beijing to crack down on illegal supplies of raw materials used to make the synthetic drug fentanyl, warning the deadly overdose crisis sweeping the US could soon spread to Europe and Asia.

Dr Rahul Gupta, the White House drugs tsar, told the Financial Times it is only a matter of time before criminal cartels in China and Mexico expand their highly profitable trade in the drug, which is 50 times stronger than heroin.

He said the illicit manufacture of cheap and easily transportable synthetic drugs such as fentanyl and methamphetamine are transforming the drug market, posing a risk to global security. Only co-ordinated, international action involving China, which is a major source of the precursor chemicals used to make synthetic drugs, could thwart criminal cartels, he added.

“You can divide the world up into three categories,” said Gupta, who is the first medical doctor to hold the post of director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

“One, you have a fentanyl or meth problem and you know it. Second, you have a fentanyl or meth problem and you don’t know it . . . And the third, it is coming to a shore near you very soon.”

China introduced controls on two fentanyl precursor chemicals — known as NPP and 4ANPP — in 2018 following dialogue between the US Drug Enforcement Administration and Chinese government officials. But Washington’s efforts to engage Beijing are being hampered by diplomatic tensions between the two countries. In August China suspended co-operation with the US on the fight against narcotics after the visit by former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan.

Gupta said tackling the fentanyl crisis is one of the “top priorities” for secretary of state Antony Blinken, who is expected to travel to Beijing next month for talks with senior Chinese officials.

He said the US would also use a meeting of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna in March to press China to further tighten rules on the transport of these raw materials.

“It is the criminal elements within the [People’s Republic of China] that are involved and engaged in production and shipping of the precursor chemicals,” said Gupta. “And we are going to say to the PRC this is an opportunity to demonstrate your global leadership on this issue.”

Washington is pressing China to enforce “know your end customer” regulations to ensure private businesses do not use middlemen that divert precursor chemicals to cartels. Proper labelling is required to track chemical cargoes and monitoring of shipping to ensure these are not diverted for illicit means while at sea, according to Gupta.

Rahul Gupta, the Biden administration’s director of the office of national drug control policy, speaking to the media in 2022 © Chandan Khanna/AFP/ Getty Images

More than 107,000 people died in the US of overdoses in the 12 months ending August 2022, equal to one fatality every five minutes. Most of these deaths were linked to fentanyl and methamphetamine.

President Joe Biden’s administration is expanding access to opioid treatments to tackle the record number of overdose deaths and is reaching out to international partners to tackle the international supply chain.

Some US anti-drugs activists believe Beijing is deliberately allowing criminals to export precursor chemicals to Mexican drug cartels to further fuel the “overdose crisis” in the US and destabilise a competitor.

“This is a third opium war,” said Jim Rauh, founder of Families Against Fentanyl, in a reference to two wars fought by China to prevent trafficking in opium by British merchants during the 19th century.

“China had the same thing done to them and now they feel vindicated in doing this . . . This is a proxy war and without bullets being fired we are losing more people than we ever lost in wars.”

Gupta said there is no evidence to suggest Beijing is using illicit drugs as a tool to destabilise the US. But Washington did want to hold Chinese authorities accountable for the illicit actions of private criminal actors in their country, he said.

Concerns about the global spread of synthetic drugs are growing. Last month Europol warned Mexican drug cartels are becoming more active in Europe, including smuggling large amounts of meth into the bloc. The discovery of fentanyl production facilities in Europe raised concerns about “development of a fentanyl market in the EU”, according to a Europol report.

Financial Times · by Jamie Smyth · January 22, 2023



20. The Trouble With Trans-Pacific Trade


Excerpts:


One way U.S. negotiators can improve prospects for a successful IPEF outcome is by tempering their expectations for how extensively and rapidly U.S.-allied nations can reduce their reliance on Chinese investors and suppliers. U.S. policymakers are identifying parts of the supply chain that they regard as critical to national security. This is a positive development, because it could provide parameters around the United States’ requests for reducing China’s role in exports.

Recent American initiatives suggest that the United States is willing to facilitate investments in IPEF partners capable of serving as alternate suppliers. For example, a recent U.S. government loan to First Solar, a U.S. manufacturer of solar panels, to set up a factory in India may be an indication of how the United States can move away from dependence on the Chinese market.


Achieving even a limited set of the IPEF’s promises requires a flexible and patient approach to relationship building. By opening a consultative and wide-ranging dialogue with a diverse set of countries, the United States is offering something of value to its Indo-Pacific partners. The IPEF can pay real dividends over time for all its members, especially if the United States tempers its ambitions by recognizing the region’s policy preferences and existing alliances.


