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Quotes of the Day:
"The United States, acting within the constraints imposed by its traditions and public attitudes, cannot crush a revolutionary movement which is sufficiently large, dedicated, competent and well supported…. The structure of U. S. military power is ill-suited to cope with guerrilla warfare waged by a determined, resourceful, and politically astute opponent."
– Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence Analysis & Report, Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam, September 11, 1967
"Twenty-first century war adds new risks: more and more often there are no front lines, no central command, no rules of engagement - only a chaotic collision of politics, power, faith and bloodlust. Victims are as likely to be civilians as soldiers."
– Nancy Gibbs
"If we were fighting an army, the work would be comparatively easy. We are fighting a secret revolutionary organization."
– Arthur MacArthur, 1845-1912, Army General, Commander of U. S. Troops in the Philippines Father of Douglas MacArthur, Explanation of his military difficulties with guerilla warfare in the Philippines, 1900
1. North Korea fires cruise missiles off west coast, Seoul says
2. Tensions Set to Rise as North Korea Drops Unification Goal
3. Defense chief warns N. Korea will face end of regime if it wages war
4. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles into Yellow Sea: JCS
5. Rights groups welcome Seoul's call for Beijing to protect N. Korean defectors at U.N. review
6. Seeking Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea: What Would Kennan Do?
7. Revisiting the Two-State System for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula
8. N. Korea attempts to use generative AI for hacking attacks: spy agency
9. An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 1
10. An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 2
11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Students and parents unhappy with shoddily-made school uniforms…Authorities crackdown on homemade uniforms to force everyone to wear the same thing
12. North Korea urges mothers to snitch on their kids who watch South Korean media
13. N. Korean agents arrest family members of defectors near border
14. Korea joins statement backing U.S., British strikes on Houthis
15. A $2,200 Dior Handbag Shakes South Korea’s Ruling Party
16. North Korea’s Model Chicken Farm Opens With Plans for More
17. Some US soldiers could see $5K bonus for extending their South Korea tour
1. North Korea fires cruise missiles off west coast, Seoul says
North Korea fires cruise missiles off west coast, Seoul says
Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-fires-cruise-missiles-off-west-coast-seoul-says-2024-01-24/?utm
SEOUL, Jan 24 (Reuters) - North Korea fired multiple cruise missiles towards the sea off its west coast on Wednesday, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said, in the latest sign of heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula.
The missiles were fired at around 7 a.m. (2200 GMT on Tuesday) and the launches were being analysed by South Korean and U.S. intelligence, the JCS said in a statement.
Further activities by the North were being monitored, the JCS said.
The latest firing of missiles by Pyongyang comes as the South Korean Navy's special warfare unit was taking part in training along the east coast in Gangwon Province bordering the North for 10 days.
The training was aimed at strengthening operational readiness following North Korea's recent artillery firing near a disputed maritime border and weapons tests, the JCS said.
Pyongyang said it tested a solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate-range earlier this month in a move that was condemned by the United States, South Korea and Japan.
The isolated North has also demolished a major monument in its capital that symbolized the goal of reconciliation with South Korea on the orders of leader Kim Jong Un, who last week called the rival a "primary foe" and said unification was no longer possible.
Satellite imagery of Pyongyang on Tuesday showed that the monument, an arch symbolizing hopes for Korean reunification which was completed after a landmark inter-Korea summit in 2000, was no longer there, according to a report by NK News, an online outlet that monitors North Korea.
Reuters could not independently confirm that the monument, known informally as the Arch of Reunification, had been demolished.
Reporting by Hyunsu Yim; Editing by Ed Davies and Raju gopalakrishnan
2. Tensions Set to Rise as North Korea Drops Unification Goal
Excellent analysis from Dr. Soo Kim. That said the one area overlooked is the possibility of domestic pressures that may be driving this - If Kim perceives internal threats to his rule the KFR playbook says to externalize the problem, meaning the threat from the South and US. Kim may also be threatened by the ROK's increasingly strong focus on both human rights and unification. And I think when we study the regime's party documents and constitution the regime's goal has never been unification as most of us would describe but instead domination of the peninsula under the KFR rule. We must understand Kim's political wharfare strategy as well as his military strategy. And his development of advanced military capabilities shows us that unification of the peninsula by force under the domination of the KFR remains the objective.
Tensions Set to Rise as North Korea Drops Unification Goal
thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo
Insights from Soo Kim.
By
January 23, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Soo Kim – principal technical advisor at LMI and a former analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency – is the 399th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Identify the key factors behind Pyongyang’s decision to remove unification with South Korea from the country’s constitution.
From a leadership perspective, I offer the conjecture that perhaps Kim Jong Un feels he no longer needs his “training wheels” as the leader of North Korea and can run his country’s foreign policy fully in his style, not relying on the doctrine and generations-old policies set forth by his father and grandfather. I would also say that Kim has been able to shed his training wheels thanks in large part to his country’s nuclear weapons program, an effort Kim has been focused on since succeeding his father.
The geopolitical context has, of late, been favorable to Kim’s nuclearization without real consequences commensurate to his behavior, allowing Kim to proliferate, test, intimidate, and extort with little pomp – as in, each successive missile test has conditioned the world to tolerating Pyongyang’s weapons threat as a fact of life.
Kim’s shedding of training wheels may also mean that he no longer needs the South – or unification – to achieve his goal. He may perceive that he has inter-Korean relations where he wants it, and now he wants to be unhindered in pressing forward on dealing with the U.S. In a sense, get rid of the intermediary and go straight to your negotiating counterpart. This also reflects Kim’s growing confidence as not just the leader of North Korea, but as a viable counterpart to his peers and adversaries.
Analyze Kim Jong Un’s characterization of South Korea as the “principal enemy” of North Korea.
This should not really come as a surprise. Kim may not have explicitly described the South as Pyongyang’s “principal enemy” in the past, but his actions and policies toward Seoul give insight into the light in which he viewed his neighbor. His nuclear weapons program, for one, serves not only as a reliable bargaining chip and “self-defensive” deterrent against the United States; it’s also a versatile tool to threaten and intimidate the South. Calling South Korean leaders derogatory names, prohibiting North Korean citizens from consuming South Korean culture, extorting economic concessions from South Korean governments, blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office… Not exactly warm feelings towards the South, to say the least.
The statement itself seems to create greater openings for Kim to act hostile and belligerently towards the South. The justifications to provoke Seoul and Washington were always readily available and producible by Pyongyang, but by openly calling the South his principal enemy, it gives Kim greater fodders, domestically and internationally, to further toughen his stance towards Seoul.
Examine why North Korea’s unification policy of “one nation, one state with two systems” is no longer viable.
In truth, I’m not sure if the North’s unification policy had been a viable idea if you consider the vast geopolitical and ideological differences between Pyongyang and Seoul today. We are all too familiar with the tremendous economic gap between the two countries. Politically and ideologically, the government systems are, I would say, antithetical to one another. Merging Seoul and Pyongyang into one nation, one state – and two systems – in this context had already been a tall order.
The hypothetical unified Korea with two systems will likely set the Koreas on the path toward a “one nation, one state with one dominant system” – and more than likely, that dominant system would be North Korea. Kim has shown no intention to denuclearize or give up his weapons in exchange for a unified Korea. Should the two Koreas pursue unification under these conditions – a nuclear-armed North Korea merging with a democratic South Korea – power will likely tip in favor of a DPRK-style system, which bears numerous implications domestically and abroad.
Going back to Kim’s recent statement, it essentially nullifies the DPRK’s long-held unification policy – for now. It’s also an expedient way for Kim to focus on amassing greater strength against his southern neighbor and more broadly, the U.S.
Explain the geopolitical and ideological implications of this policy shift.
Kim’s statement and this recent policy shift had a sensational effect; they should not come as a shock to South Korea, however, since we have been observing North Korean actions and rhetoric pointing to anything but sentiments of reconciliation and peace for many years. If anything, the policy shift can be seen as validating our assumptions about the geopolitical and ideological chasm between the two countries.
This also reinforces the divide between the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral and the China-Russia-North Korea collective. We knew where North Korea stood vis-à-vis the U.S., but this latest statement could be interpreted by Moscow and Beijing as enabling greater inroads into their own trilateral cooperation.
Assess the geopolitical risks of Pyongyang’s policy change for the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea.
Simply put, we may be headed towards greater tensions in the region. Kim, no longer anchored to his father and grandfather’s unification policy, can strike on his own and is ready to wager some big bets in foreign policy. What this means for the region, of course, is greater uncertainties about when and how Kim might provoke instability, as well as how the region will respond to more serious provocations from the North. Kim’s nuclear heft, combined with his policy shift, provides a broader range of tools and options to stir chaos in the region.
As we’re heading into election season in the U.S., Kim probably views this as a window of opportunity to deal with the U.S., stir the campaign, and negotiate with the next president. And if a Trump 2.0 administration is in the picture – with the same outlook on North Korea’s nuclear weapons as Trump 1.0 – then Kim might view 2024 as his next best chance in dealing with the U.S. directly. Should this scenario turn into reality, it could spell major security implications for the region, alliances, and peninsular dynamics.
