Quotes of the Day:
"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world."
- Nelson Mandela
"While there is a chance of the world getting through its troubles, I hold that a reasonable man has to behave as though he were sure of it. If at the end your cheerfulness in not justified, at any rate you will have been cheerful."
- H. G. Wells
"If you know how to read, you have a complete education about life, then you know how to vote within a democracy. But if you don't know how to read, you don't know how to decide. That's the great thing about our country - we're a democracy of readers, and we should keep it that way."
- Ray Bradbury
1. Pentagon Names Army Units Tapped for Possible European Deployment
2. DOD Places Variety of Troops on 'Prepare to Deploy'
3. Opinion | Putin Is Caught in a Trap of His Own Making
4. US tries to name and shame Russian disinformation on Ukraine
5. Is Defending Ukraine Vital to U.S. Security?
6. Three Things the World Should Know About Putin
7. It Might Not Be Too Late to Deter Putin
8. Opinion | ‘Web3’ is on the way. Authoritarians should be worried.
9. Afghan evacuation flights to resume with streamlined process
10. 'We don't want wars': Russia sends less hawkish message on Ukraine
11. The Ghosts of Kyiv and the Shadow of War
12. Report to Congress on Great Power Competition
13. AEI Panel Warns Against Tying National Security Strategy to Domestic Priorities
14. Vast Troves of Classified Info Undermine National Security, Spy Chief Says
15. A war in Ukraine could have global consequences
16. Brace for Russian cyber attacks as Ukraine crisis deepens, Britain says
17. The Truth Sandwich
18. After 20 Years of Civilian Drone Strike Deaths, Pentagon Creates An Office to Stop More
19. China denies interest in retrieving sunken US fighter jet
20. The Drone Threat Comes Home
21. Being a Better Partner in the Pacific
22. Why Intermediate-Range Missiles Are a Focal Point in the Ukraine Crisis
23. China Hopes Sequel to Anti-U.S. Korean War Propaganda Blockbuster Will 'Smash Theaters'
24. FDD | Biden Greenlights South Korean Release of Funds to Politically Connected Iranian Firm
25. How Russia Has Turned Ukraine Into a Cyber-Battlefield
26. The U.S. won’t send troops to Ukraine: Here’s what it might do
27. The West, not Russia, faces a Ukrainian quagmire
28. Austin Orders U.S. Military to Step Up Efforts to Prevent Civilian Harm
1. Pentagon Names Army Units Tapped for Possible European Deployment
PTDO. The usual suspects.
Pentagon Names Army Units Tapped for Possible European Deployment
Defense spokesman cautions that these units have only been alerted, not activated, as tensions continue around Ukraine.
Soldiers from the Army’s elite airborne divisions are among the 8,500 service members currently on heightened alert to rapidly deploy if NATO activates its multinational response force, the Pentagon announced Thursday.
“These forces are on a heightened preparedness to deploy. They have not been activated,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby emphasized during a news conference. “The vast majority of the troops that the [defense] secretary put on prepare to deploy are in fact dedicated to the NATO Response Force. And if and when they're activated, we'll be able to provide more specific detail in terms of breakdowns in numbers.”
Russia has been assembling military equipment and more than 100,000 troops along the Ukrainian border for months; recent additions include medical units. Ukrainian leaders have tried to temper its citizens’ concerns that Moscow, which illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, might invade at any moment while U.S. government officials continue to state an incursion could be “imminent.”
“We still believe there's time and space for diplomacy, but thus far it has not achieved the kind of results that the international community would like to see. All that combined has led us to, again, want to contribute more capabilities to Ukrainian armed forces and be ready to contribute more capabilities to our NATO allies,” Kirby said Thursday.
Kirby said units that had been put on alert include parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These forces already maintain a high level of readiness due to their mission to quickly deploy around the world, as they did during the Afghanistan airlift effort last August.
Other units put on alert include parts of the 4th Infantry Division and other units at Fort Carson, Colorado; parts of the 101st Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and units at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; Fort Hood, Texas; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington state; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; as well as several other unnamed U.S. locations.
The units include logistics, medical, aviation, transportation, and intelligence and surveillance support elements. Placing these troops on heightened alert is meant to reduce the response time to deploy, so for some units that means going from 10 to five days, Kirby said previously.
Kirby would not rule out that additional U.S. troops already in Europe—some on rotational deployments and others stationed there permanently—could be called up to help.
“I believe that Gen. [Tod] Wolters is taking prudent steps to make sure that if we need to move forces from inside Europe to other places in Europe and allied territory, that he's ready to do that,” Kirby said.
Wolters leads U.S. European Commander and is NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, capable of moving troops throughout the region. These additional troops could be sent to NATO’s eastern flank: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.
2. DOD Places Variety of Troops on 'Prepare to Deploy'
Alerted not deployed.
Note the conclusion of the statement addressing the exercise in Japan. We should need no reminder that we are a global power with global commitments. While Russia focuses on Ukraine, China on Taiwan, north Korea on the ROK, and Iran on Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq (plus the continued threats posed by violent extremist organizations), the US must be concerned with contingencies in all locations.`We do not have the luxury of diverting most resources and assets to focus on a single contingency.
DOD Places Variety of Troops on 'Prepare to Deploy'
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III placed a range of U.S. military units comprising 8,500 troops on a heightened preparedness to deploy should Russia invade Ukraine, and those units have been named, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said in a news conference today.
Press Conference
Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby holds a news conference at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Jan. 27, 2022.
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Photo By: Marine Corps Sgt. Taryn Sammet
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"[These] units include elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg [North Carolina] — which regularly maintains high readiness — as well as elements of the 18th Airborne Corps, also based at Fort Bragg; and some elements from Fort Campbell, Kentucky," Kirby said. "Additionally, from Fort Campbell, elements of the 101st Airborne Division; and from Fort Carson, Colorado, elements of the Fourth Infantry Division have also been placed on increased readiness."
The spokesman added that more units, which will now have an increased readiness posture, also include elements from Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; Fort Hood, Texas; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and select additional locations across the nation.
"These units, all told, include medical support, aviation support, logistics support and of course, combat formations," Kirby said, emphasizing that these forces are on a heightened preparedness to deploy, and have not been activated.
"The vast majority of the troops the secretary put on 'prepare to deploy,' are in fact, dedicated to the NATO Response Force," he added. The NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed, according to the NATO website.
"We still believe there's time and space for diplomacy," Kirby said of ending tensions in the region between Russia and Ukraine. "But thus far, it has not achieved the kind of results that the international community would like to see."
Press Briefing
Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby holds a press briefing at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Jan. 27, 2022.
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As for Russian buildup, the United States continues to see — including in the last 24 hours — more accumulation of credible combat forces arrayed by the Russians, in again the western part of their country and in Belarus, he said.
The possibility of using U.S. forces that are already in Europe — which are already in an accelerated readiness posture – has not been taken off the table to bolster NATO allies if necessary, Kirby noted.
Also noted in his briefing, the spokesman said the Defense Department has issued guidance pausing all activities related to processing civilian vaccination exemption requests, and any disciplinary actions for failure to become vaccinated for federal civilian workers.
"This guidance ensures compliance with a nationwide preliminary injunction order issued [on January 21] by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas," he said. "This injunction does not extend to military members, or to the department's other force-health protection measures, such as masking, testing, physical distancing and travel limitations."
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Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby holds a news conference at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Jan. 27, 2022.
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Photo By: Marine Corps Sgt. Taryn Sammet
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And yesterday marked the beginning of Exercise Keen Edge 2022 with members of the Japan Joint Staff, U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the spokesman said.
"This annual bilateral exercise is designed to deepen relationships between the [United States] and Japan and to improve interagency coordination, combat readiness and interoperability between our two nations," Kirby said.
The exercise is taking place through Feb. 3, and the primary exercise will be conducted at Yokota Air Base, Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan, Ministry of Defense in Tokyo, Japan Self-Defense Force Headquarters and Camp Smith, Hawaii, which is the home of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Headquarters.
3. Opinion | Putin Is Caught in a Trap of His Own Making
Perhaps we have him right where we want him? (note sarcasm)
Excerpts:
But instead of submitting, the United States went the other way and began arming Ukraine. On Wednesday, it formally responded to Mr. Putin’s demands: While we don’t know the exact terms of the reply, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made clear that there will be no concessions. So Mr. Putin is stuck.
His options are limited. He can demand the West stop its military supplies. He might vent his frustrations on the opposition, all the while seeking to portray Russia as victim of the nefarious West. Or he could test the waters with a deniable provocation undertaken by supposedly private Russian citizens, those Mr. Putin once called “coal miners and tractor drivers.” That may be a small way to save face, but it could easily spill out of control. The risk of outright war is enormous.
There is, perhaps, one certainty to hold on to: Mr. Putin will never start a war he’s likely to lose. So the only way to ensure peace is to guarantee that in a military confrontation, Mr. Putin would never win.
Opinion | Putin Is Caught in a Trap of His Own Making
Guest Essay
Putin Is Caught in a Trap of His Own Making
Jan. 28, 2022, 1:00 a.m. ET
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Ms. Latynina is a journalist who has reported extensively on Russia’s politics and foreign policy.
MOSCOW — The question is on everyone’s lips. Will President Vladimir Putin go to war against Ukraine? To judge by Russia’s propaganda machine, where media moguls are predicting a victory “in 48 hours,” the answer is an emphatic yes.
Yet the truth is more complex. While Mr. Putin undoubtedly regards Ukraine as little more than a Russian province, as he argued in a lengthy pseudo-historical treatise in July, it’s far from clear his aim was war. Outright conflict — as opposed to sudden swoops, covert operations or hybrid warfare — isn’t really Mr. Putin’s style. It’s probable that the troop buildup in November was an attempt to force the West to relinquish any claims over Ukraine. That would be a great P.R. victory at minimal cost.
But the West called his bluff. In the past week especially, the United States and NATO have taken a markedly sharper tone when discussing Russia — and have, more important, sent military hardware across Eastern Europe and put troops on standby. The message is clear: If Russia won’t de-escalate, then neither will the West.
Instead of trapping the United States, Mr. Putin has trapped himself. Caught between armed conflict and a humiliating retreat, he is now seeing his room for maneuver dwindling to nothing. He could invade and risk defeat, or he could pull back and have nothing to show for his brinkmanship. What happens next is unknown. But one thing is clear: Mr. Putin’s gamble has failed.
It may not seem obvious that the Kremlin, which has steadily amassed over 100,000 soldiers at the Ukrainian border since November, was not aiming at war. But the reasons to believe that Russia will pull back from an invasion are many. For one thing, Mr. Putin — whose instinctive cautiousness I’ve observed at close quarters for two decades — has a record of withdrawing at the first sign of real conflict. When Russian mercenaries were killed by U.S. troops in Syria in 2018, for example, he had the perfect opportunity to retaliate. Instead, Russia denied the slaughter ever took place.
Likewise, when Turkish drones struck down Russian mercenaries and equipment in Libya and Syria, there wasn’t a peep of acknowledgment either. In fact, it seems that Mr. Putin was so conscious of Turkey’s might that he didn’t dare to join forces with Armenia when, in September 2020, its territory was attacked by Turkish-backed Azerbaijan. And after triumphantly sending in his troops to Kazakhstan for an indefinite time, Mr. Putin started to withdraw them very soon after Russia’s foreign minister took a call from his Chinese counterpart.
Tellingly, Russia’s major successful military operations under Mr. Putin — the defeat of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 — happened when the West was looking the other way. In both cases, the world was caught unawares and Russia could complete its designs without the threat of armed international opposition. That is not the case now.
What’s more, there are no internal reasons for pursuing a war. Yes, Mr. Putin’s ratings are down and prices are up, but there’s no major domestic unrest and elections are two years away. Mr. Putin doesn’t require an expansionist escapade to either shore up his rule or distract the population from its troubles. War is a big red button that can be pushed only once. Right now, there’s no need.
And then there’s the main reason: Russia would not be assured of victory. The Ukrainian Army is much improved, having upscaled its equipment and preparations for a ground invasion, and the Russian troops deployed near the border are most likely insufficient to conquer the country. Because of its sheer bulk, the Russian Army might be able to advance: Quantity has a quality of its own, as Stalin reportedly said. But it would surely come at the cost of catastrophic losses in human life.
If he had little intention of invading, why did Mr. Putin raise the stakes so high? The answer is simple: Afghanistan. The West’s disastrous withdrawal from the country in August signaled the United States’ waning appetite for entanglement abroad. Emboldened, Mr. Putin clearly decided it was a good time to press his case for a revision of the post-Cold War order. Without the usual bargaining chips — no sound economy, no superior weapons, no fanatical followers — he fell back on unpredictability. The more irrational his behavior, went the thinking, the more likely the United States would accept his demands.
Those demands, published in mock-treaty form in December, were in many cases absurd. The call for NATO to withdraw its troops from members in Eastern Europe, for example, would never be met. The core request — that NATO deny membership to Ukraine — was silly in a different way. There was no chance of Ukraine becoming a member any time soon, ultimatum or not. But that was Mr. Putin’s point: By demanding something that was already happening, Mr. Putin aimed to claim a victory over the West.
But instead of submitting, the United States went the other way and began arming Ukraine. On Wednesday, it formally responded to Mr. Putin’s demands: While we don’t know the exact terms of the reply, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made clear that there will be no concessions. So Mr. Putin is stuck.
His options are limited. He can demand the West stop its military supplies. He might vent his frustrations on the opposition, all the while seeking to portray Russia as victim of the nefarious West. Or he could test the waters with a deniable provocation undertaken by supposedly private Russian citizens, those Mr. Putin once called “coal miners and tractor drivers.” That may be a small way to save face, but it could easily spill out of control. The risk of outright war is enormous.
There is, perhaps, one certainty to hold on to: Mr. Putin will never start a war he’s likely to lose. So the only way to ensure peace is to guarantee that in a military confrontation, Mr. Putin would never win.
Yulia Latynina (@YLatynina) is a journalist for Echo of Moscow and Novaya Gazeta.
4. US tries to name and shame Russian disinformation on Ukraine
Naming and shaming to counter propaganda is a good step. But we must be executing our better narrative to support our superior form of political warfare.
US tries to name and shame Russian disinformation on Ukraine
AP · by NOMAAN MERCHANT · January 28, 2022
WASHINGTON (AP) — In a break from the past, the U.S. and its allies are increasingly revealing their intelligence findings as they confront Russian preparations for invading Ukraine, looking to undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans by exposing them and deflecting his efforts to shape world opinion.
The White House in recent weeks publicized what it said was a developing Russian “false-flag” operation to create pretext for an invasion. Britain named specific Ukrainians it accused of having ties to Russian intelligence officers plotting to overthrow President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The U.S. also released a map of Russian military positions and detailed how officials believe Russia will try to attack Ukraine with as many as 175,000 troops.
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Experts credit the White House for declassifying intelligence and moving to rebut false claims before they’re made — a so-called “prebuttal” that undercuts their effectiveness better than an after-the-fact explanation.
But the release of information isn’t without risks. Intelligence assessments carry varying degrees of certainty, and beyond offering photos of troop movements, the U.S. and its allies have provided little other proof. Moscow has dismissed Washington’s claims as hysteria and invoked past American intelligence failures, including false information put forward about Iraq’s weapons programs.
There are no clear signs of change so far from Russia, which continues to move forces toward Ukraine and into Belarus, an ally to Ukraine’s north. There is growing pessimism in Washington and London about ongoing diplomatic efforts and a belief that Putin will likely mount some sort of invasion in the next several weeks.
Russia is known for using disinformation as a tactic to sow confusion and discord as part of its overall conflict strategy. When Russia invaded Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014, it mounted a campaign to sway ethnic Russian residents of the territory. State media and social media accounts linked to Russia promoted allegations that the West was manipulating protests in Kyiv and false or unconfirmed tales of lurid crimes committed by Ukrainian forces.
This time, the U.S. says, Russia is trying to portray Ukrainian leaders as aggressors and to persuade its own citizens to support military action. At the same time, the U.S. and its allies allege, Russia has positioned operatives in eastern Ukraine who could use explosives to carry out acts of sabotage against Russia’s own proxy forces and then blame Kyiv.
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The White House has repeatedly highlighted what it sees as disinformation and is privately sharing additional intelligence with allies including Ukraine. The State Department recently published a fact sheet listing and rejecting several Russian claims. And the Treasury Department sanctioned four men accused of ties to influence operations intended to set the pretext in Ukraine for a new invasion.
White House press secretary Jen Psaki described a “strategic decision to call out disinformation when we see it.”
“We are much more cognizant of the Russian disinformation machine than we were in 2014,” she said Wednesday, adding, “We need to be very clear with the global community and the U.S. public what they’re trying to do and why.”
Moscow continues to make demands that NATO not accept Ukraine or further expand to any other countries. And after British intelligence accused him of being a possible Russia-backed candidate for president, Ukrainian politician Yevheniy Murayev denied the claim and told the AP that it “looks ridiculous and funny.”
Meanwhile, Washington and Moscow go back and forth online. Kremlin-backed RT.com on Dec. 21 posted a video alleging “US private military companies are amassing CHEMICAL COMPONENTS in Eastern Ukraine.” The State Department rejected that claim in its fact sheet on Russian propaganda. Russia’s Foreign Ministry then responded with tweets “debunking @StateDept ‘facts’ on Russian disinformation on Ukraine.”
Washington’s efforts have raised questions in Kyiv, where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has taken a different public approach of trying to tamp down public fears of an expanded war even as many Ukrainians prepare for possible combat.
Ukrainian officials privately question why the Biden administration is warning about an impending invasion but not imposing preemptive sanctions or taking action against the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which has been criticized for giving Moscow more leverage over Ukraine and Western Europe. The Biden administration lobbied Democrats in Congress to oppose a Republican-sponsored bill that would have required the imposition of sanctions against the pipeline, which has not yet gone into operation.
The White House has threatened tough sanctions if Russia does invade and is preparing to move forces to NATO’s eastern flank in the event of an invasion. The U.S. and Western allies are also sending weapons and missile systems to Ukraine.
Molly McKew, a writer and lecturer on Russian influence, said the administration’s moves to counter Russia’s influence efforts needed to be accompanied by a clearer statement of American goals and plans to repel any invasion.
Publicly identifying Russia’s actions alone will not stop Russia from carrying them out, said McKew, a former adviser to President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia, which fought a war in 2008 with Russia and still is trying to regain control of separatist regions backed by Moscow.
“They’re trying to apply disinformation thinking to military domains,” she said. “You absolutely cannot expose away the crisis.”
In both the U.S. and Ukraine, experts say, there is far more societal awareness now of state-sponsored disinformation. Russia in the past several years has continued to bombard Ukrainians with text messages and false stories during the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine in which at least 14,000 people have died. And Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election led to several investigations and years of often fractious debates.
Bret Schafer, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, said that while there are risks to elevating false claims in the process of debunking them, “there is a need to head off information threats as opposed to responding to them after they’ve been let out into the wild.”
But publicly accusing Russia of misbehavior is ultimately a limited deterrent. “They don’t care about reputational damage,” he said.
___
Associated Press journalists Joshua Boak in Washington and Jan M. Olsen in Copenhagen, Denmark, contributed to this report.
AP · by NOMAAN MERCHANT · January 28, 2022
5. Is Defending Ukraine Vital to U.S. Security?
Is Defending Ukraine Vital to U.S. Security?
As Putin prepares to invade, Washington and its allies still appear undecided on whether Kyiv is worth fighting for.
By Emma Ashford, a senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Matthew Kroenig: Hello, Emma! We took last week off, so I’ve missed our debates. At the time, I thought we might know whether the crisis in Ukraine was going to be resolved peacefully by now, but we are still apparently standing on the precipice of an impending war.
Emma Ashford: Good morning, though not a particularly good week, I’m afraid. As you say, things have changed for the worse since our last column, and we are looking down the barrel of a major war in Europe. It’s not impossible that diplomacy could avert a conflict here, but I think that prospect is growing more distant than it was even a few weeks ago.
MK: I agree. It looks like an invasion is almost inevitable. I suspect we disagree, however, on what is at stake and what to do about it. I think allowing Vladimir Putin’s Russia to take Ukraine by force would be a significant blow to U.S. national security interests and to the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally.
I think the best chance to head it off is additional steps to strengthen deterrence (more arms to Ukraine, more NATO forces on the eastern flank, threats of tougher sanctions, etc.), but, unfortunately, I am afraid the recent, good steps from the Biden administration and NATO might be too little, too late.
But, please, tell me why I am wrong.
EA: You’re not completely wrong! Letting Russia conduct a large-scale invasion of Ukraine—whether to seize territory or simply to force concessions from Kyiv—would be a bad thing for European security. It would certainly be a bad thing for the people of Ukraine, who deserve to live in peace if they wish. And I even think it would be a bad thing for Russia, as it would undoubtedly lead NATO to dial up forces in Eastern Europe, and it would probably result in fairly severe economic penalties.
