Quotes of the Day:

 "Great thoughts speak only to the thoughtful mind, but great actions speak to all mankind." 

- Theodore Roosevelt

“The trouble with academics and commentators is that they care more about whether ideas are interesting than whether they are true.” 

- Isaiah Berlin

"The man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point that he cannot distinguish the truth within him, or around him."

- Fyodor Dostoevsky 

1. Russia fires wave of missiles at Ukraine after Kyiv secures tanks

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 25, 2023

3. DoD Announces Update to DoD Directive 3000.09, 'Autonomy In Weapon Systems'

4. The Siren Song: Technology, JADC2, and the Future of War. (China counters)

5. USSOCOM 2023 Fact Book | SOF News

6. Armed Services committee adds 11 members, quality of life panel

7. Ten Things I Learned by Skimming Thucydides by John Nagl and Matthew Woessner

8. Reconsidering Clausewitz on Friction

9. China's Port Investments Are Raising Security Fears. How to Deal With Them.

10. Why America and China Must Cooperate

11. Sending tanks to Ukraine makes one thing clear: this is now a western war against Russia

12. #Reviewing Reagan’s War Stories

13. How Xi Jinping Used the CCP Constitution to Cement His Power

14. U.S. Representative sponsors resolution calling for formal Taiwan-U.S. ties

15. Understanding the US Designation of the Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organisation

16. What is Putin thinking?

17. China Increasingly Relies on Imported Food. That’s a Problem.

18.  The U.S. Military Is In Decline. Cutting Defense Spending Would Be a Disaster

1. Russia fires wave of missiles at Ukraine after Kyiv secures tanks

Russia fires wave of missiles at Ukraine after Kyiv secures tanks

Reuters · by Tom Balmforth

• Summary
• Companies
• Explosions registered in Kyiv and Vinnytsia
• Ukraine says all drones and most missiles shot down
• Zelenskiy hails tank pledges as 'fist of freedom'
• Kremlin says they add to West's 'direct involvement'
• Biden: Tanks pose 'no offensive threat' to Russia

KYIV, Jan 26 (Reuters) - Russia launched a rush-hour barrage of missiles towards Ukraine on Thursday, killing at least one person, the day after Kyiv secured Western pledges of dozens of modern battlefield tanks to try to push back the Russian invasion.

Moscow reacted with fury to the German and American announcements, and has in the past responded to apparent Ukrainian successes with air strikes that have left millions without light, heat or water.

The Ukrainian military said it had shot down all 24 drones sent overnight by Russia, including 15 around the capital, with no damage reported.

But soon afterwards, air raid alarms sounded across Ukraine as people were heading to work, and senior officials said air defences were shooting down incoming missiles.

The Kremlin said on Thursday it saw the promised delivery of Western tanks to Ukraine as "direct involvement" of the United States and Europe in the 11-month-old conflict, something both deny.

In the capital, crowds of people took cover in underground metro stations. Mayor Vitali Klitschko said one person had been killed and two wounded when a missile hit non-residential buildings in the south of the city.

Kyiv's military administration said more than 15 missiles fired at Kyiv had been shot down, but urged people to remain on shelters.

DTEK, Ukraine's largest private energy producer, said it was conducting emergency power shutdowns in Kyiv, the surrounding region and also the regions of Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk because of the imminent danger.

In Odesa, the Black Sea port designated a "World Heritage in Danger" site on Wednesday by the U.N. cultural agency UNESCO, Russian missile strikes damaged energy infrastructure, the district military administration said.

Western analysts say the attacks on Ukraine's cities are more an attempt to break morale than a strategic campaign.

Both sides are expected to mount new ground offensives come the spring, and Ukraine has been seeking hundreds of modern tanks in the hope of using them to break Russian defensive lines and recapture occupied territory in the south and east.

Both Ukraine and Russia have so far relied primarily on Soviet-era T-72 tanks.

'FIST OF FREEDOM'

"The key now is speed and volumes. Speed in training our forces, speed in supplying tanks to Ukraine. The numbers in tank support," President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address on Wednesday.

"We have to form such a 'tank fist', such a 'fist of freedom'."

[1/19] People take shelter inside a metro station during massive Russian missile attacks in Kyiv, Ukraine January 26, 2023. REUTERS/Viacheslav Ratynskyi

Maintaining Kyiv's drumbeat of requests, Zelenskiy said he had spoken to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and asked for long-range missiles and aircraft.

Ukraine's allies have already provided billions of dollars worth of military support, including sophisticated U.S. missile systems that have helped turn the tide of the war in the last six months.

The United States has been wary of deploying the difficult-to-maintain Abrams but had to change tack to persuade Germany to send to Ukraine its more easily operated German-built Leopards.

Germany will send an initial company of 14 tanks from its stocks, which it said could be operational in three or four months, and approve shipments by allied European states with the aim of equipping two battalions - in the region of 100 tanks.

The Leopard is a system that any NATO member can service, and crews and mechanics can be trained together on a single model, Ukrainian military expert Viktor Kevlyuk told Espreso TV.

"If we have been brought into this club by providing us with these vehicles, I would say our prospects look good."

U.S. President Joe Biden said the 31 M1 Abrams tanks that Washington will provide posed "no offensive threat" to Russia.

But Sergei Nechayev, Russia's ambassador to Germany, on Wednesday called Berlin's decision "extremely dangerous", saying that it "takes the conflict to a new level of confrontation".

FIGHTING IN EAST UKRAINE

Since invading Ukraine on Feb. 24 last year, Russia has shifted its publicly stated goals from "denazifying" and "demilitarising" its neighbour to confronting a purportedly aggressive and expansionist U.S.-led NATO alliance.

The Russian invasion has killed thousands of civilians, forced millions from their homes and reduced entire cities to rubble.

The heaviest fighting for now is around Bakhmut, a town in eastern Ukraine with a pre-war population of 70,000 that has seen some of the most brutal combat of the war.

Ukraine's military said Russia was attacking "with the aim of capturing the entire Donetsk region and regardless of its own casualties".

The Russian-installed governor of Donetsk said on Wednesday that units of Russia's Wagner contract militia were moving forward inside Bakhmut, with fighting on the outskirts and in neighbourhoods recently held by Ukraine.

Reuters could not verify the battlefield reports.

Reporting by Reuters bureaus; writing by Cynthia Osterman, Himani Sarkar and Kevin Liffey; editing by Grant McCool, Robert Birsel and Timothy Heritage

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Tom Balmforth

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 25, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2023

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces may be engaging in limited spoiling attacks across most of the frontline in Ukraine in order to disperse and distract Ukrainian fronts and launch a decisive offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast.
• The Russian military appears to be shifting its focus toward conventional forces deployed to Luhansk Oblast and away from the non-traditional force structure of the Wagner Group and its focus on Bakhmut.
• The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers attempted to downplay the Western provision of tanks to Ukraine, indicating that they likely find these systems threatening to Russian prospects.
• Russian forces claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Svatove as Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces have likely made advances around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. Russian forces reportedly continued localized offensive operations near Vuhledar.
• Russian forces continued to conduct small-scale ground attacks across the Zaporizhia Oblast front line, likely to attempt to fix Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers are divided over the veracity of Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s ongoing, overblown information operation.
• The Kremlin is attempting to downplay new restrictions on crossing the Russian border, likely in an effort to contain panic within Russian society about a likely second mobilization wave.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be attempting to conduct another wave of mobilization discreetly out of concern for undermining his support among Russians.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 25, 2023

Jan 25, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Layne Philipson, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 25, 9:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces may be engaging in limited spoiling attacks across most of the frontline in Ukraine in order to disperse and distract Ukrainian forces and set conditions to launch a decisive offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces have re-initiated offensive operations, namely limited ground attacks, on two main sectors of the front in the past few days—in central Zaporizhia Oblast along Kamianske-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala Tokmachka line and in the Vuhledar area of western Donetsk Oblast.[1] Ukrainian officials have noted that these attacks are conducted by small squad-sized assault groups of 10 to 15 people and are aimed at dispersing Ukrainian defensive lines.[2] The size and nature of these attacks suggest that they are more likely spoiling attacks that seek to distract and pin Ukrainian forces against discrete areas of the front than a concerted effort to relaunch offensive operations to gain ground in the central Zaporizhia and western Donetsk directions.

These limited attacks are notably ongoing as the pace of Russian operations around Bakhmut, led by the Wagner Group, seems to be decreasing. Following the Russian capture of Soledar in mid-January, the attacks on Bakhmut and surrounding settlements have apparently dropped off, suggesting that the Russian offensive operation to take Bakhmut may be culminating. The Wagner Group has failed to deliver on its promise of securing Bakhmut and has been unable to progress beyond minor tactical gains in Soledar and other surrounding small settlements. Russian military leadership may have, therefore, decided to de-prioritize operations around Bakhmut after recognizing the low likelihood that Wagner will actually be able to take the settlement. As ISW has previously suggested, Russian sources may be pushing the narratives of claimed Russian offensive operations in central Zaporizhia and western Donetsk Oblast in order to inflate the Russian information space with positive narratives that compensate for abject failures around Bakhmut.[3] Both the information space effects and the attacks themselves may be intended to distract focus from the lack of gains in Bakhmut and draw Ukrainian forces to the areas in question.

The Russian military appears to be shifting its focus towards conventional forces and away from the non-traditional force structure of the Wagner Group, potentially in preparation for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast. On the strategic level, certain changes to Russian command reflect a gradual transition away from reliance on unconventional force groupings such as Wagner and towards supporting and empowering conventional Russian elements. The recent appointment of Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to overall theater command of Russian forces in Ukraine (and subsequent demotion of Wagner Group favorite Army General Sergey Surovikin) suggests that Russian military leadership is increasingly looking to the traditional and conventional military establishment that Gerasimov represents and leads. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has similarly engaged in efforts to reform and standardize the conventional military in line with Gerasimov’s appointment.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be empowering Gerasimov to take steps that undermine Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the unconventional force structure he represents.[5] The shift toward conventional forces is also increasingly apparent on the operational and tactical levels. Various conventional elements (namely from the 3rd Motor Rifle Division and Airborne Forces) have been arrayed across the Svatove-Kreminna line in Luhansk Oblast and are notably not supporting Wagner Group operations around Bakhmut, indicating that Russian military leadership may be allocating conventional forces to what they regard as a more promising axis of advance.[6] Ukrainian intelligence relatedly noted that elements of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District have withdrawn from Belarus and partially deployed to Luhansk Oblast.[7]

The array of conventional forces across the Luhansk Oblast frontline suggests that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort in this sector, supported by limited spoiling attacks elsewhere on the frontline to distract and disperse Ukrainian forces. ISW has previously discussed indicators of a potential decisive Russian effort in Luhansk Oblast.[8] Taken in tandem with a variety of intelligence statements that Russia is preparing for an imminent offensive operation in the coming months, it is likely that a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast would be an offensive one.[9] The most probable course of a Russian offensive action in Luhansk Oblast would be premised on launching an attack along the Svatove-Kreminna line, supported by critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that run into major logistics hubs in Luhansk City and Starobilsk, in order to reach the Luhansk Oblast administrative border and complete the capture of the remaining part of Luhansk Oblast that is still Ukrainian-controlled. Russian forces may hope to recapture critical ground in northern Donetsk Oblast around Lyman and use the Svatove-Kreminna line to launch further attacks into western Kharkiv and/or northern Donetsk Oblasts. Russian forces are exceedingly unlikely to be able to gain substantial ground on this axis even if they do launch a successful offensive operation on this sector, however.

The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers attempted to play down the Western provision of tanks to Ukraine, indicating that they likely find these systems threatening to Russian prospects. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 25 that the Western provision of Abrams and Leopard tanks to Ukraine is "quite a failure … in terms of technological aspects" and that there is a "clear overestimation of the potential that [these tanks] will add" to Ukrainian forces.[10] Some Russian milbloggers likely sought to reassure their domestic audiences by claiming that these systems do not pose a significant threat and that previous Western systems like HIMARS are a far more serious threat.[11] The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers previously framed the Western provision of purely defensive Patriot missile systems as a serious escalation between Russia and the West.[12] The fact that the Kremlin and Russian milbloggers did not frame the provision of armored vehicles that could actually aid future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as escalatory suggests that the Kremlin and the Russian information space continue to selectively choose which systems to frame as an escalation. The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers seem more concerned in this case with calming potential fears of the impact of Western commitments to supply Ukraine with tanks than with feeding the escalation narrative in the West. The Kremlin and its allies are right to be concerned about these new Western commitments, which allow Ukrainian commanders to plan against replacements for tank losses they could expect in counter-offensive operations that might be launched even before the Western tanks begin to arrive.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces may be engaging in limited spoiling attacks across most of the frontline in Ukraine in order to disperse and distract Ukrainian fronts and launch a decisive offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast.
• The Russian military appears to be shifting its focus toward conventional forces deployed to Luhansk Oblast and away from the non-traditional force structure of the Wagner Group and its focus on Bakhmut.
• The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers attempted to downplay the Western provision of tanks to Ukraine, indicating that they likely find these systems threatening to Russian prospects.
• Russian forces claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Svatove as Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces have likely made advances around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. Russian forces reportedly continued localized offensive operations near Vuhledar.
• Russian forces continued to conduct small-scale ground attacks across the Zaporizhia Oblast front line, likely to attempt to fix Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers are divided over the veracity of Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s ongoing, overblown information operation.
• The Kremlin is attempting to downplay new restrictions on crossing the Russian border, likely in an effort to contain panic within Russian society about a likely second mobilization wave.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be attempting to conduct another wave of mobilization discreetly out of concern for undermining his support among Russians.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions near Svatove on January 25. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces suppressed Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Vilshana (44km northwest of Svatove) and Berestove (44km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast, and Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (14km northwest of Svatove).[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating forces in Kupyansk and Dvorchina to conduct further offensive operations near Svatove, although ISW does not make assessments about specific future Ukrainian operations.[14] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that fighting near Novoselivske continues and that Russian forces routinely destroy Ukrainian manpower concentrations in the area.[15]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 25 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km southeast of Kreminna).[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces dislodged Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups south of Kreminna and gained a foothold near the Siverskyi Donets River.[17] Another milblogger posted footage on January 25 of BARS (Russian Combat Reserve of the Country) personnel performing a combat mission in the Kreminna area and claimed that they were under constant Ukrainian sniper fire.[18]

Ukrainian forces have likely made advances around Kreminna as of January 25. Combat footage published on January 23 and geolocated on January 24 shows Ukrainian forces ambushing a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) convoy east of Dibrova on an unspecified date.[19] The footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have likely made advances west of Dibrova. Other geolocated combat footage posted on January 23 and January 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces have also likely made advances south of Kreminna.[20] Ukrainian forces additionally conducted a HIMARS strike on Kreminna and Rubizhne in Luhansk Oblast on January 25.[21]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian officials acknowledged on January 25 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar and claimed that the frontline northeast of Bakhmut stabilized. Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar on an unspecified date after successfully exhausting Russian forces in the area and preventing a systematic Russian breakthrough into Ukrainian rear areas.[22] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely captured the settlement on January 11, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian joint forces seized the settlement on January 12.[23] Russian forces are continuing to launch assaults near Soledar, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Rozdolivka (18km northeast of Bakhmut) and Krasna Hora (7km north of Bakhmut).[24] A Russian milblogger who has been confirmed to report demonstrably false information on Russian operations claimed that Wagner Group fighters conducted an assault from Pidhorodne (5km northeast of Bakhmut) in the direction of Yahidne (4km north of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces attempted to attack near Spirne (29km northeast of Bakhmut).[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut.[26] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that the Bakhmut area remains the epicenter of combat operations and that Russian forces continue to conduct daily assaults in the direction of the city.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces only conducted assaults on three settlements in the wider Bakhmut area, which is markedly less than in previous days.[28] Geolocated footage published on January 24 likely indicates that Russian forces have advanced west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters advanced north of Klishchiivka and attempted to advance from the settlement towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the direction of Ivanivske intending to cut the T0504 highway that connects Bakhmut and Kostyantynivka.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area on January 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Novobakhmutivka (14km northeast of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (23km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (32km southwest of Avdiivka).[32] A Russian milblogger, who has previously reported demonstrably false information, claimed that Russian forces also conducted an assault in the direction of Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka).[33]

Russian forces reportedly continued localized offensive operations near Vuhledar (28km southwest of Donetsk City) on January 25. A Ukrainian military officer reported that Russian elements of the 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades of the Pacific Fleet attempted to advance north of Pavlivka (32km southwest of Donetsk City) and west of Mykilske (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[34] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions south of Vuhledar and advanced to the southern outskirts of the settlement.[35] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 7th operational tactical formation advanced southeast of Vuhledar, and that positional battles are ongoing near the settlement.[36] Russian milbloggers also amplified a Russian claim that unspecified Russian units conducted a raid near Vuhledar on the night of January 24 to 25.[37] ISW has still not observed any visual confirmation that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Vuhledar area. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may be conducting localized offensives in western Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts to distract from the lack of progress in the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut.[38] Russian forces may also be conducting localized offensive operations in the Vuhledar area as part of a series of spoiling attacks aimed at constraining possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct small-scale ground attacks across the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline on January 25, likely to attempt to disperse Ukrainian defensive positions in Zaporizhia Oblast. Spokesperson for Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces Natalya Humenyuk stated on January 25 that Russian forces are conducting limited attacks with 10- to 15-person groups to undermine Ukrainian defenses and disperse Ukrainian forces across the front line.[39] Humenyuk also stated that Russian forces are transferring additional reserves to this axis due to heavy losses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Charivne, approximately 70km southeast of Zaporizhzia City.[40] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces seized several unspecified settlements along the Malynivka-Chervone and Malynivka-Charvine lines near Hulyaipole but did not provide any evidence to back his claims.[41] A Russian milblogger, who has previously been proven to have fabricated false information about the frontline, claimed that Russian forces conducted an attack near Novodanylivka but noted that Russian forces are making little progress.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian "eastern" group of forces gained unspecified "more advantageous" positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have still not taken Kamianske (about 35km south of Zaporizhzhia City) despite forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the settlement.[44] A Russian milblogger posted UAV footage of empty trenches in a small settlement, which the milblogger claimed is Kamianske but there is no geolocated data that would confirm this claim.[45]

Russian milbloggers are divided over the veracity of Rogov’s likely exaggerated territorial claims along the Zaporizhia frontline. Rogov claimed on January 25 that Russian forces launched a "pre-emptive strike" against Ukrainian forces, who were preparing to launch their own offensive operations towards Berdyansk.[46] Some Russian milbloggers amplified Rogov’s claim, and one milblogger even claimed that the supposed pre-emptive strike allowed Russian forces to regain battlefield initiative.[47] ISW has observed no indications that Russian forces have launched a large-scale offensive operation that is successful enough for Russian forces to regain the initiative on the frontlines. ISW previously observed footage that shows Russian small groups conducting limited ground attacks in an open field, however.[48] Other Russian milbloggers have indicated that Russian forces have conducted only limited attacks and made only marginal advances.[49] Igor Girkin, a former Russian militant commander and prominent critical voice in the Russian milblogger information space claimed that there is no available data to indicate that Russian forces continued their offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast past the first day of the claimed offensive.[50] Another Russian milblogger claimed that battles along the Zaporizhia Oblast front line have become positional in nature.[51] Russian and Ukrainian sources continued to report that Russian forces shelled areas that Rogov previously claimed that Russian forces had captured, including Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, Novoandriivka, Shcherbaky, and Kamianske.[52]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to skirmish across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirms that Ukrainian forces landed near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, during an overnight raid on January 23-24.[53] This raid indicates that Russian forces may not have full control over the entire eastern shoreline of the Dnipro River. The Russian MoD acknowledged the raid on January 25.[54] One Russian milblogger downplayed Ukrainian forces’ ability to cross the Dnipro River while another criticized Russian forces for allowing Ukrainian forces to cross the river.[55] Humenyuk stated that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, in turn, continue to try to gain positions on the Potemkin islands in the Dnipro River Delta in hopes of monitoring Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[56] Humenyuk added that even if Russian forces improve their ability to monitor Ukrainian forces, they still have limited capacity to carry out precision strikes on important military infrastructure.

