Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

(Note: Just to keep all my readers informed, I will be leaving the Foundation for Defense of Democracies when my contract ends on 31 March 2023. My contract won’t be renewed because of FDD’s priorities on other policy issues but I’ve thoroughly enjoyed my experience at FDD and know that I’ve had the full support, gratitude, and appreciation from FDD’s leadership. So, I will be available to put my knowledge and experience with Korea and Northeast Asia and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare to work elsewhere.

I will continue my pro bono work with my daily news commentary (which I have been doing since 1996 through the Informal Institute of National Security Thinkers and Practitioners (IINSTP)) and editing the Small Wars Journal. I will continue to be committed to the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as a Senior Fellow with the Global Peace Foundation and I will continue to advise the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS).

For what it is worth this is my personal objective, and I am willing to explore any opportunities along the lines outlined here:

To serve as a strategic advisor in the US Government (Civilian Agency or DOD), academia, or private sector with specific focus on three areas: the full spectrum of the Korean security problem, Special Operations integration, interoperability, and interdependence (to include Irregular, Unconventional, and Political Warfare), and civilian and professional military education (teach, coach, and mentor military and civilian agency personnel) capitalizing on 30 plus years of professional experience and education as a Special Forces officer and national security practitioner. )

Quotes of the Day:

"All war is a symptom of man's failure as a thinking animal."

- John Steinbeck, “Once There Was a War”

“Tolkachev could not simply step into a backroom at his institute and make photocopies. The Soviet authorities had long feared copiers. At its most basic, the machine helped spread information, and strict control of information was central to the Communist Party's grip on power. In most offices, photocopy machines were kept under lock and key. “A copying machine is located in a special room and operated by four or five employees,” Tolkachev wrote to the CIA of the situation at his work-place. “Entry into the copying room is not allowed to persons not working there.”

- David E Hoffman the Billion Dollar Spy

"If people write well, they cannot think well, and if they cannot think well, others will do their thinking for them."

- George Orwell

1. US special operators borrowed a unique part of Army Green Beret training to prepare Ukrainians to fight Russia

2. Reimagining Joint Operations Across the U.S. Interagency

3. Opinion | The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine

4. The Magical Mossad Mystery Tour

5. China Is Trying to Play Nice, and It’s a Problem for the US

6. Mystery Synthetic Text Detector 300 (IWTSG, USSOCOM,and State's GEC)

7. Want to innovate for DoD? Pay close attention to Ukraine

8. Lawmakers propose mandatory 24-hour security at electrical substations after attacks on the power grid: ‘The targeting has increased’

9. COVID is running rampant in China – but herd immunity remains elusive

10. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 24, 2023

11. U.S. to give Ukraine advanced M1 tanks

12. German government reportedly ready to send Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks

13. Ukraine’s Zelensky Removes Top Officials in Bid to Contain Corruption Scandals

14. Foxes watching the hen house? DC insiders oversee Biden defense plans

15. Van Jackson Blames America First in the Asia-Pacific

16. What Western armour gives Ukraine in the next round of the war

17. Taiwan's president says war with China 'not an option'

18. Taiwan’s Urgent Task: A Radical New Strategy to Keep China Away

19. Biden Envoy Met Secretly with Iranians Amid Tehran’s Violent Crackdown on Protests

20. Support for Ukraine in US still high, but slowly fading: survey

21. Ukraine fighting confirms Marines' new focus on battlefield 'thinkers': Officials

22.Triple 7 Expedition completes record breaking skydive to help children of fallen soldiers

1. US special operators borrowed a unique part of Army Green Beret training to prepare Ukrainians to fight Russia

Cannot always be at the tip of the spear.

Excerpts:

Edwards acknowledged that some NATO militaries still have special operators in Ukraine, though strictly in an advisory role, and that US special operators "rely heavily on them" to understand the situation on the ground.

US Special Operations Command doesn't have an official presence in Ukraine and has adopted a "remote advise and assist" role there, but it is safe to assume that US special operators have some sort of footprint in the country — likely through US intelligence agencies — to help Ukrainians with their training and logistical challenges.

US special operators borrowed a unique part of Army Green Beret training to prepare Ukrainians to fight Russia

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

Ukrainian paratroopers train in the Zhytomyr region in September 2014.

SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images

Shortly after Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2014, US and NATO troops began training Ukrainians.
As part of that, US trainers set up a version of US Army Special Forces' "Q course" for Ukraine.
"Q course" assesses Green Beret candidates and teaches them the basics of their profession.

In 2014, Russia seized Crimea and large swaths of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine, setting off a long-running conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed fighters in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Eight years later, that low-intensity conflict escalated into a full-scale war, after Russian President Vladimir Putin sent his troops into Ukraine in late February 2022 to topple the government and install a new one under Moscow's influence.

During the intervening eight years, the US and its NATO allies were instrumental in helping Ukraine prepare to fight off that invasion, providing security assistance, intelligence, and military training.

In September, the leaders of US Special Operations Command Europe described how the Ukrainian military adjusted and evolved after the initial Russian invasion and how US special operators borrowed a unique part of US Army Green Beret training to prepare their Ukrainian counterparts to fight Russia.

Ukraine's 'Q' course

Candidates during US Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection at Camp Mackall in North Carolina in March 2020.

US Army/K. Kassens

Following Russia's 2014 invasion, the US military created the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, which brought conventional and special-operations troops from across NATO to train Ukraine's military in modern war-fighting methods.

That training created a corps of professional troops with which Ukraine is now beating back the Russians. Although there was some staff-level training on how to fight a large conventional conflict, most of the training concerned tactical-level operations, including small-arms proficiency, marksmanship, close-quarters combat, and patrolling.

"I think one of the key programs we created was a Q course, a force-generation model for Ukrainian [special-operations forces] much like US Army Special Forces and their Q course," Navy Command Master Chief Peter Musselman, the senior enlisted leader at Special Operations Command Europe, said during a New America event in September.

US Army officers train Ukrainian troops during a combat exercise at a base in Yavoriv, Ukraine in October 2017.

Gaelle Girbes/Getty Images

The "Q course," officially called the US Army Special Forces Qualification Course, assesses and teaches Green Beret candidates the basics of their profession. Special Operations Command Europe — working through the US Army's 10th Special Forces Group, which is responsible for Europe — developed the course for their Ukrainian troops.

"The Q course puts unique pressure on teams and individuals. Aside from the world-class training, it truly helps to identify and select the best of the best," John Black, a retired Army Green Beret warrant officer, told Insider.

Lasting anywhere from 56 to 95 weeks, depending on the Green Beret's military occupational specialty, Q Course includes unconventional warfare, small unit tactics, and Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training. It culminates with Robin Sage, a large-scale realistic exercise that puts all the skills into action.

The elements of Q Course that the Ukrainians have incorporated into their selection and assessment process allow the instructors to choose the best troops. For students who go through the training, the course offers them the opportunity to perform their best under stress and pressure, Black said.

A Special Forces candidate crosses a water obstacle during Robin Sage in central North Carolina in July 2019.

US Army/K. Kassens

"Being able to closely look at the individuals going through the course, then identify and select the best from that pool, is incredible. This is why the Ukrainian [special-operations force] is as strong as they are and able to handle their current conflict," Black added.

The relationships that US troops built with their Ukrainian counterparts during that period are now making it much easier to advise and assist the Ukrainians on the ground.

US Air Force Maj. Gen. Steven Edwards, commander of Special Operations Command Europe, said the Ukrainians have been "very successful" in fighting the Russians and that their success is "truly a testament to the quality of training" provided by NATO special operators.

Remote train and assist

Ukrainian troops during a training session at their base in Slavyansk in September 2014.

ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images

Ukrainian special operators have been put their training to use by ambushing Russian armored columns, conducting long-range reconnaissance, and by generally augmenting Ukraine's conventional forces on the frontline. But the war has affected the level of interaction that US and Ukrainian operators have been able to have since 2014.

Musselman, a Navy SEAL, said American special operators have had to advise their Ukrainian counterparts from a distance since Russia launched its renewed attack.

"Where previously we were able to interact with our Ukrainian partners on a daily basis, we now find ourselves having to communicate via remote devices, telephones, computers," Musselman said. "So that adds another level of complexity."

Edwards acknowledged that some NATO militaries still have special operators in Ukraine, though strictly in an advisory role, and that US special operators "rely heavily on them" to understand the situation on the ground.

US Special Operations Command doesn't have an official presence in Ukraine and has adopted a "remote advise and assist" role there, but it is safe to assume that US special operators have some sort of footprint in the country — likely through US intelligence agencies — to help Ukrainians with their training and logistical challenges.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

2. Reimagining Joint Operations Across the U.S. Interagency

A very interesting article on interagency coordination looking at two case studies in Africa. Note the working relationships among SOF and various agencies.

I will continue to beat the drum for an interagency process to drive strategy and planning and the development of an interagency "campaign."

We need to reprise Presidential Decision Directive 56 - Management of Complex Contingency Operations from May 1997 and reorient and revise that process to support strategic competition and operations in the gray zone (and especially political and irregular warfare).

See the declassified original PDD 56 message here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14vHDq6qWgfVt-uXr3D_DTiMBBjt5d-2y/view?usp=sharing

See this article from Parameters authorised by the late Len Hawley who was the driving force behind PDD 56 when he worked on the NSC. "Crisis Management Lessons from the Administration's Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 56" https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3077&context=parameters

Conclusion

Successfully rethinking operations across U.S. agencies can result in a better-balanced, competitive approach towards achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives as well as thwarting the advancement of authoritarianism. The realignment of political objectives across the trinity of diplomacy, defense and economic development will promote democratic norms and ideals and serve the greater good in national emergencies. For example, in 2018 agencies supporting a U.S. trinity of resources made international news when they worked with their Thai and international counterparts to support the rescue of 12 children and one adult after they became stuck in a northern Thai cave. The Royal Thai government requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to support a coordinated search and rescue operation. For the U.S. to remain a partner of choice, the U.S. must rethink “jointness” and harness the trinity in a coordinated, interagency approach to achieve foreign policy objectives and uphold democratic values around the world.

Reimagining Joint Operations Across the U.S. Interagency

thethreo.com · by kelly.rappuchi

By Kaley Scholl

International Team of Military Personnel Have Meeting in Top Secret Facility, Female Leader Holds Laptop Computer Talks with Male Specialist. People in Uniform on Strategic Army Meeting

In their article “Divided We Fall: How the U.S. Force is Losing Its Joint Advantage over China and Russia,” authors Col Dan Sukman and Ltc Charles Davis (Ret.) argue that U.S. military “jointness” is eroding relative to China and Russia’s focus on joint operations. As our key national security and military strategies magnify the virtues of a whole of government approach to strategic competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) still struggles to achieve “jointness” across the military services.

Historically, the U.S.’s approach to achieving national security objectives has been led by using the military instead of non-kinetic instruments of U.S. national power. To successfully compete in today’s complex world, it is necessary to develop a new concept of competition that goes beyond the U.S. military’s joint force. For the U.S. to be competitive, and to achieve national political objectives in the complex 21st century geopolitical environment, the U.S. government must rethink “joint operations” as a coordinated, interagency approach using the trinity of diplomacy, defense and economic power through development. Once our interagency objectives are aligned and synchronized, the U.S. can compete at a higher level against adversaries who combine all elements of their national power to further U.S. objectives around the globe.

Today’s Adversaries

Speaking at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in 2019, Chief of General Staff General V. V. Gerasimov announced the “emergence of new spheres of confrontation in modern conflicts and methods of warfare increasingly shift towards the integrated application of political, economic, informational, and other nonmilitary measures, realized with reliance on military force.” To that end, Russia’s military often incorporates nontraditional forces such as the Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry, and the Ministry for Emergency Situations that can place the Russian military subordinate to other interagency departments. For the Russian military to be a supporting component in an interagency “joint operation” requires a significant paradigm shift that the U.S. military has not yet made.

Similarly, the national strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fuses social and economic development strategies to meet its political goals of national rejuvenation while modifying the liberal rules-based international order. After taking office in 2003, President Hu Jintao prioritized the need for “military-civil fusion,”a literal shift in Chinese linguistic characters from “combination” to “fusion,”marking a wider scope and deeper level of military-civil integration that current President Xi Jinping exalted to the status of national strategy. In practice, military-civil fusion creates and leverages connections between PRC military modernization and economic development efforts (both domestic and foreign) in order to synchronize resources, talent, and innovation. This military-civil fusion involves synchronizing national-level efforts to include technology, big data, industry and defense mobilization . According to The Science of Military Strategy 2020, the PRC is pursuing a strategy in which “comprehensive national power is the sum of all material and spiritual power of a country – the totality of political, economic, military, technological, and spiritual power that can be used or mobilized for military conflicts.”

Our adversaries are employing a wide range of civilian, paramilitary, and military instruments across diplomatic and development projects to showcase a synchronization of national assets that the U.S. once practiced, but has since atrophied.

Case Study: Interagency Coordination Success in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the trinity of American diplomacy, defense, and economic development disrupted a PRC port construction project. During their third deployment in Nigeria, a team from the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion noticed a billboard with Chinese characters accompanying a photo of the southern Port of Harcourt. The team sent a photo of the billboard to a cross-functional team of the 3rd Special Forces Group and the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion. The cross-functional team recognized the significance of this Chinese activity and with information operations and intelligence teams from Fort Bragg, uncovered a Chinese conglomerate active in Nigeria that had announced the construction of a deep-water port as part of the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative. The team conducted a campaign to highlight Chinese activities which ignited long-standing friction between Nigerian workers and Chinese corporations. Within two weeks, the Chinese construction company lost 60% of its required labor pool for the port expansion as the Army Special Forces team worked with the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and local non-governmental organizations to establish a job fair near protest areas to provide employment for disaffected Nigerian workers..

Simultaneously, Nigerian security forces brought in by Army Special Forces discovered an illegal weapons cache traced back to the construction company. Nigerian security forces also obtained port construction blueprints, which when sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis, it was discovered that the concrete footings were designed to support surface-to-air and shore-to-ship missiles. Armed with this analysis, the U.S. Ambassador informed the Nigerian host counterparts that the port would become a strategic target and potential war zone between great powers; the Nigerians seized the Chinese-purchased land and halted the port construction. This whole of government approach halted construction of the PRC’s first Atlantic Ocean port capable of hosting weapons within range of the continental U.S..

Case Study: COVID Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean

Cold War U.S. diplomatic efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) were inextricably linked to using defense initiatives to thwart Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere. A scarring smear on 20th century U.S. diplomatic efforts includes supporting diplomatic initiatives that used paramilitary actions resulting in future DoD-led efforts being perceived with hesitation or outright suspicion of imperialism. Therefore, the U.S. interagency must approach any efforts to further strategic goals using the other levers of the trinity. For example, to support larger U.S. goals, USAID provides unique regional access and placement, working with community partners and volunteers on the ground in both urban and rural environments. Historically, USAID has developed grassroots relationships and understands cultural contexts in ways that can shape U.S. diplomatic objectives and, in turn, U.S. military training and assistance programs. By using the other levers of the trinity, the U.S. interagency is able to achieve far-reaching strategic goals with a much more diversified toolkit beyond the scope and authorities of the DoD alone.

Vaccine-related diplomacy facilitated both China’s and the U.S.’s broader engagement in the region. While the U.S. military was instrumental in providing the logistics for vaccine delivery, U.S. COVID-19 vaccine donations served broader strategic goals, such as combating the root causes of migration flows of displaced persons heading north by improving security conditions and bolstering economic prosperity during the economic uncertainty of the pandemic. In addition, U.S. vaccine diplomacy efforts shored up confidence in the U.S. as a partner of choice as perceptions of U.S. vaccines versus those vaccines donated from the PRC and Russia were markedly different. Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro repeatedly questioned the efficacy of the Chinese vaccine, preferring the U.S. vaccines for the Brazilian immunization campaign. To complement its great power ambitions, Moscow pursued a state-sponsored social media effort to promote Sputnik V, its COVID-19 vaccine, in LAC. However, Russia’s efforts were met with apprehension due to a lack of transparency in research data combined with a dearth of supplies, allowing vaccine diplomacy to reinvigorate American diplomacy and shore up broader U.S. strategic objectives, including economic equality, fostering private sector innovation, and developing climate-related industries to stimulate job growth.

Developing the Trinity for Global Competition

Africa

According to an AfroBarometer survey, the policy priority preferences for most Africans include democratic governance, investment in health and education, and infrastructure. Complicating U.S. development assistance in Africa is the requirement that U.S. initiatives are tethered to economic or political conditions. Juxtaposed against U.S. requirements to reduce risk and encourage responsible behaviors, the PRC provides African countries with unconditional spending coupled with increased diplomatic attention. This dichotomy of action translates to competitors who steadily gain influence on the continent while the U.S. falters.

Recommendations

The current U.S. strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions enumerates four objectives including open societies, the promotion of democratic and security dividends, pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, and climate adaptation balanced against a just energy transition. To advance national strategic goals, the U.S. should focus the trinity on investing in climate-resilient infrastructure projects. Where the PRC has notably dominated in infrastructure projects globally attributed to its Belt and Road Initiative, the U.S. first can focus on climate-resilient infrastructure that serves the community, such as a school, which serves as both infrastructure and community space – an outcomes-focused investment coupling education with income equality. Also, as opposed to PRC projects built with Chinese labor, an American trinity can focus on jobs and opportunities for the local populace. And, as regional terrorism feeds directly into destabilization, human migration, and food insecurity, the trinity of American resources can and should be leveraged to address stabilization efforts at their core, including projects focused on energy and climate-resilient agriculture to bolster economic development and clamp down on the sources of terrorism recruitment. Investment in human capital will create more-engaged citizens to build the foundation for stable democracies as validated by a study conducted in Nigeria that found that the cohort of students that benefited from the introduction of universal primary education in the mid-1970s was found to be more engaged in political life, paying closer attention to the news, attending community meetings, and voting more often than those who did not go to primary school. As PRC and Russian engagement in at-risk regions continues to increase, the U.S. must harness the trinity to rethink political, economic and security engagements with African and other developing states.

Conclusion

Successfully rethinking operations across U.S. agencies can result in a better-balanced, competitive approach towards achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives as well as thwarting the advancement of authoritarianism. The realignment of political objectives across the trinity of diplomacy, defense and economic development will promote democratic norms and ideals and serve the greater good in national emergencies. For example, in 2018 agencies supporting a U.S. trinity of resources made international news when they worked with their Thai and international counterparts to support the rescue of 12 children and one adult after they became stuck in a northern Thai cave. The Royal Thai government requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to support a coordinated search and rescue operation. For the U.S. to remain a partner of choice, the U.S. must rethink “jointness” and harness the trinity in a coordinated, interagency approach to achieve foreign policy objectives and uphold democratic values around the world.

About the Author:

Kaley Scholl is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Assessments Branch at the Joint Chiefs of Staff J5- Strategy, Plans, and Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition, Kaley is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, and completed her Master’s in Global Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

thethreo.com · by kelly.rappuchi

3. Opinion | The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine

Opinion | The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine

The New York Times · by Thomas Kasza · January 24, 2023

Guest Essay

The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine

Jan. 24, 2023, 10:03 a.m. ET

U.S. Army soldiers from the 2nd Battalion 87th Infantry Division overseeing the training of Afghan National Army soldiers in 2016 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.Credit...Adam Ferguson for The New York Times

Mr. Kasza served as a Green Beret in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I am an American Special Forces soldier, a volunteer knowing well the hazards of this profession in which I’ve served quietly for 14 years.

And I helped build Vladimir Putin’s foreign legion.

Green Berets — the “Horse Soldiers” who toppled the Taliban in 2001 — are not Army Rangers or Navy SEALs. We specialize in training and fighting alongside indigenous forces, and our greatest strength is the trust and camaraderie we develop with our counterparts. For years, the Green Berets and the Commandos of the Afghan National Army were a bulwark against the Taliban. It was a partnership forged at immense cost in American and Afghan lives.

Since the precipitous departure from Afghanistan, and in the absence of meaningful government support to the nonprofit organizations who have worked to aid our former allies, many of those highly trained commandos have accepted recruitment offers to fight with the Russian Army in Ukraine. For the 20,000 to 30,000 men that we trained, a steady salary and the promise of shelter from the Taliban is often too good of a deal to pass up — even if the cost is returning to combat.

As the next Congress prepares to investigate the withdrawal and how it went so disastrously wrong, they should examine not only the lead-up to those dramatic days in August 2021 when the Taliban swept into Kabul, but also what happened — and is currently happening — in the wake of their victory. How those who safeguarded American troops are actively hunted. How they’ve suffered under the Taliban. How our government turned a blind eye. How Afghans were forced to pay nearly $600 per person to apply for humanitarian parole, while Ukrainians had the fee waived.

Following the gross malfeasance of the withdrawal, I didn’t think that there were more red lines to cross, any further moral injury that could be inflicted on those of us who served or worked to save our allies. Yet, with this soul-sickening revelation that our closest partners will now bleed for Russia, here we are. Again.

We should have seen it coming. We abandoned our closest partners wholesale: what choice were the commandos left with? Those left behind are suffering destitution, famine, persecution from the Taliban.

Mr. Putin, suspect though his promises may be, provides hope. If they fight for Russia, their families might live under better conditions, they might earn the $1,500 recruitment incentive and they might earn Russian citizenship. The irony is that those who head to the front lines in the Donbas will be shredded by the very same American-built weapons that once supported them in battle.