Authors
Contributing Author
Mercy A. Kuo
Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.
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thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo
3. Defense chief warns N. Korea will face end of regime if it wages war
It is good to call out north Korea's hostile policy.
Excerpt:
"North Korea has defined the Republic of Korea as its principal enemy and has maintained a hostile policy under the goal of communizing the whole Korean Peninsula," Shin was quoted as saying, referring to South Korea's official name.
(LEAD) Defense chief warns N. Korea will face end of regime if it wages war | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 24, 2024
(ATTN: CHANGES photo)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense chief said Wednesday that North Korea will face the end of its regime if it wages war, hours after the North fired several rounds of cruise missiles into the Yellow Sea in its latest series of weapons tests.
Defense Minister Shin Won-sik issued the warning during his visit to the 17th Fighter Wing at Cheongju Air Base, 112 kilometers south of Seoul, which operates 40 F-35 stealth fighter jets.
"North Korea has defined the Republic of Korea as its principal enemy and has maintained a hostile policy under the goal of communizing the whole Korean Peninsula," Shin was quoted as saying, referring to South Korea's official name.
Defense Minister Shin Won-sik visits the 17th Fighter Wing at Cheongju Air Base, 112 kilometers south of Seoul, which operates 40 F-35 stealth fighter jets, on Jan. 24, 2024, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Shin urged the F-35 pilots to sternly retaliate in case of any North Korean provocation with the fighter jets' stealth infiltration and precision strike capabilities.
"If the Kim Jong-un regime opts for the worst choice of waging war, you should be at the vanguard of removing the enemy's leadership at the earliest possible time and put an end to the regime," he said.
The F-35A is a key asset for the South Korean military due to its high-performance radar and stealth capabilities, enabling it to carry out long-range strategic strikes without being noticed by the enemy. The Air Force plans to deploy 20 additional F-35As by 2027.
Last week, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatened South Korea with war if "even 0.001 mm" of the North's territory is violated, saying his country will not recognize the Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean maritime border.
The North also claimed it tested an underwater nuclear attack drone in the East Sea in response to the latest joint naval drills involving South Korea, the United States and Japan early last week.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 24, 2024
4. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles into Yellow Sea: JCS
Support to regime political warfare and blackmail diplomacy while developing advanced military capabilities.
(2nd LD) N. Korea fires several cruise missiles into Yellow Sea: JCS | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 24, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with more comments in paras 4-5)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired several cruise missiles toward the Yellow Sea on Wednesday, the South Korean military said, the latest in a series of saber-rattling that heightened tensions.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the North's launch took place around 7 a.m. but did not elaborate, citing an ongoing analysis.
"While strengthening our monitoring and vigilance, our military has been closely coordinating with the United States to monitor additional signs of North Korea's provocations," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.
This photo, released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Feb. 24, 2023, shows the North staging "strategic cruise missile" launch drills in an area of the northeastern city of Kim Chaek the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
According to sources, the missiles flew in a circular trajectory in waters west of the North Korean capital Pyongyang, similar to cruise missiles that fly at a lower altitude than ballistic missiles.
"The range was not short, and it is was presumed to have been launched from the ground," the source said, speculating that the cruise missiles were likely Hwasal-1 or -2, which are capable of carrying a Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead.
It marks the North's first cruise missile launch since September 2023, when it test-fired two long-range strategic cruise missiles with mock nuclear warheads toward the Yellow Sea.
The latest launch comes 10 days after Pyongyang test-fired a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile carrying a hypersonic warhead into the East Sea in its first missile launch this year.
Hypersonic missiles are considered harder to detect and shoot down as they fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 -- five times the speed of sound -- and are highly maneuverable and able to change course during flight.
Last week, North Korea claimed it has tested an underwater nuclear weapons system under development in response to the latest joint maritime exercise involving South Korea, the United States and Japan.
Tensions remain high along the inter-Korean border as buffer zones created under a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement became invalid following North Korea's conducting of live-fire drills near the western maritime border earlier this month.
The South Korean military said it will resume artillery firings and drills near the border as Pyongyang's shellings near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea, scrapped the mutually agreed buffer zones.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 24, 2024
5. Rights groups welcome Seoul's call for Beijing to protect N. Korean defectors at U.N. review
South Korea is stepping up the human rights pressure in support of a human rights upfront approach.
Excerpt:
It marked the first time for South Korea to raise the human rights issue at the U.N. peer-review process against China.
Rights groups welcome Seoul's call for Beijing to protect N. Korean defectors at U.N. review | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 24, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- An association of civic groups on Wednesday welcomed the South Korean government's recommendation at a United Nations review session urging China to protect the human rights of North Korean defectors in the country.
On Tuesday, Yun Seong-deok, the South Korean ambassador to the U.N. office in Geneva, called on Beijing to provide North Korean defectors with the required protections and humanitarian support at China's fourth universal periodic review (UPR) held under the auspices of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
It marked the first time for South Korea to raise the human rights issue at the U.N. peer-review process against China.
This photo provided by UN Web TV shows Yun Seong-deok, South Korea's ambassador to the U.N. office in Geneva, recommending China protect the human rights of North Korean defectors at China's fourth universal periodic review held under the auspices of United Nations Human Rights Council on Jan. 23, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The UPR is a mechanism that calls for each U.N. member state to go through a peer review of its human rights record every 4.5 years.
The NGO Council for North Korean Human Rights, an association of 61 rights groups based in South Korea and abroad, welcomed the move and called on China to swiftly implement the recommendation.
The organization said South Korea has put forward to the international community and China a diplomatic stance denouncing China's disregard for international norms and urging China to respect the principle of non-refoulement, which guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face the risk of persecution.
As Pyongyang's key ally, China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees and regularly repatriates them to their home country, where they could face harsh punishment.
Last year, South Korean human rights groups said China forcibly sent hundreds of North Korean defectors from its northeastern border regions back to the North.
The South Korean government has confirmed the repatriation did take place, without specifying the number of those who were repatriated.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 24, 2024
6. Seeking Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea: What Would Kennan Do?
Excerpts:
But for both sides, the long-term risks of avoiding reciprocal diplomacy are almost certainly greater than the risks and challenges of pursuing it. Notwithstanding the inevitable frustrations, minimizing the dangers to peace and stability will require sustained engagement with Pyongyang, as well as acceptance of realities that will continue to constrain U.S. options and preferences. These include recognizing the limits on U.S. power (which Kennan consistently emphasized) and thus on fulfillment of the U.S. wish list; and at least tacitly acknowledging that North Korea is a de facto nuclear state. Washington probably will also have to accept the need for reciprocity — “you can’t get something for nothing” when your negotiating partner has leverage — and some level of mutual respect.
None of this requires the United States to abandon either the traditional levers of containment or Washington’s formidable leverage over Pyongyang. As Kennan wrote early in the Cold War about the Soviet Union, the United States “has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate” and to “force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years.” The same potential now exists with regard to North Korea. But U.S. exercise of this power can and should be accompanied by a genuine belief in peaceful coexistence, and acknowledgement that Pyongyang itself is genuinely interested in the same.
With such an approach, Washington could pursue an interim settlement with Pyongyang — one that reduces risks and tensions and promotes stability on the Korean Peninsula — along the lines that Kennan proposed for dealing with China in the 1970s: “Let us collaborate where we can, agree to differ where we cannot, and see whether we cannot contrive to live reasonably peacefully together for the time being, despite our differences; not asking too much of each other—or too little.”
Seeking Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea: What Would Kennan Do?
Risk reduction will require sustained engagement with Pyongyang as well as acceptance of realities that will continue to constrain U.S. options and preferences.
Tuesday, January 16, 2024 / BY: Paul J. Heer
usip.org
Kennan’s Evolving Views of the Korean Peninsula
Kennan originally did not consider his doctrine of containment to be applicable to the Korean Peninsula because he deemed it strategically inconsequential, and thus judged that Soviet influence over it would be unfortunate but tolerable for the United States. In 1947, when he was formulating U.S. strategy as director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, Kennan wrote that because the peninsula was “not of decisive strategic importance to us,” Washington’s “main task” there should be “to extricate ourselves [from postwar occupation] without too great a loss of prestige.”
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, however, reversed Kennan’s position — but only because he judged that the extension of communist control “in the way in which this was attempted” would have been “wholly disruptive to our prestige in Asia.” Indeed, Kennan was prepared to accept a “gradual and inconspicuous” extension of Soviet control — again, because he considered the Korean Peninsula expendable.
In the ensuing decades, this position evolved as Kennan’s concern in East Asia shifted from containing the spread of Soviet influence to limiting the spread (after the Sino-Soviet split) of Chinese communist influence in the region. He wrote in 1964 that Washington “had no choice but to place ourselves in [the] path” of the expansion of Chinese power over “those insular and peninsular appendages of the Asiatic continent” — explicitly including South Korea — to which the United States had extended defense commitments in the wake of the Korean War.
