Quotes of the Day:

“We live in a world in which speed is prized above almost all else, and acting faster than the other side has itself become the primary goal. But most often people are merely in a hurry, acting and reacting frantically to events, all of which makes them prone to error and wasting time in the long run. In order to separate yourself from the pack, to harness a speed that has devastating force, you must be organized and strategic. First, you prepare yourself before any action, scanning your enemy for weaknesses. Then you find a way to get your opponents to underestimate you, to lower their guard. When you strike unexpectedly, they will freeze up. When you hit again, it is from the side and out of nowhere. It is the unanticipated blow that makes the biggest impact.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies Of War

“Obedience is not enough.  Unless he is suffering, how can you be sure he is obeying your will and not his own? Power is inflicting pain and humiliation.  Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing."

-George Orwell

"The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice as to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey".

– LTG John M. Schofield, 1879

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 23, 2023

2. “By, With, and Through” Will Not Save US Forces from Direct Combat: American Ground Force Contributions to the Campaign against ISIS

3. Ukraine war reignites debate over what constitutes a ‘tank’

4. Ukraine is not a proxy war By Lawrence Freedman

5. The world’s democracies need to stick together

6. Pentagon preparing for Speaker McCarthy to visit Taiwan

7. A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: How Bad Could It Get?

8. Is Cold War Inevitable?

9. Senator Questions If Allies Would Aid Taiwan in Potential Chinese Invasion

10. The Triumphs and Tribulations of Peter the Great: What Putin’s View of 18th-Century Warfare Can Tell Us About Ukraine

11. Russian Agents Suspected of Directing Far-Right Group to Mail Bombs in Spain

12. Ukraine purges officials and governors in biggest shakeup of war

13. ISW: Putin loses confidence in mercenary Wagner Group over futile attempts to seize Ukraine’s Bakhmut

14. Can China Pull Off Its Charm Offensive?

15.  Russia’s War Breathes New Life Into a Cold War Symbol

16. How ChatGPT became the next big thing

17. Are There ‘Too Many Asians’?

18. How China became the world’s leading exporter of combat drones

19. U.S., Israel launch military exercise to send message to Iran, others

20. Congress Questions Biden Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey

21. China Belt and Road dreams fade in Germany's industrial heartland

22. China’s Big New Warship Is Missing an Important New Weapon

23. What the Map of Korea Can Teach Us About Russia and Ukraine

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 23, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian forces are preparing for an offensive effort in the spring or early summer of 2023, partially confirming ISW’s standing assessment that Russian troops may undertake a decisive action in the coming months.
• The Wagner Group’s outsized reliance on recruitment from penal colonies appears to be having increasing ramifications on Wagner’s combat capability.
• Russia continues to deepen military and economic relations with Iran in an effort to engage in mutually beneficial sanctions evasion.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian concentration areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and on the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces likely conducted a failed offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast in the last 72 hours.
• Russian forces have not made any confirmed territorial gains in Zaporizhia Oblast despite one Russian occupation official’s continued claims. The occupation official may be pushing a narrative of Russian tactical successes in Zaporizhia Oblast to generate positive narratives to distract Russians from the lack of promised progress in Bakhmut.
• The Kremlin’s efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces are continuing to generate criticism among supporters of new Russian parallel military structures.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into Russian social, administrative, and political systems and crack down on partisan dissent in occupied areas.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 23, 2023

Jan 23, 2023 - Press ISW

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understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2023

Karolina Hird, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 23, 9:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian forces are preparing for an offensive effort in the spring or early summer of 2023, partially confirming ISW’s standing assessment that Russian troops may undertake a decisive action in the coming months. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky stated on January 20 that the spring and early summer of 2023 will be decisive in the war and confirmed that the GUR has observed indicators that Russian troops are regrouping in preparation for a “big offensive” in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.[1] Skibitsky also reiterated that Russian forces are unlikely to launch an attack from Belarus or in southern Ukraine.[2] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort (of either offensive or defensive nature) in Luhansk Oblast and observed a redeployment of conventional forces such as Airborne (VDV) elements to the Svatove-Kreminna axis after the Russian withdrawal from Kherson Oblast.[3] ISW also maintains that it is highly unlikely that Russian forces are planning to relaunch a new offensive on northern Ukraine from the direction of Belarus.[4] Skibitsky’s assessments largely support ISW’s running forecasts of Russian intentions in the first half of 2023 and underscore the continued need for Western partner support to ensure that Ukraine does not lose the initiative to a renewed Russian offensive operation.

The Wagner Group’s outsized reliance on recruitment from penal colonies appears to be having increasing ramifications on Wagner’s combat capability. Head of the independent Russian human rights organization “Rus Sidyashchaya” (Russia Behind Bars) Olga Romanova claimed on January 23 that out of the assessed 50,000 prisoners that Wagner has recruited, only 10,000 are fighting on frontlines in Ukraine due to high casualty, surrender, and desertion rates.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm these figures, but they are very plausible considering Wagner’s model of using convicts as cannon fodder in highly attritional offensive operations.[6] The model Wagner has reportedly been using of retaining its highly trained long-serving mercenaries as leadership and Special Forces–type elements on top of a mass of untrained convicts also lends itself to high combat losses, surrenders, and desertions. The Wagner Group aim of reducing casualties among its non-convict mercenaries likely undermines its ability to retain and use effectively its large mass of convicts at scale and over time. ISW has previously reported on instances of relatives of Wagner group fighters receiving empty coffins after being told their loves ones died in Ukraine, suggesting that Wagner lacks the basic administrative and bureaucratic infrastructure to track and present its own losses, adding further credibility to the “Rus Sidyashchaya” estimate.[7]

Russia continues to deepen military and economic relations with Iran in an effort to engage in mutually beneficial sanctions evasion. NOTE: A version of this item appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s Iran Crisis Update.[8] Russian Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin met with Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on January 23 to expand bilateral cooperation efforts.[9] Ghalibaf noted that Moscow and Tehran should strive to strengthen ties in the banking, energy, and commodity-trading sectors in the face of American sanctions, which Volodin credited for bringing the two countries closer together.[10] Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) sources additionally speculated on further military cooperation efforts between Tehran and Moscow. IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News published an editorial arguing that a Russo-Iranian joint production deal could allow Iran to receive Russian Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters.[11] Both Tehran and Moscow are likely looking to these agreements to mitigate the pressure of sanctions levied against them by the US.

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian forces are preparing for an offensive effort in the spring or early summer of 2023, partially confirming ISW’s standing assessment that Russian troops may undertake a decisive action in the coming months.
• The Wagner Group’s outsized reliance on recruitment from penal colonies appears to be having increasing ramifications on Wagner’s combat capability.
• Russia continues to deepen military and economic relations with Iran in an effort to engage in mutually beneficial sanctions evasion.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian concentration areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and on the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces likely conducted a failed offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast in the last 72 hours.
• Russian forces have not made any confirmed territorial gains in Zaporizhia Oblast despite one Russian occupation official’s continued claims. The occupation official may be pushing a narrative of Russian tactical successes in Zaporizhia Oblast to generate positive narratives to distract Russians from the lack of promised progress in Bakhmut.
• The Kremlin’s efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces are continuing to generate criticism among supporters of new Russian parallel military structures.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into Russian social, administrative, and political systems and crack down on partisan dissent in occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions northwest of Svatove on January 22 and 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Stelmakhivka (15km west of Svatove) and Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) on January 22 and 23.[12] Geolocated combat footage posted on January 22 shows Russian forces conducting a “human wave” style assault on Ukrainian positions near Novoselivske.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing in Novoselivske, where Ukrainian forces are trying to advance eastward towards Kuzemivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[14]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions around Kreminna on January 22 and 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks towards Terny (15km west of Kreminna) and towards the Serebrianka forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna) on January 22.[15] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian forces near Kreminna hold positions within 50 to 200 meters of Ukrainian forces.[16] Geolocated footage posted on January 21 shows that Russian forces hold positions southwest of Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna) near the Zhuravka gully.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were active along the Ploshchanka-Makiivka line northwest of Kreminna throughout the day on January 22 and claimed that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) captured three Ukrainian strongholds in unspecified areas near Kreminna.[18] Geolocated combat footage from January 20 shows Ukrainian troops recapturing positions near Bilohorivka about 10km south of Kreminna.[19]

Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes on Russian concentration areas in Luhansk Oblast on January 22 and 23. The LNR People’s Militia claimed that Ukrainian troops struck Kadiivka (50km west of Luhansk City at the nexus of the T0504 and T1317 highways) on January 22.[20] Ukrainian Odesa Oblast military administration spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk noted that one strike targeted a machine-repair plant that Chechen forces were using as a hospital.[21] LNR sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on an electrical substation between Zolote and Pervomaiske (about 50km northwest of Luhansk City on January 23.[22]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on January 22 and 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske (30km northeast), Bilohorivka (20km northeast), Krasna Hora (5km north), Vyimka (23km northeast), Rozdolivka (15km northeast), and Paraskoviivka (8km north); and west of Bakhmut near Stupochky (10km west of Bakhmut) between January 22 and 23.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces are operating southwest of Bakhmut in the Klishchiivka area in order to push towards Ivanivsk and cut the Ukrainian T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut ground line of communication (GLOC).[24] The Ukrainian State Border Guards Service reiterated that Ukrainian forces control the majority of Bakhmut itself and are conducting successful counterattacks to regain lost positions in the area.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces are advancing in urban areas on the eastern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[26] Geolocated combat footage posted on January 22 confirms that Russian troops have occupied the northern part of Opytne on the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[27]

Russian forces continued ground attacks on the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 22 and 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian assaults on Novobakhmutivka (20km north of Donetsk), Pervomaiske, and Vodiane (both of the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) between January 22 and 23.[28] Geolocated combat footage posted on January 20 shows Russian troops have made marginal advances east of Vodiane.[29] A Russian milblogger posted footage of Russian soldiers of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District conducting assault actions in the Marinka direction on January 23.[30] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are fighting for control of the western part of Marinka.[31]

Russian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk or eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on January 22 or 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops are conducting defensive operations in this area.[32] Russian forces continued routine fire along the line of contact southwest of Donetsk City and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast throughout January 22 and 23.[33]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces likely conducted a failed offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast in the last 72 hours. Russian forces have not made any confirmed territorial gains despite one Russian occupation official’s continued claims. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on January 23 that Russian forces conducted offensive actions in the Zaporizhia direction on January 20 and 21 near Mali Shcherbaky but did not specify whether Russian forces made territorial gains.[34] It is unclear if this operation is ongoing as of this publication. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 22 that unspecified Eastern Military District (EMD) elements captured more favorable positions during offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast but provided no further details.[35] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov, who initiated an unsubstantiated string of claims on January 20 that Russian forces captured several settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast, claimed that Russian forces captured Kamianske (about 30km south of Zaporizhzhia City on the bank of the Dnipro River) on January 23.[36] Rogov previously claimed that Russian forces captured Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Novoandriivka, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya on January 20.[37]

Russian sources contradict Rogov’s claims, indicating that Russian forces likely have not made territorial gains on the Zaporizhia frontline as of January 23. There is no open-source evidence supporting Rogov’s claims as of this publication. Available geolocated visual evidence from January 21 to 22 shows squad-sized Russian elements fighting in fields about 2–3 km south of Novodanylivka and Mali Shcherbaky.[38] A prominent Russian milblogger reported on January 23 that Ukrainian forces regrouped and maintained the Mali Shcherbaky-Shcherbaky-Novoandriivka-Novodanylivka line as of January 23.[39] Other Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces transitioned to shelling targets along the Zaporizhia frontline — including settlements Rogov claimed Russian forces captured — on January 23 after an attempted Russian offensive on January 22, suggesting the Russian offensive was unsuccessful.[40] The Ukrainian Zaporizhia Military Administration reported on January 23 that Russian forces shelled several villages that Rogov claimed Russian forces captured.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Zaporizhia area of operations conducted defensive operations on January 23.[42] A senior Ukrainian military spokesman stated that Russian forces in southern Ukraine are not conducting large-scale offensive operations and have not made any sustained tactical gains on January 22.[43]

Rogov may be pushing a narrative of Russian tactical successes in Zaporizhia Oblast to generate positive narratives to distract Russians from the lack of promised progress in Bakhmut. Rogov’s claims have resonated well throughout the Russian language information space and have received wide circulation in mainstream Russian state-owned wires like TASS and amongst Russian milbloggers on Telegram.[44] Many Russian milbloggers exaggerated the importance of Soledar and claimed that Russian forces’ tactical advance in Soledar foreshadowed Russian forces’ encirclement of Bakhmut.[45] Russian forces have not made significant gains near Bakhmut despite advancing in Soledar in mid-January, and an imminent Russian encirclement or capture of Bakhmut remains unlikely. The discrepancies between the high expectations set by Russian information operations on Bakhmut and Russian forces’ inability to achieve them quickly represents a current vulnerability in the Russian information space that Rogov may be attempting to cover.

Russian and Ukrainian reconnaissance elements are likely skirmishing on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta south of Kherson City. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a commandeered civilian boat carrying a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to deploy to the Potemkin Islands on January 23.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces defeated Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that attempted to capture Belohrudove and Velyky Potemkin islands on January 21.[47]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin’s efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces are continuing to generate criticism among supporters of new Russian parallel military structures. The UK Ministry of Defense reported that Chief of Russian General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, is attempting to improve deployed troops’ grooming standards and day-to-day discipline in his new role as the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.[48] ISW previously assessed that seemingly trivial affairs such as grooming are actually significant as they are a metric for the ability of a military unit’s professionalism and overall ability to follow commanders’ orders.[49] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin weighed in on the ongoing debate on grooming on January 23, stating that he fully supports Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s disapproval of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) orders for Russian servicemen to shave facial hair.[50] Prigozhin claimed that his convict forces are fighting better than Russian conventional “guards” (honorary titles that designate elite forces) units that follow standardized grooming procedures. Prigozhin then proposed that the Russian government adopt a law to criminalize “glamorization of the army” — another attempt to assert that Prigozhin’s Wagner forces are more effective than the conventional Russian military under corrupt MoD management.[51] Wagner-affiliated milbloggers amplified Prigozhin’s statement. Prigozhin is likely attempting to undermine the authority of the Russian MoD’s orders within the domestic information space which will likely further degrade discipline, professionalism, and effectiveness of the conventional Russian military.[52] The heated debate over grooming standards in the Russian military has taken on an absurd life of its own out of all proportion to its importance.

The Russian MoD has been reportedly recruiting prisoners as part of its force-generation campaign in Fall 2022. Russian independent outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian MoD officials recruited about 100 prisoners into the “Storm” battalion in late September and early October.[53] Wagner, in turn, is continuing to produce recruitment advertisements to reinforce its units’ primacy using segments from state TV broadcasts about Wagner operations in Ukraine as bait.[54]

Kremlin officials continued to issue contradictory statements regarding a potential imminent wave of mobilization. Russian State Duma member (and member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mobilization working group) Dmitry Gusev stated that mobilized servicemen will be able to return home only when the war ends or when Putin issues an order ending mobilization. Gusev also stated that mobilized servicemen will rotate, implying that some may go home or at least back to non-combat stations for a time while others take their places in the line.[55] Another Russian parliamentarian, General Viktor Sobolev, claimed that he is confident that the Kremlin will not declare the second wave of mobilization and has definitively completed its partial mobilization.[56] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov continued to claim that the call-up portion of the partial mobilization decree had been completed, while other unnamed provisions are still active.[57] Peskov likely referred to the Kremlin’s inability to legally terminate the mobilization order without demobilizing all the mobilized reservists in accordance with Russian law, as the same order authorizes the call-ups and the retention of mobilized personnel with the military.[58] The Kremlin’s consistent need to publicly address the topic of partial mobilization indicates an ongoing concern for managing the Russian public’s expectations regarding Kremlin’s force-generation efforts. The Kremlin may appreciate the complexity the law introduces, on the other hand, since the requirement to keep the order in place to keep mobilized reservists with the active force also allows the MoD to continue crypto-mobilization and more limited call-ups.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into Russian administrative and political systems. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 23 that Russian officials are looking for pro-Russia collaborators to help them stage elections in anticipation of Russia’s Unified Voting Day for local, gubernatorial, and federal elections in Russia scheduled for September 9–11, 2023.[59] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian officials will create district, territorial, and precinct election commissions in occupied Ukraine by an unspecified time in the “near future.”[60]

Ukrainian partisans may have conducted an IED attack in Mariupol on January 20. Local Mariupol news outlet Mariupol Resistance reported that Ukrainian partisans planted an IED in the car of Russian military officials after having studied their behavior and schedules.[61] Mariupol Resistance noted that Russian forces immediately removed traces of the destroyed car and will likely issue a statement that the car exploded due to demining efforts and not a partisan attack.[62] Russian sources did not report any partisan activity in Mariupol since January 20.

Russian forces continued raiding private homes in a likely effort to identify partisans and pro-Ukrainian citizens in occupied territories on January 22-23. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Internal Ministry claimed on January 23 that Russian forces seized a building reportedly holding weapons and ammunition in the Slovyanoserbsk area of Luhansk Oblast.[63] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 22 that Russian forces discovered a cache of weapons, ammunition, and Ukrainian uniforms in an abandoned house in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast.[64]

Russian forces continue to commandeer healthcare resources and increase the strain on military and civilian medical systems in occupied regions of Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 23 that Russian forces transferred approximately 150 wounded Russian servicemen to a civilian hospital in Dniprorudne, Zaporizhia Oblast.[65] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 23 that Russian forces are importing doctors from Russian to staff additional hospitals in Sevastopol, Crimea, due to insufficient medical infrastructure to treat wounded Russian servicemen in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on January 23 that all Russian servicemen seriously wounded in Kherson Oblast remain concentrated in hospitals in Kherson Oblast and that only a small number receive treatment in Crimea.[67] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan also stated on January 22 that Russian forces seized a kindergarten to house wounded Russian servicemen in occupied-Kherson Oblast.[68]

Russian occupation authorities are intensifying efforts to brainwash Ukrainian children as a means to consolidate societal control in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 23 that Russian occupation authorities developed a 10-year Russification plan to brainwash Ukrainian youth as surveys demonstrate that children in southern Ukraine do not support the Russian occupation.[69] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement (Yunarmia) Deputy Chief Viktor Kaurov held a meeting with occupation authorities of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts, developing a plan to increase the emphasis on the role of Russia in the Second World War, make regular performances of “special military operation veterans” in schools, and to increase Russian patriotic content in schools.[70]

Russian occupation authorities are intensifying efforts to depict the success of Russian-imposed social schemes in occupied areas. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on January 23 that Russian officials provided the first certificate for obtaining maternity capital in occupied territories after Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the measure at a meeting with the Russian Council for Strategic Development and National Projects on December 15, 2022.[71] Pasechnik caveated the program on January 23 by emphasizing that applicants must have Russian passports and live in LNR territory to receive the maternity capital and a single child allowance.[72] Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on January 22 that Russian occupation authorities are granting preferential loans and subsidies to support local Kherson Oblast farmers repair infrastructure and maximize their production capabilities.[73]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal system. Russian sources stated on January 23 that Russian officials appointed Major General Oleg Fedorovich Bolomozhnov to lead the Federal Security Service (FSB) branch in occupied-Donetsk Oblast.[74] Russian sources emphasized that the FSB operates in occupied territories in accordance with the Russian constitution, as well as Russian laws and regulatory standards.[75]

Russian occupation authorities continue to make life unbearable in occupied territories. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 22 that Russian occupation authorities are withholding electricity from Ukrainians until they accept energy contracts with Russian companies.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 22 that Russian occupation authorities looted the Skadovsk Central Hospital in Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast.[77]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.

ISW’s most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a potential major Russian offensive against northern Ukraine from Belarus appears increasingly unlikely. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as very low. ISW will continue reporting observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly.

Observed significant military activities in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicates an attack from Belarus is more likely:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that is ambiguous:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicates that an attack from Belarus remains unlikely:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 23.[78]
• Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky stated that a new Russian attack against Kyiv through Belarus is unlikely and that Russian and Ukrainian forces will conduct their decisive efforts in eastern Ukraine.[79]
• Major General of the Ukrainian State Security Service reserve Viktor Yahun stated on January 23 that there is “definitely no danger from Belarus” at this time.[80] Yahun stated that a mild winter and beaver damming has flooded wetlands in the Pripyat marshes in Volyn, Zhytomyr, and Rivne oblasts, making Russian mechanized maneuver through the area impossible.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vesna-ta-pochatok-lita-budut-vyrishalnymy-u-viini.html; https://rus.delfi dot ee/statja/120130892/general-ukrainskoy-razvedki-esli-by-zapadnye-vrachi-ne-podderzhivali-zhizn-putina-voyna-by-uzhe-zakonchilas?preview=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6IjEyMDEzMDg5MiIsImlhdCI6MTY3NDQ1NzU3OSwiZXhwIjoxNjc0NTQzOTc5fQ.J0jj4LRsAymstOVhWFV053PreBadyuIQbibLoCkDsVk

[2] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vesna-ta-pochatok-lita-budut-vyrishalnymy-u-viini.html; https://rus.delfi dot ee/statja/120130892/general-ukrainskoy-razvedki-esli-by-zapadnye-vrachi-ne-podderzhivali-zhizn-putina-voyna-by-uzhe-zakonchilas?preview=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6IjEyMDEzMDg5MiIsImlhdCI6MTY3NDQ1NzU3OSwiZXhwIjoxNjc0NTQzOTc5fQ.J0jj4LRsAymstOVhWFV053PreBadyuIQbibLoCkDsVk

[5] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/23/rus-sidyaschaya-iz-50-tysyach-zaklyuchennyh-zaverbovannyh-chvk-vagnera-na-fronte-ostalis-tolko-10-tysyach-ostalnye-libo-pogibli-libo-dezertirovali

[9] https://isna dot ir/xdNcgc; https://isna dot ir/xdNcbq; http://duma.gov dot ru/en/news/56223/

[10] https://isna dot ir/xdNcbq

[11] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/11/02/2840386/%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%8428-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%8152-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87-%DA%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[30] GRAPHIC https://t.me/grey_zone/16773

[36] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/16862213; https://t.me/strelkovii/3780; https://voennoedelo dot com/posts/id37475-cxr3ncaokg1pvldv47ae

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/22/na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvnyh-masshtabnyh-dij-ne-zdijsnyuye-yevgen-yerin/

[53] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2022/10/11/minoboroni-rossii-teper-tozhe-verbuet-zekov-na-front/index.html

[56] https://news dot ru/vlast/poedem-vse-v-gosdume-rasskazali-kogda-otsrochki-perestanut-rabotat/

[57] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/881821; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/23/dmitriy-peskov-ukaz-putina-o-mobilizatsii-prodolzhaet-deystvovat-poskolku-pomimo-prizyva-v-armiyu-on-vklyuchaet-i-drugie-meropriyatiya

[58] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/881821; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/23/dmitriy-peskov-ukaz-putina-o-mobilizatsii-prodolzhaet-deystvovat-poskolku-pomimo-prizyva-v-armiyu-on-vklyuchaet-i-drugie-meropriyatiya

[59] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/23/rosiyany-shukayut-kolaborantiv-na-tot-dlya-provedennya-vyboriv-u-2023-roczi/

[60] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/23/rosiyany-shukayut-kolaborantiv-na-tot-dlya-provedennya-vyboriv-u-2023-roczi/

[66] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/23/rosiyany-rozgortayut-dodatkovi-shpytali-cherez-velyki-vtraty-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku/

[69] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/23/rosiyany-rozrobyly-programu-z-rusyfikacziyi-ukrayinskoyi-molodi-na-10-rokiv/

[70] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/23/rosiyany-rozrobyly-programu-z-rusyfikacziyi-ukrayinskoyi-molodi-na-10-rokiv/

[71] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70086

[77] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/22/rosiyany-rozikraly-likarnyu-v-skadovsku/

[79] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vesna-ta-pochatok-lita-budut-vyrishalnymy-u-viini.html; https://rus.delfi dot ee/statja/120130892/general-ukrainskoy-razvedki-esli-by-zapadnye-vrachi-ne-podderzhivali-zhizn-putina-voyna-by-uzhe-zakonchilas?preview=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6IjEyMDEzMDg5MiIsImlhdCI6MTY3NDQ1NzU3OSwiZXhwIjoxNjc0NTQzOTc5fQ.J0jj4LRsAymstOVhWFV053PreBadyuIQbibLoCkDsVk

[80] https://suspilne dot media/364234-pogoda-geopolitika-ta-bobri-general-zapasu-sbu-rozpoviv-so-uskladnue-nastup-z-bilorusi/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-swamps-make-attack-belaru...

