Quotes of the Day:

"The United States, acting within the constraints imposed by its traditions and public attitudes, cannot crush a revolutionary movement which is sufficiently large, dedicated, competent and well supported…. The structure of U. S. military power is ill-suited to cope with guerrilla warfare waged by a determined, resourceful, and politically astute opponent."

– Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence Analysis & Report, Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam, September 11, 1967

"Twenty-first century war adds new risks: more and more often there are no front lines, no central command, no rules of engagement - only a chaotic collision of politics, power, faith and bloodlust. Victims are as likely to be civilians as soldiers."

– Nancy Gibbs

"If we were fighting an army, the work would be comparatively easy. We are fighting a secret revolutionary organization."

– Arthur MacArthur, 1845-1912, Army General, Commander of U. S. Troops in the Philippines Father of Douglas MacArthur, Explanation of his military difficulties with guerilla warfare in the Philippines, 1900

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 23, 2024

3. America Works. DEI Doesn’t.

4. Professional (and creative) writing at the CIA

5. National Guard soldier and social media influencer Michelle Young dies at 34

6. Iranian Military Technology and Advisers Aid Houthi Attacks in Red Sea, Officials Say

7. How U.S. Destroyers Keep Shooting Down Houthi Anti-Ship Missiles Without Fail

8. Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability

9. Strike warfare: an American fetish and a global scourge

10. Geopolitics, Not Ideology, Should Guide Our Policies Toward China, Russia, and Iran

11. Russian Bombers Were Destroyed in Russia After 600 Kilometers Spec Ops Infiltration

12. US strikes three facilities in Iraq following attacks on US forces

13. A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink

14. Biden’s Democracy-Defense Credo Does Not Serve U.S. Interests

15. Beijing’s Economic Challenges Present Opportunities for Washington

16. Israel SitRep: Jan. 23, 2024

17. He Hunted Corrupt Chinese Officials. Now He’s Set to Be Foreign Minister.

18. US launches first drone strike of the year in Somalia

19. The VA is abandoning women veterans’ rights for gender identity

20. Myanmar’s Rebels Are Gaining Ground

21. Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global

22. Russian military jet crashed near Belgorod, killing 74, officials say

23. The Future of Irregular Warfare: The United States is Winning, Now What?

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23.
• NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors.
• The Kremlin’s domestic policy focus on the “Year of the Family” in 2024 is likely in part meant to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis.
• The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises.
• The Kremlin may intend to use the 2024 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• The Russian legal system is expanding the prosecution of extortion cases to broadly suppress sources of dissent.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 23.
• Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) government chairperson Yevgeny Solntsev announced on January 23 that a branch of the Russian Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol will start instructing its first cadets on September 1, 2024.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely deliberately misrepresenting population statistics in occupied areas to encourage people to relocated to occupied settlements.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 23, 2024

Jan 23, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2024

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 23, 2024, 8pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:40pm ET on January 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that Belgium plans to provide Ukraine with 611 million euros (about $663.4 million) worth of military aid in 2024.[1] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated that the US believes that Ukraine is appropriately using military aid and stated that the United States continues to monitor and account for US security assistance delivered to Ukraine. Austin stated explicitly that the US has seen “no credible evidence of the misuse or illicit diversion of American equipment provided to Ukraine.”[2] The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that stated that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner was largely due to DoD limitations but that did not suggest that any of the material air had been misappropriated.[3] Austin reiterated US support for strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).[4] Umerov stated that Ukraine is ready to co-invest in technologies and joint production with interested companies in order to facilitate breakthroughs on the battlefield with ”innovation and significant technological progress.”[5] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Press and Information Department Head Illarion Pavlyuk stated that Ukraine and unspecified officials discussed ways to increase weapons and ammunition production, the creation of an artillery production coalition, and the development of Ukraine’s air force and air defenses.[6]

NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase of over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and General Manager of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency Stacy Cummings signed contracts, reportedly with French company Nexter and German company Junghans Defense, on January 23 for the purchase of about 220,000 155mm artillery shells worth $1.2 billion.[7] Stoltenberg stated that the war in Ukraine has become a “battle for ammunition,” so it is important that NATO refill its stocks as the alliance continues to support Ukraine. It is unclear if the contracts are meant to allow NATO to send additional ammunition to Ukraine or to fill NATO’s own ammunition stockpiles. Western security assistance remains vital for Ukraine as any slow reduction or sudden collapse of Western aid will very likely eliminate Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and could lead to the Russian military capturing significantly more territory in Ukraine, bringing Russian forward bases closer to the borders of NATO member states.[8] The replenishment of NATO stockpiles is also an important endeavor, as ISW also continues to assess that NATO rearmament is necessary to deter - and if necessary defeat - any future Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank, given that Kremlin officials have increasingly threatened NATO member states, and Kremlin-affiliated actors appear to be attempting to sow instability and set information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO members and other post-Soviet states.[9]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare. A prominent Russian milblogger stated on January 23 that Russian forces need to figure out how to break out of positional warfare but that Russian forces are unable to concentrate in numbers sufficient to break through Ukrainian lines because Ukrainian forces strike all force concentrations larger than a battalion.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces target Russian force concentrations even in near rear areas. The milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces still target small Russian groups of one-to-two infantry companies and of 10 armored vehicles with drone strikes, preventing Russian forces from even reaching Ukrainian forward defensive lines. The milblogger complained that Russian forces’ only solution thus far has been to attack with 10-20 dismounted infantrymen with armored vehicles supporting at an “extreme” distance behind the infantry. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger responded in agreement with the first milblogger, claiming that Ukrainian technological advancements have made it difficult for Russian forces to concentrate several divisions in a discrete geographic area without Ukrainian forces detecting the force concentration.[11] The milblogger emphasized that Russian forces need to both obtain indirect fire superiority over Ukrainian forces and overhaul Russian command-and-control (C2) to break out of positional warfare. The milblogger stressed that Russian forces on the frontline need to be able to quickly communicate to minimize the time between spotting and striking a target and that this change will only occur with a significant change in C2 processes.

The characteristics and problems of positional warfare that Russian milbloggers have identified in recent discussions overlap with many systemic issues in the Russian military that the milbloggers have been complaining about for a long time.[12] Russian milbloggers have complained generally about poor Russian C2 as it pertains to indirect fire, the attrition of Russian forces through unproductive “meat assaults” against Ukrainian positions, poor tactical and operational planning, and the struggle to counter Ukrainian drone operations on the front line and in near rear areas.[13] There are currently no indications that the Russian military command has materially improved on any of these identified issues at the operational level necessary to break through a positional front in one or more areas of the theater. Russian forces have recently proven themselves capable of making marginal tactical advances during intensified offensive efforts even with these systemic issues, however, particularly near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast.[14]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched four S-300/S-400 ground-to-air missiles, 15 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles, eight Kh-22 cruise missiles, 12 Iskander ballistic missiles, and five Kh-59/Kh-31 missiles and that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the Kh-101/555/55 missiles, five Iskander missiles, and two Kh-59 missiles.[15] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy oblasts.[16] This strike package is notably the first time in recent months that a large Russian missile strike series has not included Shahed-136/131 drones, which Russian forces have often used in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.[17] A Russian source posted footage on January 23 purporting to show a Russian missile releasing decoy flares mid-air, and similar footage emerged of a Russian Kh-101 during a Russian strike in late December 2023.[18] This strike package may have utilized decoys in place of Shahed drones in order to experiment with the effectiveness of using such decoys and preserving Shaheds for other purposes. Ukrainian forces appear to have recently adapted to new Russian strike packages, and Russian forces are likely continuing to experiment with new strike packages with different means of penetrating Ukrainian air defenses and force Ukraine to deploy air defense systems to certain locations.[19] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces primarily launched ballistic missiles on January 22-23 and that Ukraine needs additional means to protect against these missiles.[20] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely attempting to acquire more ballistic missiles from abroad, including from Iran and North Korea, because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking Ukrainian targets in some circumstances.[21]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors. Lavrov met with Abdollahian and emphasized strengthening mutually beneficial Russian-Iranian cooperation.[22] Both officials reiterated their support for an “early ceasefire” in Gaza.[23] Lavrov and Abdollahian discussed unspecified agreements that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi made during Raisi’s December 2023 visit to Moscow.[24] Lavrov also reiterated Russian support for an “early end to the bloodshed” and “the resumption of the Middle East settlement process” in a meeting with al Maliki.[25]  

The Kremlin’s domestic policy focus on the “Year of the Family” in 2024 is likely in part meant to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 23 officially defining families with three of more children as “large families” and establishing various social support measures for “large families.”[26] Putin also emphasized that the family is the center of Russian “traditional values,” echoing his previous statements on the importance of Russian families from his annual New Year’s Eve address on December 31, 2023.[27] The Kremlin’s focus on 2024 as the “Year of the Family” is likely meant to provide an ideological underpinning to Russian efforts to increase Russian birthrates and remedy Russian demographic issues. Russia has been reckoning with a demographic crisis since the beginning of the 1990s due to declining birthrates, an aging population, low life expectancy (particularly amongst males of working age), and high emigration levels.[28] Russia’s war in Ukraine has also impacted some aspects of Russian demographics, particularly as men of reproductive and working age are the main Russian demographic fighting in Ukraine. Between 800 to 900 thousand Russians additionally fled the country after the start of the war in February 2022, including up to 700 thousand after Putin’s partial mobilization order in September 2022.[29] A demographic forecast from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) in October 2023 notably forecasted that Russia's population will decrease to 138.77 million people by January 1, 2046 and that the rate of natural population decline will exceed 600,000 people per year between 2024-2032, slowing to 400,000 people per year from 2032-2046.[30] Social support measures for families with three or more children and other pro-natalist policies incentivize Russian women to have more children in order to receive payouts and other benefits from the Russian state, which the Kremlin likely hopes will gradually increase the birth rate in coming generations and slow down the overall pace of Russian population decline.

The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises. The Russian Baltic Fleet’s Press Service reported on January 23 that Russian Bastion coastal missile defense system crews conducted electronic launches of Onyx missiles against mock adversary ships in the Gulf of Finland and also conducted camouflage and anti-sabotage exercises.[31] About 50 Russian military personnel participated in the exercises and used 10 pieces of specialized military equipment.[32] Russian officials often portray NATO exercises as escalatory against Russia despite routinely threatening NATO member states, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the NATO Steadfast Defender exercises “increasingly provocative and aggressive” after NATO announced the exercises in September 2023.[33] Russia’s Baltic Fleet exercises are likely part of Russia’s wider effort to posture against the wider NATO alliance in preparation for potential future conflict with NATO, as ISW has previously assessed.[34]

The Kremlin may intend to use the 2024 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian opposition politician and presidential candidate Boris Nadezhdin, who Russian opposition outlet Verstka and BBC’s Russian Service described as the only Russian presidential candidate who opposes the Russian war in Ukraine, stated to Verstka in an interview published on January 23 that he believes that the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) will have to register him as a candidate due to his broad support among the Russian public.[35] Nadezhdin stated to Verstka that his campaign is collecting signatures in support of his candidacy at a growing rate of 7,000 signatures per day but that he struggles to campaign and collect signatures. Nadezhdin’s campaign announced on January 23 that Nadezhdin collected over 100,000 signatures - the amount the Russian CEC requires to register an independent candidate in the elections - but that these 100,000 signatures are thus far insufficient for the CEC’s requirements.[36] The Russian CEC additionally requires that prospective presidential candidates submit signatures from over half of Russia’s federal subjects (regions) by January 25 and that no more than 2,500 signatures from any one federal subject can count towards the 100,000 total.[37] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported, citing an interlocutor in Nadezhdin’s campaign, that some of the collected signatures are considered “imperfect” or ”defective” and that Nadezhdin wants “perfect” signatures that the Russian CEC cannot contest.[38]

A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin has developed a mechanism to funnel all opposition votes to Nadezhdin, which will account for opposition votes to give voters the semblance of choice while ultimately ensuring the reelection of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[39] The insider source claimed that the Kremlin will pay off Nadezhdin in exchange for funneling opposition votes. Nadezhdin claimed to Verstka that his struggles to campaign, including censorship on Russian state television, show that he is not a “Kremlin puppet” despite his prior affiliations with the current presidential administration.[40] BBC Russian Service noted on January 22 that Nadezhdin’s campaign initially struggled for attention but that he gained prominence in recent days, resulting in an influx in signatures.[41] The Kremlin may decide to allow Nadezhdin to run as an anti-war candidate to use frame Putin’s inevitable resurrection as a positive referendum on the war in Ukraine as the Kremlin seeks to prepare for a long-term war effort.

The Russian legal system is expanding the prosecution of extortion cases to broadly suppress sources of dissent. Russian government-affiliated outlet Lenta posted an investigation on January 23 detailing how Russian courts are increasingly using Article 163 of the Russian Criminal Code—the article defining extortion—to target various media organizations for perceived dissent.[42] Lenta reported that Russian legal experts see the extortion law as a “rubber law,” a deliberately vague law that can have flexible interpretations and that courts can cross-apply to civil cases that they would not typically try under criminal extortion laws.[43] The most severe sentence for extortion can exceed the sentence for murder in some cases.[44] Lenta noted that employees of media and public relations companies and journalists are the most vulnerable to the expanded prosecution of extortion cases and reported that Russian courts initiated 19 extortion cases against journalists and bloggers in 2022-2023 alone.[45] A prominent Russian insider source noted that Russian courts continue to “churn out criminal cases” using a “vicious” interpretation of Russian extortion law.[46] ISW has previously reported on similar Russian legislative manipulations aimed at repressing domestic dissent by introducing a fear of criminal liability to cases that would typically be tried on a civil basis.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23.
• NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors.
• The Kremlin’s domestic policy focus on the “Year of the Family” in 2024 is likely in part meant to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis.
• The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises.
• The Kremlin may intend to use the 2024 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• The Russian legal system is expanding the prosecution of extortion cases to broadly suppress sources of dissent.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 23.
• Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) government chairperson Yevgeny Solntsev announced on January 23 that a branch of the Russian Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol will start instructing its first cadets on September 1, 2024.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely deliberately misrepresenting population statistics in occupied areas to encourage people to relocated to occupied settlements.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Russian Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration claimed on January 23 that a Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) unit captured Pletenivka, Kharkiv Oblast, less than two kilometers from the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast international border and south of Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast.[48] Russian milbloggers largely disputed the occupation administration’s claim as false, however, and noted that there are no large-scale Russian offensive operations in the area.[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of the Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration’s claim and has not observed indicators that the Russian force grouping in Belgorod Oblast is sufficient to launch large-scale offensive operations into northern Kharkiv Oblast.[50]  ISW forecasted on January 9, however, that Russian forces may conduct small-scale tactical-level attacks across the Belgorod-Kharkiv Oblast border to fix and divert Ukrainian forces away from the Kupyansk axis.[51]

Russian forces continued intensified offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk on January 23 and reportedly advanced. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) advanced 650 meters in depth along a 2.2 kilometer-wide-front from the north to southwest of Krokhmalne (southeast of Kupyansk).[52] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced roughly two kilometers towards Tabakivka (just northwest of Krokhmalne) and Berestove (just southwest of Krokhmalne) in the past few days.[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the milbloggers’ claims, however. Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka.[54]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kreminna amid positional fighting continued in the Svatove-Kreminna direction on January 23. Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Kreminna towards Yampolivka.[55] Positional fighting continued northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Novoyehorivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and in the Serebryanske forest area; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova.[56] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment continue to operate in the Kreminna direction.[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on January 23. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces out of Bohdanivka, but that Ukrainian forces still control western Bohdanivka.[59] Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Bohdanivka.[60] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]); elements of the “Ruskiye Yastreby” (Russian Hawks) (33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps]; and elements of the “Korsa“ Artillery Battalion (31st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Horlivka direction south of Bakhmut.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka as positional engagements continued in the area on January 23. Geolocated footage published on January 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka).[62] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne; south of Avdiivka near Opytne; southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske; and near Avdiivka itself.[63] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced over one kilometer near the Avdiivka quartz sand quarry north of Avdiivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in the Vynohradnyky vineyard area southeast of Avdiivka.[65] Elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District) and the “Viking” special purpose detachment are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City as positional engagements continued in the area on January 23. Geolocated footage published on January 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[67] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka.[68] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) and elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka.[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area on January 23.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults south of Chervone (35km southwest of Velkya Novosilka in far eastern Zaporizhia Oblast).[71] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District) are reportedly operating south of Velyka Novosilka.[72]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces counterattacked west of Robotyne and regained several positions, although ISW has not yet seen visual evidence of this purported advance.[73] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued positional fighting near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[74] Elements of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), and 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose (Spetsnaz) Brigade, and Russian airborne (VDV) forces are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[75]

Limited positional engagements continued on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on January 23. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported ongoing fighting near Krynky.[76] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting attacks in and around Krynky less frequently, but that Russian forces cannot regain positions or clear the settlement due to constant Ukrainian drone operation in the area.[77] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of clearer weather conditions in southern Ukraine to intensify drone strikes against Kherson Oblast and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[78]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) government chairperson Yevgeny Solntsev announced on January 23 that a branch of the Russian Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol will start instructing its first cadets on September 1, 2024.[79] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the school can accommodate 560 cadets.[80] Russian occupation authorities have already mobilized Ukrainian citizens to fight in the Russian military against Ukraine and may use recruitment into to the Nakhimov Naval School to intensify these efforts.[81]

Unnamed US officials told the New York Times (NYT) in an article published on January 22 that North Korean missiles provided to Russia are as accurate as Russian-produced missiles.[82] The US officials also told the NYT that Russian forces are likely launching North-Korean provided missiles in an attempt to overwhelm Western-provided air defense systems. The NYT reported that North Korea has likely provided Russia with fewer than 50 missiles, although unnamed US and European officials assess that North Korea could have transferred more. ISW continues to assess that Russia seeks to deepen Russian-North Korean relations as part of an effort to procure more missiles and artillery ammunition from abroad.[83]

An Uzbek court reportedly sentenced an Uzbek citizen to five years in prison for mercenarism for signing a contract with the Wagner Group. A Russian news aggregator claimed that an Uzbek court sentenced Uzbek citizen Alexey Khamatkhanov for signing a Wagner contract even though he did not fight in Ukraine.[84] The Russian news aggregator claimed that Khamatkhanov arrived in Russia in May 2023 but did not deploy to Ukraine with Wagner due to its “reorganization” after the Wagner rebellion in June 2023.[85] Uzbekistan previously sentenced an Uzbek citizen to prison for fighting in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military from 2014-2015.[86]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Russian engineering company Dogeotech’s Director Alexei Devyatilov told Kremlin newswire TASS in an article published on January 23 that the Russian military will soon conduct tests on new bunkers for fortification systems.[87] Devyatilov stated that Dogeotech designed a squad bunker, platoon bunker, and a shelter bunker and that the shelters range from 2.5 meters to six meters wide and from 1.5 tons to 2.5 tons.[88] TASS reported that the Russian military has been using Dogeotech-designed fortifications in the Donetsk direction since March 2023.[89]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

The Ukrainian government continues to allocate portions of the federal budget to purchase weapons and military equipment for Ukraine’s defense. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers allocated roughly 657 million hryvnia (about $17.5 million) to strengthen Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, including with the purchase and modernization of weapons and purchase of ammunition, optical and thermal imaging devices, drones, and weapons maintenance.[90] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will allocate between one and 10 million hryvnia (roughly $26,700 to $267,000) for each of its combat brigades, prioritizing higher budget allocations to brigades deployed to combat zones.[91] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmyhal announced on January 23 that the Ukrainian government allocated 9.6 billion hryvnia of the military personal income tax to the Ukrainian MoD for urgent Ukrainian defensive needs, including for the purchase of weapons, equipment, and ammunition.[92] Shmyhal announced that the Ukrainian government also decided to allocate 10 percent of the military personal income tax directly to Ukrainian military units.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are likely deliberately misrepresenting population statistics in occupied areas to encourage people to relocate to occupied settlements. Mariupol occupation head Oleg Morgun told Kremlin newswire TASS on January 23 that the population of Mariupol is now 240,000—50 percent of its pre-war population.[93] Morgun claimed that ongoing Russian reconstruction efforts in Mariupol are encouraging people to either return to or relocate to Mariupol. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayor Advisor Petro Andryushchenko responded to Morgun’s statements on January 23 and noted that Russian forces destroyed at least half of the livable infrastructure in Mariupol, so Mariupol cannot support 240,000 people at this time, suggesting that the Morgun’s figures are deliberately wrong.[94] Morgun’s claims are likely meant to frame Mariupol as desirable city to live in to encourage people to move to Mariupol. ISW previously assessed that Russia is trying to forcibly repopulate occupied areas of Ukraine with Russians in order to permanently change Ukraine’s demographics and to create a false guise of legitimacy for the occupation of Ukraine.[95]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated a boilerplate Russian information operation aimed at placing the onus for negotiations on the West in an interview with CBS News on January 23. Lavrov claimed that Russia is open to considering proposals to end the war and that the West forced Ukraine to reject a peace proposal in April 2022.[96] Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lavrov, and other senior Russian officials continue to deny Ukrainian statehood and emphasize maximalist objectives in Ukraine, however, suggesting that Russia is not interested in engaging in negotiations in good faith.[97]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger continues to amplify criticisms of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan while continuing to portray Russia as the only mediator capable of creating a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The milblogger claimed that Pashinyan attempts to portray himself and his administration as making sacrifices toward peace while actually holding little power.[98] The milblogger also claimed that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev refused all avenues of negotiations except through Russia and that Azerbaijan is ready to sign a peace treaty with Russia.[99] Russian sources continue to amplify criticisms and negative portrayals of Pashinyan likely to punish him for increasingly anti-Russian policies. 

