Quotes of the Day:

“For most of human history, freedom had to be at least suffered for, if not died for, and that raised its value to something almost sacred. In modern democracies, however, an ethos of public sacrifice is rarely needed because freedom and survival are more or less guaranteed. That is a great blessing but allows people to believe that any sacrifice at all--rationing water during a drought, for example--are forms of government tyranny. They are no more forms of tyranny than rationing water on a lifeboat. The idea that we can enjoy the benefits of society while owing nothing in return is literally infantile. Only children owe nothing.”

– Sebastian Junger, Freedom

"The borderline between guerrilla warfare and crime, between patriotism and terrorism, is often a very thin one."

– Mario Cervi, Italian Journalist, "European Left's expedient Wrath," Il Giornale [Milan], July 1, 1999

“Of course, Orwell was not the first to teach us about the spiritual devastations of tyranny. What is irreplaceable about his work is his insistence that it makes little difference if our wardens are inspired by right- or left-wing ideologies. The gates of the prison are equally impenetrable, surveillance equally rigorous, icon-worship equally pervasive.”

– Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 24, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 24, 2024

3. What to know about Israel’s controversial ‘buffer zone’ in Gaza

4. Israel is still winning the political war

5. Cease-fire efforts for Israel-Hamas war gain steam. But an agreement still appears elusive

6. Qatar slams alleged leaked remarks by Israel's prime minister calling Gulf nation "problematic"

7. Israel Tries to Rebut Genocide Charge by Declassifying Cabinet Decisions

8. Israel denies attack on UN refuge in Gaza that drew rebuke from Washington

9. ‘A bill that will be due:’ Pentagon's Middle East buildup costs $1.6B

10. Cut funding to organizations that are empowering Hamas

11. Erik Prince Claims His Vaporware Super-Phone Could Have Thwarted Hamas Attack

12. Moscow Laughs at CIA Recruitment Video Posted to Social Media

13. How the West Can Match Russia in Drone Innovation

14. Why the War in Gaza Makes a Nuclear Iran More Likely

15. The Myths That Warp How America Sees Russia—and Vice Versa

16. AWACS over the Azov: Takeaways from Ukrainian Air Defenses’ Latest Score

17. Shifting Sands: The Future of West Africa’s Power Dynamics and the Sahel Alliance

18. Red Sea Conflict Prompts India’s Navy to Flex Its Muscles

19. Desperate Chinese Investors Are Pouring Into the U.S., Japan

20. Britain Is Lobbying U.S. Republicans on Ukraine. Here’s Why.

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 24, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2024

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crashed in Belgorod Oblast on January 24.
• Russian information space actors are seizing on the Il-76 crash to sow domestic discontent in Ukraine and undermine Western will to continue giving military support to Ukraine.
• Russian law enforcement authorities are codifying xenophobic profiling methods suggesting that migrants are predisposed to criminal activity against the backdrop of continued conflicts between Russian citizens and naturalized migrants.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian hackers recently conducted cyberattacks on Russian intelligence and communications infrastructure.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany that recent Russian missile strikes against Ukraine underscore the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses.
• Russian and Chadian officials met in Moscow on January 24, suggesting that Chad may be the Kremlin’s next target among former French colonies on the African continent.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps published photos on January 24 claiming to show Africa Corps personnel arriving in Burkina Faso.
• NATO announced on January 24 that the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises have started and will run until May 31, 2024.
• Positional engagements continued throughout the theater.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to bolster the reputation of Chechen forces.
• Russian occupation authorities are setting conditions to coerce voter turnout in the upcoming March 2024 presidential elections.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 24, 2024

Jan 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 24, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 24, 2024, 8:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on January 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crashed in Belgorod Oblast on January 24. Geolocated footage posted by various Russian sources shows the Il-76 crashing in Yablonovo, Belgorod Oblast (about 50km northeast of Belgorod City).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Il-76 was carrying 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and was en route to a pre-arranged POW exchange at the Kolotylivka border-crossing checkpoint between Russia and Ukraine.[2] The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of hitting the plane with two unspecified missiles, killing the 65 POWs, six Russian crew members, and three Russian military personnel.[3] Senior Russian propagandist and Editor-in-Chief of state-controlled outlet RT Margarita Simonyan published a list of the names of the Ukrainian POWs supposedly on the flight, but several Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that at least one of the alleged POWs had already been exchanged in a previous POW swap on January 3.[4] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and the Ukrainian Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, immediately responded to the incident by emphasizing that Ukraine is investigating the crash and urged audiences not to draw premature conclusions about the crash based on unconfirmed reporting.[5] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov confirmed that a POW exchange was scheduled to take place on January 24 but that the exchange was no longer taking place and that GUR is investigating the circumstances of the crash.[6] GUR later stated that Ukraine “does not have reliable and comprehensive information about who exactly was on board the plane.”[7] The Ukrainian General Staff did not directly respond to the incident but emphasized that Russia has conducted 19 missile strikes against Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast over the past week and stressed that Ukraine “will continue to take measures to destroy means of delivery” and “control the airspace” in the Kharkiv-Belgorod border area.[8] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda, citing unspecified sources in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, claimed that the Il-76 was transporting S-300 air-defense missiles, which Russian forces frequently use in strikes against ground targets in Kharkiv Oblast.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in his nightly address on January 24 that Ukraine is working to establish “all clear facts” and that GUR is looking into “the fate of all prisoners.” ISW offers no assessment of the circumstances of the Il-76 crash at this time and cannot independently verify Russian or Ukrainian statements on the incident.

Russian information space actors are seizing on the Il-76 crash to sow domestic discontent in Ukraine and undermine Western will to continue giving military support to Ukraine. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that Ukraine deliberately shot down the Il-76 knowing that it contained Ukrainian POWs and called for all POW exchanges to pause indefinitely.[10] Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev accused Ukrainian “internal political struggles” of contributing to the crash.[11] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is currently in New York for UN Security Council (UNSC) meetings, called for an urgent UNSC meeting to address the crash and accused Ukraine of terrorism.[12] Such Russian accusations are meant in part to sow discontent in Ukraine and galvanize distrust of the Ukrainian government, which is consistent with several other Russian information efforts aimed at weakening Ukraine domestically.[13] POW exchanges are a sensitive issue in both Russia and Ukraine, and rhetorical invocations of POWs predictably elicit emotional responses. Russian officials additionally made unsubstantiated claims that Ukraine struck the Il-76 with US- or German-provided missile systems, likely in an attempt to discourage Ukraine’s Western partners from providing Ukraine with critical air defense systems necessary for Ukraine’s continued defense.[14]

Russian law enforcement authorities are codifying xenophobic profiling methods suggesting that migrants are predisposed to criminal activity against the backdrop of continued conflicts between Russian citizens and naturalized migrants. Russian outlet RTVI reported on January 24 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) published a “criminogenic index” detailing which countries’ migrants committed the most crimes in Russia in response to a request from Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev to determine if “immigrants from certain countries have criminal characteristics.”[15] The MVD report found that crimes committed by migrants from “neighboring countries” declined between 2013 and 2019 but have increased since 2019.[16] The MVD report also found that citizens of Uzbekistan committed 40 percent of all crimes committed by foreigners from “neighboring countries” between January 2022 and May 2023. Uzbek citizens likely account for the highest percentage of crimes because there are more migrants from Uzbekistan in Russia than migrants from other Central Asian and South Caucasus countries.[17] Matveev stated that the MVD’s report excludes migrants with naturalized Russian citizenship, implying that migrants commit more crimes than reflected in the MVD’s official findings.[18] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin similarly claimed in September 2023 that the number of serious crimes that foreign citizens committed in Russia increased by 32 percent from 2022 to 2023.[19] Russian authorities’ deliberate attempts to highlight migrant crimes and portray migrants as a danger to Russian society are likely part of an ongoing effort to appease the pro-war Russian ultranationalist community that also routinely expresses xenophobia toward migrant and diaspora communities and to coerce migrants into Russian military service by limiting work opportunities in Russia.

Sakha Republic Head Aisen Nikolaev and other Russian sources claimed that unspecified foreign actors may have incited protests in Yakutsk, Sakha Republic, after a naturalized citizen from Tajikistan allegedly murdered a Russian citizen.[20] Nikolaev suggested that foreign agents may have encouraged these protests to incite conflict and divide Russian society.[21] Nikolaev instructed Sakha Republic authorities to monitor migrants and investigate the circumstances under which the murder suspect obtained Russian citizenship.[22] Nikolaev’s response of both condemning the protests as externally conceived and maintaining a harsh stance against a naturalized Russian citizen likely reflects the wider struggle Russian ultranationalists continue to face in attempting to portray non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities as an internal threat to Russian society while the Kremlin continues to portray Russia as a harmonious multiethnic society.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian hackers recently conducted cyberattacks on Russian intelligence and communications infrastructure. The GUR reported on January 24 that Ukrainian hackers conducted a successful cyberattack against the Russian “Planet” Scientific Research Center of Space Hydrometeorology's Far East branch, specifically targeting the center’s database, servers, and supercomputers.[23] The GUR reported that the attack destroyed a database that received and processed satellite data and contributed to products for over 50 Russian government agencies, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), General Staff, and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The GUR noted that the database contained two petabytes (two million gigabytes) of data potentially worth over $10 million. The GUR reported that the attack also rendered the center’s supercomputers inoperable and unable to be completely restored and brought down the center’s servers and physical infrastructure. The GUR stated that the attack will leave dozens of unspecified strategic defense companies without “critically important information” for a long time. The GUR reported on January 23 that unspecified “cyber volunteers” attacked Russian internet provider Akado-telecom, which services the Russian Presidential Administration, Federal Security Service (FSB), Federal Protective Service, Moscow Oblast governing bodies, Russian state-owned bank Sberbank, and others, causing a large-scale internet failure on January 21 and 22.[24]

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany that recent Russian missile strikes against Ukraine underscore the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses. Stoltenberg noted on January 23 that NATO has already transferred a variety of air defense systems to Ukraine, including Patriots, IRIS-T, and NASAMS, and that NATO is supplying Ukraine with additional demining equipment, winter equipment, and fuel as part of its Comprehensive Assistance Package.[25] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Press and Information Department Head Illarion Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian and Western officials discussed increasing the supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine, including adapting Western anti-aircraft missiles to Soviet-era launch platforms and expanding the production and supply of ammunition and artillery systems to Ukraine.[26] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely continue to experiment with new strike packages with different means of penetrating Ukrainian air defenses and to pressure Ukrainian air defense deployments following recent Ukrainian adaptations to prior Russian strike packages.[27] ISW continues to assess that Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remain crucial in defending Ukraine‘s growing defense industrial base (DIB) against Russian strikes.[28]

Russian and Chadian officials met in Moscow on January 24, suggesting that Chad may be the Kremlin’s next target among former French colonies on the African continent. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chadian junta leader Mahamat Idriss Deby to discuss counterterrorism efforts in Chad and announced an upcoming agreement expanding Russian–Chadian cooperation.[29] Russian Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General Alexander Fomin and Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov also met with Chadian Minister of the Armed Forces, Veterans Affairs, and War Victims Dago Yacouba to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and regional security.[30] Fomin and Yevkurov previously met with Nigerien National Defense Minister Major General Saliufou Modi.[31] ISW previously reported that Russia and the Central African Republic (CAR) are in negotiations to construct a Russian military base in CAR.[32] Russia appears to be attempting to expand its involvement with and influence on authoritarian regimes in western and central Africa, particularly focusing on former French colonies in the Sahel such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps published photos on January 24 claiming to show Africa Corps personnel arriving in Burkina Faso.[33] The Africa Corps claimed that 100 Russian personnel will perform executive protection and conduct counterterrorism operations in Burkina Faso and that another 200 personnel will arrive in the country in the near future.[34] ISW previously reported that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian MoD and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps and assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.[35] The Kremlin may also eventually set conditions to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Chad, given January 24 Russian–Chadian government meetings.

NATO announced on January 24 that the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises have started and will run until May 31, 2024.[36] NATO reported that the exercises will occur in the High North, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe.[37] ISW continues to assess that Russia will attempt to misrepresent these exercises as a threat against Russia despite the exercises’ defensive nature in response to real Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt Russian threats to NATO states.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crashed in Belgorod Oblast on January 24.
• Russian information space actors are seizing on the Il-76 crash to sow domestic discontent in Ukraine and undermine Western will to continue giving military support to Ukraine.
• Russian law enforcement authorities are codifying xenophobic profiling methods suggesting that migrants are predisposed to criminal activity against the backdrop of continued conflicts between Russian citizens and naturalized migrants.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian hackers recently conducted cyberattacks on Russian intelligence and communications infrastructure.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany that recent Russian missile strikes against Ukraine underscore the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses.
• Russian and Chadian officials met in Moscow on January 24, suggesting that Chad may be the Kremlin’s next target among former French colonies on the African continent.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps published photos on January 24 claiming to show Africa Corps personnel arriving in Burkina Faso.
• NATO announced on January 24 that the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises have started and will run until May 31, 2024.
• Positional engagements continued throughout the theater.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to bolster the reputation of Chechen forces.
• Russian occupation authorities are setting conditions to coerce voter turnout in the upcoming March 2024 presidential elections.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev reported on January 24 that Russian sabotage groups attempted to cross the international border between Russia and Ukraine, likely referring to Russian claims that Russian forces captured Pletenivka, Kharkiv Oblast, less than two kilometers from the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast international border, on January 23.[39] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger amplified claims that characterized the January 23 Russian attack on Pletenivka as a “daring raid“ after which Russian forces withdrew to their original positions.[40] ISW has not observed visual evidence supporting the claim that Russian forces captured Pletenivka and continues to assess that Russian forces may conduct small-scale, tactical-level attacks across the Belgorod-Kharkiv Oblast border to fix and divert Ukrainian forces away from the Kupyansk direction.[41]

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk direction on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Berestove and along the P07 Svatove-Kupyansk highway toward Tabaivka (both northwest of Svatove), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[42] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka.[43] Elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[44]

Positional engagements continued in the Lyman direction on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Yampolivka, and Terny; west of Kreminna near Torske; southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area and Dibrova; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka (the Hryhorivka 15km southwest of Kreminna and not the one northwest of Bakhmut).[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and from Khromove, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[46] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Bilohorivka and from Vesele towards Vyiimka and Spirne; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka; and northwest of Horlivka near Shumy.[47] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bakhmut, and elements of the Russian 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on Bakhmut’s northern flank.[48]

Positional fighting continued near Avdiivka on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[49] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional fighting continues northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove; in southeastern Avdiivka near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[50] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian shelling has destroyed most of the buildings in Avdiivka‘s southeastern residential area and that Russian forces continue to shell northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove, Berdychi, Novobakhmutivka, and Novokalynove.[51] Frontelligence Insight reported that the situation on Avdiivka’s flanks is more stable, allowing Ukrainian forces to continue defending Avdiivka in the face of ongoing shell and manpower shortages.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian “Veterany” Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Volunteer Assault Corps) participated in assaults in the “Tsarska Okhota” area on January 17, using underground tunnels to penetrate the area.[53]

Positional fighting continued west and southwest of Donetsk City, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City) but ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[54] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that there were positional engagements west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Novomykhailivka from the south to attack the Vuhledar area.[56] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near the Trudovska mine area near Marinka (west of Donetsk City).[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and north of Staromayorske and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodonetske and east of Zolota Nyva.[58] Limited positional fighting also continued south of Chervone (southeast of Hulyaipole).[59]

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued near Robotyne, south of Robotyne near Novoprokopivka, and east of Robotyne near Verbove.[60]

Positional fighting continued on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on January 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area.[61] The Russian “Aksai” detachment, possibly of the volunteer “Don” Cossack Brigade, is reportedly operating on the Kinburn Peninsula in occupied Kherson Oblast.[62]

Crimean-based Ukrainian partisan group “Atesh” reported on January 24 that Russian forces redeployed a Ropucha class large landing ship to Hrafska Bay in Sevastopol.[63] Atesh reported that Russian forces camouflaged the ship and will likely deploy it to the Black Sea for combat missions.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to bolster the reputation of Chechen forces. Kadyrov posted footage on January 23 reportedly showing the “Baysangur Benoyevsky” Chechen Rosgvardia battalion and the “Sheikh Mansur” battalion completing training at the Russian Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya.[64] Kadyrov claimed that Spetsnaz instructors worked with the Chechen battalions for three months and trained them in tactical fire, machine gun operation, combat medicine, and drone operation. Kadyrov also posted footage of the “Sheikh Mansur” battalion receiving Niva SUVs from the Chechen Regional Public Fund.[65] Kadyrov’s sixteen-year-old son Adam Kadyrov, who “oversees” the “Sheikh Mansur” battalion, accepted the Niva SUVs.[66] The conduct of Chechen fighters in Ukraine has recently drawn criticism from the Russian information space, as ISW reported on January 22.[67] Kadyrov likely continues to amplify the skill, training, and equipment of Chechen formations to distract from criticism of Chechen forces and to bolster his own reputation.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) continues attempting to adapt to Ukraine’s increased use of drones. Russian media reported on January 23 that Russia is completing tests of anti-drone “mini-missiles” that Russian forces will fire using modernized Pantsir-SM air defense systems to protect critical military assets against Ukrainian drone and quadcopter strikes.[68] The “mini-missiles” are reportedly much smaller than standard Pantsir missiles, allowing Russian forces to equip Pantsir-mounted combat vehicles with 48 of the smaller missiles as opposed to the typical 12 standard-sized missiles.[69]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Several countries announced new military aid packages to Ukraine following the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23. Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair announced that Canada will provide 10 Zodiac multi-purpose boats worth $20 million CAD (about $14.7 million) to Ukraine and provide instructors and aircraft to support Ukrainian soldiers training on F-16 fighter jets.[70] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Germany will provide six multipurpose Sea King Mk41 helicopters to Ukraine.[71] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 24 that Denmark will contribute 91 million Danish kroner (about $13.3 million) to support the Ukrainian MoD and military cyber defense as part of the IT coalition for Ukraine.[72] UK Ambassador to Ukraine Martin Harris stated on January 23 that the recently announced 200 million GBP (about $254 million) of UK military assistance allocated for producing and procuring drones will go toward reconnaissance, long-range, and first-person view (FPV) drone production in Ukraine and the UK.[73]

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimenkov stated on January 24 that the Ukrainian MoD is implementing new weapons and equipment procurement standards in accordance with NATO standards.[74] Klimenkov also reported that Ukraine is creating supervisory councils to oversee the Ukrainian State Operator of the Rear and Defense Procurement Agency, both of which conduct weapons and equipment procurement.[75]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are setting conditions to coerce voter turnout in the upcoming March 2024 presidential elections. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation election commission chairperson Galina Katyushchenko announced on January 24 that residents of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast will be able to vote in the presidential elections with Ukrainian passports.[76] Katyushchenko’s announcement is notable given that Russian occupation authorities have recently intensified passportization efforts in occupied areas in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections.[77] Russian occupation authorities may face greater resistance to passportization efforts than anticipated and may be softening the Russian passport requirement for the election to encourage Ukrainian passport holders to vote. The Kremlin likely seeks to generate high voter turnout in occupied Ukraine in order to create a guise of widespread local legitimacy of the Russian occupation of Ukraine and likely is realizing that authorities will have to lower the barriers to voting in order to accomplish the desired voter turnout.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Service published a report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) on January 23 stating that Ukraine was the most-targeted country of all information attacks in 2023.[78] The EU Foreign Policy report also noted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is one of the most targeted individuals in 2023. EU High Representative Josep Borrell stated that rapid action is essential to preventing manipulated information from spreading and that it must be debunked before it goes viral and admonished Russia’s role in facilitating information operation attacks against Ukraine.[79]

Kremlin mouthpieces continue to attack post-Soviet states for enacting perceived anti-Russia policies. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Bulgaria is trying to “rewrite history” by editing textbooks that allegedly “generate gratitude towards Russia.”[80] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger accused a Kazakh media outlet of generating anti-Russian sentiment by discussing the Kazakh famine of 1930 to 1933 and describing the famine as a “genocide” at the behest of Western actors.[81]