The Trouble With Trans-Pacific Trade

How Washington Can Get Its Allies On Board With Its New Strategy

By Mary E. Lovely

January 23, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Mary E. Lovely · January 23, 2023

Many foreign-policy analysts regarded former U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a trade pact between 12 Pacific Rim economies and the United States—as a blunder of historic proportions. The deal, which would have lowered tariff barriers between countries that collectively account for roughly 40 percent of global GDP, would have expanded the United States’ economic reach and security alliances and represented an opportunity for Washington to counter Beijing’s primacy in the Indo-Pacific.

In 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden negotiated what could be seen as the equivalent of a do-over of the TPP: the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which would unite 13 countries in the region and the United States. The IPEF is supposed to create channels for coordination and investment, diversify U.S. supply chains, and hasten the region’s green energy transition. With new rules and standards for how goods are designed and produced, the Biden administration hopes to build relationships with partners that commit to U.S. values on labor and the environment and reduce China’s presence in U.S. supply chains.

Because of abiding resistance to free trade in the United States, the IPEF has not been crafted as a traditional trade agreement. In particular, it does not offer signatories preferential access to the U.S. market. That might make the IPEF more acceptable in the United States, but it will hamper the effectiveness of the pact. South Asian and Southeast Asian countries are eager for deeper economic engagement with the United States. Without a tangible reward for meeting U.S. demands, however, leaders in these countries have little leverage to overcome their own domestic opposition for the changes in their labor and environmental policies that the IPEF would require. By overreaching in its demands for regulatory changes and supply chain purity, the United States risks squandering this second chance to influence how the fast-growing Indo-Pacific region develops.

QUID FOR WHAT QUO?

The Biden administration has claimed that the IPEF would promote a regional economy that is worker friendly, resilient, green, and socially inclusive. The initiative is designed around four issue areas, or pillars: supply chains, clean energy, decarbonization and infrastructure, and fair taxation and anticorruption. Members do not need to sign on to all pillars, but they must embrace the goals of those they do accept.

Although the IPEF is unlikely to create the model economies touted by the Biden administration, the deal has the potential to produce real benefits for its participants. U.S. engagement can enhance American investment in the region, slowing the rise of China as its dominant player. Through technical assistance and training, the IPEF can assist poorer members in their quest for higher quality development by building up their governments’ capacity to lower carbon emissions. The pact can facilitate the sale of U.S. technologies that could help address the region’s exposure to climate change and prepare coordinated responses to natural and manmade supply disruptions.


The IPEF’s trade pillar is the main reason regional leaders want to join the pact. But as things stand now, the United States is asking for major changes in signatories’ regulations and markets while offering almost no concessions of its own. The IPEF participants are a diverse group, ranging from advanced, innovative powerhouses to developing countries. The group includes Australia, India, and Japan—which along with the United States are part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal forum implicitly aimed at countering China. New Zealand and South Korea have signed onto the IPEF, as have the six biggest countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the tiny countries of Brunei and Fiji.

For the IPEF’s smaller members, the trade pillar may be a nonstarter. The United States wants its partners to adopt more stringent labor and environmental standards and refrain from adopting rules that tax digital flows or that force firms to store data locally. It calls on members to enact and enforce “high standards,” implicitly defined as those chosen by the United States. The IPEF’s trade pillar pushes far beyond recent trade agreements to govern contested areas such as the speed of decarbonization and e-commerce rules. The scope for consensus on norms in these areas is untested, especially among such a diverse set of countries. Indeed, in many of these areas—notably regulation of internet platforms, carbon border adjustment taxes, and data privacy protections—the United States has failed to form clear policy positions of its own.


Countries differ in how quickly they could adopt American standards in so many complex policy areas.

Although Washington is asking for commitments in many sensitive areas, it is offering no incentives for meeting its demands and no mechanisms to ensure compliance. U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai has made clear that the IPEF is not a traditional trade agreement and that the United States will not be lifting tariffs it currently places on exports such as apparel and footwear. As a result, member countries have little reason to take on obligations they would not otherwise consider. To be sure, governments across the Indo-Pacific are open to instituting fair working conditions, clean environments, and developing rules that enable cross-border digital sales and purchases through internet platforms. But countries differ in how far and quickly they would be able to adopt American standards in so many complex policy areas—assuming they even want to. Developing countries often view exhortations to adopt U.S.-preferred domestic regulations as an effort to constrain their ability to compete with richer nations. They see those demands as pressure to accept U.S. choices in patent protection, health and safety standards, and digital trade.

Official statements published after the first IPEF ministerial meeting commit negotiators “to consider flexibilities” in recognition of “different levels of economic development and capacity constraints” but provide no indication of why such flexibilities are needed or how they might be used. Flexibility in trade agreements typically allows less developed countries to deviate from specific commitments while still enjoying preferential access to the U.S. market. The IPEF, however, cannot provide that flexibility, since the framework lacks trade concessions to revoke and has no enforcement mechanism.