[81] https://suspilne dot media/364234-pogoda-geopolitika-ta-bobri-general-zapasu-sbu-rozpoviv-so-uskladnue-nastup-z-bilorusi/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-swamps-make-attack-belaru...

understandingwar.org

2. “By, With, and Through” Will Not Save US Forces from Direct Combat: American Ground Force Contributions to the Campaign against ISIS

Let's use the right forces for the right missions to accomplish our national security and national defense strategy objectives.

I am heartened to see a non-SOF report that gets the history of "through, with, and by" correct and acknowledges it as a fundamental core tenant of Special Forces and unconventional warfare operations and that the phrase was introduced by COL Mark Boaytt.

See the RAND Report ("Operation Inherent Resolve: U.S. Ground Force Contributions") at the link below and in particular Chapter Two. A summary of the report form the RAND website is pasted below this article.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA719-1/RAND_RRA719-1.pdf

CHAPTER TWO

What Is By, With, and Through?.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Evolution of By, With, and Through, 1993–2014: From

Unconventional Warfare to Security Force Assistance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Differentiating With, Through, and By: Challenges and Gaps in the

Existing Definition.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

By, With, and Through as an Emerging Operational Approach: The

Case of Operation Inherent Resolve.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

“By, With, and Through” Will Not Save US Forces from Direct Combat: American Ground Force Contributions to the Campaign against ISIS - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Jeff Martini, Sean Zeigler, Gian Gentile · January 24, 2023

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In 2016, as it was pushing ISIS from its Euphrates valley strongholds in Iraq, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS weighed how best to speed up the military campaign. The coalition ultimately chose to expand its military involvement in support of Iraqi forces, introducing what were described as “enablers” and “accelerants” that would, indeed, prove crucial in dislodging ISIS from Mosul the following year. These contributions are the subject of our newly released operational history of Operation Inherent Resolve. By focusing on US ground forces, the report sheds light on a less appreciated dimension of the fight to defeat ISIS in Iraq. In doing so we challenge the narrative that the concept known as “by, with, and through”—the US military’s reliance on local allies to prosecute ground fighting—does not entail combat by US forces.

Rather, the report demonstrates that defeating ISIS hinged on a ground fight, requiring the grueling liberation of territory kilometer by kilometer. And while Iraqi surrogate forces bore the brunt of frontline fighting, US forces were also engaged in on-the-ground combat operations that hastened the defeat of ISIS. Appreciating such contributions will be necessary to distill the right lessons from an operation like Inherent Resolve, so that we might correctly apply those lessons to future irregular warfare.

A Less than Propitious Start

Beginning in August 2014, through early 2015, the coalition focused on defending Baghdad from ISIS’s advance by generating sufficient Iraqi forces to produce a counterattack. During this early phase of the campaign, coalition forces won back scant ground. Indeed, it took nearly two years from the coalition’s initial military intervention for Iraqi forces to liberate Fallujah, in mid-2016. The slow turning of the tide added to already prevalent doubts that victories in the Euphrates River valley would culminate in a broader expulsion of ISIS from Iraq.

Yet these battles posed fewer operational hurdles than the coming fight along the Tigris, and ultimately the battle to liberate Mosul. For starters, Ramadi and Fallujah are relatively close to Iraq’s capital, which decreased the logistical challenges of sustaining the advance of Iraqi security forces necessary to liberate them. What’s more, the counterattack on Ramadi and Fallujah occurred within federal Iraq, thereby avoiding the political sensitivities associated with transporting federal Iraqi forces through Kurdish-held territory—though this would be required for the coming fight in Mosul. Third, ISIS’s caliphate and center of gravity was in Mosul, not in Ramadi or Fallujah. And finally, in these cities, Iraqi security forces enjoyed an overwhelming correlation of forces in their advantage—at least ten to one—that would be harder to maintain when ISIS presumably massed its remaining fighters in Mosul. So as Iraqi forces liberated Fallujah, there was something to celebrate, but also reason for concern.

Expanding Military Involvement

Faced with the prospect of an already difficult fight up the Tigris that could stall at any moment, the coalition chose to escalate its military involvement. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced new policy decisions, including the use of US Army artillery regiments and Apache squadrons to attrit ISIS prior to the advance of Iraqi security forces, as well as allowing US Army advisors to engage with Iraqi counterparts closer to the front line and at lower echelons. US military commanders subsequently built on these policy choices by issuing a tactical directive lowering the target engagement authority to speed up the strike process. Taken together, these steps expanded the role of US ground forces in the fight and accelerated the defeat of ISIS.

These accelerants were first noticeable in the series of operations that the Department of Defense described as “setting the conditions for Mosul.” The operational mission was to seize key terrain south and east of Mosul that could eventually be used to advance on the city. Unlike Ramadi and Fallujah, where the objective was to liberate the respective population centers, setting the conditions for Mosul entailed seizing roads, establishing bridge crossings, and generating firing positions and assembly areas for an eventual assault on Iraq’s second-largest city and the capital of ISIS’s self-proclaimed caliphate. US Apache squadrons conducting close combat attack were crucial to these operations, attriting ISIS forces on the west bank of the Tigris, thus enabling Iraqi security forces to maneuver through what was considered the teeth of ISIS defenses. This operation culminated in the seizure of Qayyarah West airfield, which is within artillery range of Mosul.

Once the urban fight for Mosul began, the changes in authority introduced by the overall operational commander General Stephen Townsend, alongside input from his land component commander General Joseph Martin, were significant in accelerating the speed of operations. These changes empowered field-grade officers to approve certain strikes—an authority previously held at the one-star level. That authority was made even more significant by allowing US advisors to move closer to the front lines, so they could help coordinate the delivery of joint fires. Indeed, during the Mosul operation, some US advisors were authorized to move as close as the last covered and concealed position before the front line. In the interviews we conducted with US military personnel, a common interpretation was that these changes not only provided tactical advantages but also strengthened Iraqis’ resolve by demonstrating higher levels of US commitment to the fight.

Sorting the Lessons

Our operational history details these ground force contributions, concluding they were crucial to the defeat of ISIS, which, prior to their introduction, appeared far from assured. A broadly generalizable lesson from Inherent Resolve, we argue, is that policymakers need to understand that “by, with, and through” does not obviate the need for direct combat by US forces. Even for advisors, their ability to deliver fires is often crucial to their effectiveness with their counterparts. Thus, it is more accurate to think of “by, with, and through” as buying down the risk to US personnel, not eliminating that risk altogether.

In analyzing the portability of Inherent Resolve to future contingencies, we urge caution in applying lessons too literally. One of the defining features of the operation was the degree to which US forces had prior experience in country after the 2003 US invasion, and the degree to which the United States had built a kernel of capability—in this case, the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service being the exemplar—that it could lean on. Furthermore, the operation pitted a state actor against a protostate with weak military capabilities and rudimentary command-and-control attributes. Combined, those are relatively rare circumstances. The success of Inherent Resolve will not be easily replicated in other contexts.

Jeff Martini and Sean Zeigler are senior researchers at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, as is Gian Gentile, in addition to serving as the associate director of the RAND Arroyo research center. All three served as project leaders on the study from which this article is drawn.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Cpl. Rachel Diehm, US Army

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mwi.usma.edu · by Jeff Martini, Sean Zeigler, Gian Gentile · January 24, 2023

Operation Inherent Resolve

U.S. Ground Force Contributions

rand.org · by Jeffrey Martini

This report provides a narrative account of four battles within Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and a review of U.S. ground force contributions to those battles. It is intended to serve as an operational history and review of warfighting functions as applied to OIR. Although OIR was both a Coalition fight and joint one, the focus on U.S. ground forces is meant to address gaps both in analysis and in the common understanding of OIR.

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U.S. Ground Force Contributions

Research Questions

1. What is by, with, and through?
2. What lessons can be derived from OIR practices and outcomes?

This report, which provides a narrative account of four battles within Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and a review of U.S. ground force contributions to those battles, is intended to serve as an operational history and review of warfighting functions as applied to OIR. Although OIR was both a Coalition fight and joint one, the report's focus on U.S. ground forces is meant to address gaps both in analysis and in the common understanding of OIR.

This research was structured according to the operational concept of by, with, and through. This concept refers to the U.S. military's reliance on local partners — either a host nation government or a local surrogate force — to prosecute ground fighting with U.S. support. That support typically encompasses U.S. advising and enablers and could involve U.S. forces accompanying the partner. Although the terminology is familiar to those working in national security, it has yet to be formalized in joint doctrine and there are inconsistencies in its usage. The authors trace the development of the concept and its application in OIR, then analyze how it might be better incorporated into military doctrine.

The authors detail four battles: the counterattacks on Ramadi and on Fallujah, setting the conditions for Mosul, and the urban fight in Mosul. The choice of these operations was made to ensure treatment of the Euphrates and Tigris river valleys where the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was defeated in Iraq and to cover battles at different points in the overall campaign.

Key Findings

The evolution of the by, with, and through concept over time parallels the broader expansion in the scale, scope, and strategic significance of U.S. efforts to build foreign security forces

• The U.S. military's practice of training, equipping, advising, and assisting foreign partners long predates the by, with, and through formulation.
• The concept of "through, with, and by" originated within the U.S. Army Special Forces in the early 1990s.
• Once incorporated in joint doctrine, the phrase was soon reappropriated beyond the special operations context.
• In recent years, there has been a push to establish a commonly understood definition of by, with, and through and to develop a core set of its precepts.

OIR has demonstrated that by, with, and, through works as an operational approach and has many virtues

• There is no substitute for U.S. Army advisers being able to deliver kinetic effects beyond strictly advising. Delivering kinetic effects increases adviser influence and leverage.
• Improving the Army's by, with, and through capacity will require substantial investments in training and manpower oriented toward the effort.
• OIR achieved its short-term objective but might not serve as a replicable blueprint for many future operations — particularly in places where the United States lacks deployment history.
• By, with, and through was a highly effective operational concept for OIR. However, the development of any future doctrine formalizing it should reflect insights from multiple cases.

Recommendations

• U.S. military and political leadership should resist the temptation to default to a by, with, and through approach in future contingencies in expectation of similar outcomes as OIR.
• U.S. land forces should prepare for combat even when called on to apply a by, with, and through approach to future operations. The type of warfighting they might be asked to do — close combat attack and delivery of surface fires — introduces less physical risk but is, nonetheless, combat.
• Future by, with, and through endeavors should prioritize the generation of indigenous combat-ready forces and local ownership of the fight before introducing accelerants, such as surface fires or advising at lower echelons.
• The by, with, and through concept should not immediately be elevated as a stand-alone mission or activity that warrants the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities investments that would accompany such a move. However, should it wish to formalize the by, with, and through concept into doctrine, the Army should (1) socialize this development across the joint force, especially among the services and combatant commands, and (2) harmonize any doctrinal differences in use and interpretation of this concept that currently exist within the conventional Army and among other communities, such as Special Operations Forces.

Table of Contents

• Chapter One:
• Introduction
• Chapter Two:
• What Is By, With, and Through?
• Chapter Three:
• Overview of Command Structure and Deployments of U.S. Ground Forces
• Chapter Four:
• The Battle of Ramadi, October 2015–March 2016
• Chapter Five:
• The Battles for East and West Mosul
• Chapter Six:
• Conclusion

3. Ukraine war reignites debate over what constitutes a ‘tank’

You would think with all the Hollywood films and TV shows people would by now recognize a tank from an armored personnel carrier! (note my sarcasm)

You can see the photos and graphic ( a humorous one) at the link: https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2023-01-23/what-is-a-tank-8859538.html?utm

Ukraine war reignites debate over what constitutes a ‘tank’

Stars and Stripes · by Phillip Walter Wellman · January 23, 2023

An M1A2 Abrams tank assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division fires a practice round at the Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria in 2015. Ukraine is hoping to get Abrams tanks from the U.S. for their fight against Russia. (Michael Abams/Stars and Stripes)

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A tank is just an armored vehicle with a gun, right?

Try saying that in any online forum of soldiers and behold the blast of technical debate and expletive-laden passion that follows.

The debate in military circles over what vehicles are tanks is a long one that has intensified as Western countries discuss what to send Ukraine for its fight against Russia.

The arguments reignited recently after U.S. officials said they were considering sending Bradley fighting vehicles to Ukraine.

Discussing the development with Bloomberg, Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, described the vehicle as “in effect, a light tank.”

That comment unleashed a flood of military enthusiasts on social media racing to reject the description and argue that the Bradley was in no way, shape or form a tank.

“A ‘tank’ (at least in the ground combat sense) has a specific meaning,” Twitter user Mike Glenn wrote. “Although they both wear helmets, a wide receiver on a football team isn’t a quarterback.”

The tempest grew when French President Emmanuel Macron described the AMX-10 RC vehicle his country was sending to Ukraine as a “light battle tank.”

A German army Leopard 2 tank during a Saber Junction exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, in 2012. Ukraine is hoping to acquire the tank despite German reluctance. (Markus Rauchenberger/U.S. Army)

Different languages also complicate the debate. Germany refers to several of its vehicles with armor as a type of “panzer,” which any popular online translation tool will render in English as “tank.”

Ukraine has repeatedly asked the West for tanks to help it repel Russian forces from its territory, and no one is questioning that it specifically wants main battle tanks, or MBTs.

These machines, such as the U.S. Abrams M1A2, the U.K. Challenger 2 and Germany’s Leopard 2, are used to break through enemy lines and destroy opponents with direct fire.

In terms of design, an MBT should have an enclosed turret and a large gun, move on tracks and be equipped with armor that makes it resistant to most weapons.

A Bradley fighting vehicle rolls across the range during a live-fire demonstration at the training area in Cincu, Romania, in 2017. The U.S. is sending Bradleys to Ukraine to help the country defend itself as fighting with Russia continues. (Michael Abrams/Stars and Stripes)

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But some people in the terminology brouhaha believe that it should be acceptable to refer to other types of armored vehicles used in combat as tanks, even if they aren’t used in exactly the same way as an MBT.

“It’s a valid discourse as long as the counterargument isn’t: ‘It has treads and shoots, so it must be a tank,’” said Michael Akopian, a research assistant at the Center for a New American Security who specializes in defense.

Akopian has no qualms with some vehicles besides MBTs, like the Bradley, being called light tanks.

But many active-duty and retired service members, who have generated much of the online resistance, think otherwise.

The opinions often run strongest for those who served either as members of tank crews or as infantry who dismounted from armored vehicles as part of their combat training.

A French AMX-10RC prepares to fire during Exercise Bold Alligator 17 at Camp Lejeune, N.C., in 2017. (Damarko Bones/U.S. Marine Corps)

“Bradley is not a (expletive) tank,” James Cunny wrote on Twitter. “I take personal offense, most of my career I was a dismount, but also did crew, it is NOT a (expletive) tank.”

Others took shots at news reports, particularly those produced by journalists who don’t regularly cover the military.

“If media folks would hire just a handful of the thousands of combat veterans out there from 20 years of war you won’t have this problem,” J.R. Salzman tweeted.

Meanwhile, Cancian stands by the comments he gave to Bloomberg.

“Army doctrine says that a Bradley is not a tank because the Army does not use it like a tank, they use it to support the infantry and to carry infantry,” Cancian, a retired Marine Corps reserve colonel, told Stars and Stripes by phone. “But if you just look at their capabilities, my argument is that they are, in effect, a light tank.”

A British Challenger 2 main battle tank maneuvers during an exercise at Sennelager Training Area, Germany, in 2017. (Charles Calio/U.S. Army)

In addition to the Bradleys, dozens of German-made Marders are being sent to Ukraine. Both are considered infantry fighting vehicles and play a key role in offensive warfare by protecting and transporting mechanized infantry and providing continuous fire support once soldiers dismount.

The AMX-10 RC supplied by France is an armed and armored reconnaissance vehicle with wheels instead of tracks and is therefore considered an armored car. These vehicles have less armor than main battle tanks.

The 90 Strykers the U.S. announced last week that it will send to Ukraine also have wheels instead of tracks and are a type of armored personnel carrier.

Vehicles such as self-propelled artillery and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns typically have tracks and are built on the same chassis as main battle tanks but lack an MBT’s thicker armor.

A German Marder armored personnel carrier speeds through the mud at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, in January 2022. (Alun Thomas/U.S. Army)

Tank purists argue that while all these different machines serve important functions, if they can’t do the same thing an MBT can do, they should be called “armored fighting vehicles.”

“They’re just not designed for the same thing,” Marina Mirron, a researcher at King’s College London, said in a phone interview.

Mirron, who sides with the purists, said calling them tanks is like describing a semi-trailer truck as a race car.

“That’s kind of the same logic that applies here,” she said.

The government of Ukraine might agree.

On Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told allied defense leaders meeting at Ramstein Air Base in Germany that his country needed Western tanks immediately. It’s a call he’s repeated for months.

The plea followed a recent tweet by the country’s Defense Ministry that underscored exactly what type of tanks they want most.

“Western countries are so worried about sending tanks to Ukraine, they’re arguing about what is and isn’t a ‘tank.’ We offer our humble suggestion,” said the post.

It included a short video with images of the Abrams and the words: “Introducing the all new M1A2 Abrams recreational utility vehicle.”

This widely shared internet meme has some humorous views on the definition of a tank, which has been hotly debated in recent weeks. (Twitter)

Stars and Stripes · by Phillip Walter Wellman · January 23, 2023

4. Ukraine is not a proxy war By Lawrence Freedman

Excerpts:

The relationship between Ukraine and its supporters is not always smooth. A frustrated Kyiv regularly complains that Western dithering leaves their forces at the front suffering heavy losses because they lack vital equipment. For their part Western governments have wanted to be sure that Ukraine is getting equipment it truly needs and that the demands of training and maintenance are fully taken into account, as well as the wider political impact. It is not that one is the puppet and the other the puppeteer but that there is a natural back and forth, reflecting the distinctive interests and perspectives. The boundaries set on arms deliveries have been progressively eroded over time, with the early preferences for solely “defensive” capabilities giving way to an appreciation of the need to send capabilities suitable for offensives. Much of this has been the result of Western capitals coming to terms with the logic of the conflict, accepting that there was no point willing the ends of Ukrainian survival and possible victory without willing the means. So one big decision after another has been taken – in Washington from Himars in May, Harm anti-air defence missiles in July, Patriot air defences in December, and now infantry fighting vehicles.

The scale of the supplies confirmed at the Ramstein meeting is impressive. It represents a hardening of Western attitudes. They recognise that the war is now reaching a critical moment as both sides prepare for their spring offensives and that there is no current prospect of negotiations. Ukraine is now being given a better chance of prevailing in these coming battles. But the scale of the support also adds to the stakes. Will it be possible to maintain these levels if Ukraine is unable to make another military breakthrough? Might the prospect of a prolonged stalemate encourage those in the West who worry about open-ended support for Kyiv start to call again for negotiations?

For now Western governments trust the Ukrainians to use their growing capabilities wisely and professionally. They can think of no other way to move the war to a satisfactory conclusion. If there are no military breakthroughs then the overall picture does not change but the way forward becomes harder to discern. Ukraine will not suddenly be abandoned but we can expect future support to be less substantial and more geared to keeping Ukraine viable and less geared to victory. The test of the new package is not whether it can add to Russian losses but whether it can make it possible for Ukraine to win.

Ukraine is not a proxy war

It is Kyiv – not the West – which has set Ukraine’s war aims.

By Lawrence Freedman

NewStatesman · by Lawrence Freedman · January 23, 2023

Photo by Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Germany’s baffling reluctance to authorise the transfer of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine has highlighted Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s confusion over what is at stake in this war, but also Ukraine’s dependence on this sort of decision-making. This has been a difficult couple of weeks for Ukraine, with many civilian deaths and its hold on Bakhmut, a city in Donetsk, weakening. President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that only with a major package of support can Russian forces, apparently indifferent to casualties, be overcome as they seek to consolidate their occupation of Ukrainian territory.

The tank issue dominated reporting of the Ukraine Contact Group’s meeting at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where 50 countries, including all 30 members of Nato, met to discuss future levels of support for Ukraine. Lloyd Austin, the US secretary of defence, urged the members to “dig deeper” and, leaving aside the tank issue, by and large they did.

The package of support measures announced is impressive. The US package, worth some $2.5bn, included 59 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 90 Stryker Armoured Personnel Carriers, air defence systems and tens of thousands of rockets and artillery rounds. On 19 January, nine of Ukraine’s more robust supporters, including the UK, announced a raft of new measures with lots of ammunition, training and anti-aircraft guns, as well as 600 Brimstone missiles from the UK, 19 French-made Caesar howitzers from Denmark, and Sweden’s Archer artillery system. The Poles are waiting for German permission before donating a company of Leopard 2 tanks with 1,000 pieces of ammunition. The statement from the nine explained: “We recognise that equipping Ukraine to push Russia out of its territory is as important as equipping them to defend what they already have. Together we will continue supporting Ukraine to move from resisting to expelling Russian forces from Ukrainian soil. By bringing together Allies and partners, we are ensuring the surge of global military support is as strategic and coordinated as possible. The new level of required combat power is only achieved by combinations of main battle tank squadrons, beneath air and missile defence, operating alongside divisional artillery groups, and further deep precision fires enabling targeting of Russian logistics and command nodes in occupied territory.”