Russian forces continued to target the Kherson City area on January 25. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City with incendiary munitions.[57] Turkish outlet NTV reported that Russian shelling hit the Turkish ship Tuzla in the Kherson City port overnight on January 24-25, starting a fire.[58] NTV reported that no one was aboard the ship at the time of the fire. Reuters reported that the Tuzla has been stuck at port in Kherson City since February 2022.[59]

Ukrainian sources claimed that Russian air defenses activated off the coast of northern Crimea in Karkinitsky Bay on January 25.[60] The target of the air defense missile is unclear.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin is attempting to downplay new restrictions on crossing the Russian border, likely to contain panic over a potential second mobilization wave. Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Transport and Infrastructure Development Yevgeny Moskvichev prepared amendments to the Russian law on crossing the Russian border for drivers on January 25.[61] Moskvichev originally stated that these amendments will require all drivers to reserve a date and time to cross the border between March 1, 2023, and March 1, 2024, via a government information system.[62] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 24 that the Kremlin is not considering any restrictions on the movement of Russian citizens from Russia following Moskvichev’s announcement, and Moskvichev later clarified that such reservations will only apply to commercial drivers.[63] The Kremlin may have attempted to retract or obfuscate its originally stated vision for the border crossing in response to Russian concern over movement limitations. ISW previously reported that Russian officials established several mobile military recruitment centers on Russian borders during the first wave of mobilization, and will likely use the premise of vehicle registration to obtain information about men of military age attempting to flee the country.[64]

Russian President Vladimir Putin may be attempting to discreetly conduct another wave of mobilization to retain his domestic support base. US and Western officials told CNN that Putin is planning to discreetly mobilize as many as 200,000 men because he is aware that the previous announcement of "partial mobilization" was very unpopular in Russia.[65] The officials noted that the Kremlin even conducted domestic polling to gauge Russians’ perception of mobilization. The Kremlin, however, likely wasted the funds spent on such polling: over 700,000 men fleeing Russia during the first wave of mobilization should have been a sufficient indicator of Russians’ willingness to be mobilized to fight in this war.[66] The officials also added that Putin likely had not made up his mind yet on when to start the "silent mobilization."

Putin is also trying to regulate the Russian information space in preparation for protracted war or ahead of mobilization. Putin signed a decree amending the Russian fundamentals on state cultural policy to include provisions to protect society from "external ideological values and the expansion of destructive and psychological influences."[67] The amendment states that the Kremlin is introducing new measures to defend Russian "historic truths" such as Russian language against many "unfriendly states" and organizations that seek to undermine Russia’s "cultural sovereignty."[68] Putin will likely use this decree to further impose censorship on Western outlets and raise domestic support for the Russian war effort. A prominent Russian nationalist figure noted that the Russian population, however, still lacks insights into the goals of the Russian war in Ukraine.[69]

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing to use his connections with the Russian State Duma to legitimate Wagner mercenaries in Russia through legislative means. Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin instructed the Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrey Kartapolov and Security and Countering Corruption Committee Chairman Vasily Piskarev on January 24 to urgently study a proposal introducing criminal liability for "discrediting combatants," which Prigozhin submitted to him earlier in the day.[70] ISW previously reported that Prigozhin’s appeal to Volodin on January 24 called for the Russian government to criminally punish individuals who discredit all participants of the Russian "special military operation" in Ukraine, specifically including recruited convicts and volunteers operating within Wagner units.[71] Volodin also stated that all who "defend" Russia, including members of the Wagner Group, are heroes. Prigozhin’s appeals to nationalist sentiments are unlikely to convince Putin to legalize Wagner at this point, however, given that Putin has been demonstratively siding with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)—an institution that Prigozhin frequently criticizes to promote his own forces.[72]

Prigozhin is also continuing his efforts to morally justify the recruitment of prisoners to Russian society and explain away the lack of professionalism within the Wagner Group. Prigozhin responded to a media request about the release of Alexander Tyutin—a murderer previously sentenced to 23 years in prison who completed his contract with Wagner and returned to Russia.[73] Prigozhin stated that Wagner’s philosophy on recruiting prisoners relies on an observation that Russians would rather see a prisoner die in the war than their relatives.[74] He also claimed that if a murderer survives the war he is no longer a killer, but rather a warrior. Prigozhin’s observation is an implicit criticism of Russian complacency with the Kremlin’s force generation efforts as long as they do not impact people’s families. Wagner is also reportedly recruiting deported Ukrainian citizens who are imprisoned in Russian colonies. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 25 that Wagner is recruiting Ukrainian prisoners in Krasnodar Krai, while also continuing to call up Russian prisoners with serious criminal offenses to participate in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[75]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal and economic systems. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on January 25 that he is prioritizing deeper integration into the Russian socio-economic apparatus by ensuring free access of all citizens to all types of state and municipal services and efficient re-registration of documents to receive state support.[76] Pasechnik stated that the Multifunctional Center for Provision of State and Municipal Services (MFC) opened branches in nine occupied Luhansk Oblast settlements on January 25.[77] Pasechnik claimed that all residents in occupied Luhansk Oblast can visit an MFC location to request taxpayer identification numbers (TIN) and maternity capital certificates and regist as an entrepreneur.[78] Pasechnik also claimed that MFCs will begin registering citizens’ places of residence and issuing Russian passports, real estate registrations, and insurance numbers (SNILS) on January 30, 2023.[79] Pasechnik claimed that MFCs will accept documents to provide monthly allowances for the birth and upbringing of a child, as well as a monthly payment for the birth or adoption of a first child.[80]

Russian occupation authorities continue to face administrative issues in maintaining an adequate workforce to staff enterprises in occupied territories. Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom reported on January 25 that Russian occupation authorities are trying to recruit 150 Belarusian engineers to help staff the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as Ukrainian workers continue refusing to cooperate with occupation officials in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast.[81] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on January 25 that Russian forces are importing doctors from Russia to mitigate manpower shortages in hospitals as Ukrainian doctors and hospital staff continue resisting Russian occupation efforts.[82] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 25 that Russian occupation authorities are closing down three mines in Donetsk Oblast due to a lack of miners, outdated equipment, and non-profitability.[83] The center also reported that Russian occupation authorities "privatized" several mines in Donetsk Oblast, claiming that they had found private investors to operate the mines.[84]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing filtration efforts in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on January 25 that Russian forces deported all residents of occupied-Nechaeve, Kherson Oblast, to southern Ukraine as Russian forces and occupation authorities set up their personnel in the empty homes.[85] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on January 25 that Russian forces and occupation authorities are confiscating all boats and water vessels from locals residing along the Dnipro River coastline in Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast.[86] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian forces are authorized to shoot any civilian who attempts to move toward the coastal area in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast.[87]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing passportization efforts in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 25 that Russian occupation authorities in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, intend to fire all employees of so-called Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) enterprises who have not obtained a Russian passport by March 1, 2023.[88] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on January 25 that Russian occupation authorities are intensifying pressure on Melitopol residents to obtain a Russian passport, emphasizing that passporitzation efforts ensure that residents in occupied territories can be mobilized to join the Russian Armed Forces.[89] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on January 25 that Russian occupation authorities promised to pay deported residents of Nechaeve, Kherson Oblast, 10,000 rubles (~$144) if they obtain a Russian passport.[90]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing infrastructure projects to further connectivity between occupied territories and Russia. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on January 25 that a regular bus service will resume in occupied-Kherson Oblast as Ukrainians who had previously "evacuated" from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River are farmers who are returning to fields.[91] Saldo also claimed that design and service operations are underway to construct a new highway that will run from occupied territories to Rostov, Russia.[92] Saldo claimed that the second stage of the highway project will run from Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, to Moscow, Russia.[93] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to build a new ground line of communication (GLOC) along the Azov Sea coast under the guise of civilian infrastructure construction in an effort to avoid Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[94]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to raid and seize private property in an effort to identify pro-Ukrainians and partisans in occupied territories. LNR Internal Ministry claimed on January 25 that the occupation police force seized a cache of weapons in Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, and warned that acquiring, storing, and holding firearms is punishable by up to five years in prison.[95] A Russian source posted possibly staged video footage on January 25 showing Russian security forces, possibly Chechens, seizing a cache of weapons after raiding a residential neighborhood in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast.[96]

Russian officials are likely growing increasingly distrustful of Russian-appointed occupation authorities in occupied territories. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 25 that Russian officials appointed an unnamed Republic of Tatarstan Deputy Prime Minister—likely Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeny Varakin who curated "humanitarian" aid to Lysychansk from Tatarstan—as the Deputy of Lysychansk occupation administration in Luhansk Oblast.[97] Haidai also stated on January 25 that Russian officials were unable to staff the Severodonetsk occupation administration in the summer, 2022, due to a lack of suitable collaborators.[98]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continued to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories on January 25. LNR Head Leonid Pasechnik announced that Karachay-Cherkess has taken patronage of the Starobilsk district of Luhansk Oblast following a meeting with Karachay-Cherkess Head Rashid Temrezov on January 25.[99] Pasechnik highlighted the value of securing ties with Russian regions to ensure the provision of housing and communal services, roads, schools, agriculture, and production in occupied territories.[100]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.

ISW’s most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a potential major Russian offensive against northern Ukraine from Belarus appears increasingly unlikely. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as very low. ISW will continue reporting observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly.

Observed significant military activities in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicate an attack from Belarus is more likely:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that is ambiguous:

• The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Belarusian Security Council State Secretariat conducted a combat readiness check of Belarusian formations that are part of the regional group of forces (RGF), specifically the 6th Separate Mechanized Brigade.[101]
• Russian and Belarusian aviation units continued joint tactical flight exercises as part of the RGF on January 25.[102] Joint flight crews carried out exercises to practice suppressing air defense, defeat control points, strike concentration areas, cover strike groups, and conduct aerial reconnaissance.[103] The Belarusian MoD announced that Chief of the Belarusian General Staff Major General Viktor Gulevich arrived at the Ruzhany training ground on January 25 to monitor these exercises.[104]

Observed significant military activity in Belarus in the past 24 hours that indicates that an attack from Belarus remains unlikely:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 25.[105]
• Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky stated that there are 5,800 Russian servicemembers on the territory of Belarus as of January 25.[106] Independent imagery analysis of Russian forces in Belarus in late December showed around 10,000 personnel, so Skibitsky‘s statement marks a significant decrease in the Russian force grouping in Belarus over the course of the last month.[107] Skibitsky also reported that the Russian 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District moved out of Belarus and into Russia, with some elements deploying to Luhansk Oblast.[108] The overall decrease in Russian presence in Belarus, including elements of an elite mechanized force, suggests that an attack from Belarus is increasingly unlikely.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/25/sytuacziya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-kontrolovana-vorog-zaznaye-vtrat/; https://twitter.com/kyivindependent/status/1618361554206097408?s=46&t=Wk...

[7] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/na-terytorii-bilorusi-perebuvaiut-maizhe-6000-rosiiskykh-viiskovykh.html

[9] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vesna-ta-pochatok-lita-budut-vyrishalnymy-u-viini.html; https://rus.delfi dot ee/statja/120130892/general-ukrainskoy-razvedki-esli-by-zapadnye-vrachi-ne-podderzhivali-zhizn-putina-voyna-by-uzhe-zakonchilas?preview=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6IjEyMDEzMDg5MiIsImlhdCI6MTY3NDQ1NzU3OSwiZXhwIjoxNjc0NTQzOTc5fQ.J0jj4LRsAymstOVhWFV053PreBadyuIQbibLoCkDsVk

[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/16879679

[22] https://suspilne dot media/365918-bundestag-rozglane-nadanna-zsu-tankiv-leopard-ssa-shilautsa-do-peredaci-ukraini-abrams-336-den-vijni-onlajn/

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/10501; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/25/rosiyany-znimayut-postanovchi-video-boyiv-pid-bahmutom/; https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1617975788623761408?ref_src=twsrc%5Etf... https://t.me/wargonzo/10469

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/10501; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/25/rosiyany-znimayut-postanovchi-video-boyiv-pid-bahmutom/; https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1617975788623761408?ref_src=twsrc%5Etf... https://t.me/wargonzo/10469

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/25/sytuacziya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-kontrolovana-vorog-zaznaye-vtrat/

[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/51327; https://tass dot ru/politika/16878467

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/25/sytuacziya-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-kontrolovana-vorog-zaznaye-vtrat/

[58] https://www.ntv dot com.tr/dunya/ukraynada-turk-gemisi-vuruldu,dpQTHAWMQ0m-p7fUX3HBGg

[60] https://twitter.com/RoksolanaKrim/status/1618209868183396356; https://t... com.ua/mestnyiy/2023-01-25/5776748-moshchnye-vzryvy-progremeli-v-krymu-v-rayone-aerodroma-rf-dym-chto-izvestno

[67] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202301250004?index=5&rangeSize=1

[68] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/25/putin-vnes-izmeneniya-v-osnovy-gosudarstvennoy-kulturnoy-politiki-teper-v-ee-zadachi-vhodit-zaschita-obschestva-ot-vneshney-ideyno-tsennostnoy-ekspansii

[70] http://duma.gov dot ru/news/56246/

[78] glava_lnr_info

[83] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/25/okupanty-zakryly-shahtu-im-zasyadka/

[84] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/01/25/okupanty-zakryly-shahtu-im-zasyadka/

[85] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/25/rosiyany-prymusovo-deportuvaly-selo-v-hersonskij-oblasti/

[86] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/25/na-hersonshhyni-okupanty-vyluchyly-v-misczevogo-naselennya-plavzasoby/

[87] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/25/na-hersonshhyni-okupanty-vyluchyly-v-misczevogo-naselennya-plavzasoby/

[90] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/25/rosiyany-prymusovo-deportuvaly-selo-v-hersonskij-oblasti/

[97] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8164; https://www.tatar-inform dot ru/news/my-zakrepleny-kak-respublika-v-tatarstane-naznacili-otvetstvennogo-za-pomoshh-lisicanku-5880892; https://www.tatar-inform dot ru/news/evgenii-varakin-stal-zamestitelem-premer-ministra-tatarstana-5880871

[98] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8164; https://suspilne dot media/365972-zastupnik-premer-ministra-tatarstanu-stav-zastupnikom-okupacijnoi-administracii-v-lisicansku/

[106] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/na-terytorii-bilorusi-perebuvaiut-maizhe-6000-rosiiskykh-viiskovykh.html

[108] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/na-terytorii-bilorusi-perebuvaiut-maizhe-6000-rosiiskykh-viiskovykh.html

understandingwar.org

3. DoD Announces Update to DoD Directive 3000.09, 'Autonomy In Weapon Systems'

The 24 page policy can be downloaded here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/25/2003149928/-1/-1/0/DOD-DIRECTIVE-3000.09-AUTONOMY-IN-WEAPON-SYSTEMS.PDF

DoD Announces Update to DoD Directive 3000.09, 'Autonomy In Weapon Systems'

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

Jan. 25, 2023 |×

Share

The Department of Defense announced today the update to DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems. The update reflects DoD’s strong and continuing commitment to being a transparent global leader in establishing responsible policies regarding military uses of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI).

The update also reflects changes in the Department over the last decade, changes in the world, and Department requirements to reissue and update directives within certain time periods.

“DoD is committed to developing and employing all weapon systems, including those with autonomous features and functions, in a responsible and lawful manner,” said Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Kathleen Hicks. “Given the dramatic advances in technology happening all around us, the update to our Autonomy in Weapon Systems directive will help ensure we remain the global leader of not only developing and deploying new systems, but also safety.”

The Directive was established to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements.

The requirements established in the Directive include the following:

• Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.
• Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi- autonomous weapon systems will do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.
• The weapon system has demonstrated appropriate performance, capability, reliability, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic conditions.
• The design, development, deployment, and use of systems incorporating AI capabilities is consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI (RAI) Strategy and Implementation Pathway.

The DoD 3000.09 can be found here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/25/2003149928/-1/-1/0/DOD-DIRECTIVE-3000.09-AUTONOMY-IN-WEAPON-SYSTEMS.PDF

defense.gov

4. The Siren Song: Technology, JADC2, and the Future of War. (China counters)

I missed this a few days on Breaking Defense but was flagged on one of my listservs and I think it is worth sharing.

What if the Pentagon is on the wrong path? In this analysis, CNAS fellow Andrew Metrick argues that the future mega-network the US military is hell-bent on developing — Joint All Domain Command & Control — is precisely the kind of technology the Chinese military is optimized to attack. To prevail, he writes, advanced tech is less important than highly trained humans who can make good decisions, quickly, amidst chaos, confusion and shattered networks.

I think this point needs to be highlighted.

The fundamental concept at the core of PRC warfighting doctrine, systems destruction warfare, is aimed at the very heart of U.S. dominance, network-enabled precision targeting. Vast reams of translated open-source materials point to this reality.

The Siren Song: Technology, JADC2, and the Future of War

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/the-siren-song-technology-jadc2-and-the-future-of-war/

Winning future wars will not be about maintaining information advantage but rather prevailing when neither side has the advantage. And that is not a war that can be won by new technologies alone, writes CNAS's Andrew Metrick.

By  ANDREW METRICKon January 19, 2023 at 12:12 PM

PLA helicopters support an amphibious assault during a training exercise in June, 2022. (eng.chinamil.com.cn photo by Lin Jiayu)

What if the Pentagon is on the wrong path? In this analysis, CNAS fellow Andrew Metrick argues that the future mega-network the US military is hell-bent on developing — Joint All Domain Command & Control — is precisely the kind of technology the Chinese military is optimized to attack. To prevail, he writes, advanced tech is less important than highly trained humans who can make good decisions, quickly, amidst chaos, confusion and shattered networks.

The United States military keeps worshiping at the altar of high technology when addressing rising Chinese military threats. Unfortunately, the United States will not be able to brute force its way to superiority through technology. The Pentagon needs to acknowledge this reality and start making real changes, where they can matter.

