Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:


"Without inspiration the best powers of the mind remain dormant; there is a fuel in us which needs to be ignited with sparks."
– Author Unknown, but widely attributed to Johann Gottfried von Herder

"A tyrant must put on the appearance of uncommon devotion to religion."
– Plato

"There may not be as much humanity in the world as one would like to see. But there is some. There's more than one would think... If you break faith with what you know, that's a betrayal of many, many, many, many people. I may know six people, but that's enough. Love has never been a popular movement... The world is held together, really it is held together, by the love and the passion of very few people."
–James Baldwin




1. Senate Confirms Pete Hegseth for Defense Secretary as JD Vance Breaks Tie

2. America Is Now Counting on You, Pete Hegseth

3. SOF Competitive Campaigning in Great Power Competition

4. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 24, 2025

5. Why Donald Trump Is Racing So Fast to Remake America

6. America’s Fraught, Sometimes Deadly, History With the Panama Canal

7. NATO and Ukraine in the Trump 2.0 Era

8. Expert Q&A: Former Trump Ambassador on Why Ukraine ‘Must’ Win

9. Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition

10. Free and Open Spaces: How Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and Global Leaders are Rewiring Geopolitics

11. What did Rubio say about Taiwan independence? US, China at odds

12. Trump administration confuses government workers with email test message

13. How Iran Lost Before It Lost: The Roll Back of Its Gray Zone Strategy

14. Mexico refuses to accept a U.S. deportation flight

15. Why Is China Succeeding As A Peace Broker? – Analysis

16. The Undersea Cable War

17. It's time for a new Key West agreement

18. Hegseth confirmed: This is where we find out his true mettle

19. Pacific Island Microstates and U.S. Security Cooperation: A Strategic Reassessment

20. It’s not conspiratorial to be worried about social media’s rightward swing

21. Anti-Trumpers Are So Worried About Misinformation They're Spreading It Themselves

22. Zelenskyy says allies should work on 'format' for any talks with Russia

23. Trump fires multiple agency inspectors general—without proper notice, watchdogs say

24. Prime Target review — Leo Woodall shows equations can be lethal (fascinating series with a national security premise)

25. Secretary Hegseth's Message to the Force

26. Wicker and Reed Announce SASC Subcommittee Leadership for 119th Congress

27. Trump says he could send US special operators after Mexican drug cartels. It could make things a lot worse.





1. Senate Confirms Pete Hegseth for Defense Secretary as JD Vance Breaks Tie


Best wishes and Godspeed Mr. SECDEF.


Please take care of our military: honor it and trust its men and women.


Senate Confirms Pete Hegseth for Defense Secretary as JD Vance Breaks Tie

Former Fox News host faced allegations about sexual assault and excessive drinking, which he called smears

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/pete-hegseth-defense-secretary-confirmation-vote-128b0a9f?st=tqyXto&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Nancy A. Youssef

Follow and Lindsay Wise

Follow and Siobhan Hughes

Follow

Updated Jan. 24, 2025 11:46 pm ET



Pete Hegseth on Friday after his confirmation vote. Photo: Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg News

WASHINGTON—Pete Hegseth, a former Army National Guardsman and Fox News host, was narrowly confirmed Friday by the Senate as secretary of defense, overcoming accusations of sexual assault and excessive drinking that Democrats said were disqualifying but that he and his allies called smears. 

Republicans largely stuck together to approve one of President Trump’s most controversial cabinet picks, backing him as a “change agent” for the Pentagon, after hours of tension over whether the nominee had enough support.

Shortly after the vote got under way, Sen. Thom Tillis (R., N.C.) said in a statement that he would support the nominee, providing the key 50th vote. Vice President JD Vance, in his role as president of the Senate, then broke the tie, confirming Hegseth by 51-50. 

Republicans control the Senate 53-47, and with all Democrats opposed to his confirmation, Hegseth couldn’t afford to lose the support of more than three Republican senators.

Two centrist Republicans—Sens. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Susan Collins of Maine—voted against Hegseth, citing his lack of experience, concerns about his character and his past statements opposing women in combat. They were joined by Sen. Mitch McConnell, the former Senate Republican leader, who flashed Sphinx-like smiles and raised his eyebrows to reporters on his way to vote no.

In a statement, McConnell gave a blistering critique of Hegseth, saying he failed to meet the standard to hold a job that carries “staggering consequences.” 

“Mere desire to be a ‘change agent’ is not enough to fill these shoes,” McConnell wrote. The U.S. “faces coordinated aggression from adversaries bent on shattering the order underpinning American security and prosperity. In public comments and testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hegseth did not reckon with this reality.”

Hegseth is now in charge of the largest federal agency, one that leads three million troops and civilians and has an $800 billion-plus budget. Hegseth has called eliminating “wokeness” one of his priorities, saying such efforts as diversity, equity and inclusion programs had distracted the military from its core war-fighting mission. 

The new Pentagon chief has also proposed firing some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 44-year-old, however, backed down on his call for removing women from ground combat positions, a key issue for some Republicans such as Sen. Joni Ernst of Iowa, who pressed him to clarify his stance.


Vice President JD Vance, in his role as president of the Senate, broke the tie, confirming Hegseth by 51-50. Photo: Senate Television/Associated Press

Hegseth’s nomination had been expected to be extremely tight. On Friday morning, Trump said the vote was too close to call. 

“Pete’s a very, very good man. I hope he makes it,” the president said as he left the White House for a trip to North Carolina and California.

By Friday afternoon, Senate Republicans and the Trump team had become worried about Tillis’s vote, people familiar with the matter said, fearing the North Carolina senator could join Collins and Murkowski—who had already declared their opposition—and likely McConnell, sinking Hegseth’s bid. Tillis said Thursday that he was still “completing due diligence” on the latest allegations against Hegseth.

The uncertainty made for a dramatic vote. Many senators arriving in the Capitol seemed unsure of what would happen. At around 8:15 p.m., Hegseth showed up with a large entourage including children and his wife, although nominees typically don’t attend their own confirmation votes. He flashed a thumbs-up when asked how he felt.

Hegseth and his family retreated into an area that leads to private Senate offices, including that of Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.). The children later went to the gallery to watch the vote alongside Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R., Okla.), and could be seen waving at Thune, who wiggled his fingers back at them. Hegseth himself never appeared in the chamber.

The vote started around 9 p.m. Several minutes later, Tillis finally showed his cards, with a post on social media that said he would back Hegseth to support Trump’s “peace through strength agenda.”

It marked only the second time a vice president’s vote has been required to confirm a cabinet nominee. Mike Pence broke a tie to confirm Betsy DeVos as education secretary in 2017.

Tillis told reporters his decision-making process was agonizing. A sworn statement from Hegseth’s former sister in law, Danielle Hegseth concerned him, he said, and “there was a point when I was going in with the presumption of ‘no.’” He said he talked to Hegseth for two hours Friday, and he called Trump afterward to tell him that he planned to vote in favor.


Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R., Alaska) voted against moving forward with Hegseth’s defense-secretary nomination on Thursday. Photo: Rod Lamkey/Associated Press

“I did not ask easy questions,” Tillis said.

Democrats said they were saddened but not surprised by Hegseth’s confirmation. “Unfortunately my Republican colleagues really proved spineless, and this vote may well haunt him,” said Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D., Conn.). 

Republicans said Trump had a mandate from voters and that senators should back his nominees.

“He is the president’s choice and we owe it to the commander in chief to put him in this position unless he’s not qualified for the office,” said Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.).

Concerns about Hegseth emerged shortly after he was picked last year. He has faced accusations of sexual assault, excessive drinking and financial mismanagement. Hegseth and his allies say he has made mistakes but also dismissed the accusations as politically motivated “anonymous smears.”

A string of sit-down meetings with Republican senators helped stabilize Hegseth’s standing. Trump continued to back him, while allies also heaped pressure on wobbly Republicans to stay in line.

Earlier this week, in a statement made under penalty of perjury and submitted in response to a request from Democratic Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, Danielle Hegseth accused Pete Hegseth of alcohol abuse and erratic behavior, and said his ex-wife, Samantha Hegseth, told her that she once hid from Hegseth in a closet because she feared for her personal safety. 

In a redacted portion, the statement also alleges that Samantha told Danielle that Pete Hegesth had allegedly “grabbed her groin without consent.” Court documents from Samantha and Pete Hegseth’s divorce state that neither claimed to be a victim of domestic abuse. He denies wrongdoing, and Samantha Hegseth hasn’t responded to requests for comment. 

“There is no basis to credit this deeply flawed and questionable affidavit, which was submitted at the 11th hour in a clear and admitted partisan attempt to derail Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation,” according to a letter from Hegseth’s attorney, Timothy C. Parlatore, to Wicker.

In a statement after the vote, Danielle Hegseth said that she was promised a week ago that her statement, on the record, would corroborate the other accusations and make a difference in key votes. “But in the end, it did not,” she said. “What happened today will make women who have experienced abuse and mistreatment even less forthcoming because the men involved in the decisions leading to Hegseth’s confirmation have actively perpetuated the mechanisms, including gag orders and fear of retaliation, that keep women silent.”

Pentagon officials have been closely following Hegseth’s nomination. Trump and the military butted heads during his first term, and the incoming administration has proposed “warrior boards” to purge leaders seen as unfit. 

The Trump administration has already tasked the Pentagon to deploy nearly 7,000 troops to the southern border and send aircraft to fly out people who are inside the U.S. illegally. Trump also ordered the military to devise a plan to “seal the border.” Border security, the president said, would become a greater priority for the military. 

Defense secretaries usually get overwhelming support. Ret. Marine Gen. Jim Mattis, Trump’s first defense chief pick during his first administration, received 98 votes. But in 1989, the Senate rejected President George H.W. Bush’s defense secretary pick, John Tower, in a 47-53 vote. The former Texas senator’s bid was derailed by accusations of alcoholism and womanizing. 

Alex Ward contributed to this article.

Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com, Lindsay Wise at lindsay.wise@wsj.com and Siobhan Hughes at Siobhan.hughes@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the January 25, 2025, print edition as 'Senators Narrowly Confirm Hegseth'.




2. America Is Now Counting on You, Pete Hegseth



This is how the loyal opposition (NOT resistance) should comport themselves.


Some excellent advice among frank comments.  


The new SECDEF should hire Tom Nichols as an advisor. (think Lincoln's Team of Rivals though I do not think that is the way of the President).


America Is Now Counting on You, Pete Hegseth

My advice for the incoming secretary of defense

By Tom Nichols

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · January 25, 2025

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Tradition dictates that I begin by congratulating you on your confirmation. You seem like a man who appreciates frankness, and so I will spare you empty decorum: It would be disingenuous of me to deny that I have been opposed to your nomination to lead the Department of Defense from the moment it was announced. But the Senate has voted, and you are now the leader of the most powerful military on the planet.

Rather than offer you empty congratulations, I hope you will accept—in the spirit of the love of country that I know we both share—some unsolicited advice. You face unique challenges: You are among the least qualified major Cabinet nominees in modern American history, you have no background in leading a large organization, and you come into office with serious questions about your character and fitness, even from some in your own party. I must tell you that I believe you should have told Donald Trump last fall that you could not, in good conscience, accept his offer.

But you did accept it, and so I write to you today not as a critic, but as a fellow American. I know—as you do—that your success is essential to the security and safety of our nation, and so all of us with something to offer owe you our best efforts, including our direct and honest views.

I send these thoughts to you without partisanship or ill-will: The time for that is over. We live in dangerous times and you cannot fail in your new duties. I have no interest in lecturing you about your personal life, or your reported use of alcohol. I have been through such struggles myself, and I believe that even—perhaps especially—in challenging moments, you will choose to approach your new responsibilities with both physical and intellectual sobriety.

I worked in national security and defense affairs for nearly 40 years, including a quarter-century in which my responsibility was to educate American officers. I do not know how to be a Secretary of Defense, but based on my experience, I have three recommendations for you that I hope will contribute to a successful tenure leading America’s military.

First, and most important, I implore you to listen to the men and women working for you who have served our nation. Listening is a sign of strength, Mr. Secretary, not weakness. Every bad senior leader I ever encountered in my career, including generals, admirals, and elected officials, all had the same flaw: Insecurity. They talked and opined and issued orders instead of listening. (From your own military days, you probably remember this expression: They only had Transmit Mode, no Receive Mode.) I know you’ve been charged with shaking up the Pentagon, but the dangerous world around us will not put their plans on pause if you get distracted by a superficial domestic culture war.

You will have the power of decision on almost anything that crosses your path, but you are not omniscient. You are surrounded by a wealth of experience and expertise. Yes, some of the people under you will not be happy about the election or your confirmation, but they respect the terrible burden you’re carrying, and they are there to help you. They share your love of country, and your sense of duty. Their success is your success. They are not the enemy. Hear them out.

Speaking of enemies, you must contend with the reality that you are entering office with almost no credibility with your opposite numbers in Moscow and Beijing (and elsewhere). I say this not as an insult, but to describe in plain terms the conditions you face abroad. I have long experience with the Russians, in particular, and while they will treat you with formal courtesy, make no mistake: These are hard and dangerous people who will have no respect for a former O-5 and talk-show host. I realize it is an uncomfortable truth, but defensiveness about this will only distract you from the work ahead.

You must cover a lot of distance with those opponents. Your previous skills as a public commentator will be of no help and in fact will prove counterproductive in such situations. You cannot bully and speechify your way to respect with such people; they are tough in a way that cannot be countered with macho posturing or rants about DEI. The facile charm that worked for you in public life will be a vulnerability in dealing with our enemies, who will seek to exploit every thoughtless word. The combative punditry that works so well on cable television in America might have helped you burn time during your confirmation hearing, but none of that will serve you well in negotiations or discussions with our dedicated foes. (It won’t do you much good talking to our allies, either.)

Instead, you will find that you must rely on people who have been in the rooms you’ve never seen until now. You are not required to take their advice, Mr. Secretary, but when your counterparts call you, your staff will be able to assist you in ways you might not have considered. They can warn you about your opponent’s strategies—and weaknesses—before you even pick up the phone. Your previous career has rewarded bombast and bluster; now you will have to master judiciousness, restraint, and the strategic use of silence.

Finally, I hope that you will leave behind the kind of rhetoric that brought you to prominence. I know that you gained this post by being a loyal soldier for President Trump. The truth is that most Americans—including the Americans who serve in the U.S. military—don’t really care nearly as much as you’d think about the cultural issues that brought you into the Trump administration. You are no longer a pundit or a provocateur: From today, your fellow citizens are trusting you with the lives of their children. (“Thank you for giving us your son,” a general told one of my friends whose boy, like you, went through ROTC. “We’ll take good care of him.”)

The rest of us are trusting you with all our lives. You could well be the last person to speak to the president before he decides to go to war—or considers using nuclear weapons. Partisan attachments will be meaningless at such moments.

When I was barely 30 years old, I advised a Republican senator who was trying to decide whether to support President George H.W. Bush’s 1990 decision to go to war against Iraq in Kuwait. “Am I doing the right thing?” he asked me. At that moment, I felt as if the world had fallen on my shoulders. Nothing else mattered. “Yes, I think so,” I stammered. And then we spent hours in the gloom of a winter afternoon discussing his eventual vote to send young Americans into battle.

You will face decisions galactically greater than my one small moment with my boss 35 years ago. Some decisions you make will feel small to you, but they will have an impact on hundreds of thousands of people in the military community, and others will live with them long after you’ve left government service. More importantly, some of your answers may have existential consequences for humanity itself. The election and the speeches are over. The lives of millions—or perhaps billions—now depend on things you say that no one but the president might hear.

You are a man of faith, Mr. Secretary. We have that in common. And so I’ll close with my sincere wish that the Lord keep you and guide you in the days to come.

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · January 25, 2025



3. SOF Competitive Campaigning in Great Power Competition



Some excellent points in this. We need real campaigning in the gray zone of strategic competition that focuses on winning in the gray zone versus only observing and preparing for large scale combat operations (LSCO).


Two questions: What are our irregular warfare competent campaign HQ (headquarters). How do we develop irregular warfare campaign competency to man such HQ?


But what I want to take issue with is rotation of the entire campaign HQ. I think this is one of the great undiscussed shortfalls of the GWOT. We did not have sustained campaign execution by one campaign HQ. We rotated headquarters (both conventional and SOF HQ) nearly for the duration of the GWOT. In 2009 or so USSOCOM/USASOC made the decision to "plant" the 3d SFG half in Afghanistan. But in reality for most of the operations and activities we rotated units as campaign HQ. Of course we want to get every Corps, Division, and Special Forces Group into the fight. While we think we learned lessons from Vietnam and that unit rotations are better than individual replacements is now an article of faith I think that should be challenged for at least campaign HQ. The weak point in campaign execution may be the RIP, "relief in place." No matter how good the handover is, the transition by definition means a loss of continuity and for a period of time the eye is taken off the campaign execution ball as transition counterparts work to get up to speed while others have their eye on the redeployment aircraft. 


We need to ask should we have campaign HQ established for "the duration plus 6 months" for campaigns in the gray zone and then rotate operational units at the right level? At what level should we establish long duration HQs (semi-permanent until they work themselves out of a job with a campaign victory) and use the individual personnel rotation policy (appropriately staggered so there is always continuity) to man these campaign HQ? At what level should we rotate units (ODA, ODB, ODC, Group (SFOB old school for Group HQ)?


But my bottom line is this: We need irregular warfare campaign competent HQs that can campaign in the gray zone of strategic competition below the threshold of war and achieve a win in the gray zone as the primary mission while observing and preparing for LSCO as the secondary mission. Let's win in the gray zone so that we do not need to escalate to LSCO. We need "irregular warfare campaign competent HQ" established for the duration plus six months to be able to do that.



SOF Competitive Campaigning in Great Power Competition

18 hours ago11 min read

A Small Shift in the Deployment Cycle Could Reap Huge Rewards

 

Strategy Central

For And By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth, January 24, 2025

 

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/sof-competitive-campaigning-in-great-power-competition?utm



 Introduction

 

Great power competition aims to advance and protect national interests while avoiding costly wars. Unlike traditional warfare, competition does not focus solely on defined victories or end states. Instead, it emphasizes continuous, national-level campaigns designed to secure a lasting peace that ensures the U.S. economic, societal, and military advantage. This steady-state competition involves strategic maneuvering to advance national interests at the lowest cost possible, reflecting the move-and-counter-move dynamics of international relations.

 

Competitive campaigning emerged from the 2022 National Defense Strategy as a central framework for orchestrating and synchronizing simultaneous operations to achieve national objectives across the competition continuum. This article explores the principles, strategies, and challenges of competitive campaigning, emphasizing its role in maintaining global security and advancing U.S. interests and explaining the role that Special Operations Forces (SOF) can play in a successful campaign.


A SOF Competition Campaign Imagined

 

Imagine, if you will, special operations forces (SOF) conducting a globally coordinated irregular warfare campaign in the gray zone to deter, degrade, deny, and defeat threats posed by China, Russia, or Iran to United States national security interests. This campaign would not be conducted in the conventional battle spaces of war but within the subtle and ambiguous realm of the gray zone, foreign internal defense, influence, cyber operations, proxy conflicts, and covert actions. Such efforts would mirror current operations, leveraging SOF's unique capabilities to adapt and operate in austere and politically sensitive environments. Yet, as great power competition evolves, the question arises: how can SOCOM and the SOF enterprise adapt their training, education, and operational paradigms to confront these increasingly complex and multifaceted challenges?

 

To secure an edge over these rivals, SOF must first achieve a deeper understanding of its adversaries. This involves rigorous study of their strategic cultures, decision-making processes, and methods of exerting influence in the gray zone. Enhanced intelligence integration, cultural competence, and constant wargaming with cutting-edge technology would prepare SOF for an evolving battlefield. Additionally, deployment preparation must become more precise, focusing on tailored solutions for each operational theater. SOF must innovate by incorporating advanced predictive models and simulations to anticipate better rival actions and their potential impact on U.S. interests. This level of preparation ensures that SOF remains agile and capable of executing the full spectrum of gray zone operations.

 

Finally, the conduct of these operations must be designed to advance U.S. national interests and withstand external scrutiny. Even within the secrecy of SOF missions, operational transparency is critical to ensuring accountability and effectiveness. This involves embedding robust assessment and evaluation frameworks into every mission, ensuring that actions align with strategic objectives while avoiding mission creep, unintended consequences, and capturing the operation's effectiveness. A revised approach to training, deploying, and evaluating operations would position the SOF enterprise as a more adaptive and potent force capable of deterring and defeating threats in the gray zone while maintaining its strategic relevance in an era of great power competition.

 

 The Framework of Competitive Campaigning

 

At its core, competitive campaigning integrates means and ways to accomplish policy aims, functioning as a strategic construct to align military actions with national security interests. It operates on the premise of simultaneous activities across competition, crisis, and conflict, requiring an understanding of the competition continuum—where states interact to gain influence, leverage, and advantage.

 

The Joint Force is structured as a unified and interdependent entity that executes Joint Integrated Campaigning (JIC). The Joint Force (means) synchronizes diverse military capabilities (ways) to achieve national policy objectives (ends) to address complex global challenges. JIC emphasizes the seamless integration of all military branches, interagency partners, and allied forces, ensuring a cohesive approach to conflict and competition. By combining capabilities across land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains, the Joint Force can comprehensively advance interests and respond to threats through multi-domain operations. This approach relies on coordination, advanced planning, and shared situational awareness to maximize synergy and efficiency, enabling adaptability in rapidly changing environments and ensuring dominance across the conflict spectrum, from conventional warfare to gray zone operations.

 

A central concept of JIC is "campaigning forward," which prioritizes shaping the security environment before crises arise. This proactive approach involves consistent engagement with partners and allies to build trust, enhance interoperability, and deter adversaries through a visible and credible presence. It demands a nuanced understanding of threats and the strategic use of power to gain advantage.

 

In addition to shaping the environment, competitive campaigning involves influencing perceptions and actions through asymmetric means, such as deception, coercion, confusion, or punishment of rivals. Integrating non-military tools—diplomatic, economic, and informational—expands the focus beyond battlefield success, addressing opposition and root causes of instability while fostering long-term resilience.

 

This holistic approach ensures the United States maintains a competitive edge in an era of great power competition, where threats often blur the lines between peace and conflict. Joint Integrated Campaigning establishes a unified, adaptive framework that supports national objectives and safeguards global stability.

 

Campaigning Challenges

 

One of the principal challenges in competitive campaigning is the complexity of the strategic environment. Adversaries frequently operate below the threshold of armed conflict, employing transregional and multi-domain tactics to exploit vulnerabilities. Addressing these challenges requires thoroughly understanding the operational environment and adversary strategies, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The J2 (intel shop) often cannot provide the level of detail necessary for strategic understanding or operational realities. AI is the best bet to alleviate this problem. A clear picture can be achieved by scraping the internet for unclassified information and combining it with classified intelligence. It will require pushing the bureaucratic system to gain permissions and build the infrastructure necessary. You are behind if you are not pushing your command to do this!

 

Another critical challenge is integrating military activities with interagency and inter-organizational partners. Globally integrated operations demand effective coordination and a shared understanding of risks and objectives. Campaign planning must emphasize risk assessment, including political, mission, and force-related risks. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine offers a historical framework to evaluate the justification and feasibility of military actions, ensuring campaigns are deliberate and strategically sound. There is no global and comprehensive common operating picture (COP) to go from, so developing coordinated efforts will take some effort. The place to start is in your command. Once a COP is achieved in your “house,” then you can work with adjacent units and commands/inter-agency.

 

Authorities and permissions are a perennial hindrance to campaigning. Know what the law allows, funds, and says. More often than not, a CONOP will be submitted with the particular NDAA section explaining what authority pertains to a request to conduct an operation. That habit must persist, but it should be accompanied by an explanation of risk and its mitigation. Include the risk of inaction without being melodramatic. The truly bold will also have a way to measure the outcome of both action and inaction and provide an after-action report with verifiable results or track what happens because your unit was not allowed to act. 

 

Lastly, a campaign implies conducting coordinated action across time and space to achieve an effect. Assessment and analysis are critical to demonstrate your impact and record results over time. If all your unit can ever do is report what it did but not the result, expect your ability to gain permission to act in the future and funding requests to dry up. SOCOM got used to having money thrown at it regardless of the results during GWOT. Those days are over. Provide results or perish. That is the new paradigm.

 

How To Campaign In Great Power Competition

 

The campaign process involves a systematic and strategic approach to align national security interests with operational objectives, ensuring a cohesive and effective implementation. This process generally follows current military planning processes and deployment cycles.

 

It starts with identifying interests and objectives. Here is a detailed explanation:

 

1)       Analyze National Security Interests 

The process begins with analyzing national security interests by consulting existing documents such as National Security Strategies, Defense policies, and Combatant Command (COCOM) directives. This step identifies key priorities and areas requiring military or strategic focus, ensuring operations align with broader national objectives.

