​Quotes of the Day:

"Socrates, more than any other classical figure, recognized that ignorance does not merely consist of lacking information, but in mistaking belief for knowledge. When this confusion becomes widespread, perception itself becomes governable. The manipulation of duality, good versus evil, ally versus enemy, righteous, versus corrupt, operates precisely within this vulnerability, shaping, not only what people think, but how they think."

– Joseph. Keel

"If it takes a lot of words to say what you have in mind, give it more thought." 

– Dennis Roth

"There's no way to rule innocent men. The only power any government has is the power to crack down on criminals. Well, when there aren't enough criminals, one makes them. One declares so many things to be a crime that it becomes impossible for men to live without breaking laws." 

– Ayn Rand

1. The West Stepped Back From the Brink. But Europe’s Distrust of America Lingers.

2. China Sees a Chance to Lure Jaded U.S. Allies

3. Opinion | Why Putin Was Rooting for a U.S. Invasion of Greenland

4. The Arctic Smokescreen: The most dangerous mistake about "Greenland is believing it is about Greenland.

5. China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

6. Artificial Intelligence and a Reconfiguration of Military Power

7. The Arctic is a Strategic Distraction

8. Theater Army Planning Questions for Joint All-Domain and Multi-Domain Operations

9. The School of Advanced Military Studies: Educated to Win

10. The End of Battlefield Secrets: Addressing the OSINT Gap in U.S. Special Operations

11. Politics, Ethics, and the Human Being in the Culture of Ukraine

12. Remarks by NATO Secretary General at World Economic Forum, Davos

13. TikTok Finalizes Deal to Keep Operating in the U.S.

14. The Closing of the Marine Corps Mind? Strategy, Credentialism, and the Pursuit of Intellectual Depth

1. The West Stepped Back From the Brink. But Europe’s Distrust of America Lingers.

​Summary:

Europe avoided an open breach with the United States after POTUS reversed course on using military force and punitive tariffs to seize Greenland. Yet leaders in Davos treated relief as a warning sign, not a reset. The episode, mediated by NATO’s secretary general, left a residue of distrust and a new appetite for “derisking” from U.S. leverage in software, payments, communications, intelligence, and even extended deterrence. Some European officials argue that unified pushback can work, but many now plan for further surprises. The alliance, they imply, still holds, but its predictability does not.

Excerpts:

The White House has described Trump’s Davos trip as a resounding success, and Trump ally Steve Bannon praised the president’s address as “the greatest speech since Pericles in Athens.”

Bannon wasn’t alone in reaching for references to ancient Greece. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney referenced Thucydides’s concept of raw power in international relations—“the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must”—a lawless world that many in Davos view as the essence of Trump’s doctrine.

...

Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, who is also attending Davos, didn’t hide his pessimism about the months ahead as the international order continues to fall apart. Relations between Europe and the U.S. won’t get any better, he cautioned.

“That rift will stay for a long period of time. Trump didn’t impose any new tariffs against Europeans, and they were happy, and he was happy because the market soared. But as a matter of fact this will happen again, but it will be deeper and more problematic, and everyone will have to take care of their own interests,” Vučić said in an interview Thursday. “Differences are deep.”

He noted that the conference in Davos, which assembled business and political elites, was notable by how fearful the participants were to speak out, a tinderbox. “This year, it was in a way the most hectic atmosphere, but at the same time people were very silent, not open at all, not discussing the real issues, trying to stay in the safe zone, not offend anyone,” he said. “Now, all of us, we look like zombies looking around and thinking what will happen tomorrow. Nobody feels secure in today’s world.”

Comment: I am sure the comments from some quarters will continue to say things like good, we have the Europeans right where we want them. But let's think about the bigger picture. In great power competition, does Europe’s derisking from America weaken deterrence against China and Russia, or strengthen it by reducing single point dependence? But what surprises lay ahead? And how will those surprises impact great power competition as well as our silk web of alliances around the world?

The West Stepped Back From the Brink. But Europe’s Distrust of America Lingers.

WSJ

Despite Trump’s U-turn on military force and tariffs to seize Greenland, America’s allies fear worse turbulence ahead

By Yaroslav Trofimov

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Jan. 22, 2026 9:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trump-greenland-us-europe-trust-0e11c7fa?mod=hp_lead_pos2

President Trump speaks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Thursday. Krisztian Bocsi/Bloomberg News

DAVOS, Switzerland—The West avoided an open rupture this week. But, instead of celebrating, European leaders are bracing for more serious shocks to the trans-Atlantic relationship in the months ahead.

“We are not yet out of the woods,” Latvia’s President Edgars Rinkēvičs said in an interview in Davos on Thursday, after President Trump U-turned on threats of military action and punitive tariffs to seize Greenland from Denmark. “Are we in an irreversible rift? No. But there is a clear and present danger. If we want to preserve the alliance, both sides need to be very, very careful.”

The crisis over Greenland, though defused through a compromise negotiated by North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General Mark Rutte, already has many European leaders worrying about long-term damage.

“We are in a much better place today than we were at the beginning of this week,” Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide said in an interview Thursday. “But of course, the very fact that we are relieved that a NATO country is not going to attack another NATO country tells us that we are somewhere where we never thought we would be. And that, in itself, will linger.”

Trump’s approach to Greenland has also prompted leaders in Europe and Canada to focus more on reducing their countries’ economic, technological and military dependence on the U.S., the kind of derisking previously reserved for China and Russia. Some European officials have started seriously worrying about the exposure of their economies to U.S. software, payment systems and communications platforms that could be switched off or disrupted in case of an escalating conflict.

“Trump drove Europeans for the first time to genuinely focus on alternatives to America and derisking,” said Philip Gordon, national-security adviser to former Vice President Kamala Harris and a scholar at the Brookings Institution. “We can’t just go back to where we were pre-Greenland threats.”

The Trump administration has repeatedly criticized its European allies since coming to power a year ago. Administration officials have painted European leaders as out of touch with their voters, while promoting far-right and nationalist opposition parties in Germany, France and other countries.

Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich last February focused on how the U.S. no longer shares values with Europe’s leaders. The U.S. National Security Strategy, signed by Trump in November, set “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations” as America’s policy priority, and Trump dedicated part of his Davos speech this week to blasting what he sees as Europe’s civilizational decline.

While Europeans had sought to appeal to Trump—in part because of concerns about the future of Ukraine—the key takeaway from the Greenland crisis for many European leaders is that playing hardball with the U.S. president can work.

French President Emmanuel Macron ANP/ZUMA Press

“The conclusion is that, when Europe reacts in a united way, using the tools at its disposal when it is under threat, it can force others to respect it,” French President Emmanuel Macron said Thursday.

Already last February, soon after Vance’s Munich speech, an abrupt cutoff in U.S. intelligence sharing with Ukraine jolted many European nations. For the first time, many of them started to weigh whether they should rely on American-made technology that could be weaponized to achieve political goals.

This month’s Greenland crisis, which involved several European nations sending a small number of troops to the island, significantly reinforced the conviction that continuing dependence on American technology and weapons could represent a security vulnerability for Europe. That conviction will remain even if Trump no longer questions Greenland’s status, some European officials say.

“We need to be prepared for scenarios that some might think are unthinkable,” Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans said in an interview. “There are fewer pressure points on us if you are able to do it yourself.”

Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans Remko De Waal/ANP/AFP/Getty Images

These efforts should include developing a European alternative to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, said Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker from Germany’s CDU ruling party. “A trans-Atlantic alliance cannot be built upon surprises. With Trump, we cannot calculate, and we cannot rely on the U.S. Full stop. And we must be aware that he will come up with other surprises.”

Such thinking among allies represents a problem for American leadership, said John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “This has not been a good week for American diplomacy,” he said. “We are seen as less than stable, and a leader doesn’t want to be seen in that fashion.”

WSJ Reporter Alexander Saeedy is on the ground in Davos, Switzerland, for the 2026 World Economic Forum. He explains the three big themes taking over this year’s summit. Photo: Avalon/Zuma Press

The White House has described Trump’s Davos trip as a resounding success, and Trump ally Steve Bannon praised the president’s address as “the greatest speech since Pericles in Athens.”

Bannon wasn’t alone in reaching for references to ancient Greece. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney referenced Thucydides’s concept of raw power in international relations—“the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must”—a lawless world that many in Davos view as the essence of Trump’s doctrine.

“This aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable—the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself. And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along. To accommodate. To avoid trouble. To hope that compliance will buy safety. It won’t,” Carney said in his speech that has become the talk of the town.

Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, who is also attending Davos, didn’t hide his pessimism about the months ahead as the international order continues to fall apart. Relations between Europe and the U.S. won’t get any better, he cautioned.

“That rift will stay for a long period of time. Trump didn’t impose any new tariffs against Europeans, and they were happy, and he was happy because the market soared. But as a matter of fact this will happen again, but it will be deeper and more problematic, and everyone will have to take care of their own interests,” Vučić said in an interview Thursday. “Differences are deep.”

He noted that the conference in Davos, which assembled business and political elites, was notable by how fearful the participants were to speak out, a tinderbox. “This year, it was in a way the most hectic atmosphere, but at the same time people were very silent, not open at all, not discussing the real issues, trying to stay in the safe zone, not offend anyone,” he said. “Now, all of us, we look like zombies looking around and thinking what will happen tomorrow. Nobody feels secure in today’s world.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the January 23, 2026, print edition as 'The West Stepped Back From the Brink. But Europe’s Distrust of America Lingers.'.

2. China Sees a Chance to Lure Jaded U.S. Allies

​Summary:

China is exploiting allied anxiety about POTUS and Greenland to sell itself as the steady trade partner. Canada’s Carney frames a “third path” in which middle powers hedge, diversify, and avoid swapping dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing. Beijing amplifies the “unilateralism” narrative, offers tariff relief and deals, and points to Belt and Road momentum and a huge surplus as proof of gravity. Yet Europe’s hard constraints remain Ukraine, technology risk, and coercion memories. The result is tactical opening, not strategic realignment, and a widening contest over who sets standards, not just tariffs.

Comment:  Can Beijing lure allies? Surely allies can see the effects of wolf diplomacy, debt trap diplomacy, and the results of One Belt and Road in many countries, Surely they can see China's "Allfare," Unrestricted warfare, and three warfares. Or does this make Canadian PM Carney's middle road for the middle powers more practical?

China Sees a Chance to Lure Jaded U.S. Allies

WSJ

Beijing has seized upon the disarray within the trans-Atlantic alliance

By Austin Ramzy

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Jan. 22, 2026 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china-sees-a-chance-to-lure-jaded-u-s-allies-3bc6ac6b

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing last week. Sean Kilpatrick/Press Pool

HONG KONG—China has seized upon the disarray left by President Trump within the trans-Atlantic alliance, denouncing his push to acquire Greenland and trying to entice U.S. allies with the promise of reliable trade partnerships.

But as some of Washington’s traditional allies tiptoe closer to Beijing, they appear clear-eyed about the danger of leaving the U.S. embrace only to end up in the hands of another superpower.

“In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice—compete with each other for favor, or to combine to create a third path with impact,” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney declared in a speech Tuesday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Canada, which Trump has said he would like to annex as the “51st state,” has had to “fundamentally shift our strategic posture,” said Carney.

Carney, who came away from meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing last week with a diplomatic thaw and a trade deal, said Canada, as a “middle power,” plans to be “principled and pragmatic” in its partnerships.

“What we can see in the middle powers is hedging,” said Maria Adele Carrai, an associate professor at the University of Oxford. “This is a moment of uncertainty and they are trying to diversify. They’re not aligning with China, not at all, but opening new dialogues, new alliances, new regional partnerships. Investment and trade are diversified from where it was before.”

As Trump makes aggressive use of tariffs and at one point threatened force to prize Greenland from longstanding ally Denmark, Beijing is trying to seize the moment.

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Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng delivered a speech at Davos this week denouncing “rising unilateralism and protectionism” while portraying China as a benefit to the world.

“China is a trading partner, not a rival, for other countries,” he said. “China’s development presents an opportunity, not a threat, to the world economy.”

That message has been a consistent refrain from Chinese leaders.

“Beijing sees the fractures in the trans-Atlantic relationship as an opening,” said Olivia Cheung, a China scholar at King’s College London.

China hopes to improve its relationships with key trading partners for tangible gains, such as reducing tariffs on electrical vehicles, she said, but “it is only a cautious optimism.”

The improvements have largely been marked by an easing of trade barriers, such as the new framework between China and Canada that includes slashing tariffs on Chinese EVs and Canadian canola oil.

Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer heads to Beijing later this month, shortly after the approval of a large new Chinese Embassy in London smoothed a point of friction between the two countries. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is expected to travel to China next month. French President Emmanuel Macron visited in early December.

Canada's Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Heath MacDonald with China's Customs Minister Sun Meijun, in Beijing last week. Carlos Osorio/Reuters

French President Emmanuel Macron at Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, in December. Sarah Meyssonnier/Reuters

Fundamental differences also remain between U.S. allies and China over issues including Beijing’s support for Russia’s Vladimir Putin following his invasion of Ukraine.

The European Commission introduced plans this week to phase out telecommunications hardware in critical European networks from “high-risk” suppliers, a move seen as targeting Chinese telecom companies including Huawei and ZTE.

Beijing has criticized those plans, saying Chinese telecommunications equipment has never endangered security and that its exclusion would cause economic harm to both sides.

China has denounced Trump’s designs on Greenland and the U.S. mission to seize Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro as evidence of an American imperialistic streak that is no longer concealed by talk of a rules-based order.

The U.S. is now a “purely extractive superpower,” Xinhua, the Chinese state-news agency, said in a commentary on Tuesday.

“The world map is no longer a political chart of alliances and sovereignties, but a crude inventory of assets,” it said. “A country’s status—ally, rival or neutral—is irrelevant beside the fundamental question of its utility.”

That message has found willing audiences in developing nations long wary of American military power, where China has seen substantial growth in trade and influence in recent decades.

China saw a record $1.19 trillion trade surplus last year, a figure that reflects its central importance to the global economy and the risk of backlash it faces as it unloads cheap goods on the world.

Projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure, energy and mining investment program, hit a record level of engagement in 2025, according to research by Christoph Nedopil, a professor at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia.

The study found significant increases in Chinese investment in Central Asia and construction deals in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America.

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But even as China’s ties with much of the world deepen, its ability to ease relations with Europe is relatively limited, said Zhu Feng, a professor of international studies at Nanjing University.

Beijing doesn’t expect the U.S. and its European allies to undergo a permanent split, he said. Trump’s shift on Greenland this week in Davos, where he retreated from threats of force and tariffs and moved toward a proposal that includes offers of increased Arctic security, limits the potential for a collapse of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It also restricts China’s potential trade and diplomatic gains in Europe, said David Arase, a professor of international politics at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.

Write to Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

3. Opinion | Why Putin Was Rooting for a U.S. Invasion of Greenland

​Summary:

Angela Stent’s core claim is simple: Moscow’s long game is alliance fracture, and the Greenland scare briefly handed Putin that outcome at low cost. If a NATO member even entertains coercion against another member, Russia gains three advantages. First, it validates the Kremlin narrative that Western rules are conditional. Second, it forces Europeans to hedge, slowing collective decisions on Ukraine, sanctions, and force posture. Third, it distracts leadership bandwidth from Russia’s ongoing campaign of pressure, sabotage, and political warfare. Even a U turn leaves residue: mistrust becomes a planning assumption, and cohesion becomes negotiable.

Comment: If Putin assesses his enemy center of gravity as NATO unity and the Greenland scare to NATO unity has somewhat subsided, what can Putin do next? Or should he just hope for another surprise and play the role of Bonaparte: "never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake?"  

Opinion | Why Putin Was Rooting for a U.S. Invasion of Greenland

WSJ · Why Putin Was Rooting for a U.S. Invasion of Greenland

Without lifting a finger, Russia seemed about to vanquish its ‘main opponent,’ NATO.

By

Angela Stent

Jan. 22, 2026 4:50 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/why-putin-was-rooting-for-a-u-s-invasion-of-greenland-fff51854

Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Jan. 21. Vyacheslav Prokofyev/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/POOL/EPA/Shutterstock

When Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia in 2000, a reporter asked what he did as a KGB case officer in Dresden, East Germany. Mr. Putin’s response: “We were interested in any information about ‘the main opponent,’ as we called them, and the main opponent was NATO.” The mission hasn’t changed. In office, Mr. Putin has consistently sought to weaken the Western alliance.

Since its founding in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the Kremlin’s No. 1 enemy. Successive Soviet and Russian leaders sought to undermine the alliance and separate the U.S. from Europe. Mr. Putin and his inner circle can only marvel at the dangerous game President Trump has been playing. His confrontation with the allies over Greenland’s future threatened to damage the world’s most successful alliance in a way that decades of Russian sabotage failed to do. The gap between the U.S. and its allies, on full display this week, can only reinforce Mr. Putin’s conviction that the trans-Atlantic alliance is seriously weakened.