But it’s not quite as easy to prevent as you suggest, for three reasons: First, increasing the flow of arms to Ukraine is not going to change the military balance enough to deter Russia. And it will become increasingly difficult to infiltrate those arms into the Ukrainian theater after the onset of conflict, particularly in the face of advanced Russian air defenses.
Second, increasing NATO forces on the Eastern flank might help deter Russia from an attack on a NATO member state. But it was never likely that Putin was planning to test NATO’s Article 5 commitment to collective defense, even in the Baltics! And it certainly won’t deter action against Ukraine.
Third, of course, the threat of tougher sanctions is real, but it’s limited. As Russia is one of the world’s largest oil and gas producers, there are real-world limits to how much Russian economic activity Washington can cut off without causing economic crises elsewhere. A shut-off of gas flows to Europe, for example, whether through sanctions or by Russia’s choice, would be deeply damaging to Western economies, forcing Europe to dig into reserves and raising prices around the globe. I suspect that Putin, meanwhile, has already priced more moderate financial sanctions into his calculus.
Some of the sanctions under discussion, like export controls on products made with U.S. technology, could hit hard. This could mean no iPhones in Russia.
MK: I agree that any of these items on their own is insignificant, but in combination they start to add up. Samuel Charap and Scott Boston are right that providing Ukraine with Javelin and Stinger missiles will not be enough to stop a multifront Russian invasion, but they do raise the cost.
Similarly, Putin claims he is going to war to prevent NATO from expanding into his sphere of influence, so presumably he does not like the (still small numbers of) Spanish, Danish, U.S., and other forces possibly moving into Eastern Europe. And some of the sanctions under discussion, like export controls on products made with American technology going into Russia, could hit hard. As James Lewis said, this could mean no iPhones in Russia.
So, yes, Putin strongly desires the reincorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. But if the price is a costly war, greater encirclement from NATO, and real economic pain in Russia, that should at least make him think twice.
EA: Assuming that Russia decides it wants to invade, though, I still don’t see any of these things actually deterring it—not least because they were all predictable before the Kremlin even started building up forces.
But let’s get back to basics for a minute. Is Ukraine really so important to global security that the United States should be defending it? It seems like all the rhetoric from Washington says yes, but the actions say no. If it’s so important, why not defend it in 2014? Or why not make a stronger commitment today? And if you’ve instead made the decision to not send troops to defend it— which President Joe Biden’s statements clearly indicate is the administration’s stance on this crisis—then surely it’s not that important?
MK: That’s a good point. I do think it is important and that Washington could do more if U.S. officials wanted to reliably deter Russia. Biden saying that he changed his mind and all options are on the table, sending U.S. combat forces into Ukraine, and, if things continued to escalate, putting U.S. nuclear forces on high alert would, I suspect, be enough to convince Putin not to go in. But it would be risky, and Biden has clearly decided that he is not willing to run that risk.
EA: Extremely risky! Indeed, the only person I’ve seen directly make this case is the former Defense Department official Evelyn Farkas, who argued that the United States should prepare for war with Russia. But she is effectively alone in that assertion.
MK: So, to directly answer you, it is not a black-and-white issue. It is pretty important to Washington, and Biden is willing to take some significant steps, but it is not important enough for him to risk nuclear war.
During the Cold War, the line was a thousand miles further West. Ukraine wasn’t even a member of the Warsaw Pact.
EA: But why is it so important? Again, not to diminish the lives of Ukrainians, but in the context of U.S. security, Ukraine is not that important. During the Cold War, the line was a thousand miles further West. Ukraine wasn’t even a member of the Warsaw Pact; it was an integral part of the Soviet Union.
MK: Well, Americans and Europeans have been safer over the past 30 years than they were at the height of the Cold War. I don’t think Americans are indifferent to where the line is drawn between the country’s friends and enemies in Europe.
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Even if Russia never invades Ukraine, it is accomplishing one of its major goals in Europe.
U.S. military equipment wouldn’t realistically help Ukrainians—or intimidate Putin.
More importantly, as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken eloquently argued at a speech in Berlin last week, this is about the system and principles the United States and its democratic allies put in place after the end of the Cold War. I don’t think anyone wants to go back to a world in which dictators invade their neighbors and the world stands aside.
Building up forces in NATO’s eastern member states could result in a miscalculation and accidental conflict.
EA: No one wants it, but equally, no one wants to fight a war to prevent it. And let’s remember that even the actions the United States and its allies are taking now carry some risks. Building up forces in NATO’s eastern member states could result in a miscalculation and accidental conflict, or those allies could decide to take military action on their own and suck the United States into a conflict. The Baltic states and Poland are already arming Ukraine, and the Turks have been selling them advanced drones. There is some definite entanglement risk here.
MK: And, yes, I do worry about the precedent and U.S. credibility. The United States withdrew from Afghanistan. If Washington stands aside as Russia takes Ukraine, I do worry about what is next. Why does Putin stop there? Does Iran believe that it can sprint to a nuclear weapon and the United States will not have the stomach to act? Does China’s Xi Jinping believe that the time is right to move on Taiwan? I fear that everything the United States and its democratic allies have built over the past decades may be more fragile than it appears and that everything could come tumbling down pretty quickly.
I’d rather not take that chance. And right now, the central front in that fight is in Ukraine.
EA: Oh, for goodness’ sake. Withdrawing from Afghanistan—a quagmire in which the United States spent trillions of dollars and 20 years without achieving victory—in order to pivot toward great-power competition is somehow supposed to reduce America’s credibility with Russia and China? That doesn’t make any sense.
MK: Let me first briefly answer your question about U.S. commitments; my answer is that Americans should stand behind them all to help adversaries avoid miscalculation. The United States could have stayed in Afghanistan, and getting out, in my view, was a mistake.
EA: I’ll tell you what I think the problem here is: Too many of America’s commitments over the last 30 years weren’t real commitments. Washington overextended itself. U.S. officials offered pretty words to states like Ukraine, but they never planned to actually follow through and defend them. This is a big problem. How do other states tell the difference between real commitments and the ones that are effectively a bluff? I do think the United States has a genuine commitment to defend NATO allies, for example. But Russia might misinterpret that and suck all of NATO into a conflict.
But let’s pivot to China for a second, because I think it’s the elephant in the room here. China’s choices on whether to disavow or support Russia if it does go into Ukraine are going to be critical, and I don’t think enough people are focusing on that. China could, for example, effectively undermine any sanctions regime the United States imposes.
The United States is still a global power, and it will need to develop a strategy, alongside its allies and partners, to deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia.
MK: I do think the emerging strategic tripolarity among the United States, Russia, and China may be the most important security question of our time. Many still believe that somehow the United States can prioritize China and forget about everything else. The past few weeks have shown that Putin has different ideas. The United States is still a global power, and it will need to develop a strategy, alongside its allies and partners, to deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia and China at the same time. It won’t be easy, but it’s necessary.
EA: Or—hear me out—Biden tries to find a way to not fight the other two most powerful countries on the planet at the same time. Look, you’re absolutely right that the last month has shown that the United States cannot simply place Russia in a box and assume that everything will be fine. But that doesn’t suggest to me that it needs to suddenly pivot to a two-front strategy.
Apart from anything else, as Hal Brands pointed out recently, the United States currently has a massive strategic deficit: It has commitments that far outstrip its military capabilities to follow through on them all simultaneously. Only two things will solve that dilemma: either more military spending and buildup—which is relatively unpopular and unlikely—or dialing down some U.S. commitments.
Indeed, the best solution here remains a modified version of the Biden administration’s original approach to Russia: negotiations about strategic stability. The core difference is that these talks now need to consider the big questions about Europe’s security architecture as well as the more specific arms control questions. The Pentagon can build up deterrent forces in Eastern Europe all it wants, but the quicker both sides get to the detente part of this process, the better it will be for the United States, and the faster it will allow U.S. officials to focus on China.
MK: “Big questions about Europe’s security architecture” is a euphemism for giving Russia a sphere of influence and selling out America’s allies in Eastern Europe. So, your “solution” is not a solution. It is exactly what Washington should be trying to avoid.
EA: Let’s talk like adults here, rather than D.C. policy wonks. Large states have more influence and power in the international system than small states. That’s IR 101. “Spheres of influence” are the unpleasant but logical corollary. Large states don’t tolerate threats on their borders. Consider the Cuban missile crisis, for example.
And to be frank, no one is talking about selling out Eastern Europe. What we’re talking about is a mixture of deterrent threats (like sanctions) and potential rewards for good behavior—the carrots and sticks of international diplomacy.
There’s no scenario here in which Putin simply orders the more than 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border to stand down and return to base unilaterally. That means that any attempt to deter Russia from action in Ukraine needs to be matched with a diplomatic effort to resolve at least some of the issues that led to the current crisis, such as conventional arms buildup in Eastern Europe and the future of NATO expansion. To its credit, the administration continues to plug away at the diplomacy angle.
But I do worry that it’s not focusing on the right areas. For example, I think one of the most fruitful potential avenues here is conventional arms control in Europe. It’s an idea with plenty of precedent; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed in the late Soviet period, mandated caps and inspections on tanks, artillery, and other weapons that the superpower blocs could maintain in Europe.
It was quite effective until it collapsed in the mid-2000s under the pressure of NATO expansion and Russian pushback. A similar conventional treaty—unlike the NATO expansion pledge that has been the topic of most discussion—would be practical in a way that might allow it to be implemented.
MK: So there is no scenario in which Putin backs down from the invasion in the face of threats, but he will in exchange for promises, like a conventional arms control deal? That sounds like pure fantasy to me.
Speaking of which, my daughter is asking me to read her “The Three Little Pigs.” I hope that Putin’s threats to blow his neighbor’s house down are ultimately as ineffectual as the Big Bad Wolf’s. Pick this up here next time?
EA: Unless it’s too late for debate by then.
6. Three Things the World Should Know About Putin
Excerpts:
1. The first is that regardless of Russia’s demands for legally binding guarantees from the West on issues such as an end to NATO expansion, there is no guarantee these would stop Russia.
2. The second issue currently being overlooked is that in the event of a military operation against Ukraine and spiraling confrontation with the West, the Russian regime will become more consolidated while society becomes even more repressed than ever before.
3. The third and final factor is that without a radical reshaping of global security architecture (which is not on the horizon), Russia sees Ukraine as a territory that must be returned to Moscow’s geopolitical supervision at any price
Three Things the World Should Know About Putin
The nature of Putin’s Russia has changed drastically in the last few years.
Faced with the grave prospect of a war between Russia and Ukraine, Western media is divided over the question of what Russian President Vladimir Putin wants in Ukraine. Some argue that no one can ever understand Putin’s reasoning and insist on focusing on Russia’s objective interests and the cost and benefits of its foreign policy. Others continue to speculate over Putin’s real intentions and priorities with regard to Ukraine and the West. Despite the complexity and unpredictability of the Kremlin’s reasoning, there are at least three factors currently missing from Western discourse.
The first is that regardless of Russia’s demands for legally binding guarantees from the West on issues such as an end to NATO expansion, there is no guarantee these would stop Russia. No matter what so-called ironclad guarantees the West hypothetically can provide, it will never be enough for the Putin regime. On Dec. 21, 2021, Putin told an extended meeting of Russia’s Defence Ministry Board that even written Western commitments don’t guarantee anything since the West easily withdraws from treaties. This reflects internal discussion within the Russian leadership over whether written commitments might be considered virtually binding.
In the last few years, the nature of Putin’s Russia has changed drastically—along with its self-image. In previous years, Putin acted as the leader of a geopolitically vulnerable state surrounded by more powerful and hostile players. Russia played the part of an aggrieved and oppressed nation seeking geopolitical justice, a hostage of circumstances created and influenced by others. It might occasionally dare to seize the advantage when the West stays out of its affairs, as with the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but it relies on an overtly defensive logic in its moves.
In 2018, that all changed. Intoxicated by Russia’s military success in Syria, its unique role in Central Asia, increased presence in Africa, and, above all, its newly developed “wonder weapons,” Putin switched from feeling like an oppressed player to someone who could go on the offensive far beyond Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. The current demand for, in Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s words, “ironclad, waterproof, bulletproof, legally binding guarantees” no longer stems from geopolitical vulnerability but, on the contrary, from the belief in Russia’s historically justified full-fledged right to rewrite the rules—with or without the West.
There are constant official and unofficial messages from Moscow that the world has changed, the status quo is no longer legitimate, international institutions and rules have been ruined, diplomacy in its traditional meaning does not exist anymore, everyone adapts as they can, and the value of public statements and positions has collapsed.
Russia, itself, has started crossing the red lines of others—via cyberattacks, aggressive media policies, geopolitical raids, and military interventions—regardless of warnings about the resulting damage. Russian foreign policy today has become not only about the West but also about its own geopolitical interests, which often have no direct relation to the West at all. And no security guarantees can change that. In other words, even in the event of a hypothetical deal, Russia cannot and will not guarantee to the West that it will abstain from its own raiding strategy.
Russia has moved, therefore, from a defensive to an offensive foreign policy: a new approach that has proved effective, according to Putin, and will be used more widely. In November 2021, he said, “Our recent warnings have had a certain effect,” and asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to keep Western countries in a state of tension “as long as possible, so that it does not occur to them to stage some kind of conflict on our Western borders, which we do not need.” Having acquired a taste for this offensive strategy, Moscow will be reluctant to abandon efforts that have impacted international affairs more noticeably than any defensive moves.
All of this has coincided with the siloviki, or security agencies, gradually starting to play a far more significant role in decision-making since 2014, both in domestic and foreign affairs. There are important ideological differences in how diplomats and the siloviki approach possible Russian-U.S. cooperation. While diplomats see the United States and Russia as great powers with historic responsibilities, the siloviki consider both countries to be gamblers that regularly violate international law and act outside the rules. For them, might is right. That is why the spiraling confrontation and sanctions do not scare the siloviki but, on the contrary, open up more opportunities for them.
The siloviki remain the main source of Putin’s distrust of the United States and the West in general, but they also convince the president that the worst-case scenario may be to coerce the West to deal with Russia more pragmatically, developing closer ties among the security agencies and making relations more sober and less ideological (meaning no more lectures about democracy). Plus, considering the importance of cybersecurity to Biden’s administration, Moscow believes it now has the argument that will coerce Washington to cooperation. Draconian sanctions combined with sporadic but fruitful interactions in areas of bilateral interest appear to be the most comfortable state of affairs for this part of the Russian elite that is today the most dominant.
The second issue currently being overlooked is that in the event of a military operation against Ukraine and spiraling confrontation with the West, the Russian regime will become more consolidated while society becomes even more repressed than ever before. War will not provoke protests, create more opposition, or weaken the regime—at least in the medium term.
There are, roughly speaking, two main groups within the Russian elite. The first consists of conservative decision-makers, including the siloviki, who are prepared to bear any costs of the new confrontation—and would even benefit from it. They dominate the agenda, fuel Putin’s anxieties, and provoke and escalate tension. The second group is made up of the technocrats who dominate the government but have no remit to interfere in security matters or raise concerns over geopolitics. They are tasked with adapting the economy and financial system to any geopolitical shocks.
There is also the business elite (excluding Putin’s close friends, who are ideologically often even more hawkish than the siloviki), who were ousted from political decision-making many years ago and are now deprived of the right to talk geopolitics with authorities. Their best strategy, in the event of escalation, is total invisibility and silence to avoid any clashes with the authorities that could provoke doubts about their loyalty or patriotism.
As for society, Russians are mostly focused on social problems and have shown themselves to be weary of geopolitics. They will not protest if war breaks out: In a recent poll, 50 percent of Russians blamed the United States and NATO for the escalation at the Russia-Ukraine border, whereas just 4 percent said responsibility lay with their own country. Russian society is politically depressed, and the potential for protest remains relatively low. Any opposition that could have headed possible discontent has been completely destroyed, and the fear of war has been routinized.
In addition, the regime itself has become more repressive and intolerant, and geopolitical escalation can only aggravate it further. Make no mistake: In a worst-case scenario, the Kremlin will tighten the screws even further, increase political control, and suppress the opposition, even the mostly tame “in-system” opposition. It has all the resources and instruments to do so and faces no internal resistance. Sanctions, which will drastically increase the cost of a military operation, may only have a distant impact on the political arena, even if they indirectly exacerbate socioeconomic conditions.
The third and final factor is that without a radical reshaping of global security architecture (which is not on the horizon), Russia sees Ukraine as a territory that must be returned to Moscow’s geopolitical supervision at any price. Right now, the Kremlin aims to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, but that demand does not address the core problem of Russia’s intentions toward Ukraine: shaping its political future and sidelining all but those Ukrainian players who are acceptable to the Kremlin.
The Russian ruling elite’s deeply engrained idea of bankrupted Ukrainian elites, a failed state, and geopolitical impotence create an expectation among them of inevitable upheaval associated with the threat of territorial collapse and internal skirmishes. Long before the current escalation, Moscow had been preparing for Ukraine failing as a state, with some Russian conservatives eager to assist that process. Whether or not a military offensive takes place, the Kremlin envisages domestic chaos within a few years that would open the door for Russia to directly intervene in Ukraine’s territory. This is simply a matter of time, and no security guarantees can stop that.
None of this means that dialogue is doomed to fail at preventing Russia from carrying out its raiding strategy. It may win time (which would play against Putin’s regime), slow down its hawkish intentions, and thus give society more time to wake up. It would also make hard-line policy more questionable and divisive—and less pragmatic. Even if it is only a question of time, when the world is staring down the barrel of a worst-ever Russia, continuing dialogue means there is at least a chance that when it comes to new escalation, Russia will be more incoherent and self-confident than today.
7. It Might Not Be Too Late to Deter Putin
Conclusion:
The United States is right to return to the Cold War strategy of deterrence. But it should also employ the strategy of linkage—the idea of matching strength for strength. This is language Putin understands. For 44 years, the United States protected Europe from Russian (Soviet) aggression using both strategies together. It can again.
It Might Not Be Too Late to Deter Putin - The Bulwark
Defensive military deployments on NATO’s eastern flank could change the Russian autocrat’s mind about invading Ukraine.
There are innumerable causes of the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which threatens to escalate dramatically as Russia amasses over 100,000 troops on the border. They range from claims based on events that took place centuries ago to the consequences of more recent decisions, but key to the context is this: The United States and NATO are living up to their commitments; Russia is not.
In December, Russia demanded not only that NATO drop its promise to expand to Ukraine (something that NATO has repeatedly declined to implement, much to Ukraine’s chagrin), but also that NATO withdraw all military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance after May 1997. Those member states include Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which all joined NATO after 1997 and border Russia.
But there is no substantial and permanent NATO infrastructure in these states. In Article IV of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997, the alliance unilaterally pledged, “in the current and foreseeable security environment,” not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” on the territory of new members in Eastern Europe.
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NATO has kept its pledge. After Russian forces seized Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO members responded by rotating American and other member-state forces through Poland and the Baltic states, thereby deterring Russian aggression against the alliance, while abiding by the 1997 agreement and not stationing them there permanently. By contrast, Russia refuses to carry out its obligations under other agreements: It announced it was pulling out of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in 2007, and no longer abides by the Vienna Document, an OSCE agreement that requires signatories to allow inspections of and provide information about large troop movements and exercises. Dismissing NATO’s longstanding pledge not to establish permanent bases in Eastern Europe, Russia claims NATO has destabilized the security environment there by taking in new members—even though Russia signed several agreements recognizing each state’s right to choose its own alliances.
Putin sees Article IV of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the West’s failure to punish Russia for violating arms control agreements, as a green light for the dangerous moves we’re seeing now. NATO’s refusal to station more forces in Eastern Europe weakens the concept of integrated and equal security on which the alliance is based and has the effect of making Poland and the Baltic states second-class members, to which Putin is quite amenable. His long game is to evict the United States from Europe, and preventing moves to the east is an important step.
Contrary to what the Kremlin claims (and what some in Europe and North America insist), it is not NATO but Russia’s breathtaking military buildup that has destabilized the region. As a result, the “current and foreseeable” security situation of 1997 no longer exists. The United States should respond to Russia’s destabilization by deploying defensive infrastructure, particularly air defenses, to its eastern flank, now—not after Russia starts a new offensive. The United States cannot change Putin’s calculations with threatening rhetoric. Only deeds—especially defensive military moves—can do that. Defensive installations, like Patriot anti-aircraft missile batteries, would be welcomed by NATO members in Eastern Europe; Poland even requested more forces when the Russian buildup began in November. The alliance has not responded with the kind of substantial forces needed, presumably in part because of Article IV of the Founding Act.
The Biden administration deserves high marks for refusing to negotiate away the right of Ukraine to choose its own security arrangements, and for putting 8,500 U.S. troops on high alert and uniting the transatlantic community behind a set of punitive sanctions in case Russia renews its invasion of Ukraine.
But the approach has two flaws: It tries to substitute economic power for military power, and it is too reactive. The moves the United States and its allies are contemplating are mostly economic, but the threat of sanctions will not deter Russia, which already has the means to counter them. Because of rising oil prices, Russia’s war chest, its sovereign wealth fund, has tripled in value to nearly $200 billion—money that could be used to blunt the cost of sanctions to the Russian economy. The possibility of a clash with all of NATO—whose combined economic and military strength is far greater than Russia’s—has a better chance of successfully deterring Putin from giving the order to invade.