This love of technology should not be surprising to long-time observers of the U.S. military. We are a nation of engineers with a boundless optimism in our scientific capabilities to overcome any obstacle, and perhaps nowhere is that more ingrained than the defense sector. We believe, in our bones, that superior technology will deliver us to victory.

Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the most recent example of this tech-first trend in American military developments aiming to “sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of war, across all domains, and with partners, to deliver information advantage with the speed of relevance.” Moving faster and increasing the speed of decisions is laudable in a vacuum. But technology is not applied in a vacuum: Adversaries get a vote, and China has spent the past 20-plus years looking at the U.S. military with a microscope. The fundamental concept at the core of PRC warfighting doctrine, systems destruction warfare, is aimed at the very heart of U.S. dominance, network-enabled precision targeting. Vast reams of translated open-source materials point to this reality.

Simply “running faster” is investing into the teeth of a Chinese strategy aimed at eroding the fundamental pillar of U.S. military power—network-enabled precision targeting— by disintegrating C4ISR capabilities from firepower systems. A fixation on “decision superiority” and “information advantage” to supercharge network-enabled precision targeting, a hallmark of current discussions around JADC2, will fail when your eyes are blind and ears muffled.

This is not to say that many of the technologies or even some of the concepts that are being spun out of the tangled web of JADC2 activities across the department are without merit. However, the fundamental approach often associated with these activities, data ubiquity and ultraconnectivity, is bankrupt when facing the challenge posed by China. JADC2 supercharges the Gulf War concept of network-enabled precision targeting; it fails to adequately address the challenges of systems destruction warfare.

Winning future wars will not be about maintaining information advantage but rather prevailing when neither side has the advantage. And that is not a war that can be won by new technologies alone.

New architectures and integrated collections of supporting concepts—not technologies or even one-off concepts—are needed for U.S. military operations against a true peer. Seemingly every defense review of the past 25 years has pointed to a need for new concepts. Despite this, very few new concepts seem forthcoming, let alone broad architectural solutions seeking to integrate disparate concepts into a cohesive whole. And yet, the U.S. defense community slides back to its comfort zone, a technology driven view of the future.

Architectures that permit victory from a position of information parity — or even information disadvantage — will mitigate significant adversary investments in counter-C4ISR technologies.

The point of departure should be a doctrinally driven, nodal architecture that abandons the alluring vision of data ubiquity and interconnectivity. Such an approach would accept inherent inefficiency in the name of resiliency. It would adopt the guiding principles of command decentralization and minimum necessary data in order to empower commanders at the tactical level to the use of the full breadth of available capabilities. If a forward element needs to “phone home” to use a transiting or time constrained capability, the “kill chain” may not close given adversary interference or self-inflicted procedural hurdles.

This architecture must confront the reality that the targeting process, a fundamental combat activity, is scoliotic and helplessly addicted to endless streams of data. JADC2 posits that the best way to deal with this is to maximize the data available, but the reality is the opposite: tactical commanders need to “sense, make sense, and act” with the absolute minimum of data.

Small-scale, emergent combat webs would replace a large, integrated system of systems. Forward battle networks share mere drabs of data, only sporadically link with higher echelons, and abandon rigid, centrally planned tasking orders.

Breaking the data addiction reduces the electromagnetic attack surface of these combat forces, creates resiliency, and fully unlocks the inherent lethality of stand-off and stand-in fires. Let’s use a simplified version of the analysis in a classic RAND report. Consider a notional, Mach-6, 1,000 nautical mile weapon used against a mobile target with an average relocation time of 20 minutes. The strike will fail over 50 percent of the time if data and command requirements introduce merely five minutes of delay. By comparison, reducing the data and command requirements to achieve one minute of delay allows the kill chain to complete over 75 percent of the time. More simply: the more data that has to go back and forth, the longer the delay and the less likely it is for a strike to succeed. If the Joint Force leads with doctrinal changes, accepts decentralized planning and execution, and pushes data processing, exploitation and ultimately command authority as far forward as feasible, it trims down the amount of time — and increases the success rate.

Organization and missions of the new Marine Corps Littoral Combat Regiments (graphic by RangerSidewinder @realaludiangov)

The Marine Corps offers a ray of hope toward such a future with the ongoing Force Design 2030 activities. That effort is laudable because it grapples with the reality of the new threat environment and trades the former architecture, joint forcible entry, for a new approach, distributed maritime campaigning. Some may find this disquieting, but it is the exact type of thinking and process that the Joint Force must lead with.

Ultimately, systemic problems require systemic solutions. Efforts such as the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 must be incubated and promoted; not opposed. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown has it right when he speaks of accelerating change or losing. Unfortunately, the types of systemic, department-wide change the challenges at hand require do not seem to be forthcoming. The seeds of change are present within the JADC2 framework, but this loose confederation must embrace its role as an architectural development effort tied to clear warfighting objectives rather than technology development and demonstration activity.

New, fancy deck chairs will not stop the Titanic from sinking. It is only by charting a new course that we can avoid the iceberg looming in the distance.

Andrew Metrick is a Fellow with the Defense Program at CNAS. Prior to joining CNAS, he was a campaign analyst and wargamer at Northrop Grumman.

5. USSOCOM 2023 Fact Book | SOF News

A useful reference. 40 pages of relatively detailed information about USSOCOM and the entire SOF enterprise. Some may disagree with the type and amount of information provided and call it an OPSEC problem.  Every piece of information is already in the open. It is certainly a tradeoff - OPSEC versus the importance of informing the public (and press and policy makers and the uniformed pundits). There should be no excuse for the press getting SOF information wrong. All they need to do is use this as a reference.

As an aside, I have noticed the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) now has almost all special operations related joint pubs behind the firewall and only available for access with. CAC card. And more than just SOF information - it also includes JP 1-02 the DOD Dictionary is no longer accessible to people like me. I wonder how long it will be before USSOCOM is directed to restrict public access to information like the Factbook.

It can be downloaded here: https://www.socom.mil/latest-factbook

USSOCOM 2023 Fact Book | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 26, 2023

The USSOCOM 2023 Fact Book is published annually by the United States Special Operations Command. It has a wealth of information about the elite units of the four services, JSOC, theater special operations commands around the world, and the various types of equipment used by US special operations forces.

Contents of the USSOCOM 2023 Fact Book:

• Medal of Honor Recipients
• Headquarters
• Leadership
• Mission
• USSOCOM and Component Map
• U.S. Army Special Operations Command
• Naval Special Warfare Command
• Air Force Special Operations Command
• Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
• Joint Special Operations Command
• SOCAFRICA
• SOCCENT
• SOCEUR
• SOCKOR
• SOCNORTH
• SOCPAC
• SOCSOUTH
• Theater Special Operations Command Map
• Aircraft
• Maritime
• Ground
• SOF Truths
• Glossary

USSOCOM 2023 Fact Book, United States Special Operations Command, 2023, PDF, 40 pages.

https://www.socom.mil/latest-factbook

sof.news · by SOF News · January 26, 2023

6. Armed Services committee adds 11 members, quality of life panel

Subcommittee chairs.

Rogers on Wednesday also announced his slate of subcommittee chairmen for the 118th Congress, who will work with him to set hearing and policy priorities for the next two years:

• Tactical Air and Land Forces — Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va.;
• Strategic Forces — Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colo.;
• Seapower and Projection Forces — Rep. Trent Kelly, R-Miss.;
• Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information Systems — Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc.;
• Military Personnel — Rep. Jim Banks, R-Ind.;
• Intelligence and Special Operations — Rep. Jack Bergman, R-Mich.;
• Readiness — Rep. Michael Waltz, R-Fla.

New members:

• Rep. Carlos Gimenez, R-Fla.;
• Rep. Nancy Mace, R-S.C.;
• Rep. Brad Finstad, R-Minn;
• Rep. Dale Strong, R-Ala.;
• Rep. Morgan Luttrell, R-Texas;
• Rep. Jen Kiggans, R-Va.;
• Rep. Nick LaLota, R-N.Y.;
• Rep. Mark Alford, R-Mo.;
• Rep. Cory Mills, R-Fla.;
• Rep. Rich McCormick, R-Ga.;
• Rep. James Moylan, R-Guam

Armed Services committee adds 11 members, quality of life panel

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · January 25, 2023

House Republicans on Wednesday unveiled their membership and leadership plans for the House Armed Services Committee this session, including a new special panel focused on servicemember quality of life issues.

Eleven new Republican lawmakers were named to the influential panel, joining 20 returning GOP members from last session. In a statement, Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Ala., said the committee will focus on “improving our national defense at a time when our nation is faced with unprecedented threats from our adversaries — including an increasingly aggressive China.”

Rogers has also said military personnel issues will be a major focus for the committee, and announced the formation of a “servicemember quality of life” panel to be led by Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb.

Committee officials did not release details of the panel’s planned scope of work, but Rogers said it would be in keeping with “supporting our servicemembers and their families.”

RELATED

Republicans name chairmen for Armed Services, Vet Affairs committees

Rep. Mike Rogers will lead the military panel, while Rep. Mike Bost will lead the veterans committee.

Rogers on Wednesday also announced his slate of subcommittee chairmen for the 118th Congress, who will work with him to set hearing and policy priorities for the next two years:

• Tactical Air and Land Forces — Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va.;
• Strategic Forces — Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colo.;
• Seapower and Projection Forces — Rep. Trent Kelly, R-Miss.;
• Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information Systems — Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc.;
• Military Personnel — Rep. Jim Banks, R-Ind.;
• Intelligence and Special Operations — Rep. Jack Bergman, R-Mich.;
• Readiness — Rep. Michael Waltz, R-Fla.

Bergman is the only subcommittee chairman who did not serve as the ranking member on an Armed Services panel last year. But nearly all of the subcommittees will see differences in Republican assignments from last year.

Kelly served as the ranking member on the Intelligence and Special Operations subcommittee last year.

Wittman was the ranking member on the seapower panel last year, but now will oversee Tactical Air and Land Forces issues. His district is home to numerous military bases as well as the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division.

Gallagher and Banks have swapped Republican leadership on their respective subcommittees. Gallagher — who will also chair the House select committee on China — served as ranking member on the military personnel subcommittee last year, while Banks was the top Republican on the cyber and information systems panel.

Reps. Michael Waltz, R-Fla., and Doug Lamborn, R-Colo., will chair the same subcommittees they led Republicans on last year.

Lamborn said in a phone interview that his number on priority n the Strategic Forces subcommittee would be hypersonic missile development.

“China is way ahead of us,” he said. “We used to be the lead in this field decades ago, but we let it go by the wayside and now China has taken the lead — and to some extent Russia — and we need qualitative parity with China. And we don’t have at this point in time.”

He also said that his subcommittee would address China’s “nuclear breakout” in a series of hearings this year.

Bergman, a Marine Corps veteran, and Bacon, an Air Force veteran, are among 14 Republican members of the House Armed Services Committee with previous military experience.

The 11 new Republican committee members are:

• Rep. Carlos Gimenez, R-Fla.;
• Rep. Nancy Mace, R-S.C.;
• Rep. Brad Finstad, R-Minn;
• Rep. Dale Strong, R-Ala.;
• Rep. Morgan Luttrell, R-Texas;
• Rep. Jen Kiggans, R-Va.;
• Rep. Nick LaLota, R-N.Y.;
• Rep. Mark Alford, R-Mo.;
• Rep. Cory Mills, R-Fla.;
• Rep. Rich McCormick, R-Ga.;
• Rep. James Moylan, R-Guam

RELATED

Republicans eye Pentagon savings after McCarthy spending agreement

Republican defense hawks insist that Speaker McCarthy's spending agreement won't cut military spending, but they're also brainstorming Pentagon savings.

The House’s No. 3 Republican, Elise Stefanik of New York, is returning to the committee this session. So will Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., who reportedly pushed Republican leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., for a subcommittee chairmanship on Armed Services during McCarthy’s protracted speaker bid earlier this month.

Gaetz’s push to end all U.S. aid to Ukraine makes him an outlier among other Republicans on the committee.

Democratic lawmakers have been allotted 28 seats on the committee this session. Committee ranking member Adam Smith, D-Wash., is expected to announce membership and subcommittee assignments in the coming days.

About Leo Shane III and Bryant Harris

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

7. Ten Things I Learned by Skimming Thucydides by John Nagl and Matthew Woessner

Cliff notes for Thucydides?

TEN THINGS I LEARNED BY SKIMMING THUCYDIDES

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by John Nagl, Matthew Woessner · January 26, 2023

EDITOR’S NOTE: The current temporary theme we are using only credits a single author. This article was written by John Nagl and Matthew Woessner.

Authors’ Note: One of the hallowed rites of passage each year at the Army War College is reading portions of Thucydides’ 2500-year-old The History of the Peloponnesian War. Most students find it extremely worthwhile, some to their surprise. Many scholars regard The Peloponnesian War as the first work of international relations since it attributes agency to human actions rather than to the will of the gods. A deep reading of Thucydides also requires students to navigate between the opposing pitfalls of the use of history: cherry-picking evidence to come to simplistic “lessons” or giving up any hope of drawing insights from such a distant time. Of course, every year there are always one or two students who do not make the effort. The following is a satirical portrait of one such student’s not-so-careful read of history along with the response of a more discerning classmate. (All citations come from Robert B. Strassler’s translation The Landmark Thucydides.)

The following list was found on the backside of a stained Redd’s Barbeque take-out menu a day before oral comprehensive exams at the Army War College in two separate sets of handwriting–a short list from one student and commentary from another.

Ten Things I Learned by Skimming Thucydides

It’s the day before oral comp exams. While my gullible classmates have been busy rereading Thucydides, I skimmed the text (It’s only a lot of reading if you do it!) and to be on the safe side, rewatched the movie 300. From what I could gather by flipping through the book, these are the top ten lessons I’m taking into oral comprehensive exams from The History of the Peloponnesian War:

1. War is predictable, and anyone paying attention can see how it will turn out.

The Spartan king Archidamus, preparing to invade Attica, disagreed with this assessment, as does almost anyone who has fought in any war. As Archidamus argued, “The course of war cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dedicated by the impulse of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise apprehension has often been able to make head against superior numbers.” (2:11). Any resemblance between Archidamus’ warning and the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and subsequent events in the Middle East is purely coincidental.

2. When a war is going your way, press your advantage to absolute victory.

After a major Athenian victory at Pylos in the seventh year of the war, Spartan envoys urged the Athenian Assembly to accept terms of an armistice that gave Athens much of what it wanted from the war: “You can now, if you choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and gain honor and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something further, through having already succeeded without expecting it.” (4:17). That Athens did not take this good advice can be inferred from the fact that we are only about halfway through the book at this point; that Athens would never again be in such an advantageous position vis-a-vis Sparta will become clear below.

3. If you experience a tactical setback, send more troops until your policy is inevitably vindicated.

The Athenians’ Sicilian expedition, launched in 415 BC, was met with unexpected resistance. Undaunted by initial setbacks, Athens sent waves of reinforcements over the next two years (6:94). Despite the reinforcement, the expedition ultimately proved futile. Nearly all of the Athenians who participated in the expedition were either killed or captured. While historians disagree on the ultimate failure of the expedition, the incremental addition of forces gave the Spartans time to intervene in support of the Sicilians. Having lost the initiative, the additional forces were of limited value in securing an Athenian victory. There are certainly times when additional forces can make a difference in a conflict. During the First Punic War several centuries after Thucydides’ time, Rome’s willingness to look past its appalling losses and to continuously backfill soldiers and ships played an important role in its victory over Carthage. Similarly, the United States’ willingness to combine a troop surge with its newly minted counter insurgency strategy contributed to the defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq. But merely sending more forces is no guarantor of success, as Athens learned firsthand.

4. Democracies are particularly good at formulating and implementing long term strategy.

The decision to invade Sicily, perhaps the most pivotal of the entire war, was contentious, with two leading citizens urging opposing strategies. Nicias was the strongest voice against the invasion while Alchibiades strongly supported intervention. Alchibaides carried the day, with Nicias’ argument that the invasion, would require many resources ironically ultimately increasing the cost of the defeat from survivable to catastrophic. Despite the likely cost, “Everyone fell in love with the enterprise. … With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that did not like it feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet.” (6:24) And so it began. While Athenagoras, popular leader of Syracuse, later disagreed with the contention that “democracy is neither wise nor equitable” (6:39), events in his own city would demonstrate that sometimes, democracies make mistakes–really, really big ones.

5. There is no downside to fighting a war of attrition.

From the beginning Athens understood that it could not defeat Sparta in a land war. Instead, the great Athenian leader Pericles proposed relying on a combination of naval power and strong city walls to prevent Sparta from forcing Athens to surrender (2:13). This strategy, by its very nature, precluded a quick and decisive victory. Consequently, the conflict would degenerate into a war of attrition. The long and costly struggle weakened Athens and created an opening for the Persians to intervene on behalf of Sparta. There are times a war of attrition is unavoidable. Planning which relies on siege tactics will inevitably take their toll on soldier and citizen alike.

6. Political infighting can only make a civilization stronger.

Thucydides described Pericles as a leader who “by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction.” When Pericles perished in the great plague of 430, there was no clear successor whose stature and integrity united the disparate factions of the assembly (Ekklesia) through the inevitable setbacks Athens would experience in the war. The bitter struggle to command a majority in the assembly led to inconsistent policies which made the defeat of Sparta all but impossible (2:65).

7. Multiple commanders of a single military operation will smooth everything out.

Responding to a request from the Segestans, the Athenians debated whether to send a force to Sicily. Nicias was the strongest voice against the invasion, while Alchibiades strongly supported intervention. The Athenians ultimately voted in favor of invasion, and split command among the doubter Nicias, the proponent Alchibiades, and the old warhorse Lamachus. The three commanders recommended three different strategies, ultimately compromising on one that failed utterly; see below. (6:50)

8. If you have control of the sea, victory in a land war is assured.

Athens was the greatest naval power of the ancient world, powerful enough to forward deploy ten thousand hoplite troops and thirty thousand oarsmen across 800 kilometers to Sicily. However, a series of bad tactical decisions made by a gaggle of commanders cost them dearly. “They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with total destruction, their fleet, their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily.” (7:87)

9. The moral rightness of your cause is more important than your military strength in war.

In perhaps the most famous passage from The History of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians implore the people of the island of Melos to surrender to them despite the Melian’s arguments that they have no quarrel with Athens and have right on their side. The Athenians are underwhelmed by the Melian dialogue, noting that “the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must” (5:89), and after a siege “put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves” (5:116). God tends to be on the side that has the biggest battalions, not the most noble cause.

10. There are no enduring principles of international relations, and we have nothing to learn from the ancient past.

Thucydides begins his work by hoping that it will be useful to “those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it.” Hence, he wrote this book “not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time” (1:22). The fact that it is still being read (or skimmed) and debated more than two millennia later is prima facie evidence that his analysis of human nature, power, and international relations still has relevance today.