I cannot blame those Afghan commandos who fight for Russia; to do so would deny them agency in their own survival.

And it was a deft and cunning move from Mr. Putin, who increases the lethality of his frontline soldiers without risking Russian lives. These soldiers are not amateurs, conscripts or convicts. This is a battle-tested special operations force, trained by America’s best. They might not tip the scales of Russia’s war, but they are competent. Ukrainians will die by their hands.

The Taliban must also be rejoicing. The most dangerous core for a resistance movement is fleeing the country.

Meanwhile, our national shame is perpetuated and a generation of Special Forces is saddled with mitigating the damage from America’s previous conflict while their task of winning the trust of allies — present and future — is made more difficult and more dangerous.

Compounding the tragedy is the fact that there is an army of volunteers, grass-roots organizations, and boutique nonprofits (including one that I founded) champing at the bit to help. Yet we are stymied at every turn by cowardice, political dysfunction and a lack of resources.

In July, during a video conference with members of the various nongovernmental organizations, Secretary of State Antony Blinken voiced his gratitude toward these groups, acknowledging our assumption of the State Department’s responsibilities, and expressing that “We need you to continue to do so.” Why though? Why is it incumbent on American civilians, veterans and active service members to dedicate our own time and resources to rebuild our nation’s honor?

The private refugee sponsorship initiative known as the “Welcome Corps” touted by Secretary Blinken as the “the boldest innovation in refugee resettlement in four decades” is a missed opportunity. At the very earliest, by-name sponsorship will not take effect for Afghans until at least mid 2023, effectively dooming hundreds who could be saved with immediate, decisive action. Aid at an indeterminate point in 2023 is not good enough. They need it now. If our leaders intend to wash their hands of Afghanistan, they should support the nongovernmental organizations who have stepped up to do their job for them.

I don’t know if our efforts in Afghanistan were in vain, and the memory of a fallen brother in arms complicates that question. I see the improvements to infrastructure, the generation of women and girls who received an education. But the motto of the Green Berets is “De Oppresso Liber” — To free the oppressed. The country we bled for to keep free is gone, and the very weapon we created to keep oppression at bay has been co-opted by tyranny.

Deploying to Afghanistan was easy. Trying to hold a government-size moral failing at bay feels like running a relay with no one reaching to receive the baton. Our morality has been taken for granted and we are tired. Tired of swallowing our anger. Tired of an endless moral injury. Tired of the red lines and red tape.

I can only imagine the betrayal our Afghan counterparts must feel.

I have little more to give. I’ve sacrificed finances, career opportunities and medical school aspirations. Relationships and my well-being have borne the brunt of it. I don’t begrudge those who carry on with life as usual, though I sometimes feel disconnected from them. To keep myself in equilibrium, I often feel as though I must put on a mask to hide the shame, humiliation and rage.

Tremendous advances in military medicine have been made during 20 years of war, but there is no coverage offered for a battered conscience. If I want help from the Veteran’s Administration, I lie. I lie and say this impotent, lonesome anger bloomed from a tunnel outside Kandahar where some Taliban fighters thought they were safe from the explosives I carried.

I’ll look to the healing of my own moral wounds as best as I am able. I hope that Congress in turn can lead, and help our nation start healing in it’s own right by honoring the promises we made to those who went into combat on our behalf.

It is the very least we can do because if we don’t offer our allies hope and meaningful action, someone like Vladimir Putin will.

Mr. Kasza served as a Green Beret in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is now in the National Guard and founded the 1208 Foundation, which provides humanitarian aid and immigration advocacy to Afghans who served with American Special Forces.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

The New York Times · by Thomas Kasza · January 24, 2023

4. The Magical Mossad Mystery Tour

Long read. Interesting story.

The Magical Mossad Mystery Tour

A former U.S. intelligence officer visits some old friends

Tablet · by Peter Theroux · January 24, 2023

Just East of Zar’it, Northern Israel

“You want to know a secret? Hezbollah is watching! They are usually up there with binoculars,” an Israeli soldier confided to me. She pointed north amid the green hills in the direction of Ramya, the Lebanese village which was the approximate starting point of the terrorist group’s flagship tunnel, named Wilderness Flower by the IDF but more commonly known as the Ramya Tunnel. We were standing amid a group of tourists at the tunnel’s mouth, now framed in concrete and with a metal door, nearly four years to the day that the Israel Defense Forces had exposed the assault passageway, one of six dug from inside southern Lebanon under Israeli territory. The IDF has blown up the other five.

If Hezbollah was indeed watching, it must have been a shaming experience for the surveillants. This marvel of military engineering, which would have enabled a flash mob of Shia fighters to emerge in the Upper Galilee to slaughter at will, was now entertaining a group of about 50 mostly elderly and Jewish tourists, some using walkers, many commenting on what schmucks the Hezbollahis must have been to invest so heavily in not one but six failed tunnels, as we moved on to Misgav Am for ice cream.

“It took the IDF four years to figure out all the tunnels,” said Major Nehemiah, another soldier who invited visitors to photograph anything except himself. “Hezbollah envisioned an elite force to surprise us through the tunnels. They would have surfaced here on the Old Northern Road. It would have a been a tactical, propaganda victory for them, against civilians.”

The Ramya Tunnel, he said, had taken Hezbollah about 10 years to build, and apart from Iranian funding, no foreign expertise or other role was evident in its creation. It ran for about a mile under Ramya into this area near the town of Zar’it, and the concluding section consisted of a circular cement staircase rising nearly 80 yards upward to this point. The steps were too steep for many tour members to explore, but some of our orange-helmeted number tried them out, noting that the damp dolomite walls sported power cables (labeled “Original Hezbollah Infrastructure” in Hebrew and English) but no handrails; presumably Hezbollah fighters would have been of a spryer demographic than us.

A signpost located just outside the Hezbollah tunnel openingCourtesy the author

Hezbollah’s surveillance duties at this site must be light, because visits are rare—the tunnel is not open to the public. But we were not sightseers but fortunate members of the Ultimate Mossad Mission, a biannual tour sponsored by the Israel Law Center and Shurat HaDin (“Letter of the Law”).

The busload skewed mature, affluent, American, European, and Canadian, with a scattering of family ties to Israel—several would hang on after the tour to visit grandchildren or in-laws—and we could have passed for an extended family on the road with our uniform casual clothes, sturdy shoes, mobile phones, water bottles, and laminated IDs hanging from matching lanyards. Most men wore ball caps, with or without kippahs. Some women’s hair blew in the breeze, some sported snoods or bucket hats resembling the kova tembel or fool’s hat beloved of old-timey kibbutzniks.

We shared the élan of the security-conscious elect conversant with the Spy Museum in D.C., the NSA Museum, which is open to the public, or the CIA Museum, which is not. Our travel highlights would not be luxurious hotels or opulent buffets but coveted access to sites like this, and the high-level intelligence briefings we would judge and follow up with penetrating questions.

The connections between our weeklong jaunt and the Mossad were in fact rather modest. Retired and active Israeli security officers with various affiliations provided backgrounders on security matters, but they were often from the military or law enforcement sectors, which should not have been a surprise. The Mossad is a foreign intelligence organization unlikely to provide foreign visitors with information on bread-and-butter security issues. Someone apparently figured that an “Ultimate Border Police Mission Tour” would lack snap.

Shurat HaDin’s founder, Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, modeled her organization on the Southern Poverty Law Center, embracing the principle of using lawsuits to target bad actors, especially their funding streams. At one point in 2004, Mossad approached her, impressed with her abilities to sue terrorist groups and their sponsors, and win. Mossad’s own efforts to disrupt terror finance bore the code name HARPOON, and Darshan-Leitner chose that as the title of her book, Harpoon: Inside the Covert War Against Terrorism’s Money Masters.

“[Mossad] never instructed the newly-launched law center to sue any specific target,” we read in the book. (Ultimate Mossad Mission members get free copies.) “Shurat HaDin wasn’t working on behalf of any government agency. That would have been inappropriate. But there were always suggestions … useful hints that were offered. ‘Harpoon never directed us,’ Nitsana recalled.”

Anyone familiar with U.S. intelligence agencies might see a parallel to the CIA’s relationship with cooperative contacts, which cannot be tasked, as opposed to recruited assets. Darshan-Leitner notes in the introduction to the book that given her extensive contacts with Mossad, she submitted her manuscript for Mossad officers for pre-publication review and redaction. It is useless to read anything more into this, though, as Darshan-Leitner’s friendship with Mossad is not something she tries to hide, justify, or boast of. Her law center shares common cause with the intelligence service against Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PLO, and her book shows her to be a shrewd judge of allies and adversaries.

Anyone familiar with a different book, Kingdom of Olives and Ash: Writers Confront the Occupation, might see a parallel that concerned me more. In one of the most famous online reviews in the history of Amazon, Israeli writer Matti Friedman mocked its subject as “the kind of Mideast conflagration where writers can sally forth in an air-conditioned bus, safely observe the natives for a few hours, and make it back to a nice hotel for drinks … Most of the essays aren’t journalism but a kind of selfie in which the author poses in front of the symbolic moral issue of the time: Here I am at an Israeli checkpoint! Here I am with a shepherd!” My name appears in Kingdom of Olives and Ash because I translated one of the essays from Arabic. As I sallied forth in an air-conditioned bus every day of the tour, it was not Hezbollah’s potential scrutiny that mattered, but Friedman’s. Here I am at a Hezbollah tunnel! Here I am looking at a border fence!

Misgav Am

Israel is watching, too, of course. Our next stop had been selected for its vantage point along the Israeli-Lebanese border because altitude matters—it is the rare spot along the frontier where the Jewish state looks down upon its northern neighbor.

“Misgav Am is the fingernail of the finger of the Galilee,” our guide informed us. The towns of Metulla and Shlomi are farther north but are set lower. At his back, a wide set of windows offered a panoramic view of the extreme northern Galilee and of southern Lebanon, separated by a fence topped with barbed wire. Israel is a small country and Lebanon is even smaller, but this view of Lebanon’s Shia heartland, which I had studied as a student of the late Imam Musa Sadr, later of Hezbollah, and still later doing National Geographic fieldwork, was truly a postage stamp. Here Kafr Shuba nestling in Mount Hermon was a stone’s throw from Ghajar, the village famously bisected between Israel and Lebanon; Metulla, surrounded on three sides by Lebanon; and al-Khiyam, where Israel and the South Lebanon Army had maintained a prison camp decades ago. And on the horizon, Nabatiyah and Beaufort Castle. Closest of all, practically in our laps, was the Lebanese town of Adeyseh (“little lentil”). You could take all this in without turning your head an inch.

“Look at Ghajar,” our briefer said. “All of its residents are Israelis. On the south side they are in Israel, on the north side, they are Israelis in enemy territory. Imagine the security issues, with Hezbollah controlling beyond that line. Until our pullout in 2000, Israeli and Lebanese children played together in Adeyseh—no longer.”

I had once moved around this part of southern Lebanon and noted the profusion of mansions in these humble villages built with the money expatriate workers sent home from their jobs in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, so that the outskirts of Tyre, Jibshit, Nabatiyah, and Bint Jbeil had a walled, landscaped Beverly Hills look in contrast to their sad-looking village centers.

“Very nice mansion houses,” our briefer observed, deploying his pointer. “But please notice in these towns and up to Nabatiyah al-Taybeh, the ones that are Hezbollah. Beautiful mansions but no windows! A three-story mansion in scenic territory with not one window! Interesting, yes?”

Each stop on the Shurat HaDin tour touched on some theme of Israel’s interrelated security dilemmas. Here it seemed to be the grand, Iranian-backed regional threat subsumed in this Lilliputian geography. Little Kafr Kila, for example, renowned for the fine olive oil and honey, is home to Hezbollah arms depots and observation posts. It was also the site of the first Hezbollah tunnel the IDF discovered.

Nearly 30 years before, my Hezbollah guide had kept me on a short leash as we ventured into what was already a largely (now thoroughly) militarized zone. I had already got on his bad side by photographing and laughing out loud at a town square in Nabatiyah signposted “Martyr Bassel al-Assad Square”—commemorating the late Syrian president’s no-good son who drunk-drove his Mercedes into a lethal crash in 1994 on the way to Damascus Airport on a foggy night.

Against this background, Darshan-Leitner and her husband, Aviel, took questions. Darshan-Leitner is a striking Persian beauty from Petah Tikva whose parents arrived from Shiraz around the time of independence. Avi’s rotund and lawyerly presence belied a rap sheet for violence in his youth. Addressing Shurat HaDin’s latest efforts, especially against Iran, Darshan-Leitner reeled off several, including gambits to recover money for terror victims against Boeing; an Iranian-owned property at 650 Fifth Avenue in New York; and a house in Lubbock, Texas, formerly owned by a son of the late shah and now owned by the Iranian government. This cheerful news put the group in the mood for more ice cream and energy bars.

Winding our way to the next stop past notable villages—moshav Elkosh, home to Yemenite and Kurdish Jews, and Fassuta, the birthplace of Israeli-American writer Anton Shammas—our guide reminded us that while southern Lebanon might produce excellent olive oil and honey, the towns and kibbutzes around us produced world-class poultry, apples, and even armored steel plates, some of them exported to the USA for the army’s use in military vehicles.

Behind me, tour members were engaged in cross-cultural sparring over terminology. A reference to a nursery in a kibbutz led an American to correct a Spaniard, saying, “When you say nursery, you mean kindergarten. That’s what we call it.” The Spaniard disagreed, saying, “I am talking not about children. I am talking about peach saplings.”

The conversation was notable because tour members otherwise rarely disagreed about much. Not only were all uniformly concerned with Israel’s security, about half had been on previous iterations of the mission, whose itinerary has changed with the times—the Hezbollah tunnel was a post-COVID addition. Even so, it was surprising how well-read a diverse group of nearly 50 adults was on the subjects they agreed on. Former President Obama had few fans, not only because of the Iran deal, but because of his fact-challenged account of the partition of Palestine and the independence of Israel in his memoir, which most of us had read. Stephen Hawking was known to all as someone who had soured on Israel despite needing Israeli technology to stay alive.

The Golan Heights

In Innocents Abroad, Mark Twain categorized his fellow travelers to the Holy Land as pilgrims or sinners. The passengers on board the sleek bus now winding its way towards Quneitra were mostly pilgrims—true believers in Israel’s security equities, plus one or two hawks who seemed to find the Israeli military or security officers we met a little too dovish for their taste. A few more, who may have been hunting for spouses of a congenial political background, were the closest we had to sinners. I was in a sort of penumbra, a Catholic with Jewish roots, paternally in southern France and maternally in Ferrara, Italy, and a robust Ashkenazi Jewish DNA score. (I have visited our ancestral village in France, Verdun-sur-Garonne, where my distant cousins pointed out that Theroux was a made-up name with no French root. They laughed at our family folklore relating it to taureau or toro: “C’est ridicule, ça. Tu n’est pas un taureau, tu es juif!”) More particularly, here and now, I was representing the tiny fraternity of Golan geeks who have visited its sloping majesty from within Syria, Lebanon, and now Israel.

An abandoned Soviet-built medical centerCourtesy the author

Many fellow tourists seemed to be attracted to the intimations of clandestinity in a tour bearing the name Mossad. Among ourselves, we heard the word “spy” a lot in an approving sense, asking the briefers if they were spying on Syria from here, or spying on mosques or cellphone networks in the territories. The exception was a former U.S. naval officer who had served aboard submarines and observed the superiority of everything American over everything Soviet until the John and Michael Walker spy scandal in the 1980s, which suddenly gave the Soviets observable, impressive new capabilities. Then the Jonathan Pollard case had repercussions on religious or pro-Israel Jews who, like, him, were in line for security clearances. “God, how I hate those guys,” he said. “I fucking hate spies.”

A couple of points in the Israeli Golan commemorate a very good spy, Elie Cohen alias Kamil Amin Thabit, executed by the Syrians in 1965. One is a now abandoned and colorfully graffitied Soviet-built medical clinic in the southern part of Quneitra which Cohen once visited, and which contains photos and plaques (spared graffiti) documenting his visit. This is a favorite stop for Israeli tour buses, dirt bikers and four-wheel-drive vehicles—a few of us hopped off our sleek bus to check it out on Kawasaki ATVs. And there is a statue of Cohen’s widow, Nadia, on a hilltop, eternally gazing northward into Syria and awaiting his return, thus far in vain. The return of the remains of murdered Israelis has been a feature of Israeli truce talks with Hezbollah and Hamas, and a request for the return of Cohen’s remains from Syria is occasionally reported as on the table when Israel negotiates with the Syrian regime.

Like Ramya, the Golan is a seemingly dormant frontline that might have live coals under the dead ashes. Our briefer, Major Avraham Levine, had served in the IDF’s elite Golani Brigade and lives in nearby Avney Eitan, a mile from the Syrian border. Levine sported a ginger goatee animated by wry smiles and the build you would expect of a Golani infantryman. He delivered his alarming assessments in the fluent English of the son of American olim. He pointed to a row of white buildings a stone’s throw away, within Syria, that housed the UNDOF mission, an effort frozen in time.

“Look at UNDOF—they are still counting tanks, like a conventional war might break out between us and Syria! Another tank battle? Excuse me? After the American war in Iraq, Iraq is no longer a buffer. One President Bush left Saddam in place—a mistake? Maybe not! Not for me to say! Another President Bush overthrew Saddam, so now we have no buffer—does geography tell you Iran is east of Iraq? Geography is lying!” He held up a map. “This is a bad map! Iran is one mile away.” He pointed to the low valley to the north that looked to be a 20-minute walk.

Levine’s worry was that Syria had involved Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah in its brutal internal war against dissidents, giving them not only close access to Israel but opportunities to hone their skills. U.S. forces had killed IRGC Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad, but Soleimani’s protégé, Imad Mughnieh’s son Jihad, had been active right here in the Golan, where the IDF killed him in January 2015. Worse, Hezbollah, which had fought defensive wars against Israel in 2000 and 2006, had now spent years learning offensive warfare in Syria.

This you can say for Israeli military or intelligence briefers: Inhabiting this small country with concentric rings of enemies like a bull’s eye, they are rarely cocky, hawkish, or sanguine. As with Major Nehemiah at the Hezbollah tunnel, Major Levine was measured and a little short when assessing his nearby Lebanese and Syrian adversaries.

“Can they beat us? Never. Can they invade and raise the Hezbollah flag over Metulla for two hours? I won’t say. But what would that propaganda victory mean? A boost in morale, for sure.”

“Look,” he said. “Israel might be busy with Jenin and Gaza but the real issue is here. If we did not care about civilians, which our enemies hide behind, we could solve Hamas in a matter of hours for good, but how many would we kill? No, we will never do it.”

“So what are the scenarios for war here? Like 2006, someone starts something small that gets big. Now they have precision missiles, which are a red line. We have air defense batteries for protection, but I can see from my house that Iron Dome batteries keep moving around, which tells me we do not have enough of them. Or Hezbollah or the IDF kills civilians. Or Iran openly has a nuclear bomb. So we go after it with cyber or special ops, or something kinetic but we won’t say it’s us. Hezbollah will be the retribution.”

Whatever happens, Levine said, IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi swears we will retaliate not just against Hezbollah but against Lebanon.

“Artillery is not the endgame,” he emphasized, shaking a finger at us. “It is win-win, only a matter of what is the price. Right now, we are not solving the problem, just stalling. Believe me, that will change.”

On a lighter note, for me anyway, Levine pointed to a hilltop of buildings inside the Syrian Golan and said this was where the original inhabitants of Syrian Quneitra had rebuilt after the destruction of their town in the 1973 war. “It is called Khan Arnaba.”

I tried to imagine who named it that. Maybe it was a preexisting name for the hill? But in the era in which the Syrian regime was famously brutal in Lebanon and equally quiescent in the Golan versus Israel, Arab wits had fun with the dynastic name Assad (lion in Arabic) and arnab (rabbit): “Assad fi Lubnan, Arnab fil Jawlan.” A lion in Lebanon, a rabbit in the Golan. This has held true. The Assads empower the occasional Iranian operative or Hezbollah in the unoccupied Golan, but rarely risk a Syrian life.

Qalandia Checkpoint

“Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,” Robert Frost wrote. The Journal of Palestine Studies elaborates, “checkpoints, and Qalandia specifically were more than what meets the eye. Of course they were, and still are, spaces where the Zionist/Israeli colonialist project is palpable in all its might and ugliness and where Palestinians are physically reminded of their subjugated position.”

In the Olives and Ash book, one entry about dating in the West Bank is titled “Love in the Time of Qalandia,” though the checkpoint is mentioned one single time, toward the end of the 15-page essay: “Invariably a single image comes to mind when I think of the dehumanization of the Palestinian people: men packed together like caged animals at the border crossing in Qalandiya … It is impossible to see photos like this without confronting the extent to which the architects of the occupation have ceased to view Palestinians as human beings.” Photos like this is the chef’s kiss. An author on a mission in the West Bank who makes the rather large assumption that Palestinian Arabs have been dehumanized, bases her assumption on a place she never bothered to visit, but saw in a picture.