Kennan, however, ultimately developed an ambivalent attitude toward both Koreas. He criticized administrations in Seoul that in his view were repressive, took the U.S. security umbrella for granted or interfered in U.S. politics; and he called South Korea a “dead weight” on U.S. policy toward Japan because of Seoul’s resistance to what he considered Washington’s need to focus its regional strategy on Tokyo. For those reasons, Kennan in the 1970s again came to advocate a U.S. military withdrawal from the peninsula. As for North Korea, he wrote that Pyongyang had retained its “burning hatred” of the United States for “standing in its way” in 1950, and he foresaw that North Korea would become “one of the most explosive and dangerous spots” in the world.
Containment as a Political and Economic Rather than Military Strategy
But it is important to recall that Kennan spent the latter half of his life insisting that he never intended containment to be exclusively or even primarily a military strategy. Nor did he intend it to exclude diplomatic engagement aimed at establishing the conditions and negotiating the terms for peaceful coexistence. Indeed, in a new biography — “Kennan: A Life Between Worlds” — historian Frank Costigliola emphasizes this aspect of Kennan’s Cold War career, which was eclipsed by Washington’s militarization of containment policy starting in the 1950s.
Focused on the limits of U.S. power and the requirement this imposed for some level of compromise and accommodation with the Soviet Union, Kennan advocated “serious diplomacy” aimed at “an honorable settlement that would reduce tensions.” Although he never abandoned containment, he had intended it to be primarily a political and economic strategy — the Marshall Plan in Europe was his original model — and he argued that containment needed to be accompanied by negotiations that might yield a “political settlement” that would avert conflict and facilitate a stable equilibrium even if fundamental disagreements persisted. As Costigliola observes, Kennan lamented that the militarization of containment thwarted opportunities for negotiation, and yielded a stability that was tenuous because it averted compromise and the need for “patience, sacrifice, and restraint.”
Applying Kennan’s Approach to the Soviet Union to the Current North Korea Challenge
Most of the same criteria apply to the challenge of dealing with Pyongyang today. Assessing Costigliola’s book, historian Fredrik Logevall underscored the need to “rethink the Cold War as an era of possibilities for dialogue and diplomacy, not the inevitable series of confrontations and crises we came to see.”
Washington has certainly seen a series of confrontations and crises with North Korea. And although it is a far less consequential power than the Soviet Union was, its nuclear and conventional military capabilities dictate the need for patience and restraint, and for negotiations in pursuit of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, a largely militarized approach to containing North Korea is unlikely to bring long-term stability to the Korean Peninsula because it similarly avoids both consideration of compromise and addressing Pyongyang’s legitimate security concerns. Kennan considered Washington’s approach to Moscow during the early stages of the Cold War as a futile pursuit of unconditional surrender, which is no more viable in the case of Pyongyang today.
Several other aspects of Kennan’s approach to the Soviet Union also resonate with regard to North Korea. Among these was his concern about the tendency of U.S. policymakers to caricature and vilify the strategic perspective of an adversary rather than acknowledge and confront the complexities of that perspective. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Kennan wrote that “there is a reluctance to recognize the finer distinctions of the psychology of our adversaries” because it seems safer to “credit him indiscriminately with all aggressive designs, even when some of them are mutually contradictory.” This is compounded by the presumption that strategic disputes are irreconcilable and thus peaceful coexistence is impossible. Kennan wrote in the 1970s that Washington appeared to assume that “the differences in aim and outlook between the Soviet Union and the United States are indeed of such a nature that no peaceful resolution of them is conceivable.” The same assumption is often prevalent in U.S.-North Korean relations.
A core problem, in Kennan’s view, was that such inflated threat perceptions and premature judgments, “like all false prophesies and all false images of conflict and enmity, tend to be self-fulfilling.” Moreover, such assumptions are partly grounded in a lack of strategic empathy, which hinders recognition of the impact Washington’s posture has on the mindset of the adversary. In the case of the Soviet Union, Kennan speculated that Soviet leaders were likely to see “sinister motives” behind the U.S. approach and conclude “that we have come to see war as inevitable and have put out of our minds all possibilities for the peaceful accommodation of our differences. If they gain this impression, then they too will tend to push such possibilities out of theirs.” Finally, Kennan observed that Washington was often averse to negotiating with Moscow because Russia was “identified as the epitome of evil, and it wouldn’t look good, from the domestic political standpoint, to be negotiating and compromising with evil.”
This all resonates with the current U.S. challenge of dealing with North Korea. Although there is ample U.S. analysis of the psychology of Kim Jong Un, there are limits to its accuracy and validity, given the hardness of the target (in intelligence community parlance). More importantly, Washington runs the risk of simplifying or rebuffing Pyongyang’s perspective, crediting it, in Kennan’s words, “indiscriminately with all aggressive designs,” underestimating both the potential for mutual accommodation and the impact of U.S. actions on conspiratorial North Korean thinking, and avoiding opportunities for constructive diplomacy because of the domestic political risks of advocating it.
No doubt Pyongyang poses multiple and glaring obstacles to a constructive U.S. approach. Its own obstreperous and belligerent posture has often been characterized by vilification and misattribution of U.S. motives, rather than any apparent embrace of restraint or compromise. Moreover, North Korea’s commitment to constructive diplomacy has failed several tests over the past three decades.
But for both sides, the long-term risks of avoiding reciprocal diplomacy are almost certainly greater than the risks and challenges of pursuing it. Notwithstanding the inevitable frustrations, minimizing the dangers to peace and stability will require sustained engagement with Pyongyang, as well as acceptance of realities that will continue to constrain U.S. options and preferences. These include recognizing the limits on U.S. power (which Kennan consistently emphasized) and thus on fulfillment of the U.S. wish list; and at least tacitly acknowledging that North Korea is a de facto nuclear state. Washington probably will also have to accept the need for reciprocity — “you can’t get something for nothing” when your negotiating partner has leverage — and some level of mutual respect.
None of this requires the United States to abandon either the traditional levers of containment or Washington’s formidable leverage over Pyongyang. As Kennan wrote early in the Cold War about the Soviet Union, the United States “has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate” and to “force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years.” The same potential now exists with regard to North Korea. But U.S. exercise of this power can and should be accompanied by a genuine belief in peaceful coexistence, and acknowledgement that Pyongyang itself is genuinely interested in the same.
With such an approach, Washington could pursue an interim settlement with Pyongyang — one that reduces risks and tensions and promotes stability on the Korean Peninsula — along the lines that Kennan proposed for dealing with China in the 1970s: “Let us collaborate where we can, agree to differ where we cannot, and see whether we cannot contrive to live reasonably peacefully together for the time being, despite our differences; not asking too much of each other—or too little.”
Paul J. Heer is a nonresident senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as national intelligence officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of “Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia.”
usip.org
7. Revisiting the Two-State System for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula
When I read articles like this I have to ask the author if we should abandon the Korean people in the north and allow them to be sentenced to a life of severe hardship and brutal oppression?
And the most important question is why do we think this will stabilize the Korean peninsula since the regime continues to develop advanced military capabilities while executing political warfare and blackmail diplomacy with the objective to dominate the Korean peninsula. While Kim states he no longer seeks peaceful unification he has not stated that he has given up on his quest to dominate the Korean peninsula under his rule by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Excerpts:
Between the two Koreas, however, the relationship was more complicated. In December 1991, the two countries signed the “Agreement of Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea,” also known as the “Basic Agreement,” but it defined inter-Korean relations as “not a relationship between states, but a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification.” During the negotiations for the Basic Agreement, North Korea maintained its traditional nationalistic unification rhetoric and opposed the codification of state-to-state relations. As a result, the two countries could not redefine post-Cold War, inter-Korean relations as peaceful coexistence based on a two-state system.
...
Negotiating both the Basic Treaty between the two Koreas and U.S.-North Korea diplomatic normalization will be extremely challenging. Nevertheless, the parties involved should explore these measures to help resolve the security dilemma resulting from unification competition between the two Koreas and to achieve a nuclear-free, peaceful Korean Peninsula.
Revisiting the Two-State System for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula
A system that mitigates the unification competition may promote peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.
Monday, January 22, 2024 / BY: Bong-geun Jun
usip.org
The Two-State System as a Necessary Condition for Peaceful Coexistence
During the Cold War, South and North Korea engaged in a constant and fierce competition for legitimacy and dominance to become the leading state to unify the Korean Peninsula. As each side denied the other’s right to exist as an independent state and pursued unification on its own terms, the Korean Peninsula continuously suffered from conflicts and military clashes.