The time to establish deterrence is before the new offensive, not after. The American and allied response should not be conditioned on a Russian offensive, but should respond to the massing of troops. Failure to meet the threat is an invitation to future aggression. Ideally, any moves into Poland and the Baltics should be done by NATO rapid response forces. But it is highly unlikely that Germany and others would agree to that before an invasion. So it would be up to the United States to move defensive forces into the alliance’s front-line states now, and make it clear they will be withdrawn if and only if Russia’s troops and materiel return to their bases of origin. Such a move would not only emphasize that NATO is as committed to the defense of its east as it is to its west, but would also give the alliance something concrete to negotiate with—we withdraw if you withdraw.
The United States is right to return to the Cold War strategy of deterrence. But it should also employ the strategy of linkage—the idea of matching strength for strength. This is language Putin understands. For 44 years, the United States protected Europe from Russian (Soviet) aggression using both strategies together. It can again.
8. Opinion | ‘Web3’ is on the way. Authoritarians should be worried.
Interesting and hopeful analysis.
Excerpts:
Thankfully, we are on the cusp of “Web3,” a next-generation Internet that could shift the balance back toward individuals. If the United States embraces Web3, it could also offer a pivotal advantage in its ongoing competition with authoritarian states, especially China.
What is Web3? To understand, it helps to go back to the beginning.
Opinion | ‘Web3’ is on the way. Authoritarians should be worried.
The Washington Post · by Anthony Vinci and Nadia Schadlow Today at 8:00 a.m. EST · January 26, 2022
Anthony Vinci is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Nadia Schadlow is a fellow at the Hudson Institute and at the Hoover Institution; she served as deputy national security adviser for strategy in 2018 in the Trump administration.
The Internet once held great promise as a means of empowering individuals, but it has become yet another path of control for bad actors. Today, authoritarian governments and companies around the world track and surveil individuals; data is not private and is sold for profit; some states algorithmically “score” their citizens; and propaganda and disinformation are rampant.
Thankfully, we are on the cusp of “Web3,” a next-generation Internet that could shift the balance back toward individuals. If the United States embraces Web3, it could also offer a pivotal advantage in its ongoing competition with authoritarian states, especially China.
What is Web3? To understand, it helps to go back to the beginning.
Think of Web1 as the original one-way Web pages of the 1990s — static sites coupled with the dawn of widespread email. Web2 came to life as the Internet became interactive, allowing users to log in and create their own content. At the same time, Google, Facebook and other massive tech platforms hosted “free” services in exchange for our data. Over subsequent decades, of course, the Internet has continued to advance and grow more sophisticated, but we mostly still operate in a Web2 world.
Now, we are closing in on a new version of the Internet — Web3 — built on the blockchain, a technology that makes it possible to transact data securely, and smart contracts, which allow users to make agreements without relying on intermediaries — it’s what permits you to pay a vendor directly using cryptocurrency, no bank required. Web3 is still being developed and defined, but it’s clear that, fundamentally, it will offer a more decentralized version of the Internet.
Web3 is in its heady early days. New companies are forming daily to remove central platforms and bring decentralized, more secure services to users globally. Some focus on video-sharing services with no central repository — in contrast with YouTube or TikTok. Others are creating decentralized shared-storage options, unlike centralized cloud services.
These new services address many of the biggest problems of today’s Internet. Security is improved because there is no central database to hack. Privacy is protected because users directly control their data. Resiliency is built into Web3 through decentralization.
And this decentralization makes control by authoritarian governments much more difficult.
In 1999, it would have been hard to believe that one day teenagers would become millionaires by making videos of themselves playing video games or that political revolutions would be fomented on a website designed to share photos of college students.
Web3 could turn out to be equally revolutionary by shifting power back to individual users — which would be good for democracy and for the United States, for two reasons:
First, authoritarian states cannot abide private life because that’s where anti-governmental activities can percolate. China and Russia have already set up mechanisms to spy on and control the existing Web2 infrastructure through firewalls, censorship and coercion of technology platforms. Web3 would make such authoritarian controls much more difficult.
Second, although the United States still dominates Web2 in many ways, the Web’s current framework allows China to sweep up swaths of data to power its political and military artificial intelligence systems. The decentralization and personal data control of Web3 would make it much harder for China to maintain data dominance.
Web3 will, of course, be disruptive for good actors as well. Law enforcement will confront websites for which there are no “take down” notices and no corporate CEOs to enforce regulations. Intelligence agencies will need to find new ways to monitor terrorists. Seemingly invincible technology companies could go the way of Blockbuster. Nonetheless, the United States should not fear the rise of Web3 — it should adapt to, invest in and promote it.
Geopolitics is about relative power and relative gains. Conceptually, Web3 is innately more beneficial to Western liberal democracies, which value democracy and personal privacy. This would return the advantage to the West and force China and other authoritarian states to confront their weaknesses, change them or fall behind.
The Washington Post · by Anthony Vinci and Nadia Schadlow Today at 8:00 a.m. EST · January 26, 2022
9. Afghan evacuation flights to resume with streamlined process
Afghan evacuation flights to resume with streamlined process
After a nearly two-month pause, evacuation flights from Afghanistan to Qatar are set to resume, Shawn Van Driver, founder of #AfghanEvac, told Military Times. Additionally, Van Driver said that measures to shorten the visa process are being implemented, potentially trimming a years-long process down to months.
“We are glad that it looks like we might be able to be restarting that,” Van Driver said in a phone interview. “And hopefully, we can have a reliable, repeatable process that continues to evacuate folks.”
According to Phil Caruso, Chairman of No One Left Behind, official evacuation flights carrying Afghans who worked with the U.S. to Qatar stopped in early December. Caruso and other members of the organization told Military Times that the cessation was caused by a rift between the Qatari and the new rulers of Afghanistan over Taliban migrant workers seeking entry to Qatar. The Taliban sought space for these workers on flights carrying evacuees to Qatar, a concession the Qatari government resisted.
During the pause in U.S. government-sponsored evacuations, Project DYNAMO, a non-profit dedicated to bringing Americans and Afghan allies stranded in Afghanistan to safety, ferried 70 people to safety via two flights out of Kabul. According to a press release, Project DYNAMO executed its most recent evacuation on Jan. 24 without assistance from the Department of State, instead relying on its network of contacts and donors to accomplish its mission.
While the State Department has yet to respond to a request for comment about the resumption of evacuation flights and visa processing, Van Driver said that reducing the processing time for applicants to months is a significant step.
“[That process] is down from one to three years,” Van Driver said about the reduction from years to months. “That’s a really big deal. It represents something that is really, really meaningful.”
No One Left Behind is one of more than 150 “self-activated” working under the #AfghanEvac coalition umbrella. Many groups formed organically and worked independently during the Afghan withdrawal but have joined together to continue to evacuate U.S. citizens, allies, and Afghans who worked with the U.S. during its 20 years of war in Afghanistan. These organizations helped facilitate the evacuation of some 130,000 Afghans during the final weeks of U.S. involvement in the country.
While a significant accomplishment, Van Driver, said there’s more work to be done.
“It’s not nothing that the U.S. government got out of 130,000 people 18 days,” Van Driver said. But the work is super ongoing.”
According to the Department of Homeland Security, more than 75,000 Afghans have arrived in the U.S. through “Operation Allies Welcome.” More than 52,000 of these Afghans have been resettled in communities throughout the U.S. The remaining 22,500 are still at military bases throughout the U.S. According to Axios, an additional 2,500 await admission into the U.S. at facilities overseas.
However, No One Left Behind is tracking as many as 200,000 Afghans who still need a flight out of Afghanistan. According to No One Left Behind, this number includes members of the former Afghan National Army, Afghan Special Operations Forces, and members of the Afghan intelligence services who did not initially qualify for the Special Immigrant Visa program.
“You got 76,000 SIV numbers alone. You know, you’ve probably got two or 3 times that of all those other buckets of people and their family members,” Caruso said. “I mean, it’s hundreds of thousands of people.”
Those Afghans still looking for a ticket out of Afghanistan, says Van Driver, face numerous challenges in addition to their security. Winter in Afghanistan is in full swing while the “new” Taliban struggles to govern. Aside from any association with the former Afghan government and the U.S., food, and fuel shortages make daily life exceedingly difficult for those in Afghanistan.
Farhad, a translator who worked alongside U.S. forces for years, is one such Afghan facing difficulty finding a way out of the country. In an interview from Afghanisan, he told Military Times that he applied for a visa in July, 2021, and is still waiting. Complicating matters, according to Farhad, is the Taliban’s suspension of passport services in Kabul. Without a passport or a case number, Farhad’s situation is increasingly dire.
“6 months I am jobless,” Farhad told Military Times. “And my 8 member family needs support now.”
However, says Van Driver, the impending resumption of evacuation flights, combined with a streamlined immigration process into the U.S., lends hope.
“The good news is that SIV processing is being streamlined and like they’re doing like 500 approvals a week,” Van Driver said. “And [applicants] are getting through the big barriers.”
According to Axios, the U.S. government ultimately aims to evacuate some 2,000 Afghans a month once flights fully resume. Van Driver says this will eventually help those such as former members of the ANA, which he says is a vital bookend on U.S. commitment to the people of Afghanistan.
“We want to focus on making sure that we’re meeting our commitments to all the Afghans that we served with over the years,” Van Driver said. “Anybody who worked in the national security space have a special connection to both Iraqis and Afghans. So, we just want to make sure we meet that commitment.”
James R. Webb is a rapid response reporter for Military Times. He served as a US Marine infantryman in Iraq. Additionally, he has worked as a Legislative Assistant in the US Senate and as an embedded photographer in Afghanistan.
10. 'We don't want wars': Russia sends less hawkish message on Ukraine
To get our hopes up? Of course that is a message we should expect to hear from the Foeign Minister.
'We don't want wars': Russia sends less hawkish message on Ukraine
1/2
Service members of the 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces take part in coastal defence drills in the Odessa region, Ukraine, in this handout picture released January 28, 2022. Ukrainian Defence Ministry/Handout via REUTERS
- Summary
- Lavrov says no war "if it depends on Russia"
- U.S. security proposals better than NATO ones, he says
- He expects more talks with Blinken in next couple of weeks
MOSCOW, Jan 28 (Reuters) - Russia on Friday sent its strongest signal so far that it is willing to engage with U.S. security proposals and reiterated that it does not want war over Ukraine.
"If it depends on Russia, then there will be no war. We don't want wars. But we also won't allow our interests to be rudely trampled, to be ignored," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Russian radio stations in an interview.
Russia has massed tens of thousands of troops near the Ukrainian border as it presses demands for a redrawing of post-Cold War security arrangements in Europe.
The United States and its allies have warned President Vladimir Putin that Russia will face swift and tough economic sanctions if he attacks Ukraine.
Lavrov said the West was ignoring Russia's interests but there was at least "something" in written responses submitted by the United States and NATO on Wednesday to Russia's proposals.
While the responses have not been made public, both have stated they are willing to engage with Moscow on arms control and confidence-building measures. They have ruled out acceding to other demands, including that Ukraine must never be allowed to join NATO.
Lavrov said he expected to meet U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken again in the next couple of weeks.
He said, without giving details, that the U.S. counter-proposals were better than NATO's. Russia was studying them and Putin would decide how to respond.
The comments were among the most conciliatory that Moscow has made on the Ukraine crisis, which has escalated into one of the tensest East-West standoffs since the Cold War ended three decades ago.
Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Russia said on Friday his country had absolutely no interest in a war and that conflict would break out only if Belarus or Russia were directly attacked.
French President Emmanuel Macron was due to speak by phone with Putin on Friday.
"It is up to Vladimir Putin to say if he wants consultations or confrontation," French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told RTL radio, asking whether the Russian leader wanted to be a "destabilising power" or would seek de-escalation.
The Kremlin said it did not rule out that Putin would provide some Russian assessments of the Western response to its proposals during the conversation.
Additional reporting by Reuters bureaux, Writing by Mark Trevelyan, Editing by Timothy Heritage
11. The Ghosts of Kyiv and the Shadow of War
Let us not forget the importance of the human domain.
The Ghosts of Kyiv and the Shadow of War - The Bulwark
Reflections on the spirit of Ukraine’s capital, as worries of a Russian invasion grow.
In the last years of his life, my father would frequently toast his friends with the phrase, “Glory to Ukraine!” “Glory to the heroes!” their traditional reply went.
This call-and-response used to be strongly associated with nationalists and Nazi collaborators, and before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, my father wouldn’t have been caught dead saying it. A Kyiv-born former Soviet officer, he disdained nationalists and referred to them dismissively as “Banderites,” i.e. followers of the militant Stepan Bandera.
War with Russia changed my father’s mind, and the minds of many Ukrainians. When my Russia-born mother criticized him for using the chant, he would become visibly upset. “I don’t care about what happened decades ago, I care about what’s happening right now,” he told her during one of their frequent clashes over politics.
Formerly divisive, the chant was uniting Ukrainians—especially because it so upset Russians. Similar things were happening with the Ukrainian language. Both my father and I—it must be said that the man raised me in his image—would catch ourselves speaking Ukrainian to people if we knew that it would piss them off.
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On the other hand, vehemently Ukrainian-speaking friends and relatives were changing, too. “Natalia will speak whatever language she wants in my house! Because she is one of us!” My uncle Taras, the father of my beloved cousin and a transplant from western Ukraine to Kyiv, snapped at his dinner guests when they tried to criticize me for using Russian.
My uncle had become sensitive to Russian accusations of Ukrainian militancy—and he had come to admire me when my personal loyalties to Ukraine, the country of my birth, had cost me two jobs in a row in Moscow.
Today, my father and my uncle are both dead, my father gone last spring and my uncle this terrible winter, and Russian president Vladimir Putin is massing more and more troops on the Ukrainian border. Long an American, I am shielded from this naked aggression—my friends and family not so much. Family group chats have become conversations on bomb shelters, evacuation routes, how far Putin might go, who will go and who will stay if the worst happens, and what kind of non-perishable goods are best to stock.
It makes me feel almost glad that my father picked the right time to die. Yet when I think about him, and all that he stood for, this sense of relief withers inside me. “He would want me to do something,” I think.
What I do best is telling stories. Kyiv has many of them. It’s an ancient city, long coveted by Moscow due to its historic status and significance. But for millions of us, it’s just a place we love. I was born in Kyiv, and although I grew up in North Carolina, I’ve come back frequently as an adult, particularly whenever I’ve needed to lick my wounds, when a job ended or a relationship soured. The echoes in the courtyards, the crows perching on the poplars, the moody folk songs sung at dinnertime, even the persistent bickering of family members have worked like a healing spell for me. The air is thick with ghosts in Kyiv, and one’s personal pain tends to get lost among them.
Akhmatova also wrote of the way the stars look in Kyiv, reaching needles of diamond light up to God. “And with me only you / My equal, and my love,” she finished the poem.
I’ve quoted Akhmatova’s poem to several men in my life—being my father’s daughter, I’ve always been of the opinion that love comes and goes, and that it’s okay to be corny and sincere in its presence—but looking back on it, I think that most of all, Kyiv inspires a profound sense of solitude. Not loneliness, which is very different, but inward contemplation. Maybe it’s the heavy sedimental layers of history. Or the competing ideologies that are forever clashing there, transforming one another in the process. I prefer to ascribe it to Kyiv’s peculiar magic, the sense of time slowing down, pooling thickly around your ankles as you stand in the caves by the river, or sit nursing a beer, watching the dark gather outside.
Having said that, the city of my birth is also one where you stop taking yourself very seriously. Trapped in one of Kyiv’s notorious traffic jams once, I got out of my taxi and began the process of climbing a roadside fence, as I was late for a meeting and needed to cut across. It was so cold that the air shimmered, and my mother’s vintage fur coat was heavy on my shoulders. Instantly, a man materialized out of nowhere to boost me.
“Young woman, this better be important!” He grunted under my weight. “Or are you late for a manicure?”
“I am a journalist!” I squealed as I clambered up.
“So journalists don’t get manicures?”
“I wouldn’t be climbing here if it was just a manicure!”
“Who knows, young woman, who knows.” Up over the fence I went, crashing down on the other side, narrowly missing an old woman who had leaned a bunch of old paintings against the fence, antiques she was trying to sell. She called me crazy. I bowed apologetically, and promptly stepped into some dog shit, which is rarely cleaned up in the Ukrainian capital, almost as if it is designed to bring you down a notch when you are busy and important. The old woman laughed. I scampered on. It was just another day in Kyiv.
When recounting that story, I am sometimes asked if the man, the old woman, and myself spoke Russian or Ukrainian. The truth is, I don’t remember, and it doesn’t matter. Most Kyivans switch easily between the two languages, and we rarely notice ourselves doing it. Russian propaganda would have you believe that we are all bloodthirsty russophobes, but propagandists are paid to tell lies.
The best time to be in Kyiv is at sunrise, when the light begins climbing over the city’s many hills. I’ve greeted the dawn in the city in many places—on the river, in a graveyard, on a roof. The city’s ghosts don’t leave with the sun but become gossamer and benign, absorbing the light reflected by the weighty golden domes of the many churches. Today, my family members visit those houses of worship frequently, praying for deliverance.
Experts are paid to tell you what is going to happen—particularly when a war heats up. The truth is, sometimes, it’s important to say, “I don’t know.”
What I do know is that on the nights I’ve come home at a reasonable hour, my parents often left a candle burning for me in my window in Kyiv, a flicker to welcome me back. I like to think that I carry that light inside me now, and that it can’t be extinguished. Сome friend or foe, some candles keep burning, some truths are inevitable. With the prospect of annihilation, I like to close my eyes and think back to seeing that light, and the only words that come to me then are the words of my father. Glory to Ukraine, he whispers in my ear. Glory to the heroes.
12. Report to Congress on Great Power Competition
Will the next report say "strategic competition?"
Appendix E is a useful reference list for researchers. (Appendix E. Articles on Russian and Chinese Irregular, Hybrid, and Gray-Zone Warfare)
Report to Congress on Great Power Competition - USNI News
The following is the Jan. 25, 2021 report, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress.
From the report
The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the following, all of which relate to China and/or Russia:
- grand strategy and the geopolitics of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
- organizational changes within DOD;
- nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
- the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments;
- U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
- U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
- new U.S. military service operational concepts;
- capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
- maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
- innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
- mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
- supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
- capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to the emergence of great power competition with China and Russia, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.
Download the document here.
Related
13. AEI Panel Warns Against Tying National Security Strategy to Domestic Priorities
Excerpt:
“If we do not lead in setting the rules of the road, others will,” said Lettow. This comment echoed recent ones from retired Army Gen. Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, the former top commander in Europe and Korea, on how China, Iran and North Korea are monitoring the U.S. response to the Ukrainian crisis.
AEI Panel Warns Against Tying National Security Strategy to Domestic Priorities - USNI News
Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning underway. PLAN Photo
Tying a new national security strategy focused on China and Russia to domestic priorities can become complicated when handling issues like arms control, a top security analyst said Wednesday.
Speaking Wednesday in an online forum at the American Enterprise Institute, Gabriel Scheinmann, executive director of the Alexander Hamilton Society, said that cooperating with a nation like China on climate while competing with it in other areas is “where the tradeoff becomes a problem.” He said no strategy should ignore “all the other things they’ve been rocking the boat on,” like the South China Sea.
Scheinmann said, “it’s hard to separate out these spheres [foreign and domestic] neatly” in developing a strategy.
Paul Lettow, former senior director for strategic planning at the White House National Security Council, added he doesn’t “think the current leadership of the [People’s Republic of China] sees competition and cooperation in the same way as the Biden administration does.”
Beijing has “not been particularly helpful” in addressing key domestic issues for the Biden administration, including climate change and the response to COVID-19 and, in negotiating arms control issues with Russia, he said
In his opening remarks, Lettow asked rhetorically, “what is the purpose of foreign policy [but] protecting American security” with clear definitions for the long term of “what is it we’re trying to defend here.”
He noted his concerns that the administration may be holding back the release of the strategy due to recent tensions with Russia, which is massing troops on its border with Ukraine.
The administration is expected to release its new strategy next month.
“A general principle [is] if you hold your [National Security Strategy] … by definition you’re doing it wrong.” Lettow said it has been clear for a long time that Russian leadership under President Vladimir Putin has been a “destabilizing force” in Europe.
The strategy should say “who your threats are and set a long-term policy.”
Scheinmann said the release of interim guidance in March of 2021 laid out a number of things the administration would not do – counterinsurgency operations, military involvement in the Middle East and extending the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia.
But a key point in the guidance of not sending troops forward in a crisis has already been altered with the movement of 8,500 U.S. soldiers into eastern Europe in response to Russia’s build-up of forces and continuing threats to Ukraine, he added.