A statue of Elie Cohen’s wife, NadiaCourtey the author

As our spy-enthralled pilgrims and sinners came to see every day, the reality is rather more prosaic. West Bankers line up to enter Israel to report to their jobs. The Israeli Border Police Atarot-Qalandia function as TSA. “Caged animals” reside solely in the dehumanizing imagination of the essayist. The keepers of this supposedly hellish facility rise early to open the gates at 4 a.m. for a long day of admitting workers and shoppers.

“We have 538 of us in uniform to patrol 117 square kilometers,” our young briefer informed us, with the help of a video presentation and its lush orchestral accompaniment, heavy on the Krav Maga close quarters defense training the police employ if they are physically attacked. “We get three to four Krav Maga workouts a week. We have a special mission for special needs members.” There was a video clip of smiling Down syndrome officers.

“There is a drive-through section and a section for travelers on foot. Tens of thousands cross over every day.”

“Why do you let them in at all?” snapped one of the hawkish pilgrims. “You’re helping our enemies!”

The expression on our briefer’s face seemed to show that he had heard this question before and had still not located a concise answer. He gestured in the direction of the densely built-up hills surrounding this building, with the merest suggestion of a shrug. “They are our neighbors. We share this land,” he said.

We moved on into a gymnasium-size space to meet a Belgian Malinois named Felix, and review long tables displaying jaws of life, goggles, a short-barreled Negev rifle, tear gas cannisters, an M-4 rifle, Ruger SR22. The next table held an assortment of drones: the Mavic-2 searchlight, advanced Phantom 4, and the most powerful Matrice 300. The effort is entirely defensive, in light of stabbing attacks against Israelis at Qalandia over the years. The deeply anguished commentators who see Qalandia as uniquely malevolent rarely note the history of violence or the fact that travelers show up there voluntarily.

What makes Qalandia is the topographical crazy quilt around it. There is the old Jerusalem or Atarot Airport closed to civilian flights in 2000, Qalandia village and refugee camp, and the neighborhood of Kafr Aqab. “Aqab residents have blue Israeli ID cards,” our briefer explained. “It’s part of Jerusalem, and yet it isn’t. Legally it is, but practically it is not.”

Aqab is indeed the northernmost neighborhood of formerly East Jerusalem. Organically, however, it is a suburb of Ramallah, the de facto capital of the Palestinian Authority slightly to the north; it lies seven miles north of central Jerusalem but just a mile or so from central Ramallah. Beitunia, right next door, is part of the PA.

The routing of Israel’s security barrier is the nub of the problem: Built in the form of concrete walls, wire fences, ditches, and a series of low-signature sensors, it cut to near zero the suicide attacks Yasser Arafat’s PA unleashed against Israel during the Second Intifada. Qalandia and the surrounding areas resemble the baby of Solomon’s judgment. To keep life moving and violence down, Israel cut off an Arab part of its own capital with a barrier and checkpoint, and like the rest of the larger, supposedly unsustainable status quo, life goes on, albeit with chain link, turnstiles, and metal detectors.

Driving south out of central Israel to the capital area, our briefer, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, saw the way forward as keeping the military and political decision-makers in their lanes to create security, stability, and eventually peace. “The bigger picture—we have Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, and Arrow 3,” he said. Echoing our briefer in Quneitra, he noted “Four F-16s could solve Jenin, Gaza, and Hamas in a matter of hours, but that is not our morality.”

Jerusalem, and at Last a Real Israeli Spy

At the hotel in Jerusalem, there were only 24 hours to go before the process of starting to pack and getting COVID test results for those of us flying to the U.S. My U.S. Navy veteran friend and I were just wrapping up our meal when I pointed out a stout, white-bearded individual lined up at the sumptuous buffet.

“That’s Pollard,” I said, only appropriating the knowledge another tour member had imparted to me an hour earlier. Apparently, he was here in the company of his lawyer, who was representing his efforts to get the Israeli government to settle with him for the time he had spent in U.S. prisons.

We both got up to leave, but he was not behind me as I walked to the Mamilla Mall to get a COVID test at the Super-Pharm. He was waiting with a couple of whiskeys, however, when I joined him later to celebrate my negative test result, and beaming.

“I think I might have lost a few friends before, down in the restaurant. I had a word with our friend Pollard. He had admirers all around him. I went up and asked him, ‘When is the last time anyone reminded you how you screwed up the careers of patriotic Jews in the U.S. military?’ He started to get defensive, instead of apologizing, so that did it. I had to tell that bastard what I thought of him. I didn’t have much company. Someone called the shomer who came over. Who cares. It pisses me off that people treat that bastard like a hero.”

He might not have lost friends, but he certainly scandalized a few fellow pilgrims, who gathered over coffee to express their disappointment. So out of line! So rude to Mr. Pollard, just when they had been moving in to thank him and try to shake his hand for what he had done for Israel!

So, the penultimate security briefing of the mission had to come from me. Forget the secrets he stole and whether they went to friend or foe, I suggested to my fellow pilgrims. Compromised secrets are gone for good, whether left in a briefcase on the subway, stolen in a laptop, leaked to the media, or handed over to a friend or foe for money. He damaged the country he was supposed to protect. Also, spies are recruited and handled on the basis of their suitability, access, and motivation. If they lack any one of these—good judgment and a cool head, access to information of interest, or proper motivation, they should never be recruited.

Pollard was no pillar of mental stability, and his motivations were a mess. On top of his other sins, when trying to escape capture in November 1985 he sought refuge at the embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C., a place he should have properly been warned by his handler never, ever to go near. Of course, he was turned away and arrested. But what if someone inside had let him in? The horrible decision-making behind his recruitment and handling would have insured police cars, FBI vans, and the bright lights of television networks on the embassy’s front door for days or weeks until he was handed over after incalculable damage to the relationship between the State of Israel and its superpower patron.

“Still, his wife just died a few months ago. And he was oversentenced,” a nonhawk pointed out. So the sharpest disagreement of the week had only two dissenters.

Kerem Shalom Crossing

Every daybreak had us scrambling to comply with the previous evening’s final guidance, delivered from high-decibel microphone from the front of the tour bus: some variation on breakfast at 6, all suitcases in place by the bus’s vast luggage bay in front of the hotel no later than 6:30, departure at 7. Each of us possessed a colorful Ultimate Mossad Mission brochure to consult for each day’s itinerary, which, we were forewarned, was subject to change according to local security developments.

There was particular doubt as to whether we would make our scheduled excursion toward Gaza, as it was Jerusalem Day and Hamas had threatened to “confront” Israel to mark the occasion. The threats had been vague, though, and there was speculation that they did not want to spoil a new Israeli initiative to grant a few thousand more work permits to Gazans. In the event, we sallied forth, feeling even more courageous than we had felt sallying out against Hezbollah a week before.

Inside a tunnel Courtesy the author

The Golan and southern Lebanon are scenic. Judea and Samaria are less so, but deeply interwoven into Israel’s ancient and modern identity. Gaza, however biblical, is the outlier. Israel gave it up in 2005 and Hamas took over in 2007 Over decades of Arab-Israeli negotiating, Gaza was a stepchild. The Egyptians were offered custody in the Sadat-era peace talks and took a pass. There is nothing sentimental or positive in regard to the place, though as the bus approached the triangle where Egypt, Gaza, and Israel meet, our guide had a shot at it.

“Notice the lovely fields of sunflowers. They need less water than cotton, and we get oil from them! Who can name the five cities of Philistia? We are getting near!”

A couple of pilgrims rose to the challenge—Gaza, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Gath … the guide had to supply the fifth member of the Pentapolis—Ekron. “Like your Akron in Ohio! These were symbolized in the five smooth stones David selected for his sling in the encounter with Goliath.”

“We’re not all American,” murmured a Spaniard.

The briefer at Kerem Shalom, soft spoken but gimlet-eyed Commander Ami, welcomed mission members into a classroom equipped with long tables behind him, laid end-to-end and piled with contraband: pipe bombs; caches of narcotics, mostly pills; fragments of water pipes converted to rockets; and stuffed plush toys which presumably had served as packaging for something lethal.

“I lived in Gush Katif for 20 years, and served as security chief for all Gaza settlements until 2005. The job at Kerem Shalom is moving fuel, gas, concrete, iron, industrial and building materials, and cattle feed, into Gaza.

“You have been to the Erez Crossing? You see glass construction there. Not here. This was built not for dreams of peace, but for threats. We have several missions. To bring Arab people here every day to get what they are importing and exporting. There is no trust between us and them. There have been kidnappings, which are worse than death. You are dealing with five minutes of mourning versus five years of strategic problems. So, we do not meet them. There is no option for Palestinian Arab attacks. One hundred trucks come through every day from Gaza to bring their exports to Israel, Judea, Samaria, and abroad. And we work against dual-use items being brought to Gaza for Hamas to use.”

We browsed the tables for a closer look at the pipe elbows, Captagon tablets, rolls of fiberglass tape, and other nefarious or dual-use items, before setting out on foot to tour the vast areas, separated by high concrete barriers, where goods were trucked in, offloaded, sniffed by dogs, and reloaded onto trucks for the onward journey by Israeli and Gazan workers who never got near, or even within sight of each other. Cameras were everywhere including mounted on a colorful balloon tethered high in the air nearby. Visitors moved around taking cellphone photos whose geolocation software variously indicated “Kerem Shalom,” “Southern District,” or “North Sinai” as we strolled east or west.

A Belgian Malinois performed for us, locating the briefer’s pistol which had been squirreled away between bales of goods, and executing a perfect sit-down response. We saw a truck being loaded with crates of Gaza tomatoes and peppers which then rolled toward an east-facing gate. Commander Ami cited a figure for what Gaza’s agricultural exports via Kerem Shalom were worth. The response came from a hawk, this time a different one.

“So how is this not aiding the enemy? You know how Hamas is going to use that money!”

Ami was soft-spoken, but testier than his young compatriot at Qalandia.

“Thank you. You are such a smart lady, obviously a smart and brilliant lady! Please tell me your brilliant plan to teach us how to live beside more than a million Arabs in Gaza. I need some lessons.”

If any of us wanted to sink into a hole in the ground, that opportunity was less than an hour away. Hamas digs its terror tunnels through sand rather than through the hard limestone of the Upper Galilee, so it was easy for the IDF to copy them for training exercises.

“Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,” but only if it can see the wall first. The business end of Israel’s Gaza wall was not visible—it runs underground deep enough to touch the water table, checking Hamas’ tunnel building ambitions as it held off snipers and climbers above ground. This was inside a Southern Command IDF base known by its Hebrew acronym BAF.

“So, what we do here is defend the southern border. A few weeks at this remote base exposes our units to what they will encounter in real life: poverty, simulated riots, and fighting in tunnels. We have a tunnel the IDF has built, on a slightly smaller scale than what Hamas created. Please come this way, it is built for combat training and the opening is a steep downward ramp designed to be slippery, so some of you might prefer to stay here and enjoy some fruit.”

The more mobile among us proceeded to a boxy concrete structure and clambered over a waist-high cement wall to a doorway opening onto the promised dark and slippery slope, at the bottom of which stood a soldier on a dimly lit landing. The BAF resounded with the shrieks of the intrepid visitors who slid down the greased ramp, palpating the cement-barrier walls and gliding or reeling into the soldier’s arms.

It was a labyrinth, more modest than Hamas’ famous miles of “Metro” built to hide, smuggle, and infiltrate, but it contained rooms, right-angled corners, pop-up exits like manholes furnished with ladders, mirroring the extensive Hamas tunnels which the IDF had blown up or flooded.

There was also almost enough lighting to tell friend from foe. Hearing them was something else. Outside, the Israeli Air Force was performing some low and very loud runs, presumably to incentivize Hamas to show some Jerusalem Day restraint.

At the closing banquet, former Defense Minister and IDF Chief of Staff “Bogie” Ya’alon’s theme was the superiority of the IDF and IAF over all their military adversaries, and how this had long since dissuaded those adversaries from any wish to fight back. There had not been a stand-up conventional military fight since the defeat of Egypt and Syria in 1973. This meant Israel’s enemies, chiefly Iran and its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, had moved to hitting soft targets. This was why our week had involved examining tunnels, drones, barbed wire, metal detectors, and highly trained dogs, rather than visiting the kind of military museums with tanks and artillery in the courtyards such as you see in more secure countries.

The week wrapped up on a distinctly upbeat note. The geriatrics now dispersing for local family time would be regaling the grandkids with tales of Hezbollah’s foiled plans and the drama of the Gaza border. If anyone wheelchair-bound had tested others’ patience by slowing the boarding or exiting the bus, they were now embraced and offered glowing praise for their intrepidity. As with a family college or reunion, there was already talk of next time—both first-timers and repeat customers were avidly speculating on what the next Mossad Mission might cover. With the tour ending on a weekend, there was mild chagrin among some who had procrastinated in asking Darshan-Leitner to sign their copies of Harpoon, as we learned that the frum author was unlikely to inscribe books on Shabbat. There was talk of Israel’s security and the reminder of the enemies’ focus on soft targets, with the sobering, flattering realization that that’s what we had been all week. We were ready to send away for our decoder rings.

Not that this was anything new. Targeting civilians in the Yishuv and the state has been a tradition from the massacres of the 1920s to the founding of the PLO in the 1960s, and continued even against the IDF, whose members Hezbollah far prefers to kidnap than to meet in combat. Commander Ami at Kerem Shalom had weighed five minutes of mourning versus five years of strategic programs as two different things, but the northern neighbors gloat over imposing both. With any luck, Ultimate Mossad Missions of the future might reflect the defeat of that mindset, too.

Tablet · by Peter Theroux · January 24, 2023

5. China Is Trying to Play Nice, and It’s a Problem for the US

Excerpts:

Yet one of America’s major diplomatic challenges of 2023 may be dealing with a rival that is pursuing the same old goals through subtler, more skillful means.

Much of the world, including key US allies, still prefers to engage China rather than isolate it. “China cannot be out, China must be in,” France’s finance minister declared this week. Australia’s center-left government, which took power in May, is seeking a “reset” with Beijing. Indeed, even a slightly less scary China could make things much harder for the US.

For years, Washington has been better at warning countries about the dangers of doing business with China than at offering them an attractive alternative. In Asia, close partners such as Japan and Singapore are frustrated that the US is encouraging them to reduce their entanglement with China without offering a meaningful pathway to deeper integration with America. The 14-member Indo-Pacific Economic Framework announced by President Joe Biden last May is better than nothing, but it’s not nearly as good as what was on offer in the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Washington designed under President Barack Obama and then disowned under President Donald Trump.

European countries, meanwhile, are peeved at clean energy subsidies and other measures in last year’s Inflation Reduction Act. Biden’s administration touts the bill as an investment in the free-world economy of the future, but many allies view it as America First protectionism.

Don’t make too much of these tensions, just yet: Close friends often have commercial contretemps, and administration officials tell me they are optimistic that a handful of crucial countries will emulate the semiconductor sanctions Biden slapped on China last October. But the longer China suppresses its own worst instincts, the more America’s competitive shortcomings will be on display.

China Is Trying to Play Nice, and It’s a Problem for the US

Years of Beijing's bullying neighbors and “wolf warrior” diplomacy helped Washington forge security and trade alliances, but Xi Jinping seems to be wising up.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-24/china-tries-to-undermine-us-with-australia-japan-india-europe?sref=hhjZtX76

ByHal Brands

January 24, 2023 at 5:00 PM EST

Having incompetent enemies is a blessing. For three years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has showered blessings upon the US. A self-isolated, belligerent and increasingly repressive China has been its own worst enemy, playing into America’s efforts to check Chinese power.

Now, though, Beijing is attempting an overdue course correction, and Xi’s new approach could expose America’s diplomatic weaknesses.

Mystery Synthetic Text Detector 300

https://www.tswg.gov/Projects/I2C/Mystery_Synthetic_Text_Detector_3000.html

Indirect Influence and Competition

Focus Area:

Influence and Information Capabilities

Project Cost:

$745,000

Project Duration:

10 months

Performer:

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab

Deliverable:

This project will result in the development of a prototype, user-friendly, software platform to reliably detect the presence of synthetically generated text that is designed to erode public trust in reliable sources or for disinformation campaigns.

End User:

SOCOM J39, Department of State

Description:

Synthetic text generation capabilities currently outpace synthetic text detection capabilities, with commercially available detectors being imperfect, deceivable, and useful only to experts. A more robust system needs to be developed for use by a wide range of non-technical experts: analysts, open source intelligence (OSINT) collectors, government public affairs officers, Foreign Service Officers, and others within the interagency who work to combat disinformation but are not technical specialists. The government requires development of a reliable synthetic text detection application, with flexibility for upgrades, which can support operational experimentation while also being open to modification based on user feedback.

Operational Impact:

If successful, this project would represent a significant enhancement over current human (manual) analysis by increasing the speed and accuracy of detection.

Transition:

Base contract will provide end users with an updateable app or plug-in tool that will significantly enhance their analysts’ ability to identify and counter adversarial use of synthetic text during influence messaging operations, OT&E updates and feedback sessions, end user trainings and training manual.

7. Want to innovate for DoD? Pay close attention to Ukraine

Number 2 is critically important. Technology is important but it is not as useful as it could be without highly trained and educated troops. We really need to invest in training and education and never reduce the funding for training and education as a tradeoff for high tech. . I have been having a hard time convincing some military staffs of that. There is too much chasing the shiny silver bullet and rather than develop organiza capabilities I find there are staffs who would rather contract out to consultants for well trained and educated people rather than invest in military and government employees.

Excerpts:

...five defining lessons from Ukraine on boosting innovation:

1. Getting innovative starts with recognizing and articulating the problem you’re trying to solve.

2. Don’t rely on technology alone.

3. In war and beyond, the first, fastest, most adequate solution wins.

4. Always have a backup plan

5. Train future innovators.

Want to innovate for DoD? Pay close attention to Ukraine

Defense News · by Pete Newell · January 24, 2023

The U.S. Defense Department, with its big budget, big plans and big oversight, can still learn from its agile, guerilla-minded friends defending Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine is a master class on the best and worst practices in competitive maneuvering. We are witnessing a larger, more powerful force repeatedly stymied and frustrated by its resourceful and proactive adversary — one with a single mission driving every collective move it makes.

For Pentagon employees mired in bureaucracy, there are five defining lessons from Ukraine on boosting innovation:

1. Getting innovative starts with recognizing and articulating the problem you’re trying to solve.

The Pentagon regularly gets stung by how long it takes to recognize a new problem or opportunity and quickly articulate it to the right people. If we can’t explain it and we can’t get people excited about it, we can’t draw the right people into solving it.

Ukrainian leaders made strides in mobilizing global support through genuine, regular and interactive communications with the right audiences, even when it wasn’t necessarily convenient or comfortable. Holding video chats from secret bunkers to share firsthand experience with global leaders, Ukraine’s president put communication first. This rallying of support led to drastic and game-changing collaboration from influential and wealthy nations, including the United States.

Being bold and upfront about what you need and why may sound obvious, but it is in short supply in the relationship between the DoD and innovative problem-solvers.

2. Don’t rely on technology alone.

Figuring out how to apply technology effectively will generate more success than the tech itself.

The Ukrainian military is acquiring technologies from other countries they could never afford to have developed. It’s rapidly learning how to employ them directly into the fight and, in some cases, giving donor countries new insight into their own capabilities under fire.

Government employees must learn to step outside of the default setting a bureaucracy promotes and learn to stretch beyond the obvious. This may mean applying existing tech to solve unique problems effectively and quickly. Otherwise, we risk continuing to stagnate while surrounded by a dusty mosaic of unused toys.

3. In war and beyond, the first, fastest, most adequate solution wins.

Until you deliver something into someone’s hands, you can’t have an honest discussion about the problem you need to solve. If you aren’t fast enough, your problem — and the dynamic surrounding it — will change and you’ll never catch up, or you will deliver solutions that are obsolete the day they are deployed.

The Ukrainian military’s leadership has an entrepreneur’s mindset, getting solutions to operators immediately for testing and evaluation. They also measure technology opportunity against their ability to employ operating concepts to optimally harness a tech advantage. They experiment, tweak, and experiment some more to fill tactical gaps or address emergent challenges.

4. Always have a backup plan

Organizations that aren’t willing to disrupt themselves when an opportunity arises are at a disadvantage. Successful innovation comes from recognizing when a legacy system or method is broken or a capability is decaying faster than a solution is being built.

Part of what makes Ukraine so successful is its agility in pivoting off a single method or solution the moment it no longer brings results, and having the ingenuity and fortitude to leap into a new, better response. Conversely, Russia showed us what happens when leaders aren’t prepared or willing to address antiquated systems. In the case of Russian President Vladimir Putin, this failure played out in the casualties of untold Russian troops sent into battle poorly trained, ill equipped and under the illusion they would experience no combat.

5. Train future innovators.

For leaders at all levels within the DoD, accessing tools to nurture an entrepreneurial spirit and retain people who possess that talent must become a top priority. An entrepreneurial mindset has been a part of the military forever, but has never been nurtured as a profession or ingrained in military doctrine.

It’s time to change that. Fast thinking on the front lines in Ukraine has bent the war in its favor repeatedly. It can do the same in our own competitive efforts. If managers and the chain of command cannot recognize that part of their job is to harness the passion of young people and ascertain who is an innovator and who isn’t, they’re going to lose smart people.