Russian sources continue to portray Moldovan efforts to reduce Russian influence in Moldova as futile. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Moldova’s Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation will hold its first meeting in January 2024, but that its efforts to combat Russian influence are weak given that unspecified recent polls allegedly indicate negative attitudes toward the West and Moldovan government.[100] Another Russian milblogger claimed that an alleged proposal to rename the Moldovan Ministry of Defense to the ”Ministry of National Defense,” the same designation Romania uses, is evidence of Moldovan attempts to ”merge with Romania.”[101]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will meet before the end of this week.[102] Lukashenko stated on January 22 that he and Putin will meet to discuss the meeting agenda of the upcoming Union State Supreme Council meeting.[103]

Belarusian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Viktor Gulevich stated on January 23 that Belarusian forces are taking additional measures to build out their electronic warfare, radar, and radio engineering forces due to an alleged NATO air force concentration near the Belarusian border.[104]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 23, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-23-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed attacks in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. The claimed attacks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Central Gaza Strip: Hamas’ military wing conducted a complex attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the deadliest single attack since Israeli ground operations began. The IDF Chief of Staff said that the fallen soldiers were conducting a defensive activity that will allow Israeli residents to return to their homes surrounding the Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces located an underground weapons production facility that the IDF said is the largest it has found to date. Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli operations in western Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing over several phases the remaining hostages held in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous Egyptian official told the Associated Press that Hamas rejected the proposal.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice in the West Bank. The IDF detained eight wanted individuals and confiscated weapons.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed an unspecified military asset used by Hezbollah but operated by Iran.
• Iraq: The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political factions—discussed Iranian-backed militia efforts to “provoke” US self-defense strikes in a meeting.
• Syria: Israel likely conducted two airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and an Iranian-backed militia truck transporting weapons around Albu Kamal, Syria.
• Yemen: US and UK forces conducted combined strikes on eight Houthi military targets in Yemen. The Houthis are harassing UN operations and personnel in Yemen.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized Islamic countries for not demanding a ceasefire for the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with the Tehran branch of the Martyrs’ Commemoration National Congress.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 23, 2024

Jan 23, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 23, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed attacks in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. The claimed attacks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Central Gaza Strip: Hamas’ military wing conducted a complex attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the deadliest single attack since Israeli ground operations began. The IDF Chief of Staff said that the fallen soldiers were conducting a defensive activity that will allow Israeli residents to return to their homes surrounding the Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces located an underground weapons production facility that the IDF said is the largest it has found to date. Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli operations in western Khan Younis.
• Political Negotiations: Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing over several phases the remaining hostages held in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous Egyptian official told the Associated Press that Hamas rejected the proposal.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice in the West Bank. The IDF detained eight wanted individuals and confiscated weapons.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed an unspecified military asset used by Hezbollah but operated by Iran.
• Iraq: The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political factions—discussed Iranian-backed militia efforts to “provoke” US self-defense strikes in a meeting.
• Syria: Israel likely conducted two airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and an Iranian-backed militia truck transporting weapons around Albu Kamal, Syria.
• Yemen: US and UK forces conducted combined strikes on eight Houthi military targets in Yemen. The Houthis are harassing UN operations and personnel in Yemen.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized Islamic countries for not demanding a ceasefire for the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with the Tehran branch of the Martyrs’ Commemoration National Congress.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias claimed attacks on January 23 in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. The claimed attacks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas’ military wing used thermobaric rockets, sniper rifles, and mortars to target Israeli forces southwest of Gaza City.[2] Hamas claimed that its fighters seized three drones south of Zaytoun and detonated a mine field targeting Israeli vehicles in Juhor ad Dik.[3] Several Palestinian militias separately claimed attacks and published footage of their fighters targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry east of Jabalia.[4] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on January 23 that Israeli forces are continuing to fight in the northern Gaza Strip.[5]

Hamas’ military wing conducted a complex attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the deadliest single attack since Israeli ground operations began. The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli forces near two buildings that the IDF had rigged to demolish and a nearby Israeli tank 600 meters west of Kissufim on January 22.[6] The RPG detonated the IDF explosives on the two buildings, causing the buildings to collapse. The collapsing buildings and firefight killed 21 IDF soldiers.[7] Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack on January 23.[8] The group claimed that its fighters fired an "anti-personnel” rocket at Israeli engineers, causing a secondary detonation that collapsed the building. The fighters simultaneously fired an anti-tank RPG at an Israeli tank and detonated a mine field in the area. Israeli media and Hamas reported that the fighters responsible for the attack escaped.[9]

The IDF Chief of Staff said during a visit to the site of the complex attack on January 23 that the fallen soldiers were conducting a defensive activity in the border area that will allow residents of the towns surrounding the Gaza Strip in Israel to return.[10]

Israeli forces located a large underground weapons production facility in the southern Gaza Strip.[11] The IDF said that this facility is the largest facility it has found to date. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) searched the 1.5-kilometer-long tunnel network during clearing operations in Khan Younis.[12] Palestinian fighters opened fire from tunnel entrances and detonated improvised explosive devices at tunnel entrances to prevent Israeli forces from entering the complex. Israeli forces captured the weapons production facility and a large lathe for producing rockets. Israeli forces destroyed the underground tunnel system as part of their effort to degrade Hamas’ weapons and rocket production capabilities.[13]

Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operation in western Khan Younis. The military wings of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on January 23 in western Khan Younis.[14] PIJ claimed that it targeted an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator (EFP).[15] Hamas fighters prevented an Israeli quick reaction force from removing an immobile tank after the fighters fired an RPG at it on January 21.[16]

The IDF reported on January 23 that its 98th Division encircled Khan Younis.[17] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that Israeli forces killed more than 100 operatives in western Khan Younis on January 23.[18] The 98th Division is executing an “expanded” clearing operation in western Khan Younis to “dismantle” Hamas’ military forces in Khan Younis.[19]

Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing over several phases the remaining hostages held in the Gaza Strip.[20] The first phase would have Hamas return women, men over 60 years old, and hostages in critical medical condition. Israeli media reported that the "next phases" would include the release of female IDF soldiers, civilian males under the age of 60, Israeli male soldiers, and the bodies of hostages. An anonymous Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the proposal includes redeploying the IDF out of main population centers in the Gaza Strip to allow Palestinian civilians to return to these areas. The official added that this proposal does not include the release of all 6,000 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. An anonymous Egyptian official told the Associated Press that Hamas rejected the proposal, likely because it included no measures to end the Israeli effort to destroy Hamas.[21] Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel accused the Israeli government of “not being serious” about the negotiations because the proposal did not include an agreement to end the war, according to the Wall Street Journal.[22]

The Israeli proposal is very similar to the US-Egyptian-Qatari plan that the Wall Street Journal reported on January 21.[23] The Wall Street Journal reported that Hamas would release all remaining Israeli hostages under this plan in exchange for Israel releasing an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners over a 90-day pause in fighting. This pause—according to the US-Egyptian-Qatari proposal—would lead to a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations, and the relaunching of the process to form a Palestinian state.

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal that four unspecified Arab states and Saudi Arabia proposed a separate plan for the Gaza Strip’s post-war governance.[24] Egyptian and Saudi officials said that the primary obstacle is the creation of a Palestinian state—a step that Israel has continually rejected.[25] The five Arab countries said that they will train Palestinian security forces, “revive and reform” the Palestinian Authority, and eventually “help organization elections,” according to the Arab officials. Egyptian and Saudi officials said that they are still finalizing the plan.[26]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson posted new evacuation orders covering specific areas in western Khan Younis on X (Twitter) at 03:52 EST on January 23.[27] The orders highlight specific blocks and neighborhoods in al Nasr, al Amal, the city center, and the refugee camp. The spokesperson told residents to immediately move to the al Mawasi Humanitarian Zone.

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the tenth telecommunications blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 23 that the Gaza Strip entered the second day of the telecommunications blackout.[28]

The al Quds Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades launched mortars from the Gaza Strip in a combined operation targeting Nahal Oz in southern Israel on January 23.[29] The al Quds Brigades is the militant wing of PIJ. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters two times in the West Bank on January 23.[30] The IDF detained eight wanted individuals and confiscated weapons during operations in the West Bank.[31] The IDF said that Israeli forces shot an individual armed with a knife as the individual approached an Israeli post near Ramallah.[32]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 23.[33] Hezbollah launched at least 15 rockets targeting an IDF base on Mount Meron that hosts air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communication, and jamming facilities.[34] The IDF stated that the attack caused minor damage to the base but that it did not impact the base’s reconnaissance capabilities.[35] Hezbollah stated that it targeted Mount Meron ”in retaliation“ for recent unspecified assassinations in Lebanon and Syria.[36] Israel has targeted Iranian and Hezbollah military commanders responsible for facilitating the movement of Iranian-provided materiel that Hezbollah uses to target northern Israel. Hezbollah targeted Mount Meron for the first time on January 6 after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2.[37]

Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed an unspecified military asset used by Hezbollah but operated by Iran.[38] Israeli media has provided no further details on the incident at the time of writing.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iran-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks and a rocket attack targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria. The group claimed two one-way drone attacks targeting US forces at Ain al Assad airbase in western Iraq on January 23.[39] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also fired a rocket salvo targeting US forces at the Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province on January 22, after CTP-ISW’s data cutoff that day.[40] CTP-ISW reported on January 22 that the group fired two previous barrages of rockets targeting US forces at the Conoco Mission Support Site earlier on January 22.[41]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also launched one unspecified drone targeting the Israeli port of Ashdod, south of Tel Aviv.[42] This is the first Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack targeting Ashdod during the war.

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political factions—discussed Iranian-backed militia efforts to “provoke” US self-defense strikes in a meeting on January 22.[43] Coordination Framework leadership discussed “solutions” to the Iranian-backed militia ”provocation” of US forces. An MP from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization’s Fatah Alliance said that these solutions include the removal of US forces from Iraq. Many parties within the Shia Coordination Framework, including the Fatah Alliance, are political wings of Iranian-backed militias that have been waging a campaign combining political and military pressure to remove US forces from Iraq.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and politicians frequently frame US self-defense strikes as crimes and violations of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[45]

Israel likely conducted two airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and an Iranian-backed militia truck transporting weapons around Albu Kamal, Syria, on January 23.[46] Israeli media reported that the strike on the truck killed at least two Iranian-backed militia members.[47] Syrian media reported that the militia members belonged to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces.[48] Israel has conducted a series of airstrikes since early December 2023 targeting IRGC Quds Force weapons shipments and personnel responsible for supplying Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria.[49] Israeli media said on December 29 that Israel’s strikes are responding to Iranian efforts to accelerate the supply of military equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah, which is using the Iranian-provided equipment to support attacks into northern Israel.[50]

US and UK forces conducted combined strikes on eight Houthi military targets in Yemen on January 22.[51] Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands supported the operation, which targeted Houthi missile systems and launchers, air defense systems, radars, and deeply buried weapons storage facilities. The UK Defense Ministry stated that four of its aircraft struck targets near ”Sanaa airfield.”[52] Sanaa airfield probably refers to Dailami airbase, which is north of Sanaa. The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that US and UK forces struck targets in four governorates.[53] The spokesperson also stated the Houthis will respond to the strikes. US CENTCOM stated that the strikes aimed to degrade the Houthi capability to conduct attacks on international commercial shipping and US and UK ships. CENTCOM added that the strikes “are separate and distinct” from Operation Prosperity Guardian, which is a multinational coalition protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis are harassing UN operations and personnel in Yemen. The Houthi Foreign Affairs Ministry ordered on January 20 the UN resident coordinator in Sanaa to expel all UN humanitarian workers with US or UK citizenships by February 18.[54] The Houthi ministry also ordered the United Nations to stop recruiting US and UK citizens as employees within Yemen. The internationally recognized Yemeni government’s information minister separately claimed that Houthi air traffic control threatened to shoot down a UN plane that was en route to Marib Governorate on January 23.[55]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized Islamic countries for not demanding a ceasefire for the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with the Tehran branch of the Martyrs’ Commemoration National Congress on January 23.[56] Khamenei urged Islamic countries to take actions, such as severing their respective political and economic relations with Israel.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed recent Israeli airstrikes targeting IRGC assets in Syria with UN Special Representative for Syria Geir Pederson in New York on January 23.[57] Abdollahian called on the international community to halt the Israeli strikes in Syria.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, at a meeting in New York on January 23.[58] Abdollahian demanded that Russia use its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to more actively secure a ceasefire to the war. Lavrov criticized the United States for obstructing the previous ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council on January 9.[59] Abdollahian said that he hopes that Russian President Vladimir Putin would sign a bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement with Iran during Putin’s upcoming visit to Tehran.

Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in a meeting with Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib in New York on January 23.[60] Abdollahian condemned Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip.

3. America Works. DEI Doesn’t.

Yesterday I provided two articles on DEI: One from the Wall Street Journal and one from the New York Times. I wish I had received this one prior to sending them out as I would have included this one with them.

This is the most informed critique of DEI I have ever read.  This Pastor argues that American ideals and values work.

It is a very powerful article (at least to me).

Conclusion:

Recently, I found myself standing next to Jonathan in front of the office window. He now works for my community center, Project H.O.O.D. (Helping Others Obtain Destiny), as a core member of our violence-impact team. He is also a father to three beautiful children. Across the street, we watched workers, cranes, and lifts working together to build the community center of our dreams. It was not the tomfoolery of DEI, which is a modern form of blackface, but our belief in ourselves and our own dignity, belief in the power of our community, and belief in America that is making the reversal of decades of decay possible.

America Works. DEI Doesn’t.

My community may be on the bottom of society, but the power of American principles and America’s promise are equally ours

BY

COREY BROOKS

JANUARY 16, 2024

America Works. DEI Doesn’t.

Tablet · by Corey Brooks · January 17, 2024

When I step out of my church on Chicago’s South Side onto King Drive, I can see the infamous and massive Parkway Gardens—Michelle Obama’s first home before it became a dilapidated housing project. Behind the projects is an elementary school where only 4% of the kids are proficient in math and 6% in English. The nearby Walgreens and McDonald’s fled not too long ago, leaving us with no pharmacy, fewer jobs, and two boarded-up, graffitied buildings. Few people own their homes. Gangs control the streets. And nearly everybody I see on the street has had a family member shot.

My community is so far behind that I no longer look at the data showing how we’re on the bottom of every education and socioeconomic chart. I see the evidence every day. That’s why it sickens me whenever I read news of our culture war over DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion), most recently during the public trial of Claudine Gay. What struck me was that several DEI advocates, in their defense of Gay, claimed to be fighting for communities like mine. They talked of how not everybody is born equal, how systemic racism is in the DNA of America, how white supremacy keeps us down at every turn, and the absurd oppressor-oppressed binary that leaves no gray area for nuance.

This experience was disembodying. It was like listening to people who don’t know you talk about you as if they knew you from way back when. Sometimes this disconnect between this DEI ideology and the realities of my community was so deep that it was laughable.

For instance, while DEI ideologues and beneficiaries like Gay may share the same skin color with us, there is very little, if anything, that my community had in common with a woman born to a wealthy Haitian family and schooled at the best of America’s schools. These DEI advocates were exploiting the pain of my community to gaslight their opponents and this troubled me the most because it hurts and hinders our efforts to truly make lasting progress.

The reality is that DEI is an ideology for the privileged. It helps people like Claudine Gay who exploit race for power and prestige and it hurts communities like mine by exploiting them for poverty-porn.

Let me give you an example of what my life as a pastor to my struggling community is actually like. One late night several years ago, I remember looking out my office window across the street at the empty lot where I had dreams of building a community center when I heard footsteps in the hallway. One never knows what to expect in this neighborhood and the last person I expected to see was Jonathan Watkins. I knew him around as a gang member and had tried to talk to him several times.

He stepped into my office, looked at me, and said, “Pastor, I just had my first kid and I lost her today.”

That morning he had strapped his 6-month-old baby girl, Jonylah, into the car seat. He was about to drive her to day care when a bullet entered through the car window and killed her instantly. Jonathan was shot badly, too. He belonged to a gang, and the shooting was gang related.

My community has been bombarded with one liberal policy after another since the 1960s.

Copied link

The pain on Jonathan’s face was terrible. I knew retaliation was on his mind since so few murders around here are ever solved. I feared losing him back to the streets.

Over the next several months, I counseled him in the ways of Christ and how to live on the legal side of the world. He went through job trainings, learned how to build credit and opened his first bank account. I got him a job working for Pat Milligan at Metro Ford.

Then one day he quit and disappeared. He told Pat that he could make more money in the streets than washing and buffing these cars. I also knew that he had bought a gun in the days after his baby’s death and that he knew the identity of the killer. I feared losing him to prison or worse.

I feared that I had failed to help Jonathan. I knew the struggles he faced, inside and outside. God can be a powerful help in a troubled man’s life. So can regular work. So can having a mentor who knows your situation and can help you understand your responsibilities to yourself and to your community. But in that moment, I feared that the forces arrayed against Jonathan, and within Jonathan, were simply too great for him to overcome. As someone who lives and works on the South Side of Chicago, I understood what he was up against.

DEI ideology didn’t offer Jonathan a better life; it has no ability to help him. It doesn’t offer faith, and it doesn’t offer meaningful work. It doesn’t live with us on the South Side of Chicago. It’s manipulative rhetoric, a way of exploiting Jonathan’s tragedy, and the tragedy of thousands of young men like him, on behalf of professional-class ideologues who seek to use our pain to fuel their rise through American institutions. Their stock-in-trade is a soul-destroying poison whose moral and real-world effects are as negative for our communities as those of any other drug that is sold here.

When I was younger, I used to believe in the power of race. I thought there was meaning in it. When I first arrived in Chicago from the Indiana countryside where I’m originally from, I was amazed by how many diversity type of programs there were in Chicago to help my new congregation. In my youthful earnestness, I attended these workshops where I heard a variation of the same message: We will help uplift you so you can diversify the world. But whatever hopeful energy that was stirred up within these workshops was often deflated not too long after we walked out the door.

It took me a while to understand that these trainings failed because they were grounded in race and the only way to get ahead was to play the race game. Another thing I noticed about these diversity meetings was that, as time went on, there was an increasingly totalitarian focus on race that made me uncomfortable, as a pastor and as a human being. It eventually reached the point where race and racism became the only acceptable explanations within the context of diversity language for whatever happened out in the world.

But what truly bothered me was that these diversity initiatives, especially the latest DEI version, blamed the failures of my neighborhood on white supremacy. Red-lining and block-busting certainly played a role in defining our neighborhood—a negative role. But the reality is that my community has been bombarded with one liberal policy after another since the 1960s.

We were encouraged to move out of our homes—many admittedly not in good condition, but which we owned—and into housing projects where we had zero equity. Man-in-the-house rules broke apart too many families. Our schools produced far too many illiterates. For decades, our culture celebrated and rewarded Black deviancy, as shown on countless rap videos. The only way too many of our children know how to buy food is with Uncle Sam’s dollar. All the while, government officials and nonprofit overseers whispered sweet nothings into our ears while getting paid.

I saw this coming as far back as 2011. One night that year, I remember staring out my church office’s window at the garishly ugly motel across the street. For too long, I watched kids pass by the ungodly scenes of drugs, prostitution, and murder at the motel on their way to school. I pleaded for help from everyone and received nothing. I realized there was no true interest in ending the decline, and that my community was on its own.

The very government that ran our community down to the ground and seduced those coming out of four centuries of oppression with policies of dependency, would not help us.

It was at that moment that I became free. The act of looking beyond race freed me up to see real solutions to my community’s problems.

Not too long after that 2011 night, I walked across the street from my church, placed a ladder against the motel, and climbed to the roof where I stayed for 94 days until I raised enough money to buy and tear down the building that had become a blight on our community.

In doing so, I behaved not as a Black man but as an American citizen. It was when I used America’s own principles as my guiding light that I made progress. My community could see it, and they could feel it. The motel was gone. Prostitution, drugs, and murders all went down.

That is why when I hear DEI advocates describe the American principles of merit, freedom, and agency as white supremacist values, I know that this language is toxic for my community and for the lives we are trying to save. The rhetoric of victimization isn’t truthful. It only weakens our ability to solve our own problems and deepens the damage done to our communities by post-1960s liberalism.

That is why the recent decision of Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson to eliminate some of Chicago’s top schools in the name of equity was so devastating to our communities. What equity means for these DEI folks is achieving parity with Blacks on the bottom, instead of strengthening our ability to lift ourselves up. The framework of negative achievement that DEI offers is truly insulting. After 60 years of failing to end intergenerational poverty, intergenerational violence, and intergenerational illiteracy in my community, the DEI folks have decided to lower America down to our level—right at the moment when we’re trying to get out of it.

Ever since I came down from that motel rooftop, I have preached American principles to the kids in the streets of Chicago’s South Side. I never focus on race, the violence, or the poverty around them—they know all about that already. Instead, I tell them what they never hear in the streets: that they are worthy, that they are somebody, that they have a purpose in life, and that they have the tools and the ability to create positive change for themselves and for their community.

The tools I give them are timeless and universal: Respect your parents, be on time, study hard, work hard, pray, be responsible, be accountable, don’t blame the white man, save money, build credit, plan for the future, get married, be a parent. You fall—get back up. Just do it.

I drilled those words into Jonathan in the months before he lost his daughter, which was why I was particularly despondent when he disappeared. Then, one day, he came up to me. We hugged, and he told me he had, as I feared, found out the name of the shooter, and had been debating taking vengeance for his daughter’s death for some time. “I wanted to,” he told me. “But you showed me my better self, and that’s what kept pulling me away from doing it.”