Meanwhile known support from other countries for Russia amounts to Shahed loitering munitions and the Mohajer-6 drones from Iran, and tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and trucks from Belarus. So Russia remains largely dependent upon its own defence industry to make up the losses of the past year and equip the new units being formed from mobilised troops, while Ukraine can look forward to a boost from fresh supplies of better equipment.

Russia’s rhetoric

While the official Russian line is insouciant, insisting that this new weaponry will make little difference, there are also signs of anxiety. One reason for this is that it represents the complete failure of Moscow’s efforts to coerce and cajole Western (and especially European) countries into abandoning their support, or at least a hope that they would tire of the war and forget the moral and geopolitical imperatives that led them to commit to Ukraine.

The increasingly erratic former president Dmitry Medvedev has warned that the “defeat of a nuclear power in a conventional war may trigger a nuclear war”. This reveals not so much a new position – he has said similar things many times before – but that a possible Russian defeat is being contemplated. The thought was echoed in a sermon by Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, who was praying to “the Lord that he bring the madmen to reason and help them understand that any desire to destroy Russia will mean the end of the world”. Russia’s ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Antonov, pulled together all the clichés after the report that the US would send Bradley fighting vehicles to Ukraine, observing that: “It is finally becoming clear to the whole international community that in 2014 the US unleashed a real proxy war against Russia by supporting Nazi criminals in Kyiv. Any talk about a ‘defensive nature’ of weapons supplied to Ukraine has long become absurd.

“Nobody should still have doubts who bears responsibility for prolonging this conflict. All the actions by the administration indicate a lack of any desire for a political settlement.… All this means that Washington is committed to fighting with us ‘to the last Ukrainian’, while the destiny of the people of Ukraine means nothing to the US.”

Speaking to journalists in Moscow, Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, observed that the US had assembled a coalition that used Ukraine as a proxy. He compared this effort against Russia with Hitler’s against the Jews. They are “waging war against our country with the same task: the ‘final solution’ of the Russian question”, he said, adding that “they clearly say Russia must suffer a strategic defeat”. This comparison is as odious as it is ludicrous. Russia is not the victim in this war.

This rhetoric should leave ordinary Russians perplexed about the future. It hints that defeat is on the cards, warns that it might be necessary to blow up the world, while promising a never-ending struggle with Nato, an alliance of states self-evidently far stronger in the aggregate, which, if it really did want to destroy Russia, would have the capacity to do so.

Nor is the rhetoric consistent. Moscow appears unsure who is the puppet and puppeteer. Is Kyiv playing Western states as unwitting saps, getting them to neglect their economic interests in favour of a disgraceful, Russophobic cause, or has Ukraine been so beguiled by promises of membership of the European Union or even Nato that it is prepared to sacrifice lives and infrastructure to help the US and its allies subvert and weaken Russia? For the moment Nato takes precedence in the Kremlin’s demonology. Perhaps it is more credible to be struggling against a mighty alliance than against a supposedly artificial neighbouring state with an illegitimate government.

Much of this can be dismissed as noise, possibly relevant to reassuring the Russian people that the sacrifices now being asked of them are worthwhile and that the consequences of abandoning the war would be much worse. What it does not do is make any difference to Western governments and their policies. They face constraints, but these are more of capacity and caution than any caused by the impact of Moscow’s torrent of fake news.

If Russia wanted to cause splits in the Western alliance and encourage disagreements with Kyiv it is going the wrong way about it. One reason why even the more lukewarm members of Nato have felt that they have no choice but to back Ukraine is because Putin has offered nothing to suggest that he is interested in a diplomatic solution to the conflict except on his own maximalist and predatory terms. Yet a combination of strong hints from Putin of concessions to come and a balance of military power tilting in Russia’s favour could lead to some awkward conversations between Ukraine and its main sponsors. This is a scenario that bothers many in Kyiv, but it has yet to transpire because Moscow shows no interest in compromise and there is still confidence in Ukraine’s military prowess. Nonetheless, it points to an important dynamic in this conflict that could yet become important.

Proxy wars

With a less absurd framing, Lavrov’s reference to a “proxy war” might have been one way to encourage a wedge between Ukraine and its supporters. The term is heard quite frequently in Western discussions of the war. It is not a new idea and has been employed regularly in recent years. Unfortunately for those who like their strategic concepts to be as precise as the best modern weaponry, “proxy wars” lacks an agreed meaning and is used in different ways.

The basic idea is that you get someone else to do your fighting for you. The term has been most used in recent times in conflicts in which the US and its allies were reluctant to commit ground forces to a conflict, for fear of casualties turning public opinion against the commitment. The formula therefore was to provide air power and perhaps some other specialist capabilities, while indigenous forces provided the infantry. One example came in the early stages of the Afghanistan war in 2001 when the Northern Alliance was already fighting the Taliban, and the US was able to provide it with a boost. Another was the battle for Mosul against Isis in which most of the work on the ground was conducted by Kurds and the Iraqi army while the US and allies provided air support.

The US was in command of these operations, managing the key intelligence and communications systems and controlling the air assets. No objectives were going to be pursued that had not been approved by Washington. Hence the idea that the indigenous forces were “proxies” for the Americans. But the term was misleading because the indigenous forces always had their own objectives and were quite capable of hanging back when they felt they were being used unnecessarily. And in the end it would be their war aims that mattered most: armies are better placed than air forces to influence local political developments, and if they are on home ground they expect to stay around long after their outside partners have left.

This highlighted the problem with the proxy concept: it implies a simple hierarchy and so misses the elements of bargaining that are evident in all war-time coalitions. The challenge facing the different parties is always to get their core interests into alignment.

In the case of Ukraine there is no military coalition. The Ukrainian government sets the objectives and Ukrainian commanders are in charge of the operations. So if this is a proxy war it must be an extreme case because it assumes that somehow Ukraine, despite taking all the pain and claiming all the gain, is somehow under another country’s control.

One difficulty now is that the idea that proxy wars are good things for the US, precisely because somebody else does the fighting, is so ingrained that the term has been embraced by some former US officials, although not by President Joe Biden. Thus the former supreme allied commander of Nato General Philip Breedlove stated in an interview last April: “I think we are in a proxy war with Russia. We are using the Ukrainians as our proxy forces.” The former CIA director Leon Panetta declared, when arguing that as much military aid as possible should be given to Ukraine: “We are engaged in a conflict here. It’s a proxy war with Russia, whether we say so or not.” All of these statements have been seized upon by critics of the war in the West as revealing the true intentions of the West.

Blaming Nato

For the critics, who rarely go so far as to endorse the Russian invasion, the best course for the West is to work to bring the war to a quick conclusion through a negotiated peace. Instead the Ukrainian war machine is being fed. Kyiv is encouraged to keep fighting, despite the high costs and possible hopelessness of its struggle given Russia’s immense resources and firepower. A soft version of this argument explains this decision as naivety, as if a natural desire to support the underdog led to a suspension of strategic judgement. It would have been better if Western countries had confined themselves to economic sanctions and strong words.

In the hard version, which is close to the more alarmist rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, this is not naivety but a conscious strategic judgement. Here we get to the question of proxy wars. The allegation is that the West’s aim is to reduce the long-term challenge Russia is able to pose to Nato by maximising its losses in men and equipment. If pushed hard enough the Russian Federation might even break up as the Soviet Union did just over 30 years ago and a great power threat would be removed forever. On this reading Ukraine has been exploited to change the geopolitical landscape. This fits naturally with the familiar accusation that “Nato is fighting to the last Ukrainian”, which accepts that Ukrainians are the victims in this war, but of Nato as much as Russia.

Yet despite the assumption in this critique that Nato’s interests in this war are offensive, in practice they are defensive. It has an interest in an act of blatant aggression being thwarted. If Ukraine had been occupied and Russian forces moved to its borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania this would have led to continual and dangerous tension, especially if these countries were acting as sanctuaries for Ukrainians engaged in irregular warfare against the occupiers. Alternatively, a ceasefire line, with some of Ukraine occupied while the rest remained free would also have been a recipe for continued instability. To sustain any sort of deterrence the West would have had to boost its defence spending (the first reaction to the Russian invasion last February) while working out how to support Ukraine resistance to the occupation over the long term.

The most serious objection to this critique is that it denies Ukraine agency, which is the basic problem with all talk of a “proxy war”. It suggests that the Ukrainians are only fighting because Nato put them up to it rather than because of the more obvious reason that they have been subjected to a vicious invasion, with those in occupied territories treated brutally. Ukraine has set its war aims as getting Russians out of its country but not as destroying Russia as a great power.

It is the case that the outcome of this war will leave Russia much diminished. Its economy has taken a downward turn, and it has lost markets for its energy exports even as prices start to revert back to pre-war levels. Its armed forces have suffered heavy losses. Although Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister, has been announcing ambitious plans for the military’s future expansion and reorganisation it is hard to see that much can be achieved with a weakened economy for some time – perhaps a decade. Even if Moscow clings to its aggressive stance Nato countries will have time to strengthen their forces and replenish their depleted arsenals.

Russia has been severely weakened by this war and that potentially helps the West. This is the respect in which Western supporters of the war have been happy to talk of this being a proxy war. This was explained clearly by Hal Brands in May: “The war in Ukraine isn’t just a conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently declared. It is a ‘proxy war’ in which the world’s most powerful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is using Ukraine as a battering ram against the Russian state.

“Lavrov is one of the most reliable mouthpieces for President Vladimir Putin’s baseless propaganda, but in this case he’s not wrong. Russia is the target of one of the most ruthlessly effective proxy wars in modern history. And the less US officials say about it, the better.

“Proxy wars are longstanding tools of great-power rivalry because they allow one side to bleed the other without a direct clash of arms. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union bled the US by supporting communist proxies in Korea and Vietnam.”

The same thought might be behind Austin’s suggestion last April that the US wants “Russia weakened to the point where it can’t do things like invade Ukraine”.

But this is not why Western countries came to Ukraine’s aid and will not be the measure of their success, which is getting Russian forces out of Ukraine. Nobody suggests that Ukraine will be encouraged to carry on fighting once this has happened just to weaken Russia more. Clearly the effect of the war on Russia’s ability to do more mischief to neighbouring countries is a bonus for Nato but that is not why the war is being fought. That muddles cause and effect. The impact on Russia is a measure of Moscow’s folly and not Nato’s intent. If it wanted to stay strong it should not have embarked on this reckless war.

Furthermore, beyond welcoming a Russia that is less able to throw its weight around and bully others, few in the West relish the prospect of Russia falling apart, for that would simply unleash yet more unruly forces. Again, it is possible that there might be instability in Russia after this war, but that will not be because the US and its allies have willed it but because Putin set events in motion that he was unable to control.

Ukraine and its suppliers

There is another use of the proxy war concept that is more neutral. It is evident that Ukraine is only able to sustain its military effort and have any prospect of victory because of the West’s support. In practice, this gives the US, which is by far the most important supplier, important leverage over Ukraine’s war aims and how they are pursued. From this comes an argument, often heard in Washington, that this should be more of a proxy war, in that Washington must ensure that its interests are fully taken into account by Kyiv, and in particular the need to avoid a nuclear war and ensure that they do not empty their own weapons inventories to the point where they cannot defend security interests away from Europe, to consideration of post-war relations with Russia.

These critics warn that Washington has been unwise to allow Kyiv to set the alliance’s war aims, for these may be unrealistic, and to play down the possibilities of a serious negotiation and the likelihood that at some point to end the war some Ukrainian territory might have to be conceded. They worry, for example, that a Ukrainian move to try to take Crimea might be the one that could lead to a Russian nuclear response. From this perspective it is the US and its allies that have become the proxies, drawn further into Ukraine’s fight than is really wise. To redress the balance they must be more prepared to use their leverage to either rein Ukraine in or push it towards negotiations.

From this perspective, proxy war is not an accusation or an allegation but a description of a relationship that could become difficult and unbalanced at some point. The term is still unhelpful but there is a real issue here. There are great commonalities of interest between Ukraine and its suppliers but they are not complete. This was evident early on in the war when the Biden administration rejected Kyiv’s calls for a no-fly zone to protect Ukraine’s cities against air raids, as this would have led to direct confrontations between Nato and Russian forces, or the reluctance to supply Ukraine systems that would enable it to hit targets well into Russian territory (which of course we might have expected to be pressed on Ukraine if the real aim was to damage Russia as much as possible). As the tank issue demonstrates, this type of issue has not gone away.

The relationship between Ukraine and its supporters is not always smooth. A frustrated Kyiv regularly complains that Western dithering leaves their forces at the front suffering heavy losses because they lack vital equipment. For their part Western governments have wanted to be sure that Ukraine is getting equipment it truly needs and that the demands of training and maintenance are fully taken into account, as well as the wider political impact. It is not that one is the puppet and the other the puppeteer but that there is a natural back and forth, reflecting the distinctive interests and perspectives. The boundaries set on arms deliveries have been progressively eroded over time, with the early preferences for solely “defensive” capabilities giving way to an appreciation of the need to send capabilities suitable for offensives. Much of this has been the result of Western capitals coming to terms with the logic of the conflict, accepting that there was no point willing the ends of Ukrainian survival and possible victory without willing the means. So one big decision after another has been taken – in Washington from Himars in May, Harm anti-air defence missiles in July, Patriot air defences in December, and now infantry fighting vehicles.

The scale of the supplies confirmed at the Ramstein meeting is impressive. It represents a hardening of Western attitudes. They recognise that the war is now reaching a critical moment as both sides prepare for their spring offensives and that there is no current prospect of negotiations. Ukraine is now being given a better chance of prevailing in these coming battles. But the scale of the support also adds to the stakes. Will it be possible to maintain these levels if Ukraine is unable to make another military breakthrough? Might the prospect of a prolonged stalemate encourage those in the West who worry about open-ended support for Kyiv start to call again for negotiations?

For now Western governments trust the Ukrainians to use their growing capabilities wisely and professionally. They can think of no other way to move the war to a satisfactory conclusion. If there are no military breakthroughs then the overall picture does not change but the way forward becomes harder to discern. Ukraine will not suddenly be abandoned but we can expect future support to be less substantial and more geared to keeping Ukraine viable and less geared to victory. The test of the new package is not whether it can add to Russian losses but whether it can make it possible for Ukraine to win.

[See also: Ukraine’s problematic nationalist heroes]

Topics in this article : Nato , Olaf Scholz , Russia , Ukraine , Vladimir Putin

NewStatesman · by Lawrence Freedman · January 23, 2023

5. The world’s democracies need to stick together

Excerpts:

All these tensions could spell trouble for efforts to keep democracies in Europe, Asia and the Americas working together over the coming year. But while the splits within the “global west” are discernible, they can be narrowed by intelligent policy shifts. US policymakers are increasingly aware of European angst about the Inflation Reduction Act — and may try to tweak the law. A more tightly defined US policy on tech exports to China would also reassure allies.

Above all, the Nato allies need to agree a common position on weapons supplies to Ukraine — and do so fast, before fighting intensifies this spring. The unity between democratic allies that was achieved in 2022 was a precious thing. It should not be frittered away in 2023.

The world’s democracies need to stick together

Maintaining a united front on Ukraine and on China is getting harder

GIDEON RACHMAN

Financial Times · by Gideon Rachman · January 23, 2023

In 2022, something good came out of something bad. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to a remarkable display of unity and determination from the democratic world.

The US, the EU, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia imposed unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia. Ukraine was provided with billions of dollars of military and economic support. In Europe, Germany promised to make historic shifts in its defence and energy policies. Finland and Sweden applied to join Nato.

China’s hostility towards Taiwan and its announcement of a “no limits” partnership with Russia also sparked a reaction in the Indo-Pacific. Japan announced a major increase in military spending. The Philippines tightened its ties with America. The Quad nations — India, Japan, Australia and the US — held a summit.

Democracies in Europe and Asia also began to work more closely together. For the first time, Japan, South Korea and Australia attended a Nato summit.

This year, it will be considerably tougher to maintain the unity of the advanced democracies. Active and engaged US leadership has been crucial to the democratic world’s response to the Russia-China partnership. But serious tensions are emerging between Washington and its allies.

In Europe, the key issues are both strategic and economic. The western alliance is openly divided over future military aid to Ukraine. Those divisions were on full display at an allied meeting in Ramstein on Friday, when Germany resisted intense pressure to allow the transfer of Leopard tanks to Ukraine.

While the headlines after the Ramstein meeting focused on Germany’s isolation, the divisions within the western alliance are more complex than that. There is a hawkish wing that includes Poland, the Nordic countries, the Baltic states and the UK, and is pressing for the rapid transfer of more advanced weaponry, including tanks, to Ukraine.

The US is somewhere in the middle between the hawks and the ultra-cautious Germans. The hawks worry that the Biden administration has allowed itself to be spooked by the threat of nuclear war and so been too timid about the delivery of advanced weaponry, such as longer-range missiles. But the criticisms are muted because the US is by far the largest donor of military and financial aid to Ukraine.

These divisions are manageable for now. But, if the war turns against Ukraine this spring, the recriminations could get nasty.

The tensions between the US and Europe also have an economic dimension — with many in the EU accusing Washington of protectionism, by providing large subsidies to green industries and electric vehicles inside the US.

The common US response — that Europe should simply provide its own subsidies for green tech — may be unrealistic. Letting states subsidise their own industries might blow up the EU single market, while a unified EU subsidy regime would immediately spark arguments about how the money was raised and where it was spent.

Lurking behind this is a growing fear that the US is pulling ahead of Europe economically — and that the Ukraine war is hastening this process. European industrialists point to key advantages enjoyed by the US: cheap energy, plentiful land, technological leadership and the world’s reserve currency.

Then there is China. Confrontational language and attitudes towards Beijing are now routine in US politics. Most European and Asian governments are still hedging. China is now the largest potential faultline in the relationship between America and its Asian allies. Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines are treaty allies of the US and agree on the need to increase military deterrence of China. But all are wary of how far America may go with economic decoupling.

I noticed that division of opinion while chairing a session on Japan at the World Economic Forum last week. An American participant, Stephen Pagliuca, the outgoing co-chair of Bain Capital, argued that the world’s democracies would increasingly trade among themselves — and cited the Ukraine war as a warning about becoming too economically dependent on an autocracy. Tak Niinami, the chief executive of Tokyo-based drinks group Suntory Holdings, was wary of that argument — and welcomed the fact that Japan’s trade with China was increasing.

The Singaporeans — key US partners on both trade and security — are openly alarmed about the wide scope of America’s restrictions on tech exports to China. They worry that they will lead to a further, dangerous spike in US-China tensions. There are also concerns that US efforts to “friend-shore” supply chains will make industry less efficient and fuel inflation.

All these tensions could spell trouble for efforts to keep democracies in Europe, Asia and the Americas working together over the coming year. But while the splits within the “global west” are discernible, they can be narrowed by intelligent policy shifts. US policymakers are increasingly aware of European angst about the Inflation Reduction Act — and may try to tweak the law. A more tightly defined US policy on tech exports to China would also reassure allies.

Above all, the Nato allies need to agree a common position on weapons supplies to Ukraine — and do so fast, before fighting intensifies this spring. The unity between democratic allies that was achieved in 2022 was a precious thing. It should not be frittered away in 2023.

[email protected]

Financial Times · by Gideon Rachman · January 23, 2023

6. Pentagon preparing for Speaker McCarthy to visit Taiwan

Pentagon preparing for Speaker McCarthy to visit Taiwan

Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan triggered a huge reaction from China

foxnews.com · by Anders Hagstrom | Fox News

Video

Study analyzing the fallout if China invades Taiwan is 'scary': Michael Pillsbury

Hudson Institute senior fellow Michael Pillsbury says war games conducted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is 'all the more reason to try to deter' an invasion on 'Fox News @ Night.'

The U.S. military is drafting plans to ensure House Speaker Kevin McCarthy's safety on a trip to Taiwan later this year.

McCarthy's office did not immediately respond to a request to confirm his plans to visit the island, which were first reported by Punchbowl News. Former Speaker Nancy Pelosi triggered China to launch weeks of military drills surrounding Taiwan when she visited the island last year. Given the hotly charged environment, the Defense Department must go to great lengths to ensure the speaker's safety.

McCarthy's trip would be the latest in a series of U.S. lawmakers who have traveled to Taiwan since Pelosi's trip in August. China has responded to each subsequent visit with a ramp-up in military drills.

China argues that visits from U.S. lawmakers are an infringement of the One China policy, which states that Beijing is the sole government of China. It also prevents the U.S. from holding formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

PELOSI DEFIES CHINA DURING MEETING WITH TAIWANESE PRESIDENT TSAI ING-WEN: 'WE WILL NOT ABANDON OUR COMMITMENT'

Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., conducts a news conference in the U.S. Capitols Statuary Hall on Thursday, January 12, 2023. (Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)

In this photo released by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, center pose for photos after she arrives in Taipei, Taiwan, Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2022. Pelosi arrived in Taiwan on Tuesday night despite threats from Beijing of serious consequences, becoming the highest-ranking American official to visit the self-ruled island claimed by China in 25 years. (Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs via AP)

CHINA FIRES 'PRECISION MISSILE STRIKES' IN TAIWAN STRAIT DAY AFTER NANCY PELOSI CONCLUDES CONTROVERSIAL VISIT

Pelosi was the highest-level U.S. official to visit the island since House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1997. Her trip set off nearly two weeks of Chinese military drills around Taiwan in a simulation of a potential invasion.

China has long claimed Taiwan as its own territory, despite the island having its own democratic government. While the U.S. has agreed not to hold formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it has supplied the government with means of defense and other support.

Taiwan first split from mainland China after pro-democracy forces lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.

In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, fighter jets of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) conduct a joint combat training exercises around the Taiwan Island on Aug. 7, 2022. (Gong Yulong/Xinhua via AP)

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President Biden's administration has vowed to continue supporting Taiwan amid rising tensions with China. The U.S. has already delivered significant defense aid and is strengthening military alliances with Japan and other regional partners.

Anders Hagstrom is a reporter with Fox News Digital covering national politics and major breaking news events. Send tips to [email protected], or on Twitter: @Hagstrom_Anders.

foxnews.com · by Anders Hagstrom | Fox News

7. A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: How Bad Could It Get?

Commentary on the recent CSIS report on the Taiwan war games.

Excerpts:

Lastly, it’s worth commenting on the report’s odd-seeming title: The First Battle. The wargame, the coauthors contend, may have merely explored the first phase in an on-again-off-again struggle for Taiwan. Even learned commentators sometimes oversimplify Clausewitz’s observations on how wars end, contending that he says “the outcome is never final.” No. What the Prussian master does say is that “even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final” (my emphasis). That’s because “the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”

The vanquished can try to overturn the verdict of arms. But a challenge isn’t a sure thing.