My faculty advisor assures me that citing these lessons during oral comp exams will make an indelible impression on the evaluation board and perhaps even alter the trajectory of my career. While those who have carefully read Thucydides may take issue with one or two of the above assertions, history is subjective, and my take on the text is just as valid as that of every other reader. Yeah, I’m going to crush these comps. Much like attacking Syracuse, what could go wrong?

If you want to fail oral comps by relying on Hollywood to discern historical lessons, that’s your business. At least pick the right war. The movie 300 is a fictional account of the Battle of Thermopylae during the Second Persian invasion of Greece. The Peloponnesian War takes place nearly fifty years later during an intra-Greek struggle for political dominance. You might as well derive lessons from World War Two by reading a fictional account of the Spanish-American War. Good luck tomorrow. You’re going to need it.

John Nagl is an Associate Professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College.

Matthew Woessner is Professor of Institutional Research at the U.S. Army War College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: The Peloponnesian War in Lego® by Sean Edmison

Photo Credit: Photo by wiredforlego via flickr Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC 2.0)

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by John Nagl, Matthew Woessner · January 26, 2023

8. Reconsidering Clausewitz on Friction

Clausewitz is still teaching us - whether you disagree with him or not. Engaging with his ideas helps us to develop coup d'œil - roughly translate and described as the "inward looking eye" - Clausewitz' intent was for us to develop military genius - based on education and experience the ability to exercise sound military decision making and judgment with less than perfect information in the fog and friction of war.

Reconsidering Clausewitz on Friction - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Olivia A. Garard · January 26, 2023

In the marginalia of his copy of On War, influential fighter pilot-theorist John Boyd laments that Carl von Clausewitz never thought about inducing friction for the adversary: “Overcome friction, yes—but also why not magnify friction for the adversary commanders?” Perusing his pencil marks, “He does not imply that it may be beneficial to increase friction.” If only, Boyd thinks, Clausewitz had “the notion of entropy and the idea of Gödel and Heisenberg and the 2nd Law to generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder as a payoff instead of just interfering with friction as a payoff.” Overall, Boyd finds Clausewitz too inwardly focused, keen “on reducing/overcoming (friction) confusion and disorder,” without seeking to “undermine [the] adversary and diminish his expenditure of effort.”

I imagine Clausewitz rebutting Boyd: If one cannot be certain enough about oneself, or one’s own disposition, then how could one be sure enough of the adversary to affect them in such a way? War takes place in a haze: “three-fourths of those things upon which action in War must be calculated, are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty.” Following this back-of-the-napkin math, we see that most knowledge of the enemy is uncertain — importantly, just as much of the knowledge about one’s own force and disposition. Moreover, even the degree of uncertainty is uncertain: It is “mehr oder weniger” — more or less. This German phrase is one of the most common phrases that Clausewitz uses, a tick to indicate that he is always hedging his bets.

While Boyd’s critique of Clausewitz points to their epistemic divergence, it also underscores a misunderstanding of the concept of friction. Clausewitzian friction is not an object, but a condition. Friction is a Newtonian concept, which refers to the resistant force between two interacting surfaces. Per Clausewitz, friction concerns how “action in war is movement in a hindering medium.” Out of the originating clash and two-fold fight, the Zweikampf, warfare whips up its own atmosphere that hampers activity therein. It is in this realm of danger, bodily exertion and suffering, uncertainty, and chance that one’s engagement with the world is different, skewed. “Everything is very simple in war, but simplest thing is difficult.” The difference is the hindering difficulty.

Become a Member

To understand how and why, let’s first consider the word “ullage” — one of my favorites. Ullage is the amount by which a bottle or a container comes short of being full. The amount of air trapped in a bottle of wine is that bottle’s ullage. While friction, too, is a kind of lack, it is not the lack itself. Friction is the concept that accounts for the difference between war on paper and war in reality. Ullage, in this case, would be the deviation from the war on paper whereas friction is the underlying condition that makes the difference. It induces the “chasm,” as Clausewitz writes, between planned or anticipated actions and how they unravel under conditions of warfare. Danger, strain and suffering, bias, opinion, and conflicting information, scale, freedom, and multiplicity all impede action. However, these are only indirectly related to the adversary since they arise from the condition of fighting. An adversary may create situations that induce more friction — more uncertainty, more danger, more suffering, more contingency, more distortion between expectations and the encounter with the material world — but friction itself is not something one can unleash. Friction is only ever a concept that depicts the relation between oneself, one’s plans and intentions, and one’s actions. Hamlet, one could say, is a play about friction.

This may explain why Clausewitz’s example of friction proper is not about war but about travel. Whereas Clausewitz considers a traveler trying to “accomplish the two stages at the end of his day’s journey” riding (poor) horses as twilight fades to dark, imagine instead taking a flight, perhaps on Southwest, somewhere. You arrive for your flight, check in, and make it through security only to see that your flight is delayed because the plane took off late from its point of origin. The incoming flight lands but is sent to a different gate. As you are gathering your luggage, you glance up at the monitor and see your flight with “Final Boarding” flashing. Confused, you race to the new gate. The gate agent smiles as your run up, confirming that the flight has not started boarding yet. Instead, it’s delayed again, for maintenance. You cannot find a seat and you need to charge your phone, so you wander away. Over the intercom your flight is announced not for boarding but for cancellation. The delays broke crew day, the duration that limits how long pilots can perform their duties before being obliged to stop. On and on it goes. Any number of personal experiences of flying provide ample experience of friction. Travel, as movement from one point to another, may be simple — but it is also difficult.

Travel can encounter any manner of difficulties, but under the conditions of warfare, these difficulties are amplified. In warfare — and On War — travel is renamed the march. Book five, Military Forces, another book most ignore, focuses on the difficulties of living: marching (movement), bivouacking and billeting (dwelling), maintenance (healthiness), and supplying and providing logistics (nourishing). Ultimately, all actions in war are aimed such that the “soldier is levied, clothed, armed, trained, he sleeps, eats, drinks, and marches, all merely to fight at the right time and place.” The simple acts that prove difficult are not those of fighting, and especially not today given the inherent complexity of the technology involved, but those found in the sheer act of living, which are anything but simple in war given the proximity to death.

It is not just that walking, talking, sleeping, and eating are difficult, but so is thinking, for the bare appearance of the world is skewed. The substance-as-danger distorts the mind through fear, excitement of the passions, and overstimulated sensibilities. Existing is difficult. The substance-as-physical exertion inhibits through the exhaustion of humans (and now machines): There is a limit to use before a rest and refit is required. Endurance is difficult. The substance-as-information refracts because of the process of receiving information or news. As it is processed the information either helps judgment, leading one to critical analysis, or hinders it by leading one to the basest tendencies of human biases. Thinking is difficult. The substance-as-friction-proper amplifies the small things that are unaccountable or unforeseeable in life, like the weather. Acting is difficult.

In an earlier work, Principles of War, Clausewitz also wrestles with friction. This work, which is often considered as falling into the category of prescriptive military theory — it must be remembered it was written directly for the future King of Prussia — ends with a discussion in section four about applying the principles discussed in war. Here the difficulty is not understanding how to fight (an early strike against the necessity of genius), but simply to “remain faithful throughout to the principles.” For the Crown Prince, he deems this point on the difficulty of executing theory in reality as the most important. Again, friction is at the heart. Clausewitz then acknowledges that while “[i]t may be impossible to enumerate exhaustively the causes of the friction,” the main ones are: having confidence in the assessment of the adversary; mitigating the influence of rumor and adjudicating between information streams; trusting subordinates; embracing the suck or, what Frederick II called, “difficulties”; imprecision; overestimating one’s strengths; supply and logistics (considered, too, “the main cause for the unwieldiness of the whole war machine which keeps the results so far beneath the flight of our great plans”); and the distortion of wartime appearances. While situationally more specific, these eight instances of friction do not contradict what is written in On War. Instead, they serve as moments wherein which the danger-exertion-information-friction medium hinders existing, enduring, thinking, and acting in different proportions.

But Clausewitzian friction is not just conceptually tied to the idea of mechanics, warfare also attempts to make itself a machine. In Principles of War, he writes: “The conduct of war resembles the workings of an intricate machine with tremendous friction, so that combinations which are easily planned on paper can be executed only with great effort.” This is related to the underlying critique Simone Weil pens in her essay “The Iliad: Or the Poem of Force,” whereby men are instrumentalized. For her, “force—it is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing.” And yet, Clausewitz seems to note, even in the most mechanizing of circumstances, the parts will wear down, the process will sputter and jerk, and the machine will even succumb to “the most insignificant [who] is able to occasion and even some irregularity.” The question is, then: How long can the commander maintain the machine? But also, is there any “kind of oil which is capable of diminishing this friction?”

The lubricant is habituation to war and its theoretical twin, methodism. Through a kind of conditioning, which creates structures for the mind and the body, individuals can act as a composite whole in the face of resistance, can act despite the assault on the senses and the prejudices of the intellect. “Habit gives strength to the body in great exertion, to the mind in great danger, to the judgment against first impressions.” Whereas methodism creates “a readiness, precision, and firmness [that] is attained … which diminish the natural friction and make the machine move easier.” And so, unlike Weil who observes how “battles are fought and decided by men deprived of these faculties … who have dropped either to the level of inert matter, which is pure passivity, or to the level of blind force, which is pure momentum,” Clausewitz argues that warfare is never that pure — either of force or of momentum. War is always more or less. The degree to which that is the case is a result of how one has counteracted friction with habit and methodism — in other words, hard, dangerous, yet safe, realistic training.

The logic of force that Weil described correlates to the three Clausewitzian extremes that emerge, independent of Politik, from the clash — to the utmost violence, to make the enemy defenseless, and to maximal strength. The logic of momentum correlates to the puzzlement concerning the standstill, a product of the inherent superiority of the defensive form of warfare. Nor is the defense a form of pure passivity, a contradiction for Clausewitz: The attack entails elements of the defense as force protection and the defense entails elements of the attack as counter-attack. But as all these logics crash into the substantial reality of the world itself, warfare does not attain its extremes. And so Clausewitz must account for two limitations on war and warfare: Politik, the community, the macro, and friction, the individual, the micro. It is here that François Jullien, in his excellent A Treatise on Efficacy, elegantly distills Clausewitz: “The essence of warfare is to betray its model,” and the concept of friction was his attempt to explain why–a way to “theorize that deficiency on the part of theory.” But now this sounds as if we have taken the long way around just to end up back at Boyd and his essay “Destruction and Creation.”

As we return to Boyd, we can see his critique in a new light. If friction, as Jullien quips, is Clausewitz’s attempt to reconcile the fact that warfare will betray its model, then we need a way to update and adjust our model. Boyd argues that with the act of destructive deduction (“unstructuring”) and constructive induction (“restructuring”) we can change our perceptions of reality. This dialectical process of “Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Restructure is repeated endlessly.” This is hard enough day-to-day, let alone in war. In other words, Boyd identified an added challenge — it’s not just that warfare will betray its model, but that we must adapt and update that model as we go. The full observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop uses feedback to constantly adjusts one’s conceptual settings as one fights. Thus, if we were to rephrase Boyd’s lament in these terms, we see that he wants to create a situation such that there is as much distance as possible between the adversary’s model and the world, but not so much that the adversary realizes the gap and restructures. Clausewitz would now agree, but would still emphasize minimizing one’s own friction — adjusting one’s models according to the difficulties warfare presents — over trying to adjust the adversary’s. In other words, keep it simple, because the simple is hard enough.

Become a Member

Olivia A. Garard served as an active duty officer in the US Marine Corps from 2014 to 2020. She is currently reading the Eastern canon with St. John’s College. Her first book is An Annotated Guide to Tactics: Carl von Clausewitz’s Theory of the Combat. She tweets at @teaandtactics.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Olivia A. Garard · January 26, 2023

9. China's Port Investments Are Raising Security Fears. How to Deal With Them.

China's Port Investments Are Raising Security Fears. How to Deal With Them.

About the authors: Leonard D. Lane is a senior lecturer, Strategy at the UC Irvine Paul Merage School of Business. Christopher S. Tang is a university distinguished professor and Edward W. Carter chair in business administration at the UCLA Anderson School of Management.

Barron's · by Leonard D. Lane and Christopher S. Tang

Chinese companies own or operate terminals in 96 ports in 53 countries according to research by Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert. This economic influence gives China significant political power. But there are steps the Biden administration can take to reduce the security concerns.

French shipping company CMA CGM announced in December its decision to purchase container terminals at the Port of New York and New Jersey. But as the Hudson Institute’s Christopher O’Dea writes, “CMA CGM has significant financial and operational links with Chinese state-owned companies.” It sold a minority stake of its terminal business to China Merchants Holdings (International) and has received financing from the Export-Import Bank of China.

Across the Atlantic, the German government approved Chinese state shipping company COSCO to own 24.9% of the port of Hamburg late October. Partial ownership of a port can be mutually beneficial from a global trade perspective. However, when 7 of the world’s 10 busiest ports are already in China, the extensive investment in foreign ports should raise concerns about China’s dominance of international shipping. Former President Trump forced COSCO to relinquish its ownership of the Port of Long Beach in 2019 over security concerns.

In a free-market world at peace, port ownership and logistic dominance wouldn’t be an issue. But historically seaports have played an important role in developing economic and military power. China’s consolidation of its economic influence needs to be considered in the context of its growing naval ambitions.

In Africa, 46 nations have signed into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to stimulate economic development with Chinese investments. Since 2017, China has maintained a naval base in Djibouti—its first overseas—next to the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port situated at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The U.S. has said it is concerned about surveillance because the Chinese facility is located next to the U.S. Navy’s Camp Lemonnier.

On the other side of the continent, the U.S. expressed concerns in December 2021 about China’s intention to build a naval base in Equatorial Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean coastline across from Brazil.

In Asia, a China-funded upgrade of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base broke ground in June amid Western concern about China’s military presence in the Gulf of Thailand. Last month, the Biden administration pressured Cambodia to clarify whether the Chinese Navy now has exclusive access to the base.

China’s military intentions are murky. But President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear he intends China to “take center stage in the world.”

As British philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote decades ago after a 1920 visit to China, “As soon as China has proved strong enough for successful defense, it is apt to turn to foreign aggression.”

But Chinese development into a global naval threat isn’t a foregone conclusion. We see three strategies the U.S. could deploy to limit the risk.

The first strategy is to leverage the power of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity launched in May to bring Cambodia and other strategic countries in Asia into the fold. The 12 initial partners include India, Japan, and South Korea, representing 40% of the world’s gross domestic product. In exchange for stronger trade relationships, the U.S. could negotiate with Cambodia to ensure its Ream Naval Base provides equal access to other countries.

The second strategy is to develop countermeasures against China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It is already facing setbacks, funding shortfalls, and political pushback that has stalled certain projects. There is public concern in some countries over issues like excess debt after the default of Sri Lanka in April and over China’s political influence. In June, President Biden and other G-7 leaders announced a $600 billion infrastructure plan in Africa over the next 5 years to compete with China. Given many Africans prefer the U.S. development model to China’s, the U.S. and G-7 can use this investment to negotiate for military presence in certain strategic locations within the Africa continent.

The third strategy is to develop a concrete plan based on the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Biden announced in June. This partnership aims to mobilize new investments in the region, but the U.S. can negotiate deals that can pre-empt China’s infrastructure investments in the future.

A smart deployment of U.S. economic influence now would reduce the risk of military confrontation going forward.

Guest commentaries like this one are written by authors outside the Barron’s and MarketWatch newsroom. They reflect the perspective and opinions of the authors. Submit commentary proposals and other feedback to ideas@barrons.com.

Barron's · by Leonard D. Lane and Christopher S. Tang

10. Why America and China Must Cooperate

Excerpts:

The United States also needs to carefully distinguish what it must have from its allies from what is merely nice to have. Controlling weapons-related technologies and dual- and multiple-use technologies, and more intensively screening Chinese investments and mergers and acquisitions with global tech companies is a must. But Washington does not need to encourage deintegration in areas that are not central to national security or the competitiveness of the world’s democracies at the technological bleeding edge.

Some level of decoupling is inevitable. In the case of high technologies, some targeted decoupling will be absolutely necessary. But wholesale decoupling makes no sense. Americans benefit from access to the world, and China will remain a huge market that Americans can either partake in or abandon to competitors. China is the world’s second-largest economy, its largest manufacturer, and its largest trader. It will be a big part of the global financial picture for decades to come. Instead of fatalistically accepting the descent of an economic iron curtain, Washington should negotiate aggressively with China to win opportunities for Americans in its market. Administration officials should have serious discussions with Chinese leadership about how to manage the decoupling in a way that allows for mutually beneficial trade. Right now, the two countries are mostly trading charges and countercharges while doing nothing to expand mutually beneficial economic opportunities.

Chinese-U.S. security tensions cannot be wished away, and Americans are rightly concerned, especially after the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine, that Beijing will throw its weight around, not least by coercing Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence is a big part of the answer. So are improved relations with allies. But U.S. allies and partners have made no secret of their desire not to isolate or contain Beijing. That is one message Washington should take away from the world’s refusal to disengage with China—and from China’s effort to drive wedges between Washington and everyone else.

The political winds are strong and the desire to punish China even at the United States’ expense is driving many in Congress. Biden will need a lot of courage to be smart and bold in the face of these challenges.

Why America and China Must Cooperate

The Dangers of a Full Decoupling

By Henry M. Paulson, Jr.

January 26, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Henry M. Paulson, Jr. · January 26, 2023

For all the talk of how we have entered a new global era, the last year bears a striking resemblance to 2008. That year, Russia invaded its neighbor, Georgia. Tensions with Iran and North Korea were perennially high. And the world faced severe global economic challenges.

One notable difference, however, is the state of Chinese-U.S. relations. At that time, self-interested cooperation was possible even amid political and ideological differences, clashing security interests, and divergent views about the global economy, including China’s currency valuation and its industrial subsidies. As Treasury secretary, I worked with Chinese leaders during the 2008 financial crisis to forestall contagion, mitigate the worst effects of the crisis, and restore macroeconomic stability.

Today, such cooperation is inconceivable. Unlike during the financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic failed to spark Chinese-U.S. cooperation and only intensified deepening antagonism. China and the United States jab accusatory fingers at each other, blame each other for bad policies, and trade barbs about a global economic downturn from which both countries and the world have yet to recover.

The world has clearly changed. China has very different and more assertive leadership. It has more than tripled the size of its economy since 2008 and now has stronger capabilities to pursue adversarial policies. At the same time, it has done far less to open its economy to foreign competition than many in the West have advocated and expected. Meanwhile, U.S. attitudes toward China have turned sharply negative, as have the politics in Washington. What has not changed, however, is the fact that without a stable relationship between the United States and China, where cooperation on shared interests is possible, the world will be a very dangerous and less prosperous place.

In 2023, unlike 2008, nearly every aspect of Chinese-U.S. relations is viewed by both sides through the prism of national security, even matters that were once regarded as positive, such as job-creating investments or co-innovation in breakthrough technologies. Beijing regards U.S. export controls aimed at protecting the United States’ technologies as a threat to China’s future growth; Washington views anything that could advance China’s technological capability as enabling the rise of a strategic competitor and aiding Beijing’s aggressive military buildup.