A prominent, Kremlin affiliated milblogger continued to attack Armenia for rejecting the Russian narrative attempting to portray Russia as the only mediator capable of creating a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[82]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 24 that the deputy head of the Belarusian General Staff Military Academy’s Faculty, Colonel Andrei Bogodel, stated that Belarus’ updated military doctrine identifies the Baltic states, Poland, the US, Ukraine, and NATO as “unfriendly countries and organizations" to Belarus.[83]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 24 that elements of the Belarusian 6th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade (Western Operational Command) participated in fire training exercises at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus, and that elements of the 120th Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted training exercises at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.[84]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 24, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-24-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed airstrikes to kill many Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces destroyed an underground tunnel route 1.5 kilometers from the Israeli border that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis on January 24.
• Political Negotiations: Israel and Hamas continued indirect talks regarding a ceasefire on January 24. Hamas demanded a total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: CTP-ISW did not record any clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias in the West Bank on January 24.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 24.
• Iraq: The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on January 23.
• Yemen: Houthi fighters fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting two US-flagged ships transporting US military supplies through the Gulf of Aden on January 24.
• Iran: Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Russian officials on January 24.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 24, 2024

Jan 24, 2024 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, January 24, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed airstrikes to kill many Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.
• Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces destroyed an underground tunnel route 1.5 kilometers from the Israeli border that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis on January 24.
• Political Negotiations: Israel and Hamas continued indirect talks regarding a ceasefire on January 24. Hamas demanded a total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: CTP-ISW did not record any clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias in the West Bank on January 24.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 24.
• Iraq: The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on January 23.
• Yemen: Houthi fighters fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting two US-flagged ships transporting US military supplies through the Gulf of Aden on January 24.
• Iran: Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Russian officials on January 24.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed airstrikes to kill many Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.[1] CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas fighters are already reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces cleared in the northern Gaza Strip, which will facilitate Hamas’ reconstitution.[2] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) military wing published footage on January 24 of its fighters firing mortars targeting an Israeli supply line east of Jabalia.[3] The militia claimed that it targeted an Israeli supply line east of Jabalia in a combined operation with Hamas fighters on January 22.[4]

Israeli forces destroyed an underground tunnel route 1.5 kilometers from the Israeli border that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[5] The IDF 646th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) and engineers destroyed the tunnel system last week during operations north of Bureij, in the central Gaza Strip. Israeli forces located anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, warheads, and equipment for rocket production and launch systems in the tunnels. The 646th Brigade previously located an underground tunnel route beneath Salah al Din Road on January 16, which the IDF said Palestinian militias used to move fighters between the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[6]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) fired at an armed Palestinian fighter who was observing them on January 24.[7] Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on January 24.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis on January 24. Hamas and other Palestinian militias claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis where Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli offensive operations.[8] Hamas claimed that its fighters detonated explosives that Israeli forces had planted to demolish a building in western Khan Younis.[9] The group conducted a similar attack on January 22 that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the central Gaza Strip.[10] Hamas and PIJ also conducted a combined attack that targeted an Israeli tank with an anti-tank RPG in western Khan Younis on January 24.[11] Hamas mortared Israeli forces advancing east of al Fukhari in southern Khan Younis.[12] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces as they advanced in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis.[13]

The IDF reported on January 24 that the 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.[14] Israeli forces are “increasing the pressure” on Hamas and targeting Hamas squads with sniper fire, tanks, and airstrikes.[15] Israeli forces operating in the center of the Khan Younis refugee camp encountered many Palestinian fighters and raided Hamas facilities in the area.[16]

The top US Middle East mediator, National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk, arrived in Qatar on January 24 for negotiations over the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip.[17] McGurk will discuss a new hostage deal with Qatari officials. The discussions will also focus on humanitarian assistance, IDF operations, and the protection of civilian life in the Gaza Strip.

Israel and Hamas continued indirect talks regarding a ceasefire on January 24.[18] Israeli media reported on January 24 that Hamas suspended negotiations for a hostage deal with Israel, according to two sources privy to the details of the negotiations.[19] The sources said that Hamas demanded a total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[20]

PIJ’s military wing claimed that its fighters fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting nearby Israeli towns on January 24.[21]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

CTP-ISW did not record any clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias in the West Bank on January 24. Israeli forces detained seven wanted individuals across the West Bank.[22] Israeli forces also destroyed the home of a Hamas fighter who killed four Israelis in an Israeli settlement south of Nablus in June 2023.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 24.[24] Israeli forces struck multiple Lebanese Hezbollah military targets in southern Lebanon on the same day.[25]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on January 23.[26] The United States conducted the strikes in response to a Kataib Hezbollah ballistic missile and rocket attack targeting Ain al Assad Airbase on January 20 that left four US personnel with traumatic brain injuries and injured at least one Iraqi Security Forces member.[27] The US strikes targeted the 45th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade’s 3rd Regiment in al Qaim and the 46th and 47th PMF brigades in Jurf al Sakhr.[28] US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kataib Hezbollah commands and mans the 45th, 46th, and 47th PMF Brigades.[29] US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kataib Hezbollah controls the al Qaim border crossing between Iraq and Syria.[30] The group also committed acts of sectarian cleansing in Jurf al Sakhr, which it now controls.[31] Kataib Hezbollah does not allow the Iraqi government access to Jurf al Sakhr, which is notable because it means that the Iraqi government does not have control over the town.[32] US Central Command reported that the strikes targeted KH's “headquarters, storage and training locations for rocket, missile, and one-way attack UAV capabilities.”[33] Iran uses the al Qaim-Albu Kamal border crossing to transport air defense equipment, precision-guided munitions, and other weapons into Syria.[34]

Numerous Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN), and the Badr Organization reiterated their demand for the removal of US forces from Iraq following the US strikes.[35] HHN repeated the claim that US self-defense strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facilities "violate” Iraqi sovereignty.[36] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conduct attacks targeting US forces, which provoke US self-defense strikes. The militias then incorrectly characterize these self-defense strikes as "violations” of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The United States reserves the right to protect its forces in Iraq, which are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi government to fight ISIS.[37]

Iranian-backed political factions also condemned the US strikes. State of Law Coalition member Turki al Utbi stated on January 24 that the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—will meet within 72 hours to discuss efforts to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[38] The State of Law Coalition is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and is part of the Shia Coordination Framework.[39] Interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi also condemned the US strikes and separately announced that Parliament will hold a session on January 27.[40] Mandalawi is a member of the Shia Coordination Framework and the Independent Iraq Alliance.[41] It is unclear whether the parliament session will focus on the US strikes or another topic, such as the parliament speaker vote.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iran-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three strikes on US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 24.[42] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacked US forces at Erbil International Airport and Ain al Assad Base in Iraq.[43] The group attacked US forces in Syria at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province.

Houthi fighters fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting two US-flagged ships transporting US military supplies through the Gulf of Aden on January 24.[44] US Central Command reported that the USS Gravely intercepted two of the anti-ship ballistic missiles and one anti-ship ballistic missile landed in the sea.[45] The two ships operated by Maersk’s US subsidiary Maersk Line, Limited (MLL) also reported seeing explosions near the vessels, according to a statement from Maersk.[46] MLL provides transportation for the US government and its vessels are enrolled in the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). These programs partner US-flagged merchant vessels with the US Department of Defense (DOD) to support DOD operations in emergency situations.[47] MLL announced that it will suspend transits through the Red Sea until further notice due to increased risk to its vessels.[48]

CENTCOM conducted airstrikes targeting two anti-ship ballistic missiles in Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen on January 23.[49] CENTCOM reported that the missiles were aimed at the southern Red Sea, were prepared to fire, and posed an imminent threat to merchant vessels and the US Navy in the region.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate meetings with the French, Algerian, and Malaysian foreign ministers in New York on January 23.[50]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke about the Israel-Hamas war and Turkish-Iranian relations at a press conference prior to departing for Turkey on January 24.[51] Raisi called the Israel-Hamas war one of the most important regional issues. Raisi condemned US support for Israel. Raisi reiterated Iranian calls for increased isolation of Israel.[52] Raisi will meet with senior Turkish leaders, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during his visit to Ankara beginning January 24.[53]

Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi discussed the Israel-Hamas war with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Iran delegation head Vincent Cassard in Tehran on January 24.[54] Safavi called for the ICRC to play a role in bringing about a ceasefire and increasing humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people. Safavi served as the IRGC commander from 1997 to 2007 before becoming the Supreme Leader’s military affairs adviser. [55]

Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Russian officials on January 24. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Pastrushev in Moscow.[56] A senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official and former Persian Gulf Affairs director general also called for an immediate ceasefire during a meeting with the Russian President's Special Representative for Syrian Affairs in Astana, Kazakhstan.[57] Iranian and Russian officials have engaged in political coordination vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war since at least October 26, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[58]

3. What to know about Israel’s controversial ‘buffer zone’ in Gaza

Imagery at te link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/24/israel-buffer-zone-gaza-war/

What to know about Israel’s controversial ‘buffer zone’ in Gaza

By Loveday Morris, Sarah Cahlan and Jonathan Baran

January 24, 2024 at 5:45 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Loveday Morris · January 24, 2024

Israel’s announcement that 21 soldiers died in Gaza this week as they came under attack while rigging two buildings with explosives included an unexpected revelation — that the military was pushing ahead with a controversial plan to create a “buffer zone” along its border with Gaza by demolishing buildings in the area.

While officials had floated the idea on numerous occasions, Tuesday’s comments by the Israel Defense Forces were the first public confirmation that the strategy was in motion.

“It’s one of the additional efforts or layers of security that are being implemented after Oct. 7,” said Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a spokesman for the IDF until earlier this month.

The U.S. has been vocally opposed to the creation of a buffer zone, saying there should be no permanent change to Palestinian territory. Human rights groups say the destruction of civilian homes and farms could amount to war crimes.

Here’s what to know:

What Israel has said

The IDF said the soldiers killed Monday near the southern city of Khan Younis were part of a demolition crew that was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, causing the explosives to detonate and bringing the two buildings down on top of them.

“The forces were removing structures and terrorist infrastructure” about 650 yards from the border fence, said IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari, to “create the security conditions for the return of the residents of the south to their homes.”

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said the troops had died “in the buffer zone between the Israeli communities and Gaza.”

Before Oct. 7, Israeli border guards enforced a 330-yard buffer zone around the length of the 36-mile fence, though Palestinians could farm in the area. Israeli officials now argue that lax enforcement of the zone enabled Hamas to break through the border fence on Oct. 7.

In the months leading up to the attack, Israeli border units reported seeing people approaching the barrier with maps, appearing to study it for weak spots.

The military has declined to give further details on the buffer zone, including the depth of the area it plans to clear. “This is part of the imperative actions that are needed in order to implement a defense plan that will provide improved security in Southern Israel,” the IDF said in a statement Wednesday.

Conricus said his understanding is that the zone will extend just over half a mile from the border — more than double the size of the prewar buffer area. “In some areas it might be wider, in some areas it might be a little less,” he said.

A total of 2,850 buildings once stood in the planned buffer zone, according to Israel’s Channel 12, and the IDF has already destroyed roughly 1,100 buildings. The IDF declined to comment.

Israeli officials have been lobbying for the creation of an expanded buffer zone since the beginning of the conflict — providing another militarized layer between the enclave and the kibbutzim that were overrun by militants.

“At the end of this war, not only will Hamas no longer be in Gaza, but the territory of Gaza will also decrease,” then-Foreign Minister Eli Cohen told Israel’s Army Radio on Oct. 18.

A few days later, Israeli Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter, a former intelligence chief, said the plan was for a “fire zone” where no Palestinians will be allowed to enter.

What videos and satellite imagery show

Videos of what appear to be IDF forces carrying out controlled demolitions of buildings, some near the border, have circulated for months.

In a video posted online Dec. 12 and verified by The Post, Israeli soldiers can be heard shouting and clapping as a school in northern Gaza is blown up.

The school, which the IDF said was used as a Hamas outpost, was about a mile from the border fence. Satellite imagery from Jan. 20 shows damage to the school and other nearby buildings, especially to the north and east.

GAZA

GAZA

Demolition site

1000 FEET

Satellite © Planet Labs, Jan 20

500 FEET

GAZA

Demolition site

Satellite © Planet Labs, Jan 20

Other videos posted online in mid-January and verified by The Post show the destruction of several residential buildings in As Sureij, an agricultural area in Khan Younis, about one kilometer from the fence. In one video, a drone rises above the rooftops, capturing the moment when roughly 10 buildings go up in smoke and flames. In another video, about 11 structures are demolished at once. Satellite imagery from Planet shows the buildings completely flattened.

GAZA

GAZA

Demolition sites

1000 FEET

Satellite © Planet Labs, Jan 19

500 FEET

GAZA

Demolition sites

Satellite © Planet Labs, Jan 19

The IDF did not respond to questions from The Post about the videos or whether the demolitions were linked to the buffer zone.

United States response

The United States has consistently said the size of the Palestinian territories should not be reduced after the current conflict.

“So if any proposed buffer zone was inside Gaza, that would be a violation of that principle and something we oppose,” State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in December.

Israel has informed the United States that the buffer zone being constructed inside Gaza is only a temporary security accommodation to eliminate Hamas firing positions close to the border, according to a U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic communications.

Speaking during a visit to Nigeria on Tuesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the U.S. had been clear in “our opposition to the forced displacement of people,” but added that it’s “appropriate” that security measures are taken so Israelis can return to their homes in the south.

“If there need to be transitional arrangements to enable that to happen, that’s one thing,” he said. “But when it comes to the permanent status of Gaza going forward … we remain clear about not encroaching on its territory.”

The IDF declined to comment on whether the buffer zone would be temporary.

Conricus said he expected it would be enforced for as long as there were militant groups present in Gaza. IDF officials have said the war against Hamas could last for years.

Reaction from rights advocates

Videos of IDF soldiers blowing up swaths of buildings in Gaza were included in South Africa’s recent filing to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing Israel of genocide.

“The scale of destruction in Gaza, the mass targeting of family homes and civilians … all make clear that genocidal intent is both understood and is being put into practice,” said South African lawyer Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, referring to a video of 50 buildings being destroyed in the eastern Shujaiya district.

Israel has denied what it says are “false and baseless” claims by South Africa and has defended the demolitions as essential to dismantling Hamas’s infrastructure.

“Civilian properties are protected under international humanitarian law,” said Basel al-Sourani, an advocacy officer for the Palestinian Center for Human Rights. “These houses are empty and nobody is in them. Why are they making these explosions other than part of their plan of forced displacement?”

Israeli’s prewar buffer zone had encompassed more than 40 percent of Gaza’s farmland, said Sourani, blocking farmers from their fields for more than a decade. In 2006, a deal brokered by the International Red Cross allowed them to return to their land.

“Now with this 1-kilometer buffer they are talking about, and I’m sure it’s more, what are we going to do?” Sourani wondered. His family farm, which includes some 10,000 olive tress and sits around a mile and a half from the border, has already been bulldozed, he said.

“Not a branch of an olive tree is left.”

Karen DeYoung and Jarrett Ley contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Loveday Morris · January 24, 2024

4. Israel is still winning the political war

Excerpts:

Nothing could be more extreme than the contrast between Israel’s economic, technological and military strength and the chronic political paralysis afflicting the nation. But in this, modern Israel is also different. The day before Hamas’s attack, Israel was just about the world’s most divided country, torn bitterly between antagonistic camps that could not form a coalition government. But immediately afterwards, an instant coalition mobilised more than 230,000 civilian reservists, only to discover that, at a number of bases, the troop count was distinctly larger, because reservists over the age limits also turned up, some from as far away as Silicon Valley. There was even talk of calling in the military police to send these extras home, surely a first for an institution more usually tasked to return deserters to their units.

Yet no amount of wartime unity will remedy the political tumult — particularly over Gaza and the West Bank — that will return as soon as the fighting stops. Indeed, the Biden administration has been trying to exploit this division to induce the Israelis to accept a ceasefire, counting on the increasingly vocal demands of the hostages’ families to give up all other priorities and liberate them from their agony. Meanwhile, on the other side, an entire battalion of Israeli reservists, who had been withdrawn from Khan Yunis to be demobilised, staged a protest to denounce any reduction in the offensive. They were duly reprimanded for protesting while still in uniform.

Faced with nationwide Israeli support for the war in Gaza, Washington can still take solace in the respect it has earned thanks to the President’s unequivocal backing following October 7. After all, even the hardest of Israeli hardliners knows that US support might again soon be in demand, as it tries to drive back Hezbollah’s forces across the Litani river. Moreover, Biden’s demand that the Palestinian Authority be installed to govern Gaza has much support within Israel as well, simply because of the lack of any other alternative. For now, however, such a conclusion is still a long way off. The necessary ceasefire prelude to every post-war plan is still being held up by Hamas, which demands full control of the entire Gaza Strip, as if it had just won a war. So long as it persists, the Israeli army can continue its war — knowing that, this time, its days of isolation are over.

Israel is still winning the political war

From the West to Saudi Arabia, its days of isolation are over

BY EDWARD LUTTWAK

unherd.com · by Edward Luttwak · January 24, 2024

Even if its form is military, war is always a political struggle. And in spite of all the anti-Israel demonstrations around the world, Israel is definitely winning the political war — the real one, waged not in the streets but in the foreign ministries of adversaries, neutrals and allies.

How times have changed since 1967, when socialist Israel still enjoyed the enthusiastic support of global “progressives”, but was so diplomatically isolated that it received no support at all from Europe or America when openly threatened with war by Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Before launching its pre-emptive attack, only France had been willing to sell weapons to Israel, but Charles de Gaulle stopped all further sales as soon as the fighting started. In Rome, meanwhile, a cargo of gas masks headed for Tel Aviv was intercepted at the airport, even though Egypt’s occupying force had recently killed many in Yemen with phosgene and mustard gas.

For Israel, however, the greatest penalty of its diplomatic isolation was the inevitability of the UN Security Council imposing a ceasefire as soon as it started to win. In 1967, this came after only six days of fighting. Israeli forces had just fought their way up the steep tracks onto the Golan Heights when they had to stop. I was there myself, eager to visit Damascus when the Soviet Union found itself unopposed at the Security Council in demanding an immediate ceasefire.

It was much the same during the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Caught by surprise by simultaneous offensives from both Egypt and Syria (overconfidence is definitely an Israeli trait), the Security Council did nothing as Israel suffered 10 times as many casualties as in all of the Gaza fighting to date. Moreover, when the US finally agreed to airlift urgent supplies, neither the UK nor France nor Spain would allow its transport aircraft to fly over their airspace. Only Portugal permitted a refuelling stop in the Azores, and even US supplies stored in Europe had to be flown there before being turned around to Israel.

But once again, as soon as Israel was able to overcome initial defeat, the inactive Security Council suddenly became active. With Britain just as vehement as the Soviet Union — which was desperate to stop the rout of the Arab armies it had lavishly equipped and trained for years — the Council powers tried to impose a ceasefire on 22 October. The Israelis tried to fight on regardless, but were forced to stop two days later when Henry Kissinger decreed a nuclear alert in response to Moscow’s threat to intervene with its airborne forces.

At the time, the British and French were fiercely determined to gain the favour of the new oil nabobs who were such good customers for both Bond Street jewellery and jet fighters. As for Washington, whose foreign policy was entirely shaped by Kissinger, nobody wanted to bother with Israel, then still a poor country that had to spend one quarter of its GDP to rebuild its battered forces. This time, 50 years later, it has all been very different. The US, UK and European Union did not try to stop the Israeli counter-offensive against Hamas. The US found itself unimpeded in sending military supplies, while the Italian government came out in full support of Israel.

