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Quotes of the Day:
"Socrates, more than any other classical figure, recognized that ignorance does not merely consist of lacking information, but in mistaking belief for knowledge. When this confusion becomes widespread, perception itself becomes governable. The manipulation of duality, good versus evil, ally versus enemy, righteous, versus corrupt, operates precisely within this vulnerability, shaping, not only what people think, but how they think."
– Joseph. Keel
"If it takes a lot of words to say what you have in mind, give it more thought."
– Dennis Roth
"There's no way to rule innocent men. The only power any government has is the power to crack down on criminals. Well, when there aren't enough criminals, one makes them. One declares so many things to be a crime that it becomes impossible for men to live without breaking laws."
– Ayn Rand
1. Peace with North Korea Is a fantasy, not pragmatism
2. S. Korea warns NATO of North Korea cyber, space threats
3. Greenland framework's lessons for the ROK-US alliance
4. Peace through pragmatism, not illusion
5. How spies from both North and South Korea targeted a human rights advocate
6. North Korea replaces “socialist fatherland” with Kim Jong Un’s name on classroom bulletin boards
7. North Korea’s snow-covered military runways reveal air force weaknesses
8. 3 civilian suspects banned from leaving nation over alleged drone flights to N. Korea
9. Korea battery makers chase solid-state and sodium-ion tech
10. Book review: The untold story of Kim Jong Un’s Japan-born mother
1. Peace with North Korea Is a fantasy, not pragmatism
Summary:
Ri Jong Ho argues that South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s New Year proposal for peaceful coexistence and phased denuclearization mistakes wish for realism. Kim Jong Un, he says, fears exchange and cooperation more than military pressure because contact with South Korea exposes north Koreans to freedom and prosperity that undermine regime legitimacy. Pyongyang’s DMZ fortifications are framed as deliberate military preparation, not mere distrust. Ri contends phased deals have repeatedly failed because north Korea exploits freezes to gain resources, buy time, and advance its program under unverifiable conditions. He concludes that deterrence, alliance strength, and information penetration are more pragmatic than summit diplomacy.
Comment: We are fortunate and happy to be able to publish our first piece from Ri Jong Ho from north Korea in our Korea Regional Review. We look forward to many great insights in the future from him.
Voices Jan. 22, 2026 / 1:53 PM
Peace with North Korea Is a fantasy, not pragmatism
By Ri Jong-ho
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/01/22/perspective-north-korea-realism/7901769106810/
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung advocatd in his New Year's press conference peaceful coexistence with the North and a phased approach to denuclearization. Photo by Ahn Young-joon/EPA/Pool
Jan. 22 (UPI) -- In his January New Year's press conference, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung unveiled two core diplomatic initiatives toward North Korea. The first is peaceful coexistence with the North; the second is a phased approach to denuclearization.
He defined a state in which war becomes unnecessary as the most reliable form of security, arguing that this would serve as the foundation for economic growth.
On the nuclear issue, he proposed a step-by-step plan: freezing North Korea's nuclear activities as a starting point, followed by arms reduction and ultimately leading to complete denuclearization.
On the surface, this approach appears realistic. It acknowledges that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons in the short term and pursues incremental progress. However, the fundamental question is straightforward: Will Kim Jong Un accept such goodwill? The answer is unequivocal. He will not.
What Kim Jong Un fears most is exchange with the South
Lee interpreted unprecedented measures along the DMZ -- triple-layer fencing and the destruction of inter-Korean roads and railways -- as expressions of extreme mutual distrust. But this is not distrust; it is calculated military preparation. The timing of North Korea's construction of tank barriers coincided precisely with the deployment of North Korean troops to the Russia-Ukraine war.
A more fundamental issue is at stake. What Kim Jong Un fears most is not South Korea's military threat, but rather dialogue, cooperation and exchange with the South. Through such engagement, North Korean citizens would witness the freedom and prosperity of South Korean society. The moment they see fellow Koreans -- sharing the same language and ethnicity -- living freely and enjoying abundance, North Koreans would yearn for the South and lose faith in their own system.
This is why North Korea strictly prohibits by law all South Korean films, dramas and publications. Violations result in sentences of 10 years or more or execution. Countless North Koreans have been executed for watching Korean dramas. South Korea is living proof that negates the legitimacy of the North Korean system. For the Pyongyang regime, peaceful coexistence, with engagement and exchange, would mark the beginning of systemic collapse.
There is no historical precedent for antagonistic systems with diametrically opposed ideologies peacefully coexisting while sharing a border. Even U.S.-Soviet coexistence during the Cold War was maintained only through complete separation behind an Iron Curtain.
The two Koreas differ in politics, economics and ideology, and because they share the same language and culture, the comparison effect is far more devastating. To expect peaceful coexistence under these conditions is unrealistic utopianism.
Phased denuclearization: three decades of repeated failure
The phased denuclearization proposal suffers from equally serious flaws. The suggestion to begin with a nuclear freeze has been proposed repeatedly within the United States. The question is how North Korea acts. Three decades of experience provide a clear answer: North Korea has deceived the international community, extracted resources, bought time and completed its nuclear weapons program.
• The 1994 U.S.-North Korea agreed framework: North Korea promised to freeze nuclear development and received heavy fuel oil and food aid. Yet, it secretly pursued uranium and plutonium enrichment.
• The six-party talks of the 2000s: Involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan and both Koreas, North Korea sat at the negotiating table, stalled for time and extracted concessions. Then in 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test. All parties were deceived.
If North Korea signs yet another phased agreement, who can verify it? North Korea is a closed state without press freedom. If it continues enhancing its nuclear arsenal within countless underground tunnels, how can this be confirmed? If verification were possible, the United States would have stopped North Korea long ago. An unverifiable promise is not a promise -- it is an instrument of deception. North Korea has proven this perfectly over three decades.
Conclusion: Realism, not fantasy, is what the moment demands
Lee advocates "approaching this pragmatically." It sounds reasonable. But pragmatism only functions when the counterpart is rational and predictable. North Korea is not a rational actor. The regime is an opaque, closed system for which maintaining hostile relations with the South is essential to survival.
Genuine pragmatism begins with confronting the essential nature of the North Korean regime. For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons are not bargaining chips but the core of regime survival. Peaceful coexistence represents not stability, but threat. Maximum deterrence, strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and long-term strategies of information penetration may prove more effective than summit diplomacy.