The Soviet Union’s answer to NATO was the Warsaw Treaty Organization, created in 1955. Before disbanding in 1991, it was the only such alliance in history whose members invaded each other. Soviet troops invaded Hungary in 1956 and Warsaw Pact troops marched into Czechoslovakia in 1968. These invasions ensured Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe. Mr. Putin aspires to control the former Warsaw Pact states, as he made clear in the draft treaty he presented to NATO before Russia invaded Ukraine.

After the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the future of NATO was debated in Russia and the West. Did it still have a purpose? Communism was defeated and Russia wanted to become a democracy. What was the need for this Cold War relic? Why not create an all-European security organization in which Russia and the U.S. would have an equal voice?

While Russians and their Western supporters argued for a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture, NATO and its supporters understood that the world’s most successful alliance shouldn’t disband but adapt and admit those former Warsaw Pact states that were clamoring to join.

The Clinton administration offered Russia a distinctive partnership with NATO, hoping to give Moscow a stake in the trans-Atlantic order. The NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in Paris in 1997, but it did little to diminish the Russian conviction that NATO was the adversary. Mr. Putin early in his presidency discussed the possibility of joining NATO with both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, but it became clear that Russia wouldn’t join an alliance it couldn’t dominate.

Mr. Putin’s antipathy toward NATO has only grown. The Kremlin has increasingly supported European political parties and groups on the left and right that oppose NATO and the U.S. Mr. Putin justified Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 by declaring that, if Russia hadn’t moved, “it would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of Southern Russia.”

Mr. Putin doesn’t fear NATO because it threatens Russia’s physical security. Rather, he understands that expanding NATO membership to former Soviet states and Warsaw Pact members undermines his goal of re-establishing Russia’s sphere of influence. NATO remains the chief obstacle to Mr. Putin’s imperial ambitions. Had Ukraine been a member of NATO, Russia wouldn’t have dared to invade it.

How ironic, then, that a dispute between the U.S. and its allies over a NATO member’s territory could end up undermining NATO and helping Mr. Putin realize his goal of subjugating Ukraine. “It was hard to imagine before that such a thing could happen,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Tuesday. He added that it could create a scenario in which “one NATO member is going to attack another NATO member.” Although three NATO members—Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—have experienced something similar.

Ms. Stent is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of “Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest.”

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the January 23, 2026, print edition as 'Why Putin Was Rooting for a U.S. Invasion of Greenland'.

WSJ · Why Putin Was Rooting for a U.S. Invasion of Greenland

4. The Arctic Smokescreen: The most dangerous mistake about "Greenland is believing it is about Greenland.

​Summary:

The piece argues the Greenland drama is misframed as spectacle. It is presented instead as a strategic play to secure heavy rare earths, especially dysprosium and terbium, and break China’s processing chokehold. Force talk is treated as negotiating theater meant to shift Denmark from sovereignty to price. The author adds a risk signal: prediction markets diverge because Americans price coercion while global traders price norms. Then comes the thesis of coherence across fronts: resource capture, tariff pressure on Europe, and Russian probing of Baltic cables. The rules-based order, it claims, cannot restrain actors who ignore it.

​Comment: This is published on X/Twitter. Fascinating analysis. In other words, are we seeing an advanced game of chess or Go/Wei Chi/Baduk?

The Arctic Smokescreen

The most dangerous mistake about "Greenland is believing it is about Greenland.

Josh Wolfe

@wolfejosh

https://x.com/wolfejosh/status/2013768012642349120

We are told this is a diplomatic spat, a real estate obsession, a chaotic throwback to 19th-century imperialism. The press treats it as spectacle. Commentators debate whether the administration is serious or simply trolling. Europeans express outrage at the affront to sovereignty. The whole affair is framed as noise: eccentric, embarrassing, ultimately inconsequential.

This framing is comfortable. And almost surely wrong.

The conventional reading of the Greenland saga is diplomatic incompetence in real time. The administration threatens force, gets rebuffed, escalates, gets rebuffed again, then retreats to the language of a purchase. Commentators shake their heads. Europeans express bewilderment.

What looks like flailing is a classic Trump-style negotiation sequence. You open with an outrageous demand precisely so your real demand seems reasonable by comparison.

It goes like this: Signal acquisition. Denmark scoffs. Mention force. Denmark recoils. Insist on force, loudly, repeatedly. Denmark reaches peak indignation. Others come to their side. Then pivot. A purchase offer that eliminates Denmark's entire national debt ($142B) and nearly doubles Greenland's GDP (~$450B)...

And suddenly the question is no longer "how dare you" but "wait, how much?"

The force rhetoric was never the plan. It was the anchor. Denmark is no longer defending sovereignty against an imperial aggressor; Denmark is evaluating a financial proposition. The frame has moved.

And i feel crazy saying this...

The math is not absurd. The deal probably pays for itself within a generation. The minerals alone are worth multiples of the purchase price. Greenland's 57,000 residents become millionaires on paper. Denmark sheds a fiscal dependent and erases its debt. The United States secures the rare earth supply chain for the military of the 2030s.

What is actually underway is a supply chain annexation dressed in the costume of territorial ambition. The target is not an island; it is two geological formations in Southern Greenland—Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez—that contain the heavy rare earth elements without which no advanced weapons system can be built.

Dysprosium. Terbium. Names that mean nothing to the public but everything to the Pentagon. These elements are irreplaceable in the actuators of F-35 fighters, the guidance fins of precision munitions, the sonar arrays of Virginia-class submarines, and the permanent magnets of every electric vehicle motor. China controls over 90% of global processing. The United States controls almost none.

The "purchase" of Greenland is not a land deal. It is an attempt to break a chokehold.

In 2026, prediction markets have become the closest thing we have to honest price signals on geopolitical risk. And right now, they are telling two different stories.

Kalshi, the US-regulated exchange, prices the probability of American acquisition of Greenland at roughly 42%. Polymarket, the decentralized platform populated by global crypto-natives and offshore speculators, prices it at 15-23%.

This is not market inefficiency but more a disagreement about the nature of power.

The Kalshi bettors—institutional, US-based, integrated into the American financial system—believe the administration will force the deal through. They are pricing coercion. The Polymarket bettors—international, skeptical of American omnipotence, often operating outside US jurisdiction—believe European resistance will hold. They are pricing norms.

The 20-point spread between these markets is the most important signal in the world right now. If Polymarket moves up to meet Kalshi, it means the global "smart money" has accepted that the United States will break international law to secure the Arctic flank.

There is precedent for such acceptance. Weeks ago, a trader placed a $32,000 bet on the ouster of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and netted over $400,000 when US forces captured him. The "Maduro Effect" has recalibrated risk appetites across every geopolitical market. Traders are no longer pricing diplomatic negotiations. They are pricing hostile takeovers.

The Three-Theater Squeeze

The average observer sees three separate news stories: a trade dispute with Europe, a strange fixation on Greenland, and some localized internet outages in the Baltic.

These are not separate stories. They are three fronts of a single conflict.

The Resource Front: The administration is securing the mineral inputs for the military of the 2030s. The Tanbreez deposit—rich in heavy rare earths, free of uranium complications, owned by Western interests—is the crown jewel. The neighboring Kvanefjeld deposit, which has Chinese equity participation through Shenghe Resources, is the problem to be neutralized. Control of Greenland solves both.

The Economic Front: The tariffs announced against Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, and four other European nations are not protectionist measures. They are precision-guided economic strikes against political dissenters. The £31 billion US-UK Tech Prosperity Deal—Microsoft's data centers, Google's R&D investment—has been suspended indefinitely. The message is unambiguous: alignment with American geopolitical objectives is the price of American capital.

The Kinetic Front: While diplomats argue over tariffs, Russian vessels drag anchors across Baltic telecommunications cables. The cargo ship Fitburg, seized by Finnish and Estonian authorities, is part of the "Shadow Fleet"—vessels with opaque ownership that operate below the threshold of open war. These are not accidents. They are shaping operations, mapping vulnerabilities, demonstrating the capacity to sever the digital infrastructure that binds the Western alliance together.

The average observer sees chaos. The intelligence reality is coherence: resource acquisition, economic coercion, and kinetic preparation, operating in concert.

The Rules-Based Mirage

The European response to all of this has been to invoke international law, sovereignty, and the rules-based order. These invocations are emotionally satisfying. They are also strategically meaningless.

International law functions only among actors who agree to be constrained by it. It assumes a mutual understanding of legitimacy, a shared framework of rules, and an enforcement mechanism capable of compelling compliance. None of these conditions hold. There is no global sovereign. There is no monopoly on force. Agreements endure only until interests diverge.

The United States has decided that securing rare earth supply chains is more important than maintaining the post-war settlement with Europe. The prediction markets have priced this in. The cable sabotage operations have demonstrated it. The tariff announcements have made it explicit.

European leaders can invoke norms. They cannot enforce them. And actors who openly reject the framework—whether by dragging anchors across undersea cables or by demanding territorial concessions under economic duress—gain advantage over those who internalize constraints the other side does not recognize.

This is the asymmetry of the current moment. It is not new. Thucydides identified it twenty-five centuries ago: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. The innovation of 2026 is the speed at which the mask has slipped.

The Signal and the Noise

The public narrative offers comfort: this is chaos, incompetence, a diplomatic embarrassment that will resolve itself. The operational reality offers none.

The US is annexing a supply chain. Europe is being coerced into alignment. Russia is probing the infrastructure that holds the alliance together. The public is fragmented across information silos that prevent collective response. Prediction markets are pricing outcomes that official discourse still treats as unthinkable.

The statements in the press are not meaningless. But they're rarely decisive. The decisive forces operate quietly, guided not by norms but by leverage, not by law but by geology, not by principle but by the irreducible logic of who controls the inputs for the next generation of weapons.

5. China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

​Summary:

Beijing’s week reads like system consolidation under constraint. Xi frames the 15th Five Year Plan as command architecture that fuses development, security, and social control, signaling endurance over growth. Fiscal messaging hints at expanded deficits, but the method is administrative management rather than structural reform, which boosts short term stability while increasing opacity and brittleness. The Political and Legal Work Conference hardens the regime by refining law as a compliance tool, not an accountability mechanism. Industrial policy is treated as strategic infrastructure, locking capacity in place even when demand lags. Externally, elite narrative placement in US venues extends governance logic outward, shaping decision environments rather than publics.

Excerpts:

Irregular Warfare Spotlight

China’s gray zone tactics often hide in plain sight. Each week, I will feature one that deserves a closer look.

Elite Narrative Insertion as Governance Warfare: Beijing’s “Grand Bargain” Messaging

Another prominent Chinese foreign-policy scholar published an article in Foreign Affairs arguing for a US–China “grand bargain,” framing accommodation as stabilizing, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial during a period of global strain. This elite narrative insertion complements the week’s internal moves on planning discipline and legal control, extending the same governance logic outward into US administrative and policy discourse.

Why this is an irregular warfare case study:

The key action here is placement more than argument. Publishing this narrative in a premier US policy journal targets elite administrative cognition rather than public opinion. It seeks to normalize accommodation, de-center alliances, and reframe Taiwan and technology competition as manageable irritants rather than structural conflicts. This is governance warfare in plain sight, shaping the institutional environment in which policy choices are made.

Comment: While we focused on Davos, Xi continues to expand his "rule BY law" rule. Note Erika LaFrennie's focus on Irregular warfare in addition to her excellent insights and useful information. Her IW case study begs the question: Is Foreign Affairs a "useful idiot," complicit in supporting the Chinese narrative, or is it an objective platform or outlet for dialogue and exchange of views? I opt for the latter as long as it helps us to recognize Chinese strategy, understand Chinese strategy, EXPOSE Chinese strategy, and then help us to attack that strategy through our own superior political warfare strategy.

China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

January 16 – January 22, 2026

Erika Lafrennie

Jan 23, 2026

https://www.xinanigans.com/p/china-weekly-2026-1-23

A standing weekly operational intelligence brief tracking China’s governance-based competition.

Bottom Line: Beijing used the week to align long-range planning, fiscal signaling, legal control, and elite narrative positioning into a coherent governance strategy for 2026 and beyond. As economic constraints persist, the CCP is doubling down on administrative control, five-year planning discipline, and institutional influence abroad, treating governance itself as the decisive terrain of competition. The pattern this week is not escalation through force but consolidation through systems.

1. Xi Directs 15th Five-Year Plan Implementation as Governance and Security Architecture

Xi Jinping addressed senior provincial and ministerial officials on the implementation of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), framing long-term planning as a core political advantage of the Chinese system. The speech emphasized Party leadership over planning, coordination of development and security, risk prevention, and social governance as integrated responsibilities of the state.

Why it matters:

Xi is treating five-year planning as command architecture, designed to impose certainty, discipline, and direction amid rising uncertainty. By explicitly linking economic development, national security, and social stability, Beijing is formalizing governance as an operational system rather than a policy domain. The plan prioritizes political control and strategic coherence under constraint over growth targets.

Implications for US National Security:

• Planning as command system: Five-year plans function as governance infrastructure that directs capital, labor, and administrative attention toward strategic priorities.
• Development–security fusion: Economic policy is being explicitly subordinated to stability and risk control imperatives.
• Reduced flexibility under stress: Heavy reliance on top-down planning increases brittleness when assumptions fail.
• Long-horizon competition signal: Beijing is preparing for sustained competition rather than short-term recovery.

2. Beijing Signals Fiscal Expansion While Managing Constraint Administratively

Chinese officials signaled the possibility of expanded fiscal deficits for 2026 alongside the release and interpretation of full-year 2025 economic data. Messaging emphasized stabilization, continuity, and confidence management, downplaying persistent weakness in real estate, consumption, and industrial momentum.

Why it matters:

Fiscal signaling this week complements Xi’s planning guidance. Beijing is preparing to finance strategic priorities through centralized fiscal tools while avoiding structural reform. Rather than market adjustment, the CCP is leaning on administrative instruments to manage slowdown: directed credit through state banks, fiscal mandates to local governments, real-estate forbearance, and political discipline. The emphasis remains on control over correction.

Implications for US National Security:

• Economic signaling as strategic enabler: Confidence management supports external diplomacy and trade engagement.
• Opacity risk: Administrative intervention obscures real capacity constraints and complicates forecasting.
• Policy error under pressure: Command-driven economic management raises volatility during shocks.
• Leverage sensitivity: Heavy signaling suggests Beijing is attentive to foreign reactions and capital confidence.

3. Central Political and Legal Work Conference Reinforces Regime Hardening

Beijing convened the annual Central Political and Legal Work Conference, issuing guidance on law-based governance, social stability, risk prevention, and political discipline across legal and security institutions.

Why it matters:

This conference operationalizes internal control. Legal and security systems are being further aligned with Party priorities, reducing institutional autonomy and reinforcing political supervision. Rather than rule-of-law reform, Beijing is refining law as a governance tool used to discipline society, manage dissent, and ensure compliance during periods of economic and geopolitical stress.

Implications for US National Security:

• Law as coercive infrastructure: Legal mechanisms are being optimized for control, not accountability.
• Reduced internal signaling: Political discipline suppresses early warning signs of policy failure or dissent.
• Escalation insulation: Regime hardening increases the CCP’s tolerance for external risk.
• Human rights pressure points: Expanded legal control increases exposure to reputational and legitimacy costs.

4. Modern Industrial System Framed as Strategic Infrastructure

Authoritative commentary and policy guidance this week emphasized “deep and accurate” implementation of a modern industrial system, positioning advanced manufacturing, technology integration, and infrastructure as pillars of national competitiveness and security.

Why it matters:

Industrial policy is being treated as strategic infrastructure rather than economic modernization. This week’s guidance emphasized maintaining a “reasonable proportion” of manufacturing and accelerating advanced manufacturing capacity despite weak demand, signaling that industrial structure, not efficiency, is the priority. By embedding industrial development within planning and security frameworks, Beijing is attempting to lock in long-term capacity while insulating core sectors from market volatility and foreign pressure.

Implications for US National Security:

• Industrial base as governance asset: Manufacturing and technology are instruments of state power, not market outcomes.
• Selective decoupling: China is prioritizing autonomy in critical sectors while remaining integrated elsewhere.
• Long-term capacity signaling: Industrial investments are calibrated for endurance, not rapid returns.
• Standards competition risk: System-level integration challenges US-aligned economic norms.

Irregular Warfare Spotlight

China’s gray zone tactics often hide in plain sight. Each week, I will feature one that deserves a closer look.

Elite Narrative Insertion as Governance Warfare: Beijing’s “Grand Bargain” Messaging

Another prominent Chinese foreign-policy scholar published an article in Foreign Affairs arguing for a US–China “grand bargain,” framing accommodation as stabilizing, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial during a period of global strain. This elite narrative insertion complements the week’s internal moves on planning discipline and legal control, extending the same governance logic outward into US administrative and policy discourse.