After its establishment in 1948, South Korea prioritized membership in the United Nations to be recognized as the only legitimate state on the peninsula. North Korea, on the other hand, criticized separate U.N. membership as perpetuating the division. Instead, North Korea advocated to join the U.N. as a unified confederated republic with a single seat. North Korea also blocked South Korea’s bids for separate U.N. membership with the help of the Soviet Union and China.
However, the end of the Cold War gave South Korea a new opportunity. After normalizing diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990, the Soviet Union declared that it would not veto South Korea’s entry to the U.N. China followed suit the next year. Afraid of being left out of the U.N., North Korea suddenly changed its position and joined the U.N. with South Korea, but separately, in September 1991.
The simultaneous admission of South and North Korea to the United Nations opened the era of the two-state system on the peninsula. Both countries were recognized internationally as legitimate, sovereign states under the U.N. Charter. Afterwards, expectations for peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas grew. As of May 2023, 192 countries have diplomatic relations with South Korea, 159 countries with North Korea and 156 countries have simultaneous diplomatic relations with both — which means that 156 countries recognize both Koreas as separate, independent sovereign states.
Between the two Koreas, however, the relationship was more complicated. In December 1991, the two countries signed the “Agreement of Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea,” also known as the “Basic Agreement,” but it defined inter-Korean relations as “not a relationship between states, but a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification.” During the negotiations for the Basic Agreement, North Korea maintained its traditional nationalistic unification rhetoric and opposed the codification of state-to-state relations. As a result, the two countries could not redefine post-Cold War, inter-Korean relations as peaceful coexistence based on a two-state system.
As the post-Cold War era progressed and South Korea’s economy grew to outpace North Korea’s by 50 times, a crisis-ridden North Korea shut its doors tighter and launched a nuclear development program, partly out of fear of “absorption unification” by South Korea. This shift ended the brief opportunity for peaceful coexistence based on a two-state system. Although unification competition was less severe during Kim Jong Il’s reign (1994-2011), as inter-Korean dialogue and U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations progressed on and off, North Korea never completely stopped developing nuclear weapons out of the fear of absorption by the South.
As North Korea continued to develop its nuclear weapons after its first nuclear test in 2006, the peninsula entered another phase of unification competition, but now with the threat of nuclear use. North Korea’s nuclear armament posed an existential threat to the South, which caused Seoul, mostly under conservative administrations, to respond with a massive military build-up, a preemptive strike principle against North Korea’s nuclear missiles, frequent requests for demonstrations of U.S. strategic assets and the launch of the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group. Today, with the two Koreas remaining trapped in the unification competition and U.S.-North Korea relations at a hostile standstill, intense security competition and arms racing between the two Koreas continue.
A two-state system would establish a legal and political framework that can help mitigate unification competition, facilitate peaceful coexistence and reduce security risks on the peninsula. Though experts have explored the two-state system in the past, public debates have been sensitive due to criticisms of the two-state system as anti-nationalist, anti-unification and anti-constitution, given the South Korean constitutional provision that claims the whole Korean Peninsula as its territory. However, in today’s environment where the risk of conflict, especially nuclear, is greater and the chances of unification are very slim, the two-state system is worth exploring seriously.
How to Build the Two-State System
First, both Koreas should organize their respective national policies around a two-state system. Of the two Koreas, South Korea, which has greater national power and higher international standing, should convene an inter-Korean dialogue for the two-state system as it did in 1991. When South Korea entered the U.N. together with the North and signed the Basic Agreement in 1991, it was ready to institutionalize a two-state system. Lee Hong-koo, the former minister of unification and prime minister who drafted South Korea’s still operative Unification Plan in 1989, recalled in 2015 how his government pursued the two-state system at the time in a column titled “Systemizing the Division.” South Korea’s National Community Reunification Plan prescribed the institutionalization of a two-state system on the peninsula that would allow the two Koreas to coexist and cooperate for a considerable period of time. This Korean version of Germany’s two-state solution led to the 1991 Basic Agreement and simultaneous membership in the U.N. Lee also argued that the two Koreas should relaunch the aborted project of the two-state system to reduce the risk of war.
Second, South Korea should utilize the Kim Jong Un regime’s recent abandonment of traditional nationalist and pro-unification rhetoric in favor of a state-centered stance as an opportunity to raise the two-state system to North Korea. At a party plenum at the end of 2023, Kim for the first time renounced unification as an explicit goal of North Korea’s inter-Korean policy, claiming that reunification is impossible. This announcement follows earlier signals that North Korea was viewing the South as a separate belligerent state. In 2018, North Korea abandoned traditional calls for unification and intra-national cooperation, and instead promoted “Our State First” and “Our People (North Koreans) First” slogans. Recently, the North Korean leadership unusually began calling South Korea by its official name, “Republic of Korea,” instead of the more commonly used “South Chosun” or “Puppet Regime.” In July 2023, North Korea drew attention again when its Foreign Ministry, rather than the agency in charge of inter-Korean affairs, announced a statement on the proposed visit of a South Korea businesswoman to the North. It remains to be seen whether North Korea is truly treating the South as a foreign state rather than a separated half. South Korea should still utilize this state-centered shift as an opportunity to build normal state-to-state relations, under the U.N. Charter and international law, for peaceful coexistence instead of unpredictable, emotional relations competing for unification and dominance.
Third, the two Koreas should conclude a Basic Treaty that codifies the two-state system while postponing unification until a permanent peace is reached. The new Basic Treaty would inherit most elements of the 1991 Basic Agreement, such as recognition of and respect for each other’s system, noninterference in internal affairs, nonaggression, no slandering and vilifying, and no sabotage and subversion of the other’s regime. More importantly, the new treaty should recognize each state’s full statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity under its current control as in the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies. To ensure the international legal status of the Basic Treaty, it should be signed by the heads of the two Koreas, ratified by their legislatures and registered as an international treaty at the U.N. Secretariat in accordance with Article 102 of the U.N. Charter.
Fourth, in order to institutionalize the two-state system and peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, it is essential to secure the support of major stakeholder states, especially the United States. Lee, the former prime minister of South Korea, claimed that the failure of the two-state system to take hold in the early 1990s was due to the “failure of the then-hegemonic U.S. to provide international guarantees.” The United States and North Korea have agreed to work toward normalized relations in all previous nuclear agreements, including the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement, but they repeatedly failed to deliver on these commitments.
Negotiating both the Basic Treaty between the two Koreas and U.S.-North Korea diplomatic normalization will be extremely challenging. Nevertheless, the parties involved should explore these measures to help resolve the security dilemma resulting from unification competition between the two Koreas and to achieve a nuclear-free, peaceful Korean Peninsula.
usip.org
8. N. Korea attempts to use generative AI for hacking attacks: spy agency
The all purpose sword is a key tool for the regime.
N. Korea attempts to use generative AI for hacking attacks: spy agency | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · January 24, 2024
By Kim Na-young
SEOUL, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's state intelligence agency has detected signs that North Korea tried to incorporate generative artificial intelligence (AI) into its hacking attacks and other illicit cyber activities, officials said Wednesday.
"Recently, it has been confirmed that North Korean hackers use generative AI to search for hacking targets and search for technologies needed for hacking," a senior official at the National Intelligence Service (NIS) told reporters.
The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the spy agency is keeping close tabs on North Korea's attempts to use generative AI for cyberattacks.
Still, North Korea has not used generative AI in actual cyberwarfare, the official said.
The NIS said it identified a daily average of 1.62 million hacking attempts in South Korea's public sector last year, up 36 percent from a year ago.
This image provided by Yonhap News TV depicts North Korean hackers attempting to steal cryptocurrency. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
North Korea accounted for 80 percent of the total hacking attempts last year, followed by China at 5 percent, NIS officials said.
The target of North Korean hacking attempts varied last year, apparently in line with the North's leader Kim Jong-un's political agenda and interests, the NIS said.
Early last year, Pyongyang's hacking groups extorted information from South Korean agricultural and fisheries institutions after Kim called for plans to solve the North's food shortage crisis.
In August and September, many of the attacks were focused on the South's shipbuilding companies as Kim ordered measures to strengthen the North's naval power.
Over the past four years, North Korea launched hacking attacks on defense companies of at least 25 countries in the world, including South Korea and Russia, according to the NIS.
The attacks were mainly targeted at the aviation industry at 25 percent, followed by technologies related to tanks at 17 percent, satellites at 16 percent and naval vessels at 11 percent.
North Korea is also suspected of using its overseas IT workers to find jobs at IT companies to plant malicious codes on software programs they developed at the companies to steal cryptocurrencies, the NIS said.
The NIS said South Korea is expected to see more cyberthreats this year amid the strained relationship with North Korea and the general elections slated for April.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · January 24, 2024
9. An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 1
Excerpts:
In light of all these indications, North Korea appears to view 2024 as a “stepping stone” to 2025, during which it will focus on strengthening its nuclear arsenal and strengthening the home front by increasing control over its citizens. At the same time, it is expected to employ the strategy and tactics of fomenting conflict within South Korea and strengthening its status through various online and offline provocations, including a seventh nuclear test, and promoting a coalition against the U.S.