For Kim Jong Un, peaceful coexistence, with engagement and exchanges, marks the beginning of systemic collapse. Phased denuclearization represents merely another opportunity to buy time and extract resources.
Three decades have proven this beyond doubt. In Korean Peninsula diplomacy, the line dividing pragmatism from fantasy is defined not by attitude, but by structure. Recognizing the immutable nature of the North Korean regime is not pessimism. It is realism. And realism is what this moment demands of the Republic of Korea.
Ri Jong-Ho is a former senior North Korean economic official who served under all three leaders of the Kim family regime. His most recent role was based in Dalian, China, where he headed the Korea Daehung Trading Corp., overseen by the clandestine Office 39 under the direct control of the ruling Kim family. Before his assignment in Dalian, Jong Ho held pivotal positions, including president of the Daehung Shipping Co. and executive director of the Daehung General Bureau of the North Korean Workers' Party, a role equivalent to vice-minister rank in the North Korean party-state. Subsequently, he was appointed chairman of the Korea Kumgang Economic Development Group under the North Korean Defense Committee by Kim Jong Il. Jong-Ho is a recipient of the Hero of Labor Award, the highest civilian honor in North Korea. Following a series of brutal purges by Kim Jong Un, he defected with his family to South Korea in late 2014. Currently, Jong-Ho resides in the greater Washington D.C., area.
2. S. Korea warns NATO of North Korea cyber, space threats
Summary:
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs vice chairman, Kwon Dae-won, attended a NATO Military Committee meeting in Brussels and warned that north Korea’s cyber and space activities are growing threats that demand tighter international coordination. Kwon represented Joint Chiefs Chairman Jin Young-seung at the Chiefs of Defense session held Tuesday and Wednesday at NATO headquarters.
Comment: Beware Kim Jong Un's all purpose sword.
World News Jan. 22, 2026 / 10:32 PM / Updated Jan. 22, 2026 at 10:32 PM
S. Korea warns NATO of North Korea cyber, space threats
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/22/joint-chiefs-of-staff-vice-chairman-kwon-attended-nato-military-committee-meeting/7621769138719/
Chair of the NATO Military Committee (CMC), Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone attends a press conference of Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, 22 January 2026. Photo by OLIVIER MATTHYS/ EPA
north Korea’s cyber and space activities are growing threats that demand tighter international coordination. Kwon represented Joint Chiefs Chairman Jin Young-seung at the Chiefs of Defense session held Tuesday and Wednesday at NATO headquarters.
Jan. 22 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff vice chairman Kwon Dae-won attended a NATO Military Committee meeting in Brussels this week and said North Korea's cyber and space threats require closer international coordination, the military said Thursday.
Kwon attended as a representative for Joint Chiefs Chairman Jin Young-seung at the Military Committee Chiefs of Defense meeting held at NATO headquarters in Brussels from Tuesday to Wednesday local time. South Korea took part as an Indo-Pacific partner, the Joint Chiefs said.
The NATO Military Committee meeting brings together senior military officials from allied and partner countries to discuss key security issues. The South Korean Joint Chiefs participated for the 11th time, having first attended in 2010, the military said.
Kwon met with NATO Military Committee Chairman Giuseppe Cavo Dragone and other senior officials from NATO allies and partner nations to exchange views on security challenges and the need to expand cooperation, the Joint Chiefs said.
He was scheduled to deliver a presentation Wednesday titled "The Rapidly Changing Security Environment and Korea's Response," offering an overview of security conditions on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea's cyber and space threats, and calling for close international cooperation to address them, the military said.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
3. Greenland framework's lessons for the ROK-US alliance
Summary:
Chun In-bum argues that POTUS’s Davos tariff reversal matters less than the simultaneous “Framework for the Future of Greenland,” which signals a new U.S. alliance model. Under the framework, Denmark keeps legal title, but Washington gains practical control over key security functions and strategic resources, backed by a U.S.-led missile defense system. Chun says this reflects domestic U.S. pressure to price alliances and demand measurable contributions, after Europe free rode while trading with rivals. For the ROK-US alliance, burden sharing may expand to semiconductors, batteries, shipbuilding, and tech when demands rise.
Comment: Surely if we try to apply this model to Korea it will result in huge blowback. The presence of US troops has been a long festering sovereignty issue for some vocal factions within South Korea and this type of framework will only make it worse.
Greenland framework's lessons for the ROK-US alliance - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Chun In-bum
- Published Jan 23, 2026 11:03 am KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260123/greenland-frameworks-lessons-for-the-rok-us-alliance
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at the "Board of Peace" meeting during the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos on Jan. 22. AFP-Yonhap
U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent decision in Davos to withdraw proposed high tariffs on European goods was widely interpreted as a welcome easing of trade tensions. On its own, that reading would be reasonable. But viewed alongside the simultaneously unveiled “Framework for the Future of Greenland,” the move points to something far more significant: a fundamental shift in how the United States now defines and manages its alliances.
Chun In-bum
At the core of the Greenland framework are open-ended commitments and the deployment of a U.S.-led missile defense system. While Denmark formally retains legal ownership of the territory, effective control over strategically important rare earth resources and key security prerogatives rests largely with Washington. This separation between legal form and strategic substance reflects a new model of alliance management — one focused less on symbolism and more on redistributing security burdens and control.
It would be a mistake to interpret this shift as merely a reflection of Trump’s personality. The so-called “Trump phenomenon” is better understood as a result, not a cause. Within the United States, the traditional logic of security provision justified by global leadership has lost much of its domestic appeal. Growing political pressure to reassess the costs and benefits of alliances has prompted the U.S. to adopt a more explicitly transactional approach. In this context, Trump’s strategy is not impulsive but calculated.
Europe, moreover, is not a passive victim of this recalibration. For decades, major European states relied heavily on U.S. security guarantees while deepening economic ties with America’s strategic competitors. Germany pressed ahead with Nord Stream 2 despite repeated U.S. warnings, increasing its dependence on Russian energy and its geopolitical vulnerability. France and other Western European countries, drawn by access to the Chinese market, often hesitated to take firm positions on technology security and human rights when commercial interests were at stake.
From Washington’s perspective, this created an imbalance that could no longer be sustained: American taxpayers underwriting European security while European economies contributed to the strength of rival powers. The resulting frustration paved the way for Trump-style transactional diplomacy, with the Greenland framework serving as a concrete example of that logic in action.