 

2)       Align Campaign Objectives with Theater Military Objectives 

Next, the campaign design connects SOF capabilities to specific theater military objectives. These objectives aim to protect or advance identified national security interests. This alignment ensures that SOF operations contribute directly to achieving overarching strategic goals within the capabilities and deployment timelines available. If protecting interests, develop a deep understanding of what threatens them and how (study enemy).

 

3)       Apply NSW Activities to Military Objectives 

The process integrates SOF-relevant activities into the military objectives for each theater. This involves tailoring operations and resources to meet specific regional challenges and opportunities, ensuring that SOF efforts complement broader campaigns.

 

4)       Compare Campaign Objectives Across Theaters 

A comparative analysis is conducted to identify areas of mutual support across theaters. This step enhances efficiency by leveraging shared objectives and resources, minimizing redundancy, and promoting coordination between various operational theaters.

 

5)       Develop SOF Ways and Means to Achieve Objectives 

This phase focuses on defining the methods and resources (ways and means) required for SOF to achieve its objectives. Planning is essential to ensure that the SOF are prepared, adequately equipped, and capable of executing the designed strategy.

 

6)       Train for the Campaign 

Training is tailored to the campaign's specific requirements to ensure operational readiness. This includes scenario-based exercises and rehearsals to prepare forces for potential challenges and contingencies during deployment.

 

7)       Campaign Execution in Time and Space 

Campaigning involves carefully orchestrating operations in time and geographic space. Deployment schedules and resource allocations are planned to maintain continuity and effectiveness throughout the campaign. Continuous evaluation and adaptation ensure that the campaign remains responsive to evolving circumstances. Intra- and inter-theater coordination should be well established to coordinate effects and maximize their impact.

 

Through this structured process, the campaign ensures alignment with national priorities, efficient resource use, and the capability to adapt to dynamic operational environments, ultimately enhancing mission success and strategic impact.

 

The Campaign Cycle

 

 The continuous and iterative campaign cycle ensures operational readiness, strategic alignment, and effective mission execution. It integrates deployment phases, training, and pre-deployment preparations, creating a seamless flow of operations and learning. By systematically capturing insights from each phase, the cycle enables SOF units to refine their strategies and tactics, enhancing their adaptability to evolving threats and challenges. This structured approach ensures that lessons learned translate into actionable improvements, maintaining operational superiority and alignment with national objectives.

 

A detailed explanation of the cycle and its steps:

 

Post-Deployment Phase

 

This phase involves reflecting on the most recent deployment to capture valuable insights and prepare for future operations. 

 

1)       Relief in Place (RIP) 

The outgoing team conducts a handover with the incoming unit, ensuring continuity in operations and minimizing disruption. 

 

2)       Debriefing and Lessons Learned 

Post-deployment, the unit conducts a detailed debrief to identify successes, challenges, and areas for improvement. Advanced tools like AI synthesize reports and data to create comprehensive insights for the next deployment cycle. 

 

3)       Adaptation of Training 

Based on the lessons learned, the unit adjusts its technical and tactical training to address identified gaps and improve overall effectiveness. 

 

4)       Mission, Enemy, and Area Analysis 

This step focuses on studying enemy tactics and strategies, analyzing regional dynamics, and reviewing current global campaigns. These insights inform future planning and operations. 

 

Work-Up for Deployment

 

This stage bridges the gap between post-deployment analysis and operational readiness. 

 

1)       Capture Mission Summary and Intelligence 

The returning team shares its mission summary and lessons learned with the preparing unit. This includes identifying intelligence gaps and updating requirements for the upcoming mission. Study rival strategies, TTPs, and activities relevant to your area of operation and beyond.

 

2)       Campaign Development and Wargaming 

The work-up phase involves crafting and refining the campaign plan. Teams engage in wargaming exercises to simulate potential scenarios, improving readiness for specific missions. Maximize the use of AI and war game hundreds of times.

 

3)       Mission-Specific Training 

Tailored training focuses on the unique requirements of the mission, ensuring personnel are equipped with the skills and knowledge needed for success. 

 

4)       Deployment Preparation 

Final preparations include equipment checks, administrative tasks, and movement coordination. The unit also completes the relief-in-place process to ensure a smooth transition into the next phase. 

 

Deployment and Campaign Execution

 

During deployment, teams execute the campaign plan while maintaining flexibility to adapt to dynamic conditions. 

 

1)       Relief in Place (RIP) 

The incoming team receives a comprehensive briefing and shadows the outgoing team to understand the current operational environment and priorities. 

 

2)       Situational Analysis 

Teams review theater objectives with operational planners (J3/J5) and integrate intelligence updates to refine their understanding of the mission landscape. 

 

3)       Integration with TSOC/COCOM 

The deployed unit aligns its objectives with Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) and Combatant Command (COCOM) strategies to maintain coherence with broader campaigns. 

 

4)       Execution and Adaptation 

The team actively executes the campaign plan, creating strategic effects that advance or defend U.S. interests. Emerging threats or opportunities may require adjustments to the original plan, including submitting new Concepts of Operations (CONOPS). 

 

5)       Coordinated Effects

Achieving meaningful effects on nation-states requires a deeper understanding of both supportive parallel initiatives and adversaries' actions and motivations. The impact of Special Operations Forces (SOF) actions and activities is maximized when they are executed in a strategic sequence or at a specific time and location that amplifies their overall effect or impression.

 

This campaign cycle represents a disciplined and iterative approach to operational readiness, emphasizing the seamless integration of learning, planning, and execution. It ensures that each phase, from post-deployment analysis to active campaigning, is interconnected and contributes to the overarching goal of achieving national objectives. By focusing on capturing lessons learned, refining strategies, and adapting training to real-world challenges, the cycle prepares units to operate effectively in dynamic environments. The careful study of mission objectives, enemy strategies, and regional dynamics equips teams with a comprehensive understanding of their operational landscape, enabling them to make informed decisions and execute precise actions. The continuous refinement through wargaming and mission-specific training ensures that units remain adaptable and capable of addressing evolving threats.

 

This framework may appear similar to current deployment cycles but introduces critical enhancements that distinguish it. Key features include a strong emphasis on understanding objectives, thorough analysis of adversaries, and careful mission planning, which form the foundation of this cycle. The integration of wargaming, enhanced by artificial intelligence, adds predictive capabilities and scenario analysis that significantly improve operational preparation. Furthermore, the focus on coordinating efforts across different theaters ensures that all actions contribute to a cohesive strategic impact. These elements streamline operations and ensure that each phase of the cycle maximizes its potential to advance or protect U.S. interests, making this approach a modernized and highly effective iteration of existing deployment practices.

 

 Conclusion

 

The framework of competitive campaigning reflects a holistic and dynamic approach to addressing the challenges of great power competition. Rooted in aligning military objectives with national security priorities, it emphasizes a proactive stance in shaping the global environment and deterring adversaries. Through the integration of irregular warfare, advanced technology like AI, and the strategic application of resources across domains, competitive campaigning equips forces with the tools to navigate the complexities of modern conflict.

 

A defining characteristic of this approach is its iterative nature, which spans pre-deployment preparation, deployment operations, and post-deployment analysis. This cycle ensures continuous learning, adaptability, and the ability to respond effectively to emerging threats and opportunities. The principles of capturing lessons learned, rigorous mission planning, wargaming, and coordinating actions across theaters underscore its focus on achieving sustainable outcomes in a volatile global landscape.

 

While this model introduces incremental changes to traditional deployment cycles, its emphasis on understanding objectives, studying the adversary, leveraging technology, and coordinating effects across domains highlights its transformative potential. By integrating these elements, competitive campaigning offers a means to secure strategic advantages while mitigating risks, ensuring the Joint Force and SOF remain agile and prepared for the demands of great power competition.

 


Ultimately, competitive campaigning reaffirms the need for innovation, collaboration, and strategic foresight to protect U.S. interests and maintain global security. As the Joint Force adapts to an environment defined by competition and complexity, this framework provides a roadmap for aligning capabilities and achieving long-term strategic objectives. SOF can lead the way by campaigning in the gray zone to out-compete and out-hustle our competitors.




4. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 24, 2025


China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 24, 2025


https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-24-2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;


Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute


Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute


Data Cutoff: January 21, 2025

The KMT-led Taiwanese legislature passed significant cuts and freezes to the 2025 national budget. The budget reductions will almost certainly impede the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led administration's ability to function and undermine Taiwan's resilience against PRC pressure. Opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) legislators, who hold a collective majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY), finalized amendments on January 21 that cut a total of 6.6% from the Executive Yuan’s proposed expenditure, making the largest budget cut in Taiwan’s history. The Executive Yuan originally approved the budget in August 2024, which projected a slight surplus.


ROC Premier Cho Jung-tai, who leads the DPP-controlled Executive Yuan, accused the opposition parties during a press conference on January 21 of “indiscriminately cutting budget items” for the purpose of disrupting the government’s operations. Cho stated that the budget cuts would affect Taiwan in five key ways: harming national competitiveness, weakening national defense capabilities, undermining technological advancement, constraining public services, and diminishing the government’s ability to communicate to the public. The KMT has framed the budget cuts as a necessary measure to exercise oversight of the DPP administration and rein in its excessive and wasteful spending.


The Ministry of National Defense (MND) experienced a freeze of 30% of its operating budget and a 3% cut to its military equipment expenditure, which will affect the military’s basic functions, including weapons and materiel maintenance. Deputy Minister of Military and Political Affairs Alex Po Horng-Huei stated during an MND press conference on January 20 that the PRC benefits from MND-related budget reductions, which negatively affect Taiwan’s combat readiness. Taiwan’s domestic submarine program experienced a 50% freeze, effectively halting construction of submarines until completed submarines pass sea trials, at which time the LY may decide to unfreeze the funds. The budget amendments also froze 50% of the budget for the Minxiong Aerospace and Drone Park, an industrial manufacturing and testing facility that is at the center of Taiwan’s drone development. Taiwan’s state-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) manages the park and is responsible for R&D and production of new defense technology and weapons. Constraints on Taiwan’s drone production capability constitute a significant setback for its ability to defend itself from a PRC invasion, which would heavily rely on the use of drones to thwart the advancement of enemy forces.


The budget reductions and freezes will fundamentally constrain government agencies’ capacity to carry out their core functions. The government’s degraded ability to operate is potentially disastrous for the policy agenda of President Lai Ching-te’s administration, which is intensely focused on combatting pervasive PRC efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty.



Key Takeaways:


  • The KMT-led Taiwanese legislature passed significant cuts and freezes to the 2025 national budget. The budget reductions will almost certainly impede the DPP-led administration's ability to function and will undermine Taiwan's resilience against PRC pressure.


  • Taiwan’s two undersea internet cables between Taiwan itself and its offshore Matsu Islands were disconnected within one week due to natural deterioration. Taiwan restored the internet to Matsu with an emergency microwave transmission system, showing significant progress in strengthening emergency communications infrastructure since 2023.


  • The PRC announced that it will soon resume group travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province. PRC officials and media continued to blame Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for creating obstacles to cross-strait exchanges, however.


  • The Philippines and PRC agreed to strengthen dialogue and bilateral cooperation efforts during the first high-level bilateral exchange to discuss South China Sea disputes to occur since July 2024. These talks occurred amid a spike in tensions between the two countries due to coercive PRC behavior in the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).




5. Why Donald Trump Is Racing So Fast to Remake America


Why Donald Trump Is Racing So Fast to Remake America

The president has a short window to fulfill a long list of promises that include fixing illegal immigration, slashing government spending and ending the war in Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-immigration-border-pardons-26b72288?mod=hp_lead_pos1


By Alex LearyFollow and Meridith McGrawFollow

Jan. 24, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Four years after departing Washington, defeated and with the nation reeling from the attack on the Capitol, Donald Trump walked through the doors of the White House’s South Portico as the 47th president.

“It’s great to be back,” he told members of the household staff who applauded his return on Inauguration Day.

Trump then proceeded to kick off a first week in office unlike any other, dominating attention in the U.S. and abroad as he raced to fulfill campaign promisesmake deals and settle scores. 

Facing high expectations and a limited political window, the president headed to the Oval Office hours after he was sworn in Monday. A stack of executive orders waited on the Resolute Desk for his signature, and an aide asked if Trump wanted to assemble the press corps.

“Let’s do it,” the president said. For the next 47 minutes, Trump held court, taking questions from reporters in the same venerated office that Joe Biden had occupied hours earlier. Trump called stage directions to a photographer: “Not on the side angle. Do you mind?”


President Trump in the Oval Office showing pardons for the Jan. 6 rioters during the signing Monday of executive orders. Photo: carlos barria/Reuters

The president scribbled his signature on one directive after the next. His first order of business: pardons for the Jan. 6 rioters. The president later signed an order to withdraw the U.S. from the World Health Organization. “That’s a big one,” he said. Another designated drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations.

There was one major campaign promise Trump couldn’t deliver. He had boasted he could immediately end Russia’s war with Ukraine. This week, he threatened Russia with sanctions and tariffs and expressed disappointment that Chinese leader Xi Jinping hasn’t done more to help.

As the week continued, Trump threatened tariffs and demanded allies spend more on defense in a virtual address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. On Friday, he embarked on his first domestic trip, which included a tour of hurricane recovery areas in North Carolina and damage left by the Los Angeles-area wildfires. Trump said he planned to eliminate or overhaul the Federal Emergency Management Agency, saying states should handle their own disasters. 

The torrent of activity was acknowledgment that Trump must move quickly to enact his far-reaching agenda. He enters office with unified Republican control of Washington and his highest approval ratings in years, a commanding position that history shows is likely to soften. 


Trump speaking Friday in Swannanoa, N.C., an area damaged last year by Hurricane Helene. Photo: mandel ngan/AFP/Getty Images


Residents in Swannanoa, N.C., asking for an extension of government help as Trump’s motorcade passes. Photo: jonathan drake/Reuters

Public opinion typically plummets after an inauguration honeymoon. Cracks in Trump’s popularity would threaten the GOP’s narrow majority in Congress during the midterm elections.

While Trump and his aides claim a voter mandate—the president won all seven swing states—the U.S. remains divided. Trump risks reading too much into his electoral victory, GOP pollster Whit Ayres said, and the president should keep in mind the fate of his predecessor.

“Joe Biden terribly overplayed his hand when he was persuaded by some historians that he could be a historically consequential president when he was, in fact, elected to return the country to normalcy and fairly moderate governance,” Ayres said.

recent Wall Street Journal poll showed the public would prefer a more restrained Trump. Most voters say, for instance, that only undocumented immigrants with criminal records should be deported, and longtime residents who entered the U.S. illegally should be protected. Most voters in the poll expressed skepticism of Trump’s plans to replace career civil-service workers, and 57% opposed pardoning those convicted in the Jan. 6 riot at the Capitol.


A vigil Tuesday in support of immigrant rights outside Immanuel Presbyterian Church in Los Angeles. Photo: Damian Dovarganes/AP


American soldiers patrolling the U.S.-Mexico border Friday in Eagle Pass, Texas. Photo: charly triballeau/AFP/Getty Images

Voters shouldn’t be surprised by the speed and reach of Trump’s early policy moves, advisers said. Trump repeatedly laid out his plans during campaign rallies, interviews and Truth Social posts, from nationwide immigration raids to hefty tariffs on imports.

“I think he feels a sense of pent up energy, because he had to spend four years in the wilderness thinking about it,” said former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, a Trump ally.

High gear

Trump struggled in his first term with a set of aides who arrived at the White House with little idea how to run the government. From the outside, the president’s team appears more unified, disciplined and loyal. Many have spent years preparing for a second term.

Minutes after Trump was sworn in, a redesigned White House website went live, featuring a video montage of a soaring bald eagle, military jets and a saluting Trump. “America Is Back,” a banner on the site said.

During a meeting at the White House on Thursday night, Trump told staff he had made a lot of promises during the campaign and now it was time to deliver, according to a senior administration official. Aides are working on legislation to change the tax code and immigration policy, relying on strong ties to Republican lawmakers.


Trump onstage with a member of the Village People during a rally Sunday. Photo: carlos barria/Reuters

Trump is upbeat and more comfortable in the role of commander in chief, aides and friends said. Following the signing of executive orders Monday evening in the Oval Office, Trump attended three late-night balls, cutting a cake with a sword and dancing on stage with family members as the Village People performed the campaign-rally staple “Y.M.C.A.” Trump has taken a personal interest in presidential trappings, from designing a commemorative challenge coin—with the family crest emblazoned on the back—to noting with approval the rug in the Oval Office.

“He’s in high gear and he feels triumphant,” said Roger Stone, a longtime Trump ally. The president’s sense of vindication and confidence has swept through a West Wing staff that stuck with him through the lows and highs of the past few years, including Trump’s various prosecutions. Some are second-timers.

Harrison Fields, the principal deputy press secretary, opened the drawer of his former desk at the White House and saw the signature he left at the end of Trump’s first term. Presidential press secretary Karoline Leavitt returned to a building where she had started as an intern. 

Susie Wiles, the first woman to hold the role of White House chief of staff, last worked at the White House while serving as President Ronald Reagan’s scheduler. She is credited with imposing order on the Trump campaign and is expected to do the same in her new job.

Wiles will have her hands full. Billionaire Elon Musk, now ensconced in Trump’s orbit and charged with the quixotic task of slashing government spending and regulations, has been a source of drama. Seemingly on a whim, he pops off to millions of followers on X, annoying other presidential advisers. 


Tesla CEO Elon Musk speaking at the Capital One arena Monday. Photo: amanda perobelli/Reuters


Trump meeting Tuesday at the White House with, from right to left, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Oracle CTO Larry Ellison and SoftBank CEO Masayoshi Son. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Musk trashed a $500 billion AI joint venture that the president announced this week with the leaders of OpenAI, Oracle and SoftBank. The president gave an eye-roll when Musk provoked a social-media fight with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, according to a Trump administration official.

While some of Trump’s allies, including his former chief strategist Steve Bannon, have called for Musk’s ouster, Trump, who himself fires off provocative social-media missives, didn’t budge. “He hates one of the people in the deal,” Trump told reporters, referencing Musk’s well-documented dislike for Altman. “But I have certain hatreds of people, too.”

Musk is a constant presence, according to aides. One staffer ran into the Tesla chief executive making a 6:30 a.m. coffee run this week at the White House cafeteria.

No, he called me

Trump appeared determined this week to reward those who aided his victory, regardless of political cost. In particular, the blanket Jan. 6 pardons—including people who attacked police—made many Republicans on Capitol Hill squeamish. In an echo of Trump’s first term, reporters cornered GOP senators to ask if they approved of the president’s actions. 


A member of the Proud Boys, right, listening to Enrique Tarrio, former leader of the group, during a news conference Friday in Doral, Fla. Tarrio was pardoned by Trump on Monday. Photo: Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Trump has pledged during his campaign to punish drug dealers with the death penalty. He threatened China, Mexico and Canada with tariffs, in part because he alleges they haven’t done enough to stop the flow of fentanyl into the U.S. Yet Trump took action this week that seemed to undercut such concerns. The president, carrying out a campaign promise to libertarian supporters, also pardoned Ross Ulbricht, founder of darknet marketplace Silk Road.

Federal prosecutors said that Silk Road sold more than $200 million worth of illegal drugs and other illicit goods.

Trump had previously called for Chinese-owned TikTok to be shut down in the U.S. because of national-security concerns. This week, the president signed an executive order that keeps the app operating in the U.S. for at least 75 days. The order raised legal questions—Biden signed a law that required the app’s Chinese parent to sell it or close it—and was criticized by such China hawks as Trump-ally Sen. Tom Cotton (R., Ark.). Trump brushed aside objections, noting his popularity on the platform.

Other decisions this week, including on illegal immigration, drew broad GOP approval. Trump declared an invasion at the U.S.-Mexico border and ordered work to restart on the border wall. He granted federal authorities permission to make immigration arrests near churches and schools, and he ended programs to admit asylum seekers and refugees.

The flurry of executive orders laid the groundwork to pursue Trump’s “America First” trade agenda—directing assessments of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement and the 2020 trade deal with China—and to expand fossil-fuel production in the U.S.


Trump speaking in May 2018 alongside former national security adviser John Bolton, right. Photo: Oliver Contreras/PRESS POOL

Trump stripped security protection from first-term officials who angered or annoyed him, according to people familiar with the matter. Those officials included former national security adviser John Bolton, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Dr. Anthony Fauci, the former top U.S. infectious disease official. Bolton and Pompeo have faced threats from Iran. Fauci testified to Congress about threats to him and his family. Trump said former government officials shouldn’t have protection for the rest of their lives.

The president also ran into roadblocks this week. A judge on Thursday temporarily halted his plan to end birthright citizenship, and legal challenges to other policy moves are piling up. Public-interest groups this week filed lawsuits against the Department of Government Efficiency, which is being led by Musk.

Trump wanted to make clear that world leaders are reaching out to him, not the other way around. When World Economic Forum CEO Børge Brende mentioned during a virtual panel discussion Thursday that Trump had called Xi just days before the inauguration, Trump immediately corrected him: “He called me.”

Democrats so far have mounted a muted counteroffensive, compared with the broad appeals for political resistance during Trump’s first term.


Trump turning to the Episcopal bishop, the Right Rev. Mariann Edgar Budde, left, during the National Prayer Service on Tuesday at Washington National Cathedral. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

“It’s hard to respond to so much chaos, which is Trump’s MO. Flood the zone,” said Rep. Veronica Escobar (D., Texas). “We’ve got to prioritize those things that are important to us and to the American people, because there will be far too much for us to battle.”

Trump’s critics have done little but watch from the sidelines—with one high-profile exception. The president sat in the front row Tuesday at a prayer service where an Episcopal bishop implored him to show mercy to immigrants and LGBTQ children. Her remarks generated more than 30 million online views in 48 hours.

The president, in a social-media post hours later, called the bishop a “radical left hard line Trump hater.”

Katy Stech Ferek contributed to this article.

Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com and Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the January 25, 2025, print edition as 'President Sets Breakneck Pace To Try to Deliver on Promises'.




6. America’s Fraught, Sometimes Deadly, History With the Panama Canal



Please go to the link to read the entire article with the interactive photos. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/panama-canal-us-american-history-e79a34f0?st=3bnx92&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink



America’s Fraught, Sometimes Deadly, History With the Panama Canal

Trump’s push to take back control of the strategic waterway stokes memories of a period of U.S. imperial ambition and violence



By José de CórdobaFollow and Santiago PérezFollow

Jan. 22, 2025 11:00 pm ET

President Trump wants Panama to return its namesake canal to the U.S.

Panama’s birth as a nation is directly linked to the U.S.’s coming of age as a young imperial power after its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In the age of gunboat diplomacy with former Rough Rider Theodore Roosevelt as president, the U.S. engineered Panama’s secession from Colombia in 1903. Aiming to project naval power, Washington embarked on what became the construction marvel of the early 20th century: linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through a canal across Panama’s deadly tropical forests.

Panamanian grievances over the U.S. presence led President Jimmy Carter in 1977 to sign treaties handing over the waterway and requiring a neutrality that guaranteed the peaceful passage of ships from all nations. The pacts were approved by the U.S. Senate despite vociferous opposition by conservatives. Trump’s push to grab back power over the waterway is the latest twist in the canal’s nearly 150-year saga. 

On Tuesday, Panama submitted a complaint to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres over Trump’s remarks, citing a breach of the U.N. charter requiring member states to refrain from threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of nations.


President Theodore Roosevelt tested a steam shovel during the construction of the Panama Canal in 1906. Photo: AP

Early failures

As far back as 1534, the Spanish crown ordered the first study for a canal route across the 40-mile isthmus between the Atlantic and the Pacific for the transport of gold and silver from Peru to Spain.

Key infrastructure in the Panama Canal and start year for operations

CARIBBEAN SEA

Caribbean Sea

NICARAGUA

Area of detail

COSTA

RICA

PANAMA

COLOMBIA

PACIFIC OCEAN

Colón

Atlantic Bridge (2019)

Atlantic Bridge (2019)

Gatun Locks

(1914)

Gatun Locks

(1914)

Agua Clara Locks (2016)

Agua Clara Locks (2016)

Lake

Alajuela

3

Gatun Lake

(1913)

9

Panama Railroad

PANAMA

Culebra Cut

Centennial Bridge (2004)

Centennial Bridge (2004)

Miraflores Locks (1914)

Miraflores Locks (1914)

Panama City

Pedro Miguel Locks (1914)

Pedro Miguel Locks (1914)

4th bridge under construction

4th bridge under construction

Cocolí Locks (2016)

Cocolí Locks (2016)

PANAMA BAY

Bridge of the Americas

(1962)

Bridge of the Americas

(1962)

4

La Chorrera

5 miles

5 km

Sources: Panama Canal Authority (Atlantic Bridge, Bridge of the Americas, locks); Structurae (Centennial Bridge)

Emma Brown/WSJ

The Panama Canal’s initial construction project began in 1880, led by celebrated French diplomat and developer Ferdinand de Lesseps, flush from his triumph building the flat, seawater Suez Canal in Egypt. But the lush jungle and mountainous terrain proved insurmountable obstacles, pushing the project into insolvency. De Lesseps was convicted of mismanagement and fraud. France’s failure resulted in the deaths of about 20,000 workers, most of them Caribbean laborers who were exposed to malaria and yellow fever spread by mosquitoes.