Unfortunately, the military loses innovative thinkers in droves. They get tired of fighting the bureaucracy and not receiving the tools they need, so they quit, go to the private sector and do great things. We can address this by building professional development pathways to help intrapreneurs build like-minded ecosystems to solve critical challenges and accelerate change.

Pete Newell is a retired U.S. Army colonel and chief executive of BMNT, an advisory company focused on getting innovation to the government.

8. Lawmakers propose mandatory 24-hour security at electrical substations after attacks on the power grid: ‘The targeting has increased’

Lawmakers propose mandatory 24-hour security at electrical substations after attacks on the power grid: ‘The targeting has increased’

BYHANNAH SCHOENBAUM AND THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

January 22, 2023 at 12:57 PM EST

Fortune

After the latest attack last week on a substation in Randolph County, northeast of Charlotte, Moss is urging fellow lawmakers to prioritize new legislation that would secure the state’s critical infrastructure when the legislative session begins in earnest this week. He’s among the first state legislators to propose power grid protections this year amid a surge in attacks on U.S. substations, primarily in the Carolinas and Pacific Northwest.

The recent attacks in Moore County, North Carolina, and others in Washington, Oregon, South Carolina and Nevada, have underscored the vulnerability of the nation’s far-flung electrical grid, which security experts have long warned could be a target for domestic extremists.

Lawmakers in at least two affected states — North Carolina and South Carolina — have begun proposing remedies.

“I don’t want to see anybody else go through what Moore (County) did,” said Moss, a 2024 candidate for state labor commissioner whose district saw a peak of more than 45,000 customers lose power. “When the power goes out, you don’t have heat, don’t have food, can’t get fuel or some medications, the people are unsafe.”

Moss is drafting legislation, obtained in its preliminary form by The Associated Press, that would require utilities to provide 24-hour security at substations, which transform high-voltage electricity into the lower voltages that power communities. Security provisions would vary across sites, some of which are already gated with nearby cameras while others are more exposed.

He considers the bill “a conversation opener” between lawmakers, utilities and security experts to help the General Assembly identify cost-effective defenses that wouldn’t drive up consumer prices.

His call for increased surveillance comes as questions linger about the Moore County shootings. The FBI is still seeking information and no arrests have been made.

Federal regulators in December ordered a review of physical security standards across the nation’s vast electricity transmission network following the attacks in North Carolina. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which oversees the nation’s bulk power system, has until early April to submit a report and recommend possible improvements.

Manny Cancel, a NERC senior vice president and the CEO of the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, said the situation demands more communication and collaboration between the different levels of government, industry leaders and law enforcement.

“The frequency has increased, the targeting has increased,” Cancel said. “What we’ve seen are patterns of clusters … or assets that are in proximity to each other being repeatedly targeted.”

Utilities in South Carolina — where gunshots were fired near a Duke Energy facility but caused no damage days after the North Carolina shootings — are asking lawmakers to increase penalties for intentionally destroying electrical infrastructure or other utility property.

A state Senate proposal would set a sliding scale based on how much damage is done — if it costs more than $25,000 to fix equipment and cover losses, the perpetrator could face up to 20 years in prison, double the current 10-year maximum.

A maximum 25-year penalty would apply if anyone died or their health was endangered by a resulting outage.

Dominion Energy South Carolina President Keller Kissam said the state saw at least 12 incidents of people intentionally damaging equipment last year.

“You want to demoralize people, you put them in the dark,” he said.

Some state senators worried that the law could be used against hunters who accidentally damage utility equipment. Kissam agreed but said sometimes that damage isn’t an accident, as hunters use equipment to set their gun sights or as target practice. A subcommittee plans to review the bill further in a few weeks.

Another South Carolina bill seeks stiffer penalties for destruction caused specifically by a gun or explosive.

Brian Harrell, former assistant secretary for infrastructure protection at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said that although harsher penalties for equipment sabotage may be a deterrent, state legislatures can best support utilities by freeing up funds for additional security measures.

“Specifically, ensuring monies for perimeter security, cameras and alarms,” said Harrell, who now oversees security for an energy company that services multiple states.

Construction of all new security features would cost about $2.5 million per site, he said. But many substations already have fencing, which reduces the cost significantly. About $800,000 can outfit a single substation with pan-tilt-zoom cameras, intrusion detection and an access control system.

The Pacific Northwest has become a hotspot for these physical attacks, with Washington and Oregon utilities reporting at least 15 incidents in 2022, including 10 in the last two months of the year.

Attackers hit four Washington substations on Christmas Day, forcing entry, setting fire to equipment and temporarily cutting power to thousands of customers.

Michael Furze, director of the Washington State Energy Office, said that although no legislation specifically addressing substation security has been introduced, broader bipartisan discussions are underway about grid resilience.

Washington is already revamping its electrical infrastructure under the Clean Energy Transformation Act, which commits the state to an electricity supply free of greenhouse gas emissions by 2045. Physical and cybersecurity updates are in the works as the electrical grid undergoes significant changes to meet new standards, Furze said.

“’Security by design’ is a core component of these systems,” he said.

In neighboring Oregon, the state’s Public Utility Commission is working with regulated utilities to increase vigilance and explore possible security updates, after gunfire attacks damaged two substations southeast of Portland in late November. Spokesperson Kandi Young said the commission monitors proposed legislation and is not aware of any related bills introduced this session.

And in Nevada, where a man set fire to a solar power unit this month, a search of the 138 bill draft requests with pre-filed text found none that would explicitly address electrical infrastructure security. But with more than two weeks until the biennial session begins, most legislative proposals have yet to be formally introduced.

___

Hannah Schoenbaum is a corps member for the Associated Press/Report for America Statehouse News Initiative. Report for America is a nonprofit national service program that places journalists in local newsrooms to report on undercovered issues.

___

Associated Press writers Jeffrey Collins in Columbia, South Carolina, Claire Rush in Portland, Oregon, and Gabe Stern in Reno, Nevada, contributed reporting.

Fortune

9. COVID is running rampant in China – but herd immunity remains elusive

Charts and graphics at the link: https://theconversation.com/covid-is-running-rampant-in-china-but-herd-immunity-remains-elusive-197454?utm

COVID is running rampant in China – but herd immunity remains elusive

Adam Kleczkowski
Professor of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Strathclyde

Disclosure statement

Adam Kleczkowski receives funding from the UKRI and the Scottish Government.

theconversation.com · by Adam Kleczkowski

After nearly three years of keeping COVID under control, China is experiencing a massive new wave of COVID infections. The official figures reporting 60,000 deaths between December 8 and January 12 are widely seen as underestimating the impact of the outbreak.

Until December 2022, China had used lockdown policies to reduce the opportunity for COVID spread in the hope of eliminating the virus or building up enough population immunity through vaccination. The exceptionally strict zero-COVID policy was very successful in stopping the virus’ spread while the world faced returning deadly waves.

However, the prolonged lockdowns eventually became politically and economically unsustainable. China’s official policy is currently concentrating on strengthening the early detection and treatment of severe cases rather than the prevention of infections. This has led to claims the country is now pursuing a “herd immunity” approach.

But would this be a realistic goal? Lessons from other countries’ experiences suggest not. Let’s take a look at why.

Herd immunity: a recap

The herd immunity concept was introduced some 100 years ago to explain why epidemic waves often stop before affecting the whole population.

As a disease such as COVID spreads, more people become infected. Most of them recover and gain infection-induced immunity. Those who become infected increasingly have contact with immune rather than susceptible people. This leads to lower risk of passing on the infection.

The epidemic wave slows down and eventually declines. The decline is caused by a sufficiently large number of people becoming immune, therefore protecting the whole population – or the “herd”. In the 1970s, epidemiologists found a simple formula that predicts the proportion of immune individuals at which the number of infections stops growing.

The formula includes the R number, the average number of people one infected person passes the disease onto. Non-pharmaceutical interventions, like social distancing, lockdowns, or mask-wearing, are aimed at reducing the transmissibility of the virus, lowering the value of R.

China’s COVID zero strategy proved unsustainable. Graeme Kennedy/Shutterstock

The herd immunity threshold also depends on the proportion of people with pre-existing immunity from either previous outbreaks or vaccination. Using these concepts, scientists have designed vaccination strategies that successfully keep contagious diseases such as smallpox, polio, diphtheria and rubella under control.

For such public health policies to be successful, mass vaccination needs to reach a high proportion of the population. Sublineages of the omicron variant BA.5 are currently dominant in China. Omicron has an average R of 9.5, so around 90% of the population needs to be fully protected to reach herd immunity, according to the model.

However, vaccination is not perfect. Some 89% of China’s population has so far reportedly received two doses of the vaccine. But booster uptake is low and the efficacy of the Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines used in China is lower than the mRNA vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna used widely. So, the actual percentage of people protected by the vaccine will be lower than in other countries – perhaps as low as 5%.

Before December 2022, China had seen relatively few COVID cases, leaving infection-induced immunity low. This creates a significant gap between the existing levels of immunity and those required to achieve herd immunity, as illustrated in the figure below. In the absence of other control measures, this gap will need to be filled in by infection, resulting in a massive outbreak.

The 5% vaccination-induced immunity level, shown here for illustration purposes, reflects the limited booster coverage and the lower efficacy and faster waning of China’s vaccines. Adam Kleczkowski

Predictions are challenging

Predicting what will happen next in China is difficult due to the lack of reliable data. Although cases now seem to be decreasing, the traditional activity around the lunar new year will most likely cause a new wave.

Several models have explored different assumptions. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation expects almost three million cases per day at an upcoming peak following the lunar new year and 1.6 million deaths by the end of 2023.

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, University of Washington and Adam Kleczkowski

Health data analytics company Airfinity predicts four million cases per day at the peak of the upcoming wave, and that the number of deaths could reach 2.1 million. Given the uncertainty about the epidemic spread in China, these numbers might even be underestimates.

Eventually, China’s population will temporarily reach the “herd immunity” level, and the upcoming wave will probably peak around March 2023, according to these models. But this is not a guarantee that the epidemic will end there.

The virus persists even in countries like the UK, where roughly 80%–95% of the population have COVID antibodies. This indicates high levels of immunity from prior infection, vaccination, or both.

Unfortunately, the immunity from COVID vaccines and prior infections wanes after some months and may be less durable against new variants. As a result, new waves appear as herd immunity is temporarily breached, before being restored again.

If China is really aiming at herd immunity to eliminate the virus – and some young Chinese people are apparently seeking infection – it will very likely fail again. The repeated lesson from other countries is that the loss of immunity and the appearance of new variants make herd immunity a futile goal when it comes to COVID.

theconversation.com · by Adam Kleczkowski

10. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 24, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2023

Key Takeaways

A coalition of NATO member states reportedly will send Ukraine modern main battle tanks.
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov continued efforts to portray himself and the traditional Russian military command structure as the true defenders of Russia.
Russian outlet RBK claimed on January 23 that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu appointed Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev as the Southern Military District (SMD) commander and Lieutenant General Yevgeny Nikiforov as the Western Military District (WMD) commander.
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. Russian forces made marginal territorial gains near Bakhmut.
Russian sources claimed, likely to distract from the lack of progress in Bakhmut, that Russian forces launched an offensive around Vuhledar.
Russian forces likely continued to conduct limited and localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast but likely did not make territorial gains, further undermining Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s prior territorial claims.
Ukrainian special forces conducted a raid across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 23-24.
Russian authorities are likely continuing efforts to mobilize ethnic minorities to fight in Ukraine.
Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly increasing the production of drones and loitering munitions.
Ukrainian partisans targeted a member of the Zaporizhia occupation administration.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 24, 2023

Jan 24, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 24, 9:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

A coalition of NATO member states reportedly will send Ukraine modern main battle tanks. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 24 that US President Joe Biden is preparing to send "a significant number" of Abrams M1 tanks to Ukraine and that the White House may announce the delivery as soon as January 25.[1] German newspaper Der Spiegel reported on January 24 that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz decided to deliver at least one tank company (14 tanks) of Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine in an unspecified time frame.[2] Poland likely will send Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks following Germany’s decision. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak stated on January 24 that Poland formally requested Germany grant permission to transfer Poland’s Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated that Berlin would not interfere if Poland wanted to send its Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.[3] British officials confirmed on January 16 that the United Kingdom would send Ukraine 14 Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine.[4] French President Emmanuel Macron stated he would not rule out the possibility of France sending Ukraine Leclerc tanks on January 22.[5]

Western states’ provision of main battle tanks to Ukraine will help enable Ukraine to conduct mechanized warfare to defeat the Russian military and liberate Ukrainian territory. ISW previously assessed that the West has contributed to Ukraine’s inability to take advantage of having pinned Russian forces in Bakhmut by slow-rolling or withholding weapons systems and supplies essential for large-scale counteroffensive operations.[6] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny previously emphasized in December 2022 that Ukraine needs 300 main battle tanks (among other weapon systems) to enable Ukrainian counteroffensives.[7]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov continued efforts to portray himself and the traditional Russian military command structure as the true defenders of Russia. Gerasimov reiterated on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin approved Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s plan to develop Russian forces’ ability to respond to "new threats to the military security" of Russia, and Gerasimov accused Ukraine and NATO states of aiming to threaten Russia.[8] Gerasimov invoked the Russian General Staff’s historical role in guiding and protecting Russia through several military crises, including the Great Patriotic War (World War II). Gerasimov claimed that "modern Russia has never known such a level and intensity of hostilities" and heavily implied that the current war in Ukraine presents the greatest threat to Russia since the Great Patriotic War, therefore necessitating the leadership and protection of the Russian General Staff under Gerasimov’s leadership. Gerasimov’s framing of the war and the General Staff’s ongoing revitalization efforts within the historical context of the Great Patriotic War is part of the continued campaign to counter the growing power and influence of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, and their respective paramilitary structures, all of which threaten Gerasimov and the Russian General Staff as ISW has previously reported.[9] It also continues Putin’s efforts to reframe the current struggle as an effort like the Great Patriotic War to justify protracted demands for sacrifice and mobilization by the Russian people.[10]

Russian outlet RBK claimed on January 23 that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu appointed Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev as the Southern Military District (SMD) commander and Lieutenant General Yevgeny Nikiforov as the Western Military District (WMD) commander.[11] RBK claimed that Nikiforov replaced Kuzovlev as WMD commander after Kuzovlev held the position from December 13, 2022, to January 23, 2023.[12] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Kuzovlev WMD Commander in late October of 2022.[13] RBK claimed that the Russian MoD had appointed Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov as WMD commander in October of 2022, however.[14] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 26, 2022, that Nikiforov left his position as Chief of Staff of the Eastern Military District (EMD) to replace Kuzovlev as a part of the internal power struggles between Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov.[15] Nikiforov previously commanded Wagner Group fighters in Ukraine as commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army in 2014 and may have connections to Prigozhin.[16] The conflicting reporting on the WMD and SMD command suggests that military district command dynamics remain opaque, indicating that the Russian military is struggling to institute sound command structures and maintain traditional command.

Key Takeaways

A coalition of NATO member states reportedly will send Ukraine modern main battle tanks.
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov continued efforts to portray himself and the traditional Russian military command structure as the true defenders of Russia.
Russian outlet RBK claimed on January 23 that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu appointed Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev as the Southern Military District (SMD) commander and Lieutenant General Yevgeny Nikiforov as the Western Military District (WMD) commander.
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. Russian forces made marginal territorial gains near Bakhmut.
Russian sources claimed, likely to distract from the lack of progress in Bakhmut, that Russian forces launched an offensive around Vuhledar.
Russian forces likely continued to conduct limited and localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast but likely did not make territorial gains, further undermining Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s prior territorial claims.
Ukrainian special forces conducted a raid across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 23-24.
Russian authorities are likely continuing efforts to mobilize ethnic minorities to fight in Ukraine.
Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly increasing the production of drones and loitering munitions.
Ukrainian partisans targeted a member of the Zaporizhia occupation administration.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line, and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on January 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it that Russian forces continue to deploy many mobilized personnel to the frontline in Luhansk Oblast.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that battles are ongoing near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), where Russian and Ukrainian forces are fighting for control of the N-26 highway that leads to Svatove.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to hold positions near Novoselivske and push Russian forces out of the area to resume counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove.[19] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance towards Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[21] A BARS (Russian Combat Reserve of the Country) commander claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to use small groups to attempt to gain positions in the forests around Kreminna and conduct infantry assaults toward Kreminna from the south.[22] Russian and social media sources amplified footage of Russian Airborne forces (VDV) operating near Kreminna, including footage showing the 76th Guards Air Assault Division defending against a Ukrainian assault on an unspecified date near Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna).[23]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself; within 22km northeast of Bakhmut near Bilohorivka, Rozdolivka, Sil, and Krasna Hora; and 7km southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[24] Geolocated footage posted on January 23 likely indicates that Russian forces have advanced west of Pidhorodne (5km northeast of Bakhmut) and that they control the settlement.[25] Geolocated footage posted on January 23 indicates that Russian forces have likely made marginal advances in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[26]The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Defense reiterated claims that Russian forces captured Dvorichchia (12km north of Bakhmut) and Krasnopolivka (15km northeast of Bakhmut) as of January 23, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation to corroborate these claims.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters are attacking in the direction of Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut), Mykolaivka (17km northeast of Bakhmut), and north of Blahodatne (12km northeast of Bakhmut).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the southeastern part of Paraskoviivka (9km north of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this advance.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wager Group fighters continued attempts to advance in the southern, northern, and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[30] Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows Russian forces south of Bakhmut and west of Klishchiivka and likely indicates that Russian forces control the settlement.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and conducted an assault near Predtechyne (15km southwest of Bakhmut) to cut a section of the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[32]

Russian sources continue to falsely claim that Russian forces are cutting off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut as of January 24. DNR Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Ukrainian forces only control one road into Bakhmut after the Russian capture of Klishchiivka gave Russian forces operational control over the majority of the GLOCs in the Bakhmut area.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are able to completely interdict Ukrainian forces on the M03 highway between Pidhorodne, Paraskoviivka, and Krasna Hora as of January 20 and on the T0504 highway between Ivanivske and Bakhmut as of January 22.[34] The Russian milblogger claimed that the T0504 highway between Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut is Ukrainian forces’ last remaining GLOC into Bakhmut that Russian forces are not fully interdicting.[35] Another Russian source had previously claimed that Russian forces could completely interdict all Ukrainian GLOCs into Bakhmut as of December 1, 2022.[36] Russian sources are likely amplifying the claim that Russian forces can interdict the majority of Ukrainian GLOCs into Bakhmut to present recent tactical advances as operationally significant and to combat assessments that the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut is likely culminating. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have not cut the majority of Ukrainian GLOCs into Bakhmut. These GLOCs have been within the range of Russian tube artillery for months; recent Russian tactical gains around Soledar and Klishchiivka have not granted Russian forces new capability to interdict these GLOCs beyond what already possessed.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Novobakhmutivka (14km northeast of Avdiivka) and within 32km southwest of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka, Vodyane, and Marinka.[37] Geolocated footage published on January 17 and 23 indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into the outskirts of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that the DNR "Somalia" Battalion occupied unspecified high ground near Vodyane and pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[39] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Special Forces and the DNR "Sparta" Battalion captured Vodyane and cleared the settlement, although ISW still cannot independently verify that Russian forces have captured the settlement.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted an assault in the direction of Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka).[41] Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against Russian railroad infrastructure in Ilovaisk (14km east of Donetsk City) on the night of January 23 to 24.[42]

Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces launched an offensive around Vuhledar (28km southwest of Donetsk City) on January 24. The claim was likely meant to generate positive narratives to distract from the lack of progress in Bakhmut. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet broke through Ukrainian defenses in the Vuhledar area and advanced north of Pavlivka (32km southwest of Avdiivka) and west of Mykilske (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[43] Many Russian milbloggers amplified Vostok Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky’s claim that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade took part in the operations, but Khodakovsky edited his initial post, removing references to specific Russian units.[44] DNR First Deputy Information Officer Danil Bezsonov claimed that the DNR "Kaskad" battalion also participated in offensive operations in the Vuhledar area.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing offensive operations towards Vuhledar and also near Velyka Novosilka (55km southwest of Donetsk City).[46] ISW has not observed any footage indicating that Russian forces have launched a localized offensive in the Vuhledar area as of January 25. Russian sources likely intend to repeat a similar ongoing effort in Zaporizhia Oblast, where Russian sources have circulated claims of localized Russian advances without any confirmation to distract from the fact that Russian forces have not made any operationally significant gains around Bakhmut.[47] Whether Russian forces are conducting localized offensive operations near Vuhledar or Russian sources are exaggerating Russian activity on this sector of the front, the Russian effort is likely focused on supporting this information operation and does not portend a resumption of a Russian offensive in western Donetsk Oblast. The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade was previously badly degraded during offensive operations in the Vuhledar area in November 2022 and is unlikely to have the capacity to relaunch a new offensive on this sector of the front.[48]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces likely continued to conduct limited and localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 24. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations at a slow pace but disagreed on whether elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District made marginal territorial gains after attacking Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, and the Novoandriivka-Novodanylivka line, or Ukrainian forces successfully repelled the attacks.[49] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces gained positions along the Malynivka-Chervone line southeast of Hulyaipole.[50] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces made marginal gains along the bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir but claimed that Russian forces had not advanced into Kamianske despite claiming to have forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the village.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces transferred 450 wounded personnel to a hospital in Dniprorudne, Zaporizhia Oblast, (within 30km of the purported frontline) following unspecified battles with Ukrainian forces, supporting Russian reports that there has been combat in the Zaporizhia sector recently.[52]