Both Scheinmann and Lettow worked on a newly-released Forum for American Leadership report on “priorities and elements necessary for the NSS to meet the severe and intensifying challenges to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty.”
“If we do not lead in setting the rules of the road, others will,” said Lettow. This comment echoed recent ones from retired Army Gen. Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, the former top commander in Europe and Korea, on how China, Iran and North Korea are monitoring the U.S. response to the Ukrainian crisis.
Related
14. Vast Troves of Classified Info Undermine National Security, Spy Chief Says
"Significant public interest." How to define it? Recognize it? Does it require the Justice Potter Stewart test?
Excerpt:
Ongoing declassification review efforts are focused on identifying topics that hold significant public interest, the intelligence official said.
Vast Troves of Classified Info Undermine National Security, Spy Chief Says
Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, says current classification system strains intelligence agencies and erodes public trust
“It is my view that deficiencies in the current classification system undermine our national security, as well as critical democratic objectives, by impeding our ability to share information in a timely manner” with allies, policy makers and the public, Ms. Haines wrote in a letter earlier this month to Sens. Ron Wyden (D., Ore.) and Jerry Moran (R., Kan.), which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.
The letter was in response to an October request for information from the senators, who have pushed for overhauls of the declassification system to assist federal agencies struggling to process a large volume of secret information that is no longer sensitive, such as backlogged historical records Congress has said must be released. Messrs. Wyden and Moran have said classification costs taxpayers about $18.5 billion annually.
It is not publicly known how much information is classified by the government, but watchdogs and open-government activists believe such a trove is likely to include billions of records and is rapidly expanding, in part because of the explosion of digital communications.
Such secrecy, Ms. Haines wrote, “reduces the intelligence community’s (IC) capacity to effectively support senior policy maker decision-making, and further erodes the basic trust that our citizens have in their government. It is a fundamentally important issue that we must address.”
Despite numerous reviews looking at problems with classification, Ms. Haines said current efforts to address the exponential growth of classified material “are simply not sufficient.”
Government transparency advocates have argued for decades that the classification regime among intelligence agencies is overly restrictive and prevents the public from knowing what the U.S. government is doing on a range of security issues, such as drone strikes in foreign countries, surveillance practices at home and abroad, and offensive cyber operations.
Often unflattering information—such as civilian deaths from drone strikes—only comes to light after Freedom of Information lawsuits from media organizations, or if an official risks years of jail time by leaking classified material. U.S. national security officials, while acknowledging some shortcomings, have historically defended expansive classification practices as necessary to their core intelligence collection missions.
“Some of the most consequential decisions our government makes are related to national security,” said Alex Abdo, a lawyer with the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, which advocates for more government transparency.
“‘Some of the most consequential decisions our government makes are related to national security.’”
— Alex Abdo, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University.
Ms. Haines, 52 years old, is the first woman director of national intelligence, a job that oversees 18 intelligence agencies and units, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, which employ hundreds of thousands of federal workers and contractors.
She has previously expressed concerns about the classification system in intelligence agencies, but never before as starkly or substantively. In a book chapter published last year, but written before she became the nation’s intelligence chief, Ms. Haines identified overclassification as a problem in part because “it actually encourages leaking.”
In her letter, Ms. Haines included two declassified efforts under way at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Department of State to address the intelligence community’s classification issues, both of which involve efforts to modernize and digitize records to make them easier to search and identify in order to more quickly release material to the public.
“Director Haines clearly recognizes that the current broken classification system harms U.S. national security while eroding the public’s trust in government,” Messrs. Wyden and Moran said in a joint statement. The senators said Ms. Haines had offered to work with them on overhauls, and that they had asked her to coordinate with the White House on potential updates to the presidential executive orders governing the classification system.
An aide to Mr. Wyden said additional examples of efforts to improve declassification work included in Ms. Haines’s letter were shared with Messrs. Wyden and Moran but marked “for official use only,” a government designation assigned to documents that, while not technically a classification level, limits the public’s access to them.
A senior intelligence official said those examples were downgraded to that level to enable wider circulation in Congress, but because they include information about pending budgetary decisions, they couldn’t be made public.
Ongoing declassification review efforts are focused on identifying topics that hold significant public interest, the intelligence official said.
About four million people have some level of security clearance in the U.S., including about one million contractors, according to recent federal estimates. The number has fluctuated but drawn bipartisan scrutiny in Congress for years amid worries of insider threats—employees who steal classified national security information and disclose it to a foreign power or to the public.
Mr. Abdo said the Biden administration had taken encouraging steps over the past year to be more transparent, including the declassification of an intelligence report on the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi—which had been written during the Trump administration but never released—and the decision by Mr. Biden not to assert executive privilege over documents from the Trump White House related to the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. But Mr. Abdo said he was still skeptical about the Biden administration’s overall commitment to overhauling the classification regime.
“People lose their jobs or get prosecuted if they release information that they shouldn’t, but they face no consequences for failing to disclose something the public needs to know,” Mr. Abdo said. “Unsurprisingly, that has bred a culture of secrecy in government.”
The Biden administration has declassified an intelligence report on the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi that wasn’t released by the Trump administration.
Photo: yasin akgul/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Battles over classification have recently centered on former officials attempting to publish books about their time in government that are subjected to a process known as pre-publication review. Typically, government employees and contractors with access to classified information must submit any published works—even works of fiction—to their agency for reviews.
Some former Trump administration officials have sought to publish books about their encounters with the former president, including former Defense Secretary Mark Esper, who sued the Pentagon in November for redacting portions of his manuscript.
Lawyers in a separate case—including Mr. Abdo of the Knight First Amendment Institute—that involves several former intelligence officials who have sought to publish writings on their government service have appealed to the Supreme Court after losing in lower courts. Their lawsuit argues that the pre-publication review is overly restrictive and violates freedom-of-speech protections. The government has countered that the reviews don’t violate the First Amendment and are necessary to protect national security.
15. A war in Ukraine could have global consequences
So will a war in Taiwan.
So will a war in Iran.
So will a war in north Korea.
A war in Ukraine could have global consequences
Human suffering, economic shock and a geopolitical realignment
Jan 29th 2022
SELDOM IN THE field of human conflict did so much hang on the whims of one man. Is Vladimir Putin about to invade Ukraine, as the massing Russian troops on its borders suggest? Or is he bluffing, to extort concessions from his neighbour and the West? No one can be sure of Mr Putin’s intentions. Even his own foreign minister seems to be kept guessing. But, if fighting is about to break out, the world needs to understand the stakes.
Perhaps Mr Putin is planning a full-scale invasion, with Russian forces thrusting deep into Ukraine to seize the capital, Kyiv, and overthrow the government. Or he may seek to annex more territory in eastern Ukraine, carving out a corridor linking Russia with Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula Mr Putin grabbed in 2014. Then again, he may want a small war, in which Russia “saves” Kremlin-backed separatists in Donbas, an eastern region of Ukraine, from supposed Ukrainian atrocities—and, at the same time, degrades Ukraine’s armed forces.
Because Mr Putin has the initiative, it is easy to conclude he has the advantage. In fact he faces perilous choices. A big war entails extraordinary risks. But a smaller war that limits these risks may fail to halt Ukraine’s Westward drift. And if a small war does not bring the capitulation of the government in Kyiv, Mr Putin may ineluctably be drawn into a larger one.
A full Russian invasion would be Europe’s biggest war since the 1940s, and the first toppling since then of a democratically elected European government by a foreign invader. Russians would not only suffer casualties, especially during a long-running insurgency, but also cause the death of untold Ukrainians—fellow Slavs, with whom many have family ties.
Russia would also suffer heavy sanctions. Its banks would be harshly penalised and its economy deprived of crucial American high-tech components. The ultra-rich, including possibly Mr Putin himself, might be prevented from spending and saving abroad. Ordinary Russians would suffer from lower living standards, which have already been falling over the past seven years.
And the subjugation of Ukraine would come at a strategic cost to Russia. Every country in its shadow would revise its security calculations. NATO would reinforce the defences of its eastern members. Sweden and Finland might join the alliance.
For Mr Putin, the economic consequences of war would be survivable, at least in the short term. His central bank has $600bn in reserves—more than enough to weather sanctions. But the political gains in Ukraine could easily be overwhelmed by setbacks at home which, as Mr Putin knows better than anyone, is where his fate will ultimately be determined.
Perhaps, then, he will start with a less ambitious invasion. However, a limited war could claim many lives and be hard to contain. Sanctions might be lighter, but they would still be painful. Russia’s decoupling from the West would still accelerate. Moreover, if the government in Kyiv remained independent, it would only redouble its efforts to join the West. Mr Putin’s thuggery over the past eight years means that even Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine no longer hanker for closer ties with Moscow.
The coming weeks will determine how Mr Putin chooses, and nobody should doubt the stakes. Europe faces the prospect of Russia throttling the flow of piped gas. Even in the absence of a cut-off, it was expected to spend $1trn on energy in 2022, twice as much as in 2019. War would affect the prices of other commodities, too. Oil is already spiking. Russia is the world’s largest exporter of wheat, with Ukraine close behind. Russia is a big source of metals: in today’s tight markets even a small shock could send commodity prices upwards.
A successful invasion of Ukraine would also set a destabilising political precedent. The global order has long been buttressed by the norm that countries do not redraw other countries’ borders by force of arms. When Iraq seized Kuwait in 1990 an international coalition led by America kicked it out. Mr Putin, who has a nuclear arsenal at his command, has already got away with annexing Crimea; if he seizes a bigger slice of Ukraine, it is hard to see him suddenly concluding that the time has come to make peace with NATO.
More likely, he would push on, helped by the newly established presence of Russian troops in Belarus to probe NATO’s collective-security pact, under which an attack on one member is an attack on all. Not only would he relish the chance to hollow out America’s commitments to Europe, but he has also come to rely on demonising an enemy abroad to justify his harsh rule at home.
Other potential aggressors would take note, too. The likelihood of China invading Taiwan would surely rise. The regimes in Iran and Syria would conclude they are freer to use violence with impunity. If might is right, more of the world’s disputed borders would be fought over.
With so much at risk, the West should respond in three ways: deter, keep talking and prepare. To deter Mr Putin, Western powers—especially Germany—should stop equivocating, present a united front and make clear that they are willing to pay the price for imposing sanctions on Russia and also to support those Ukrainians who are ready to resist an occupying army. Meanwhile, diplomats should keep talking, looking for common ground on, say, arms control and pressing for a face-saving climbdown that Mr Putin and his captive media would be free to spin however they wish. And Europe should prepare for the next crisis by making clear that its energy transition will cut its dependence on Russian gas by using storage, diversification and nuclear power.
Seldom has the difference between a country’s interests and those of its leader been so stark. Russia would benefit from better, closer, peaceful relations with the West. Such ties would be available if Mr Putin didn’t behave so abominably. Only he benefits from discord, since he can tell Russians they are under siege and need a strongman to defend them. But even the wiliest strongman can miscalculate. Invading Ukraine could ultimately prove Mr Putin’s undoing, if it turns into a bloody quagmire or makes Russians poorer, angrier and more eager for change. Even if just for his own sake, he should claim a victory over the imaginary threat Russia confronts in Ukraine—and back down. ■
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Russia’s roulette"
16. Brace for Russian cyber attacks as Ukraine crisis deepens, Britain says
Excerpts:
A cyber attack on Ukraine earlier this month warned Ukrainians to "be afraid and expect the worst". Ukraine said Moscow was behind the attack.
"Incidents in Ukraine bear the hallmarks of similar Russian activity we have observed before," said Chichester.
The world's top cyber offensive powers are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, according to a 2020 ranking by the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School.
Britain's spymasters say Russia remains the biggest immediate threat to the West but Communist China's long-term dominance of technology poses a much bigger problem.
"UK organisations are being urged to bolster their cyber security resilience in response to the malicious cyber incidents in and around Ukraine," Britain's National Cyber Security Centre said.
Brace for Russian cyber attacks as Ukraine crisis deepens, Britain says
1/2
A Russian flag is seen on the laptop screen in front of a computer screen on which cyber code is displayed, in this illustration picture taken March 2, 2018. REUTERS/Kacper Pempel/Illustration
LONDON, Jan 28 (Reuters) - Britain warned big business on Friday to bolster defences against possible Russian cyber attacks as Western fears deepened that President Vladimir Putin would order his troops to annex another part of Ukraine.
The United States, the European Union and Britain have repeatedly warned Putin against attacking Ukraine after Russia deployed around 100,000 troops near the border with its former Soviet neighbour.
Russian officials say the West is gripped by Russophobia and has no right to lecture Moscow on how to act after it expanded the NATO military alliance eastwards after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union and sowed chaos in Iraq and Syria.
Britain's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a part of the GCHQ eavesdropping intelligence agency, warned large organisations to bolster their cyber security resilience amid the deepening tensions over Ukraine.
Western leaders say the 21st Century will be defined by a struggle between democracies and rivals such as China and Russia who they say are challenging the post-Cold War consensus militarily, technologically and economically.
"Over several years, we have observed a pattern of malicious Russian behaviour in cyberspace," said Paul Chichester, NCSC director of operations.
A cyber attack on Ukraine earlier this month warned Ukrainians to "be afraid and expect the worst". Ukraine said Moscow was behind the attack.
"Incidents in Ukraine bear the hallmarks of similar Russian activity we have observed before," said Chichester.
The world's top cyber offensive powers are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, according to a 2020 ranking by the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School.
Britain's spymasters say Russia remains the biggest immediate threat to the West but Communist China's long-term dominance of technology poses a much bigger problem.
"UK organisations are being urged to bolster their cyber security resilience in response to the malicious cyber incidents in and around Ukraine," Britain's National Cyber Security Centre said.
Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; editing by James Davey and Kate Holton
17. The Truth Sandwich
A simple, elegant construct, the "truth sandwich."
Carrying the Gun
Last week I wrote about the illusory truth effect – the psychological phenomenon wherein a lie that is repeated – even in refutation – is more likely to be remembered than the truth.
How to use it?
- Start with the truth. This is the frame.
- Introduce the lie – clearly stating that it is a lie.
- End with the truth.
It doesn’t always work. Especially if the recipient is no longer engaging in critical thought.
But for those who might be swayed, those who are still among the few willing to be wrong from time to time, it may nudge them towards the truth.
In the race to correct false information, the lie often gets too much air. You have to frame it in the right way.
Leaders – especially military leaders – need to suppress the urge to “do something” all the time.
“How are we countering this!?” screams the agitated military leader.
“We’re not, sir. It’s nonsense. And it will pass.”
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18. After 20 Years of Civilian Drone Strike Deaths, Pentagon Creates An Office to Stop More
A counterfactual thought: What if there were no drones and all the strikes conducted over the past two decades were conducted by manned aircraft? Would there be the same outrage? - the answer is probably yes. (and I acknowledge that every civilian casualty is a tragedy and we must do everything in accordance with the laws of war to prevent civilian casualties to the best of our abilities. This of course gets to a key question, were these civilians harmed while military forces still acted correctly IAW the laws of war?)
After 20 Years of Civilian Drone Strike Deaths, Pentagon Creates An Office to Stop More
The military keeps repeating mistakes and is not ready for future fights because the lessons learned have not been instilled throughout the DOD, an independent review found.
Thousands of innocent civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have died from U.S. drone strikes in the past 20 years, and those casualties continue because past mistakes have not been acknowledged, reported, or shared among drone operators, an independent review by RAND found. That lack of institutional knowledge means that future conflicts involving drone strikes could be far deadlier.
On Thursday, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin outlined guidance to establish a “civilian protection center of excellence” that would be the central point of collection for drone strike lessons learned and establish a uniform, central way for strikes to be reported and investigated, and victims compensated.
Two high-profile strikes—including the Aug. 29 strike in Kabul that killed a family of 10, and a 2019 strike in Baghuz, Syria, that killed as many as 70 civilians but was not acknowledged before it was detailed in a recent The New York Times’ investigation—elevated the department’s attention to the issue, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said Thursday.
“Some of the thinking that's going into the ways the secretary wants to have a more structural implementation of changes is also quite frankly informed by some recent press reporting,” Kirby said.
For too long the department has eroded its credibility by not acknowledging the deaths, or by significantly undercounting them, said RAND senior researcher Mike McNerney.
“The way DOD engages external parties is often in a defensive sort of skeptical approach, doubting the allegations that come forward,” McNerney said. “That inconsistency creates problems from the perspective of the department's reputation, its reliability.”
For example, independent assessments of the number of civilian deaths in Syria in 2019 ranged from 490 to 1,118, RAND found—but the Pentagon’s official estimate was 21.
“When we looked at DOD civilian casualty estimates from conflicts, we found them to be far too low and damaging to the department's credibility,” McNerney said.
In the Thursday memo, Austin directed the under secretary of defense for policy, the comptroller, and other offices to report back within 90 days with a plan to reduce future civilian deaths and create a common approach among the services on how strikes will be investigated, reported, and compensated.
Because lessons from the past two decades of drone strikes have not been captured and shared across the services, the department is also ill-prepared to avoid drone strikes on civilians if conflict arises with Russia or China, McNerney said.
“The Pentagon is not ready for conflicts with potential adversaries like Russia or China,” McNerney said. “The scale of a conflict with a country like Russia or China or North Korea, the fact that some of that fighting would take place in urban environments with much more powerful munitions being used on both sides—it just means the risk of civilian casualties is much higher.”
A senior defense official who briefed reporters on the guidance said the department’s emphasis on civilian casualties was driven by previous deadly strikes, but was not meant to be a look back.
“Our main focus here is really looking at future conflicts. And if we're thinking about Syria, or Iraq, we're thinking about, I think, today's conflicts, if we're thinking about China or Russia. We're looking at this through the lens of more the strategic issues we're going to be dealing with in the future.”
19. China denies interest in retrieving sunken US fighter jet
Admit nothing, deny everything...
China denies interest in retrieving sunken US fighter jet
The $100-million, state-of-the-art stealth aircraft crashed in the South China Sea on Monday.
China denied Thursday that it has any interest in recovering the wreckage of the crashed U.S. F-35C fighter jet that may contain sensitive technological information.
“We have no interest in their aircraft,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told reporters, adding that Beijing urged “the country concerned to do things that are conducive to regional peace and stability, rather than flex muscles in the region.”
The U.S. Navy said earlier that it was working to recover the F-35C Lightning II fighter jet, a $100-million, state-of-the-art stealth aircraft, which crashed in the South China Sea on Monday.
The single-engine fighter skidded over the side while attempting to land on the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier during a training session and tumbled into the sea.
The pilot safely ejected and was recovered by a U.S. military helicopter.
Seven servicemen were injured in the accident that happened during a joint operation conducted by the USS Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln strike groups in the South China Sea. All the injured are in a stable condition.
The U.S. Navy is making recovery operations arrangements for the F-35C aircraft. A former U.S. Navy officer told RFA it could take anything from three weeks to four months to locate and haul the plane from the depths of the ocean.
China is likely to be watching closely.
“They are interested but the announcement suggests they will not attempt to recover it if the U.S. chooses to do so,” said Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii.
“They don’t want to risk a confrontation or increase the already extensive Sino-U.S. frictions.”
Challenging task
“However, they will monitor the U.S. recovery and if they can do it surreptitiously, they will examine it with a submersible to gather what information they can,” said Schuster, who is also a former U.S. Navy captain.
“It is my belief that they have about 30-60 percent of what they need to know about the F-35 from their cyber-espionage efforts. A good thorough survey would add to that,” he said.
Some Chinese analysts believe that there’s another dimension to the crash.
“While China, and any other country, would certainly be interested in a closer look at the F-35 there is another issue that must be considered. That question is whether the plane was lost in China’s territorial waters,” asked Andy Mok, a well-known, Beijing-based commentator.
“If so, the U.S. will be in an awkward position as China would be entirely within its rights to not return it,” said Mok.
China insists that it holds “historical rights” to most of the South China Sea, and draws straight baselines around four groups of islands there to claim expansive territorial seas that are deemed illegal by international law.
Schuster said the recovery process could be protracted.
“I would think 20-60 days, depending on weather, currents, underwater conditions and PRC (China’s) activity.”
“Under ideal conditions, you are looking at 10-20 days from finding to lifting. Strong and unpredictable underwater currents, bad weather and other challenges or work interruptions add to the time. Worse case, 90-120 days, if the monsoon hits,” he told RFA.
“The U.S. has demonstrated the capability to recover aircraft from 15,000 feet (4,572 meters) and the South China Sea’s deepest point is 16,000-feet (4,876-meters) deep. So, the challenge is to find it, then send the equipment to lift it off the bottom and bring it to the surface,” Schuster explained.
“China will be watching in any case, to learn what they can; about the plane perhaps but definitely about how to recover a 70,000-pound (35-ton) aircraft from several thousand feet.”
From Beijing, the views are more dismissive.
“This incident is only the latest in a string of mishaps that only raise more questions about U.S. military readiness,” said Mok, the security analyst.