Before the French attempt, a U.S. company had already built a railroad linking the two oceans to help thousands of Americans seeking to join the California Gold Rush from the U.S. East Coast in the mid-19th century. The Panama Railroad opened for business in 1855.



7. NATO and Ukraine in the Trump 2.0 Era


NATO and Ukraine in the Trump 2.0 Era

The alliance contemplates the war and its future with a less predictable partner in Washington

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/nato-and-ukraine-in-the-trump-2-0-era?utm

EXPERT INTERVIEWSPresident of the United States of America Donald Trump makes a speech via video-conference during the the 55th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 23, 2025. (Photo by Halil Sagirkaya/Anadolu via Getty Images)


Posted: January 24th, 2025

By The Cipher Brief

EXPERT INTERVIEWS — While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long counted the United States among its most generous and loyal members, many NATO nations were deeply concerned about the prospects of a second Trump administration. During his first term, and then again as a candidate for reelection, Trump had criticized the alliance for not doing enough to shore up its own defenses, and on more than one occasion threatened to pull the U.S. out of NATO entirely. Experts in the U.S. and in Europe are divided on whether the threats were reckless examples of American isolationism, or pragmatic ways of pressuring NATO’s European members to do more, and lean less heavily on Washington. 

Either way, in the first week of the Trump administration, these issues have come to the fore. Speaking virtually at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on Thursday, Trump called for NATO members to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, saying this “is what it should have been years ago.” He harkened back to his first administration when he demanded alliance members reach the 2% target: “I insisted that they pay, and they did, because the United States was really paying the difference at that time and it was unfair to the United States.”

The Cipher Brief spoke with two American experts with deep experience in matters pertaining to NATO: Ian Brzezinski, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy, and Alexander Vershbow, former Deputy Secretary General of NATO and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia. They spoke with our Senior international correspondent Ia Meurmishvili for a recent episode of The World Deciphered

Their conversations have been edited for length and clarity. 

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow

Ambassador Alexander “Sandy” Vershbow is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Vershbow was the deputy secretary general of NATO from February 2012 to October 2016. Prior to that, he served for three years as the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He previously served as U.S. ambassador to NATO (1998-2001), the Russian Federation (2001-05), and the Republic of Korea (2005-08).

Ian Brzezinski

Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group. He also leads the Brzezinski Group, which provides strategic insight and advice to government and commercial clients. Brzezinski served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy (2001-05) and served in senior policy positions in the US Department of Defense and the US Congress.

The Cipher Brief: What do you think of the idea of NATO allies boosting defense spending to 5% of GDP?

Brzezinski: I think it’s actually a sound recommendation. We face a much more volatile and dangerous world. That’s one of the realities [we are] unfortunately inheriting from the Biden administration. We have a high-intensity war in Ukraine that’s unresolved; we have the spreading of violence across the Middle East; we have increasing Chinese predatory conduct and aggression in the Indo-Pacific, not to mention a plethora of other threats. So we do need to spend more.

During World War II, we spent roughly 37% of GDP to defeat the Axis [powers]. During the Korean War, it was 14% of GDP. During the Vietnam War, it was 9%, and one can make the case that it was a less complex, less volatile context then, even [though] we had the Cold War. So 2% today is not going to cut it, and 5% to me sounds like a very reasonable figure if we’re really going to, as an alliance, develop a deterrent posture, and the defense capabilities necessary to protect and promote our interests.

We’re no longer talking about one theater. We’re talking about three theaters that are now interconnected and on the cusp of metastasizing into something that could be a really global conflagration. We’re not prepared.

The transatlantic community has a GDP of $54 trillion. So we have the wealth. This is a world where there have to be sacrifices made, and I would argue that that sacrifice is worth it to prevent what could be a devastating, catastrophic set of conflagrations. It’d be far cheaper to spend that 5% now than to pay the human and financial costs of a broader war.

Amb. Vershbow: I would say it’s very ambitious. It’s not that it wouldn’t be justified in terms of the gaps within the alliance and the gap between what the Europeans spend on defense and what the United States spends on defense, but there’s probably an element of bargaining in [Trump’s] selection of 5%. I would be very happy if we ended up somewhere in the 3-4% range. And as I have said before, it’s necessary. We’re dealing with a much more dangerous security situation than during Trump’s first term. Our adversaries are now more united and more capable militarily, as well as with all kinds of other subversive activities. So spending more is going to be absolutely essential. I hope that that’s what he chooses to focus on rather than terminating NATO, which would be bad for everybody.

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that provides the best way to unwind while staying up to speed on national security. (And this Nightcap promises no hangover or weight gain.)  Sign up today.

The Cipher Brief: What do you think is going to happen under President Trump to the Ramstein Group, which has coordinated Western aid for Ukraine?

Amb. Vershbow: The Ramstein group, officially known as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, has been an extremely effective mechanism in coordinating military assistance to Ukraine, to include both equipment training and intelligence sharing, and I expect that it will continue to function in some similar way. It’s been a good example of transatlantic partnership, with the U.S. Secretary of Defense chairing these meetings. I think NATO is already anticipating that there might be somewhat reduced engagement or participation by the U.S., and they already began to revamp some of the institutional mechanisms that will allow the Ramstein Group to continue to be effective, with maybe more burden sharing with Europeans and other non-native countries. I think that’s going to be a success story that they will build on. There may be some other changes, but the important thing, of course, is the policy behind it, which is to help Ukraine build up the capacity to defeat the Russians in the short term, and to deter any future Russian aggression after this war is over, so that there’s no repeat of what happened in 2022.

Brzezinski: My initial gut is that the Trump administration will be happy to have the Europeans lead it, which I think would be a mistake because without American leadership you lose a lot of that momentum. You lose a lot of the pressure that’s necessary to get the Europeans to continue providing the level of assistance they’ve had and that, as necessary, to increase those levels of assistance. Leadership counts and American leadership counts, and when we’re not there, the situation is likely to be worse.

The Cipher Brief: What is the role of NATO in ending the war in Ukraine?

Brzezinski: This is a tragic war. It’s a war that’s cost over a million combatant casualties, both Russian and Ukrainian. It’s displaced millions of people. It’s destroying a democracy in the heart of Europe – that’s Ukraine. And we have an interest in bringing this war to a swift and just end and in a way that ensures enduring stability, at least military stability, on a continent that probably is going to have to face long-term confrontation with Russia.

If we want to achieve those objectives, the most effective way to do that is through NATO, with NATO playing a leadership role in the support of Ukraine and the securing of Ukraine. For me, the most effective way to do that is to extend NATO membership to Ukraine, including its Article Five security guarantee. Under the current circumstance, that would involve some sort of deterrent force that would deploy to Ukraine to, at a minimum, secure the territory or help Ukraine secure the territory it currently controls. That is the most effective way to bring this war to an end – and then also it’s a foundation for military stability in the aftermath. It would have to involve the United States, because a deterrent force without the United States will lack the credibility and probably the capacity necessary to be truly an effective deterrent to Russian aggression and a defense against any kind Russian provocation or attack.

Amb. Vershbow: There have to be important decisions taken by the Trump administration on what kinds of policies and activities they want to continue, and where they may take a different approach. I certainly hope they don’t follow the lead of some of the MAGA Republicans who would just as soon stop supporting Ukraine and pressure them into a bad deal, which would be extremely shortsighted and would end up probably costing the U.S. and the allies much more to repair the damage and rebuild the defenses in Ukraine that might’ve been lost. So we’re all waiting with bated breath to see what the Trump Administration’s course of action will be. But I think what’s needed is to give the Ukrainians not just enough to hold off the Russians or to avoid losing, but to really achieve a much more decisive edge on the battlefield. And then there may be more favorable conditions to generate leverage before you sit down at the bargaining table. The way to do that is not just to keep Ukraine afloat, but to give them more decisive capabilities to turn the tide on the battlefield. Then Putin will have to face the fact that he’s not winning, that the longer this drags out, the worse it’s going to be and the more costly it’s going to be for Russia, and then we may be able to get to a ceasefire that will last.

Any ceasefire, of course, has to be enforced. Every agreement the Russians ever signed with Ukraine since independence, Russia has violated and abandoned, so we can’t repeat that mistake. There’s been some talk about some kind of peacekeeping force that could separate the sides and provide the environment for implementing the ceasefire. That would have to be a very robust force.

Brzezinski: How Trump manages this conflict, how he brings it to its next phase—hopefully one which is an end of the fighting on just and stable terms—will define the credibility of his “peace through strength” strategy. If he does what he has said he would do during the campaign, that would be [British Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain-like concessions that would strip Ukraine of its sovereignty and security and probably lead to a wider war. Trump doesn’t want that, but he still has to be convinced.

I would say there are three arguments and actions that the Europeans need to make to Trump: One is to leverage his fear of a wider war that would suck in U.S. involvement. That’s the one thing Trump fears. He doesn’t want to have on his watch another war, another endless war that drags in American troops.

He’s coming in, sitting before a world that, as we have talked about, has three major contingencies: Hot war in Ukraine; spreading violence in the Middle East; and increasing Chinese provocation and aggression. They are all interlinked. They are at risk of metastasizing into a global war of really catastrophic proportions. Ending the war on Ukraine on stable and just terms is the most effective way to prevent that escalation.

Second point would be that if he wants his “peace through strength” national security strategy to have credibility, it’s going to be defined by what he does on Ukraine. If he makes concessions to the Russians that are extreme, that are strategically unstable, that reward aggression, peace through strength will be associated less with Churchill and more with Chamberlain. He doesn’t want that. We don’t want that.

And the third thing is an action item and it falls on the Europeans, and there’s actually some legitimacy to it. They need to stand up now and say that they are willing to put together a deterrent force. I don’t know if it’s 50,000, 75,000 personnel, but a sufficient force that would be willing to go in and deploy into Ukraine to provide that deterrent capacity. The request they would make to Trump is that they would want some American dimension in that; they would propose that it would be 80-90% European with an American dimension, probably command and control arrangement or capacities like a headquarters, maybe some air assets and missile defense assets that we already have in Europe. That would be the kind of burden sharing that Trump would expect. That’s the kind of action that could help bring this war to an appropriate end. And that is something that Trump, I think would find appealing because it would end the war, it would validate his peace through strength strategy, and it would demonstrate that he has led the Europeans to carry their share of the burden that he’s been demanding for so long.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? Get expert-level analysis about The Middle East, Russia, China and the other issues driving today’s headlines. 

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief



8. Expert Q&A: Former Trump Ambassador on Why Ukraine ‘Must’ Win


Expert Q&A: Former Trump Ambassador on Why Ukraine ‘Must’ Win

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/expert-qa-former-trump-ambassador-on-why-ukraine-must-win?utm

Posted: January 24th, 2025

By James S. Gilmore III

Ambassador James S. Gilmore III was the 68th Governor of Virginia from 1998 to 2002. He chaired the Republican National Committee in 2001. He also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe during the first Trump administration.

EXPERT Q&A — As the Trump Administration takes the reins for a second term, it has pledged a 100-day end to the war in Ukraine, and put out a mixed set of messages in terms of future support for Kyiv and how it may approach a negotiation with the Kremlin. Above all, President Trump has said – and he said it again this week – that the war must end, and that he will meet Vladimir Putin as part of his efforts to be sure it does. 

The Cipher Brief turned recently to former Virginia Governor James Gilmore, who also served as U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the first Trump administration, about what is at stake in Ukraine.

“If Putin prevails in this war and reduces Ukraine into a vassal state or divides it and demonstrates to Europe that they’re prepared to commit their people and their resources to conquest, it will alter the politics of Europe,” Gilmore told us. “The Eastern Europeans at that point will become much more tentative about their pro-Western support, which is universal right now. Western Europe could become more neutralized. Europe could cease to be a strategic partner of the United States. In my judgment, that threatens the existence of the United States of America. So – what’s at stake for the United States besides the money? The answer is everything.”

Governor Gilmore spoke with former Senior CIA Officer Glenn Corn for an episode of The State Secrets podcast. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity. You can also listen to the full discussion on Spotify and Apple Podcasts

Corn: What is your assessment of the situation in Ukraine up until now and your thoughts going forward?

Gilmore: Direct answer is that the United States ought to be supporting Ukraine as much as possible. They need to win. This is a critical moment in European history and therefore in American history. And the U.S. needs to be steadfast in this and to be as supportive as we possibly can be.

I was in Ukraine in 2021 and took the measure of the people that were there. I met with about 12 different cabinet ministers. The message that I was hearing from Ukrainians was that they were relentless in their determination to prevail against Russian aggression.

I know from my time as United States Ambassador in Vienna at the OSCE, I interacted with and met in concourse with the representatives and ambassadors from Ukraine. Ukraine is not an appendage of Russia. It is an independent nation. It may have been conquered in the past, but it is not conquered now. The Ukrainians told me that they are not Russians, that they’re determined to not be Russians, and that they intend to be sovereign and independent. They do not want to have a society like the Russians have that is authoritarian tyranny. They want to be part of the West. That determination to be part of the West is probably the reason why the Russian dictator decided to attack them.

 Corn: What is your assessment of the European response to what Russia has done?

Gilmore: The Europeans are actually contributing more money and more resources to Ukraine than the United States is. They are providing some financial support, some refugee support. America is best equipped to provide military support, and we are the leading provider of military support, but not the only ones.

The Europeans understand what’s at stake here, and we just need to try to teach the Americans what’s at stake here. This determination of the United States to end the war is very humanitarian because this is a terrible war that Putin has inflicted on an independent country. But you can have peace just by surrendering. And the Ukrainians, the last time I looked, are determined to not surrender.

The question really is what’s in it for the United States of America? That’s the issue in all this debate that’s going on. I’ll give you two things that are at stake for America in this war. 

Number one, the money that we’re sending over there. So far, I think it’s been somewhere around $175 billion. It represents about 5% of the defense budget of the United States. As far as the federal budget of the United States overall, it represents one and a half percent of that. So I suppose that someone could say that degrading the Russian aggression capacity and threat to Europe is not worth the money because the money is all that’s at stake. In my view, this is a priceless opportunity to stand up against aggression. There are no American lives at stake being put at threat in this war. I think that this is a very good expenditure of money.

The second thing that’s at stake for the United States is – everything. If Putin prevails in this war and reduces Ukraine into a vassal state or divides it and demonstrates to Europe that they’re prepared to commit their people and their resources to conquest, it will alter the politics of Europe. The Eastern Europeans at that point will become much more tentative about their pro-Western support, which is universal right now. Western Europe could become more neutralized. Europe could cease to be a strategic partner of the United States. In my judgment, that threatens the existence of the United States of America. It probably leads to World War III, where the US would be fighting on two fronts, one in the Pacific and one in Europe, if we decided at some point that an authoritarian world is one we can’t live in.

So I say once again, what’s at stake for the United States besides the money? The answer is everything.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? Watch expert-level discussions on The Middle East, Russia, China and the other top stories dominating the headlines.

Corn: How has the Russian narrative been able to be so successful here in the last few years in terms of promoting the idea that it’s a waste for the U.S., some of the claims that have been made about the Ukrainians, that they’re not really a nation, that they don’t have their own history, that Ukrainian is the Russian language, that they’re anti-church. Why do you think that’s happened? 

Gilmore: The Russian disinformation program is very great. I think that it works on the minds of conservatives. I think conservatives are suspicious of spending any federal money on anything. And so, they are amenable to this argument.

The second thing is there’s always been an isolationist sense in the United States of America. It re-emerges every so often. It was very powerful right before World War II. It was our sense that Europe was not our problem. They harken back to George Washington, who was leading a very different America at that time, who was saying, Well, we need to not get in entanglements with greater powers in Europe. But once Hitler began to actually conquer Europe, and we had a true worldly person in FDR who understood the threat, he began to move the United States towards supporting Europe, and particularly Britain during that time of crisis. But remember, the United States never did get into the war until Pearl Harbor, until the Japanese forced us into the war. And then at that point, it was perfectly obvious that the central point of that war was Europe because if Hitler had conquered Europe, that would have once again been a launching pad and a threat to the existence of the United States.

Corn: A lot of people think that Putin is in the driver’s seat now, that he is in a good situation, that Russia is more resilient than the US and the Europeans, that he can wait us out, that the Russian economy really isn’t suffering. What is your assessment of that?

Gilmore: On the battlefield, we’re getting mixed reports. We don’t know exactly who’s winning and losing there. The conventional wisdom is because Ukraine has less of a population, less money, is less developed, that they’re the weaker of the two countries. I’m not so sure that’s true.

All the reports we’re seeing right now is that the economic sanctions that have been imposed by the United States and its allies are starting to bite on the Russian economy. We’re seeing that really the oil economy is the only thing that’s keeping [the Russians] afloat. They have lost over 700,000 people wounded or dead in this conflict. They’re out of soldiers. That’s why they went off to North Korea and hired basically mercenaries to come in and supply their army. Frankly, I find that astonishing that you would inject North Korean soldiers into the European theater. So I think that by all evidence, Russia is cracking.

If the West stays resolute, I believe that Russia will not be able to continue this war. That doesn’t minimize the damage that’s being done to Ukraine. But to surrender politically now to Vladimir Putin would be a catastrophe in my point of view.

Let’s be real clear that this war is being fought by the Ukrainians for Ukraine for their future. They must make that decision. It’s not the role of the United States to keep them in a war they don’t want to be in. If Zelensky and the Ukrainians want to make a compromise at this point, it’s their country and their war, not ours. We’re in a supportive role, not an engaged role.

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that provides the best way to unwind while staying up to speed on national security. (And this Nightcap promises no hangover or weight gain.)  Sign up today.

Corn: To those people that say that we’re wasting energy and effort in Ukraine when the PRC is the real problem and we need to focus on China, what is your response to that line of thinking? 

Gilmore: First of all, I don’t minimize the threat of China. It’s very frustrating to me that China is behaving the way they are. They have had leaders like Russia did, as a matter of fact, that opened themselves up to the opportunity to do something better for their populations. Somehow that has gone haywire. Now they have more or less a dictator in charge who has a different goal, which is the domination of the Pacific, the domination of that part of East Asia. 

We’ve done everything we can do to trade with [China] and to open up our economy to them, to enrich them, to give them an opportunity to be a better country. This belligerence is not on us. It’s on them. 

Fortunately, we do have allies in the Pacific that understand this with clarity in the same way our European allies do — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea. These are countries that understand exactly the situation. So we’re not alone in the Pacific. 

And the Chinese are smarter than the Russians. They have not launched a feckless, ridiculous invasion of Taiwan in order to try to open themselves up to the rest of the Pacific, if they could capture that. They have not done that. And frankly, I think it’s a very difficult task for them. If you think about how hard it was for us to get across the English Channel to Normandy during World War II, [China has] to cross 110 miles of open ocean to get an occupying army into Taiwan. They can missile Taiwan, they can blow up Taiwan, but it’s pretty tough to get over there to conquer it.

The point is that in the long run, I don’t minimize the danger of China. But I think a pivot to China at this point opened up the door to the invasion in Europe, which is the more immediate problem. 

Corn: I often argue you have to view all these regions as a whole. Russia’s not separate from what’s going on in Iran, in the Middle East. We’ve seen some very serious changes have taken place in Syria. What is your assessment there?  

Gilmore: I think you’re very insightful when you begin to address the linkages between all of this. My view is we’re at a moment in which the authoritarian powers have made a decision about what kind of world that they want to live in. It’s a society where people are under dictatorships, they have to be afraid of the knock on the door in the middle of the night, with somebody being hauled away to a cellar to be tortured or beaten and ultimately murdered. That is the world that these authoritarians believe is best. We don’t. And as a result of that, I think that we need to recognize that all of this is linked. 

I just want to introduce the idea of hybrid warfare, which means that you project your entire national power against an adversary. It isn’t just military, it’s diplomacy, going to the bargaining table and making your enemy quit or give up something precious. It’s information, messaging, propaganda, and economic sanctions. And we have seen reports that there’s sabotage going on in Western Europe and other places. If you’re gonna see that kind of sabotage against Western Europe, it means that we all are engaged in a global conflict right now. I think the United States has to wake up and prepare itself for the conflict that is right before us.

It’s astonishing that the Russians would engage in terrorist activity, in sabotage, murder, undermining things. I don’t know what they think they’re going to accomplish. None of that stuff is going to weaken American resolve whatsoever. Are we really going to be frightened by that kind of thing? We’re not. So all they’re really doing at this point is announcing that we’re at war. We’re at a hybrid war. If somebody is attacking us with cyber attacks, that’s an act of war. If they’re blowing up our cables, that’s an act of war. If they’re actually engaged in disinformation and propaganda in order to weaken our political system, that’s war. Just because you are not engaged in a nuclear exchange or we’re not sending the 101st Airborne to France doesn’t mean you’re not at war. It’s a low-level war, but I think we have to get serious about it.

Furthermore, we’re going to very soon have to begin to seriously invest in America’s economy and the ability here to actually prepare and engage in this war. We’re not really ready right now. I’ve heard people say that we’re not really ready to engage in Europe and in the Pacific at the same time. Well, if our enemy knows that, that’s what’s going to happen, isn’t it? We just have to begin to prepare in a much more serious way.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief



9. Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition


All three articles are from the Cipher Briefs 3 part series are below.


1. Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition
2. What are our Adversaries trying to achieve in the Gray Zone?
3. How Can the U.S. better manage the Gray Zone?


 In response to the last article's title: "How can the U.S. better manage in the gray zone:"


Rather than "manage" we must execute campaigns to win in the gray zone short of the threshold of war.


My six words to do that: Execute a superior political warfare strategy.


LTG Cleveland and Daniel Egel make some important recommendations here:

Is it Time to Finally Put Someone in Charge of Waging America’s Irregular Wars?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/13/is-it-time-to-finally-put-someone-in-charge-of-waging-americas-irregular-wars/


My recommendations for the Gray Zone:

Seizing the Initiative in the Gray Zone: The Case for a US Office of Strategic Disruption

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/seizing-the-initiative-in-the-gray-zone-the-case-for-a-us-office-of-strategic-disruption/

 


Welcome to the Gray Zone and the Future of Great Power Competition

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/welcome-to-the-gray-zone-and-the-future-of-great-power-competition

SPECIAL SERIESThe Chinese ship, the bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 (R) is anchored and being monitored by a Danish naval patrol vessels in the sea of Kattegat, near the City og Granaa in Jutland, Denmark, on November 20, 2024. Denmark’s navy said on November 20, 2024 it was shadowing a Chinese cargo vessel in the Baltic Sea, a day after Finland and Sweden opened investigations into suspected sabotage of two severed undersea telecoms cables. “The Danish Defence can confirm that we are present in the area near the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3,” the military wrote in an email to AFP, adding that it would make no further comment for the time-being. (Photo by Mikkel Berg Pedersen / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP) / Denmark OUT (Photo by MIKKEL BERG PEDERSEN/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images)

Posted: January 8th, 2025

By Dave Pitts

Pitts is a senior national security executive with over four decades of experience ranging from counterterrorism and special operations to regional and global affairs. Pitts served as the Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia and was responsible for all CIA activities and engagement across South and Central Asia and for policy coordination in Washington.

This is part one of a 3-part series by Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia Dave Pitts, who also serves as a member of The Cipher Brief’s new Gray Zone Group.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Ten thousand North Korean soldiers arrive in Russia to attempt to drive the Ukrainians from Russian soil, although North Korea isn’t at war with Ukraine. 

China conducts persistent and aggressive Coast Guard incursions into Taiwan’s territorial waters to attempt to extend and normalize control over the Taiwan Strait, while also trying to intimidate the Philippines to give up its presence in the Second Thomas Shoal.

Russia, China, and Iran use cyber and disinformation operations to attempt to interfere in U.S. elections, a clear violation of U.S. sovereignty and political independence. 

Russia is conducting sabotage operations across Europe targeting critical infrastructure to destabilize NATO allies and disrupt their support for Ukraine. 

Pyongyang conducted 97 cyberattacks between 2017 and 2024 with total damage of around $3.6 billion.

Welcome to the Gray Zone.

The consequences of the military escalation of great power competition can be severe, and great powers will go to great lengths to avoid direct conflict, given the potential for devastating losses. The reality is that this shadowy gray zone has become a space of increasing activity by U.S. adversaries.

What is the Gray Zone?

The gray zone is the geopolitical space between peace and war where nations conduct activities to advance their national interests and weaken their adversaries without triggering a military response. Gray zone activities may also set the conditions for a future war but remain below a threshold that would provoke an immediate military response.