The broader strategic direction of the United States is now becoming clearer. As long-term competition with China defines American grand strategy, alliances are being redefined less as value-based communities and more as instruments of national power. Contributions must be tangible. Burdens must be shared in measurable ways. Rhetorical alignment alone is no longer sufficient.
For Korea, this evolution carries serious implications. If Denmark — a core NATO member with no active battlefield on its territory — has accepted a significant transfer of practical control in the name of alliance realignment, it would be unrealistic to assume that Korea will be treated as an exception. A country living under the reality of an armistice, not peace, will inevitably face even more searching demands.
Future U.S. expectations toward Korea are likely to extend well beyond traditional defense cost-sharing. Strategic industries such as semiconductors, batteries, shipbuilding and advanced technologies will increasingly be viewed as components of alliance contributions. In this environment, assurances that the U.S.–ROK alliance is “strong” or “ironclad” are no longer sufficient by themselves.
What is required instead is strategic clarity. Korea must soberly reassess what it can offer, what it must protect, and where its red lines lie. Alliances today are sustained not by sentiment, but by relevance. The critical question is not whether the United States will ask more of its allies, but whether Korea will be prepared when it does.
The choice is not between loyalty and autonomy. It is between preparation and surprise.
Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
4. Peace through pragmatism, not illusion
Summary:
The editorial argues that President Lee Jae Myung’s New Year message is realism, not defeatism, because the peninsula now lives with chronic instability and a growing north Korea nuclear arsenal. It criticizes the long U.S. insistence on complete denuclearization as a precondition for talks, claiming that stance has not stopped Pyongyang’s advances. It endorses Lee’s phased plan: freeze further nuclear development, pursue arms reduction, then aim for denuclearization, with priority on limiting material production, ICBMs, and proliferation. It urges Washington to reengage, noting POTUS’s past willingness to talk, and says Moon-era dialogue reduced war risk even if it fell short.
Comment: Perhaps the illusion is with the idea that Kim would negotiate in good faith. POTROK as "pacemaker" and POTUS as "peacemaker."
- Opinion
- Editorial
ED Peace through pragmatism, not illusion
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- Published Jan 21, 2026 5:49 pm KST
US must reengage N. Korea to promote ties and peace
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20260121/ed-peace-through-pragmatism-not-illusion
President Lee Jae Myung answers questions from reporters during his New Year’s press conference at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul, Jan. 21. Korea Times photo by Kim Do-hoon.
President Lee Jae Myung’s New Year's press conference offered a stark but necessary diagnosis of the Korean Peninsula’s condition. His remark that “it would be fortunate just to avoid war, let alone unification” was not an exercise in pessimism, but a sober acknowledgment of reality. Decades of stalled diplomacy, hardened mistrust and unchecked nuclear development in North Korea have left the peninsula in a state of chronic instability. Lee’s call for pragmatic peace and coexistence deserves serious consideration, both at home and abroad.
At the heart of Lee’s message was a refusal to cling to ideals divorced from reality. On denuclearization, he posed an uncomfortable but unavoidable question: Will North Korea truly give up its nuclear weapons under current conditions? The international community’s insistence on complete denuclearization as a precondition for engagement has not halted Pyongyang’s nuclear advances. On the contrary, North Korea today possesses more nuclear material, more sophisticated missiles and greater leverage than ever before. Ignoring this reality in the name of principle has only deepened the crisis.
Lee’s proposed three-stage approach — first freezing further nuclear development, then pursuing arms reduction and ultimately aiming for denuclearization — seeks to reconcile ideals with practical risk management. This is not an abandonment of the denuclearization goal, but a recognition that progress requires sequencing. Preventing the additional production of nuclear material, halting intercontinental ballistic missile development and blocking proliferation would significantly reduce global risk. In diplomacy, reducing danger is often a necessary precondition for achieving transformation.
The United States has a central role to play in this process. Without sustained U.S.-North Korea dialogue, no meaningful progress is possible. Lee’s emphasis on U.S. President Donald Trump’s “unconventional” leadership style reflects a pragmatic assessment rather than political preference. Trump remains one of the few U.S. leaders to have demonstrated both willingness and ability to engage directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. However unpredictable, that channel matters. Washington must decide whether it prefers managing an expanding nuclear threat or testing the possibilities of phased agreements that constrain it.
Equally important is a lesson from recent history. During the Moon Jae-in administration, inter-Korean diplomacy reached levels once thought unimaginable. North and South Korean leaders met repeatedly, military tensions eased and a visit by Kim Jong-un to Seoul, while ultimately unrealized, was actively discussed. The significance of that moment lies not in what failed to materialize, but in what briefly became possible. During that period of dialogue, the specter of war receded and crisis management replaced crisis escalation. The experience demonstrated that engagement, even when incomplete, can meaningfully reduce risk.
The collapse of dialogue since then has produced the opposite result. Mutual suspicion has hardened into hostility. Incidents such as drone incursions and North Korea’s construction of layered border fortifications underscore how badly trust has eroded. Lee’s observation that distrust has reached an extreme is difficult to dispute. However, this very deterioration makes renewed engagement more urgent, not less. Deterrence alone, however robust, cannot substitute for communication. Peace is not achieved by goodwill alone, nor is it sustained by force alone.
Critically, Lee has been clear that advocating for dialogue is not “taking North Korea’s side.” It is an exercise in strategic empathy and understanding the adversary’s calculations in order to influence them. If North Korea cannot be eliminated, the only rational course is to shape its behavior in ways that reduce harm and open pathways toward eventual change. Recognizing reality is not weakness — it is the foundation of effective statecraft.
The responsibility for peace on the Korean Peninsula does not rest with Seoul alone. The United States must move beyond a binary choice between pressure and paralysis, while North Korea must recognize that permanent nuclear expansion will only deepen its isolation and insecurity. South Korea, for its part, must act as a facilitator, strengthening its defense while persistently reopening channels for dialogue.
Choosing managed peace over managed crisis is not an act of surrender. It is a deliberate, disciplined effort to prevent the worst outcomes while keeping the door open to better ones. The alternative — endless escalation without engagement — has already shown us where it leads.
5. How spies from both North and South Korea targeted a human rights advocate
Summary:
Roberta Cohen, long-time advocate on north Korea human rights, describes being pressured from both sides. In 2009, South Korean officials, whom she believed included NIS officers, courted her with lunches, gifts, and requests to write paid op-eds critical of Pyongyang, seeking influence and access to her network; she refused and alerted U.S. authorities. Separately, she faced north Korean cyber operations that evolved from crude disruptions to sophisticated spearphishing using fake invitations from credible institutions and even hijacked email threads. Cohen’s lesson is disciplined verification, strong operational security, and guarding independence, while still pushing information that undermines the regime’s closed system.