On the other side, in UN venues highly suited for empty words, Russia and China both ceremonially declared their support for the Palestinians. Yet Moscow has continued to co-operate smoothly with Israel’s air force as it operates over Syria to attack Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, while not one Chinese partner has withdrawn from any joint venture in Israel. Nor did the rising calls to reduce the bombardment of Gaza, led by Belgium of all countries and eventually backed by the White House, have any actual consequence — Israel’s bombing was reduced in any case by the diminishing supply of worthwhile targets.

Likewise, not one of the Arab countries with whom Israel has diplomatic relations has interrupted them in any way, while relations with Egypt have blossomed into a veritable security partnership over Gaza and Sinai. Even more important are the statements of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, who has made it clear that normalising ties with Israel will not long be delayed once the fighting ends. Even though intelligence exchanges and multiple technology joint-venture negotiations have been underway for some years without any need for official relations, such assurances cannot be overestimated: they are, after all, definitive evidence that Hamas’s assault on October 7 has failed.

The purpose of that deliberately horrific attack was precisely to stop any alliance between the Saudis and Israelis. That was certainly the goal of Iran, which has every reason to dread the fusion of Israel’s technology with Saudi Arabia’s financial resources: Tehran rightly fears this would entail some form of military co-operation, which in turn might bring Israeli air power within a short distance of its Iranian targets.

For now, though, Saudi Arabia’s declared goals are more prosaic. Just like the world’s venture capitalists, the Saudis believe that joint investments in Israeli tech will be profitable. But far more important is Israel’s proximity, which can greatly facilitate the training of Saudi engineers, technicians and skilled workers — thus achieving progress towards the central aim of putting Saudis to work and ending its reliance on expatriate labour. For Israel, it scarcely matters that the Saudis want a quiet Gaza ruled by reliably corruptible Palestinians, just as in the West Bank, before they start investing their billions; after all, the Israelis themselves obviously need some sort of political arrangement to retreat from Gaza without more rockets being launched the day after.

Israel’s diplomatic success is not just due to its changed economics however: its high-tech military equipment has arguably been more influential. It is the reason, for instance, why India has emerged as a steadfast ally, as it relies on Israeli tactical missiles for both its air and naval forces, along with much else. It is also the reason why the Pentagon does not begrudge military aid to Israel — it benefits from a constant backflow of valuable technology, including famous helmet-mounted display at the core of the F-35 fighters that now equip the Air Force, Navy and Marines.

Of course, such high-tech weaponry did nothing to prevent the October 7 attack, but it has proved itself since. Almost 10,000 Hamas rockets have been intercepted by the Iron Dome, avoiding many deaths and much damage, while a full-scale ballistic missile made in Iran and launched from Yemen was intercepted by an Arrow 3 out in space — mankind’s first instance of space combat. More prosaically, relatively few Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza, both a result of their training and their sophisticated equipment.

Nothing could be more extreme than the contrast between Israel’s economic, technological and military strength and the chronic political paralysis afflicting the nation. But in this, modern Israel is also different. The day before Hamas’s attack, Israel was just about the world’s most divided country, torn bitterly between antagonistic camps that could not form a coalition government. But immediately afterwards, an instant coalition mobilised more than 230,000 civilian reservists, only to discover that, at a number of bases, the troop count was distinctly larger, because reservists over the age limits also turned up, some from as far away as Silicon Valley. There was even talk of calling in the military police to send these extras home, surely a first for an institution more usually tasked to return deserters to their units.

Yet no amount of wartime unity will remedy the political tumult — particularly over Gaza and the West Bank — that will return as soon as the fighting stops. Indeed, the Biden administration has been trying to exploit this division to induce the Israelis to accept a ceasefire, counting on the increasingly vocal demands of the hostages’ families to give up all other priorities and liberate them from their agony. Meanwhile, on the other side, an entire battalion of Israeli reservists, who had been withdrawn from Khan Yunis to be demobilised, staged a protest to denounce any reduction in the offensive. They were duly reprimanded for protesting while still in uniform.

Faced with nationwide Israeli support for the war in Gaza, Washington can still take solace in the respect it has earned thanks to the President’s unequivocal backing following October 7. After all, even the hardest of Israeli hardliners knows that US support might again soon be in demand, as it tries to drive back Hezbollah’s forces across the Litani river. Moreover, Biden’s demand that the Palestinian Authority be installed to govern Gaza has much support within Israel as well, simply because of the lack of any other alternative. For now, however, such a conclusion is still a long way off. The necessary ceasefire prelude to every post-war plan is still being held up by Hamas, which demands full control of the entire Gaza Strip, as if it had just won a war. So long as it persists, the Israeli army can continue its war — knowing that, this time, its days of isolation are over.

unherd.com · by Edward Luttwak · January 24, 2024

5. Cease-fire efforts for Israel-Hamas war gain steam. But an agreement still appears elusive

Cease-fire efforts for Israel-Hamas war gain steam. But an agreement still appears elusive

BY JOSEF FEDERMAN

Updated 2:36 PM EST, January 24, 2024

AP · January 24, 2024

Efforts to reach a new cease-fire between Israel and Hamas appear to be gaining steam.

Egyptian and U.S. officials confirmed this week that they are actively pursuing ways to halt a war that has raged for over 110 days. An Egyptian official said that Israel has presented a proposal for a pause in fighting, while the White House said it dispatched a senior envoy to the region for consultations with Egypt and Qatar.

An Israeli army tank moves near the Gaza Strip border, in southern Israel, Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Tsafrir Abayov)

Any deal would have to include a pause in fighting, an exchange of hostages held by Hamas for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and large quantities of desperately needed humanitarian assistance for the war-battered Gaza Strip.

But finding a formula acceptable to both sides has been elusive. The gaps between Israel and Hamas remain wide, and the chances of an agreement anytime soon still appear slim.

“There are contacts all the time but they have not yielded results,” said an Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were discussing behind-the-scenes negotiations. “There is a long road ahead.”

Here is a closer look at the cease-fire efforts:

AN INITIAL DEAL

Palestinians look for survivors at a mosque destrooyed in an Israeli strike in Rafah, Gaza Strip. Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Hatem Ali)

Israel declared war following a surprise cross-border attack by Hamas on Oct. 7 that killed 1,200 people and took 250 others hostage. An Israeli air and ground offensive has since left over 25,000 Palestinians dead, displaced an estimated 85% of Gaza’s population and caused widespread destruction and humanitarian suffering, according to local health officials and international aid agencies.

Israeli women May, left, and Lilach, right, comfort each other as they visit the marker for Tifret Lapidot, their friend who was killed on Oct. 7, 2023 at the Nova music festival by Hamas militants during a cross-border attack, as they visit the site in Re’im, southern Israel near the Gaza border, Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo)

Israel has vowed to press ahead until it destroys Hamas’ military and governing capabilities and frees all hostages.

In late November, the sides agreed to one-week cease-fire. Hamas released over 100 of the 250 hostages it was holding, mostly women and children, while Israel freed 240 Palestinian prisoners.

The sides blamed each other for the failure to extend the deal, and fighting has worsened since then.

FILE - Israeli soldiers stand by a truck packed with bound and blindfolded Palestinian detainees, in Gaza, Friday, Dec. 8, 2023. (AP Photo/Moti Milrod, Haaretz, File)

WHAT DOES EACH SIDE WANT?

Israel believes Hamas is still holding about 110 hostages, in addition to the bodies of some 25 others who were killed on Oct. 7 or died in captivity. It wants all hostages and remains to be returned as part of any deal. Israel also is offering a temporary pause in fighting, but says it will continue the broader war until all of its goals are accomplished.

Hamas wants Israel to release all of the thousands of Palestinian prisoners it is holding. These include prisoners convicted in deadly attacks on Israelis as well as hundreds of Hamas militants who participated in the Oct. 7 massacre. It also wants Israel’s offensive to end and a permanent withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza.

WHAT HAS BEEN PROPOSED?

According to the Israeli official, several proposals are floating around. But the sides remain at odds over the length of any pause in fighting, the pace of the hostage releases and the scope of any prisoner release.

A senior Egyptian official said Israel has proposed a two-month cease-fire in which hostages would be freed in exchange for the release of Palestinians imprisoned by Israel, and top Hamas leaders in Gaza would be allowed to relocate to other countries.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media, said Hamas rejected the proposal and insists no more hostages will be released until Israel ends its offensive and withdraws from Gaza. He also said Hamas’ leaders in Gaza do not want to go into exile.

Israel’s government declined to comment on the talks.

FILE - In this June 7, 2017, file photo, Brett McGurk, the U.S. envoy for the global coalition against IS, speaks during a news conference at the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq. (AP Photo/Hadi Mizban, File)

Egypt and Qatar — which have brokered past agreements between Israel and Hamas — were developing a multistage proposal to try to bridge the gaps, the official said.

The White House’s national security spokesman, John Kirby, said Tuesday that a senior envoy, Brett McGurk, was in Cairo for talks on a “humanitarian pause” that would include a hostage deal.

“That’s definitely on the agenda,” he said.

McGurk continued to Qatar on Wednesday, Kirby said.

COULD A TRUCE BRING AN END TO THE WAR?

In the short term, that appears unlikely.

FILE - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, center, wears a protective vest and helmet as he receives a security briefing with commanders and soldiers in the northern Gaza Strip, on Monday, Dec. 25, 2023. (Avi Ohayon/GPO/Handout via AP, File)

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel will continue with the offensive until a “final victory” achieves all of its goals. He expects the war to last throughout 2024 and has resisted calls from the U.S. and other allies to lay out a clear postwar plan for Gaza.

But a sustained pause could make it difficult for Israel to resume the fighting, especially as the world learns more about the full extent of the damage to Gaza’s people and infrastructure. Mediators also hope it could provide a foundation for further understandings between the enemies.

Israel’s public has overwhelmingly supported the war effort so far. But the slow pace of the offensive and mounting death toll of Israeli soldiers risks softening that support.

Palestinians pray next to the bodies of those who were killed in the Israeli ground offensive and bombardment of Khan Younis, outside a morgue in Rafah, southern Gaza, Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Fatima Shbair)

Israeli soldiers carry the flag-draped casket of reservist Elkana Vizel during his funeral at Mt. Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, Tuesday, Jan. 23, 2024. (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)

While Israel says it has killed over 9,000 Hamas militants, the group continues to put up fierce resistance. On Tuesday, Israel said 21 soldiers had been killed in an explosion in central Gaza. It was the deadliest single attack since Israel sent ground troops into Gaza in October.

Nahum Barnea, a veteran columnist for Israel’s largest daily, Yediot Ahronot, wrote Wednesday that he believes the public remains in favor of what is seen as a just war, but that people are beginning to weigh the costs and benefits of the campaign.

“I don’t think that the number of casualties on Monday changed the degree of the Israeli public’s support for the war; but looking ahead, the price will begin to have an impact,” he wrote.

Palestinian protesters demand an end to the war with Israel and call for the release of the Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip by the Hamas militant group, in Deir al Balah, Gaza Strip, on Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Adel Hana)

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Find more of AP’s coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/israel-hamas-war

AP · January 24, 2024

6. Qatar slams alleged leaked remarks by Israel's prime minister calling Gulf nation "problematic"

Qatar slams alleged leaked remarks by Israel's prime minister calling Gulf nation "problematic"

https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-25-24/index.html

From CNN's Ruba Alhenawi and Amir Tal

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends the weekly cabinet meeting at the the Kirya military base in Tel Aviv, Israel, on December 31. Abir Sultan/Reuters

Qatar on Wednesday said Benjamin Netanyahu was undermining mediation efforts in the Israel-Hamas war after a leaked recording allegedly captured the Israeli Prime Minister criticizing the Gulf nation.

On the recording, which aired on Israeli television, a voice – purportedly Netanyahu’s – describes Qatar as “problematic.”

The speaker also says he is “very mad at the Americans” for renewing a lease on their military base in Qatar without extracting a concession on hostages from the country. CNN cannot verify that the voice on the leaked recording belongs to Benjamin Netanyahu.  

"These remarks if validated, are irresponsible and destructive to the efforts to save innocent lives, but are not surprising," Qatar's foreign ministry spokesperson, Majed Al Ansari, said.

Netanyahu has not made a public comment about the recording, but an Israeli official Wednesday told CNN: “Israel works with Qatar as a mediator with Hamas for the release of the hostages, due to its close ties with this murderous terrorist organization. Israel is well aware of the complexity involved.”

The recording that aired on Israel's Channel 12 on Tuesday night purports to come from a meeting with the family of hostages. The voice attributed to Netanyahu says that Qatar is not doing enough to put pressure on Hamas to free the hostages.

Israel's far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich responded to Qatar's comments late Wednesday, asserting the country was a "patron of Hamas" that funds terrorism. Qatar has provided funding for Hamas at least since 2018, with the approval of the Israeli government.

7. Israel Tries to Rebut Genocide Charge by Declassifying Cabinet Decisions

Israel Tries to Rebut Genocide Charge by Declassifying Cabinet Decisions

South Africa has accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza. Israel’s legal team has challenged the charge by providing the court with secret orders made by Israel’s civilian and military leaders.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/25/world/middleeast/israel-genocide-defense-declassified.html

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Lawyers representing Israel at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.Credit...Remko De Waal/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Patrick Kingsley

To report this article, Patrick Kingsley reviewed Israel and South Africa’s submissions to the International Court of Justice and spoke to legal experts.

Jan. 25, 2024

Updated 5:37 a.m. ET

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Israel has declassified more than 30 secret orders made by government and military leaders, which it says rebut the charge that it committed genocide in Gaza, and instead show Israeli efforts to diminish deaths among Palestinian civilians.

The release of the documents, copies of which were reviewed by The New York Times, follows a petition to the International Court of Justice by South Africa, which has accused Israel of genocide. Much of South Africa’s case hinges on inflammatory public statements made by Israeli leaders that it says are proof of intent to commit genocide.

Part of Israel’s defense is to prove that whatever politicians may have said in public was overruled by executive decisions and official orders from Israel’s war cabinet and its military’s high command.

The court, the U.N.’s highest judicial body, began hearing arguments in the case this month, and is expected to provide an initial response to South Africa’s petition — in which it could call for a provisional cease-fire — as soon as Friday.

Since October, Israel has pounded Gaza in a campaign that has killed more than 25,000 Gazans, or roughly one in 100 residents of the territory, according to Gazan health officials; displaced nearly two million people; and damaged the majority of the buildings, according to the U.N. The campaign is a response to a Hamas-led assault that led to the deaths and abductions of roughly 1,400 people in Israel, according to Israeli officials.

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An airstrike in Khan Younis, Gaza, in October left a crater near a residential area.Credit...Yousef Masoud for The New York Times

The Genocide Convention of 1948, which South Africa has accused Israel of violating, does not define genocide solely as killing members of a particular ethnic or national group. Crucially, it says the killings must be committed “with intent to destroy” that group.

“Everything hinges on intent,” said Janina Dill, a professor at Oxford University and co-director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict.

To that end, both South Africa and Israel are focused not only on what leaders and soldiers have done, but also what they have said. The roughly 400-page defense includes what Israel says is evidence that it sought a legal war with Hamas and not a campaign of genocide against the Palestinians.

Among the declassified Israeli documents are summaries of cabinet discussions from late October, in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered supplies of aid, fuel and water to be sent to Gaza. He also instructed the government to examine how “external actors” might set up field hospitals to treat Gazans, as well as consider mooring a hospital ship off the coast of the territory.

Mr. Netanyahu’s most declarative statements were made in November, according to the released documents.

“The prime minister stressed time and again the need to increase significantly the humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip,” reads one declassified document that Israel’s lawyers said was taken from the minutes of a cabinet meeting on Nov. 14.

“It is recommended to respond favorably to the request of the U.S.A. to enable the entry of fuel,” another document said.

On Nov. 18, according to the declassified minutes of another meeting, Mr. Netanyahu emphasized “the absolute necessity” of allowing basic humanitarian aid to continue.

But the dossier is also highly curated and omits most wartime instructions given by the cabinet and the military. The available documents do not include orders from the first 10 days of the war, when Israel blocked aid to Gaza and shut off access to the electricity and water it normally provides to the territory.

Image

A woman mourning the loss of family members killed in Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip in October. Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

While the court could take years to reach a verdict, it may seek to impose “provisional measures” as soon as this week. Those measures could include a symbolic — and largely unenforceable — request for Israel to cease its attacks while the court deliberates.

To do so, the court’s 17 judges must find it plausible that Israel has killed residents of Gaza with the deliberate goal of destroying Palestinians as a group, according to international legal experts.

Israel-Hamas War: Live Updates

Updated Jan. 25, 2024, 3:04 a.m. ET3 hours ago3 hours ago

• Hostage families plan a protest to block aid going into Gaza.
• Britain’s foreign secretary pressures Netanyahu to open channels for more aid to Gaza.

Actions that can constitute genocide can “be features of a war without being genocide,” Professor Dill said. “So it is really imperative to show this intent.”

Israel’s cabinet decisions could prove more relevant in several months, when the court begins to assess the merits of the case. The judges will need to decide whether Israel had no other motive to kill Palestinians aside from genocide, the experts said.

But at the current “provisional measures” stage, the experts said, the judges need only be convinced of the plausibility of South Africa’s claim in order to instruct Israel to suspend its campaign.

South Africa has tried to prove genocidal intent by citing more than 50 comments and statements made since October by Israeli leaders, lawmakers, soldiers and commentators.

Those cited include Yoav Gallant, the Israeli defense minister, who said Israel was fighting “human animals”; Amichay Eliyahu, the minister for heritage, who suggested dropping a nuclear bomb on Gaza; the country’s mainly ceremonial president, Isaac Herzog, who described Palestinians as “an entire nation out there that is responsible”; and Ghassan Alian, the Israeli general who oversees the distribution of aid to Gaza.

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Defense Minister Yoav Gallant of Israel. South Africa claims Mr. Gallant’s inflammatory language proves Israel’s intent to commit genocide in Gaza. Credit...Pool photo by Saul Loeb

Israel has also submitted to the court a handful of emails between military officers and aid workers that it says shows its efforts to supply Gaza with food, medicine and vaccinations. Were Israel intent on the wholesale destruction of Gaza’s Palestinian population, the Israelis argue, it would not be working with the U.N. to distribute lifesaving aid.

One email, from a senior U.N. official to an Israeli officer overseeing aid distribution to Gaza, detailed an approved request to deliver solar-powered refrigerators to the territory to store vaccines and lab tests. A U.N. official confirmed the messages were authentic.

International legal experts said that the secret orders and emails provided important context, but that the court would regard them as one part of a wider picture.

Israel’s submission contained only a few of the decisions made by its cabinet and military leadership since October. The judges will need to assess whether or not the dossier tells the whole story of Israel’s plans, said William A. Schabas, an international law professor at Middlesex University, London, and the author of “Genocide in International Law.”

“When you’re trying to prove that you didn’t give an order to do something, obviously you’re going to show orders that indicate something else,” Professor Schabas said. “And if there is an order to do something or a plan to do it, you’re not going to provide that.”

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An Egyptian truck carrying humanitarian aid enters the Gaza Strip from the Kerem Shalom border crossing on Monday. Israel says allowing aid into the enclave proves it does not seek the wholesale genocide of Palestinians. Credit...Menahem Kahana/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Orders to provide sufficient humanitarian aid to Gaza would also need to be assessed against what Israel has actually allowed to happen on the ground, Professor Schabas said.

“Things that appear to be directed at sustaining life don’t necessarily disprove the opposite,” he said.

The United Nations, for example, recently accused Israel of blocking aid to north Gaza, a charge Israel denied. The U.N. has also warned of a looming famine amid food shortages and the collapse of Gaza’s health system.