Therefore, the Yoon administration must thoroughly prepare for the possibility that North Korea will drastically worsen inter-Korean and foreign relations. In the meantime, it should take preventive measures to ensure that the “two Koreas” doctrine officially adopted by Kim Jong Un (namely, the doctrine of the reunification of Korea by nuclear means in the event of war) cannot be used to sow division in South Korean society during the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in March, the parliamentary elections in April, the ROK-U.S. nuclear contingency drills in August and the U.S. presidential election in November.
In the long term, the Yoon administration must develop countermeasures for the possibility that North Korea will convene the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea earlier than expected in 2025, which will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the party and the completion of its five-year plan for national defense and economic development. This could allow Pyongyang to get a head start on the U.S. after the outcome of the presidential election in November.
An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 1
North Korea seems to regard 2024 as a “stepping stone” to 2025 during which it will focus on bolstering its nuclear arsenal and reinforcing the home front by strengthening controls over its citizens
By Gil-sup Kwak - 2024.01.22 5:00pm
dailynk.com
An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 1 - Daily NK English
A meeting between Kim Jong Un and his military leaders on Dec. 31, 2023, as reported by state-run media on Jan. 1, 2024 (Rodong Sinmun - News1)
During his New Year’s speech at the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea held from Dec. 26-30, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un emphasized the “two states” narrative along with the legitimacy of his “strength-against-strength frontal confrontation” line.
Achievements and goals
Describing 2023 as the “year of great transition and great transformation,” North Korea emphasized the importance of enshrining Kim’s nuclear-armament policy in the constitution (in September 2023), while touting achievements beyond the party’s goals in food production, missile development, and reconnaissance satellites.
The main “struggle goals” outlined for 2024 include fighting against the Biden administration in the U.S. and the Yoon administration in South Korea, “seizing the heights” in food supply and 12 other areas, eliminating anti-socialism through stronger ideological indoctrination, and advancing nuclear capabilities by launching three more reconnaissance satellites under the key approach of “strength-against-strength frontal confrontation”.
Points to note
Notably, Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations not as a national concept but as “relations between two states” (or relations between belligerents). This amounts to a sophisticated form of psychological warfare that brands South Korea as a separate, hostile, belligerent state that is not part of the same nation, with the goal of preventing resistance to the preemptive use of nuclear weapons while instilling a high level of fear and discord in South Korean society. At the same time, it preserves Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s ideal and framework of reunification through a federation of one nation in one state under two systems.
Kim’s emphasis on “preparing for a great event to oppress the entire territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces, including nuclear forces in case of emergency” can be seen in the same context and is believed to be part of the North’s strategy to gain supremacy in inter-Korean relations and in its “reunification front” against South Korea.
Another notable development was a meeting of related departments chaired by Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui on Jan. 1 to “accomplish the tasks of abolishing and liquidating the bodies responsible for dealing with our enemy South Korea and changing the basic direction and principles of our struggle.”
Conclusion
The above moves by North Korea suggest that the party leadership’s channels for negotiations with South Korea, including the United Front Department, may be transferred to the foreign ministry. As such, any conclusions reached by the ministry would be reported to Kim Jong Un after receiving approval from his sister, Kim Yo Jong, who has overall authority over relations with South Korea and other countries. Also noteworthy is the possibility that this will go beyond the mere transfer of functions from one organization to another and lead to the establishment of a supreme security body along the lines of South Korea’s National Security Council to underscore North Korea’s status as a “separate state.”
In light of all these indications, North Korea appears to view 2024 as a “stepping stone” to 2025, during which it will focus on strengthening its nuclear arsenal and strengthening the home front by increasing control over its citizens. At the same time, it is expected to employ the strategy and tactics of fomenting conflict within South Korea and strengthening its status through various online and offline provocations, including a seventh nuclear test, and promoting a coalition against the U.S.
Therefore, the Yoon administration must thoroughly prepare for the possibility that North Korea will drastically worsen inter-Korean and foreign relations. In the meantime, it should take preventive measures to ensure that the “two Koreas” doctrine officially adopted by Kim Jong Un (namely, the doctrine of the reunification of Korea by nuclear means in the event of war) cannot be used to sow division in South Korean society during the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in March, the parliamentary elections in April, the ROK-U.S. nuclear contingency drills in August and the U.S. presidential election in November.
In the long term, the Yoon administration must develop countermeasures for the possibility that North Korea will convene the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea earlier than expected in 2025, which will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the party and the completion of its five-year plan for national defense and economic development. This could allow Pyongyang to get a head start on the U.S. after the outcome of the presidential election in November.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Gil-sup Kwak
President of One Korea Center and Adjunct Professor at Kookmin University
dailynk.com
10. An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 2
The author touches on possible internal instability. The regime seems to be "projecting" when it says to watch South Korea for demonstrations and protests.
But the author concludes with recommendations for a human rights upfront approach and an information campaign to encourage change from the bottom up while resting on a foundation of deterrence and defense. He is calling on support for resistance without using those words. I concur.
Excerpts:
Shoring up the home front
In a group meeting on Jan. 1 with various departments responsible for “dealing with the enemy,” Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui discussed the issue of “abolishing and liquidating bodies responsible for dealing with our enemy South Korea and changing the basic direction and principles of our struggle. Her remarks suggest that the various party organs in charge of dealing with South Korea, including the United Front Department, will be incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may now be largely responsible for relations with the South.
A Daily NK report on Jan. 9 quoted a source in North Hamgyong Province as saying that the Rason branch of the party had received and disseminated the following message from Kim Jong Un: “Considering that South Korea is an enemy state opposed to us on both the political-ideological and military levels, it would be fatal to cling to the illusion that we are homogeneous nations… All preparations should be made for the possibility that the demonstrations of the South Korean people against the U.S. and its president may suddenly escalate into an internal revolt.”
A source in North Pyongyang Province was quoted in an earlier report as saying, “North Korea has called for strengthening war preparedness because of the political tension. Civil defense drills were organized and held for about 20 days in December last year.”
...
So how should South Korea respond to North Korea’s drastic measures? In addition to carefully preparing preventive measures and our early warning system, we should also redouble our efforts to educate North Korean society about human rights issues and the truth about the outside world to encourage change from the bottom up. This should be coupled with a national movement in South Korea to counter North Korea’s psychological warfare (convincing people of North Korea’s intentions to provoke a conflict between the two Koreas and the need for the temporary tension to be resolved to achieve real peace).
An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 2
We can conclude that there are two reasons for North Korea's adoption of the "two states" narrative
By Gil-sup Kwak - 2024.01.24 8:00am
dailynk.com
An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative: Part 2 - Daily NK English
On Jan. 8-9, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected important military factories, reviewing the production status of weapon combat technology and equipment and presenting revolutionary policies to “rigorously perfect” the country’s war readiness posture, according to Rodong Sinmun on Jan. 10. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
In a speech wrapping up the review of achievements at a year-end plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said that inter-Korean relations are now “the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones anymore” and ordered “preparations for a great event to suppress the whole territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces including nuclear forces in contingency.”
I have analyzed this “two states” narrative as a strategy and tactic designed to provide North Korea with an excuse to strengthen its nuclear arsenal and tighten control over its citizens, and to provoke conflict within South Korea through various forms of online and offline provocations and psychological warfare. Now that more than 10 days have passed since Kim made his remarks about the “two states” narrative – and about achieving unification through nuclear power – I will turn to actions the regime has taken after the remarks and their implications.
Explosive language
In public activities, including an inspection of a munitions factory earlier this year, Kim has defined South Korea as the “main enemy” and made extremely bellicose remarks. “We have reached the historical moment when we must define the Republic of Korea as the most hostile state,” he said. “I have no intention of avoiding war. In the event of war, we will mobilize all means and capabilities to completely annihilate the Republic of Korea.”
Kim’s powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, has also issued two statements criticizing and rudely denigrating the South Korean administrations of Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol, while also attempting to spread fear of war in South Korea to divide voters before the general election in April.
Kim said in a Jan. 7 statement that the Korean People’s Army has already released the “safety” on its triggers.
“The military gangsters should bear in mind that they can ‘die immediately and violently and [meet their end]’ if they continue to rely on the so-called principle of counteraction such as ‘prompt, strong and to the end’ that they often tout,” she added.
Show of force
For three days beginning Jan. 5, North Korean coastal artillery near the Northern Limit Line conducted live-fire drills in violation of the Agreed Framework. These provocations, which follow Kim’s declaration that inter-Korean relations are “relations between two warring states,” are deliberately designed to raise tensions and create a sense that the Yoon administration’s North Korea policy has failed.