Why this is an irregular warfare case study:

The key action here is placement more than argument. Publishing this narrative in a premier US policy journal targets elite administrative cognition rather than public opinion. It seeks to normalize accommodation, de-center alliances, and reframe Taiwan and technology competition as manageable irritants rather than structural conflicts. This is governance warfare in plain sight, shaping the institutional environment in which policy choices are made.

Implications for US National Security:

• Administrative terrain shaping: Elite discourse venues are treated as strategic infrastructure.
• Narrative risk-shifting: Responsibility for stability is subtly transferred to US restraint.
• Transition exploitation: Messaging is calibrated for leadership change and policy recalibration.
• Legitimacy contestation: Beijing seeks to redefine what “responsible” great-power behavior means.

Chinese Vulnerabilities & US Counter-Opportunities

This week’s actions reveal a system prioritizing control over adaptability. Long-range planning, fiscal centralization, legal discipline, and elite narrative insertion reflect confidence in administrative power, but also sensitivity to credibility, legitimacy, and external perception. Beijing’s reliance on signaling and governance tools increases exposure to credibility gaps if economic or social stress intensifies. Even limited coordination such as aligned transparency requirements on industrial subsidies or exposure of governance conditions attached to Chinese trade and investment platforms would raise the political cost of Beijing’s signaling strategy.

For the United States and its allies, these patterns create leverage. Coordinated scrutiny of Chinese planning assumptions, fiscal sustainability, industrial subsidies, and elite influence campaigns can raise the cost of Beijing’s governance-based strategy. Transparency, standards alignment, and narrative contestation—especially in elite policy spaces—remain low-cost, high-impact countermeasures.

China is governing for competition. Understanding how governance functions as power is essential to competing effectively in 2026.

6. Artificial Intelligence and a Reconfiguration of Military Power

​Summary:

Annett and Giordano argue the Department of War is moving from “using AI” to being structurally shaped by it. Enterprise deployment, including commercial large language models across networks, turns AI into an epistemic actor that filters reality, ranks options, and compresses time for commanders. That shift changes authority, not just efficiency. It also creates systemic dependencies on data integrity, model robustness, and infrastructure resilience, while opening non-kinetic attack paths through manipulation of algorithms and inputs. They warn competitive pressure can outrun doctrine, oversight, and accountability, so AI may set defaults in crisis. Their remedy is doctrinal clarity, commander accountability, and leader education.

Comment: There is so much we (or I ) have to learn about AI. On some days I feel like it is key to an amazing future for us and at other times I wonder what we will be losing as AI dominates our lives (let alone dominates military operations). 

Regarding warfare Annet and Giordano's essay sparks some critical questions: If AI curates what commanders see, who governs the model, and how do we audit bias, corruption, and “option framing” under time pressure?

In a fight where cognition is the terrain, how do we measure whether AI increases true decision superiority or just accelerates escalation with false confidence? Does it compress the time for the OODA loop to operate and allow us to act faster than the enemy? What happens if we do the wrong thing, just faster? 

Data integrity. As I think I heard Dr. Giordano (or someone like him) say at a Mad Scientist conference a few years ago: who controls the data controls everything.

News | Jan. 20, 2026

Artificial Intelligence and a Reconfiguration of Military Power

By Elise Annett and Dr. James Giordano Strategic Insights

https://inss.ndu.edu/Research-and-Commentary/View-Publications/Article/4382869/artificial-intelligence-and-a-reconfiguration-of-military-power/

Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering Emil Michael has emphasized that the Department of War (DoW) has historically under-deployed artificial intelligence (AI) and that the current moment demands rapid, enterprise-wide integration of AI capabilities across the DoW workforce to better support both efficiency and warfighting functions. Recent developments such as the Department of War’s 2026 Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the planned integration of commercial large-language models like Grok across classified and unclassified DoW networks, reflect Under Secretary Michael’s incentivization, and illustrate ongoing commitments to rapid AI adoption and technological primacy. 

We believe that this initiative, announced by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at SpaceX, signifies a reconfiguration of decision-making authority, informational control, and strategic agency within the conduct of war. AI is becoming a constitutive element through which operational knowledge is acquired, filtered, and acted upon. As such, AI reshapes both how force is applied and how tactical engagement and strategic judgment are structured and enacted.

AI as a Strategic Actor in the Battlespace

AI systems employed across DoW networks increasingly function as epistemic actors. They determine which data are viable and valuable, which patterns are prioritized, and how actionable options are presented to commanders. Under these conditions, decision superiority emerges less from better sensors or faster weapons, and more from control over the decision environment itself.

This reframing is reflected in the statutory policy of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, which embeds AI and autonomous technologies within a  range of defense programs and initiatives as part of DoW’s broader priorities toward modernization.

Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee versions of the FY 2026 NDAA include AI-related provisions that direct the Secretary of War to integrate commercial AI capabilities, develop AI governance frameworks, and establish cross-functional teams for model management, oversight, and assessment to fortify  current and future force design and deployment. 

The Artificial Intelligence Strategy for the Department of War establishes AI as a central pillar of national power. We opine that this reflects an intentional convergence of defense modernization, economic competitiveness, and geopolitical influence within a unified strategic logic. Increasingly, AI is regarded as an enabling element of state capacity, by virtue of its capacity to shape and bolster military effectiveness, prompt industrial vitality, and leverage diplomacy.

Within this framework, AI leadership operates as an internal force multiplier and an external signaling mechanism. Executive guidance emphasizes accelerated integration of AI across federal agencies, adaptive procurement pathways, and sustained incorporation of commercial innovation(s) in AI to national security initiatives and missions. Internationally, United States’ prominence in AI research, development and use is a reference point for interoperability, norm establishment, and technological alignment with allies, and force capability against adversaries. The strategic implication of this posture is that leadership in AI enables the U.S. to influence global standards, expectations, and operational conventions within the emerging AI ecology. 

To our view, future strategic competition will be shaped less by discrete platforms and more by interconnected ecosystems of innovation. Defense, industry, finance, and data infrastructure operate within ever more integrated environments wherein AI functions to link military modernization to supply chain resilience, industrial base vitality, and long-term economic credibility and power. From this perspective, defense AI policy directly aligns with — and contributes to — national efforts to sustain technological superiority, and strategic leverage. 

Operational Velocity, Cognitive Integration, and Strategic Risk

In this light, we posit that two interrelated factors shape AI-enabled military operations: (1) operational velocity: AI compresses temporal cycles of sensing, analysis, and response to reshape the pace of tactical engagement(s) and strategically relevant decision-making, to alter how legitimacy is conferred upon military decisions and how political control is exercised over force; (2) cognitive integration: AI systems curate and filter the informational environment, shaping the set of feasible options made available to commanders. As these systems are embedded across command-and-control constructs such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), human judgment interacts with algorithmic prioritizations rather than unfiltered situational data. 

Without doubt these dynamics enhance the tempo of military operations and can contribute to enhanced operational effectiveness. However, they also recalibrate how authority and agency are exercised, given that AI will increasingly precondition both strategic interpretation and operational orientation of mission execution.

Strategic Competition and Incentive Structures

Such integration of AI is occurring in an environment of intensifying strategic competition. State actors are advancing concepts of “intelligentized warfare” emphasize iterative use of  AI within and across operational domains as a defining feature of future conflict. This imparts pressure on U.S. forces to accelerate the adoption and deployment of AI in order to preserve operational relevance, competitive advantage, and deterrence capability and credibility.

But these competitive incentives also shape organizational priorities in ways that can compromise deliberative efforts. The imperative to accelerate incorporation of AI (and other emerging critical technologies) can reduce institutional tolerance for deep evaluation, debate, and recalibration of research, development and operational goals and tempo, despite the importance of coherence of doctrine, governance, and force employment.

Weighing Systemic Consequences

We believe the most consequential effects of AI will extend beyond the battlefield. AI introduces systemic dependencies that center on data validity and integrity, model robustness and reliability, and  resilience of information infrastructures that undergird contemporary military operations. These dependencies influence operational readiness, and strategic confidence across a variety of domains.

Moreover, AI is expanding exposure of the defense ecosystem to novel modes of vulnerability and attack. Adversaries’ exploitation of AI algorithms, purloinment and corruption of data, and  manipulation of AI-based models create new vectors and opportunities for incurring disruptive and/or destructive effects without direct kinetic engagement. Such vulnerabilities elevate the informational and cognitive aspects of engagement, and thereby alter the character of conflict.

A View Toward Strategic Conditions, Readiness and Capability

In conclusion, we maintain that the progressive integration of AI within the military constitutes a reconfiguration of agency, and is not merely a technological evolution. Decisions about the use of force will be increasingly defined by AI mediation, priorities, and compressed temporal scales. We perceive the emergence of a dual architecture that on one side promotes AI at scale, and on the other is poised, yet paused to develop and articulate robust operational norms and accountability mechanisms with equivalent velocity. In practice, we think that this may enable AI systems to shape interpretive frameworks by default; especially in those situations and environments where the operational tempo and competitive pressures outpace the evolution and enforceability of governance. 

Thus, to afford equivalence of technical and doctrinal pacing and capabilities, we offer the following recommendations:

1. Codify AI-mediated decision authority within operational doctrine.
Doctrine should delineate where and how AI informs or accelerates command decisions, while preserving decisive human judgment and unity of command under accelerated tempo.

2. Align ethical responsibility with command accountability in AI-enabled operations.
Responsibility for AI-influenced decisions should remain vested in command authority; the aforementioned doctrine should prevent accelerated decision cycles from obscuring accountability for the use of force.

3. Integrate cognitive effects and escalation dynamics into operational planning.
Operational planning and wargaming should account for AI effects on threat perception, option salience, and decisional tempo, as these factors directly influence escalation dynamics, crisis stability, and cross-domain command and control.

4. Protect the integrity of AI-relevant data, models, and decision environments.
Operational and counter-adversary planning should address risks arising from data manipulation and algorithmic exploitation, as these directly affect command judgment, tactical engagement, and strategic decision-making.

5. Embed AI competence and ethical judgment within professional military education and leader development.
Leader development should prepare commanders to critically evaluate AI function(s), understand system capabilities and limitations, and recognize when algorithmic recommendations for tactical commitment are in contrast or conflict with strategic intent, rules of engagement, and/or ethical precepts, responsibilities and obligations.

Collectively, we opine that these recommendations support the integration of AI within military operations, and concomitantly necessitate the doctrinal clarity, strategic discipline, and ethical accountability commensurate with expanding the roles for AI in shaping how force is perceived, authorized, and employed.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government, Department of War or the National Defense University.

Elise Annett is Institutional Research Associate at the National Defense University. She is a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University. Her work addresses operational and ethical issues of iteratively autonomous AI systems in military use.

Dr. James Giordano is Director of the Center for Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

7. The Arctic is a Strategic Distraction

​Summary:

T.X. Hammes argues the Arctic is being oversold as a defense priority and risks becoming a strategic distraction. The 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy was “prudent and measured,” and the 2025 NSS omitting the Arctic signals it is not a top-tier theater. Shipping promises are constrained by shallow drafts, drifting multi-year ice, sparse infrastructure, insurance and escort costs, and poor schedule reliability for container networks. Resource urgency is also inflated since most deposits sit inside Arctic states’ EEZs, and the real bottleneck is processing, not ore. Homeland defense can rely on surveillance plus chokepoint control, not major forward force shifts.

Comment: T.X. is arguing and from other articles I have read I think we need a balance between the East and West Arctic between Greenland and Alaska. And if rare earths are really the issue (they are) why are we not focusing on refining? That seems to be the long pole in the tent? Perhaps we should realize that what is actually "rare" is our refining capabilities or assured access to refining capabilities. T.X. raises so many questions

How do we prevent “Arctic anxiety” from laundering shipbuilding, basing, and ISR demands that should be funded in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and Europe?

If chokepoint control is enough, what specific scenarios would justify a discrete Arctic force package beyond sensors, comms, and long-range fires?

What concrete Arctic scenario would justify diverting high-demand assets from Asia-Indo-Pacific, Europe, or the Middle East, and what do we stop doing to pay for it?

If the real center of gravity is rare earth processing, why are we debating geography instead of building resilient refining capacity and trusted supply chains at home and with allies?

​One thing I will say for all the controversy about POTUS and Greenland, it has forced me to look at the Arctic in ways I never have before. I had long ignored it as a strategic issue because it did not seem to have a direct impact on my other areas of focus (Northeast Asia, East Asia, and unconventional, irregular, and political warfare). But it is obvious to me now how important the Arctic is and how it does impact these areas more directly than I realized despite T.X.'s admonition.

And maps and graphics at the link.

Arctic

The Arctic is a Strategic Distraction

January 21, 2026 Guest Author 2 Comments

By T.X. Hammes

https://cimsec.org/the-arctic-is-a-strategic-distraction/

Over the past five years, numerous articles have called for increased U.S. defense resources focused on the Arctic. This is a strategic mistake, a distraction.

This article will outline the reasons proponents feel the high north has increased value, examine the actual strategic value of each, and show that none is sufficient to divert scarce resources from higher value theaters. Strategy should serve as an appetite suppressant to keep the nation from committing to peripheral missions at the expense of critical ones.1

The 2024 Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy was justifiably “prudent and measured,” limiting DOD actions to enhancing domain awareness, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It planned to work with Allies and partners to uphold deterrence and homeland defense.2 The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy did not mention the Arctic.3 In contrast, proponents agitate for the United States to dedicate increased defense assets to maintain access to its vast natural resources, exploit the increased economic and shipping opportunities, and provide for national defense.

Unfortunately, the Joint Force is already overtasked in trying to meet its global and domestic missions while rebuilding the force. It is therefore prudent to examine the actual value of the far north before committing scarce resources to what is, at best, a strategic distraction.

A potential new trade route

The most exaggerated claim concerns the value of the Arctic as shortened and hence cheaper shipping routes between Asia and Europe. Many stories tout the speed and value of the shorter route for Asia to Europe shipping.4

While factual, these stories exaggerate both the volume and the value of shipping using the northern routes. To evaluate the real value of these routes, it is essential to understand their current usage and the limits that geography and oceanography impose. Figure 1, below, illustrates both routes.

Figure 1: Arctic Sea Routes. (Photo source: Arctic Council Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report.)

The Congressional Research Service notes:

“The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the ‘Northeast Passage’), along Russia’s northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in length…Most transits through the NSR are associated with the carriage of LNG from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula…The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands…potentially applicable for trade between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America, but it is less commercially viable than the NSR.”5

While this description sounds promising, it is important to understand the current and potential flow of shipping, the nature of containerized shipping, and the impact of oceanography on its future growth.

Almost all of the Northwest Passage lies within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Russia also claims that key straits on the route lie within its internal waters.6 See Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Northern Sea Route in Russian Waters. (Photo source: Andrew Todorov, “New Russian Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation: Gathering Arctic Storm or Tempest in a Teapot?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023.

Thus, almost all transits must pass through straits Russia claims as internal waters. Russia has assigned responsibility for managing the NSR to Rosatom, the state-owned nuclear power monopoly, which complicates obtaining the required permission for internal passage. In 2022, Russia also claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, a subsea mountain range, as part of its continental shelf. This pushes its claimed EEZ boundaries to the edge of those areas claimed by Greenland and Canada. See Figure 3, below.

Figure 3: Arctic Nations Territorial Claims. (Photo source: Ian Birdwell, “Rival Claims to a Changing Arctic,” Maritime Executive, August 15, 2016.)

The percentage increase in shipping along these routes may sound very impressive, but only because the baseline was miniscule. Actual shipping remains minimal. The Centre for High North Logistics recorded only 97 voyages on the NSR during 2024.7 See Figure 4, below.

Figure 4: NSR Transits by Type in 2024. (Photo source: “Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2024,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, November 28, 2024)

Despite continued official Chinese and Russian efforts to promote the route, as of August 31, 2025, only 52 vessels had transited the NSR. Container freight represented only 20 percent of the total. See Figure 5, below.

Figure 5: NSR transits by type through August 31, 2025. (Photo source: “Overview of Transit voyages along the Northern Sea Route as of August 31, 2025,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, September 1, 2025.)

Further restricting traffic growth, in October 2025, four of the world’s five biggest container shipping companies — MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, CMA CGM SA and Hapag-Lloyd AG — stated they will not use the NSR due to environmental, safe navigation, and transit issues. The fifth company, Cosco Shipping, a Chinese company, has not made a statement.8

The Northwest Passage supports even less shipping than the NSR. As the 2024 shipping season concluded only 18 ships completed the full journey – eight cruise ships, nine cargo ships and one tanker.9

Factors restricting the value of shipping via NSR or NWP

Several major and enduring factors – draft restrictions, unpredictable sea ice, the requirement for ice breakers, and higher cost per container–reduce the economic viability of these routes.