What I tried to explain to him was that hope lies in American principles. Despair and further generations of poverty, disease, and hopelessness lie in the DEI principles. We may be on the bottom of America, but the power of American principles and America’s promise are equally ours. The tragedy is that false promises of uplift from outsiders have blinded us to our greatest power for so long: ourselves.

Recently, I found myself standing next to Jonathan in front of the office window. He now works for my community center, Project H.O.O.D. (Helping Others Obtain Destiny), as a core member of our violence-impact team. He is also a father to three beautiful children. Across the street, we watched workers, cranes, and lifts working together to build the community center of our dreams. It was not the tomfoolery of DEI, which is a modern form of blackface, but our belief in ourselves and our own dignity, belief in the power of our community, and belief in America that is making the reversal of decades of decay possible.

Tablet · by Corey Brooks · January 17, 2024

4. Professional (and creative) writing at the CIA

Excellent. I also recommend reading Sherman Kent's 8 page article that is discussed in this. You can read it in PDF at this link: https://www.cia.gov/static/Need-for-Intelligence-Literature.pdf

I (and others) would argue that this is a problem for Irregular Warfare. We lack a coherent, authoritative, and comprehensive body of IW literature.

Paul Tompkins, when he ran the USASOC G3X, recognized this and he had the vision to try to improve our intellectual foundation . He single handedly revitalized and modernized the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project (from the1950-1960s era Special Operations Research Office (SORO)). Please go to the web site and see the wealth of information Paul developed by partnering with (and contracting) Johns Hopkins APL's National Security Division. See this link for the overview https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html and this link for all the ARIS Studies: https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html

Professional (and creative) writing at the CIA

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/professional-and-creative-writing?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1772757&post_id=140615163&utm

ZACHARY GRIFFITHS

JAN 23, 2024

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“Invisible Ink: At the CIA’s Creative Writing Group” splashed across social media last week. The humorous travelogue is worth reading as novelist Johannes Lichtmas tries (and fails) to negotiate for a speaking fee, battles parking, and is surprised by how free spies are to write. 

But the piece got me wondering—does the CIA have a professional journal? 

It does.

Studies in Intelligence

The CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence sponsors Studies in Intelligence, just as the Army maintains a system of journals to provide useful articles and to stimulate military thought. Intelligence is a quarterly journal that publishes unclassified and classified articles on the methodology and history of intelligence that is now in its 68th year.

Subscribed

Notably, Studies in Intelligence partially meets the web-first, mobile-friendly standard advocated for by the Harding Project. Their slick website works well on mobile devices and phones, but readers must download PDFs to move past the introduction.1 Unfortunately, their archives hard to use. On the website, the archives go back to 1992, with author, title, and topic guides similar to what Infantry produces for a larger pool of articles, and then the rest of the unclassified holdings available at the National Archives. Given that so much of the CIA’s work is classified, continued emphasis on the printed form may make sense for them.

As with the Army’s journals, Studies in Intelligence has evolved over time. The CIA credits Sherman Kent with piloting Studies in Intelligence. Kent’s forceful first article asserted the requirement for a literature to mature the profession that should sound familiar to readers here.2 Kent argues:

As long as [the intelligence] discipline lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity. I will not say that you cannot have a discipline without a literature, but I will assert that you are unlikely to have a robust and growing discipline without one.

And he persuaded the CIA’s senior leaders of the importance of a journal. In an early issue, the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, wrote in an introductory essay that Intelligence would serve “as a dynamic means of refining our doctrines . . . [that] cannot but improve our capabilities to turn out a better product.” Since the 1950s, Intelligence has published hundreds of articles and evolved into its current form.

Today, the unclassified excerpts of Studies in Intelligence contain five sections. First, historical pieces. The current issue includes an article on General Marshall as special envoy to China in the 1940s. Second, methodological pieces. Three articles on artificial intelligence fill this section in the current issue. Third, commentary. A sole article on the humanities and intelligence comprises this section in this issue. Fourth, tradecraft. An article on the introduction of “devils advocate” analytical approaches after the 1973 war is the sole article on tradecraft in this issue. Finally, there is a section on intelligence in public media. The current issue includes eight pieces reviewing books and media, and a recommended reading list for intelligence professionals. Notably, all of the articles in the unclassified excerpts are by retired or non-CIA personnel, at least according to their bios, suggesting articles by active CIA personnel are classified.

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Studies in Intelligence and the Army’s journals both demonstrate a remarkable commitment to freedom of thought. Kent fought for and established Intelligence at the CIA in the 1950s as leaders today must protect and advocate for our journals today.

1

Studies in Intelligence occasionally gets social media support as well with at least one tweet.

2

Kent’s article “The Need for an Intelligence Literature” is remarkably readable and definitely applicable to the Army as well. I strongly encourage readers to skim through or read the entire thing.

5. National Guard soldier and social media influencer Michelle Young dies at 34

What a tragedy. We can never know what is happening in someone's mind. But that does not mean we should use that as an excuse to give up trying to look out for our fellow human beings. We must look out for each other.

National Guard soldier and social media influencer Michelle Young dies at 34

By Jonathan Snyder Stars and Stripes2 min

January 23, 2024

View Original

Arizona Army National Guard Staff Sgt. Michelle Young poses in a photo posted to her Instagram account.

A social media fitness influencer who served as a staff sergeant in the Arizona Army National Guard died by suicide last week in Prescott, Ariz., according to Guard and police spokespeople.

Michelle Young, 34, assigned to the 98th Aviation Troop Command, died Friday, Prescott Police Lt. Corey Kasun told Stars and Stripes by email Tuesday.

For most of her 16-year military career, Young served as an aviation operations noncommissioned officer, Arizona Guard spokeswoman Capt. Erin Hannigan said by email Tuesday.

“Young was a valued member of our team, known for her dedication and impact on our organization,” she said.

She deployed to the Middle East in 2021, according to 12News of Phoenix.

“The Arizona National Guard is deeply saddened” by Young’s death, Hannigan said. “We extend our heartfelt condolences to Young’s family and friends during this difficult time.”

Young died by suicide, Kasun said.

On her Instagram page, dedicated to fashion and fitness, her death shocked many of her 111,000 followers.

“I just heard the news,” wrote william.isbister17. “I’m floored. Such an incredible soldier mom and human being. Be at peace.”

Sarah Maine, owner of Curves N Combatboots, a women’s activewear business that Young endorsed, and her husband, Elijah Maine, started a GoFundMe page, In loving memory of SSG Michelle Young, to raise donations on behalf of Young’s 12-year-old daughter.

“I write this today with a heavy heart. Our good friend and athlete Michelle was taken from us by suicide,” Sarah Maine wrote Saturday on the fundraising website.

The site had raised more than $43,000 toward a $50,000 goal as of Tuesday.

Young’s Instagram account featured photos of travel, fashion and activities like ice skating, snowboarding and swimming, along with photographs of her in uniform and with her daughter.

“From the outside looking in it looked like she had it all,” Maine wrote. “Drop dead gorgeous, her career, her beautiful daughter, fun travel adventures … but you just never know what kind of demons are haunting someone behind closed doors.”

Anyone contemplating suicide or who knows someone who is should seek assistance immediately by contacting the Military/Veterans Crisis Line at 988 and pressing 1 when prompted.

6. Iranian Military Technology and Advisers Aid Houthi Attacks in Red Sea, Officials Say

Graphics and photos at the link.

Iranian Military Technology and Advisers Aid Houthi Attacks in Red Sea, Officials Say

Tehran has sent high-tech missile components and drone jammers

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iranian-military-technology-and-advisers-aid-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea-officials-say-6ee971f2?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Benoit Faucon

Follow and Warren P. Strobel

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Updated Jan. 24, 2024 12:01 am ET

Iranian-made missile components bound for Yemen’s Houthi, according to the U.S. military. PHOTO: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Iran is sending increasingly sophisticated weapons to its Houthi allies in Yemen, Western officials and advisers say, enhancing their ability to attack merchant vessels and disrupt international commerce despite weeks of U.S-led airstrikes.

The Houthis, once derided as a ragtag militia operating in Yemen’s arid backcountry, have emerged as one of Iran’s most capable proxies, these officials and analysts say, due to the flow of weapons from Tehran—and their own homegrown ingenuity.

Among other high-end gear, Iran has provided the Houthis with drone jammers and parts for long-range rockets and missiles. The Iranians and their Lebanese Hezbollah allies have sent advisers to Yemen to help the Houthis plan and launch their attacks.

Iranian advanced conventional weapons seized earlier this month, according to U.S. Central Command. PHOTO: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

The Houthis’ missile and drone attacks on merchantmen and U.S. warships, which they say come in retaliation for Israel’s war on Hamas, have prompted two weeks of American and British counterattacks. Those in turn risk drawing Washington into a long-running tit-for-tat military campaign and escalating the U.S.-Iran proxy war. As the Houthis come under pressure from U.S. strikes, Western officials see signs they are adapting militarily, and they say the new technologies could increase the effectiveness of the Houthis’ attacks on ships and Israeli territory.

On Monday, the U.S. and the U.K. launched a second major assault against eight Houthi locations, the eighth time overall that the U.S. has targeted the group and its weapons, many of them provided by Iran. U.S. officials said the strikes destroyed missiles, drones and weapons storage areas.

On Jan. 11, the day before the first of those Western counterstrikes, U.S. Navy SEALs seized a vessel laden with state-of-the-art Iranian military technologies, the Western officials and advisers said. Those included assembly kits for the Ghadir, an Iranian antiship rocket with a range of over 200 miles that the Houthis haven’t been using before; engine nozzles for the Toufan, a ballistic missile recently unveiled by the group that could target Israel more effectively; and optical extensions designed to improve the accuracy of drone attacks. Three days earlier, Omani authorities also confiscated drone jammers, which Western officials and advisers said had also come from Iran.

Ghadir cruise missile

The Ghadir enables the Houthis to target ships more effectively.

Range: 186 miles

Speed: 0.9 mach

Soldier

Ghadir

Toufan

Toufan missile

With the Toufan, Yemen’s Houthis can reach out all the way to Israel.

Range: 1,100 miles

Sources: Islamic World News (Ghadir cruise missile); Fabian Hinz and International Institute for Strategic Studies (Toufan missile)

Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Along with the weapons, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, have dispatched advisers to Yemen to assist the group’s naval attacks and the launch of rockets and drones, according to Western security advisers and officials.

Tehran engages smugglers to bring the weapons to Yemen from Iran and middlemen to purchase spare parts through front companies, they said. Engineers in Yemen and other countries in the region help assemble the missiles and drones and operate them, and shipping-industry workers provide live intelligence about which vessels to target, the security advisers and officials said. 

Iran’s growing military assistance to the Houthis has prompted Washington to complain to Tehran through the Swiss. 

“Iran is a supplier of the Houthi and has provided equipment and training and expertise to other proxy organizations in the region,” a senior U.S. defense official said late Monday. “We have communicated…that we consider that activity to be unacceptable.” A spokesman for Iran’s delegation at the United Nations in New York didn’t return a request for comment. 

Iran’s assistance to the Houthis is handled by some of the most elite officers in the Revolutionary Guard. The head of Tehran’s operations in the country is Abdolreza Shahlai, who once oversaw attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq, the Western security advisers and officials said. He is now wanted by Washington with a $15 million bounty.

The Western security advisers and officials said that the transfer of ballistic-missile technologies and training is overseen by Unit 340, which trained Houthi personnel in Iran and Lebanon and is led by Hamid Fazeli, a former head of Iran’s space-rocket program.

Newly recruited members of the Houthi militia in San’a, Yemen, on Monday. PHOTO: YAHYA ARHAB/SHUTTERSTOCK

‘The resistance has its own tools’

Iran’s paramilitary forces are also providing real-time intelligence and weaponry, including drones and missiles, to Yemen’s Houthis that the rebels are using to target ships passing through the Red Sea, Western and regional security officials have previously said. 

Iran insists it has no involvement in Houthi operations and that the group’s actions are solely driven by anger over the war in Gaza. “The resistance has its own tools…and acts in accordance with its own decisions and capabilities,” Ali Bagheri, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, said in December, referring to its allies in Yemen and across the Middle East. 

But Iran analysts said that while the Yemeni faction acts largely autonomously, Iran is allowing the situation to escalate because it serves its agenda of pressuring Israel and the U.S. without fear of direct retaliation. 

“Iran’s military DNA is to deny responsibility and get others to do the dirty work,” said Saeid Golkar, an authority on Tehran’s security services at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

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The Red Sea is one of the most important shipping waterways in the world, but it is also one of the most dangerous. Here’s how the cargo industry is responding to try to guard against attacks from the Houthis in Yemen. Illustration: Annie Zhao

To erode the Houthi arsenal, the U.S. and its allies have been bombing missile launch sites and weapons caches in Yemen, and patrolling waters to disrupt the flow of weapons to the Houthis. That includes the Jan. 11 operation that seized the most recent Iranian-made missile parts bound for Houthi rebels in Yemen, in which two Navy SEALs were lost at sea.

Yet the Houthis and their Iranian allies are adapting to the pressure. After American warships moved into the Red Sea, Yemeni rebels started to target vessels eastward in the Gulf of Aden, where the U.S. doesn’t have a presence, shipping executives say.

The Houthis also move around equipment and personnel to avert strikes and appear to be receiving weapons in floating packages rather than in ship-to-ship transfers that would be more visible from the air, the Western officials and advisers say. Meanwhile, an Iranian spy vessel that provided information on targets in the Red Sea moved out, apparently to avoid being targeted by the U.S., they said.

Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington, said the Houthis have the most lethal long-range strike capability of any Iranian proxy group and are the only ones to use antiship ballistic missiles.

The Houthis have at least on one occasion used a missile that was later found in Iran’s arsenal, representing the first known instance of proxy-to-patron ballistic missile proliferation, he said.

“There is evidence to suggest that Yemen is an important battleground for Iranian weapons testing, and potential development,” he said “Iran has both an arsenal at home and an arsenal in exile.”

A Royal Air Force Typhoon FGR4 taking off from Cyprus on Monday to carry out airstrikes against Houthi military targets in Yemen. PHOTO: U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE/GETTY IMAGES

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com

7. How U.S. Destroyers Keep Shooting Down Houthi Anti-Ship Missiles Without Fail

Knock on wood. I hope we can sustain this.

How U.S. Destroyers Keep Shooting Down Houthi Anti-Ship Missiles Without Fail

With a sure-fire air-defense system, including two fail-safes, here’s how the U.S. Navy takes out enemy anti-ship missiles.

BY KYLE MIZOKAMIPUBLISHED: JAN 23, 2024 4:50 PM EST

Popular Mechanics · January 23, 2024

The undeclared missile war between Yemen’s Houthi rebels and the United States Navy has made one thing irrefutably clear: the tens of billions of dollars the service has poured into protecting its warships has paid off.

The U.S. is allied with most countries in the Red Sea region, but the recently declared terrorist group, the Houthis, is making trouble by hijacking commercial ships and lobbing missiles at them as they sail past their coastline. The rebels are backed by the larger, expansionist regional power, Iran, which uses the Houthis as a proxy to attack other regional powers, arming and equipping them with weapons including anti-ship and ballistic missiles.

Following the major attack on American ally Israel by the terrorist group Hamas, Houthi rebels have entered the war by launching drones and firing missiles at Israel. These drones and missiles take a path over the Red Sea—the flattest stretch of terrain in the region—to simplify their route and ensure they reach their target. In their path lie U.S. Navy destroyers—three destroyers, as of December 18—acting to defend America’s ally from these long-range attacks.

Related Story

• Destroyer Downs Drones, Missiles Over the Red Sea

After the U.S. destroyers thwarted a number of Houthi attacks, the rebels turned their missiles on the ships themselves. Since then, American guided-missile destroyers have swatted down numerous drones and missiles using radar and missile systems designed to protect aircraft carriers from sophisticated mass attacks—and the fight isn’t even close.

Here’s how the air-defense systems on U.S. destroyers work.

US Navy photo

Sailors assigned to the destroyer USS Carney stand watch in the ship’s Combat Information Center during an operation to defeat a combination of Houthi missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, October 19, 2023.

Detection

US Navy photo

The first hint of missile attack would likely come from the AN/SLQ-32, which listens for enemy radar emissions.

In our scenario, we’re on an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer. The first hint of trouble comes via the AN/SLQ-32 electronic combat system, commonly known as “Slick 32.” Most anti-ship missiles use a nose-mounted radar to detect and home in on ships at sea. Slick 32 is designed to search for those radar emissions, which may even become detectable before the ship’s radars can detect the missile itself.

In milliseconds, Slick 32 detects the radar emissions, sounds the alarm, and compares them to a digital library of emissions to identify the type of missile. The system then passes the information, along with the missile’s rough heading, to its human operators. The operators conclude the missile is on a collision course with the ship and that an attack is in progress.

Related Story

• Navy’s Oldest Destroyer to Serve for 40 More Years

Tracking

picture alliance//Getty Images

A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer uses its SPY-1D radar, the hexagonal-shaped plate seen just below the bridge, to detect incoming threats. Pictured is the USS Roosevelt.

As the missile closes the gap with the ship, it comes into range on the destroyer’s SPY-1D radar. The Houthi missile is 1970s-era technology, and the SPY-1D picks it up right away. The missile is barreling in at 600 mph, just 30 feet above the surface of the ocean. As advanced as it is, the ship’s radar can only detect targets in its line of sight, and the missile’s low altitude, along with the curvature of Earth, means the missile only becomes detectable at 30 miles away. Math tells us that, given the speed of the missile and its distance to the ship, the crew only has three minutes to shoot the missile down.

Engagement: Round 1

US Navy photo

An SM-2 missile rises from an armored silo aboard the destroyer USS McCampbell, March 2019.

The destroyer crew decides to engage the missile at maximum range and selects the Standard SM-2 medium surface-to-air missile. The SM-2, first fielded in the 1980s, is an all-air-defense missile capable of engaging a wide spectrum of aerial threats, from low and slow cruise missiles to fast and high-flying fighter jets. The SM-2 is rocket powered, racing towards targets at Mach 3 and destroying them with a proximity fuze, high-explosive warhead.

The door of an Mk 41 vertical launch system swings open, and with a roar the SM-2 emerges from the bowels of the ship on a pillar of flames. In less than ten seconds, the SM-2 has turned 90 degrees and is speeding off in the direction of the incoming missile. Seconds later, a second silo door opens and another SM-2 tears off downrange, giving the destroyer two chances to shoot it down. Meanwhile, one of the destroyer’s three AN/SPG-62 fire control radars illuminates the incoming missile like a flashlight with electromagnetic energy, showing the SM-2s where to go.

As we understand them, every real-world engagement has begun and ended with SM-2 missiles intercepting the threat. But an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has several layers of defenses, so to illustrate those, we’ll assume that both SM-2s failed to find their target.

Engagement: Round 2

Photo by Seaman Recruit Thomas Stangnes / Royal Norwegian Navy

An Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile rises from an Mk 41 silo on the Norwegian Frigate HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen during NATO exercise Formidable Shield, May 2021. Unlike most missiles, the ESSM is small enough to be packed four per silo.

Within seconds, the destroyer crew is aware the SM-2s failed to destroy the threat. The Houthi missile is still coming. The crew next chooses to engage with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), a short-range self-defense missile originally derived from the Sparrow air-to-air missile. Unlike other missiles, the smaller ESSMs are packed four missiles per Mk 41 silo. Two ESSMs leap away from an open silo, roaring away at Mach 4 and quickly picking up the incoming missile as it is bathed in energy from the AN/SPG-62.

At the same time, the U.S. destroyer hedges its bet by launching Nulka anti-missile decoys. Nulka, a joint U.S.-Australian system, is designed to be fired from the decks of warships under attack. Once fired, Nulka hovers in the air, presenting an alternative, decoy radar signature for an incoming missile. This process, known as seduction, is a so-called “soft kill” that doesn’t rely on actively destroying the missile, but merely luring it away from the intended target instead.

Engagement: Round 3

View full post on Youtube

Miraculously, the ESSMs still fail to destroy the enemy missile. That’s okay, because there is a third layer of defense built into the destroyer: the Phalanx close-in weapon system. Consisting of both search and tracking radars linked to a six-barrel 20mm Gatling gun, Phalanx is a last-ditch defense designed to intercept missiles at just over two miles.

The Phalanx turret quickly rotates to orient itself against the incoming threat, and then with a roar like a chainsaw fires a quick burst of 20mm cannon shells. The half-dozen rounds of tungsten penetrators tear into the missile, shredding it in midair. The missile warhead detonates, creating a fireball and a shockwave half a mile from the ship—too far away to cause any harm.

The Takeaway

The missiles work. With as much money the Navy has poured into air defense over the last half century, the missiles, sensors, and combat systems all work—and they work well. A U.S. guided-missile destroyer is so good at shooting down missiles, that every real-world intercept so far hasn’t needed to resort to either of the back-up air-defense systems.

While the conflict between the U.S. and the Houthis appears increasingly open-ended, one thing is for sure: if it flies near the U.S. Navy, it dies.

Kyle Mizokami

Kyle Mizokami is a writer on defense and security issues and has been at Popular Mechanics since 2015. If it involves explosions or projectiles, he's generally in favor of it. Kyle’s articles have appeared at The Daily Beast, U.S. Naval Institute News, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, Combat Aircraft Monthly, VICE News, and others. He lives in San Francisco.