As the U.S. and its allies seek to maintain the world order that has been in place since WWII, Russia and China, often working together (and supported by nefarious actors such as Iran and North Korea) have sought to diminish the influence and standing of the U.S. in favor of their own ascent and their authoritarian views.

The gray zone isn’t just one aspect of great power competition—it’s quickly becoming the dominant space where that competition plays out. Gray zone activity is increasing because great power competition is intensifying.

The Gray Zone Offers Unique Opportunities

Countries often need deniability in order for gray zone activities to be successful, even if only a fig-leaf of deniability in some cases. Gray zone activities can span the spectrum of attribution from attributable (overt) to unattributable (covert), or misattributable (false flag).

Advances in technology, particularly in AI, and evolving warfare tactics like the ones we are observing in real time in Ukraine, (advances in drone technology, for example) are providing new capabilities to nations that have the ability to ‘level the playing field’ in some ways.

AI is also bolstering both the reach and impact of cognitive warfare tactics, providing new methods of persuasion, coercion, and manipulation. And because countries want to avoid a costly war, there is a high threshold, as well as general uncertainty, on how to respond to gray zone activities.

Using these advantages, smaller countries, like Iran and North Korea, can today attempt to make strategic gains against the U.S. and the West, either alone or in alliance with Russia or China, that would be unachievable in a conventional war. The gray zone provides options to nations that otherwise may have none.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? Watch The Cipher Brief’s interview with CIA Director Bill Burns as he talks about The Middle East, Russia, China and the thing that keeps him up at night.

There are a few additional considerations for truly understanding gray zone operations.

First, determining what is gray zone activity versus normal statecraft can be difficult and confusing given the often-tense relations between nations. Some of what we consider as operations in the gray zone may simply be harsh diplomacy. There’s room for debate there, but we should avoid the urge to label every aggressive action our adversaries take as being ‘in the gray zone’.

There is also some thought that adversary activities have to be covert or ambiguous to be considered gray zone activities. That probably aligned well during the Cold War, but maybe less so today.

Some gray zone activities require varying levels of ambiguity or covertness, but not all. Some gray zone activity is meant to have an audience, such as China’s aggressive gray zone actions in the South China Sea.

What common strategies or tactics do our adversaries employ?

There are several tactics used by our adversaries that make deterrence and effectively responding to gray zone activities more challenging. 

The first, “salami tactics”, speaks to the use of small, incremental encroachments or actions that don’t merit a response, but that are often followed by similar small encroachments or actions that in sum, change the status quo over time. It’s hard for nations to know how to respond to this approach.

The second, “fait accompli” refers to bolder actions that are taken quickly with the calculation that a military response would be too escalatory or risky.

Russia likely calculated that its plan in 2022 to quickly decapitate Ukrainian leadership and take the country in a matter of days—along with some saber rattling and threats—would have made the takeover of Ukraine a fait accompli that was too risky for U.S. and NATO intervention.

Unlike in 2014 in Crimea, that strategy by Moscow failed in 2022.

One key attribute of gray zone activities is that the fear of the consequences of 21st century conflict, and particularly conflict that can draw in countries with powerful militaries, restrains responses to gray zone activity.

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea watch U.S. responses closely, and a lack of response or inconsistent responses, encourages additional gray zone action. 

Are we already in a ‘Gray War’ with China and Russia?

Given the growing intensity and systematic use of gray zone activities by U.S. adversaries, it is worth considering whether we are now in a “Gray War” with China and Russia. And is that Gray War being supported by help from Iran and North Korea?

Consider that a Gray War would take place entirely in the gray zone and would be well beyond the periodic use of gray zone activities by our adversaries to gradually erode U.S power and influence.

A gray war could be defined as the systematic and coordinated use of gray zone activities by our adversaries to achieve the same strategic results as a conventional war, without the risks of direct conflict.

The question now is whether China believes that it can strategically defeat the U.S. – using Russia as a primary surrogate – so that it can take Taiwan and establish itself as the dominant global superpower without direct superpower conflict. 

Instead of China using the gray zone to gradually weaken the U.S. and to help set the conditions for a future war, the new reality is that the gray zone may now be the place where the next war is already being fought.

This is part one of a 3-part series by Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia Dave Pitts, who also serves as a member of The Cipher Brief’s new Gray Zone Group.

Read the next installment of Pitts’ Gray Zone series next Wednesday exclusively in The Cipher Brief. And join Pitts and other Cipher Brief Experts in a series of live conversations happening in 2025 led by former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers. 

Subscriber+ Members, check your email for an exclusive invitation to register for the first session on Wednesday, January 22 at 1:30p ET. Not a member? We can help with that.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.


What are our Adversaries trying to achieve in the Gray Zone? 

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/what-are-our-adversaries-trying-to-achieve-in-the-gray-zone

SPECIAL SERIESPosted: January 15th, 2025

By Dave Pitts

Pitts is a senior national security executive with over four decades of experience ranging from counterterrorism and special operations to regional and global affairs. Pitts served as the Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia and was responsible for all CIA activities and engagement across South and Central Asia and for policy coordination in Washington.

This is part 2 of a 3-part series by Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia Dave Pitts, who also serves as a member of The Cipher Brief’s new Gray Zone Group. 

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Even with a broad understanding of the gray zone, it can be difficult to put into strategic perspective the gray zone activities we see. The tools of the gray zone are diverse and evolving: cognitive warfare; cyber operations; use of surrogates, proxies, and ambiguous forces; aggressive espionage; political and economic coercion; and darker tools such as sabotage and assassinations come to the top of the list, but there are others.  

Our adversaries are using these tools in key five areas in the gray zone to advance their strategic objectives, to gain a strategic advantage, and to attempt to weaken and undermine the U.S.  

First, our adversaries want to win the cognitive battle 

Beyond disinformation, our adversaries, particularly Russia and China, are conducting much more advanced and AI-enabled cognitive warfare activities to advance their strategic objectives by attempting to manipulate how we see the world, what we think, how we make decisions, and which decisions we make.  

For example, the current debate over TikTok is based on concerns that TikTok allows China to discreetly drive the national security narrative in the U.S. to its advantage, with an audience of 170 million Americans. There are also concerns about China’s access to the personal data of all those users.  

TikTok is just one example. Today’s cognitive warfare is a comprehensive assault on human cognition. Our adversaries attempt this by influencing individuals, groups, and societies, including our policymakers, at the cognitive level—through persistent influence and disinformation activities, but also through a wide range of actions and pressures, including intimidation—that can influence cognition. Cognitive warfare has become a prevalent gray zone activity. 

Second, our adversaries are working to alter the geopolitical landscape to their advantage 

The gray zone allows nations to alter the geopolitical landscape or “change the map”, figuratively and literally, so that it favors their interests and possibly sets conditions for a future war.  

In 2014, Russia seized control of Crimea to change the map around its borders using ambiguous forces, soon to be labeled “little green Men”. This created a thin veneer of deniability and enough confusion for Russia to gain full control of Crimea before there could be an effective international response; essentially a fait accompli.  

Today China is expanding its artificial island-building activities in the South China Sea, creating new strategic locations that didn’t exist. China began these activities more than a decade ago in the Spratly Islands. The strategy has allowed China to project military power far from its mainland, potentially threaten U.S. bases in the Philippines, and intimidate its neighbors.  

Join Pitts and other Cipher Brief Experts for a real-time conversation on defining the gray zone and the impact on U.S. national security led by former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers and Dave Pitts on Wednesday, January 22 at 1:30p ET. Subscriber+ Members, check your email for an exclusive invitation to register for this exclusive conversation. Not a member? We can help with that

China’s aggressive maritime activities around Taiwan, meanwhile, are part of a strategy to erode Taiwan’s control over these waters, normalize the presence of Chinese forces, and assert Chinese jurisdiction through force; a change in the status quo outside of international norms. 

Iran’s development of proxy forces in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen are another example, changing the map in a more figurative way, allowing Iran to project power well beyond its borders, to provide strategic depth, and to threaten Israel, the U.S., and the West.  

The polar regions, particularly the Arctic, are new areas of contested space ripe for gray zone activities in an evolving and important geopolitical landscape. Russia is already trying to exert control over Arctic waters close to the U.S., and China’s growing influence in Greenland is heating up great power competition. 

Third, our adversaries want to compromise and disrupt our essential national systems 

Penetrating and compromising national systems can have devastating impacts while still avoiding a military response.  

Cyberattacks on U.S critical infrastructure constitute one of the most potentially damaging gray zone activities by our adversaries. According to DHS, China, Russia, and Iran are the most pressing foreign threats to U.S. critical infrastructure 

FBI Director Christopher Wray recently said that Chinese government-linked hackers have burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure and are waiting “for just the right moment to deal a devastating blow.” The U.S. response has been robust, but this is a race we are not yet winning

Although not formally designated as critical infrastructure, space and space infrastructure have also become a frontier for gray zone activity. Our adversaries can disrupt GPS and communications satellites, and other methods, such as deorbiting, obstructing, or soft kill may also be possible. This may be a new type of space race. 

Sabotage is a tool of war, but it is also a gray zone activity. Sabotage can damage, disrupt, or destroy critical infrastructure, resources, or capabilities, and is often conducted covertly. Some forms of sabotage can also create chaos, intimidate, convey threats, and undermine confidence in a government’s ability to protect it citizens and sovereignty.  

Russia has a long history of sabotage, including suspicion that it may have collaborated with China in cutting two fiber-optic data cables in the Baltic Sea in November. Russia was also implicated in plotting to put incendiary devices on cargo planes and other acts of sabotage in an escalation of Russian sabotage activities against the West. 

One non-adversary example also stands out. Israel’s innovative sabotage of Hezbollah pagers and hand-held radios last September disrupted Hezbollah’s command and control, shattered Hezbollah’s confidence in its communication, reminded Hezbollah that Israel had deeply penetrated its organization, and sent shockwaves throughout Hezbollah leadership and the rank-and-file. This was sabotage not only with a strong disruptive effect but also with a strong cognitive component, as an example of the broad impact that sabotage operations can have. 

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? Get expert-level analysis about The Middle East, Russia, China and the other issues driving today’s headlines. 

Supply chain disruption is a frequent gray zone activity. Russia is using sabotage to disrupt the flow of support to Ukraine. In 2017, Russia’s NotPetya cyberattack on the Ukraine, which Russia continues to deny, also disabled global supply chains.  

Iran also poses a threat to U.S. and global supply chains. Iran has seized almost 20 ships since 2021, including the 2024 seizure of MSC Aries in international waters. The Houthi attacks on international shipping also threaten and degrade Israeli and Western supply chains.  

The assassination of foreign officials—political, military, and industry—is a long-standing gray zone tactic. Many countries have a history of using assassinations to silence political dissent, and the KGB has been credited with numerous assassinations of foreign leaders during the Cold War.  

Russia’s disrupted plan to assassinate the Chief Executive of a German arms manufacturer that produces artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine, and other defense industry executives across Europe, is an example of Russia’s willingness to assassinate foreign officials – beyond military targets – to achieve its goals. 

And while it did not involve a foreign official, Russia’s plan to assassinate Russian defector Aleksander Poteyev, which was disrupted in Florida in 2020, is a clear signal that Russia will take action with no regard for sovereignty or law. 

The U.S. Justice Department recently announced murder-for-hire charges against an Iranian IRGC asset including plots against President-elect Donald Trump. This is the latest in a long series of Iranian plots to assassinate Americans and other Westerners.  

Fourth, U.S. adversaries want to steal data and technology to gain an advantage 

Espionage is taking place every day around the world, but the gray zone allows for bolder, more aggressive espionage that is harmful to the U.S. but difficult to deter and counter.  

The 2024 large-scale hacking of telecommunications infrastructure, perpetrated by “Salt Typhoon”, a China-backed hacking group, exposed the cell phone records of millions of Americans, including political figures, and went undetected for more than a year.  

Russia’s 2020 SolarWinds cyberattack, which involved widespread infiltration of government and private sector networks, is another example of large-scale cyber espionage campaigns. Both attacks resulted in incalculable national security damage to the U.S. 

The intersection of technology, defense, space and intelligence is critical to future U.S. national security. Join The Cipher Brief on June 5th and 6th in Austin, Texas for the NatSecEDGE conference. Find out how to get an invitation to this invite-only event at natsecedge.com 

FBI Director Wray identified China’s technology theft as the “defining threat of the generation”, and it is also a global threat. Technology theft potential gives China and other countries a means to undermine a U.S. technological edge.  

China uses cyberattacks, hacking operations, recruitment of employees, and social and professional networking sites to identify targets, and direct acquisition of companies and land. The impact is widespread. One in five U.S. corporations report that China has stolen their intellectual property within the last year; overall, such theft has an annual impact estimated at between $225-600 billion. Targets range from Fortune 100 companies to small startups, which may be particularly vulnerable. 

Russia and China employ other methods as well. The Chinese surveillance balloon episode from early 2023 illustrated that China will use all means available to spy on the U.S., including violating U.S. territory.   

The ten “Operation Ghost Stories” SVR agents arrested in the U.S. in 2010 not only gave Russia an ongoing intelligence collection capability, but also a potential gray zone capability inside the U.S. for the future – had it not been disrupted. 

Finally, U.S. adversaries are working to undermine U.S. global activities and influence 

Our adversaries work in the gray zone to undermine and disrupt U.S. global activity, influence, and standing around the world, particularly with prospective partners. Unexpected setbacks in global initiatives or the reversal of diplomatic gains can often be traced back to the gray zone.  

U.S. and NATO efforts to provide Ukraine with an advantage over Russia are directly undermined by Iran and North Korea shipping missiles, drones, and munitions to Russia, and China providing billions of dollars in microchips—an effort aimed as much at the U.S. as Ukraine. 

The U.S., NATO, and other countries have taken significant steps to sanction Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. But ghost fleets, shell companies, money laundering, and other behind-the-scenes cooperation with countries unwilling or unable to cut ties with Russia enable gray zone sanctions evasion and undermine U.S. efforts. 

Past U.S. efforts in Syria were systematically undermined by Iran and Russia, often working in parallel. Their activities had the intent to diminish U.S. presence, influence, and resolve in the Middle East. However, the December collapse of the Assad regime represents a significant setback for Russia and Iran.  

China and Russia both have a long history of gray zone activities to subvert legitimate political processes and undermine political independence of other countries to put in place governments favorable to them. This is well beyond traditional diplomacy. 

Russia has used a variety of coercion, bribery, voter bribery schemes, economic leverage, and support for separatists and pro-Russian groups to manipulate political processes in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and in at least 28 countries in Africa

Europe has been a favorite political interference target for Russia, and Russia has used similar tactics to influence political outcomes in RomaniaFrance, and Italy. Russia still hopes to maintain considerable influence in, if not control over, Central Asia through political interference.  

China has employed varying levels of bribery, coercion, and debt diplomacy with mixed degrees of success in countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Bhutan, Pakistan, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. It’s fair to say that China’s diplomatic engagement and economic investment can easily set the stage for more nefarious gray zone activity.  

China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) currently provides China with diplomatic and economic access in 150 countries. BRI does provide economic advantages for many of those countries, but it would be a mistake to not also see the BRI as a foundation for China’s global gray zone activity—political interference, expansion of Chinese intelligence and military infrastructure, and negating of U.S. access and influence. 

Read the next installment of Pitts’ Gray Zone series next Wednesday, exclusively in The Cipher Brief.  

Join Pitts and other Cipher Brief Experts for a real-time conversation on defining the gray zone and the impact on U.S. national security led by former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers and Dave Pitts on Wednesday, January 22 at 1:30p ET. 

Subscriber+ Members, check your email for an exclusive invitation to register for this exclusive conversation. Not a member? We can help with that

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business. 



How Can the U.S. better manage the Gray Zone?

"We have to rethink, retool, and reorient so that we are as prepared for gray zone activity as we are for traditional conflict; we’re not there yet."

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/how-can-the-u-s-better-manage-the-gray-zone

SPECIAL SERIESView of four sailors manning a radar scope, mid twentieth century. (Photo by US Navy/Interim Archives/Getty Images)Tweet

Share

Pin

Share

0

Shares

Posted: January 22nd, 2025

By Dave Pitts

Pitts is a senior national security executive with over four decades of experience ranging from counterterrorism and special operations to regional and global affairs. Pitts served as the Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia and was responsible for all CIA activities and engagement across South and Central Asia and for policy coordination in Washington.

This is part three in a three-part series by Cipher Brief Expert and former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia Dave Pitts, who also serves as a member of The Cipher Brief’s new Gray Zone Group. You can read parts one and two exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

“In this three-part series, Dave Pitts brings conceptual clarity to strategic competition and conflict in the gray zone. As Dave notes, gray war is likely to be the primary mode of conflict going forward between America and its great and regional power adversaries, just as it was during the Soviet-American Cold War. Indeed, the new gray war has been underway for some time. Gray war encompasses a range of operations from non-lethal and lethal covert action to overt, indirect (proxy) war, and from cognitive warfare to cyber operations. It even extends into space. Through gray war, our adversaries seek to undermine our national will and capacity to oppose them, alter the geopolitical landscape to their advantage and undermine our global influence, compromise our critical national security systems, and steal our data and technology. Intelligence will be our first line of defense, but it is not enough. We must act. To date, America has been mostly reactive and on the defensive in the gray war. That must change.”

— Dr. Michael Vickers, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION — The question of how the U.S. can better manage the gray zone – that geopolitical space between peace and war where nations conduct activities to advance their national interests and weaken their adversaries without triggering a military response – is crucial to future U.S. national security. What the U.S. can do better in this space is something The Cipher Brief’s Gray Zone Group is tackling this year as a priority. Here are some things we need to consider.

First, the gray zone is a primary component of current and future great power competition; we’re in a gray war already.

One of the first steps we can take is to recognize in practical terms the reality of the gray zone in great power competition. The U.S. hasn’t fought a conventional war of great powers in eight decades. In contrast, we face increasingly complex and consequential gray zone activity at home and abroad every day, and the pace is increasing.

Today, we are in a gray war—which I offered in a previous article as the systematic and coordinated use of gray zone activities by our adversaries to achieve the same strategic results as a conventional war, without the risks of direct conflict. We have to rethink, retool, and reorient so that we are as prepared for gray zone activity as we are for traditional conflict; we’re not there yet.

There are limits to traditional statecraft and war has high costs. For some countries, the gray zone is seen as effective, less resource intensive, deniable if needed, and an opportunity to weaken powerful adversaries without risking a military response.

China, Russia, Iran and North Korea believe there are more gains than risks in the gray zone and any risks they may face are acceptable. That is the underlying calculation of the gray zone. Conventional deterrence—such as the strong, experienced U.S. Military—which may constrain conventional military action, does not always translate into deterrence in the gray zone.

Given these considerations and the perceived advantages of the gray zone, our adversaries will only reconsider gray zone attacks against the U.S. when the risks of those attacks outweigh the gains. The U.S. will need to demonstrate consistency and resolve in the gray zone.

Second, develop and adapt capabilities for the gray zone.

One key challenge of countering gray zone activity is that the U.S. has to have world-class capabilities built for the gray zone. As just two examples:

We certainly have world-class cyber capabilities, but that expertise and those capabilities are concentrated in some organizations and not distributed across the rest of the government and the private sector. Even with these considerable capabilities, we have been unable to prevent penetration of dispersed and exposed critical infrastructure or to stop countless data breaches and technology theft, all significantly damaging to our national security.

Our national cyber capability, considerable as it is, wasn’t built for today’s gray zone and is now working to catch up. We certainly have the capabilities and expertise to be more effective in the gray zone.

The U.S. has strong expertise and experience in detecting and countering disinformation by foreign adversaries. Today, we lag behind in the development of a broader and coordinated cognitive warfare capability that can fully counter the cognitive warfare waged by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, all aimed at the U.S. simultaneously.

It’s a hard but fair question to ask if Russia’s and China’s cognitive warfare efforts have been effective in influencing U.S. opinion and policy on Ukraine, NATO, Taiwan, and the Middle East; if their actions have undermined our confidence in our institutions; and if they have created social turmoil and unrest to undermine our national security.

We certainly have the know-how and capabilities in this cognitive space; we just need to re-orient for the gray zone.

Join Pitts and other Cipher Brief Experts for a real-time conversation on defining the gray zone and the impact on U.S. national security led by former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers and Dave Pitts on Wednesday, January 22 at 1:30p ET. Subscriber+ Members, check your email for an exclusive invitation to register for this exclusive conversation. Not a member? We can help with that

Third, a strategy of monitor-deter-respond with a focus on seizing the initiative.

Laying out a comprehensive approach to countering our adversaries in the gray zone is a task for diverse public and private sector experts, which I hope will take place, but I will offer a few thoughts. Enabling this approach likely requires leadership at the National Security Council level with the integrated support of the U.S. interagency community and the private sector.

Monitor.

“Gray Zone Intelligence” and shared situational awareness is important. Gray zone intelligence isn’t necessarily a real term, but perhaps it should be. Let me just use it to make a point.

Our ability to deter gray zone activity is enhanced by intelligence from the US Intelligence Community and our partners that allows the U.S. to act in advance—as evidenced by the U.S.’ use of “strategic declassification” prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Knowing what steps our adversaries may take in the gray zone—before they take them—is the goal. 

We should relook at our intelligence posture to assess if we have an appropriate focus on adversary gray zone activity beyond more traditional threats.

The U.S. private sector is on the front lines of U.S. global engagement in many ways and is often the target of adversary gray zone activity. It is also a significant force enabler. We likely need a new collaborative initiative to help the private sector better monitor and recognize potential gray activity against the U.S.

Deter and respond.

Deterrence begins with clear communications. We have to communicate clearly and convincingly to our adversaries about their gray zone actions. These actions are often violations of U.S sovereignty and law, and they pose a threat to our government, the private sector, our citizens, and our allies. We should provide clear warnings to our adversaries that the U.S. will respond to these activities and the responses will be persuasive. Of course, we have to back that up.

We can enable those communications by publicly highlighting our adversaries’ gray zone activities in advance when we know it, unless that exposes sensitive sources and methods, or following a gray zone activity when attribution is sufficiently clear. This is taking place now in some cases, but it should become more systematic and more calculated to ensure that narratives of denial by our adversaries do not prevail.

The U.S. requires an evolving range of effective responses to gray zone activity when deterrence fails. A range of options are already in play, including U.S legal, economic, and diplomatic power; combined responses with our allies; sanctions; and expulsion of officials. We need innovative thinking on additional options given the difficulty in persuasive deterrence and effective response.

We’ll certainly need public-private sector collaboration on the technologies, capabilities, and critical thinking necessary to support those efforts. We also need to coordinate closely with our international partners on responding to gray zone activity involving the interests of multiple countries.

From deterrence and response to seizing the initiative 

We can protect U.S interest through persuasive deterrence and effective responses, but we can’t advance them. The best approaches are those that advance U.S. interests as we are mitigating gray zone activity against us. The gray zone is about both defense and offense as well as an opportunistic approach. For example:

The U.S.-led effort to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia was and is an opportunity to weaken Russia beyond Ukraine, to strengthen NATO’s posture against Russia, and to reduce Russia’s military power and global aggression that threatens the U.S and its allies—without the U.S. engaging in direct military conflict against Russia.

U.S. activity with international partners to defy Chinese efforts to redraw maritime borders in the South China Sea have been important in maintaining the status quo despite aggressive action by China. Beyond deterrence, this has expanded intelligence sharing, increased the capabilities of our partners, and bolstered U.S. standing in the region.

NATO is beefing up its presence in the Baltic Sea to monitor the presence and activities of foreign ships that might threaten undersea cables. A UK-led maritime force, made up of 10 nations, Operation Nordic Warden is using AI to more precisely monitor threats to undersea infrastructure, specifically Russia’s shadow fleet—aka Ghost Fleet—that also enables Russia to avoid U.S. sanctions.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? Get expert-level analysis about The Middle East, Russia, China and the other issues driving today’s headlines. 

Fourth, rethink how we assess risk in the gray zone.

The gray zone is filled with real threats, many things that aren’t real, and outright deception. Cognitive warfare by Russia, China, and Iran floods the zone with false and manipulated information; fabricated organizations and events; persuasive but false national narratives; and calculated threats and intimidation intended to weaken our resolve, impair our judgment, and push us toward decisions that favor their interests.

This is the gray zone’s version of the “fog of war”.

Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, countless redlines, and other threats may be real or they may be calculated cognitive efforts to persuade countries to make decisions favorable to Russia. At times, that has worked. China’s aggressive maritime actions around Taiwan and in the South China Sea may be bluffs, but they may change the status quo permanently if unchallenged.

The point is that we have to look at the gray zone through a different lens. That requires strong intelligence but also a much deeper understanding of the gray zone and the tactics employed by our adversaries. There are risks in acting and risks in not acting, but an ever-present risk is that we simply fail to fully understand what is happening around us in the gray zone.