Patrick Kingsley is the Jerusalem bureau chief, covering Israel and the occupied territories. He has reported from more than 40 countries, written two books and previously covered migration and the Middle East for The Guardian. More about Patrick Kingsley

8. Israel denies attack on UN refuge in Gaza that drew rebuke from Washington

Israel denies attack on UN refuge in Gaza that drew rebuke from Washington

By Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Fadi Shana and Henriette Chacar

January 24, 202410:09 PM ESTUpdated 4 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/plan-one-month-gaza-truce-makes-progress-israel-hits-khan-younis-2024-01-24/?utm

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• LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:Israel says it ruled out that it was responsible for strike on U.N. shelterIsrael says it is investigating if Hamas was behind shellingWashington says it deplores the attack

GAZA/JERUSALEM, Jan 24 (Reuters) - The United Nations said on Wednesday that Israeli tanks struck a huge U.N. compound in Gaza sheltering displaced Palestinians, causing "mass casualties", but Israel denied its forces were responsible and suggested Hamas may have launched the shelling.

The attack, which the U.N. said hit a vocational training centre housing 30,000 displaced people in Khan Younis, southern Gaza's main city, prompted rare outright condemnation from the United States.

"Mass casualties have taken place, some buildings are ablaze and there are reports of deaths. Many people are trying to flee the scene, but unable to do so," U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for the Palestinian Territory James McGoldrick said.

Thomas White, director of Gaza affairs for the U.N. agency UNRWA, said two tank rounds hit one of the centre's buildings where some 800 displaced people were sheltering. At least nine people were killed and 75 wounded. The agency's head Philippe Lazzarini said the death toll was probably higher.

"The compound is a clearly marked U.N. facility and its coordinates were shared with Israeli Authorities as we do for all our facilities. Once again a blatant disregard of basic rules of war," Lazzarini said.

In Washington, U.S. State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel said: "We deplore today's attack on the U.N.'s Khan Younis training centre."

"Civilians must be protected, and the protected nature of U.N. facilities must be respected, and humanitarian workers must be protected so that they can continue providing civilians with the life-saving humanitarian assistance that they need," Patel said.

Israel's military initially released a statement describing the wider Khan Younis area as a base of Hamas fighters and acknowledged that fighting was taking place near large numbers of civilians.

In a second statement sent following Washington's criticism, the military said an examination of its operational systems ruled out that its forces had struck the centre. It added that a through review was still under way to examine the possibility that the strike was a result of Hamas fire.

Since Israel's ground offensive began in late October, Washington has raised concerns and asked Israel for information about incidents, but has rarely been openly critical of a specific Israeli action.

Hours after the attack as night fell, U.N. staff were still unable to reach the area and all communications were shut down.

Israeli forces have launched their biggest ground offensive in at least a month, encircling Khan Younis where hundreds of thousands of people who fled fighting elsewhere in Gaza are staying.

Residents said that Israeli announcements warning them to leave the area came only after the operation was under way and the main road out already shut.

[1/10]Palestinians inspect the site of an Israeli strike on a mosque, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, January 24, 2024. REUTERS/Fadi Shana Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

The bulk of the 2.3 million-strong population of Gaza is now penned into Khan Younis and the towns just north and south of it. Palestinian officials say the Israelis have cut off and besieged the city's main hospitals, making it impossible for rescuers to reach many of the wounded and the dead.

Israel said that Hamas has "command and control centers, Hamas outposts and Hamas security headquarters" in the area.

"Dismantling Hamas' military framework in western Khan Younis is the heart of the logic behind the operation," the Israeli military said.

"It is a dense area and an area that consists of civilians, it is a place that requires very specific methods of action and precise operations. There is an area with shelters, there are several hospitals, several sensitive sites. We have seen terrorists use these sites."

'WHERE DO WE GO?'

Palestinian health officials said at least 25,700 people had been killed in Gaza in the war, including 210 in the previous 24 hours. Israel launched its assault to wipe out Hamas after fighters stormed Israeli towns on Oct. 7, killing 1,200 people and capturing more than 240 hostages.

In Rafah, a small town just south of Khan Younis on the Egyptian border, an air strike hit a mosque, and residents were gathering scattered pages of holy books from among the pulverised ruins.

Several men hoisted up a concrete block and pulled away rubble, revealing the legs of a dead man in jeans. When the body was finally pulled out, they carried it on a blanket under a stretcher, chanting religious slogans.

Several bodies were later laid in plastic body bags at a morgue, where relatives wailed in sorrow, clutching the corpses.

Um Khaled Baker, whose son was among the dead, told Reuters they had fled to Rafah because it was supposed to be safe.

"I don't even have a tent to stay in. They bombed us and my son is a young martyr. Where do we go? The old and helpless people? What can they do? Where do we go?"

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society, which runs the Al-Amal hospital in Khan Younis, said troops had blockaded its staff inside and imposed a curfew in the area, including its local headquarters, where three displaced individuals had been killed.

Israel says Hamas fighters operate in and around hospitals, which hospital staff and Hamas deny.

Reporting by Nidal al-Mughrabi in Doha, Fadi Shana in Gaza, Mohamed Ahmed Hassan in Cairo, Dan Williams, Ari Rabinovitch, Maayan Lubell, Henriette Chacar and Kate Holton in Jerusalem, Humeyra Pamuk in Washington Writing by Peter Graff and Cynthia Osterman; Editing by Ros Russell and Diane Craft

9. ‘A bill that will be due:’ Pentagon's Middle East buildup costs $1.6B

Every time we try to pivot to Asia we pirouette 360 degrees back to the magnet of the Middle East that just keeps pulling us back.

Excerpts:

The cost to support the unplanned Middle East operations associated with the 120-day window between October and January totals $1.6 billion: $29.2 million in military personnel costs; $708.6 million in operations and maintenance; $528.4 million in procurement; $51.9 million in research, development, test and evaluation; and $248.5 million for transportation, pulled from the Department of Transportation’s working capital fund.

The Pentagon also projected the cost to maintain those operations for a full year, estimating a total price tag of $2.2 billion: $47.2 million in military personnel; $940.7 in operations and maintenance; $531.4 million in procurement; $96.1 million in research, development, test and evaluation; and $549.8 million in transportation.

‘A bill that will be due:’ Pentagon's Middle East buildup costs $1.6B

By LARA SELIGMAN, JOE GOULD and CONNOR O’BRIEN

01/24/2024 12:35 PM EST

Politico

‘A bill that will be due:’ Pentagon’s Middle East buildup costs $1.6B

Lawmakers are seeking ways to pay for the unplanned bill.

Since the Oct. 7 terrorist attack, the Pentagon has ordered an additional aircraft carrier strike group, Marine-carrying amphibious ships, fighter jets, air defenses and hundreds of troops to the Middle East. | Kaitlin Watt/U.S. Navy

01/24/2024 12:35 PM EST

The Pentagon estimates the U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks on Israel will cost $1.6 billion, a bill the department is unable to pay due to lawmakers’ inability to pass a budget, according to two U.S. officials.

The Defense Department recently sent the estimate to congressional appropriators in response to questions, said the officials, who were granted anonymity to speak about information that hasn’t been made public.

The overall number includes the cost to send additional warships, fighter jets and equipment to the region, and keep them there for the last four months, the officials said. It does not include the cost of the missiles the U.S. military has expended striking Houthi positions in Yemen or knocking down drones and missiles in the Red Sea, they said, because there is not enough data yet to make those calculations.

Over a full year, the cost for the military surge could rise to $2.2 billion, according to the estimate.

The ballooning tab is the latest complication in the rapidly expanding Middle East conflict. And the estimate hits Congress as negotiations over President Joe Biden’s supplemental request for more than $100 billion to assist Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan reach a pivotal point in the Senate.

Since the Oct. 7 terrorist attack, the Pentagon has ordered an additional aircraft carrier strike group, Marine-carrying amphibious ships, fighter jets, air defenses and hundreds of troops to the Middle East. Those forces initially served to deter additional groups from getting involved in the conflict, and more recently have been protecting civilian ships in the Red Sea from attacks by Houthi rebels.

But because lawmakers have not yet agreed on a full-year spending bill for the Defense Department, the military does not have the money to pay for those unplanned operations, as POLITICO reported in November.

“It will be, I think, a hole that we would want to be filled,” said one of the officials. “It is a bill that will be due and we will have to pay for it within a limited amount of resources.”

Lawmakers are aware of the unplanned cost and are weighing how to pay for it. Options include adding it to the annual spending bill, adding it to the $111 billion emergency supplemental for Ukraine and Israel, or funding it through a stand-alone supplemental for war costs.

Top members of Congress — including appropriators tasked with negotiating the massive aid package and a full-year government funding deal — aren’t yet aligned on whether the Middle East funding should be in the mix for supplemental.

“We’re negotiating all those pieces right now,” Senate Appropriations Chair Patty Murray (D-Wash.) said. “I want to see the whole picture before I answer” whether that spending should be included.

Senate Armed Services Chair Jack Reed (D-R.I.) warned Congress may need to consider a second round of funding.

“I sense, given the unexpected cost, that there will have to be a separate supplemental,” he said. “These aren’t routine costs. They’re because of our reaction to the Houthi disruption, to Iranian malign behavior, etc. And I think that’s probably where we would go for it.”

Senate and House appropriators also must still iron out a deal to fund the entire government for the rest of fiscal 2024. After keeping federal spending on autopilot at last year’s lower level for a third of the fiscal year, congressional leaders now aim to finalize federal funding by March, which may make it a vehicle for more Middle East funding.

Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.), who chairs the Senate Appropriations panel that controls most Pentagon spending, said the regular appropriations bill is his path of choice.

“First we have to get the supplemental passed, and then we have those conversations,” Tester said.

But the top Republican on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Susan Collins of Maine, said the military cannot wait.

“They need it sooner. They’re fast running out of funds,” she said of U.S. Central Command.

The cost to support the unplanned Middle East operations associated with the 120-day window between October and January totals $1.6 billion: $29.2 million in military personnel costs; $708.6 million in operations and maintenance; $528.4 million in procurement; $51.9 million in research, development, test and evaluation; and $248.5 million for transportation, pulled from the Department of Transportation’s working capital fund.

The Pentagon also projected the cost to maintain those operations for a full year, estimating a total price tag of $2.2 billion: $47.2 million in military personnel; $940.7 in operations and maintenance; $531.4 million in procurement; $96.1 million in research, development, test and evaluation; and $549.8 million in transportation.

POLITICO

Politico

10. Cut funding to organizations that are empowering Hamas

Excerpts:

Will anyone care about the $5 billion or more that will flow to the World Food Program, even though its leadership parroted Hamas propaganda? It has been demanding an immediate Israeli ceasefire, while saying nothing about Hamas surrendering, giving up hostages or calling on Egypt to open its border and admit displaced refugees. 

Except for UNRWA, all of these organizations operate across the globe — not just in Gaza or other Palestinian-administered territories. In some cases, they do important humanitarian work. But if the U.S. is to be their largest donor, shouldn’t taxpayer contributions come with conditions that prohibit support to U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. Part of the core problem here, of course, is that neither the UN nor the Red Cross officially recognizes Hamas as a terrorist group. Nor do they put that label on Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

That’s a fundamental challenge that inevitably leads to the U.S. indirectly funding terrorism through the UN. It’s also the logical starting point for congressional legislation. 

For agencies that refuse to recognize Hamas and other groups as terrorist organizations, U.S. funding should be cut or withheld. We owe nothing less to the victims of Oct. 7 and the hostages who remain in captivity.

Cut funding to organizations that are empowering Hamas 

BY BONNIE GLICK AND RICHARD GOLDBERG, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/24/24 9:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4422336-cut-funding-for-orgs-that-empower-hamas/?utm

As Congress mulls its next moves on big federal spending bills, members of both political parties are refusing to confront an elephant in the room: Billions of taxpayer dollars are being sent to international organizations enabling Hamas terrorism.

With 34 Americans already murdered by Hamas and six more still held hostage in Gaza, it’s time for Washington to withhold contributions to agencies that actively subsidize, enable or defend the evil the world witnessed on Oct. 7.

The U.S. sends billions of dollars to the United Nations every year and hundreds of millions more to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Are we getting our money’s worth? Hamas certainly is. 

Take the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for starters. This organization runs schools in the West Bank and Gaza that explicitly teach kids to hate Jews and of course Israel. Many of its staff members are members of terrorist groups such as Hamas. Its facilities are used by Hamas to launch attacks and build terror tunnels. Employees stand accused of celebrating Oct. 7 and even holding some of Hamas’s Israeli hostages in their homes.

UNRWA does not submit the names of its staff, contractors or beneficiaries to the U.S. for counterterrorism vetting. And so, despite funding UNRWA with over $1 billion under the Biden administration, there is no accountability in terms of who has access to that money. 

These aren’t shocking revelations — they go back many years. This is what led the Trump administration to cut off all funding to UNRWA in 2018. The Biden administration, however, subsequently reopened the spigot. And with roughly 40 percent of UNRWA’s budget focused on Gaza, that’s $400 million of U.S. funding to an organization that employs Hamas members and whose employees are credibly believed to have participated in its crimes against humanity.

Absent an outright prohibition in an appropriations law, Congress may greenlight hundreds of millions more this year, both in the regular budget and the president’s requested emergency supplemental.

The same goes for the International Committee of the Red Cross, to which the U.S. will send another $600-700 million this year as if on autopilot. This, while the Red Cross refuses to pressure Hamas to allow medical visits to the hostages it kidnapped, and after an apparent cover-up of Hamas’s use of hospitals as both terror base camps and holding centers for hostages. 

It gets worse. While the Red Cross won’t visit Jewish hostages held in Gaza, its staff does visit Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails to sign them up for the Palestinian Authority’s “pay to slay” program — a policy that gives government benefits to the families of those who commit terrorist attacks against Israel. Taxpayer dollars have no place promoting terrorism, yet that’s exactly what the Red Cross does.

Congress could at least withhold a certain percentage of Red Cross funds until its conduct improves — but again, that would require an amendment to the appropriations law. 

The list goes on. More than $100 million will flow to the World Health Organization despite its materials showing up in Gaza hospital areas where Hamas held hostages, its inability to condemn Hamas for anything (Oct. 7, the use of human shields, the abuse of hospitals, holding hostages, and more) and its executive board’s decision to condemn Israel in an emergency session instead. 

Another $10 million will go to UN Women, an organization which, to this day, cannot bring itself to condemn Hamas for the mass rape committed against Jews on Oct. 7. Washington will throw in another $3.5 million for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which has turned its social media accounts into a daily cudgel for beating Israel. 

Will anyone care about the $5 billion or more that will flow to the World Food Program, even though its leadership parroted Hamas propaganda? It has been demanding an immediate Israeli ceasefire, while saying nothing about Hamas surrendering, giving up hostages or calling on Egypt to open its border and admit displaced refugees. 

Except for UNRWA, all of these organizations operate across the globe — not just in Gaza or other Palestinian-administered territories. In some cases, they do important humanitarian work. But if the U.S. is to be their largest donor, shouldn’t taxpayer contributions come with conditions that prohibit support to U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. Part of the core problem here, of course, is that neither the UN nor the Red Cross officially recognizes Hamas as a terrorist group. Nor do they put that label on Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

That’s a fundamental challenge that inevitably leads to the U.S. indirectly funding terrorism through the UN. It’s also the logical starting point for congressional legislation. 

For agencies that refuse to recognize Hamas and other groups as terrorist organizations, U.S. funding should be cut or withheld. We owe nothing less to the victims of Oct. 7 and the hostages who remain in captivity. 

Bonnie Glick was the deputy administrator of the US Agency for International Development from 2019-2020. Richard Goldberg, a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is a former Senate aide and National Security Council official.

11. Erik Prince Claims His Vaporware Super-Phone Could Have Thwarted Hamas Attack

Excerpts:

Hamas’s assault displayed a stunningly sophisticated understanding of the Israeli state security apparatus, but there’s been no evidence that this included the use of commercially obtained mobile phone data.

While it’s possible that Unplugged phones block all apps from requesting location tracking permission in the first place, this would break any location-based features in the phone, rendering something as basic as a mapping app useless. But even this hypothetical is impossible to verify, because the phone has yet to leave Prince’s imagination and reach any actual customers, and its customized version of Android, dubbed “LibertOS,” has never been examined by any third parties.

While Unplugged has released a one-page security audit, conducted by PwC Digital Technology, it applied only to the company’s website and an app it offers, not the phone, making its security and privacy claims largely articles of faith.

Erik Prince Claims His Vaporware Super-Phone Could Have Thwarted Hamas Attack

The special features of the Blackwater founder’s Unplugged device can be replicated on most phones by adjusting the settings.

Sam Biddle

January 24 2024, 2:11 p.m.

The Intercept · by Sam Biddle · January 24, 2024

Notorious Blackwater founder and perennial mercenary entrepreneur Erik Prince has a new business venture: a cellphone company whose marketing rests atop a pile of muddled and absurd claims of immunity to surveillance. On a recent episode of his podcast, Prince claimed that his special phone’s purported privacy safeguards could have prevented many of the casualties from Hamas’s October 7 attack.

The inaugural episode of “Off Leash with Erik Prince,” the podcast he co-hosts with former Trump campaign adviser Mark Serrano, focused largely on the Hamas massacre and various intelligence failures of the Israeli military. Toward the end of the November 2 episode, following a brief advertisement for Prince’s new phone company, Unplugged, Serrano asked how Hamas had leveraged technology to plan the attack. “I think that when the post-op of this disaster is done, I think the main source of intel for Hamas was cellphone data,” Serrano claimed, without evidence. “How does Gaza access that data? I mean, Hamas?”

Prince answered that location coordinates, commonly leaked from phones via advertising data, were surely crucial to Hamas’s ability to locate Israel Defense Forces installations and kibbutzim.

Serrano, apparently sensing an opportunity to promote Prince’s $949 “double encrypted” phone, continued: “If all of Israel had Unplugged [phones] on October 7, what would that have done to Hamas’s strategy?”

Prince didn’t miss a beat. “I will almost guarantee that whether it’s the people living on kibbutzes, but especially the 19, 20, 21-year-old kids that are serving in the IDF, if they’re not on duty, they’re on their phones and on social media, and that cellphone data was tracked and collected and used for targeting by Hamas,” he said. “This phone, Unplugged, prevents that from happening.”

Unplugged’s product documentation is light on details, privacy researcher Zach Edwards told The Intercept, and the features the company touts can be replicated on most phones just by tinkering with settings. Both Android devices and iPhones, Edwards pointed out, allow users to deactivate their advertising IDs. It’s unclear what makes Unplugged any different, let alone a tool that could have thwarted the Hamas attack. “Folks should wait for proof before accepting those claims,” Edwards said.

“Simply Not True”

This isn’t the first time Prince has used an act of violence as a business opportunity. Following the 1999 mass shooting at Columbine High School, Prince constructed a mock school building called R U Ready High School where police could pay to train for future shootings. In 2017, he pitched the Trump White House on a plan, modeled after the British East India Company, to privatize the American war in Afghanistan with mercenaries.

With Unplugged, Prince’s main claim seems to be that, unlike most phones, his company’s devices don’t have advertising IDs: unique codes generated by every Android and iOS phone that marketers use to surveil consumer habits, including location. Unplugged claims its phones use a customized version of Android that strips out these IDs. But the notion that Prince’s phone, which is still unavailable for purchase more than a year after it was announced, could have saved lives on October 7 was contradicted by mobile phone security experts, who told The Intercept that just about every aspect of the claim is false, speculative, or too vague to verify.

“That is simply not true and that is not how mobile geolocation works,” said Allan Liska, an intelligence analyst at the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future. While Prince is correct that the absence of an advertising ID would diminish to some degree the amount of personal data leaked by a phone, it by no means cuts it off entirely. So long as a device is connected to cellular towers — generally considered a key feature for cellphones — it’s susceptible to tracking. “Mobile geolocation is based on tower data triangulation and there is no level of operating system security that that can bypass that,” Liska added.

Unplugged CEO Ryan Paterson told The Intercept that Prince’s statement about how his phone could have minimized Israeli deaths on October 7 “has much to do with the amount of data that the majority of cell phones in the world today create about the users of the device, their locations, patterns of life and behaviors,” citing a 2022 Electronic Frontier Foundation report on how mobile advertising data fuels police surveillance. Indeed, smartphone advertising has created an immeasurably vast global ecosystem of intimate personal data, unregulated and easily bought and sold, that can facilitate state surveillance without judicial oversight.