Comment: Spies can target your friends and colleagues. There is probably no 6 degrees of separation in the espionage world. If Roberta was targeted we can be sure many others are being targeted as well. Many of us have seen the emails that were supposedly from ROberta but were phishing attempts against us. But I would be cautious about the "whataboutism" comparison between north and South.
How spies from both North and South Korea targeted a human rights advocate
In an interview, Roberta Cohen recounts encounters with ROK agents and DPRK hackers, and shares lessons for activists
Shreyas Reddy January 23, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/how-spies-from-both-north-and-south-korea-targeted-a-human-rights-advocate/
North Koreans using computers | Image: KCTV (Jan. 9, 2020)
On one side, South Korean spies offer payment for articles critical of the North Korean regime. On the other, North Korean cybercriminals try to steal information and disrupt computers.
These are some of the challenges Roberta Cohen, former chairperson of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, says she repeatedly faced in her brushes with the two Koreas’ very different approaches to espionage during her long career of human rights advocacy.
Since her days in the State Department during the Jimmy Carter administration, Roberta Cohen has been a leading voice calling for action on North Korea’s human rights abuses.
But as she outlined in a recent blog post for Spy Talk about her encounters with spies from both allied and enemy states, not all attention is good.
In an interview with NK News, Cohen recollected Seoul’s past efforts to recruit her to write anti-DPRK commentaries, Pyongyang’s attempts to hack her and others in the “human rights racket,” and the lessons for human rights advocates who come under pressure from both Koreas.
Roberta Cohen speaking at NYU Law School about international human rights in 2014 | Image: Roberta Cohen, edited by NK News
COURTED BY SOUTH KOREAN SPIES
“What motivates you to write these articles?”
This was the question that a young man at the South Korean Embassy in Washington posed to Cohen in 2009 about her op-eds in the New York Times and Washington Post, which called for stronger responses to North Korea’s human rights abuses.
At the time, conservative President Lee Myung-bak was ramping up a more hardline approach to North Korea after his progressive predecessors’ pro-engagement Sunshine Policy, with particular focus on spotlighting Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation and human rights situation.
Cohen explained that she grew interested in the subject through her prior work as a human rights advocate at the State Department and private organizations, and felt too little attention was being paid to the plight of North Koreans.
That answer interested the South Korean official’s superiors, and soon a more senior officer — whom Cohen later concluded was from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) — entered the picture.
Invitations to lunch followed, then briefings for visiting officials in dimly lit restaurants. Despite the lack of lighting, Cohen said she could easily identify the intelligence officers: They were the ones who said nothing and offered no business cards.
A CIA friend later explained to Cohen that the South Koreans were sizing her up as a potential “agent of influence.”
“Initially I thought they were looking for information from me,” she told NK News. “They were not.”
What they wanted was access to her network — and her pen.
After the NIS officer practically ordered her to write additional op-eds, Cohen pushed back that she was “an independent scholar.”
Undeterred, the South Korean spy kept showing up at public events to ask when she would write her next article, creating the impression he had some role in her work.
Eventually, at a private Washington club, the officer handed her news clippings and pressed her more directly to write pieces highlighting U.N. criticism of Pyongyang in exchange for payment, but Cohen turned him down.
“I felt a strong opposition having to do with controlling my thoughts or controlling me to the point that I’d act on his government’s behalf rather than my own as an independent scholar,” Cohen remembers.
As she left, the agent produced a bottle of French wine worth over a hundred dollars as a “holiday gift.”
Cohen’s husband, a retired diplomat, was blunt on the drive home: “The cost of that wine told me something. You must get out of this.”
Cohen contacted the State Department, who alerted the FBI. The officer didn’t bother her again.
But Seoul wasn’t finished. In 2011, another South Korean “diplomat” began offering Cohen rides to events.
She thought they were being friendly, until one morning he revealed he’d been disinvited from a meeting, but insisted on picking her up afterward anyway.
“Finally, my alarm bell went off,” Cohen wrote in her blog post. “They expected me to debrief them on what had transpired inside.”
When they arrived at her home, the officer jumped out and gave her a hug, which Cohen said was “quite out of line.” She wondered if the driver had snapped a compromising photo.
“Wining and dining, driving me places, giving me gifts — these are all possible warning signs,” Cohen reflected. “Intelligence groups have a job and a purpose. They’re not your friends.”
The North Korean human rights issue dropped down Seoul’s list of priorities under subsequent administrations, particularly during an era of renewed inter-Korean diplomacy under progressive President Moon Jae-in in 2018-19.
By the time a new conservative South Korean government came to power in 2022 and sought to put the spotlight back on North Korea’s abject human rights record, the NIS’ relationship with human rights advocates appeared to have improved.
This time, Seoul’s agents “seemed to understand not to make any untoward requests,” according to Cohen.
The expert accepted speaking engagements for modest honoraria, “a far healthier arrangement” that she said is “more in line with how allied governments should be behaving.”
However, other accounts suggest South Korean intelligence didn’t completely move away from its previous tactics with DPRK experts.
In 2024, U.S. federal prosecutors charged Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst and White House official, with allegedly working for the NIS for over a decade in exchange for luxury goods, expensive dinners and government funding. Terry has denied the allegations.
Roberta Cohen with former North Korean political prisoner and author Kang Chol-hwan | Image: Roberta Cohen, edited by NK News
IN PYONGYANG’S CYBER CROSSHAIRS
Pyongyang was also reading Cohen’s articles.
To the regime, she was part of the “human rights racket.” Their response was cyber warfare.
One morning in the early 2010s, Cohen opened her computer to find the screen bright red with a white skull and crossbones. When a technician came to investigate, they said her line was connected to someone else’s, but provided no other details.
Other times her keyboard got stuck when writing about North Korea, Cohen told NK News. Once her words appeared on the screen in Russian. On other occasions, she said she heard strange sounds on her landline — whirring, random voices and the echo of her own speech being recorded.
These early attacks were crude and used “primitive” English that could be spotted a mile away, according to Cohen.
However, by 2020, the cybercrime groups operating under the North Korean military’s Reconnaissance General Bureau had dramatically upgraded their capabilities.
Flattering invitations began arriving, purportedly from Western officials and academics, praising Cohen as “a leading authority” whose expertise they would “greatly value.”