Amid these developments, North Korean media released photographs of Kim inspecting the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile and a mobile launch pad factory on Jan. 5, accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju Ae. This media coverage reinforced to domestic and international audiences that the country is working to mass-produce and deploy strategic missiles.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju-ae, led a field tour of an “important military vehicle production plant,” according to Rodong Sinmun on Jan. 5. The newspaper also unveiled a launch pad vehicle (TEL) carrying a cylindrical tube for the Hwasong-18, a new solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
But during an inspection of an ammunition factory on Jan. 8-9, Kim emphasized the “principle of prioritizing current political goals” while pointing out shortcomings in the ammunition production sector. This can be seen as an indication of problems in the production of ammunition for export to Russia.
Shoring up the home front
In a group meeting on Jan. 1 with various departments responsible for “dealing with the enemy,” Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui discussed the issue of “abolishing and liquidating bodies responsible for dealing with our enemy South Korea and changing the basic direction and principles of our struggle. Her remarks suggest that the various party organs in charge of dealing with South Korea, including the United Front Department, will be incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may now be largely responsible for relations with the South.
A Daily NK report on Jan. 9 quoted a source in North Hamgyong Province as saying that the Rason branch of the party had received and disseminated the following message from Kim Jong Un: “Considering that South Korea is an enemy state opposed to us on both the political-ideological and military levels, it would be fatal to cling to the illusion that we are homogeneous nations… All preparations should be made for the possibility that the demonstrations of the South Korean people against the U.S. and its president may suddenly escalate into an internal revolt.”
A source in North Pyongyang Province was quoted in an earlier report as saying, “North Korea has called for strengthening war preparedness because of the political tension. Civil defense drills were organized and held for about 20 days in December last year.”
Conclusions and countermeasures
North Korea’s recent moves are part of its geopolitical “crisis management” strategy of creating an external enemy to strengthen internal cohesion. The tactic is twofold: Internally, it serves as “positional warfare” that creates a pretext for suppressing the positive feelings toward South Korea that are widespread among the public, especially the youth; externally, it serves as a “battle for high ground” aimed at placing the blame for the collapse of inter-Korean relations on the hardline North Korea policies of the Yoon and Biden administrations.
In other words, we can conclude that there are two reasons for North Korea’s adoption of the “two states” narrative. The first is the North Korean leadership’s fear that the series of laws it has enacted since 2020 to stop the spread of the “Korean wave” (the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Exclusion Act, the Act to Guarantee Ideological Education for Youth, the Pyongyang Dialect Protection Act, and the Inminban () Organization and Operation Act, the latter from January 2024) and a series of restrictions and educational measures, such as stressing the need for mothers to raise their children properly, have not been very effective. The second reason involves upcoming elections, including South Korea’s parliamentary elections in April and the U.S. presidential election in November.
So how should South Korea respond to North Korea’s drastic measures? In addition to carefully preparing preventive measures and our early warning system, we should also redouble our efforts to educate North Korean society about human rights issues and the truth about the outside world to encourage change from the bottom up. This should be coupled with a national movement in South Korea to counter North Korea’s psychological warfare (convincing people of North Korea’s intentions to provoke a conflict between the two Koreas and the need for the temporary tension to be resolved to achieve real peace).
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Gil-sup Kwak
President of One Korea Center and Adjunct Professor at Kookmin University
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11. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Students and parents unhappy with shoddily-made school uniforms…Authorities crackdown on homemade uniforms to force everyone to wear the same thing
Most Korean parents in the north are like parents everywhere. They want the best for their children, even when it comes to school uniforms. But it is an indicator of the regime's oppression - make the children all wear the same "shoddy" uniforms to keep them in check. Uniformity, in the minds of authoritarian dictators, means control.
As we pontificate about Kim's new pronouncements about South Korea as the enemy and no more peaceful unification, we should be concerned with the welfare of the Korean people in the north and their brutal oppression. And we must observe for indicators of potential resistance to the regime. That is the real existential threat to Kim Jong Un and what may be driving Kim Jong Un's decision making.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Students and parents unhappy with shoddily-made school uniforms…Authorities crackdown on homemade uniforms to force everyone to wear the same thing
asiapress.org
A design for a North Korean elementary school uniform. Taken from an article published in the Rodong Sinmun in May 2023.
In September of last year, the new school year began with North Korean authorities inspecting students' uniforms. The quality of state-supplied uniforms is so poor that people have been making their own similar-looking uniforms, which is what the authorities decided to crack down on. There is growing dissatisfaction among parents with the government’s totalitarian move to force everyone to wear the same low-quality uniforms. (KANG Ji-won / CHO Eui-sung)
◆ State-supplied school uniforms are all spin and no substance
"Provide quality school uniforms to students across the country," Kim Jong-un said at the Workers' Party plenary session in late December 2023. Since then, state-run media has frequently reported that the government is responsible for producing and supplying essential goods to students, which the regime promotes as the country’s future generation. However, the government’s propaganda may be an indication of the shortage of school uniforms.
Free compulsory education, along with free medical treatment, has long been a measure of North Korea's superiority as a socialist nation. As a result, students were generally provided with free school supplies and uniforms each semester. However, since the 1990s, North Korea's economic situation has shaken up the entire education system, and uniforms are only supplied every few years.
In the spring of 2023, North Korea provided students with school uniforms, but they were shoddily designed and made of poor-quality materials, according to an ASIAPRESS reporting partner in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. As a result, the uniforms were rejected by students and parents alike.
"The clothes they supplied this spring are made of mixed fabrics, which are very wrinkled and of low quality... and they fall apart immediately. The quality of the uniforms is so pathetic that the kids look like homeless children when they wear them, so parents have to spend money to buy new ones."
◆ Back-to-school uniform inspections in North Korea
According to the reporting partner, North Korean authorities conducted uniform inspections at schools in preparation for the first day of school on September 1, 2023. The inspections took issue with new, high-quality uniforms purchased by parents. The inspection found that about a third of students were not wearing the uniforms provided by their schools. The government said the reason for the crackdown rested on the need to ensure all students wore the same uniforms.
"We spent money to make similar clothes for the kids, and now the parents are worried that the crackdown will force us to make them again with inferior fabrics."
The crackdown on the availability of quality school uniforms has led to growing dissatisfaction among students and parents. In fact, there are even those who do not welcome the government distribution of school uniforms, saying that it is a waste of money for the government to supply inferior uniforms, particularly given that the government did not conduct crackdowns during periods it was unable to supply uniforms at all.
◆ School uniform makers happy to take advantage of the situation
The only ones who are smiling at all of this are the makers of school uniforms. Since the beginning of the month, there has been an increase in the number of orders to school uniform makers asking them to make clothes with the same quality fabrics as those supplied by the government. The uniform makers are purposely making low-quality uniforms in order to earn a profit.
In addition, a reporting partner recently told ASIAPRESS that the cost of making a school uniform for boys in North Korea is 25,000 to 30,000 won, and 23,000 to 28,000 won for girls.
※ 1,000 North Korean won is about $0.118.
The government crackdown on school uniforms is part of an effort to return to a collectivist and egalitarian society, but has led to discontent in schools. The effort is backfiring, as students and parents are increasingly resentful of the socialist system.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
asiapress.org
12. North Korea urges mothers to snitch on their kids who watch South Korean media
"Anti-socialist" actions are the real threat to the regime.
North Korea urges mothers to snitch on their kids who watch South Korean media
The government has offered forgiveness to teens whose mothers report on their ‘anti-socialist’ actions.
By Son Hye-min for RFA Korean
2024.01.22
rfa.org
North Korea is asking mothers to snitch on their kids who steal government property and watch illegal media, promising forgiveness if they report their actions to authorities, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.
The request came during the country’s national meeting for mothers, held from Dec. 3-5, the fifth ever meeting of its kind and first in 11 years. Speakers at the meeting emphasized that mothers must strengthen family education and do their part to eradicate anti-socialist elements.
In January, people who attended the national meeting were obliged to provide lectures organized by the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea, the country’s premier women’s organization. The message of forgiveness was relayed to the mothers during these lectures, sources said.
In the city of Anju in the western province of South Pyongan, attendees to the lecture were surprised that it was an ordinary woman who spoke to them rather than an official, a resident there told RFA Korean.
“This is the first time that an ordinary member of the Women’s Union gave a lecture,” she said, adding that the speaker told them the usual messages of respecting their husbands and having lots of children.
“The lecturer said that it is important for mothers to educate their children to eliminate anti-socialism,” she said. “If their children have committed a crime, such as watching South Korean movies or stealing state property, mothers should voluntarily report it to the judicial authorities and receive forgiveness.”
Serious crime
Stealing from government supplies and watching illegal media are serious crimes in North Korea, with violators punished harshly, sometimes even with public executions.
Last year RFA reported that parents would take the rap if their kids were caught watching foreign media, but now authorities appear to be asking moms to tell on their kids.
At the lecture held in Tongrim county, in the northwestern province of North Pyongan, the speaker took it a step further, saying that mothers should police how their kids dress and forbid them from dancing in a certain way, a resident there told RFA.