“Unplugged’s UP Phone has an operating system that does not contain a [mobile advertising ID] that can be passed [on], does not have any Google Mobile Services, and has a built-in firewall that blocks applications from sending any tracker information from the device, and delivering advertisements to the phone,” Paterson added in an email. “Taking these data sources away from the Hamas planners could have seriously disrupted and limited their operations effectiveness.”

Unplugged did not respond to a request for more detailed information about its privacy and security measures.

Neither Erik Prince nor an attorney who represents him responded to questions from The Intercept.

Articles of Faith

“While it’s true that anyone could theoretically find aggregate data on populated areas and possibly more specific data on an individual using mobile advertiser identifiers, it is completely unclear if Hamas used this and the ‘could have’ in the last sentence is doing a lot of work,” William Budington, a security researcher at the Electronic Frontier Foundation who regularly scrutinizes Android systems, wrote in an email to The Intercept. “If Hamas was getting access to location information through cell tower triangulation methods (say their targets were connecting to cell towers within Gaza that they had access to), then [Prince’s] phone would be as vulnerable to this as any iOS or Android device.”

The idea of nixing advertising IDs is by no means a privacy silver bullet. “When he is talking about advertising IDs, that is separate from location data,” Budington noted. If a phone’s user gives an app permission to access that phone’s location, there’s little to nothing Prince can do to keep that data private. “Do some apps get location data as well as an advertising ID? Yes. But his claim that Hamas had access to this information, and it was pervasively used in the attack to establish patterns of movement, is far-fetched and extremely speculative,” Budington wrote.

Liska, who previously worked in information security within the U.S. intelligence community, agreed. “I also find the claim that Hamas was purchasing advertising/location data to be a bit preposterous as well,” he said. “Not that they couldn’t do it (I am not familiar with Israeli privacy laws) but that they would have enough intelligence to know who to target with the purchase.”

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Hamas’s assault displayed a stunningly sophisticated understanding of the Israeli state security apparatus, but there’s been no evidence that this included the use of commercially obtained mobile phone data.

While it’s possible that Unplugged phones block all apps from requesting location tracking permission in the first place, this would break any location-based features in the phone, rendering something as basic as a mapping app useless. But even this hypothetical is impossible to verify, because the phone has yet to leave Prince’s imagination and reach any actual customers, and its customized version of Android, dubbed “LibertOS,” has never been examined by any third parties.

While Unplugged has released a one-page security audit, conducted by PwC Digital Technology, it applied only to the company’s website and an app it offers, not the phone, making its security and privacy claims largely articles of faith.

Contact the author:

Sam Biddle sam.biddle@theintercept.com +1 978 261 7389  on Signal @sambiddle on Keybase @sambiddle.bsky.social on Bluesky

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The Intercept · by Sam Biddle · January 24, 2024

12. Moscow Laughs at CIA Recruitment Video Posted to Social Media

Moscow Laughs at CIA Recruitment Video Posted to Social Media

kyivpost.com · January 23, 2024

Kremlin notes that X (formerly Twitter) is banned in Russia and that better platforms exist to draft double agents.

by John Moretti | January 23, 2024, 10:56 pm |

A screenshot of the CIA's recruitment video posted to X (formerly Twitter) reads "Everyone dreams of changing the world."

The Kremlin on Tuesday guffawed at a Twitter video posted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the day before, aiming to recruit Russian double-agents to join the US spy service.

“Someone needs to inform the CIA that [the Russian social network] Vkontakte is much more popular in our country than the banned X [formerly Twitter],” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

The video follows a fictional Russian whose deceased father often spoke of the valor of cosmonauts and scientists, and whose mother took him to Moscow to see a military parade in Red Square. Then, the narrator came to the realization that “the true enemy” lies within, and decides to contact CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to “save Russia” for the benefit of his own son.

About halfway through the Russian-language script, the 35-year-old narrator quotes a passage from “Three Methods of Reform” by revered author Lev Tolstoy: “Everyone thinks of changing the world, but no one thinks of changing himself.”

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(Perhaps clumsily in this case, the Russian word for “to change” is nearly identical to, and one vowel away from the word for “to betray”.)

Почему я связался с ЦРУ: Ради Родиныhttps://t.co/mhQbzet5X2 pic.twitter.com/sBNWgc93PM

— CIA (@CIA) January 22, 2024

“The elite sold out the country for palaces and yachts, while our soldiers chew on rotten potatoes and fire ancient weapons,” the narration continues.

At the end of the post, the CIA explains how to get in touch with its recruiters via encrypted channels.

Other Topics of Interest

Eurotopics: Russia - Open Protest in Bashkortostan

A selection of what European papers are saying.

When asked about the video on Tuesday, Peskov said that “the CIA does it all the time.”

According to The Moscow Times, CIA Director of Operations David Marlowe said in November 2022 that the agency was “open for business” for any Russian disillusioned by the so-called “special operation” in Ukraine.

On Tuesday, Reuters reported that CIA Director William Burns said that the agency recognized a rare opportunity to reach Russians disaffected with Moscow’s foreign policy, and therefore decided to disseminate the video.

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John Moretti

John Moretti is a freelance journalist and author dividing his time between Europe and the United States. He has also spent more than a decade working with companies that protect travelers from health and security emergencies abroad. His academic background is in Eastern European Studies, international public policy and counterterrorism.

kyivpost.com · January 23, 2024

13. How the West Can Match Russia in Drone Innovation

Conclusion:

The war in Ukraine is pushing innovation on both sides to the limit, forcing the adversaries to adapt and adopt the latest in military and civilian technologies for combat. While Ukraine had the initial lead in such innovation in 2022, by late 2023 to early 2024 the Russian military and the volunteer efforts have caught up, adopting many similar technologies and concepts while building on these developments to fit their needs. The volunteer communities in Russia are especially tuned into the latest technical developments, given that many volunteers come from academia and the high-tech sector, and often contribute to drone research, development, and assembly after their full-time jobs. Drone use in the Russo-Ukrainian war is only going to grow, with first-person-view and small quadcopter drones becoming dangerous technologies in the field in ever-increasing numbers. Enabling their operations with AI is the next logical and technological step already undertaken by both belligerents.

The “homegrown” AI use is likely to accelerate and might make drone warfare even deadlier. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense is much more focused on augmenting human warfighters than on replacing them. It is taking a measured and thoughtful approach, navigating the intricacies of maneuvering a large existing bureaucracy and infrastructure. When ample time permits the refinement of such a system, strategizing for the long term could yield favorable results. However, the imperative question beckons: What measures would we be willing to undertake if our preparation falls short as the clock ticks down?

The rapid integration of unvetted commercial technologies into military operations, as observed in the approaches adopted by Russia and Ukraine, might not align with the rigorous standards upheld by the United States. In light of this, Washington should critically contemplate the alternative strategies. At the current rate, the United States may well face a set of choices, both of which can be unacceptable: taking unknown or unquantified risks on fielding AI-enabled systems, or entering a conflict with mostly traditional military systems while adversaries move forward with the first choice. The only way to avoid this set of choices is to urgently channel leadership, resources, infrastructure, and personnel toward assuring these technologies. With many in the Department of Defense leadership now keenly aware of the magnitude of the AI assurance issue for the department, Pentagon funding allocations should reflect a commitment to securing a technological edge while remaining true to America’s democratic values.

How the West Can Match Russia in Drone Innovation - War on the Rocks

SAMUEL BENDETT AND JANE PINELIS

warontherocks.com · by Samuel Bendett · January 25, 2024

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the use of AI for military operations has been one of the most debated topics across public media and the open-source literature. But for all the praise Ukrainian innovation has garnered, there is too little recognition of how effective Russia’s more reckless approach to AI has been.

Ukrainian and Russian forces have used AI for decision-making and data analysis when processing information received from multiple sensors and observation points, including drones, uncrewed aerial vehicles, manned aircraft, satellites, and ground-based forces and systems. But there have also been differences in the way both sides employed AI. Ukrainian and Western AI has focused on fast identification, tracking, and targeting. Russia, in turn, has used loitering munitions, as well as different command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, to meet its need for precision targeting.

Put simply, the focus of Western AI-enabled systems is on the left side of the observe, orient, decide, and act loop. But while the West prioritizes faster targeting and enhanced warfighter capabilities, Russia is attempting to make strides to automate the entire kill chain. In short, Russia’s aggressive military and volunteer-driven AI use stands in contrast to the United States’ cautious and responsible, if under-resourced, approach. Now, the U.S. Department of Defense needs to urgently prioritize AI assurance to ethically compete in the dynamic AI battlefield.

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Russian Innovation

While the United States has focused on methodically fixing technology acquisition and data integration challenges, Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine are being bolstered by a thriving landscape of funding, manufacturing, and opportunistic deployment of commercial technologies into operational environments.

Russia’s AI development extends beyond official military channels. The rapidly growing and sophisticated ecosystem that supports the country’s military in Ukraine is made up of numerous volunteer efforts that develop and supply fighting equipment and systems to the front. This supply process is taking advantage of commercial off-the-shelf technologies to build and assemble weapons like first-person-view style drones — light, one-way attack (kamikaze) uncrewed aerial vehicles. This drone’s operator usually sees an image transmitted by this aerial vehicle similar to what would be seen from an aircraft pilot’s seat. Such efforts are a natural outgrowth of the rapid acquisition and mass-scale use of commercial drones and related systems during this invasion. They are also aided by donations from Russian citizens, private businesses, and wealthy individuals, enabling both purchasing power capacity and rapid innovation. Some of these organizations further benefit from direct links to the Russian government, with access to funding, technologies, and government protection for their efforts.

The Russian Ministry of Defense frequently touts AI-enabled small and mid-sized drones and uncrewed aerial vehicles — often during major events like its annual military expo and forum. Commercial off-the-shelf technology apparently enables Russian volunteer efforts to incorporate AI into their drone development. In August 2023, specialists from the “Tsar’s Wolves” announced that their Shturm 1.2 heavy quadcopter drone utilizes AI, claiming that this semi-autonomous uncrewed aerial vehicle can make decisions and drop projectiles independently of the human operator. According to these developers, an operator places a crosshair on a target on the uncrewed aerial vehicle control panel, and then this drone independently calculates the time and distance before releasing its munitions.

Such “point and click” AI claims are difficult to corroborate in the absence of proof. If true, they suggest a growing sophistication of Russian volunteer organizations that are experimenting with limited AI-enabled image recognition and terrain mapping algorithms. The Shturm 1.2 drone is allegedly equipped with a thermal imaging camera and can also be used as a one-way kamikaze drone. This indicates that despite a sophisticated interior, it’s still cheap enough to be expendable in combat.

In August 2023, another Russian volunteer group unveiled the Ovod (Gadfly) first-person-view drone. According to its developers, the drone’s onboard AI system allows for attacking static and dynamic targets, with mission accuracy of up to 90 percent. There is a claim that Ovod was tested in combat in Ukraine. Also in August 2023, a volunteer effort called “Innovators for the Front” exhibited “Aqua-22” AI-enabled quadcopter for autonomous operations. The developers claimed that this drone can autonomously recognize adversary equipment, manpower, and other objects. While this also appears to be a “homegrown” effort, the developers also admitted that this drone was a joint development with the military-affiliated research and development institution.

In fact, some Ukrainian volunteers and military experts are concerned by several instances of Russia’s limited AI-enabled first-person-view drones that are already appearing at the front in early 2024. Today, Russia actively tests its commercial systems in live military operations, providing insights into their practical efficacy. While this allows for a review of advanced technology in combat, this approach is antithetical to American democratic values. In the United States, testing an AI-enabled system in combat directly violates the Department of Defense ethical AI principles and long-established international norms. Instead, the Department of Defense is playing the long game by conscientiously (though rather unwillingly) dedicating resources to a comprehensive expansion of its testing infrastructure, aimed at fostering a robust AI assurance framework and adherence to U.S. values and regulations, like Department of Defense Directive 3000.09.

Plausibility and Analysis: How Much Can Be Done on the Fly?

How plausible are Russian claims, and how likely are these volunteer organizations to field an actual AI-enabled military drone? Many Russia-based commentators and drone enthusiasts claim AI is necessary in this war, given the need for all kinds of drones to operate more autonomously to avoid multilayered countermeasures like electronic warfare that permeate the Ukrainian battlespace.

The public discussion on the Russian side points to the possibility of ground-based commands to kamikaze-type drones with onboard AI systems, along with AI-enabled drone swarms converging on identified adversary personnel, weapons, and systems. Given that many major militaries around the world are working on such developments, it’s not far-fetched to conclude that organizations tasked with developing combat first-person-view drones would also consider how such advanced technology may aid their efforts. Such Russian volunteer efforts are also competing with Ukrainian initiatives working on AI-enabled first-person-view drones.

In the United States, however, the focus has been on developing alternatives to positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, testing and hardening systems for adversarial actions, and implementing mission autonomy by enabling inference on the platforms themselves rather than relying on communications. But America will likely face some of the same needs Russia does today. The likely loss of communications, global positioning systems, and other connectivity is as much a driver of autonomous systems development as is the desire to speed up military decision-making.

Russian volunteer claims about AI-enabled drones may be grounded in related international developments. The same month when Russian volunteers made their August 2023 announcements, a Switzerland-based effort unveiled AI technology for its racing “Swift” drone to beat human racers. According to the developers, this drone reacted in real time to the data collected by its onboard camera, while an artificial neural network used data from the camera to localize this drone in space and detect the obstacles and pathways along the racetrack. This data was fed to a control unit based on a deep neural network that chose the best pathway to finish the racing circuit. The drone was also trained in a simulated environment where it taught itself to fly by trial and error, using machine learning called reinforcement learning. The developers made the drone fly autonomously via precise positions provided by an external position-tracking system while it recorded data from its camera — this process allowed it to autocorrect errors in interpreting data from the onboard sensors. While this achievement marked a milestone in drone development, some international commentators cautioned that human drone pilots can recover rapidly from mistakes and collisions, while Swift “fumbled significantly when faced with unexpected physical changes, like abrupt weather shifts.”

AI software is a key component in drones, with many commercial companies selling computer vision systems, object and terrain recognition, and related technologies. Moscow-based hive.aero develops “autonomous drone solutions for regular monitoring,” advertising a neural network to analyze input data such as photo, video, symbols, text, sound, thermal images, chemical reagents, and spatial indicators, and noting that “the possibilities of a neural network for defining typical cases are practically endless.” Some companies even advertise inexpensive AI software downloads for less than $50 for small and medium-sized commercial drones.

Public sources highlight the use of AI software for drones and uncrewed aerial vehicles to analyze data from onboard cameras and process this information to identify, extract, and classify features. Such AI software may be installed on embedded processing devices such as general-purpose graphics processing units, central processing units, and systems-on-a-chip. However, onboard AI processing systems can consume a large amount of resources and may pose challenges for drones with limitations in size, weight, and power consumption.

This last point is important given that while Russia’s Shturm first-person-view drone is relatively large, the Ovod remains small in size. Claims about onboard AI computing needing a lot of power have to be taken into account when scrutinizing the Russian announcements above. Shrinking the required computational and power requirements with existing drones is an issue the United States is actively trying to solve as well. But those efforts are being tested in carefully designed experiments rather than on the battlefield and do not include any kinetic capability whatsoever.

Another contrast is that Russia repeatedly demonstrates a focus on minimizing drone operator involvement in combat, and possibly taking the first-person-view drone’s operator out of the equation altogether with the help of AI is key, given that each side in this war now hunts drone operators as priority targets. Of course, it’s also important to consider that not all of the Russian AI-enabled plans for first-person-view drones described here will eventually end up on the battlefield in their present form, with current testing and evaluation probably leading to changes or even complete drone redesign. At the same time, there are recent rumors of “AI-enabled” Russian first-person-view drones on the Ukrainian battlefield, although it is hard at this point to prove such claims. Still, with readily available key software and components that can be procured by a number of legal or illegal schemes, Russia’s private and volunteer-sector plans for AI-enabled drones may not be that far-fetched.

Although U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 does not explicitly prohibit AI-enabled weapons systems without a human in the loop, there has not been any evidence that America is pursuing such capabilities. Project Maven uses commercial AI and drone technologies but only for inference, with the latter taking place on the ground rather than on the platform. The Department of Defense Chief Digital and AI Office’s Smart Sensor abolishes the need for ground processing, effectively performing the functions that link the collection and the dissemination of information to intelligence consumers via the Reaper drone platform, in preparation for degraded communications with ground control stations and operators. Still, the vision is simply to augment humans in their mundane tasks and shift them to supervisory duties requiring less command and control, rather than replace them altogether.

American Caution

The United States has largely embraced the long-term view of AI’s role in national security and is tackling its processes first, starting with acquisitions. The conventional acquisition system, marked by slow, linear processes and preoccupied with fairness and safety above all, doesn’t align with the dynamic demands for AI-enabled systems. The Chief Digital and AI Office has continued its Tradewinds acquisition program, primarily aimed at empowering small businesses against traditional defense companies.

Additional process focus has been on addressing data integration challenges rather than delivering battlefield-ready capability. While combined joint all domain command and control remains the Chief Digital and AI Office’s priority, its focus is still on digitizing battle management rather than adopting commercial drone technologies in military operations. Integrating AI with legacy technologies and ensuring interoperability among and between different service branches and mission sets, all while ensuring basic functionality and survivability of new technology remain a tremendous challenge, requiring frequent iteration and experimentation.

Still, the biggest limitation to the Department of Defense’s capacity to arm the warfighter with AI-enabled systems remains its inability to assure these systems to the satisfaction of its many stakeholders. Independent government testing of contractor technology has proven necessary on many occasions, but today, lack of infrastructure, methodologies, resources, and personnel threatens this important function. Unlike Russia’s apparently swift and ruthless approach to acquiring and fielding commercial drones, the United States has opted for a deliberate and careful strategy that might prove insufficient in times of conflict. When it comes to traditional defense technology, the United States has long had a set of standards and regulatory bodies in place to ensure that the military fields systems that are an asset and not a liability to the warfighter. However, lack of equivalents for rigorous test, evaluation, and assurance for AI-enabled systems might force a choice between fielding unassured systems or not fielding AI-enabled systems at all.

In the United States, an autonomous or semiautonomous weapon system, similar to the ones being fielded in Russia today, has to go through predevelopment and pre-fielding reviews, per Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 on the guidance for autonomous and semiautonomous armed platforms. Those acquiring this system would have to demonstrate to a review board that they have minimized the probability and consequences of failures that could lead to an unintended engagement. That would require rigorous, resource-intensive, and repeated test and evaluation of technology, to include operational and live-fire testing.

America’s steadfast commitment to safety and security assumes that the United States has the three to five years to build said infrastructure and test and redesign AI-enabled systems. Should the need for these systems arise sooner, which seems increasingly likely, the strategy will need to be adjusted. Balancing assurance considerations and urgency to deploy AI-enabled systems to the warfighter poses a challenge. An even bigger challenge is optimizing readiness in all domains while balancing investments across traditional and emerging technologies. Still, as we start seeing the wolves circle, the only solution to upholding both competitiveness in AI and democratic values is unwavering advocacy, leadership, sponsorship, and investment in all aspects of AI assurance, as highlighted in a recent report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine is pushing innovation on both sides to the limit, forcing the adversaries to adapt and adopt the latest in military and civilian technologies for combat. While Ukraine had the initial lead in such innovation in 2022, by late 2023 to early 2024 the Russian military and the volunteer efforts have caught up, adopting many similar technologies and concepts while building on these developments to fit their needs. The volunteer communities in Russia are especially tuned into the latest technical developments, given that many volunteers come from academia and the high-tech sector, and often contribute to drone research, development, and assembly after their full-time jobs. Drone use in the Russo-Ukrainian war is only going to grow, with first-person-view and small quadcopter drones becoming dangerous technologies in the field in ever-increasing numbers. Enabling their operations with AI is the next logical and technological step already undertaken by both belligerents.