The current contours of the agreement, however, could allow the United States to penalize those who fail to meet the agreement’s high standards. New tariff penalties could be justified by appeal to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows the U.S. trade representative to act if partners do not meet commitments made in trade agreements. With no dispute-resolution mechanism in the IPEF, penalized countries would have no way to contest U.S. penalties. India has decided that such an outcome is too much of a risk: it has preemptively opted out of the trade pillar, citing concerns that the United States would condition access to its market on India’s labor and environmental policies. Unless the United States restrains its ambitions for high and uniform standards, more developing countries will follow India’s lead.

TIES THAT BIND

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing demand for resilient and sustainable supply chains. The IPEF negotiating framework highlights essential areas for cooperation, including identifying critical sectors and goods, diversifying supply sources, developing information sharing and a crisis-response mechanism, and improving supply chain logistics. China is not mentioned by name in the IPEF Ministerial Statement guiding the supply chain pillar, but the country remains a powerful presence in negotiations.


China is a top export market or import source for every IPEF country. Eleven are members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—a trade pact between the ASEAN members and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—and thus are already in an economic partnership with the Asian behemoth. Six of these RCEP members are also parties to ongoing ASEAN negotiations over an updated free trade agreement with China. Despite these growing links to China—or maybe because of them—China’s recent weaponization of trade against Australia, Lithuania, and South Korea, in each case stopping imports from these countries as retaliation for perceived diplomatic slights, has heightened the desire of IPEF members to diversify both their import sources and their export markets. As they navigate the IPEF, Asian negotiators must thread a narrow path between their desire to hedge against Chinese influence and their need for access to Chinese markets and investment.

So far, the Biden administration has failed to define where and to what extent it wishes to see Chinese participation in supply chains curtailed. On her first visit to India, in November 2022, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen called for “like-minded countries” to work together to reduce the world’s dependence on “risky countries,” taking clear aim at China. This is bold rhetoric, but it plays poorly outside of India, where such statements suggest an open-ended push to decouple supply chains from the region’s largest economy.

Despite the risks IPEF countries face in reducing China’s role in their supply chains, they are eager to participate in the United States’ push toward “friendshoring,” or encouraging companies to shift manufacturing away from authoritarian states and toward allied nations. After U.S. President Donald Trump imposed tariffs of up to 20 percent on U.S. imports from China in 2018 and 2019, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam gained a larger share of the U.S. market. Since then, India and Southeast Asian countries have become increasingly important global supply nodes. Through IPEF-related foreign investment and technology transfer, they hope to become major suppliers of electronics, energy components, and medical products to the U.S. market, as well as provide traditional labor- and resource-intensive goods.


The Biden administration has failed to define where it wishes to see Chinese participation in supply chains curtailed.

The success of U.S. friendshoring efforts in the region likely hinges on whether the United States commits IPEF partners to intermediate input sourcing only from other countries that the United States deems to be allies. By eliminating China as a source of intermediate goods, participants in friendshoring risk degrading their own export competitiveness. If the United States were offering preferential market access to those who meet the new no-China requirements, taking on new obligations that raise production costs to serve U.S. buyers might make economic sense. Without such access, private investment in constrained supply chains will be hard to raise.

One way U.S. negotiators can improve prospects for a successful IPEF outcome is by tempering their expectations for how extensively and rapidly U.S.-allied nations can reduce their reliance on Chinese investors and suppliers. U.S. policymakers are identifying parts of the supply chain that they regard as critical to national security. This is a positive development, because it could provide parameters around the United States’ requests for reducing China’s role in exports.

Recent American initiatives suggest that the United States is willing to facilitate investments in IPEF partners capable of serving as alternate suppliers. For example, a recent U.S. government loan to First Solar, a U.S. manufacturer of solar panels, to set up a factory in India may be an indication of how the United States can move away from dependence on the Chinese market.

Achieving even a limited set of the IPEF’s promises requires a flexible and patient approach to relationship building. By opening a consultative and wide-ranging dialogue with a diverse set of countries, the United States is offering something of value to its Indo-Pacific partners. The IPEF can pay real dividends over time for all its members, especially if the United States tempers its ambitions by recognizing the region’s policy preferences and existing alliances.

MARY E. LOVELY is the Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Foreign Affairs · by Mary E. Lovely · January 23, 2023



21. The PLA’s Weak Backbone: Is China Struggling to Professionalize its Noncommissioned Officer Corps?



When I was at the National War College we traveled to China with about 15 students in 2011. When we visited the Kunming Military Academy I spent the day with the political officer (a one star general) since the PLA commandant spent the day with our NWC commandant and senior professor. 