Of course, the ultimate risk is that we or our adversaries miscalculate the impact of a gray zone activity or the impact of a response. Those miscalculations could begin an escalation toward conflict that is difficult to manage.

Miscalculations in the gray zone have consequences.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which Russia assumed would go the way of its 2014 gray zone grab of Crimea with little or no real response by the U.S. and NATO, is a good example. Russia now finds itself in a protracted war with Ukraine and vulnerable to actions by the U.S. and its allies.

According to Ukraine, Russia has lost over 800,000 military personnel and a staggering list of armor, artillery, aircraft, UAVs, missiles, ground vehicles, and naval vessels. Using Ukraine’s data, Russian losses would form a military that would rival or surpass many militaries in the world.

Russia’s invasion led to a unified and now-larger NATO, and a long list of sanctions which have resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in financial loss, diminished factory production and trade, reduced oil revenues, and loss of access to Western technologies. Russia has proved resilient in evading the impact of many of these sanctions, but this incredible damage to Russia’s national power is clearly not what Putin bargained for.

Iran miscalculated the response to Hamas’ Oct 2023 attack on Israel and misjudged the military capabilities of its surrogates, Hamas and Hezbollah, against a world class military, especially one with committed military support from the U.S. Hamas and Hezbollah are still capable organizations, but they are experiencing significant, likely permanent, setbacks.

Iran’s overall strategic position in the region has been weakened and its now-diminished air defense capability expose its energy infrastructure and nuclear program to attacks from Israel.

Join Pitts and other Cipher Brief Experts for a real-time conversation on defining the gray zone and the impact on U.S. national security led by former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers and Dave Pitts on Wednesday, January 22 at 1:30p ET. 

Subscriber+ Members, check your email for an exclusive invitation to register for this exclusive conversation. Not a member? We can help with that

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business. 



10. Free and Open Spaces: How Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and Global Leaders are Rewiring Geopolitics


Is "Free and Open Spaces" the new US foreign policy vision and tag line?


To achieve this vision requires faith and trust in the people which is perhaps the ultimate populist vision. This requires governments to protect the individual liberty and human rights of all its people (such as the US Constitution does for Americans).


Excerpts:

Unlike the deceitful promises of globalism and the Belt and Road, free and open spaces are not advertising and can’t deliver a new rules-based order, let alone a Utopia free from war and want or tariffs.
On the other hand, free and open spaces can allow free sovereign nations more space to make their own choices. The ones that choose good governance in service of their people will, without question, profit most.


Free and Open Spaces: How Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and Global Leaders are Rewiring Geopolitics

19fortyfive.com · by James Jay Carafano · January 25, 2025

When Elon Musk looks back at Earth on his travels to Mars, the big blue beachball may look the same, but here is to bet the future geopolitics of homeland Earth will be different. Expect this new world map to come not from the puffing chests of great power politics but rewired more by mundane paths of trade and commerce, the free and open spaces that connect the planet together. In part, this change will be stewarded by entrepreneurial visionaries like space captain Musk but also earthbound global leaders like his pals Trump (US), Meloni (Italy), Melei (Argentina), and Modi (India).

A New Old

It would be a bad bet to believe that the US, as well as friends and allies, will stop skirmishing with the likes of China, Russia, and Iran anytime soon (unless the three collapse from the internal rot plaguing each adversary in its own way). That said, the great power struggle doesn’t answer the question of what the rest of the world does while the great powers are struggling.

For sure, the odds of the planet splitting into a complex sphere of influence, despite the dire predictions of pearl-clutching strategic pundits, dim every day. Like the polar bear plunge, America and its enemies might plummet into another Cold War. Still, they don’t have the power and influence to divide the world among themselves into private playgrounds—no East and West, no neutral zones or Global Souths distinguished from Global Norths, no poles with nations circling great powers like little planets.

Rather, the old geography, the traditional paths that linked Eurasia together and link Eurasia to the rest of the world, are going to reemerge. Neither Beijing nor Moscow nor even Washington, certainly not Tehran, have the power to stop them from growing back like mowed grass.

Trump and his clique have already figured out the times they are a-changing. Instead of fighting the new old geography, they are instead, like Musk’s incessant posting on X, nudging the world along—because in the end, they too benefit from not lapsing into the brutal old practices of imperialism or isolationism trying to prevent or insulate themselves from the changes of a changing world.

Three big geopolitical projects will tie the world together. They are not a form of globalization, which was just another practice of imperialism, a Davos political project to unite the world under a progressive vision that, in the end, was not delivering the promised progress and prosperity or, for that matter, a rules-based order with any rules that anyone was really following. Nor are these new geopolitical projects a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, another version of old imperialist practice (more old wine in new bottles with Mandarin labels). Instead, Trump et al. are backing something truly new and let timelessly old projects that are the opposite of globalization and the Belt and Road ploys. They are going with the flow.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The first of these big ideas was a free and open Indo-Pacific, a proposal birthed by one of Trump’s pals, the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. While the free and open Indo-Pacific was, while not stated, a project to counter China, the strategy was not to offer an alternative cage to Beijing’s domination of the world encompassing the Pacific and Indian Ocean but a more modest strategy to block the CCP from being the master of the Asian neighborhood.

The plan for a free and open Indo-Pacific was not just aspirational. The concept included leadership to spur operationalizing the vision—the Quad. This framework included Japan, the US, India, and Australia, each with its own interests but united by one common bond: the belief that they were all better off with the region being free and open. The idea took off when Trump’s buddy, Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing economies, joined the team.

The Quad has become an enduring institution in the emerging new old world. Biden kept it going despite the fact the alliance was a Trump-initiated project. Meanwhile, the first foreign policy act in the new Trump administration was a meeting of the Quad foreign minister chaired by the first-day-on-the-job US Secretary of Defense Marco Rubio. Further, the Quad has evolved into a Quad-Plus club, with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, New Zealand, and South Korea more closely aligning with the idea.

Free and Open Indo-Mediterranean

This second space was the brainchild of another part of the Trump-Musk posse, Georgia Meloni, the Prime Minister of Italy, whose outreach to Modi’s India became an initiative to extend free and open spaces from the Indian Ocean through the Middle East and East and North Africa to Europe. This opening birthed projects, including the IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor), the proposal to massively expand the throughput across the Middle East beyond the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe.

Italy sits at the nexus of three geopolitical corridors that had united Eurasia for centuries and are reemerging. One is the trade and commerce through the Middle East. Projects like IMEC. The second corridor is the old Silk Road, often called the Middle Corridor, connecting the Central Asia States and the Caucuses of Europe across the Black Sea. The third connects North, Central, and Southern Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Aegean and the Black Seas. Once the pathway for Viking traders, today, the effort to connect the backbone of Europe is championed by the Three Seas Initiative.

The Indo-Mediterranean conceptually expands the campaign for free and open spaces from the Panama Canal to the West Coast of North and South America, across the Pacific Islands to all of Europe, the Greater Middle East, and East Africa. A free and open Indo-Mediterranean is not just an idea made in Rome. The vision fits well with Modi’s Look East policy, efforts to be a leader in the Global South, and India’s quest to be a major trading partner in Europe. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan also want to increase their engagement in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. For his part, Trump loved the Three Seas Initiative last time he was president. He is also the author of the Abraham Accords, which fits like a hand-in-glove with IMEC. Further, the U.S. is a proponent of the Middle Corridor. Secretary Rubio, for example, mentioned during his confirmation hearings the importance of America having a strategy for Central Asia.

Free and Open Atlantic

Completing the free and open pathways across the blue dot is the vision for a free and open Atlantic Community. Little known is that in the closing days of Trump’s first presidency, his team at the National Security Council worked on an Atlantic Strategy to combat malicious Chinese actions in the Atlantic region, a space that the US had not seen a serious adversarial threat since the last German U-boats plied the Atlantic. The Atlantic Strategy included an integrated, partnered approach to protecting free and open spaces from the High North to the transatlantic community and the littoral space in Africa and South America.

There is evidence Trump is picking up where he left off with his salvo of comments on Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal. Greenland is a strategically vital waypoint in the transatlantic bridge. Greenland has been essential to the US presence in the Atlantic since World War I. That has never changed. Trump has raised the profile of the island now out of concern of encroachment by China. This is equally true of the Panama Canal, the strategic link between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific worlds. Canada, along with Iceland and the Nordic and Baltic countries, is America’s indispensable partner in ensuring a Free North. The “new” Monroe Doctrine is aimed at targeting Chinese, as well as Russian and Iranian influence, not to make the Atlantic an American lake but to keep this part of the world free and open—and safe.

The Atlantic world extends to Latin America. No leader grasps this better than Argentina’s Javier Milei, who hangs out with Trump and Meloni not just because they are the cool kids but because they are leaders who share the belief that security, prosperity, and freedom can be secured by partnerships building free and open spaces.

West Africa is also an important part of this community. The Africa-Atlantic pipeline project, for example, which will connect the economies of West and Central Africa to Europe, is an example of the expanding web of connectivity spreading over the Atlantic world.

The Musk Factor

Musk fits in with the free and open tribal leaders much like Pope John Paul, who is paired with Ronald Reagan and Margret Thatcher as the transformational leaders of the Cold War world. Musk, like John Paul, adds an ethical dimension. Musk is a great humanist. Sure, he is a successful science and business leader. Starlink, for example, is one of the technological fuels driving the rapid implementation of spaces, delivering capability without even having physical infrastructure on the ground.

Elon Musk enters Twitter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

In addition, Musk provides an explanation of why all this matters to the human race. Whether reaching for Mars or reaching across free and open spaces, he is championing leadership that delivers more opportunity for human flourishing, for people to deservedly benefit from the fruits of their liberty and the promise of security in their person and freedom of expression from present and future imperialists and globalists.

Braver New World

Unlike the deceitful promises of globalism and the Belt and Road, free and open spaces are not advertising and can’t deliver a new rules-based order, let alone a Utopia free from war and want or tariffs.

On the other hand, free and open spaces can allow free sovereign nations more space to make their own choices. The ones that choose good governance in service of their people will, without question, profit most.

About the Author: Dr. James Jay Carafano

Dr. James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy affairs. Carafano previously served as the Vice President of Heritage Foundation’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and served in the US Army for 25 years. He is an accomplished historian and teacher as well as a prolific writer and researcher. Follow him on X: @JJCarafano.

19fortyfive.com · by James Jay Carafano · January 25, 2025



11. What did Rubio say about Taiwan independence? US, China at odds


Below this article is a Chat GPT summary of the three important documents that guide US-China policy:

1. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

2. Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués

3. Six Assurances (1982)



What did Rubio say about Taiwan independence? US, China at odds

A certain detail is conspicuously absent from State Department’s account of a phone call reportedly made at the top American envoy’s request

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3296235/top-diplomat-marco-rubio-tells-wang-yi-us-does-not-back-taiwan-independence?utm_source=rss_feed


Robert Delaneyin Washington

Published: 12:33am, 25 Jan 2025Updated: 10:54pm, 25 Jan 2025

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a phone call with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on Friday, affirming Washington does not back Taiwan independence, according to China’s foreign ministry, a detail omitted from the American side’s read-out.

“The United States does not support ‘Taiwan independence’ and hopes that the Taiwan issue will be peacefully resolved in a way accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” Rubio said in a call that he requested, according to Beijing’s foreign ministry.

However, in the State Department’s telling, Rubio “stressed the United States’ commitment to our allies in the region and serious concern over China’s coercive actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea”.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary.

Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons, as authorised by the Taiwan Relations Act.

The State Department and Beijing’s embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to requests for clarification about the differing accounts of what was said about Taiwan.

The call marks the first direct contact Rubio has had with Beijing after a string of one-to-one engagements with counterparts throughout the Indo-Pacific region, including those in Japan and the Philippines.

In both those cases, their joint statements warned of a need to counter China’s “destabilising actions” in the region.

In its read-out of Rubio’s call with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, also on Friday, the State Department said they “discussed regional concerns to include China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea”.

Friday’s calls follow one held a week prior between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping – days before the American leader was inaugurated for his second term.

The two in their call pledged to establish “strategic channels of communication and maintain regular contacts on major issues of common interest”, according to a read-out from Beijing.

Trump at the time posted on social media that the conversation was a “very good one” for both China and the US, saying the two “will do everything possible to make the world more peaceful and safe”.

And in an interview with Fox News late on Thursday in which he said Xi “was like my friend”, Trump was asked whether he could strike a deal with China on trade practices and replied, “I can do that.”

“We have one very big power over China and that’s tariffs and they don’t want them and I’d rather not have to use it,” Trump said.

He described his call with Xi as “a good, friendly conversation”, adding that the Chinese leader “was like my friend”.

As for Wang’s exchange with Rubio on Friday, China’s top envoy was said to have stated that “we have no intention of surpassing or replacing anyone, but we must defend our legitimate right to development”, according to Beijing’s report.

Wang also urged Rubio to “play a constructive role for the future of the people of China and the US and for the peace and stability of the world”.

The State Department’s read-out, meanwhile, said Rubio told Wang the Trump administration would pursue a bilateral relationship that “advances US interests and puts the American people first”.

Rubio earned a reputation during his many years in the US Senate for espousing a hardline China policy.

He sponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, for example, a law that authorised the sanctioning of more than a dozen officials from the semi-autonomous city and in mainland China. Beijing twice sanctioned him in 2020.

The first instance came in retaliation for US measures against senior Chinese officials over the treatment of ethnic minority Uygurs. The second was after mainland and Hong Kong officials were sanctioned following the 2019 protests in Hong Kong.

While the recent phone calls carried signals of intent to continue bilateral engagement, a more hawkish message emerged from Capitol Hill on Friday.

Lawmakers in the US House announced they would reintroduce a bill that would require Trump to review whether Hong Kong officials should be sanctioned for human rights violations.

American lawmakers have long sought to punish authorities they deem responsible for a crackdown on pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong.

Among the dozens named in the bill sponsored by California Republican Young Kim are Hong Kong Justice Secretary Paul Lam Ting-kwok, Commissioner of Police Raymond Siu Chak-yee and judges Andrew Chan Hing-wai, Johnny Chan Jong-herng, Andrew Cheung Kui-nung, Alex Lee Wan-tang, Esther Toh Lye-ping and Amanda Woodcock.

Jim McGovern of Massachusetts, the bill’s Democratic co-sponsor, was sanctioned by Beijing last year for “frequently interfering” in China’s domestic affairs.

Additional reporting by Bochen Han in Washington



Robert Delaney

FOLLOW

Robert Delaney is the Post’s North America bureau chief. He spent 11 years in China as a language student and correspondent for Dow Jones Newswires and Bloomberg, and continued covering the country as a correspondent and an academic after leaving. His debut novel, The Wounded Muse, draws on actual events that played out in Beijing while he lived there.



Here’s a concise summary of the Taiwan Relations Act, Three Communiqués, and Six Assurances:

1. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

  • Date: Enacted in 1979 after the U.S. shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
  • Purpose: To maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan and ensure its security despite no formal diplomatic ties.
  • Key Provisions:
  • The U.S. will provide Taiwan with arms to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
  • Any attempt to determine Taiwan's future by non-peaceful means would be a matter of "grave concern" to the U.S.
  • Establishes the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to handle unofficial relations.

2. Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués

These are a series of diplomatic statements issued by the U.S. and PRC to establish and guide their bilateral relationship.

Shanghai Communiqué (1972):

  • The U.S. acknowledged that "all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."
  • The U.S. did not challenge this stance but expressed interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

Normalization Communiqué (1979):

  • The U.S. recognized the PRC as the "sole legal government of China."
  • The U.S. terminated formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan but continued unofficial relations through the TRA.

August 17 Communiqué (1982):

  • The U.S. stated it "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan."
  • It emphasized arms sales would be reduced over time, depending on the situation across the Taiwan Strait.

3. Six Assurances (1982)

These were provided by the Reagan administration to reassure Taiwan following the August 17 Communiqué:

  1. No fixed date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.
  2. The U.S. would not consult with China about arms sales to Taiwan.
  3. The U.S. would not act as a mediator between Taiwan and China.
  4. The U.S. would not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with China.
  5. The U.S. did not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
  6. The TRA would not be altered to appease China.

Significance:


Together, these frameworks reflect a delicate balance in U.S. policy: maintaining unofficial relations and defense support for Taiwan while acknowledging China's "One China" position to manage tensions with the PRC.



12. Trump administration confuses government workers with email test message


Trump administration confuses government workers with email test message

CBS News · by Ed O'Keefe

A new Trump administration plan to send an alert to the federal government's roughly 2.3 million employees from a single email address launched this week and confused at least some of the rank and file, who were concerned it looked suspicious.

The Office of Personnel Management "is testing a new capability allowing them to send important communications to ALL Federal employees from a single mail address, [hr-at-opm-.gov] If you receive an email from this address, it can be considered trusted," according to the message sent Friday.

CBS News obtained a screengrab of the message and confirmed its authenticity with multiple federal employees and officials.

OPM, which serves as the federal government's human resources and employee benefits department, sent the government-wide message overnight, two agency officials confirmed to CBS News.

"This is a new effort under this administration," one of the officials said.

White House officials didn't immediately respond to questions about what the new email alert system might be used for or why the new system was being implemented this week.

The Washington Post also reported on Friday that similar messages went out at other agencies and departments starting on Thursday. Several people who claim to be government employees reported the email as spam or phishing in two Reddit threads for federal employees. One person in these Reddit threads said the Food and Drug Administration had sent out an email Friday asking employees to stop reporting it, since the message is legitimate.

The email seen by CBS News came with a warning from respective departments' information technology offices that the message "originated from outside the Department" and its content might not be safe.

"Everyone thought it was spam," said the tipster, who asked that the screengrab not be published. "There was a flurry of messages, 'Is this spam?'"

Waking up to a suspicious-looking email on Friday morning did little to calm nerves amid a wave of big personnel changes across the federal government this week. President Trump, as promised during his presidential campaign, issued new executive actions and executive orders this week freezing some hiring; temporarily halting the publication of government public health reports; calling for the end of federal diversity, equity and inclusion programs; and reviving a proposed civil service hiring plan from his first administration that critics warn could politicize the historically nonpartisan federal workforce.

And the new administration is seeking ways to root out waste, fraud, abuse and Biden-era policies with a new government efficiency program led by billionaire businessman Elon Musk.

"They had to send this this week, of all weeks? Really?" said the person who flagged the email.

OPM officials said leaders of other agencies and departments received advance notice on Thursday of plans to test a new "Federal Government-Wide Email Communication Test," which was also posted on the OPM web site. In some cases, the rank-and-file didn't learn about plans for the email until it arrived, leading to Friday morning's confusion, one of the officials said.

Representatives of the American Federation of Government Employees, one of the largest labor unions representing civilian federal workers, had no immediate comment on the new email system.

Erielle Delzer contributed to this report.



13. How Iran Lost Before It Lost: The Roll Back of Its Gray Zone Strategy



​Excerpts:


As a result of these circumstances, Iran was unable to strengthen its economy, causing its GDP to decline to approximately $262 billion in 2020, the lowest level since 2006. Further, the Iranian Parliament Research Center announced that in 2020 Iran’s share of global trade had decreased to a low of 0.2 percent.
The dire economic situation has increased domestic dissatisfaction, reducing support for the Islamic Republic’s regional approach and posing a challenge to the political system on one hand. On the other hand, it has hindered Iran’s ability to strengthen its geopolitical reach in the region, due to a lack of economic power and the loss of human resources and experts, many of whom have left the system or immigrated abroad in search of a better life. Heavy sanctions, increasing financial constraints, and serious economic inefficiencies have limited Iran’s financial resources, leaving the government struggling to maintain supply lines and operational support for militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Additionally, heightened sensitivities, such as the recent scrutiny over the search of an Iranian plane and diplomat at a Beirut airport, have compounded logistical challenges in supplying arms and funds to these groups, significantly undermining the effectiveness of Iran’s efforts.
As a result of these challenges, Iran has been unable to sustain internal support or align diverse factions under a shared strategic vision. This lack of unity has eroded consistency and long-term resilience, leaving the country vulnerable to intensifying domestic and external pressures. It is time for the Islamic Republic to make a decision: remain on the path of resistance or turn to the path of development. The first route briefly opened a direct pathway from Tehran to Beirut—a connection that has since been lost. Perhaps following the second route will elevate Tehran to a position of prominence, like a shining city on a hill.



How Iran Lost Before It Lost: The Roll Back of Its Gray Zone Strategy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Farzin Zandi · January 24, 2025

“Today, you can get in a car in Tehran and get out in the Dahia, Beirut.” Five years and two months after Gen. Qasem Soleimani made this statement, the Islamic Republic of Iran is in retreat. Iran’s air and ground lines of supply to Lebanon now go through Sunni-dominated Syria, where the Assad regime recently crumbled. Even if Iran could more easily get to Lebanon, Hizballah is the weakest it has been in over a generation, having been relentlessly battered by Israel. In the words of one high-ranking commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps: “We lost, we badly lost.”

Iran’s ability to deter and wage war in recent decades was largely through gray zone methods. And the structures, resources, and allies that allowed it to do this are now in tatters. But the erosion of Iran’s gray zone strategy was already happening when Assad was still in power and Hizballah loomed over Israel as a fearsome threat. Iran’s economic dysfunction and political disarray prevented it from building and sustaining resilience. This analysis highlights how Iran’s economic malfeasance, fueled by internal divisions among government stakeholders, has undermined its geopolitical ambitions and prevented it from converting regional influence into sustainable economic leverage, marking a potential turning point in its regional strategies.

Become a Member

Battle in the Fog

Iran’s gray zone strategy refers to a strategic approach that operates between conventional warfare and peacetime competition. Characterized by ambiguity, deniability, and reliance on proxies, Iran uses organizations like Hizballah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq and Syria to project influence and challenge adversaries — such as confronting the United States as the dominant external power in the Middle East, along with its regional allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Through asymmetric tactics — including political, economic, social, intelligence, and military support for various non-state actors — Iran pursues its geopolitical objectives while avoiding full-scale conflict. This strategy enables Tehran to expand its regional influence, counterbalance its rivals, and maintain plausible deniability in the face of international criticism or retaliation. The United States has sought to counter this strategy through various means, focusing particularly on “push back” and “roll back” approaches.

The Starting Point

Despite initial optimism in 2021 about President Joe Biden’s commitment to reviving the nuclear deal with Iran, which is known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, negotiations failed to result in any agreements. The administration then essentially pursued a pressure campaign far less aggressive than the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy.

During the renewed nuclear negotiations, the first ambiguous attack on trade ships under Biden’s presidency occurred on July 29, 2021. On this date, the MT Mercer Street, a commercial oil tanker managed by an Israeli-owned company, was targeted by drones near the coast of Oman. These challenges escalated further with drone and missile attacks by the Houthis on Abu Dhabi airport and Emirati oil infrastructure, reportedly supported by Iran.

These ongoing tensions intersected with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. During the conflict, reports emerged that Iran was supplying drones to Russia, exacerbating the European Union’s frustration. The European Union, as the primary mediator in the nuclear talks for over a decade, had been striving to reach an agreement among all parties. The last significant round of negotiations took place in Vienna in August 2022, when the European Union presented a “final text.” However, Iran requested further changes, leading to a stalemate. Iranian hardline negotiators optimistically spoke of a “hard winter in Europe,” viewing it as potential leverage for getting more concessions during the talks.

The Economy Driving Decisions

After Iran rejected signing the final agreement, several significant attacks on commercial vessels occurred in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and surrounding areas. Amid these challenges, Iran sought to increase pressure on the United States and its partners in the Middle East in various ways. These conflicts deeply and negatively impacted the regional economy and global trade, while all “push back” efforts to limit or halt Iran’s progress proved ineffective.

In addition to global trade disruptions, countries in the region were concerned about their economic development and efforts to attract substantial foreign direct investment. Between 2011 and 2021, Israel led the region with 238 percent growth in foreign direct investment (from $9.1 billion to $30.7 billion), followed by the United Arab Emirates with a steady 189 percent increase (from $7.2 billion to $20.7 billion). Saudi Arabia recorded an 18 percent rise (from $16.3 billion to $19.3 billion), with its economic ambitions tied closely to Vision 2030. Meanwhile, Turkey’s real GDP steadily climbed, achieving a compound annual growth rate of 5.7 percent during the same period and ranking as the 17th largest economy globally by 2021.

These major economic efforts depend heavily on one pivotal factor: stability. The economy’s demand for stability could create a foundation for agreements aimed at addressing sources of instability, such as Iran’s regional activities. However, amid these challenges, Hamas unexpectedly attacked Israel in October 2023 — resulting in another strategic trap for an ambitious Iran, which is now also aligned with Russia in recent conflicts. This time, it would be Iran’s turn to face broader consequences.