The “homegrown” AI use is likely to accelerate and might make drone warfare even deadlier. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense is much more focused on augmenting human warfighters than on replacing them. It is taking a measured and thoughtful approach, navigating the intricacies of maneuvering a large existing bureaucracy and infrastructure. When ample time permits the refinement of such a system, strategizing for the long term could yield favorable results. However, the imperative question beckons: What measures would we be willing to undertake if our preparation falls short as the clock ticks down?

The rapid integration of unvetted commercial technologies into military operations, as observed in the approaches adopted by Russia and Ukraine, might not align with the rigorous standards upheld by the United States. In light of this, Washington should critically contemplate the alternative strategies. At the current rate, the United States may well face a set of choices, both of which can be unacceptable: taking unknown or unquantified risks on fielding AI-enabled systems, or entering a conflict with mostly traditional military systems while adversaries move forward with the first choice. The only way to avoid this set of choices is to urgently channel leadership, resources, infrastructure, and personnel toward assuring these technologies. With many in the Department of Defense leadership now keenly aware of the magnitude of the AI assurance issue for the department, Pentagon funding allocations should reflect a commitment to securing a technological edge while remaining true to America’s democratic values.

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Samuel Bendett is an adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program

Dr. Jane Pinelis is a chief AI engineer with The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Samuel Bendett · January 25, 2024

14. Why the War in Gaza Makes a Nuclear Iran More Likely

Excerpts:

Even if the United States and its allies do catch Iran trying to go nuclear, they have no good way to stop it. They could attempt to take out some facilities or expertise with military strikes. But Iran and its allies would respond with attacks on U.S. assets, and Iran now has enough knowledge and talent that strikes alone would only delay Iranian nuclearization. If Tehran were to disperse its highly enriched uranium to secret facilities for further enrichment and weapons manufacturing, Washington would have to either carpet bomb the entire country or attempt regime change, either by invasion or internal revolt. None of these options seem plausible. Iran has a population nearly twice the size of Iraq’s, a landmass nearly four times as large, and a far more powerful military. The United States would struggle mightily to flatten the country or to take and hold it. The humanitarian consequences of an extended bombing campaign or an invasion would be ghastly. And as the Iranian regime’s crackdowns against repeated protests illustrated, Tehran retains a brutally effective grip on power.

That leaves the United States with just one real option: diplomacy. It is the only thing that has curtailed Iran’s nuclear program in the past, and it is the only thing that stands a chance of doing so today. “Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy, this is what we need,” declared the UN nuclear czar, Rafael Grossi, while speaking about Iran in January. “We need to prevent the situation deteriorating to a degree where it would be impossible to retrieve it.” But to avoid such a deterioration, countries need a policy that goes beyond just deterring Tehran from further escalating its nuclear program. That policy would, even in the best case, still leave Iran in a worryingly advanced position. Instead of merely focusing on not crossing the precipice, policymakers should aim to move away from it.

Restarting talks will not be popular or easy in key Western capitals, where Iran is understandably more reviled than it has been in decades. It may also be hard to sell in Tehran, where policymakers are increasingly adversarial. But an atomic Iran could make an already volatile region a whole lot more explosive, and even if the odds are long, the West should still push Tehran to use its nuclear program as leverage at the negotiating table—rather than as a deterrent on the battlefield. As a 1970s antinuclear slogan put it: Better active today than radioactive tomorrow.

Why the War in Gaza Makes a Nuclear Iran More Likely

The Conflict Has Empowered Tehran—but Also Fueled Its Sense of Vulnerability

By Ali Vaez

January 25, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Ali Vaez · January 25, 2024

Since the start of the war in the Gaza Strip, Iran’s government has sounded bullish, even triumphalist notes. “The Zionist regime’s defeat in this event is not just the defeat of the Zionist regime,” contended Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a speech last month, referencing Israeli setbacks on the battlefield. “It is also the defeat of the U.S.” At the beginning of January, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi boasted that his country’s enemies “can see Iran’s power, and the whole world knows its strength and capabilities.” And a few days later, an Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson declared that the so-called axis of resistance—the network of partners and proxies Iran backs across the region—is more “coherent, resilient and united than ever.”

It is easy to see why Tehran seems pleased. The war has bogged down its chief regional foe, Israel, in a protracted and perhaps unwinnable conflict. And it has forced Iran’s main global adversary, the United States, to focus on preventing that conflict from escalating, even as it fights off threats from Iran’s allied militias.

Yet for Tehran, the ongoing conflict may not end in anything like the clear-cut victory it has already claimed. Iran wants to be the Middle East’s dominant power, but it has not been willing to capitalize on the war in Gaza by having the axis of resistance open major new fronts against Israel or the United States. Hezbollah—Tehran’s most capable ally—has lobbed missiles at Israel, but it has not sparked an all-out war on the country’s northern border. The Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have repeatedly menaced international shipping and targeted Israel with their missiles and drones, but these attacks have done little to pull Israel out of Gaza. The overall message is clear: Iran can cause chaos, but it is not strong enough to go on a real offensive. It still needs its regional allies primarily to defend its own territory. Tehran may therefore conclude that this conflict has made it look weaker, rather than stronger. It may, accordingly, feel more vulnerable.

If that is the case, Tehran could make a final dash for the ultimate deterrent: nuclear weapons. Doing so would have risks, but it might provide Iran with the kind of immunity North Korea and Russia have enjoyed as they confront the West. A nuclear-armed Iran could also be more brazen in unleashing its partners across the Middle East, calculating that the backlash would be limited as its enemies work to avoid Armageddon.

Should Tehran decide to go nuclear, it will be difficult to stop it. The government’s nuclear program is already quite advanced, and it is now subject to limited international oversight. The United States could order a military strike, but even if successful, that strike would, at best, delay Iran’s drive toward weaponization. Yet the consequences of a nuclear Iran are so perilous that it is still worth preventing, which means trying to restart diplomacy.

MIXED BAG

Hamas’s October 7 attack against Israel, in which it unconscionably murdered hundreds of civilians, broke the country’s aura of military invincibility. It marked the first time in decades that outside fighters successfully invaded Israeli territory, and it left many of the country’s residents feeling vulnerable and insecure. It showed that Israel’s intelligence apparatus, long reviled and feared by the country’s adversaries, was not nearly as omnipotent as it seemed.

For Iran, this terrible attack was, almost by definition, something of a victory. Tehran has long been the subject of Israeli covert operations, including the assassination of top Iranian nuclear scientists and military commanders, and Israel has sabotaged Iran’s nuclear and military facilities. Iran thus got to see its principal antagonist immeasurably suffer. When Israel launched its campaign in Gaza, Tehran was able to portray itself as the flag bearer for the newly revived Palestinian cause, bolstering Iran’s reputation across the Middle East. Israel’s reputation, by contrast, tanked, as the war turned Gaza into a humanitarian catastrophe. The image of Israel’s Western patrons has also suffered. To people all over the world, Western criticisms of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine now seem to reflect a hypocritical double standard.

The war has helped Iran in other ways, too. The conflict has, at a minimum, delayed the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which could have reisolated Iran following the Chinese-brokered Iranian-Saudi détente last March. The axis of resistance has used the conflict to burnish its capabilities and wide reach. In addition to attacks by Hezbollah and the Houthis, Iraqi and Syrian paramilitary groups have launched well over 150 attacks against U.S. military and diplomatic facilities in Iraq and Syria.

Deterrence is partly a mind game.

Yet beneath this bullish exterior, Tehran has shown signs of strategic weakness. According to The New York Times, U.S. intelligence assessments indicate Iran was surprised by Hamas’s attack, which it viewed as premature. And Iran has done little to assist its supposed ally, even though Hamas dealt Israel its greatest defeat in half a century. The Times also reported that Khamenei ordered his military chiefs to practice “strategic patience” in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. October 7 was, in theory, Iran’s time to shine—a moment when it had a chance to go all out and alter the political order in the Middle East, flexing its hard power via proxies. Instead, its actions have been impetuous and its rewards far from assured.

To some extent, the reluctance to enter the fray in full force makes sense. Under Iran’s strategy, the axis of resistance is primarily aimed at deterring Israel and the United States from attacking Iran itself, something that has not yet happened. But although the Iranian homeland has not been struck by either country (it has been attacked by the Islamic State, or ISIS, and, in a retaliatory operation, by Pakistan), Iranian commanders and their allies have been hit by American and Israeli strikes. According to a Reuters report, for example, Israel killed one of Iran’s most senior commanders in Syria. Four intelligence officers from the Revolutionary Guards were killed in Damascus a few weeks later. Israel also killed a close Hamas contact based in Beirut and a senior Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon. The United States, meanwhile, targeted a Shiite militia leader in Baghdad and has been bombing the Houthis in Yemen in response to their attacks in the Red Sea. And even if Israel and the United States had conducted no strikes, Iran’s restraint in response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza—relative, at least, to Tehran’s full capacity—would be noteworthy.

Deterrence is partly a mind game in which adversaries must fear not just a state’s capabilities but also a state’s willingness to use them. Iran’s reluctance to sacrifice members of its network for the sake of saving Hamas is, therefore, a sign the country is not the mastermind or behemoth destabilizing the region. Instead, it is a reticent actor on its back foot.

PLAYING WITH FIRE

After U.S. President Joe Biden took office in 2021, Iran and the United States began holding indirect negotiations in hopes of reducing regional tensions, lightening U.S. sanctions, and, critically, constraining Iran’s nuclear program. The talks did not succeed in restoring the 2015 nuclear deal, but by the summer of 2023, they appeared to have reached a stopgap, de-escalatory understanding. Iranian proxies halted attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, and Iran slowed its high-level enrichment for the first time since 2021. In exchange, the United States released some frozen Iranian funds. The two sides exchanged some prisoners in September 2023. Building on that progress, Iran and the United States were supposed to return to the negotiating table on October 18 in Oman, where they would start more expansive talks. But that small window of opportunity was shut down the minute Hamas militants paraglided into Israeli territory. With the U.S. entering a presidential election year and the Iranian regime now complicit in two wars against U.S. allies—Israel and Ukraine—there is no real prospect for serious diplomatic engagement.

This breakdown comes as Iran inches ever closer to the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Today, it would take about a month for the country to produce enough enriched nuclear material for an arsenal of four to five nuclear warheads. It could manufacture a deliverable bomb perhaps just a few months later. The exact timing is difficult to predict, in part because the United Nations nuclear watchdog cannot fully monitor Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran no longer complies with the now defunct nuclear deal’s transparency measures, which allowed inspectors to monitor centrifuge production plants and undeclared nuclear facilities. As a result, Tehran can now potentially divert its production of highly enriched uranium to clandestine facilities.

Tehran still has good reasons not to build a nuclear weapon or even to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels and bar UN inspectors entirely. Merely crossing these thresholds, for instance, could prompt a preventive strike by Israel or the United States. If Iran manages to construct a weapon undetected, it risks triggering a regional nuclear arms race with its Gulf competitors, such as Saudi Arabia. And if Iran goes nuclear, it would likely anger China, far and away Iran’s most critical oil customer and an invaluable diplomatic partner.

To stop a nuclear Iran, the United States has just one real option: diplomacy.

Still, Tehran might decide that the benefits of going nuclear outweigh the risks. Iran has already paid the economic price for nuclear weapons after suffering from years of sanctions. It no longer believes that the West would be willing and able to offer effective and sustainable sanctions relief, even if it were to roll back its nuclear program. And unfortunately, the aftermath of October 7 makes nuclearization more likely. Tehran’s cautious response has exposed its vulnerability, weakening the credibility of its regional deterrence. Iranian leaders may see acquiring nuclear weapons as a way to gain newfound assurance that it won’t be attacked by Israel or the United States—freeing the axis of resistance to wreak far more havoc. Plus, Iranian officials who want the country to get a nuclear weapon (Tehran itself is likely divided on whether to go nuclear) could view this as a moment of great opportunity. Iran’s rivals, after all, are distracted by the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, competition with China, and elections.

Even if the United States and its allies do catch Iran trying to go nuclear, they have no good way to stop it. They could attempt to take out some facilities or expertise with military strikes. But Iran and its allies would respond with attacks on U.S. assets, and Iran now has enough knowledge and talent that strikes alone would only delay Iranian nuclearization. If Tehran were to disperse its highly enriched uranium to secret facilities for further enrichment and weapons manufacturing, Washington would have to either carpet bomb the entire country or attempt regime change, either by invasion or internal revolt. None of these options seem plausible. Iran has a population nearly twice the size of Iraq’s, a landmass nearly four times as large, and a far more powerful military. The United States would struggle mightily to flatten the country or to take and hold it. The humanitarian consequences of an extended bombing campaign or an invasion would be ghastly. And as the Iranian regime’s crackdowns against repeated protests illustrated, Tehran retains a brutally effective grip on power.

That leaves the United States with just one real option: diplomacy. It is the only thing that has curtailed Iran’s nuclear program in the past, and it is the only thing that stands a chance of doing so today. “Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy, this is what we need,” declared the UN nuclear czar, Rafael Grossi, while speaking about Iran in January. “We need to prevent the situation deteriorating to a degree where it would be impossible to retrieve it.” But to avoid such a deterioration, countries need a policy that goes beyond just deterring Tehran from further escalating its nuclear program. That policy would, even in the best case, still leave Iran in a worryingly advanced position. Instead of merely focusing on not crossing the precipice, policymakers should aim to move away from it.

Restarting talks will not be popular or easy in key Western capitals, where Iran is understandably more reviled than it has been in decades. It may also be hard to sell in Tehran, where policymakers are increasingly adversarial. But an atomic Iran could make an already volatile region a whole lot more explosive, and even if the odds are long, the West should still push Tehran to use its nuclear program as leverage at the negotiating table—rather than as a deterrent on the battlefield. As a 1970s antinuclear slogan put it: Better active today than radioactive tomorrow.

• ALI VAEZ is Director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group.

Foreign Affairs · by Ali Vaez · January 25, 2024

15. The Myths That Warp How America Sees Russia—and Vice Versa

Excerpts:

Neither the United States nor Russia can easily dispel the myths that the other holds. Both countries nourish their myths for a reason. The Russian regime wants the United States—and everyone else—to think that it has no domestic politics and that Putinism and Russia are one. If the United States frames the war in Ukraine principally as a struggle for territorial integrity rather than as a good-versus-evil battle against a lone tyrant, Americans may lose interest.

And even if leaders wanted to, it would be hard to dislodge the myths. The more actively Washington deployed public diplomacy to try to change Russian perceptions of the United States, the more Russians would perceive the United States to be manipulating their country. And to transform its image within the United States, the Russian government would have to divest itself of autocracy and pull back militarily from Europe—which has never been a winning recipe for ruling Russia.

These myths will long be with us. But Washington must recognize them as such. If the United States could, in its own internal policy debates, challenge the myth of Russia’s unalloyed autocracy and uncover the ways in which domestic politics and public opinion constrain and construct Russian foreign policy, it might discover tools that could disrupt Russia’s war effort. It would also be more ready for a post-Putin political transition. Politically, Russia tends to change suddenly; its politics do not remain forever frozen.

As they try to predict Russian behavior, U.S. leaders would also benefit from a greater awareness of the United States’ mythical status in the Kremlin, which is wildly at odds with Washington’s self-image. Russians believe that the timeless essence of the United States is the will to power: this clarifies the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine, and it also explains Russia’s refusal to wind down its devastating war in Ukraine. Captivating as they are, myths mislead by obscuring the awesome complexity and open-endedness of reality. In all they reveal about human nature, myths admit endless interpretation. But at their heart, they are also static—and they get in the way of sound strategy and agile diplomacy.

The Myths That Warp How America Sees Russia—and Vice Versa

How Mutual Misunderstanding Breeds Tension and Conflict

By Michael Kimmage and Jeremy Shapiro

January 25, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Collisions: The War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability · January 25, 2024

“Mythology is not a lie,” wrote Joseph Campbell, the great scholar of myth and archetype. “It is metaphorical.” Myths and metaphors provide the narratives that inspire patriotic devotion, motivate soldiers to fight, and help explain the outside world. And the myths that nations cherish about themselves often reinforce the complementary myths that they adopt about others.

Russia and the United States harbor especially powerful myths about each other. The myth that Russia believes about the United States is that it has vassals rather than allies—that it is a hegemonic power that hides ruthless ambition and self-interest behind appeals to liberal principles and legal order. Americans see Russia, meanwhile, as a country without domestic politics—the ultimate autocratic power whose malicious, unaccountable leader runs roughshod over what citizens want. As long ago as 1855, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln described Russia as a place “where despotism can be taken pure and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.”

After more than a century of tension and conflict, the U.S.–Russian relationship is now structured around these myths. Myths weigh down that relationship, obscuring nuance and clear perception. And they have shaped, and will continue to shape, each country’s part in the war in Ukraine. The myth that many Russians hold of the United States is continually driving the Kremlin toward harmful belligerence.

The myth that Americans hold of Russia is also a trap, leading policymakers to misread the Kremlin and miss opportunities to weaken the regime or to find compromises. To minimize dangerous misinterpretations, U.S. leaders need to work harder to rise above these myth and archetypes. A better understanding of America’s own myths—and of Russia’s—would give U.S. policymakers more flexibility, help to foster strategic empathy, and anticipate future changes in the Russian body politic.

HIDDEN FIGURE

In Russia, it is conventional wisdom that the United States is power-mad. The American public, many Russians believe, is under the thumb of a megalomaniacal U.S. elite. Enthusiasm for a liberal international order gets little traction in Russia not because all Russians are realists but because their mythic view of the United States reduces the liberal international order to a vehicle of American ambition. Many Russians are convinced that U.S. leaders’ references to a supranational web of norms, laws, and partnerships are merely smokescreens for the cooptation that lies at the core of American foreign policy.

The reigning Russian myth is of Soviet vintage. According to this myth, during the Cold War, American capitalist elites wanted to run the world and found innumerable military pretexts to exert their wishes. The nightmare purportedly began after World War II, when the United States rewired the political codes in Japan and Germany, pushed those countries into alliances dominated by the United States, used them as staging grounds for U.S. military operations, and compelled them to serve as cheerleaders for the U.S. national interest. To keep up, the Soviet Union had to build a bulwark of “friendly countries” in Eastern Europe and establish its own global footprint, lest the perfidious United States advance uncontested.

For Moscow, Ukrainian hostility is simply the veiled extension of American hostility.

The United States’ global influence during this era was real. But the Soviet characterization was a caricature—and one that proved enduring. Even after the Cold War ended, according to the Russian myth, the United States kept seducing others with false rhetoric, including Russia’s neighbors—countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. In this telling, U.S. allies operate more as instruments of American power than as independent states. Where governments resisted—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Serbia, and Syria, as well as in Ukraine before the 2014 Maidan uprising—regime change has been the American preference. Hegemony by invitation, hegemony at the barrel of gun: the means may vary, but the end is never in question.

Moscow has paid a high price for holding onto this myth. It has obligated itself to contend with the American monster even at the expense of becoming more dependent on China. The EU’s Eastern Partnership program, which led to Ukraine’s Maidan uprising, was an authentic expression of idealism about the country’s European future, not a covert exercise of American hegemony. But the contention that the CIA had staged a coup in Ukraine was a lie that Russians had long been primed to believe. Even if Russia’s top leaders knew this claim was false, their public insistence on it closed off moderate responses (such as accommodating the new government in Kyiv) and made more extreme options (such as annexing Crimea) seem necessary.

In general, the myth of a United States drunk on power and unwilling to stick to agreements makes it very hard for Moscow to negotiate over regional questions. Russians cannot imagine that the leaders of countries such as Ukraine have minds of their own. For Moscow, Ukrainian hostility is simply the veiled extension of American hostility, and American hostility toward Russia demands equal Russian hostility toward the United States. If the only language the United States understands is power, then negotiation, deliberation, and the granting of concessions all entail undue risk.