Since I was the second ranking officer the political assumed I was the US political officer. He asked me how I performed my duties as a political officer. I told him we do not have political officers in the U.S. military. He was surprised (and I was surprised that he was unaware of the fact we do not have political officers).  


He asked me who was responsible for the welfare of the soldiers as well as who performed the necessary ideological training. To the second point I said we do not conduct ideological training but we all (officers, NCOs, and Soldiers) swear an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.


To the first question I told him that is the NCO corps that looks out for the welfare of the troops and that NCOs at each level of command from platoon to division to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) provide advice and recommendations to their officers concerning issues with the troops. He seemed to not understand the concept of a professional NCO corps because he asked me if it is true that Sergeants can provide advice to their officers.


Yes, a data point of one but that was my experience.


The PLA’s Weak Backbone: Is China Struggling to Professionalize its Noncommissioned Officer Corps? - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Matt Tetreau · January 23, 2023

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Steven Biddle’s 2004 work, Military Power, offers one of the most comprehensive and convincing explanations of modern military effectiveness. His argument, that a “modern system of force employment” emerged during and following World War I to improve troop effectiveness and survivability in the face of overwhelming and lethal firepower, is both logical and historically sound. The system, “focused on reducing exposure to hostile fire and enabling friendly movement while slowing the enemy’s.” While conceptually intuitive, Biddle reiterates throughout the work that although most states accept and attempt to implement the modern system, few do so effectively. Reasons for the wide variance in implementation of the modern system include domestic political and budgetary considerations, but perhaps no factor has a greater bearing than the efficacy of a state’s noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. At the tactical level, the modern system requires that ground forces master a series of tasks to, “survive the hail of metal long enough to perform meaningful military missions.” These tasks—which include cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, and suppression—are ideally suited to execution by NCOs. In the absence of competent and empowered NCOs, these responsibilities fall to junior commissioned officers who often lack the experience, span of control, and intellectual bandwidth to effectively implement them.

China’s campaign to modernize its military over the past twenty years is exceptional in both scope and rapidity. At the Chinese Communist Party’s Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017, President Xi Jinping famously committed to transforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into “world-class forces” by 2049. Western military experience suggests that the PLA’s ability to achieve this aspiration is contingent, in no small part, on its ability to professionalize its NCO corps. The PLA Army (PLAA) has, through a series of measures over the course of decades, sought to professionalize its NCOs. It remains to be seen whether the PLAA’s efforts bolster its ability to implement the modern system, and thereby support the goal of achieving “world-class” status.

The PLA Army NCO Corps

The PLA “Interim Regulations for Sergeants,” issued on March 31, 2022, establishes two important facts about the structure of the PLA NCO corps. The first is that the PLA recognizes two categories of NCOs: management and skilled. These categories define the scope of NCOs’ responsibilities, but also their training and professional advancement requirements. Second, there are three distinct paths to become an NCO in the PLA. Under the most traditional path, NCOs are selected from the pool of conscripts who volunteer for continued service at the end of their two years of mandatory service. Once accepted, applicants undergo specialty-specific NCO training that lasts six to twelve months. A second path to NCO leadership involves an “NCO-cadet” or “targeted training NCO” program. This model involves recruitment of high school graduates with demonstrated technical aptitude for a three-year NCO training pipeline. Over the course of three years, an NCO cadet receives approximately two and a half years of technical training and six months of military field training. The final path is known as the “direct recruit NCO” model, recruiting civilians with bachelor’s degrees into technical fields as corporals. The second and third models are used to build technical expertise within the force, particularly in fields such as information technology, engineering, and data science. This influx of specialists mitigates a deeply held concern within the PLA that it lacks the human capital to operate the increasingly sophisticated technology that will be critical to winning under the “informationized warfare” conditions China’s leaders expect. It appears that NCOs in tactical leadership roles ascend almost exclusively through the first model, and they are typically assigned first as deputy squad leaders. Technical NCOs are more likely to go through the latter models and assume roles as technical specialists and leaders of small sections.

Self-Assessment

The current trajectory of the PLAA NCO corps is one of increasing professionalization, trust, and importance. Despite that, statements by senior PLA and government leaders indicate that they are not satisfied with the progress. In his excellent 2018 essay, “Breaking the Paradigm: Drivers Behind the PLA’s Current Period of Reform,” David Finkelstein points to a surprising volume of statements from senior officials, Xi included, that suggest that the PLA is not fit to execute the missions envisioned by the party. Statements like these and repeated reference to the “five incapables” suggest that the state of PLA personnel is insufficient for the conduct of the types of operations envisioned by senior leaders.