From Push Back to Roll Back

The Oct. 7, 2023 attacks on Israel initiated a process aimed at rolling back Iran’s influence to its borders, designed to eliminate or dismantle Iran’s preferred security structure in the region. What the Iranian Supreme Leader had feared in 2022 was beginning to unfold. He had then mentioned America’s intention in the nuclear deal as being a trap to deprive Iran of its natural nuclear rights. He had warned his militia supporters about the implications of a potential renewed nuclear deal, implying that Iran might have to completely withdraw from the region and abandon its strategic presence, similar to the pressure of reducing and abandoning its nuclear activities. These developments could be seen as a roll back strategy, designed to eliminate or dismantle Iran’s preferred security structure in the region.

This marked a new phase in the proxy war in the Middle East, with the United States targeting Iran’s geopolitical ambitions through the lowest level of direct intervention. Unlike previous proxy wars where Iran relied on its proxies while staying out of direct engagement, this time Iran itself was drawn into the conflict. Conversely, the United States, supporting Israel as its proxy in the conflict, remained largely in the background, mostly stepping in to help Israel thwart Iranian attacks and to deter escalation. The strategy proved remarkably effective, as it led to the removal of critical figures within the so-called Axis of Resistance, the destruction of Hizballah’s organizational capabilities, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and heavy attacks on Houthi arsenals in Yemen.

It is also notable that the weakening of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, a paramilitary umbrella group that is closely tied to Iran, was facilitated earlier by pressuring it to integrate into Iraq’s official military structure. Iran now faces a new challenge in Lebanon with President Joseph Aoun, who aligns more closely with the Western–Arab axis.

What is Happening with Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy?

Success in a gray zone strategy hinges on harmonizing diverse elements of statecraft and ensuring effective management of resources and operations — something the Iranian political system has been unable to sustain. From the outset, the Islamic Republic’s statecraft has suffered from dysfunction, which has worsened significantly in recent years. This has left Iran facing deep challenges domestically and in foreign relations.

Triumph in the gray zone requires maintaining coherence between political, military, economic, and informational efforts, enabling activities to reinforce one another without creating vulnerabilities or contradictions. Centralized yet flexible command structures are essential for coordinating multiple actors, including state entities and proxies, while preserving plausible deniability. Effective management also demands precise goal-setting, adaptive strategies, and robust intelligence capabilities to anticipate adversaries’ responses. All of this, however, requires a crucial foundation: economic power.

Iran’s Achilles’ heel is its economic weakness, which has undermined the political system across multiple dimensions. Fundamentally, the Iranian political system has failed to design a viable and practical economic development model. This weakness has been compounded by heavy economic sanctions and, more critically, by systemic dysfunction rooted in ideological priorities rather than merit-based governance. Iran lost its territorial achievements due to two main economic reasons: First, government stakeholders within the system are united only in their opposition to each other, which prevents the country from achieving development. Second, as a result of the first issue, Iran has been unable to translate its regional influence into economic leverage, thereby failing to make its presence sustainable and constructive. For example, Iran’s significant investments in Syria (around $20–$30 billion) have not yielded long-term economic or strategic benefits, as the Assad regime’s instability drained resources without strengthening Iran’s position.

It is evident that the severe economic sanctions, particularly following U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, have significantly impacted Iran’s economy. U.S.-led sanctions have significantly reduced Iran’s oil revenue, which has traditionally been a primary source of funding for its proxies. from 2016 to 2024, Iran’s crude oil exports decreased by approximately 615,784 barrels per day, reflecting the impact of external pressures on the country’s oil sector. Alongside this major factor, numerous internal issues have also contributed to the Iranian economy’s growing fragility. Corruption within the ideologically driven political system and the mismanagement of resources are key obstacles to Iranian economic growth. Between 2003 and 2023, Iran’s average score on the Corruption Perceptions Index was 26.14, ranked 149 out of 180 countries in 2023, as reported by Transparency International.

Also, Iran’s Trade Freedom scores, as assessed by the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, were consistently low from 2017 to 2022, reflecting significant barriers to international trade. In 2022, Iran’s overall economic freedom score was 42.4, ranking 170th out of 177 countries. This low score has critical domestic drivers: Some factions close to the core power of the political system are in favor of Iran’s economic isolation and seek to impose high tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and restrictive trade policies that impede trade freedom. As a result, from 2012 to 2022, foreign direct investment in Iran averaged only $2.4 billion annually, with a paltry $1.5 billion recorded in 2022.

These powerful factions and their aligned interest groups seek to exploit the situation to seize control of the entire Iranian economy, using resistance-driven rhetoric, while maintaining dominance over industries and financial institutions through their connections to the centers of power. This has led to severe corruption and profound dysfunction in Iran’s economy, which is largely state-controlled. As a result, the system is under immense economic pressure with no possibility of reform. Meanwhile, these stakeholders, who are a critical part of the political system and contribute to governing the state, are unwilling to surrender the advantageous situation that allows them to exploit and plunder.

As a result of these circumstances, Iran was unable to strengthen its economy, causing its GDP to decline to approximately $262 billion in 2020, the lowest level since 2006. Further, the Iranian Parliament Research Center announced that in 2020 Iran’s share of global trade had decreased to a low of 0.2 percent.

The dire economic situation has increased domestic dissatisfaction, reducing support for the Islamic Republic’s regional approach and posing a challenge to the political system on one hand. On the other hand, it has hindered Iran’s ability to strengthen its geopolitical reach in the region, due to a lack of economic power and the loss of human resources and experts, many of whom have left the system or immigrated abroad in search of a better life. Heavy sanctions, increasing financial constraints, and serious economic inefficiencies have limited Iran’s financial resources, leaving the government struggling to maintain supply lines and operational support for militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Additionally, heightened sensitivities, such as the recent scrutiny over the search of an Iranian plane and diplomat at a Beirut airport, have compounded logistical challenges in supplying arms and funds to these groups, significantly undermining the effectiveness of Iran’s efforts.

As a result of these challenges, Iran has been unable to sustain internal support or align diverse factions under a shared strategic vision. This lack of unity has eroded consistency and long-term resilience, leaving the country vulnerable to intensifying domestic and external pressures. It is time for the Islamic Republic to make a decision: remain on the path of resistance or turn to the path of development. The first route briefly opened a direct pathway from Tehran to Beirut—a connection that has since been lost. Perhaps following the second route will elevate Tehran to a position of prominence, like a shining city on a hill.

Become a Member

Farzin Zandi is a geopolitical analyst, PhD student, and research assistant in political science at the University of Kansas, specializing in Middle Eastern politics and Iran’s gray zone strategies.

Image: Midjourney

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Farzin Zandi · January 24, 2025



​14. Mexico refuses to accept a U.S. deportation flight


​I suppose they could just drop them at the Mexican border. But what if all other countries that do not border the US do not accept US flights with their returned citizens?


Excerpts:


On Friday, Guatemala received three flights from the U.S. with Guatemalan nationals who had been sent back to their home country. A spokesperson for the Guatemalan Migration Institute told NBC News that two of Friday's flights were on military aircraft and the other was on a non-military plane. The total number of Guatemalans who arrived in Guatemala City from the three flights was about 265.
The military deportation flights are part of a broader Trump administration crackdown on illegal immigration that has been set in motion with executive orders signed in his first week in office. During his campaign, he vowed to stop illegal immigration into the U.S. and pursue a campaign of mass deportation of undocumented immigrants already living in the country.



Mexico refuses to accept a U.S. deportation flight

The Mexican government has criticized President Donald Trump's unilateral immigration actions, and the landing would have required Mexico's assistance.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Jonathan Allen · January 25, 2025

WASHINGTON — Mexico denied a U.S. military plane access to land Thursday, at least temporarily frustrating the Trump administration's plans to deport immigrants to the country, according to two U.S. defense officials and a third person familiar with the situation.

Two Guatemala-bound Air Force C-17s, carrying about 80 people apiece, flew deportees out of the U.S. Thursday night, the sources said. The third flight, slotted for Mexico, never took off.

It was not immediately clear why Mexico blocked the flight, but tensions between the U.S. and Mexico, neighbors and longtime allies, have risen since President Donald Trump won the November election. Trump has threatened to slap 25% across-the-board tariffs on Mexico in retaliation for migrants crossing the border the countries share. But he has not yet put them in effect.

A White House official said in a text message that “the flights thing was an administrative issue and was quickly rectified.”

After the publication of this article, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt tweeted, "Yesterday, Mexico accepted a record 4 deportation flights in 1 day!"

A White House official, however, did not clarify whether they were military, commercial or private flights.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum's government has said it opposes Trump taking "unilateral" action to implement restrictive immigration standards — including the reinstatement of a "remain in Mexico" policy that forces migrants to stay in that country while they await adjudication of asylum claims. Flying deportees into a foreign country requires the cooperation of that nation's government.

In a statement, Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not go into detail on why the U.S. plane was not allowed to land in the country.

“Mexico has a very good relationship with the United States government and we cooperate with respect for our sovereignty on a wide range of issues, including migration," the statement read. "When it comes to repatriations, we will always welcome the arrival of Mexicans to our territory with open arms. Mexico embraces you.”

On Friday, Guatemala received three flights from the U.S. with Guatemalan nationals who had been sent back to their home country. A spokesperson for the Guatemalan Migration Institute told NBC News that two of Friday's flights were on military aircraft and the other was on a non-military plane. The total number of Guatemalans who arrived in Guatemala City from the three flights was about 265.

The military deportation flights are part of a broader Trump administration crackdown on illegal immigration that has been set in motion with executive orders signed in his first week in office. During his campaign, he vowed to stop illegal immigration into the U.S. and pursue a campaign of mass deportation of undocumented immigrants already living in the country.

In addition to the flights, he has enlisted the military to beef up its presence on the border with an additional 1,500 troops.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Jonathan Allen · January 25, 2025



15. Why Is China Succeeding As A Peace Broker? – Analysis


​Excerpt:


To sum up, a mix of economic interest, conscious neutrality and chutzpah has helped China navigate the turbulent waters of mediation between sworn enemies, score some successes and raise hopes for a more productive future as a peace maker.




Why Is China Succeeding As A Peace Broker? – Analysis

By P. K. Balachandran

eurasiareview.com · January 23, 2025

China’s efforts in peace-brokering are based on a mix of economic interest, conscious and transparent neutrality and chutzpah.

Given its rapid rise as an economic giant, China has been wanting to foster world peace by a variety of means, including brokering peace between warring parties, whether sovereign countries or no-State actors.


China’s venture is based on observing neutrality between the contesting or warring parties; non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries; laying stress on infrastructural development; and fostering global schemes such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilizational Initiatives (GCI).

China has so far played a constructive role in bringing about transitions in the perpetually disturbed Afghanistan; it has helped warring Iran and Saudi Arabia strike a deal; and has initiated ceasefires agreements in war-torn Myanmar.

In all this, the bottom line has been a combination of China’s self-interest (mainly economic) and the long term and sustainable interest of the parties in conflict.

Myanmar Ceasefire

China’s latest bid for peace has been in Myanmar, a disturbed country no power in the world has wanted to enter as a peace maker, partly because of the complexity of the problem and partly because Myanmar has no strategic value yet.

In the third of week of January 2025 China announced that it has mediated a ceasefire between the military government of Myanmar and an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) called the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said in Beijing: “We hope that all parties will maintain the momentum of ceasefire and peace talks, earnestly implement existing common understandings, take the initiative in deescalating the situation on the ground, and further negotiate and settle relevant issues through dialogue.”


She added that China stands ready to actively promote talks and provide support for the peace process in northern Myanmar.

The MNDAA is made up of the ethnic Chinese Kokang minority inhabiting the North Eastern Myanmar bordering China. The MNDAA is a member of the “Three Brotherhood Alliance”. Myanmar’s EAOs including MNDAA have been fighting for decades for greater autonomy from the central government based in Yangon.

The EAOs are loosely allied with the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the pro-democracy armed resistance group among the majority Bamars, which was formed after the army’s February 2021 coup. The PDF’s membership is largely drawn from the majority Bamar community but is bitterly opposed to the junta, though the latter is composed entirely of Bamars.

Writing in The Irrawaddy, Bertil Lintner, a Swedish expert on Myanmar, says that China has once again shown that it is the “only outside power with the means, capacity, and motivation” to intervene in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. China has a vital interest in keeping the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) going. The CMEC provides China’s landlocked South Western provinces with an outlet to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

China has had close military and political relations with some ethnic groups living near its Western border, in addition to having close military ties with the ruling junta in Yangon. The Kokangs and Wa who inhabit the Sino-Myanmar border on the Myanmar side have had close links with China.

In early December 2024, the MNDAA passed a resolution to opt for Chinese arbitration. The MNDAA and its close ally, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), said that there will not “march on Mandalay” and escalate the conflict with the junta and antagonise the majority Bamar community. The TNLA said that it would “always cooperate with China’s mediation efforts and continue to cooperate to achieve good results.”

The third member of the “Brotherhood Alliance”, the Arakan Army (AA), which has managed to overrun most of its homeland of Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh, announced in December 2024 that it is ready to negotiate with the military regime.

Western peace-making outfits have had little success in Myanmar so far. Lintner says that nothing constructive can be expected from ASEAN. ASEAN’s “Five-Point Consensus” formula, which was adopted a few months after the February 2021 coup and which called for the immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue and humanitarian assistance to areas which had been affected by the fighting, was a non-starter.

As Lintner put it, ASEAN has never, in its 58-year history, managed to solve a single bilateral conflict or dispute between its 10 member countries, let alone end an internal crisis in a member state. Western countries have outsourced the Myanmar issue to ASEAN without looking at its antecedents, Lintner says.

Kachins, Karens and Chins Defy

Lintner points out that not all EAOs are eager for peace. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) ignored China’s 2024 request not to seize control of the border town of Pangwa. China has even less influence in areas along the Thai border where Karen and Karenni resistance forces are active. China has no control over the Chins in the west bordering India.

But there is a question nobody seems to have asked: “Will the Bamar, who are the majority community in Myanmar, agree to the ethnic groups’ demand for autonomy or independence?” True, the mainly Bamar People’s Defence Forces (PDF) has been fighting alongside the ethnic armies against the junta, but fighting for democratic institutions is one thing and rendering justice to ethnic and religious minorities is another ballgame altogether.

As a mediator, China will have to face this issue of demands and goals. Can China view its economic interests in isolation from political issues? Lintner has another interesting doubt: whether the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic, and federal Myanmar, is in China’s strategic interest?

Be that as it may, there is another hard reality to be faced, and that is: It is highly unlikely that the Myanmar junta will be defeated any time soon. And it is doubtful whether the resistance will be strong and united enough to unseat the junta.

Saudi-Iran Deal

In March 2023 China successfully mediated a peace treaty between Iran and Saudi Arabia. According to Barnett R. Rubin of the Stimson Centre, both Iran and Saudi Arabia wanted to have good relations with China. And they did not see China as a threat. These two factors helped China mediate.

Rubin says that there is a lesson for the US in this. The US has to negotiate with Iran one day, and to do so, it needs to have some sort of relationship with Tehran. It does not have that now. If President Trump is to negotiate a deal with Iran, he could take the help of China which already has Iran’s ear. And China might respond favourably as, like the US, it also wants peace in the Persian Gulf.

Trump could take the help of China to bring a ceasefire in Ukraine too, as China is seen by both Putin and Zelensky as being neutral. In fact, China had wanted to mediate in Ukraine. Trump too has been saying that he will mediate. Trump could use Putin’s economic dependence on China to make the Russian leader see reason.

Rubin has discussed China’s role in the mediation efforts in Afghanistan. China is interested in tapping Afghanistan’s natural resources (lithium, coal, iron, copper, oil, and gas) and hence the search for peace. Insecurity and conflict in Afghanistan has threatened the security of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia and Pakistan, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

At various stages China had tried to mediate in conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between the Afghan government, the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. It did so through both confidential and public meetings, bilaterally, trilaterally and quadrilaterally, involving the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban. In all these meetings, China’s neutrality had ensured its acceptability as a mediator.

Even in the midst of the war and talks, Chinese companies had been trying to invest in the extraction of natural resources from Afghanistan. In 2007, a major mining firm had signed a contract to open what has the potential to be the world’s largest copper mine in Mes Aynak, in the Logar province. Other companies also signed a joint venture agreement with Watan Industries, an Afghan company, to exploit the oil and gas resources of the Amu Darya basin in Jawzjan province.

To sum up, a mix of economic interest, conscious neutrality and chutzpah has helped China navigate the turbulent waters of mediation between sworn enemies, score some successes and raise hopes for a more productive future as a peace maker.

eurasiareview.com · January 23, 2025




16. The Undersea Cable War


​I think most of us do not appreciate how important these cables are to our everyday lives. 




The Undersea Cable War

Russia and China are suspected of targeting these key data channels.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/nato-deployment-baltic-sea-undersea-cables-china-russia-europe-c34fa89f?mod=Searchresults_pos10&page=1

By The Editorial Board

Follow

Jan. 24, 2025 5:34 pm ET


A handout picture released by the Britain's Ministry of Defence (MOD) in London on January 22 shows Royal Navy Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset (foreground) patrolling near the Russian vessel Yantar, near U.K. waters, earlier this week. Photo: -/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

NATO said last week it’s sending frigates, aircraft and naval drones to patrol the Baltic Sea, and the question is what took so long. The deployment follows multiple suspected acts of sabotage targeting Europe’s undersea cables. Add another threat to the West’s burgeoning list.

Nearly all of the world’s international data is transmitted through subsea fiber-optic cables. The French government recently described them as “the accessible physical layer of cyberspace,” and they’re vital for everything from financial transactions to diplomatic communications to video streaming.

That makes cables a prime military and espionage target. The Yantar, a Russian spy ship “used for gathering intelligence and mapping the U.K.’s critical underwater infrastructure,” is now in the North Sea after sailing through the English Channel, British Defense Secretary John Healey said Wednesday. In November the U.K. detected the Yantar “loitering over critical undersea infrastructure.”

On Christmas Day a cable connecting Finland and Estonia was damaged by an anchor dragged across it. Finnish authorities detained crew members and a tanker identified by the maritime-traffic analytics company Lloyd’s List Intelligence as part of a Russia-linked shadow fleet. The probe continues, but the lead investigator this week described “suspicions of deliberate action.”

Two more Baltic cables—one between Sweden and Lithuania and another between Germany and Finland—were severed a month earlier. “No one believes these cables were accidentally severed,” said German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius in November. The investigation has focused on a Chinese commercial vessel that had left a Russian port, then sailed alongside both cables.

The U.S. noted Russia’s ability to target Western undersea infrastructure in a 2024 annual threat assessment. The British think tank Policy Exchange cites “eight unattributed yet suspicious cable-cutting incidents in the Euro-Atlantic” since 2021, “and over 70 publicised sightings of Russian vessels behaving abnormally near critical maritime infrastructure.”

Taiwan suspects China was responsible for damage to an undersea cable off its northern coast on Jan. 3. China denies it. But Taiwan says Chinese vessels also severed deep-sea cables in 2023 and cut off Internet access for 14,000 residents of Matsu Island. Taiwan is beefing up its maritime surveillance within 24 nautical miles of its coast.

The threat to undersea cables is a classic example of asymmetric vulnerability for a West that relies on data networks and communications for daily living. An anchor dragged by a rickety vessel along the sea floor can snap a cable while also offering plausible deniability to adversaries. And fixing cables is expensive and time-consuming. There are only a few special repair vessels worldwide.

Increased military surveillance at sea is a good first step, though the West lacks the resources to monitor all of this vast infrastructure. Artificial intelligence and detection technologies can help countries focus on suspicious activity and respond more efficiently, but this threat also underscores the importance of Western naval power.

Under the current legal framework, victims have little legal recourse to prosecute or punish those who sabotage cables in international waters. The U.S. and Europe will also have to consider how to respond so hostile actors don’t enjoy impunity when sabotage occurs.

Meanwhile, redundancies in cables can mitigate the risks of serious disruption, and reducing red tape and streamlined permitting would encourage cable construction and hasten repairs. This is a vital project for the Trump Administration and U.S. allies.

You may also like

Copy LinkCopy EmbedFacebookTwitter

0:05



0:00

/

5:23

Tap For Sound

Free Expression: As Donald Trump’s domestic critics get in line, so the world has saluted his restoration, if reluctantly. Photo: Brandon Bell/Pool via Reuters

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8



17. It's time for a new Key West agreement


​Have uncrewed aircraft (drones) created the "democratization" of airpower? After all, even a single private citizen can fly a drone and possibly wreak havoc.


Excerpt:


These and other concerns suggest that the time is right for a second Key West conference to examine and update service roles and missions. Here, the passion for service “equities” and autonomy must be ruthlessly suppressed in favor of a truly optimized Joint Force, organized, trained and equipped for lethal, high-technology warfare across all warfighting domains. Now, at the start of a new administration, fresh ideas and innovation are most likely to flourish. Let’s not miss the opportunity.




It's time for a new Key West agreement

By R.D. Hooker, Jr.

Senior Associate, Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center

January 24, 2025 02:47 PM ET

defenseone.com · by R.D. Hooker, Jr.


In this 2008 photo, a crew chief with the 455th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron directs an A-10 Thunderbolt II at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. U.S. Air Force / Staff Sgt. Rachel Martinez

Airpower, air defense, Marines’ role—all need revisiting, three-quarters of a century after the seminal roles-and-missions pact.

|

January 24, 2025 02:47 PM ET


Roles and missions for the U.S. military were laid down in 1948 at Key West at a conference chaired by James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense. Subsequently approved by President Truman, these accords have remained in place ever since, despite extraordinary changes in the national-security environment. The end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the rise of China, NATO expansion, 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine all represented seismic shifts. Rapid and dramatic advances in technology do as well. While the basic roles of the military services are fundamentally sound, service missions should be revisited in light of these changes. It’s time for a reboot.

As in 1948, a key point of contention today concerns airpower. In every conflict, concerns resurface about close air support, traditionally the lowest priority for the Air Force. While “strategic” missions maximize the employment of Air Force assets under Air Force commanders, close air support requires close coordination and integration with ground commanders, violating tenets deemed essential for the optimum employment of airpower. Army doctrine depends heavily on airpower, which enables the flexible and powerful concentration of combat power more than any other capability on the battlefield. From the perspective of most airmen, however, CAS is seen as a wasteful dispersion of airpower for tactical and not strategic ends. As Carl Builder noted in his classic Masks of War, “losing the freedom to apply airpower independently to decisive ends is to lose that which pilots have striven so hard to achieve for much of the history of the airplane. Thus, close air support will always be an unwanted stepchild of the Air Force.” Strong and ultimately successful pressure from the Air Force to retire the A-10, its only dedicated CAS platform, confirms this point.

Mindful of these facts, the Navy and Marine Corps fought persistently and successfully to retain control of their fixed-wing aviation at Key West, a consideration denied the Army. Over many decades the Army built up a rotary-wing “attack” community in the form of the AH-1 and later AH-64-series helicopter gunships. Though an important capability, Army attack helicopters lack the speed, range, weapons load, and survivability of the A-10—an airplane the Air Force doesn’t want for a mission it doesn’t like. The Army needs fixed-wing combat aviation for the same reasons that the Navy and Marine Corps do: to provide immediate and responsive air support for service missions. An obvious solution is to transfer both the mission and the platform to the Army, freeing the Air Force to focus on its traditional and favored missions of air supremacy, strategic bombing, air interdiction and air mobility.

Another anomaly is high-altitude air and missile defense. In almost every foreign military, these capabilities reside in the air force, but in the United States, the Army owns these systems and units. They consist of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system, which defends against incoming ballistic missiles, and the Patriot air defense system, which can engage and defeat aircraft as well as missiles. The Army provides eight THAAD batteries to support combatant commanders; there are also 15 Patriot battalions and 44 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense interceptors based in California and Alaska. Although a joint function, airspace management and deconfliction is dominated by the Air Force, which normally provides the air component commander and the combined air operations center in military campaigns, as well as the preponderance of air assets. Decades of emphasis by the Army air-defense community on these longer-ranged missions and systems has contributed markedly to the decline of short-range air defense, or SHORAD, in Army brigades and divisions, which have no air-defense units at all. For these reasons, high-altitude air and missile defense should more properly reside with the Air Force, while the Army rededicates itself to SHORAD, including radar-directed gun systems. In the early 1990s, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak suggested just such a swap, offering the A-10 to the Army in exchange, but Army leaders demurred.

In every major conflict since 1945, the Marine Corps has provided large formations that conducted sustained operations on land alongside Army divisions and corps. Similarly organized as their Army counterparts, Marine divisions with supporting armor and field artillery (as well as very capable organic air support) played major roles in land warfare. Beginning in 2022, the Marine Corps began to divest its tanks and tubed artillery to optimize as an island-based, Pacific-focused service that emphasizes rocket artillery and unmanned vehicles. (The Marine Corps’ “Force Design 2030” blueprint also eliminates one of the Corps’ eight active infantry regiments, six of 32 helicopter squadrons, all bridging assets and all four Marine Air Wing Support Groups.) Criticized by experts as “custom-designed for distributed operations on islands in the Western Pacific [and] poorly designed and poorly trained for the land campaigns it is most likely to fight,” these moves fundamentally alter USMC capabilities, rendering the service unable to support major land campaigns and leaving it poorly suited for missions outside the Indo-Pacific region. Formerly praised for its flexibility and adaptability, the Marine Corps today can offer fewer options across a reduced mission set to the National Command Authorities.