Russian and Ukrainian reporting indicated that Russian forces likely did not make territorial gains on January 24, further undermining Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s prior territorial claims. A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the vicinity of settlements that Rogov previously claimed Russian forces had captured, including Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, and Bilohirya.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces shelled Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, and Novoandriivka, all encompassed in Rogov’s earlier claims.[54] Another milblogger characterized the purported Russian "offensive" in Zaporizhia Oblast as "unhurried," suggesting that any Russian ground attacks on this axis occur at a slow rate of advance similar to Russian ground attacks around Soledar and Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast.[55] These Russian reports support Ukrainian official reporting about military activity in this sector. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration continued to report that Russian forces shelled all six settlements that Rogov previously claimed as Russian-controlled: Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, Novoandriivka, Bilohirya, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky.[56] The continued undermining of Rogov’s territorial claims further supports ISW’s prior assessment that Rogov and other Russian sources conducted an information operation to distract from Russian forces’ lack of promised progress near Bakhmut.[57]

Ukrainian Special Forces conducted a raid across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 23-24. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on January 24 showing Ukrainian Special Forces conducting a night raid in the vicinity of Nova Kakhovka on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[58] GUR reported that Ukrainian forces discovered a Russian forward deployment point and destroyed a Russian command post during the raid. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 24 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attempt to land on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Kakhovka.[59] The milbloggers likely significantly exaggerated their claims of Ukrainian losses, likely in a further attempt to distract from the lack of Russian progress on the axis. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a reconnaissance mission for a future attempt to establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the Kherson River and warned that Ukrainian activity in the area will likely escalate in the near future.[60]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities are likely continuing efforts to mobilize ethnic minorities to fight in Ukraine. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on January 22 that Russian border guards are preventing Kyrgyz migrants from leaving Russia and telling migrants that their names are on mobilization lists.[61] RFERL’s report comes a week after Head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, proposed the mobilization of all migrants who received Russian passports.[62] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted on January 24 that the policy of mobilizing migrants might feasibly extend to forcibly deported Ukrainians who are now living in Russia and were forced to acquire Russian citizenship.[63] ISW previously reported on Russian military authorities’ efforts to place the burden of mobilization on ethnic minority enclaves.[64]

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to discuss various forms of ongoing covert mobilization in Russian and occupied Ukrainian territory. A local Stavropol Krai media outlet reported on January 20 that several people received summonses to appear at military enlistment offices within a week to "clarify" their personal data.[65] Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian authorities are continuing covert mobilization in occupied Crimea and are now sending mobilization summonses to IT and economic sector workers who previously held deferments.[66] The Russian Ministry for Digital Development similarly announced on January 19 that IT employees who meet certain criteria will be eligible to apply for draft deferrals, suggesting that certain Russian industries are continuing efforts to preserve their workforce in the face of mobilization by expanding deferment opportunities.[67]

Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly increasing the production of drones and loitering munitions. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kalashnikov Concern production plant on January 24 and announced that the Russian DIB is expanding its supply of reconnaissance and attack drones and loitering munitions to support operations in Ukraine.[68] Medvedev’s claimed that the increase in drone and munition production disproves those who say Russia is running out of these assets and reported that the Russian DIB will be able to produce everything needed for operations in Ukraine in 2023.[69] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously complained that there is a lack of production of military supplies such as reconnaissance drones and called on his ministers to issue quicker state defense procurement contracts.[70] Russian officials have recently undertaken a line of effort to reinvigorate the Russian DIB to address Putin’s appeals and the demands of troops in Ukraine.[71]

CNN reported on January 24 that it received a Ukrainian military intelligence document detailing Wagner’s tactics in Ukraine.[72] The intelligence document highlights the role of convict-based squad-sized assault groups of 12 or fewer that are followed by more experienced fighters with higher-quality equipment.[73] CNN emphasized that Wagner’s success relies on the fact that it poses an outsized threat in close quarters due to the sheer number of convicts being hurled at a small area and whose deaths ultimately do not matter to Russian society.[74] ISW has previously reported on Wagner’s use of a model relying on tactical attrition of convicts to support and drive its operations.[75]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to bolster the reputation of Wagner’s convict force and attritional operational model. Prigozhin submitted an appeal to Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin on January 24 to introduce an article to the Russian Criminal Code that would "prohibit public actions discrediting" volunteers and convicts and disseminating information on "their past offenses."[76]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans targeted a member of the Zaporizhia occupation administration on January 24. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian partisans blew up the car of Valentina Mamai, a pro-Russian collaborator, entrepreneur, and member of the Zaporizhia occupation council, in Berdyansk with an improvised explosive device (IED).[77] Russian law enforcement agencies and the Ministry of Emergency Situations are reportedly working at the site of the explosion and investigating it as a case of terrorism and extremism.[78] Russian occupation authorities in Berdyansk will likely escalate law enforcement crackdowns against perceived partisans in response to the incident.

Russian security authorities are continuing to target Crimean Tatar communities in occupied Crimea. Russian-backed head of the Crimean occupation administration, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed that law enforcement detained six individuals on suspicion of their affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (a pan-Islamist political organization that has historically been active in Central Asia and in Crimea amongst the Crimean Tatar community and that is banned in Russia).[79] The Crimean Solidarity human rights NGO stated that the Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) conducted arbitrary raids on Crimean Tatar households in Dzankoi in the early hours of the morning on January 24 and are detaining six individuals in unknown locations.[80] Russian security services have historically targeted Crimean Tatar communities to consolidate social control of occupied Crimea and frame anti-Russian sentiment as extremist or terrorist activity by affiliating it with Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in Russia.[81]

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin appointed a new head of the Mariupol occupation administration in an effort to solidify administrative control of a major occupied city in Donetsk Oblast. Pushilin signed a decree on January 24 appointing Oleg Morgun, previous head of the Novoazovsk raion, to be head of Mariupol.[82] Russian media reported that Morgun replaced Konstantin Ivashchenko, although Pushilin’s decree did not mention how or why Ivashchenko was replaced.[83] Ukrainian advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol, Petro Andryushchenko, suggested that Pushilin is trying to cater to Russian authorities by replacing DNR-affiliated officials with Russian-affiliated officials.[84] Pushilin likely made this change to consolidate administrative control of Mariupol and align DNR leadership with Russian authorities in order to ensure better funding for his administration’s activities in Mariupol.[85]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to consolidate social, economic, and bureaucratic control of occupied territories through instituting various "standard of living" projects. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded on January 24 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin expedite a range of measures to improve the living standards in occupied areas of Ukraine and emphasized that funds have already been allocated for these purposes.[86] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Putin ordered the Kherson occupation administration to bring 85% of the roads in Kherson Oblast to an appropriate "normative" state by 2027 and allocated 10 billion rubles (about $144,446) to this project.[87] Luhansk People’s Republic Head Leonid Pasechnik outlined efforts by the LNR’s Ministry of Construction and Housing to prepare for a "Housing and Urban Environment" construction competition.[88] Pasechnik also noted that Russian officials from Tyumen Oblast have taken over a project to overhaul control of hospitals in Sorokyne, Luhansk Oblast.[89] DNR Head Denis Pushilin similarly announced that Russian officials from Rostov Oblast are constructing a pipeline to bring water from Rostov Oblast to occupied Donetsk Oblast.[90] Such infrastructure projects are likely intended to present the occupation administrations as productive and effective while generating a reliance on Russian infrastructure and social and economic services.

Russian occupation authorities continue measures to erase Ukrainian identity and instill pro-Russian ideals into the social sphere of occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 24 that Russian forces in occupied Luhansk Oblast are seizing books related to Ukrainian history and identity on a large scale.[91] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces are removing Ukrainian literature from bookstores and libraries and replacing them with Russian literature.[92]

Russian occupation authorities are taking measures to build out local election infrastructure in occupied areas. A Russian opposition outlet reported, citing internal Kremlin sources, that the Russian Presidential Administration’s election bloc is preparing for elections for oblast parliaments and municipal councils in occupied areas of Ukraine.[93] The article noted that the Kremlin hopes to hold local elections in September 2023 in line with Russia‘s Unified Voting day to saturate occupation administrations with pro-Russian collaborators.[94] Putin likely hopes to use local elections to create the veneer of legal legitimacy to Russia’s occupation of regions of Ukraine by presenting the local population as engaged in the electoral process and willing to vote for pro-Russian politicians.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.

ISW’s most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a potential major Russian offensive against northern Ukraine from Belarus appears increasingly unlikely. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as very low. ISW will continue reporting observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly.

Observed significant military activities in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicate an attack from Belarus is more likely:

Nothing significant to report.

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that is ambiguous:

Russian milblogger Boris Rozhin reported on January 24 that the Belarusian military officially opened unspecified Belarusian long-term military storage warehouses and began providing unspecified vehicles for combat coordination activities for the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV).[95] Russian forces may be using these vehicles for training in Belarus or may transport them to Russia to support combat operations in Ukraine. Belarus reportedly has been sending artillery ammunition from Belarusian ammunition depots to Russia since summer 2022.[96]
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree for the Belarusian annual spring conscription cycle on January 24. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that Lukashenko signed a decree on January 24 to conscript Belarusian reservists in February and March 2023.[97] This is activity is consistent with the usual Belarusian spring conscription cycle and does not indicate a Russian offensive against Ukraine from Belarus is any more likely. Lukashenko historically signs similar decrees in January or February each year. [98]

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicates that an attack from Belarus remains unlikely:

The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 24.[99]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[2] https://www.spiegel dot de/politik/deutschland/krieg-in-der-ukraine-deutschland-schickt-leopard-panzer-a-e2dde871-88d0-4cf5-8aae-482d58fd850f

[7] https://en.interfax.com dot ua/news/general/879537.html

[8] https://aif dot ru/society/army/glava_genshtaba_takogo_urovnya_deystviy_sovremmennaya_rossiya_ne_znala

[11] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/23/01/2023/63cec90a9a7947978567094d

[12] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/23/01/2023/63cec90a9a7947978567094d

[14] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/23/01/2023/63cec90a9a7947978567094d

[15] https://gur.gov [dot] ua/content/okupanty-pryznachyly-novoho-komanduvacha-zakhidnoho-vo-chetvertoho-z-pochatku-povnomasshtabnoi-ahresii.html

[16] https://ssu.gov dot ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/6157#.VgWQkX3a.dpbs; https://old.defence-ua dot com/index.php/home-page/7606-sbu-vstanovyla-prychetnist-kremlya-do-zbyttya-ukrayinskoho-viyskovo-transportnoho-litaka-il-76; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/sbu-poimenno-vstanovylo-vbyvcz-ukrayinskyh-desantnykiv-ta-lotchykiv/

[63] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/24/kreml-gotuye-fundament-dlya-mobilizacziyi-deportovanyh-ukrayincziv/

[65] https://newstracker dot ru/news/2023-01-20/zhiteli-stavropolya-rasskazali-o-poluchenii-novyh-povestok-iz-voenkomata-2642137

[66] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/24/v-krymu-okupanty-znimayut-mobilizaczijnu-bron-z-ekonomistiv-ta-it-fahivcziv/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nduPNGeBVQMR2K9cQc...

[68] https://t.me/readovkanews/51286 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/16872633 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/76267

[69] https://t.me/readovkanews/51286 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/16872633 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/76267

[76] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/331; https://t.me/concordgroup_offic... https://news dot ru/society/prigozhin-prizval-volodina-zapretit-negativnye-posty-o-dobrovolcah-svo/

[82] https//denis-pushilin dot ru/doc/ukazy/Ukaz_15_23012023 dot pdf

[86] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16872737

[91] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/24/rosiyany-vyluchayut-ukrayinski-knygy-na-tot/; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/22/sprotyv-propagandi-oglyad-brehni-rosiyan-za-tyzhden/

[93] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/01/24/oni-podderzhivayut-spetsoperatsiyu-i-za-eto-budut-voznagrazhdeny

[94] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/01/24/oni-podderzhivayut-spetsoperatsiyu-i-za-eto-budut-voznagrazhdeny

[96] https://mil.in dot ua/en/news/ammunition-began-to-be-exported-from-belarus-to-russia/; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3515934-belarus-sends-about-20-railcars-with-ammunition-to-russia-general-staff.html; https://kyivindependent dot com/news-feed/belarus-has-provided-russia-with-65-000-metric-tons-of-ammunition-since-march; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2022/06/27/7354850/; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/144

[98] https://sputnik dot by/20180118/prezident-podpisal-ukaz-o-vesennem-prizyve-1033102087.html; https://pravo dot by/novosti/novosti-pravo-by/2021/february/59805/; https://volkovysk dot by/society/lukashenko-podpisal-ukaz-o-vesennem-prizyve-2020.html; https://1prof dot by/news/v-strane/vesennij-prizyv-v-armiju-kogda-nachalsya-i-skolko-prodlitsya/; https://www.sb dot by/articles/lukashenko-podpisal-ukaz-ob-uvolnenii-v-zapas-i-prizyv-na-voennuyu-sluzhbu.html; https://newsbel dot by/01/28/ukaz-prezidenta-nachinaetsya-vesennij-prizyv-2017-goda/; http://factmil dot com/news/12_02_2016_v_vs_belarusi_objavlen_vesennij_prizyv/2016-02-12-5949

understandingwar.org

11. U.S. to give Ukraine advanced M1 tanks

U.S. to give Ukraine advanced M1 tanks

The American-made Abrams tanks, probably numbering at least 30, are not likely to arrive in time for an expected spring offensive, however

By Karen DeYoung, Dan Lamothe and Loveday Morris,

January 24, 2023 at 6:57 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · January 24, 2023

The Biden administration has decided to provide M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, overriding previous concerns that the heavy battle tanks, the world’s most powerful, are too logistically burdensome for Kyiv’s forces, according to U.S. officials.

The decision, due to be announced Wednesday, comes after a rare dispute last week among Western allies over the provision of tanks made in Germany, which has been reluctant to allow its Leopard 2 main battle tanks to be transferred to Ukraine unless the United States first provides Abrams.

The U.S. vehicles, probably numbering at least 30, are unlikely to arrive by spring, when Russian forces are expected to begin a new offensive and Ukraine plans to launch its own counteroffensive to take back Russian-occupied territory. Instead, the Abrams are “probably not for the near fight,” one U.S. official said, and are not likely to arrive for many months, if not years.

Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, declined at a news briefing Tuesday to respond to queries about the tanks, saying “I have no announcements at this time.”

“We want to make sure [the Ukrainians] have the ability to maintain it, sustain it, train on it,” Ryder said of the Abrams. He emphasized that the administration — while “focused on what is it that Ukraine needs right now, to have an immediate effect on the battlefield” — is “continuing to have discussions about what are the medium- and long-term defense requirements.” In the last few weeks, the administration has announced it will quickly ship hundreds of armored combat vehicles to Ukraine.

Pentagon officials have emphasized in recent weeks that they are planning how to build Kyiv’s security forces for the future. The Abramses are expected to be ordered from manufacturers, rather than transferred from existing U.S. stocks, and the main usefulness in announcing them now appeared designed to break a logjam with the Germans.

The apparent softening of the U.S. position comes amid increasingly urgent pleas from the Ukrainian government, with President Volodymyr Zelensky in the lead, for movement on the issue.

Germany said it did not want to go first, and indicated it would approve sending its own Leopards, or authorize other numerous other European countries that field the German tanks to send them, only if such a move was coordinated with the United States. Kyiv and U.S. lawmakers had both urged the Biden administration to approve even a small number of Abramses, believing it would provide Berlin with the top cover it needed to feel comfortable cooperating.

On Tuesday, Poland formally requested required German authorization to re-export 14 of its Leopard tanks to Ukraine, and a number of other European members of NATO have indicated they are prepared to do the same. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is expected to meet with his Cabinet early Wednesday before making his own formal announcement.

One European official confirmed reports from several German news outlets, citing government and coalition officials, that Berlin has decided to deliver at least one tank company, consisting of about 14 of its own Leopards, and to grant permission to others. A German government spokesman declined to comment on the reports. Earlier Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Biden was considering moving ahead with Abrams.

Top national security advisers from Germany, France, Britain and the United States are expected to meet Wednesday morning in Washington to discuss Ukraine. Britain has already said it would supply a small number of its Challenger 2 main battle tanks.

NATO allies, including the United States, have agreed the heavy armor is needed, particularly as they step up training of Ukrainian forces to perform “combined arms” maneuvers as they move against entrenched Russian forces along the lengthy front line across the eastern part of the country.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, speaking at a news conference in Berlin on Tuesday with German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, said that delivery of battle tanks and other armored vehicles is “urgent … because Russia is preparing new offensives.”

Stoltenberg made no mention of the Abrams, but said that allies “must provide heavier and more advanced systems so that the Ukrainian forces are able to repel the Russian forces. Not only to survive, but to win, take back territory and prevail as a sovereign, independent state in Europe.”

He was at pains to praise what Germany has given Ukraine thus far, saying that he agreed “with the Chancellor and also the minister that actually we need to remember and recognize these significant German contributions,” including sophisticated air defense and infantry fighting vehicles.

Last week, the issue occupied much of a day-long meeting at Ramstein Air Base in Germany of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, senior defense officials from dozens of countries that support Ukraine.

No deal on the tanks was announced after the session. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin declined to say at a news conference afterward whether he was disappointed in the apparent lack of agreement, and defended Berlin as a reliable ally. Austin noted that Scholz had said there is no linkage between the United States providing Abrams tanks and Germany providing the Leopard, and “this notion of unlocking” German tanks by requiring Abrams “is not an issue.”

But others said it was a major factor. Zelensky expressed exasperation with the situation, saying in a video address to the group at Ramstein that “hundreds of ‘thank you’ are not hundreds of tanks,” and that he couldn’t “use thousands of words” against Russian artillery.

In a statement later in the day, Zelensky said that, “Yes, we will still have to fight for the supply of modern tanks, but every day we make it more obvious there is no alternative to making the decision about tanks.”

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said in an interview with The Washington Post late last year that if the United States sent even one Abrams, “like a big brother,” it would be a symbolic step that opened the door to Germany sending Leopards.

A senior U.S. defense official, informed at the time of Reznikov’s comments, said that sending even one Abrams was out of the question. It is hard for the United States to maintain the Abrams tanks and their sophisticated turbine engine, the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity.

For the Ukrainians, the official said, “it would be impossible.”

Morris reported from Berlin. Alex Horton and John Hudson contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · January 24, 2023

12. German government reportedly ready to send Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks

14 tanks? One company? Hardly a game changer or war winner.

German government reportedly ready to send Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks

Defense News · by Sebastian Sprenger · January 24, 2023

WASHINGTON — The German government is expected to announce Wednesday a decision to support Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks, as Washington is considering a similar move with Abrams tanks, according to media reports in Germany.

The decision by the government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, first reported by Der Spiegel this afternoon and since confirmed by other outlets, would end weeks of hesitation that critics used to paint Berlin as indifferent about Ukraine, despite Germany’s substantial military contributions to the war-torn country.

The number of Leopard 2 tanks under consideration is 14, enough to equip a company, according to reports.

Along with the decision to send German tanks, government officials also are expected to clear export requests to send Leopards by other nations. Polish leaders said they filed such a request on Tuesday after weeks of saying Warsaw would proceed regardless of Germany’s decision.

Export control regulations of Germany and other Western nations state that the originating country must approve onward movement of weapons throughout their life cycle.

Meanwhile, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung media outlet that his government is considering giving Ukraine 18 Leopard 2 tanks leased from Germany. “We leased them, which means we can buy them and donate them,” he told the newspaper.

Previously, the U.K. government announced it would send 12 Challenger 2 heavy tanks to Ukraine.

Germany’s expected announcement on tanks could clear the way for other countries in Europe to follow suit, as officials there fear a Russian spring offensive in the coming months. Ukrainian leaders have said they want to use donated weapons to expel Russian forces from all of Ukraine.

The debate, often shrill in its tone, over whether modern tanks represent an escalation of the war with Russia, and whether they make sense militarily, has threatened to undo the Western unity that Ukraine’s allies had worked hard to cultivate since the start of Moscow’s assault almost a year ago.

About Sebastian Sprenger

Sebastian Sprenger is associate editor for Europe at Defense News, reporting on the state of the defense market in the region, and on U.S.-Europe cooperation and multi-national investments in defense and global security. Previously he served as managing editor for Defense News. He is based in Cologne, Germany.

13. Ukraine’s Zelensky Removes Top Officials in Bid to Contain Corruption Scandals

Ukraine’s Zelensky Removes Top Officials in Bid to Contain Corruption Scandals

Leader seeks to sustain Western backing for Kyiv in war with Russia

By Ian Lovett

in Kyiv, Ukraine and Lindsay Wise

in Washington

Updated Jan. 24, 2023 6:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-president-zelensky-removes-top-officials-in-bid-to-contain-corruption-scandal-11674560046?

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has removed nearly a dozen top officials as he tries to contain a series of corruption scandals and shore up Western confidence in his administration at a critical moment in the war.

Though the scandals are small compared with those of previous Ukrainian governments—some of which were accused of stealing billions in public funds—they are nonetheless a blow to Mr. Zelensky, who has garnered praise at home and abroad for his leadership of the country during Russia’s invasion.