The 7th Fleet spokeswoman Cmdr. Hayley Sims told the U.S. military newspaper Stars and Stripes on Wednesday that the U.S. Navy is currently investigating the F-35C crash together with four other serious “Class A” mishaps involving aircraft assigned to the USS Carl Vinson carrier that occurred between Nov. 22 and Dec. 31.
A “Class A mishap” is an incident either involving loss of life or permanent disability, or the complete loss of an aircraft or property damage of $2.5 million or more, according to the U.S. Navy.
All five incidents remain under investigation, said Sims.
20. The Drone Threat Comes Home
Is that a "drone" delivering my Amazon package or is that a "drone" preparing to drop an IED that is made to look like an Amazon package?
Excerpts:
The U.S. government’s failure to address the security implications of an emerging technology recalls the mistake it made with the Internet during its infancy in the 1970s and 1980s. Back then, the architects of that network traded encryption and privacy for nimbleness and growth—an error the country is paying the price for today.
Looking back, Steve Crocker, one of the engineers who worked on the design of the Internet, regretted not taking security into consideration. “We could have done more,” he said, “and most of what we did was in response to issues as opposed to in anticipation of issues.”
Drones have the potential to revolutionize life for the better, offering everything from faster deliveries to more efficient farming to smarter weather forecasts. To preserve those benefits while mitigating the costs, Washington needs to take a fundamentally different approach: anticipating the many dangers from drones, rather than responding to them as they arise. Otherwise, as with the Internet, it risks losing control.
The Drone Threat Comes Home
Time to Wake Up to a Growing Domestic Danger
January 28, 2022
On January 17, 2022, Houthi rebels in Yemen sent a group of armed drones on a journey of nearly 1,000 miles. Launched alongside ballistic missiles as part of a coordinated attack, the drones flew into the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Saudi-led coalition the Houthis are fighting. After passing above the Abu Dhabi skyline, some of the drones started a fire at the city’s airport. Others hit a group of oil trucks at a state-owned fuel depot, killing three people and injuring six.
The attack was just the latest reminder of the destructive efficiency of drones, which have become a weapon of choice for militaries, militias, and terrorists. But the strike on Abu Dhabi was also a reminder of something else: that the threat of drones is not confined to remote conflict zones; drones can also jeopardize the safety of those living in developed, seemingly safe cities. For the United States, where the civilian use of drones has grown exponentially, the implications of thousands of drones traversing the nation’s airspace are worrisome. Now that unmanned aerial vehicles are widely available, increasingly affordable, and easily adaptable, the drone threat is about to come home.
That threat is frustratingly multifaceted. Drones have been used in terrorist attacks, assassination attempts, and strikes on critical infrastructure. Like cyberattacks, they are hard to attribute. As the range and accuracy of drones have increased, they have essentially become a weapons delivery system—what one commentator has called a “cheap cruise missile.”
The looming domestic security threat posed by drones has been given far too little consideration by the U.S. government, which has left decisions largely to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and to state governments, resulting in a patchwork of regulations, and neglected to build security into the basic design of the technology. With a threat as complex and dangerous as drones, Washington cannot afford to wait.
THE DRONE AGE
Drones have a distinctly military heritage. The United States first used them in the Vietnam War for reconnaissance. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli military deployed modified U.S. drones for surveillance and as decoys. Only around 2000 did the United States weaponize drones, adding Hellfire anti-tank missiles onto the Predator.
Over time, drones became essential weapons in the modern military arsenal. The United States has been a prominent user, relying heavily on them in its war on terrorism, but it is hardly alone. Today, by one count, 102 countries have active military drone programs. Some are powerful U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom, which conducted 398 drone strikes in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019, whereas others are newer entrants: Azerbaijan, for example, used Turkish-made drones to tip the scales in its favor during its 2020 war with Armenia.
Nonstate actors have also come to rely on drones. Over the first nine months of 2021, Houthi rebels launched 33 missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, many targeting critical infrastructure such as oil pipelines and tankers. Each drone costs the Houthis just a few hundred dollars. The Islamic State (also known as ISIS) had a significant drone program in Syria and Iraq, launching 60 to 100 drone attacks every month in 2017 alone.
In parallel, drones have exploded in popularity among civilians. According to the FAA, as of 2020 there were 1.4 million recreational drones and about 500,000 commercial drones registered in the United States. In a 2020 survey of Americans, eight percent of respondents reported owning a drone, and 15 percent reported having ever flown one. In the United States today, anyone over the age of 13 can buy and register a drone. The uses are diverse: not only can drones capture high-quality photographs and video, but they can also map terrain, monitor crops, forecast weather, and assist with search-and-rescue operations. In Cape Cod, beachgoers are even flying them to spot great white sharks. One market research group has put the value of the global drone market at nearly $30 billion.
Perhaps most revolutionary is the potential effect drones could have on shipping, deliveries, and transportation. In an effort to shorten arrival times, increase geographic coverage, and save money, Amazon, Google, and Uber have all invested heavily in drones that deliver orders. One research firm has predicted that by 2026, one million drones will be conducting commercial deliveries globally.
CHEAP AND EASY
For all the benefits of drones, their pervasiveness in everyday life poses significant security risks. For one thing, drones are easy to weaponize. Take the case of a Connecticut teenager who in 2015 posted videos of homemade drones he had altered to fire a semi-automatic handgun and shoot a flamethrower. Although off-the-shelf drones can generally carry only small payloads, this will soon change, and even today, some commercial drones can carry a 1,000-pound payload. Besides, even low-powered drones can deliver biological weapons or nuclear materials.
Another factor making drones so threatening is their ability to hover, which allows them to stay on target. It was this ability to have a persistent presence that initially made drones so essential for reconnaissance in warfare and for tracking the enemy, but it also makes them a potential privacy and security threat. Before the advent of readily available drones, reconnaissance required surreptitiously installing cameras, personally staking out a given location, or regularly flying over a target. Not so today. In 2017, a diesel-powered drone, the Vanilla Aircraft VA001, conducted a five-day continuous flight—landing with three days of fuel left to spare.
Other characteristics can also make drones dangerous. Drones are cheap and easy to make: in 2018, Syrian rebels fighting Russian forces strapped explosives to drones constructed from little more than a small engine, packing tape, plywood, and plastic. Drones are vulnerable to hacking and espionage as well, especially as their operating systems grow more sophisticated and remotely operable.
Finally, drones have a particularly destructive potential when enabled with artificial intelligence. Most salient is the danger from drone swarms: massive numbers of drones communicating and coordinating with one another using artificial intelligence to destroy a preprogrammed target. Drone swarms should be thought of as an emerging arms control challenge, as they are exceedingly difficult to counter or control. In 2020, a Chinese state-owned company released a video showing a Hummer-like vehicle that can launch a swarm of 48 drones, each carrying a high-explosive warhead. The next year, the Indian army staged a demonstration featuring a swarm of 75 drones, with plans to scale it up to 1,000 drones.
These attributes raise a number of risks for the U.S. homeland. The first and perhaps the most straightforward is the use of drones by terrorists and criminals, domestic or foreign, who might wish to transport contraband, attack a crowd, or assassinate a political leader. In 2015, a drone containing radioactive material landed on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s office. In 2018, a pair of drones exploded near Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro while he was giving a speech outdoors. In November 2021, an explosives-laden drone landed on the residence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, injuring seven of his bodyguards.
Then there is the threat to critical infrastructure. For proof of concept, look no further than Saudi Arabia, where, in 2019, Iranian drones attacked two massive oil-processing facilities. The incident knocked out five percent of global oil supply overnight, causing the biggest sudden disruption in history. American infrastructure is also vulnerable. In 2020, a consumer drone that had been modified with a copper wire trailing behind it tried to land on an electrical substation in Pennsylvania—an attempt that, had it succeeded, could have caused a short circuit and taken down the electric grid. Between 2014 and 2019, there were at least 57 sightings of drones flying above domestic nuclear sites. The FAA receives more than 100 reports a month of drones flying around airports. In 2018, the United Kingdom’s Gatwick Airport shut down for 36 hours after drones were spotted in the sky nearby.
Last, the pervasive presence of drones can threaten Americans’ quality of life. They make a consistent and piercing buzzing noise that can become a constant annoyance; they also pose a physical risk from collision. Perhaps more acute are privacy concerns. In 2011, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency unveiled the AeroVironment Nano Hummingbird, a surveillance drone that is 6.5 inches long and lighter than a AA battery. Imagine the risks posed to personal privacy if this technology were adapted for civilian use: a nosy neighbor or a vindictive employer could spy on a person for days at a time, watching every aspect of one’s pattern of life.
READY FOR TAKEOFF
The current challenge from drones is reminiscent of the terrorist threat before 9/11. Drones are still in their infancy in terms of widespread adoption and technological evolution, and there is still time to address their risks, before losing control. If Washington waits, however, the costs of establishing adequate security measures and regulation will far exceed the costs of acting now. Delay also risks allowing the parties that have the most to gain from the mass proliferation of drones—namely, companies that make or intend to use drones—to dominate the rulemaking process.
To address the drone threat, the Biden administration should begin by issuing an executive order that establishes a senior interagency group—including representatives from the FAA, the Pentagon, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to catalog drones’ security risks and come up with recommendations for mitigating them. Alternatively, the president could set up a public-private commission composed of government officials and industry leaders. In either case, the effort would be designed to counterbalance the legitimate commercial and economic imperatives of drones by focusing on the security side of the ledger.
Any solution should include strengthened public-private collaboration, whereby regulators work with drone manufacturers to build in security measures at the point of construction and provide greater oversight of drone operators. The good news is that the U.S. government has made progress in this direction over the past few years. In 2015, the FAA mandated the registration of all recreational drones, and drones are now required to include a “remote ID” that broadcasts the drone’s identity, location, velocity, and altitude. Three years later, Congress passed a law giving the DHS and the Department of Justice new powers to identify, track, and even shoot down threatening drones.
One important improvement has been proposed by Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York, and others: requiring that geofencing, technology that establishes virtual perimeters beyond which a drone cannot fly, be built into every drone, and mandating penalties for disabling the capability. The system could be informed by a government database containing the coordinates of sensitive areas, from airports to power plants. Although geofencing technology exists today and is built into many drone models, it is not required, and users can turn it off.
To protect critical infrastructure, the U.S. government should build what the analyst Zak Kallenborn has called a “national counter-drone network.” As he has argued, this could entail a system of bases at various critical sites across the country, each with defenses that would include remotely operated drones that can take down other drones. Such a network wouldn’t be cheap, but the costs would pale in comparison to those of a successful attack.
Policymakers also need to rethink who regulates drones. Today, the FAA serves as the primary regulator; it is worth considering whether more oversight power might be granted to the DHS. After all, drones originated as military tools. They should fundamentally be treated and regulated as potential weapons or instruments of surveillance, rather than as recreational or commercial objects. To that end, the DHS could be tasked with establishing the counter-drone network, for example, or with coordinating the installation of mandatory geofencing targets in every drone.
Last, the federal government needs a uniform approach to addressing privacy concerns related to drones. To date, the FAA has refrained from acting in this area, leaving regulation to a messy patchwork of state and local laws. California, for example, has passed a law aimed at the paparazzi that bars drone operators from flying over private property and capturing pictures and video, whereas Alabama has no laws specifically related to drone privacy. Although some federal legislation has been introduced, the issue remains unresolved. Congress should pass a law creating uniform standards to protect all Americans from being spied on by commercial or government drones.
NO TIME TO WASTE
The U.S. government’s failure to address the security implications of an emerging technology recalls the mistake it made with the Internet during its infancy in the 1970s and 1980s. Back then, the architects of that network traded encryption and privacy for nimbleness and growth—an error the country is paying the price for today.
Looking back, Steve Crocker, one of the engineers who worked on the design of the Internet, regretted not taking security into consideration. “We could have done more,” he said, “and most of what we did was in response to issues as opposed to in anticipation of issues.”
Drones have the potential to revolutionize life for the better, offering everything from faster deliveries to more efficient farming to smarter weather forecasts. To preserve those benefits while mitigating the costs, Washington needs to take a fundamentally different approach: anticipating the many dangers from drones, rather than responding to them as they arise. Otherwise, as with the Internet, it risks losing control.
21. Being a Better Partner in the Pacific
Conclusion:
Taken together, these four steps would make significant advances in U.S. engagement and involvement in the Pacific Islands. By creating a strategy predicated on durable engagement, the United States would position itself in the region with a rationale inclusive of strategic competition but also stretching to areas of non-traditional security concerns.
Being a Better Partner in the Pacific - War on the Rocks
The Dec. 20 eruption of the volcano Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai in the Kingdom of Tonga focused global attention on this tiny, fragile Pacific Island country. Tonga’s water and food supplies were disrupted and its undersea internet cable was cut. In one explosive moment, life in Tonga was dramatically altered. All Pacific Island countries face natural and human security threats. At the moment, U.S. engagement among these countries is uneven at best.
U.S. Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell recently grabbed attention by saying that the United States may soon face a “strategic surprise” in the Pacific. He appears to have had in mind agreements and basing arrangements between Pacific Island countries and China. Campbell went on to say that the United States has not done enough to engage with the island countries, while Australia and New Zealand have done plenty. He called on the United States to “substantially up our game” and said he looked “to Australia to lead.” The seven-decade-long alliance between Australia and the United States has seen profound changes with the addition of AUKUS. The Pacific presents a another set of challenges for the alliance, which are important both for the alliance itself and in the broader context of strategic competition. Failure to effectively manage these new challenges will have profound repercussions for both the United States and Australia.
Two related questions emerge — how can the United States raise its game among the Pacific Island countries, while at the same time building on the foundations laid by its long-time ally, Australia?
The Biden administration has an opportunity to build on the steps taken by the previous administration and deepen U.S. engagement in the Pacific. Improving U.S. engagement with these fragile island states, while enhancing collaboration with Australia as a key regional ally, will serve as proof positive that the United States is able to successfully shift its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific. Failure to effectively improve U.S. regional involvement in Oceania will be a failure of American will, with broader implications. An essential element to U.S. engagement is a durable strategy uniquely aligned to the needs of the small Pacific Island states.
Over the past decade, two issues — climate change and strategic competition — have animated American interest in the Pacific, the latter the more significantly. U.S. Pacific Island strategy should be informed by the Pacific Islands Forum Boe Declaration, which endorses a commitment to the rules-based international order and upholds the right of member countries to conduct their “national affairs free of external interference and coercion.” Importantly, the declaration also promotes both a traditional and non-traditional view of security, emphasizing human, environmental, and cybersecurity as well as concern over transnational crime. These are the areas in which the United States can most productively collaborate with Australia to enhance security among the Pacific Island countries.
Whether the United States can sustain and deepen security cooperation remains an open question. The perennial competition for budgets and the power and influence of Department of Defense may challenge America’s capacity to be an effective partner in addressing regional needs. Pacific Islanders like Meg Taylor, the former secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, have voiced concern that American interest in their region is driven purely by an anti-China perspective. Furthermore, she warns against a transactional approach to relationships. The call for partnerships has a long history — consider the words of the late Peter Tali Coleman, governor of American Samoa and the longest serving governor of any U.S. territory or state, when he said, “Come, let us build for the future in partnership.”
China’s apparent desire to expand its military capability among the Pacific Islands has raised concerns in both Australia and the United States. China has announced plans to improve an airfield on the coral atoll of Katon in Kiribati, which is roughly 3000 kilometers from Oahu and lies near the sea lanes connecting Hawaii with Australia and New Zealand. Elsewhere, China has completed work on improving Momote Airport on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, which is the closest airfield to Lombrum Naval Base. Australia, the United States, and Papua New Guinea are collaborating on upgrading Lombrum, originally built by the U.S. Navy in World War II and rivaling Pearl Harbor in size and capacity. China has also reportedly sought basing opportunities in Vanuatu and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. While these efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful, U.S. officials clearly remain worried. Beyond basing rights, China could well seek to emulate American Pacific arrangements and negotiate its own compact of free association with, for example, Kiribati.
Letting an Ally Lead
Some might wonder why Campbell would suggest that the United States should play junior partner to Australia. After all, America has extensive bases in the North Pacific and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is headquartered in Honolulu. The challenge that Campbell has in mind is not in the North Pacific, however, but in the south where most of the Pacific Islands lie. Across the Pacific, Australia leads the globe in development assistance, followed by New Zealand. According to the Lowy Institute, the top five donors of overseas development assistance to all Pacific Island countries in 2019 (the most recent data available) were Australia at $864 million, New Zealand at $254 million, Japan at $179 million, China at $169 million, and the United States at $140 million. Overseas development assistance plays a vital role in these small island states, which are amongst the most aid-dependent countries in the world. Australia’s diplomatic presence in the region outstrips that of all other countries, with 19 embassies among the Pacific Island nations. By comparison, the United States has embassies in just six of them, three of which are in the North Pacific. Where America has the greatest, albeit subjective, potential is in the allure of its soft power.
Australia has manifest strengths in the region. So, how can the United States improve its engagement in the Pacific and work with its capable ally?
The Trump administration had already made inroads on raising U.S. engagement in the Pacific. Its declassified U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific links competition with China and U.S. Pacific Islands policy, calling for the United States to “Ensure the Pacific Islands (e.g., the U.S. territories, the Freely Associated States, the Melanesian and the Polynesian states,) remain aligned with the United States.”
Free association maintains the sovereignty of these island states but gives the United States the task of their defense, while denying any other state the right of military access, in exchange for financial support of the islands for a defined period of time following negotiations and U.S. Congressional approval. Funding for the Micronesian and Marshallese compacts will expire in 2023, along with Palau’s in 2024. The Trump administration sought to renew funding for all three compacts, and the three island leaders met briefly with President Donald Trump in the Oval Office on May 21, 2019. They also went to Capitol Hill, where legislators promised speedy passage of any new compact funding. Negotiations for renewed funding have since become bogged down amid COVID-19 travel restrictions and the 2020 U.S. election. In September 2019, the United States also announced $65 million of new funding in the Pacific Pledge, focusing on enhancing resilience to environmental challenges, building resilient infrastructure and expanding connectivity, enhancing good governance, enhancing maritime security, and building cyber capacity.
At the same time, the Trump administration also cancelled U.S. involvement in the Paris Agreement on climate change. The Paris agreement had broadly been seen as a victory for Pacific Island diplomacy, and the U.S. withdrawal was met with disappointment. Tuvalu’s prime minister, Enele Sopoaga, said, “We are very, very distressed,” and Fiji’s prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, said that the “loss of America’s leadership was unfortunate.”
Climate change threatens American islands just as much as it threatens Tuvalu and Fiji, and recognizing this is an essential step to creating a lasting Pacific Island strategy. The same can be said of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. For many Pacific Island countries, fishing represents their main source of income — 75 percent in Kiribati, for example. Such fishing results in Pacific Island countries losing an estimated 12 percent of their prized tuna catch.
The United States shares a destiny with the other Pacific Island countries through the state of Hawaii, the territories of Guam and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas. It is this shared destiny that should keep the United States engaged well beyond strategic competition. Yet, strategic competition creates even greater urgency as the United States embraces a free and open Indo-Pacific. Once again, America has an interest in maintaining the international rules-based order as much as the Pacific Island countries do. In embracing America’s Pacific Island identity, U.S. policymakers should listen to American Pacific Island voices, giving greater durability to American involvement with the Pacific Islands.
There are five steps that the United States should take to improve security cooperation. First, it should continue to adapt Pacific Deterrence Initiative projects to better align with the realities of the Pacific Island countries. Second, Washington should move forward on funding the compacts of free association with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. Third, Congress should legislate for deeper and more reliable cooperation and collaboration with allies and partners regarding the Pacific Island states. Fourth, Congress should embrace the language for interagency working groups found in the Maritime SAFE Act and incorporate that into other non-traditional security cooperation legislation. Finally, the United States should improve the management of these policies and legislation through the appointment of a Pacific coordinator.
Sending the Pacific Deterrence Initiative South
In its original form, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, was designed to
enhance budgetary transparency and oversight, and focus resources on key military capabilities to deter China. The initiative will also reassure U.S. allies and partners, and send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the American people are committed to defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.
The lion’s share of Pacific Deterrence Initiative funds will be used in the North Pacific, especially in Guam. A small portion of the funds, however, should be used to build traditional and non-traditional security cooperation, in particular to build and improve infrastructure in the islands where the United States could anticipate deploying forces. Harbor facilities throughout the region should be examined for upgrading to provide berthing for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels, for example. Serious consideration should be given to negotiating with Papua New Guinea to create Coast Guard facilities at either Lae or Madang. Equally, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command should identify where airfields could be improved, as in the example of Baucau Airfield in Timor-Leste.
Pacific Deterrence Initiative funds should also be used for forward positioning of defense material. These efforts would both expand the capacity of the U.S. military to operate in the region and, importantly, invest in employment among the islands. The numbers employed need not be large to have an impact in these small, aid-dependent states. While most Pacific Island countries do not have militaries, the United States should as a matter of urgency complete the suite of status-of-forces agreements with the remaining regional nations to allow for the potential of visits by U.S. forces.