China and the United States are in a headlong descent from a competitive but sometimes cooperative relationship to one that is confrontational in nearly every respect. As a result, the United States faces the prospect of putting its companies at a disadvantage relative to its allies, limiting its ability to commercialize innovations. It could lose market share in third countries. For those who fear the United States is losing the competitive race with China, U.S. actions threaten to ensure that fear is realized.

COALITION OF THE WILLING

The United States is attempting to organize a coalition of like-minded countries, especially the democracies of Asia and Europe, to counterbalance and pressure China. But this strategy is not working; it hurts the United States as well as China; and over the long term, is likely to hurt Americans more than Chinese people. It is also clearly in Washington’s interest to cooperate or work in complementary ways with China in certain areas and to maintain a beneficial economic relationship with the world’s second-largest economy.

Although many countries share Washington’s antipathy to China’s policies, practices, and conduct, no country is emulating Washington’s playbook for addressing these concerns. It is true that nearly every major U.S. partner is tightening up its export controls on sensitive technologies, scrutinizing and often blocking Chinese investments, and calling out Beijing’s coercive economic policies and military pressure. But even Washington’s closest strategic partners are not prepared to confront, attempt to contain, or economically deintegrate China as broadly as the United States is.

In fact, many countries are doing the opposite of what the hardest-line voices in Washington seek. Instead of decoupling or deintegrating economically, many countries are instead deepening trade with China even as they hedge against potential Chinese pressure by diversifying business operations, building new supply chains in third countries, and reducing exposure in the most sensitive areas. Perhaps that is why, in 2020, despite years of American warnings, China overtook the United States as the European Union’s largest trading partner. Both EU exports to and imports from China grew in 2022. And Asian and European leaders, spurred by the November 2022 visit to Beijing by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, now look set to beat a path to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s door, with trips by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., French President Emmanuel Macron, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni likely to drive a broader trend.

Washington risks pushing against economic gravity.

Washington’s “less of China” approach is faring even worse in the “global South.” Chinese-African trade reached a historic high in 2021, rising by 35 percent from 2020. An intensive U.S. campaign to push Chinese technology firms like Huawei out of backbone telecommunications architecture has fared comparatively well in Europe and India but poorly nearly everywhere else. Just take Saudi Arabia. Its largest trading partner is China, and its Vision 2030 reform plan leans heavily on hoped-for collaboration with Chinese tech firms, including Alibaba and Huawei, even in the sensitive areas that are squarely in Washington’s crosshairs, such as artificial intelligence and cloud services. Indonesia, a huge Asian democracy that Washington has courted to counterbalance Chinese influence, has actually made Huawei its partner of choice for cybersecurity solutions, and even for government systems.

These U.S. efforts are likely to be even less successful now that China is reopening. Beijing is matching Washington’s “less of China” strategy with its own “more of everyone but America” strategy.

Beijing is reversing its restrictive COVID-19 policies, reopening its borders, courting foreign leaders, and seeking foreign capital and investment to reboot its economy. Last year, Xi made his first foreign trips since the outbreak of the pandemic to Central Asia and the Middle East, underlining his strategy to increase China’s global connectivity. With Xi now traveling the world again after a three-year hiatus, scattering renewed pledges of Chinese investment, infrastructure, and trade at every stop, it is Washington, not Beijing, that may soon find itself frustrated.

Trade rules are a good example. In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and six years later, Washington clearly has no intention of rejoining it. Yet Beijing has applied to join the pact, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). China has also ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia, applied to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, and upgraded or initiated new free trade agreements with countries from Ecuador to New Zealand. China is now the world’s largest trading nation. Nearly two-thirds of all countries trade more with China than the United States.

Competition with China begins at home.

Meanwhile, the United States is pursuing a “worker-centric” trade policy that looks very much like protectionism. And Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework looks timid by comparison. The framework is struggling, not least because it denies new market access to the very countries that have joined the pacts that Washington has shunned.

Washington risks pushing against economic gravity. The United States has succeeded in controlling the most sensitive technologies, including advanced semiconductors. But it will have less success with a strategy premised on promoting broader technology deintegration with China because most countries are not following its lead and may, eventually, find ways to adjust.

These efforts to shut out China will certainly hurt China, but they hurt the United States, too. American businesses are put at a huge competitive disadvantage, and U.S. consumers pay the price. One sensible step to correct this problem would be to limit tariffs on imports of Chinese consumer goods, which make them more expensive for U.S. consumers. These are politically popular but economically nonsensical. They hurt China but hurt U.S. job creators, as well, including ordinary companies that depend on Chinese suppliers, have few workarounds, and have been crushed under the weight of inflation and high energy bills. But these should not be lifted without getting something in return. For example, Washington should push China to live up to the terms of the 2020 Phase One trade agreement, including by buying more U.S. agricultural products. China also should be required to open its markets to more U.S. goods.

TALK IT OUT

Ultimately, competition with China begins at home. The United States and China have very different political systems. The United States’ is superior, but it must be demonstrated through results. This means sticking to the principles that made the U.S. economy the envy of the world and underpin U.S. national security. It also means demonstrating economic leadership abroad.

It is critically important that Washington win the race to develop technologies and attract talent. Economic success will be driven to a large extent by technological superiority. This requires the United States to not just develop those technologies of the future but to commercialize them and not hoard them. It demands the United States set global standards rather than ceding the playing field to China. And the United States should be leading on trade, not withdrawing from the very pacts China has applied to join and cutting U.S. workers off from export opportunities.

To be sure, security tensions are baked into the relationship, and Xi’s China is a formidable competitor with which the United States must take a very tough-minded approach. Beijing is pursuing policies inimical to U.S. interests in many areas, and it is unlikely to adjust any time soon. Washington needs to be tough-minded but fair, open to dialogue but not for its own sake, and prepared for a tough, long slog in pursuing self-interested coordination with China.

Such cooperation has been meaningful in the past. At the height of the financial crisis of 2008, China was a huge holder of corporate, banking, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities. The close coordination established with Chinese leaders during the Strategic Economic Dialogue helped Washington convince Beijing not to sell U.S. securities, which was critical to avoiding another Great Depression. The Chinese stimulus package that followed the first G-20 in 2008 also helped to counteract the effects of the crisis and assist the global economic recovery.

Xi’s China is a formidable competitor.

Financial crises are inevitable, and they will be much easier to manage in ways that limit the economic hardship in both countries and the world if the two largest economies and drivers of economic growth are able to communicate and coordinate to anticipate and forestall economic disruption, as well as to mitigate its impact. And it is in China and the United States’ shared interests to do just that. But this requires U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and her colleagues to have a regular dialogue with their Chinese counterparts where they discuss and monitor global and domestic macroeconomic and financial risks.

A shock in the real economy can move quickly to the financial system, and financial excesses can wreak havoc on people’s lives if left unaddressed. Modern finance, where money can move around the world with the speed of light, makes the world seem like an increasingly small place. The Chinese economy is so large and integrated globally that disruptions there in 2015 and 2021 immediately rippled through global financial markets. And, of course, the primary and secondary economic and financial linkages between China and the United States are so broad and deep they cannot be wished away, which makes it particularly important that the two states share views on macroeconomic risks. China is the second-largest holder of U.S. Treasury bonds and a large investor in other U.S. securities, so it is in both countries’ interests for China to have an understanding of U.S. economic policy and confidence in U.S. policymakers, particularly when Congress is wrangling over the debt limit. The lack of transparency around China’s lending to some very troubled economies and the large amount of U.S. business investment in the Chinese economy, which can seem like a black box to outside analysts and where abrupt policy changes can take the market by surprise, mean it is critical to both states that U.S. policymakers have a better understanding of China’s economic policies and challenges.

The United States needs to solidify the floor that the Biden administration has tried to put under the freefall. This is essential because the allies and partners Washington hopes to enlist to pressure China expect a good-faith effort to seek cooperation with it, where possible. And that is one reason that U.S. President Joe Biden, in his meeting with Xi in Indonesia last November, sought to establish guardrails around a deteriorating relationship.

To improve coordination, Chinese and U.S. decision-makers should meet more frequently and talk much more candidly. Friendship is no prerequisite for such coordination. And obvious political, security, and ideological tensions do not preclude self-interested cooperation on issues such as macroeconomic stability, pandemic preparedness, climate change, combating terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and firewalling the global financial system against future crisis and contagion. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s upcoming meeting with Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi is a good starting point. Yellen should be talking regularly to China’s new economic czar, He Lifeng. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell should also be speaking with China’s top central banker.

Washington should negotiate aggressively with Beijing to win opportunities for Americans in its market.

And Beijing should not hold hostage cooperation on global issues such as climate change because it is upset about unrelated issues. Linking different foreign policy issues undermines China’s effort to present itself as a constructive global problem solver.

The United States also needs to carefully distinguish what it must have from its allies from what is merely nice to have. Controlling weapons-related technologies and dual- and multiple-use technologies, and more intensively screening Chinese investments and mergers and acquisitions with global tech companies is a must. But Washington does not need to encourage deintegration in areas that are not central to national security or the competitiveness of the world’s democracies at the technological bleeding edge.

Some level of decoupling is inevitable. In the case of high technologies, some targeted decoupling will be absolutely necessary. But wholesale decoupling makes no sense. Americans benefit from access to the world, and China will remain a huge market that Americans can either partake in or abandon to competitors. China is the world’s second-largest economy, its largest manufacturer, and its largest trader. It will be a big part of the global financial picture for decades to come. Instead of fatalistically accepting the descent of an economic iron curtain, Washington should negotiate aggressively with China to win opportunities for Americans in its market. Administration officials should have serious discussions with Chinese leadership about how to manage the decoupling in a way that allows for mutually beneficial trade. Right now, the two countries are mostly trading charges and countercharges while doing nothing to expand mutually beneficial economic opportunities.

Chinese-U.S. security tensions cannot be wished away, and Americans are rightly concerned, especially after the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine, that Beijing will throw its weight around, not least by coercing Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence is a big part of the answer. So are improved relations with allies. But U.S. allies and partners have made no secret of their desire not to isolate or contain Beijing. That is one message Washington should take away from the world’s refusal to disengage with China—and from China’s effort to drive wedges between Washington and everyone else.

The political winds are strong and the desire to punish China even at the United States’ expense is driving many in Congress. Biden will need a lot of courage to be smart and bold in the face of these challenges.

• 
  
• HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., is Founder and Chair of the Paulson Institute. He was Secretary of the U.S. Treasury from 2006 to 2009.
• MORE BY HENRY M. PAULSON JR.

Foreign Affairs · by Henry M. Paulson, Jr. · January 26, 2023

11. Sending tanks to Ukraine makes one thing clear: this is now a western war against Russia

Sending tanks to Ukraine makes one thing clear: this is now a western war against Russia | Martin Kettle

Volodymyr Zelenskiy is finally getting the help he wants, but it places more of Ukraine’s future in US hands

The Guardian · by Martin Kettle · January 25, 2023

Sending more western tanks to support Ukraine does not mean, as some politicians occasionally come dangerously close to implying, that the war is now almost over – save only for the fighting. The Ukraine war will still last months, if not years, and today’s decisions are more of a strategic body swerve than a complete and fully executed U-turn. Nevertheless, this is an unmistakably big moment, and for three main reasons.

The first is that battle tanks give Ukraine a military advantage that, in the words of Ed Arnold of the Royal United Services Institute, could be transformative. The three types of western battle tank now being committed to Ukraine – the US’s M1 Abrams, Germany’s Leopard 2 and the UK’s Challenger 2 – are all significantly more powerful than the Soviet-era T-72s that form the bulk of the Russian and Ukrainian tank forces. The same goes for the French Leclerc tanks, whose dispatch to Ukraine has not been ruled out either.

These western tanks all have greater mobility, more lethal firepower and stronger armour than those used by Russia. This also makes them heavier, which gives the lighter Russian tanks an advantage on boggy ground, of which there is no shortage in Ukraine once the thaw takes place. Even so, the modern western tanks’ control and navigation systems give them an all-round ability to operate in combined manoeuvres involving artillery and infantry, including at night, that the Russians cannot match.

These advantages give western tanks the potential to break through Russian lines and control the shape of the conflict across significant stretches of occupied territory. The tanks would also play a key role in defending Ukrainian lines against counterattack. But the most alluring potential of these weapons to Ukraine and its allies is that, if they are as successful as the hype implies, they could eventually put Kyiv in a position to dictate ceasefire and peace terms to Moscow.

There is, though, a long way to go before that. Two immediate caveats stand out – numbers and logistics. Ukraine has pressed for 300 tanks. Today’s announcements in Berlin and elsewhere leave the number committed at fewer than 100. Arnold says this war has shown that you need a lot of tanks on a modern battlefield. The current western total is still way short.

There is also the not inconsiderable matter of getting the tanks to the frontline. The US’s tanks are apparently still in North America. They also need a lot of backup. The New York Times reported US officials warning that deployment could take years. Germany’s Leopards, by contrast, are in Europe and can be serviced in Ukraine’s neighbouring countries. All the same, they all have to get to the battlefield. Proper supply and maintenance lines must be established. This is a necessarily secretive area, but deployment will not happen at the flick of a switch.

A demonstration demanding that German chancellor Olaf Scholz ‘Free the Leopards’, Berlin, 20 January 2023. Photograph: Maja Hitij/Getty Images

The second reason why today’s decisions are a watershed is that Germany has stood up to be counted. Given that Germany has already spent more in support of Ukraine than any other European country (Britain included), and has sent large mobile guns and armoured vehicles, this may seem churlish, but Olaf Scholz leads a country that (unlike Britain or France) must permanently look both eastwards and westwards. He has held off committing tanks until the US could be persuaded to follow suit. He has acted in his own time rather than at the behest of freelance grandstanders such as Boris Johnson. Note, too, that the German commitment still remains limited, as is Washington’s, though it will doubtless grow.

There have been many reasons for German hesitation. Each is understandable in its own individual way. They include not wanting to be out of step with the US; the legacy of Germany’s 20th-century war history; reluctance to be Europe’s military leader; divisions in public opinion over military issues; the wish to maintain the three-party coalition government’s fragile unity; the appointment only last week of a new defence minister, Boris Pistorius; and – never, ever to be underestimated – anxiety over relations with Russia.

Yet the plain fact is that the need to defend Ukraine and to hold back the Russian threat transcends all of them. Scholz has finally crossed a Rubicon, albeit in a characteristically cautious manner that may serve to undermine some of his own objectives.

The final reason why this week’s announcements matter is that this is now, more clearly than before, a western war against Russia over the independence of Ukraine. That is not to say it is a war the west has sought. Nor that Ukraine’s forces are simply proxies for western interests; that argument, as Prof Lawrence Freedman says, would deny Ukrainians the agency they manifestly possess. Nor are the west’s aims other than defensive; they do not extend beyond helping to liberate Ukraine from its invaders.

There is war in Ukraine. We have sanctions. So why would the UK Treasury help Putin’s brutal ally? | Pat McFadden

Read more

The commitment of battle tanks has shown that there is not a precise fit between the goals and tactics of Ukraine and its military allies. This has been true since the start of the war, when western nations were anxious (as they still are) to avoid a slide towards nuclear conflict, or opposed Kyiv’s calls for a no-fly zone over Ukraine. It has continued as the western allies have argued over the weaponry provided to Kyiv, and the scale of it, a process in which battle tanks provide another example.

There is no doubt now that western attitudes have hardened and Ukraine’s allies agree a pivotal moment in the war is being reached. The commitment of tanks confirms that the pivot is now towards a push for Ukrainian victory. But the uncertainty about numbers and logistics in the tank deployment is not simply down to the need for secrecy. It also reflects continuing political ambivalences.

In the future, the most important lack of fit is likely to come over ending the war, especially over Ukraine’s intention of recapturing Crimea from Russia. The key here will be the stance of Ukraine’s indispensable backer, the US administration. Today, Volodymyr Zelenskiy finally got some of what he asked for when he flew to Washington before Christmas, but in achieving this he has inescapably placed more of Ukraine’s future in the hands of Joe Biden.

• Martin Kettle is a Guardian columnist

The Guardian · by Martin Kettle · January 25, 2023

12. #Reviewing Reagan’s War Stories

The impact of pop culture on President Raegan.

A new book for my "to read pile."

We should take a lesson from Tom Clancy's books. I think an author from Taiwan ought to write a Tom Clancy like book about the future PLA invasion of Taiwan and how it gets chewed up by the terrina, advanced weapons and the resistance making it unable to occupy and pacify Taiwan.

#Reviewing Reagan’s War Stories

thestrategybridge.org · January 25, 2023

Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency. Benjamin Griffin. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022.

Buy on Amazon

While many aspects of Ronald Reagan’s legacy continue to be hotly debated in the more than thirty years since he left the White House as President of the United States, one facet that is widely agreed upon is that the vast majority of his time and attention during his tenure was focused on strengthening U.S. forces vis-à-vis their paramount Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union. In Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency, Benjamin Griffin deftly analyzes the impact of popular culture on the decisions Reagan made that directly impacted upon the course of the Cold War. Griffin uses a plethora of primary and secondary sources to craft a convincing argument that Reagan, who has been considered by some contemporaries and historians alike as an “intellectual lightweight,” was, in actuality, laser focused on improving the U.S. position against the Soviet Union, effectively using popular culture, especially as conveyed through novels in the current zeitgeist, to help his platform resonate with the general public.[1]

Reagan was infamous for boiling down a complex argument into an easily digestible, if not always accurate, summation. Griffin argues throughout the book that Reagan was highly impressionable, particularly through novels and movies, and that he leaned on these resources to help him make decisions over the course of his life. Reagan’s War Stories can essentially be broken down into three main areas, all of which are novels, movies, or genres of fiction Griffin argues shaped Reagan’s perception and would weigh heavily in his decision-making during his time in public office, at times even more so than formal reports or briefings.

The first novels in question were the books Reagan enjoyed as a youth, particularly the John Carter books by Edgar Burroughs, a science fiction series incredibly popular during Reagan’s childhood, along with other significant books such as That Printer of Udell’s by Harold Bell Wright. Griffin argues that the strong characters, virtuous plot lines, and prevailing savior tropes resonated with Reagan, who lacked a reliable father figure in his life. This is not a groundbreaking or earth shattering observation, and it is a link that any amateur psychologist could make. However, what makes this book special and worthwhile is how Griffin ties the impact of these novels on a young Reagan’s psyche to his actions as president. An example of how these novels led to Reagan’s decisions later in life is when Griffin ascribes Reagan’s continued support of futuristic technology to the initial exposure he received on the subject from his reading of Burroughs as a youth. Griffin argues these works would play a major role in the eventual culmination of the Cold War, when Reagan would announce his support for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); science fiction novels from his childhood would “help Reagan conceptualize the impact of technology, a technique he saw as perfectly reasonable.”[2]

Gary Cooper in High Noon (IMDB)

The second focus area is an entire genre that profoundly formed Reagan’s vision of the world: the western. Reagan’s love for western movies such as Stanley Kramer’s High Noon and books by the former president’s favorite author, the award winning Louis L’Amour, was well known and documented.[3] Griffin argues authors such as L’Amour were able to create an engaging story where the “good guys” were easily identifiable through their virtues and actions and were always pitted in a battle with “bad guys,” who were inherently and obviously villainous and evil. These tendencies would replicate themselves in Reagan’s actions as president, often through his misguided attempts at over-simplifying complex and nuanced situations that in reality required skillful diplomatic resolution.