Popular Mechanics · January 23, 2024

8. Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability

The executive summary is here: https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/01/iiss_long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific_executive-summary_012024.pdf

The full report is here: https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/01/iiss_long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific_implications-for-regional-stability_012024.pdf

Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability

There are significant efforts across the Asia-Pacific region to acquire or expand long-range strike capabilities. This new report examines the existing and planned capabilities of some of the most significant players in the region, along with national drivers and doctrines. It also analyses the second-order implications for the United States’ alliance framework and for regional stability.

https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/01/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the--asia-pacific-implications-for-regional-stability/?mc_cid=7f825bd676&mc_eid=70bf478f36

AUTHORS

• Veerle Nouwens
• @VeerleNouwens
• ABOUT VEERLE NOUWENS
• Timothy Wright
• @Wright_T_J
• ABOUT TIMOTHY WRIGHT
• Dr Euan Graham
• ABOUT DR EUAN GRAHAM
• Blake Herzinger

Missile arsenals are growing at an exponential rate in the Asia-Pacific region, as countries there attempt to alter or maintain the regional balance of power. China’s and North Korea’s expanding ballistic- and cruise-missile inventories, along with Beijing’s increasingly assertive behaviour and Pyongyang’s aggressive rhetoric and frequent testing of systems, are undermining regional security and driving other countries to improve their own long-range strike capabilities in response, albeit with widely differing levels of resources. Although most of those other countries are not developing missile types analogous to those now possessed by China and North Korea, their focus on long-range strike capabilities has contributed to a regional arms race that is unlikely to be constrained by arms-control limitations in the foreseeable future. It is therefore highly probable that all the countries of the Asia-Pacific will continue to expand their arsenals horizontally and vertically.

In response to China and North Korea attempting to upset the regional balance of power, Australia, Japan and South Korea have advanced furthest in their efforts to maintain the status quo. Australia’s decision to invest in long-range strike capabilities represents an adjustment of Canberra’s defence posture after supporting operations in the Middle East and the South Pacific for the last two decades. Many of the more advanced capabilities Australia seeks to acquire and develop are integral to the trilateral AUKUS agreement, and some will take more than a decade to come to fruition. In the meantime, to boost its deterrence, Australia is procuring several different types of long-range strike capabilities from allies and partners. Meanwhile, Japan’s decision to acquire long-range land-attack capabilities is a major change for a state that has not had a substantial offensive strike capability since the Second World War. Although these capabilities will be used in accordance with Japan’s post-war constitution, they will allow for a greater division of labour between Japan and the United States in the event of any joint military action. As for South Korea, it continues to expand and diversify its long-range strike capabilities in response to North Korean aggression. This has been facilitated by discarding the previous guidelines that restricted the range and warhead size of the missiles South Korea could develop.

Changing threat perceptions of China and North Korea, and resultant defence requirements, are visible elsewhere in the region. Taiwan’s robust indigenous development programme and its ongoing imports of anti-ship missiles from the US reflect its unique security situation. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Vietnam are embarking on their own long-range-strike programmes, although on a smaller scale than Japan and South Korea. For now, many of these efforts are focused on developing anti-ship capabilities, mostly in response to China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and to ongoing territorial disputes. In the future, however, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam may develop or procure more advanced capabilities, especially if regional security continues to deteriorate.

Despite all these developments, future long-range strike capabilities will need to be supported by connective tissue, including space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and joint commands. While some countries in the region are attempting to address these issues, many US allies will be reliant on Washington to provide these capabilities in the short term.

The spread of long-range strike capabilities could play a stabilising role by helping to maintain the regional balance of power, thereby boosting deterrence against any temptation towards military adventurism that may arise in Beijing following China’s advances in conventional- and nuclear-missile technology. Nonetheless, there are significant risks attached to this new ‘missile age’ in the Asia-Pacific. For instance, if some countries pursue independent capabilities and associated targeting cycles, and plan to operate them unilaterally, this could potentially result in unintentional conflict escalation. Chinese and North Korean missile developments also have a nuclear dimension, given that many of these systems are dual-capable, and their use in a conflict could increase the danger of nuclear escalation because of pre- and post-launch warhead ambiguity. Despite these risks, advocates for arms control are likely to be disappointed, given China’s and North Korea’s intransigence on this issue. An accelerating security dilemma all but ensures this arms-racing dynamic will continue in an environment of limited transparency with regard to capabilities, inventories and intentions.

9. Strike warfare: an American fetish and a global scourge

From the Quincy Institute.

Conclusion:

Surrounded by the wreckage around the world wrought by strikes stretching back over half a century, you’d think that it was time for us to get into the rehab center and confront our addiction, yet this latest round of strikes tells us that our habit depressingly remains as strong as ever.

Strike warfare: an American fetish and a global scourge

A common thread through recent history is that 'hellfire from above' doesn't really work

JAN 24, 2024

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/are-us-airstrikes-houthis-working/

It was hard to know whether to laugh or cry in response to recent press reports suggesting that the Biden Administration is gearing up for a “sustained bombing campaign” against the Houthis in Yemen. Unsurprisingly, the initial coalition strikes against the Houthis apparently did not destroy the Houthi arsenal being launched at commercial vessels in the Red Sea.

As was the case in the great jihadi hunt across Southwest Asia stretching over nearly a quarter century, the United States today finds itself at war in a conflict with no defined political objective and a clearly unachievable military objective against an enemy that is nested in a complex political and strategic circumstance that is completely unfamiliar to the United States. Sound familiar?

It is also a war with no apparent timeline in which the application of force is linked to ill-defined benchmarks, suggesting that we could launch our bombs and missiles indefinitely or until we run out of ammunition — to no strategic purpose.

Have we learned nothing from our follies of the last 25 years in which we proved incapable of clearly relating ends, ways, and means in making decisions on when and under what circumstances to use force?

For those states that can afford them, standoff weapons and bombs have become the preferred method of policing the international system. Yet it’s hard to remember any of these strikes having any sort of lasting positive impact once the headlines and videos faded. Strangely, these tools of war maintain a hold on government and the popular imagination as some sort of “decisive” action that curiously demonstrates strength, commitment, and resolve.

The reality is that strike warfare — long range strikes by planes and missiles — has rarely achieved its advertised political and strategic consequence. Yet it remains a dangerous, drug-like chimera to countries like the United States desperately searching for some sort of easy, low-cost way of maintaining global influence, control, and primacy in a chaotic world. Like all drugs, the initial rush feels great, but the long-range addiction is, in the end, far more destructive, dangerous, and difficult (if not impossible) to kick.

We tell ourselves that the state/bad guy on the receiving end (in this case the Houthis) will feel the wrath of our (duly proportionate) strikes and reconsider continuing their attacks.

Yet, of course, the Houthis in public pronouncements seem to have welcomed the chance to start shooting directly at the United States. Moreover, we have limited knowledge of the Houthi anti-ship weapon arsenal in its entirety, let alone the political motivations that surround their own use of force. The truth is we have no knowledge or understanding of whether and under what circumstances the Houthis will cease fire, but blithely assume that our missiles and bombs will make them behave.

The history of America's festish

Open-ended military strikes regrettably have become an ill-considered American fetish. We told ourselves the same thing in December 1998, in the three-day fusillade against Iraq known as Operation Desert Fox, when Washington wanted to stress its disapproval of Saddam Hussein’s recalcitrance toward UN weapons inspectors. And, of course, Desert Fox was really just the exclamation point on a campaign of long-range strikes during the 1990s that sought to control the Iraqi dictator’s non-existent WMD programs.

My favorite strike of the 1990s was the 1996 cruise missile strike to warn Saddam off attacking the Kurds in northern Iraq. He did not. But the strategic consequences of those strikes went unrecognized at the time, and they had little to do with Saddam. Following those strikes, the U.S. took on the role of protecting the Kurds and tacitly endorsed their dream of statehood — a decision that today continues to shape the region in ways that may or may not support our interests. In the end, the era of the 1990s culminating in Desert Fox proved to be little else but the bridge to the next phase of the U.S. war on Iraq.

We told ourselves the same thing in the opening phases of the shock and awe campaign of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as we blasted away in our creative targeting against Saddam’s armies under the rubric of “shock and awe” and “effects-based operations.” Sure enough, Saddam’s armies indeed melted away from our initial bombing and our advancing armies, only to regroup and morph into something much more dangerous and deadly that is still shaping the landscape of the Middle East today.

We told ourselves that same thing in Afghanistan, as we unleashed a fusillade of strikes called in by CIA jawbreaker teams that sent the Taliban scurrying over the border into Pakistan in 2001 to rest and refit. Once they had done that, they slipped back across the border to resume the war — a conflict they would eventually win 20 years later — forcing the United States to retreat leaving the Taliban in control of the country.

We told ourselves the same thing in Libya in 2011, when we believed that a few well-placed missiles and bombs would enable a peaceful transition of power from Qadafi to something more amenable to, well, us. Of course, as was the case in Iraq, the strikes were only the opening round in an ongoing struggle for political power and authority that continues to this day.

As was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, the second-order effects of the strikes in Libya ended up being of far greater strategic consequences than was anticipated at the time. The current Biden national security team, which engineered these strikes, obviously learned nothing from the experience.

We’ve told ourselves the same thing in the global war on terror, where we have sent our robots and special forces hunting for sought-after “high value targets” all over the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. We have surely rained death and destruction on these enemies (and killed lots of innocent people who were at the wrong place at the wrong time) with our Hellfire missiles, but did we win any of these wars?

Yet we remain addicted 

Despite these uncertain results and even colossal failures, we remain addicted to strike warfare, telling ourselves that we can police the politics on the ground by dropping bombs from on high. The reality is, of course, different. Targeting people and property with high explosives tends to make them angry and fight harder. Just ask the Houthis, who have endured years of US-sponsored and supported airstrikes by the Saudis and others in the Yemeni civil war. Obviously, the Houthis were not bombed into submission.

Therein lies the strategic dilemma for the West, which has invested billions in the strike, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities designed to blow things up at long range with little advertised collateral damage. The revolution in military affairs (and billions of taxpayer dollars) indeed delivered the strike complex — much to the delight of political leaders, who saw in it a low-cost substitute for sending armies to the four corners of the globe to police local political disputes. As described above, this is largely a myth.

The Houthis have indicated they’ll stop shooting when the Gaza War ends. Perhaps Secretary Blinken should stop by Sana'a on his next trip to the region for consultations. Even more importantly, maybe the Biden Administration should listen to the Houthis and others and take decisive steps to end the war in Gaza instead of becoming enmeshed in the conflict's wider fires to no strategic purpose.

Surrounded by the wreckage around the world wrought by strikes stretching back over half a century, you’d think that it was time for us to get into the rehab center and confront our addiction, yet this latest round of strikes tells us that our habit depressingly remains as strong as ever.

James A. Russell

James Russell is an associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. The views expressed here are his own.

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

10. Geopolitics, Not Ideology, Should Guide Our Policies Toward China, Russia, and Iran

north Korea insulted as an "afterthought?"

Geopolitics, Not Ideology, Should Guide Our Policies Toward China, Russia, and Iran

By Francis P. Sempa

January 24, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/24/geopolitics_not_ideology_should_guide_our_policies_toward_china_russia_and_iran_1006974.html?mc_cid=7f825bd676&mc_eid=70bf478f36

The neoconservative crusade against “autocracy” is on display in the pages of National Review, where Corban Teague of the McCain Institute’s Human Rights & Freedom Program and Daniel Twining of the International Republican Institute call upon America to “robustly counter” the “axis of autocracy” composed of China, Russia, and Iran. After the failures of the Afghan and Iraq wars, which the neoconservatives transformed into a Global War on Terror (GWOT), the search for a new ideological opponent has been found: Autocracy. Once again, the neoconservatives are attempting to transform a geopolitical conflict into an ideological crusade. The “axis of evil” has been replaced by the “axis of autocracy.”

The Biden administration has bought into this crusade, framing of our policies toward China, Russia, and Iran as a struggle between democracy and autocracy. But there are plenty more autocracies out there (including some of our allies) so the list of enemies can be expanded (North Korea, formerly of the “axis of evil,” comes to mind). Of course, autocratic regimes have existed on the earth since the beginning of recorded history. A crusade against autocracy will take a long time--even longer than the failed GWOT. In his first State of the Union address, President Biden stated: “In the battle between democracy and autocracy, democracies are rising to the moment, and the world is clearly choosing the side of peace and security.” This “battle,” the president said, is “going to take time.” Biden’s language was reminiscent of George W. Bush’s speeches after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. And, as we have seen, crusading rhetoric can lead to crusading wars, with disastrous results.

Teague and Twining contend that what is at stake in the war against autocracy is whether the world “balance of power tilts toward freedom and individual liberty, or a world dominated by brutal autocrats oppressing their own people and terrorizing their neighbors.” “China, Russia, and Iran,” they write, “pose a connected threat and must be addressed collectively.” The goal of the axis of autocracy, they claim, is to “make the world safe for autocracy,” which is why we need to supply aid and weapons to Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel. Teague and Twining note that the three regimes of their “axis” collaborate with one another, but the notion that they are pursuing a collective ideological goal instead of their respective geopolitical interests is speculative, at best. Nations, even autocracies, pursue their own interests. Iran, for example, was an autocracy under the Shah but an ally of the democratic United States. China in the 1970s and 1980s was a totalitarian regime but allied with the United States when it was in its geopolitical interest to do so. The United States during the Cold War (which had an ideological component) reached out to communist Yugoslavia and Romania and China for sound geopolitical reasons. The Nixon-Kissinger “triangular diplomacy” worked in the early 1970s because those two statesmen emphasized geopolitics over ideology. So, by the way, for all of his ideological rhetoric, did Ronald Reagan.

Not satisfied with taking on China, Russia, and Iran, Teague and Twining propose that America and its fellow democracies adopt a “political and economic Article 5--modeled after Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty--that would spur collective responses to the economic and political coercion of democracies by authoritarian powers.” An attack upon on any democracy will be an attack upon all democracies. They also want the United States to support “democratic activists and human-rights defenders within autocratic regimes.” So their crusade against autocracy will include policies of “regime change” to reshape the world in America’s image.

Teague and Twining would have America endlessly “go abroad in search of monsters to destroy,” in defiance of the wise counsel of John Quincy Adams. They have learned nothing from the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Francis P. Sempa writes on foreign policy and geopolitics. His Best Defense columns appear at the beginning of each month. Read his latest "Is America the "New" Great Britain?."

11. Russian Bombers Were Destroyed in Russia After 600 Kilometers Spec Ops Infiltration

Follow-up on previous reporting.

Russian Bombers Were Destroyed in Russia After 600 Kilometers Spec Ops Infiltration

kyivpost.com · January 24, 2024

Ukraine’s military intelligence department disclosed details of a special operation during which three Russian Tu-22M3 bombers were destroyed at the Soltsy airfield in the Novgorod region of Russia.

by Kyiv Post | January 24, 2024, 1:02 pm

Tupolev Tu-22M3 military aircrafts fly over central Moscow during the general rehearsal of the Victory Day military parade on May 7, 2022. Russia will celebrate the 77th anniversary of the 1945 victory over Nazi Germany on May 9. (Photo by Yuri KADOBNOV / AFP)

Ukraine’s military intelligence department (HUR) disclosed for the first time the details of a special operation conducted last August, that destroyed or disabled three Russian TU-22M3 bombers, using drones.

A special forces unit, commanded by the Hero of Ukraine, Colonel Oleh Babii, covered more than 600 kilometers on foot through Russian territory in order to carry out the task.

As Kyiv Post reported at the time the aircraft had been used to launch missile attacks against civilian targets in Ukraine.

Having accomplished the task deep in the enemy’s rear, the reconnaissance team began their extraction with their commander, Oleh Babii, providing cover. He was killed covering the withdrawal of his men.

An HUR statement said: “Returning to the territory controlled by Ukraine, Colonel Oleh Babii's reconnaissance group was ambushed and engaged in an unequal battle with Russian invaders. In this battle, on Aug. 30, 2023, covering the retreat of his comrades-in-arms, Ukrainian reconnaissance man Oleh Babii was mortally wounded and killed.”

For his deeds, Oleh Babii was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine and the Order of the Golden Star.

At the time the Aug. 19 attack the Soltsy military airfield was credited to drones, which were described as “copter-type UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]” by Russia’s Defense Ministry.

The relatively short range of this type of drone led to immediate speculation, by the UK defence ministry among others, that the drones must have been launched from within Russian territory

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine Says Downed Eight Russian Drones Overnight

The attack comes in the wake of several aerial assaults on border regions of Russia that have targeted oil storage facilities.

According to the HUR, from the first days of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Babii had organized, carried out and led a number of special forces operations both in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and on Russian terrain that had actually had an impact on the course of this war.

He is credited with nine successful operational tasks behind enemy lines, and twelve missions to organize and support the resistance movement in the occupied areas and behind enemy lines.

During these operations “Up to 70 important strategic enemy targets were identified: command posts, military equipment, engineering and fortification equipment, etc.” the HUR statement said.

Because of the successful completion of tasks by Colonel Babii's group, logistics support to Russian troops was severely disrupted and important facilities and elements of critical infrastructure were destroyed. Entire units of the Russian occupation forces were deprived of their combat capability, suffered loss of command and control of its troops as well as weapons, suffered communications disruption, and thus the cohesion and efficiency throughout Russian rear areas was negatively impacted.

kyivpost.com · January 24, 2024

12. US strikes three facilities in Iraq following attacks on US forces

US strikes three facilities in Iraq following attacks on US forces

militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp and Lolita C. Baldor, The Associated Press · January 23, 2024

The U.S. military struck three facilities in Iraq on Tuesday, targeting an Iranian-backed militia in retaliation for missile and drone attacks on American troops in Iraq and Syria over the past several days, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said.

The U.S. strikes hit militia facilities in western Iraq, near the Syrian border, U.S. Central Command said.

“At President Biden’s direction, U.S. military forces conducted necessary and proportionate strikes on three facilities used by the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia group and other Iran-affiliated groups in Iraq,” Austin said in a statement. “These precision strikes are in direct response to a series of escalatory attacks against U.S. and Coalition personnel in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-sponsored militias.”

The strikes came hours after the U.S. said militants fired two one-way attack drones at the al-Asad Air Base, injuring U.S. service members and damaging infrastructure. And they follow the militia’s most serious attack this year on the air base, when they launched multiple ballistic missiles on Saturday at the western Iraq facility used by U.S. troops.

U.S. Central Command said the attack targeted headquarters, storage, and training locations for rocket, missile, and one-way attack drone capabilities of the group.

militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp and Lolita C. Baldor, The Associated Press · January 23, 2024

The U.S. military struck three facilities in Iraq on Tuesday, targeting an Iranian-backed militia in retaliation for missile and drone attacks on American troops in Iraq and Syria over the past several days, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said.

The U.S. strikes hit militia facilities in western Iraq, near the Syrian border, U.S. Central Command said.

“At President Biden’s direction, U.S. military forces conducted necessary and proportionate strikes on three facilities used by the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia group and other Iran-affiliated groups in Iraq,” Austin said in a statement. “These precision strikes are in direct response to a series of escalatory attacks against U.S. and Coalition personnel in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-sponsored militias.”

The strikes came hours after the U.S. said militants fired two one-way attack drones at the al-Asad Air Base, injuring U.S. service members and damaging infrastructure. And they follow the militia’s most serious attack this year on the air base, when they launched multiple ballistic missiles on Saturday at the western Iraq facility used by U.S. troops.

U.S. Central Command said the attack targeted headquarters, storage, and training locations for rocket, missile, and one-way attack drone capabilities of the group.

13. A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink

Conclusion:

The current tensions, while troubling, were not entirely unpredictable. The terms of this memorandum are particularly provocative for Somalis given Ethiopia’s fraught imperial and postimperial history with Somalia and the persistence of Somali irredentism that sees Ethiopian Somalis as occupied subjects. But the truth is that any other country that pledged to recognize Somaliland would catalyze a similarly angered response from Mogadishu and Somalis at large, making it likely that some type of crisis of this sort would emerge sooner or later. The status quo has been unsustainable, as the chances of a reunification of Somaliland and Somalia are close to nil under current conditions. Despite the indications of growing internal cracks within Somaliland detailed above, it is most likely that a majority of Somalilanders (or at least a majority of the crucial Isaaq constituency) seek independence and will do whatever they feel is needed to achieve that goal (including violently suppressing dissent).

The maximalist positions taken by the three principal parties in this dispute make it unlikely that negotiations will result in a major breakthrough — if they are even held at all. International parties are attempting to bring all sides to the table, but so far there appears to be little appetite for any side to start making concessions. It is also entirely possible, given Abiy’s erratic nature and the many internal challenges that Ethiopia faces, that Ethiopia could end up walking back or effectively freezing the memorandum, which could lead tensions to subside, at least temporarily.

Notwithstanding the possibility that diplomacy does prevail, however, it appears for now that the Horn of Africa is in for another protracted crisis. To make matters worse, this crisis comes at the worst possible time in the region’s shared fight against al-Shabaab.

Without the continued intelligence-sharing between the three major parties to this crisis, al-Shabaab also stands to expand its mobilization and recruitment bases, which further puts all three parties at risk of fresh acts of terror. Failing that, the region risks further confusion and, potentially, bloodshed from which jihadis, particularly al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab, stand to benefit.

A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink - War on the Rocks

CALEB WEISS AND JAMES BARNETT

warontherocks.com · by Caleb Weiss · January 24, 2024

With Washington focused on the threat to international shipping from Yemen, trouble is brewing on the other side of the Red Sea as well. On Jan. 1, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia that proclaims independence, signed a memorandum of understanding that allows Ethiopia direct access to the Red Sea in return for officially recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The memorandum has inflamed regional tensions among multiple states in the already volatile Horn of Africa. At a time when Somalia remains mired in conflict and Ethiopia is battling multiple internal insurgencies in the aftermath of its brutal two-year civil war, the current tensions, if not quickly ameliorated, could exacerbate these conflicts and potentially spawn new ones.