Mr. Zelensky’s decision to dispatch apparently tainted officials, while others tendered resignations, underscores the importance of maintaining a clean image, both for Ukrainian citizens, who are dying in the thousands on the front lines and enduring economic hardship, and for Western governments, which are giving Ukraine billions in aid despite their own tepid economies. In the U.S., some Republicans have openly questioned whether the country should continue to fund Ukraine at the same levels as last year.

In a series of public addresses this week, Mr. Zelensky indicated he was seeking to clean house by dismissing officials of various levels in ministries, the regions and law enforcement, and tried to present the firings as proof of a break from corrupt regimes of the past.

“We will continue to take appropriate steps—the public will see each of them,” he said during his nightly address on Tuesday. “Any internal issues that hinder the state are being removed and will continue to be removed.”

Deputy Defense Minister Vyacheslav Shapovalov resigned on Tuesday.

PHOTO: UKRAINIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PRESS OFFICE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

In Washington, a bipartisan group of senators who traveled to Ukraine earlier this month said at a news conference on Capitol Hill that the firings hadn’t shaken their confidence in Mr. Zelensky, but rather demonstrated that he was taking allegations of corruption seriously. They said they were assured while in the country that there is no evidence that U.S. equipment or funds had been affected.

Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D., R.I.) said that a briefing the lawmakers received in Ukraine at the U.S. Embassy gave them confidence that the checks and balances in place were adequate, and that the Ukrainians were working hard to demonstrate accountability, even in some cases with great difficulty.

“When you’re actually running around being shot at, to make sure you’re saving your missile tubes so that you can keep score correctly, it’s not an easy ask,” Mr. Whitehouse said. “And they are not complaining. They’re doing it because they know that we need to have that confidence in America, and the embassy on the ground, knowing this, including our military officials, are confident.”

Over the past year, the annual defense-policy bill and multiple supplemental Ukraine funding bills passed by Congress have included provisions requiring regular reports by inspector-general offices within the federal agencies responsible for delivering the billions in economic, humanitarian and military aid: the Defense Department, State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Some Republicans have called for additional oversight and audits of U.S. aid to Ukraine. A bill proposed by Sen. John Kennedy (R., La.) would establish an inspector general solely dedicated to monitoring Ukraine aid, modeled on the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP

What’s News

Catch up on the headlines, understand the news and make better decisions, free in your inbox every day.

Preview

Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D., Conn.) said at Tuesday’s news conference that lawmakers pushing for continued aid to Ukraine aren’t asking for a blank check. “We’re asking for a big check with oversight and scrutiny,” he said. “And what was impressive to me, in fact, is that all of the scrutiny and oversight so far has disclosed no fraud or waste. No misappropriation of any of the military or humanitarian assistance that we’ve provided so far.”

Mr. Blumenthal said the firings were “very important because it demonstrates what President Zelensky has told us, that there will be zero tolerance for fraud or waste.”

Some Republicans reiterated their criticism of U.S. aid to Ukraine after Mr. Zelensky’s anti-corruption moves.

“Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries in the world and the war with Russia doesn’t change that,” Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R., Ga.) said on Twitter on Tuesday. “How much of America’s hard earned tax dollars are being stolen or going to people or things it wasn’t supposed to go to? We will audit Ukraine.”

The dismissals in Ukraine included the removal on Tuesday of the governors of five of the country’s regions, according to Taras Melnychuk, the government’s representative in parliament. Six top officials in Kyiv were also removed.

Though no reason was given for most of the dismissals, the shake-up follows a series of public corruption allegations, and Mr. Zelensky has decided to let go of some who were accused of malfeasance months ago.

Valentyn Reznichenko, who had been the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, has been accused in local media of funneling more than $40 million in government contracts to associates, including his girlfriend. He couldn’t be reached for comment. The governors of the Kyiv, Sumy, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions were also fired.

Deputy Defense Minister Vyacheslav Shapovalov resigned on Tuesday, following allegations in the local media that the country’s military was overpaying for food services. Mr. Shapovalov couldn’t be reached for comment.

Kyrylo Tymoshenko, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s deputy chief of staff, resigned Monday.

PHOTO: KYRYLO TYMOSHENKO VIA TELEGRAM/VIA REUTERS

Kyrylo Tymoshenko, a deputy head of the presidential administration who resigned on Monday, had been photographed driving a Porsche that Ukrainian media said belonged to a businessman, and was accused of appropriating for his own use a sport-utility vehicle donated to deliver aid. In a post on Telegram on Tuesday, Mr. Tymoshenko thanked a list of people, including Mr. Zelensky, but offered no reason for his resignation.

Ukraine’s deputy infrastructure minister, Vasyl Lozinskiy, was caught accepting a bribe of $400,000 and arrested, according to Ukrainian law enforcement. He was dismissed from his post earlier this week. Mr. Lozinskiy couldn’t be reached for comment.

In addition, Mr. Zelensky signed a decree barring state employees from leaving the country except on official government business.

The ban was an apparent response to reports in the Ukrainian media last week that Deputy Prosecutor General Oleksiy Symonenko went on vacation in December to Spain, where he drove a car belonging to a prominent Ukrainian businessman. Mr. Symonenko has also resigned. He couldn’t be reached for comment.

“Officials will no longer be able to travel abroad for vacation or for any other nongovernmental purpose,” Mr. Zelensky said in his video address. He added: “If they want to take vacations now, they will take vacations outside the civil service.”

Ukraine is seeking more military aid from the West to achieve a breakthrough amid what has turned into a grinding war, after Kyiv toward the end of last year regained swaths of territory lost early in the Russian invasion. The U.S. and its allies are funneling billions to prop up Ukraine’s economy, along with the provision of military aid.

Some Republicans in the U.S., who now control the House of Representatives, have called for more accounting of the money being sent to Ukraine and questioned whether the U.S. should continue to offer billions in aid.

Josh Hawley, a Republican senator from Missouri, said he skipped Mr. Zelensky’s speech to Congress last month. “I didn’t want to be part of a photo op asking for more money from the United States government when they haven’t given us a single piece of accounting on anything they’ve spent,” he said at the time.

The corruption accusations appeared small compared with past scandals that have seen billions drained from public coffers. Former President Viktor Yanukovych, for example, was accused of stealing billions from the state before he fled to Russia amid mass street protests in 2014, leaving behind an opulent palace with a garage replete with luxury cars and an animal park including ostriches. He denied wrongdoing.

Since the ouster of Mr. Yanukovych, Ukraine has sought to demonstrate progress in fighting corruption to draw closer to the West, opening an anticorruption bureau with help from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. But antigraft campaigners said progress was slow amid foot-dragging and resistance among corrupted elites.

When European Union member states agreed to grant Ukraine candidate status last June, they tasked the government with giving teeth to its anticorruption offices. Ukraine has since then appointed an anticorruption prosecutor, a post that had been vacant for two years.

The European Commission will report on Ukraine’s progress in cracking down on corruption and reducing the influence of oligarchs in the fall. That report will pave the way for discussions among member states about whether the country is ready to begin accession talks with the bloc.

The EU has also linked some of its financial assistance to Ukraine to steps to tackle corruption.

“Ukraine is of course expected to further strengthen the fight against corruption in particular at high level through proactive and effective investigations and a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions,” Ana Pisonero, a European Commission spokeswoman, said on Tuesday following the announcement of the firings and resignations.

Mr. Zelensky, a former actor in a sitcom where he played a graft-busting president, ran for office pledging to root out corruption.

Even before the war, however, he faced criticism among opponents and activists about not following through on his promise to end the culture of graft.

Daria Kaleniuk, co-founder of the nongovernmental Anticorruption Action Center, said that before the war, Mr. Zelensky, like past presidents, protected his deputies who were accused of wrongdoing.

The dismissal of Mr. Tymoshenko—who like Mr. Zelensky worked in entertainment before entering politics—was a good sign, Ms. Kaleniuk said, but she added that the allegations about food procurement in the Defense Ministry needed a more forceful response. Though the deputy minister resigned, the minister of defense had denied wrongdoing.

“Usually in Ukraine, presidents don’t like firing their team members,” in response to corruption allegations, she said. “It’s a step forward, compared to how other presidents behaved.”

Laurence Norman contributed to this article.

Write to Lindsay Wise at lindsay.wise@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Kyrylo Tymoshenko was President Volodymyr Zelensky’s deputy chief of staff. An earlier version of this article and a photo caption incorrectly identified him as Mr. Zelensky’s chief of staff. (Corrected on Jan. 24)

14. Foxes watching the hen house? DC insiders oversee Biden defense plans

Excepted critique from the Quincy INstitute. But what is missing from this commission is any member with sufficient knowledge of or experience with irregular warfare.

Foxes watching the hen house? DC insiders oversee Biden defense plans - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Eli Clifton · January 25, 2023

U.S. Foreign Policy

Foxes watching the hen house? DC insiders oversee Biden defense plans

After years at the trough, these govt. contractors are now empowered to judge how billions are spent on a key national security strategy.

January 25, 2023

Written by

Eli Clifton

Earlier this month, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees named eight commissioners who will review President Joe Biden’s National Defense Strategy and provide recommendations for its implementation.

But the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, which is tasked with “examin[ing] the assumptions, objectives, defense investments, force posture and structure, operational concepts, and military risks of the NDS,” according to the Armed Services Committees, is largely comprised of individuals with financial ties to the weapons industry and U.S. government contractors, raising questions about whether the commission will take a critical eye to contractors who receive $400 billion of the $858 billion FY2023 defense budget.

The potential conflicts of interest start at the very top of the eight-person commission. The chair of the commission, former Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), sits on the board of Iridium Communications, a satellite communications firm that was awarded a seven-year $738.5 million contract with the Department of Defense in 2019.

“Iridium and its Board members follow Iridium’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics and all rules and regulations applicable to dealings with the U.S. government,” Iridium spokesman Jordan Hassin told Responsible Statecraft.

A January 11 press release announcing the commission’s roster cited Harman’s current board memberships at the Department of Homeland Security and NASA but made no mention of her Iridium board membership, which paid her $180,000 in total compensation in 2021. Harman held 50,352 shares in Iridium, now worth approximately $3 million, in March 2022, according to the company’s disclosures.

“The members of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy each hold long records of ethical public service and national security leadership,” a Senate Armed Services Committee spokesperson told Responsible Statecraft. “The commissioners have committed to adhering to all government ethics policies to prevent any potential conflicts of interest. Congress will provide responsible oversight throughout the Commission’s work.”

That oversight will be complicated, judging by the financial ties to government and defense contractors held by six of the eight commission members.

“Lets face it, the National Defense Strategy and the Commission on the National Defense Strategy Commission are flipsides of the same coin,” Mark Thompson, national security analyst at the Project on Government Oversight, told Responsible Statecraft. “Both are heavily infected by Pentagon spending and Pentagon contractors.

“These folks have a vested interest in spending more,” said Thompson. “In Washington’s national security community, the way you get credibility is to work at think tanks funded by defense contractors or serving on boards of defense contractors.”

Indeed, Thompson’s characterization of who has “credibility” appears to be reflected in appointments to the Commission.

Commission member John “Jack” Keane serves on the board of IronNet, a firm that describes itself as providing “Collective Defense powered with network detection and response (NDR), we empower national security agencies to gain better visibility into the threat landscape across the private sector with anonymized data, while benefiting from the insight and vigilance of a private/public community of peers.” The firm’s 2022 second quarter report made clear that IronNet is dependent on government contracts.

“Our business depends, in part, on sales to government organizations, and significant changes in the contracting or fiscal policies of such government organizations could have an adverse effect on our business and results of operations,” the report said.

Keane received $210,751 in total compensation from IronNet in their fiscal year ending January 31, 2022.

Ties to contractors extend beyond the commission members who serve on corporate boards.

Another commission member, Thomas Mahnken, serves as president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, a job that paid him $394,924 in 2019, the last year in which financial disclosures are available. Major weapons firms, and some of the government’s biggest contractors, are listed as funders of the Center, including Aerojet Rocketdyne, BAE Systems, General Atomics, General Dynamics, L3 Technologies, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and Boeing.

Similarly, commission member Roger Zakheim serves as Washington Director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, a job that earned him $495,500 in 2020, the last year for which financial disclosures are available. Major defense contractors play an outsized role in funding the Foundation, including: Boeing, General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Anduril, L3Harris, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Palantir, Raytheon, Leonardo DRS, Sierra Nevada Corporation and Thales.

Finally, employees of two major tech companies with government contracts were appointed to the commission: Alissa Starzak, Vice President and Global Head of Policy at Cloudflare and Mariah Sixkiller, General Manager of Strategic Defense at Microsoft.

Last year, Cloudflare told investors, “Our business depends, in part, on sales to the United States and foreign government organizations which are subject to a number of challenges and risks.”

When reached for comment, a Cloudflare spokesperson told Responsible Statecraft, “Alissa Starzak is one of the country’s leading experts at the intersection of national security and cyber security.

“Cloudflare is proud of the contributions that she is making to the Commission. All Cloudflare internal policies and all government ethics policies have been satisfied to prevent any potential conflict of interest,” said the spokesperson.

Microsoft, for its part, is the recipient of billions of dollars in cloud computing contracts from the Department of Defense. The company declined to comment on Sixkiller’s appointment.

The appointment to the commission of individuals with deep ties to the contracting and weapons sectors is also consistent with campaign contributions to the chairs of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

SASC chairman Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.H.) counts General Dynamics employees as the top source of campaign contributions over his entire political career, and HASC chairman Rep. Mike D. Rogers (R-Ala.) saw Lockeed Martin employees as his top source of campaign funds in the past election cycle.

As the defense budget creeps toward $1 trillion, voices who will bring a critical eye to the NDS, and the enormous costs associated with the strategy, are unlikely to be found within the newly appointed commission. .

“The nation’s security is an important responsibility, but the subordinate question is whether we’re doing it in the best way possible,” said Thompson. “It seems that the NDS commission is going to give us more of the same.”

Iridium, IronNet, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment and the Reagan Foundation did not respond to requests for comment.

15. Van Jackson Blames America First in the Asia-Pacific

Excerpts:

Jackson describes China’s goals as the “desire to promote its interests.” And while he acknowledges that the CCP “is hardly a force for peace,” he urges Washington and its regional allies to simply accept the reality of China’s increased economic and political influence throughout the Asia-Pacific. In his view there is no need to try to counter this influence. Indeed, he urges the countries in the region to form a new non-aligned bloc to position themselves as neutral toward both the U.S. and China because “small states are wary of being forced to take sides in a great-power competition.” America’s efforts to, in Jackson’s words, “smite China” will only “prompt China to engage in even more aggressive conduct abroad or further stroke nationalist sentiments at home,” which will produce “more militarism from the United States.” In Jackson’s worldview, its the United States that causes China’s aggressive behavior.

Jackson proposes that the United States encourage and “partner” with an Asian non-aligned bloc; promote regional economic interdependence; offer reparations to “the many societies the United States has damaged, such as the Marshall Islands (devastated by U.S. nuclear testing), Cambodia and the Philippines (which owe the United States debts odiously incurred by previous corrupt autocratic regimes), and Guam (a colonial possession that has not been afforded a chance of self-determination).”

Van Jackson Blames America First in the Asia-Pacific

By Francis P. Sempa

January 25, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/25/van_jackson_blames_america_first_in_the_asia-pacific_877687.html?mc_cid=48f56c56f0

Since the Battle of Midway in the Second World War, the United States has dominated the Pacific Ocean. It used that dominance to push back and ultimately destroy the imperial Japanese empire. It used that dominance to wage Cold War against the Soviet Union and its allies in Asia. It used (and uses) that dominance to assure the free flow of trade and commerce. Today, it uses that dominance to contain the rising and threatening power of China. But Van Jackson thinks it is the United States, not China, that is seeking to undermine the stability of the Asia-Pacific.

Jackson teaches international relations at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand. He writes a far-left newsletter where he has called America “the preeminent revisionist power.” Jackson’s latest diatribe against American “hegemony” appears in Foreign Affairs. In it he lashes out in bi-partisan fashion at Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden for what he views as their efforts to maintain U.S. primacy in the Pacific. Obama launched the “pivot to Asia.” Trump launched a “trade war” against China and “deepened” ties with Taiwan. Biden, he writes, is attempting “to assemble the beginnings of an anti-Chinese containment coalition along with local Asian powers.” According to Jackson, these U.S. policies “run headlong into what the preservation of peace demands.”

And what the preservation of peace demands, writes Jackson, is American retrenchment in the Asia-Pacific. We must surrender primacy--presumably to China--in the name of peace and stability. Apparently it does not matter to Jackson that U.S. allies in the region have a different take on things. The leaders of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and, yes, Taiwan, see things quite differently. Even India’s leaders recognize that American power is necessary to check China’s bid for regional and global hegemony.

Jackson does not evidence any appreciation for the role that the United States plays in maintaining the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia, which requires dominance in the Pacific Ocean. Perhaps this Senior Lecture in International Relations missed his undergraduate or graduate classes on Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Perhaps, too, he has not studied the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) nor acquainted himself with Chinese strategic writings. At the very least, he should consider taking the time to read some important books on China’s strategic threat--may I suggest Red Star over the Pacific by Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, The Hundred-Year Marathon by Michael Pillsbury, or The Strategy of Denial by Elbridge Colby.

Jackson criticizes U.S. policymakers for entering “an arms race against a rapidly modernizing People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” and for providing advanced weapons to its regional allies. He accuses Washington of engaging in “radical militarism” in the region. Indeed, Jackson contends that China’s military build-up resulted from its anticipation of America’s “techno-containment strategy.” Its as if we are back in the 1960s and 1970s, when far-left professors like Jackson blamed the United States, not the Soviet Union, for the arms race.

As Chinese warplanes and warships regularly conduct military exercises near Taiwan, Jackson accuses Washington of “risking military escalation” and “stok[ing] jingoism” that leads both the U.S. and China “to adopt the most malign interpretations of the other’s intentions.” Jackson essentially concedes Taiwan to China. “To repel a PLA attack against Taiwan,” he writes, “the United States would need absurd levels of modern weaponry--meaning a blank check for the Pentagon.”

Jackson describes China’s goals as the “desire to promote its interests.” And while he acknowledges that the CCP “is hardly a force for peace,” he urges Washington and its regional allies to simply accept the reality of China’s increased economic and political influence throughout the Asia-Pacific. In his view there is no need to try to counter this influence. Indeed, he urges the countries in the region to form a new non-aligned bloc to position themselves as neutral toward both the U.S. and China because “small states are wary of being forced to take sides in a great-power competition.” America’s efforts to, in Jackson’s words, “smite China” will only “prompt China to engage in even more aggressive conduct abroad or further stroke nationalist sentiments at home,” which will produce “more militarism from the United States.” In Jackson’s worldview, its the United States that causes China’s aggressive behavior.

Jackson proposes that the United States encourage and “partner” with an Asian non-aligned bloc; promote regional economic interdependence; offer reparations to “the many societies the United States has damaged, such as the Marshall Islands (devastated by U.S. nuclear testing), Cambodia and the Philippines (which owe the United States debts odiously incurred by previous corrupt autocratic regimes), and Guam (a colonial possession that has not been afforded a chance of self-determination).”

We have been here before. During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the far-left blamed America for the arms race, for “militarizing” our competition with the Soviet Union, for causing Soviet aggressive behavior, and advocated American retrenchment from Europe and Asia. Thankfully, our policymakers largely rejected the far left narrative, ignored their advice, and pursued policies that ultimately won the Cold War. But our victory in the Cold War was, as the Duke of Wellington said about Waterloo, a close run thing. In the 1970s and 1980s, many leaders of the Democratic Party talked and acted like Van Jackson (the “blame America first party”), and opposed Ronald Reagan’s policies that helped bring down the Soviet empire.

Hopefully, today’s U.S. policymakers will similarly reject the advice of Van Jackson and his ilk, which is based on a similarly false, far-left narrative that always blames America first.

Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21^stCentury, America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics and War, and Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: A Combat Soldier’s Journey through the Second World War. He has written lengthy introductions to two of Mahan’s books, and has written on historical and foreign policy topics for The Diplomat, the University Bookman, Joint Force Quarterly, the Asian Review of Books, the New York Journal of Books, the Claremont Review of Books, American Diplomacy, the Washington Times, The American Spectator, and other publications. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a former contributing editor to American Diplomacy.

16. What Western armour gives Ukraine in the next round of the war

But it seems it might be a small iron fist.

14 Leopards and 30 Abrams? Barely a battalion's worth of tanks (56 in a US battalion)

Maybe it will give the Ukrainians Bruce Lee's one inch death punch.

What Western armour gives Ukraine in the next round of the war

A new iron fist should confer an advantage over Russia, but the stakes are rising

The Economist

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis.

EACH PHASE of the war in Ukraine has brought its iconic weapons. In the battle for Kyiv last winter the shoulder-fired Javelin anti-tank and Stinger air-defence missiles had the starring roles. When fighting shifted to the eastern Donbas region in the spring, it was the turn of the 155mm howitzer. When Ukraine went on the counter-offensive in the autumn the plaudits went to the HIMARS rocket launcher. Now, as both sides prepare for new offensives with the approach of spring, the spotlight has turned to armour—above all tanks and lighter infantry fighting vehicles.