MORAL HAZARD

American myths about Russia have similarly deep historical roots. The U.S. image of Russia as an unadulterated autocracy dates to the nineteenth century. It flourished during the Soviet era and briefly retreated during Boris Yeltsin’s nine-year presidency. (Americans venerated Yeltsin as more democratic than he actually was.) Putin has restored the familiar image of Russia. The U.S. approach to the Cold War often had the fervor of a messianic struggle, and Putin once again inspires Americans’ moral indignation.

America’s myth of Russia—that Russia is an evil and ambitious tyranny—has some domestic political uses. To interest inward-looking Americans in the outside world, Washington needs to conjure a single omnipotent villain. Americans want to believe that they are fighting an individual who can be killed rather than a whole country that must be subdued. In crisis after crisis, comparisons to Hitler are used to shock democracy-loving yet complacent Americans into action. Putin is simply the latest in a long line of autocratic leaders—Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and Bashar al-Assad, to name a few—who are portrayed as single-handedly obstructing democracy and progress.

Putin’s larger-than-life persona has exacerbated the view that autocratic Russia has no domestic politics and that whatever the ruler wants happens. Brian Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND Corporation, summed up this view when he wrote, “At home, Putin faces no elections, no party or state institutions that threaten his rule, no domestic political opposition. He is Russia. And Russia is his.” If Putin is Russia, the only thing that needs to be understood about Russia is Putin’s psyche. Ukraine and its allies are fighting Putin’s war against Putin’s Russia. It is no surprise, then, that the U.S. intelligence community has reportedly made evaluating Putin’s state of mind its top analytical priority.

The U.S. image of Russia as an unadulterated autocracy dates to the nineteenth century.

Studying leaders matters for understanding one’s adversaries and particularly for understanding Russia; the Russian president clearly dominates his country. But Putin still faces dilemmas at home. He sits uncomfortably atop a complicated system of competing factions and interests. He needs to ensure that the warring cronies beneath him do not kill one another or rise up against him. At the same time, he must keep the public adequately enthusiastic about him. The biggest producer and consumer of sociological research in Russia is, in fact, the Russian government, which nervously follows minute alterations in public opinion.

Washington’s various wars against evil dictators should, by now, have yielded some hard-won lessons. None of these leaders turned out to be all-powerful. Nor were they responsible for every problem in their polity, as the United States repeatedly discovered after expending enormous effort to remove them from the scene. For every such leader, including Putin, domestic politics set the parameters of their foreign policy. They rarely fought wars without their people behind them. Like democratic leaders, autocrats know how to bring their populations along when they go to war.

Public opinion and the bureaucracy are both somewhat opaque in the dictatorship that Russia has become. But public opinion limits the way Putin wages war and the settlements the Kremlin can accept. Like any belligerent, the Russian government wants to be able to claim victory: if Russia demonstrably loses the Ukraine war, public frustration and outrage may well topple the government.

Committed to the myth of a Russia without domestic politics, however, the United States struggles to interpret Russia. Its policymakers fail to see that many of the Kremlin’s actions are aimed at a domestic constituency. Take Putin’s sudden decision in September 2022 to annex territories in Ukraine, many of which Russia did not even control. Just a few months earlier, Putin had publicly mocked his intelligence chief for suggesting annexation. Putin’s turnabout baffled U.S. analysts, who interpreted it as part of a grand, if phantasmagoric, plan to subdue Ukraine. Was Putin losing his mind? In reality, these aspirational annexations may have been a rhetorical flourish for internal consumption, an opportunistic attempt to rally popular support behind a war veering out of control.

EGO DISTORTION

The burdens that these myths impose go beyond their distortions of reality. In international affairs, myths are dangerous because they entrench archetypes. The archetypal Russia is a malign autocracy, the archetypal United States a rapacious hegemon. Archetypes are the refined cousins of stereotypes, the problem of stereotypes being their negation of complexity. The country that believes its adversary can be understood in simple categories is likely to stop looking for subtle adjustments it could make to its policies and to cease trying to respond creatively to its adversary’s adjustments.

Had American leaders better understood that Russian is not a monolith but is capable of fissuring, for instance, they may have been able to better exploit the 2023 mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner paramilitary company, capitalizing on splits within the Russian elite and the military. An informed understanding of why those splits occurred could have allowed the United States and its allies to accentuate them, perhaps by highlighting Prigozhin’s attacks on the Russian air force or stressing the ways in which Putin was losing control of his security services. Instead, preoccupied with Putin’s power, Washington missed the signs of division and were bewildered by the mutiny. Washington could be missing similar vulnerabilities emerging ahead of Russia’s presidential election in March, which it presumes will merely be a ritual of autocratic self-congratulation. Putin will certainly win, but it will nonetheless be an important political moment as competing Russian political constituencies jockey for greater power and influence.

The biggest problem posed by the myths that Russia and the United States have of each other is that they are mutually reinforcing. The more fanatical Moscow becomes about contesting putative acts of American hegemony, the more Russia resembles the maniacal autocracy of American myth. And the more Washington envisions Russia as the abiding and wicked “other” in U.S. foreign policy, the more militarized its relations to Europe are bound to become—and the more likely Moscow is to construe the United States’ aims as hegemonic. So far, the war in Ukraine has epitomized this cycle of progressively hardening preconceptions. With every passing month, each country sees its myths draw closer to the objective truth.

Both America and Russia nourish their myths for a reason.

Neither the United States nor Russia can easily dispel the myths that the other holds. Both countries nourish their myths for a reason. The Russian regime wants the United States—and everyone else—to think that it has no domestic politics and that Putinism and Russia are one. If the United States frames the war in Ukraine principally as a struggle for territorial integrity rather than as a good-versus-evil battle against a lone tyrant, Americans may lose interest.

And even if leaders wanted to, it would be hard to dislodge the myths. The more actively Washington deployed public diplomacy to try to change Russian perceptions of the United States, the more Russians would perceive the United States to be manipulating their country. And to transform its image within the United States, the Russian government would have to divest itself of autocracy and pull back militarily from Europe—which has never been a winning recipe for ruling Russia.

These myths will long be with us. But Washington must recognize them as such. If the United States could, in its own internal policy debates, challenge the myth of Russia’s unalloyed autocracy and uncover the ways in which domestic politics and public opinion constrain and construct Russian foreign policy, it might discover tools that could disrupt Russia’s war effort. It would also be more ready for a post-Putin political transition. Politically, Russia tends to change suddenly; its politics do not remain forever frozen.

As they try to predict Russian behavior, U.S. leaders would also benefit from a greater awareness of the United States’ mythical status in the Kremlin, which is wildly at odds with Washington’s self-image. Russians believe that the timeless essence of the United States is the will to power: this clarifies the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine, and it also explains Russia’s refusal to wind down its devastating war in Ukraine. Captivating as they are, myths mislead by obscuring the awesome complexity and open-endedness of reality. In all they reveal about human nature, myths admit endless interpretation. But at their heart, they are also static—and they get in the way of sound strategy and agile diplomacy.

• MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Nonresident Senior Associate in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio. His forthcoming book Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability, will be published in March.
• JEREMY SHAPIRO is Research Director at the European Council on Foreign Relations. During the Obama administration, he served on the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and as Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.

Foreign Affairs · by Collisions: The War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability · January 25, 2024

16.  AWACS over the Azov: Takeaways from Ukrainian Air Defenses’ Latest Score

AWACS over the Azov: Takeaways from Ukrainian Air Defenses’ Latest Score - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Peter Mitchell · January 24, 2024

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Ukrainian air defense made its presence known again last week when they announced the double interception of a Russian A-50 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and an Il-22 airborne command post early on the morning of January 15 over the Sea of Azov. A photo said to be of the Il-22’s tailfin later surfaced on Russian Telegram channels after the initial furor had died down. This photo, along with accompanying evidence, lends credence to the Russian claim that the Il-22 was able to perform an emergency landing at the Anapa airfield northwest of Novorossiysk and east of the Kerch Strait. The A-50, on the other hand, vanished from radar over the Sea of Azov and has not been seen since. This incident, however, is only a small part in the greater battle for air superiority that continues to rage over the skies of eastern Ukraine.

How Did It Happen?

The Ukrainian government has not announced what weapons system was used to shoot down the two aircraft. Considering the A-50 was downed over 160 kilometers from the front line and the Il-22 was orbiting over the Kerch Bridge nearly 270 kilometers away, the only two weapons likely used would be the S-200 or one of the two MIM-104 Patriot batteries that Ukraine operates. The target distance exceeds the 120-kilometer range of the Italo-French SAMP/T, as well as the range of the older S-300 systems that Ukraine still operates, to say nothing of the shorter-range IRIS-T or NASAMS systems. The higher and bigger the target aircraft is, the further away a ground-based air defense missile can reach it. And few aircraft fly higher (in order to get a better radar picture on the ground) or are bigger than AWACS. The fragmentation pattern on the Il-22’s tail also matches the warheads on the S-200, S-300, and the Patriot PAC-2 family of missiles.

The S-200, despite being built in the 1960s, boasts an extremely long range due to being a two-stage missile. It is debated how many S-200 batteries the Ukrainians are currently fielding, but its range would enable them to be launched far behind the front line, possibly even from the western side of the Dnipro River. Its dated homing warhead and low maneuverability make it useless against ballistic missiles, but still effective against large, slow-moving aircraft. Patriot launchers are relatively small and nimble, especially compared to the S-300 launchers which Kyiv prefers to keep well back around their core cities as the backbone of Ukraine’s strategic air defense against Russian ballistic missile attacks targeting civilian infrastructure. This is evidenced from the lack of Kremlin publications taking credit for destroyed Ukrainian S-300s. The interception also closely matches the modus operandi of a notable July 2023 interception. Patriot missile launchers have a long-standing ability to be fired remotely at some distance from both the controlling electronic control station and the Patriot radar itself. This allows the launchers to be placed far forward of the vulnerable radar, increasing both the system’s range and its survivability. The interceptor, either Patriot or S-200, could also have been cued in by passive air defense sensors picking up the tremendous amount of electromagnetic radiation coming from the Il-22 and A-50.

It is also worthy of note that channels friendly to the Kremlin claimed that both the downed A-50 and damaged Il-22 were mistakenly attacked by friendly fire, an interesting continuation of the Russian penchant for insisting on their own incompetence rather than acknowledging Ukrainian successes.

Lessons from the Air War

So what are the most important takeaways from this episode? First, the incident indicates that the Russian air force continues to struggle mightily with the suppression of Ukrainian air defense (SEAD). The Russian air force historically did not put nearly as much effort into counter–air defense pilot training as its US and NATO counterparts and continues to pay the price against the patchwork quilt of air defense systems the Ukrainians are fielding. SEAD is a highly complex mission that requires tremendous coordination across air and land forces. Merely having antiradiation homing missiles is not sufficient, as can be seen by Ukraine’s equivalent failure to neutralize the Russian air defense network beyond the front line.

Second, the Russians likely felt that putting their valuable AWACS aircraft at risk was necessary. The A-50 over the Sea of Azov as well as its companion AWACS orbiting over Belgorod would not have dared come so close to the front unless the need for a complete radar picture running the full length of the front line was extremely pressing. It is possible that the report of the imminent arrival of Ukrainian F-16s encouraged the Russians to move their A-50s farther forward back in November and take the risk of losing one of their priceless AWACS in the hopes of getting the first shot in against Ukrainian close air support aircraft. The Russians only have eight (likely now only seven) A-50s available, making this loss as damaging as it was avoidable.

Finally, how will this impact Russian air operations going forward? The air defense operation will likely have the effect of forcing the Russians to move their AWACS orbits further east. This in turn will increase detection time and the cushion that Ukrainian aircraft have to perform their mission and escape before being detected and intercepted themselves, a crucial advantage on the modern battlefield where so often to be seen is to be dead. Recently, the Kremlin stationed another replacement A-50 east over Krasnodar, further away from the range of Ukrainian land-based air defense, an implicit admission of the loss of their AWACS over the Sea of Azov, but also of the importance that control of the air has for both sides as the war continues to rage.

Maj. Peter Mitchell is an air defense officer and strategic studies instructor at West Point.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Aktug Ates

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Peter Mitchell · January 24, 2024

17. Shifting Sands: The Future of West Africa’s Power Dynamics and the Sahel Alliance

Shifting Sands: The Future of West Africa’s Power Dynamics and the Sahel Alliance - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Raphael Parens, Marcel Plichta · January 25, 2024

If there is a way to conduct irregular warfare in the Sahel without the UN and France, Mali has yet to crack the code. Despite the assistance of Turkish Bayraktar drones and Russian mercenaries, the Malian Armed Forces are taking heavy losses from extremist groups and making limited gains against separatist rebels in the country’s north. Recent advances near Kidal are a short-term political victory rather than a military one, and Malian forces are potentially walking into a trap after securing a valley between two mountain ranges. Mali’s approach contributed to a 38% increase in violence against civilians in 2023, with the military and their Wagner Group associates causing many of these incidents.

Mali is not a unique case. Burkina Faso is also struggling after its coup and breakage with France. Instead of mercenaries, Burkina’s leadership opted for popular mobilization to combat armed groups. It has not paid dividends. An attack on an army base and an internally displaced persons camp in Djibo on December 17th killed 40 and injured 42. Like Mali, their drone campaign has resulted in some successful strikes, but also civilian casualties. Though the Kremlin seems keen on military assistance programs, even sending a small number of military personnel to Ouagadougou, it is unclear how committed Moscow can be while still directing the lion’s share of its attention to Ukraine.

Like its neighbors, Niger is closing the door on France after a long standoff. Jihadist violence in Niger is lower than Mali or Burkina Faso today, but a security vacuum created by France’s exit could provide jihadist groups with operational areas in Niamey’s backyard. Unlike Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger maintains an open but tense relationship with the United States following an October 10th State Department declaration that Niger is a coup government and therefore ineligible for some types of aid and security assistance. Yet, the presence of a U.S. drone base with MQ-9 drones, and some balanced messaging from Washington signal ongoing, albeit cautious, U.S. engagement with Niamey.

Despite, or perhaps because of their individual failures, Burkina Faso and Mali are taking the unusual step of forming a defensive alliance to fight an irregular war. The two are now courting the junta that overthrew the government of Niger too. In mid-September, the three signed an agreement forming the “Alliance of Sahel States” (known by its French acronym AES). A November 25th meeting of economic ministers from the three states recommended lofty goals for trade, population movement, and infrastructure, as well as establishing a tripartite airline. However, the pact mostly exists on paper, leaving questions about the form and function of their security cooperation.

Why Ally?

While AES’s function is difficult to nail down, it can be useful to understand the different lenses through which the juntas rationalize and internalize the organization. AES developed from a variety of motivations on the part of the coup leaders. These junta motivations can be grouped into three categories–idealistic, pragmatic, and cynical.

The most idealistic motivation is the belief that an alliance of young(er) Sahelian leaders can cooperate to counter jihadism. Junta leaders cast themselves as representatives of their populations’ interests and portray their predecessors as corrupt, incompetent, and reliant on the UN, France, and the United States. Free from the constraints imposed by the West, Sahelian leaders argue they can take the fight to the towns and villages occupied by the enemy, even if that comes at the cost of civilian casualties.

Shifting to the pragmatic motivations, AES’s inception may also reflect a blend of youth, hierarchical rigidity, and frustration with the status quo. Traoré (34-35), Goïta (40), and even Tchiani (61), the new leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, are members of a younger political-military class that have encountered a glass ceiling. The older generation of Sahelian leaders entrenched themselves in corrupt and self-serving political systems under the veneer of democratic elections. As soldiers, all three rulers witnessed firsthand their countries’ struggles against jihadism and the failure of alliances with the UN, EU, and France to bring stability. Their coups and the forthcoming alliance can thus be seen as an attempt to establish a new order and peace, spearheaded by a younger generation. Although polling and public demonstrations in Niamey, Bamako, and Ouagadougou would suggest popular support for this approach, it is unclear how such arguments play outside national capitals or without other incentives.

A more cynical explanation suggests a variety of motivations for the coup leaders, spanning counterterrorism, regional politics, and relations with Russia. This approach suggests that the coups and alliance-making are the work of a collection of military officers unhappy with their positions and the inflexibility of their states’ political-military structures. In this scenario, coup leaders revolted against their government because they felt both underpaid, underemployed, and under fire. The latter reflects a Western approach to counterterrorism that eschews violence against civilians, particularly one adopted by Operation Barkhane, UN peacekeeping operation MINUSMA, and the EU’s Takuba taskforce. Instead, as seen in more recent strategies in Mali and Burkina Faso, coup leaders prefer to explicitly target civilian populations, particularly Fulani ethnic communities, which they believe to be actively backing jihadist forces. This approach to counterterrorism is brutal and destructive, while likely continuing the cycle of jihadist recruitment, especially in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border region.

This approach can also be applied to regional power politics, where the coups are manifestations of cyclical power dynamics between West Africa’s coastal and landlocked states. Here, landlocked states are attempting to reassert themselves against their wealthier coastal neighbors. The coup leaders are competing with wealthier neighbors, but also neighbors who indirectly benefit from the counterterrorism efforts of the landlocked states.

Lastly, this cynical perspective assumes that alliance members maintain a genuine interest in aligning with Russia for security and political purposes. Thus the coup governments are aligned with Russia’s revanchist world order, where the strong dictate the political order against a Western-based system. As echoed by Russia, junta leaders argue that their approach is motivated by a desire for a multipolar world order and see Russia as a more reliable and formidable counterterrorism partner. While the rhetoric from the coup leaders sometimes supports this idea, it does not hold up to scrutiny. The coup leaders have limited options and take what they can get. Burkina Faso and especially Niger were more cautious about alienating the international community and less eager to rely on Russia than Mali.

Can the Alliance Work?

There are three likely outcomes for the AES. The first is that it succeeds in both stabilizing the junta governments and rolling back terrorist groups. Alternatively, the AES could stabilize the regimes but fail to contain extremist groups, leading to mutually supporting failed states. The final possible outcome could be the collapse of the alliance, characterized by stagnation beyond the initial agreement or the complete dissolution of the pact.

Successful cooperation among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is the least likely possibility. Nonetheless, it has a mixed set of consequences. Degrading extremist groups and especially their ability to cross borders with impunity pays dividends for regional counterterrorism efforts and would forestall terrorist expansion into coastal West Africa’s democracies. However, the practical hurdles would be enormous: they would largely be operating without Western partners, and Russia’s ability to supply more arms and contractors is an open question as the conflict in Ukraine continues.

An awkward middle case is successful cooperation among the AES members, but a failure to degrade or defeat terrorist groups. In this scenario, the regimes become increasingly isolated in their capitals but maintain their hold on power. Although any AES counterterrorism operation is likely to fail due to lack of resources, external partners, and civilian targeting strategies, the juntas remaining in power is also unlikely in the long term. Popular disapproval as terrorist groups expand, stress on the security services, and high civilian casualties will likely lead to future coups and rebellions. French and UN withdrawal from Mali already emboldened rebel groups to take advantage of the chaos, and Burkinabe authorities claimed that they foiled a coup attempt in September.

The most likely scenario is that the alliance fails to get off the ground. Lacking a single, strong backer without significant internal conflict, it’s unlikely that alliance partners will be able to provide any substantive support for each other. If anything, a failure to work together may push the coup governments into direct competition. Alternatively, the pact could continue as it exists today–on paper only. The consequences would be severe. Terrorist groups will continue to spread across the Sahel and into West Africa and the juntas will fail to secure meaningful support from any country other than Russia. The choice for the United States and European countries is whether to forge some kind of practical relationship with them before things get worse or hope that coastal West Africa’s democracies can weather the storm with modest western financial and security backing.

What’s Next?

An alliance strengthens the parochial interests of the coup leaders. For all the claims that the Sahelian juntas are in power to defeat terrorism, some of the plotters were motivated as much by poor conditions of the security services and the threat of demotion as they were by a desire to “take the gloves off.” None show any interest in a democratic transition that removes them from power–Mali’s Colonel Goita even launched a second coup to avoid it. In this war, civilian casualties may not be an unfortunate consequence, but an intentional effort to target regions and ethnic groups that the elite consider rebellious or in support of jihadist groups.