Griffin illustrates how instead of such a thoughtful approach, Reagan viewed such situations as America being right (in the manner of the heroes of his favorite western novels) and countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua being wrong.[4] Griffin also ties these decisions into Reagan’s admiration of heroes such as the eponymous John Carter from the previous section, and his efforts time and again to replicate virtuous efforts to “save” countries with less economic or political stability in regions throughout Latin America and Africa instead of collaborating on collective security programs. Through this overly simplistic lens, Reagan would make decisions as president that would negatively impact relations with developing countries for the sake of strengthening U.S. Cold War security in a region, paying little if any heed for the nuanced and complicated societies impacted by his policies. A perfect example of this can be seen in the Iran-Contra debacle, as Reagan’s “single-minded focus on the Soviet Union would lead to policy in Africa and Latin America that ranged from tone-deaf to disastrous.”[5] Reagan saw the conflict in Nicaragua between the Contras and Sandinistas through his Cold War prism, and in doing so escalated a regional issue into one that almost destroyed his administration in part due to his desire to simplify complicated problems into an easily digestible right-against-wrong concept, which in this case meant the Contras were right since they were opposing the socialist Sandinista government.

Buy on Amazon

The final section of Reagan’s Cold War Stories focuses on the initial works by author Tom Clancy: The Hunt for Red October, Red Storm Rising, and The Cardinal of the Kremlin. Griffin not only highlights how Clancy’s techno-thrillers proved irresistible to Reagan, so much so that his staff and advisors made them mandatory reading to clarify Reagan’s many references, but also how Clancy would rise from a non-descript insurance agent to a national bestselling author with ringing endorsements from the President of the United States. Griffin explains that Clancy’s portrayals of American heroism and democratic virtue spoke directly to Reagan’s favored traits in a novel, and that the United States always won at the end of a Clancy novel sealed the deal for his support and readership. Reagan would often quote or reference Clancy novels, and Griffin argues the book Red Storm Rising even helped Reagan visualize the force laydown in Europe at that time and how a conventional war with the Soviet Union could play out. While largely inconceivable that a novel could impact a president so directly, Griffin argues convincingly that the plot influenced Reagan’s stunning offer to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 for both countries to abolish nuclear weapons.[6] Reagan and Clancy would go on to have a mutually beneficial relationship, the former with a staunch supporter churning out popular novels that ran parallel to the president’s desired goals and the latter with glowing reviews from the president and increased access to Department of Defense research and resources.

While the reviewer thinks this book is already a valuable contribution, it is worth noting that an increase in overall depth would have made it even more significant. At fewer than 180 pages, this book had plenty of space to expand on areas left uncovered. While the works Griffin explores are, indeed, pivotal to Reagan’s psyche and decision making, one is left wondering how other popular novels and movies—like the massively popular Star Wars films—impacted his mindset. There are also other events that occurred during Reagan’s presidency not featured in this book, such as the invasion of Grenada in Operation Urgent Fury, a decision Reagan made which was inherently Cold War centric and whose analysis by Griffin would have added value to the book. These small notes aside, overall Griffin’s thesis is interesting, well defended, and leaves the reader intrigued with the topic and desirous of more stimulating research from the author on this subject.[7]

Highly engaging and thought-provoking, Griffin has put together an insightful book that leaves the reader with an improved understanding of pop culture’s impact on Reagan in not only leading the nation through the Cold War, but in the totality of his life as well.

Chris Booth is an officer in the U/S/ Coast Guard. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Coast Guard or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: President Ronald Reagan at a Reagan-Bush Rally, Endicott, New York 1984 (White House Photographic Collection).

Notes:

[1] Benjamin Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 4.

[2] Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories, 146.

[3] Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories, 63.

[4] Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories, 10-11.

[5] Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories, 11.

[6] Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories, 108.

thestrategybridge.org · January 25, 2023

13. How Xi Jinping Used the CCP Constitution to Cement His Power

Excerpts:

The new additions are not as important as those from 2017, because ideological catchwords without clear reference to the leader’s name are vague enough to be interpreted freely in the future. They can remain unrevised without causing problems for subsequent leaders, like the many other phrases accumulated in the past.

Already in 2018, the party constitution was revised in a way that binds any future successor by having the outgoing leader named as an indispensable part of the organization. It departs from the established custom of group decision-making and diminishes efforts toward more institutionalization of the CCP.

But these charges were also a result of the always-existing need for a dominating leader, which is inherent in such a centralized and personalized structure. Deng’s authority derived his role in the establishment of the PRC and allowed him to exercise power without formal leadership status. Jiang Zemin, as the leader chosen by Deng himself, protected his position by inserting Deng’s paragraph into the constitution, then at his departure his own name, thereby making a precedent followed by Hu Jintao.

All these personal references that accumulated over time confirm the tensions caused by internal power struggles, which were masked by official unity and harmony. It would be difficult otherwise to explain the importance that the party leaders attach to enshrining these personal remarks in the main party document.

That weakness – intrinsic insufficient institutionalization in an over-centralized structure – can also help explain why the critical changes made by Xi Jinping in 2017 passed so smoothly. They might even be seen by many in the party as a stabilizing factor, since their negative impact will be revealed fully only during the next power transition period. But it is doubtful that the changes will help maintain party unity on that day. As in so many other aspects in China, the prospects of leadership continuity look increasingly fragile and uncertain.

How Xi Jinping Used the CCP Constitution to Cement His Power

Xi’s eventual successor will face the problem of major revisions to the party constitution – meaning a complicated transition period.

thediplomat.com · by Jarek Grzywacz · January 26, 2023

Advertisement

“Après moi, le déluge,” the famous and ambiguous expression by an absolutist French monarch typifies assertive rulers’ propensity to cling to power without considering the consequences for their successors. In China, the reform and opening period from the late 1970s onward was characterized by sweeping economic reforms, contrasted with insipid political changes. Nevertheless, the gradual institutionalization of the party-state apparatus and relatively smooth transfers of power brought a fair amount of stability into the system, and was widely appreciated.

By contrast, Xi Jinping’s leadership period, which began in 2012 with no end in sight, is characterized by a series of centralization measures that are intended to increase internal cohesion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and strengthen its grip on society. In contrast with the more group-oriented leadership style of his post-Mao predecessors, Xi’s actions have led to a concentration of power in his own hands, unseen since Mao’s times.

The highly personalistic style of official policymaking under Xi Jinping obviously and consciously tries to imitate Mao’s standing. To some extent, this is explained by the hierarchically structured “democratic centralism” mechanism of the party’s organization, and the need for visibility and unquestioned authority of the current leader. But the personalization of the official ideology (“Xi Jinping Thought” in its various versions) and insistent demands of constant deference to the leader by the party members depart significantly from previous practice, which tried to accommodate more diverse leadership groups.

The party’s constitution, which can be revised only once in five years, during the National Party Congress, is one of the important tools to ensure the institutional stability of the CCP and protect it from abrupt and unexpected changes. Although it can’t be viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to arbitrary changes – the interpretation of the text belongs to those who wield real power – the amount of attention given to the wording of the amendments reveals not only its importance for the legitimization of the leadership role, but also internal tensions in the leadership circles over each alteration.

The last major revision of the CCP Constitution took place during the 12th Party Congress in 1982, at the beginning of the reform and opening era. The text from 1977 was in many parts rewritten. The post of the chairman of the Central Committee was scrapped in favor of a general secretary, as a sign of a more collective leadership. The new constitution also included an explicit ban on one-man arbitrary decision-making and a personality cult. (The term “collective leadership” as a prescribed way of managing the party on every level, appeared in the 1956 revision and had been brought back already in 1977, just after Mao’s death.)

The constitution of the 12th Congress redefined the role of Mao Zedong as the founder of the PRC, and the foremost party leader and ideologue in those formative years. The paragraph describing the officially confirmed role of Mao in the PRC and party history was placed in the introductory section. Mao Zedong Thought, sustained as the official party ideology, was mentioned together seven times in different parts of the document.

The constitution from 1982 remained the base for all the subsequent revisions made at the following Party Congresses. Most of these changes were incremental, adding new phrases, passages and paragraphs. Major changes to the existing text were avoided.

Advertisement

The paragraph concerning Mao’s role that was created in 1982 was passed in almost the same form until the 15th Party Congress in 1997, after the death of Deng Xiaoping. There were also no changes in the positioning of Mao’s ideology. The only revision that took place during that period was an editorial change of two characters in the description of Marxist-Leninist principles, altered from “universal” to “fundamental” in 1992. The change, although small, was significant in phrase-obsessed party culture, as it justified the necessity of creative adjustments of “fundamental” ideological tenets.

In 1992, the biggest editorial change in the introductory historical part of the party constitution was an extension of a paragraph that followed the description of Mao’s role. It didn’t mention any CCP leaders by name but added an explicit remark about post-Mao reforms and their ideological underpinnings. The phrase “reform and opening,” which hasn’t been used in the constitution previously, appeared together 12 times in the 1992 revision. The reform period was named “a new phase” and its doctrinal fundamentals called the “Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”

After Deng Xiaoping’s death, during the 15th Party Congress in 1997, the 1992 additions were used as a base for an entirely new paragraph, one that explicitly described the role of Deng and “Deng Xiaoping Theory” in the party and state history. Deng’s theory was pronounced as a current development of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and equivalent to the Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. The phrase “Deng Xiaoping Theory” was mentioned in the whole document six times (mostly substituting previous mentions of the “Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”), always with Mao Zedong Thought preceding it. The two ideologies were positioned as equally indispensable stages of development of the Marxist ideological basis of the party.

The 1997 revision of the constitution was the first time that the name of a party leader – and the theory bearing his name – appeared in the document, with the exception of Mao. It was an important precedent, as all constitutions after 1949 avoided mentioning personal names other than the founder of the party-state, Mao Zedong.

The 1997 revision of the CCP constitution revealed the meticulous attention paid by the party leadership to avoid diminishing the role of Mao and to refrain from substantial changes to the text. Mao’s and Deng’s sections would remain unchanged until the 19th Party Congress in 2017, and, with only minor editorial changes made in that year, are largely the same even now.

The 2002 revision of the constitution, made during the 16th Party Congress, added the name of the outgoing general secretary, Jiang Zemin. Through this, the precedent set in 1997 to honor Deng was extended further to include all outgoing principal leaders. The new paragraph describing Jiang’s role was inserted beneath Mao’s and Deng’s section, and his part was a bit shorter than theirs.

To further avoid putting Jiang on par with Mao and Deng, Jiang’s name wasn’t used to label the new version of the official ideology. The new ideological input was called the “Theory of ‘Three Represents’” and described as a recent development of CCP’s official ideology formulated under Jiang’s leadership, but the theory itself didn’t bear his name. Jiang’s paragraph was never revised again and appears in the same form in the current version of the constitution.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

In 2007, during the next party congress, under the leadership of Hu Jintao, a new paragraph was added beneath Jiang’s that introduced a new contribution to the official theory called the “Scientific Outlook on Development.” Although the document didn’t name Hu personally, the new chapter and “new theory” was linked with his term in office. This increased the importance of Hu’s rule, especially given Jiang’s strong remaining influence. Yet the new chapter contained only 165 characters, obviously less than the preceding ones.

At the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the retiring Hu Jintao got the same privilege as Jiang Zemin, and in the paragraph about “Scientific Outlook on Development” his name was included in the same way: i.e., mentioning his role as a leader at the time, but without attaching his name to the theory. Hu’s chapter afterwards received only minor changes in 2017.

Xi’s Constitutional Power Grab

Advertisement

The amendments that took place in the party constitution at the 19th Congress in 2017, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, although they maintained the practice of small changes and incremental additions, nevertheless constituted a visible departure from the cautious ways the edits were made in the post-Mao era. The most striking difference was the inclusion of the name of the current party leader, something that was not practiced after Mao.

The preservation of Mao’s name in the constitution was regarded as a symbol of the party’s unity and continuity, and treated as an exception due to his role as the founder of the party-state. Jiang Zemin broke this rule first by including Deng’s name after his death in 1997 – a bid to preserve the fundamentals of the reform era – and then his own name in 2002, as he tried to avoid being marginalized after stepping down. But he didn’t put himself on par with Mao and Deng.

That precedent was willingly converted into a custom by Hu Jintao. Not including his name as the outgoing leader would have appeared as a statement on the diminished status of his rule and his supporters.

Xi Jinping built his changes on those precedents, but went much further. First of all, he succeeded in adding his own paragraph, analogous to those already mentioned, with his name included even while serving as the current leader – a privilege that wasn’t granted to any leader except Mao. To make the difference with the previous leaders even more visible, Xi also included a new version of the official theory bearing his own name: “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” His section in the amended constitution consisted of 336 characters, visibly more than the others, including Deng’s and Mao’s.

The most unexpected and visible departure was qualifying Xi Jinping as the “leadership core.” The phrase in this form didn’t have precedent in the party’s previous constitutional revisions. The word “core” appeared first in the 1956 revision, in the context of describing the CCP’s leadership of the whole society. Afterwards the word was used in this way, with the exception of the 1973 revision, when it didn’t appear. From 1982 onward, marking the changes of the reform and opening era, the description of the party’s leadership role in the Chinese society as a leadership core, was put at the very beginning of the text.

From 1992 the phrase became repeated more widely in the document, first four times, then six times in 2002, eight times in 2007, nine times in 2012, and a record 11 times in 2017. But even at the peak of Mao’s power, the title “core” was never applied in such a personal way (in the 1969 constitution Mao obtained the famous title of “supreme leader,” but “the core” status remained attached to the party).

It is worth noting that giving Xi Jinping the unprecedented title of “leadership core” didn’t meet with any visible dissent in the leadership circles. But the consequences of the wording are far-reaching and difficult to overestimate. That the party constitution, its supreme document that can be changed only once every half a decade, officially stated Xi’s name was a visible confirmation of his intention to remain in the post indefinitely – especially when taking into account the party’s custom, well established from 1982, of adding new content rather than explicitly editing the existing text.

The description of Xi as the “leadership core” was used in the section about the obligations of party members and will have to be revised when the new leader takes the seat. For Xi, confirming him as an unquestioned leader in the main party document facilitates lifelong rule and makes internal resistance more difficult. Mao is the only other living leader to be named in the party’s constitution as a source of official ideology (remember, Deng was named only after his death), and Mao remained in charge until his death.

In case of Xi’s death, the need for revision will be obvious, but – as was the case with Mao – the new leader will face the challenge of dealing with the legacy of his predecessor, either positively (the title “supreme leader” was preserved for Mao in 1977 constitution after his death, then removed in 1982), or more critically (the extensive changes in the 1982 constitution).

Even more perplexing would be a situation where Xi Jinping steps down, for whatever reason. In that case, even removing his title as “leadership core” would leave Xi still as a frontman of official ideology, so there would be a need to redefine the place of Xi’s ideological formulations – or leave him in a privileged and influential position for longer.

In any case, Xi’s successor will encounter many problems when deciding on the proper place and the wording for Xi Jinping and his theory. The same happened when defining the role of Mao and his ideology; this time it could also lead to another round of fierce contention for power, internal divisions, and radical redrawing of the rules.

The 20th Party Congress Revisions

It seems that Xi Jinping put effort into making any potential transfer of power as difficult as possible, and countering the danger of diminishing or erasing his role in future revisions to the CCP Constitution. As previously noted, no past leader has had his section in the constitution significantly downgraded, much less erased. By modeling his position to resemble the first generation of leaders, Xi seems to seek indefinite power now, and everlasting glory afterwards.

Xi’s catchphrase of the “new era” (新时代) is similar to the description of the reform and opening period in the party constitution as “a new phase” (新时期) and thus claims at least the same importance – or even indicates a replacement of the previous epoch, making Xi a founder of a new one. His ideological formula “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” is also based on Deng’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”

These intentions were confirmed further in the latest revisions of the CCP constitution at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022. There was much speculation circulating before the event, that Xi would get the coveted title of “supreme leader,” which would elevate him to the same level of glory as Mao and above everybody else. There were also expectations that Xi would try to simplify the name of his theory to “Xi Jinping Thought,” parallel to Mao’s and Deng’s ideological catchphrases.

The fact that these changes didn’t happen can be seen as a sign of insufficient power and internal resistance to these plans. Whatever the cause of the restraint, the changes that were made further solidify Xi’s position and confirm his intentions of remaining in power indefinitely, while leaving open the possibility of the aforementioned adjustments.

The changes that took place in 2017 at the 19th Party Congress are sufficiently radical to prop up Xi’s aspirations without any new additions. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping still felt the necessity to demonstrate his dominance over the party-state apparatus by significantly enlarging the paragraph describing his rule, from 336 to 409 characters, which further highlighted the disparity with the paragraphs about his predecessors (Mao’s 277 characters, Deng’s 278, Jiang’s 263, Hu’s 236). Xi also inserted some new ideological catchwords associated with him in recent party documents and official media, albeit without explicitly linking them to his name: “Four Consciousnesses,” “Four Confidences,” “Two Safeguards,” and the economic policy catchphrase “Dual Circulation.”

The phrase “Two Establishes,” however, is conspicuously absent from this list, especially because it is usually used together with the “Two Safeguards.” Even if this omission is yet another sign of internal resistance inside the party leadership toward concentrating excessive power in Xi’s hands, it doesn’t really change things in an important way. Xi’ s core position in the party and his theory as the obligatory guideline are already confirmed elsewhere in the document.

The new additions are not as important as those from 2017, because ideological catchwords without clear reference to the leader’s name are vague enough to be interpreted freely in the future. They can remain unrevised without causing problems for subsequent leaders, like the many other phrases accumulated in the past.

Already in 2018, the party constitution was revised in a way that binds any future successor by having the outgoing leader named as an indispensable part of the organization. It departs from the established custom of group decision-making and diminishes efforts toward more institutionalization of the CCP.

But these charges were also a result of the always-existing need for a dominating leader, which is inherent in such a centralized and personalized structure. Deng’s authority derived his role in the establishment of the PRC and allowed him to exercise power without formal leadership status. Jiang Zemin, as the leader chosen by Deng himself, protected his position by inserting Deng’s paragraph into the constitution, then at his departure his own name, thereby making a precedent followed by Hu Jintao.

All these personal references that accumulated over time confirm the tensions caused by internal power struggles, which were masked by official unity and harmony. It would be difficult otherwise to explain the importance that the party leaders attach to enshrining these personal remarks in the main party document.