In 2023, she received an invitation to a conference at a leading Washington think tank. After selecting a panel, the organizer wrote back that planners had decided to “exclude” her.
“No English speaker would write that to somebody,” Cohen told NK News.
She reached out to someone she knew at the organization, who confirmed there was no such meeting.
As it turned out, she had been corresponding with North Korean intelligence. By clicking the agenda link, she had likely compromised her computer.
More bogus invitations followed from reputed Princeton professors, Reuters and Voice of America journalists, the South Korean Embassy in Washington and the Netherlands Embassy in Seoul.
“They learned how to draw you in,” Cohen says. “It’s much more sophisticated now. They’re also looking for information.”
Most disturbing was the interception of legitimate correspondence. Operatives would infiltrate ongoing email exchanges, making tiny alterations to sender addresses, then continue conversations in new threads while asking questions that didn’t fit.
“You suddenly realize — wait a minute, whom am I writing to?” she said.
Having seen the evolution of North Korea’s cyber operations, Cohen said she now scrutinizes every North Korea-related email for signs of subtle alterations and confirms invitations independently.
For those entering the DPRK human rights field, she offered hard-won advice: verify everything, tell colleagues to authenticate messages from you and set aside money for new computers.
On the flip side, Cohen believes North Korea’s aggressive response confirms that human rights advocates’ work is making an impact.
“The tougher they get with the outside human rights world, the more threatened they feel,” she said. “You’re breaching the walls of their closed society.”
North Korean soldiers using laptops | Image: KCTV (Sept. 8, 2024)
LESSONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES
Cohen said her experiences show that human rights advocates must be wary of both friends and foes.
When she realizes she’s corresponding with North Korean operatives, Cohen said she sometimes deliberately provides information about prison camps and conditions, noting that defectors often cite access to forbidden information as a key factor behind their decision to flee.
“All the people being hacked should be flooding information into North Korea,” she argued. “We shouldn’t just be on the defensive.”
The risks from allied services are different but serious. Accepting foreign government direction — even from allies — can compromise independence, she warned.
“If funds are accepted … it can lead to self-censorship,” she said. “You never want to be in that position.”
But on the whole, the long-time human rights advocate is confident neither allied nor enemy spies will be able to sway the convictions of those seeking to shine a spotlight on Pyongyang’s human rights abuses.
“The human rights crowd is a pretty tough crowd,” she said. “They don’t run away.”
According to Cohen, what’s at stake is not just personal security but the ability of independent voices to speak truthfully about one of the world’s most repressive regimes.
“Human rights should be part of what South Korea or the United States does,” she said. “It can’t be set aside as if you took off a jacket. It should be who we all are.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
6. North Korea replaces “socialist fatherland” with Kim Jong Un’s name on classroom bulletin boards
Summary:
Daily NK reports that classroom bulletin boards for the Korean Children’s Union have shifted from a collectivist slogan about preparing for the “socialist fatherland” to slogans that name Kim Jong Un directly. A source in North Hamgyong says the classroom slogan changed in 2015 to “prepare for our Esteemed General Kim Jong Un,” then in 2018 to “prepare for our Esteemed Father, Marshal Kim Jong Un,” signaling a tightening personality cult aimed at the next generation. Officially, the older slogan still appears in national rally messaging, creating a dual practice: public continuity and classroom indoctrination. The article argues this targets market exposed youth, filling a perceived ideological vacuum and binding loyalty to the leader.
Commentary. No one is too young to experience indoctrination. The regime is a mafia like crime family CULT. But you cannot eat ideology.
North Korea replaces “socialist fatherland” with Kim Jong Un’s name on classroom bulletin boards
The bulletin board changes reflect Kim's strategy to reorganize the children's union as a support base and prevent the market-savvy generation from losing emotional ties with the regime
By Eun Seol - January 23, 2026
dailynk.com
A classroom in North Korea (Stefan Krasowski, Flickr, Creative Commons)
The slogan of the Korean Children’s Union displayed for decades on classroom bulletin boards at North Korean elementary and middle schools has been replaced with a slogan that directly mentions supreme leader Kim Jong Un’s name.
The traditional slogan that emphasized the Korean “fatherland” and the ideology of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il was updated on two occasions (in 2015 and 2018) with phrases that put the spotlight on Kim Jong Un, who is often described as the Marshal. These pedagogical changes coincide with indications that a cult of personality is forming around the North Korean leader.
A source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK that the bulletin board used to display the children’s union slogan: “Let’s always prepare for the socialist fatherland!”
That was replaced with the slogan “Let’s always prepare for our Esteemed General Kim Jong Un” in 2015 and then again with the slogan “Let’s always prepare for our Esteemed Father, Marshal Kim Jong Un” in 2018.
Curiously, the original slogan is still used for the national rally of the children’s union. In a letter sent to the ninth rally in 2022, Kim called on the children present to “raise high the slogan ‘Let’s always prepare for the socialist fatherland!'”
In effect, a dual practice has developed in which the official slogan for the general public has not been changed, even as a different slogan is displayed in classrooms.
Political move to capture next generation
The regime’s tinkering with bulletin board messages seems to be not a mere slogan update, but a political move.
Since Kim Jong Un took over the country, he has made “educating the next generation” a primary goal of his government. While the children’s union only held one national rally under previous leader Kim Jong Il, it has held three during the 15 years of Kim’s rule.
That points to Kim’s intention of reorganizing the children’s union—which represents the upcoming generation—as a key base of support for the regime.
These changes also coincide with a transformation of the fabric of North Korean society.
Since the economic crisis of the 1990s, North Koreans’ mindset has become less collectivistic and more individualistic, and the state’s ability to mobilize the public has weakened as a consequence.
It is no longer possible to galvanize North Koreans with such collectivist slogans as “one for all and all for one.” The greatest concern for the regime is that this may create an ideological vacuum in the future generation.
North Korea has identified the classroom as the place where that vacuum can be filled. Every day, students’ eyes fall on the bulletin board, which serves as a visual representation of norms.
Placing a slogan that mentions Kim Jong Un by name appears to be a systemic intervention designed to naturally insert a leader-oriented political standard into students’ lives.
Students at North Korea’s elementary and middle schools are part of a generation familiar with the market economy and foreign media content. They have ambiguous feelings about socialism and do not share the collective trauma of the Arduous March (a euphemism for the severe famine that struck North Korea in the mid-1990s).