However the alliance system plays out among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, initiating such a system in the first place could have wide-ranging consequences. An alliance can change state leverage and interstate power dynamics. Further, they can play into larger power dynamics, in this case between the United States and Russia. Last, inter or intra-alliance tensions can be exacerbated by outside spoilers.

By aligning together, AES changes the relationship between the governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the now-defunct G5 Sahel. By removing themselves from the G5 Sahel force and continued saber rattling with other ECOWAS members, AES is changing regional and interstate power dynamics. After the coup in Niger, accusations launched between the Nigerien junta and ousted President Bazoum nearly led to conflict between ECOWAS and Niger. With the creation of AES, opposing regional alignments could sleepwalk their way to war.

How could this happen? Jihadist groups may provide a key spoiler, pushing these coalitions to war. West Africa’s open borders are particularly vulnerable to cross-border terrorist activity, with jihadist groups often using neighboring states as safe havens before or after attacks. In the past, ECOWAS states have targeted jihadist groups across these porous borders. However, in a pressure-cooker environment made all the worse by social media coverage of conflict, cross-border targeting could intensify competition or escalate states to conflict under the right circumstances. At worst, cross border attacks could even be seen as an invasion.

For Washington, the most important question is whether to shift its approach towards coup governments and if so, how far. The Niger coup showed that simply leaving a country with a significant U.S. military presence is not a straightforward proposition. The United States needn’t support Mali or Burkina Faso directly, but assistance to Niger against transnational groups could still pay some security dividends to its neighbors at the cost of further entrenching Niger’s military rule in the short term. If policymakers decide to bite the bullet and believe that working with coup regimes is the lesser of two evils, it is likely to drive a wedge between the United States and France rather than put an end to the AES members’ relationship with Russia. For the Sahel’s military regimes, it would be the best of both worlds: more legitimacy and resources from the United States to stay in power, and more tolerance for civilian casualties and the lack of a democratic transition.

Washington has no good options in dealing with these coup governments but ignoring the issue will not make it go away. The Sahel’s cycle of violence will likely continue in Mali and Burkina Faso and expand further into Niger and West African littoral states like Benin. Washington and its allies, particularly Germany, should continue diplomatic and military engagements with Niamey. They must also find a way to overcome diplomatic disputes between Niger and its littoral neighbors, while also encouraging the military regime to set firm dates for a democratic transition. Niger is a critical piece in the West African security puzzle and leaving it to Russia and a tenuous partnership with Mali and Burkina Faso will only exacerbate growing terror trends in West Africa.

Raphael Parens (@MoreSecurityInt) is a Eurasia Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He studies African conflict, Russian military policy, and paramilitary groups. He received his M.A. in international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and he is currently based in London.

Marcel Plichta (@plichta_marcel) is a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews and a former analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. He has previously written on sub-Saharan African security issues and U.S.-Africa policy for Defense One and Foreign Policy.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

A Malian special forces soldier aims his AK-47 during combat reload drills in Loumbila, Burkina Faso on Feb. 14, 2019. This drill encompasses moving, shooting and reloading to encourage effective fighting techniques. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Alcantar via U.S. Army)

18. Red Sea Conflict Prompts India’s Navy to Flex Its Muscles

Red Sea Conflict Prompts India’s Navy to Flex Its Muscles

Indian officials say its navy, beefed up to better deal with China concerns, is closely monitoring and responding to ships in distress

https://www.wsj.com/world/india/red-sea-conflict-prompts-indias-navy-to-flex-its-muscles-5b096317?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Rajesh Roy

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Updated Jan. 25, 2024 12:02 am ET

NEW DELHI—India is deploying a growing number of warships to counter rebel attacks on commercial ships plying around the Middle East, while steering clear of joining the official U.S.-led force in the Red Sea, as it looks to protect its ties with Iran.

Houthi rebels in Yemen have attacked ships passing to and from Egypt’s Suez Canal, a heavily used trade route vital to India’s crude oil imports. The Houthis, a militia backed by Iran, said they are targeting ships in retaliation over Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas. The attacks have snarled global shipping and widened the Middle East conflict. In recent days, after U.S. and U.K. strikes on Houthi weaponry, the rebels have turned their attention to U.S. ships.

India has sent 10 warships to the area stretching from the north and central Arabian Sea to the Gulf of Aden, up from the two that are usually stationed in the region, according to serving and former security officials. 

The ships are monitoring India-flagged ships, but have also been the first responders in a number of recent incidents. Last week, India’s guided-missile destroyer INS Visakhapatnam responded to a distress call from U.S.-owned bulk carrier Genco Picardy, which came under a drone attack in the Gulf of Aden.

India has sent 10 warships to the Red Sea area, which is the shipping route for much of the country’s crude-oil imports. PHOTO: RAJANISH KAKADE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Yet India isn’t participating in the U.S.-led coalition to ensure safe passage to vessels in the Red Sea, largely because of its policy of participating only in United Nations missions, said Indian officials and experts. U.S. allegations that Iran is backing the Houthi attacks also complicate India’s response, given New Delhi’s friendly ties with Tehran.

Last week, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar raised concerns over attacks on commercial ships in Tehran on a visit that was days after the U.S. and the U.K. launched airstrikes on Houthi targets.

“Joining a U.S.-led coalition would mean looking at the conflict through the prism of the U.S….where the U.S. has taken a position that this is Iranian instigation,” said Harsh Pant, vice president for foreign policy at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based international relations think tank. India has long sought to telegraph its independence from the influence of major powers in its foreign policy dealings.

Indian navy operations nevertheless reflect growing cooperation with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China, and rely in part on U.S. military equipment, officials said. A $3 billion military procurement deal with the U.S. for 31 Predator drones, half of which are intended for the navy, will further boost India’s capabilities. A delivery date hasn’t been set yet.

“There is already adequate coordination happening with the U.S. and other like-minded nations on the naval front. All the channels of communications are open,” said Biswajit Dasgupta, a former vice admiral and commander-in-chief of India’s Eastern Naval Command.

The U.S.-owned bulk carrier Genco Picardy came under attack in the Gulf of Aden last week. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

India closely monitors Chinese vessels in the Indian Ocean region, and its officials say periodic efforts by China to dock research vessels in nearby countries are a pretext for maritime surveillance. The Indian navy is currently watching a Chinese research vessel on its way to the Maldives at a time when the archipelago nation’s new President Mohamed Muizzu is looking to deepen ties with Beijing, and end a longstanding but small Indian troop presence.

In recent days, India diverted its two Predator drones—a basic version of the tool on lease from the U.S.—from routine operations to provide precision footage over troubled ships. In one such incident this month, the drone surveillance was part of an operation by Indian marine commandos to thwart a hijack attempt aboard Liberian-flagged bulk carrier MV Lila Norfolk in the Arabian Sea, the Indian navy said.

In a little over a decade, the navy has added more than a dozen warships armed with missiles and torpedoes that are all produced domestically. The additions bring the total number of warships in India’s fleet to 140, and the navy aims to add about half that number to its fleet in the next few years, with almost all of them made in India. 

How Cargo Ships Try to Defend Against Houthi Attacks in Red Sea

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The navy began ramping up operations in around 2017, putting specialized equipment and personnel on warships on routine patrol to equip them to quickly respond to a range of distress calls, from hijacking to natural disasters, according to Indian officials. Since 2018, the Indian navy has also been operating a maritime security-information-sharing hub that receives real-time intelligence on vessel movements via radar stations scattered across Indian Ocean nations.

This year, India became a full member of the multilateral Combined Maritime Forces initiative, based in Bahrain with representatives from a dozen countries including the U.S., Australia, Japan, U.K., Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The new operation to secure the Red Sea is taking place under that initiative.

“Our navy vessels, navy ships are there, patrolling the area and they are trying to do their best to secure the Indian shipping lines and giving support to others,” Randhir Jaiswal, India’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, said last week. “So that is where we are, we are looking at the unfolding situation. We aren’t part of any multilateral arrangement as of now.”

At least one of the attacks has come surprisingly close to India. In late December, Japanese-owned tanker MV Chem Pluto, was headed from Saudi Arabia to India when it was struck about 200 nautical miles off the Indian coast. The U.S. military said the drone was fired from Iran.

Jaishankar’s recent visit to Tehran also visit also coincided with Iran’s strikes in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan, at what it said were anti-Iran groups, prompting a tit-for-tat response from Pakistan.

In a joint statement with the Iranian foreign minister, Jaishankar said the international community was concerned about the increased risks to shipping, which also threaten India’s economic interests.

“This fraught situation isn’t to the benefit of any party and this must be clearly recognized,” said Jaishankar.Write to Rajesh Roy at rajesh.roy@wsj.com

19. Desperate Chinese Investors Are Pouring Into the U.S., Japan

Desperate Chinese Investors Are Pouring Into the U.S., Japan

Alarmed Chinese fund managers briefly halted trading in certain ETFs as prices skyrocketed

https://www.wsj.com/tech/defense-startups-risk-becoming-failed-experiment-without-more-pentagon-dollars-dc9e663a?mod=hp_lead_pos10

By Rebecca Feng

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Jan. 25, 2024 5:16 am ET

The frenzied buying of Japanese and U.S. ETFs is a sign of how tough it will be for Chinese authorities to lift investor sentiment. PHOTO: YING TANG/ZUMA PRESS

Chinese individual investors want to shift their money out of the country—and they are willing to pay a big premium to do so.

The best example of their desperation: Some this week have been buying funds that offer exposure to Japanese stocks at a 20% premium to what those stocks are worth.

An exchange-traded fund launched by China Asset Management Co. traded at a 14% to 20% premium to its indicative net asset value over the first three days of the week. 

The ETF became so popular that China AMC halted its trading for an hour on Thursday, a move also taken by another firm. It warned investors about the big difference between the fund’s price and its net value and said investors could suffer heavy losses if they invest blindly. 

The premium came down to 5% on Thursday. 

“The current craze for U.S. and Japanese stocks is no different from the panic buying of real estate, bitcoin, and gold by Chinese aunties years ago,” said Qi Wang, chief investment officer at 

UOB Kay Hian’s wealth management division, referring to Chinese mom-and-pop investors, who have a huge influence on stock prices.Earlier this week, China’s top government body urged stronger measures to stabilize markets and boost confidence. 

The frenzied buying of Japanese and U.S. ETFs is a sign of how tough it will be for authorities to shift investor sentiment in a stock market that is mired in a yearslong slump. 

The benchmark CSI 300 index lost 11.4% of its value last year, cementing its third year in a row of declines. That has pushed Chinese investors overseas, including to Japan and the U.S., where stocks boomed in 2023.

Four China-listed ETFs tracking Japan’s Nikkei 225 index recorded about $3.3 billion in trading volume this week as of Thursday, putting it on track to become the busiest week on record, according to Wind, a financial-data provider. 

Chinese investors have also flooded into ETFs tracking the U.S. stock market. Another China AMC ETF tracking the S&P 500 closed Wednesday at an 18% premium to its net asset value, according to Wind. The premium shrank to 5.8% on Thursday after the fund manager also halted its trading for an hour. 

Foreign investors pulled out of China’s stock market in droves last year, after an early-year rally made way for a prolonged slump amid questions about the country’s economic recovery. Individual investors in the country are increasingly joining the exodus.

China’s hundreds of millions of individual investors are the biggest source of volumes in the stock market. Last year, they shifted their money into safer assets, including money-market funds, after losing confidence that the stock market would turn around.

China’s strict capital controls limit the amount individuals and institutions in the country can invest overseas. That is one reason ETFs traded inside China that allow exposure to foreign markets are popular—and occasionally prone to surges in price. Since funds can only invest a pre-approved amount in foreign stocks, they cannot easily buy more in response to demand.Write to Rebecca Feng at rebecca.feng@wsj.com

20. Britain Is Lobbying U.S. Republicans on Ukraine. Here’s Why.

Britain Is Lobbying U.S. Republicans on Ukraine. Here’s Why. - The New York Times

nytimes.com · by Mark Landler · January 25, 2024

Britain Is Lobbying U.S. Republicans on Ukraine. Here’s Why.

The U.K., often a wingman to the United States in defense, is pushing its ally to stand firm against President Vladimir V. Putin, amid fears that Russia poses an existential threat to Europe.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of Britain and President Volodymyr Zelensky during a visit by Mr. Sunak to Kyiv this month.Credit…Pool photo by Stefan Rousseau

By Mark Landler

Reporting from London

Jan. 25, 2024, 12:01 a.m. ET

When David Cameron, Britain’s foreign secretary and onetime prime minister, visited Washington last month, he took time out to press the case for backing Ukraine with Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, the far-right Georgia Republican who stridently opposes further American military aid to the country.

Last week, Boris Johnson, another former prime minister, argued that the re-election of Donald J. Trump to the White House would not be such a bad thing, so long as Mr. Trump comes around on helping Ukraine. “I simply cannot believe that Trump will ditch the Ukrainians,” Mr. Johnson wrote in a Daily Mail column that read like a personal appeal to the candidate.

If the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States has taken on an air of special pleading in recent weeks, it is because Britain, rock solid in its support for Ukraine, now views its role as bucking up an ally for whom aid to the embattled country has become a political obstacle course.

British diplomats said Mr. Cameron and other senior officials had made it a priority to reach out to Republicans who were hostile to further aid. For reasons of history and geography, Britain recognized that support is not as “instinctive” for Americans as it for the British, according to a senior diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the matter.

Unlike in the United States, where Ukraine has gotten tied up in a dispute with Republicans over President Biden’s border policy and come under the shadow of a dismissive Mr. Trump, support for Kyiv in Britain has stayed resolute, undiminished, and nonpartisan in the two years since Russia’s invasion.

David Cameron, Britain’s foreign secretary, meeting with Mike Johnson, the speaker of the House, last month in Washington.Credit…Al Drago for The New York Times

Even in an election year, when the Conservative government and its Labour Party opponents are clashing over almost everything, there is not a glimmer of daylight between them on Ukraine, the biggest foreign policy challenge facing the country.

When Prime Minister Rishi Sunak recently announced 2.5 billion pounds ($3.2 billion) of additional aid for Ukraine, the Labour leader, Keir Starmer, instantly lent his support. Britain, the third-largest supplier of weapons after the United States and Germany, was the first major power to commit to new aid in 2024.

“We will remain united across our political parties in defense of Ukraine against that aggression from Putin,” Mr. Starmer said. On a visit to British troops deployed in Estonia, near the Russian border just before Christmas, he warned of the problems that fester “when politics goes soft on Putin.”

That political consensus mirrors public opinion in Britain. Some 68 percent of people favor military assistance to Ukraine, and 53 percent say that aid should flow there “for as long as it takes,” according to a British Foreign Policy Group survey in July.

Many Britons view the war in Ukraine — just over three hours away by plane — as almost on their doorstep, and their support reflects a fear that a Russian victory would pose an existential threat to the security of Europe and Britain. Addressing the Ukrainian Parliament earlier this month, Mr. Sunak described military aid as “an investment in our collective security” and said, “if Putin wins in Ukraine, he will not stop here.”

Britain’s army chief, Gen. Patrick Sanders, warned in a speech on Wednesday that Britons were now a “prewar generation,” who could be pressed into service to confront a military threat to Europe from an emboldened Russia. Downing Street later clarified that General Sanders was not opening the door to peacetime conscription.

Britain’s army chief, Gen. Patrick Sanders, in 2018. The general warned in a speech on Wednesday that Britons were now a “prewar generation.”

There is ample precedent for Britain trying to steady a wavering United States in international conflicts. In 1990, when President George H.W. Bush was struggling to build a United Nations coalition to oppose Iraq after it invaded Kuwait, Margaret Thatcher famously told him, “Remember, George, this is no time to go wobbly.”

At other moments, Britain plays the role of America’s ready wingman. On Monday, it joined the United States in a second round of airstrikes against Houthi militants in Yemen, just hours after a phone call between Mr. Sunak and Mr. Biden, in which they agreed on the need to combat Houthi attempts to block commercial shipping in international sea lanes.

Malcolm Chalmers, the deputy director general of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank, said the British American cooperation on Yemen, and Britain’s prodding of Washington on Ukraine, captured the push-pull dynamic that has characterized the trans-Atlantic relationship for decades.

“People sometimes mischaracterize U.K. security policy as being a poodle of the U.S.,” he said. “The U.K. puts a very close value on its relations with the U.S., but that doesn’t mean we won’t push the U.S. if we feel it is not in the right place.”

The contrast between the allies on Ukraine has been especially stark, in part because both are entering election cycles in which such policies are easily held captive to broader political debates. Brexit-era populist figures like Nigel Farage still roam restlessly on the fringe. Mr. Farage, a conspicuous ally of Mr. Trump who shares his softer views of President Vladimir V. Putin, is backing a new anti-immigration party, Reform U.K., which some Tory lawmakers fear will siphon votes from them.

Nigel Farage, a British ally of former President Donald J. Trump, shares Mr. Trump’s softer views of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.Credit…Doug Mills/The New York Times

But the Conservatives, unlike the Republicans, do not have a “pro-Putinist wing” in their party, said Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London. To the extent that any British leader might have sought an accommodation with Russia, he said, it would more likely have been the last Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn.

Mr. Corbyn, after all, once said he would like to see NATO “ultimately disband.” Comments like that saddled Labour with the reputation for lacking in patriotism, something that Mr. Starmer has worked methodically to root out, along with the anti-Semitism that once contaminated its far-left ranks.

Banishing that history may be another reason Ukraine has not become a contentious issue. While Britain’s election is likely to be driven by economic rather than national security concerns, analysts said Mr. Starmer needed to inoculate Labour against charges that it is insufficiently patriotic. Security is one of the few issues on which polls show that voters still trust Labour less than the Tories.

“There is a thread in Labour history of being very patriotic,” said Jonathan Powell, a former chief of staff to a Labour prime minister, Tony Blair, who famously stuck with President George W. Bush through the Iraq War. “But Labour has had a problem convincing people again of its patriotism.”

Mr. Powell pointed out that traditional Labour strongholds, including Mr. Blair’s old district in northern England, had long been fertile recruiting grounds for the military. But in 2019, propelled by Mr. Johnson’s promise to “get Brexit done,” the Conservatives picked off many of these seats.

In a column last fall in the pro-Tory Daily Telegraph, Labour’s shadow defense secretary, John Healey, and shadow foreign secretary, David Lammy, argued that Britain’s nuclear-weapons deterrent, as well as its membership in NATO, were legacies of the post-World War II Labour government of Clement Attlee.

The Labour lawmakers accused successive Conservative-led governments of bleeding Britain’s armed forces through years of budget cuts imposed by fiscal austerity. “Over the last 13 years,” Mr. Lammy and Mr. Healey wrote, “our army has been cut to the smallest size since the days of Napoleon.”

British soldiers training in Kenya in 2022.Credit…Daniel Irungu/EPA, via Shutterstock

Much of Britain’s support for Ukraine, of course, is rooted in cultural and national identity, which runs deeper than party politics. As Mr. Powell put it, “the notion of a plucky nation plugging away by itself is something we get.”

Britain has taken a hard line against Russia ever since Winston Churchill warned of an “Iron Curtain” after World War II. Its cynicism about Russian motives deepened in 2018, after the Kremlin was accused of poisoning a former Russian intelligence agent and his daughter in Salisbury, England, with a nerve agent. Britain blamed the operation on Russia’s military intelligence and expelled its diplomats.

But a succession of Conservative prime ministers has also discovered that backing Ukraine is an appealing strategy for a country groping for a post-Brexit role on the global stage. Without having to commit its own troops, or even to make a financial commitment beyond this year, Britain can look like a world leader at relatively modest cost.

“It’s not a great strain on the U.K. to take on this policy,” Professor Freedman said. “And if you’re the first mover, as the U.K. has been on a number of occasions, and now with security guarantees, you get credit for it.”

is the London bureau chief of The Times, covering the United Kingdom, as well as American foreign policy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has been a journalist for more than three decades.

nytimes.com · by Mark Landler · January 25, 2024

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