On Congress’ To-Do List
A second task should be completing the negotiations and passing the funding for the compacts of free association. The compacts came into being as part of the decolonization process following World War II, when the United States administered the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands that included the Marianas, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. The Marianas elected to become a commonwealth with the United States, whereas the others opted for sovereignty. Compact funding for the Marshall Islands and Micronesia was renewed in 2003 for a twenty-year period. Palau’s compact funding was negotiated in 2010, though Congress did not appropriate funds until 2016, and it will expire in 2024.
The Biden administration is yet to make significant advances on these negotiations. Several missing building blocks need to be restored to move forward. A simple yet important step would be the timely nomination of an Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Insular Affairs, who is largely responsible for the three freely associated nations. A more complex building block is trust, which has been eroded over the years by remaining issues around compensation for nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands. Trust was further damaged when the United States removed Medicaid coverage from the Marshallese with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996. The compact had originally promised to provide access to healthcare, but it took roughly a decade from the first introduction of legislation by then-Rep. Mazie Hirono to restore access to Medicaid for the Marshallese. Swift and meaningful action in negotiating the new funding agreements by the Biden administration could go a long way toward securing the financial future of the compact states, as well as repairing trust.
The United States also needs to deepen its work with allies and partners with an interest in development assistance in the Pacific. Congress has before it two pieces of legislation, the Boosting Long-Term Engagement in the Pacific Act (or the BLUE Pacific Act) and the Honoring Oceania Act, both of which promote greater cooperation with partners in the Pacific.
The BLUE Pacific Act envisions cooperation with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan to deescalate conflict in the region, safeguard Pacific populations, and ensure complementarity of programing. The Honoring Oceania Act calls on
Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (commonly referred to as ‘IUU fishing’), maritime security, and economic development.
In some ways, the act merely codifies what is already taking place in practice. The United States has partnered with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in the electrification of Papua New Guinea, and Australia, Japan, and the United States have laid new high-speed internet cables for Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau.
American work on traditional and non-traditional security cooperation requires coordination across a disparate number of agencies and authorizations. The federal government deals with issues that cross organizational boundaries via an interagency working group, more often than not ad hoc in nature. The Maritime SAFE Act envisions the challenges of addressing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and mandates the structure and composition of an interagency working group. This approach to interagency working groups should be used in promoting U.S. work on non-traditional security threats. Congress should amend the Honoring Oceania Act to incorporate specific instructions, drawn from the Maritime SAFE Act, on how the United States can align and coordinate programs and resources.
Point Person Needed
A fourth recommendation is that a coordinator for U.S. Pacific Island policy be appointed. The coordinator should work to orchestrate and align policy across the administration, with Congress, and internationally. The Trump administration had a National Security Council staff member covering Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, and Antarctica), but this position is too junior to undertake the tasks at hand. The coordinator should be appointed at the level of ambassador-at-large, report directly to the White House, and have deep experience in U.S. government service. This suggestion goes beyond that made in a bipartisan Congressional letter of June 29, 2021, which merely called for a senior official to lead negotiations over compact renewal, instead calling for a senior official who will work, both domestically and internationally, at integrating policy across the Pacific.
Taken together, these four steps would make significant advances in U.S. engagement and involvement in the Pacific Islands. By creating a strategy predicated on durable engagement, the United States would position itself in the region with a rationale inclusive of strategic competition but also stretching to areas of non-traditional security concerns.
Alan Tidwell is professor of the practice and director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
22. Why Intermediate-Range Missiles Are a Focal Point in the Ukraine Crisis
Excerpt:
While it is folly to discount the potential that Putin fully intends to use force to achieve his strategic goals, it is also unwise to dismiss a potential path to resolution, a compromise that may let all parties save face. The return of theater-support missiles, brought on by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty’s demise, challenges Russia’s security and undoubtedly influences the country’s decision-making. Since the treaty’s end, Russia’s actions have sent a clear message that it would not let intermediate-range missiles reemerge in Europe. However, the response from the West not only failed to address Russia’s concerns but treated the reintegration of these missiles as a foregone conclusion, focusing almost exclusively on the relative advantage that their deployment could provide to the United States and NATO. While NATO expansion may very well be the primary driver of Russia’s actions toward Ukraine, the return of these strategic missiles is also a factor that the United States should consider. Consequently, while reversing NATO expansion is a non-starter for many in the West, a potential arms agreement concerning the formerly banned missiles is not only a realistic goal, but it is something that all parties have expressed a willingness to work towards. In this context, if successful negotiations occur, missiles will be the likely focal point. Consequently, the United States may have to concede the tactical and operational benefits that theater-support missiles could provide in Europe for the potential strategic victory of defusing the tensions on the Ukraine border.
Why Intermediate-Range Missiles Are a Focal Point in the Ukraine Crisis - War on the Rocks
In seeking to explain why there are currently 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border, commentators have invoked everything from the role of NATO expansion in the 1990s to the history of Kievan Rus in the 9th century. But a more recent development deserves discussion as well: America’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019.
If nothing else, Moscow has been eager to highlight this factor. Russia’s proposal for ending the current crisis stipulates that the United States “not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach [Russian territory].” One need not take Russian rhetoric at face value to consider how America’s potential reintroduction of formerly banned missiles to Europe influences Russia’s decision-making on Ukraine. Examining the United States and Russia’s differing responses to the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty highlights the interconnectedness of these events and the failure of the nations to communicate. While Russia’s threats are fundamentally tied to maintaining influence over Ukraine and deterring NATO expansion, a renewed focus on arms control can still play a role in finding a peaceful resolution.
The Fate of the Treaty
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed in 1987, which eliminated a specific delivery system: surface-to-surface missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, henceforth referred to as theater-support missiles. Washington withdrew from the treaty in 2019, citing a series of Russian violations while also emphasizing the benefits that the new missiles could provide the United States in Europe and, perhaps more importantly, Asia.
The treaty’s end paved the way for the United States to reintroduce these missiles to the battlefield, this time as conventional strike assets instead of the nuclear-armed versions that had dominated the Cold War.. Because the U.S. Army had previously established long-range precision fires as its top modernization priority, the associated loosening of missile restrictions created an innovation opportunity for U.S. forces. Moreover, China was never a signatory, which had allowed it to become a world leader in intermediate-range missile technology. This missile asymmetry had been a criticism of the treaty for years, likely influencing the U.S. decision to withdraw.
Since the United States withdrew from the treaty, the Army has embarked on numerous projects at varying ranges, including a moderate range increase from its current systems to a 500–600-kilometer range precision strike missile and a more strategically designed 2,700-kilometer range hypersonic missile. Additionally, future long-range strike capabilities have begun to influence emerging U.S. military doctrine, which emphasizes their importance in neutralizing anti-access systems. Overall, while the treaty’s demise may have been controversial internationally, domestically the U.S. military was quick to capitalize on its newfound freedom. Instead of internal debates on the strategic implications of reintroducing these missiles, the public military discourse centered on which service would have employment and development responsibility. This implied that the new missiles’ eventual employment and forward basing were foregone conclusions.
Adding to this perception, U.S. analysis covering the treaty’s demise focused heavily on the benefits of theater-support missiles. In 2019, a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment research team conducted a cost-benefit analysis on deploying these new missiles, arguing that the decision “may contribute to a cost-imposing strategy against China and Russia by pressuring them to invest in expensive defenses and resiliency measures rather than devote those same resources to power-projection capabilities.” The report added that the employment of missiles in Europe and the Pacific could “compensate for the vulnerabilities of U.S. air and naval forces in potential conflicts involving capable opponents such as China and Russia.” European pundits also weighed in on the immediate tactical benefits that conventional missiles could provide to NATO. Christian Mölling and Heinrich Brauß, members of the German Council on Foreign Relations, contended that theater-support missiles “could threaten Moscow’s command facilities and limit Russia’s military ability to act.” Luis Simón, an international security professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and Alexander Lanoszka, an international relations professor at Waterloo University, made a similar argument, noting that missiles were “likely to become the center of gravity of deterrence and security in Europe in a post-INF and maturing precision-strike context.” I’ve even put forward this argument myself, writing last year that rocket artillery proliferation in Europe can deter Russian aggression in the Baltics.
The Western narrative is straightforward: Theater-support missiles provide the United States and NATO with new capabilities to better deal with a resurgent Russia and a rising China. But this discourse overlooked the strategic implications of employing these missiles, and neglected any potential Russian response.
The Russian Response
On Feb. 2, 2019, the day that the United States officially suspended its treaty obligations, President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with his defense and foreign ministers to discuss Russia’s way forward. Putin informed his ministers that the Russian response to the treaty’s demise would mirror that of the United States but warned that Russia “must not and will not be drawn into an arms race.” On Aug. 2, 2020, the day that the United States officially withdrew from the treaty, Russia proposed that the United States “declare and enforce a moratorium on the deployment of short and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.” In October 2020, Putin expanded on the details of this proposal, adding verification measures for missile defense systems and reinforcing his earlier claim that Russia would not deploy any controversial theater-support missiles as long as NATO members did not.
Consequently, some European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, have questioned America’s dismissal of the Russian offer. While not technically supporting the Russian proposal, Macron pressed for the need to open the lines of communication with Russia. “Has the absence of dialogue with Russia made the European continent any safer?” he asked, “I don’t think so.”
Reintroducing theater-support missiles to Europe creates the potential for nuclear escalation, primarily based on a target nation’s inability to determine whether an incoming missile is armed with a nuclear warhead. This potential warhead ambiguity can lead to a nation misidentifying a missile in flight, creating a response dilemma that could lead to inadvertent escalation. This issue drives Russian policy. Recently, the Russian military newspaper Red Star invoked this dual-use missile dilemma in a controversial proclamation: “Russia will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation.” Senior Russian military officers explained the dilemma in plain language: “there will be no way to determine if an incoming ballistic missile is fitted with a nuclear or a conventional warhead, and so the military will see it as a nuclear attack.” In June 2020, Putin signed an executive order outlining Russia’s basic nuclear strategy. Specifically, he described the four scenarios that would justify nuclear weapon use. In addition to a direct nuclear attack and the identification of an incoming ballistic missile, these included an attack “against critical governmental or military sites” that “undermine nuclear force response action,” and a conventional attack when the “existence of the state is in jeopardy.”
In this context, even without the potential nuclear threat, missiles may represent an existential threat for Russia, one that Putin believes calls for a nuclear response. Vladimir Isachenkov, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted that Russia’s proclamation follows a new Russian “nuclear deterrent policy that envisages the use of atomic weapons in response to what could be a conventional strike targeting the nation’s critical government and military infrastructure.” This Russian response complicates any missile strategy that the United States may formulate for the European theater, raising doubts about the strategic benefit of deploying new missiles to Europe — conventional or nuclear. Overall, while the United States may have envisioned a future where theater-support missiles provided it with a relative advantage over its old adversary, Russia made it clear that it viewed the reintroduction of the formerly banned missiles as an escalation, one with nuclear implications. Therefore, even before Russia massed roughly 100,000 troops on the Ukraine border, there was a clear strategic gap in communication between the United States and Russia.
Missiles in the Ukraine Negotiations
In October 2021, just as the current Ukraine crisis began, Putin expressed his frustration with the international community regarding his proposed missile moratorium: “Has anyone even reacted to our statement that we will not deploy this kind of missile in the European part if we produce them, if they tell us that no one will do so from the United States or Europe? No. They never responded.” He built on these comments in a December press conference, saying “Are we putting our rockets near the borders of the United States? No we’re not. It’s the U.S. with its rockets coming to our doorstep.”
By bundling an arms control agreement with its proposal for ending the Ukraine crisis, Russia has forced a conversation on the subject. But does this mean that it is seriously looking for an agreement? Michael Kofman, the Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analysis, argues it is not: “Moscow has not only been asking for things that it knows it cannot attain, but it has been doing so in a manner that will ensure that it cannot attain them … By publicizing its demands and refusing to unbundle them in ways that might achieve compromise, Russia has made its diplomatic effort appear more performative than genuine.”
But there is an alternative reading. Russia could be demonstrating how seriously it perceives the missile threat. By providing an achievable demand in its negotiations, Russia can secure a minor diplomatic victory and compromise on the “non-starters,” while still addressing one of its significant security concerns. Russia has created room for the West to make concessions, and thereby potentially give Russia the opportunity to defuse the situation without appearing to “back down” from the West.
Whatever Russia’s intentions, the missile conversation is now taking place in a more formal setting. On Jan. 10, 12, and 13 there were meetings between Russian and Western officials to discuss Russia’s published peace proposals and find common ground. At the first of this series of meetings, held in Geneva, the concerned parties made little progress. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov noted in a news conference following the event, “Unfortunately we have a great disparity in our principled approaches to this. The U.S. and Russia in some ways have opposite views on what needs to be done.” While the crux of the disagreement is NATO expansion, the parties broached the topic of arms control, specifically concerning the future employment of missiles in Europe.
The topic reemerged on Jan. 12 at a Russia-NATO Council meeting. After the meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko built on Putin’s December comments and reinforced the importance of Russia’s proposed missile moratorium. Specifically, he argued that neither Russia nor the United States would benefit from a return to Cold War missile tensions and that accepting a missile agreement “would meet the interests of all countries — not only Russia, but the European states as well.” Grushko further echoed Macron’s missile moratorium concerns, challenging Europe, not the United States, to take action to avoid a Cold War missile resurgence. “On this issue,” he stated, “Europe should declare its stance and prevent such a scenario from happening in the current security situation.” In response to a question on this matter, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that “NATO Allies made it clear in the meeting that we are ready to schedule a series of meetings addressing a wide range of different topics, including missiles and reciprocal, verifiable limits on missiles in Europe.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman made similar remarks, explaining that while many of the Russian propositions were “non-starters,” arms control is an area that Russia and NATO may be able to “work together on.”
Sadly, the standstill continued in the final talks hosted in Vienna. Russia’s representative, Alexander Lukashevich, was disappointed in the lack of progress, noting that if Russia does not “hear a constructive response to our proposals within a reasonable time frame and an aggressive line of behavior towards Russia continues, we will be forced to draw appropriate conclusions and take all necessary measures to ensure strategic balance.” He further stressed “the need to obtain these legally formalized security guarantees for us is unconditional.”
After the week of talks, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan summarized the events and outlined the U.S. position moving forward. Specifically, he noted that the United States was “firm in our principles and clear about those areas where we can make progress and those areas that are non-starters.” He explained that “the discussions were frank and direct … They gave Russia things to consider.” When asked about limiting missiles in Europe, Sullivan responded that the United States is “prepared to discuss reciprocal limitations on the deployment of missiles, as long as Russia is prepared to fulfill its end of the bargain and that there’s adequate verification.” Accordingly, while a quick agreement is unlikely, missile restrictions appear to be a potential area for compromise amongst all parties.
A fundamental question remains, however. Can an agreement on a singular issue, in this case a missile moratorium, defuse the Ukraine situation? Kofman contends that “while a discussion on future missile placement, mutual reductions in military activity, and other measures might count as a diplomatic success for Moscow, it is unlikely that this is enough to satisfy Putin.” Thus “after the meeting in Geneva, the United States was unable to determine if the Russian diplomatic effort was genuine or cover for a planned military operation.”
Conclusion
While it is folly to discount the potential that Putin fully intends to use force to achieve his strategic goals, it is also unwise to dismiss a potential path to resolution, a compromise that may let all parties save face. The return of theater-support missiles, brought on by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty’s demise, challenges Russia’s security and undoubtedly influences the country’s decision-making. Since the treaty’s end, Russia’s actions have sent a clear message that it would not let intermediate-range missiles reemerge in Europe. However, the response from the West not only failed to address Russia’s concerns but treated the reintegration of these missiles as a foregone conclusion, focusing almost exclusively on the relative advantage that their deployment could provide to the United States and NATO. While NATO expansion may very well be the primary driver of Russia’s actions toward Ukraine, the return of these strategic missiles is also a factor that the United States should consider. Consequently, while reversing NATO expansion is a non-starter for many in the West, a potential arms agreement concerning the formerly banned missiles is not only a realistic goal, but it is something that all parties have expressed a willingness to work towards. In this context, if successful negotiations occur, missiles will be the likely focal point. Consequently, the United States may have to concede the tactical and operational benefits that theater-support missiles could provide in Europe for the potential strategic victory of defusing the tensions on the Ukraine border.
Brennan Deveraux is a major in the U.S. Army and is currently attending the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is an Army Strategist and an Art of War Scholar specializing in rocket artillery and missile warfare. He has completed combat deployments to Iraq and the Horn of Africa and has two defense-related master’s degrees, focusing his research on military adaptation and emerging technology management.
23. China Hopes Sequel to Anti-U.S. Korean War Propaganda Blockbuster Will 'Smash Theaters'
The Chinese propaganda and agitation department is on a roll. Looks like domestic preparation of the information environment so the people will be ready in the right mind to deal with a conflict with the US.
China Hopes Sequel to Anti-U.S. Korean War Propaganda Blockbuster Will 'Smash Theaters'
Breitbart · by John Hayward · January 27, 2022
Chinese state media on Thursday giddily hailed the arrival of Watergate Bridge, the hastily-filmed sequel to China’s Korean War propaganda film The Battle at Lake Changjin.
In a “news” article that would make the vaudevillian hucksters of Hollywood’s Golden Age blush, the Communist Party’s Global Times predicted the new film would “smash theaters” and “crown the box office” during the Lunar New Year holiday season.
Watergate Bridge actually has some competition for fans of big-budget Communist history revisionism, because another film covering the same period called Snipers is opening as well. The latter project was helmed by famed director Zhang Yimou, who is also in charge of the opening ceremonies for the Beijing Winter Olympics.
Snipers, as the Global Times described it, “picks up a true story of a Chinese sniper defeating American enemies in the War.”
Snipers promotional poster (Enlight Media)
Watergate Bridge follows the same “Chinese People’s Volunteers” unit from The Battle at Lake Changjin as it fights for control of “a crucial bridge on the retreat route of American troops.”
The Global Times fought a brief and comical struggle with itself to explain why it is a complete coincidence that nationalist propaganda films about the Korean War (which the Communist Party calls “The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” even though China’s involvement condemned half of Korea to live under a psychotic dictatorship and the other half to live in fear) are flooding theaters during the busy spring holiday.
The article then trotted out some Communist Party “film critics” to gush that both films are guaranteed to be artistic and financial triumphs, although The Battle at Lake Changjin’s massive box office lead-in suggests Watergate Bridge will make more money. Watergate Bridge has supposedly racked up $15.82 million in presales already.
On the other hand, one critic wondered if holiday audiences were eager to sit through a 149-minute war movie during the Lunar New Year holiday, while Zhang Yimou’s competing film might benefit from the Olympic buzz around the director, and some of the other competing films scheduled for holiday release are breezy comedies and cartoons that might be more appealing to family audiences.
It is hard to quantify the box-office benefits of an authoritarian regime strongly hinting to moviegoers that buying tickets to a nationalist extravaganza is their patriotic duty. The Communist Party inflated box-office returns for The Battle at Lake Changjin by making sure no other movies were playing in some theaters. Audience members were encouraged to chew on frozen potatoes to get the full experience of the scrappy, starving Chinese soldiers who defeated arrogant, overfed American troops.
Breitbart · by John Hayward · January 27, 2022
24. FDD | Biden Greenlights South Korean Release of Funds to Politically Connected Iranian Firm
FDD | Biden Greenlights South Korean Release of Funds to Politically Connected Iranian Firm
fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · January 27, 2022
The Treasury Department on January 6 issued a special license to authorize the South Korean government to pay $63 million that it owed to the Entekhab Group, an Iranian consumer electronics company. However, a closer look at the Iranian counterparty shows potential connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military force that Washington has sanctioned due to its terrorism, human rights abuses, and nuclear proliferation.
The Biden administration’s authorization, which came after meetings between U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley and South Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun, constituted a goodwill gesture to Tehran as part of ongoing nuclear negotiations in Vienna. One of Tehran’s demands in the talks was the release of more than $7 billion in frozen Iranian assets held in South Korea.
Entekhab is part of the business empire of the Dayyani family, which has business interests in various sectors of the Iranian economy, including oil, gas, petrochemical products, real estate, construction, and steel. However, the family’s crown jewel is its control over Iran’s home appliance market. According to Iranian media reports, the Dayyani family controls 40 percent of this market.
Basij News Agency calls the CEO of the Entekhab Group, Mohammad Reza Dayyani, a Basiji entrepreneur — that is, he is a member of the Basij, which is a branch of the IRGC and the primary organization that Tehran deploys to repress urban protests, often through force. The United States has designated the IRGC and Basij as Specially Designated Global Terrorist entities and has added the IRGC to the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list.
Dayyani enjoys exceptional support in the office of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In 2021, Dayyani co-signed a letter to Khamenei asking the regime to ban the importation of Samsung and LG home appliance products to Iran. The two companies had a significant presence in Iran’s market but left the country after the Trump administration reintroduced the sanctions Washington had lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal. Their absence benefited Iranian producers, who now want to make sure LG and Samsung will not return.