Personnel Management

The PLA’s system of personnel management appears to be at odds with its efforts to build a professional NCO corps due to low retention of quality personnel and inadequate professional development. Retention rates for PLA enlisted personnel are largely unavailable, but there is evidence that the PLA recognizes that they are not retaining talented personnel beyond the initial period of conscription. Chinese media reports suggest that college students and graduates are particularly unlikely to reenlist. Further, this reporting found that benefits, such as hiring preferences for veterans, induce many service members to leave the service. It appears likely, therefore, that PLA NCOs are not drawn from the top performers of the conscript force, but from those who have few civilian career prospects.

The PLA’s current personnel system also does not appear to place emphasis on experience as a prerequisite for NCO leadership. In the case of those PLA NCOs in technical fields that earn their corporal’s stripes through the “targeted training NCO” or “direct recruit NCO” programs, they likely assume their responsibilities with no military experience outside of their initial (basic) training. Even accepting that the PLA assigns these NCOs to technical duties without significant leadership responsibilities, the experience deficit described above is stark. While there is significant variance in US Army enlisted career timelines, new US Army NCOs likely have nearly twice as much experience as their former-conscript PLAA counterparts. Most new NCOs in PLAA combat arms roles have only eighteen months of on-the-job experience and approximately a year of schoolhouse instruction. Given the annual cycles of conscription and collective training progressions, a new PLAA corporal has likely only experienced a single iteration of that training cycle. To put a finer point on the issue, newly minted deputy squad leaders may have previously participated in a single squad live-fire event with their units, which they are now expected to help lead. A rough comparison between promotion timelines for PLA “intermediate-grade NCOs”—using the figures provided in a November 2022 report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission—and average promotion timelines for their US counterparts suggests that the PLA soldiers possess approximately three years less experience.

Professional Education and Training

The quality of training and availability of professional education for PLAA NCOs are additional hurdles to professionalization. Quality training at the small-unit level is primarily hampered by the semiannual conscription cycle. Currently, PLA conscripts serve for a period of two years, and new conscripts are inducted into the service twice a year. The first six months of conscripts’ service are spent in basic training, rendering them unavailable for unit training. If the new conscripts are allocated evenly, tactical units receive a new batch of conscripts every six months. According to a report by the Jamestown Foundation, conscripts may require up to six months of additional on-the-job training before they are sufficiently proficient to contribute to collective tasks. Thus, under ideal conditions, 50–75 percent of the authorized troops in any unit are competent in collective tasks and, for six months of the year, units are manned at only 75 percent. To further illustrate the difficulty of this system, picture a standard nine-man Chinese infantry squad. From April to June, the squad leader can count on being assigned seven soldiers, of whom only five are competent in squad drills and maneuver. At this point even a single soldier injured, assigned to a special detail, going on leave, or attending a military school drastically undermines the ability of the squad to operate.

Access to professional military education for NCOs is a deficiency that the PLA has sought to address in recent years. As previously mentioned, before assuming their responsibilities, prospective management NCOs attend six to twelve months of leadership and specialty-specific training. Promotion to higher NCO ranks carries requirements for additional schoolhouse training, typically lasting one to five months depending on the individual’s grade and specialty. Before promotion to the intermediate-grade NCO rank of sergeant second class, Chinese troops must earn at least the equivalent of an associate degree in a technical field. An additional requirement imposed in 2009 stipulates that NCOs earn technical certifications in subjects such as weapon repair and equipment maintenance. These two requirements reinforce the supposition that PLA leaders are concerned with the development of sufficient subject matter expertise within the ranks to operate increasingly sophisticated weapons, sensors, and other equipment. NCOs, as the long-serving and technically oriented backbone of the PLA, are ideally suited to fill this role. Based on recent cuts to the PLA education system, questions remain regarding the PLA’s capacity to provide training to the hundreds of thousands of NCOs ascending through the ranks. Further, technical training (to say nothing of political training) appears to be a higher priority than leadership training for PLA NCOs.

Parochialism and Centralized Command

A final hurdle facing optimization of the PLAA NCO corps, and one that is unlikely to be solved by bureaucratic means, is that of parochialism. In short, Chinese NCOs lack the respect and stature of their Western counterparts. This is likely the case for two separate but related reasons. First, the history of a professional NCO corps in the PLA is quite short, and its rise has come at the expense of the commissioned officer corps. Since the late 1990s, but especially in the era of Xi’s sweeping reforms, the PLAA has shifted from an officer-heavy formation to one that increasingly relies on sergeants. As documented in a 2019 volume published by the National Defense University Press, Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, the Chinese military force reductions eliminated over thirty percent of the commissioned officer corps, with NCOs absorbing many of the responsibilities once performed by junior officers. Some career officers may resent the perception that their stock has fallen, while that of newly empowered and professionalized NCOs has risen.