What North Korea is most anxious about is the possibility of this generation losing its emotional ties with the regime. It is precisely to prevent such a rupture that the bulletin board at the back of the classroom is being so overtly used as a means of control.
The classroom has transformed from a place for mere education into a battleground for control of the future generation that is being zealously managed by the regime.
The slogan hanging on the bulletin board becomes a natural part of students’ daily routines. The significance of “the socialist fatherland” being replaced with “Marshal Kim Jong Un” is quite clear. It means that the strategy of unifying the regime around the leader is permeating the routine spaces of the youngest members of the population.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
7. North Korea’s snow-covered military runways reveal air force weaknesses
Summary:
Daily NK reviews Sentinel-2 satellite imagery from late 2025 through early 2026 and finds that 12 of north Korea’s 21 military airports and airfields, about 57 percent, left runways covered in heavy snow after winter storms. The article argues this is not simple negligence. It reflects fuel scarcity, shortages of snow-clearing equipment, and a rational decision that limited flight operations do not justify the manpower and resources needed for constant runway upkeep. In several locations, civilian or mixed-use runways were cleared while adjacent military runways remained buried. A source adds that schoolchildren are often mobilized for seasonal maintenance, underscoring labor shortfalls and degraded readiness.
Comment: An indication of severe scarcity if they cannot maintain the airfields. The priority is to the military. If they cannot fully support military activities every other sector must be suffering worse. Omainge mobiliing school children to shovel snow from a military airfield?
North Korea’s snow-covered military runways reveal air force weaknesses
Satellite analysis shows 57% of military airfields left uncleared after winter storms, pointing to resource shortages and deprioritized maintenance
dailynk.com
The snowstorms that batter the Korean Peninsula each winter are more than just a seasonal occurrence—they can also expose the weaknesses of North Korea’s military infrastructure.
A detailed analysis of satellite images (with 10-meter resolution) captured by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-2A and Sentinel-2B satellites between late 2025 and early 2026 reveals that runways at 12 of North Korea’s 21 military airports and airfields (57.1%) remained blanketed in heavy snow.
This failure to clear military runways appears to reflect more than simple maintenance neglect. Rather, it points to the practical limitations of North Korea’s air power.
In other words, North Korea’s decision not to clear snow from military airport runways suggests that their maintenance is not a regime priority.
Limited resources make even routine tasks challenging, let alone acquiring fuel and heavy equipment. Consequently, basic snow-clearing equipment has apparently been deprioritized.
This stands in stark contrast to South Korean airports, which are equipped with advanced runway heating systems and automated snow-clearing technology to ensure year-round operations.
After heavy snowfall during frigid winter weather, runways at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang and Hyesan Airfield in Ryanggang province are buried under snow, making them nearly indistinguishable from surrounding snowfields. (Sentinel-2A/2B)
Satellite images show runways at Sunan International Airport and Hyesan Airfield in Ryanggang province buried under snow following winter storms. The runways are difficult to distinguish, their outlines nearly obscured by accumulated snow. These images, taken after heavy snowfall during a cold snap, suggest that the equipment needed to clear military runways was not readily available.
At Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang, the runway at the civilian airport in the southern section had been largely cleared after the heavy snow, but the four-kilometer runway at the military airport in the northern section remained snow-covered. At the airfield in Hyesan, Ryanggang province, a 1.3-kilometer runway was so deeply buried that it was nearly invisible.
In short, these satellite images indicate that runways at North Korean military airports are not being cleared of snow, unlike runways at international airports designated for civilian use.
This should be understood as more than maintenance negligence. Rather, it appears to reflect the North Korean Air Force’s pragmatic assessment that investing resources and manpower in runway maintenance makes little sense given the fuel shortage that limits flight operations and training.
Heavy snow also fell on Uiju Airfield and Panghyon Airport in North Pyongan province on New Year’s Day. Once again, the runways at these airfields had not been cleared and were barely visible in satellite images. (Sentinel-2A/2B)
After snow fell on Kusong, a city in North Pyongan province, the runway at Panghyon Airport—the presumed operational hub for that air force facility—was clearly neglected, with no apparent attempt to address the winter storm’s impact.
Following heavy precipitation, the runway remained under so much snow that its boundaries were unclear in the imagery. Such conditions would presumably severely hamper the ability of combat aircraft to take off or land.
After a snowstorm, a 2.5-kilometer stretch of the civilian-military joint-use runway at Uiju Airfield remained snow-covered. Images captured by the Sentinel-2A satellite on the first day of 2026 show the entire runway blanketed in snow.
A snow-covered runway is an unfamiliar sight for South Koreans, who expect runways to be cleared immediately to ensure continuous aircraft operations.
But North Korean military airports are understaffed and lack adequate snow-clearing equipment. Additionally, fighter jets rarely fly. These are the likely reasons runway snow-clearing is not considered a priority.
After snowstorms hit Sohung Airport in North Hwanghae province and Unchon Airport in South Hwanghae province, surrounding fields were transformed into a winter landscape. The runways at both airports also remained covered in snow. (Sentinel-2B)
In satellite images of Sohung Airport in North Hwanghae province and Unchon Airport in South Hwanghae province taken last December, the runways at both airports appear white with snow after heavy precipitation. The runways (measuring 850 and 800 meters respectively) are barely visible in the images. Fighter jets would presumably have great difficulty taking off or landing in such harsh winter conditions.
Assessing North Korea’s snow-covered military runways
Our review of imagery from the Sentinel satellite series found that runways at 12 of 21 military airports and airfields in North Korea—57.1%—had not been cleared of snow after severe winter storms struck the country, leaving layers of ice and snow.
Rather than simply representing worker negligence in snow-clearing duties, this appears to indicate a fundamental problem: even routine maintenance is not being properly performed at military airports.
According to a source inside North Korea, airport maintenance and repairs are performed not by regular soldiers but by schoolchildren, who are regularly mobilized for mandatory weeding and snow-clearing duties depending on the season. This reliance on non-military workers exemplifies North Korea’s shortage of trained personnel and the limitations of its maintenance capabilities.