In the letter, Dayyani and his colleagues called themselves soldiers of the Islamic Revolution who reside on the front line of the U.S. economic war against Iran. They would defend the Islamic Republic’s achievements, the authors added, to their last drop of blood.
Khamenei responded by ordering the ban, an unprecedented step against private companies.
The case of the Entekhab Group and Dayyani shows the danger of doing business with Iran and the importance of enforcing enhanced standards for compliance with sanctions, Know Your Customer rules, and safeguards against terror finance. By greenlighting South Korea’s transfer of funds to Iran, the Biden administration may be setting a dangerous precedent and weakening enforcement of Washington’s IRGC-related sanctions.
President Joe Biden may decide to declare Tehran fully open for business as a result of nuclear negotiations. Private companies, however, should think twice before engaging in such dealings. The next U.S. administration may reverse course and reimpose sanctions. Private firms could be held accountable if they provide material support to entities clearly involved in gross human rights violations, terrorism, or money laundering.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Saeed, the Iran Program, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Saeed on Twitter @SGhasseminejad. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · January 27, 2022
25. How Russia Has Turned Ukraine Into a Cyber-Battlefield
Excerpts:
In this respect at least, the message from the hackers who took over the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s website contains a kernel of truth: Ukraine should prepare for the worst. At this stage, Ukrainian military and civilian leaders should focus on making the country better able to weather cyberattacks—for instance, by making plans for the government and the military to fall back on noncomputerized systems in the event that Russian cyberattacks disrupt their networks.
This will require not only extensive preparation but also a healthy dose of creativity. There are, however, some promising signs that Ukraine is thinking outside the box. The New York Times recently reported that Ukrainian troops were salvaging crank-powered World War II–era field telephones to evade high-end Russian electronic surveillance systems. As anachronistic as this may seem, it is exactly the kind of tactical sophistication that is needed to withstand an attack from a more technologically sophisticated enemy.
Such considerations point toward a broader truth about the role of cyberspace operations in modern military conflicts: there is no such thing as a pure cyberwar. There is just war, fought with a range of tools across a range of domains. In this respect, cyberattacks are not even a separate front in an otherwise conventional conflict but rather an extension of warfare itself.
How Russia Has Turned Ukraine Into a Cyber-Battlefield
The Kremlin’s Hackers Are Already Targeting Kyiv
January 28, 2022
Every day brings ominous new signs of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has amassed over 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border, withdrawn the families of diplomats from the Russian embassy in Kyiv, and deployed troops to neighboring Belarus for unplanned joint military exercises with the Belarusian military, suggesting that it could attack Ukraine on multiple fronts.
Eight years after Russia annexed Crimea and supported a secessionist movement in eastern Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin looks poised for yet another incursion into Russia’s western neighbor. In response to sustained Russian aggression, Kyiv has grown increasingly close to NATO, which has supplied the Ukrainian military with weapons, tactical support, and military advisers. Putin now seeks to halt the alliance’s eastward expansion and to secure Russia’s near abroad, re-creating the sphere of influence once enjoyed by the Soviet Union. Washington’s efforts to broker a peaceful resolution to the standoff have so far failed—and Moscow has continued its apparent march toward war.
Any Russian attempt to take over Ukraine is unlikely to be confined to traditional military domains, however. It will probably also play out in cyberspace, where Moscow has been waging a relentless campaign against Ukraine for nearly a decade already. Since 2014, hackers affiliated with the Russian government have interfered in Ukraine’s elections, targeted Ukrainian government agencies and private-sector companies with destructive malware, and carried out cyberattacks against electric utilities that caused widespread power outages. In recent weeks, the Ukrainian government has been hit by a series of cyberattacks—possibly conducted with the support of the Kremlin—that defaced government websites and wiped out data on some government computers. Hackers took over the websites of numerous departments and agencies, including that of the Foreign Ministry, leaving a threat to leak private data and an ominous warning to the Ukrainian public: “Be afraid and expect the worst.”
Operations in cyberspace will not by themselves be enough to achieve Putin’s ultimate objective of bringing Ukraine firmly into Russia’s sphere of influence and preventing NATO from expanding into Russia’s backyard. For that, Putin will need to use conventional military means. But cyber-operations can give Moscow a battlefield advantage, frustrate Ukrainian efforts to respond militarily to an invasion, and sow division and confusion among the Ukrainian public—all of which bodes ill for Kyiv.
CYBER-ADVANTAGE
In the event of a full-scale invasion, Russia is likely to conduct three types of campaigns in cyberspace to support its military objectives: intelligence gathering operations, operations aimed at disrupting or deceiving the Ukrainian military, and psychological operations against the Ukrainian public. The first would seek to monitor Ukraine’s military operations. By tapping communications between Ukrainian military units, Russian intelligence agencies could access unfiltered information on Ukrainian troop deployments, defensive tactics, and other battlefield logistics.
In addition to giving Russia a military advantage, this type of cyber-espionage operation could also help Russia prepare for an eventual occupation of parts of Ukraine. By infiltrating Ukrainian national police databases, Moscow could identify and neutralize potential leaders of a future insurgency, for example, or pinpoint Ukrainian citizens who might be willing to collaborate with Moscow in a future pro-Russian government. In fact, Russia is probably already conducting some of these operations in preparation for a potential conflict.
Second, Russia would likely use cyberspace operations to deceive the Ukrainian military or disrupt its operations. For instance, Russian hackers could target the Ukrainian forces’ command-and-control networks, including both its wireless and wired communications networks, making it difficult for Ukrainian military leaders to coordinate troop deployments or efficiently mobilize reservists and volunteers. Moscow could also disrupt major Ukrainian telecommunications providers or target the digital databases of the Ukrainian military’s logistics hubs, undermining Kyiv’s ability to distribute equipment and provisions to soldiers and aid to civilians. Or hackers could attack Ukrainian air traffic control networks, disrupting civilian flights and impeding international support and aid for Ukraine.
When it comes to cyberdefense, the best time for preparation is yesterday.
Finally, Russia could conduct psychological operations to sow confusion and doubt among the Ukrainian population, thereby eroding the public’s will to resist Russian aggression. Moscow could launch a cyberattack against Kyiv’s power grid, for instance, leaving millions of people without heat or electricity in the dead of Ukraine’s brutally cold winter. Or it could attack Ukraine’s financial system and make it difficult for civilians to buy groceries with a credit card or withdraw cash from an ATM.
Russian attacks on media outlets could cause news blackouts and impede the Ukrainian government’s ability to communicate directly with its citizens, sowing additional uncertainty and fear. Moscow could also inject false reports and rumors into informal civilian information networks, such as WhatsApp groups, to cause panic or prompt people to flee strategic areas. It could even disrupt Ukraine’s emergency communications systems, preventing firefighters, medics, and police officers from responding to emergencies or setting off air-raid sirens or shelter-in-place notifications at random.
Moscow may not do any of these things. Indeed, a Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine would likely succeed even without the help of cyberattacks. But Moscow’s consistent use of cyber-operations against Ukraine in recent years suggests that it is likely to attack across the full spectrum of military domains. Taken together, such operations would send a powerful signal to Ukrainian leaders and citizens alike that resistance is futile—and that Russia is both omnipresent and omnipotent.
ANALOG DEFENSE
What can Ukraine do to shield itself from a possible Russian cyberoffensive? Unfortunately, not very much this late in the game. When it comes to cyberdefense, the best time for preparation is yesterday. If Russia has already laid the groundwork for a campaign of cyberattacks against Ukraine, it is probably too late for Ukraine to completely defend itself. Even with the best defenses in place, Ukraine would likely suffer at least some damage to its Internet-connected infrastructure, although it is impossible to know in advance how extensive that damage could be.
In this respect at least, the message from the hackers who took over the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s website contains a kernel of truth: Ukraine should prepare for the worst. At this stage, Ukrainian military and civilian leaders should focus on making the country better able to weather cyberattacks—for instance, by making plans for the government and the military to fall back on noncomputerized systems in the event that Russian cyberattacks disrupt their networks.
This will require not only extensive preparation but also a healthy dose of creativity. There are, however, some promising signs that Ukraine is thinking outside the box. The New York Times recently reported that Ukrainian troops were salvaging crank-powered World War II–era field telephones to evade high-end Russian electronic surveillance systems. As anachronistic as this may seem, it is exactly the kind of tactical sophistication that is needed to withstand an attack from a more technologically sophisticated enemy.
Such considerations point toward a broader truth about the role of cyberspace operations in modern military conflicts: there is no such thing as a pure cyberwar. There is just war, fought with a range of tools across a range of domains. In this respect, cyberattacks are not even a separate front in an otherwise conventional conflict but rather an extension of warfare itself.
26. The U.S. won’t send troops to Ukraine: Here’s what it might do
It pains me to hear what we will not do, e.g., not send troops to Ukraine (even though there are already troops in country - a 2000 person Florida National Guard unit is training Ukrainian forces).
But we should be asking what action or combination of actions will have the best chance of deterring Putin from making the decision to invade Ukraine or conduct low level incursions or use little green men to try to subvert the country. I would submit the statement that we will not send troops to Ukraine makes our deterrent efforts operate from a position of weakness. And yes, every action does have a downside.
The possible actions:
Sanctions: Tech, banking and Putin’s allies
Military aid: Now — and in the event of war
U.S. troops to Europe
The energy war
The U.N.
Humanitarian aid
The U.S. won’t send troops to Ukraine: Here’s what it might do
When it comes to Ukraine, President Joe Biden has a broad range of options. They all have their downsides.
Global Security Reporter
There still may be no war. Perhaps some combination of a diplomatic breakthrough and threats from Ukraine’s allies will convince Russian President Vladimir Putin that invading Ukraine is either no longer necessary or not worth the price. Perhaps Putin has never intended to use these troops, and his buildup on Ukraine’s borders is just a bluff.
Perhaps not.
Hear more from Joshua Keating about this story:
The coming weeks could see a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. If it comes to that — and even before it comes to that, if the situation continues to deteriorate — what options are on the table for the United States? President Joe Biden has ruled out deploying U.S. troops to Ukraine to fight the Russians, and few expect that stance to change. But it’s equally unlikely that the U.S. would just back away from what Biden and others have suggested could be the largest invasion of its kind since World War II.
The U.S. does have a range of options to respond to a Russian invasion — or to prepare for the possibility — but most of those options are likely to be limited in their effectiveness and carry significant risks.
Sanctions: Tech, banking and Putin’s allies
The main U.S. policy response is likely to come in the form of economic punishment. The U.S. already has dozens of sanctions in place on Russian entities and individuals for activities ranging from the 2014 annexation of Crimea, to Russia’s military intervention in Syria, to human rights abuses. But there are other targets available, including Russia’s state-owned banks, much of its energy industry, and its mining and metals sector.
Another dramatic step the administration is contemplating would hurt the Russian consumer in a tangible way: applying controls on exports of U.S. technology to Russia. In practice, the impact would be sweeping: Beyond direct U.S. exports, if a company is manufacturing smartphones in South Korea and Taiwan, and using any American components — say, Qualcomm semiconductors or Corning glass screens — they would not be able to sell those phones in Russia without a license. The Trump administration used export controls like these to target the Chinese tech giant Huawei, but applying them to an entire country would represent is a dramatic escalation.
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Another step that would have significant effects: banning Russian banks from SWIFT, the communications network through which financial institutions conduct global payments and other financial transactions. SWIFT is a major engine of the global economy; more than half the world’s high-value cross-border financial transactions use the network. This is what the U.S. did to Iran in 2012. As another means of cutting Russian financial institutions off from the global economy, Biden has also threatened to block Russian banks’ payments from being converted into dollars, the currency of choice for most financial transactions around the world.
Meanwhile, Putin’s opponents, such as the jailed dissident Alexei Navalny, have long called for the U.S. to apply targeted sanctions to senior Russian oligarchs and officials — the people Putin relies on to keep power. Biden has also said that personal sanctions on Putin himself are not off the table, a step that would put the Russian president in a rogues’ gallery of global leaders who have been sanctioned by the U.S. — a group that includes Bashar al-Assad, Saddam Hussein, Robert Mugabe and Slobodan Milosevic.
The cumulative impact of these sanctions would likely run in the billions of dollars — but would any of them modify Russia’s behavior? Adam Smith, an attorney specializing in sanctions compliance and a former Treasury Department senior adviser, is skeptical. “I think they’re significantly better positioned than they were in 2014, when Russia was in a much more perilous position, geopolitically and economically,” he told Grid.
This isn’t just because Russia’s economy and military are in a stronger position than they were eight years ago. The Russian government has also taken specific steps to sanction-proof its economy, including building one of the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves and developing its own alternative to SWIFT. Russia’s increasing reliance on trade with China also makes it less vulnerable than it once was to Western trade sanctions. And any Russian oligarch worth his salt has no doubt stashed assets outside the reach of U.S. authorities.
This isn’t to say that these measures won’t have a profound impact on Russian companies and ordinary citizens. But if Putin gets to the point where he’s willing to take such drastic military action, he will almost certainly have priced sanctions into the equation.
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Military aid: Now — and in the event of war
If the invasion happens, and if it results in a protracted conflict, a lot more of what is euphemistically called “lethal aid” will likely follow, with an emphasis on anti-tank weapons, air defense systems, small arms, medical equipment and spare parts. The U.S. might also provide intelligence support and targeting assistance to Ukrainian forces.
Unmanned aerial drones will almost certainly play a significant role in any conflict — both for reconnaissance and the targeting of enemy positions. (The remarkably effective use of drones by Azerbaijan against Armenia in last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh war may have been something of a preview.) Ukraine has lately been stockpiling Turkish drones, which it has used effectively against Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine.
But fighting the Russian military itself presents another level of challenge. “You’re going to be dealing with the Russian forces that have layered air defenses and very sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities that can mess with the communications and the command and control of these drones,” Margarita Konaev, a research fellow focused on Russian military technology at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, told Grid. For this reason, Konaev sees drone-related electronic warfare capabilities as a key area for U.S. assistance.
Even if U.S. troops aren’t taking part in combat, there may be Americans on the ground. U.S. special operations forces and CIA paramilitaries have been training Ukrainian special forces in the U.S. and in Ukraine for years, and there’s likely to be more covert assistance and training if the war turns into an “insurgency” against Russian occupiers.
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U.S. troops to Europe
When the Biden administration says no troops to Ukraine, that doesn’t mean no troops in support of Ukraine. Some 8,500 U.S. troops have been put on high alert for possible deployment to Ukraine’s neighbors and the Baltic states if the situation in Ukraine deteriorates further. As Biden put it, “We’re going to actually increase troop presence in Poland, in Romania, et cetera, if in fact [Putin] moves.” Most of these troops would be sent to bolster the existing NATO Response Force, a 40,000-member multinational contingent intended to respond quickly to emergencies.
These troops could support Ukrainian forces (the U.S. Air Force is already flying reconnaissance missions over eastern Ukraine) and bolster the security of NATO allies in the region. Perhaps as important — symbolically at least — such deployments would be a clear rebuke to one of Russia’s core goals in this conflict — namely, the removal of NATO troops from the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe.
There are risks to the further militarization of this region: NATO scrambled jets hundreds of times during 2021 in response to Russian military flights. A disputed incident involving a British warship passing close to Russian-occupied Crimea in the Black Sea last summer may have been one of the precipitating incidents behind Russia’s current military buildup. The chances of misunderstanding and flare-ups will multiply.
The energy war
If Russia goes to war, its pipelines into Europe may prove as valuable as its tanks or planes. The European Union imports 41 percent of its natural gas and 27 percent of its oil from Russia. Particularly in the dead of winter, this leverage limits just how aggressively Western countries would be willing to target Russia’s all-important energy sector. (At a time of high gas prices and low approval ratings, it may limit just how aggressive Biden is willing to be as well.)
Still, the U.S. is making preparations to fight back in the energy wars. A wide-ranging sanctions bill drafted by Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), reportedly backed by the Biden administration, would slap sanctions on Nord Stream 2, a controversial pipeline under the Baltic Sea owned by Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom. If switched on, Nord Stream 2 would double Russian gas exports to Germany. The proposed U.S. sanctions would come into effect if Russian invaded; the Biden administration has pushed back against Republican efforts to immediately sanction the pipeline over the past year. “I want to be very clear: If Russia invades Ukraine one way or another, Nord Stream 2 will not move forward,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price said this week. While the German government has been reluctant to play politics with the pipeline in the past, Germany’s foreign minister said Thursday that shutting the pipeline could be part of the “broad bandwidth of responses at our disposal.”
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The U.N.
A war in Ukraine is likely to see a return of high drama to the United Nations. As International Crisis Group’s U.N. director, Richard Gowan, writes, the goal of the U.S. and its allies “will not be to stop the conflict — which will require negotiations far away from New York — but to shame Moscow.” The Russians may also be keen to use the U.N. Security Council, where they will hold the rotating presidency in February, to sell their own narrative on the conflict.
The U.S. could table a resolution at the Security Council condemning Russia’s actions, which Russia — a permanent member of the council — would naturally veto. It’s then likely to turn to the U.N. General Assembly, where Russia does not hold veto power and where every country gets a vote. In 2014, a Ukrainian resolution backed by the U.S. condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea passed in the chamber with 100 votes in favor, 11 against and 58 abstentions. In addition to a PR victory, another U.S. goal at the U.N., according to reporting by Foreign Policy, would be to drive a wedge between Russia and its ally, China, which has been one of the council’s staunchest proponents of defending the territorial sovereignty of U.N. member states.
It may not hearken back to the U.N. drama of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, but expect heated, high-profile, public debates between U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield and her Russian counterpart, Vassily Nebenzia.
Humanitarian aid
Lastly, a helping hand. Konaev says that in addition to military assistance, the U.S. and its allies should be preparing to deliver humanitarian aid: food, water, medicine, gas masks and more. Nongovernmental organizations and governments may also have to contend with a new refugee crisis in both western Ukraine, where fighting is likely to be less severe, and in neighboring countries. Some 1.5 million people have already been internally displaced in Ukraine since the 2014 conflict. In the event of a full-scale Russian invasion, the violence is likely to be far more intense, particularly in the event of a long war involving urban combat.
All the above measures are part of what some have termed a “porcupine” strategy for Ukraine: As in, there’s no way Ukraine can defeat Russia in a head-to-head military contest, but the prospect of conflict can be made too difficult and unappetizing to swallow. The thing is, if the Kremlin is not deterred and invades Ukraine anyway, the essence of the porcupine strategy — setting the stage for a long and costly quagmire, in which Russian invaders are bogged down against an internationally backed insurgency — will wind up making things miserable for those living near the front lines. The United States needs to be prepared for those consequences as well.
27. The West, not Russia, faces a Ukrainian quagmire
This is from the Chinese-language website “Observer” (guancha.cn). This appears to be the Chinese propaganda and agitation department providing supporting information fires to Russia.
The West, not Russia, faces a Ukrainian quagmire
The United States and the West have so far failed to force Russia to withdraw its army from the Ukrainian border. For Russia, the best military option will be to enter Ukraine until reaching the Dnieper River in the first stage of its operation. It is easy to quickly stabilize the post-war situation as the east side of the river is greatly influenced by Russia and the Orthodox Church.
The mission has to be completed within three to seven days. Russia should launch its attack in May and June when the melting period has passed, rather than in January and February. The sunshine time is longer while the operations of mechanized equipment and personnel have fewer problems in summer than in severe winter.
The NATO countries do not seem firm in supporting Ukraine as they are still paying Russia for its gas supply. If the US and the West impose sanctions on Russia, they will only push Russia toward China, the world’s second-largest economy. (Translator’s summary)
Under the continuous provocation of Western countries, the situation in Ukraine has suddenly heated up.
According to some reports, Russia has recently assembled 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border and held joint military exercises with Belarus. Together with Crimea, it has caused huge military pressure on Ukraine from three directions. The US and Russia have begun talks on the presidential and foreign minister levels but the result has only been “expectation for further talks.”
Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe by land area, larger than France or Germany.
The straight-line distance from the Ukraine border to Moscow is only about 450 kilometers. By road the distance is 490 kilometers. Since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the West has greatly advanced its sphere of influence – but the West doesn’t want to bear the burden of Ukraine’s weak economy.
The frequent conflicts in Eastern Ukraine have made Ukraine a hot potato that could be neither held nor thrown away. The Crimea issue has become a predicament for the West: The West has no intention of helping Ukraine retake Crimea – nor of admitting the reality that Russia has taken it. In this dilemma, it is sinking ever more deeply into Ukraine’s quagmire and the situation is getting worse and worse.
The West only provides political support to Ukraine verbally, but it does not provide critical economic support. It is providing military support to Ukraine but on a small scale. Now it is focusing on providing military advice and training, plus some Javelin anti-tank missiles.
Western military advisers have a limited role in Ukraine. No matter how expert their military knowledge is, their expertise is only compatible with the training, equipment, and command system of their own (or NATO) troops. They may not be useful in Ukraine.
Retraining the Ukrainian army is impossible. The US military had been training the Afghanistan army for 20 years. But in the end, the Afghanistan soldiers fled before the enemy arrived.