After nearly a year of fighting, despite spectacular Ukrainian successes in halting and then pushing back an ostensibly superior enemy, Russia still occupies about 17% of Ukraine’s territory, including Crimea, the peninsula it annexed in 2014, which poses some of the most difficult questions about the future of the war. Right now, the conflict has become one of grinding, bloody attrition. In the air, volleys of Russian missiles and drones seek to cripple Ukraine’s electrical grid. On the ground, artillery battles and human-wave attacks have allowed Russian forces to inch forward around the town of Bakhmut in the eastern region of the Donbas.

The spring fighting season may prove decisive. Ukraine’s advantage in battlefield manpower is eroding now that the Kremlin has mobilised 200,000-300,000 soldiers, and may soon order another large call-up. With Russian military factories working triple shifts, the West’s depleting stocks of ammunition are unlikely to give Ukraine a decisive edge in artillery firepower. There is thus a growing sense in the West that Ukraine needs a game-changing strategy to achieve a victory large enough to force Russia to withdraw, or at least to negotiate.

That, in turn, explains the ambition of America’s two unusually large military-aid packages this month, which mark a shift from providing weapons in piecemeal fashion to training and equipping entire fighting units. The United States announced the dispatch of more than 100 tracked Bradley fighting vehicles, 90 wheeled Stryker vehicles, 100 M113 armoured personnel-carriers and much more. They add up to arming two brigades’-worth of mechanised infantry.

Add in the scores of fighting vehicles from elsewhere—German Marders, French AMX-10RCs and Swedish CV90s—and the Ukrainians have the makings of another brigade or two, perhaps making up overall a division’s-worth of Western equipment. Self-propelled howitzers are an important part of armoured units, providing supporting fire on the move. America will supply 18 such guns; Denmark donated its entire stock of 19 French-made CAESAR guns.

To make a cohesive whole, America is training Ukrainian forces, a battalion at a time (usually three or four battalions make up a brigade), in combined-arms operations. This involves co-ordinating armour, infantry, engineers and drones to reinforce the strengths of each and mitigate their respective weaknesses. General Mark Milley, the chairman of America’s joint chiefs of staff, says the aid “will significantly increase Ukraine’s ability to defend itself from further Russian attacks and to go on the tactical and operational offensive to liberate the occupied areas”.

Conspicuously absent, though, are large numbers of Western main battle tanks that would maximise the power of such an armoured fist. Britain has promised 14 Challenger tanks. That would equip only a company, not a battalion–let alone a brigade. A British armoured brigade has 56 Challengers, for instance; an American one fights with 87 M1 Abrams tanks.

For the glaring gap, blame disagreements among Western allies, and particularly German angst. The German-made Leopard 2 tanks offer the best military option: the diesel-engined Leopards are plentiful (about 2,000 are in service across Europe) and easier to operate than the turbine-powered Abrams. Several countries are willing to supply Leopards, but to the outrage of many allies, Germany has so far declined to send the tanks, or even to give permission for others to send the Leopards it has sold them.

At one point German officials said the dispatch of Leopards would be contingent on America’s sending the Abrams, a linkage the Pentagon rejects. The new German defence minister, Boris Pistorius, has sensibly backed away from playing “you first”. He said Germany needed more time to decide—perhaps just days. In the meantime, he said allies could begin training the Ukrainians on Leopards. Exasperated by “global indecision”, Mikhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, tweeted: “Every day of delay is the death of Ukrainians. Think faster.” Lindsey Graham, a prominent Republican Senator, urged both America and Germany to send tanks, chiding them: “I am tired of the shit show […] Putin is trying to rewrite the map of Europe by force of arms. World order is at stake.”

That said, tanks might not be as important as the political rows suggest. Ukraine has hundreds of Soviet-era tanks, from pre-war stocks, as well as refurbished ones given by eastern European countries and, not least, the many it has captured from Russia. Western tanks are better protected and more capable. In their absence, though, Ukraine could mix its Soviet-vintage heavy armour with Western infantry fighting vehicles to pack a substantial punch. Bradleys, for instance, performed well as tank-killers during the Iraq war of 1991.

Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a British think-tank, argues that the latest pledges of weapons will create “the most powerful armoured force in the Ukrainian military; it gives them something that allows them to move quickly, take damage and conduct breakthrough operations.”

A bigger disappointment than the absence of tanks is the lack of longer-range precision weapons to strike Russian command posts and logistics hubs deeper behind Russian lines, adds Ben Hodges, a retired general who used to command the American army in Europe. The GPS-guided missiles fired by HIMARS (and the related MLRS launcher) have a range of 70-84km. At first they caused mayhem in Russia’s rear areas, but it has since re-organised itself to keep targets out of range. The Pentagon refuses to supply the 300km-range ATACMS missile that can be fired from the same launchers, deeming it escalatory. America and Ukraine “agree to disagree” about ATACMS, says Colin Kahl, the Pentagon’s under-secretary for policy.

Mr Kahl concedes that Ukraine needs the means to wage “the deep fight”. But the Pentagon is also withholding the Grey Eagle armed drone, with a range of hundreds if not thousands of kilometres. Western military jets are out of the question for now. Some had hoped that a new 150km-range weapon, known as the GLSDB missile, which can also be fired from HIMARS, would be announced in the latest arms-supply packages. It features the Small Diameter Bomb, a laser- or GPS-guided bomb dropped from aircraft and used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would be mounted onto obsolete unguided M26 rockets. With wings that unfold in mid-flight, the GLSDB manoeuvres by gliding towards its target, increasing the range and options for attack.

With more and better armour, and the means of conducting deep missile strikes, says General Hodges, Ukraine would have the best chance of taking Crimea, which he deems the “decisive terrain”. He argues that, by concentrating its armour, Ukraine could make a thrust to the Sea of Azov and sever the land bridge between Russia proper and Crimea. Long-range-precision munitions, meanwhile, would allow it to destroy the actual bridge to Crimea over the Kerch strait, which was partly damaged by a still-unexplained explosion in October 2022. Ukraine could then pound the Russians at will, make their position in Crimea untenable and force them to give up the peninsula, he contends.

Control of Crimea allows Russia to choke Ukrainian ports and supply its forces in southern Ukraine. Losing it would be a severe military and, perhaps more important, political blow to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, General Hodges notes. But that is also why some allies are queasy about Ukraine trying to retake it, fearing it might push Mr Putin to resort to nuclear weapons.

Are the allies willing to take the risk? America asserts that “Crimea is Ukraine” and Ukraine has every right to reconquer it. Whether America would in practice be prepared to support a Ukrainian operation to take Crimea is another matter. Ever vague about the endgame, American officials concede that, at some point, American and Ukrainian war aims may diverge. But giving Ukraine at least the means to threaten Russia’s position in Crimea may have advantages. “If you want a negotiated settlement, then prioritising Crimea might well be sensible, not escalatory,” argues Mr Watling.

Talk of retaking Crimea seems premature to some. “Look at the map of the current front lines in Ukraine. The Ukrainians would have to first achieve significant military success in the south before Crimea is up for discussion,” notes Michael Kofman of CNA, a think-tank. Like General Hodges, he agrees that the focus for Ukraine should be on precision weapons, equipping new units and manoeuvre warfare. Unlike him, though, he thinks further gains will be more difficult and costly for Ukraine to attain.

Ukraine’s recapture of the port city of Kherson in November was an arduous affair even though it was fighting a semi-isolated Russian garrison with its back to the Dnieper river. Since their retreat, the Russians are now defending a shorter overall front line with more soldiers and reserves. What is more, “if the next Ukrainian offensive goes poorly, it carries the risk of a Russian counter-offensive and, in the worst-case scenario, losing territory rather than gaining it,” argues Mr Kofman.

American combined-arms tactics have often relied on air superiority. “The missing ingredient for Ukraine is not that it doesn’t have Western tanks; it’s that it doesn’t have a Western air force,” notes Mr Kofman. “Combined-arms manoeuvre is much easier to effect when you also have the advantage of US airpower.”

Gian Gentile of the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, recognises that, as a cavalry officer commanding Bradleys in Iraq, “I didn’t have to worry about anything flying above me”; now Russia and Ukraine both lack control of the air. He also acknowledges the risk to the Ukrainians of going on the offence. Clausewitz, a 19th-century Prussian general and strategist, argued that defence was the stronger form of war. But, Colonel Gentile says, “ultimately it’s the offensive that produces the decisive results. The attackers have the initiative: they know when, and where and how they want to strike.”

As both sides prepare for the next round, there is a sense of foreboding. Even as he asserted that Ukraine could make progress, General Milley declared: “For this year it would be very, very difficult to militarily eject the Russian forces from every inch of Russian-occupied Ukraine.” The conflict would have to end at the negotiating table at some point, he said, adding: “This is going to be a very, very bloody war.”

Nervousness is palpable in the Kremlin, too. Air-defence weapons have recently appeared on rooftops in Moscow. And Dmitry Medvedev, who serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s security council, warned in a post on Telegram, a messaging app: “The defeat of a nuclear power in a conventional war may trigger a nuclear war.” His nuclear bombast was nothing new. Yet his acknowledgment that Russia could be defeated amounted to a novel and striking admission of weakness.■

The Economist

17. Taiwan's president says war with China 'not an option'

Unfortunately as the saying goes, the enemy has a vote.

Taiwan's president says war with China 'not an option'

AP · January 24, 2023

TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen told Pope Francis in a letter that war with China is “not an option” and said constructive interaction with Beijing, which claims the island as part of its territory, depends on respecting self-ruled Taiwan’s democracy.

Vatican City is the last European government to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan instead of Beijing, although the United States and other Western nations maintain extensive informal ties. Taiwanese leaders are uneasy about Vatican efforts to develop relations with Beijing.

Tsai, in the letter released by her office, expressed support for Vatican positions on Russia’s war against Ukraine, “migrant-friendly policies” and public health.

“We identify profoundly with your views,” Tsai wrote.

Taiwan and China split in 1949 after a civil war and have no official relations but are linked by billions of dollars in trade and investment. The Chinese Communist Party regularly flies fighter planes and bombers near Taiwan to enforce its stance that the island is obliged to unite with the mainland, by force if necessary.

Tsai noted Francis’s Jan. 1 message for the World Day of Peace that the “virus of war” must be cured. She quoted herself in an Oct. 10 speech rejecting armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait and calling for “peace and stability.”

Russia-Ukraine war

In reversal, US poised to approve Abrams tanks for Ukraine

After US offer, Germany unleashes Leopard tanks for Ukraine

Ukraine forces pull back from Donbas town after onslaught

Germany sees brighter outlook for Europe's largest economy

“Armed confrontation is absolutely not an option,” Tsai wrote.

“Only by respecting the commitment of the Taiwanese people to our sovereignty, democracy and freedom can there be a foundation for resuming constructive interaction across the Taiwan Strait,” Tsai’s letter said.

China stepped up efforts to pressure the island, including firing missiles into the sea, after then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi of the U.S. House of Representatives in August became the highest-ranking American official to visit the island in 25 years. Legislators from Britain and other countries also have visited Taiwan in a show of support for its elected government.

A former Taiwanese vice president under Tsai, Chen Chien-jen, represented the island at this month’s funeral of former Pope Benedict.

AP · January 24, 2023

18. Taiwan’s Urgent Task: A Radical New Strategy to Keep China Away

Heavy technology weapons, equipment, procurement focus. Does not appear to be very radical. Some mention of alliances and training and only an indirect reference to developing a holistic resistance operating concept.

Excerpts:

Any effective deterrence strategy against China must begin with Taiwan’s own defenses. The United States needs to signal to Beijing that Taiwan will resist an invasion just as fiercely and creatively as Ukraine has. To be credible

...

In addition, Congress should give top priority to delivering the $19 billion in arms that Taiwan has already ordered, including Harpoon and Javelin missiles. Congress should also provide Taiwan the same drawdown authority to deliver weapons from current U.S. stockpiles as Ukraine has and appropriate funds for direct military assistance as it has with Ukraine. This would enable the Pentagon to send military supplies directly to Taiwan as well as weapons that might otherwise be decommissioned.

Lastly, the administration must continue its efforts to strengthen regional alliances such as AUKUS, the trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a coalition including Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Beijing needs to know that a united front stands ready to assist Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack. Washington and its allies should also declare in advance a set of financial sanctions and trade embargoes that would be triggered by any Chinese military action against Taiwan. Such a declaration would clearly signal to Beijing the severe economic crisis that an unprovoked attack would cause—a prospect that may, in fact, be more persuasive in deterring the Chinese leadership than fear of U.S. military action.

...

In order to help Taiwan acquire these new systems, the U.S. Department of Defense will need to significantly streamline its procurement process. Currently, the department buys commercial items such as small drones the same way it buys fighter jets: after specifying what it wants to buy, the department enters a lengthy acquisition process with the desired weapon system funded through multiyear program requests. This means that even when funds are planned and agreed upon at the Pentagon, it can take years before Congress appropriates the money. In fact, on average, planning for every dollar the Pentagon spends begins 24 to 30 months earlier. To reform this process for commercial items, the Pentagon needs to eliminate unnecessary steps, such as the requirement to define the specifications for items that the commercial world is already building. It also needs to leverage more efficient federal purchasing mechanisms—such as Other Transaction Authority—and ask Congress for enough budget flexibility to buy lots of small things in a given fiscal year.

With such reforms in place, the U.S. government should be able to quickly identify the most valuable commercial technologies, determine which vendors can best provide them, and allocate funds to acquire them on a cycle that keeps apace with the development of new systems. For Taiwan, this would open up a host of new technologies from U.S. vendors that could be immediately deployed for enhanced defense.

Finally, the Defense Department should include Taiwan in its joint military exercises. Today’s exercises in the Indo-Pacific involve many nations’ forces, including those of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Yet they do not include Taiwan. Although China would regard such participation as provocative, U.S. diplomats can point out that the Chinese initiated the provocation by increasingly flying into Taiwanese airspace and crossing the maritime line dividing China and Taiwan with growing frequency.

Taiwan’s Urgent Task

A Radical New Strategy to Keep China Away

By Michael Brown

January 25, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Michael Brown · January 25, 2023

Since the Ukraine war began, a growing number of U.S. officials have stressed the urgency of deterring Chinese military action against Taiwan. President Xi Jinping’s comments in October reinforced this view when he declared that China was prepared to take “all measures necessary” against foreign “interference” on the island and that “the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification” with it. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Beijing may intend to seize Taiwan on a “much faster timeline” than previously thought.

Despite this assessment, the United States has not devoted sufficient attention to the current approach to deterrence—and whether it is adequate to meet an accelerated threat. For years, Taiwan has been preparing for a conventional war with China, for which it has acquired big military hardware from the United States, such as Abrams tanks and F-16 jets. But Taiwan cannot match China in these categories, and a direct military confrontation is one that it cannot win. Moreover, despite its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity, Washington has suggested that it would come to Taiwan’s aid if China invaded. Yet the United States has not taken adequate steps to put military resources in place and increase its own capacity to resupply those resources in anticipation of such an event.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not resemble the Ukraine conflict in which the United States and its allies have been able to build economic sanctions and supply Ukraine with increasingly powerful weapons over many months. Given Taiwan’s location—only 100 miles from the Chinese mainland and 5,000 miles from the headquarters of the United States Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii—Washington would not have time to prepare a response once an invasion was underway. Were the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense without sufficient planning, the outcome could be truly catastrophic. If China and the United States go to war, there would be few incentives for either side to back down and numerous paths to rapid escalation. With the prospect of a historically destructive conflict looming, ensuring effective deterrence is the most critical U.S. national security challenge in Asia, and by far the most urgent.

Given the growing threat of an invasion, deterring China will require a far more proactive approach. Taiwan must redesign the way that its forces are organized, armed, and deployed so that it can deny China a rapid victory. At the same time, Washington needs to evolve its own policy, making clear that direct military support is available to Taiwan today and would be strengthened if an invasion were to take place. Above all, by their actions and preparations, the United States and Taiwan must seek to significantly raise the uncertainty in Xi’s mind about whether military action against the island would succeed. Deterrence failed in Ukraine, and the United States must ensure that it does not fail in Taiwan.

THE PANDA AND THE PORCUPINE

Any effective deterrence strategy against China must begin with Taiwan’s own defenses. The United States needs to signal to Beijing that Taiwan will resist an invasion just as fiercely and creatively as Ukraine has. To be credible, Taiwan should double the proportion of its budget reserved for defense and double its current troop strength of 169,000. At present, Taipei spends about $19 billion on defense, a figure that pales in comparison with China’s $293 billion. And although Taiwan will not be able to close the gap with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it can greatly increase deterrence with a stronger and more prepared military. The goal must be to deny easy access to the island and cause significant damage to attacking Chinese forces, buying time for the United States and allies to assist.

But U.S. and Taiwanese officials must also recognize the lopsided threat Taiwan faces. Historically, Taiwan has spent its defense budget on equipping its military for a head-on conflict with China, including through the extensive purchase of U.S. tanks and fighter jets. But given the overwhelming numbers of tanks, ships, and airplanes that China can now field, this is not an effective use of procurement funds. For example, although Taiwan now has 400 fighter jets and 800 tanks, its forces are dwarfed by China’s 1,600 fighters and 6,300 tanks. China also has 450 bombers, nine nuclear submarines, two aircraft carriers, and other equipment that Taiwan does not possess. And in terms of manpower, China has a standing army of more than two million soldiers—nearly 12 times as many as Taiwan.

Faced with this dramatic force disparity, Taiwan would be better off developing asymmetric capabilities that can thwart superior firepower. The Taiwanese government could, for example, purchase the data as a service (DaaS) from dedicated commercial satellites, which could provide imagery of what and how many Chinese forces are amassing to provide as much early warning as possible. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites, for example, can provide images of the earth with resolution down to a third of a meter and, unlike traditional optical satellites, can operate through cloud cover and at night. SAR images have become a game changer for Ukrainian forces, giving Kyiv a real-time view of Russian tanks, trucks, and ground forces. Moreover, since this technology is available commercially, neither the Taiwanese nor the U.S. military need to own the satellites or the rockets to launch them.

Swarming drones and autonomous undersea vessels could help thwart China’s invasion plans.

Taiwan should also build a resilient and flexible communications network. Ukraine has shown the effectiveness of SpaceX’s Starlink system, which has allowed the country to withstand repeated attacks on its infrastructure without losing communications for its military or its citizens. Taiwan should establish a similar space-to-ground system to ensure uninterrupted communications availability during an invasion. Additionally, Taiwan should invest more resources into both cyberdefenses—to protect its critical infrastructure—and, with the assistance of U.S. Cyber Command, offensive cyber-capabilities to disrupt PLA operations during an attack.

As Ukrainian forces have demonstrated, Taiwan can strengthen its military with smaller, smarter weapons. Admiral Lorin Selby and I, as well as former State Department senior adviser James Timbie and Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., have argued that Taiwan could enhance its forces by acquiring “a large number of small things”—weapons that can provide robust deterrence against an invading force, serving as a hedge to the large weapons platforms China is expecting to encounter. Examples of these include smart mines (which can be turned on and off); over-the-horizon, long-range antiship missiles (Harpoons); Javelin antitank missiles; and antiaircraft defenses such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). All of these weapons have proven valuable in Ukraine. For Taiwan to be able to use them, however, they will need to already be in place at the time of a Chinese attack.

Yet another way for Taiwan to enhance its deterrence would be to acquire more unmanned military systems. Such autonomous technology includes small drones that can swarm in the air; solar-powered surface vessels for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and undersea vessels that can gather intelligence or intercept enemy vessels. A combination of these systems would give Taiwan more comprehensive intelligence and, potentially, the power to intercept vessels across the Pacific—capabilities it currently lacks. The United States is already demonstrating the benefits of such technologies today with the navy’s Task Force 59, set up to integrate unmanned systems, sensor data, and artificial intelligence into maritime operations. Combined with enhanced satellite imagery, these capabilities would hinder the ability of China’s naval forces to project power or operate undetected in Taiwanese waters.

But asymmetric and autonomous capabilities alone will not be enough to withstand a Chinese invasion. Taiwanese forces will also need immediate access to fuel, munitions, food, and medical supplies to sustain their defense efforts in the opening phase of any attack. The United States should preposition these supplies to be accessible before a potential Chinese offensive or naval blockade. Currently, for example, Taiwan has only a seven-day fuel supply—for all its needs as a nation—concentrated in tanks on its west coast. By distributing ample fuel and other supplies around the island as well as on nearby islands, the United States and its allies can help Taiwan withstand an initial attack and prevent China from blocking crucial supply lines. The goal should be to transform Taiwan into what many have called an indigestible porcupine, brimming with asymmetric military capabilities that would surprise and frustrate any invading force.

STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY, PRACTICAL COMMITMENT

As Beijing steps up its pressure on Taiwan, the United States has confronted a growing dilemma. On the one hand, U.S. President Joe Biden has repeated publicly four times that the United States will not stand idly by if China moves to seize Taiwan. But on the other hand, according to its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity, the United States is not explicitly committed to defending the island, reserving instead the right to respond if an attack occurs. Clearly, this wait-and-see approach no longer serves U.S. interests. If the United States is not prepared in advance with prepositioned materiel on the island and the immediate capacity to resupply Taiwan, the administration’s statements become empty rhetoric. Yet abandoning strategic ambiguity as a policy would be a direct provocation to Beijing and would likely lead to an escalatory response.