So a lasting victory in the Taiwan Strait is possible, and worth striving for should China mount an amphibian assault across the strait. But strategic and geographic facts endure. War would set all combatants back, including China. Neither Taiwan nor China is going anywhere. Beijing could try for a rematch at a more auspicious time, and it lays colossal weight on the island. It’s willing to pay a great price for its goals. Whether the United States and other friends of Taiwan would be game for periodic rematches is less certain. China might lose this round, as the CSIS game suggests it would. That, however, may not be the end of the story. Plan accordingly.

Read the whole thing.

A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: How Bad Could It Get?

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · January 23, 2023

Beware, China. And Taiwan, and Asia, and America. Just after the holidays, a team from the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a hefty report entitled The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. It is jam-packed with insight. One hopes it finds avid readership among the uniformed services, their political masters, and Congress.

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The report details the design and results of an unclassified wargame set in the Taiwan Strait in 2026, toward the end of the much-discussed “Davidson window,” which postulates a Chinese attack on Taiwan by 2027. The game overseers ran twenty-four iterations, changing different variables—political and strategic decisions, alliance politics, strategy and operations, weaponry and sensors available to the combatants—to identify cross-cutting themes, and to compile findings and recommendations applicable across a variety of likely circumstances.

On the whole the CSIS game struck a more upbeat note than games conducted by the armed forces themselves, which tend to prophesy bitter defeat. The First Battle of the Next War observes that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generally lost or fought to a stalemate under most plausible scenarios. The coauthors attribute the disparity between think-tank and Pentagon games to the fact that the CSIS hosts factored history into the game’s conduct alongside more traditional statistical methods.

Bringing in non-quantitative measures is wise. Military sage Carl von Clausewitz warns against trying to reduce a messy, complex affair like warfare to rules and formulas. Relying overwhelmingly on the probability of a kill during an exchange of fire employing certain weapons and sensors, as Pentagon games are wont to do, feels like flouting Clausewitzian counsel.

History is an antidote to fixating on numbers.

Probably the three biggest themes to emerge from the report are this: Taiwan must take ownership of its own defense rather than depend on outside intervention for survival; to succeed the U.S. armed forces must obtain permission from the Japanese government to operate from U.S. bases in Japan; and the U.S. military must bulk up its magazine of air-launched anti-ship ordnance to the maximum extent possible in order to sink a PLA Navy amphibious task force trying to cross the Taiwan Strait.

Otherwise Taiwan will fall. The island and its protectors will be unable to concentrate enough firepower at the time and place of battle to prevail.

The early chapters in The First Battle of the Next War are interesting, but they focus more on game design than actionable takeaways. The coauthors turn to the results of the game and their findings and recommendations around halfway through the report. That’s where makers and executors—and funders—of strategy should concentrate their attention.

For instance, the coauthors urge Washington to prime the armed forces and American society for the realities of great-power war. And to do it ahead of time. No cross-strait war, they say correctly, will be a standoff, pushbutton, antiseptic affair. It will be bloody, and costly. Losses will be grave. The U.S. Navy typically lost two aircraft carriers and between ten and twenty major surface combatants depending on the iteration of the game. Aircraft losses were traumatic, as were casualties to aviators, mariners, and soldiers.

In all likelihood, life will imitate gaming.

In other words, it’s worth disabusing service folk and American citizens of the notion that the United States, its allies, and Taiwan can score a quick, decisive victory in the Taiwan Strait. That assumption is what we’ve grown accustomed to since the Soviet Union’s demise. America’s post-Cold War era of martial supremacy—and easy triumphs over outmatched foes—has come to a close. History has returned. Statesmen and senior commanders should acculturate the services, the U.S. government, and the populace to basic facts of warfare now.

Let’s zero in on a couple of critical points from the report. Strikingly, one weapon system comes up again and again in the report, namely the AGM-158B Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER). The report doesn’t quite tout the JASSM-ER as a war-winning capability. But close.

Here’s why. Designed chiefly for air-to-ground missions, the JASSM-ER is a precision strike weapon boasting a range officially estimated at 575 miles. That’s standoff range, beyond the reach of PLA Navy ships’ defenses. This lethal missile is also plentiful in the U.S. Air Force inventory. The air arm will boast an estimated 3,650 of them by 2026. By contrast, the newfangled AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a JASSM-ER derivative optimized for shipkilling, is scarce in the Air Force and Navy inventories. (At present Air Force B-1B bombers and Navy F/A-18 fighter/attack jets are certified to tote LRASMs.)

The numbers are humbling. The services will field 450 LRASMs or so in 2026. That’s a shallow magazine for fighting a peer competitor. But it appears the air and sea services can multiply their inventories of air-launched shipkillers through software necromancy. The coauthors note that the U.S. Navy leadership requested funding for JASSM-ERs in its budget request for fiscal year 2022, justifying the request in part to augment the sea service’s capability for offensive anti-surface-warfare missions. For going against surfare warships, that is.

Evidently a software upgrade can give the JASSM-ER an anti-ship capability that duplicates—to some extent, anyway—the destructive potential of the purpose-built LRASM.

If so the JASSM-ER would become a literal force multiplier for the U.S. and allied anti-ship arsenals, in effect adding thousands of anti-ship munitions to the stockpile. The deeper the missile magazine, the more engagements a fighting force can undertake, and the longer it can keep up operations. And the more engagements it undertakes, the better its chances of pummeling a hostile force—such as, say, a Chinese invasion fleet making its way to Taiwan—into scrap.

Because the CSIS wargame was unclassified, the coauthors profess agnosticism on the degree to which the JASSM-ER is fit for seaborne missions, and how many missiles will be repurposed by 2026 if it is. Part of the ambiguity surrounding the JASSM-ER-to-LRASM transformation is deliberate. Military magnates tend to be closemouthed about details of weapons and sensors. They disclose enough to discomfit and deter potential foes, while remaining vague about technical characteristics to deny competitors an accurate understanding of U.S. armaments should war come.

In an effort to peer through the fog, the coauthors posit that the JASSM-ER will have at least modest anti-ship capability by 2026 and that some will have been converted for sea service. But they also ran some variants of the game without this new weapon, yielding sobering results. In those scenarios the allies soon exhausted their supply of standoff LRASMs, then had to resort to shorter-range weapons. That meant firing platforms had to close within reach of PLA Navy ships’ anti-air missiles. Losses of allied combat aircraft mounted as Chinese brought their defenses to bear.

Lastly, it’s worth commenting on the report’s odd-seeming title: The First Battle. The wargame, the coauthors contend, may have merely explored the first phase in an on-again-off-again struggle for Taiwan. Even learned commentators sometimes oversimplify Clausewitz’s observations on how wars end, contending that he says “the outcome is never final.” No. What the Prussian master does say is that “even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final” (my emphasis). That’s because “the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”

The vanquished can try to overturn the verdict of arms. But a challenge isn’t a sure thing.

So a lasting victory in the Taiwan Strait is possible, and worth striving for should China mount an amphibian assault across the strait. But strategic and geographic facts endure. War would set all combatants back, including China. Neither Taiwan nor China is going anywhere. Beijing could try for a rematch at a more auspicious time, and it lays colossal weight on the island. It’s willing to pay a great price for its goals. Whether the United States and other friends of Taiwan would be game for periodic rematches is less certain. China might lose this round, as the CSIS game suggests it would. That, however, may not be the end of the story. Plan accordingly.

Read the whole thing.

Author Expertise and Experience: Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone. Holmes is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · January 23, 2023

8. Is Cold War Inevitable?

In addition to the new Kennan biography (Kennan: A Life between Worlds, Frank Costigliola, Princeton University Press, 648 pp., $35.49, January 2023) another book is mentioned: The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam, Marc J. Selverstone, Harvard University Press, 336 pp., $35.00, November 2022

Excerpts:

What about now? Just as Acheson and others argued about the Soviet Union during the Cold War, many policymakers today say that China under Xi seeks only to buy time while it grows stronger vis-a-vis U.S. power—and then strike against Taiwan. Beyond that, Beijing is looking to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power, no matter what it takes, the hawks say. And Xi is marrying his huge, technologically advanced economy with Russia’s resource-rich state in an effort to see this ambition through.

Perhaps. But it is worth noting that while Beijing has backed Putin rhetorically, it has not delivered military or much economic aid to Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine. The China-Russia partnership may well prove to be as flimsy as the Sino-Soviet partnership did in the early Cold War. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s apparent preference for public posturing over genuine efforts at a realist approach—negotiating a modus vivendi with China and, perhaps someday, a post-Putin Russia—poses serious risks. Once again, NATO is playing a controversial role, with almost no debate in Washington or other Western capitals.

Although the alliance was expressly designed for threats across the “north Atlantic,” to little notice last summer, NATO expanded its focus to what was effectively a new containment policy toward China. At its summit in Madrid, the alliance invited the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to join in for the first time, and NATO’s new “strategic concept” named China as one of its priorities, saying Beijing’s ambitions challenge the West’s “interests, security and values.”

If Biden doesn’t want a new cold war, it would hardly be surprising if Xi thought he did. And yet with Xi on a back foot because of his disastrous COVID shutdown and sagging economy, new possibilities for diplomatic engagement may now exist. “I do not think that Xi sees himself or China in an absolutely existential struggle with the United States over competing ideological systems,” Leffler said. “I do not think Xi thinks that American and Chinese interests are mutually exclusive.” Or as Kennan would put it, according to Costigliola, “sharply opposed positions are just the asking price in the long, necessarily patient process of diplomacy.”

One thing is certain: We won’t know for sure unless serious diplomacy is attempted. Were Kennan alive today, no doubt he would agree.

Is Cold War Inevitable?

A new biography of George Kennan, the father of containment, raises questions about whether the old Cold War—and the emerging one with China—could have been avoided.

JANUARY 23, 2023, 6:00 AM

Foreign Policy · by Michael Hirsh · January 23, 2023

hirsh-michael-foreign-policy-columnistMichael Hirsh

By Michael Hirsh, a columnist for Foreign Policy.

Even at the advanced age of 94, George Kennan was still arguing that the Cold War hadn’t been inevitable—that it could have been avoided or, at least, ameliorated. A decade after that 44-year conflict ended, Kennan, the somewhat dovish father of the United States’ Cold War containment strategy, contended in a letter to his more hawkish biographer, John Lewis Gaddis, that while Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was alive, an early way out might have been possible.

The so-called Stalin Note from March 1952—an offer from Moscow to hold talks over the shape of post-World War II Europe—showed that the United States had ignored the possibilities of peace accomplished through “negotiation, and especially real negotiation, in distinction from public posturing (italics original),” Kennan wrote in 1999.

Those words still resonate today. Because public posturing is mostly what we’re seeing as the United States finds itself spiraling toward a new kind of cold war with both China and Russia. Yet almost no debate or discussion about these policies is taking place in Washington. Especially when it comes to the challenge from China—which has replaced the Soviet Union as the major geopolitical threat to the United States—politicians on both sides of the aisle see political gain in out-hawking each other by calling for a tougher stance against Beijing. What is emerging as a result is a long-term struggle for global power and influence that could easily outlast the first Cold War. This, despite President Joe Biden’s insistence after a November 2022 summit meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping that “there need not be a new Cold War.” When Secretary of State Antony Blinken makes his first visit to Beijing in a few weeks, it will be an attempt to repair diplomatic relations that have been all but suspended since former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year.

Even at the advanced age of 94, George Kennan was still arguing that the Cold War hadn’t been inevitable—that it could have been avoided or, at least, ameliorated. A decade after that 44-year conflict ended, Kennan, the somewhat dovish father of the United States’ Cold War containment strategy, contended in a letter to his more hawkish biographer, John Lewis Gaddis, that while Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was alive, an early way out might have been possible.

The so-called Stalin Note from March 1952—an offer from Moscow to hold talks over the shape of post-World War II Europe—showed that the United States had ignored the possibilities of peace accomplished through “negotiation, and especially real negotiation, in distinction from public posturing (italics original),” Kennan wrote in 1999.

Those words still resonate today. Because public posturing is mostly what we’re seeing as the United States finds itself spiraling toward a new kind of cold war with both China and Russia. Yet almost no debate or discussion about these policies is taking place in Washington. Especially when it comes to the challenge from China—which has replaced the Soviet Union as the major geopolitical threat to the United States—politicians on both sides of the aisle see political gain in out-hawking each other by calling for a tougher stance against Beijing. What is emerging as a result is a long-term struggle for global power and influence that could easily outlast the first Cold War. This, despite President Joe Biden’s insistence after a November 2022 summit meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping that “there need not be a new Cold War.” When Secretary of State Antony Blinken makes his first visit to Beijing in a few weeks, it will be an attempt to repair diplomatic relations that have been all but suspended since former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year.

Biden and Xi Jinping shaking hands in front of American and Chinese flags.

Then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands inside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Dec. 4, 2013.Lintao Zhang/Getty Images

The Kennan-Gaddis letters appear in the new biography Kennan: A Life Between Worlds, by Frank Costigliola. That exchange is absent from Gaddis’s magisterial 2011 work, George F. Kennan: An American Life. The new book, based on access to Kennan’s private papers and other sources, reveals just how passionately Kennan sought to ease the Cold War as it grew into a global game of military brinkmanship, as well as his post-Cold War opposition to the rapid eastward expansion of NATO’s borders. Shortly before Russian President Vladimir Putin took power, Kennan predicted this policy would inflame nationalist and anti-Western attitudes in Russia and “restore the atmosphere of the Cold War.”

Gaddis’s account of Kennan’s life “had slight sympathy for, and devoted scant attention to, Kennan’s efforts to tone down the Cold War,” writes Costigliola, a historian at the University of Connecticut. The true story of Kennan’s career “demands that we rethink the Cold War as an era of possibilities for dialogue and diplomacy, not the inevitable series of confrontations and crises we came to see.”

The book cover of Kennan: A Life between Worlds by Frank Costigliola

Kennan: A Life between Worlds, Frank Costigliola, Princeton University Press, 648 pp., $35.49, January 2023

A fresh look at Kennan’s views is warranted more today than ever. The great diplomat, one of the most influential strategists in U.S. history, did not promise that negotiations would provide a way out of the Cold War—only that Washington would never know unless it tried. Washington didn’t try very hard back then, and it doesn’t appear to be trying very hard now, despite new opportunities that may be presenting themselves. “Kennan’s lesson for us, in understanding the Cold War of the twentieth century and in defusing the explosive tensions of the twenty-first century, is that seemingly intractable conflicts may be more susceptible to settlement than it may at first appear,” Costigliola writes.

Although Putin has placed Russia beyond the pale of rapprochement for the present with his murderous invasion of Ukraine, China still appears to be open for diplomatic business. In a way that is perhaps analogous to Stalin in 1952, Xi and his newly appointed foreign minister, Qin Gang, may be hinting at ways to step back from what has been, for the first two years of the Biden administration, a harsh atmosphere of confrontation on both sides. In his annual new year’s message, broadcast on Dec. 31, Xi appeared to somewhat moderate his formerly truculent tone toward Taiwan. Qin, in a Washington Post op-ed giving his farewell as China’s ambassador to Washington, said that the Sino-American relationship “should not be a zero-sum game in which one side out-competes the other or one nation thrives at the expense of the other.” He added that he leaves his post “more convinced that the door to China-U.S. relations will remain open and cannot be closed.” In recent weeks Beijing also moved Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian, known for his anti-U.S. rhetoric, into a less prominent role.

There are, no doubt, more differences than similarities between the Cold War conflict that pitted the Soviet Union and United States against each other and the current tensions between Beijing and Washington. And yet those differences might offer an even greater chance for breaking the descent into long-term Sino-American conflict than existed during the Cold War. In contrast to that earlier era, when the Soviet Union and United States existed in entirely separate spheres of influence, the world economy is well integrated, and both the United States and China have gained much of their wealth by trading and investing in it. Xi discovered this anew as the Chinese economy slowed dramatically last year and its population shrank. Moreover, the new challenges demanding sustained international cooperation—in particular, stopping climate change and future pandemics—are far more pressing than they were then. Indeed, it is very likely that the threats from global warming and new COVID-like viruses are far greater than the strategic threat that China and the United States pose to each other.

Unlike the Soviet Union, which surrounded itself with cooperative, tightly controlled governments, China today finds itself virtually surrounded by U.S. allies or Westernized states that are a counterbalance to its growing military power. The Biden administration has already laid down a tough policy approach to China, including helping arm Australia and Japan; forming the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, India, and Australia; and orchestrating an unprecedented decoupling of high-tech trade with China, including a frankly protectionist industrial policy aimed at boosting U.S. competitiveness.

Read More

A military propaganda image appears on a giant screen in Beijing on May 18, 2021.A military propaganda image appears on a giant screen in Beijing on May 18, 2021.

5 Ways the U.S.-China Cold War Will Be Different From the Last One

Guardrails and statesmanship will be even more important this time around.

US President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev sign the SALT II treaty.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter (L) and Leonid Brezhnev (R), general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sign the SALT II treaty in Vienna on June 18, 1979. VOTAVAFOTO/AFP/Getty Images

Kennan might well have approved of this approach—while at the same time urging serious negotiations from such a position of strength, said Melvyn Leffler, a historian of the Cold War at the University of Virginia, in a phone interview. When Kennan proposed containment of the USSR in his famous “X” article in Foreign Affairs in 1947, he urged a robust response to Soviet aggression “designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.” Only later did he propose negotiations.

Similarly, today, Leffler said, Kennan “would be talking about the power relationships that are arrayed all around China at this time.” And rather than worrying about China’s strategic alignment with Russia—even though Xi plans to visit Moscow this year—Kennan would likely be focused on the two countries’ different interests, which remain profound. In particular, Leffler said, Russia and China are still vying for influence in Central Asia. Moscow and Beijing also seriously mistrust each other, despite their mutual hostility to U.S. dominance.

These differences are more significant “than the short-term expediency that’s bringing them together now,” Leffler said. “Much of the talk now about Chinese-Russian cooperation resembles the anxieties about Sino-Soviet cooperation during the Cold War, which turned out to be exaggerated.”

Indeed, there is much today’s policymakers could learn from Kennan—in particular his deep understanding of geopolitics and power. Over the years Kennan has gained a reputation as a brilliant strategic and abstract thinker but also as someone who was often naive when it came to practical diplomacy. And yet even Kennan’s detractors during his lifetime agreed that no one in the U.S. national security establishment knew Russia better. Nor was Kennan a knee-jerk liberal dove. After all, in the early years of containment doctrine the columnist Walter Lippmann, in a famous series of articles later collected in a book called The Cold War, fiercely attacked Kennan as a feckless hawk and containment as a strategic “monstrosity,” writing that the strategy would doom the United States to endless intervention overseas. Costigliola concedes that while Kennan “had spent the four years from 1944 to 1948 promoting the Cold War, he devoted the subsequent forty to undoing what he and others had wrought. That’s not a bad record.”

Kennan later came around to Lippmann’s views, arguing that he’d never intended for containment to be seen primarily in a military sense. As early as 1948, Costigliola writes, he began to push for negotiations—a campaign he continued for the rest of his long life. Eight years before his death in 2005 at 101, Kennan marshaled his Russia expertise again when he warned that in extending “NATO’s borders smack up to those of Russia we are making the greatest mistake of the entire post-Cold-War era.”

Couple looking over the Berlin Wall.

A young West Berlin couple looks over the Berlin Wall into East Berlin in Germany. Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

The reasons for the ultra-nationalism and anti-Western fervor of Putin and his Kremlin supporters are complex and reach back deeply into Russian history. But Kennan may well have been right about the perils of poking the Russian bear too hard for too long. A little-noted U.S. Army study commissioned by the Trump administration nearly five years ago anticipated both Putin’s aggression and popular Russian support for his Ukraine invasion. The study, co-authored by intelligence specialist C. Anthony Pfaff, concluded that “the Russian people share the same sense of geographic insecurity and political humiliation as their government [and] demonstrations of global power and confrontation with the West, especially in Eastern Europe, will only serve to bolster the popularity of any future Russian government.”

This realpolitik sensitivity to other nations’ strategic interests was a constant theme in Kennan’s thinking. In the late 1950s, in a series of radio addresses that Costigliola writes were “arguably more impressive” than Kennan’s famed “long telegram” and “X” article in Foreign Affairs laying out the groundwork for containment, Kennan “shook the very foundations of Cold War regime in Britain, West Germany, and the United States.” He challenged the division of Germany into western and eastern halves, the rigid heart of the Cold War orthodoxy at the time. Kennan proposed that West and East could find a way to negotiate a partial disengagement if the Westerners withdrew from Germany in return for a Soviet military pullback from Eastern Europe. A reunified Germany—one that would remain neutral and only lightly armed—would be a buffer, avoiding the brinkmanship that occurred later in 1958-59 and then again in 1961-62, culminating in the Cuban missile crisis and the threat of Armageddon. Germany would also not remain in NATO—echoing the deal first offered by Stalin in 1952. Kennan proposed keeping some nuclear weapons for deterrence, but he said that tactical nukes would only cement the division of Europe. If nothing was done, he warned, a runaway nuclear arms race would ensue.

Kennan proved to be correct about that, too. But his proposals, the so-called Reith lectures, never went anywhere—especially after Moscow launched Sputnik in 1957, raising the threat of nuclear apocalypse on New York and Washington—and Kennan was accused of Munich-style appeasement. His friend and strategic archrival, Dean Acheson, complained that Kennan “lived part of the time in a world of fantasy” and even, at one point, compared his old diplomatic comrade to a species of ape engaged in “absurd and idle chatter.” Kennan was devastated and lamented that no one in power was “interested in a political settlement with the Russians.” The Soviet collapse a little over three decades later appeared to vindicate Washington’s hard-line strategy, but people also tend to forget just how close the world came to all-out nuclear war in the interim.

Kennan also presciently opposed the Vietnam War. In Senate testimony in 1966 that was so closely followed around the country that it “pre-empted I Love Lucy,” Costigliola writes, Kennan declared that containment did not apply to a civil war in Vietnam that would only damage prestige by attacking “a poor and helpless people.” Quoting John Quincy Adams, he said the U.S. should not go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” But as with NATO’s response, by then U.S. policies were entrenched.

President Kennedy gives a press conference standing in front of a map of Vietnam.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy gives a news conference on the situation in Southeast Asia, standing next to a map of Vietnam, on Nov. 23, 1961.Corbis/Getty Images

The paramount question today is whether Washington’s posture of confrontation is similarly entrenched. One reason both Democrats and Republicans agree on a tough response to China is a mutual sense that they’ve long been duped by Beijing. For most of the last quarter-century, both U.S. political parties were eager to engage China, only to conclude that its leaders were mainly interested in stealing intellectual property and building up China’s economy so as to displace the United States as the world’s leading power. Biden, accordingly, has populated his China advisory team with hawks such as Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi.