These and other concerns suggest that the time is right for a second Key West conference to examine and update service roles and missions. Here, the passion for service “equities” and autonomy must be ruthlessly suppressed in favor of a truly optimized Joint Force, organized, trained and equipped for lethal, high-technology warfare across all warfighting domains. Now, at the start of a new administration, fresh ideas and innovation are most likely to flourish. Let’s not miss the opportunity.




18. Hegseth confirmed: This is where we find out his true mettle



​From the Quincy Institute.


I doubt he will be "absorbed" based on what we can see of his personality and temperament and more importantly because of his relationship with POTUS.





Hegseth confirmed: This is where we find out his true mettle

The big test is whether he can face down the service chiefs, or will he merely be 'absorbed'

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/hegseth-confirmed/

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Jan 24, 2025

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos


After weeks of acrimony and consternation over his personal indiscretions, Pete Hegseth was confirmed tonight as secretary of defense. Republicans Mitch McConnell, Lisa Murkowsi, and Susan Collins voted against him, leaving a 50-50 tie which was broken by Vice President J.D. Vance in Hegseth's favor.

Now the fun begins. Hegseth, an Army veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, has testified that President Donald Trump has put his faith in him to "bring the warrior culture back to the Department of Defense. He, like me, wants a Pentagon laser-focused on lethality, meritocracy, war fighting, accountability and readiness.”

Most of the opposition from Senate Democrats revolved around Hegseth's personal indiscretions and public opposition to women serving in combat; to a lesser extent, his "frontal assault" on the "woke" culture he claims infected the institution, degrading every facet of force readiness and cohesion. Even fewer questions were devoted to how he used his pull as a Fox News host to get war criminals pardoned in the last Trump administration, which some might consider more problematic than a lot of the other stuff.

Hegseth, much like his new boss, is a bit of puzzle when it comes to how he plans to reform the military "from the top down" and put the "warfighter first." It is worth noting that many a defense secretary has promised reform. None in my professional lifetime have quite delivered, at least in any lasting sense that made the military leaner, meaner, ready for combat with strategy dictating investment, and not the other way around. My friend Winslow Wheeler, who banked four decades working on Capitol Hill and literally co-wrote the book, "The Pentagon Labyrinth: 10 Short Essays to Help You Through It," sees the era of Hegseth going in few different directions.

"The moment he is confirmed today, Hegseth will lose his protection from Trump and his base. Trump will now expect Hegseth to be the protector, but much more importantly, Hegseth will be on his own (along with his immediate staff) to deal with the public and private elements of being SecDef," Wheeler said in an email today. Specifically, he said, he must be prepared:

"Political bromides ("anonymous smear," warrior rhetoric) will not suffice to respond to unwanted questions from the press and in hearings.

For the canned, superficial questions he will get in hearings, he will need a minimal command of the facts on an ocean of subjects to avoid self-embarrassment.

He will gain a reputation inside the Pentagon for either being an empty suit as people like me expect, or he will win a reputation for actually knowing what is going on and in command of what it takes to run the building.

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.

Invalid email

Enter your email

Subscribe 


He will either piss of Members of Congress for being unhelpful with their earmark (pork) demands or as a 'problem solver' for satisfying those and other myriad demands; the same thing goes for dealing with the defense corporations and especially Silicon Valley and the Brahmins there who think they know how to run the Pentagon and acquisition.

In short, he will emerge as someone who is in command (for better or worse) like (GW Bush/Obama Sec Def Robert ) Gates or a pushover and weak reed like (Chuck) Hagel or (William) Cohen."

Worse yet, said Wheeler, "he could end up like (Donald) Rumsfeld and help to foist historic disasters driven by the agenda of others. He may think, like Rumsfeld, that the way to escape ignominy as an ineffectual manager is to be a driver of such a foisted disaster."

It could be that Hegseth will focus mostly on the lethal military side and work to make good on his pledge to "reestablish deterrence" and "re-build the military" through boosting domestic industrialization, modernizing the nuclear triad, and "rapidly fielding emerging technologies," all of which should make Silicon Valley, Wall Street, the 5 major primes, and assorted Beltway Bandits happy.

But he has also promised the DoD would pass an audit, an ambitious goal since it has never passed one. He has also criticized "feckless civilian leaders and foolish brass." His boss wants to end the Ukraine war quickly after nearly three years of the Pentagon pledging to help build up Europe and Kyiv with more and more weapons and assistance to fight it. And Trump doesn't seem keen on keeping U.S. troops out in the deserts of Syria and Iraq (his Pentagon opposed withdrawal the last time, including his Sec Def Jim Mattis).

It would be interesting if Hegseth's critique of "warped, woke, and caustic" policies ever extends to the nub of why the military continues to promote bad leaders who lose wars, as raised in this excellent piece by Ret. Navy Capt. Steve Deal just a few weeks ago, which went viral on RS.

Hegseth has certainly passed the first ring of fire. Now let's see how the Borg treats him, and, how he treats the Borg.



Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.


19. Pacific Island Microstates and U.S. Security Cooperation: A Strategic Reassessment


​Download the 23 page chapter at this link: https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CH23_PacificIslandMicrostates_AXJT2495.pdf




Chapter Twenty Three

Pacific Island Microstates and U.S. Security Cooperation: A Strategic Reassessment

Kevin D. Stringer and Madison Urban

The Pacific is the most dynamic region of the world, and what happens here will shape the future for generations to come.

— Henry Kissinger, World Order, 2014

Abstract

Pacific Island microstates are crucial in the U.S.-China strategic competition due to their diplomatic influence, strategic location, and valuable maritime resources. The United States has re-engaged these nations with diplomatic initiatives and partnerships. This chapter proposes a comprehensive U.S. security cooperation strategy focused on four key pillars: U.S. Coast Guard and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-led maritime security cooperation, strategic collaboration with the European Union, expansion of U.S. Civic Action Teams, and regular deployment of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs units. These actions will enhance maritime security, bolster crisis preparedness, and foster resilient partnerships, countering Chinese influence and promoting regional stability.

https://doi.org/10.71236/AXJT2495


20. It’s not conspiratorial to be worried about social media’s rightward swing


​Says a left leaning media outlet.


The paradox of the conspiracy theory.  


The quickest way to both shutdown or deligeimatize something for certain target audiences is to brand it a conspiracy theory. On the other hand the quickest way to amplify something for certain target audiences is to brand it a conspiracy theory. 




It’s not conspiratorial to be worried about social media’s rightward swing

https://www.vox.com/culture/396686/facebook-instagram-tiktok-conservative-trump?utm

Meta denies any funny business on Instagram in the aftermath of Trump’s inauguration. Should we believe them?

by Rebecca Jennings

Jan 24, 2025, 12:45 PM EST


Getty Images


Rebecca Jennings is a senior correspondent covering social platforms and the creator economy. Since joining Vox in 2018, her work has explored the rise of TikTok, internet aesthetics, and the pursuit of money and fame online.

Many Instagram users this week had their scrolling interrupted by the bearded visage of our newly elected Vice President JD Vance. Suddenly it seemed that on the week of their inauguration, everybody on the app was following or being suggested to follow the official accounts of President Donald Trump and Vance (@POTUS and @VP, respectively).

Chaos ensued. In group chats, on Instagram Stories, on X, and Bluesky, people frantically wondered what was up. Some, like pop stars Gracie Abrams and Demi Lovato, said that when they tried to unfollow the VP and POTUS accounts, the app wouldn’t let them until they attempted multiple times. Other hashtags appeared to be banned or hidden, like #jan6 or #democrat.

Meta, meanwhile, has been busy assuring users that nothing new or weird is going on here. The accounts for the POTUS and VP, including their followers, were automatically handed over to the new administration as is customary during a presidential transition, while the accounts for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris previously under those usernames would be duplicated in an archive account. They’ve said it “may take some time for follow and unfollow requests to go through” but did not provide details when asked by the New York Times why that might be. Hashtags like #democrat were hidden, Meta said, due to “an error” that affected many hashtags, not just left-leaning ones (those hashtags are now visible).

RelatedThe danger of Meta’s big fact-checking changes

The episode came just weeks after Meta, Instagram, and Facebook’s parent company, announced sweeping changes to the platforms: CEO Mark Zuckerberg said he would be firing Meta’s fact-checkers and relaxing standards for moderating posts in an effort to prevent “bias” and “censorship” — a move that was widely read as an attempt to curry favor with the Trump administration. Since 2018, Instagram and Facebook have deprioritized political and news content; now, it plans to bring these topics back to the forefront of users’ feeds.

Meta’s assurances that they are not boosting certain accounts or censoring others, and that these issues are no more than glitches may very well be true. But due to the secretive, black box nature of algorithms like Meta’s, it’s very hard to fact-check such claims.

Jillian York, author of Silicon Values: The Future of Free Speech Under Surveillance Capitalism, says that Meta has a long history of censorship. “We should not take Meta at their word for anything,” she says. “There’s a history of Meta saying, ‘This is a glitch,’ and what they really mean is internal bias, human error, or AI error. It’s unclear at this point which we’re talking about.”

Vox CultureCulture reflects society. Get our best explainers on everything from money to entertainment to what everyone is talking about online.

Email (required)

Sign Up

For years, Republicans have believed that social media companies were inherently biased against conservative speech, despite evidence to the contrary. (More news influencers lean conservative, and most are male.) Now with a new Trump administration in power, it’s liberals who are expressing concern — and their fears, watchdogs say, are more reasonable than they might initially seem.

People worried about how Silicon Valley tycoons are kowtowing to Trump need not look far for an example of what conservative control of a platform might look like. “We saw this happen with X after Musk took over. My feed was completely different, and I think that’s possible with Meta too,” says York. Twitter was famous for its searchability, its transparency (you could see exactly who follows who, who liked what, what time a tweet was posted, and what was trending), and its allowance for free speech relative to other platforms.

“We should not take Meta at their word for anything.”

But under Musk, who describes himself as a free speech absolutist, censorship on X has gotten worse, not better. He banned links to competitor websites like Instagram and Substack, and admitted that X throttles posts that include any links at all, preventing users from accessing the kind of substantial, quality information found in news articles. He downranked tweets about Ukraine and appeared to limit views of posts that included words like “transgender,” “gay,” and “bisexual,” while allowing slurs for gay people to go unchecked. He dissolved the company’s Trust and Safety Council and boosted his own tweets so that they became inescapable for any user, regardless of whether they followed him.

RelatedElon Musk doesn’t deserve the benefit of the doubt

Just like Musk pulled certain levers to make X a friendlier place for hate speech, spam, and AI slop, so too can any other platform. They can deprioritize links to certain websites (or any websites at all) so that posts that include them will receive fewer views. They can amplify hatred against minority groups while banning speech critical of the established order (for instance, under Meta’s new rules, writing “white people have mental illness” is prohibited on Facebook, while “gay people have mental illness” is allowed). They can, in theory, throttle users they deem problematic so that their posts don’t spread while boosting those who are sympathetic to their own interests.

Platforms can also limit transparency, as was the case when Meta got rid of CrowdTangle, the tool that allowed researchers and journalists to track what’s trending, how information spreads, and which accounts are driving it. TikTok, too, quietly killed its feature that allowed people to see how many views videos containing certain hashtags received. The move came after accusations that TikTok was boosting pro-Palestinian content due to the popularity of pro-Palestine hashtags, even though no evidence ever emerged that that was true.

All of the major platforms already filter “sensitive” topics (why else would so many people be using algospeak, like “seggs” or “unalive”?). There’s nothing stopping them from continuing to bury whatever they deem fit; several rights watch organizations have warned that Facebook and Instagram routinely censored pro-Palestine content.

RelatedThe broligarchs have a vision for the new Trump term. It’s darker than you think.

On TikTok, many users complained that their algorithms seemed to lean more conservative after the app was offline in the US for several hours, then reinstated, perhaps a reflection of a shift in the user base that has been underway for months. The app welcomed users back with an announcement that explicitly thanked Trump, a rare move for a tech company. During the weekend’s inaugural events, TikTok sponsored a party celebrating the top 30 conservative influencers who helped secure Trump the election. In the days afterward, TikTok users claimed they couldn’t search for terms like “fascism” or comment “free Palestine.”

Though TikTok has denied that it is censoring this content, the problem is the same as it is with Meta: No one can be absolutely sure the company isn’t lying, and it’s no wonder people are suspicious.

Internet users fear more than just the erosion of trust in their social platforms: AI has made Google Search barely useable, filled AmazonEtsy, and other storefronts with junk, populated social media with bots, and regurgitated misinformation to the millions of people who use tools like ChatGPT or Google Gemini. Humans have never spent more time online, but the spaces we’re in often make us mistrust everyone we interact with and everything we’re told.

Despite the backlash against the rightward swing of the major platforms, it’s curious that there isn’t a larger mass movement away from them. As Politico’s Derek Robertson wrote in Liberties Journal, so many of us feel like we’re hurtling toward a dystopian technocracy where human life and connection are continually degraded and devalued, and yet, “Why has a popular movement for technological self-governance failed to coalesce — something akin to the political movement inspired by the urbanist Jane Jacobs? Why, to return to our original question, don’t people care?”

It’s clear that people do care, but perhaps they feel as though their concerns won’t be heard unless they’re on the same platforms as everybody else, or that the platforms they’re on will morph into something unrecognizable. Perhaps we’re all just burnt out by the thought of building a presence on yet another new app — one that could, like all the others before it, only disappoint us in the end.



21. Anti-Trumpers Are So Worried About Misinformation They're Spreading It Themselves


Clickbait headline but some useful infomration to ponder.


​I think this is an important insight for all of us, regardless of political leaning.


Excerpts:

Dr. Jess Maddox, an assistant professor at the University of Alabama and digital culture expert, tells Rolling Stone she’s not surprised that misinformation is coming from liberal accounts, mostly because
“We as a culture have failed at understanding how false information spreads,” Maddox says. “People who are spreading misinformation believe what they’re spreading. But this is not a partisan issue. As we’ve seen over the past couple days online, progressive leftists are just as susceptible to this as the people they chastise on the right.” So in the case of Trump’s executive orders and PopCrave, people share it because they hear the President revoked the Equal Employment Opportunity Act and think, “likely thing for him to do.”
...
Very few people are probably comforted by the adage that surviving Trump’s administration — and the legal battles for human rights that it brings — will be a marathon and not a sprint. And what’s clear is that many of these viral — and incorrect — snippets of news are coming from a place of people wanting to be informed, to not let decisions from the Trump administration go unnoticed. But spreading misinformation about what’s actually becoming law in the U.S. doesn’t help everyday citizens understand what’s going on; it just muddies the water. Maddox tells Rolling Stone that she understands people might have done so much doom-scrolling that they feel too emotionally drained or triggered to dive deep into the specifics of Trump’s proclamations. But she notes that while processing those emotions, people should still make sure to to verify the info they’re sharing.
“This is a moment that requires a lot of nuance and a lot of care. We shouldn’t look away from horrors and atrocities. We need to witness them, to act and resist and protest, but at the same time, we also do have to take care of ourselves,” Maddox says. “It’s important to either engage or don’t engage, but be careful of engaging halfway, because when you’re consuming just snippets, it contributes to misinformation.”




Anti-Trumpers Are So Worried About Misinformation They're Spreading It Themselves

On TikTok, X, Instagram, and more, people are dodging news to avoid the doom — and spreading conspiracies in the process

By CT Jones






January 24, 2025

Rolling Stone · by CT Jones · January 24, 2025

In the four days since President Donald Trump was sworn in to his second term, he’s signed dozens of executive actions targeting birthright citizenship, the TikTok ban, and diversity, equity, and inclusion programs in government. It’s a tidal wave of information — one online communities have been struggling to digest, react, and stand up against at the same time. The answer so far has been an odd mix of avoiding doom scrolling and periodically checking in to rail against injustice, but the myriad reactions have delivered the same result: misinformation. And it’s not from the groups people might expect.

The resurrection of the Trump administration has been heavily covered across social media platforms, dominating timelines on X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, TikTok, and Facebook. But the sheer volume of news — and the popularity of aggregation accounts that summarize summaries of primary sources — means some of the biggest headlines from popular accounts (i.e not reputable and/or fact checked news sources) are either mistaken or blatantly wrong. Add that to the general anger at Trump’s clear goal of erasing any trace of the civil rights movement, and online spaces are filled with both frustration from left wing users and celebratory antagonization from Trump supporters. People are mad and upset and furious — but a lot of the things they’re railing against simply aren’t true. In fact, many liberal accounts are so worried about misinformation under Trump’s presidency that they’re inadvertently spreading it themselves.


One perfect example was a tweet from popular aggregate account PopCrave. The profile has 1.9 million followers on X (formerly Twitter) and posts small summaries of everything from entertainment and culture to executive-level politics. On Jan 22. Pop Crave posted that Trump revoked “the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1965” which “prohibited discrimination in hiring and employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” It was retweeted 52,000 times, had over 78 million views, with people railing at Trump’s clear disregard for civil rights progress and discrimination laws. But that’s not what Trump did. Trump revoked Executive Order 11246, which was put into place by President Lyndon B Johnson and prevented federal contractors from discriminating against employees by race. It’s still bad — but not at all what PopCrave said. Not only is the Equal Employment Opportunity Act a federal level civil rights law, but it was actually passed in 1972. A fact checking Community Note is currently up on the PopCrave tweet, but the information spread for almost nine hours before it was corrected by users — and PopCrave itself still hasn’t issued a correction. (PopCrave did not immediately respond to Rolling Stone’s request for comment.)


Dr. Jess Maddox, an assistant professor at the University of Alabama and digital culture expert, tells Rolling Stone she’s not surprised that misinformation is coming from liberal accounts, mostly because

“We as a culture have failed at understanding how false information spreads,” Maddox says. “People who are spreading misinformation believe what they’re spreading. But this is not a partisan issue. As we’ve seen over the past couple days online, progressive leftists are just as susceptible to this as the people they chastise on the right.” So in the case of Trump’s executive orders and PopCrave, people share it because they hear the President revoked the Equal Employment Opportunity Act and think, “likely thing for him to do.”

There’s also a clear sense of disillusionment following the all-day coverage of Trump’s courting session of American billionaires, especially around the return of TikTok. The app was only dark for about 14 hours before it returned with a promise from Trump to give the company a 75 day extension to find an American buyer for 50 percent of the company. “We thank President Trump for providing the necessary clarity and assurance to our service providers that they will face no penalties providing TikTok to over 170 million Americans and allowing over 7 million small businesses to thrive,” TikTok said at its return. But TikTok users quickly began spreading rumors that the app returned because an American company had already bought it. And as the news came right on the heels of Mark Zuckerberg’s announcement that Meta would be removing fact-checking — which they saw as him essentially fully bowing to Trump’s rule — people blamed Meta.

Thousands of posts and comments claimed that the TikTok ban wasn’t a ban at all, but an IT update to allow Meta to merge its data with TikTok. After Meta announced it was releasing its own version of an editing app, similar to ByteDance’s CapCut, people claimed it was the app under a new name. Some said that Meta was already working with TikTok to shadow ban or straight-up suppress content about the election, free speech or abortion rights, and a hack to fix it was to block Meta properties on TikTok. There’s no evidence that any of these words have been banned or suppressed on the app. In fact, the one instance where the word “democrat” and “republicans” were unable to be searched on Instagram, which people claimed was post-election suppression, was quickly resolved by Meta.

Others said TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew had removed his title of CEO from his TikTok page because it was Zuckerberg’s now, even though Shou’s description has remained the same since 2020. But as creator Hank Green helpfully posted in a debunking video, that’s simply not how company purchases work, especially considering any merger of this size would require significant regulatory input from the U.S. government — something Meta is already facing in an active suit from the Federal Trade Commission.


@hankgreen1
#greenscreen
♬ original sound – Hank Green

Very few people are probably comforted by the adage that surviving Trump’s administration — and the legal battles for human rights that it brings — will be a marathon and not a sprint. And what’s clear is that many of these viral — and incorrect — snippets of news are coming from a place of people wanting to be informed, to not let decisions from the Trump administration go unnoticed. But spreading misinformation about what’s actually becoming law in the U.S. doesn’t help everyday citizens understand what’s going on; it just muddies the water. Maddox tells Rolling Stone that she understands people might have done so much doom-scrolling that they feel too emotionally drained or triggered to dive deep into the specifics of Trump’s proclamations. But she notes that while processing those emotions, people should still make sure to to verify the info they’re sharing.

“This is a moment that requires a lot of nuance and a lot of care. We shouldn’t look away from horrors and atrocities. We need to witness them, to act and resist and protest, but at the same time, we also do have to take care of ourselves,” Maddox says. “It’s important to either engage or don’t engage, but be careful of engaging halfway, because when you’re consuming just snippets, it contributes to misinformation.”

Rolling Stone · by CT Jones · January 24, 2025



​22. Zelenskyy says allies should work on 'format' for any talks with Russia




Zelenskyy says allies should work on 'format' for any talks with Russia

25 Jan 2025 10:23PM

channelnewsasia.com


KYIV: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Saturday (Jan 25) said allies should work towards determining a format for any upcoming peace talks with Russia and that Kyiv must be involved for successful negotiations.

His comments are the latest to pile speculation over the possibility of talks to end the brutal conflict that has cost tens of thousands of lives after almost three years of fighting.

"I understand that contacts can be in different formats," Zelenskyy said, referring to possible negotiations that would lead to "a just peace".

"I think we should focus on this today," he said.

President Vladimir Putin earlier this week said he was ready for talks with US counterpart Donald Trump on Ukraine, praising him as a "smart" leader who might have prevented the conflict from starting in February 2022.

Putin did not say when talks could take place, and the Kremlin said earlier it was still waiting for "signals" from Washington, despite Trump announcing Thursday he was willing to meet Putin "immediately".

Trump, who was inaugurated on Monday, has called the conflict "ridiculous" and threatened Russia with tougher economic sanctions if it does not agree to stop its offensive.

Zelenskyy said in Kyiv that talks to end the war should be held between the United States, Ukraine and Russia, as well as the European Union.

"I can't say today what kind of negotiations will take place, what will be the structure of the negotiation process, because we don't have a common plan yet," Zelenskyy added.

He reiterated a common talking point among Ukrainian officials that any negotiations that excluded Kyiv would not ultimately guarantee any lasting peace.

"It is impossible to exclude Ukraine from any negotiation platform, or this negotiation platform will not have real results, but will have political results," he said.

"And such results will have nothing to do with security and the end of the war," he said.

Zelenskyy has put forward several proposals to end the conflict, including his so-called victory plan at a Ukraine summit last year that brought together dozens of countries and international organisations.

Source: Reuters/gr



23. Trump fires multiple agency inspectors general—without proper notice, watchdogs say


Trump fires multiple agency inspectors general—without proper notice, watchdogs say

At least a dozen were removed, including the IGs for the departments of Defense, State, and Energy, the Washington Post reported.


By Sean Michael Newhouse

Staff Reporter

January 25, 2025 11:00 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Sean Michael Newhouse

President Donald Trump late Friday fired multiple inspectors general for federal agencies.

At least a dozen were removed, including the IGs for the departments of Defense, State, and Energy, according to the Washington Post, which first reported the news. The New York Times and Reuters reported that the number could be up to 17.

Federal law requires Congress to be notified 30 days before an IG is dismissed. Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, said that did not happen.

“There may be good reason the IGs were fired. We need to know that if so. I’d like further explanation from President Trump. Regardless, the 30 day detailed notice of removal that the law demands was not provided to Congress,” he said in a statement to Government Executive.

Grassley in November told Politico that Trump should not pursue a mass firing of IGs.

“I guess it’s the case of whether he believes in congressional oversight, because I work closely with all the inspector generals and I think I’ve got a good reputation for defending them," Grassley said. "And I intend to defend them."

In a letter obtained by Politico, Hannibal “Mike” Ware, the chairperson of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, informed the White House on Friday that he does not believe the removals of him and others are legal because of the ignored notice period.

“I recommend that you reach out to White House Counsel to discuss your intended course of action. At this point, we do not believe the actions taken are legally sufficient to dismiss Presidentially Appointed, Senate Confirmed Inspectors General,” Ware wrote.

He is the IG for the Small Business Administration and acting IG for the Social Security Administration.

In 2020, the last year of Trump’s first term, the president fired five IGs over a span of six weeks.

“Trump’s Friday night coup to overthrow legally protected independent inspectors general is an attack on transparency and accountability, essential ingredients in our democratic form of government,” House Oversight and Government Reform Committee ranking member Rep. Gerald E. Connolly, D-Va., said in a statement. “Replacing independent inspectors general with political hacks will harm every American who relies on social security, veterans benefits and a fair hearing at IRS on refunds and audits.”