In summary, the lack of timely snow-clearing at North Korea’s military airports illustrates not only the deprioritization of runway maintenance and shortages of resources like fuel and snow-clearing equipment, but also a widespread labor shortage that necessitates mobilizing schoolchildren.
dailynk.com
8. 3 civilian suspects banned from leaving nation over alleged drone flights to N. Korea
Summary:
South Korean police and military investigators imposed travel bans on three civilian suspects accused of sending drones toward north Korea. The suspects include a graduate student, Oh, who said he flew the drones, Jang, alleged to have built them, and a third person tied to a drone manufacturing company they set up. The probe began after north Korea claimed drone incursions in September and on January 4, while South Korea’s military denied involvement and said it does not use the drone models cited. Investigators suspect a launch from Ganghwa County, with the drone reportedly photographing a South Korean Marine Corps base en route. Potential charges include aviation and military base protection violations.
World News Jan. 23, 2026 / 3:41 AM
3 civilian suspects banned from leaving nation over alleged drone flights to N. Korea
By Chae Yun-hwan, Yonhap News Agency
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/23/drone-flights-North-Korea-three-civilians-travel-bans-police-military-investigators/2121769157184/
Investigators transport seized objects from the office of suspects accused of flying drones into North Korea at a university in Seoul on Wednesday. Photo by Yonhap
A joint team of police and military investigators has imposed travel bans on three civilian suspects accused of involvement in alleged drone flights to North Korea, sources said Friday.
The suspects include a graduate student in his 30s, surnamed Oh, who claimed to have flown the drones, an individual, surnamed Jang, suspected of building them, and a third person known to have worked at a drone manufacturing company set up by the other two, according to the sources.
The joint investigation was launched last week after North Korea claimed South Korea infringed on its sovereignty with drone incursions in September and on Jan. 4. South Korea's military has denied involvement, saying it does not operate the drone models in question.
The suspects are accused of flying a drone bound for North Korea from Ganghwa County, just west of Seoul. The aircraft reportedly took pictures of a South Korean Marine Corps base as it flew across the inter-Korean border.
Related
Investigators seek to press charges against the suspects for violating the Aviation Safety Act and the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act.
The joint team has stepped up investigative efforts after Oh claimed to have sent the drones to North Korea on the dates alleged by Pyongyang in a media interview aired last Friday
Investigators have widened the probe following revelations that Oh and Jang worked at the presidential office under former President Yoon Suk Yeol, as well as allegations that Oh operated online news outlets suspected of being linked to a military intelligence official.
The Defense Intelligence Command later confirmed the link between them, in a briefing to ruling party Rep. Boo Seung-chan, saying the online news outlets were used to issue fake identification cards to help agents conduct intelligence activities.
The command, however, said it has yet to be verified whether military intelligence officials were involved in the alleged drone flights, according to Boo's office.
Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.
9. Korea battery makers chase solid-state and sodium-ion tech
Summary:
South Korea’s leading battery firms are accelerating work on solid-state and sodium-ion batteries as EV demand cools and cost pressure increases. LG Energy Solution is pushing sodium-ion most visibly, building a pilot line at its Nanjing plant in China and aiming to produce samples within the year to test mass-production feasibility. Sodium-ion offers cheaper, more abundant raw materials than lithium, though with lower energy density, making it attractive for energy storage and some mass-market EVs. Samsung SDI is also developing sodium-ion while targeting all-solid-state mass production in 2027. SK On is prioritizing solid-state, aiming for commercialization around 2029, with sodium-ion still earlier-stage.
World News Jan. 22, 2026 / 10:40 PM / Updated Jan. 22, 2026 at 10:40 PM
Korea battery makers chase solid-state and sodium-ion tech
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/22/battery-makers-chase-sodium-ion-teech/6311769139163/
1 of 2 | Choi Joo-seon, chief of Samsung SDI Co., South Korea's second-biggest battery maker, speaks to reporters before he attends InterBattery 2025, the country's premier battery industry exhibition, at the COEX exhibition center in Seoul, South Korea, 05 March 2025. File. Photo by YONHAP / EPA
Jan. 22 (Asia Today) -- As electric vehicle demand cools and cost pressure rises, South Korea's top battery makers are accelerating work on solid-state and sodium-ion batteries as next-generation bets, industry sources said Thursday.
LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI and SK On are focusing on improving performance, lifespan and manufacturing stability, with commercialization goals generally aimed at the late 2020s.
LG Energy Solution is moving most visibly on sodium-ion batteries. The company is building a pilot production line at its Nanjing plant in China and plans to begin producing samples within the year as it evaluates mass-production feasibility, reports said.
Sodium-ion batteries use sodium rather than lithium, an advantage for raw-material availability and price stability. While their energy density is typically lower than lithium-ion cells, they are widely viewed as more suitable for uses where cost and supply chain resilience matter, including energy storage systems and some mass-market electric vehicles.
Related
Samsung SDI is also developing sodium-ion technology, though it has not publicly detailed a production timeline. SK On is concentrating more heavily on solid-state batteries, with sodium-ion work still described as earlier-stage research.
Solid-state batteries are often described as a potential game-changer because replacing liquid electrolytes with solid materials can improve safety and increase energy density. Challenges include manufacturing complexity and cost, making near-term mass production difficult. Samsung SDI has said it is targeting mass production of all-solid-state batteries in 2027. SK On has said it is accelerating its solid-state timeline and targeting commercialization in 2029.
The two technologies are increasingly seen as both competing and complementary. Sodium-ion batteries are positioned for cost-sensitive segments, while solid-state batteries are aimed at premium electric vehicles that prioritize high performance and safety.
Chinese companies are widely viewed as leading the push to commercialize sodium-ion batteries. CATL has introduced "Naxtra," a sodium-ion battery brand it said would enter mass production in December 2025. CATL separately announced an upgraded Shenxing fast-charging battery it said can deliver 520 kilometers of range with a five-minute charge.
Industry officials say South Korean firms are not necessarily behind in technical maturity but face pressure on speed and cost competitiveness as China scales up through rapid market application.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
10. Book review: The untold story of Kim Jong Un’s Japan-born mother
Summary:
The review assesses Japanese journalist Gomi Yoji’s book on Ko Yong Hui, Kim Jong Un’s Japan-born mother, tracing her family from Jeju to Osaka, then to north Korea via the zainichi repatriation program. Raised in Japan until age 10, Ko arrived in Chongjin in 1962, later trained in dance, joined the Mansudae Art Troupe, and attracted Kim Jong Il in the 1970s. Despite regime suspicion toward returnees from Japan, her status boosted her family and she bore Kim Jong Chol, Kim Jong Un, and Kim Yo Jong. Ko died of breast cancer in Paris in 2004. The book highlights how her Japanese roots complicate regime bloodline mythology and propaganda about the “Paektu” lineage.