So far, the three countries have offered little assurance that they wish to resolve this row quickly and diplomatically. However, neither Somalia nor Somaliland have the capabilities to take each other head on in a conventional military confrontation. This is doubly true for Somalia if it wishes to challenge Ethiopia militarily over the memorandum. Instead, there exists a multitude of proxy options that the three sides, including other regional states, could take that appear much more likely of a scenario should this crisis turn bloody. Waiting in the lurch, moreover, is al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab, which seeks to gain from this increasingly worrying crisis.

Background

The memorandum signed by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi has not been published. Reportedly, it allows Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s major port in Berbera and provides Ethiopia additional territory in Somaliland’s west that it can lease to build a naval base on the Gulf of Aden. Abiy had already begun stoking regional tensions prior to the signing by announcing his determination to resecure landlocked Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea in October 2023. Ethiopia, the most populous land-locked country on Earth, previously had direct access to the Red Sea prior to Eritrea’s independence in 1993, and resecuring such access has been an objective of nationalists of various stripes. Some observers saw Abiy’s rhetoric as nationalist drum-beating intended to deflect from his government’s domestic troubles, but it nearly sparked a war with neighboring Eritrea regardless. While the current deal with Somaliland avoids this immediate risk, Ethiopia is viewed suspiciously in the Horn of Africa, perhaps no more so than in Somalia, creating a new set of potential conflicts.

Become a Member

In return for access to the sea, Somaliland’s government maintains that Ethiopia will formally recognize its independence as a sovereign nation — a much-coveted recognition that Somaliland has worked toward since unilaterally announcing its separation from Somalia in 1991. Ethiopia has been more circumspect in how it has framed this part of the deal, but it has not contradicted Somaliland’s claim either.

International actors that are heavily engaged in Somalia such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Turkey, and East Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development have all voiced concern about the escalation in tensions in the Horn of Africa. By restating their commitment to Somalia’s “territorial integrity,” they have also all implicitly criticized Ethiopia and Somaliland for the deal. The African Union has also come out defending Somalia’s territorial integrity, reflecting many countries’ wish to avoid setting a precedent that could encourage separatists within their own territory. But this has not mitigated the escalatory dynamics in the Horn itself.

For its part, the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu has vehemently rejected the memorandum, stating that it is a flagrant violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity (even though it lacks de facto sovereignty over most of Somaliland). It has also recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia, marking the first stage in a possible deterioration of relations, and recently began denying flight permissions for Ethiopian Airlines to cross Somali airspace. The rhetoric from the government in Mogadishu has been uncompromising and at points bellicose and is matched by that of ordinary Somalis who have rallied around the country in recent weeks in opposition to the memorandum. Somalia has so far rejected overtures from international partners to engage in mediation with Ethiopia, stressing that its position is nonnegotiable.

Another key player in this evolving saga looks to be al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa. The group has come out in strong opposition to the memorandum and implicitly threatened to attack Ethiopia and Somaliland over a deal that it says “violates Somalia’s sovereignty.” Hoping to shore up public support and mobilize its members and supporters to acts of violence, al-Shabaab’s messaging also acts as a real challenge that complicates any plan of action meant to calm down regional tensions.

Effectively, a major multisided zero-sum competition is heating up between Somaliland and Ethiopia on one side and the Federal Government of Somalia on the other. A conventional war remains unlikely. But there is a possibility of significant escalation in indirect conflict between various forces and/or proxies between the competing sides. At minimum, tensions seem likely to lead to the freezing of critical regional counter-terrorism cooperation at a time when al-Shabaab is poised to profit from widespread Somali anger.

Conventional War Is Unlikely

Neither Somalia nor Somaliland has much in the way of conventional militaries with which to fight a protracted conflict. The broad failure of internationally assisted state-building and military capacity-building in Somalia is well documented: The vast majority of what could be construed as “security forces” in Somalia are clan militias or warlord armies of questionable loyalty to the central government (which is itself perennially divided). Within the nominal Somali National Army, the only consistently effective units are small special forces groups trained by the United States and Turkey to combat al-Shabaab. No Somali government since 1991 has had the conventional military capacity to challenge the authority of the Somaliland administration in the latter’s territory, and no degree of bellicose rhetoric from Mogadishu will change that.

Somalia’s inability to wage a conventional war with Somaliland applies as well to the case of Ethiopia, which has traditionally had one of the largest and best equipped militaries in Africa and presently maintains several thousand troops in Somalia as contingents in the African Union peace enforcement mission and as unilateral deployments. Egypt, which has its own acrimonious dispute with Ethiopia and has a close relationship with Somali President Hassan Sheikh, has staunchly backed Mogadishu in the dispute. But setting tough rhetoric aside, Cairo has struggled to effectively support its principal ally within Sudan’s ongoing civil war despite sharing a border with the country. It is therefore unclear how significantly Egypt could become involved in any proxy conflict with Ethiopia.

Somalia’s volatility notwithstanding, Somaliland’s military, and the state’s stability as a whole, has also been exposed as more brittle in recent months than the government in Hargeisa or its international admirers would like to admit. In December 2022, protests erupted in eastern Somaliland among the minority Dhulbahante clan (a subclan of the wider Darod, which has strong ties to the neighboring Puntland state in Somalia) in response to the Somaliland government’s heavy-handed administration of the disputed Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn regions. These protests soon morphed into a clan insurgency centered around the provincial capital of Sool, Las Anod, in which the Dhulbahante, under the banner of the Sool Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo movement, sought to break away from Somaliland and return into union with Somalia (albeit as an autonomous constituent member state). One of the authors traveled to Las Anod in June 2023 to interview these clan militias and found that, while poorly organized and fractious, they shared a strong rejection of Somaliland’s independence and enmity toward the Isaaq clan that dominates Somaliland’s politics. Most surprisingly, however, on Aug. 25, 2023, the previously disorganized Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn militias organized a joint multifront offensive that routed the Somaliland forces, breaking Somaliland’s siege of Las Anod, advancing roughly 90 kilometers westward toward the informal boundary between Isaaq and Dhulbahante-inhabited territories, and capturing some 300 soldiers. According to Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn officials and Western diplomatic sources in the region, the offensive had been facilitated by the fracturing of Somaliland along clan lines, with one sub-clan of the Isaaq that has been vocally opposed to Bihi, the Garhajis, turning its guns on Somaliland forces at around this time.

Despite tough rhetoric from Bihi and his ministers and pro-war rallies in Hargeisa, Somaliland has not been able to launch any offensive to retake Las Anod to date. In other words, Somaliland is no longer in de facto control of roughly one-third of the territory to which it lays claim, and specifically the eastern provinces that form (in its view) the eastern buffer zone and international border with Somalia’s Puntland state. The Somaliland military, meanwhile, has experienced a strategic setback and fracturing without yet showing signs of regrouping. Somaliland’s ability to wage a conventional conflict is likely limited.

Given the inability of either Somalia or Somaliland to mount a conventional military challenge, it is far more likely that, should this brewing conflict persist, it will take the form of a multisided proxy conflict — not a historically unknown scenario in the region. Given the brittleness of both Somalia and Somaliland as well as Ethiopia (which is presently fighting multiple large-scale insurgencies), this scenario is hardly more reassuring than the prospects of a conventional war. One central question in it all is what role al-Shabaab will play.

Al-Shabaab’s Potential Responses

Al-Shabaab, as mentioned above, is already attempting to mobilize its supporters to violently stop the memorandum’s implementation. The group’s official statement rejecting the deal underscores its ideological hybridity. Al-Shabaab is a transnational Salafi-jihadist organization in its vision and ambitions and loyalty to al-Qaeda. But the group’s leadership is entirely Somali, and the group has historically capitalized on Somali nationalism and irredentism, particularly in opposition to Ethiopia’s military interventions, in order to build its social base within Somalia. Unsurprisingly, al-Shabaab seems to see this moment as an opportunity in which the collective anger among the wider Somali populace can serve to breathe new life into the organization. The memorandum therefore may end up marking the most energetic period for al-Shabaab in years and act to accelerate the group’s long-plotted expansion into Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Al-Shabaab’s robust propaganda machine has made numerous statements since the memorandum was announced. Many of its top leaders, including Ali Mohamud Rage, Jama Abdisalam, and Mahad Karate, have publicly spoken out against the memorandum. Al-Shabaab’s central leadership has also released an official statement condemning it, adding that combating the deal is a religious obligation and that all Somalis must “liberate” their country from the Ethiopian invaders. On the ground, it has organized protests throughout the territory it holds from southern to central Somalia, in which it publicly called for jihad against the memorandum’s implementation.

While the threats are all rhetorical for now, there remains a strong precedent to suggest that the group will take action. This level of mobilization suggests the group retains the ability to recruit and potentially enable acts of terror, despite the major military offensive against al-Shabaab since the fall of 2022. Al-Shabaab has already been able to make some gains on the ground in Somalia as a counter-offensive in central Somalia slowed and a planned major second front in southern Somalia was repeatedly delayed. As African Union forces continue to leave, al-Shabaab has gone on its own offensive, retaking many former African Union bases or assaulting waning bases still occupied. This growing momentum, coupled with popular Somali anger over the memorandum (as well as the current war in Gaza), offers al-Shabaab new opportunities to spread its violent message, recruit more widely, and encourage or inspire supporters to take up violence for its stated agendas. In other words, the memorandum could not come at a worse time in the fight against al-Shabaab.

Worse yet, there remains real concern that al-Shabaab could expand its terror campaign internationally. As noted above, al-Shabaab’s leadership has openly called for jihad against the memorandum’s implementation, which puts both Ethiopia and Somaliland within the group’s crosshairs. These threats are not unfounded. For instance, Ethiopia has long been a stated target for Somali jihadis, dating back to the mid-1990s. Indeed, this is what caused Ethiopia to launch its first invasion of Somalia to combat the militants in 1996. With the rise of al-Shabaab in the mid-2000s, Ethiopia again invaded Somalia to combat the group. Since that period, Ethiopia has been a major focus of al-Shabaab’s propaganda, which has culminated in several bombing attempts, and even al-Shabaab’s own multiday invasions of Ethiopia in 2022. Some al-Shabaab fighters even reached the mountains surrounding Moyale in southern Ethiopia, where they have reportedly maintained camps since. More recently, in 2023, following the destruction of mosques in Addis Ababa, al-Shabaab released a separate series of statements calling on Muslims to attack the state as a response. Ethiopia, for its part, has also routinely announced the arrests of al-Shabaab members plotting attacks on its soil over the years. If the aforementioned al-Shabaab invasions of Ethiopia were meant to help “erect its black flag” within the country, recent calls for jihad over the memorandum only serve to revive and rejuvenate that desire. Indeed, knowledgeable sources in Somalia with whom the authors have spoken have reported that al-Shabaab is looking to escalate operations in Ethiopia in the coming months.

More complicated is al-Shabaab’s threat to Somaliland. Somaliland has been relatively safe from al-Shabaab’s violence since a series of coordinated bombings in the capital of Hargeisa in 2008. This is not to say that al-Shabaab is not active within Somaliland, but most of its activity is relegated to the eastern region of Sanaag, much of which is outside Hargeisa’s control. For instance, in 2019, al-Shabaab said it briefly occupied a village just outside the regional capital of Ceerigaabo. A year later, the group captured several other villages near the coastal city of Las Qoray. And in 2022, al-Shabaab conducted a suicide bombing just outside of Las Qoray.

Even in areas actually within Hargeisa’s control, the al-Shabaab threat is present. As Somaliland officials told one of the authors on a research trip in 2021, al-Shabaab actively maintains sleeper and support cells in many Somaliland cities, including Hargeisa, Burco, and even the port city of Berbera, where the memorandum itself would be implemented. Though it remains more difficult for al-Shabaab to operate in Somaliland, that it maintains cells throughout the proclaimed state, including in Berbera, is a cause for concern. Similarly, al-Shabaab managed to dispatch a small team of fighters to eastern Somaliland in March 2023 amid the eruption of the Las Anod conflict in an effort to establish a small bridgehead there, although the fighters likely left without succeeding. Somaliland officials, as well as outside analysts and policymakers, should not be complacent and mistake relative peace in Somaliland as evidence that al-Shabaab cannot or will not attempt to operationalize its cells there.

Concerns of Proxy Conflict

Finally, the memorandum could have drastic effects on Somaliland’s own domestic politics and security. Somaliland’s own government has been shaken by the memorandum, with the defense minister resigning in protest just a week after it was signed. Somaliland authorities have also been arresting journalists and even former state ministers for speaking against the proposed agreement, suggesting that the memorandum is not quite as popular as Bihi would like. Indeed, while there have been rallies in support of the agreement in Isaaq-dominated urban areas such as Hargeisa and Burco, Somaliland’s minority clans have typically been in opposition. The Gadabuursi of Somaliland’s western Awdal region, where the Ethiopian port is reportedly set to actually be built in the town of Lughaya, have protested against the agreement.

Though their size and strength are hard to gauge, there are in fact armed militias in Awdal that are hostile to the Somaliland administration and have recently denounced the memorandum. These militias could pose another internal threat to Somaliland, not unlike in Somaliland’s recent war with the militias around Las Anod. Notably, the Dhulbahante militias that eventually routed the Somaliland military around Las Anod began as a poorly equipped insurgency before growing by way of indirect support from Puntland, which allowed (if not actively encouraged) the transit through its territory of arms and supplies to Las Anod from sympathetic clans elsewhere in Somalia. In the case of Awdal, the Somaliland administration faces a potential challenge insofar as, like with the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn movement the Awdal dissidents operate along one of Somaliland’s self-proclaimed borders, in this case with Djibouti. Long-time Djiboutian strongman Ismail Omar Guelleh has been rattled by the memorandum since Djibouti stands to lose its position as the principal port for Ethiopian imports and exports, a position that has granted it significant revenue and geopolitical heft. Djibouti may resort to clandestinely supporting dissident Awdal militias on its border to undermine the functioning of the Lughaya port if the memorandum proceeds as planned.

The government in Mogadishu may also lean on the now well-armed Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn movement based in Las Anod, which President Hassan Sheikh reluctantly agreed to recognize in October 2023, to apply pressure on Somaliland from the east. Unable to wage a conflict directly against Somaliland, Mogadishu might conceivably arm or even deputize the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn militias to advance beyond their current positions around Oog into the central core of Somaliland. At the same time, increased support to the Oromo Liberation Army, an ethnic Oromo rebellion currently mounting an insurgency against Abiy’s government, could be on Mogadishu’s table given the latter’s previous support to the Oromo Liberation Army’s predecessors.

While Mogadishu may be eager to wage a proxy conflict with Somali clan militias against Somaliland and/or the Oromo insurgency in Ethiopia, the persistent and ever-evolving divisions within Somalia’s political elite and among its clans would complicate this strategy. These divisions also provide potential opportunities for Ethiopia and/or Somaliland to try to undermine Somalia by backing local forces hostile to the central government–although at present, the shared opposition among Somalis toward the memorandum seems to be overshadowing their other longstanding divisions.

One should not assume that Ethiopia and Somaliland inevitably have the upper hand, however. Somaliland also appears to be the most internally divided it has been in years. Somaliland military’s defeat at the hands of the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn militias on Aug. 25, 2023, exposed fissures that are likely to widen given apparent domestic opposition to the memorandum. While many Somalilanders and the nation’s international advocates are understandably excited by the prospects of the memorandum building toward international recognition of Somaliland, if Hargeisa does not handle the domestic and regional fallout effectively, it could prove to be a highly destabilizing gamble for the aspiring nation-state. Abiy’s government, meanwhile, is continuously struggling to maintain its authority internally following Ethiopia’s tumultuous civil war, and this bold gamble by Abiy may jeopardize efforts to stabilize the country.

Conclusion

The current tensions, while troubling, were not entirely unpredictable. The terms of this memorandum are particularly provocative for Somalis given Ethiopia’s fraught imperial and postimperial history with Somalia and the persistence of Somali irredentism that sees Ethiopian Somalis as occupied subjects. But the truth is that any other country that pledged to recognize Somaliland would catalyze a similarly angered response from Mogadishu and Somalis at large, making it likely that some type of crisis of this sort would emerge sooner or later. The status quo has been unsustainable, as the chances of a reunification of Somaliland and Somalia are close to nil under current conditions. Despite the indications of growing internal cracks within Somaliland detailed above, it is most likely that a majority of Somalilanders (or at least a majority of the crucial Isaaq constituency) seek independence and will do whatever they feel is needed to achieve that goal (including violently suppressing dissent).

The maximalist positions taken by the three principal parties in this dispute make it unlikely that negotiations will result in a major breakthrough — if they are even held at all. International parties are attempting to bring all sides to the table, but so far there appears to be little appetite for any side to start making concessions. It is also entirely possible, given Abiy’s erratic nature and the many internal challenges that Ethiopia faces, that Ethiopia could end up walking back or effectively freezing the memorandum, which could lead tensions to subside, at least temporarily.

Notwithstanding the possibility that diplomacy does prevail, however, it appears for now that the Horn of Africa is in for another protracted crisis. To make matters worse, this crisis comes at the worst possible time in the region’s shared fight against al-Shabaab.

Without the continued intelligence-sharing between the three major parties to this crisis, al-Shabaab also stands to expand its mobilization and recruitment bases, which further puts all three parties at risk of fresh acts of terror. Failing that, the region risks further confusion and, potentially, bloodshed from which jihadis, particularly al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab, stand to benefit.

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Caleb Weiss is a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the Islamic State across Central and East Africa. He is also a co-editor of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal, primarily tracking jihadist insurgencies in Africa. He has conducted extensive fieldwork across much of East Africa, including in Somalia/Somaliland and the Great Lakes region.

James Barnett is a nonresident research fellow at Hudson Institute specializing in African security studies. He is presently pursuing a PhD (DPhil) in political science at Oxford University, and he has conducted extensive fieldwork in conflict zones in West and East Africa, including in Somalia/Somaliland.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Caleb Weiss · January 24, 2024

14. Biden’s Democracy-Defense Credo Does Not Serve U.S. Interests

What about the self determination of the government? Is that not a right of all people?

Conclusion:

The “defense of democracies” concept does the opposite of that. It inclines the U.S. to over-identify with certain foreign countries and become partisans in their fights. This kind of global leadership divides not only the world but also the nation it is supposed to serve. The United States needs a foreign policy that helps democracy deliver for Americans, not one that asks Americans to deliver ever more for democracies abroad.

Biden’s Democracy-Defense Credo Does Not Serve U.S. Interests

Centering U.S. foreign policy on this principle is destabilizing abroad and divisive at home.

By Stephen Wertheim

The Atlantic · by Stephen Wertheim · January 23, 2024

“We’ve got to prove democracy works,” Joe Biden declared in his first press conference as president. He has dedicated his administration to this task. Biden took office weeks after his predecessor tried to overturn an election and sparked an insurrection. The violent transition of power confirmed America’s spot in the “democratic recession” that has beset dozens of countries since the mid-2000s. Several times since, Biden has remarked that future generations will see that the global contest between democracy and autocracy was in no small part decided during his presidency. Democracies, as he told world leaders at the inaugural Summit for Democracy, which he convened in December 2021, must show that they “can deliver for people on issues that matter most to them.”

Yet what matters most to the American people? Not the fortunes of democracy overseas. During the same nearly two decades in which democracy has declined globally, the public has turned against attempts to remake other countries in America’s image, especially through military intervention and nation building. In surveys, Americans rank democracy promotion among their lowest foreign-policy priorities. Biden may think he’s unifying the country by defending distant democracies, but his democracy-first framing is divisive—and may be making overseas conflicts worse.

Biden and his team are aware of the public’s long-simmering discontent. Even before he took office, they had formulated a response. The national-security establishment would finally heed what the American people were demanding: no more long and bloody campaigns to “make Western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western democracy,” as Donald Trump put it in 2016. Instead of promoting democracy in new lands, the United States would protect democracies where they exist. The costs of American global leadership would fall, public support would rise, and Trump and his fellow populists would lose a rallying cry.

Biden has tried to act accordingly. After terminating America’s nation-building mission in Afghanistan, he has framed each focal point of U.S. foreign policy—Ukraine, Israel/Palestine, and Taiwan—around the imperative to defend democracies against forces that seek their destruction. The problem is that his approach is not delivering, either abroad or at home. The war in Ukraine has reached an impasse and is shedding domestic support. The war in Gaza is a humanitarian disaster and even threatens Biden’s reelection by repelling a segment of his voters. And a catastrophic war over Taiwan looms as a larger prospect than ever.

Read: The threat to democracy is coming from inside the U.S. House

Biden’s “defend democracy” credo did not create these challenges, but it has aggravated them. It fosters one-sided, maximalist policies that intensify conflicts without resolving them, while entangling the United States within them. Not since George W. Bush has a president so tightly linked democratic ideals with military instruments. And Biden’s effort is failing for similar reasons as Bush’s did, only in a more divided America and a more competitive world.

Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship in Russia undoubtedly seeks to undermine Ukrainian democracy. But that does not mean the war is best understood as a “battle between democracy and autocracy,” as Biden casts it. Ukraine was a fledgling democracy for decades, mixing competitive elections and a vibrant civil society with entrenched corruption, before Putin sent his forces toward Kyiv. He invaded mainly because Ukraine was drifting out of Moscow’s orbit, in reaction to Russia’s own actions, and closer to the institutions of the West. Such aggression is illegal and unacceptable, not because one party is an autocracy and the other a democracy, but because one state invaded another and then sought to overthrow its government and absorb some of its territory. Russia’s aggression implicates two vital principles of international life: that disputes should be resolved peacefully and that sovereign states should enjoy independence.

When Biden instead appears to make democracy his first principle, much of the world hears that an aggressive war is wrong only when conducted by an autocracy against a democracy. Many countries outside the West have little interest in supporting such a principle. They would like to resist an illegal invasion of their country regardless of whether their form of government meets with Washington’s approval. It should be no surprise that dozens of nations have stayed neutral toward the war in Ukraine, finding fault with both Russia and the West; several countries have even shifted away from Kyiv’s side since the fighting began. Having avoided international isolation, Russia has weathered Western sanctions and ramped up production of artillery rounds, missiles, and drones.