Draft restrictions

Arctic hydrography is particularly restrictive for commercial shipping. The NSR has a controlling draft of 12.5 meters and the NWP is limited to 10 meters. This means the Panamax-class (5,500 TEU maximum) is the largest that can use the NSR but they draw too much water for the NWP. In addition, ships may not have a beam of more than the ice breaker escorting them, or about 30 meters maximum.10

In August 2025, the NEWNEW company proudly announced it had increased its NSR traffic from 7 voyages in 2024 to 13 voyages in 2025. In those 13 trips, it carried a total of around 20,000 TEUs.11 For comparison, the Inira-class carries over 24,000 TEUs on a single voyage. From January 2022 to April 2024, over 800 ships per week transited the Cape of Good Hope and Suez Canal,12 for a yearly total of over 41,000 transits. More ships pass the Cape every 11 hours than use the NSR in a year and many are much larger than the Panamax-class.

Unpredictable Sea Ice

While Arctic Sea ice is steadily receding, this does not mean passages are necessarily or predictably clear. Sea ice moves with prevailing currents with thicker multi-year ice moving into areas where one year ice has melted. As such, moving multi-year ice often stacks up in restricted waters. The NASA image (Figure 6 below) shows how the melting ice on the NWP flows east and closes the route despite major reductions in total ice coverage. It led NASA to conclude:

“Despite overall declines in the thickness and extent of Arctic sea ice, shipping routes along the northern coast of North America have become less navigable in recent years.”13

Figure 6: Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage. (Photo source: “Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage,” NASA Visible Earth, August 8, 2024.

The fact that the sea ice floats means it is very difficult to predict exactly where the passage will be blocked. This problem is not limited to the NWP. As late as September 2025, “a non ice-class Suezmax oil tanker has been forced to wait several days due to ice conditions before proceeding along Russia’s Northern Sea Route…at very slow speeds in close proximity to the shoreline to find a route through the ice.”14 Even ice rated ships are often delayed, the Buran, an Arc4 rated Liquid Natural Gas tanker “reached the Northern Sea Route north of the Bering Strait on October 29 and for the past three days has been struggling to find a path through early winter sea ice.”15

Compounding the problem of drifting ice, the routes have notoriously shallow water. The channels are not well marked and still surprise mariners. On September 7, 2025, the Thamesborg, a Dutch bulk freighter, ran aground in the remote Franklin Strait of the NWP. It required three salvage ships to refloat the Thamesborg.16 The vessel was not unloaded and refloated until October 9 – a delay of 33 days. Canadian Coast Guard inspections also revealed damaged ballast tanks.17

In addition to ice, Arctic weather ranging from storms to heavy fog often slows transiting ships. While delays are not a significant problem for bulk shipping, they have major impacts on the timeliness required for container freight.

Icebreaker requirements

Paradoxically, as the arctic ice cap is melting, the demand for icebreakers is surging. Russia has 47 in service with 15 under construction. Canada is funding two dozen new ones. Both nations require numerous ice breakers to support domestic industries in their EEZs.

In contrast, the United States currently has two icebreakers with one of those used primarily as a research vessel. The U.S. Coast Guard has also purchased a used icebreaker and hopes to have it in operation by 2026.18 Although the Coast Guard analysis indicated it would only need three heavy and three medium icebreakers, on October 10, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security announced the United States and Finland have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a Finnish company to produce four icebreakers with the next seven being produced in U.S. shipyards.19Given only 18 NWP passages in 2024, it is unclear why the United States needs to increase its icebreaker fleet from two to 11. 

Cost

Proponents of Arctic shipping routes note that shorter northern routes will mean lower costs. Unfortunately, several factors mean the cost of shipping individual containers will often be higher. Draft restrictions, lack of ports enroute, slow emergency response, stricter construction requirements, specialized crew training, ice breaker escorts, and insurance costs all contribute to higher cost per container. While the cost of an individual ship’s voyage may be less on a shorter route, the Thamesborg and Lynx show a shorter route does not necessarily mean it is cheaper or even faster.

Bulk cargo is usually shipped point to point so can benefit from a shorter route. Obviously, it makes sense to ship coal, LNG, and oil that is produced in northern Russia to China or India via the NSR. However, due to economies of scale, bulk cargo originating elsewhere may be cheaper to ship via the much larger ships that can transit southern routes. Not only are Arctic-capable ships much smaller, but they must also meet strict construction, outfitting, and crew training requirements which make them more expensive to purchase and operate. Due to the route hazards, insurance rates are also higher. Further inflating the cost per voyage is the requirement for ice breaker escorts. Both Canada and Russia charge each vessel for icebreaking services.20

For its part, container shipping has different cost factors. The most important metric is the cost per container rather than the cost of the voyage for an individual ship. Thus, scale is an important factor.

A second critical metric for container freight is timeliness. Unlike either northern route, southern routes can be part of a shipping network. This is critical for on-time delivery and economy of scale. The desired standard for on-time delivery for containerized freight is 99%. To achieve this goal, container ships operate in networks with “strings” or routes of many ports serviced by multiple ships on a steady schedule. For example, a US east coast to Southwest Asia route taking 42 days round trip serviced by six ships means regular weekly service out of the ports serviced on that route.21

The network described limits delays to a week. Today, much of the global economy consists of subcomponents built in one country, shipped to a second for final assembly of the subcomponents, and then on to another country for inclusion in the final product. Such supply chains are based on just-in-time delivery. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, failure to deliver on time means production lines must be idled, making reliable delivery time critical. As noted, the unpredictable sea ice, infrequent sailings, and often brutal weather on the northern routes reduce reliability. Given the northern routes cover 2,500 miles with minimal infrastructure or support services, weeks-long delays are not unusual.

Access to natural resources

Minerals, particularly those yielding rare earth metals, are often touted as the primary resources of interest in the north. In fact, the Geological Survey of Norway estimated the value of rare earth minerals in the Arctic alone is $1.5-2 trillion.22 However, most of the minerals lie within the Exclusive Economic Zones of the six nations bordering the Arctic — Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the United States, and Iceland. Any exploitation will be done by those nations, and so there is no special urgency to secure them against competitors. Figure 3 shows how only a small slice of the Arctic Ocean lies outside national EEZs. A paper from the Institute for Security & Development Policy also noted:

“Overall, the High North’s … resources have long attracted global interest, but their exploitation is technologically difficult and capital-intensive, and often faces local resistance due to risks to nature-based livelihoods and cultural heritage. … In short, the Arctic’s mineral wealth is both enormous and yet largely untapped…”23

Just as important, rare earths are not rare. The High North is estimated to hold only 15 percent of the world’s supply.24 In fact, in the last year major deposits have been found in Wyoming and Arkansas; these deposits have the obvious advantage of easier access. The issue is not the ore but the refining process. Currently most rare earth minerals are shipped to China for refinement into rare earth metals. If the United States continues to invest in refining facilities, supplies of rare earths will not be an issue.

Oil is another driver of interest. According to the U. S. Geological Service “roughly 22 percent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable fossil fuel resources in the world” may remain in the Arctic with 84 percent of it outside the Exclusive Economic Zones of Arctic nations.25

However, the high production cost of High North oil meant the United States government received no bids in the January 2025 Alaska Wildlife Refuge lease sale.26 Apparently, oil firms have decided it makes no economic sense to invest in very high-cost production when there is still oil in fields with much lower production costs. Russian firms are the obvious exceptions. As state-controlled firms, they must continue to invest onshore in the north of the country. Oil revenues are essential to the Russian economy and government budget.

National Security

Two threads emerge from the discussion of the need for U.S. defense of the High North. The first is the need for surveillance to detect any Russian attack coming over the pole. The second concern is the security of Greenland, Svalbard, and the protection of shipping routes.

During the Cold War, the United States and Canada operated the Defense Early Warning (DEW) radars from 1957 to 1985 to provide warning of Soviet bomber and missile attacks over the pole. From 1985 to 1988, DEW transitioned to the North Warning System (NWS). The NWS provides surveillance for the atmospheric defense of North America. Today, the United States and Canada are working to improve the surveillance element of missile defense. Re-establishing the radar system in the High North will be an extremely difficult, very expensive, and time-consuming project.27 A potential alternative is space surveillance. The Pentagon is already exploring deploying space-based sensors as part of the Golden Dome. If this very expensive project continues, it will provide the surveillance aspect of the DOD tasks.

The sudden concern that the United States must field and deploy forces to physically defend Greenland, Svalbard, and the new shipping routes is a bit puzzling. By holding the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, NATO credibly defended the western exit from the High North throughout the Cold War against a highly capable Soviet Navy. Even with global warming, the Gap will remain Russia’s best exit to the west. In the east, the Bering Strait is about 50 miles wide with two islands in the middle.

In fact, the most significant change since the Cold War has been the steady decline of the Russian forces in the region. “Decades of attrition, neglect, and resource depletion have left Russia’s Arctic capabilities outdated and functionally broken.”28 Against the degraded Russian air and sea forces, land-based missiles and drones can provide an affordable option. There is no requirement for U.S. or allied forces to penetrate the NSR. Containerized land-based missiles, drones, radar, command and control systems integrated with space-based surveillance can allow U.S. and allied forces to engage surface ships and aircraft transiting the Arctic. In short, the United States and its allies can control traffic that attempts to leave the Arctic. These systems can also support the most challenging mission – tracking and, if needed, engaging Russian submarines.

Conclusion

Strategy should provide discipline to guide the investment of limited defense resources. Proponents of investing in capabilities focused on the High North point to defending Greenland and Svalbard; balancing the increased Chinese and Russian interests in the region; maintaining access to its vast natural resources; and taking advantage of the shortened shipping via the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Yet, the vastly increased range of land-based missiles supported by pervasive surveillance means it is easier and cheaper to defend the chokepoints at the exits to the Arctic Ocean than during the Cold War. And they will do so against vastly reduced Russian forces. The vast natural resources lie within the EEZs of the Arctic nations, so access requires diplomacy and businesses willing to make arrangements for western firms to exploit them. Military resources will not improve access. Finally, the shipping routes will, even with massive growth, never amount to more than a minor fraction of global trade. So, while there is some value in investing in High North capabilities, those resources will have to be taken from already under-resourced theaters with much higher strategic value. Strategy requires allotting scarce assets to priority missions – the High North is not one of them.

While there is essentially no need for major military investment in the High North, the United States should continue to engage concerning environmental issues and apply sanctions against violators. It should also reduce its icebreaker contract to the maximum of six suggested by the Coast Guard. While the current two icebreakers may be insufficient, the proposed buy is much too large. It will take shipbuilding resources away from the Navy at a time when the fleet is understrength and has no path to sufficient numbers of ships. The U.S. can continue to maintain a defense of the High North using the same terrain and maritime chokepoints used during the Cold War. The investments in new generations of cruise missiles and long-range drones necessary to support the priority theaters will also provide a flexible force to defend the north if needed. Lastly, it should not allocate limited DOD assets to the region because high-priority theaters like Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are already under-resourced. These measures can effectively manage Arctic interests within the appropriate context of focused national strategy.

T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He served 30 years in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Endnotes

1. Frank G. Hoffman, “Strategy as an Appetite Suppressant,” War on the Rocks, March 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/strategy-as-appetite-suppressant/.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, “2024 Arctic Strategy,” https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF.

3. Donald J. Trump, “United States National Security Strategy, November 2025,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

4. “Arctic Shipping Update: 37% Increase in Ships in the Arctic Over 10 Years,” Arctic Council, January 31, 2024, https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/ and Malte Humpbert, “Chinese Containership ‘Istanbul Bridge’ Reaches UK via Arctic Route in Record 20 Days,” gCaptain, October 13, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-containership-istanbul-bridge-reaches-uk-via-arctic-route-in-record-20-days/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-5ee6139183-381157581&mc_cid=5ee6139183&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.

5. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Updated July 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41153.

6. Cornell Overfield, “Wrangling Warships: Russia’s Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation,” Lawfare, October 17, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/wrangling-warships-russias-proposed-law-northern-sea-route-navigation.

7. ”Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2024,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, November 28, 2024, https://chnl.no/news/main-results-of-nsr-transit-navigation-in-2024/.

8. Brendan Murray and Danielle Bochove, “China Turns to Arctic Shortcut While Major Carriers Steer Clear,” gCaptain, October 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/china-turns-to-arctic-shortcut-while-major-carriers-steer-clear/. 

9. “International Voyages on the Northwest Passage in 2024,” Aker Arctic, November 13, 2024, https://akerarctic.fi/news/international-voyages-on-the-northwest-passage-in-2024/.

10. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.

11. Malte Humpert, ”Chinese Companies Dispatch Multiple Container Ships Along Arctic Route for Faster European Trade,” High North News, August 4, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-companies-dispatch-multiple-container-ships-along-arctic-route-for-faster-europe-trade/.

12. ”Ship crossings through global maritime passage: January 2022 to April 2024,” Office of National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/bulletins/shipcrossingsthroughglobalmaritimepassages/january2022toapril2024.

13. ”Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage,” NASA Visible Earth, August 8, 2024, https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/images/153166/sea-ice-chokes-the-northwest-passage.

14. Malte Humpert, “Sanctioned Suezmax Oil Tanker Without Ice Protection Stuck for Days on Russia’s Arctic Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, September 15, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/sanctioned-suezmax-oil-tanker-without-ice-protection-stuck-for-days-on-russias-arctic-northern-sea-route/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-245bcea0f7-381157581&mc_cid=245bcea0f7.

15. Malte Humpbert, ” Russia Pushes ‘Shadow Fleet’ to Limit as LNG Carrier Struggles Through Early Arctic Ice on Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, November 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/russia-pushes-shadow-fleet-to-limit-as-lng-carrier-struggles-through-early-arctic-ice-on-northern-sea-route/.

16. Malte Humpbert, ”Two Salvage Vessels Arrive in Canadian Arctic to Begin Refloating of Grounded ‘Thamesborg’,” gCaptain, September 23, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/two-salvage-vessels-arrive-in-canadian-arctic-to-begin-refloating-of-grounded-thamesborg/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-a458a9f7c7-381157581&mc_cid=a458a9f7c7&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.

17. Malte Humpbert, ” Arctic Cargo Ship ‘Thamesborg’ Refloated AIS Data Show, Awaiting Company Confirmation,” gCaptain, October 9, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/arctic-cargo-ship-thamesborg-refloated-ais-data-show-awaiting-company-confirmation/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-400f2f7a4e-381157581&mc_cid=400f2f7a4e&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.

18. Stew Magnusen, ” The Icebreaker Numbers Game,” National Defense, January 13, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/1/13/the-icebreaker-numbers-game.

19. ”DHS Celebrates Purchase of New Coast Guard Icebreakers as President Trump Signs Deal with Finland,” Department of Homeland Security, October 10, 2025, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/10/10/dhs-celebrates-purchase-new-coast-guard-icebreakers-president-trump-signs-deal.

20. Nouman Ali, “The Cost of Icebreaking Services,” SeaRates, Jun 11, 2020, https://www.searates.com/blog/post/the-cost-of-icebreaking-services.

21. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.

22. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.

23. Mia Landauer, Niklas Swanström, and Michael E. Goodsite, ”Mineral Resources in the Arctic: Sino-Russian Cooperation and the Disruption of Western Supply Chains,” Niklas Swanström & Filip Borges Månsson, editors, The “New” Frontier: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and its Geopolitical Implications, September 2025, Institute for Security and Development Policy, https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SP-Arctic-Sep-2025-final.pdf.

24. Ibid, p.109.

25. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.

26. ”Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Status of Oil and Gas Program,” Congressional Research Service, updated July 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12006#:~:text=On January 8%2C 2025%2C DOI,the lease sale discouraged participation.

27. Sune Engel Rasmussen, ” Inside the West’s Race to Defend the Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/inside-the-wests-race-to-defend-the-arctic-0f04ca7a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAi4UrfELbN8TNIpkiANQ9qkJ409UcY7ybn1KHm71Es8FzKPdjCv2Sk3_6eJxEI%3D&gaa_ts=68efa5d0&gaa_sig=X9bLexZswY1r8pD8-BgF7-BUcPWUSkNZB5DFNXcqGswh-PVRHJkHIZ_O-GK6LEEDyK8b2uDpyvgFayIxLxTHnA%3D%3D.

28. Michael S. Brown, ”Rethinking the Arctic Threat Landscape,” Proceedings, November 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/november/rethinking-arctic-threat-landscape?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PWNov6-25&utm_id=PWNov625&utm_source=U.S.+Naval+Institute&utm_campaign=f01c9a3224-Proceedings_This_Week_2025_6_November&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_adee2c2162-f01c9a3224-223022301&mc_cid=f01c9a3224&mc_eid=e0ac270dd4.