That weakness – intrinsic insufficient institutionalization in an over-centralized structure – can also help explain why the critical changes made by Xi Jinping in 2017 passed so smoothly. They might even be seen by many in the party as a stabilizing factor, since their negative impact will be revealed fully only during the next power transition period. But it is doubtful that the changes will help maintain party unity on that day. As in so many other aspects in China, the prospects of leadership continuity look increasingly fragile and uncertain.

GUEST AUTHOR

Jarek Grzywacz

Jarek Grzywacz is an analyst and freelance writer based in Warsaw, specializing in Chinese politics and economy. He holds a Ph.D in Chinese History from National Taiwan University, Taipei.

thediplomat.com · by Jarek Grzywacz · January 26, 2023

14. U.S. Representative sponsors resolution calling for formal Taiwan-U.S. ties

U.S. Representative sponsors resolution calling for formal Taiwan-U.S. ties - Focus Taiwan

focustaiwan.tw · by Link

Washington, Jan. 25 (CNA) U.S. Representative Tom Tiffany said Wednesday that he has sponsored a resolution calling for Washington to abandon its "antiquated" one-China policy in favor of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

"It's time to change the status quo and recognize the reality denied by the United States government for decades: Taiwan is an independent Nation," Tiffany said in a statement shared with The Epoch Times.

"As our long-standing and valued partner, correctly acknowledging their independence from Communist China is long overdue."

In February 2021, Tiffany tabled an identically-titled resolution to the one introduced Jan. 15, which called on U.S. President Joe Biden to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations and negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement, in addition to establishing diplomatic ties.

Alluding to the previous resolution, Tiffany said in an interview with New Tang Dynasty Television aired on Thursday that this was the first time he had received strong support from fellow lawmakers.

"A couple of years ago, it was me alone -- this year we're going to have 18 original co-sponsors," Tiffany said.

The 18 co-sponsors of the Jan. 15 resolution, all Republicans, are Buddy Carter, Dan Crenshaw, Scott DesJarlais, Byron Donalds, Bob Good, Lance Gooden, Doug LaMalfa, Jake LaTurner, Nancy Mace, Tom McClintock, Nicole Malliotakis, Lisa McClain, Ralph Norman, Andy Ogles, Burgess Owens, Scott Perry, Michelle Steel, and Randy Weber.

Tiffany said that "more and more people in Congress are understanding how important Taiwan is, and how important it is that we recognize Taiwan and that we trade with Taiwan."

Tiffany argued that Taiwan deserved to be recognized for expanding democracy and being peace-loving and free, instead of being "put on the same footing … as North Korea and other recalcitrant countries like that."

(By Chiang Chin-yeh and Sean Lin)

Enditem/ASG

focustaiwan.tw · by Link

15. Understanding the US Designation of the Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organisation

Excerpts:

The Wagner Group has acted in a predatory manner, siphoning resources in exchange for security. Practically speaking, the TCO designation is not all that different from the US sanctions imposed on Wagner in 2017 for supporting separatist forces in Ukraine. Both sanctions regimes block Wagner’s property and financial assets in the United States. But the implications of the designation go further than financial impact.

For one, there are implications in the United States with respect to budgets that can be drawn from and authorities that can be invoked vis-a-vis Wagner now that it is considered a TCO. Perhaps more importantly, the imposition of multiple sanctioning mechanisms against the PMC provides a layered approach. Some states that are unwilling to take the diplomatic risk of cooperating with the United States on Ukraine-related sanctions on Wagner may be more willing to cooperate on criminal sanctions. Moreover, should circumstances change that cause the Ukraine-related sanctions on Wagner to be lifted (such as, for example, the end of the Ukraine war), the TCO designation ensures continued sanctioning authority. Most of the groups that have been designated as transnational criminal organisations under EO 13581 have remained on the list indefinitely.

The US designation of Wagner as a TCO represents a new layer in countering the PMC by targeting its financial assets and may trigger other authorities like watch-listing that enable interdiction of its network. Even so, Wagner has demonstrated its ability to circumvent sanctions, and thus the tangible impact of the designation may be difficult to observe. A fully resourced strategy for dealing with Wagner and other groups like it is still needed.

Understanding the US Designation of the Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organisation - ICCT

icct.nl ·

Keywords: Wagner Group, Russia, transnational organized crime, private military company, mercenaries, sanctions

Last week US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that the Treasury Department will designate the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organisation (TCO). Western states and institutions have explored a variety of legal mechanisms against Wagner in recent years, including terrorism designations and sanctions for supporting separatist forces in Ukraine. The TCO designation is thus the latest measure in a layered sanctioning strategy designed to counter the PMC’s vital and frequently brutal role in advancing Russian state interests internationally. In this piece, we demonstrate that the legal case for the TCO designation is strong. Wagner unambiguously meets the criteria for what constitutes a TCO.

The United States is declaring Wagner a TCO under Executive Order (EO) 13581, established in 2011 to block the assets of “significant transnational criminal organizations” that pose “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” What constitutes a significant transnational criminal organisation under EO 13581 is admittedly broad, including any “group of persons … that includes one or more foreign persons; that engages in an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity involving the jurisdictions of at least two foreign states; and that threatens the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”

As this Perspective details, there is ample evidence to suggest that Wagner engages in an ongoing pattern of serious cross-border criminal activity. Natural resource smuggling in Africa is Wagner’s main criminal enterprise, but it has also been implicated in money laundering and illicit financing. Much of this activity appears to be designed for private gain and to help Russia circumvent and offset the impact of US and European sanctions. Wagner’s transnational criminal activities likely also extend quite a bit further. Another criminal activity that Wagner could be involved in that may come to light as the PMC’s activities are further exposed is trafficking. Wagner likely also engages in the mafia-style actions that violent non-state actors (of which PMCs are one sub-set) often resort to in conflict zones, such as extortion, theft, and armed robbery. Indeed, the group’s trajectory into criminality is only likely to increase due to its members’ feelings of impunity and the highly questionable new recruits that it is now bringing aboard.

The plummeting quality of Wagner recruits is connected to the group’s forces suffering significant casualties in Ukraine. Reporting suggests that, in response, Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin has lowered standards for his mercenaries to the point where he is now deliberately recruiting felons directly from Russian prisons. Additionally, security sources in the Central African Republic (CAR) claim that Wagner is freeing and conscripting criminals from prisons in CAR and Mali, many of whom are reportedly considered terrorist fighters by these governments and were imprisoned for violent crimes. Adding violent criminals to Wagner’s ranks underscores the PMC’s image as a TCO and ensures future anomie in areas where its members operate.

Designating a tool of Russian state power like Wagner involves numerous policy considerations, and we are not arguing in favour of the US’s designation decision. Rather, the point of this Perspective is to explain the legality of, and evidence for, Wagner’s designation for its connections to transnational organised crime.

The Wagner Group’s International Network

Wagner’s network structure facilitates its transnational criminal activity. Wagner is a node in an international web of companies owned by Prigozhin, who has been sanctioned by the United States for his close connections to the Russian government, sponsorship of disinformation campaigns, and interference in US elections. Moreover, Wagner itself is a constellation of interrelated entities. Though it functions as a coherent organisation led by Dmitry Utkin (a former officer in Russia’s military intelligence service), it does not legally exist as an incorporated entity. Instead, Wagner is best understood as a shadowy network of mercenaries fronted by various Prigozhin-linked companies, subsidiaries, and other affiliated groups. Indeed, much of Wagner’s transnational criminal activity is only visible through the activities of these constituent parts.

Though Russia and Prigozhin have long denied connections to Wagner, in September 2022 Prigozhin finally publicly acknowledged that he founded and finances the organisation. According to the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), “Prigozhin relies upon a vast network of financial facilitators and front companies to enable his ability to evade sanctions and transact in U.S. dollars despite being blocked from the U.S. financial system.” This network provides a front for Wagner operations, particularly in Africa. Moreover, as OFAC notes, the network “highlights the interplay between Russia’s paramilitary operations, support for preserving authoritarian regimes, and exploitation of natural resources.”

The interconnectedness of Wagner, Prigozhin, and the Russian government provides opportunity, cover, and deniability for each of the three. One key component of this network’s business model is security agreements with African governments and in-kind payment in the form of natural resource mining concessions rather than hard currency. The model allows the network to exploit valuable natural resources like gold and diamonds for private gain and to help Russia access lucrative revenue streams while operating outside of formal financial systems—an arrangement with clear implications for helping Russia to circumvent sanctions levied against it. Wagner Group has also forged agreements with African governments to gain access to uranium, oil, and manganese. Some of Prigozhin’s front companies carrying out natural resource extraction in Sudan (M Invest and Meroe Gold) and the Central African Republic (M Finans and Lobaye Invest) have been sanctioned by OFAC, which also linked them directly to Wagner, noting that they “serve as cover for PMC Wagner forces.”

The Wagner network is also linked to other entities, including government actors and paramilitary groups. In countries where Wagner provides security services to governments, it typically establishes close relationships with officials in those countries’ security apparatuses. In some cases (for example, Sudan and the Central African Republic), local government officials appear to be complicit in the network’s criminal activities.

The Wagner Group’s Transnational Criminal Activity

Natural Resource Smuggling

Wagner’s most direct connection to TOC activity is the smuggling of natural resources. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, told the U.N. Security Council in October 2022 that “one of the most immediate and growing concerns in Africa is the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group’s strategy of exploiting the natural resources of the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Sudan, as well as other countries … to fund Moscow’s war machine.” Although Russia may legally extract and transport some of the natural resources it has access to via concessions awarded by local governments, it also appears to smuggle some of these resources in a manner explicitly designed to circumvent US sanctions. Wagner’s role in helping Russia evade sanctions is a criminal act in itself, and is a modus operandi likely to be used even more frequently by Moscow moving forward.

In Sudan, Wagner has been implicated in Russian gold smuggling operations. The smuggling network appears to be facilitated by Prigozhin-linked Wagner front companies and corrupt Sudanese military officials. In July 2022, international news outlets reported that Sudanese officials had intercepted a Russian cargo flight preparing to leave Khartoum with about a ton of gold hidden in the cargo hold. Around the same time, Sudanese anti-corruption officials said they had detected sixteen Russian cargo flights traveling between Latakia, Syria (where Russia has a major air base) and Port Sudan that were suspected of smuggling gold. Sudanese military leadership reportedly waived inspections of the flights. The primary recipient of Russia’s gold concessions in Sudan is M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold, which, as noted above, are sanctioned by the United States due to their links to Prigozhin and Wagner. Though the connections between the cargo flights and these front companies are somewhat opaque, because they are Russia’s main gold conduit in Sudan, it is reasonable to infer that the outfits and, therefore, Wagner were involved in facilitating the smuggling operations.

Although the July 2022 incidents are the most definitive evidence in open source reporting of Wagner’s connection to Russian gold smuggling in Sudan, it is likely that such activity is part of an ongoing pattern. According to British media, while official statistics suggest that Sudan exports hardly any gold to Russia, a Sudanese gold company executive said that “the Kremlin is the largest foreign player in the country’s huge mining sector.” The executive went on to claim that much of Russia’s gold mined in Sudan “is smuggled in small planes from military airports dotted across the country to Russia.” An estimated 70 to 90 percent of Sudan’s gold is smuggled out of the country, often routed and laundered through the United Arab Emirates. A large portion of this gold’s movement is handled by Russian smuggling operations, according to experts and Sudanese officials. Wagner almost certainly plays a role in facilitating these operations.

Sudanese officials say that Russia smuggles Sudanese gold via land routes to CAR, where Wagner is also facilitating gold smuggling activity, given its longstanding presence there and intimate security relationship with the government. Russia smuggles gold and diamonds out of the CAR, according to European security officials, who say Wagner once ran the country’s customs operations. Russia’s main gold and diamond mining companies in CAR are M Finans and Lobaye Invest, which, as noted, OFAC sanctioned for their links to Prigozhin and Wagner. Given Wagner’s close relationship with the CAR government, reported involvement in the country’s customs operations, and links to Russia’s main mining companies in the CAR, it is likely that Wagner is involved in Russian gold and diamond smuggling there.

Wagner’s involvement in Russian natural resource exploitation and smuggling likely also extends to other countries in Africa where it operates (or may soon operate), including Mali and Burkina Faso, which along with Ghana are among the top three gold-producing countries in West Africa. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa noted that Wagner’s “warm relations with [some of] the [West African] governments present an opportunity for Russia to continue to financially benefit from gold-mining operations and evade sanctions by laundering gold through transit and destination markets.”

Money Laundering and Illicit Financing

Wagner almost certainly engages in money laundering and illicit financing, though evidence in open sources of its involvement in these activities is somewhat murky. Wagner’s most visible financial dealings walk the line between licit and illicit activity, relying heavily on cut-outs to circumvent US and European sanctions on itself, Prigozhin, and Russia. Through Prigozhin-linked companies, Wagner procures government contracts, in many cases receiving payment in the form of natural resource mining and exploration rights or hard assets such as gold and diamonds. By avoiding formal financial systems, these types of transactions enable Wagner and Prigozhin to skirt the US financial system. Since sanctions are typically only enforceable where transactions touch US jurisdiction or US financial regulatory systems, Wagner and Prigozhin are able to generate funds while circumventing sanctions. Moreover, Wagner’s acceptance of payment in gold and diamonds may lead to the smuggling and laundering of these proceeds.

Wagner may also be indirectly helping Russia circumvent sanctions through cryptocurrency fundraising by its network. According to credible information from blockchain analysis firms, Wagner-affiliated Task Force Rusich (which has since been designated by OFAC) began fundraising on Telegram in February 2022, posting cryptocurrency addresses that as of September 2022 had received more than $100,000 USD. Though small in scale, such activity still helps Russia by funding a US-sanctioned entity aiding its war effort in Ukraine. This example also highlights the possibility that Wagner and the Prigozhin network could be using other affiliated entities to raise funds for Russia.

Wagner has also been suspected by experts in the past of attempting to use cryptocurrency to skirt sanctions. In May 2022, when CAR announced that it would adopt cryptocurrency as legal tender, experts posited that the move might be geared toward enabling Russian investments in the country. Internet access in CAR is sparse, making widespread cryptocurrency use by the local population unlikely. Given Wagner’s robust security presence in CAR and close relationship with the corruption-prone government, expert speculation at the time noted that Wagner could be seeking to use cryptocurrency as another form of payment—besides natural resource concessions—to circumvent sanctions.

Other Criminal Activity

While there are few instances in open sources linking Wagner directly to drug, weapons, or human trafficking, it is not beyond the pale to speculate that Wagner may have engaged in such activity. Further investigation in this regard, including by government offices and journalistic outlets, is thus amply justified.

For one thing, Wagner has been implicated in international arms embargo violations, especially in Libya. According to a European Council decision, Wagner has been “involved in multiple and repeated breaches of the U.N. arms embargo in Libya … including delivery of arms as well as deployment of mercenaries into Libya in support of the Libya National Army (LNA).” US military officials have also accused Wagner, in cooperation with Moscow, of violating the UN arms ban in Libya by accepting and using cross-border shipments by Russia of various types of weapons to support the LNA.

In addition to this rather robust evidence of arms embargo violations, there are also some weak indicators regarding Wagner that are worth noting in case a broader pattern becomes evident. In 2012, Nigerian authorities arrested fifteen members of a Wagner precursor company, Moran Security Group, for arms smuggling. The group, which had contracts in Nigeria to protect merchant ships from pirates, sailed into Lagos carrying a cache of arms and ammunition. Authorities said that “there is no indication that the vessel was authorized to come into Nigeria and, worse still, to carry arms,” though they later dropped charges due to diplomatic pressure.

In 2021, Lithuanian media reported that a Lithuanian national connected to Wagner was arrested for leading a drug smuggling organisation. The man was reportedly recruited by a Wagner subsidiary in Germany and was also on the radar of Spanish authorities for his drug smuggling activities. It is unclear if he was a member of Wagner at the time of this arrest or whether his activities were connected to Wagner.

Finally, though not transnational organised crime activity in the traditional sense (because the activity does not cross borders or jurisdictions), Wagner uses criminal means, including violence and excessive force, to control civilian populations in the countries where it operates. Indiscriminate violence, public executions, and sexual assault have been central to the group’s intentionally brutal campaigns. Examples include summary executions and systemic sexual violence in Ukraine; numerous instances of rape, murder of unarmed civilians, and human rights violations in CAR; deployment of landmines and IEDs in and around Tripoli; and the execution of nearly 300 men in a village in Mali.

Conclusion

The Wagner Group has acted in a predatory manner, siphoning resources in exchange for security. Practically speaking, the TCO designation is not all that different from the US sanctions imposed on Wagner in 2017 for supporting separatist forces in Ukraine. Both sanctions regimes block Wagner’s property and financial assets in the United States. But the implications of the designation go further than financial impact.

For one, there are implications in the United States with respect to budgets that can be drawn from and authorities that can be invoked vis-a-vis Wagner now that it is considered a TCO. Perhaps more importantly, the imposition of multiple sanctioning mechanisms against the PMC provides a layered approach. Some states that are unwilling to take the diplomatic risk of cooperating with the United States on Ukraine-related sanctions on Wagner may be more willing to cooperate on criminal sanctions. Moreover, should circumstances change that cause the Ukraine-related sanctions on Wagner to be lifted (such as, for example, the end of the Ukraine war), the TCO designation ensures continued sanctioning authority. Most of the groups that have been designated as transnational criminal organisations under EO 13581 have remained on the list indefinitely.

The US designation of Wagner as a TCO represents a new layer in countering the PMC by targeting its financial assets and may trigger other authorities like watch-listing that enable interdiction of its network. Even so, Wagner has demonstrated its ability to circumvent sanctions, and thus the tangible impact of the designation may be difficult to observe. A fully resourced strategy for dealing with Wagner and other groups like it is still needed.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is an Associate Fellow at ICCT and the founder and chief executive officer of the private firm Valens Global. Before founding Valens, Gartenstein-Ross had established himself as a leading subject matter expert on violent non-state actors and terrorism, with the International Herald Tribune describing him as a “rising star in the counterterrorism community.” He is also a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and leads a project on domestic extremism there. @DaveedGR

Emelie Chace-Donahue is the director of analysis at Valens Global and supports the firm’s public sector clients.

Colin P. Clarke is a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center. He is the Director of Policy and Research at The Soufan Group, where his research focuses on domestic and transnational terrorism, international security, and geopolitics. Prior to joining The Soufan Group, Clarke was a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he spent a decade researching terrorism, insurgency, and criminal networks. Clarke is also an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), a non-resident Senior Fellow in the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), an Associate Fellow at the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), and a member of the “Network of Experts” at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Related Readings:

Demuynck, M., Mehra, T. Raising the stakes against the Wagner Group: From mercenaries to a designated terrorist group? Perspective, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 17 January 2023.

Mehra, T., Thorley, A. Foreign Fighters, Foreign Volunteers and Mercenaries in the Ukrainian Armed Conflict. Perspective, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 11 July 2022.

Baldaro, E., D’Amato, S. Counter-Terrorism in the Sahel: Increased Instability and Political Tensions. Perspective, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 7 July 2022

icct.nl · by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

16. What is Putin thinking?

A clever OpED in Putin's voice.