Worse, Biden’s democracy framing inhibits U.S. policy. After the past year of fighting barely moved the battle lines, the government of Ukraine insists that its objective is still to eject Russian forces from every inch of territory occupied since 2014. Rather than induce a sense of realism in its partner, the Biden administration has vowed to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” and refused to put forward territorial aims of its own. It has not, for example, ruled out U.S. support for a campaign to recapture Crimea, which Russia has controlled for a decade and might plausibly resort to nuclear weapons to retain.

Biden’s “defend democracy” rhetoric has boxed him in: If democracy is the central value at stake, the notion of pressuring Ukraine’s elected leaders sounds illegitimate, even if Kyiv should adopt more achievable goals or explore negotiations with Russia. Indeed, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, has stated that “we’re not going to pressure” Ukraine into negotiations, as though the U.S. should keep supplying Ukraine to do as it likes, as long as it likes, without regard for costs, risks, effectiveness—or American interests.

Stephen Wertheim: The one key word Biden needs to invoke on Ukraine

The United States does in fact require Ukraine to use U.S.-provided equipment as Washington prefers, and policy makers appreciate that U.S. and Ukrainian interests are not identical. But Biden’s democracy rhetoric makes it harder to apply overt leverage or contradict Kyiv’s positions, steps that may be needed to show that he is serving his own citizens and steering the war toward an acceptable close in the coming months or years. Already, Trump, Biden’s presumptive challenger in this November’s presidential election, has accused Biden of “sending American treasure and weaponry to fuel endless war,” and Republicans in Congress are holding up Ukraine aid as public support for it wanes. For the sake of American democracy, Biden should say less about Ukraine’s democracy and more about a strategy to preserve its independence and end the killing.

The idea of defending democracy has played a more superficial but still damaging role in the wake of the heinous October 7 attack in southern Israel by Hamas, which massacred about 1,200 people, most of them civilians. Weeks later, Biden appealed to the American people from the Oval Office to support his request for $105 billion of emergency aid, mainly for Israel and Ukraine. Those two countries deserve America’s support, he argued, because they are democracies facing foes who seek their annihilation. The claim was arguably accurate but beside the point (which is perhaps why U.S. officials under the president have tended not to invoke democracy to rationalize U.S. policy). Hamas seeks through terrorist violence to establish a Palestinian state on land Israel controls. It opposes Israel because Israel is a Jewish state, regardless of whether it is a democratic one. Israel, in turn, seeks to protect itself and preserve control over the occupied territories. The conflict is principally about who gets what land, not about which form of government they establish on that land.

Biden has wielded the defense of democracy as a justification to back Israel as Israeli forces have bombarded and invaded Gaza. Yet Biden’s touting of Israel’s status as a democracy, without qualification, is questionable given the country’s recent backsliding. For most of last year, the right-wing government attempted to curtail the independence of Israel’s judiciary, provoking huge protests in the name of saving Israeli democracy. Biden himself had reportedly told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to rush his reforms.

Biden’s democracy-mongering deflects not only from the reality of the problem but also from how to solve it. A more farsighted American president would oppose Palestinian terrorism and Israeli occupation as mutually reinforcing injustices that must be challenged together. The United States could still provide significant support for Israeli retaliation after October 7, but only if Israel created conditions for peace—by using far greater discrimination in targeting Hamas leaders and minimizing the killing of civilians, by freezing settlements and halting settler violence in the West Bank, and by announcing a multiyear plan to facilitate a viable Palestinian state. The watchwords of this approach would be statehood and security for Israel and Palestine alike. Anything less than this, after all, would almost certainly perpetuate the conflict, at great cost to the United States.

Read: The anticlimactic end of Israel’s democracy crisis

As the Israel Defense Forces lay waste to Gaza, one should hope that the world takes Biden’s democracy rhetoric no more seriously than Netanyahu has taken his suggestions that Israel exhibit restraint. Israel’s democracy does not justify its brutality. Democratic wrongs are still wrongs, and if democracies act with impunity, autocracies can do so more easily. Indeed, by being too tolerant of the occupation and annexation of Palestinian land, Biden has undercut his principled stand against the occupation and annexation of Ukrainian land. The world has noticed, and so have Americans. Since he linked the two conflicts under the dubious banner of “defending democracy,” Biden has not united the country to support both causes but has seen it divide further: Young and progressive Democrats have grown more critical of backing Israel’s war, while conservatives have become more hostile toward Ukraine’s.

The misguided moralism that has intensified two conflicts also increases the risk of bringing about a third and even worse one. Taiwan, a self-governing island of nearly 24 million people, is a thriving democracy and held its latest free and fair election earlier this month. But Taiwan became democratic only after the Cold War, whereas its dispute with China dates back to 1949, when the Communists took over the mainland and sent their Nationalist opponents fleeing to Taiwan. For decades, the two governments—one in Beijing, the other in Taipei, and both one-party dictatorships—each claimed to be the legitimate ruler of all China and threatened to invade the other.

Beginning in the 1970s, the United States devised a policy that has helped the fraternal adversaries live and let live. Washington recognized Beijing as the sole legal representative of China and acknowledged that only “one China” exists. The U.S. also agreed to maintain strictly unofficial relations with Taipei, while sending it arms for self-defense. Under this evenhanded, pragmatic framework, the U.S. has prevented both sides from upsetting the status quo—deterring Beijing from launching an invasion across the strait and deterring Taipei from making unilateral moves toward independence. This policy has allowed Taiwanese democracy to emerge and flourish, but as a by-product of the main priorities: stability and peace.

Biden has degraded this successful approach by framing U.S.–China relations around an “ongoing battle in the world between autocracy and democracy.” Although he has avoided applying this terminology specifically to Taiwan, members of Congress in both parties have done so—most notably former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California. “Today the world faces a choice between democracy and autocracy,” Pelosi declared when she met with Taiwan’s president in 2022. “America’s determination to preserve democracy, here in Taiwan and around the world, remains ironclad.” Her visit induced China to conduct major military exercises around the island.

Read: Beijing won’t allow Taiwan’s democracy to survive

The president himself has risked the stability achieved by America’s long-standing policy. Twice he has said that the people of Taiwan should decide whether to declare independence, remarking in 2022, “That’s their decision.” (On top of this, Biden has vowed four times to use military force if China invades Taiwan, contradicting the U.S. policy of maintaining “strategic ambiguity” over whether to intervene.) Biden’s principle is unimpeachably democratic, but its consequences could be calamitous. For the president to assign such a prerogative to Taiwan’s public risks giving Taipei license to take provocative actions and making Beijing fear it cannot achieve unification peacefully. Overwhelmingly, experts believe that if Taiwan declared independence, China would promptly invade.

Thankfully, the official policy remains that the U.S. “does not support Taiwan independence,” a formula that Biden has used subsequently, including immediately after Taiwan’s latest election. Yet the president’s supposed gaffes, when repeated, become difficult to ignore, and Chinese officials complain that the U.S. is adopting a “hollowed out” and “fake” one-China policy. If they conclude that Washington and Taipei seek the island’s permanent separation from the mainland, Beijing could resort to war as the only way to prevent an unacceptable outcome.

That is why many U.S. partners in Asia bridle at Biden’s democracy rhetoric. Putting democracy first increases the odds of a terrible war, one that countries in the region might blame the United States for provoking.

Americans, of course, should not be indifferent to the fate of democracy abroad, but their government needs to get the order of operations right. Channeling investment and aid to countries already moving toward democracy, as the administration is doing through its Democracy Delivers Initiative, is a constructive measure. Likewise, Biden served the cause of democracy well by publicly affirming the integrity of Brazil’s presidential election in 2022 and privately warning military leaders not to back a coup. When supporting democracy aligns with countries’ sovereign status and serves U.S. interests, the U.S. can play a positive role.

But privileging democracy above sovereignty leads to grief. It injects an endlessly destabilizing principle into international relations, implying that states do not have legitimate rights unless they are democracies, as defined by Washington. Under Biden, the United States has abandoned the disastrous foreign-policy choices of the post-9/11 era—invading other countries to overthrow their governments and install democratic ones—yet it continues to speak as though it reserves the right to do so. The point is not lost on states around the world. And one day, Americans will not want a yet more powerful China to assert the same principle of intervening abroad on behalf of the form of government it favors.

Read: Why these progressives stopped helping Biden

Right now, as Biden rightly urges, Americans must preserve their own democracy. This is the overriding imperative, and it won’t be decided in Ukraine, Israel, or Taiwan. Large majorities of Americans are dissatisfied with the way things are going and find the federal government unresponsive to their needs. In that context, national leaders who choose to send billions of dollars to fund other countries’ wars had better have realistic goals and high odds of success, and ensure that core U.S. interests guide their policy.

The “defense of democracies” concept does the opposite of that. It inclines the U.S. to over-identify with certain foreign countries and become partisans in their fights. This kind of global leadership divides not only the world but also the nation it is supposed to serve. The United States needs a foreign policy that helps democracy deliver for Americans, not one that asks Americans to deliver ever more for democracies abroad.

The Atlantic · by Stephen Wertheim · January 23, 2024

15. Beijing’s Economic Challenges Present Opportunities for Washington

January 23, 2024 | Policy Brief

Beijing’s Economic Challenges Present Opportunities for Washington

Craig Singleton

China Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/23/beijings-economic-challenges-present-opportunities-for-washington/?__cf_chl_tk=EhiCn4omugmoeWbFnlQT_Wey6gaXGwOyMWQdFMnd6Qw-1706101156-0-gaNycGzND7s

China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported last week that the country’s economy grew by just 5.2 percent in 2023, with the World Bank forecasting that China’s growth rate could slow even further in 2024 and 2025. Washington should capitalize on China’s economic downturn to curtail Beijing’s economic influence and technological reach, albeit without impinging upon America’s post-pandemic recovery.

Excluding the pandemic years, China’s 5.2 percent growth in 2023 was its slowest since the tumultuous period following the 1990 Tiananmen Square massacre. Even that figure may be exaggerated. China’s economic statistics are based on opaque models the late Chinese Premier Li Keqiang once referred to as “manmade” and “unreliable.”

Doubts concerning China’s economic health have mounted since Xi Jinping assumed power. Since then, Beijing has ceased reporting a range of verifiable economic indicators and has altered the methodologies used to track politically sensitive economic trends. For instance, after June 2023, Beijing stopped publishing China’s urban youth unemployment rate after it peaked at 21.3 percent. However, this month, Chinese officials claimed youth unemployment had dropped to 14.9 percent based on a new formula that excludes millions of college-aged citizens previously accounted for in China’s unemployment statistics.

For two decades, China has reportedly met or exceeded nearly all its predetermined gross domestic product (GDP) targets. To do so, China has relied on massive debt issuance to fund non-productive investments in certain sectors, such as housing and infrastructure. As a result, Chinese government debt today is more than triple the country’s GDP, well above the levels observed in many industrialized nations, such as the United States.

Compounding China’s dire economic situation is weak global demand for Chinese exports, which declined by 4.6 percent in 2023. China’s real-estate market, accounting for one-quarter of Chinese GDP, also faltered. In all, property investment contracted by 9.6 percent, new construction starts dropped by 20.4 percent, and new homes sales declined by 6 percent. China’s economic turbulence coincided with a major demographic downturn, with the population shrinking by two million last year, foreshadowing serious productivity challenges ahead.

Chinese stock market indexes also declined sharply in 2023, signaling weakened investor confidence. The blue-chip CSI 300 index plunged 11 percent. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index, which lists shares for many Chinese companies, declined 3.7 percent even as U.S. indexes surged.

These and other indicators suggest China’s economy is not merely slowing but potentially entering a deflationary spiral akin to Japan’s “Lost Decade” in the 1990s. In a move likely to further deter investment and stifle private-sector vitality, Xi recently vowed to show “no mercy” in cracking down on perceived corruption within China’s finance, energy, pharmaceutical, and infrastructure sectors. Having ruled out major stimulus measures, Beijing has hinted that it hopes to export its way out of the economic crisis by flooding global markets with cheap goods, including discounted electric vehicles (EVs), potentially undercutting U.S. producers in a range of industries.

China’s economic woes present a strategic opportunity for the United States. Washington should tighten its leverage over Beijing and undermine its global position in ways that do not adversely impact the U.S. economy. For starters, policymakers should consider selectively increasing tariffs and expanding other measures under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, including raising the duty levied on Chinese vehicles to prevent an onslaught of cheap Chinese EVs.

Congress should also require the administration to screen, and in some cases ban, certain outbound investment to China in high-tech sectors, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and hypersonics. The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s chairman and ranking member have proposed bipartisan legislation that would do exactly that. Meanwhile, policymakers should intensify their warnings about the heightened risks of investing in Chinese firms, particularly those entwined with China’s military, amidst increasing legislative and executive branch scrutiny.

In taking these and other actions, the United States stands to emerge stronger while China grapples with the consequences of its own misguided economic policies.

Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and Senior Director of FDD’s China Program. For more analysis from Craig and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on X @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

16. Israel SitRep: Jan. 23, 2024

January 23, 2024 | Israel at War Situation Report

Israel SitRep: Jan. 23, 2024

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/23/israel-sitrep-jan-23-2024/

Today’s Issue: 24 IDF Soldiers Killed on Monday, 21 in One Incident | IDF Troops Complete Encircling of Khan Younis in Southern Gaza | Two Islamic State Supporters from Eastern Jerusalem Indicted for Car-Bombing Plot | Israeli Forces Arrest Wanted Individuals, Confiscate Weapons and Money in West Bank | Latest FDD Analysis

24 IDF Soldiers Killed on Monday, 21 in One Incident: On Monday, 24 IDF soldiers were killed in southern Gaza in two separate incidents. According to an IDF statement on Tuesday, Hamas operatives apparently fired an RPG at a tank that was securing soldiers near Khan Younis who were removing terrorist infrastructure that posed a threat to Israelis. The soldiers, who were operating 600 meters (654 yards) from the border with Israel, across from Kibbutz Kissufim, were working to create a secure area from which Hamas could not fire on Israel and were preparing to destroy buildings that Hamas could have used to attack Israeli communities. The soldiers were in two adjacent buildings being prepared for demolition, when an explosion caused the buildings to collapse. A total of 21 soldiers were killed. The cause of the incident is being investigated. In addition, three paratrooper officers were killed earlier in a separate incident in a refugee camp west of Khan Younis.

IDF Troops Complete Encircling of Khan Younis in Southern Gaza: On Monday, troops from the IDF’s 98th Division completed the encirclement of Khan Younis in southern Gaza and, in coordination with the Israeli Air Force, killed “many dozens” of terrorists. In a large-scale attack, soldiers from the paratroopers, the 7th Armored Brigade, and the Givati Brigade encircled Khan Younis, and the division’s Commando Brigade attacked the heart of the area, a stronghold for Hamas’s Khan Younis Brigade. IDF soldiers killed dozens in face-to-face battles that involved cooperation with the Israeli Air Force. During the fighting, Hamas operatives fired anti-tank missiles, and IDF soldiers killed operatives armed with RPGs who were several dozens of meters away, and others who were booby-trapping buildings. IDF troops discovered tunnel openings, rockets ready for launch, and numerous weapons.

Two Islamic State Supporters from Eastern Jerusalem Indicted for Car-Bombing Plot: On Monday, the Israel Police announced that Jerusalem District police officers, the Border Police, and the Shin Bet had foiled a terrorist attack by two Islamic State (IS) supporters from eastern Jerusalem. The men, Mustafa Abdel Nabi, 19, and Ahmad Natsha, 20, were arrested on December 26 in the Ras al-Amud neighborhood of Jerusalem. The Jerusalem District Attorney’s office on Monday submitted an indictment against them to the Jerusalem District court. When Jerusalem District police and Border Police officers searched their homes, they found chemicals that they believe the men planned to use to prepare explosives. They also found IS and Hamas flags along with a notebook with details about preparing explosives. According to the Israel Police, the two men had pledged allegiance to IS and intended to use explosives to attack civilians and security forces. The indictment alleges that the two planned to set off a car bomb with gas tanks near the Knesset.

Israeli Forces Arrest Wanted Individuals, Confiscate Weapons and Money in West Bank: IDF soldiers, Border Police officers, and the Shin Bet arrested eight wanted individuals overnight in the West Bank and seized weapons and materials for preparing explosives. In addition, reserve soldiers carried out operations in Nablus in the casbah and the Balata Refugee Camp. In the village of Mazra’a, Israeli forces found weapons and arrested a wanted man, and in Khirbat al-Luz and Dhahiriya, troops seized weapons. In Hebron and in the village of Shuyukh, troops confiscated tens of thousands of shekels which according to the IDF, were intended to support terrorism. On Tuesday, a Palestinian carrying a knife approached soldiers near the fence to the community of Psagot in the West Bank and was shot.

Latest FDD Analysis:

“Iran’s Leaders Say They Don’t Want a War. Should We Believe Them?” Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, The New York Times

“After Israel-Hamas war, Egyptian Copts face ambiguous future,” Haisam Hassanein, Washington Examiner

“Freeing Gaza from Hamas is a priority, but very complex,” Seth J. Frantzman, The Jerusalem Post

“The Hamas numbers game: Recruiting new terrorists,” Seth J. Frantzman, The Jerusalem Post

“Iranian media falsely claims to have ‘injured’ Israeli in Iraq attacks,” Seth J. Frantzman, The Jerusalem Post

“Iran considering next steps against Israel, US amid strikes,” Seth J. Frantzman, The Jerusalem Post

“Palestinian-ISIS Attacks in Jerusalem Foiled,” FDD Experts, FDD Flash Brief

“12,000 Trucks With Humanitarian Aid Have Entered Gaza Since October 7,” FDD Experts, FDD Flash Brief

“Houthis Protect Chinese and Russian Shipping, Target Global Shipping,” FDD Experts, FDD Flash Brief

“Israel Offers Two-Month Pause in Fighting in Exchange for Hostages,” FDD Experts, FDD Flash Brief

“Israel SitRep: Jan. 22, 2024,” FDD Experts, FDD Israel at War Situation Report

17. He Hunted Corrupt Chinese Officials. Now He’s Set to Be Foreign Minister.

He Hunted Corrupt Chinese Officials. Now He’s Set to Be Foreign Minister.

Liu Jianchao was a key figure in Beijing’s anticorruption ‘Fox Hunt’

https://www.wsj.com/world/he-hunted-corrupt-chinese-officials-now-hes-set-to-be-foreign-minister-aa4144c6?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1

By Lingling Wei

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 and Charles Hutzler

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Updated Jan. 24, 2024 12:04 am ET

Liu Jianchao, center, who is expected to be named China’s next foreign minister, visited Washington, D.C., earlier this month. PHOTO: SUSAN WALSH/ASSOCIATED PRESS

When Xi Jinping was looking for someone to succeed the abruptly removed Qin Gang as foreign minister last summer, people familiar with the matter say, one name made it to the top of the Chinese leader’s list.

Liu Jianchao was an unusual candidate in many ways. A translator-turned-diplomat, he heads a Communist Party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other Communist states such as North Korea and Vietnam. His U.S. experience has been relatively limited compared with that of many previous foreign ministers. His stints at the party’s anticorruption watchdog also make him a rarity in the country’s foreign-policy establishment.

But Liu came highly recommended to the leader by senior foreign-affairs officials precisely for his party experience and demonstrated political loyalty—traits especially valued by Xi at a time of heightened party control and emphasis on security, according to the people familiar with the matter.

The top leader decided to give Liu a trial run first, the people said, with the focus on beefing up his experience in dealing with the U.S.—China’s biggest geopolitical rival. As a stopgap measure, Xi reassigned former Foreign Minister Wang Yi to his old post in July.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meeting with China’s Liu Jianchao at the State Department in Washington this month. PHOTO: ANNA ROSE LAYDEN/REUTERS

Now, having taken on a more active diplomatic role in the past six months, including handling a U.S. congressional delegation’s visit to Beijing in the fall, Liu is on track to be named China’s next foreign minister, the people said, likely during the nation’s legislative sessions in March, though they cautioned that no final decision on the timing of the appointment has been made.

China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to questions.

To prepare for his appointment, the people said, Beijing sent Liu to New York, Washington and San Francisco earlier this month to bolster his profile in the U.S.’s foreign-policy and business communities.

During the weeklong trip, Liu interacted with American think tanks such as the Asia Society, investors such as 

Blackstone Chief Executive Stephen Schwarzman and Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, and Biden administration officials including Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

“The Chinese were basically telling us that he’s going to be the next foreign minister,” a U.S. official said. “They were saying, ‘He’s going on to bigger things.’ ”

Throughout his U.S. visit, Liu continued Xi’s effort to tamp down tensions with the U.S. while steadfastly defending China’s policies, from its sovereignty claims over Taiwan and its national-security agenda to its trillion-dollar Belt and Road infrastructure program. 

His expected appointment comes at a delicate time in U.S.-China relations, after Xi and President Biden in California in November set off a fragile detente in ties. Beijing’s foreign-policy objective this year is to keep its relations with Washington on an even keel, especially as economic challenges pile up at home.

The Biden administration, dealing with wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, also wants to avoid serious friction with China, especially as Biden enters a tough re-election campaign. China is likely to be a contentious issue, as it has been in previous presidential races, and both the administration and the Chinese leadership are seeking to bolster U.S.-China relations to withstand any battering by American electoral politics.

“The indications are that Xi Jinping wants to stabilize relations before the U.S. election season and for domestic reasons,” said Daniel Russel, a former career State Department official now with the Asia Society Policy Institute. 