Beyond that bipartisan consensus, there has long been a political bias toward confrontation over negotiation—at least since former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave a bad name to appeasement at Munich. The politics of all wars—including cold wars—are such that presidents gain advantage from looking strong and tough-minded. The benefits of such an approach are immediate—a strong, leaderly image for the president and higher poll ratings—while the costs are long term and diffuse: ever-worsening global warming, the slow escalation of an arms race and the even slower unraveling of the international system, the vague but increasing threat of future pandemics. As for a more conciliatory, realpolitik approach, on the other hand, its benefits are long term and diffuse, and its costs immediate: an image of weakness and indecisiveness, which is something no U.S. president likes, especially when he’s fighting a war.

The book cover of The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam.

The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam, Marc J. Selverstone, Harvard University Press, 336 pp., $35.00, November 2022

Those questions go to the heart of another recent book about the Cold War, The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam, by University of Virginia historian Marc J. Selverstone, who argues that even presidents who might realize the potential hazard of overreacting can nonetheless be pulled in. In his book, Selverstone dissects one of the last enduring shibboleths of the Cold War: the Camelot myth that President John F. Kennedy would have avoided the quagmire of Vietnam had he lived.

True, Kennedy was, by many accounts, always leery of being pulled into a conflict that he, as a young senator, recognized was essentially a nationalist movement against French colonialism. As Selverstone writes, Kennedy presciently told his Senate colleagues as far back as 1954 that “no amount of American military assistance … can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere.” Kennedy, by the time of his assassination, had also adopted much more subtle foreign-policy views and was looking for fresh ways to reduce U.S.-Soviet tensions. Even so, he was still a confirmed Cold Warrior, worried about credibility and ready to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty,” as Kennedy declared in his inaugural address. Selverstone argues that Kennedy “continued to operate from a worldview that embraced the precepts of domino thinking … and the demonstration of resolve,” and Costigliola notes that Kennedy shied away from embracing Kennan because of the latter’s support for “disengagement.”

But other scholars disagree. Harvard University historian Fredrik Logevall, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam, and a not fully completed two volume biography of Kennedy, said that Kennedy was a far more subtle student of history than former President Lyndon B. Johnson and was skeptical of the domino theory. He believes Kennedy would have found a way to scale down the U.S. presence in an unwinnable war. “I don’t think the Cold War was inevitable, and I don’t believe a major U.S. war in Vietnam was inevitable,” Logevall said in an email.

What about now? Just as Acheson and others argued about the Soviet Union during the Cold War, many policymakers today say that China under Xi seeks only to buy time while it grows stronger vis-a-vis U.S. power—and then strike against Taiwan. Beyond that, Beijing is looking to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power, no matter what it takes, the hawks say. And Xi is marrying his huge, technologically advanced economy with Russia’s resource-rich state in an effort to see this ambition through.

Perhaps. But it is worth noting that while Beijing has backed Putin rhetorically, it has not delivered military or much economic aid to Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine. The China-Russia partnership may well prove to be as flimsy as the Sino-Soviet partnership did in the early Cold War. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s apparent preference for public posturing over genuine efforts at a realist approach—negotiating a modus vivendi with China and, perhaps someday, a post-Putin Russia—poses serious risks. Once again, NATO is playing a controversial role, with almost no debate in Washington or other Western capitals.

Although the alliance was expressly designed for threats across the “north Atlantic,” to little notice last summer, NATO expanded its focus to what was effectively a new containment policy toward China. At its summit in Madrid, the alliance invited the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to join in for the first time, and NATO’s new “strategic concept” named China as one of its priorities, saying Beijing’s ambitions challenge the West’s “interests, security and values.”

If Biden doesn’t want a new cold war, it would hardly be surprising if Xi thought he did. And yet with Xi on a back foot because of his disastrous COVID shutdown and sagging economy, new possibilities for diplomatic engagement may now exist. “I do not think that Xi sees himself or China in an absolutely existential struggle with the United States over competing ideological systems,” Leffler said. “I do not think Xi thinks that American and Chinese interests are mutually exclusive.” Or as Kennan would put it, according to Costigliola, “sharply opposed positions are just the asking price in the long, necessarily patient process of diplomacy.”

One thing is certain: We won’t know for sure unless serious diplomacy is attempted. Were Kennan alive today, no doubt he would agree.

Books are independently selected by FP editors. FP earns an affiliate commission on anything purchased through links to Amazon.com on this page.

Foreign Policy · by Michael Hirsh · January 23, 2023

9. Senator Questions If Allies Would Aid Taiwan in Potential Chinese Invasion

Senator Questions If Allies Would Aid Taiwan in Potential Chinese Invasion - USNI News

news.usni.org · by John Grady · January 23, 2023

Taiwanese Marines on Jan. 11, 2023. Taiwan Ministry of National Defense Photo

A senior Republican on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence questioned several allies’ willingness to come to Taiwan’s aid if China invaded the island.

Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) said Monday at the American Enterprise Institute that debating if the United States should drop its strategic ambiguity stance if the island democracy was attacked is a “moot point.” While Chinese President Xi Jinping expects the U.S. and Japan to respond, Cornyn is “a little less confident what our other allies would do.”

Australia and New Zealand have voiced support for Taiwan, but it “is a far cry from committing troops to repel an invasion,” Cornyn said as he also questioned Australia’s and New Zealand’s willingness to help Taiwan during a potential invasion.

As was the case with Russian President Vladimir Putin, “one guy decides whether to invade or not,” when it comes to Taiwan’s future, Cornyn said.

“I don’t think the Taiwanese are ready” for an attack. But “we’ve see all the signs” of increased Chinese belligerency following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) visit to Taiwan, Cornyn said. This summer, Pelosi told Taiwanese officials that the United States “will not abandon its commitment” to the island’s security.

Beijing responded with missile tests over and near the island, flying hundreds of aircraft into its air identification zone over several days, sending warships around the island as it would in a blockade and using military exercises to test amphibious assault operations.

For several years, the United States has pressed Taiwan to improve its internal defenses by investing in anti-air and anti-ship weapons, investing in mines and mine countermeasures, extending training periods for reservists and stepping up military exercises rehearsing how to repel an invasion.

Cornyn also questioned whether Taiwan could “hold out for a couple of weeks … until the cavalry arrives” for its rescue. The situation is very different from that of Ukraine, which has land connections with NATO countries to move support into the country. Taiwan is an island and support would have to come by air or sea.

When asked what would deter Xi from an attack in the near future, Cornyn pointed to “cost” leading to potential failure.

On continued aid to Ukraine, he expected strong congressional support to continue. “My own view is that it is money well spent, he said. The senator said the expected audit – requested by the House – of past expenditures for and to Kyiv is necessary.

Cornyn is skeptical that the Kremlin is interested in serious negotiations with the Ukrainians now.

“If peace broke out tomorrow, they [would use the time] to regroup and re-arm,” he said.

He agreed with the Ukrainian assessment that the war began in 2014, when the Kremlin seized Crimea and backed separatists in the Donbas region with weapons, manpower and financing.

The Ukrainians have to set the terms of negotiations that lead to a settlement, he added. Putin’s goals now are “to grind the Ukrainians … and outlast the West” in the struggle.

The defense industrial sector is feeling the impact of that continued support to Ukraine, Cornyn said. He cited a new Center for Strategic and International Studies report that found it will take five years to replenish U.S. stocks of 155 mm artillery rounds.

“Javelins and Stingers, same story,” the senator said.

Aggravating the shortages is the potential for simultaneous engagement in two conflicts – one in Eastern Europe and another in the Western Pacific, he added. “I don’t see all hands on deck,” including the industrial base, should a crisis escalate to fighting in Asia or the Pacific.

“This ought to be a flashing red light to us,” Cornyn said.

“Certainly we are in a race” with China on advanced technologies, like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, he added. “There’s enough warning signals that we need to be ramping up our readiness” in the technology sector as well. Cornyn cited the semi-conductor manufacturing industry, for which both China and the United States rely on Taiwan.

Congress compounds the problem by relying on continuing resolutions, instead of passing budgets on time, and then passing appropriations through huge omnibus spending packages. The resolutions, with their caps on spending and restrictions on where money can go until a budget is passed, breaks up planning in the Pentagon and disrupts industrial base production, he said.

“I think it’s going to be a real heavy lift to get back to regular order” of passing individual appropriations bills with amendments accepted or rejected on the floor of both chambers of Congress, he said.

“CRs and sequestration is one of the places you would not want to go,” Cornyn said.

The fiscal year begins Oct. 1. President Joe Biden signed the Fiscal Year 2023 $1.7 trillion omnibus spending package into law on Dec. 29. The government ran on continuing resolutions during that time.

Related

news.usni.org · by John Grady · January 23, 2023

10. The Triumphs and Tribulations of Peter the Great: What Putin’s View of 18th-Century Warfare Can Tell Us About Ukraine

Excerpts:

As Putin prepares the Russian people for a long war in Ukraine, they may begin to hear more about this part of their history. On Dec. 22, Putin’s government registered a general education plan for Russian students that featured topics such as “Overcoming initial failures in the Great Northern War.”

Russia didn’t conquer Crimea on the first attempt, or even the sixth. In the current war, the Russian military made many initial mistakes. But then, the same is true for many of its 18th-century conflicts. Today, Russia retains the ability to reconstitute its forces over a period of months or years. Indeed, the country’s nuclear deterrent makes it even easier for Putin to continue to reenact his fantasy of being a modern 18th-century czar. Only Ukrainian resolve and Western support can determine if his reenactment looks more like Peter’s failure on the River Prut, or Catherine’s conquests later in the century.

The Triumphs and Tribulations of Peter the Great: What Putin’s View of 18th-Century Warfare Can Tell Us About Ukraine - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Alexander Burns · January 24, 2023

Why did Peter the Great wage the Seven Years War? Why did he fight the Swedes for seven years? And the Battle of Poltava, do you know where it is? Where are Sweden and Poltava? The decisive battle of the armies of Peter the Great and Charles XII took place near Poltava: Why were they there?

Several months before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin played history teacher for a class of Russian schoolchildren. For Putin, the answers were obvious. Peter’s armies were in Poltava, now located in northeast Ukraine, waging a great power struggle with the West, represented at the time by Swedish King Charles XII. Unfortunately for Putin, one student in the classroom was more hung up on details than grand narratives and replied: “Speaking generally, it wasn’t called the Seven Years War, it was called the Great Northern War.”

Putin of course, is famously obsessed with this history. But Putin’s comments on 18th-century history reveal that he doesn’t even always get the details right. His allusions to the era of Peter I and Catherine II are shallow, upbeat, and focused on what academics call the great man history. He likes kings, generals, and heroes who successfully turned the wheel of Russian history. He wants to highlight Peter’s early victories in 1709 and Catherine’s conquest of Crimea in 1783, rather than the many defeats that marked the intervening years. Up to this point, Putin has publicly ignored the long, painful, and grinding process of 18th-century Russian imperialism.

It’s easy to see how Putin’s greatest hits version of Russian history — all the victories, none of the brutal setbacks — might have led to the false confidence with which he ordered his forces into Ukraine last February. But despite his public rhetoric and occasional errors, Putin undoubtedly knows the real history behind Russia’s long, difficult 18th century struggles. As Russia prepares for a longer conflict in Ukraine, this history also offers examples he can draw on where Russian armies overcame significant setbacks, reconstituted their forces, and fought on to victory. As a result, looking back at how Putin uses and distorts the story of Russia’s 18th century wars can help us anticipate what he envisions for his own war today.

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A Heroic History

Like most heads of state, Putin is fairly upbeat when discussing his country’s heroes in public. In his speeches, Putin primarily focuses on two eras: the portion of the reign of Peter the Great that lasted from 1700 to 1721 and Catherine the Great’s reign between 1768 and 1783. In the long arc of 18th-century Russian history, this would be a bit like talking about the American Revolutionary War by mentioning Lexington and Concord and then skipping to Yorktown. The progression may be correct, but a lot of the nuances and complexities are lost.

Discussing Peter I on the 350th anniversary of his birth last June, Putin commented:

Almost nothing has changed. It can be surprising when you start to understand this. Peter waged the Great Northern War for 21 years with Sweden and annexed some territories. He didn’t annex anything, he reclaimed them! Yes, truly. All of Karelia where St. Petersburg exists was founded then. When [Peter] founded a new capital, none of the European countries recognized this territory as Russia. Everyone claimed it was Swedish. But since the dawn of time, not just Finns, but also Slavs lived there and this territory was once under the control of Kyivan Rus. The same is true to the west, with Narva and his first campaigns. He was reclaiming territories and fortifying borderlands, that’s what he was doing. Well, it is also now our destiny to reclaim and fortify.

Here, Putin justifies his invasion of Ukraine by reference to 18th-century Russian history. By changing Peter I from a conqueror into a reclaimer, Putin creates a narrative that he and the early Russian leader are in the same position. In his mind, European powers refused to recognize Russia’s rightful claims under Peter, just as the international community fails to recognize his seizure of Crimea.

Putin usually frames his understanding of the Great Northern War as a great power competition in which the enemy was the West but the battlefield was Ukraine. During the Great Northern War, the most unified Ukrainian resistance to Russia came in 1708 to 1709, when Hetman Ivan Mazepa took a few thousand Hetmanate cavalry and a larger number of Zaporizhian Cossacks into an alliance with Swedish King Charles XII. The Swedish, Hetmanate, and Zaporizhian force was crushed at Poltava by Peter in 1709. During the period of the Russian Empire, and in modern pro-Russian circles, followers of Mazepa, or Mazepintsy, have become synonymous with traitors to Putin’s vision for Russia and Ukraine.

But for all of his focus on Peter, Putin’s favorite topic is the fifteen years between 1768 and 1783 when Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire, stripped it of the Crimean Khanate, and annexed Crimea. Putin has said that Catherine achieved victory with less cost than Peter, and that he admires this. Catherine the Great led Russia during this era, and Putin seems to identify with her. Putin remembers her as a conqueror and founder of cities. Russia’s armies were highly successful in this period, led by famous figures such as Peter Rumyanstev and Grigory Potemkin. (When they withdrew from Kherson, Russian forces removed Grigory Potemkin’s bones from St. Catherine’s Cathedral.) During these years, Russia fought against an ailing Ottoman Empire. In 1690, few would have bet on the emerging Muscovite state against the Ottoman forces. But by the 1760s, the Ottoman military had grown weaker. As a result, in the 1768 war, Catherine’s armies travelled from victory to victory at battles such as Larga, Kagul, and Kerch.

Here, as in the Great Northern War, Putin’s narrative holds that victories over other great powers allowed Russia to crush Ukraine. Victories over the Ottomans allowed Catherine a free reign in dealing with the Ukrainian Cossacks. In 1764, Catherine founded a new province called Novorossiya to consolidate her military frontier, which grew to encompass Kharkiv, the Donbass, old Crimean Khanate possessions, and the territories of the dissolved Zaporizhian Cossack host.

Under the direction of Putin and Patriarch Kirill, this history is celebrated. Since 2014, commentators have noted Putin’s use of the name Novorossiya. On Jan. 16, 2023, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society announced a competition for Russian school children focused Catherine’s annexation of Crimea and the foundation of Novorossiya. And, not surprisingly, in response to the invasion, Ukrainians have started to dismantle statues of the Empress that remained on their territory.

In Putin’s heroic interpretation, Peter I beat the West during the Great Northern War, which blocked any effort at Ukrainian independence. Then Catherine II defeated the Ottoman Empire to seize Crimea and southern Ukraine. With the help of heroes like Pyotr Rumyanstev, Alexander Suvorov, and Fyodor Ushakov, Russian victory was always assured. In 1708, a Russian commander proudly reported back to the Kremlin, “the bandit’s den at Bakhmut is taken and destroyed, and the inhabitants have been slaughtered.” Putin is undoubtedly hoping to receive a similar report any day.

A Century of Setbacks

Yet this whole narrative obscures the fact that Russia’s historical fight to conquer its southern frontier lasted for centuries, and even its decisive phase ran over one hundred years. In presenting his triumphant account, Putin often publicly glosses over the failures and costs associated with Russian imperialism. What Putin leaves unsaid is almost as telling as his boasting about 18th-century commanders. Despite its eventual victory, Moscow experienced plenty of severe losses during this period. Russia endured defeats and setbacks when on the offensive in Crimea in 1687, 1689, 1736, 1737, 1738, and 1739. It also suffered losses at Azov in 1695, Narva in 1700, Fraustadt in 1706, Holowczyn in 1708, the Prut River in 1711, Gross-Jägersdorf in 1757, Zorndorf in 1758, Colberg in 1758 and 1760, Khotyn in 1769, Izmail in 1789, Porrassalmi in 1789, and Uttismalm in 1789. Then, as now, defeats often stemmed from a lack of logistical preparation and overconfidence.

In July of 1711, Peter I led the Russian army into a disastrous fight against the Ottomans on the River Prut. The czar had been misled by his cronies into believing, much like Putin in Ukraine, that victory would be quick and easy and that his forces would be welcomed as liberators by Christians in the Ottoman Empire. But the Ottoman army surrounded his forces and compelled his surrender. According to one recent survey of the campaign, “Peter… nearly lost everything—his army, his territorial gains since 1701, his throne—because the army had been placed in an untenable position on the Prut by poor political intelligence and inadequate logistics.” Only Ottoman leniency in peace negotiations allowed Peter to withdraw, reconstitute his forces, and continue the concurrent war against the Swedish Empire. Putin has been silent on this incident, and since the invasion of Ukraine, Russian critics of his policies have noticed the silence.

Tellingly, Putin has never publicly referred to the career of Field Marshal Burkhard von Münnich, one of the most important figures in 18th-century Russian military history. In a war over Crimea in 1735, Münnich allowed himself to be lulled into a false sense of security, leading to a string of falsely optimistic assessments: In 1736, he predicted “Azov will be ours…perhaps even Crimea will fall to us.” Then, in 1737, “All of Crimea will be subordinated to our control.” By 1738, he was already anticipating the conquest of modern-day Romania. Then, more boldly, in 1739: “the standards and flags of the Empress will be hoisted, where you ask? In Constantinople, in the oldest Greek Christian Church, the Hagia Sophia.”

Historians from the nineteenth century on criticized Münnich’s overconfidence in light of his underwhelming performance in the 1735-1739 war. But Brian L. Davies has presented a new interpretation of this conflict, arguing that Münnich and his subordinate officers learned from each year of failure, and that by 1739, the Russian military emerged from the conflict with new tactical doctrines and a strengthened logistical system.

If Russia suffered multiple defeats, how was it ultimately able to ultimately emerge victorious in conflict after conflict? During the 18th century, Russia demonstrated an impressive ability to suffer losses and absorb casualties, then recruit new forces and resume the offensive. During the Great Northern War, Russia drew on its manpower in order to solve military deficiencies and avoid internal problems. Today, Russia frequently recruits men from rural areas, and tries to avoid recruitment from large urban centers. By contrast, between 1700 and 1705, Moscow frequently avoided rural drafts in order to preserve its agricultural economy. Instead, servants, craftsmen, and the urban poor were initially targeted by the Russian state. As the war continued, this proved insufficient, and, from 1705 to 1711, the state turned to the rural agricultural population. This system of conscription endured for the rest of the eighteenth century and supplied the Russian army with men. During the war against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire in the 1730s, the Russians lost more men from disease, the climate, and privation than enemy action. In order to maintain their strength of 120,000 men in the face of casualties, Russian armies in this theatre alone were forced to bring in 150,000 replacements between 1738 and 1739. Adjusted for today’s Russian population, that is the equivalent of 1.4 million losses.

Conclusion

As Putin prepares the Russian people for a long war in Ukraine, they may begin to hear more about this part of their history. On Dec. 22, Putin’s government registered a general education plan for Russian students that featured topics such as “Overcoming initial failures in the Great Northern War.”

Russia didn’t conquer Crimea on the first attempt, or even the sixth. In the current war, the Russian military made many initial mistakes. But then, the same is true for many of its 18th-century conflicts. Today, Russia retains the ability to reconstitute its forces over a period of months or years. Indeed, the country’s nuclear deterrent makes it even easier for Putin to continue to reenact his fantasy of being a modern 18th-century czar. Only Ukrainian resolve and Western support can determine if his reenactment looks more like Peter’s failure on the River Prut, or Catherine’s conquests later in the century.

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Alexander S. Burns is a visiting assistant professor at Franciscan University of Steubenville studying the American Continental army’s connection to European militaries. His edited volume, The Changing Face of Old Regime Warfare: Essays in Honour of Christopher Duffy, was published in 2022.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Alexander Burns · January 24, 2023

11. Russian Agents Suspected of Directing Far-Right Group to Mail Bombs in Spain

Dry run? Confidence targets? Does Russia's support extend to other far right groups?

Excerpts:

Fiona Hill, a senior director for Europe and Russia on the White House National Security Council in the Trump administration, said it would not be surprising if the G.R.U. had directed the Russian Imperial Movement to carry out the attacks.

“Most of these kinds of organizations are of course linked to Russian intelligence, either the G.R.U. or the F.S.B.,” she said, referring also to the Federal Security Service, Russia’s domestic intelligence agency. “Oftentimes they’re just front groups for the intelligence activities.”

Intelligence agents use the groups to sow confusion and create “implausible deniability,” she added.

American and British intelligence officials have been working with the Spanish national police and counterintelligence officials on the investigation. Their suspicions about the Russian Imperial Movement and the G.R.U. coalesced late last year, soon after the bombs were discovered, U.S. officials say.

The radical group is only partially aligned with the Russian government. The movement’s leadership has criticized the incompetence of Russian leadership in the Ukraine war and accused Mr. Putin of corruption. Yet because the group shares Moscow’s aims of undermining Western governments and sowing chaos in Europe, Russian intelligence has been able to influence its operations, according to American officials.

Russian Agents Suspected of Directing Far-Right Group to Mail Bombs in Spain

By Edward Wong, Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt

The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · January 24, 2023

U.S. officials say the operation may be a signal by Russia that the country and its proxies could carry out more terrorist actions in Europe if nations continue supporting Ukraine.

Spanish and foreign investigators have been looking into who sent six letter bombs in late November and early December to sites mostly in Madrid.Credit...Samuel Aranda for The New York Times

Jan. 22, 2023

WASHINGTON — American and European officials believe that Russian military intelligence officers directed associates of a white supremacist militant group based in Russia to carry out a recent letter bomb campaign in Spain whose most prominent targets were the prime minister, the defense minister and foreign diplomats, according to U.S. officials.

Spanish and foreign investigators have been looking into who sent six letter bombs in late November and early December to sites mostly in Madrid, including the official residence of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, which also serves as his office; the American and Ukrainian Embassies; and the Defense Ministry. No one was killed in the attacks, which U.S. officials consider terrorism. An employee of the Ukrainian Embassy was injured when one of the packages exploded.