“The lecturer said that educating our children is important to eliminate the trends of unusual clothing and dancing that has recently appeared among young people,” she said. “If mothers voluntarily reported their children who took drugs at home, indulged in exotic cultures, or committed social crimes, the authorities would take responsibility, educate them, and not charge them with any crime.”
But many in attendance were not buying it.
“Women responded to the lecture about reporting their children to the judicial authorities with astonishment,” she said, “saying mothers are now being used as a means of controlling young people.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
13. N. Korean agents arrest family members of defectors near border
Corruption on multiple levels.
N. Korean agents arrest family members of defectors near border
"The agents, who have to make year-end payments to their superiors, feverishly watched the families until the very last day of the year," a source told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Un - 2024.01.24 4:00pm
dailynk.com
N. Korean agents arrest family members of defectors near border - Daily NK English
North Korean soldier stationed at the Sino-DPRK border. (Roman Harak, Flickr, Creative Commons)
Security agents made several arrests of family members of North Korean defectors living in the China-North Korea border areas of Yanggang Province late last year, Daily NK has learned. Authorities in the border areas reportedly kept a close watch on defectors’ families until the last day of the year.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Monday that “security agents made a series of arrests of defectors’ family members late last year while they were picking up money sent by their relatives in South Korea for the New Year.”
According to the source, a family in Hyesan picked up money sent by their relative in South Korea through a remittance agent on Dec. 29.
Soon after, however, security agents barged into their home. Having followed the broker earlier, the agents sensed something was up and immediately searched the family’s home.
Ultimately, the security agents confiscated all the cash they found in the house, arrested a member of the family and the remittance broker who transferred the money and took them to the city branch of the Ministry of State Security.
On Jan. 10, the family member was sentenced to three months of hard labor, while the remittance agent was sentenced to six months.
This was not the only such detention. Local security agents in Hyesan arrested the family member of another defector on Dec. 31, the last day of the year.
Thinking everything would be okay because it was the last day of the year, the person in question went to collect money from a remittance agent, but security agents raided the scene and arrested him. As a result, the person had to start the New Year in jail, the source said.
“Security agents in the border region stepped up their surveillance of defectors’ families at the end of last year,” the source said. “The agents, who have to make year-end payments to their superiors, feverishly watched the families until the very last day of the year, knowing that the defectors would send money to their relatives in the North for the New Year’s holiday.”
“Since the border closure, the only people with money are the defectors’ families and remittance agents, so they’ve become the main prey of the security agents,” the source said. “The families of defectors and remittance brokers are being as careful as possible, but they live in fear because it’s not easy to avoid raids.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
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14. Korea joins statement backing U.S., British strikes on Houthis
Wednesday
January 24, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 24 Jan. 2024, 18:13
Korea joins statement backing U.S., British strikes on Houthis
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-24/national/diplomacy/Korea-joins-statement-backing-US-British-strikes-on-Houthis/1966052
In this photo released by the U.S. military's Central Command on Monday, U.S. and British forces, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, conduct strikes on eight Houthi targets in Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen. [AFP/YONHAP]
South Korea joined the United States, Britain, New Zealand and 20 other countries in stating support for additional strikes by the U.S. and Britain against Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on Tuesday.
“Our government maintains that freedom of navigation must be guaranteed under all circumstances and is concerned about recent threats and attacks by Houthi rebels against commercial ships in the Red Sea,” the Foreign Ministry in Seoul said in a statement on Wednesday.
The White House announced on Tuesday that the 30-plus attacks that the Houthis have launched on commercial and naval vessels since mid-November “constitute a threat to all countries that rely on international maritime shipping,” adding that the countries — including South Korea — that joined the statement “condemn these attacks, and demand an end to them.”
U.S. and British forces, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, conducted strikes against eight targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, it said.
“These strikes were designed to disrupt and degrade the capability of the Houthis to continue their attacks on global trade and innocent mariners from around the world, while avoiding escalation,” said the White House.
Korea had joined earlier statements condemning the Houthi rebels' attacks on Dec. 19, Jan. 3, and Jan. 11, and also a UN Security Council resolution on Jan. 10.
Following naval interception by the United States and the United Kingdom of missiles and drones fired from Houthi-controlled territory into the Red Sea on Jan. 9, the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels.
The council adopted the resolution by a vote of 11 in favor to none against, with four abstentions, including from China and Russia.
BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
15. A $2,200 Dior Handbag Shakes South Korea’s Ruling Party
A $2,200 Dior Handbag Shakes South Korea’s Ruling Party
Questions about the first lady’s acceptance of the bag have put pressure on the ruling party ahead of April elections
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/a-2-200-dior-handbag-shakes-south-koreas-ruling-party-7ebde470?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
By Dasl Yoon
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Updated Jan. 23, 2024 9:37 am ET
South Korean first lady Kim Keon-hee’s last public appearance was when she accompanied President Yoon Suk Yeol on a state visit in December. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
SEOUL—South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol is facing an increasingly hostile North Korea. In Seoul, he has a very different problem: a $2,200 luxury Dior handbag.
The handbag has been shaking Yoon’s political party since a video secretly filmed by a pastor showed first lady Kim Keon-hee accepting it. The controversy sparked by the video, which was first published in November by left-leaning news site Voice of Seoul, has heated up in recent days in South Korea’s highly polarized political atmosphere.
Yoon’s party is fighting to win control of the National Assembly in April elections. The opposition has used the incident to attack Yoon, and the president’s People Power Party has been divided over how to respond. Some members have called on the first lady to apologize, while others have defended her, calling the video a “spy-camera trap.”
The opposition party has called on the presidential office to provide an explanation for Kim’s alleged violation of South Korea’s antigraft law, which makes it illegal for public officials and their spouses to accept gifts exceeding about $750 at once or $2,200 a year.
Voice of Seoul filed a complaint with South Korean authorities accusing the first lady of bribery while a civic group filed a complaint with the national anticorruption agency requesting an investigation.
On Monday, Lee Chul-gyu, a ruling party lawmaker who is close to the president, said that the video had been an illegal trap. He said he believed the Dior bag was being held in storage by the government. The president and first lady haven’t publicly responded to questions about the bag. The presidential office said it had no information to share.
Choi Jae-young said Monday that he decided to secretly film Kim at her office because she was abusing her power as first lady. He said he and the first lady came from the same hometown and members of their families know each other. Choi, an American, is an activist devoted to Korean reunification who has traveled to North Korea several times.
In the video, Choi walks into an office for an exhibition agency that was run by the first lady at the time. The pastor hands a Dior shopping bag to Kim as soon as they meet, saying it is a way to show his appreciation. “Don’t bring expensive gifts like this,” the first lady can be heard saying.
The video was filmed by Choi in September 2022, he said. Supporters of Yoon have accused Choi and Voice of Seoul of releasing the video now to try to influence the election. Yoon, a conservative, has taken a tough stand against North Korea.
The bag controversy presents another political problem for Yoon, whose job approval ratings have suffered amid economic stagnation and rising inflation. About three-fifths of South Koreans disapprove of Yoon’s job performance, according to polls. A recent poll showed that 62% of respondents viewed the Dior bag incident as a violation of antigraft laws while 30% saw it as an unethical hidden-camera trap. The majority of South Koreans think the allegations should be investigated, polls showed.
The bag affair has also created waves in Yoon’s ruling party. One party member compared the first lady to Marie Antoinette, the queen of France before the French Revolution, before apologizing for the comment. The interim leader of Yoon’s party, Han Dong-hoon, said last week the video was a hidden-camera trap but that the bag could be a matter of public concern. On Monday, he said he had rejected a request from the president’s office to step down from his position.
The Dior-bag incident isn’t the first time the first lady has attracted controversy. Even before Yoon took office in May 2022, Kim apologized over allegations that she falsified her credentials on a résumé for a teaching job. She has also faced allegations of involvement in manipulating stock prices. The presidential office has denied the allegations, and earlier this month Yoon vetoed a bill aimed at launching a special investigation into Kim’s alleged involvement in the stock manipulation.
Kim has made banning the consumption of dog meat one of her main causes as first lady. The presidential couple owns six dogs and six cats. She has garnered attention for wearing local fashion brands that are eco-friendly, with vegan handbags carried by the first lady selling out in South Korea.
Kim has been out of the public eye for more than a month. Her last public appearance was when she accompanied Yoon to the Netherlands on a state visit in December.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
The South Korean presidential couple owns six dogs and six cats. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said they owned six dogs and eight cats. (Corrected on Jan. 23)
\Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the January 24, 2024, print edition as 'A $2,200 Dior Handbag Rattles South Korea'.
16. North Korea’s Model Chicken Farm Opens With Plans for More
"Eat Mor Chikin: Inspire More People" (Chik -fil -a). Maybe Kim Jong Un could write a book about his success.
North Korea’s Model Chicken Farm Opens With Plans for More
https://www.38north.org/2024/01/north-koreas-model-chicken-farm-opens-with-plans-for-more/
The Kwangchon Chicken Farm (광천닭공장) is finally up and running, according to North Korean state media. The project is said to have been “personally initiated” by Kim Jong Un and is being held up as a new model for the country’s poultry production as North Korea tries to increase the amount of protein available to citizens.