Featured Image: The icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB 20) keeps station while conducting crane operations alongside a multi-year ice floe for a science evolution in the Beaufort Sea, Aug. 9, 2023. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Briana Carter)

8. Theater Army Planning Questions for Joint All-Domain and Multi-Domain Operations

​Summary:

Chad Pillai frames the Theater Army as the integrator of Joint All-Domain and Multi-Domain Operations, not merely a land headquarters. His planning questions expose where the Theater Army must synchronize air, maritime, space, cyber, special operations, information, sustainment, and protection functions to enable the GCC and joint force. The emphasis is less on tactics and more on authorities, apportionment, protection of critical nodes, and Army responsibilities as Support to Other Services and Executive Agent. The list highlights that MDO success depends on disciplined prioritization of scarce enablers, clear request mechanisms, and early identification of infrastructure whose loss would collapse joint tempo.

Comment: Chad provides great questions that actually help me gain a better understanding of MDO and JADO. Questions 3 through 7 all have implications for cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence.

Theater Army Planning Questions for Joint All-Domain and Multi-Domain Operations

Chad Pillai

Director of Strategy, Plans, and Assessments; Freelance Editor, Author, and Mentor.

January 23, 2026

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/theater-army-planning-questions-joint-all-domain-chad-pillai-dkjbe/?trackingId=muXyLk5mzuPDHNH9WzmODw%3D%3D

As the former Chief of Plans, G-5 for U.S. Army Europe and Africa, I spent considerable time thinking about how to integrate Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) / Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) into the Theater Army planning process.

Here are the MDO questions I asked my operational planning team (OPT) during the military decision-making process (MDMP) at the Theater Army level, designed to inform operational and resourcing risks and opportunities. Many of these questions are tied to the Army’s Support to Other Services (ASOS) and Executive Agent (EA) responsibilities that require more deliberate thinking to inform the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), Joint Component Commands, and provide specificity to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) on Army resourcing and capabilities needed to accomplish the Theater Army’s mission. I believe these are important questions because they illustrate the unique role the Theater Army plays that Army Corps and Division headquarters generally do not face. The following questions were framed as a Theater Army serving as a combined and joint land force component command (CJFLCC).

1. Air Domain. How many U.S., Allied, and partner assets and capabilities can the air component provide for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and targeting to support the CJFLCC’s ground scheme of maneuver? How much should be allocated or apportioned to subordinate Corps headquarters vs. how much should the CFLCC retain? What support does the air component need for the protection of its air bases (i.e., air defense and localized defense against ground attack or sabotage), logistical support (support the U.S. Air Force’s agile combat employment (ACE) concept), and ground-based signal architecture?

2. Maritime Domain. What U.S., Allied, and partner assets and capabilities can the maritime component provide for ISR and targeting support to the CJFLCC’s ground scheme of maneuver? How does the CJFLCC integrate amphibious capabilities coming ashore, and how does the CJFLCC assume the lead for logistical support? What are the key maritime ashore facilities that the CJFLCC must provide support for protection (i.e., air defense and localized defense against ground attack or sabotage) or logistical support? What enemy coastal defense systems should the CJFLCC prioritize to defeat with its ground-based precision fires to protect maritime forces?

3. Special Operations. What U.S., Allied, and partner special operations are operating in the CJFLCC area of responsibility (AOR)? What assets and capabilities can they provide for ISR, targeting (deep strike), and unconventional warfare (UW) to disrupt or degrade the enemy’s command and control (C2), operational and strategic reserves, and sustainment nodes? Specific to U.S. special operations forces (SOF), what are the ASOS requirements?

4. Space Domain. What U.S., Allied, and partner space-based assets and capabilities are available to support ISR requirements, disrupt or degrade an enemy’s space-based assets or ground-based C2 nodes, and what is the mechanism to request them? Where are the ground-based terminals / relay stations that must be protected to support space operations, and what priority order?

5. Cyber Domain. What U.S., Allied, and partner cyber capabilities and authorities are available to support ISR or request effects to disrupt or degrade an enemy’s C2 nodes, the enemy’s ISR platforms, and what is the mechanism to request support from the cyber component to support the CJFLCC ground-based scheme of maneuver? Where are the land-based physical locations of the cyber server farms, satellite uplink (similar to the space domain), and fiber-optic cable (on land or land-based connection to maritime undersea cables) in the CJFLCC AOR that need to be protected, and in what priority order?

6. Electronic Warfare (EW). What U.S., Allied, and partner EW capabilities exist to jam, spoof, degrade enemy systems (i.e., UAS), are available to support the CJFLCC ground-based scheme of maneuver, and what is the mechanism to request them? Are there any specific land-based EW sites that need to be protected? This could be answered as part of air and maritime domain crosstalk.

7. Information Domain. What is the information – strategic narrative – operating environment look like? Who are the influencers and what platforms do they utilize, and how do people respond (i.e., television, radio, social media, etc.)? Tied to space, cyber, and special operations domains, how can information support military deception operations to confuse the enemy of the CJFLCC’s ground-based scheme of maneuver? How can this domain pass information to the host nation's resistance elements? How is it used to analyze the population’s view of the U.S., Allies, and partners, and that of the enemy?

8. Signal Support. What U.S., Allied, and partner signal architectural capabilities exist in the CJFLCC AOR? Is there sufficient signal bandwidth to support all coalition and joint operations, and if not, how much is available to the CJFLCC? What kinds (i.e., satellite uplink, ground base fiber-optic cables, and data processing centers) and where are the fixed or mobile signal sites that must be protected and in what priority order?

9. Medical Support. What U.S., Allied, and partner medical capabilities (military and civilian) exist in the CJFLCC AOR? What is the mechanism to request civilian support (especially from host nations that must prioritize their population)? What assets are fixed vs. mobile, and what sites need to be protected and in what priority order?

10. Logistical Support. What U.S., Allied, and partner logistical assets are available (military and civilian) in the CJFLCC AOR? What defense industrial base (DIB) sites exist in the CJFLCC AOR that can support surge production to support U.S., Allied, and partner force requirements, to include reconstitution operations? What DIB sites need to be prioritized for protection? Who prioritizes theater-wide logistical support, and who will provide transportation and protection assets?

I’m sure others can develop additional questions, but I felt these were the ones needed to get the OPT thinking and asking the right questions during MDMP.

COL Chad M. Pillai is a senior U.S. Army Strategist who has served in a variety of assignments in the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. He is an editor for Emergent Defense Magazine and a member of the Military Writers Guild. He earned his Master of International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and served as a Visiting Defense Fellow at the Centre for International Defence Policy at Queen’s University.

9. The School of Advanced Military Studies: Educated to Win

​Summary:

SAMS is the Army’s premier warfighter school, known for producing exceptional planners, but designed to educate practitioners of operational art. Founded through Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege’s vision, it adds depth beyond CGSS through history, theory, doctrine, debate, and applied exercises, then reinforces learning via demanding utilization tours. Since 1984, graduates have shaped major operations and risen to senior command. SAMS now runs three competitive tracks: AMSP for operational artists and a master’s degree, ASLSP for strategic leaders and JPME II, and ASP3 for PhD-level strategists. Its aim is judgment under uncertainty, producing leaders who can fight and win.

Comment. I hope the SECWAR gets the message that this is the premier warfighter school (maybe describe it as Top Gun for planners? - Where lethality is planner? ) 

This is an excellent warm up for Kevin Benson's forthcoming book on the history of SAMS (March 1st).  Kevin and I had a recent exchange and when he mentioned his new book I wrote a 1000 missive/reply about my SAMS experience and the critical impact it had on me and my thinking. A few excerpts here.

SAMS has had such an impact on me. My first experience with SAMS was as a Brigade Plans officer in 3d ID in Schweinfurt in 1985. We had to do two complete rewrites of the GDP plan, one for the outgoing commander and then when the new commander took over 6 months later. The 3ID division plans officers were SAMS grad from the first class and they were so impressive that I said at the time I want to learn how to think like them. Then I had Bn Cdr when I was Co Cdr in Korea who was a SAMS grad. Then I was an SF team leader and Bn S3 for another Bn CDR who was a SAMS grad and also a Group Assistant S3 for a Group Commander who was an Advance Fellow from SAMS (AOSF). I was a SOCCE commander during BCTP exercises and watched the Corps planners who were SAMS grads. Again, I said I wanted to learn to think like them because they were so impressive.

So I attended CGSC (2d look selection) in 1995. I had already been fully BQ as an SF Company Commander, Bn S3 and Bn XO. I wanted to go to SAMS. But SF branch had already chosen another SF officer who was below the zone selectee for Major. But I signed up and took the test and then had an interview with Greg Fontenot, the Director at the time. He challenged me on every aspect of SF but said that SF was worthless because when he was a tank Bn CDR in ODS SF did not do jack for him. I thought I had bombed the interview but of course he was testing me (he did not really feel that about SF). But I was selected. But then SF branch said I could only go if SAMS agreed to take two SF officers and fortunately SAMS said okay.  

So I had a great experience. However, the problem came with utilization assignments for SF. SF Branch did not want to send officers to Corps and Divisions (the SOCCORDs had died a slow death by then). They were not sending SF to TSOCS because they were joint assignments and not Army assignments. The only non Division/Corps assignment was to the 8th Army/USFK/CFC in Korea. I had already been assigned to Korea for 3 years and I was in the Korean battalion in SF in 1st SFG. So they sent me to Korea. At SAMS I wrote my second monograph in 1996 on the Catastrophic Collapse of north Korea. When I arrived in Korea the SECDEF had tasked CFC to plan for collapse so I was assigned to the planning team with my good friend Bob Collins who had written the 7 phases of north Korean collapse (getting his masters at a Korean university writing in Korean) and he was a north Korea intelligence expert (and became the chief of strategy at CFC). Our combined academic writing formed the basis for our strategic estimate for the collapse problem. Advice I give to all students about this Korea anecdote is this:

The lesson here is that when attending professional military education or civilian schooling, conduct research and write papers that can be used later in your professional work, especially your next assignment. I did not realize that at the time I was doing this – it was just luck on my part, but I offer it for those who can think about this in their future professional military and civilian educational opportunities. 

Later after battalion command (in Japan and the Philippines for the first missions of the GWOT) I came to DC to be the chief of SF officer assignments in 2002. On our way to DC we flew to Leavenworth because we left our car there 6 years before when we left for Korea in 1996. Since I was going to be the chief of SF officer assignments I went to see the SAMS DIrector who was Jim Greer. I asked him for his desire for SF officers going to SAMS. He said he wanted one in every seminar. In my year as the branch chief I think we were able to get 5 SF officers into SAMS. And over the years I have had the opportunity to influence a number of young officers to attend SAMS, the number is up to about 15 now.

Now I mean no disrespect to the great National War College where I had an equally outstanding experience as student as well as on the faculty for my last assignment in the Army, but SAMS was the most important academic experience that definitely influenced the remainder of my military career. The only education that was as important as SAMS and the National War College came from the University of Pineland and its NCO "professors." (IYKYK)

Now that is just my career. SAMS has had an equal impact on hundreds if not over perhaps over a thousand officers. But it has had an even greater impact on our Army and our military (spawning equally important programs in the Air Force and Marine Corps). I think we can judge that of all military organizations it had the greatest impact on AirLand Battle and ultimately our success in Desert Storm.

So I can't say enough good things about SAMS.

The School of Advanced Military Studies: Educated to Win

by Dwight D. Domengeaux, Jr., by Barry M. Stentiford

|

01.23.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/23/the-school-of-advanced-military-studies/

Graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) have a well-earned reputation as skilled planners. However, the mission of SAMS, the U.S. Army’s premier institution for warfighter education, is not to produce planning specialists. A rigorous education in history, theory, doctrine, and the practical application thereof, makes SAMS graduates integral to operational and strategic planning staffs. Their success as planners is an added benefit rather than the intent of a SAMS education. SAMS’ purpose is to educate skilled practitioners of Operational Art, some of whom would become senior commanders or strategic leaders. In short SAMS develops multi-domain warfighters who can lead, fight, and win in any environment.

The late retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Huba Wass De Czege (1941-2025), was the founding visionary of SAMS. In his early writings on officer education, Wass De Czege, noted that selected officers, who graduated the second year of studies, between 1929 and 1936, at the Army’s Command and General Staff School (CGSS) were over-represented among division and corps commanders during World War II. Wass De Czege was also struck by the paucity of Professional Military Education for US Army officers in the 1970s compared to their allies and probable opponents. At the time, seemingly few officers saw a need, or had a desire, to undertake an in-depth study of war itself. Seeing the gap in advanced military education as a potential risk during war-time, Wass De Czege, with the backing of Lieutenant General William R. Richardson (former Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command), proposed a second year of education for highly selected graduates of the CGSS course. In this second year, students delve into the history and theories of war and current doctrine. The additional year of advanced warfighter education would deepen students’ understanding of the complexities of war and equip them to meet the challenges of an unknown future. After the graduates gained experience through future command and staff assignments, ideally, some would eventually rise to command divisions and corps, as had their World War II predecessors.

An integral part of the education was their follow-on assignments to divisions, corps, and Army Service Component Commands as operational planners. These assignments were like internships, better acquainting them with how to fight a division or corps (authors note: From interview with Major General Crosbie B. Saint, quoted in Benson, “Commemorative History,” p. 7). That experience was envisioned as a vital phase of their education, not the goal. While at SAMS, students were immersed in academic seminars led by former battalion commanders who had taken the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) under respected civilian academics the previous year. Junior field-grade officers, who were students in the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) would concentrate on history and theory, have lively classroom debates on the meaning of what they read, and participate in exercises. Students were to become masters of doctrine without becoming indoctrinated.

The first SAMS class graduated in 1984. Since then, the school has consistently produced graduates who are skilled practitioners of operational art and doctrine, serving in every conflict and contingency operation involving the United States Army. Notable examples include Operation JUST CAUSE (1989) in which SAMS graduates crafted plans that overwhelmed Manuel Noriega’s Panamanian forces, and later during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM (1990-91), General Norman Schwarkopf specifically asked for SAMS graduates—the “Jedi Knights”—to plan the Liberation of Kuwait. Their achievements demonstrated the value of a SAMS education and solidified the reputation of the school. The apprehension of the officer corps to a second year of field grade education, instead of time with the troops, faded as SAMS graduates became selected for battalion, brigade, and higher commands at a high rate. Several SAMS graduates have since fulfilled Wass De Czege’s larger vision by becoming division, corps, and senior Army commanders, such as Lieutenant General Charlie Costanza, Gen. Vincent Brooks, and late generals Charles Jacoby, and Charles “Hondo” Campbell.

Initially organized as a department within the CGSS, SAMS became a separate school under the Command and General Staff College in 1985. Originally, SAMS was exclusively for U.S. Army officers, mostly from the Combat Arms branches. Starting in the late 1980s SAMS admitted other military services – the first U.S. Marine Corps students graduated in 1989, and, later, international and interagency students who have added to the educational experiences of annual cohorts. The exceptional civilian faculty (including many retired officers) went from serving mainly as course authors, to becoming primary instructors on a combined military and civilian teaching team. SAMS regularly evaluates its curriculum and teaching approach, ensuring the school stays attuned to emerging trends in Operational Art and changes to the character of war. The school’s teaching team model and applied warfighter education approach prepares graduates to lead, fight, and win anywhere through the competition, crisis, or conflict continuum.

SAMS consists of three highly competitive programs to meet the Army’s and joint force’s expectations for educated warfighters. Graduates are critical and creative thinkers, agile and adaptive leaders and skilled practitioners of doctrine and Operational Art, who enable senior leaders to achieve favorable strategic, operational and tactical outcomes. All selectees are high-performing officers in their respective military branches who voluntarily apply for a spot in the school.

Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP)

AMSP educates 115 field-grade officers each year. The program integrates history, theory, and doctrine, with practice to develop skilled Operational Artists. Graduates serve a utilization tour as operational planning team (OPT) leads, G/J-5 officers, and commanders. In the longer term, they have the educational depth to serve the Army, joint force, and the nation at ever higher levels of command.

The curriculum emphasizes critical thinking, decision-making, and the application of Operational Art. Students study and evaluate historical campaigns, assess the theory and practice of multidomain operations, and use Design and Systems Thinking to generate options and innovative solutions to military problems. Students undertake a week-long Western Theater Staff Ride studying General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1863 Vicksburg Campaign that, combined with classroom lessons and readings, gives students better understanding of the linkage between tactical actions and strategic outcomes, the essence of Operational Art. AMSP includes six exercises, including division and corps-level Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) planning and joint task force multidomain operations (JTF MDO). Some students participate in operational practicums which offer students short-duration, hands-on experience working with units in the field. Additionally, students research and write a 10,000-word publication-worthy monograph on an operational-level topic. Graduates earn a Master of Arts in Military Operations.

Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program (ASLSP)

Also known as the Marshall Scholars program, is the successor to Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF). It is a two-year senior service college program that combines strategic education with practical application. The curriculum includes modules on strategy, regional studies, joint warfighting, strategic leadership, and 21st-century conflict. They too research and write a monograph of 10,000 words, albeit one focused on the strategic level. The Marshall Scholars undertake extensive field studies to all Regional and Global Combatant Commands, as well as to select allies and partners. Students engage in five exercises annually, applying joint doctrine to campaign planning and design, with a focus on LSCO and multidomain operations. Graduates are Military Education Level 1 (MEL 1) I and Joint Professional Military Education Level II (JPME II) qualified.

In their second year, Marshall Scholars serve as seminar leaders for AMSP and as SAMS teaching faculty. Graduates are uniquely positioned to engage and enable senior leaders, analyze and assess operating environments, and anticipate and adapt to emerging missions. Their ability to communicate succinctly, assess risk, and generate options makes them invaluable advisors to commanders at the highest levels. Marshall Scholars serve in some of the Army’s most demanding staff assignments, and many are selected for senior-level commands.

Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3)

The ASP3, also known as Goodpaster Scholars, is multi-year program that combines academic rigor with practical application. Scholars attend a six-week long summer session at Fort Leavenworth before beginning their formal graduate education at a top-tier civilian university to earn a Ph.D. in a field relevant to the Army’s strategic priorities. Goodpaster Scholars serve tours as advisors to Army senior leaders and as operational unit commanders. Scholars are equipped to address the challenges of the future operating environment, such as integrating artificial intelligence and machine learning into military operations.

Conclusion

The contemporary operating environment is dynamic and complex, stretching the creativity and critical thinking of the most experienced military professionals; future operating environments will be even more demanding. Military leaders face multifaceted challenges, ranging from supporting U.S. allies and partners in ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, to deterring strategic competitors, especially China, and solving strategic challenges in the Western Hemisphere. The complexities of these environments are compounded by adversaries who “employ myriad available technologies (low cost and high-end), they continuously adapt and innovate seeking asymmetries to U.S. strengths.” The U.S. Army and joint force must have warfighters who are ready for these evolving operational and strategic threats. The School of Advanced Military Studies educates warfighters who can lead, fight, and win in any environment, at any level of war. SAMS graduates have the mental agility, creativity, and foresight that “helps commanders in the operational force to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations in a complex environment, and create war-winning solutions” now and in the future (author’s note: quote from SAMS PowerPoint briefing slide, “Applied Warfighter Education,” November 20, 2025).

Check out all of the articles from Small Wars Journal and the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College partnership.

Tags: Army learning, CGSC, Command and General Staff College, PME, Professional Military Education, SAMS, School of Advanced Military Studies

About The Authors

• 
  
• Dwight D. Domengeaux, Jr.
• Colonel Dwight D. Domengeaux, Jr. is the 19th Director of the United States Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). A career Armor Officer, he has served in tactical, operational, and strategic assignments including commanding a Cavalry Squadron and Armored Brigade Combat Team, Senior Cavalry Trainer at the National Training Center, Chief of Plans US Army Pacific, and a Readiness Policy Director on the OSD staff. Colonel Domengeaux has a Bachelor of Science in Economics from Louisiana State University, and master’s degrees from Webster University, SAMS, and The National War College.
• View all posts
• 
  
• Barry M. Stentiford
• Barry M. Stentiford, is a Professor of History at SAMS, teaches in the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program. He holds a PhD in Military History from the University of Alabama, an MA in American History from the University of Montana, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the US Army War College. He has written on non-Regular US forces, the Philippines, Thailand, and other topics. Dr. Stentiford retired from the Army Reserve with the rank of colonel.

10. The End of Battlefield Secrets: Addressing the OSINT Gap in U.S. Special Operations

​Summary:

Jared Martin argues that battlefield secrecy is collapsing under ubiquitous phones, social media, drones, and commercial satellites, and that U.S. Special Operations must treat open-source intelligence as a primary discipline rather than an adjunct. Drawing on Ukraine, he contends OSINT can provide early warning and targeting value faster than traditional classified collection and validation cycles, if integrated intentionally. The core problem is organizational and cultural: OSINT is often ad hoc, request-driven, and insufficiently supported at the tactical edge. He proposes persistent OSINT fusion, embedded analysts, delegated authority for rapid use, and training that builds disinformation detection and decision integration.

Comment: I thought I was practicing using OSINT every day since I began sending out these daily news and commentary messages in 1996. So much useful information comes from open source. But Jared Martin is of course describing something on a whole other level (higher) than what I do.

The End of Battlefield Secrets: Addressing the OSINT Gap in U.S. Special Operations

by Jared Martin

|

01.23.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/23/the-end-of-battlefield-secrets-addressing-the-osint-gap-in-u-s-special-operations/

A member of U.S. Special Forces checks a social media website for intelligence alongside partner forces during a command post training exercise

Abstract: Modern conflict unfolds in an environment no longer covered in secrecy. In a new era of unprecedented transparency, publicly available information often shapes operations faster than classified intelligence. Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, this article argues that United States (U.S.) Special Operations must treat open-source intelligence (OSINT) as a primary discipline and reform organizational structures to enable faster decision-making. Without proactive OSINT integration, Special Operations risks ceding tempo and information advantage to adversaries who operate in the open.

Introduction 

After two decades of operating in politically denied environments and training partner forces during the Global War on Terror, U.S. Special Operations are transitioning away from Counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. With the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, the conclusion of the Syrian civil war in late 2024, and force reductions in Iraq, the counterinsurgency era is effectively closed. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and growing competition between world powers mark the return of conventional warfare. 

In the rebirth of traditional warfare, new battlefronts emerge. Instead of concealed maneuvers and protected communications, conflict now unfolds in a digital environment of environmental transparency and information confrontation. Environmental transparency is where civilian devices, social media, and commercial sensors continuously expose operational activity. Information confrontation is where adversaries weaponize that visibility to shape perception, disrupt decision cycles, and influence outcomes before armed forces can engage. In this new era of battle, open-source data, commercially available imagery, and real-time digital reporting shape mission plans long before a Special Operations team deploys to the battlefield. The forces that recognize and respond to this shift will dictate operational tempo on future fronts. The forces that do not will be forced to react to an environment defined by its foes.  

When Ukrainian forces began pinpointing Russian troop concentrations using open-source imagery and social media faster than conventional intelligence collection means could validate them, it became clear that information dominance now often starts outside classified channels. The lesson to be learned is profound: special operations units that treat OSINT as supplementary risk losing tactical and strategic momentum to adversaries who treat it as another primary weapon.   

OSINT as a Primary Intelligence Discipline 

Today’s digital battlespace is defined by transparency. Drones stream real-time footage, citizens post battlefield updates, and commercial satellites provide near-continuous global overwatch. In such an environment, the speed and accessibility of OSINT can outperform traditional intelligence collection methods, but only if integrated intentionally and organizationally. Research from the U.S. Army War College’s Lessons from Ukraine confirms that OSINT provided Ukrainian forces with early warning indicators, operational targeting value, and even tactical advantages along the front lines. Yet within U.S. Special Operations, OSINT is often used reactively or ad hoc, dependent upon informal networks rather than a systemic organizational structure.  

Why Special Operations Struggles to Integrate OSINT 

Rather than waiting for validation through traditional multi-layered channels, commanders incorporate OSINT into decision-making and action cycles, enabling faster targeting than Russia’s conventional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)-driven model (a model which the U.S. also relies upon)

The Department of Defense has pioneered advanced tools and invested heavily in OSINT capabilities at the strategic level, but operational and tactical integration remains uneven. Analysts and leaders recognize its value, but many still prioritize classified intelligence methodologies as the default, reflecting a bias in the culture rather than a gap in capabilities.  

Compounding the problem, operators frequently lack OSINT support. This gap in support leads to a reliance on individual initiative rather than on doctrine-driven frameworks. Commanders implement OSINT when asked, but it is not guaranteed when the situation demands it. In the Ukrainian case study, open-source information – whether from intelligence agencies, private-sector technologists, or even civilian volunteers – flows rapidly to operational-level commanders. Rather than waiting for validation through traditional multi-layered channels, commanders incorporate OSINT into decision-making and action cycles, enabling faster targeting than Russia’s conventional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)-driven model (a model which the U.S. also relies upon). An excerpt from the Intelligence chapter of A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force offers direct takeaways for U.S. Special Operations: 

“Although the United States’ use of OSINT increased gradually during the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War, the Russia-Ukraine War suggests the vast information environment of publicly and commercially available intelligence is a tremendous untapped opportunity.” 

Battlefield transparency – enabled by social media, commercial sensors, and ubiquitous connectivity – dramatically reduces the value of secrecy alone. The side that processes publicly available data the fastest obtains the decision advantage.  

Operationalizing OSINT Across the SOF Enterprise 

Rather than relying on request-based or ad hoc OSINT exploitation, operators need proactive, persistent OSINT analysis and fusion throughout the planning, movement, execution, and assessment phases.  

The issue for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is not whether the tools exist; rather, it is whether organizational design supports their practical use. Current Special Operations Forces (SOF) came from a time when the intelligence edge resided in collection rather than in interpretation. Just as special operators pioneered distributed mission command, SOCOM must now lead distributed intelligence integration. Rather than relying on request-based or ad hoc OSINT exploitation, operators need proactive, persistent OSINT analysis and fusion throughout the planning, movement, execution, and assessment phases.  

To fully operationalize OSINT, SOCOM should take immediate steps to improve OSINT integration across the intelligence spectrum. A centralized OSINT fusion cell at the theater level could coordinate OSINT intelligence collection and synchronize with classified ISR. Having a centralized OSINT fusion cell provides valuable data to strategic leaders, their headquarters elements, forward-deployed SOF units, and partner intelligence community cells. Furthermore, an OSINT analyst embedded with SOF teams on missions could serve as a liaison to the OSINT fusion cell and directly support deployed SOF commanders. OSINT should be treated as co-equal in mission planning and targeting, rather than as a supplement to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), or other intelligence disciplines. Training must evolve beyond technical proficiency toward cognitive integration, enabling operators to identify disinformation, interpret public sentiment, and act in ambiguous situations. The authority to apply OSINT rapidly should be delegated at or below the level of battalion commanders so that actionable intelligence collected through open-source means is not lost in the process of adjudication. Finally, OSINT integration should be incorporated into readiness assessments, ensuring deployment standards reflect the realities of modern transparent battlefields.  

Conclusion 

The current SOF intelligence framework is highly competent but built for a slower-paced environment. Future adversaries will move faster than our traditional intelligence validation cycles. They will exploit publicly accessible data to orchestrate digital deception, operational masking, and population shaping in real time. Without restructuring now, SOCOM risks repeating legacy intelligence failures in a future conflict where speed and information dominance are more decisive than secrecy. Put simply, SOF cannot win in an era defined by mass transparency if you wait for classified confirmation of what the world already knows. 

OSINT is no longer an additive capability. As societies deepen their engagement in the digital age, spurred by social media and online publications, publicly available intelligence must be a central pillar of Special Operations intelligence and operational design. The framework already exists; it just needs organizational reform, delegated authority, and leadership-driven integration to make OSINT operationally decisive in the battlespace.  

Check out all of Small Wars Journal’s great content.

Tags: open source intelligence, OSINT, Special Operations, Special Operations Forces

About The Author

• 
  
• Jared Martin
• Jared Martin is a U.S. Army veteran and former senior intelligence analyst with over fifteen years of experience in defense and national security. He is currently completing a Master of International Policy & Practice at The George Washington University, where his research supports multiple Integrated Research Projects at the U.S. Army War College as a researcher, editor, and contributing author. His work has been previously featured with Modern War Institute at West Point and BBC News Arabic.

11. Politics, Ethics, and the Human Being in the Culture of Ukraine

​Summary:

Ilya Ganpantsura argues that wartime music in Ukraine has become both a tool of unity and a source of ethical risk. He contrasts the humane, sacrificial ethos of “Bella Ciao” with Ukrainian wartime adaptations that center hatred and “death against the enemy,” warning this can normalize dehumanization and distort civic motivation. He claims World War II myths also shape unrealistic visions of victory, feeding propaganda that mobilizes fear while crowding out pragmatic concepts of peace, recovery, and national renewal. As artists become opinion leaders, he argues, their influence becomes political power and therefore moral responsibility. Ukraine, he concludes, must protect the human being to protect culture, renewing ethics in public life rather than letting politics eclipse it.

Comment: I do love Bella Ciao (HERE). But I also really like "Kyiv Calling." (The Ukraine cover by Beton of the hit pop song "London Calling" by the Clash). Take a few minutes and watch this YouTube video. (HERE)

Politics, Ethics, and the Human Being in the Culture of Ukraine

by Ilya Ganpantsura

|

01.23.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/23/politics-ethics-and-the-human-being-in-the-culture-of-ukraine/

With the outbreak of war in 2022, the patriotic song once again became for Ukrainians a form of collective unity and conscious resistance. This is a stable function of art in times of war. However, when Ukraine’s domestic war has already lasted longer than World War I, it seems that everything has been placed at stake upon the heavy fate of the Ukrainian people: both the choice of the future and the interpretation of the past. The question of the role of culture in the vital rituals by which Ukrainians have lived for almost four years recedes into the shadow of a war that appears to be transforming into an all-consuming fire.

Fate poses a penetrating question: what role does the Ukrainian song occupy in Ukraine today? Does it stand at the tip of the bayonet, or does it sustain life in the rear?

The Risk of Dehumanization

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2022, songs with motifs alluding to the era of World War II became popular in Ukraine. The most vivid example is the song “Ukrainska Liut” (“Ukrainian Fury”) by Khrystyna Solovii, which has garnered over 7 million plays on YouTube Music. The title of the song includes the note “(Bella Ciao Cover).” The melody is indeed taken from the Italian original, while the lyrics are contemporary. The song addresses the outbreak of the war, the destruction of the enemy, the glorification of the Ukrainian army, and the then-popular weapons systems (Javelin and Bayraktar TB2).

The Italian Bella Ciao, a well-known partisan song, symbolizes popular resistance against fascist regimes. Its musical image became canonical and one of the cornerstones of the myth of World War II. In the Ukrainian song, the image of a small people fighting against a vast Russia is adopted, akin to partisans, while the instrumental base of the Italian original reinforces the Ukrainian song with the myth of World War II.

Yet the content of the songs diverges far beyond a shared myth. In the original “Bella Ciao,” there is not a single line about cruelty; the song is devoted to the sacred ideals of love and loyalty, even unto death. The Ukrainian version, by contrast, shifts the emphasis toward the violence of military struggle.

The practical danger is this: such Ukrainian songs distort the motivation for struggle. They cultivate death in war, not in the positive sense of death for the homeland or sacrifice for love, but in a purely negative sense — against the enemy. And while any struggle in war always implies a readiness to die, this framing formulates the song’s idea as “death against the enemy.” Such an idea is reactionary in nature, placing the primary emphasis on hatred rather than on love that seeks wholeness, and contradicting the ideal of military duty.

Beyond the direct promotion of nihilism, the phenomenon of a song becoming a hit also raises the issue of the immaturity of Ukrainian artists in their ethical engagement with military narratives. There is, in part, an explanation for this: the full-scale war began abruptly in 2022, even though it had continued in the background since 2014. However, this in no way diminishes the existing problem of ethical illiteracy within the Ukrainian musical mainstream. On the contrary, the problem shows the potential for further development, as we can observe now, in the fourth year of the war. To the growing tendency toward dehumanization is also added the problem of retreat from reality.

The Loss of Reality in a Fateful Time

The historical scenario of World War II became firmly embedded in people’s minds back in the Soviet Union, where the war functioned as the central ideological construct of the “Great Victory,” almost as a war of independence.

Shortly before the 2022 invasion, decommunization was proclaimed in Ukraine. Ukrainian groups that used the myth of the Second World War to unite the nation and raise morale were forced to turn to motifs from Western songs such as Bella Ciao. Nevertheless, they still reawakened a long-established image of the Second World War in people’s minds — precisely in the Soviet scenario, in which the war ended with the capture of the enemy’s capital and the total defeat of the Wehrmacht.

It is precisely through this myth that Ukrainians imagine the image of victory. The mere halting of the aggressor, or even the return of territories, appears as a far paler idea of victory. In the emotional world of song, it pales in comparison to the image of total annihilation and complete retribution.

A vivid example is the song “Moskva Zghorila y Vtonula” (“Moscow Burned and Sank”) by the band Spiv Brativ, which has amassed over 10 million plays on YouTube Music. The song is built on an extremely simplified metaphor: the city of Moscow is equated with the cruiser of the same name that was sunk in the spring of 2022.