Investigators in recent weeks have focused on the Russian Imperial Movement, a radical group that has members and associates across Europe and military-style training centers in St. Petersburg, Russia, the officials said. They added that the group, which has been designated a global terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, is believed to have ties to Russian intelligence agencies. Important members of the group have been in Spain, and the police there have tracked its ties with far-right Spanish organizations.

U.S. officials say that the Russian officers who directed the campaign appeared intent on keeping European governments off guard and may be testing out proxy groups in the event Moscow decides to escalate a conflict.

The apparent aim of the action was to signal that Russia and its proxies could carry out terrorist strikes across Europe, including in the capitals of member states of NATO, which is helping defend Ukraine against Russia’s invasion, said the U.S. officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivities around the investigation. Spain is a member of the alliance and has given military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, as well as diplomatic support.

One of the letter bombs was sent to Instalaza, a weapons maker in Zaragoza, northeastern Spain, that manufactures grenade launchers that Spain is giving to Ukraine, and another went to the Torrejón de Ardoz Air Base outside Madrid.

There are no signs that Moscow is ready to engage in widespread covert attacks or sabotage in Europe, which Russian officials believe could provoke a response from NATO and, potentially, a costly wider conflict, according to U.S. and allied officials. For that same reason, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and his generals have not ordered a conventional attack on a NATO country.

Mr. Putin’s calculus on terrorist attacks could change if Russia continues to suffer major setbacks in Ukraine, U.S. officials say. Mr. Putin has given his military intelligence agency wide latitude to develop and conduct covert operations in Europe, but the degree to which the Kremlin was involved in the letter bomb operation is unclear, they say.

“This seems like a warning shot,” said Nathan Sales, the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator in the Trump administration, when the Russian Imperial Movement was designated a terrorist organization. “It’s Russia sending a signal that it’s prepared to use terrorist proxies to attack in the West’s rear areas.”

The Russian officers behind the bombing campaign work for the Main Directorate, commonly referred to as the G.R.U., one of Moscow’s more aggressive intelligence shops, U.S. officials say. In recent years, the group has carried out bold and lethal covert actions with impunity.

The State of the War

• Military Aid: Western defense officials meeting in Germany failed to reach an agreement for sending battle tanks to Ukraine. It was a setback to Kyiv’s hopes to quickly receive weapons that President Volodymyr Zelensky has called crucial to the next phase of the war.
• NATO Rifts Emerge: The Western alliance has been holding strong, but disagreements over strategy for the coming year and what Ukraine needs ahead of a major offensive in the spring are breaking into public view.
• Helicopter Crash: A helicopter crashed in a fireball in a Kyiv suburb, killing a member of Mr. Zelensky’s cabinet and more than a dozen other people, and dealing a blow to Ukraine’s wartime leadership.

Members of the agency have been involved in a range of shadowy activities, from interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election to shooting down a Malaysian civilian airliner over Ukraine in 2014, according to U.S. officials.

One specific part of the agency, Unit 29155, has tried to destabilize Europe through attempted coups and assassinations, according to U.S. and European security officials. Its agents include Russian war veterans, and it was so secretive that most G.R.U. operatives probably did not know it existed. American and allied officials learned about the unit only in recent years.

The headquarters of the Main Directorate in Moscow, a Russian intelligence organization. Members of the agency have been involved in a range of shadowy activities, U.S. officials say.Credit...Pavel Golovkin/Associated Press

U.S. officials suspect that the Russian officers involved in the Spain action are part of the 161st Special Purpose Specialist Training Center, whose headquarters in eastern Moscow house Unit 29155, among other groups, U.S. officials say.

Spanish investigators have identified “persons of interest” they believe were involved in the attacks, one senior U.S. official said.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

Learn more about our process.

A spokeswoman for the Spanish Embassy in Washington declined to comment, citing the continuing inquiry.

Fiona Hill, a senior director for Europe and Russia on the White House National Security Council in the Trump administration, said it would not be surprising if the G.R.U. had directed the Russian Imperial Movement to carry out the attacks.

“Most of these kinds of organizations are of course linked to Russian intelligence, either the G.R.U. or the F.S.B.,” she said, referring also to the Federal Security Service, Russia’s domestic intelligence agency. “Oftentimes they’re just front groups for the intelligence activities.”

Intelligence agents use the groups to sow confusion and create “implausible deniability,” she added.

American and British intelligence officials have been working with the Spanish national police and counterintelligence officials on the investigation. Their suspicions about the Russian Imperial Movement and the G.R.U. coalesced late last year, soon after the bombs were discovered, U.S. officials say.

The radical group is only partially aligned with the Russian government. The movement’s leadership has criticized the incompetence of Russian leadership in the Ukraine war and accused Mr. Putin of corruption. Yet because the group shares Moscow’s aims of undermining Western governments and sowing chaos in Europe, Russian intelligence has been able to influence its operations, according to American officials.

The ability to use the Russian Imperial Movement as a sometime proxy force is useful to Russian intelligence, particularly because that makes it more difficult for rival countries to attribute actions to the Russian government.

The State Department designated the group and its leadership global terrorists in April 2020, the first time such a label had been applied to a white supremacist group.

“R.I.M. has provided paramilitary-style training to white supremacists and neo-Nazis in Europe and actively works to rally these types of groups into a common front against their perceived enemies,” the department said in the announcement of the designation.

The department said the group had two training centers in St. Petersburg that “are likely being used for woodland and urban assault, tactical weapons and hand-to-hand combat training.”

The leaders designated by the State Department were Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev, who founded the group in St. Petersburg in 2002; Denis Valiullovich Gariyev, the leader of its paramilitary arm, the Russian Imperial Legion; and Nikolay Nikolayevich Trushchalov, an organizer of the group’s activities abroad.

The department said that two Swedes who committed a series of bombings in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 2016 had attended a training course run by the Russian group. The perpetrators, who were convicted in court, had targeted a refugee shelter, a shelter for asylum seekers and a cafe.

According to U.S. officials, President Vladimir V. Putin’s calculus on terrorist attacks could change if Russia continues to suffer major setbacks in Ukraine.Credit...Ilya Pitalev/Sputnik, via Agence France-Presse

The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University describes the Russian Imperial Movement as “white supremacist, monarchist, ultranationalist, pro-Russian Orthodox and antisemitic.” The group advocates the restoration of czarist rule to Russia, it said, and nurtures ties with neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups in the United States and Europe.

American and European security officials have had growing concerns about white supremacist groups with transnational links for most of the last decade. In 2019, for example, an Australian man who killed 51 people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, published a manifesto online before the massacre saying he had drawn inspiration from white extremist terrorism attacks in Europe and the United States.

As a result of the recent letter bombs, U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials have increased their scrutiny of the Russian Imperial Movement, including updating terrorist watchlists to flag suspected leaders of the group or its members, U.S. officials said.

Russian intelligence agents have attracted more attention from counterintelligence officials and police departments in recent years as they have carried out increasingly bold operations, particularly in Europe.

In 2018, they tried to kill Sergei V. Skripal, a former G.R.U. officer recruited by Britain as a spy, by poisoning him and his daughter at their residence in England; those two barely survived, but a British woman died. Russian agents have also carried out bombings and assassination attempts in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and tried to pull off a coup in Montenegro, according to European intelligence officials.

The same elite group active in Europe, Unit 29155, has operated in Afghanistan and offered bounties to reward Taliban-linked militants for killing American and coalition troops, according to a U.S. intelligence assessment first reported by The New York Times. American officials said in 2021 that they had no evidence showing the Kremlin had ordered the covert action.

Charlie Savage contributed reporting from Washington, and José Bautista from Madrid.

The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · January 24, 2023

12. Ukraine purges officials and governors in biggest shakeup of war

Ukraine purges officials and governors in biggest shakeup of war

Reuters · by Tom Balmforth

• Summary
• Deputy head of Zelenskiy's office steps down
• Defence official denies accusations of overpaying for supplies
• Deputy prosecutor had been criticised for holiday in Spain
• Allies seek German tanks for Kyiv

KYIV, Jan 24 (Reuters) - Ukraine dismissed the governors of five battlefield provinces and an array of other senior officials on Tuesday in the biggest shakeup of its wartime leadership since Russia's invasion last year.

Separately on Tuesday, a long-awaited decision on whether allies could send German-made heavy tanks to Ukraine finally reached Berlin, after Poland said it had formally sent its request.

Among more than a dozen senior Ukrainian officials who resigned or were dismissed on Tuesday were the governors of the Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. All five regions have been major battlefields over the past year, giving their governors an unusually high national profile.

A deputy defence minister, a deputy prosecutor, a deputy head of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's office and two deputy ministers responsible for regional development were among the others who left.

Some, though not all, had been linked with corruption allegations. Ukraine has a history of graft and shaky governance, and is under international pressure to show it can be a reliable steward of billions of dollars in Western aid.

"There are already personnel decisions - some today, some tomorrow - regarding officials at various levels in ministries and other central government structures, as well as in the regions and in law enforcement," President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in an overnight video address.

Zelenskiy aide Mykhailo Podolyak tweeted: "The president sees and hears society. And he directly responds to a key public demand – justice for all."

The purge came two days after a deputy infrastructure minister was arrested and accused of siphoning off $400,000 from contracts to buy generators in one of the first big corruption scandals to become public since the war began 11 months ago.

The Defence Ministry said Deputy Defence Minister Vyacheslav Shapovalov, responsible for supplying troops, had resigned to retain trust after what it called untrue media accusations of corruption. It followed a newspaper report that the ministry overpaid for food for troops, which the ministry denied.

The prosecutor's office gave no reason for the sacking of Deputy Prosecutor General Oleksiy Symonenko, who had been under fire in Ukrainian media for taking a holiday in Spain. Though Zelenskiy did not name any officials in his address, he announced a new ban on officials taking holidays abroad.

Kyrylo Tymoshenko, deputy chief of staff in Zelenskiy's office, announced his own resignation, also citing no reason. He had helped run the president's 2019 election campaign and more recently had a role in overseeing regional policy.

The changes are a rare shakeup of an otherwise notably stable wartime leadership in Kyiv. Apart from purging a spy agency in July, Zelenskiy has mostly stuck with his team, built around fellow political novices the former television actor brought into power when he was elected in a landslide in 2019.

DECISION TIME ON TANKS

[1/5] Ukrainian servicemen are seen near the frontline, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, near Soledar in Donetsk region, Ukraine January 23, 2023. REUTERS/Oleksandr Ratushniak

Poland's announcement that it had officially asked for Berlin's permission to export German-made tanks to Ukraine appears to leave German Chancellor Olaf Scholz little room to continue putting off a decision in what has become the main debate among allies over how best to support Ukraine.

"I hope that this answer from Germany will come quickly, because the Germans are delaying, dodging, acting in a way that is difficult to understand," Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki told a news conference. "We can see that they do not want to help Ukraine defend itself in a wider way."

A German government spokesperson said: "We will treat the proceedings with the urgency they deserve."

Kyiv has pleaded for months for Western tanks, which its says it desperately needs to give its forces the firepower and mobility to break through Russian defensive lines and recapture occupied territory.

Germany's Leopards, fielded by armies across Europe, are widely seen as the best option, available in large numbers and easy to deploy and maintain. But Germany has so far resisted pressure to pledge any of its own Leopards, and until now had said its allies had yet to formally request permission to send theirs.

"The Germans have already received our request for permission to transfer Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine," Polish Defence Minister Mariusz Blaszczak wrote on Twitter.

"I also appeal to the German side to join the coalition of countries supporting Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks," he added. "This is our common cause, because the security of the whole of Europe is at stake!"

The chief of staff of Germany's military said whether to send tanks was a political decision. A senior official said the choice lay ultimately with Scholz and his cabinet.

"At the end of the day, the decision will obviously be taken at the chancellery, in consensus by the government," Tobias Lindner, state secretary at the foreign ministry, said at a defence conference in Berlin organised by Handelsblatt.

'SPRING WILL BE DECISIVE'

Front lines in the war have been largely frozen in place for two months despite heavy losses on both sides. Russia and Ukraine are both widely believed to be planning offensives in coming months.

Western countries pledged billions of dollars in military aid last week, but have yet to respond to Kyiv's request for hundreds of heavy battle tanks, pending a decision from Germany over the fate of its Leopards.

A Ukrainian official said the upcoming spring and summer would be decisive.

"If the major Russian offensive planned for this time fails, it will be the ruin of Russia and Putin," Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine's military intelligence, said in an interview with news site Delfi.

Reporting by Reuters bureaus, Writing by Peter Graff, Editing by Timothy Heritage

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Tom Balmforth

13. ISW: Putin loses confidence in mercenary Wagner Group over futile attempts to seize Ukraine’s Bakhmut

ISW: Putin loses confidence in mercenary Wagner Group over futile attempts to seize Ukraine’s Bakhmut

https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/01/23/isw-putin-loses-confidence-in-mercenary-wagner-group-over-futile-attempts-to-seize-ukraines-bakhmut-en-news

07:07 AM, 23 January 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin no longer relies on the Wagner Group, Russia’s notorious mercenary private military company, over its fruitless attempts to capture the town of Bakhmut, east Ukraine, and is now focused on reforming the regular army, US Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes in its daily report.

“Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s star has begun to set after months of apparent rise following his failure to make good on promises of capturing Bakhmut with his own forces,” the ISW underlines.

Putin is believed to have given Prigozhin and ex-head of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine Sergey Surovikin chances to show what drafted convicts and a campaign targeting Ukraine’s civil infrastructure can achieve, the analysts note. However, both failed: the Wagner Group could not capture Bakhmut, while weekly strikes on Ukraine and its population yielded very few results apart from exhausting Russia’s stockpile of high-precision missiles.

“Putin appears to have decided to turn away from relying on Prigozhin and his irregular forces and to put his trust instead in Gerasimov, Shoigu, and the conventional Russian military once more,” the ISW writes. Earlier, the Russian leader handed command over the Russian troops in Ukraine to General Valery Gerasimov, while the Russian Defence Ministry on 17 January announced large-scale reforms to expand the Russian army.

According to the ISW experts, these reforms and appointments “mark a significant inflection in the Kremlin’s efforts to reconstitute its conventional military and a deemphasis of short-term mitigation efforts such as the use of irregular formations on the frontlines”.

14. Can China Pull Off Its Charm Offensive?

The question for us is how can we help CHina fail in its charm offensive. Just stay out of the way? Or are there specific actions we should be considering?

Can China Pull Off Its Charm Offensive?

Why Beijing’s foreign-policy reset will—or won’t—work out.

Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20Stephen M. Walt

By Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Click + to receive email alerts for new stories written by Stephen M. Walt Stephen M. Walt

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt · January 23, 2023

One of the alleged advantages of autocracies is their supposed ability to turn on a dime in response to changing conditions. If one person has supreme power and doesn’t have to worry about bureaucratic rigidity, a pesky press, domestic opposition, influential interest groups, an independent judiciary, and all those other messy appurtenances of democracy, then in theory they can just issue a new edict and set the ship of state on a new course.

This image of agile and adaptive autocrats is probably mistaken, or at least incomplete. Even seemingly unchallenged dictators usually worry about potential rivals, competing power centers, and whether distant officials will implement directives effectively. Tyrants sometimes get stuck with failing policies because underlings won’t tell them what is really going on, or they refuse to change course because they don’t want to appear weak. Moreover, those supposedly sloth-like, dysfunctional democracies can sometimes act with surprising vigor and swiftness, especially in an emergency.

These caveats notwithstanding, the scope and speed of the changes recently undertaken by Chinese President Xi Jinping are still impressive. Having consolidated his hold on power at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022, Xi responded to an unexpected outbreak of public protests by suddenly abandoning the rigid and costly zero-COVID policy he had championed. He has partially moderated his statist, Leninist approach to the Chinese economy and tried to reassure and reinvigorate China’s private sector in the face of anemic economic growth and his past efforts to clip the wings of high-flying Chinese companies like Alibaba. (For a fuller description of these steps, see this useful paper from the Asia Society.)

One of the alleged advantages of autocracies is their supposed ability to turn on a dime in response to changing conditions. If one person has supreme power and doesn’t have to worry about bureaucratic rigidity, a pesky press, domestic opposition, influential interest groups, an independent judiciary, and all those other messy appurtenances of democracy, then in theory they can just issue a new edict and set the ship of state on a new course.

This image of agile and adaptive autocrats is probably mistaken, or at least incomplete. Even seemingly unchallenged dictators usually worry about potential rivals, competing power centers, and whether distant officials will implement directives effectively. Tyrants sometimes get stuck with failing policies because underlings won’t tell them what is really going on, or they refuse to change course because they don’t want to appear weak. Moreover, those supposedly sloth-like, dysfunctional democracies can sometimes act with surprising vigor and swiftness, especially in an emergency.

These caveats notwithstanding, the scope and speed of the changes recently undertaken by Chinese President Xi Jinping are still impressive. Having consolidated his hold on power at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022, Xi responded to an unexpected outbreak of public protests by suddenly abandoning the rigid and costly zero-COVID policy he had championed. He has partially moderated his statist, Leninist approach to the Chinese economy and tried to reassure and reinvigorate China’s private sector in the face of anemic economic growth and his past efforts to clip the wings of high-flying Chinese companies like Alibaba. (For a fuller description of these steps, see this useful paper from the Asia Society.)

Most important for our purposes, China is now trying to mend fences with the outside world as part of a broader effort to improve its global image, reignite economic growth, and disrupt U.S. efforts to unite several key countries into a loose anti-Chinese coalition. Will this latest “charm offensive” work?

It doesn’t take a genius to figure out why Xi is acting this way: His basic approach to foreign policy simply wasn’t working. It was a mistake to openly proclaim the goal of becoming a (if not the) leading world power by the middle of this century. It might be a worthy goal, but such a bold boast was certain to alarm the United States and put a number of other countries on their guard as well. It was a mistake to combine a major military buildup with militarized “island-building” in the South China Sea. It was short-sighted to reject the ruling of an international tribunal that dismissed Chinese territorial claims in this crucial waterway, and counterproductive to threaten Taiwan and Japan by sending planes and ships into contested areas. It made little sense for Chinese troops to clash with Indian forces in the remote Himalayas. And it was surely a mistake to align China so closely with Russia on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine. Either Xi got duped (if Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t tell Xi what he was planning), or he chose to tacitly back a brutal partner who turned out to be less capable and competent than Xi thought. Either way, it’s not a good look. Worst of all, these worrisome policies have been pursued and defended through aggressive, hyper-combative “wolf-warrior” diplomacy, based on the odd idea that repeatedly bullying and belittling foreign diplomats and government officials was going to win them friends and enhance Chinese influence.

The results of Xi’s handling of foreign policy have been all too plain: a bipartisan consensus in the United States in favor of countering the “China threat”; an increasingly intense high-tech trade war, including export controls intended to hamstring China’s tech sector; the consolidation of the so-called Quad coalition of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia; a Japanese decision to double its defense spending by 2027 and collaborate even more closely with the United States; South Korean hints that it might acquire nuclear weapons, which are partly a response to North Korea’s actions but also a reflection of concerns about China; and a dramatic deterioration of China’s public image in the European Union, Australia, and several other places.

The need for a reset was obvious, and so China has been making nice of late. Xi and U.S. President Joe Biden held a reasonably cordial meeting at the Bali G-20 summit. Xi has welcomed German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Beijing for a state visit, and Xi himself has met with heads of state in Southeast Asia and traveled to Saudi Arabia in for a series of summit meetings orchestrated by Saudi leader Mohammed bin Sultan. Chinese Vice Premier Liu He told a Davos audience that “China is back” and “open for business,” and the Party’s Central Economic Work Conference has been issuing business-friendly guidance intended to spur greater economic growth. Liu also appeared with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and invited her to visit Beijing, signaling an interest in Sino-American economic coordination for the first time in years.

Will all this work? That depends.

In the short term, abandoning wolf-warrior diplomacy and reiterating China’s desire for close economic ties with other countries will find a receptive audience in many regions. China’s status and influence in the world today is due to the size of its economy and growing technological sophistication. Its growing military power, by contrast, makes others nervous. Even close U.S. allies do not want to sever their economic ties with China (and to be clear, neither do many U.S. businesses), despite their objections to China’s human rights practices and efforts to challenge the regional status quo. As Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte told a Davos audience last week, “China is a ‘huge economy with huge potential and a huge innovation base,’ even if ‘legitimate security concerns’ exist.” French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire echoed this view, saying, “The U.S. wants to oppose China, we want to engage China. … I strongly believe that in the world game, China must be in, China cannot be out.”

What this tells me is that China should stop trying to force the pace of change and adopt a policy of strategic patience instead. Its primary focus should be on domestic economic development—especially in critical areas of advanced technology—which will reinforce other states’ desire to maintain close ties with it and discourage them from participating fully in U.S. export controls and other measures Washington has deployed to slow China’s growth. China should also continue its efforts to build influence within existing global institutions, an endeavor that is more likely to succeed if other states are not worrying about how Beijing might use its enhanced influence in the future.

This approach would also take advantage of China’s strong (if not entirely consistent) commitment to Westphalian-style national sovereignty. China’s own political model is not universally appealing, but it rarely tells other countries how to organize their internal politics and explicitly embraces the idea that each country should determine for itself how it wants to be governed. The United States, by contrast, loves to lecture others on how they should govern themselves and keeps trying to get other countries to embrace our liberal values. Other things being equal, Beijing’s less intrusive approach to bilateral relations is likely to be especially appealing to other non-democracies. Here it is worth remembering that non-democracies outnumber true democracies by a considerable margin in today’s world.

If China cannot return to something akin to its previous strategy of a “peaceful rise,” however, then the reset it is now attempting is going to fail. It may fail because Xi remains fully committed to achieving certain goals (such as reunification with Taiwan) while he is still alive and in office, even though a military assault on the island would be a risky proposition and drive fears of China to new heights. Or it may fail because China’s leaders think its power may be peaking and that necessary changes in the status quo need to be achieved and consolidated before a combination of demography, economic stagnation, and regional balancing put them out of reach.

There is a broader lesson here, one that the leaders of all major powers (and some minor ones, too) should ponder. States in the international system rarely react strongly and negatively when a foreign country’s economy is growing rapidly; on the contrary, they often welcome it because they can benefit from expanded economic opportunities. This policy may be short-sighted if it enables challengers to arise more rapidly than they might otherwise have done, but it still seems to be a widespread tendency. It is only when a rising power starts throwing its newly acquired weight around—and, in particular, by trying to alter the status quo by force, as Russia is now attempting in Ukraine—that other states become fully alarmed and start taking direct action to contain the problem.

Here the United States was very lucky: Its rise during the 19th century didn’t trigger a hostile reaction because it was distant from other major powers, they were more worried about each other, and the United States could expand across North America without having to fight any of them directly. China’s position today is not as favorable, and the population of Taiwan remains strongly opposed to being governed by Beijing and could only be compelled to reunify through military action. The success of Beijing’s latest charm offensive will depend primarily on whether Xi and his associates recognize this problem, keep their nationalist ambitions in check, and focus their efforts on continuing to build economic power at home.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen M. Walt · January 23, 2023

15.  Russia’s War Breathes New Life Into a Cold War Symbol

And Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. These are important US capabilities to broadcast the news around the world.