Second, socioeconomic disparities between officers and enlisted are exacerbated by the issue of party membership, presenting obstacles to mutual trust and candor. Party membership has been extended to some NCOs, apparently based on quotas, but as Dennis J. Blasko and Marcus Clay have described, NCOs wield limited influence within PLA party committees. Given the reticence of the Chinese Communist Party to allow more than token NCO membership, and the seeming antipathy that superiors have for NCOs within the party, it appears that the party’s effect is not one of cohesion. Social divides between officer and enlisted ranks persist within the PLA and are amplified by unequal access to party membership and authority. These tensions may prevent the proliferation of an effective NCO-officer relationship.


Before uncritically dismissing the Chinese NCO corps as ineffectual two alternative theories must be considered. First, Western military professionals (this author included) analyzing Chinese practices through Western paradigms may be altogether mislead. It is not clear that the Chinese view the American NCO corps as the platonic form they should strive to replicate. In other words, PLA Army NCOs may never look like their Western counterparts, but could still meet the intent of the PLA and party leadership and prove successful on the battlefield. Perhaps the high degree of technical proficiency that they bring, even if lacking leadership acumen, will prove decisive. Second, one could argue that the Chinese way of war is less dependent on the initiative and agency that professional NCOs bring to a force. Indeed, it may be the case that an operational concept predicated largely on deception, standoff, and the “Three Warfares,” rather than small-unit maneuver in the model of the modern system, may succeed with less effective small-unit leaders.

Without a doubt, the PLAA NCO corps has improved over the past two decades. These improvements are due in large part to efforts to recruit technically proficient personnel, overhaul the professional military education system, extend party membership to NCOs, and retard parochial tendencies. However, significant hurdles to optimizing effectiveness remain. First, PLAA NCOs are significantly less experienced than their US Army counterparts. In the Western tradition, years of experience and repetition in tactical tasks are the foundation of a sergeant’s influence with both troops and officers. If we are to accept that mastery of the modern system is critical to success in tactical ground warfare, then it follows that small-unit leaders must have both the experience and the authority to apply the tenets of that system. Second, while technical training appears to be a priority, there is less emphasis on leadership training. As Brian Waidelich and Bernard D. Cole have identified, it appears that the PLAA is more interested in building a body of technocrats than small-unit leaders. Finally, socioeconomic prejudices and parochialism may undermine PLAA NCOs’ authority. The existence of a rigid hierarchy, discrepancies in party membership, and class-based prejudice may prevent NCOs from exercising their authority and candidly advising commanders. As with many of its institutions, the People’s Republic of China has built its noncommissioned officer corps in a uniquely Chinese form and at a uniquely Chinese pace. This particular institution is among the most underappreciated elements of a modern state’s security apparatus, and may hold the key to realization of the Chinese dream.

Major Matt Tetreau is an active duty United States Army strategist and student at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro, US Navy

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mwi.usma.edu · by Matt Tetreau · January 23, 2023

22. China attacks, insults US on Twitter


China attacks, insults US on Twitter

americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · January 20, 2023

A top China spokesperson condemned “U.S. greed” and said the country’s actions plunge “other countries into turmoil and disaster” during a press conference on Tuesday, according to a transcript.

The remark from Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin was then amplified on the ministry’s official Twitter account.

“The level of US greed in stealing resources from Syria is as striking as its ‘generosity’ in giving out military aid. Whether the US gives or takes, it plunges other countries into turmoil & disaster, and the US gets to reap the benefits for its hegemony and other interests,” the tweet said.

The level of US greed in stealing resources from Syria is as striking as its “generosity” in giving out military aid. Whether the US gives or takes, it plunges other countries into turmoil & disaster, and the US gets to reap the benefits for its hegemony and other interests. pic.twitter.com/NKgnIUUjWO
— Spokesperson发言人办公室 (@MFA_China) January 17, 2023

Wang was reacting to a Syrian state news report that U.S. troops drove “looted oil” from the Syrian countryside to military bases in Iraq last weekend in a convoy of 53 tankers. The Syrian state news agency, SANA, has reported similar stories numerous times in recent years, and Chinese officials have spoken up about it before.

READ MORE: Syria demands US troops leave immediately

Wang said China is “struck by the blatancy and egregiousness of the U.S.’ plundering of Syria,” adding that Syrian data shows more than 80 percent of its daily oil output was smuggled away by the U.S. in the first half of last year.

“Such banditry is aggravating the energy crisis and humanitarian disaster in Syria,” Wang continued. “The US must answer for its oil theft. … We urge the US to stop trampling on international rule of law and breaking international rules.

The U.S. intervened in Syria’s ongoing civil war in 2014 to contain the spread of the Islamic State (ISIS). The militant Islamist group was largely defeated around 2019, but there are still about 900 U.S. troops deployed in Syria “to keep an ISIS resurgence at bay,” a military spokesman told the Washington Post last month.