The danger of this pattern lies in the fact that it shapes the narrative of how Ukrainians envision victory or defeat in the war. Increasingly, the word “capitulation” can be heard in the public sphere. Ukrainian military commentators, frightening audiences with the prospect of defeat, have invoked the image of “the Russian flag over Lviv,” echoing the iconic image of “the Soviet flag over the Reichstag.” The harsh reality on the front lines in 2024–2025 has naturally sharpened this narrative. As a result, the myth of World War II has come to be used by propagandists to rally the Ukrainian people not around struggle, but around fear. At the same time, the possibility of stopping the war along the line of contact as a chance to begin implementing a new project for Ukraine’s development — to grow, become stronger, and more culturally vibrant — is not being considered. A victory plan that would make Ukraine more attractive to the many Ukrainians who have left the country would constitute a true victory of peace, not according to the script of the Second World War, but according to the script of Ukraine’s future. However, war-hawk propagandists dismiss this option, placing their bet on a narrative driven by negative motivation and a war fought to the very end.

“At the same time, the world, even while anticipating the next war, offers a chance for political change, for deep reforms, for full recovery, economic growth, and the return of citizens.” — Popular among both the public and the military, General Zaluzhnyi, Liga.Net.

The Anthropology of Fear

Disturbing news from the front can be perceived extremely painfully, especially if someone familiar is fighting in the war. The instinct of psychological self-preservation compels a person to stop watching battlefield maps or reading the news. One distances oneself from the real disposition at the front as from a psychological irritant, all the more so if the front is far away and one’s own life is not under immediate threat.

From this, follow the main characteristic features of songs that influence a society that relies heavily on emotional experience. A person may stop following news from the front, but the habit of living on an emotional high remains. News is then replaced by art and music as one of the most accessible forms of escape and entertainment.

In songs, the dependent individual hears two dimensions that flatter them and construct an informational bubble detached from reality. On the one hand, war songs function as a form of extremity that mobilizes people for struggle. On the other hand, they always contain hope (a law of art described already by Aristotle: tragedy must not be without an exit).

Nevertheless, even under such circumstances, a person remains a human being. And as Aristotle said, the human being is a political animal who realizes their nature by living in the polis, the community, the state, and by participating in shared life.

And when the time comes for referendums or sociological surveys, the individual chooses a position shaped by propaganda and culture — by songs. In songs, even the most dramatic ones, the question is nonetheless posed in heroic terms. Yet this is precisely the problem: the heroism of songs is a myth, while the human being remains detached from reality.

Songs That Shape Ukraine

In 2025, Kyiv officially received the status of a “UNESCO City of Music,” indicating institutional recognition of the role music plays in the city’s cultural life. In cultural publications, Ukraine’s folk song heritage is often described as comprising approximately 15,500 folk verses. This is hardly surprising given Ukraine’s vivid history, which resembles not so much a musical album as an immense catalogue of songs. By primarily intertwining cultures and historical events, Ukrainian songs form a rich and multifaceted image of the Ukrainian world. It is of fateful importance, even amid the fog of war, not to forget this principle of diversity.

Today, Ukraine is rejecting Russian cultural heritage, which, incidentally, in various forms is included in UNESCO’s register of Ukrainian heritage. In doing so, it violates its own historical principle of formation, cultivating within itself the seed of contradiction. Do Ukrainians — who are always ready to defend their traditions — truly allow the arbitrary erasure of the memory of their culture from the Soviet and imperial periods solely because of the aggression of a neighboring state? This undermines multiculturalism as the central factor in Ukraine’s formation. The aggressive actions of the dictator in the Kremlin are merely a catalyst.

Protect the human being — and we will protect culture; Protect culture — and we will protect the human being.

The true threat arises when ethics withdraws from politics. Aristotle wrote of politics as the highest form of association, encompassing all other forms of human existence, including the sphere of culture. Today, when singers become popular opinion leaders, in times of hardship, their creative work begins to exert decisive influence on people, thereby acquiring the power of the highest political good. According to Aristotle: “…the most authoritative of all associations and the one that embraces all the others. This association is called the state, or the political association” (Aristotle, Politics, Book I).

With the emergence of power among artists, immense responsibility also arises. Therefore, when culture borrows the myths of total war and replaces ethics with hatred, it loses its humanizing function and begins to operate as a mechanism of fear and propaganda.

The ethical danger for Ukraine today lies not only in the fact that, in choosing between struggle and capitulation, it risks losing its connection with reality, but also in the possible loss of a part of its own political culture. When activists begin conversations about statehood, heroism, and war, they rarely address in their reasoning the place of the ordinary human being. Today, not only for Ukraine but everywhere where an ordinary person can be destroyed by the immorality of politics, it is more important than ever to raise the question of humanity, of people’s mental health, and of the ethical literacy of opinion leaders — not by restricting culture through censorship, but by establishing a new trend focused on preserving the human being in the unpredictable world of politics.

The defeat of ethics by politics will lead to the demise of democracy. Human consciousness will experience its own insignificance before the steel rain of events, powerless to change anything. In such a case, only philosophers can help politicians by deconstructing the terrifying myths of propaganda and initiating dialogue from the standpoint of traditions, societies, and human beings.

“Compassion is the chief, perhaps the only, law of the existence of all humanity.” — Fyodor Dostoevsky.

Tags: Kyiv UNESCO City of Music, Resistance Movements, Russia-Ukraine War, Wartime Music

About The Author

• 
  
• Ilya Ganpantsura
• Ilya Ganpantsura is an independent Ukrainian cultural and political critic. He studies the political philosophy of conservatism and analyzes the societal consequences of contemporary conflicts, particularly in the modern context of Ukraine, Russia, and global politics.

12. Remarks by NATO Secretary General at World Economic Forum, Davos

​Summary:

At Davos, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte framed NATO as essential to U.S. and European security, arguing a safe Arctic, Atlantic, and Europe are inseparable. He refused to comment publicly on Greenland, saying public statements would hinder de-escalation, while stressing NATO must strengthen Arctic defense against Russia and China. Rutte credited POTUS with forcing Allies to reach 2 percent and pushing the new 5 percent ambition, then warned money is not enough without a surge in defense industrial production. He repeatedly redirected the room to Ukraine, urging sustained near-term support and more interceptors as Russia continues high-casualty attacks.

Excerpt:

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

You talked about security in the Arctic, no matter how you come out of this Greenland row. I mean, it really seems as if the dynamics have fundamentally changed within NATO. You have Macron saying yesterday, we are shifting to a world without rules. Hasn't all of this fundamentally damaged the foundations of NATO, this shared trust, the shared values.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

Of course, I see that there are these tensions at the moment. There's no doubt. Again, I'm not going to comment on that, but I can assure you, the only way to deal with that is, in the end, thoughtful diplomacy. So statements from me will not add anything here.

And when it comes to the Arctic, I think President Trump is right, other leaders in NATO are right: we need to defend the Arctic. We know that the sea lanes are opening up. We know that China and Russia are increasingly active in the Arctic. There are eight countries bordering on the Arctic. Seven are a member of NATO, that's Finland and Sweden and Norway and Denmark, Iceland, Canada and the US. And there's only one country bordering on the Arctic outside NATO, that's Russia.

And I would argue there is a ninth country, which is China, which is increasingly active in the Arctic region. So, President Trump and other leaders are right. We have to do more there. We have to protect the Arctic against Russian and Chinese influence. And that is exactly what NATO ambassadors decided to do in September. We are working on that, making sure that, collectively, will we defend the Arctic region.

Question

I'm [inaudible] from Saudi Arabia with a Greek mother and an Italian wife. Europe can defend itself. That's very clear today. But my question is, do we feel safer? I'm planning to retire in Europe. Do I feel safer today with all this stock up of military? As you asked the question, when the war is over, what you do with all this military?

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

If you want to prevent war, prepare for war. The only way we can prevent the Russians or anyone who wants to do us harm is to make sure that they know that the reaction we will have is devastating. Today, yes, it is. But if we would have continued with this 1.8, 1.9% defence spending and the defence industrial base - which is not producing enough- we would not be ready in ‘29, ’31. And our adversaries know this. So, I know that people are worried that we are spending more on defence. Yes, we do this to prevent war from breaking out. You have to be strong. We have to be strong against those who wish us ill.

Comment: There could be no better concluding comment from the Secretary General than the one above. It has has to be read in the context of this excerpt as well:

There was one big irritant on the American side with NATO, and the big irritant, since Eisenhower, was that they were spending, the US was spending, so much more than Europe was spending. Even today, the US is spending 3.5% of GDP on core defence; we are spending in Europe average 2% on defence. And here's my question to the audience. I mean, many of you, I know, criticize Donald Trump, but do you really think that without Donald Trump, eight big economies in Europe, including Spain and Italy and Belgium, Canada, by the way, also outside Europe, would have come to 2% in 2025 when they were only on 1.5% at the beginning of the year?

No way. Without Donald Trump, this would never have happened. They are all on 2% now. Do you really think that in the Summit in The Hague, as already Alex was saying, sorry, the President of Finland was saying, that we would come to a overall defence spending of 5%, including 3.5 in core defence, if President Trump would not have been re-elected as president of the United States?

No way. It would never have happened. So again, I'm not popular with you now because I'm defending Donald Trump, but I really believe you can be happy that he is there because he has forced us in Europe to step up, to face the consequences that we have to take care more of our own defence. And this is the thing – the Americans still have over 80,000 soldiers in Europe. They are still, including in Poland, in Germany, etc, they are still heavily invested in European defence. And yes, they have to pivot more towards Asia. So, it is only logical for them to expect us in Europe to step up, over time.

Remarks by NATO Secretary General at World Economic Forum, Davos

nato.int

• 21 January 2026

https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/01/21/nato-secretary-general-at-world-economic-forum-davos

© 2026 World Economic Forum. Copyright: World Economic Forum/Valeriano Di Domenico

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

Hello and a very warm welcome to this special edition of Deutsche Welle’s Conflict Zone from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. I'm Sarah Kelly. We're here with the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the President of Poland Karol Nawrocki, President of Finland Alexander Stubb, the President of the European Investment Bank Nadia Calviño, and the CEO of Sanofi, Paul Hudson.

Welcome to all of you, and thank you so much for joining us. Now, this question, can Europe defend itself has really been thrust into the forefront as Donald Trump threatens Allies over Greenland. As we wait for Trump to deliver a statement in just a few hours, there has been so much discussion in the past few days, not only about the potential for a trade war with Europe, but also even the collapse of the NATO Alliance itself. And with that, Mr. Secretary General, I'd like to begin with you, because, with the US still a guarantor of European security, are European NATO Allies hostage to Trump's demands?

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

Listen, NATO since 1949 is the Transatlantic Alliance, and I think we have to be very careful in considering the fact that the US and Canada are not only in NATO to prevent the historic mistake the US made, in their own view, after the First World War, which was retreating from the world stage and then the long arm of history reaching out to the US again in the Second World War, not wanting to repeat that mistake.

They are in NATO because NATO is crucial, not only for the defence of Europe, but also for the defence of the United States. For the United States to stay safe, you need a safe Arctic, a safe Atlantic, and a safe Europe. And all the military, all the politicians, and you guys know this, and we really have to be mindful of this. So when the question is, is Europe safe? Yes, Europe is safe because of what Europe is doing itself within NATO, but also because we have that strong transatlantic relationship.

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

But we know the history, we know the stakes. Let's talk about the current dynamics. And I'd like to ask you, you know, for perhaps a bit of reflection here, did you ever think that you would ever see one NATO member threaten the territorial integrity of another? I mean, you have now the prime minister of Greenland telling his public, an attack cannot be ruled out.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

Listen, my role as NATO Secretary General, when there is tension within the Alliance, it has been there in the past between Greece and Türkiye, there have been other moments when there was tension, then my predecessors always took the view that they should not comment on that in public. That's impossible. Why is that impossible? Because as soon as I do, I cannot any longer help to somehow, with others, of course, not me, only myself, but of course, with other leaders, to basically defuse the tension, to deescalate, etc. That's why you will not hear me comment. You can be assured that I'm working on this issue behind the scenes, but I cannot do it in public. So, sorry, no comments from me on Greenland.

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

Well, sometimes behind the scenes, comments do become public in various ways.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

That's true.

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

You talked about security in the Arctic, no matter how you come out of this Greenland row. I mean, it really seems as if the dynamics have fundamentally changed within NATO. You have Macron saying yesterday, we are shifting to a world without rules. Hasn't all of this fundamentally damaged the foundations of NATO, this shared trust, the shared values.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

Of course, I see that there are these tensions at the moment. There's no doubt. Again, I'm not going to comment on that, but I can assure you, the only way to deal with that is, in the end, thoughtful diplomacy. So statements from me will not add anything here.

And when it comes to the Arctic, I think President Trump is right, other leaders in NATO are right: we need to defend the Arctic. We know that the sea lanes are opening up. We know that China and Russia are increasingly active in the Arctic. There are eight countries bordering on the Arctic. Seven are a member of NATO, that's Finland and Sweden and Norway and Denmark, Iceland, Canada and the US. And there's only one country bordering on the Arctic outside NATO, that's Russia.

And I would argue there is a ninth country, which is China, which is increasingly active in the Arctic region. So, President Trump and other leaders are right. We have to do more there. We have to protect the Arctic against Russian and Chinese influence. And that is exactly what NATO ambassadors decided to do in September. We are working on that, making sure that, collectively, will we defend the Arctic region.

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

Do European NATO Allies need to think more about having capabilities that overlap with the United States? To hedge their bets.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

NATO is constructed like this: that the US, Canada and the European NATO Allies work completely integrated. It doesn't mean that there is the US coming to the rescue of Europe, or Europe coming to the rescue of the United States – we are working completely integrated. And for the protection of both the US and Europe, it's crucial that NATO is there.

There was one big irritant on the on the American side with NATO, and the big irritant, since Eisenhower, was that they were spending, the US was spending, so much more than Europe was spending. Even today, the US is spending 3.5% of GDP on core defence; we are spending in Europe average 2% on defence. And here's my question to the audience. I mean, many of you, I know, criticize Donald Trump, but do you really think that without Donald Trump, eight big economies in Europe, including Spain and Italy and Belgium, Canada, by the way, also outside Europe, would have come to 2% in 2025 when they were only on 1.5% at the beginning of the year?

No way. Without Donald Trump, this would never have happened. They are all on 2% now. Do you really think that in the Summit in The Hague, as already Alex was saying, sorry, the President of Finland was saying, that we would come to a overall defence spending of 5%, including 3.5 in core defence, if President Trump would not have been re-elected as president of the United States?

No way. It would never have happened. So again, I'm not popular with you now because I'm defending Donald Trump, but I really believe you can be happy that he is there because he has forced us in Europe to step up, to face the consequences that we have to take care more of our own defence. And this is the thing – the Americans still have over 80,000 soldiers in Europe. They are still, including in Poland, in Germany, etc, they are still heavily invested in European defence. And yes, they have to pivot more towards Asia. So, it is only logical for them to expect us in Europe to step up, over time.

And there is this plan already — since Jens Stoltenberg, my predecessor, designed it — the NATO Defence Planning Process, to over time, make sure that Europe can take over more of these capabilities, of these core enablers from the US to do more of the protection of the European continent.

We are still having a strong, conventional US presence in Europe also going forward, and, of course, the nuclear umbrella as our ultimate guarantor. But again, I'm absolutely convinced, without Donald Trump we would not have taken those decisions. And they are crucial, particularly for the European and the Canadian side of NATO to really grow up in the post-Cold War world.

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

Secretary General, I'd like to ask for your remarks also on that point. We've been talking about can Europe defend itself? The question is, how and how that evolves also over the next years? Do you ever see a day where European defence doesn't have NATO as the cornerstone?

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

No, I don't. And let's not forget, the EU is great. It is 23 countries in NATO of the 32 are also in the EU. But it is only 25% of NATO’s overall GDP. 75% of NATO GDP is outside the European Union. Let's not forget, that's a fact. The US is by far the most powerful nation on Earth. And the President of the United States is therefore the leader of the free world. And you cannot envision NATO without the leader of the free world being an integral part of that organisation. And nobody wants it, not on the US side, not on the European side. He said last night in his presser that he was doubtful whether the Europeans would come to the rescue if Article 5 would be triggered. I tell him: yes, they will. And they did on the 11th of September — 9/11 — in 2001 when, for the first and only time, Article 5 was triggered. I have no doubt the US will come to the rescue here [in Europe]. We will come to the rescue of the US. And we need each other for our collective protection.

You [President Stubb] made a very good point. The risk here is that we focus, of course, on Greenland because we have to make sure that that issue gets solved in an amicable way. But the main issue is not Greenland now, the main issue is Ukraine. And I agree with everything Alex Stubb was saying, but I'm also a little bit worried that we might drop the ball focusing so much on these other issues. And, as we speak, Russian missiles and Russian drones are attacking the energy infrastructure in Ukraine. We know that it is now minus 20 degrees in Kyiv. We know that Ukraine can only take care of 60 percent of its own electricity. And yes, it is true, the Russians have lost in December 1000 people dead – not seriously wounded, dead – a day. That's over 30,000 in the month of December. In the 1980s in Afghanistan, the Soviets lost 20,000 in 10 years. Now they lose 30,000 in one month.