Fortunately, the United States has another option. Without formally changing policy, Washington can provide Taiwan the military resources it needs before an invasion occurs. In doing so, the U.S. government can demonstrate to Beijing that China will face stiff resistance to any military action and that it is ready to supply the island with war materiel for an extended conflict. As a first step, the United States needs to stockpile on Taiwan such weapons as Harpoons, Stingers, Javelins, and HIMARS launchers. At the same time, Congress should authorize the Pentagon to aggressively ramp up production of these systems.

Equally important, Washington must eliminate the bottlenecks it has faced in supplying missiles and other munitions to Ukraine. A crucial vulnerability has been the production of so-called energetics—a broad category of explosives, propellants, and other material needed for ammunition, rocket and missile motors, and other devices. Because the United States has not fought a sustained conflict with a peer competitor in years, it has severely underinvested in energetics production, with the result that the Defense Department has struggled to resupply Stinger missiles to Ukraine. In the case of Taiwan, such a delay could prove devastating, as even a few weeks could determine the outcome of the war.

The United States should pre-position war materiel on and around Taiwan.

To avoid these logjams, the Pentagon needs to break the paradigm of single-year defense appropriations, which have in the past limited its ability to invest in greater production capacity. As William LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, has observed, by moving to multiyear appropriations, the U.S. would be far better equipped to increase production capacity of energetics in a sustained way. Representative Mike Gallagher from Wisconsin, a Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee and chair of the House’s new Select Committee on China, has further suggested using the Defense Production Act to achieve more rapid stockpiles of munitions, provide project financing for munitions vendors, fast-track permits for vendors to expand capacity, and invest in workforce training. As the COVID-19 crisis made clear, the Defense Production Act gives the president broad authority to mobilize the private sector to meet a national emergency. To prepare for an extended conflict with China, the government needs to identify now which manufacturers will need to be tapped and for what items. Having such plans in place with preapproved funds to pay for them would itself have an important deterrent value.

In addition, Congress should give top priority to delivering the $19 billion in arms that Taiwan has already ordered, including Harpoon and Javelin missiles. Congress should also provide Taiwan the same drawdown authority to deliver weapons from current U.S. stockpiles as Ukraine has and appropriate funds for direct military assistance as it has with Ukraine. This would enable the Pentagon to send military supplies directly to Taiwan as well as weapons that might otherwise be decommissioned.

Lastly, the administration must continue its efforts to strengthen regional alliances such as AUKUS, the trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a coalition including Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Beijing needs to know that a united front stands ready to assist Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack. Washington and its allies should also declare in advance a set of financial sanctions and trade embargoes that would be triggered by any Chinese military action against Taiwan. Such a declaration would clearly signal to Beijing the severe economic crisis that an unprovoked attack would cause—a prospect that may, in fact, be more persuasive in deterring the Chinese leadership than fear of U.S. military action.

LESS RED TAPE, MORE DETERRENCE

In addition to improving its military stockpiles and munitions capacity, the U.S. Department of Defense should accelerate its own development of the asymmetric systems that will help transform Taiwan into a porcupine. One type of such technology is small, unmanned electric aircraft. Currently in development as air taxis, these aircraft do not need runways and can amplify Taiwan’s air forces at relatively low cost. Other examples include autonomous floating barges that could serve as logistics platforms and could be positioned where needed; underwater drones that can gather intelligence or intercept enemy vessels; and small satellites serving as multispectral sensors, providing Taipei with precise images of enemy force movements within a large radius of the island.

A crucial advantage of these new technologies is the element of surprise they would bring to Taiwan’s military response. After all, the Chinese military has stolen U.S. aircraft designs and studied U.S. military operations around the globe for decades to prepare for a potential conflict. But since many of the asymmetric systems are new and can be fielded in only one to two years, they introduce capabilities that China is little prepared for. The more these systems create uncertainty and the greater their number, the more difficult it will be for the Chinese military to have confidence in its invasion plans. At the same time, these commercial capabilities also have the benefit of being lower cost than traditional defense platforms, and since they are unclassified, they can be readily shared with U.S. allies. In short, the United States can intensify deterrence without a dramatic shift in official policy and without enormous cost—provided it acts now.

The Pentagon needs to get new technologies to Taiwan faster.

In order to help Taiwan acquire these new systems, the U.S. Department of Defense will need to significantly streamline its procurement process. Currently, the department buys commercial items such as small drones the same way it buys fighter jets: after specifying what it wants to buy, the department enters a lengthy acquisition process with the desired weapon system funded through multiyear program requests. This means that even when funds are planned and agreed upon at the Pentagon, it can take years before Congress appropriates the money. In fact, on average, planning for every dollar the Pentagon spends begins 24 to 30 months earlier. To reform this process for commercial items, the Pentagon needs to eliminate unnecessary steps, such as the requirement to define the specifications for items that the commercial world is already building. It also needs to leverage more efficient federal purchasing mechanisms—such as Other Transaction Authority—and ask Congress for enough budget flexibility to buy lots of small things in a given fiscal year.

With such reforms in place, the U.S. government should be able to quickly identify the most valuable commercial technologies, determine which vendors can best provide them, and allocate funds to acquire them on a cycle that keeps apace with the development of new systems. For Taiwan, this would open up a host of new technologies from U.S. vendors that could be immediately deployed for enhanced defense.

Finally, the Defense Department should include Taiwan in its joint military exercises. Today’s exercises in the Indo-Pacific involve many nations’ forces, including those of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Yet they do not include Taiwan. Although China would regard such participation as provocative, U.S. diplomats can point out that the Chinese initiated the provocation by increasingly flying into Taiwanese airspace and crossing the maritime line dividing China and Taiwan with growing frequency.

CHANGING XI’S CALCULUS

Some of these steps will take years to complete. But by initiating them now, the United States can signal to Beijing, and to Xi in particular, that invading or blockading Taiwan would set off a confrontation that China could lose. By making the island difficult to conquer, Taiwan and the United States may be able to change Chinese thinking about an invasion, persuading Xi that it would be far better to continue strong rhetoric about reunification than to succumb to self-imposed pressure to seize Taiwan by force.

Beijing already has reasons to avoid a new geopolitical crisis. After all, Xi is already contending with many challenges at home, including dramatically slower economic growth (in part due to Beijing’s failed zero-COVID policies), an increasingly skeptical set of trading partners, and the biggest aging demographic crisis of any nation in history. And these leave aside the dire economic implications of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan: beyond the costs of a war, if China cannot get semiconductors from Taiwan, it would precipitate a collapse of the 70 percent of the world’s electronics that China produces and largely exports. If the United States and other countries lose access to semiconductors, a global depression will result. An unsuccessful effort to seize Taiwan, on top of these other challenges, might mean the end of Xi’s tenure in power and, possibly, the end of the Chinese Communist Party as the ruling regime.

But if the West appears complacent or distracted, Xi may see opportunity. To change his calculus, Taiwan, the United States, and its allies must show they are resolute about thwarting an invasion. With China’s increasingly bellicose declarations about retaking the island, time is running out for Washington to demonstrate commitment through action.

MICHAEL BROWN is a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and is the former Director of the Defense Innovation Unit at the U.S. Department of Defense.
MORE BY MICHAEL A. BROWN

Foreign Affairs · by Michael Brown · January 25, 2023

19. Biden Envoy Met Secretly with Iranians Amid Tehran’s Violent Crackdown on Protests

Biden Envoy Met Secretly with Iranians Amid Tehran’s Violent Crackdown on Protests

fdd.org · by Danielle Kleinman · January 24, 2023

Latest Developments

Iran International reported in an exclusive story last week that U.S. special envoy for Iran Robert Malley met at least three times with Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Saeed Iravani in the last two months. The U.S. State Department did not deny or confirm whether the meetings occurred when responding to Iran International’s request for verification. Rather, State said the United States has “the means to deliver specific and firm messages to Iran when it is in America’s interest to do so” and that “we’re not going to get into details about how we deliver these messages, except to say that we do so in close coordination with allies and partners.” Iran’s mission to the United Nations told Iranian state media that its ambassador “meets with various political and academic figures, but he has not had any negotiations with American officials.”

Expert Analysis

“Since Malley’s objective remains securing some form of nuclear agreement with Iran that includes the United States lifting sanctions on Tehran, secret meetings between Malley and the regime in Tehran raise serious concerns about the Biden administration’s commitment to the Iranian protest movement and Ukraine’s defense from the Russian-Iranian war machine. The administration should answer basic questions on the timing, content, and third-party coordination of these meetings: Who authorized these meetings, what was discussed, and who has been briefed outside of the U.S. government?” — Richard Goldberg, FDD Senior Advisor

Reported Meetings Would Embolden Tehran Regime

Over the course of the last two months, when Malley reportedly was meeting with Tehran’s UN ambassador, the regime was intensifying its crackdown on dissent in Iran, including public executions of peaceful protesters. At the same time, Tehran continued to provide military and sanctions evasion support to Russia, with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan even accusing Iran of complicity in war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. Sending Malley to meet with the regime — and perhaps even offer incentives to change its behavior — could have backfired by signaling American weakness to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

What Else Could Have Been Discussed

Malley’s meeting with Iravani might be related to Iran’s continued detainment of U.S. citizen Siamak Namazi, who last week declared a hunger strike and wrote an open letter urging President Joe Biden to do more to win his release. Last year, Malley reportedly offered to unfreeze billions of dollars in regime assets held in Iran’s U.S.-sanctioned bank accounts in South Korea in exchange for Namazi’s release. The administration should explicitly state whether Malley’s recent secret meetings included any discussion relating to the unfreezing of accounts or lifting of sanctions on Iran — a move that would directly undermine the ongoing protest movement in Iran and Kyiv’s drive to hold Tehran accountable for transferring armed drones to Russia.

Related Analysis

“Iran Hangs Two Protesters While 109 Face Prospect of Execution,” FDD Flash Brief

“U.S. May Allow Payment to Iran for Hostages,” FDD Flash Brief

fdd.org · by Danielle Kleinman · January 24, 2023

20. Support for Ukraine in US still high, but slowly fading: survey

Support for Ukraine in US still high, but slowly fading: survey

BY NICK ROBERTSON - 01/24/23 1:45 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3828545-support-for-ukraine-in-us-still-high-but-slowly-fading-survey/

A majority of Americans still support sending military aid to Ukraine, but that majority is thinning, according to new polling from global research firm Ipsos.

54 percent of Americans support sending weapons to Ukraine, down from 59 percent last spring, according to the new survey.

That rate is still higher than the average opinion of Western countries in the poll — members of the European Union, NATO and Australia — which stayed the same at 48 percent since the beginning of the war.

The Ipsos poll surveyed 19,000 people from 23 countries around the world in late November and early December last year.

Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova spoke at the Army and Navy Club on Tuesday to discuss the poll and international support for Ukraine’s war effort.

“This is an existential war not only for Ukraine,” Markarova said. “We have to actually not think about the next election … but think in terms of how to avoid a catastrophe.”

Though the U.S. and E.U. have committed billions worth of weapons to Ukraine since the war began 11 months ago, Kyiv has kept up pressure for even heavier weapons, particularly as it braces for a renewed Russian offensive in the coming months.

Ukraine’s demands for heavy tanks have caused tension among its Western allies in recent weeks; however, a standoff between the U.S. and Germany appears to be nearly resolved, with reports Tuesday that both countries are preparing to commit tanks.

“We’re working with our partners here on all [military] capabilities,” Markarova said. “So whatever our partners are able to provide us that can be scalable, that we can use effectively on the battlefield, we are grateful.”

Earlier this month, the Biden administration announced nearly $4 billion in military aid for the conflict, the latest in a series of billion-dollar packages that it says proves its commitment to support Ukraine until the war is won.

However, the polling shows that some Ukraine fatigue is being felt in America and other allied countries.

Support for Ukrainian refugees has slid on average globally. While most people still support helping refugees — 66 percent of respondents globally and in the U.S. — those rates have fallen by 7 and 6 percent, respectively, in the last year.

“In the U.S., there is tepid support for the status quo,” said Clifford Young, president of U.S. public affairs at Ipsos. “That status quo is the United States helping Ukraine economically and with military material, but not with boots on the ground.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is also becoming increasingly partisan. House Republicans have cast doubts on the future of U.S. support for Ukraine, especially economic and humanitarian aid. Polling appears to show that that sentiment is felt among some Republican voters as well.

“There is attenuation of support … especially among Republicans,” Young said.

Global inflation and economic uncertainty is also driving skepticism about continued support for Ukraine, the polling found. A majority of respondents globally agreed that, “Given the current economic crisis, [their country] cannot afford to lend financial support to Ukraine,” including 59 percent of Americans.

However, oil and gas sanctions against Russia from European countries remain popular despite their impact on rising heating gas prices this winter.

Non-economic sanctions are also popular. Two-thirds of global respondents said that Russian athletes should continue to be barred from international competition, with 76 percent of Americans agreeing.

Support for Ukraine militarily and economically is strongest in the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Poland, and weakest in Hungary, India and Thailand, the poll found. Overall, support was weaker in Latin America and Asia than in North America and Europe.

21. Ukraine fighting confirms Marines' new focus on battlefield 'thinkers': Officials

I want to have that MOS, "battlefield thinker."

Seriously, as we have long known, NCOs are the key to success on the battlefield.

I am reminded of these quotes:

"Irregular Warfare far is more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”

T.E. Lawrence

“Who thinks, wins...”

General Downing

“Train for certainty. Educate for uncertainty.”

General Schoomaker

Ukraine fighting confirms Marines' new focus on battlefield 'thinkers': Officials - Breaking Defense

"We need a cognitively agile [non-commissioned officer] that can outmaneuver our enemies in the future," said Sgt. Maj. Stephen Griffin.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · January 24, 2023

U.S. Marines standby to conduct an integrated training exercise at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Angel D. Travis)

WASHINGTON — The Marine Corps today took the latest step in its Force Design 2030 efforts, initiating a wide range of assessments and overhauls that are all aimed at revamping how the service produces Marines. Russia’s war in Ukraine, senior officials say, have “confirmed” the direction the new document sets for the Marine Corps.

“Current events, I would say, were more confirming that we know that this is what’s necessary,” Sgt. Maj. Stephen Griffin, the senior enlisted at the service’s Training and Education Command, told reporters today at the Pentagon. “That we need a cognitively agile [non-commissioned officer] that can outmaneuver our enemies in the future. It’s just more confirmation.”

The document itself, titled “Training and Education 2030,” is roughly 24 pages long, signed out by Commandant Gen. David Berger, and goes through nearly every element required to produce a United States Marine, from selecting a military occupational specialty and the technology used in the classroom to hosting large-scale exercises and honing marksmanship, a skill the service prides itself on teaching every Marine.

Each section concludes with specific tasks Berger is ordering Training and Education Command, also called TECOM, to undergo. There’s a little more than two dozens tasks, all of which have timelines to be completed no later than sometime in 2025, and they collectively amount to reevaluating every aspect of how Marines train and learn, and whether that way is still the best.

As the TECOM chief, Lt. Gen. Kevin Iiams is the officer primarily responsible for ensuring the tasks are done. While speaking to reporters alongside the sergeant major today, he said one of the structural changes the document solidifies is that his role will now be “dual-hatted” as both the commanding general of TECOM and an associated deputy commandant position. Internal changes like that reflect the importance of the command to the Marine Corps and in the eyes of the current commandant.

Iiams said in total the Marine Corps is now moving away from the “rote, repetitive training” the service once relied upon.

“We want cognitive, problem-solving thinkers for the future. So our [professional military education] programs are going to talk about how we build young Marines into being able to do that, knowing that they are going to be some of the folks who make the critical decisions in the battlefield,” he said.

When asked about potential critics — something that Berger and Force Design 2030 has attracted in groves during his tenure as the senior Marine Corps officer — Iiams called the process of making a Marine “sacred” and said that process “fundamentally is not going to change.”

“Modernization, new technology. Can we make it better? Absolutely,” he said. “How do we use these new tech and capabilities to do it faster [and] to do it better?”

As Russia’s war in Ukraine approaches the one year mark, a consistent commentary by military observers has been a lack of strong NCO corps in the Russian army. By contrast, producing NCOs is a point of pride for all the US service branches, and in particular, the Marine Corps. (On a panel of six senior Marine officials who spoke to reporters today, nearly all of them were keen to reinforce that point when asked about it.)

“I think a lot of what you have seen in Ukraine is — here’s a force who is very well equipped, but not very well-trained,” said Iiams, referring to Russia. “The strength of our Marine Corps against our peer-level adversaries is going to be that thinking, well-trained Marine that we’re going to provide for the future.”

Although the new document’s publication was prompted by a variety of other factors and initiatives unrelated to the past year in Ukraine, Anthony Greco, TECOM’s executive director, hinted that current events always play a part in force development efforts such as “Training and Education 2030.”

“You can’t provide realistic training without understanding the threat and ensuring that that’s an element of the calculus that you make with regards to providing that training,” he said.

Col. Mark Smith, director of the range training programs division at TECOM, in responding to the same question put it even more succinctly.

“Our NCOs aren’t going to show up [on a battlefield] and ask: ‘Why are we here’?” he said.

22. Triple 7 Expedition completes record breaking skydive to help children of fallen soldiers

Quite a mission. It is great to see that it was successful.

Triple 7 Expedition completes record breaking skydive to help children of fallen soldiers

wfla.com · by Xavier Harris · January 18, 2023

Posted: Jan 18, 2023 / 08:11 AM EST

Updated: Jan 18, 2023 / 08:11 AM EST

ZEPHYRHILLS, Fla. (WFLA) – Triple 7 is a record-breaking, adrenaline-fueled adventure to raise 1,400 life-changing scholarships in support of the families of fallen and disabled service members and first responders.

The nine former U.S. and Canadian military service members broke three world records. Starting their jump journey on January 9th in Antarctica and completing the 7th jump in Australia.

On Wednesday, the nine men will complete a celebratory jump at Sky Dive City in Zephyrhills to honor the 13 service members who died in Kabul Afghanistan during the American’s withdrawal in August of 2021.

“We wanted to use it as a platform to go in line with the legacy expeditions to never forget and forever honor and tell the story of our fallen brothers and continue that legacy, so their story doesn’t die,” said Mike Sarraille who’s a part of the expedition team.

Since starting the clock in Antarctica, the men have jumped into seven continents:

In six days and six hours
Took 16 flights (including connecting flights)
Went over 100 hours of travel time
Went over 80.5 hours of flight time (travel time includes waits at the airport)
456 hours away from family

The celebratory jump is scheduled for 11:00 am and News Channel 8 will speak with some of the jumpers right before they take their final dive.

Folks can donate to the scholarship fund here.

Thanks for signing up!

Watch for us in your inbox.

Subscribe Now

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

US special operators borrowed a unique part of Army Green Beret training to prepare Ukrainians to fight Russia

Ukraine's 'Q' course

Remote train and assist

Reimagining Joint Operations Across the U.S. Interagency

Opinion | The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine

The Afghans I Trained Are Fighting for Putin in Ukraine

The Magical Mossad Mystery Tour

A former U.S. intelligence officer visits some old friends

China Is Trying to Play Nice, and It’s a Problem for the US

Mystery Synthetic Text Detector 300

Want to innovate for DoD? Pay close attention to Ukraine

Lawmakers propose mandatory 24-hour security at electrical substations after attacks on the power grid: ‘The targeting has increased’​

January 22, 2023 at 12:57 PM EST​

COVID is running rampant in China – but herd immunity remains elusive

Disclosure statement

Herd immunity: a recap

Predictions are challenging

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 24, 2023

Jan 24, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

U.S. to give Ukraine advanced M1 tanks

The American-made Abrams tanks, probably numbering at least 30, are not likely to arrive in time for an expected spring offensive, however

German government reportedly ready to send Ukraine Leopard 2 tanks

Ukraine’s Zelensky Removes Top Officials in Bid to Contain Corruption Scandals

Leader seeks to sustain Western backing for Kyiv in war with Russia

Foxes watching the hen house? DC insiders oversee Biden defense plans - Responsible Statecraft

Van Jackson Blames America First in the Asia-Pacific

What Western armour gives Ukraine in the next round of the war

A new iron fist should confer an advantage over Russia, but the stakes are rising

Taiwan's president says war with China 'not an option'

Russia-Ukraine war

Taiwan’s Urgent Task

A Radical New Strategy to Keep China Away

By Michael Brown

THE PANDA AND THE PORCUPINE

STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY, PRACTICAL COMMITMENT

LESS RED TAPE, MORE DETERRENCE

CHANGING XI’S CALCULUS

Biden Envoy Met Secretly with Iranians Amid Tehran’s Violent Crackdown on Protests

Latest Developments

Expert Analysis

Reported Meetings Would Embolden Tehran Regime

What Else Could Have Been Discussed

Related Analysis

Support for Ukraine in US still high, but slowly fading: survey

Ukraine fighting confirms Marines' new focus on battlefield 'thinkers': Officials - Breaking Defense

"We need a cognitively agile [non-commissioned officer] that can outmaneuver our enemies in the future," said Sgt. Maj. Stephen Griffin.

Triple 7 Expedition completes record breaking skydive to help children of fallen soldiers

Lawmakers propose mandatory 24-hour security at electrical substations after attacks on the power grid: ‘The targeting has increased’

January 22, 2023 at 12:57 PM EST