The UN estimates that more than 350,000 people have been killed in Syria since the war began in 2011, and describes the conflict as unleashing “unprecedented devastation and displacement” on the country.

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americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · January 20, 2023

23. An unlikely alliance: could US far right and progressives agree on defense cuts?





An unlikely alliance: could US far right and progressives agree on defense cuts?

The Guardian · by Joan E Greve · January 23, 2023

Progressives and ‘America first’ Republicans in Congress both want to re-examine US military budget – but for vastly different reasons

Progressives have recently found themselves in an unfamiliar position: in agreement with members of the hard-right House Freedom Caucus.

Some of the latter caucus’s members have recently called for re-examining the amount of money spent by the US military, echoing demands that progressives have issued for years. Although progressives are clear-eyed about their ideological differences with “America first” Republicans on foreign policy, they encourage a renewed debate over the Pentagon’s budget.

McCarthy may be speaker, but Trump is the real leader of House Republicans

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“The idea that effective American foreign policy requires this [level of spending], I think, is not only wrong,” said Matt Duss, a former foreign policy adviser to progressive senator Bernie Sanders, “it’s just absurd and unsustainable.”

The Freedom Caucus reportedly pushed for spending cuts as part of their negotiations with Kevin McCarthy, who offered concessions to fellow Republicans to secure the House speakership earlier this month. One of those concessions involved a promise to cap fiscal year 2024 discretionary spending at fiscal year 2022 levels, after Republicans expressed outrage over the $1.76tn omnibus funding bill that Joe Biden signed into law last month.

If such a fiscal policy were evenly applied to all federal agencies, the department of defense would see its budget cut by $75bn compared with this fiscal year.

That possibility has simultaneously sowed division among House Republicans and attracted the interest of progressives. They hope the latest dust-up over the Pentagon’s budget will spark what they consider to be an overdue conversation over US defense spending, which will hit a record high of $858bn this fiscal year.

Among House Republicans, the proposal to cut the Pentagon’s budget has won some support from far-right members who have embraced Donald Trump’s “America first” approach to foreign policy. Speaking to Fox News this month, Congressman Matt Gaetz, one of the Republican holdouts in the speakership battle, partly blamed the Pentagon’s large budget on America’s financial assistance to Ukraine amid its war against Russia.

“We can defend this country and project power more efficiently and more effectively than we do,” Gaetz said. “How about we start with Ukraine?”

McCarthy himself previously promised that Republicans would not provide a “blank check” to Ukraine if they won back the House. But aid to Ukraine has continued to win bipartisan support in Congress.

“I do not see that money getting taken away from us,” Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said earlier this month. “It is there. It is rock solid through nearly all or all of 2023.”

McCarthy has expressed openness to examining the Pentagon’s budget, but the proposal has stoked outrage among many of the more hawkish members of his conference. Republican congressman Tony Gonzales of Texas cited the potential cuts to explain his opposition to the House rules package, saying he thought the proposal was a “horrible idea”.

“How am I going to look at our allies in the eye and say, I need you to increase your defense budget, but yet America is going to decrease ours?” Gonzales told CBS News.

Republicans’ dysfunction over speaker threatens the health of US government

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While a number of House Democrats have joined Gonzales in rejecting the idea of defense spending cuts, the idea of reconsidering the Pentagon’s budget has long held sway with progressives. When Biden called for an increase in funding for the defense department last year, leaders of the Congressional Progressive Caucus attacked the proposal as “simply unacceptable”. Progressive activists and their congressional allies note that the US military has a larger budget than the next nine largest militaries combined and urged lawmakers to reallocate some of that funding to other needs, such as healthcare or education.

“For far too long, we have blindly and excessively pumped money into the Pentagon, which – despite its massive budget – has yet to pass an audit,” said the progressive congresswoman Barbara Lee, who has long championed fiscal reform at the defense department. “Imagine what we could do with even a fraction of [the Pentagon’s funding]. We need to rethink our foreign policy priorities and invest in diplomacy first and defense second.”

Ro Khanna, a progressive congressman from California, said he would welcome a bipartisan conversation about the Pentagon’s budget, but he rejected Republicans’ efforts to tie spending cuts to the looming fight over the debt ceiling. The US hit its debt limit this month, and the treasury secretary, Janet Yellen, has warned that the government is at risk of defaulting this summer if Congress does not increase its borrowing capacity – a move that would have catastrophic effects on the US economy. Democrats fear that House Republicans will attempt to extract concessions on government spending in exchange for helping to raise the debt ceiling.