But they still continue the attack. They still increase the attacks. And that means that if we Europeans here in NATO are thinking that because of the 90 billion the Commission has been able to bring together with the nations, or because the peace process is moving in the right direction, we can forget about the defence of Ukraine, don't. They need our support now, tomorrow and the day after. And yes, great if there is a peace deal. Everybody's working on that. The Americans, of course, are leading that process. Great that the 90 billion is there, but that will only be there in March, April, May, whenever. So that still takes time. So I need European Allies to keep focus on this issue. And what I'm really worrying about is that because of the peace process and because of the 90 billion we lose sight. And that in the meantime, Ukrainians do not have enough interceptors, [do not] have enough American gear — [which] particularly they need because it is not any longer available in Europe - for them to defend themselves. So, this focus in Ukraine should be our number one priority, and then we can discuss on all the issues, including Greenland. But it should be Ukraine first because it is crucial for our European and US security.

Sarah Kelly, Moderator

I'd like to open up the conversation now to the audience. This is a very high-level audience, we have to say. I'm seeing President of Latvia sitting in the front row. I believe I also spotted the Defence Minister of the Netherlands here as well, right there. We'll be passing around a mic, and I would like to ask that you please stand up and that questions are kept brief, because I see many hands going up.

Question from the audience

Thank you very much. I have a very short question to SecGen Rutte. There are negotiations about Ukraine, and I fully agree with you that Ukraine is a main challenge, and Russia, basically is the main threat. The question is, once we agree that there are some chances for the long-lasting peace, are we as Europe prepared for what would be next with Russia, with this aggressive approach with the society — which is still through disinformation — educated with aggressive approach towards the West. What will happen with those hundreds of thousands of troops, capabilities, etc, if they won't be engaged in Ukraine? They won't just wait for the better prosperous future. Are we ready as NATO to take this problem. Thank you very much.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

Yes, we are ready today. There's no doubt. But we have to be ready in ‘27 and ‘29 and ’31. And this is why what we decided in The Hague — to ramp up defence spending to this 5% — was crucial. But you also have to ramp up the defence industrial production. And we're not doing it. Not in the US, not in Europe. We're not nearly producing enough. The fact that Poland, which is the closest Ally to the US you can find, is buying in South Korea, is because they cannot buy enough in the US or in the European-

President of Finland Alexander Stubb

And buying in Finland.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

Yes, Alex, I love you, but you’re not producing enough. Your defence industrial base has to ramp up. And you know it, so please spend time on that. And this is true for the whole of NATO territory. So, it is not only money, it's also the defence industrial base, including preparing our other industries, including our car industries, etc, for a moment when there might be a situation where we need them. Russia is on a war economy footing. They spend 40% of the state budget on defence, 200 billion a year with a spending power with the 200 billion - because of the structure of their economy, which is much higher than we can do in Europe. So we really have to be watchful here. Yes, we can defend ourselves today, but we have to deliver on The Hague commitments. Not because of Donald Trump — yes, it equalizes with the US that keeps them in — but particularly because we have to defend ourselves.

Question

My name is Andrea Malaguti. What do you think about the Board of Peace with Lukashenko and Putin for Gaza?

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

NATO is 32 countries in the Northern Atlantic, and I'm not commenting on things outside the North Atlantic area. Sorry, I have too much on my plate already. Thank you.

Question

Mark Rutte, can you please comment on Mark Carney’s speech yesterday here in Davos. It was very honest. What is your reaction to it?

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

I respect him a lot, and I’ll see him later today. And I think he had a speech which was strong on Canadian values and what Canada can contribute to the world. At the same time, I would say this is very good, and Canada is back when you look at NATO. They were spending 1.3, 1.4%. They got to the 2%. They have now a plan to reach the 5%. They're massively helping out with Ukraine now so I could say, since he [Mark Carney] became Prime Minister, [Canada] is really back in NATO, back in defending the transatlantic Alliance. And I think that's great news.

Question

Thank you very much. Would you think that if the transfer of the sovereignty of agreement can be achieved, would you think this might lead to the demise of the idea of so called ‘Western collective?’ And secondly, that if this needs to be transferred, would you think that the NATO 3.0 just like President Stubb said, might be veer into something more like the Warsaw Pact rather than original NATO. Of course, we have the Polish president; you can also coordinate. Thank you very much.

Question

I'm [inaudible] from Saudi Arabia with a Greek mother and an Italian wife. Europe can defend itself. That's very clear today. But my question is, do we feel safer? I'm planning to retire in Europe. Do I feel safer today with all this stock up of military? As you asked the question, when the war is over, what you do with all this military?

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte

If you want to prevent war, prepare for war. The only way we can prevent the Russians or anyone who wants to do us harm is to make sure that they know that the reaction we will have is devastating. Today, yes, it is. But if we would have continued with this 1.8, 1.9% defence spending and the defence industrial base - which is not producing enough- we would not be ready in ‘29, ’31. And our adversaries know this. So, I know that people are worried that we are spending more on defence. Yes, we do this to prevent war from breaking out. You have to be strong. We have to be strong against those who wish us ill.

13. TikTok Finalizes Deal to Keep Operating in the U.S.

​Summary:

The new TikTok joint venture reduces some classic risks by moving U.S. data handling and algorithm training under Oracle oversight, and by capping ByteDance’s stake. Yet cognitive warfare risk is not only about ownership. It is about recommender tuning, content moderation incentives, and the ability to shape attention at scale across 200 million U.S. users. The 2024 divest-or-ban law was driven by these influence concerns, not just privacy.

Comment: If the algorithm is the weapon, who will continuously verify that its objectives, training data, and enforcement decisions are insulated from foreign party-state leverage?

TikTok Finalizes Deal to Keep Operating in the U.S.

WSJ

The agreement was negotiated to comply with a 2024 law requiring the company to do a deal to address U.S. national-security concerns

By Amrith Ramkumar

Follow

Updated Jan. 22, 2026 10:23 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-finalizes-deal-to-keep-operating-in-the-u-s-dd2c161a?mod=hp_lead_pos1

The TikTok logo in Davos, Switzerland. TikTok said it has 200 million users in the U.S. Krisztian Bocsi/Bloomberg News

TikTok officially established a joint venture that would allow it to keep operating in the U.S., the company said Thursday, resolving a yearslong fight to address Washington’s national-security concerns.

Under the terms of the deal negotiated by the Trump administration, the popular video-sharing app will be operated by a new U.S. entity controlled by investors seen as friendly to the U.S. Its data-management and algorithm-training on American users will be overseen by Oracle, the cloud-computing giant that has safeguarded its U.S. data for years and has close ties to the Trump administration.

The deal was negotiated to comply with a law passed in 2024. President Trump delayed the implementation of the law a year ago after starting his second term to keep TikTok operating in the U.S. He signed a series of executive orders to extend the deadline for completing a deal until it was met Thursday.

“I am so happy to have helped in saving TikTok!” Trump said in a social-media post Thursday night. He thanked Chinese leader Xi Jinping “for working with us and, ultimately, approving the Deal. He could have gone the other way, but didn’t, and is appreciated for his decision.”

Trump and TikTok’s investors and allies pushed the deal through despite lingering concerns among lawmakers and security hawks that China could still influence the new entity through TikTok parent ByteDance, which owns almost 20% of it.

“The majority American owned joint venture will operate under defined safeguards that protect national security through comprehensive data protections, algorithm security, content moderation and software assurances for U.S. users,” TikTok CEO Shou Chew said in an internal note to employees announcing the news.

Chew’s deputy Adam Presser will lead the new entity, which was created after securing approval from the U.S. and Chinese governments. The board members include Chew, Oracle executive Ken Glueck and several investors.

Oracle, private-equity firm Silver Lake and Abu Dhabi-based MGX will each own 15% of the new entity while existing TikTok investors own about 30%.

Other notable investors include Vice President JD Vance’s former firm Revolution and tech executive Michael Dell’s family investment office.

Vance spent a brief stint at the firm founded by AOL co-founder Steve Case during his time as a venture investor, which preceded his 2022 Senate campaign.

Vance said previously that the deal values the new entity at about $14 billion.

The investors are paying the U.S. government a multibillion-dollar fee for arranging the deal, a concept Trump previously called a “tremendous fee-plus.”

TikTok said it has 200 million users in the U.S., up from its 2024 estimate of about 170 million.

Trump touted his popularity on TikTok earlier Thursday, posting on Truth Social that his posts on the platform get more engagement than posts on TikTok competitor Instagram, which is owned by Meta Platforms.

Trump said that TikTok helped him win his second term after previously trying to ban the app in the U.S. during his first term.

Write to Amrith Ramkumar at amrith.ramkumar@wsj.com

Copyright ©2026 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the January 23, 2026, print edition as 'TikTok Wraps Up Deal to Stay in U.S.'.

WSJ

14.The Closing of the Marine Corps Mind? Strategy, Credentialism, and the Pursuit of Intellectual Depth

​Summary:

Benjamin Van Horrick argues the Marine Corps is signaling a hunger for intellectual depth while sustaining a system that rewards credentialism over disciplined study. Using Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind as the centerpiece, he treats the Commandant’s reading list as a symptom: eclectic titles without a guiding framework can fragment attention rather than build strategic judgment. He warns that professional military education too often optimizes for the next billet, then confuses seat time and master’s degrees with rigor. His remedy is old-fashioned and demanding: guided engagement with great books, sustained discussion, and institutional support that turns reading into education, not self-help.

Excerpts:

Bloom’s prescription—the close, disciplined reading of great books—has never been more accessible. Podcasts, YouTube lectures, online reading groups, and widely available digital editions now place the classical education Bloom championed within easy reach of any motivated Marine. The Marine Corps should seek to facilitate this learning. It could consider, for example, partnering with St. John’s College in Annapolis, which focuses its liberal arts curriculum on great books, to bring these to its Marines. Ancient texts such as the Iliad, the Odyssey, the works of Thucydides, and Plato’s Republic offer insights and spur self-examination for students, particularly those facing danger, risk, and uncertainty.

In his initial guidance to Marines upon being nominated to serve as commandant, General Eric Smith declared, “We prepare for the worst-case scenario—the pacing threat. If the day comes that we must face that threat, we will be ready.” That pacing threat remains China. Should the grim casualty estimates for a potential conflict with China prove accurate, the Marine Corps will only be as ready as its leaders at all levels. It will need leaders who have spent hard hours training in the field, but who have also spent evenings around a seminar table wrestling with enduring works, gaining the intangible qualities on which victory has so often depended: historical understanding, moral clarity, and the resolve to endure.

Comment: Hmmm... Of course I am a fan of the great books. But do they really need to be on the Commandant's Reading List? The great books should be foundational in our education system. If the only time service members are exposed to them is through the Commandant's Reading List or if it takes the Commandant to tell Marines to read them then perhaps the problem is with our education system.

The Closing of the Marine Corps Mind? Strategy, Credentialism, and the Pursuit of Intellectual Depth - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Benjamin Van Horrick · January 23, 2026

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-closing-of-the-marine-corps-mind-strategy-credentialism-and-the-pursuit-of-intellectual-depth/

Former Secretary of Defense and Marine Corps General James Mattis once observed that “the most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears.” Yet, recent efforts to foster intellectual depth remain fragmented. The recent release of the Marine Corps commandant’s annual professional reading list features Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind. A cultural thunderclap upon its 1987 release, the University of Chicago professor’s tome raced to the top of the bestseller lists. The book’s scathing indictment of higher education’s lack of focus, leading to relativism, is a curious entry in the strategy category of the reading list. The inclusion of Bloom’s book identifies the need for intellectual depth but ultimately falls flat given the unfocused nature of both the reading list and the Marine Corps’ broader educational offerings.

The Closing of the American Mind portrays higher education as adrift, abandoning the Western canon in favor of classes guided by ideological trends, not universal truths. As a result, pupils no longer pursue lofty aims like the quest for justice, truth, and beauty, settling instead for the low-hanging fruit of moral relativism. As Bloom warns, “We are like ignorant shepherds living on a site where great civilizations once flourished. The shepherds play with the fragments that pop up to the surface, having no notion of the beautiful structures of which they were once a part.” Bloom contends that “the failure to read good books both enfeebles the vision and strengthens our most fatal tendency—the belief that the here and now is all there is.” Casting aside great books had the opposite effect: “Openness used to be the virtue that permitted us to seek the good by using reason. It now means accepting everything and denying reason’s power.” Bloom’s warnings proved prescient, as the trends he identified in the late 1980s are today the focus of criticism not only of colleges and universities but even K-12 curricula. However, the complexity of Bloom’s work risks readers not grasping its intended meaning, especially in a self-directed program without guided discussion.

The inclusion of The Closing of the American Mind under the strategy category prompts questions about how the book will improve strategic outcomes. The reading list describes the book as “a provocative analysis of America’s intellectual decline and its impact on culture, education, and leadership.” Even more puzzling is its placement alongside other titles in the same strategy category, such as Simon Sinek’s The Infinite Game, John Lewis Gaddis’s On Grand Strategy, and Lawrence Freedman’s Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine. The eclectic mix of books, blending dense cultural critique with modern leadership guides and operational histories, mirrors the fragmented university curricula that Bloom scorches. The rotation of titles on the professional reading list attempts to keep suggestions fresh, but the changes often disorient, contributing to this lack of thematic cohesion. A serious reading of the book identifies the problems of modern education, yet the Marine Corps supplies no remedy—instead, it exacerbates them. Such a collection of titles, with little commonality or complementary attributes, does not build an intellectual foundation but further fragments attention.

To be sure, a self-study reading list will almost inevitably be characterized by some degree of a scattershot quality, by virtue of being what it is—a reading list, rather than an educational framework. The risk, however, is that that same scattershot quality that focuses institutional attention on a wide variety of intensely current subjects absent historical context—precisely what Bloom warned against—manifests elsewhere in a military service’s identity. Just over a year before releasing the updated reading list, at the Reagan National Defense Forum in December 2024, the commandant emphasized US advantages over China: “The advantage lies with us because our last combat was captured on somebody’s iPhone 14. [China’s] last combat was captured on oil and canvas, and they should not forget that.” He added, “I would not undersell the value that our combat experience brings to this fight.” While this was likely intended as motivational rhetoric, the remarks prioritize the vivid here and now. The Marine Corps must be careful about doing so at the cost of nuanced historical engagement—precisely the tendency Bloom warned would enfeeble strategic vision.

Bloom’s book serves as a critique of modern education, including the offerings of the US military. The pedagogical trends that Bloom identified in the 1980s now permeate its professional military education. For officers, these courses focus on preparing them for their next assignment rather than fostering lifelong learning. Just as in the ivory towers of civilian academia, military professional military education institutions mistake classroom hours for rigor and the number of pages read for depth. The decision to confer master’s degrees sought to professionalize these courses—and reflects a proliferation of master’s degrees in American society as a whole. But it also reveals a normative expectation among the US armed services that promotion to field-grade ranks and above is associated with earning a graduate degree, even if it is not a statutory requirement. In the case of professional military education, the resulting bloated curricula and added seat time transformed military education into just another credentialing exercise. By watering down the master’s degree while depriving students of genuine intellectual rigor, the military instilled false confidence in its officers through the hollow validation of an advanced degree. The résumés of military officers grew longer, but intellectual growth retreated. This is the very process Bloom diagnosed decades ago. James Burnham, in his 1941 The Managerial Revolution, foresaw this trend toward credentialism as the emerging managerial class focused on the bottom line and, in a professional military context, not leading those on the front line. The process risks turning leaders in the profession of arms into a managerial class in combat boots.

Bloom’s prescription—the close, disciplined reading of great books—has never been more accessible. Podcasts, YouTube lectures, online reading groups, and widely available digital editions now place the classical education Bloom championed within easy reach of any motivated Marine. The Marine Corps should seek to facilitate this learning. It could consider, for example, partnering with St. John’s College in Annapolis, which focuses its liberal arts curriculum on great books, to bring these to its Marines. Ancient texts such as the Iliad, the Odyssey, the works of Thucydides, and Plato’s Republic offer insights and spur self-examination for students, particularly those facing danger, risk, and uncertainty.

In his initial guidance to Marines upon being nominated to serve as commandant, General Eric Smith declared, “We prepare for the worst-case scenario—the pacing threat. If the day comes that we must face that threat, we will be ready.” That pacing threat remains China. Should the grim casualty estimates for a potential conflict with China prove accurate, the Marine Corps will only be as ready as its leaders at all levels. It will need leaders who have spent hard hours training in the field, but who have also spent evenings around a seminar table wrestling with enduring works, gaining the intangible qualities on which victory has so often depended: historical understanding, moral clarity, and the resolve to endure.

Major Benjamin Van Horrick is a Marine officer based in Virginia.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the United States Marine Corps and Department of the Navy.

Image credit: Spc. Christopher Brecht, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Benjamin Van Horrick · January 23, 2026

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com