Comment: How can we exploit the fact that KJU's mother was born in Japan?
Book review: The untold story of Kim Jong Un’s Japan-born mother
A Japanese book explores how Ko Yong Hui went from living in Osaka to becoming the mistress of North Korea’s leader
Stephen Mercado January 23, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/book-review-the-untold-story-of-kim-jong-uns-japan-born-mother/
A close-up of the cover for “Ko Yong Hui: The Korean Resident of Japan Who Became the ‘Mother of Kim Jong Un’” | Image: Bungeishunju, edited by NK News
Those who have followed North Korea’s 77-year history are likely to know of its founder Kim Il Sung, his successor Kim Jong Il and his heir Kim Jong Un. But relatively few are familiar with the mother of the current leader, including the vast majority of DPRK citizens.
“Ko Yong Hui: The Korean Resident of Japan Who Became the ‘Mother of Kim Jong Un’” (高容姫 「金正恩の母」になった在日コリアン), written by former Japanese news reporter Gomi Yoji, chronicles the life of Ko Yong Hui, who caught the attention of Kim Jong Il in the 1970s despite having roots in Japan, a hostile nation in the eyes of Pyongyang.
Gomi previously reported for the Japanese newspaper Tokyo Shimbun and is the author of several books on key North Korean figures, most notably Kim Jong Nam, the older half-brother of Jong Un who was assassinated in 2017.
His latest book published in June is the result of dogged research that takes him from the streets of Koreatown in Osaka, Japan, to the outskirts of Paris. He discovers Ko’s half-brother and a relative of her mother, estimating that Kim Jong Un has around 50 biological relatives in Japan.
The result is a work that shines a light on a difficult research subject, even as much remains unknown.
Image: Bungeishunju, edited by NK News
KOREANS IN JAPAN
The book starts off by introducing readers to Yong Hui’s father and Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Ko Kyong Thaek, who hailed from the southern island of Jeju.
As a subject of the Japanese Empire, Kyong Thaek left Korea in search of a better life in Osaka, as did many other Koreans. By the mid-1930s, three quarters of the island’s migrants had settled in Japan’s “second city.”
After working as a factory manager in Japan, and after political upheavals and personal misfortunes, Kyong Thaek would leave Japan for North Korea.
When American bombs began raining down on Osaka during World War II, Kyong Thaek returned to Jeju with his wife and children.
After Imperial Japan lost the war and its claim of the Korean Peninsula, Kyong Thaek left Jeju for Mokpo in South Jeolla Province with his extended family to escape punishment for their collaboration with the Japanese.
When North Korean military forces swept south at the start of the Korean War, Kyong Thaek was smuggled by boat back to Osaka; his wife and children later rejoined him there. He was repeatedly jailed in Japan for smuggling and faced deportation to one of the two Koreas.
Kyong Thaek chose North Korea as his destination.
Zainichi Koreans being processed before their so-called repatriation to North Korea, Oct. 15, 1959 | Image: Creative Commons, edited by NK News
AN IMMIGRANT STORY
Yong Hui was Kyong Thaek’s eldest daughter, born in Osaka and raised there until the age of 10.
A student of Kita Tsuruhashi Elementary School, she sailed from Niigata in 1962 with her family aboard the Soviet ship Krilyon for Chongjin, North Korea.
Yong Hui’s family was part of a large-scale repatriation program in which over 90,000 resident Koreans in Japan, or zainichi Koreans, migrated to North Korea from 1959 to 1984. Around 90% of them had family roots in Jeju and other parts of what would eventually become South Korea.
Yong Hui would graduate from the College of Dance and Music in Pyongyang and join the Mansudae Art Troupe, which was created in 1969 by Kim Jong Il, the director of the Propagation and Agitation Department under the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
Beautiful and talented, Yong Hui soon caught the eye of Kim Jong Il. At 20 years old, she received the title of Merited Actress in 1972 and was given a plum role when the troupe toured Japan the following year.
Koreans repatriated from capitalist Japan were generally viewed in the DPRK with suspicion; many were classified as members of the enemy class. However, Yong Hui’s family undoubtedly benefited from Kim Jong Il’s love for the actress.
Kyong Thaek, who worked at a chemical factory in distant North Hamgyong Province, was promoted to the post of advisory manager for a factory in Pyongyang. In 1977, he received the title of Labor Hero.
Yong Hui bore Kim Jong Il two sons, Kim Jong Chol and the future leader Jong Un, and daughter Kim Yo Jong. Kim Jong Il’s first son Kim Jong Nam, who was born to his previous wife Song Hye Rim, fell out of favor compared to Kim Jong Un.
Kim Il Sung never recognized his son’s relationship with Yong Hui, nor did he ever meet her children.
Ko Yong Hui holding a pistol in a documentary film | Image: Bungeishunju
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UNRESOLVED HERITAGE
Yong Hui, who was afflicted with breast cancer, would never live to see her son take the reins from her husband. She died while undergoing treatment at a Paris hospital in May 2004.
Her connection to Japan as a zainichi Korean haunts her son to this day.
A documentary distributed to cadres in 2011, the year of Kim Jong Il’s death, presented Yong Hui as the nation’s mother. However, perhaps due to high-level resistance, authorities never released the film to the general public.
Korean Central Television broadcast a biography of Kim Jong Un to introduce the new leader in Jan. 2012, with his mother making a brief appearance. How Yong Hui, a former resident of Japan, is presented to a people taught to respect the Kims’ revolutionary Korean bloodline remains an unresolved issue.
Some of the propaganda leaflets launched by balloon to North Korea have lampooned Pyongyang’s leader for being “not of the Paektu bloodline, but of the Mount Fuji bloodline.”
Paektu was purportedly the base for Kim Il Sung’s fight for Korea’s independence against Imperial Japan and the birthplace of Kim Jong Il. Mt. Fuji is Japan’s most famous, sacred mountain.
One has to wonder what Kim Jong Un thinks of his family history. Perhaps he was thinking of his roots when he told then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in that he would like to visit Mount Halla in Jeju, according to Moon’s memoir.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The story of Ko Yong Hui and her family includes photographs from the forged credentials used in her trips to Japan, as well as pictures of her final days in Paris.
But even after uncovering so much information, Gomi remains unsatisfied with his work. At the end of the book, he leaves his email address for anyone with information about Ko’s family.
Several of Gomi’s books on North Korea have been translated to Korean and have hit South Korean bookshelves. Let’s hope that his latest work joins them.
Edited by David Choi
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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