“I do not support any debate on spending demands that threaten a debt-ceiling showdown. If Republicans want to have conversations about future defense cuts that are strategic, then I am open to that,” Khanna told the Guardian. “While I support the funding for Ukraine’s defense, we need to take ourselves off the path to a trillion-dollar Pentagon budget.”

Progressive advocates similarly rejected the notion that the US must choose between cutting the Pentagon’s budget and supporting Ukraine. Stephen Miles, president of the progressive group Win Without War, blamed the Pentagon’s ballooning budget on ineffective weapons systems and excessive contracts to private companies, which have accounted for as much as half of US defense spending in recent years.

“The spending on Ukraine is not what’s driving the Pentagon’s growth,” Miles said. “We’re talking about major weapon systems procurement; we’re talking about private service contracting. We’re talking about a lot of things that aren’t being driven by Ukraine.”

Duss, now a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the war in Ukraine should not prevent any debate over defense spending. He noted that politicians like Sanders and Lee have demanded reductions in the Pentagon’s budget for years, long before the war in Ukraine began.

“There’s always going to be some crisis of the moment that prevents us from thinking about how to spend less on defense,” Duss said. “But this is a conversation that we absolutely have to have.”

As of now, the prospects for enacting Pentagon budget cuts appear bleak. Even some of the House Republicans who, like Gaetz, initially opposed McCarthy’s speakership bid have downplayed the possibility. Congressman Chip Roy of Texas, a key negotiator in the talks between McCarthy and his Republican detractors, claimed that “cuts to defense were NEVER DISCUSSED” during the speakership fight.

“In fact, there was broad agreement spending cuts should focus on NON-DEFENSE discretionary spending,” Roy’s office said on Twitter.

US heads for debt-ceiling standoff as House Republicans refuse to budge

Read more

A funding bill that solely cut non-defense discretionary spending would almost certainly be rejected by Democrats, who still control the Senate and the White House. In addition to the procedural hurdles of Roy’s proposal, Miles mocked the idea of excluding defense spending from potential cuts as utterly unrealistic.

“You can’t look at the level of spending that the US government is doing and say we’re going to exempt more than half of discretionary spending,” Miles said. “When you have the Pentagon taking up as much money as it is now, there’s no way to look at cutting government spending without it.”

Even if Congress could somehow reach an agreement on the need to reduce the Pentagon’s budget, conservatives would inevitably clash with progressives over what programs to cut and how to reallocate that funding.

“The reason Matt Gaetz wants to cut defense spending is not the reason why I would,” Duss acknowledged.

Still, Duss argued that progressives and some lawmakers on the right have a “shared interest” in starting a reinvigorated conversation over defense spending. That communal goal could work to progressives’ advantage.

“If Republicans want to prize this open and look inside this budget … that’s a debate I think everyone should welcome,” Duss said. “And I think it’s quite telling who’s not welcoming it.”

The Guardian · by Joan E Greve · January 23, 2023


​24. Soldiers from 101st Airborne, 10th Mountain divisions expected to deploy to Romania


Soldiers from 101st Airborne, 10th Mountain divisions expected to deploy to Romania

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · January 23, 2023


U.S. soldiers with the 101st Airborne Division fire M4 rifles on a range in Constanta, Romania, Jan. 12, 2023. Elements from the divisions 1st Brigade Combat Team are preparing to deploy to Europe and backfill units that have been deployed to Romania since the summer. (Nicholas Goodman/U.S. Army)


STUTTGART, Germany — Army units are gearing up for a potential deployment to Europe, where they are expected to be tasked with deterring Russian aggression in the Black Sea region.

Elements from the 101st Airborne Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 10th Mountain Division headquarters are preparing for the mission, the Army said in a statement Saturday.

“Preparation for this potential deployment provides flexibility to reassess conditions and respond to a dynamic security environment,” the Army statement said.

The Army said the move doesn’t change force levels, but rather aims to ensure forces are positioned to provide “a robust deterrent and defensive posture alongside our Allies across the European continent.”

The Army statement did not specify where the units are going, but a military official told Stars and Stripes the soldiers are expected to backfill a 101st Airborne Division headquarters and a subordinate brigade deployed to Romania since the summer. However, the military could adjust where those forces go based on security conditions in the coming weeks and months.

The 101st units were ordered to Romania in June and operate mostly out of Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, which serves as a hub for the Army in the Black Sea region.

During their time in Romania and other locations around Europe, 101st soldiers have been tasked with monitoring events in Ukraine for potential spillover into allied countries, while incorporating lessons from the war into how American ground forces train.

“The United States will continue to adjust its posture as needed in response to the dynamic security environment,” the Army said in its statement.

John Vandiver

John Vandiver

John covers U.S. military activities across Europe and Africa. Based in Stuttgart, Germany, he previously worked for newspapers in New Jersey, North Carolina and Maryland. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · January 23, 2023




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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 


FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.


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