Excerpt:

Nuclear weapons are my trump card. If I didn’t have them, Biden might have done what Bush the First did after Saddam swallowed Kuwait.

But my strategy is more clever than his: I threaten to play the nuclear card, but I don’t. I hold it because to use it is to lose it. And if this strategy brings me victory in Ukraine, I can play it again.

What is Putin thinking?

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

OPINION:

I’ve begun talking to myself. Not good. But who else can I talk to? I’m surrounded by fools and incompetents. Yes, there are those who defend me and the special military operation I initiated a year ago next month to restore Russia‘s dignity, power and glory. But how many of them are just hungry for crumbs from my table?

Half a million young Russians have now fled rather than fight for the Fatherland. There was a time when traitors were not allowed to just pack up and leave. Maybe it’s time to enforce such rules again.

I need to be honest with myself: The Ukrainians have surprised me. When I took Crimea back from their sweaty hands nine years ago, they just whined and licked their wounds.

This time they’re fighting like grizzly bears. And my generals? They failed me. I should have shot a few right away to encourage the others.

I do blame myself for not remembering how stubborn Ukrainians can be. Stalin found that out when he began collectivizing agriculture. The peasants didn’t like that. So, Stalin took away their grain and let a few million starve to death. That taught them a lesson! It’s time to give them another.

I also underestimated Zelenskyy, that comedian, that Jew. I thought as soon as he saw my tanks rolling toward Kiev — not Kyiv, damn it! — he’d run crying to the West where he’d give speeches for gelt.

Perhaps I should have limited myself to what Biden called a “minor incursion.” The problem is I’m not getting any younger. I don’t have years to spend slicing the kolbasa.

Russia isn’t like Britain and France. They resigned themselves to the loss of their empires, to being has-beens, vassals of the uncultured, decadent, mongrel Americans.

We Russians are too proud to accept such a fate. We’ve always been an empire, not a nation-state. Yes, during the Soviet era, we claimed to be anti-imperialists, but only idiots believed us.

Our imperial possessions still stretch over 11 time zones. Vladivostok means “conqueror of the East.”

But I see a problem there. Vladivostok was Chinese before we Russians annexed it. Xi Jinping is my friend, but he knows that if Russia weakens, he will have an opportunity to expand his empire. He has hundreds of millions of people he can send north to take our land and exploit our resources. But that problem must wait. For now, I need him. And for now, Taiwan is at the top of his to-conquer list.

I’m encouraged by last week’s meeting of senior Western defense officials in Germany. They’re divided.

The Germans are still refusing to send their Leopard 2 tanks to the Ukrainians. Herr Scholz, mein alter Freund, fears me. With reason.

I’m told quite a few Americans — mostly Republicans, which seems odd since I thought they were the tough guys — want to cut support to Ukrainians and even reduce military spending. And I’m hearing that the French are reading a novel about me called “The Wizard of the Kremlin.” Nice title!

German pacifists, American isolationists, French appeasers — they’re helping me decide what to do next: Refuse to negotiate and plan a spring offense that will finally force the Ukrainians to submit. The Ukrainians may think they want freedom, but what they need is order — the order that a czar provides.

Biden has surprised me, too, frankly. When he was vice president, he and Obama gave me Syria on a silver platter. Then, as president, Biden surrendered to those medieval barbarians in Afghanistan.

After that, his highest priority was “waging a war” against fossil fuels. Which didn’t prevent him from telling the Germans to go ahead with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have made them more dependent on my fossil fuels.

So, it only seemed logical that he’d respond to my special military operation by just wagging his finger and imposing some new sanctions.

But when the Ukrainians refused to submit, Biden felt compelled to send them weapons — to a point. I get it: His strategy is to show restraint — stopping short of giving them weapons that can strike inside Russia — in the hope that I’ll show restraint, too.

Nuclear weapons are my trump card. If I didn’t have them, Biden might have done what Bush the First did after Saddam swallowed Kuwait.

But my strategy is more clever than his: I threaten to play the nuclear card, but I don’t. I hold it because to use it is to lose it. And if this strategy brings me victory in Ukraine, I can play it again.

Moldova would be the lowest-hanging fruit. It’s not a NATO member. After that, maybe I’d invade Lithuania from Belarus. Even if I took only the southern part of that country, I’d then have a land bridge to Kaliningrad, where my Baltic fleet is based.

Yes, Lithuania is a member of NATO, but which other NATO members are going to send their troops to die to liberate southern Lithuania, especially after Ukraine and Moldova have been ceded?

From there, I could move on to reclaim other breakaway provinces of Russkiy mir. “The hen pecks grain by grain,” as my grandfather would say.

Of course, if my nuclear blackmail strategy fails, I’ll have to lower my sights. I’ll have to ask Scholz or Macron to arrange a cease-fire — freezing the conflict but with me still in possession of Crimea and at least some of Donbas. That would give me time to prepare for another round of fighting.

What would Peter the Great do?

I have so much to decide. And the only one with whom I can have an honest and intelligent conversation is me.

• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washington Times.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

17. China Increasingly Relies on Imported Food. That’s a Problem.

Excerpts:

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s approach to food security [page in Chinese] aims to achieve self-sufficiency with an emphasis on domestic supply. Since he took office in 2013, Xi has frequently said that “the rice bowls of the Chinese people must always be held firmly in our own hand and filled mainly with Chinese grain.”

On the domestic supply side, the government has established stockpiles of food such as corn, rice, wheat, and pork. In 2006, it introduced a support price for wheat to protect farmers from losses. It also set a “farmland red line” policy with a target of preserving no less than 120 million hectares (an area slightly larger than Sweden) of arable land for crop farming. So far, it has been able to maintain this target. The government has worked to boost high-quality farmland, achieving in 2020 [article in Chinese] a target to develop 53.3 million hectares of such farmland. In 2022, Xi raised the target for high-quality farmland to 66.7 million hectares and called for the protection of fertile black soil. The government has also worked to bolster food supply chains, providing funds to stabilize domestic agricultural production and investing in the global agriculture industry and overseas farmland. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Chinese investors owned 383,935 acres [PDF] of agricultural land in the United States in 2021, slightly less than 1 percent of foreign-owned acres.

On the demand side, most notably, the government has worked to reduce food waste through initiatives such as the “clean plate campaign.” A Chinese Academy of Sciences survey found that Chinese consumers in big cities wasted up to eighteen million tons of food in 2015, enough to feed up to fifty million people annually. In addition, the government has used legislative measures to combat food waste, improve food safety, protect seeds and the seed industry [PDF] and safeguard farmland [article in Chinese].

The Chinese government has also sought to diversify import sources and advance global agricultural cooperation through its Belt and Road Initiative. The United States used to be China’s largest agricultural supplier, but its position weakened following the U.S.-China trade war in 2018. In 2021, Brazil replaced the United States as China’s largest agricultural supplier, providing 20 percent of China’s agricultural imports.

China Increasingly Relies on Imported Food. That’s a Problem.

China has so far been able to feed its 1.4 billion people, but climate change and a dependence on imports could pose challenges.

Article by Zongyuan Zoe Liu

January 25, 2023 3:54 pm (EST)

cfr.org · by Zongyuan Zoe Liu

China has increased its reliance on food imports over the past two decades, prompting concerns among officials who worry that disruptions to food supply chains could trigger domestic unrest. In particular, this reliance has heightened China’s sensitivity to food supply disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s war in Ukraine.

What is China’s current food security situation?

With less than 10 percent of the planet’s arable land, China produces one-fourth of the world’s grain and feeds one-fifth of the world’s population. Data from the country’s National Bureau of Statistics showed that in 2022, China’s grain output reached a record high of 686.53 million tons [page in Chinese] despite delayed plantings, extreme weather, and COVID-19 disruptions. China ranks first globally in producing cereals (such as corn, wheat, and rice), fruit, vegetables, meat, poultry, eggs, and fishery products.

Despite its domestic production, China has been a net importer [DOC] of agricultural products since 2004. Today, it imports more of these products—including soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and dairy products—than any other country. Between 2000 and 2020, the country’s food self-sufficiency ratio decreased from 93.6 percent to 65.8 percent. Changing diet patterns have also driven up China’s imports of edible oils, sugar, meat, and processed foods. In 2021, the country’s edible oil import-dependency ratio reached nearly 70 percent [article in Chinese], almost as high as its crude oil import dependence.

Why does China now depend on imported food?

The World This Week

A weekly digest of the latest from CFR on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. Every Friday.

View all newsletters >

Daily News Brief

A summary of global news developments with CFR analysis delivered to your inbox each morning. Most weekdays.

Think Global Health

A curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide. Weekly.

By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. You are also agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.

View all newsletters >

A primary factor has been Chinese people’s increasingly sophisticated dietary demands, driven by a growing city-dwelling middle class pursuing safer, more diverse, and higher-quality food. Concerns about food safety in particular have increased demand for imports. While the Chinese government improved its national food safety standards in 2022, the country’s prolonged lack of strict food safety regulations has allowed opportunistic domestic producers to produce unsafe or toxic food. Several deadly food safety scandals over the past two decades have hurt Chinese people’s trust in local brands, leading them to prefer foreign ones. For example, contaminated baby formula killed six babies and poisoned three hundred thousand children in 2008; today, Chinese parents still favor foreign baby formula.

Additionally, imports tend to be cheaper than local options because of higher costs and lower efficiency to grow certain food products in China. For example, the cost to grow soybeans in China is 1.3 times [article in Chinese] than it is in the United States, and the yield is 60 percent less. Because wages are lower for farmers than for factory workers and other urban occupations, farmers feel incentivized to abandon the profession altogether.

China’s food import dependence will likely increase as the amount of arable land continues to diminish. Between 2013 and 2019, China lost more than 5 percent of its arable land due to factors such as excess fertilizer use and land neglect, according to Chinese government figures. Extreme weather, environmental degradation, water scarcity and pollution, and climate change could exacerbate the problem. Scholars from the United States and China estimate that climate change and ozone pollution together reduced China’s national average crop yields by 10 percent (fifty-five million tons per year) from 1981 to 2010.

What’s at stake for the Chinese government if the country suffers a food crisis?

Famines and food crises were graveyards for Imperial China’s dynasties. They repeatedly sparked peasant rebellions and political uprisings that led to regime collapses. Since 1949, Chinese Communist Party leaders and policymakers have consistently prioritized food security as an indispensable prerequisite to maintaining power.

Since 1949, Chinese Communist Party leaders and policymakers have consistently prioritized food security as an indispensable prerequisite to maintaining power.

China’s last nationwide food crisis was the Great Famine in 1959–1961, the largest famine in human history. Sparked by the Great Leap Forward, a series of radical industrialization policies, it led to thirty million people starving to death and about the same number of lost or postponed births. The Great Famine sowed the seed for the decade-long sociopolitical turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976. Although current Chinese leaders do not publicly discuss such policy-induced catastrophes, they lived through these events. Their continued prioritization of food self-sufficiency suggests they would not want to repeat such mistakes.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, food supply disruptions and lockdown-induced food shortages showed that the political system remains vulnerable to food insecurity. Collective grievances aggravated by food shortages contributed to a burst of protests in more than a dozen cities, with demonstrators chanting, “We want food, not COVID tests,” in a rare show of dissent since China’s mass protests in 1989. Local officials apologized for food shortages in areas including Changchun, Guiyang, and Xinjiang. In Shanghai, three officials were fired for failing to resolve food shortage complaints during a lockdown.

How is the Chinese government trying to boost the country’s food security?

Today, Chinese leaders consider food security an integral part of national security, with Article 22 of the 2015 China National Security Law [PDF in Chinese] requiring the state to take comprehensive measures to ensure food security, safety, and quality. The “No. 1 Document,” [page in Chinese] the first policy document issued by China’s top authorities every year, has consistently focused on the “three issues of agriculture, the countryside, and farmers” since 2004.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s approach to food security [page in Chinese] aims to achieve self-sufficiency with an emphasis on domestic supply. Since he took office in 2013, Xi has frequently said that “the rice bowls of the Chinese people must always be held firmly in our own hand and filled mainly with Chinese grain.”

On the domestic supply side, the government has established stockpiles of food such as corn, rice, wheat, and pork. In 2006, it introduced a support price for wheat to protect farmers from losses. It also set a “farmland red line” policy with a target of preserving no less than 120 million hectares (an area slightly larger than Sweden) of arable land for crop farming. So far, it has been able to maintain this target. The government has worked to boost high-quality farmland, achieving in 2020 [article in Chinese] a target to develop 53.3 million hectares of such farmland. In 2022, Xi raised the target for high-quality farmland to 66.7 million hectares and called for the protection of fertile black soil. The government has also worked to bolster food supply chains, providing funds to stabilize domestic agricultural production and investing in the global agriculture industry and overseas farmland. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Chinese investors owned 383,935 acres [PDF] of agricultural land in the United States in 2021, slightly less than 1 percent of foreign-owned acres.

On the demand side, most notably, the government has worked to reduce food waste through initiatives such as the “clean plate campaign.” A Chinese Academy of Sciences survey found that Chinese consumers in big cities wasted up to eighteen million tons of food in 2015, enough to feed up to fifty million people annually. In addition, the government has used legislative measures to combat food waste, improve food safety, protect seeds and the seed industry [PDF] and safeguard farmland [article in Chinese].

The Chinese government has also sought to diversify import sources and advance global agricultural cooperation through its Belt and Road Initiative. The United States used to be China’s largest agricultural supplier, but its position weakened following the U.S.-China trade war in 2018. In 2021, Brazil replaced the United States as China’s largest agricultural supplier, providing 20 percent of China’s agricultural imports.

cfr.org · by Zongyuan Zoe Liu

18. The U.S. Military Is In Decline. Cutting Defense Spending Would Be a Disaster

Excerpts:

Nor is a $75 billion cut to the military’s budget even what’s really on the table. Speaker McCarthy seems to think that returning to budgets at 2022 levels is simply “what we were spending just two or three weeks ago.”

No, Mr. Speaker.

The 118th Congress is charged with funding the military for fiscal year 2024 and 2025. This year’s budget for 2023 is settled, overwhelmingly voted upon, and signed into law.

Returning to 2022 spending levels for 2024 is much more than a $75 billion cut for the US military. The House GOP is proposing a defense cut well north of $100 billion once more accurate inflation data is available.

The result of this short-sighted and unserious proposal would be near immediate and create a “force that is measurably smaller and less capable than the one we have today.”

As my colleagues have said, while “prospects for these cuts are not looking good, it is important to understand how dangerous even presenting them as a viable option is to our nation’s national security.”

As former Secretary of Defense Mattis was fond of saying: “Let’s take our own side in this fight.”

The U.S. Military Is In Decline. Cutting Defense Spending Would Be a Disaster

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · January 25, 2023

As House Republicans continue to bandy about a major cut to the US military’s budget for next year, one voice of reason explained why that tired and non-strategic approach only serves to hurt the troops and harm our strategic position in the world relative to our problems.

Speaking at AEI this week, US Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) said the United States tries to “repeatedly cash the ‘peace dividend’ when there is no peace.”

Note the adverb used: repeatedly.

The 1990’s peace dividend provided cover for a very real procurement holiday from which the U.S. military has never fully recovered. That lapse in military modernization was followed by a hollow buildup for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was then bookended by the Budget Control Act era and sequestration.

The result is a smaller, older, less ready—but more expensive—military. America is confronting its own diminishing combat power alongside shrinking conventional and nuclear deterrents. Not only is our military superiority in decline across the armed forces and domains of warfare, but we are outmatched by potential enemies in some specific operational challenges.

Compounding the problem is that our decline has been underway for some time.

Four years ago, the 2018 national defense strategy said America’s “competitive military advantage has been eroding.”

Just under a decade ago, the 2014 National Defense Strategy Commission found that “America’s military superiority—the hard-power backbone of its global influence and national security—has eroded to a dangerous degree.” The bipartisan commissioners said the convergence of negative trends has created a crisis of national security for the United States, quite possibly “an emergency.”

In 2010, the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel said in no uncertain terms that similar issues raised in their report were “sufficiently serious” that all 20 commissioners believed an explicit warning was appropriate. They said “a train wreck is coming” given the “aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, escalating personnel entitlements, overhead and procurement costs, and the growing stress on the force.”

The 2010 body concluded that the consequences for a “business as usual” attitude towards their findings were “not acceptable.”

Yet business-as-usual seems to be the approach de jure for military investments over three decades. These disturbing trend lines were obvious each time Washington has voted to cut defense spending without strategic forethought or rationale. And the House may be set to do it again, but this time in light of an unforgiving history and lack of margin within the force to do more with less without severe consequences.

As Sen. Cornyn said, the nation is clearly in the midst of great power competition and has not “risen to the challenge.” He said the situation requires “a sense of urgency” lacking in Washington. He noted that he sees nothing that gives him a great deal of comfort that the US is adequately prepared for a multi-front conflict. “I don’t see all hands on deck,” Cornyn continued, including regarding America’s defense and aerospace industrial base, should a crisis escalate in Asia.

That is an accurate, if understated, assessment of our current comfort level surrounding assumptions about when or how severely others may use force and challenge the status quo in varied regions of the world—and how much luxurious time the US would have to respond.

Given the worrying state of our defenses and industrial capacity, as well as the rising number and severity of challenges around the world, why would House Republicans arbitrarily pick a topline budget number that is not threat-informed?

Because any reasonable analysis would say—and has said for years now—that defense budgets above inflation are only the minimum needed to stem the tide and recover.

What took decades to create will similarly take decades to un-do with robust defense spending that is predictable, consistent, and on-time.

Nor is a $75 billion cut to the military’s budget even what’s really on the table. Speaker McCarthy seems to think that returning to budgets at 2022 levels is simply “what we were spending just two or three weeks ago.”

No, Mr. Speaker.

The 118th Congress is charged with funding the military for fiscal year 2024 and 2025. This year’s budget for 2023 is settled, overwhelmingly voted upon, and signed into law.

Returning to 2022 spending levels for 2024 is much more than a $75 billion cut for the US military. The House GOP is proposing a defense cut well north of $100 billion once more accurate inflation data is available.

The result of this short-sighted and unserious proposal would be near immediate and create a “force that is measurably smaller and less capable than the one we have today.”

As my colleagues have said, while “prospects for these cuts are not looking good, it is important to understand how dangerous even presenting them as a viable option is to our nation’s national security.”

As former Secretary of Defense Mattis was fond of saying: “Let’s take our own side in this fight.”

Expertise and Experience: Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a resident fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. You can follow her on Twitter: @MEaglen. While working at AEI, Ms. Eaglen served as a staff member on the National Defense Strategy Commission, a congressionally mandated bipartisan review group whose final report in November 2018, “Providing for the Common Defense,” included assessments and recommendations for the administration. Earlier, Ms. Eaglen served as a staff member on the 2014 congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, established to assess US defense interests and strategic objectives, and in 2010 on the congressionally mandated bipartisan Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, which evaluated the Pentagon’s defense strategy. She is also one of the 12-member US Army War College Board of Visitors, which offers advice about program objectives and effectiveness.

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · January 25, 2023

19.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com