Russia’s War Breathes New Life Into a Cold War Symbol

By Matina Stevis-Gridneff

Matina Stevis-Gridneff reported from Prague, where RFE/RL is headquartered.

The New York Times · by Matina Stevis-Gridneff · January 24, 2023

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a news network originally set up as a C.I.A. operation early in the Cold War, is experiencing a renaissance and making a case for its independence.

A Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — or RFE/RL — broadcast last week in Prague. Until 1971, Radio Free Europe was a covert U.S. intelligence operation seeking to penetrate the Iron Curtain and foment anti-communist dissent.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

By

Matina Stevis-Gridneff reported from Prague, where RFE/RL is headquartered.

Jan. 24, 2023, 12:01 a.m. ET

Anyone who didn’t live through the Cold War might find the Portuguese Netflix spy thriller series “Glória” improbable.

Deep in the Portuguese countryside, in the tiny village of Glória, a complex radio transmission operation run by Portuguese and American engineers springs up in the 1950s, a branch of a Munich-based news organization called Radio Free Europe.

It broadcasts news and anti-communist messages in languages of various Soviet republics, but, in the show and in real life, that’s only part of its early mission: It’s also a C.I.A. front.

Until 1971, Radio Free Europe was a covert U.S. intelligence operation seeking to penetrate the Iron Curtain and foment anti-communist dissent in what was then Czechoslovakia, in Poland and elsewhere.

The C.I.A. stopped funding Radio Free Europe when its operation was revealed. Since then, the news organization has been funded by the United States Congress and has had editorial independence.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — or RFE/RL — now barely resembles its historical predecessor, as dramatized in “Glória,” but it is still very much pursuing its mission of fact-based journalism by local reporters, in local languages for local audiences across the former Soviet sphere and Central Asia.

The organization is now based in Prague instead of Munich, and is growing, opening new offices this month in Riga, Latvia, to host a big part of its Russia-focused staff.

An editorial meeting in mid-January at RFE/RL headquarters in Prague. Some in the younger generation of journalists who left the Moscow bureau feel relief at having relocated to Prague safely before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

These days, RFE/RL is only partly a radio broadcaster, although in some regions, the airwaves are still how people access it. The majority of its Russian-language audience finds its reporting online, especially through social-media platforms.

At the Prague offices, high gates, tight security checks and U.S. flags waving up front leave visitors little doubt that they are entering a building with American ties.

The State of the War

• Military Aid: Western defense officials meeting in Germany failed to reach an agreement for sending battle tanks to Ukraine. It was a setback to Kyiv’s hopes to quickly receive weapons that President Volodymyr Zelensky has called crucial to the next phase of the war.
• NATO Rifts Emerge: The Western alliance has been holding strong, but disagreements over strategy for the coming year and what Ukraine needs ahead of a major offensive in the spring are breaking into public view.
• Helicopter Crash: A helicopter crashed in a fireball in a Kyiv suburb, killing a member of Mr. Zelensky’s cabinet and more than a dozen other people, and dealing a blow to Ukraine’s wartime leadership.

But this great gray marble-and-concrete cube — just up a hill from where Franz Kafka is buried — holds a modern newsroom that reaches millions of people each week.

The outlet says it draws an average of 40 million people weekly through its programs and channels, broadcasting in 27 languages and 23 countries “where media freedom is restricted, or where a professional press has not fully developed.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February both shook up Radio Free Europe’s operations and highlighted its mission’s importance. Within days of the invasion, the organization suspended its operations in Russia. It had already faced years of growing pressure from Moscow and evacuated most staff to Prague and other offices even before the war broke out.

Jamie Fly, the broadcaster’s president and chief executive, has long been in firefighting mode.

“The challenge we’re facing now, and the invasion of Ukraine, is just the latest iteration,” Mr. Fly said in an interview late last year. “We are increasingly getting pressure when we’re operating in these environments, and in some cases, we’re getting pushed out of countries. That’s always been a challenge for us.”

Andrei Shary, director of RFE/RL’s Russian Service, at the office in Prague. “We are nobody’s agent,” he said last year in objecting to Russian measures against the broadcaster’s operations.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Strictures in Taliban-led Afghanistan and authoritarian Belarus are among the broadcaster’s other severe challenges.

According the RFE/RL, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought in new audiences, despite the fact that its engineers have to work constantly to get ahead of censors by finding new ways to circumvent prohibitions in Russia and elsewhere.

In the first week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, traffic to RFE/RL websites almost tripled to nearly 70 million, compared with the same week in 2021, the organization said. More than half of that traffic came from Russia and Ukraine.

Those gains have stabilized since then. From the start of the war through the end of 2022, viewership of Current Time, RFE/RL’s flagship Russian-language channel, more than tripled on Facebook and more than quadrupled on YouTube, where it remains accessible within Russia, according to RFE/RL.

The broadcaster’s work in Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan has been impactful, especially in uncovering corruption. The local network was blocked for two months last year by the Kyrgyz government on accusations that it breached a “fake news” law. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty rejected the claims and, as it did in Russia, encouraged its audience to use VPNs to continue following its journalism.

And while its coverage of the war in Ukraine is a crucial part of its offerings, the organization’s most distinctive service is its region-specific programs broadcast in the local vernacular, including those focusing on Russian areas like Chechnya and Tatarstan.

This approach — even for languages spoken only by small populations — has long been a key feature of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty operations.

The broadcaster says it draws an average of 40 million people weekly through its programs and channels in 27 languages and 23 countries.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Toomas Hendrik Ilves, a former president of Estonia who worked for the broadcaster in Munich from 1984 to 1993, said that reaching those audiences with objective, quality news, in their own languages, was particularly vital.

“RFE/RL’s role is most important in providing objective information in the native language — and is the same role it had 30 years ago,” he said in a phone interview last week.

He added that this mission became more critical for audiences without the many information outlets that the Russian-speaking world has. “There are limited sources of quality information for others, and being able to hear quality news reporting in your own language is important,” he said.

And, as in Mr. Ilves’s time at the organization, its 21st-century incarnation is a kind of Noah’s ark for journalists and émigrés from a vast region undergoing another period of epochal change.

On March 6, 10 days after Russia invaded Ukraine, RFE/RL announced it would suspend its Moscow operations after the local authorities began bankruptcy proceedings against it, citing millions of dollars in unpaid fines over the organization’s refusal to comply with a 2021 order to label itself and some of its staff as foreign agents.

“We are nobody’s agent, and we considered — and continue to consider — this labeling demand to be censorship, an attempt to interfere in editorial policy,” Andrei Shary, director of RFE/RL’s Russian Service, said at the time.

Mr. Shary, who describes himself as a “proud Russian,” has made a home in Prague, as have some of his other Russian colleagues.

The news organization’s most distinctive service is its region-specific programs broadcast in local languages.Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

Mr. Fly, the chief executive, thinks Mr. Shary would most likely be jailed if he returned to Russia. It’s a reality Mr. Shary confronts with stoicism, even though, he says, “I’ll probably never get to see my mother alive again.”

Some in the younger generation of journalists who left the Moscow bureau feel relief at having relocated safely before the invasion, avoiding the panic of friends who fled overnight.

Anastasia Tishchenko, 29, a human-rights reporter, said she struggled with the decision to relocate to the broadcaster’s office in Prague in 2021. It was a time when “you could feel some kind of danger” because of Russian pressure on the network, she said. “But you still didn’t see anything specifically dangerous to you.”

“Now I think that it’s one of the best decisions in my life,” she said in an interview, adding, “All of my friends who are well-educated, if they had opportunities, they escaped, living in Germany, Turkey, Portugal — but not in Russia.”

Ms. Tishchenko’s heartbreak has been that she has had a falling out with her parents over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Her parents, who were born in Ukraine, believe the Kremlin’s version of events — that Russia is conducting a liberation operation fighting against an oppressive government in Kyiv, and winning. It is a divide that is playing out among countless families.

She said she didn’t know if she would ever be able to go home to Russia and tried instead to focus on her work in Prague as part of a supportive community of people like her.

“To dream about one day going home, to walk on the streets I grew up in, to play with my sister’s child, that’s just a dream,” she said.

Anastasia Tishchenko reading the news at RFE/RL. Of her move to Prague from Moscow, she said, “I think that it’s one of the best decisions in my life.”Credit...Akos Stiller for The New York Times

The New York Times · by Matina Stevis-Gridneff · January 24, 2023

16. How ChatGPT became the next big thing

This tweet string from my good friend and escape from north Korea, Hyun-Seung Lee, is very instructive about ChatGPT (and about north Korea)

Hyun-Seung Lee

@LeeHyunSeung85

Describe 10 reasons why the North Korean leader should be replaced. #ChatGPT answer.

1.Human rights abuses, including widespread repression and censorship of the North Korean people.

2.Failure to provide basic necessities for citizens, resulting in widespread poverty and hunger.

3:43 PM · Jan 22, 2023·1,979

Views

3.Development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, posing a significant threat to global security.

4.Refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue with the international community and disregard for international law.

5.The leader's cult of personality and lack of political accountability.

6.Failure to address the country's economic problems and lack of investment in infrastructure and industry.

7.The lack of freedom of speech, press, and assembly.

8.Discrimination against certain groups such as religious minorities and political dissidents.

9.Lack of access to information and education for citizens.

10.Failure to address the COVID-19 pandemic in a transparent and effective manner.

How ChatGPT became the next big thing

Axios · by Erica Pandey,Dan Primack,Ina Fried · January 24, 2023

ChatGPT has captured the public imagination in a way the tech world hasn't seen since the debut of the iPhone in 2007.

Why it matters: Most of us are only now getting a glimpse of just how smart artificial intelligence has become. It's awe-inducing — and terrifying.

• When ChatGPT launched to the public, it proved to be much more advanced than even many in the tech industry had expected.

What it is: ChatGPT is a free (for now) site that lets users pose questions and give directions to a bot that can answer with conversation, term papers, sonnets, recipes — almost anything. In almost any style you specify.

The big picture: The possibilities for ChatGPT seem endless. It recently passed all three parts of the U.S. Medical Licensing Examination, although just barely, as part of a research experiment.

• You can tell the chatbot you're a gluten-free lover of Italian food and it'll spit out a meal plan and grocery list for you in seconds.

Everyone seems to see an array of uses for the technology in ways that are both exciting and scary.

• It might one day handle complex tasks better and more efficiently than humans have ever been able to. And it might lead us to dark places we can't even anticipate yet.

How it works: Most software is specifically coded to do certain tasks. If the programmer didn't think of it, the software doesn't do it. Generative AI programs like ChatGPT, though, can create unique content in response to user prompts.

• ChatGPT, developed by a company called OpenAI, uses text as both its input and output. Other systems — including another OpenAI product, called DALL·E — can generate images from a text prompt. Google and Meta are working on similar technologies.
• Anyone can use ChatGPT for free via a simple web interface, although there's talk of OpenAI planning to launch a paid version, and it has licensed many of its technologies to Microsoft to sell to businesses.

Between the lines: Researchers have been working on generative AI for a long time. In fact, OpenAI itself is already more than 7 years old.

• But most of that was occurring outside of the public eye. Even some experts were taken aback by how advanced it turned out to be.
• That's led some to assume OpenAI will manage to fix ChatGPT's many problems, such as the incorrect information it sometimes provides.
• But that's not a sure bet. Marc Andreessen recently referred to such certainty as "hand-waving" away some very real challenges.

The bottom line: Artificial intelligence has long seemed like science fiction, or at least like something in the distant future. But ChatGPT is forcing us to confront the fact that AI may play a big role in our daily lives — and much sooner than we imagined.

Go deeper:

What ChatGPT can't do

Newsrooms reckon with AI following CNET saga

Why Microsoft is betting big on ChatGPT

The chatter around ChatGPT

What's next for ChatGPT

Axios · by Erica Pandey,Dan Primack,Ina Fried · January 24, 2023

17. Are There ‘Too Many Asians’?

A provocative headline. But this article unpacks the perceived threat of overpopulation decades ago and that population control measures imported from the West.

Are There ‘Too Many Asians’?

Like Marxism itself, population control was imported to China from the West.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-there-too-many-asians-population-control-china-children-babies-family-growth-humanity-birth-rate-11674508135?mod=opinion_lead_pos9

Doubleday once published a book with a title—“Too Many Asians”—that would never fly today. Author John Robbins argued that “if humanity is to have a future,” the West would have to see to it that fewer Asians were born in the years ahead. That was 1959.

Robbins was but one voice in a chorus of think tanks, government aid organizations, international development specialists, environmentalists, zero-growthers, doom mongers and do-gooders who all saw population control as the cure for poverty. China’s recent announcement that its population fell by 850,000 last year, the first recorded drop since the Mao-induced famines of the early 1960s, provoked much comment on the social and economic challenges decline brings. Yet conspicuously absent was any recognition that the whole idea that Chinese moms having children threatened the country’s prosperity was, much like Marxism itself, a noxious Western import.

That’s no overstatement. In 1977, World Bank President Robert McNamara spoke in Al Gore-ish tones of apocalypse. Population growth, he said, was the gravest issue the world faced “short of thermonuclear war.” It might even be more dangerous, because population growth was “not in the exclusive control of a few governments but rather in the hands of literally hundreds of millions of individual parents.”

Mao himself was conflicted, given Marx’s view of overpopulation as a problem of capitalism and his own tendency to see China’s population as a sign of its strength. The irony is that China today, like so many of its Asian neighbors that once tried to reduce their populations, is offering financial incentives to have more babies. But once the decline starts it’s all but impossible to reverse.

In 1974, the New York Times summed up the received wisdom in a piece reporting on the United Nations World Population Conference in Bucharest. “The consensus of the affluent industrialized Western nations,” the Times said, was based on the understanding that overpopulation “threatens to overstrain world resources, particularly food.”

This orthodoxy was echoed by almost all the experts of the day: the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, International Planned Parenthood Federation, the Club of Rome (publisher of “Limits to Growth”), the Population Institute, Paul Ehrlich, Lester Brown and the Worldwatch Institute, etc. When members of the Reagan administration pushed back—arguing that population growth wasn’t the cause of poverty—they were attacked as yahoos. Herblock published a cartoon of a well-fed Ronald Reagan holding a “world population policy” banner above a sea bursting with impoverished people.

Western groups that pushed population control on the Chinese typically denied that they supported the coercion that often resulted. But they never got too worked up about it, either. If you accept the idea that population growth uncontrolled by government is an existential threat, and if people don’t willingly stop having babies, then coercion is the obvious next step—and it’s far easier in nondemocratic countries such as China.

One example: In 1983, Stanford dismissed student Steven Mosher from its doctoral program after Beijing threatened to close its doors to the university’s scholars. Mr. Mosher, who now heads the Population Research Institute, was doing research in a rural Chinese village when he published photos of pregnant Chinese women, some in their seventh or eighth months, being led off for forced abortions. As a Journal editorial noted about Stanford’s decision, “no one has ever raised significant objections to the veracity of Mr. Mosher’s revelations on this subject.”

Against this there were a handful of lonely voices—including this page—which objected to the outrages against Chinese women and maintained that what was inhibiting China’s development was Chinese communism, not Chinese babies. Among the most eloquent was University of Illinois economist Julian Simon, who argued that human beings were not just mouths but minds, and that a mind was “the ultimate resource.” He laid out his argument in a seminal book with that title in 1981, at just about the same time Beijing was cranking up its one-child policy.

Simon pointed out that by almost every material measure—life expectancy, daily caloric intake, food production—human life was getting better, not worse. In 1985, he added a prediction: If China embraced the free market, it would likely experience labor shortages. Look where we are today.

Last week the New York Times ran a story headlined “Why China’s Shrinking Population Is Cause for Alarm.” The piece hits on some of the casualties of China’s population decline: fewer workers supporting an aging society, the “hundreds of millions of Chinese women” who were forced to abort their babies, the shortage of girls and large surplus of single men with no prospect of marriage, higher costs for the global economy, etc. And no easy fix.

All sound points. If only that were the message being sent 50 years ago—when it might have made a difference.

Write to [email protected].

18. How China became the world’s leading exporter of combat drones

Excerpts:

“China imposes fewer restrictions on end-user usage,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, senior fellow at IISS.

“This means countries purchasing UAVs can deploy them as they see fit, even if it violates international law and human rights,” he said.

For China, meanwhile, other countries’ use of its drones on battlefields provides it with valuable feedback to fine tune the equipment’s capabilities.

And while the US continues to hold the technological edge in UAVs, some analysts say China could catch up fast.

“Many of China’s unmanned programmes are inherently technology demonstrators intended to bolster domestic ingenuity. Local industries work on these projects to enhance their proofing, developmental and manufacturing capacities,” said Kadidal at Janes. “However, once the concept has viability, China has been shown to rapidly mature the platform for induction into the armed forces.”

Kadidal pointed to the unveiling of the Wing Loong 10 UAV at a recent air show in the Chinese city of Zhuhai. He said the PLA’s Air Force unveiled the drone in its own colours, suggesting that the UAV, which is said to be capable of electronic warfare operations, had entered service.

“Development of this UAV has gone from concept stage to a potential induction in the span of just six years,” he said.

How China became the world’s leading exporter of combat drones

Cheap, ‘good enough’ Chinese armed drones dominating world market due to US export controls, analysts say.

Al Jazeera English · by Zaheena Rasheed

From Saudi Arabia to Myanmar and Iraq to Ethiopia, more and more militaries across the world are stockpiling Chinese combat drones and deploying them on the battlefield.

In Yemen, a Saudi-led coalition has dispatched the Chinese aircraft, also known as uncrewed aerial vehicles or UAVs, as part of a devastating air campaign that has killed more than 8,000 Yemeni civilians in the past eight years. In Iraq, authorities say they used Chinese drones to carry out more than 260 air raids against ISIL (ISIS) targets as of mid-2018, with a success rate of nearly 100 percent.

In Myanmar, the military — armed with Chinese drones — has conducted hundreds of air attacks on civilians and ethnic armed groups opposed to its power grab two years ago, while in Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s fleet of Chinese, Iranian and Turkish drones was critical in helping his forces thwart a rebel march in 2021 that threatened to overthrow his government.

Other buyers of China’s combat drones — aircraft that, in addition to intelligence gathering, can also fire air-to-surface missiles — include Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Pakistan and Serbia.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which tracks global arms transfers, shows China has delivered some 282 combat drones to 17 countries in the past decade, making it the world’s leading exporter of the weaponised aircraft. By comparison, the United States — which has the most advanced UAVs in the world — has delivered just 12 combat drones in the same period, all of them to France and the United Kingdom, according to SIPRI data.

The US, however, still leads in the export of unarmed surveillance drones.

China’s domination of the global market for combat drones over the past decade is partly due to a vast state-funded effort that seeks to elevate the country’s armed forces to “world class standards”. Chinese President Xi Jinping has described drones as capable of “profoundly changing war scenarios” and pledged during the Communist Party’s Congress last year to “speed up the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities”.

“Drones are an important part of China’s informatised warfare concept,” said John Schaus, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Advanced capabilities like these allow China the ability to conduct missions far from its borders with far less infrastructure or political risk than if its military personnel were physically present,” he said.

While China is not known to have carried out a drone attack, it deployed the combat aircraft in exercises around Taiwan in September in the aftermath of then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the self-ruled island.

China considers Taiwan as part of its own territory and has not ruled out the use of force to take control of the island.

And drones will play a critical role in any confrontation over Taiwan.

Fu Qianshao, a Chinese military aviation expert, told the Communist Party-owned Global Times tabloid in September that the unmanned aircraft will be among the first weapons to be deployed in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Straits, while Western analysts also say the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is likely to use large numbers of drones at the beginning of any war in a bid to overwhelm the territory’s air defences.

‘Good enough’

So far, the main focus of China’s drone programme has been on replicating the capabilities of other countries, said Akhil Kadidal, an aviation reporter at Janes, a media outlet specialising in defence issues. These include surveillance, attack and electronic warfare capabilities.

He noted that China’s bestselling drone, the Caihong 4, is nearly identical to the US-made MQ-9 Reaper, while the popular Wing Loong 2 is similar to the US-built MQ-1 Predator. “Many of China’s UAV programmes suggest Beijing’s interest in creating a better platform than their western counterparts. The Wing Loong 2 and 3 are examples of this,” said Kadidal. “Based on Chinese statements, both of these UAVs are not only faster than their American counterparts but are said to be capable of carrying a greater weapons payload.”

While similar in design and capabilities to the US-made drones, the Chinese aircraft are also much cheaper, making them more attractive to global buyers. For instance, the CH-4 and the Wing Loong 2 are estimated to cost between $1m and $2m, while the Reaper costs $16m and the Predator $4m, according to CSIS, the US-based think tank.

The cheaper price tag means interested governments can also buy the drones in larger quantities.

“In terms of performance and cost, on a like-for-like basis, Chinese systems are likely less expensive, and in some areas less capable, but the latter may not be a concern for many of the purchasing states, where the capability offered is good enough,” said Douglas Barrie, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

China also offers flexible payment terms to interested buyers.

“Chinese companies realised that those countries in North Africa are not rich, and allowed them not to pay cash, but by instalment, sometimes even to barter drones for local natural resources like minerals,” Zhou Chenming, a Beijing-based analyst, told the South China Morning Post last year.

More than any other factor though, analysts say countries are turning to China because of export controls imposed by the US.

Washington restricts the sales of its combat drone sales by citing the Missile Technology Control Regime, an agreement established in 1987 to limit the proliferation of platforms capable of delivering chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It reportedly denied requests for the weaponised aircraft from Jordan, Iraq, and the UAE, forcing these countries to buy from China instead.

“China imposes fewer restrictions on end-user usage,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, senior fellow at IISS.

“This means countries purchasing UAVs can deploy them as they see fit, even if it violates international law and human rights,” he said.

For China, meanwhile, other countries’ use of its drones on battlefields provides it with valuable feedback to fine tune the equipment’s capabilities.

And while the US continues to hold the technological edge in UAVs, some analysts say China could catch up fast.

“Many of China’s unmanned programmes are inherently technology demonstrators intended to bolster domestic ingenuity. Local industries work on these projects to enhance their proofing, developmental and manufacturing capacities,” said Kadidal at Janes. “However, once the concept has viability, China has been shown to rapidly mature the platform for induction into the armed forces.”

Kadidal pointed to the unveiling of the Wing Loong 10 UAV at a recent air show in the Chinese city of Zhuhai. He said the PLA’s Air Force unveiled the drone in its own colours, suggesting that the UAV, which is said to be capable of electronic warfare operations, had entered service.