On January 7, Kim visited the farm with his daughter, one of the few times she’s been seen accompanying her father in a non-military setting. During the visit, Kim called for the country’s other poultry farms to be upgraded following the Kwangchon model and announced plans to build a second new farm in the Pyongyang area this year.
The plant was formally inaugurated a few days later, and officials began touring it to see how it works. While it is unclear what new technology has been implemented to modernize this farm, it is already being studied as the answer to what Kim has described as outdated poultry farming practices.
Figure 1. Overview of Kwangchon Chicken Farm on satellite imagery from August 31, 2023. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2. Kim Jong Un and his daughter look at chickens during a visit to Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Background
Ground clearance for the farm began around May 2019, and several buildings were already well under construction when Kim Jong Un made his first reported visit to the site on July 22, 2020. At the time, state media said it would produce thousands of tons of meat and tens of millions of eggs per year and quoted Kim as saying it would be an “icon” on which others would be based. The report also gave a poor review of the country’s existing poultry farms, saying, “chicken farms in our country which are said to have been modernized are now backward as they are more than 20 years old.”
Figure 3. Kim Jong Un during a visit to Kwangchon Chicken Farm on July 22, 2020. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Despite its seeming importance, Kim’s visit last week was apparently his first since 2020. Typically, the leader might be expected to make one or two subsequent visits to projects he has personally started, but if such visits were made, they were not reported. Moreover, photos of the site’s museum, which is a standard part of major North Korean industrial sites and memorializes visits by the leader, also only showed images from the 2020 visit.
In between Kim’s visits, other senior officials did stop by to monitor progress. Five days after Kim’s initial visit, Choe Ryong Hae, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, visited, and both Premier Kim Tok Hun and Pak Pong Ju, now retired but at the time vice chairman of the State Affairs Council, made reported visits in 2020 before dwellings for over 1,000 households associated with new feed supply farms were opened in the area in December 2020.
Choe made two visits in the first half of 2021 and a single visit in January 2022, followed by Kim Tok Hun in April 2022, but no senior officials were reported to have visited since. The farm has barely been mentioned by state media in the last year, leaving somewhat of a question over its status for most of 2023.
However, that question has now been answered.
The Inauguration
The plant was ceremoniously inaugurated on January 13, although images from Kim’s visit a week earlier show it had already been operating. TV images showed hundreds of chickens already processed by the plant and thousands of eggs.
Similar images were broadcast with the opening ceremony, including shots of a freshly painted mural of Kim’s visit six days earlier. Although Kim’s daughter was present in most shots broadcast on state media a week earlier, she does not appear in the mural.
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Figure 4b. Image from January 13, 2024 showcasing a painted mural depicting Kim Jong Un's visit. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 4a. Image from January 7, 2024 showcasing a painted mural depicting Kim Jong Un's visit. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 4b. Image from January 13, 2024 showcasing a painted mural depicting Kim Jong Un's visit. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 4a. Image from January 7, 2024 showcasing a painted mural depicting Kim Jong Un's visit. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 4b. Image from January 13, 2024 showcasing a painted mural depicting Kim Jong Un's visit. (Source: Korean Central Television)
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If there were delays getting the farm up and running earlier, they have not directly been mentioned in the reports. However, Kim was credited with solving “the problems arising in the construction, including the design and the supply of materials and funds.”
The Farm
Upon Kim’s initial visit in 2020, state media said the farm would produce thousands of tons of meat and tens of millions of eggs per year. Those numbers have not been repeated, but the TV images show a substantial operation.
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Figure 5d. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5a. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5b. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5c. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5d. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5a. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5b. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5c. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 5d. Hundreds of chickens and thousands of eggs seen in state media footage of Kim Jong Un's visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 7, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
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Viewed from overhead, the farm is dominated by long coops and does not look particularly different from other poultry farms in the country. It relies on the same battery farming technique used across the country. Battery farming is an intensive farming process where animals are kept in long lines of identical, small cages, often stacked several high. Several hens occupy each cage, and the eggs they lay roll to a gutter in front of the cage, making collecting them easy.
What is apparently different is the production process. The report on Kim’s visit lauded the production process as both “intensive” and “automatic” but did not give further details about what that meant.
Still images broadcast by Korean Central Television show Kim looking at parts of the production line with his daughter and officials.
The farm is also notable for a large solar array on its north side that provides power for the facility.
Figure 6. Aerial view of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
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Figure 7f. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7a. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7b. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7c. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7d. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7e. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7f. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7a. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7b. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7c. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7d. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7e. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 7f. On the ground images of Kwangchon Chicken Farm. (Source: Korean Central Television)
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North Korea’s Chicken Farms
Since Kim Jong Un made his first visit to Kwangchon Chicken Farm in 2020, two other chicken farms have reportedly been renovated. Both Sinuiju and Kusong farms were reportedly remodeled in November 2021, but this might not have been in accordance with what Kim is calling for now. At the time of those renovations, Kwangchon was nowhere near finished, so it’s unlikely any lessons from its construction would have been possible.
However, a day after the site’s inauguration on January 13, state media reported that “officials in the agricultural field, ministries and national institutions” visited the farm to inspect the site and learn how it operates.
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Figure 8b. Officials visit the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 14, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 8a. Officials visit the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 14, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 8b. Officials visit the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 14, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 8a. Officials visit the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 14, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Figure 8b. Officials visit the Kwangchon Chicken Farm on January 14, 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
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Farming Modernization
The opening comes at a time when the country is increasingly looking to technology to upgrade its agricultural sector and increase food production.
At the plenary meeting of the party congress in late December, Kim set a 2024 goal for the “development of farm machines” and “mechanization of the rural economy.” These will be significant steps for a sector that still largely relies on manual labor and necessitates the mobilization of students and city dwellers into the countryside to support farmers during busy periods.
To underline this push, Kim spent January 2 visiting an exhibition of farming machinery in Pyongyang that included “tractors, rice-transplanters, unmanned helicopters for agriculture, wheat and barley planters and mobile combined maize threshers.” During the visit, he said the modernization of farming methods was an “urgent requirement.”
And last week, as news of Kim’s visit was still being replayed, state television broadcast a 32-minute-long feature on foreign farming methods.
Figure 9. Kim Jong Un looks around an exhibition of farming machinery in Pyongyang in January 2024. (Source: Korean Central Television)
Food Security
The focus on farming is all about increasing food security in the country, which is chronically short of food at the best of times. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that around 40 percent of the population is undernourished, and 18 percent of children are stunted due to chronic malnutrition. WFP hasn’t had an active presence in the country since the COVID-19 pandemic, so current conditions are largely unknown.
At December’s party plenum, state media noted “a rare harvest was achieved” in 2023, but also stated there had been a “serious food shortage caused by the last year’s poor farming.”
17. Some US soldiers could see $5K bonus for extending their South Korea tour
Some US soldiers could see $5K bonus for extending their South Korea tour
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 23, 2024
Black Hawk helicopter mechanics are among the soldiers eligible for up to a $5,000 bonus for extending their tours in South Korea by one year. (Travis Mueller/U.S. Army)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — Eighth Army troops in jobs on a critical shortage list may earn up to $5,000 for extending their tours in South Korea for another year.
Career specialties on the critical list are eligible for that incentive; jobs deemed “understrength” could be offered $3,600, Eighth Army assistant chief of staff Col. R. Arron Lummer said by email Tuesday.
The critical list includes fire control specialists, rocket system crew members, Black Hawk helicopter mechanics, information technology specialists, satellite communication systems operators, military working dog handlers, preventive medicine specialists, wheeled vehicle mechanics, culinary specialists and AH-64E Apache helicopter pilots.
Understrength jobs include combat engineers, joint fire support specialists, air defense enhanced early warning system operators, air traffic controllers, cavalry scouts and utilities equipment repairers.
The bonuses are dispersed to eligible soldiers in a lump sum on the first day of their extended yearlong tour in South Korea.
The incentive program is part of Eighth Army’s annual funding request to the Department of the Army, Lummer said. The program gives commanders “a financial incentive tool to increase unit readiness and team cohesion,” he said.
The lists of undermanned jobs are reviewed monthly and are changed depending on “impacts to mission readiness,” Lummer said.
Most soldiers are eligible for the $3,600 bonus “and we encourage anyone interested to talk to their command team and unit personnel office so they can choose the best option to remain on an assignment of purpose here in South Korea,” Lummer said.
Soldiers may receive the incentive pay twice; however, they may be eligible for other bonuses if they wish to extend, such as an in-place consecutive overseas tour or a foreign service tour extension bonus.
Soldiers who are accompanied by their families in South Korea typically serve two-year tours; unaccompanied soldiers serve one year.
Roughly 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea, most of them at Camp Humphreys, about 40 miles south of Seoul.
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David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 23, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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