In fact, the US has little to do apart from intimidation. Its sanctions will not frighten Putin. The US wants Russia to consider the consequences of military action, but for Russia, there is no more serious consequence than having a Western sword pointed at its head.
The new American script is to repeat that a Russian invasion of Ukraine is imminent in January and February, thereby forcing Russia to deny it. If Russia delays its action, the US will keep changing the timetable in its script so long as Russia does not withdraw its army from the border. If Russia launches an attack, that will prove its previous denials false, putting Russia in the wrong.
It is simply impossible for such a trick to materially influence Russian decision-making. Only Russia can decide whether it should attack. What’s more, winter is not necessarily the best season for an attack. In summer, daylight hours are longer, while mechanized equipment and personnel have fewer problems than in severe winter. Operation Barbarossa and the Battle of Kursk both were launched in summer.
The deployment of Russian troops at the border is a reaction to earlier Ukrainian deployments in Eastern Ukraine. Russia cannot sit back and watch the Ukrainian army attack East Ukraine. And Russia has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of taking the initiative for an attack. If Russia is triggered by certain conditions to launch an attack, what military options does it have?
The Russian Air Force is far more powerful than Ukraine’s, but aerial warfare is not Russia’s forte. In Russia’s Georgia operation, airpower was employed only for support. The same would be true in Ukraine. The Russian Navy is even less powerful. The Black Sea Fleet was the country’s weakest in the Soviet Union era, and it remains so.
Russia’s attack is most likely to be based on land. Not only does the Russian Army have an overwhelming inherent advantage; it also almost surrounds Ukraine, deployed as it is on three sides – that’s a positional advantage.
Ukraine’s flat terrain is also suitable for the Russian army to use its armor advantageously. In World War II, the Dnieper River did not stop the German attack, nor the Soviet counterattack, and today it is only a convenient geographical line of demarcation.
Speaking of which, the Russian military has six military options, each with different consequences:
1. Temporarily withdraw some troops from the border and focus on diplomatic solutions while continuing to support the Eastern Ukrainian armed forces. That was the state affairs before the Russian army deployed troops to the border. In fact, it is not an option at all. If the matter could be solved diplomatically, we wouldn’t have the present situation.
2. March into Donetsk and Luhansk in the name of peacekeeping, and keep the army there until a favorable result for Eastern Ukraine and Russia is reached in peace negotiations. This isn’t a likely scenario. With the Russian army positioned at the border, it is unlikely that the Ukrainian army will defeat the Eastern Ukrainian armed forces.
3. Enter Ukraine until Russian forces reach the Dnieper River. The Dnieper River is not only the main geographical demarcation line in Ukraine; it is also the demarcation line of two populations. The west side of the river is influenced by Poland and Roman Catholicism, and the Ukrainian ethnicity is stronger there. The east side of the river is more influenced by Russia and the Orthodox Church, and the ethnic composition is friendlier to Russia. It would be easy to stabilize the situation on the ground following an incursion. This would simply solve the problems in Eastern Ukraine once and for all.
4. March from the Sea of Azov to the coast of the Black Sea while marching along the Dnieper River. In this way, a land bridge would be opened between Russia, Crimea and Transnistria, Ukraine would become effectively a landlocked country, and Crimea would also solve its freshwater shortage.
5. Enter the Azov Sea and the coast of the Black Sea. But this is a flat territory without defensive strong points. It also lacks the rivers and mountains that make it easy to defend the east bank of the Dnieper River.
6. Enter all of Ukraine. Among all the available options, this operation would be the largest in scale and have the greatest political, military and economic impact. It would also place the Russian army directly opposite NATO for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (apart from the three Baltic States).
In operational terms: If the Dnieper River is the destination, the three main routes will include the northern, central and southern routes. Specific combinations will be determined by the above choices.
The northern route focuses on attacking Kyiv separately. If Belarus cooperates, the Russian army can bypass the Chernobyl area, which is not suitable for transit, and attack Kyiv from the flank and rear. The Novyurkovich-Chernihiv-Kyiv route is about 250 kilometers long, and the Tropotnoy-Konotop-Nizin-Kyiv route is about 320 kilometers long. If the Russian army can pass through Belarus, the Masur-Korosten-Kyiv route is about 250 kilometers long. In an ideal situation, the encirclement of Kyiv can be completed in as few as three days, at most in seven days.
There are three main routes for the central approach: Belgorod-Kharkiv-Poltava-Kremenchuk (about 320 kilometers long) route, the Donetsk route (it can be divided into two: Netsk-Dnipro and Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia, each about 220 kilometers), the Rostov-Mariupol-Bertyansk-Melipol route, with the Dnieper River as the main goal. If the Russian army can bypass Kharkiv and march straight forward, it can also reach the Dnieper in as few as three days, at most in seven days.
The southern route starts from Crimea. The eastern flank and the southern flank of the central route march separately and meet at Melipol, while the western flank advances to the Dnieper estuary of Kherson. Again, the operation can be completed within three to seven days. By itself, however, the logistical route through the Kerch Bridge and Crimea would not easily support a large-scale military operation.
The three-line simultaneous operation would have the largest scale, impact and effect.
If the southern front did not halt at the Dnieper, the advance on the Dnieper could be the first phase of an operation the second phase of which could then be carried out by amphibious assault on Odessa at sea at the same time that Russian forces crossed the Dnieper.
If this should succeed, the north road would open up the land passage with Transnistria (an enclave of ethnic Russians between Moldova and Ukraine), and the southern road would open up the connection with Bujak (south of Moldova, across the bay from Odessa, connected to the National Forest Park with a width of only two kilometers on land, mainly by seawall and bridge at the mouth of the bay). The Russian sphere of influence would then advance to the Romanian border.
If Russia decided to enter the west bank of the Dnieper River aiming for the whole territory of Ukraine, it would need yet another two-stage operation, with a short stop in the Vinnytsia-Zhytomyr-Korosten line for resupply. It would then continue to advance westward, eventually reaching the borders of Hungary, Slovakia and Poland.
Vinnytsia was an important location in the Great Patriotic War. Hitler’s Eastern Front Command, code-named “Werewolf,” was headquartered 12 kilometers north of Vinnytsia and Hitler’s code-name was “Wolf.” It was here that Hitler ordered the division of German troops on the southern front respectively into the Caucasus and Stalingrad, and here he oversaw the Third and Fourth Battles of Kharkov.
If the Russian army should prove strong enough, with the political cooperation of Belarus it would be possible to combine into one operation the two phases of the advance towards the west side of the Dnieper River. Starting from Belarus, Russian forces could march all the way along the Polish border and cut off the Ukrainian army’s retreat and connection with NATO. The other way is to outflank the Vinnytsia-Zhytomyr-Kristen line and join up with the Russian army on the eastern front.
It can be seen that Russian army logistics are still highly dependent on the railway, so the attack route would follow the railway line. Important railway hubs would be the focus of the battles.
The Russian army is good at blitzkrieg. But Ukraine is a very large country, measuring more than 1,000 kilometers from east to west and more than 600 kilometers from north to south, and has a population of 41 million including the cities of Kyiv (3 million), Kharkiv (1.5 million), Odessa (1 million), Dnipro (1 million), Zaporizhzhia (750,000), Mariupol (500,000). They are not small cities.
The Russian army would have to fight quickly, bypass the cities and go straight to the rear. Otherwise, the attack would become a deadlock like the one in Grozny (with only 400,000 people), and Russia would become a passive force.
The time factor mainly depends on the preparation of the Russian army and the resistance of the Ukrainian army. The arrival at the Dnieper front line has to be completed within three to seven days. The mission will fail if it takes longer. Should it “settle” the cities behind the front before advancing? Or should it give up the street fighting and continue to advance at high speed to the western border of Ukraine? Each of these strategies has its own advantages and disadvantages, and it mainly depends on the military resources and operational decisions of the Russian army.
Western commentators argue emphatically that the Russian army will attack when the ground is frozen in January and February, so as to avoid the difficulty of mobilizing mechanized equipment during the thaw after March. This is a very strange argument. The present deployment of the Russian army is a countermeasure to the previous deployment of the Ukrainian army in Eastern Ukraine. It has been in place for some time. If the Russian army wants to take action, January and February will be too late, as the ground already has been frozen for a month. The opportunity for the Russian Army to take action diminishes as the thaw approaches.
On the other hand, the thaw will be over in May and June. The summer is not only dry, but also has longer daylight hours, which are more conducive to operations. In the Great Patriotic War, the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad all started in summer. The German army had become stationary. It was defeated after its military action was delayed until the severe winter due to the resolute resistance of the Red Army.
Although the US and the West can provide the Ukrainian army with air defense, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare, light weapons, artillery, ammunition, vehicles, aircraft spare parts, fuel, supplies and medicine, it would take time for Ukraine to upgrade its combat power. We are no longer in the era of World War II when resistance fighters could fight immediately by picking up submachine guns and explosives airdropped to them.
Ukraine soldiers stand in formation for the opening ceremony of Rapid Trident in International Peacekeeping and Security Center, Yavoriv, Ukraine, September 3 2018. Rapid Trident was a Ukrainian-led exercise with multinational support consisting of 14 allied and partner nations. Photo: US Army National Guard / Pfc Andrea Torres
The Ukrainian army, which is familiar with Soviet-made equipment, would need some time to adapt to Western equipment. It is difficult to say whether the Ukrainian army still has enough time.
Or, like the Afghan mujahideen, the Ukrainian army could try to fight an anti-Russian guerrilla war in Ukraine and try to exhaust Russia. It sounds like a great idea, but it’s actually not feasible. Ukraine and Russia are too close in terms of culture and blood.
This is a quasi-civil war. It can even be seen as an expansion of the Eastern Ukraine war. There will not be a language and cultural gap for the Russian army when fighting guerrilla battles. During the Great Patriotic War, Ukrainian nationalist armed forces were supported and armed by the German army but achieved nothing.
On the other hand, while America and the West have some political and economic options, none of them will work.
No matter how severe the economic sanctions from the US and the West may be, they will not be enough to fundamentally shake Russia’s decision-making. They will only push Russia toward China. China’s economy continues to develop at a high speed. Its size, which is the world’s second largest and will become number one in the future, is a powerful driving force and a development opportunity for Russia.
Secondly, the war of public opinion that the US and the West are waging cannot hurt Russia, which has been smeared for a long time. Some people may say that NATO countries can provide asylum to Ukrainian refugees and can put moral pressure on Russia, but in fact such a move will help Russia reduce the burden of controlling Ukraine.
At the same time, Ukraine is the main route for Russian gas to Europe, and any military conflict may seriously affect the delivery of Russian gas to Europe. It is possible to supplement European demand with American LNG, but that brings up a strange problem. If NATO countries want to help Ukraine, shouldn’t they take the initiative to stop “funding the enemy”? They don’t even need to wait until the conflict starts. If NATO is not firm about this position, what kind of support is it talking about?
Of course, the US and the West could try to use diplomatic pressure to force Belarus to refuse to cooperate with Russia, and to refuse to allow the Russian army to pass through. This might have been feasible if the West had not attempted a color revolution in Belarus. The West in effect slaps Belarus in the face with its left hand and pulls Belarus to its side with his right hand. Does that make any sense?
Finally, the West could also resort to the trick of an international tribunal to investigate Russia’s supposed “war crimes,” but I personally feel that the subject most worthy of investigation is American war crimes in Afghanistan.
Ukraine has become a difficult problem for the US and the West. Russia is still talking with the US, but it is clear that it will make decisions on its own. The US won’t be able to get what Russia doesn’t want to give up at the negotiating table. The reverse is also true. Russia won’t be able to get what the US doesn’t want to give up.
The US cannot force Russia to promise not to attack, and Russia cannot force the US to promise that Ukraine will never join NATO. The stalemate in Ukraine will continue.
America’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific provides the best moment for Russia to exert pressure on Ukraine. Despite the strong influence of the US, Russia can do whatever it wants in many parts of the world, such as openly developing military cooperation with a Burmese military government that is besieged by the West. It has delivered two Su-30SME heavy fighter jets to Myanmar.
It is also conceivable that Russia might provide fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to North Korea and Iran.
In fact, China has already kept the US busy. If the US wants to put pressure on Russia, it may not be able to do very much.
It will be bad news for countries like Ukraine and Georgia if the US remains inactive on the Ukraine issue. It will expose America’s character of only caring about warfare but not about other countries’ economies.
It will also be bad news for NATO allies, especially the Eastern European countries of the former Soviet sphere. Europe can no longer count on the US. This is also why France proposes to regain European strategic autonomy. Poland’s president would rather annoy the US by coming to the Beijing Winter Olympics. While Lithuania is hastening to support Taiwan independence, the US only supports it verbally. The EU refuses to accept a situation in which the tail wags the dog. It is now trying to figure out how to make its predicament less embarrassing.
In the era of Anglo-German naval competition at the beginning of the 20th century, the United Kingdom adopted a strategy of retreating from deployments around the world while making every effort to ensure its naval superiority in the North Sea. In the end, it was lucky to win World War I at the cost of the expansion of Japan in the Far East, and the expansion of the United States in the two oceans.
But Germany could have gained the advantage if it had delayed war and focused on economic development. World War II was a continuation of World War I. After World War II, Britain became a completely second-rate empire. Now it is only a second-rate country, not even an empire.
Everyone is studying the experience of history. The US is studying how to avoid the decline of its empire, China is studying how to avoid Thucydides’ trap, Russia is studying how to find “undervalued treasures” (e.g. Siberia) and Europe is studying how to become an onlooker. What is Ukraine studying? It had better study the historical experience of neighboring Poland.
This article first appeared in the Chinese-language website “Observer” (guancha.cn). It is translated and republished by permission. The original version can be found here.
28. Austin Orders U.S. Military to Step Up Efforts to Prevent Civilian Harm
Austin Orders U.S. Military to Step Up Efforts to Prevent Civilian Harm
A new directive outlines steps intended to change how commanders think about their jobs, after New York Times investigations into botched airstrikes.
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Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III’s directive comes after Congress imposed restrictions on some military funds until the Pentagon submits a new civilian casualty policy.Credit...Yuri Gripas for The New York Times
Jan. 27, 2022
WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III ordered the military on Thursday to strengthen its efforts to prevent civilian deaths and to improve the way it investigates and acknowledges claims of civilian harm in U.S. combat operations.
In his most sweeping statement on the issue to date, Mr. Austin set in motion a series of measures that military officials say are intended to change how commanders in the field think about their jobs, fostering a culture in which they view preventing civilian harm as a core part of their missions.
“We can and will improve upon efforts to protect civilians,” Mr. Austin said in a two-page directive to top civilian and military officials. “The protection of innocent civilians in the conduct of our operations remains vital to the ultimate success of our operations, and as a significant strategic and moral imperative.”
Mr. Austin’s directive also follows a decision by Congress to impose restrictions on some military funds until the Pentagon submits that civilian casualty policy. It also comes on the same day that the RAND Corporation published a congressionally mandated report evaluating the military’s processes and procedures on civilian casualties. Congress has been briefed on the directive.
“While some progress has been made on the Department’s response to allegations of civilian harm, it is clear that more must be done,” Senator Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat who is the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement.
The RAND report found “considerable weaknesses” in the military’s approach to evaluating the deaths and injuries of innocents, most notably deficiencies in carrying out investigations and identifying root causes or lessons that could allow the military to better prevent civilian harm.
In interviews, several members of the military who witnessed civilian casualties said that they repeatedly filed formal reports to the authorities but never received any response, and that airstrike teams rarely spoke about how to avoid future accidents. One Air Force officer said this week that the reports seemed to “disappear into the ether.”
The Aftermath of Syria’s Civil War
After a decade of fighting, many Syrians wonder if the country can be put back together.
For example, the U.S. military has long been taught that the laws of war prevent intentionally targeting civilians or carrying out strikes where the anticipated scale of bystander deaths is disproportionate to the combat aim. Military leaders and presidents have long articulated a policy of minimizing or trying to prevent collateral damage.
In recent years, a number of military officials said, loopholes in the regulations routinely allowed Special Operations forces to sidestep safeguards.
But Mr. Austin and his senior advisers declared an intention to overhaul policy rules and cultural norms in the military in a meaningful way. The challenge facing them is whether they can translate their abstract intentions into concrete change in the field.
To that end, Mr. Austin’s memo directs Pentagon officials to take immediate action on some matters, like the establishment of a standardized system for reports of civilian harm and the creation of the Pentagon center that would focus on how to prevent, mitigate and respond to civilian harm.
The defense secretary also gave officials 90 days to develop a so-called Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan to carry out recommendations from recently completed Pentagon-commissioned studies, including the report from RAND, an inspector general’s inquiry into the drone strike in Kabul and a review of the 2019 airstrike in Syria.
A drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan, in August led to calls for an overhaul of the procedures that the U.S. military uses to identify targets and carry out strikes.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
The memo does not say who will oversee that effort. But a person familiar with the matter said it was being assigned to Christopher P. Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.
The decision to assign the task to someone on the operational side, rather than to Pentagon officials who typically focus on humanitarian concerns, is said to be a subtle reflection of Mr. Austin’s determination that fighters in the field will take seriously the ideas that emerge from the new effort to mitigate civilian harm.
Then, within 180 days of the memo — leaving three months to incorporate the policy plans Mr. Maier will develop — Mr. Austin directed the Pentagon to complete a broad, new policy on mitigating civilian harm that has been under development for more than two years. Known as an “instruction,” it will lock down the changes as Pentagon doctrine.
“It will adopt a comprehensive approach, reinforcing that D.O.D.’s efforts to protect civilians are the responsibility of all leaders throughout the department, always, and not only that of our commanders and personnel in the field,” Mr. Austin said.
While the memo is sparse on details, a person familiar with the internal deliberations that led to it said the intention was not limited to making changes in the context of war zone and counterterrorism strikes using drones and other aircraft, which have led to high-profile instances of civilian deaths in recent years.
With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Somalia and the drawdown of troops in Iraq and Syria, the frequency and relative importance of such strikes is expected to diminish.
Rather, the person said, the policy goal is more ambitious and future oriented: to incorporate new thinking about civilian protections across the entire range of military activities — including emerging realms like offensive hacking and space — where disabling infrastructure like power grids or satellites could harm civilians in myriad ways, and so-called “information” operations or propaganda.
Mr. Austin’s memo contained veiled hints of the project’s forward-looking scope.
“We will revisit the ways in which we assess incidents that may have resulted in civilian harm, acknowledge the harm to civilians that resulted from such incidents, and incorporate lessons learned into the planning and execution of future combat operations and into our tactics, techniques and procedures,” it said.
A Times investigation based on the military’s confidential assessments of more than 1,300 reports of civilian casualties and ground reporting at the sites of more than 100 civilian casualty sites showed that the air campaign against the Islamic State was marked by flawed intelligence, confirmation bias and scant accountability.
In the deadly drone strike in Kabul, during the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August, nearly everything that senior Pentagon officials claimed in the hours, days and weeks after the attack turned out to be wrong. A week after a Times video investigation showed that the man driving the car was an aid worker, the Pentagon acknowledged that the strike had been a tragic mistake and that no Islamic State Khorasan fighters had been killed.
The inquiry in the Kabul strike by the Air Force’s inspector general, Lt. Gen. Sami D. Said, blamed “confirmation bias” for warping operators’ interpretation of what they were seeing. The inquiry made several recommendations for fixing the process through which strikes are ordered, including putting in new measures to cut down the risk of confirmation bias and reviewing the prestrike procedures used to assess the presence of civilians.
In November, Mr. Austin promised to revamp military procedures and hold top officers responsible for civilian harm. But he did not outline any systemic problems that had allowed those casualties to persist on battlefields in Syria and Afghanistan.
And two weeks later, after a New York Times investigation described allegations that top officers and civilian officials had sought to conceal casualties from a U.S. airstrike in Syria in 2019 that killed dozens of women and children, Mr. Austin ordered a high-level investigation into the matter.
The attack, by a shadowy Special Operations unit called Task Force 9, took place near the Syrian town of Baghuz on March 18, 2019. It was among the largest episodes of civilian casualties in the yearslong war against the Islamic State, but the U.S. military had never publicly acknowledged it.
The investigation, by Gen. Michael X. Garrett, the four-star head of the Army’s Forces Command, is examining the strike and the military’s initial inquiries into it, Pentagon officials said.
Several of the steps in Mr. Austin’s memo include recommendations raised in the RAND report. Many of the findings echo other recent reviews of civilian casualties, which also found problems with the post-strike assessment process.
An April 2018 Joint Chiefs of Staff review found that “feedback to subordinate commands on the cause and/or lessons learned from a civilian casualty incident is inconsistent.” A May 2021 report from the Pentagon inspector general also raised problems with post-strike assessments.
“The fact that civilian harm is being recognized as a priority at the highest levels of the department is a positive and welcome step,” said Annie Shiel, a senior adviser for the Center for Civilians in Conflict. “But the impact will depend entirely on results.”
Dave Philipps contributed reporting from Colorado Springs.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