“Development of this UAV has gone from concept stage to a potential induction in the span of just six years,” he said.

Al Jazeera English · by Zaheena Rasheed

19. U.S., Israel launch military exercise to send message to Iran, others

In addition to the specific importance of this exercise for deterrence in the region, I think it is also important to note how the US is conducting exercises around the world with friends, partners, and allies. I think the public would be surprised ot learn ahow many exercises are taking place around the world on any given day. The US can walk and chew gum at the same time.

U.S., Israel launch military exercise to send message to Iran, others

A senior U.S. defense official said that the exercise is not oriented around a particular threat but that regional adversaries like Iran will take notice.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube · January 23, 2023

The United States and Israel began a massive joint military exercise in Israel on Monday to show adversaries like Iran that Washington is not too distracted by the war in Ukraine and the threat from China to mobilize a large military force, a senior defense official said.

Juniper Oak 23 is “the most significant exercise between the United States and Israel to date,” the official said, citing the enormous number of aircraft, extensive coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, and the complicated live-fire component.

About 6,400 U.S. personnel have joined 1,100 Israeli personnel for the exercise, which will employ 142 total aircraft. Of them, 100 aircraft are from the U.S. military, including four B-52 bombers, four F-35 fighter jets, 45 F/A-18 Hornet fighters and two MQ-9 Reaper drones. Six U.S. ships, including a carrier strike group, and six Israeli ships will also participate.

Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command, said, “Juniper Oak is a Combined Joint All-Domain exercise which improves our interoperability on land, in the air, at sea, in space, and in cyberspace with our partners, enhances our ability to respond to contingencies, and underscores our commitment to the Middle East.”

“What we think this exercise demonstrates is we can walk and chew gum at the same time,” the senior defense official who spoke to NBC News said, citing the focus on China and the roughly 100,000 forces in Europe to support NATO and Ukraine.

“We still have the excess capacity to be able to flex to another high priority area of responsibility and conduct an exercise on this scale.”

The official said that the exercise is not oriented around a particular nation, but that regional adversaries like Iran will take notice.

Netanyahu sworn in as Israeli prime minister with far-right Cabinet

Dec. 30, 202203:33

“The scale of the exercise is relevant to a whole range of scenarios, and Iran may draw certain inferences from that,” the official said. “It’s really meant mostly to kick the tires on our ability to do things at this scale with the Israelis against a whole range of different threats. But, you know, it would not surprise me if Iran sees the scale and the nature of these activities and understands what the two of us are capable of doing.”

Unlike many military drills, this one is all-domain, meaning it includes naval, land, air, space and electronic warfare exercises. It culminates with a live-fire exercise that will expend 180,000 pounds of live munitions while simulating suppression of enemy air defenses, strategic air interdiction and electronic attack. The U.S. will use four U.S. Army HIMARs rocket launchers, laser-guided bombs and stealthy “low-observable” cruise missiles minus payloads.

An exercise of this size would normally take a year or more to plan, but this came together in a matter of months, the official said, not because of an imminent threat but a window of availability.

“This is a sign that we continue to have Israel’s back at a time where there’s a lot of turbulence and instability across the region,” the official said, and this is a chance to show that the U.S. and Israel can work together on a large scale in a short period of time.

The exercise will run from Monday through Friday. The official could not say how Iran may react to the drills.

“My guess is the next time they do a military exercise, they’ll say, even if it was planned for months, they’ll say it was reaction to this. I mean, they’ll do something probably in the information space.”

The exercise comes as the U.S. military footprint in the Central Command region is smaller than it has been in decades, in part after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2021 and fewer American service members left in Iraq. While the Pentagon and Central Command downplay the decrease, allies in the region worry the U.S. is less committed to the area.

Israeli airstrike kills top Islamic Jihad commander

Aug. 7, 202200:31

The senior defense official said this drill is a signal to other nations that argument is not true.

“If there’s a sense that the Americans are distracted, or the Americans are going away from the Middle East, and therefore they have free rein for their malign activities. I think this will disabuse them,” the official said.

“I suspect Iran will take note of that, but not only Iran, China will take note of that, Russia will take note of that, other folks will take note of it.”

NBC News · by Courtney Kube · January 23, 2023

20. Congress Questions Biden Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey

Quid pro quo for approval of Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO?

Excerpts:

If Biden brushes aside lawmakers’ objections, he would put the White House in direct confrontation with congressional allies, primarily for the sake of patching up troubled relations with Turkey. Congress should once again stress to the administration its strong reservations, insisting Turkey must start upholding its obligations as a NATO ally prior to receiving the F-16s. This should include, but not be limited to, immediately ratifying Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership bid, providing written guarantees that end Turkey’s overt threats to seize sovereign Greek territory in the Aegean Sea, and taking steps to ensure free and fair elections in Turkey in May, especially the approval of international monitoring missions.

Congress Questions Biden Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · January 23, 2023

The Biden administration informally notified Congress of its intention to sell 40 new F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, along with 79 upgrade kits to modernize the Turkish Air Force’s existing F-16 fleet. Some congressional leaders have objected strongly to the sale, citing Turkey’s human rights violations, intimidation of its neighbors — especially Greece — and obstruction of Sweden and Finland’s applications to join NATO.

Ankara has long sought to modernize its aging fleet of fighter jets. Until 2019, Turkey was on track to receive about 100 F-35 fighters, the most advanced fighter America produces. However, Washington removed Ankara from the F-35 program because it acquired the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system, which also resulted in sanctions on Turkey under the Countering of America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

The proposed sale to Turkey has a total value of $20 billion. In addition to the F-16s and upgrade kits, the sale reportedly includes 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs. The administration also plans to sell at least 30 F-35s to Greece. Since Turkish threats against Greece have provoked congressional ire, the pairing suggests an effort to address lawmakers’ concerns. Yet hostility toward Athens is just one of Erdogan’s provocations, which range from protecting Hamas leaders to helping Iran move billions of dollars in contravention of U.S. sanctions.

Once the administration formally notifies Congress of its intent to sell weapons to Ankara, lawmakers have 15 days to try to block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval before the administration can proceed. Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), has opposed the sale of jets to Ankara, citing Ankara’s aggressive stance towards NATO ally Greece, the country’s poor human rights record, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s continued refusal to approve Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership bid.

Lawmakers have never succeeded in blocking a foreign weapons sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. In 2019, Donald Trump vetoed a set of resolutions Congress passed in an attempt to block the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The current give and take between Congress and the administration could influence the White House’s decision whether to submit a formal notification to proceed with the F-16 sale. The Congressional Research Service observes, “Congress has, by expressing strong opposition to prospective arms sales, during consultations with the executive branch, affected the timing and the composition of some arms sales, and may have dissuaded the President from formally proposing certain arms sales.”

It is unclear whether Biden will press ahead with a formal notification of the F-16 sale. Even if the White House decides to proceed with the sale, it will have to address the impact of the sanctions Washington has imposed on Turkey’s Defence Industry Agency (SSB), which manages Ankara’s supply of military technology.

If Biden brushes aside lawmakers’ objections, he would put the White House in direct confrontation with congressional allies, primarily for the sake of patching up troubled relations with Turkey. Congress should once again stress to the administration its strong reservations, insisting Turkey must start upholding its obligations as a NATO ally prior to receiving the F-16s. This should include, but not be limited to, immediately ratifying Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership bid, providing written guarantees that end Turkey’s overt threats to seize sovereign Greek territory in the Aegean Sea, and taking steps to ensure free and fair elections in Turkey in May, especially the approval of international monitoring missions.

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from Sinan, the Turkey Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · January 23, 2023

21. China Belt and Road dreams fade in Germany's industrial heartland

Charts and graphics at the link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/China-Belt-and-Road-dreams-fade-in-Germany-s-industrial-heartland?utm_source=pocket_reader

China Belt and Road dreams fade in Germany's industrial heartland

Geopolitical tensions derail Duisburg's hopes of trade bonanza

JENS KASTNER, contributing writer

JANUARY 24, 2023 06:00 JST

DUISBURG, Germany -- Suad Durakovic, the owner of a truck driving school on the outskirts of the western German city of Duisburg, made it into Chinese newspapers in 2019 by testifying that Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative had triggered a local logistics industry boom.

Today, his business benefits from a shortage of qualified truckers, but not because of China's global infrastructure development strategy.

"The Silk Road has not developed for us," Durakovic told Nikkei Asia. "First it was COVID, then it was the Ukraine war, so the boom is no longer about Silk Road logistics."

Duisburg, a city of half a million people, is located in Germany's industrial heartland at the junction of the Rhine and Ruhr rivers. A downturn in the country's steel and coal industries in the 1990s and early 2000s battered its economy.

But the city found a savior in Chinese President Xi Jinping, who visited Duisburg in 2014 to officially make its inland port Europe's main Belt and Road hub. While this fueled anticipation of a new heyday, recent events suggest the prospects are dimming.

Much of this stems from the Ukraine war and Germany's awkward relationship with China.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz was the first European leader to visit Beijing since Xi secured a third term as party leader at the Communist Party Congress in October. But German attitudes have soured recently over China's cozy relationship with Russia, Taiwan and human rights, as well as its growing trade deficit with the world's second-biggest economy.

Germany is currently reviewing its relationship with Beijing, with the unveiling of Berlin's new basic guidelines for its China policy expected in the next few weeks.

Draft excerpts show lawmakers urging a significantly toughened stance and a reduction of economic reliance on China. The more drastic prescriptions include limiting investment in China and stricter monitoring of companies overdependent on China for business.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Nov. 4, 2022. © AP

Plans were buried in 2021 for a sprawling China business center on the banks of the Rhine, from where hundreds of Chinese companies were meant to grow their European distribution networks.

In November, Duisburg cited China's ties with Russia as a reason for letting expire a memorandum of understanding for a sweeping "smart city" project with Chinese tech giant Huawei.

Russia's sudden reduction of natural gas exports to Germany fueled a notion among German policymakers that it was not a good idea to let critical infrastructure fall into the wrong hands.

Around the same time, it became known that Chinese state-owned Cosco Shipping Holdings had in June quietly returned a 30% stake in a 100 million euro ($108 million) Duisburg port terminal project.

"As state-owned Cosco pulls out, other privately-owned Chinese logistics players stay engaged, which suggests that Cosco pulled out of the port terminal project over political headwinds," said Markus Taube, the University Duisburg-Essen's professor for East Asia economics and China. "That event and the expired Huawei deal nurture doubts among Duisburg's Chinese business community whether Duisburg still is a good place for them to do business."

The mood has certainly changed since 2011, when the first train on the China Railway Express -- an alternative to container shipping -- arrived in Duisburg and opened a new chapter in China-Europe land transportation.

The line constituted a key part of China's efforts to entice electronics-makers to move their manufacturing away from China's coastal provinces to the Chinese inland, where cities are served by the new train services.

Data by Duisport, the port's owner and operator, show that pandemic-related disruptions to maritime trade boosted the Silk Road freight rail business, with the geopolitical upheaval stemming with the Ukraine war causing the opposite.

While the annual number of trains rose by 12% to 2,800 in 2021, bookings dropped by about 30% in the spring of 2022, as businesses that adopted rail freight faced reputational, insurance, sanction and confiscation risks along the Russian route.

In late 2022, a port spokesman told Nikkei Asia that although momentum has since improved, figures remain below pre-pandemic days -- the share of the China-Europe freight rail business in the port's overall turnover is now 3-4%.

Duisburg is home to Europe’s largest inland port. (Photo by Jens Kastner)

Nanjing High Accurate Drive Equipment Manufacturing Group (NGC) in 2015 opened its European headquarters in the city for design, testing, maintenance, and refurbishment of gearboxes for wind turbines and industrial equipment. The company cited direct train services between Duisburg and its headquarters in Nanjing as one of the main factors for choosing the city.

But one complaint among opposition Duisburg council members is that Chinese companies are not contributing to the local economy.

Nikkei Asia's research of local trade registers suggests that nearly all of the 100 or so Chinese companies that opened brick-and-mortar presences in Duisburg are engaged in either logistics or cross-border e-commerce. For example, a company with the Germanic-sounding name Hermann Commerce distributes Chinese instant food, soy sauce and food seasonings to more than 20 European countries.

Chinese-owned Lisstec markets a cosmetics brand with the similarly Germanic-sounding name Hermuna, which is pitched as "Made in Germany." But the brand only appears to be available for consumers in China despite the company's Chinese-language Weibo social media account suggesting its products are made in a German factory for sale in German cosmetics stores and pharmacy chain stores.

"The Chinese e-commerce companies that have set up here are not known to be big local job creators or tax contributors," said Sven Benentreu, the deputy chairman of the local chapter of the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP), an opposition party in Duisburg.

"We as the FDP appreciate the presence of Chinese companies here, but the strong China focus of the city government is obviously not paying off as expected," he added.

NGC and the other Chinese-owned companies approached by Nikkei Asia for this article either declined to be interviewed or did not return phone calls.

Kai Yu, director of the China Business Network Duisburg, also declined to be interviewed, just saying in November that "the Chinese managers I know are unavailable, because they have already traveled back to China for the Chinese New Year holiday."

China is currently celebrating the lunar new year, two months after Nikkei Asia approached Yu.

Chinese students in Duisburg are also not integrating into the city, local academics say.

About 2,000 Chinese nationals are enrolled at University Duisburg-Essen, the largest intake among German universities, due mainly to a city partnership signed between Duisburg and Wuhan in 1982 that encouraged academic exchanges.

Duisburg's Chinese student population is concentrated in the streets near the university, where there are a handful of Chinese restaurants and shops. Several part-time student restaurant workers said they mainly came from Shandong province under academic exchange arrangements.

"It has always struck me how isolated Duisburg's Chinese student population is compared to those of other Asian countries, with Chinese community groups effectively shielding new arrivals by assisting in all the initial tasks such as arrangement of accommodation," said Antonia Hmaidi, an analyst at the China think tank Merics in Berlin, who previously taught at University Duisburg-Essen.

"China's deteriorating image as an autocratic rival also made China-centered career planning unpopular among German students," she added. "The relationship with China has become more politicized than a few years ago."

"After the German government releases its new China strategy, the overall climate will probably further worsen, which will probably further cool Duisburg's business relationship with China."

22. China’s Big New Warship Is Missing an Important New Weapon

China’s Big New Warship Is Missing an Important New Weapon

When will we finally see the HQ-26 missile?

By THOMAS CORBETT and PETER W. SINGER

JANUARY 23, 2023 02:04 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Thomas Corbett

Last Christmas, the PLA Navy received a long-awaited gift when its seventh and eighth Type 055 destroyers entered service, completing delivery of its first batch of its lethal new class of warship. At roughly 13,000 tons, the Type 055s are Asia's biggest surface warships since World War II; the U.S. Navy classifies them as cruisers. However, despite impressive armaments, advanced radar systems, and other impressive capabilities, initial reporting indicates that the Type 055s appear to be missing a key weapon: the long-planned next-generation ship-to-air missile.

Ten years ago, rumors began to circulate of Chinese plans for a greatly improved version of its Russian-derived HQ-16 medium-range ship-to-air missile system. The HQ-16 was based on the Russian 9K37 Buk, whose development Moscow began back in 1972. China’s current upgraded HQ-16B dates from 2011 and has a reported maximum range of 70 km. The anticipated HQ-26 was said to be roughly equivalent to the U.S. SM-3 missile used by the Aegis ballistic missile defense system. Reportedly, it would be able to destroy short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and manned and unmanned aircraft out to 400 kilometers.

This new HQ-26 interceptor seemed tailor-made for the Type 055, which is intended for use as a missile-defense ship. Yet when the lead ship of the class, the Nanchang, was commissioned in January 2020, we saw only the old HQ-16 system, accompanied by notable silence from China’s military enthusiasts. Almost three years later, some speculate the HQ-26 still remains a year or two from deployment.

This follows similar delays with the HQ-19 SAM system. Roughly analogous to the U.S. THAAD, the HQ-19 is a two-stage missile built to hit medium-range ballistic missiles and other threats. It was expected to be operational by 2021, but there has been no official word on its prospects, much less a public unveiling.

Much like THAAD, the HQ-19 is expected to use a kinetic-kill vehicle: a non-explosive warhead that uses small engines to course-correct and collide with an enemy missile. But delays have plagued China’s efforts in this area as well. Since 2007, China has been developing mid-course interceptors, beginning with the DN-1 (also called SC-19). While it’s not clear if the DN-1 featured kinetic-kill capabilities, its successors, the DN-2 and the DN-3, appear to have them. First appearing in 2015, the DN-3 was most likely tested again in 2018, 2021, and 2022. This string of tests imply that the DN-3 is being actively developed, with China either troubleshooting faults or testing the feasibility of new features. Pentagon officials expect the DN-3 to achieve initial operating capabilities no earlier than the late 2020s.

With the HQ-26 missing, the HQ-19 still unconfirmed, and the DN-3 not through testing, Chinese ballistic missile defense efforts face a number of hurdles. While cruise missiles travel at relatively low speeds, ballistic missiles can reach speeds of 8 kilometers per second and require robust supporting architecture for missile defense systems to accurately target. Although several of China’s basic missile-defense systems claim their updated versions can handle such a challenge, their actual capabilities remain untested in battle.

Yet China remains committed to building defenses against ballistic missiles, primarily to close what is viewed as a strategic gap with the mature missile-defense capabilities of Russia and the United States. For instance, in interviews dating back to 2015, Chinese strategists openly worried about China’s ability to keep pace with, much less catch up to, U.S. ballistic missile defense capabilities. Meanwhile, many of China’s most common missile systems are copied directly from Russian designs. As an example, China bought the Russian S-400 Triumf SAM system in 2014, presumably to both plug gaps in its current missile-defense capabilities, and to take apart and copy.

Another motivator may be China’s comparatively small nuclear arsenal. According to a 2015 report by the Federation of American Scientists, Chinese strategists believed that America’s new generation of missile-defense capabilities, particularly THAAD and its strong X-band radar, could shoot down enough Chinese ICBMs to undermine their deterrent effect. Given China’s relatively small nuclear force, the PLA was also concerned that future U.S. missile-defense developments would have an outsized effect on its nuclear deterrent.

Despite these strong motivators, it appears that the PLA has faced setbacks in the development of the HQ-26 ship-to-air missile system. Already past due, it’s unclear when the system will finally be deployed on PLAN destroyers. And even if the system is finally added on to the PLAN’s newest Type 055 Destroyers in the near future, it’s not clear how effective it will be against ballistic missiles.

Building a ballistic missile defense system involves solving a host of exceedingly difficult technical problems, and it’s not clear that PLA engineers are up to the challenge. Indeed, even the U.S. GMD missile defense system has been plagued with ballooning costs, technical challenges, and can still reportedly only hit targets between 25 and 50 percent of the time in scripted tests.

While the latest warships may raise the PLAN’s capabilities, it still remains unclear whether Chinese missile defense systems will be up to the challenge.

Thomas Corbett is a research analyst with BluePath Labs. His areas of focus include Chinese foreign relations, emerging technology, and international economics.

defenseone.com · by Thomas Corbett

23. What the Map of Korea Can Teach Us About Russia and Ukraine

What the Map of Korea Can Teach Us About Russia and Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · January 23, 2023

The map that distinguishes North Korea from South Korea is well known. At night, it shows South Korea filled with light while North Korea stands as a virtual island of darkness.

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The map has become symbolic of the differences between the two Koreas: One is open, dynamic, and energetic, while the other is closed, dark, and hostile. These differences are one result of a war that the international community helped wage 70 years ago.

While the analogy is imperfect, its implications for the survival of Ukraine are clear.

Engagement and Isolation

The story of North Korea is as well known as that map. The so-called hermit kingdom has isolated itself from the international community. In its self-imposed isolation, it has developed impressive ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.

By contrast, in recent years, South Korea has become an artistic and cultural juggernaut, exporting film and music around the world and setting the terms for youth culture. South Korea has long been a critical cog in the global economy, displaying industrial and technological prowess competitive with the world’s most advanced countries.

Having started in relatively similar post-war economic circumstances, the contrast in the countries’ development could not be clearer.

The other difference between North Korea and South Korea is that the latter is democratic, with a robust protest culture, and the former is run by a collection of gangsters determined to redirect the country’s wealth to serve the purpose of their own domination. North Korea should be a wealthy country. It is heavily industrialized and technologically advanced in certain areas, and it has a well-educated workforce. It is not wealthy only because that band of gangsters, having wrapped themselves in nationalism and communism, have invested the greater part of the nation’s treasure in weapons of war, and have insisted on torturing its populace into uneasy submission.

An Illuminating Parallel

When thinking about the differences between the two Koreas, it is difficult not to let one’s thoughts drift to the war between Russia and Ukraine.

One of the primary justifications for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the idea that Russians and Ukrainians are fundamentally the same people, sharing the same culture if not necessarily the same language. Of course, the cultural and linguistic differences that distinguish Russia and Ukraine are unquestionably greater than those that separate the Koreas. But Russian President Vladimir Putin was not wrong to argue that Ukraine and Russia have a deep historical connection. And there can be no question that Russia’s core war aim is to prevent Ukrainian democracy from succeeding because that would demonstrate that Russia itself could prosper with democratic institutions. This is the last thing that the band of thugs inhabiting the Kremlin wants people to believe.

Like the Republic of Korea, Ukraine faces enormous challenges. On the upside, it is already (mostly) democratic, a status that the ROK did not achieve until the 1980s. On the downside, its economy has been devastated by the war, and it will struggle to recover in the absence of a strong trade relationship with Russia. But the Kyiv government has most certainly chosen to culturally and economically align itself with the West, and Ukrainians are conscious that the stakes in the war are greater even than the territories Russia has claimed in Ukraine’s south and the east.

The metaphor will never be exact. Russia will never quite go dark, if only because it sits on vast reserves of energy. But like North Korea, Russia has chosen a path of isolation, committing its national wealth to the preservation of a murderous, warlike clique. Unlike North Korea, Russia has the opportunity and wherewithal to launch devastating wars of conquest against its neighbors. There is every reason to believe that, in fifty years, the difference between a free Ukraine and an autocratic Russia will be as great as the differences between North and South Korea. Moreover, it is impossible to argue that the world as a whole isn’t a better place because of South Korea’s prominent position in global culture and the global economy.

And so, once again, the international community faces a choice. It cannot contribute to this war in the way that it contributed in Korea. The breezeway leading to the War Museum of the Republic of Korea is guarded by the flags of the countries that sent support to South Korea in the 1950s. Some of these (the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey) are well known, while others (Colombia, Ethiopia) are somewhat less so. These nations did not support Korea out of altruism, and of course there is no need to wash away the worst excesses of that war, or of the Cold War in general. But in an important way, South Korea comes alive at night in the 2020s because of the sacrifices that Koreans and their allies made in the 1950s. It would serve the nations of Europe and the rest of the world to contemplate what kind of Ukraine they want to engage with in the future.

Expertise and Experience: A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · January 23, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]