Rep. James Comer, R-Ky., the chairman of that committee, said at a Dec. 10 hearing that he was trying to work with the new administration to identify poor-performing IGs.

“This committee has jurisdiction over the inspector general. I have found there are good inspector generals, there are average IGs and there are poor IGs,” Comer said. “We're trying to work with the new administration on identifying which is which, so we need the IGs to work with us because finally this town is fixing to get serious about being more efficient.”

Comer did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Before Friday’s mass firing, there were 15 IG vacancies, including those of the intelligence community and CIA, who left their positions just before the start of Trump’s second term.


defenseone.com · by Sean Michael Newhouse


24. Prime Target review — Leo Woodall shows equations can be lethal (fascinating series with a national security premise)


Two articles below. I have watched the first two episodes. I am rock when it comes to math but this has really piqued my interests because of the premise about the importance of prime numbers to digital security (and warfare).




Prime Target review — Leo Woodall shows equations can be lethal

A barmy but entertaining thriller led by the One Day star — think Good Will Hunting meets The Da Vinci Code

https://www.thetimes.com/culture/tv-radio/article/prime-target-review-apple-tv-leo-woodall-3clhjbs5h?utm

Carol Midgley

Wednesday January 22 2025, 2.40pm GMT, The Times

Maths nerds are probably the most dangerous people on the planet. Whoa! Strong words. But not mine, reader. They are spoken by a US National Security operative, Taylah Sanders (Quintessa Swindell), in the naffly named Prime Target (Apple TV+), a barmy but entertaining thriller in which Ed (Leo Woodall), a rude but brilliant maths post-grad at Cambridge, is about to solve a riddle by finding a pattern in prime numbers that could bring down defence systems, banks, hospitals, governments, causing global chaos. Because, you see, “primes” are the cornerstone of all digital security. Digital locks are based on randomly selecting prime numbers. Quick, someone page Carol Vorderman.

I must say Woodall, great as he was in The White Lotus and One Day and now a bit of a heartthrob, doesn’t seem an obvious choice to play a surly maths genius, a modern-day Archimedes in a crumpled jacket who could be “the destroyer of worlds”. This drama is definitely not shy about its knowing winks to Oppenheimer. They also had Woodall taking off his shirt for no reason at all in the first episode, the message being: “Hot prodigy!”

Perhaps to play this down, he portrays Ed as charmless and without empathy, obsessed with his work and who tells a history of art student trying to chat him up that this is a subject for an “oligarch’s trophy wife”. To be fair he seems to prefer men (though he claims he’s not gay) but after sleeping with the college bartender (Fra Fee) he’s mean to him too. “Can you leave?” he says in the morning. Nice!

David Morrissey is Robert Mallinder, his Cambridge professor, who finds Ed so annoying that “sometimes I want to punch him in the face”. You see his point, especially when Ed starts drawing mathematical formulas on his kitchen tablecloth (couldn’t he have just used a big piece of paper?). The big shock at the end of episode one is … well, let’s just say one key character’s part is surprisingly short. All thanks to Ed’s toxic theorem which ends up getting people killed.

If you buy into the implausible premise that security experts and hired assassins are spying 24/7 on the 15 most gifted mathematicians in the world in case they crack the code and the answer to all of nature’s mysteries, even watching them eat dinner with their spouses and probably a lot more besides, then this is a rollicking ride. It’s kind of Good Will Hunting meets The Da Vinci Code with Cambridge optics.

• Bridget Jones’s boyfriend? I wouldn’t say no

There is an entwined sub-plot in Baghdad about a hidden ancient chamber, the greatest library ever built containing lost knowledge, which is unearthed after a suspicious explosion and which is the obsession of Mallinder’s wife Andrea (Borgen’s Sidse Babett Knudsen). This too very much stretches credulity.

But it is the tetchy relationship between Ed and Taylah, both geeky, both ridiculously bright, both sullen, which is its driving energy. There are some comical chase scenes where you are expected to believe that highly trained security agents cannot catch a man on a wobbly student bike in the narrow streets of Cambridge (hilarious), yet it has little actual humour. However, if you want something escapist with a nice aesthetic, a lot of attitude and an airport thriller vibe that tells us that the next global “war” will be about maths, then it’s not at all a bad binge.

★★★★☆

Love TV? Discover the best shows on Netflix, the best Prime Video TV shows, the best Disney+ shows , the best Apple TV+ shows, the best shows on BBC iPlayer , the best shows on Sky and Now, the best shows on ITVX, the best shows on Channel 4 streaming, the best shows on Paramount+ and our favourite hidden gem TV shows. Don’t forget to check our critics’ choices to what to watch this week and browse our comprehensive TV guide

Culture


Prime Target

pluggedin.com

Jump to:

TV Series Review

“Math nerds are probably the most dangerous people on the planet.”

So says Taylah Sanders, a young employee for the National Security Agency tasked with monitoring those math nerds. And they live some surprisingly interesting lives.

Take Edward Brooks, a brilliant mathematics graduate student at Cambridge. How do we know he’s brilliant? Someone mentions it at least every 15 minutes or so. But his brilliance has led him into some dangerous waters: the world of prime numbers.

That’s right: 1, 3, 5, 7, 11 … No, no. Best look away now. Before you, too, are chased by murder-minded terrorists.

What—You’re Still Reading? Well, Don’t Say We Didn’t Warn You

Edward does think himself rather clever. Studying at Cambridge University—yes, that Cambridge, where Sir Isaac Newton set the mathematics world in new motion—Edward believes that the study of math has some grand new discoveries lurking in the shadow of well-known numbers and trig signs. “(New) numbers are out there, just waiting to be found, like vast, hidden continents.”

He believes that people have not looked into the mysteries of prime numbers nearly enough. Even though the world is built around numbers neatly divisible, nature leans into the primes. And those prime numbers, Edward believes, may be the key to unlocking the secrets of the universe itself.

“What if God’s cipher here on earth—the DNA of existence—is actually prime numbers?” he asks his mentor, Professor Mallinder.

Mallinder knows that his brilliant (everyone says so) student is onto something. He knows because another brilliant student of his was on the same path 30 years before. Oh, and hey, she mysteriously died. Forces untold aren’t so much interested in prime numbers as “God’s cypher,” but rather a key to unlock every computer encryption known to man.

You wouldn’t want something like that falling into the wrong hands, would you?

Taylah—she of the NSA—knows someone is after Edward’s prime-number theories. Why? Because Professor Mallinder also died mysteriously just a few days ago. And when Taylah brought it up to her boss, that boss was promptly gunned down.

So now, Taylah takes it upon herself to save Edward and whatever secret knowledge he has rattling around in his head … before both he and she meet unfortunate fates of their own.


Prime-al Leer

Prime Target feels like an Apple TV+ misfire.

Certainly, we see plenty of plot holes that seem out of place in a show predicated on advanced mathematics. And both Edward and Taylah—despite being nicely telegenic and all—are rather unappealing as characters.

But Prime Target comes with other issues, as well.

Edward’s true love may be math, but he’s not above a physical tryst or two. He falls into a casual relationship with a (seemingly) clueless male bartender in the first episode—one that swiftly lands them both in bed. But he may not be that particular about who he sleeps with: When the bartender asks if Edward’s parents know he’s gay, Edward tells him “I’m not anything.” Which suggests that if the bartender had been a woman, Edward might’ve just happily bedded her, too.

The show labels itself a thriller, so we shouldn’t be surprised that bodies are beginning to pile up like snow in North Dakota. And while Prime Target seems to try to keep things to a PG-13 level, some of the deaths we see can feel R-rated bloody.

Foul language, while not ubiquitous, can still be harsh when we hear it. S-words and an occasional f-word speckle the dialogue, with some more mild profanities folded in.

Give Apple TV+ credit: It’s not every streaming service that would give its viewers a thriller predicated on “math nerds.” But Prime Target serves up some Prime problems. And, as we know, those sorts of negatives rarely add up to be positive.

(Editor’s Note: Plugged In is rarely able to watch every episode of a given series for review. As such, there’s always a chance that you might see a problem that we didn’t. If you notice content that you feel should be included in our review, send us an email at [email protected], or contact us via Facebook or Instagram, and be sure to let us know the episode number, title and season so that we can check it out.)

Episode Reviews

Jan. 22, 2025 – S1, E1: “A New Pattern”

Edward tells his mentor, Prof. Robert Mallinder, that he’s exploring the significance of prime numbers—suggesting that they might prove to be “God’s cypher” on Earth. Mallinder seems to scoff at Edward’s theories, telling him that they’re strictly for the “tinfoil hat mob.” But then he breaks into Edward’s room, steals his research and promptly burns it—suggesting that Mallinder’s not so much dismissive of Edward’s work as he is threatened by it.

In an opening sequence, a massive explosion rips through downtown Baghdad, blowing several people backward and leaving many seriously injured. A woman and her daughter fall through a weakening floor—their fates unknown. A man is found dead in his car, and the authorities presume it’s suicide. (We see the lifeless body.)

Edward and a male bartender flirt at a bar and, later, go to bed together. When the bartender tries to discuss Edward’s sexuality, Edward suggests he’s more interested in math than anything else. We see the bartender shirtless. There’s a hint that Mallinder may have had an affair with someone decades earlier. Characters drink wine and other alcoholic beverages.

We hear characters say the s-word about four times. The word “h—” is also used.

Jan. 22, 2025 – S1, E2: “Syracuse”

The primary storyline switches to the south of France, where Taylah and a small band of NSA agents monitors Europe’s most brilliant mathematical minds. But when Taylah sees Mallinder and his car disappear behind a metal garage door—the last time he was seen alive by anyone—the security footage around the area all cuts out at the same time. And when Taylah reports the anomaly to her supervisor, who dutifully reports it up the chain, the supervisor soon winds up dead.

That death is a bloody one: He’s standing outside when he’s shot in the head by a sniper. Taylah, who was talking with him at the time, is forced to run and dive into the water as bullets pepper the liquid.

Back in Cambridge, Edward breaks into Mallinder’s office in an effort to get his research back. When he finds that research destroyed, he starts to destroy the office—and is promptly thrown out of Cambridge for his tantrum.

A guy hits on Taylah, and Taylah surmises that the Frenchman has already slept with most of the women in town. Someone offers to get a friend drunk. Edward tries to make amends with his jilted bartender lover. We learn of two mysterious suicides connected to the research of prime numbers. Characters say the f-word once, the s-word twice and utter the word “h—.”


Elevate family time with our parent-friendly entertainment reviews! The Plugged In Podcast has in-depth conversations on the latest movies, video games, social media and more.

Learn More and Subscribe Here!

pluggedin.com



25. Secretary Hegseth's Message to the Force


Just received.


​Not to be snarky but I hope he means on the seas as well.


Excerpt:


We will reestablish deterrence by defending our homeland — on the ground and in the sky. 



Secretary Hegseth's Message to the Force

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4040940/secretary-hegseths-message-to-the-force/

Jan. 25, 2025 |   

It is the privilege of a lifetime to lead the warriors of the Department of Defense, under the leadership of our Commander in Chief Donald J. Trump. We will put America First, and we will never back down.

 

The President gave us a clear mission: achieve Peace through Strength. We will do this in three ways — by restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military, and reestablishing deterrence.  

 

o   We will revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military. We are American warriors. We will defend our country. Our standards will be high, uncompromising, and clear. The strength of our military is our unity and our shared purpose. 

 

o   We will rebuild our military by matching threats to capabilities. This means reviving our defense industrial base, reforming our acquisition process, passing a financial audit, and rapidly fielding emerging technologies. We will remain the strongest and most lethal force in the world. 

 

o   We will reestablish deterrence by defending our homeland — on the ground and in the sky. We will work with allies and partners to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific by Communist China, as well as supporting the President’s priority to end wars responsibly and reorient to key threats. We will stand by our allies — and our enemies are on notice.

 

All of this will be done with a focus on lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards, and readiness.

 

I have committed my life to warfighters and their families. Just as my fellow soldiers had my back on the battlefield, know that I will always have your back. We serve together at a dangerous time. Our enemies will neither rest nor relent. And neither will we. We will stand shoulder to shoulder to meet the urgency of this moment.  

 

Like each of you, I love my country and swore an oath to defend the Constitution. We will do that each and every day, as one team. Together we will accomplish the President’s mission to deter war, and if necessary, defeat and destroy our enemies. Godspeed!

26. Wicker and Reed Announce SASC Subcommittee Leadership for 119th Congress



​For those interested in SOF and Irregular, Unconventional, and Political Warfare this is the ley committee.


Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities (15 members)
Chairwoman: Sen. Joni K. Ernst, R-Iowa
Ranking Member: Sen. Elissa Slotkin, D-Mich.
Responsibilities: Policies and programs related to science and technology, special operations, intelligence, counterterrorism, security cooperation, strategic communications and information operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, and homeland defense.
Subcommittee Members: Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., Sen. Mike Rounds, R-S.D., Sen. Kevin Cramer, R-N.D., Sen. Markwayne Mullin, R-Okla., Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., Sen. Tim Sheehy, R-Mont., Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D., N.H., Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand, D-N.Y., Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev., Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz.



Published:

Friday, January 24, 2025

Wicker and Reed Announce SASC Subcommittee Leadership for 119th Congress

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/wicker-and-reed-announce-sasc-subcommittee-leadership-for-119th-congress

Today, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Chairman Roger Wicker, R-Miss., and Ranking Member Jack Reed, D-R.I., announced the SASC subcommittee assignments for the 119th Congress, including the top Republican and Democrat for each subcommittee.


The SASC subcommittee Chairs, Ranking Members, and rosters for the 119th Congress are as follows:


Subcommittee on Airland (13 members)

Chairman: Sen. Kevin Cramer, R-N.D.

Ranking Member: Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz.

Responsibilities: Army planning and operations policy and programs (less space, cyber, and special operations); and Air Force planning and operations policy and programs (less nuclear weapons, space, cyber, and special operations).

Special additional area: National Guard and Reserve planning and operations policy and equipment.

Subcommittee Members: Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, Sen. Markwayne Mullin, Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., D-Mich., Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill., Sen. Elissa Slotkin, D-Mich.


Subcommittee on Cybersecurity (9 members)

Chairman: Sen. Mike Rounds, R-S.D.

Ranking Member: Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev.

Responsibilities: Policies and programs related to cyber forces, operations, and capabilities.

Subcommittee Members: Sen Tom Cotton, R-Ark., Sen. Joni K. Ernst, R-Iowa, Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand, D-N.Y., Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., Sen. Elissa Slotkin, D-Mich.


Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities (15 members)

Chairwoman: Sen. Joni K. Ernst, R-Iowa

Ranking Member: Sen. Elissa Slotkin, D-Mich.

Responsibilities: Policies and programs related to science and technology, special operations, intelligence, counterterrorism, security cooperation, strategic communications and information operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, and homeland defense.

Subcommittee Members: Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., Sen. Mike Rounds, R-S.D., Sen. Kevin Cramer, R-N.D., Sen. Markwayne Mullin, R-Okla., Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., Sen. Tim Sheehy, R-Mont., Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D., N.H., Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand, D-N.Y., Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev., Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz.


Subcommittee on Personnel (9 members)

Chairman: Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala.

Ranking Member: Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass.

Responsibilities: Military and DOD civilian personnel policies; end strengths for military personnel; military personnel compensation and benefits; military health care; and military nominations.

Special additional areas: Professional Military Education; DOD schools; DOD child care and family assistance; civil-military programs; POW/MIA issues; Armed Forces Retirement Home; Morale, Welfare and Recreation; military commissaries and exchanges; and financial literacy and DOD implementation of the Military Lending Act.

Subcommittee Members: Sen. Joni K. Ernst, R-Iowa, Sen. Rick Scott, R-Fla., Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., Sen. Jim Banks, R-Ind., Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., Sen. Mazie K. Hirono, D-Hawaii, Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill.


Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support (11 members)

Chairman: Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska

Ranking Member: Sen. Mazie K. Hirono, D-Hawaii

Responsibilities: Military readiness including training, logistics, and maintenance; military construction; housing construction and privatization; contracting and acquisition policy; business and financial management; Pentagon audit; base realignment and closure; and defense energy and environmental programs.

Special additional areas: Conventional ammunition procurement; RDT&E infrastructure; National Defense Stockpile; defense industrial and technology base policies; facility and housing maintenance and repair; land and property management; information technology management policy (excluding cyber); and industrial operations, including depots, shipyards, arsenals, and ammunition plants.

Subcommittee Members: Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., Sen. Kevin Cramer, R-N.D., Sen. Rick Scott, R-Fla., Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., Sen. Tim Sheehy, R-Mont., Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill.


Subcommittee on Seapower (11 members)

Chairman: Sen. Rick Scott, R-Fla.

Ranking Member: Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va.

Responsibilities: Navy planning and operations policy and programs (less nuclear weapons, space, cyber, and special operations); and Marine Corps planning and operations policy and programs (less space, cyber, and special operations).

Special additional areas: Maritime issues.

Subcommittee Members: Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., Sen. Markwayne Mullin, R-Okla., Sen. Jim Banks, R-Ind., Sen. Tim Sheehy, R-Mont., Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., Sen. Mazie K. Hirono, D-Hawaii, Sen. Angus King, I-Maine.


Subcommittee on Strategic Forces (11 members)

Chairman: Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb.

Ranking Member: Sen. Angus King, I-Maine

Responsibilities: Nuclear and strategic forces; arms control and non-proliferation programs; space programs; Department of Energy defense nuclear and defense environmental management programs; and missile defense.

Subcommittee Members: Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., Sen. Mike Rounds, R-S.D., Sen. Kevin Cramer, R-N.D., Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., Sen. Jim Banks, R-Ind., Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand, D-N.Y., Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev., Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz.


Note: Senator Wicker and Senator Reed, as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee, serve as ex-officio (non-voting) members of all subcommittees.

Press Contact

Jack Beyrer (SASC Republicans) (202) 224-0418

Cole Stevens (SASC Democrats) (202) 224-8636




27. Trump says he could send US special operators after Mexican drug cartels. It could make things a lot worse.


The key question: Desired end state?


Excerpts:

He also recommended a closer examination and targeting of China's role in the US drug crisis, pointing to the supply of chemical and financial support to cartels.
It's unclear what endstates the Trump administration desires to achieve to define success, said the SOF operator. Lacking such parameters could lead to another quagmire. It seems likely, however, that any effective operation to dismantle them will take years, he said.
"It's not done in a short amount of time; it takes consistent effort and partnership," the operator said. "It's going to take a generation or two; it's not going to be done in four years."




Trump says he could send US special operators after Mexican drug cartels. It could make things a lot worse.

Business Insider · by Kelsey Baker

Military & Defense

Kelsey Baker

2025-01-25T12:30:02Z

Facebook Email X LinkedIn Copy Link Impact Link

Read in app

A US Army Special Forces soldier provides security during an advising mission. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Sara Wakai/ Released

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now. Have an account? .

  • Trump and others have floated sending US special operations forces to Mexico to combat cartels.
  • Experts told Business Insider that intervention in Mexico could create instability.
  • SOF missions like foreign internal defense could be prudent, but only to augment nonmilitary approaches.

Trump world is kicking around the idea of sending special operations forces into Mexico to combat drug cartels. There's a risk these operations could make things worse, experts said.


While designating Mexican cartels as "foreign terrorist organizations" on Monday, President Donald Trump was asked by reporters whether he would consider sending US special operations personnel to Mexico.

"Could happen," the president said, noting that "stranger things have happened."


Experts on the cartels and warfare said that sending any military troops into Mexico risks stirring instability, which could then spill over the border into US territory.

"I don't think that the American people have the stomach for what's going to happen if we start messing around down there," a senior active-duty special operator told Business Insider, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to the media.

"Just throwing any military mechanism at this problem for the purpose of just killing cartel leaders is not going to change anything," he said. "It's only going to make things worse."



US Army Green Berets prepare to breach and enter a building as part of Close Quarter Battle training. US Army/Staff Sgt. Thomas Mort

Trump floated the idea of military intervention in Mexico in his first term, but his team now appears to be considering the idea more seriously.

"How much should we invade Mexico?" a transition team member told Rolling Stone in November 2024 for a report on Trump's musings about combating cartels in Mexico. "That is the question."

Trump's new national security advisor, Mike Waltz, a former Green Beret, has pushed the idea of using special operators. And Trump's "border czar," Tom Homan, has said that special operations forces could be used to take the cartels out, or "take them off the face of the Earth."


Direct action raids — hard-hitting missions US special operations is known for and which Trump appears inclined to pursue — on Mexican soil would bring disastrous consequences, especially if conducted without an invitation from Mexico, the operator and other experts BI spoke with warned. But other, less kinetic missions, like training foreign troops or improving foreign internal defense, could prove worthwhile, they said.

Such missions have long been the bread and butter of forces like the Army's Green Berets. With Trump's formal designation of cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, those kinds of missions could augment other government efforts to more effectively stem the flow of drugs into the US, sources told BI.

Related stories

An idea that keeps coming up

The idea of using special operators to combat cartels in Mexico has gained traction among leading Republicans, particularly military veterans. Before Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, a former naval officer, ended his bid for the White House, he told CNN that if elected president, he would deploy US special operations forces into Mexico "on day one."


In 2023, Waltz, then a congressional representative from Florida, and Dan Crenshaw, a Texas congressman and former Navy SEAL, introduced new Authorization of Military Force legislation aimed at Mexican cartels. Such legislation is notably not often quickly reversed — both of the AUMFs that allowed the Global War on Terror to balloon in scope are still in place.

Wanting to send special operations forces into Mexico is understandable, said Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations. Other measures have failed to curb the flow of drugs into the US, though some of the efforts at home appear to be working, as deaths from fentanyl overdoses are finally on the decline.


A member of US Naval Special Warfare Task Unit Europe (NSWTU-E) provides cover during a raid with foreign special operations forces. U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt

But special operations is much smaller than conventional military forces, he said, and isn't designed to solve every problem that might warrant military intervention.


"Despite the public imagination, SOF is not on a regular basis engaged in the kinds of operations that people often imagine, that are depicted in Hollywood," Hoffman said.

"They're engaged in less glamorous things like training indigenous forces, gathering intelligence, psychological operations, [and] civil affairs," he said.

Bolstering Mexico's internal defenses could be a worthwhile endeavor, the active-duty special operator told BI, but prioritizing military intervention over non-violent approaches, like empowering the State and Treasury departments to apply pressure on the financial institutions used by cartels, would be foolhardy.


The dangers of getting it wrong

Violence against cartels could trigger a humanitarian crisis and spur more immigration to the US, said Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, a professor at George Mason University who has extensively studied cartels.

Mexican civilians caught in the crossfire would likely flee communities, which could create a refugee crisis, she said. "They are going to apply for asylum in a desperate situation," she said, calling the idea of immediate military intervention illogical.

It's not as simple as killing top leaders either. Complicating the grip cartels have on Mexican society is their seemingly infinite complexity, she said.


"We're not talking about businesses that operate vertically, like El Chapo and El Mayo, and all these guys that provide orders to everyone," she said, referring to two infamous drug kingpins. Most cartels operate with less centralized command structures and are splintered into smaller cells. Some of these focus on drug movements and production, while others focus on kidnapping, extortion, and human smuggling.

If the goal is to limit the reach of the cartels and the violence and the destruction that comes with them, "you are going to get the exact opposite effect" if you start killing leaders, said Carolyn Gallaher, a professor at American University who studies cartels, in an interview with BI.

Top leaders can be easily replaced by others zealously vying for power, creating an even more complex battlefield for American troops and Mexican civilians.


"When you start fighting an army that is not behaving like a regular military, you are basically in the middle of civilian life," Gallaher said. "And you don't have an accurate way to differentiate between civilian and soldier."


Coalition and Anti-Terror Forces fire mortar rounds on an overseas live-fire range. US Army/Sgt. Brandon White

Doug Livermore, vice president of the Special Operations Association of America and a senior Green Beret officer in the National Guard who has written about narcoterrorism, said special operations is just one tool in the vast US government toolbox, and can't be the main effort.

"A military approach by itself will not be sufficient. It will not solve the problem," Livermore told BI.


He suggested a broader approach involving US special operations-provided intelligence or efforts to bolster internal security. However, Livermore said rampant corruption in Mexico's government agencies could complicate these efforts.

He also recommended a closer examination and targeting of China's role in the US drug crisis, pointing to the supply of chemical and financial support to cartels.

It's unclear what endstates the Trump administration desires to achieve to define success, said the SOF operator. Lacking such parameters could lead to another quagmire. It seems likely, however, that any effective operation to dismantle them will take years, he said.


"It's not done in a short amount of time; it takes consistent effort and partnership," the operator said. "It's going to take a generation or two; it's not going to be done in four years."

Business Insider · by Kelsey Baker






De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:


"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website
Facebook  Twitter  Pinterest  
basicImage