President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California in November, setting off a fragile detente in U.S.-China relations. PHOTO: DOUG MILLS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Russel ticked off a list of positive signs in relations: recently revived communications between the U.S. and Chinese militaries, cooperation on countering fentanyl trafficking and high-level visits. Liu’s trip is part of that, said Russel, who met with the Chinese diplomat.

The Wall Street Journal has reported that the previous Chinese foreign minister, Qin, was ousted last year after an internal party investigation found him to have engaged in an extramarital affair while serving as Beijing’s top envoy to Washington—a finding that raised national-security concerns for the leadership. The downfall of Qin, who was in his post for just seven months, cast doubt inside and outside China over Xi’s personnel choices and added a particular sensitivity to the selection of his successor.

During his U.S. trip, Liu stuck to the message Xi conveyed to Biden in California: China isn’t intending to challenge the U.S. or change the existing international order—claims that are increasingly viewed with skepticism, if not outright dismissed, in Washington.

Speaking in fluent English, Liu engagingly delivered his message, according to people who interacted with him. Chinese officials in similar discussions in the past were mostly interested in repeating Beijing’s talking points.

In particular, some American participants took note of Liu’s willingness to both listen to and address concerns over China’s policies, including the clampdown on Western firms assessing investment risks in the country. 

Such actions have contributed to foreign capital fleeing China, and participants said that Liu appeared keenly aware of the risks of further alienating the U.S. business community, traditionally among Beijing’s strongest supporters in Washington.

“He seemed genuinely interested in understanding what it would take for U.S. business people to engage with China again,” one of the participants said.

The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, chaired by Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.), a harsh China critic, late last year called for a review and potential repeal of the U.S.’s “permanent normal trade relations” with China, which could lead to dramatically increased tariffs on Chinese products. Former President Donald Trump, running to be the Republican presidential nominee, has also called for revoking China’s normal trade status.

“You can tell the Gallagher proposal was in his briefing book,” a participant in conversations with Liu said. “He acknowledged that a repeal would be disastrous to the U.S.-China relationship.”

Qin Gang was ousted as China’s foreign minister last year over allegations that he had an extramarital affair. PHOTO: THOMAS PETER/REUTERS

Liu, 59 years old, was of the generation of Chinese who started their careers after Deng Xiaoping put the nation on a path of growth and openness more than four decades ago. 

After studying international relations at Oxford University in the late 1980s, Liu joined the Foreign Ministry’s translation department and went on to hold different positions at the ministry, including as its spokesman—a job he held during the 2008 Beijing Olympics—and as Chinese ambassador to the Philippines and Indonesia.

The most unusual part of his résumé is his appointment in 2015 to head the international office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. That post made him a key figure in Xi’s Operation Fox Hunt, a secretive global operation to hunt down Chinese officials suspected of corruption who had fled to other countries, including the U.S.

Speaking at a Jan. 9 forum held by the Council on Foreign Relations, Liu said in response to a question from the audience that he was picked for that job because of his experience in international cooperation. 

“When they flee the country, you know, in the past nothing could be done about them,” Liu said. “But then we decided to take them back with the support and help from our partners, our colleagues from other countries.” He said the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security had provided help to that effort.

During the forum, Liu also denied that China has ever engaged in aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy, even as Chinese diplomats have frequently adopted a combative approach to any perceived criticism of Beijing.

When Xi called for a diplomatic “iron army” during a recently concluded high-level meeting on foreign affairs, Liu said, “He really means that Chinese diplomats both at home and around the world should stay disciplined.”

At the end of the hourlong forum, Michael Froman, president of the council that hosted the discussion, said, “I go as far as to say, you’re a wolf warrior in sheep’s clothing.”

The comment incurred a laugh from the audience, as well as from Liu himself.

—James T. Areddy contributed to this article.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com and Charles Hutzler at charles.hutzler@wsj.com

18. US launches first drone strike of the year in Somalia

US launches first drone strike of the year in Somalia | FDD's Long War Journal

longwarjournal.org · by Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss · January 23, 2024

The United States launched its first drone strike in Somalia this year on Sunday, reportedly killing three Shabaab members. Neither Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. military command responsible for such strikes, nor Somalia itself have confirmed the exact coordinates, though both countries confirmed the strike took place in the country’s Lower Juba region.

According to AFRICOM, “at the request of the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command conducted a collective self-defense airstrike with two engagements against the al Shabaab terrorist group on Jan. 21.”

The U.S. military command continued by adding that “the collective self-defense strike occurred in a remote area of Somalia, approximately 35 kilometers northeast of Kismayo.” According to the U.S., three Shabaab members were killed without inflicting any civilian casualties.

The strike marks the first of its kind so far this year inside Somalia and the first since Dec. 20, 2023, when AFRICOM conducted two such “collective self-defense” strikes in Somalia’s Lower Juba. The results of those combined strikes remained inconclusive.

Just days earlier, on Dec. 17, the United States conducted another airstrike against a Shabaab position in its long-time stronghold of Jilib in the Middle Juba region. AFRICOM said that it killed at least one Shabaab member in the attack, offering no other details.

However, the Somali National Army (SNA) reported that the strike on Dec. 17 targeted Maalim Ayman, the emir of Shabaab’s eponymously named Jaysh al-Ayman. Jaysh al-Ayman acts as the military wing of Shabaab’s Kenyan branch, which is responsible for all militant activity along the Kenya-Somalia border. This includes the January 2020 attack on the U.S. base in Manda Bay.

While the SNA has reported that Maalim Ayman was killed in the strike, this remains unconfirmed. No other independent source has corroborated this information nor has Shabaab itself commented on the matter as of the time of publishing.

If confirmed, Ayman’s death would be the first high-profile leader removed from the battlefield since Abdullahi Yare, a co-founder of Shabaab and former emir of its da’wah [proselytizing] operations, was killed in Oct. 2022.

The targeting of Maalim Ayman is also the first targeted operation conducted by the U.S. in Somalia since May 2023, when it also attempted to kill Maalim Osman, the emir of Shabaab’s external operations.

American, other strikes in Somalia

AFRICOM conducted at least 18 airstrikes inside Somalia in 2023, in addition to a special operations raid in February. This marks the most active year for U.S. military operations inside Somalia since President Biden took office in Jan. 2021.

The U.S. has conducted at least 262 strikes in Somalia since 2007, reportedly killing over 1200 Shabaab militants according to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal. This is likely an undercount as the U.S. sometimes does not comment on selected strikes due to security measures or lack of confirmation of results.

It is important to note that the U.S. is not the only state actor conducting drone strikes inside Somalia, with Turkey also being an active participant with at least 19 drone strikes since 2022 according to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal. That said, Turkey’s strikes remain difficult to track and corroborate as they do not comment on any such operations. Its total number of drone strikes in Somalia is thus likely significantly higher.

The United Arab Emirates is also alleged to have launched at least one drone strike in Somalia, though this remains entirely unconfirmed and denied by Somali officials.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal. Caleb Weiss is a research analyst at FDD's Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.

Are you a dedicated reader of FDD's Long War Journal? Has our research benefitted you or your team over the years? Support our independent reporting and analysis today by considering a one-time or monthly donation. Thanks for reading! You can make a tax-deductible donation here.

longwarjournal.org · by Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss · January 23, 2024

19. The VA is abandoning women veterans’ rights for gender identity

Veterans Affairs personnel speaking out and speaking truth to power.

The VA is abandoning women veterans’ rights for gender identity

BY CATHERINE M. NOVOTNY, EDWARD WALDREP AND NINA SILANDER, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 01/20/24 9:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/4416673-va-is-abandoning-women-veterans-rights-in-favor-of-gender-identity/?utm

Women’s equality is founded on sex-based rights, enshrined in law, culturally supported by nearly all Americans and historically protected at institutions like our employer, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

Unfortunately, that last statement can no longer be counted on.

VA leadership, perhaps inspired by President Biden’s executive order on “Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation,” recently began enforcing in earnest its directive from 2018, injecting concepts of gender ideology into our clinical work. From here on, the distinction that will matter in patients is their self-identified gender, not their biological sex. We believe this effectively extinguishes the entire class of women, undermining many physical and legal protections for female veterans.

Single-sex spaces within the VA — those ensuring bodily privacy, such as bathrooms, exam rooms and medical exam areas — can now be accessed by males who self-identify as women. This VA move is part of a larger cultural pattern, most notably in women’s sports, where biological males identifying as women tend to crush the competition, and in women’s prisons that allow mixed-sex housing based on gender identity, often with tragic results.

Together, the three of us have a combined 44 years of professional experience, much of it focused on sexual trauma recovery. We know that the perpetrators of sex crimes are usually male. We view this VA policy as a betrayal of our female patients. 

Women face a disproportionate statistical risk of assault, harassment and voyeurism by men. And male violence patterns are unchanged by subjective feelings about gender. Long-term research shows that males identifying as women have a similar pattern of criminal behavior to other males.

Yet female veterans are now required to share vulnerable recovery spaces with men, including specialty clinics, therapy groups and residential recovery programs. These are violations of women’s privacy, and especially of victims’ privacy.

Imagine a rape victim being forced to share a bedroom in a residential program with a man. Even worse, according to VA policy, if the female veteran objects, she is required to relocate, despite being the complainant. What has happened to women’s security? What of bodily privacy?

The VA must restore single-sex spaces in which biology is the only relevant factor. Why? First, because only women get pregnant by rape. Second, because vulnerable people, especially victims of violence, need clinically attuned help recognizing predators and boundary intrusions. They do not need our government institutions, with obtuse attitudes toward women, to create confusion about these matters.

The VA’s policy is silencing reasonable objections to genuinely dangerous individuals and ignores the concerns of women. Objections from women are treated as “an opportunity to educate” the complainants, rather than as grounds for the department to change its misguided policy.

Not only veterans, but also VA employees, are being harmed by this policy, which holds that veterans may claim a gender identity contrary to their sex, but which simultaneously orders the VA to provide medical screens, many of which are dependent upon biological sex. This is contradictory and procedurally incompatible with the practice of medicine.

Further, it imposes mandates upon employees’ language, clearly violating their First Amendment right to free speech while corrupting clinical interactions.

As clinicians, we don’t object to the courteous use of preferred pronouns or other such identifiers, so long as we are free to choose their use in a thoughtful, clinical manner. We believe most VA staff and fellow veterans would also agree to such social courtesies, and as therapists we understand that in certain cases our voluntary use of preferred pronouns could help build clinical rapport.  

But humans are a sexually dimorphic species, and this has medical consequences irrelevant to the metaphysical concept of gender identity. Sex is an immutable biological trait, carrying with it biological and medical consequences that doctors cannot overlook. Given that reality, the VA cannot rightly discipline employees for expressing opinions, beliefs or viewpoints skeptical of a concept that lacks scientific measurability beyond an individual’s subjective view.

Mandated affirmation of subjective feelings, apart from an individual’s unique clinical context, harms rather than helps patients.

The VA’s current policy is based on premises we believe are contradictory, anti-female and unconstitutional. It appears to be motivated by politics and fickle media narratives rather than by sound clinical practice.

Other solutions can be sought that do not damage women’s rights, override clinical discretion or disregard the basic constitutional rights of employees. We cannot accept such a policy as a tradeoff for true equality, at the expense of the VA’s culture and clinical work, especially as it would effectively turn back the clock on 60 years of advancement in the area of women’s rights.  

Catherine M. Novotny, Edward Waldrep and Nina Silander are clinical psychologists working at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Views expressed here are not necessarily those of the VA.

20. Myanmar’s Rebels Are Gaining Ground

Conclusion:

The current moment is, arguably, the most sensitive in Myanmar’s modern history. The junta is the weakest it has ever been and the resistance has made unprecedented territorial, political, and military gains. The various resistance groups will need to negotiate settlements among themselves to ensure that a potential post-junta Myanmar does not descend into a civil war, as happened in Afghanistan when its government collapsed in the 1990s. To avoid Afghanistan’s fate, Myanmar’s resistance should take a page from the antiapartheid movement in South Africa, which put a premium on national reconciliation over centralizing power. Only then will Myanmar have a fighting chance of emerging as a federal democracy.

Myanmar’s Rebels Are Gaining Ground

As the Ruling Junta Reels, the Country Faces a Perilous Tipping Point

By Avinash Paliwal

January 24, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Avinash Paliwal · January 24, 2024

Since a military coup in 2021 toppled Myanmar’s democratic government, the country’s army has found itself contending with a tenacious and committed rebel insurgency. The military junta’s opponents are varied and various, including armed organizations representing Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities and militias loyal to the ousted government. Many observers had written off such resistance groups as too fractious and weak to present a genuine challenge to the junta. But that all has changed in recent months. Rebels have been strikingly successful in an offensive against the junta in the northern Shan State—which borders China—called Operation 1027, named for the day it started, October 27, 2023. The offensive has been led by a coalition of ethnic armies called the Three Brotherhood Alliance, made up of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army.

Thanks to their efforts, the junta is rocking on its heels. The Three Brotherhood Alliance now controls Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang region, and many other towns in Shan State. Trade routes with China and other key arteries remain under rebel control. Critically, Operation 1027 has spurred into action other resistance groups, some independent and some led by the National Unity Government, a shadow administration that includes many supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader who was overthrown by the coup. The junta has lost control of its border crossing with India near Mizoram and is struggling to dominate the heartland region of Mandalay. In Kayah State, the junta is under pressure from the Karenni Army, whereas the People’s Defence Force—an assortment of groups that emerged to resist the junta, which are nominally under the control of the National Unity Government—and the Karen National Liberation Army are harassing the junta in the south Tanintharyi region and the eastern regions bordering Thailand. In the sensitive Rakhine State—ground zero of the genocide against Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority between 2016 and 2018—the Arakan Army broke a tenuous two-year cease-fire that it had signed with Myanmar’s army and struck at their positions.

The junta is on the back foot in most parts of the country. These rebel offensives have proved so effective that Myanmar’s president warned in November that the country risks “breaking apart.” Out of desperation, Myanmar’s army has become increasingly violent. Beijing’s struggle to broker a fresh cease-fire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the junta led an irate Naypyidaw to launch punitive aerial strikes against civilians and insurgents alike. Even after a cease-fire agreement was signed in January 2024, the junta continued to breach it, according to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. Such collective punishment, though par for the course for the junta, continues to cement Naypyidaw’s territorial and political losses. Morale in the army appears low, and, unsurprisingly, the violence has triggered a fierce debate among Myanmar watchers about the country’s future.

From Naypyidaw’s view, Myanmar’s odds of breaking into ethnic statelets is real. Such a scenario could play out regardless of the junta’s survival. But the defeat and ouster of the junta altogether cannot be discounted either. From the perspective of the motley resistance, Myanmar could be on the cusp of rewriting its social contract along federal lines. The resilience, coordination, tactical innovation, and strategic gains of the resistance are unprecedented. The offensive took months of planning, and the coordination among disparate groups inspires hope that the country could reach a model of interethnic unity framed by federalism. Myanmar’s future will be determined as much by the success of the resistance as by the underlying social and economic realities that broke the union in the first place.

DRUGS AND SCAMS

The 2021 coup ended a decade-long experiment with democracy. In ousting Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, the coup’s architect, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, miscalculated on two counts. He underestimated the deep sense of attachment that Myanmar’s youth had to the freedoms they experienced between 2011 and 2021. During those years, majoritarianism marred the country’s incipient democracy and the military largely dominated the parliament, but most people viewed democratization as a work in progress and wanted it to continue. By launching a coup, Min Aung Hlaing stripped an entire generation of a dream and drove away the very social base he needed to preserve power. For decades, ethnic militias had been fighting the Burmese government, which has been dominated by the majority Bamar group. But after the 2021 coup, even people from the Bamar heartland joined ethnic militias or launched their own armed organizations, resistance groups that are at the forefront of the current offensive.

When the junta toppled Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 and plunged the country into chaos, it assumed that the ethnic armed organizations would quickly sue for peace. Myanmar’s army believed it could compel them into submission because it was stronger and willing to use indiscriminate force, while the ethnic armies were fractured and had little foreign support. The junta still uses artillery and aerial bombardment to soften resistance strongholds without regard for civilian casualties and displacement of whole communities. In regions where it is stretched thin, the junta hires private militias and border guard forces to attack resistance fighters and terrorize civilians. Such proxies are paid using cash generated from the regional drug trade and by turning a blind eye to vast illicit enterprises, such as centers for online gambling and Internet scams that target people in China. The excesses of one such scam center at the Chinese border in Kokang helped trigger Operation 1027. These scam centers keep Chinese nationals hostage for forced labor—including cleaning, cooking, and sex work—and drain billions of dollars from the Chinese economy. On October 20, guards shot at dozens of hostages trying to escape, killing several, some of whom were undercover Chinese agents. The Three Brotherhood Alliance took this event as an opportunity to launch Operation 1027, promising to “clean up” all such scam centers in Kokang.

The junta was wrong to assume that ethnic armies would crumble under pressure. In fact, the 2021 coup exacerbated ethnic minority anxieties and pushed even signatories of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement—signed by Naypyidaw and nearly ten different rebel groups—to the jungles. The coup birthed a rare consensus in the resistance that the only way to liberate Myanmar from the military was to rid the country of the junta by force, as opposed to a nonviolent approach previously embraced by some groups, including the Karen National Union and the Chin National Front. And such a defeat seems plausible for the first time since 1949, when the Burmese army lost control of the major city of Mandalay and the town of Pyin Oo Lwin to the military arm of the Karen National Union. This is because, in addition to uniting the resistance, the coup has also debilitated Myanmar’s army.

Myanmar’s army views itself as the vanguard of Burman-Buddhist nationalism. In the aftermath of the coup, it witnessed a closing of ranks among its top brass, even including reformists who had supported political and economic liberalization during the prior decade. But as Myanmar’s civil war expanded, the army’s soldiers began losing faith in their commanders. The rank and file began defecting en masse, and 13,000 to 15,000 troops in Myanmar’s army were killed within two years of the coup (the figure is higher today). The junta remains unpopular, hindering its ability to recruit. In trying to please its senior ranks, the army has allowed officers to benefit from criminal enterprises—the army helps preside over Myanmar’s licit and illicit economies. But in turning a blind eye to corruption, the army has undermined its system of command and control, lowered morale, and caused high casualties. Although the military’s collapse is not imminent, the coup has significantly reduced its political, military, and economic power.

REBELS WITH A CAUSE

The resistance groups say they want to do more than just defeat the junta—they have declared that they will also remake Myanmar as a federal democracy, bestowing equal rights to all communities regardless of their ethnic, religious, or racial configurations. Even though the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the National Unity Government are not formal allies, their willingness to coordinate military action can be seen as an example of the kind of cooperation necessary to build a federal republic. And there are signs that other militias are getting over internecine conflicts and aligning against the junta. In November, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Shan State Progressive Party, two warring groups, signed a cease-fire. The Shan State Progressive Party had been resisting the junta since 2014, while the Restoration Council of Shan State had maintained channels with Naypyidaw. But the success of Operation 1027 left the Restoration Council isolated with little choice but to make peace with the resistance.

Myanmar’s resistance has little regional diplomatic support and cannot expect meaningful help from outside the country. The only way to overpower the junta is to transcend divisions and exploit the junta’s own internal crises. Resistance groups have silently and effectively revamped coordination mechanisms. They have built bodies—the Central Command and Coordination Committee and Joint Command and Coordination Committee—to ensure that militias and ethnic armies can work together more closely and effectively. Through these organizations, different groups brainstorm tactics and coordinate military action. The National Unity Government has formed a committee to support coordination with the Three Brotherhood Alliance to plan attacks, train new recruits, and supply weapons and aid. To encourage defections from Myanmar’s army, the National Unity Government has built camps that help defectors transition to civilian life. In Kawlin, a town in the central district of Sagaing that recently fell to the National Unity Government, political prisoners have been freed and food and medical deliveries have resumed. Similarly, the Arakan Army has established parallel governance systems in areas under its control. It has built courts, policing mechanisms, and medical clinics, and it allows aid agencies to operate on the ground, demonstrating an ability to govern. And it offers aid to both Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims, indicating a commitment to federal principles.

The junta is the weakest it has ever been.

But this federal dream faces two challenges: the resurgence of interethnic tensions and the entrenchment of drugs and illicit trade in Myanmar. Take, for example, the unease most resistance groups feel when it comes to including the Rohingya. The Arakan Army, which has promised to rehabilitate the Rohingya community, many of whose members have fled the country, has not recruited a single Rohingya despite being avowedly secular. In fact, the Arakan Army occupies properties that previously belonged to the Rohingya. Similarly, there is suspicion among minority communities that the National Unity Government could return to the Buddhist-Bamar majoritarianism that characterized Aung San Suu Kyi’s rule. Such mistrust has prevented the Three Brotherhood Alliance from accepting the National Unity Government’s leadership, military coordination notwithstanding. These tensions could easily flare to unwind the partnership.

Resource distribution is another point of tension. The desire for autonomy among minority communities is not just political, it is also economic. A functioning federal union would need to dole out limited resources equitably. Like the junta, the resistance is steeped in the drug trade and does not have means to generate mass employment. Fights over resources could propel different ethnic outfits to practice protectionism when the war ends, leading to second-order frictions and possibly breaking Myanmar into ethnic statelets akin to the situation that prevails in Wa State. Though the state is nominally part of Myanmar, the Wa have their own political structures, use the Chinese renminbi instead of the kyat, and have a separate armed force. Their quasi-sovereign existence is guaranteed by China and could serve as a model for future ethnic statelets that may emerge from Myanmar’s ruins. But such dependence on China will undermine the federal model. It is not in Beijing’s interest to have a coherent federal democracy in its backyard. China will likely play one group against another in order to maintain its leverage within Myanmar.

The current moment is, arguably, the most sensitive in Myanmar’s modern history. The junta is the weakest it has ever been and the resistance has made unprecedented territorial, political, and military gains. The various resistance groups will need to negotiate settlements among themselves to ensure that a potential post-junta Myanmar does not descend into a civil war, as happened in Afghanistan when its government collapsed in the 1990s. To avoid Afghanistan’s fate, Myanmar’s resistance should take a page from the antiapartheid movement in South Africa, which put a premium on national reconciliation over centralizing power. Only then will Myanmar have a fighting chance of emerging as a federal democracy.

• AVINASH PALIWAL is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London and the author of India’s Near East: A New History.  
• MORE BY AVINASH PALIWAL

Foreign Affairs · by Avinash Paliwal · January 24, 2024

21. Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global

Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global

As the war in Gaza gives the Houthi militia an international audience, the group has seized the opportunity to take its message far beyond Yemen’s borders.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-propaganda.html

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Tribesmen loyal to the Houthis march on the American and Israeli flags during a military parade for new tribal recruits. The parade was held on Monday amid escalating tensions with the U.S.-led coalition in the Red Sea, in Bani Hushaish, Yemen.Credit...Khaled Abdullah/Reuter​s

By Vivian Nereim

Jan. 24, 2024

Updated 3:58 a.m. ET

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Soon after Yemen’s Houthi militia hijacked a commercial ship in the Red Sea, taking it and its 25-member crew hostage, the armed group used the vessel to record a music video.

In the slick production, called “Axis of Jihad,” a drone camera pans over the hulking ship. Then a famous Houthi poet appears on the deck — accompanied by what appears to be a cardboard cutout of Qassim Suleimani, the Iranian commander assassinated in 2020 — and begins to sing.

“Death to America and hostile Zion,” the poet, Issa al-Laith, calls out, backed by a relentless beat. “By God, we shall not be defeated!”

The Houthis — an Iran-backed militia that controls northwestern Yemen — have long been skilled producers of propaganda, crafting poetry, television shows and catchy music videos to spread their messages. But they have never had as large an audience as they do now, as the war in the Gaza Strip propels them to the center of a global battle of accounts and attracts new admirers around the world.

Over the past few months, the Houthis have vaulted to worldwide prominence by shooting missiles toward Israel and attacking ships in the Red Sea, causing limited damage but disrupting the flow of global trade. The United States and its allies have targeted the group with repeated airstrikes this month, further raising its profile, but the assaults on shipping have continued.

The Houthis have declared that a direct battle with the United States is their goal, and at recent demonstrations, their supporters have chanted a line from a famous Houthi poem: “We don’t care, we don’t care: Make it a great World War.”

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A photograph released by Houthis purporting to show a Houthi military helicopter hovering over the Galaxy Leader, a commercial cargo ship, as Houthi fighters walk on the ship’s deck in the Red Sea in November.Credit...Houthi Military Media, via Reuters

Houthi leaders have portrayed their campaign as a righteous battle to force Israel to end the war in Gaza, where the Israeli military has killed more than 25,000 Palestinians since the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, according to Gazan health authorities.

Now the Houthis, capitalizing on widespread anger over Israel’s conduct in the war, are speaking not only to fellow Arabs, but also to South Asians, Europeans and Americans, many of whom know little about the group of former rebels and their bloody, repressive history in Yemen.

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“Victory in the battle of awareness is more important than victory in the military battle,” a senior Houthi politician, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, wrote on X on Tuesday, promoting a YouTube video of an interview he had done with an American writer.

On X, Mr. al-Bukhaiti has been posting almost exclusively in English in recent days, criticizing Western imperialism and the “ruling Zionist cabal” while beseeching American followers to read the work of the leftist intellectual Noam Chomsky.

“I will spread my message to the peoples of Western countries now, and I hope that the free people of the world will re-spread it on the largest scale,” he wrote.

Many people with large social media followings have been eager to share pro-Houthi messages in English, praising the group for challenging Israel and its main ally, the United States.

“This is what they’ve been working toward for years,” said Hannah Porter, an independent Yemen researcher who has studied Houthi propaganda. “They are very open about the fact that the so-called soft war, meaning psychological warfare, is just as important, if not more important, than warfare.”

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A Houthi rally in Sana, Yemen, on Friday.Credit...Mohammed Huwais/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The group, which calls itself “Ansar Allah,” or God’s helpers, began as a movement, led by members of the Houthi tribe, that focused on the religious and cultural revival of the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam. Its early communication strategies were decidedly low-tech, including paper leaflets and summer camps for children, Ms. Porter said.

But in the early 2000s, a charismatic leader, Hussein al-Houthi, spearheaded the group’s transformation into a rebel force fighting Yemen’s autocratic, U.S.-backed government.

It was during years of war against the government that Houthi propaganda was built, Ms. Porter said. The Houthis described themselves as an anti-imperialist force, battling against corruption and foreign influence, and adopted a slogan, shouted at rallies, that includes the phrase “Death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews.” In 2012, they expanded their narrative reach by founding Al-Masirah, an Arabic-language television channel based in Beirut.

In 2014, the Houthis formed an alliance of opportunity with Yemen’s recently deposed president — the same one they had fought for years — and swept into the capital, Sana, ousting the government. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rival, led an Arab military coalition into a yearslong bombing campaign in Yemen in an attempt to rout the Houthis, and hundreds of thousands of Yemenis died of fighting, hunger and disease.

Yet the Houthis not only survived that war against the Saudis, who were aided by American military assistance andweapons, but also thrived, setting up an impoverished quasi-state that they rule with an iron fist. They now present themselves as the legitimate government of Yemen, ignoring the internationally recognized government that operates largely in exile.

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A Yemeni man selling models of the Galaxy Leader, a cargo ship, in Sana, Yemen, last week.Credit...Mohammed Huwais/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“They’ve managed to hijack that image and say ‘It’s only us in Yemen, we represent Yemenis,’” said Hisham Al-Omeisy, a Yemeni political analyst who was imprisoned by the Houthis in 2017. It’s partly because the Houthis are skilled at propaganda, he said, “but it’s also because the Yemeni government is really weak.”

Mr. Al-Omeisy, who lived in Sana when the Houthis took over, recalled people leaving the city but returning soon after because economic and security conditions were even worse in government-controlled areas.

Since the war in Gaza began, Houthi leaders have presented themselves as courageous underdogs: the only Arab group willing to take on Israel and the imperial might of the United States. In doing so, they have played on the sense of impotency felt by many Arabs who are desperate to stop the carnage in Gaza.

Powerful Arab states like Saudi Arabia have focused on diplomacy to try to end the war, shunning the more forceful measures that they once used to pressure Israel and its Western allies, like the 1973 oil embargo.

In that context, the Houthis have “pitched themselves as the highly moral, credible, real heroes, if you will — of not just Arabs, but humanity in general,” Mr. Al-Omeisy said.

And across the Middle East, where grief on behalf of Palestinians and fury at Israel run deep, Houthi popularity has skyrocketed.

“At least they are making an effort in a time when other countries like Egypt and the Emirates did nothing for Palestine,” said Baha’eddine Jomli, a 35-year-old Tunisian.

In Bahrain, a Persian Gulf kingdom that aided the U.S.-led coalition striking the Houthis, the Yemeni group has attracted admiration from many citizens who are frustrated with their government’s stance.

Ahmed Elmorshedy, a 30-year-old software engineer in Egypt, said that while he does not support Houthi ideology and is “very suspicious of their motives,” he finds it hard to condemn the militia’s attacks in the Red Sea.

“They seem to be a desperate attempt to exert pressure on the international community, particularly the United States, urging intervention to halt the ongoing genocide in Gaza,” he said.

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Murals in Sana depicting military and political figures of the Iran-backed Shiite movements of Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine.Credit...Yahya Arhab/EPA, via Shutterstock

A Houthi spokesman did not respond to a request for comment. But last month, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a senior member of the group, dismissed the idea that it was seeking popularity.

“We aren’t in elections,” he wrote in a post on X. “Our stance is one of duty.”

Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a Yemeni nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute, said Houthi narratives are often directed toward potential sympathizers on the Western left, tapping into anger over Gaza and “the fear of America getting involved in another war.

At home, the Houthis tolerate little dissent, relying on some of the same authoritarian techniques deployed by the U.S.-allied Arab rulers whom they despise. They have shut down radio stations and detained journalists, activists and members of religious minorities — in one case sentencing four journalists to death before releasing them in a prisoner exchange.

And even as they criticize Israel for severely limiting the flow of food and water to more than two million Gazans, the Houthis have blocked water from reaching civilians in Taiz, one of Yemen’s largest cities, Human Rights Watch noted in a recent report.

The militia’s narrative success has been surreal for Yemenis who suffered under Houthi rule, Mr. Al-Omeisy said. In 2017, after he publicly criticized the Houthis, they arrested him, held him for months and accused him of being a spy. He recalled a tiny, pitch-black prison cell that made him feel like he was “being buried alive.”

“I am actually one of the lucky ones,” he said. “A lot of people didn’t make it out of there.”

Now based in the United States, he is stunned when Egyptian, Palestinian or American strangers attack him online for criticizing the Houthis.

“I’m like, What the hell, do you even understand who the Houthis are?” he said.

Reporting was contributed by Saeed Al-Batati, Nazeeha Saeed, Nada Rashwan and Ahmed Ellali.

Vivian Nereim is the lead reporter for The Times covering the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. She is based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. More about Vivian Nereim

​22. Russian military jet crashed near Belgorod, killing 74, officials say

Russian military jet crashed near Belgorod, killing 74, officials say

By Mary Ilyushina

Updated January 24, 2024 at 7:52 a.m. EST|Published January 24, 2024 at 6:02 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Mary Ilyushina · January 24, 2024

RIGA, Latvia — A Russian military plane crashed on Wednesday in the western Belgorod region near the border with Ukraine, killing 74 people on board, Russian state media reported.

Immediately after the 11 a.m. crash, there were conflicting reports about who was on the Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft.

The Russian Defense Ministry said it was carrying 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war who were being transferred to the region for a subsequent swap. Ukrainska Pravda, a Ukrainian news outlet, citing unnamed military officials, reported that the plane was transporting missiles.

Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War said in a statement it is still analyzing the reports about the crash.

“Before official statements or comments by authorized individuals or authorities are released, we urge the media and citizens to refrain from spreading unverified information,” the body said. “Emphasizing that the enemy actively conducts information special operations against Ukraine aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society.”

The cause of the crash was not immediately clear, though senior Russian officials, without providing evidence, said it was shot down by Ukrainian forces using either German or U.S.-made missiles.

None of the claims, either about who was aboard or about the cause, could be independently verified.

“An Il-76 plane crashed in the Belgorod region at around 11 a.m. on Jan. 24 while on a scheduled flight,” the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement. “It was transporting 65 captive servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Belgorod region for an exchange, in addition to six crew members and three accompanying people.”

One official, Andrei Kartapolov, chairman of the defense committee in Russia’s lower house of parliament, said that a second plane had narrowly escaped a similar disaster.

“There was the second Il-76 plane following which was carrying about 80 more prisoners of war. It was rerouted in time,” Kartapolov said.

“The leadership of Ukraine was well aware of the impending exchange; they were informed about how the prisoners would be delivered,” Kartapolov added. “But the Il-76 plane was shot down by three missiles from either a Patriot or an Iris-T antiaircraft missile system made in Germany.”

The speaker of the Russian parliament, Vyacheslav Volodin, said lawmakers would hold their U.S. and German counterparts accountable.

“The defenseless pilots of our military transport plane who were conducting a humanitarian mission have been shot using American, German missiles,” Volodin said during a parliamentary session. “Lawmakers of these countries must realize their responsibility, where this is all leading.”

Serhiy Morgunov in Lisbon contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Mary Ilyushina · January 24, 2024

23. The Future of Irregular Warfare: The United States is Winning, Now What?

January 16, 2024

The Future of Irregular Warfare: The United States is Winning, Now What?

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/perspectives/the-future-of-irregular-warfare-the-united-states-is-winning-now-what/

Thomas R. Searle

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Since at least the Cuban Revolution during the Eisenhower administration, the conventional wisdom has been that the U.S. consistently fails in irregular warfare (IW) and that dramatic changes are required to remedy this situation. In the spirit of full disclosure, the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) is an effort by the U.S. Congress to address the perceived IW crisis. The consensus view is so pervasive that, in a recent irregular warfare planning effort, a retired U.S. Army three-star, turned to this author and said: “maybe if we get this right, we will finally win a war.”

This narrative of universal U.S. failure and enemy triumph in IW could not be further from the truth, and a better approach to IW must start by accepting the impressive U.S. track record in IW. This brief essay will start by reviewing the IW performance of the United States compared to that of Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Iran. Having proven that questions about why the U.S. is losing and why adversaries are winning are based on false premises, the essay concludes by offering some new premises and some better questions we should be asking.

Photo by Michael Fousert on Unsplash

U.S. Success in Irregular Warfare

The U.S. won the Cold War without defeating Soviet nuclear or conventional forces. From the Soviet perspective, they successfully deterred a U.S. nuclear attack on the USSR. They also successfully deterred a conventional invasion of the USSR. Yet, the U.S. still destroyed the USSR through hostile actions below the level of direct large-scale armed conflict, i.e., through IW. NATO enlargement constitutes another, spectacular IW success. (There were 16 NATO members in 1990. Since then, 15 nations have joined NATO and Sweden is expected to join soon.) Anyone who doubts that NATO enlargement constitutes IW success by the U.S. needs to consult Vladimir Putin who views it as aggression below the level of armed conflict, i.e., as Irregular Warfare. We must also acknowledge that comparable expansion of Russian, PRC, or Iranian military alliances would be seen as Irregular Warfare successes.

The defeat of the Soviet Union, and NATO enlargement, are part of a larger pattern of U.S. success through IW. For other examples, consider the so called Color Revolutions that toppled the governments of Yugoslavia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005), Moldova (2009), Armenia (2018), and Bolivia (2019), drove Syrian forces out of Lebanon in 2005, and caused major civil disturbances that threatened to bring down many other regimes. The U.S. government does not claim credit for Color Revolutions, but deniability is an aspect of many IW activities. Moreover, Russia, the PRC, and many others blame the U.S. for all Color Revolutions. It is certainly the case that individuals and organizations funded by the U.S. government assist democratic dissidents and that Color Revolutions are based on democratic principles long advocated by the U.S. government. All this makes it fair to consider Color Revolutions examples of U.S. IW success. The same could be said for the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011 that brought down the governments of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, and forced government reforms in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Oman, since these represented similar pro-democracy revolutions.

In addition to population-centric IW successes like the collapse of the USSR, Color Revolutions, and NATO enlargement, the U.S. has also enjoyed significant success in IW efforts that are not population-centric. These include strategic sabotage efforts such as Cold War programs that deliberately allowed the Soviets to steal faulty technology leading to disastrous accidents inside the USSR and the Stuxnet cyber weapon that sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program. Additional examples of non-population centric U.S. success in IW would be the financial warfare innovations by the Treasury Department, the extraordinary economic sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia, and the targeted killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, which significantly degraded Iranian IW efforts in the Middle East.

While Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a conventional war, Moscow also considers U.S. support for Kiev to be Irregular Warfare against Russia. This U.S. IW campaign has been spectacularly successful and has dramatically weakened Russia diplomatically, militarily, and economically. The war has also damaged Russia’s reputation as a Great Power and even as a functioning state. The level of U.S. IW victory increases every day as Russia continues to waste enormous resources for minimal gains.

We also need to acknowledge U.S. adversaries’ assessment of U.S. IW efforts. In Russia, the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine is an attempt to explain spectacular U.S. success in Irregular Warfare to the Russian Army in hopes of countering it. In the PRC, Xi Jinping is terrified of becoming the victim of a U.S.-sponsored Color Revolution, as the USSR was. The PRC has also criticized U.S. actions as “salami slicing” tactics (i.e., IW) and insisted that these tactics will not work. Of course, these complaints announce the PRC’s fear that U.S. IW might work, and the PRC’s inability to find a countermeasure to “salami slicing” that is more effective than public complaints.

Adversary Failure in IW

In addition to recognizing U.S. successes in IW, debunking the idea that the U.S. is being trounced in IW also requires us to acknowledge the IW failures of Russia, the PRC, and Iran.

Russia’s catastrophic failure in IW is plain for all to see. Before 2022, when outsiders were lauding Putin’s supposed brilliance in Irregular Warfare, Putin himself recognized that in Ukraine—the most important target of his IW efforts—his campaign failed. As Putin admits, he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 because his IW campaign was doomed and he was left with “no other choice” than a major conventional war to avoid strategic defeat in Ukraine. Fortunately for the U.S., by replacing an inexpensive failed IW campaign with a disastrously expensive failed conventional warfare campaign, Putin has put his entire regime in jeopardy.

The PRC is not doing much better. Its IW efforts are making zero progress in resolving the Taiwan issue in Beijing’s favor and seem to be having the opposite effect since residents of the contested island are becoming increasingly hostile to the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC’s IW efforts have also been counterproductive elsewhere by arousing active opposition from the U.S. and a growing number of other states. For example, the counter-PRC groupings known as The Quad—consisting of Australia, India, the UK, and the U.S.—and AUKUS—consisting of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.—have been energized by PRC IW. Likewise, the states bordering the South China Sea—Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines—have hardened their attitudes against the PRC in response to predatory PRC behavior, i.e. IW, in the region. Europe is also taking a tougher line with the PRC and the Belt and Road Initiative has lost much of its luster in many places and is producing lower than expected returns for the PRC. Furthermore, while U.S. economic sanctions on the PRC are nothing compared to those on Iran and Russia, they do target key technologies and are specifically designed to counter the conventional and irregular PRC threat to U.S. security.

At the time of this writing (November 2023), Iran’s Hamas proxies are being pounded by Israeli firepower. Iran claims credit for the tactical competence Hamas showed in its October 7, 2023, attack. However, Israeli military operations will certainly leave Hamas weaker and Gaza poorer than they were before. Israel may eventually remove Hamas as the government of the Gaza statelet, reducing it to the status of a small but famous terrorist group and costing Iran one of its most important IW proxy forces. Hezbollah’s obvious reluctance to join the fight in a significant way indicates that it recognizes Hamas made a mistake on October 7 and that Iran does not want to lose two proxies in the same year.   

From late 2022 through early 2023, Iran was wracked by long-running protests against the regime. Iran blamed the U.S. for the unrest claiming it was waging a propaganda war, i.e., IW, against Iran. The protests and the government crackdown killed more than 500 Iranians, created substantial dissension within the regime, and led to additional European sanctions. Regardless of whether the protests were U.S. IW against Iran, the results were identical to those from a successful campaign.

Some claim that Iranian IW enables Iran to control four Arab countries—Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon—but the picture is less rosy than it sounds. Iranian (and Russian) assistance keeps the Assad regime in power in Damascus, but the ongoing civil war left Syria a shattered nation with a per capita GDP that ranks 198th in the world. This makes Syria a drain on Iranian resources rather than an asset for the foreseeable future. Yemen, ranking 202nd in per capita GDP, is in even worse shape than Syria. Iran’s influence in Iraq and Lebanon is challenged by popular protests in both countries, thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq, and the enduring paralysis in Lebanese politics. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Iran’s IW efforts have brought it little benefit at high cost and that some future IW success will not save the regime.

Abandoning False Premises, Adopting Better Ones, and Asking Better Questions

The U.S. is not invincible in IW and U.S. adversaries do not always fail, but the paragraphs above should put to rest the notion that in IW, the U.S. always fails and its adversaries always win. This means traditional IW questions about why the U.S. always loses and why its adversaries always win are based on false premises. To ask better questions we should start with at least three new premises and develop new questions based on them.

The first new premise is to take the Color Revolutions as seriously as U.S. adversaries do. From this premise new questions emerge such as: What works and does not work in facilitating a pro-democracy revolution? What are the challenges in consolidating success after a revolution (e.g., in Libya) and how can these be mitigated? What are the adversaries’ techniques for countering Color Revolutions and specifically how did Russia prevent a Color Revolution in Venezuela and how did Iran save the Assad Regime? How should the U.S. counter the adversary’s countermeasures?

The second new premise is to acknowledge adversary IW mistakes. From this premise new questions emerge such as: How did Putin fail so badly in IW against Ukraine leading up to the Orange Revolution, the Maidan Revolution, and between 2014 and 2022? How can the U.S. facilitate Putin’s continued failure and avoid imitating his mistakes? How did the PRC spend so much and get so little in return from its efforts to make unification with the PRC attractive to the people of Taiwan, and in convincing its neighbors that increased PRC power is a benefit to them? How can the U.S. facilitate continued PRC mistakes while avoiding similar mistakes?

The third new premise is that Russia and the PRC have studied U.S. IW closely to avoid the fate of the USSR. From this premise new questions emerge such as: How are U.S. adversaries trying to change the script and avoid Soviet mistakes? How can the U.S. thwart their efforts and create new traps for them? Kennedy-era reforms in U.S. IW helped win the Cold War but what will the U.S. need to conduct successful IW for the next half-century or more?

The three premises above and the related questions merely scratch the surface of what will emerge when we finally abandon the false narrative of consistent U.S. failure and adversary success in IW. The new premises and new questions do, however, start us on the road toward a more honest and accurate assessment of what the future of U.S. IW should look like.

Editor’s note: A longer discussion of many of these points will appear in the forthcoming Irregular Warfare Center book, titled The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare.

Tom Searle is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with more than 30 years of experience in the Special Operations Community. During his military career he deployed to combat with every Active and Reserve Special Forces Group, JSOC, and most AFSOC and NAVSPECWARCOM elements. He earned a Ph.D. in Military History from Duke University and is currently a Professor at the Joint Special Operations University.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com